Briefing Room December 2025

Briefing Room

firm victories

Partner Jennifer Rosner And Associate Viddell Lee Heard Persuade Arbitrator

To Uphold Deputy Sheriff’s Termination.

A deputy began work for a county sheriff’s department in 2018. While he was a field deputy, his supervisors identified a pattern of poor judgment, inadequate investigations, and policy violations. Following an internal audit of his calls for service, the department found he often failed to investigate crimes, made false statements, turned off his body-worn camera, or dissuaded victims from pursuing legitimate complaints, particularly in domestic violence cases.

The department issued a notice of intent to terminate the deputy. After a Skelly conference, the county terminated the deputy for dishonesty, neglect of duty, incompetence, and conduct unbecoming of a peace officer. The deputy appealed his termination through the administrative arbitration process.

The arbitrator upheld the county’s decision to terminate the deputy, finding that the county had just cause for discharge based on multiple and serious rule and conduct violations. The arbitrator reviewed body-worn camera footage, reports, and testimony covering six months, and found that the deputy repeatedly failed to properly perform his duties, was dishonest in his interactions with the public, and acted unprofessionally on several occasions.

Among the most serious incidents, the arbitrator found that the deputy failed to investigate a domestic violence victim’s report of being choked. The deputy turned off his body camera and filed no report, effectively concealing the victim’s report. In another case, he knowingly relayed false information from a suspect to a victim during a vandalism investigation. The arbitrator also determined that the deputy discouraged victims from pressing charges, failed to write required reports, treated citizens rudely, made inappropriate comments about a person’s nationality, and argued with members of the public. In addition, he violated emergency driving rules by speeding with lights or sirens activated without required supervisor approval.

The arbitrator concluded that this conduct reflected a pattern of dishonesty, neglect, and poor judgment, rather than isolated mistakes. Based on the evidence, the arbitrator found that the county had ample justification to terminate the deputy for “significant” violations that risked the department’s credibility and the public’s trust.

LCW Partners Adrianna Guzman And Laura Kalty, And Associate Attorney Barbara Boktor, Win Early Dismissal Of PERB Unfair Practice Charge.

An employee filed an unfair charge against his city-employer, claiming the city violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). The employee alleged harassment, being singled out, and possibly threatened by a supervisor. But the employee did not identify any facts that concerned any of the labor-relations matters under the jurisdiction of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB).

PERB’s General Counsel noted that the charge contained time-barred allegations and did not include any of the elements necessary to state a case subject to PERB’s jurisdiction. The General Counsel issued the employee a warning letter that the charge would be dismissed if the employee did not include facts regarding MMBA-protected activities, such as discrimination because of labor activities, or interference with the employee’s labor activities. The employee amended the charge twice, but never alleged any MMBA-protected labor activities.

LCW attorneys highlighted both the untimeliness of the employee’s allegations and the employee’s failure to state a MMBA claim. PERB’s General Counsel ultimately dismissed the employee’s charges entirely on both grounds that LCW highlighted in the city’s position statement.

Partner Laura Kalty Convinces PERB’s GC That Hard Bargaining Is Not Illegal Surface Bargaining.

A union filed an unfair practice charge alleging that a district violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) by surface bargaining. During reopener negotiations, the union proposed that the district increase its health insurance contribution by 31%. The parties met, and the district rejected the proposal without making a counteroffer. The district explained that it had increased its health insurance contribution in the previous negotiations; the current contribution allowed most employees to receive significant cash back; comparisons to other units were not valid; and the health insurance premium had only increased by 3 percent.

The union offered a second proposal for a reduced health insurance contribution. The district told the union it would take the second proposal to the governing board and did so. The district then notified the union that the board had declined the union’s offer, and the district would not make any counteroffer. The union filed an unfair practice charge.

