CHACRDIGEST
DECEMBER 31st, 2025
#51
The conclusion to the year sees not just the continuing conflict in Ukraine as the primary focus but also mounting anxiety about the longer term security intentions of US president Donald Trump. With a detailed examination of how Britain is preparing – or not – for any future conflict and renewed warnings by senior NATO officials that Russia could attack before the end of the decade, there remains no shortage of discussion about what are the greatest areas and regions of concern and what steps need to be taken in response. And increasingly, reference is growing not just to the potential threat to Eastern Europe and the Baltic States but also NATO’s northern flank extending into the Arctic. This comes with a warning of the danger of basing assessments on outdated criteria and thinking, rather than reflecting more on how Russia views the strategic environment and what really drives its goals and ambitions.
AUTHOR: Professor Andrew Stewart, Head of Conflict Research
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
EUROPE
The potential for widening conflict or war in Europe remains a commonly discussed concern. Speaking in Berlin in the middle of December, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned “Russia has brought war back to Europe, and we must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents and great grandparents endured”. Repeating the commonly referenced timeline of a potential Russian attack within five years, he welcomed NATO members’ commitment to increase overall military spending to five per cent of gross domestic product annually by 2035 but argued more has to be done and a “wartime mindset” was needed. He also highlighted Russian links with China and the increasingly critical role its technology plays in the production of weapons targeting Ukraine. Related to this is the debate about how President Donald Trump’s recent actions are forcing European leaders to plan for a regional-led security order. With many of the most important decisions regarding Ukraine already being undertaken by a loose ‘coalition of the willing’, a report has noted that “EU policymakers are exploring deeper coordination through the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force” alongside calls for a stronger ‘European pillar’ inside NATO, long popular in France but now also gaining support in Germany. The publication of the US National Security Strategy, and what were seen as attacks on various European political leaders, has only strengthened concerns about the continuing applicability of Article 5 and its underpinning guarantee of collective security. The pattern of events throughout the year points to a conclusion offered by current and former security
1 // WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE // CHACR DIGEST
Picture: NATO
The BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner has written a lengthy piece (also available as a spoken version) considering the impact of war on Britain and how the country might respond. Drawing on current events and the conflict in Ukraine as its background, the writer references Vladimir Putin’s comment made earlier in the month that: “We are not planning to go to war with Europe. But if Europe wants to, and starts, we are ready right now.” In anticipating how a still “extremely unlikely” war might begin, Gardener suggests the opening phase would involve a significant increase in hybrid activity with disruption to energy, communication and essential food and fuel supplies with potential efforts to disable undersea cables and pipelines and satellites in space. He refers to the recent RUSI ‘Fighting the Long War’ conference and draws on some of the organisation’s analysts for detail, one of whom points out there is little evidence that Britain has a plan to fight a war lasting more than a few weeks such is the lack of depth in current force design. Another analyst highlights the ‘shortfalls’ which exist in personnel and equipment, particularly when compared to Russia. While its army is described as being of “generally of a very low quality” with poorly equipped, poorly led and poorly fed troops, the country’s war economy means it can produce equipment as levels far beyond what is possible in Britain. The respected analyst Keir Giles explains that Ukraine has demonstrated “that mass is absolutely vital for anybody that is going to face Russia on land” but what is referred to as “a cultural thing within the UK” suggests that any move to introduce some form of military service – such as has been recently announced in both France and Germany – would be resisted. With it being argued that the actual deployable strength of the British Army is only 54,000, the suggestion is that in the event of a war it would most likely be degraded within weeks, although with the caveat that much depends on the intensity of the fighting. There is also a lengthy discussion about current UK defence spending levels and lengthy procurement programmes, including reference to the Ajax armoured vehicle project. And some consideration of where a Russian attack may occur with the Suwalki Gap, the Baltic States (noted as including in Estonia a UK battle group) and the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard the three highlighted examples. Add to this the possibility for attacks against the homeland such as the 2006 assassination of former KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko and the 2018 Salisbury attack. While the value of membership of the NATO alliance is asserted – the conclusion being the country would be unlikely to have to fight alone – the essay concludes with the warning that British society “is unquestionably not ready for war”.