IN-DEPTH BRIEFING // #92 // SEPTEMBER 25
AUTHOR
Professor Andrew Stewart Head of Conflict Research, CHACR
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research is the British Army’s think tank and tasked with enhancing the conceptual component of its fighting power. The views expressed in this In Depth Briefing are those of the author, and not of the CHACR, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Ministry of Defence or British Army. The aim of the briefing is to provide a neutral platform for external researchers and experts to offer their views on critical issues. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. www.chacr.org.uk
RUSSIAN SURPRISE?
TALES OF THE UNEXPECTED
I
N the business of war, the line between crushing surprise and utter defeat is narrow. The fight for Ukraine’s Antonov airport, on the northern outskirts of the town of Hostomel, lasted for 36 hours and provides the most recent example of what might be achieved if ‘plan’ and ‘execution’ can overcome both a determined physical opponent and ‘friction’s’ vagaries. On the 24 February 2022 – the opening morning of their full invasion of Ukraine – the Russian military attempted a vertical flank assault, targeting Kyiv as the centre of gravity. Its capture offered the opportunity both to secure the country’s seat of power and neutralise its leadership. The initial heliborne coup de main aimed to create an airbridge for reinforcements which would likely make untenable any efforts to save the capital, only 12 miles distant. A hasty
defence enacted by Ukrainian National Guard conscripts was able to delay the attackers and the unexpected level of resistance – which included losses inflicted by Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (perhaps 20 per cent of the total Russian helicopter force), a failure to suppress air defences and even the Ukrainian ability to place obstructions on the runway – along with the psychological impact proved decisive and the larger second airlanding wave was abandoned. In the continuing ground battle for the airstrip which followed, although recaptured but then lost again, it was so badly damaged as to make it unusable. Five weeks later, Russian forces finally withdrew as part of a general evacuation from Kyiv Oblast having lost any possibility of securing a quick, limited cost outcome.1 Already a well-examined
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moment, in what has become a much longer and now likely in some form perpetual conflict, a commonly shared argument is that there was nothing entirely surprising about the initial Russian attack. Western intelligence agencies had detected worrying indications from late 2021, sharing these with the government in Kyiv and more widely to the international community.2 The surprise could therefore be seen as being the lack of response.3 While the opening 72 hours of the invasion Liam Collins, Michael Kofman and John Spencer, ‘The Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv’, Commentary, War on the Rocks, 10 August 2023; Tim Cooper et al, War in Ukraine, Volume 2: Russian Invasion, February 2022 (Helion & Company Limited, 2023), 3945; Liam Collins, James Sladden and Ben Connable, ‘The Battle of Irpin River’, The British Army Review (Issue #187; Spring 2024), 17-21
1
Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O’Brien, ‘The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure’, CSIS (September 2024), 1.
2