Laura argued on behalf of the district that the ultimate question in surface bargaining claims is whether a party’s conduct, when viewed in its totality, was sufficiently egregious to frustrate negotiations. To bargain in good faith, a party must be willing to exchange reasonable proposals and try to reconcile differences. Parties must explain the reasons for a particular bargaining position with sufficient detail to permit negotiations to proceed based on mutual understanding. But hard bargaining is allowed. A party’s refusal to move from its position, if supported by rational arguments, can constitute permissible hard bargaining rather than a refusal to bargain. Failing to make a counterproposal does not necessarily violate the duty to bargain. When a party has previously objected to proposals in a way that makes it clear that a later proposal would likely be unacceptable, a counterproposal that offers a different response is not required.

PERB’s General Counsel agreed with the district’s argument that the Union did not state a prima facie case for surface bargaining and dismissed the Union’s charge.

LCW Partner Melanie Chaney And Associate Attorneys Gabriella Kamran And Anni Safarloo Convince PERB That Association Waived Bargaining.

Partner Melanie Chaney and Associate Attorneys Gabriella Kamran and Anni Safarloo brought these consolidated Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) charges to a successful conclusion. These cases arose from two separate sets of negotiations between a city and its fire association: 1) a city-driven change in the firefighter job description; and 2) a successor MOA. Each negotiation had a separate bargaining team.

After the city declared impasse in the MOA negotiations, the association refused to continue bargaining over job specification changes, asserting that its duty to bargain was “dormant” because of the impasse in the MOA negotiations. The city responded by filing an unfair practice charge alleging that the association’s refusal to bargain violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).

Meanwhile, the parties reached a tentative agreement on a successor MOA, without further discussing the job description issue. The city then implemented the job specification changes consistent with the city’s proposal. The association filed its own unfair practice charge alleging that the city unlawfully changed the job description without exhausting its bargaining obligations.

An ALJ held a consolidated hearing and dismissed both charges. The ALJ found that the association had not violated the MMBA in refusing to bargain and further concluded that the association had waived its right to continue bargaining over job specification changes, which served as a complete defense to its charge against the city.

On review, PERB determined the ALJ had adequately addressed the issues raised and that no errors existed that would change the outcome. PERB affirmed the ALJ’s conclusions and dismissed both unfair practice charges.

First Amendment

Advisory Warning Public Of Prosecution For False Statements

In Peace Officer Misconduct Complaints Violates First Amendment.

California law requires law enforcement agencies to investigate misconduct complaints that the public makes against their peace officer employees. (Penal Code section 832.5.) Since 1995, Penal Code section 148.6(a): 1) makes it a crime to knowingly file a false allegation of misconduct against a peace officer; and 2) requires every person who files a complaint to sign an advisory that warns that submitting a false complaint may result in criminal prosecution. Section 148.6 advisory informs people they have a right to file a complaint, even if there is not enough evidence to warrant action on the complaint, but warns that it is against the law to make a complaint known to be false.

The City of Los Angeles did not require those who filed complaints against peace officers to sign the section 148.6 advisory. The Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL) sued the City to compel it to require the advisory. The City relied on federal precedent for its arguments that the section 148.6 advisory violated the First Amendment protections for free speech.

The trial court ruled for LAPPL, relying on the California Supreme Court’s precedent. That precedent was at odds with the federal precedents the City cited, and had upheld the section 148.6 advisory. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that it was bound by California precedent even though several federal courts had since

found the advisory unconstitutional. The City petitioned for review and urged the California Supreme Court to reconsider its own precedent.

The California Supreme Court reversed and overruled its prior precedent, holding that the section 148.6(a) advisory violated the First Amendment. The Court decided that the advisory created a substantial risk of deterring truthful or well-intentioned complaints of peace officer misconduct.

Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court recognized that the Legislature had a significant interest in preventing false accusations but held that section 148.6(a) was not narrowly tailored to that goal. The Legislature could have addressed false complaints through less restrictive means, such as adding a materiality or harm requirement, improving procedural safeguards for officers, or revising the advisory language. Instead, the statute imposed an uneven and speechdeterring burden on people while leaving other false statements unregulated. The Court concluded that the law’s structure and mandatory warning created an unconstitutional risk of suppressing speech critical of government officials.

As a result of this decision, law enforcement agencies may not use or enforce section 148.6’s advisory requirement on formal complaints of peace officer misconduct. Law enforcement agencies cannot seek criminal prosecution if they receive a complaint that may have been submitted with knowingly false allegations.

Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (Nov. 10, 2025, No. S275272) ___Cal. 5th___ [2025 Cal. LEXIS 7261].

County Sheriffs

Sheriff Had No Authority To Retain Independent Counsel.

Former Los Angeles County Sheriff Alex Villanueva attempted to settle an employment litigation involving a deputy sheriff. He directed the reinstatement of the deputy with back pay and benefits. The County filed a writ petition challenging Villanueva’s settlement directive as void and illegal because it was not approved by the Board of Supervisors or County Counsel.

The County Counsel sent Villanueva a letter notifying him that the Board had agreed to offer him conflict counsel on the question of whether the Sheriff had authority under the Los Angeles County Charter to settle the deputy’s employment action without approvals from the County Counsel and the Board. The letter informed the Sheriff that pursuant to California Government Code section 31000.6(a), the Board would provide the Sheriff independent legal counsel for that sole issue. The letter noted that the Sheriff could select his own counsel, but the Board had the discretion to pay only the compensation the Board deemed just and proper.

Villanueva selected Quinn Emanuel (Quinn) as his independent legal counsel. Quinn then sent the Sheriff a retainer agreement that quoted billing rates ranging from $695 to $1,400 an hour and contained an arbitration clause. The following day, the County Counsel’s office emailed Quinn a letter regarding a “retainer agreement.” The letter stated: the Board would determine the appropriate hourly rate; the County would pay a blended rate for attorneys of $495 an hour; and other terms and conditions.

Villanueva chose to sign the Quinn engagement letter without obtaining approval from County Counsel. When Quinn did not sign the County’s retainer agreement, the County Counsel’s office sent repeated communications stating the need to sign the County’s retainer agreement for Quinn to be paid. Quinn rejected the County Counsel’s retainer agreement and stated the County Counsel was conflicted and should have no involvement.

The County filed an ex parte application, citing Government Code section 31000.6, that asked the court to remove Quinn as counsel of record. The judge denied the application, finding that the section provided no procedure for such relief. But, the judge also stated that there was no contract between the Board and Quinn, and Quinn could not be paid with County funds until a contract was made.

In January 2020, Quinn substituted out of the case. In February 2020, Quinn sent the Sheriff an invoice for services for $1,740,001.70. The County did not pay Quinn.

Next, Quinn served the County, the Sheriff, and the Sheriff’s Department with a demand for arbitration at JAMS, based on arbitration provisions in the engagement agreement that Villanueva signed. The County responded with a lawsuit for declaratory relief. The County plaintiffs (the County, the Sheriff’s Department, and Villanueva in his official capacity) sought a declaration that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate, nor a valid contract with any County plaintiff to represent the Sheriff. The County’s lawsuit also sought to enjoin the pending arbitration and to require Quinn to withdraw the arbitration demand.

The trial court granted the County’s motion for preliminary injunction. The County then filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the County’s motion, finding no triable issues of fact as to whether the County entered into a fee agreement with Quinn, and that the Sheriff lacked the authority to enter into the Quinn agreement.

After the summary judgment hearing, but before the judgment was entered, Quinn filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint for breach of contract and related claims, contending leave should be granted to avoid forfeiture of “compulsory cross-claims.”

The County opposed Quinn’s motion to file a cross-complaint, and the court denied it. The court then entered judgment for the County plaintiffs and against Quinn as to all causes of action contained in the County’s complaint, permanently enjoining the arbitration and ordering Quinn to withdraw its demand.

