CHACRDIGEST
SEPTEMBER 1st, 2025
#47
Commentators expected very little meaningful progress from the Alaska summit in August and most concluded that President Putin gained more from it. Fortunately, concerns about a potential betrayal of Ukraine, in their absence, were not realised. Any comparison to the 1938 Munich conference was largely inaccurate and inappropriate, although one commentator insightfully identified that Chamberlain could be forgiven, in 1938, for not fully anticipating Hitler’s future actions. There can be no debate, however, about President Putin’s ongoing war crimes and goal of subjugating the sovereign state of Ukraine. As ever, history has much to teach us. If only we’d listen. The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
Prior to the Alaska summit, the Financial Times considered President Trump’s ignorance of President Putin’s true intentions and his desire to see a deal done quickly to be reasons why the Russian chief could be hopeful ahead of the talks. Amusingly, the article concludes that whilst Theodore Roosevelt said US presidents should speak softly and carry a big stick, Trump had been “talking loudly and wielding a noodle”. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggested, before the summit, that it risked isolating the United States from Ukraine and Europe. Afterwards, it recognised that any other outcome, other than a ceasefire in Ukraine, was a win for Putin. This was echoed by Matthew Savill, Tom Keatinge and Dr Neil Melvin from RUSI, who commented that, in sum, Putin avoided concessions, Trump withheld economic pressure, and Europe was left carrying more of the security and economic burden. Moreover, Alexander Baunov, argued, Putin’s insistence on “fair balance of European and global security” could mean ending the war in Ukraine now depends not only on Ukrainian concessions but how far the West is prepared to retreat in Europe and globally. The danger is Ukraine becomes a hostage for extracting concessions from other countries in the West. The former UK Ambassador to Moscow and Kabul, Sir Laurie Bristow, writing in Prospect magazine, is clear the first rule of dealing with Putin is to listen to what he says. In this context, a “land for peace” deal could never work because it assumes the conflict is primarily about territory, contrary to all that President Putin has said and done regarding Ukraine. This is addressed in depth by the Centre for Democratic Integrity in a series of recently published articles focused on Russian political mythology and the war on Ukrainian identity. Most notably, Alexey Levinson’s article Through the Russian Gaze: Perceptions of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Away from the theatre of the Alaska summit, John Foreman’s article for The Moscow Times, Medvedev Doesn’t Matter. Stop Acting Like He Does gives informed insight into the ‘noise’ surrounding the former President and warns against exaggerating the relevance of his extreme views. Equally, Peter Frankopan’s substack – From Washington to the Wheatfields: Why Putin Wants a Deal Now – and article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies contains meaningful analysis of factors affecting decision making in the Kremlin, rather than the journalistic speculation and hyperbolic conjecture of the 24-hour news channels. He highlights that unseasonable spring frosts damaged more than 240,000 hectares of crops across Russia, with 100,000 hectares lost outright. Record summer temperatures followed, meaning the 2025 harvest is likely to be Russia’s worst in years. Frankopan concludes “this will weaken one of the key pillars of Russia’s global position at a time when others (such as gas and oil exports) are under strain”. This perspective is also presented in the Foreign Affairs article Putin’s Play for Time: How Trump’s Performative Diplomacy Strengthens Russia’s Hand, which argues that despite putting Russia’s economy and society on a war footing, the country’s ballooning budget deficit indicates severe pressure on the economy. It is also worth reading the RAND report Understanding Russian strategic culture and the low-yield nuclear threat, which examines, through historical, cultural and ideological analysis, how Russian strategic culture shapes its nuclear posture, and concludes with the motivations underlying Russia’s ‘zero-sum’ nuclear doctrine and decision making and the challenges these pose for NATO deterrence and escalation management.
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Picture: The White House, Public domain
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