IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #95 // JANUARY 25
SMOKE SIGNALS FROM SOMALIA
AUTHOR
Captain James Wakeley (7th Battalion, The Rifles Regiment) deployed to East Africa as the Counter al-Shabaab Strategic Communications Coordinator (from October 2023 to July 2024) and continues to work at the British High Commission, Nairobi, in a civilian capacity.
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
AL-SHABAAB: NATURE, THREAT AND POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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HIS In-Depth Briefing offers an update on the world’s most resilient land-holding Islamist insurgency: al-Shabaab. The first half of 2025 saw dramatic developments in a conflict that has witnessed the UK invest at least £2.3 billion since 2012 in aid and support to the internationally recognised authorities. Al-Shabaab – proscribed as a terrorist group in 2010 – made significant territorial gains. The group once again came to set the tempo of conflict across central and southern Somalia and even increased its attacks on Aden Adde International Airport, the home of Op Tangham. In an age and policy environment shaped above all by state threats and the European theatre, countering terrorism in Africa has become a second-order consideration in a third-tier geography. The strategic nature of the Horn of Africa and the considerable British equities in Kenya – where al-Shabaab continues to operate an endemic, low-level insurgency – should, however, force us to maintain
sight on how best to address the continued challenge from alShabaab. In December 2024, six soldiers of the Somali National Army were killed by clan militiamen in the vicinity of El Baraf, Hirshabelle State, central Somalia. This attack, on men who were ostensibly members of the national army stationed in the area to combat al-Shabaab, shines a light on the underlying dynamics of the War on Terror’s last ‘forever war.’ The six were killed in an act of clan revenge. The men belonged to the Hawadle sub-clan of the Hawiye, other members of whom had murdered camel herders from the Hawiye-Abgaal some months before. Hundreds of Hawadle defected from the Somali National Army and other agencies of the Federal Government of Somalia after this incident, with high-level members of the Government rushing to the area to mediate with clan elders. Diya – blood money – was paid, and a balance between the clans restored. Given persistent and endemic competition over resources and political prestige between the
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two sub-clans, however, this balance hardly meant a complete resolution to the rivalry and the reassertion of a united front against al-Shabaab, let alone a demonstration of lasting state authority in the area.1 State power in Somalia is a phantom. The ability of the Federal Government to control its territory and to prosecute the war against al-Shabaab relies largely on international support and the cooperation of Somalia’s clans. In late February 2025, just before the beginning of Ramadan, simmering clan rivalry in the Middle Shabelle valley and an upcoming reduction in international support interacted with the other main driver of the war in Somalia – al-Shabaab’s intent – to create what is now widely recognised to be a new status quo. THE RAMADAN OFFENSIVE In the years before what has become dubbed the ‘2025 Ramadan Offensive’, al-Shabaab suffered considerable territorial Internal HMG reporting.
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