Humility pride and christian virtue theory oxford studies in analytic theology kent dunnington

Humility, Pride, and Christian Virtue Theory (Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology)

Kent Dunnington

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OXFORDSTUDIESINANALYTICTHEOLOGY

SeriesEditors

MichaelC.ReaOliverD.Crisp

OXFORDSTUDIESINANALYTICTHEOLOGY

AnalyticTheologyutilizesthetoolsandmethodsofcontemporaryanalytic philosophyforthepurposesofconstructiveChristiantheology,paying attentiontotheChristiantraditionanddevelopmentofdoctrine.This innovativeseriesofstudiesshowcaseshigh-quality,cutting-edgeresearchin thisarea,inmonographsandsymposia.

PUBLISHEDTITLESINCLUDE:

MetaphysicsandtheTri-PersonalGod WilliamHasker

TheTheologicalProjectofModernism

FaithandtheConditionsofMineness

KevinW.Hector

TheEndoftheTimelessGod

R.T.Mullins

RitualizedFaith

EssaysonthePhilosophyofLiturgy

TerenceCuneo

InDefenseofConciliarChristology

APhilosophicalEssay

TimothyPawl

Atonement

EleonoreStump

HumilityandHumanFlourishing

AStudyinAnalyticMoralTheology

MichaelW.Austin

Humility,Pride, andChristian VirtueTheory

KENTDUNNINGTON

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Preface

Inamemoirpublishedshortlyafterhisdeath,PaulKalanithirecounts his finaldaysasayoungphysicianfacingterminalcancer.Diagnosed at35withstageIVmetastaticlungcancer,Kalanithistrugglesto understandwhatcouldmakehisshortenedlifeworthwhile.The memoirislacedwithreflectionsonidentity,forKalanithidiscovers thathisillnessthreatenshimwithmeaninglessnessbysabotagingthe storyofPaulKalanithithebrilliantyoungneurosurgeon.

Onechapterofmylifeseemedtohaveended;perhapsthewholebook wasclosing.Insteadofbeingthepastoral figureaidingalifetransition, Ifoundmyselfthesheep,lostandconfused.Severeillnesswasn’tlifealtering,itwaslife-shattering....Mylifehadbeenbuildingpotential, potentialthatwouldnowgounrealized.Ihadplannedtodosomuch, andIhadcomesoclose.Iwasphysicallydebilitated,myimagined futureandmypersonalidentitycollapsed,andIfacedthesameexistentialquandariesmypatientsfaced.(Kalanithi2016:120)

Kalanithiisparalyzedbyaninabilitytoformulateanewidentitythat couldmakeintelligiblehisremainingtime.

WhowouldIbe,goingforward,andforhowlong?Invalid,scientist, teacher?Bioethicist?Neurosurgeononceagain,asEmma[hisdoctor] hadimplied?Stay-at-homedad?Writer?Whocould,orshould,Ibe? (Kalanithi2016:147)

Kalanithi’sdescriptionoftheneedtoknowwhohecouldandshould beinordertogoonisadescription inextremis oftheprocess wherebyallofus,ornearlyallofus,attempttomakemeaningful storiesofourlives.Weprojectontoourfuturesomepictureoftheself wecouldandwouldbe,andthatpictureorientsthesignificant decisionsofourlives.Wearesowellversedinthisprocessthatit usuallygoesunnoticed,buttheformulation,rehearsal,andmanagementoftheseself-idealstakesupmuchofourmoralenergy.The slightestalterationinourperceivedpossibilitiestriggersalightningfastadjustmenttothepictureofwhowecouldandshouldbe,such adjustmentseeminglyrequiredforustogoon.Moresignificant alterations arejectionletterinthemail,anunexpectedpregnancy,

acareer-endinginjury,abrokenengagement canderailusmuch longer,sinceourpictureofwhoweareandwillberequiresfarreachingrevisionifitistosustainourfuture.Insevereinstances chronicorterminalillness,thebetrayalofaspouse,thelossofa child ourself-idealissocompletelyshatteredthatwecannotmove forward,wanderinginsteadinawastelandofconfusion.Thisperpetualefforttoconstructforourselvesasenseofwhoweareandmight beIcall “thequestforidentity.”