Undeterred, Quinn filed a new lawsuit against the County, the Sheriff’s Department, and Villanueva in his official capacity. The complaint alleged the same causes of action as Quinn had alleged in the arbitration and in its proposed cross-complaint in the County’s declaratory relief action. The County demurred, contending each cause of action was barred by the Government Claims Act, forfeited under the “compulsory counterclaim” statute, and unsupported by sufficient facts to state a valid claim as a matter of law. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend.

Quinn timely appealed both cases. The California Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals for oral argument and decision. The Court framed the cases as a dispute centered around the distinction between the Sheriff’s authority to select independent counsel versus his authority to retain independent counsel. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Sheriff did not have the authority to retain Quinn. The Court found that: summary judgment for the County plaintiffs in their declaratory relief action was proper; there was no error in the court’s denial of Quinn’s belated motion for leave to file a cross-complaint in that action; and Quinn’s subsequent lawsuit against the County was properly dismissed on demurrer on either of two grounds: because it was a compulsory cross-complaint in the earlier declaratory relief action or because Quinn failed to allege compliance with the presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. The Court affirmed both the judgment in the County’s action and the order of dismissal in Quinn’s action.

County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel, 115 Cal.App.5th 489 (2025).

Discrimination

Three Dealer Business Managers (DBMs) were long-term employees at Circle K: Brian Caldrone (54), Joseph Celusta (56), and Kathleen Staats (57). Each had a history of strong performance evaluations, awards and wanted to advance to regional leadership roles.

In 2020, Circle K’s West Coast Regional Director position became vacant. In the past, Circle K had posted position openings internally or circulated announcements by email or intranet to encourage qualified employees to apply. This time, the company did not post or open the position for applications. Instead, Circle K’s senior management handpicked a younger employee, Miko Angeles, aged 45, to fill the position. Angeles had previously served as the Southeast Regional Director, though he had a mixed performance record in that role.

When the three DBMs learned of the promotion, they believed that the company had bypassed its normal process to promote a younger employee. They sued Circle K in California state court for age discrimination under both the ADEA and FEHA. Circle K removed the case to the U.S. district court.

The district court granted summary judgment for Circle K, holding that the DBMs could not establish age discrimination because they had not applied for the position. The court also found that, even if they could establish age discrimination, Circle K had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, and the DBMs had not shown that this reason was pretextual.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit held that, when an employer does not announce a vacancy or solicit applications, employees are not required to show that they applied for the position to

establish age discrimination. The Court also clarified that, although a ten-year age difference is the usual threshold for a “substantial” age gap, the DBMs could overcome a smaller gap by providing evidence that age was a significant factor in the employer’s decision. The Court found that the DBMs had presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of pretext and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Caldrone, et al. v. Circle K Stores, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 25766 (9th Circuit 2025).

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

California Civil Rights Department Publishes New Regulations To Prevent Discrimination From Use Of AI Tools.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and other automated decision systems (ADS) have a growing role in public sector hiring. Resume screeners, video interview platforms, and other algorithmic tools promise efficiency, but they also create legal exposure.

On October 1, 2025, California’s new Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) regulations took effect. They include a new regulation that defines terms (2 Cal. Code Regs. section 11008.1) and revisions to several existing regulations. They clarify how FEHA applies to AI and ADS in employment decisions. And, they aim to prevent discrimination in hiring and promotion practices based on protected characteristics such as race, gender, age, disability, religion, and other categories. The new regulations apply this protection to any AI or ADS tool used in recruiting, testing, evaluating, or promoting employees. Employers must treat automated tools the same way they treat human decisionmakers under the regulations.

Key Provisions:

• Disparate Impact Counts: Even when bias is unintentional, agencies can face liability if an automated system disproportionately excludes applicants from a protected group.

