DIVINING LESSONS FOR THE DIVISIONAL FIGHTER CHACR COMMENTARY // JANUARY 2026
BY: Colonel Simon Worth, Chief of Staff 3rd (UK) Division
T
HE ability to generate warfighting capability at the divisional level lies at the heart of the British Army’s operational design and its offer to NATO, however, preparing formations for the challenge of fighting at higher tactical level is far from easy. This short Commentary highlights insights from 3 (UK) Division’s recent deployment on Exercise Warfighter (WFX) and offers some thoughts that may be of value to those with an interest in divisional warfare.
Though we must be cautious with lessons drawn from a single exercise, and particularly one that relies on simulation, Warfighter continues to offer a useful and operationally relevant platform for analysis.1 It does not feel too much of a stretch to suggest that this US Army-delivered exercise provides the most demanding
training currently available to a formation HQ outside of warfighting operations. This was the fifth time that the Division has deployed on an WFX and so the insights on offer reflect an approach that has been developed by our predecessors over time. Perhaps the headline lesson from our experience is that the Army’s Land Operating Concept works and must be applied at all levels of command. The Division’s strong performance was underpinned by application of recce strike2 (and a conscious effort to fight at range), a constant effort to integrate multi-domain effects, and a significant increase in emphasis on protection. As a consequence, this Commentary does not propose substantial revisions to our way of fighting but instead offers a view on how the Land Operating Concept might be applied in practice.
KEY INSIGHTS Achieving system disintegration – shaping becomes decisive. Though it has long been accepted that the Division’s principal focus should be on the deep fight, it has often been tempting to focus on the close battle and to view it as our primary concern. In contrast, our experience on WFX indicated strongly that mission success was instead determined by our ability to disintegrate the enemy’s fighting system at range, principally through a ruthless and relentless approach to targeting. We might characterise this change in emphasis as the shaping phase becoming the decisive activity determining outcome. This is not to suggest that the close battle is no longer inevitable or important, there remain critical functions that only our close elements can deliver,3 however, our experience suggests that the efficacy of our
targeting system from sensor – though decider to effector4 – is the key determinant in mission success and thus deserves greater emphasis in our thinking.5 This change in emphasis should, perhaps, not come as a surprise WFX 25.4 saw 3 (UK) Div deployed under III US Armoured Corps which, in turn, was positioned under a NATO Multi Corps Land Component Command. The scenario involved large-scale combat operations in Eastern Europe.
1
Defined as the coordinated employment of sensors and fires to find and destroy priority targets at extended range.
2
For example, seizing and holding ground.
3
And supported by effective sustainment.
4
It is worth noting that most corps and divisional exercises (US, NATO and UK) tend to focus on generating an immediate kinetic close fight rather than allocating time for shaping activity. While the temptation to ‘get things going’ is understandable, there would be merit of rebalancing training time to focus on corps and div shaping activity.
5
1 // DIVINING LESSONS FOR THE DIVISIONAL FIGHTER // CHACR
U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Jose Escamilla
Members of 3rd United Kingdom Division conduct a rehearsal of concept drill during Warfighter Exercise 25-4.