Ihaveforsometimethoughtofthisquestforidentity,inevitable thoughitmayseem,asmainlyatemptation.Ihavethoughtofit, indeed,astheheartofpride.Ihavethoughtoftheseself-ideals,which aresoabruptlysnatchedfromusbythethievesoffortuneandwhich wesoassiduouslyremake,aslikethegarmentsintheGardenofEden: pitifulattemptstocoverournakedness;necessary,perhaps,givenour condition,butartifactsofourmiserynonethelessandsusceptibleas allsuchearthlytreasurestobedevouredbymothsandhollowedout byrust.Ihavethoughtthatwewillmostcertainlybefreedfromthe questforidentityifourfutureisinGod,andthatwemighttastethat futureevennowjusttotheextentweabandonourselvestoGod. IlearnedtothinkthiswayfromtheChristiansaints,monks,mystics, andmartyrsthatappearinthepagesofthisbook,but,longbefore Ihadencounteredthem,Ilearnedtothinkthiswayfromthesaints whoraisedme.

Icanstillrememberthe firsttimeIgavemy “testimony.” Inthe littlechurchesthatnourishedmychildhoodfaith, fledglingdenominationalsplinteringsoftheWesleyan–Holinessmovement, Wednesday-nightserviceswerefortestimonies.Forayoungchild, goingtothealtarmeant “gettingsaved,” butstandingfromthepewto giveapersonaltestimonymeantyouweregettingseriousabout walkingwithGod.Thepeoplewhoinstructedmeinthefaithloved totestifytotheirexperienceofGodintheirlives,buttheyotherwise sharedlittleabouttheirinnerlives.Mymotherandmymaternal grandparents thesaintswhoraisedme,towhomIdedicatethis book arenoteasilybroughttoextendedruminationsontheirsubjectivity,except,again,todescribehowtheSpiritisatworkinthem. Inthisrespect,theyresembletheearlyChristiansaintAugustine,one ofmymainconversationpartnersinthisbook,sometimesmistakenly calledthefatherofthemodernmemoirorautobiography.Sucha descriptionisamistake,forAugustinehadnointerestinexploring

hispersonalsubjectivity,exceptasawayof findinghislifeinGodand findingGodpresentinhislife.

Ourcultureisopposedtoanysuchreticenceaboutpersonal subjectivity.Wecanthinkoflittlemoreinterestingthanthequest foridentity,whichiswhyquintessentiallymodernnovels,asPaul Griffiths(2014:226)observes, “occuralmostentirelyonthestageof theircharacters’ innertheater.” Assuch,modernreadersaretypically alittledisappointedbyAugustine’ s Confessions.Wethinkitwould havebeenmoreinterestingifithadnotbeenwrittenasaprayer.

Althoughtheywouldnothaveputitintheseterms,Ilearnedfrom thesaintswhoraisedmethatmyhopeshouldbetomakeofmylifea prayer,whichistosay,athingtransparenttoGod,inwhichthereis no “I” thatcouldstandinthewayofGod’slight.Itisnoaccident, Ithink,thatIlearnedthisintheWesleyantradition.In APlain AccountofChristianPerfection,Wesley(1872:113)writes:

Forwhatisthemostperfectcreatureinheavenorearthinthypresence, butavoidcapableofbeing filledwiththeeandbythee;astheairwhich isvoidanddark,iscapableofbeing filledwiththelightofthesun,who withdrawsiteverydaytorestoreitthenext,therebeingnothinginthe airthateitherappropriatesthislightorresistsit.

IammodernenoughthatIstruggletodelightinWesley’svision,let alonewholeheartedlytodesireit.Iamsomewhatappalledbyit. IsuspectIamnotalonehere.Isn’ttheresomethingrightandgood aboutKalanithi’swishtoforgeanewandworkableidentity?Isn’t theresomethingabit too humble,indeedabitservile,inWesley’ s apparentreadinesstodisappear?ThereaderwillseethatIsharethese questions.Indeed,muchofthebookengagesaseriesofpowerful modernandcontemporarydefensesof “properpride” asalimit placeduponhumility.Nevertheless,Icannotshakethesensethat Wesleyisright,thatthereisnosuchlimit,andthatwhatWesley describesherewouldbethehopeofsomeonecharacterizedbyfull humility.Thisbookisanefforttoputsucharadicalperspectiveon humilityintoconversationwiththebestmodernandcontemporary thoughtabouthumility.Thosewhoaresuspiciousoftheradical perspectivesuggestedherewill findmuchtointeresttheminwhat follows.