• Examples of Risk: Tools that rank candidates by schedule availability, measure reaction time, or evaluate facial expressions or speech patterns in video interviews may disadvantage applicants with disabilities, religious commitments, or language differences.

• Pre-employment Inquiries: FEHA limits what an employer can ask before hiring, and those limits apply equally to inquiries made by or through automated systems.

• Liability Extends to Agents: When a vendor or recruitment partner uses a discriminatory algorithm on an agency’s behalf, the agency remains responsible under FEHA.

• Recordkeeping Required: Agencies must retain records of ADS use for at least four years. This includes data inputs, selection criteria, and employment outcomes

• Bias Testing Encouraged: Although the regulations do not mandate bias testing, the Civil Rights Council encourages agencies to conduct self-audits and fairness evaluations. The timing, scope, and quality of these efforts can support a defense if a discrimination claim arises.

Steps Toward Compliance:

Public agencies can continue to use AI and automated tools under the new regulations, but they must manage those systems carefully to maintain FEHA compliance.

1. Inventory and Assess AI Tools: Identify every automated system involved in recruitment, hiring, promotions, and employment decisions. Determine whether each tool directly or indirectly screens or ranks applicants.

2. Audit for Bias: Test each system for disparate impact on protected groups. Request documentation from vendors showing validation studies and fairness testing.

3. Update Policies and Vendor Contracts: Require vendors to certify compliance with FEHA. Include shared responsibility and indemnification clauses in contracts. Specify that human review will supplement any automated recommendations or scores.

4. Strengthen Recordkeeping: Maintain ADS-related data, selection criteria, and decision records for at least four years. Document all compliance activities to create a clear record of diligence.

5. Train HR and Hiring Staff: Educate staff about the capabilities and limitations of AI tools. Train them to identify potential bias and to exercise independent judgment when reviewing automated results.

6. Ensure Transparency and Accessibility: Provide accessible hiring processes for applicants with disabilities. Offer reasonable accommodations or alternative methods for completing applications or assessments when needed, including for religious observances.

new to the Firm!

Talin Derohanessian's broad experience across legal operations positions her to play a meaningful role at LCW as she joins the firm’s management team as the Executive Operations manger.

Riley Jacobs is an Associate in the San Diego office of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, where she advises clients on a variety of labor and employment and educational matters.

Meg Berkowitz joins our Los Angeles office, bringing extensive experience in complex litigation and regulatory matters. She has successfully led pre-suit investigations, negotiated settlements, and managed litigation.

Consortium Call Of The Month

Members of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s employment relations consortiums may speak directly to an LCW attorney free of charge regarding questions that are not related to ongoing legal matters that LCW is handling for the agency, or that do not require in-depth research, document review, or written opinions. Consortium call questions run the gamut of topics, from leaves of absence to employment applications, disciplinary concerns and more. This feature describes an interesting consortium call and how the question was answered. We will protect the confidentiality of client communications with LCW attorneys by changing or omitting details.

Question:

Is our agency allowed to perform a credit check as part of the background process for hiring a sworn peace officer?

Answer:

Yes, agencies are allowed to conduct credit checks for applicants to sworn peace officer positions. (Labor Code section 1024.5.)

Did You Know?

Whether you are looking to impress your colleagues or just want to learn more about the law, LCW has your back! Use and share these fun legal facts about various topics in public safety.

• The “CHP Truckee” Instagram account combines up-to-the-minute road-condition updates for the sometimes-treacherous Interstate-80 Donner Pass corridor with light-hearted posts. The account has drawn nearly 300,000 users.

• Over 18,000 law enforcement agencies operate in the United States, spanning local, state, and federal jurisdictions.

• AB 1388, effective January 1, 2026, prohibits any law-enforcement agency in California from entering into a settlement with a peace officer that requires the agency to destroy, remove, conceal, or restrict disclosure of a misconduct investigation record, or to halt or dictate findings in such an investigation.

Harassment Prevention Training for Law Enforcement Agencies

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