Ibegantoworkoutsomeofthebook’sideasandargumentsinthe followingarticles: “Humility:AnAugustinianPerspective,” ProEcclesia,25/1(2016),18–43; “IsThereaChristianVirtueEpistemology?”

ResPhilosophica,93/3(2016),637–52;and “IntellectualHumilityand theEndsoftheVirtues:ConflictingAretaicDesiderata,” Political Theology,18/2(2017),95–117.

Manypeoplehavehelpedmewritethisbook.Ibeganstudying humilityoverthespanoftworesearchfellowships,oneatStLouis UniversityandoneatBiolaUniversity,bothofwhichwerefundedby theJohnTempletonFoundation.MattFriseandEleonoreStump wereespeciallyencouragingatStLouisUniversity,andStephen Parduehasbeenahelpfulconversationpartnereversinceourtime togetherasfellowsatBiola.Ibenefitedfromasummerseminarat CalvinCollege,alsofundedbyTempleton,whereKyleBennett,Craig Boyd,NathanCarlson,AaronCobb,RebeccaDeYoung,Kevin Timpe,JamesvanSlyke,andRonWrighteachofferedcomments ondraftsofearlieressaysonhumility.Severalofmycolleaguesat Biolahaveinteractedwithpartsofthisbook,includingDavidCiocchi,DougGeivett,PeteHill,MattJenson,AdamJohnson,Ryan Peterson,andMelissaSchubert.TomCrispandGreggTenElshof havebeenespeciallyinspiringcolleaguesandfriendsatBiola,and IthankthemalongwiththerestoftheSealBeachroundtablewho tooktimetoreadandcommentonportionsofthebook:JasonBaehr, MichaelPace,StevePorter,andDanSpeak.Mybestfriend,Ben Wayman,asusual,readeveryword,offeringhelpfulcommentsand consistentencouragement.StanleyHauerwas’sinfluenceonmy approachwillbeevident,andIamgratefulforhissupportand direction.BobRobertswasasortofelderstatesmenofmanyofthe Templeton-fundedprojects,andtheopportunitytolearnfromhim hasbeenoneofthehighlightsofthelastfewyears.Iinteractwith Bob’sworkinthisbookmorethanwithanyothercontemporary scholar’s.Althoughmyengagementwithhisviewsissometimes critical,itshouldbeclearthatIthinkhisworkonhumility(and properpride)isthemostnoteworthy.

Finally,whilewritingthisbookImet,andcourted,andproposed to,andmarriedmywife,Rachel.ToRachel,andourdaughter, Gemma:thankyouforopeningyourheartsandyourlivestome, forbelievinginme,andforsurprisingmewithsomuchhappiness. Whatanunimaginablegift.

Introduction

ToGoAgainstSelf

ThisbookoffersanaccountofChristianhumility.Morespecifically, itoffersaninterpretationofthedominantstreamofthoughtand practiceabouthumilityinearlyChristianity.TheChristiantradition is,ofcourse,notunanimousinitsviewofhumility,andlate-medieval treatmentsofhumilityoftendilutethemorerevolutionaryearly Christianviews.Istickresolutelytotheearlyandmostradicalstrand ofChristianthinkingabouthumility,whichisfoundespeciallyin Augustineandtheearlymonastictradition,usingtheirmostextreme statementsasatestcasefortheaccountbeingdeveloped.Throughout thebookIusethedescriptor “radicalChristianhumility” asawayof signalingthisstreamofthetradition.

MygoalistoprovideanaccountofwhatmostearlyChristians tookhumilitytobe.Itis not mygoaltoinvalidateotheraccountsof humilityoreventoshowtheirinferiority.Theexerciseiscomparative,butonlyforthepurposeofbringingintostarkerreliefthe distinctivenessofaparticularearlyChristianvision.Thereaderwill beconfusedanddisappointedifsheislookingforadefinitionof humilitythatwillsilenceeveryotherandincorporateeveryconceivableintuitionaboutwhatcountsasauthentichumility.Thereare manyconceptsofhumility,bearingfamilyresemblances.Perhapsone ofthemlatchesontowhat real humilityis,perhapstheyallmissthe markinsomeimportantrespect.Iamnotinterestedintryingto defendanaccountofradicalChristianhumilityagainstanyalternativeaccount.IamsimplyinterestedingettingradicalChristian humilityintoclearview.

Thisinterestwassparkedbymyattempttounderstandcontemporary (mostlyanalytic)philosophicaltreatmentsofhumilityalongside earlyandmedievalChristiancommentaryonhumility.Tryingto bringthesetwobodiesofliteratureintofruitfulconversation convincedmethatearlyChristiannotionsofhumilityareobscuredby mostcontemporaryphilosophical theorizing.Sayingthatcontemporaryphilosophicalaccountsofhumility “ obscure” earlyChristian understandingsisdifferentthansayingthey “reject ” earlyChristian understandings.Many,indeedmost,contemporaryphilosophical accountsofhumilityquiteself-consciouslyrejectwhatistaken tobetheChristianviewofhumility,eventhoughtheyadmitthat Christianityisresponsibleformakinghumilityacentralvirtueof themorallife.Whatistakenbythesecontemporarytheoriesto betheChristianviewofhumilityisnot,however,theChristian view,atleastnotinitsearliestandmostoriginatingarticulations. AsChapter1shows,thephilosophicalstudyofhumilityishampered byhistoricalforgetfulness.Therearemanyreasonsforthatforgetfulness,butamongthemthre earemostdeterminative.

First,earlyChristiantextsdonotoffer “accounts” ofhumilityin thephilosophicalsense;theydonotsetastheirprimarygoaltheclear analysisofaconceptortheprecisearticulationofthecoredisposition ofavirtue.EarlyChristiansweremoreconcernedtoenjoin,teach, andnarrativelydisplaythevirtuesthantheyweretodefineorcarefullydelineatethem.Bycontrast,contemporaryvirtueethicsis mostlyconfinedtotheofferingofsuchaccounts.WhencontemporarytheoristslooktotheChristianpastforanaccountofhumility, they findonlyanassortmentofsayingsthatcantooeasilybepressed intosomevariantofacontemporaryview.Itoftenturnsoutthat Christianhumilitysomisconstruedistheperfectfoiltowhatever viewisbeingsetforth.Itakeadifferentapproach,beginningwiththe (oftenstrange)thingsthatweresaidabouthumilityandthe(often strange)practicesthatwerethoughttoconducetohumilityinearly Christiantradition,andworkingfromtheretodevelopanaccountof radicalChristianhumility.

Second,becauseofwhatcouldbeassumedbyitsintendedaudience,mostearlyChristiancommentaryonhumilitydoesnotmake explicitthetheologicalcommitmentsthatunderwritetheviewof humilitybeingexpressed.Thisisespeciallytrueintheearlymonasticliterature,whereevenscripturalsupportissparse,letalone extendedtheologicalrumination.Iargue,however,thatthemost

distinctivethemesofearlyChristiantheology specificallythecruciform characterofsalvationandthetriunityofGod underwritetheradicalstrandofearlyChristianthinkingonhumility.Becausehumility wassobuttressedbytheologicalconvictions,itisappropriateto talkspecificallyof Christian humility.Theaccountofhumilityset forthheremakeslessandlesssensethemoreitisabstractedfrom asetoftheologicalcommitmentsuniquetotheChristiantheological tradition.

And,third,theinfluenceofmodernmoralthought,especially DavidHume’s,onourintuitionsabouttheproperrelationship betweenhumilityandprideissodecisivethatwemodernscanhardly believewhatearlyChristianssaidabouthumility,orelseweassume theymusthavebeenperverse.BecauseofHume’sinfluence,thisbook focusesonthecategoryof “properpride” morethanIoriginally envisioned.Significantportionsofthebookinteractwiththebest contemporarydefenseofproperpridefromaself-consciouslyChristianperspective.Ichallengethedominantcontemporaryintuition accordingtowhichanyaccountofvirtuoushumilitywillrequirea counterbalancingaccountofproperpride,althoughIsharetheset ofconcernsthatunderwritethisintuition,concernspowerfully expressedinfeministandwomanistcritiquesofthelegacyofChristianhumility.Ishowhowonecantakethoseconcernsseriously withoutrejectingaradicalChristianunderstandingofhumility.

ItisbecausetheradicalChristianapproachtohumilityisso discordantwithmodernassumptionsaboutvirtueanditsrelation tohuman flourishingthatmyargumenthasthepotentialtodisplay thedifferenceChristmakestothewayChristiansconceiveofthe morallife.Eventhoughthebookisanefforttoreclaimatraditionof thoughtabouthumilitythatisobscuredbycontemporaryphilosophicalvirtuetheory,Iinteractwithvirtuetheorythroughout.Some theologicalcommentatorsallegeitisamistaketothinkofhumility asavirtue,ortoapproachquestionsaboutthenatureandvalueof humilityfromtheperspectiveofvirtueethics(Louf2000;Foulcher 2015).Iunderstandtheworry:thereisindeedaprofoundtension between,ontheonehand,theeudaimonismthatframesclassical thoughtaboutthevirtuesand,ontheotherhand,theseverelyselfsacrificialdimensionsofearlyChristianhumility.Abandoningthe fieldofvirtueethicsforasupposedlypuretheologicalapproachisa mistake,however,becauseitcordonsoffphilosophicalwisdomfrom theologicalwisdomandtherebymissesanopportunitytoseehow

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

Christmakesallthingsnew,includingourunderstandingsofvirtue, human flourishing,andhumandestiny.

Humilitynamesahumandispositionthatmanyhavethoughtcrucial forultimatehuman flourishing.Assuch,itisthenameofavirtue.Rather thanabandonthe fieldofvirtueethicsaltogether,Iprefertofollow Augustineandallowthisvirtuetheologicallyunderstoodtochallenge andunsettletraditionalphilosophicalwaysofthinkingaboutthemoral life.ByshowinghowinterestingitcanbetoputChristiantheologyin dialoguewithcontemporaryvirtuetheory,Ihopetoshowthatitisa mistaketoattempttocarryoutcontemporaryphilosophicalvirtue theoryinawaythatinsistsonthetraditionaldistinctionbetween theologyandethics.AlthoughIwillnotoftenstepbacktoaskbroader methodologicalquestionsaboutthe fieldofvirtuetheorygenerally,the conclusionofthebookwilldojustthat,andreaderswho findthemselves distrustfulofmyapproachshouldreadtheconclusionaheadoftime.

AlthoughAugustine’sisthedominantvoiceinthisbook,itwasthe livesandsayingsoftheearliestChristianmonks,thedesertmothers andfathers,thattriggeredmyoriginalsuspicionsthatwehavelost trackofradicalChristianhumility.Inthefourthand fifthcenturies ,Christians fledtotheEgyptiandesertsinsearchofhumility.They prizedhumilityasapreeminentvirtue:

AbbaOrsaid, “Thecrownofthemonkishumility.” (Ward1975:247)

JohntheDwarfsaid, “HumilityandthefearofGodareaboveall virtues.” (Ward1975:90)

Asthescripturallymandatedformofdiscipleship:

AbbaJohnoftheThebaidsaid, “Firstofallthemonkmustgain humility;foritisthe firstcommandmentoftheLordwhosaid: ‘Blessed arethepoorinspirit,fortheirsisthekingdomofheaven.’”

(Ward1975:106)

AbbaJohnofLycopolissaid, “ThetextofScripture says, ‘Whosoever humblethhimselfshallbeexalted.’ Andso,mychildren, firstofallletus disciplineourselvestoattainhumility,sincethisistheessentialfoundationofallthevirtues.” (Ward1980:59–61)

Andasthepathtosalvation:

AmmaTheodorasaid, “Neitherasceticism,norvigilsnoranykindof sufferingareabletosave,onlytruehumilitycandothat.”

(Ward1975:84)

AmmaSyncleticasaid, “Justasonecannotbuildashipwithoutnails,so itisimpossibletobesavedwithouthumility.” (Ward1975:235)

NoothercharactertraitmatteredmoretotheseearlydesertChristiansthanhumility.Theclassicalquartetofcardinalvirtues courage,temperance,prudence,andjustice arebarelymentioned intheirsayings.TheChristiantriooftheologicalvirtues faith,hope, andlove combinedarediscussedlessthanhumility.

Iftheywereextremeintheirprivilegingofhumility,thedesert mothersandfatherswereequallyextremeintheirformulationsofthe demandsofhumility.Theydidnotofferdefinitionsorphilosophical accountsofhumility,buttheyrecurrentlynotedfourpracticesthat bothengenderedandexpressedhumility.First,thepracticeof submission:

AbbaPoemensaid, “Donotdoyourownwill;youneedratherto humbleyourselfbeforeyourbrother.” (Ward1975:189)

AmmaSyncleticasaid, “Obedienceispreferabletoasceticism.[Asceticism]teachespride,[obedience]humility. ... Aslongasweareinthe monastery,wemustnotseekourownwill,norfollowourpersonal opinion,butobeyourfathersinthefaith.” (Ward1975:234)

Second,thepracticeofsteadfastnessunderphysicalsuffering:

AbrotheraskedAbbaCronius, “Howcanamanbecomehumble?” ... Theoldmansaid, “Inmyopinion,heshouldwithdrawfromall businessandgivehimselftobodilyafflictionandwithallhismight rememberthathewillleavehisbodyatthejudgementofGod.” (Ward1975:115)

TheoldmansaidtoAbbaJohntheDwarf, “Go,beseechGodtostirup warfaresothatyoumayregaintheafflictionandhumilitythatyouused tohave,foritisbywarfarethatthesoulmakesprogress.” Sohe besoughtGodandwhenwarfarecame,henolongerprayedthatit mightbetakenaway,butsaid, “Lord,givemestrengthforthe fight.” (Ward1975:88)

Third,thepracticeofquietlybearinginjustice:

Ahermitwasasked, “Whatishumility?” Hesaid, “Itisifyouforgivea brotherwhohaswrongedyoubeforeheissorry.” (Ward2003:163)

Abrothertookituponhimselftoacceptanychargemadeagainsthis community,sothatheevenaccusedhimselfoffornication.Someofthe monks,whodidnotknowthetruthabouthislife,begantomurmur againsthim,saying, “Thismandoesmuchwickednessandnowork.”

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

Theabbot,knowingthetruth,saidtothebrothers, “Iwouldratherhave oneofhismatswithhumilitythanallyourmatswithpride.” (Ward2003:168)

And,fourth,thepracticeofself-abasement:

AbbaTithoessaid, “Thewayofhumilityisthis:self-control,prayer,and thinkingyourselfinferiortoallcreatures.” (Ward1975:237)

AbrotheraskedAlonius, “Whatishumility?” Thehermitsaid, “Tobe lowerthanbrutebeastsandtoknowthattheyarenotcondemned.” (Ward2003:158)

Insum,fortheseearliestChristianmonks,humilityisthefoundationalvirtueofChristiandiscipleship,essentialtosalvation,nurtured andexpressedthroughwillingsubmission,steadfastsuffering,silence underinjustice,andself-abasement.Fromtheperspectiveofmodern psychologyormoralphilosophy,suchanethicalregimeappears perverseinitsvalorizationofself-denial,self-sacrifice,andselfhatred.The Sayings and Lives ofthedesertmothersandfathers readlikeonelongassaultonthestable,secure,andsignificantself presupposedasnormativebymostmodernpsychologyandmoral philosophy.

Evagriussaid: “Togoagainstselfisthebeginningofsalvation” (Ward2003:153).Onitsown,thisisconventionalwisdom;moral formationrequiresself-opposition.Buttowhatend?Bothancient (Greek)andmodern(psychological)wisdomhasitthatproperselfoppositionisinservicetoamoreintegratedself.Bysuccessfully opposingsomeoftheirdesires,conflictedmoralagentsslowlyretrain their first-orderdesiresintoalignmentwiththeirsecond-order desires.Thisisnoprogramofwarontheselfperse;ratherwaris tobewagedonsomeaspectoftheself waywarddesire,for example thatinhibitstheefficientfunctioningoftheself.Theaim ofsuchself-oppositionis,therefore,betteralignmentbetweenreason anddesireinthepsycheand,correspondingly,moreharmoniousand securepersonalagency.

Thisisnotthekindofself-oppositionenvisionedbyEvagrius,or theotherdesertammasandabbas,however.Onesearchestheir sayingsinvainforanendorsementofanintegratedandpowerful self,orforanynotionthatthemonk’squestforhumilitymustbe counterbalancedbyameasureofproperprideandself-esteem.Their attacksontheselfarerelentless,andthereislittlediscerniblelimit

placedonthoseattacks.Forinstance, “Zachariastookhiscowlfrom hishead,andputitbeneathhisfeetandstampedonit,andsaid, ‘Unlessamanstampsuponselflikethat,hecannotbeamonk’” (Ward2003:153).

Whatistherecommendationhere?IsAbbaZachariasenjoining destructionoftheselfentirely?Thisappearstoleadtoparadox, forthepossessorofthevirtueofcompletehumilitywould,bydefinition,ceasetobeaself.Butvirtuesareattributesofselves,orsoit seems.Sothepossessorofhumilitywouldthenbe,bydefinition, incapableofpossessingthevirtueofhumility.The reductio isnot beyondcriticism,butitpromptsalegitimateworryaboutwhether ornotthedesertperspectiveonhumilitycanbestatedinanoncontradictoryway.

Perhapstheself-oppositionisdirectednotatthedestructionofthe self,butratherattheforgettingoftheself.AbbaJohnofLycopolis commendsthemonkwho “hasnotonlydeniedhimselfbuteven becomeforgetfulofhimself ” (Ward1980:62).Yetsuchapsychologicalstateistoo fleeting,onemightthink,tobeconstitutiveofthe psychologicalprofileofahumanvirtue.Virtuesaresupposedtobe stablecharactertraits,sopeggingthevirtuetoarareandephemeral psychologicalstateisunpromising.Thiscritiqueisnotunassailable, either,butitraisesasimilarquestionaboutwhetherwecanunderstandthesedesertsayingsasanythingotherthanmetaphorsor exaggerations.

RowanWilliams(1991:27)hasdescribedthisstrandofdesert wisdomasatraditioncommittedto “unselfing. ” Itisaprovocative phrase,andindeedIwilladoptitasadescriptionofthekindof accountofhumilitytowhichIthinkearlyChristianswerecommitted. Thechallengeistoseeifitcouldbecoherenttoconceptualizea virtueofapersonthatinsomemeaningfulsensedoesawaywith theself.1 Itrytodevelopsuchanaccountofhumility,anaccountIcall

1 Ananonymousreaderraisesworriesaboutanachronismhere.CitingCharles Taylor’sthesis(1989:x)thatthesensethatwehave “selves” with “innerdepths” isa distinctivelymodernone,thisreaderworriesthatmyaccountofradicalChristian humilitymayobscuretheconceptualshiftsthatattendedthenotionof “self ” from classical,throughChristian,tomodernethics.Thisisalegitimateworry,thesortthat attendseveryhistoricalretrievalproject.Iofferthreebriefresponses.First,Taylor’ s thesisisitselfcontested,andIremainunsurewhethertheconceptualshiftsareasclear andextremeashealleges.Second,Taylorindexesthemodernnotionofself,particularlythesenseof “inwardness,” toAugustine,myprimaryinterlocutorasIdevelopan

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

.IarguethatradicalChristianhumilityreallyisabout thestripping-awayoftheselfinsofarastheselfisidentifiedwithwhat somepsychologistscallone’segoideal.Theaccounthassomeformal similaritiestoaprominentcontemporaryviewofhumility,butsome importantdifferencesaswell.Ialsotrytodisplaytheattractionof suchanaccountofChristianhumilityfromatheologicalperspective.

InChapter1,Iofferatypologyofcontemporaryaccountsof humilityandshowhowcontemporaryvirtuetheoristshavesettled onastandardaccountofhowhumilitymightberelatedtoChristianity.InChapter2,IshowhowAugustine’sthinkingabouthumility problematizesthestandardaccountofChristianhumility,andalso stretchesthebestcontemporaryaccountsbeyondthebreakingpoint. InChapter3,Ishowhowcontemporarytheorizingabouthumilityis miredinwhatIcalla “mundane” approachtothevirtue,indebted especiallytoDavidHume’scritiqueofChristianhumility.In Chapter4,IofferanaccountofradicalChristianhumility,distinguishingitfrommundaneaccountsofhumility.Gettingclearonjust whatprideandhumilityhavetodowiththe “self ” isacentral undertakinginthischapter,forunselfingiscoherentasadescription ofavirtueonlyifthereisawayofunderstandingtheselfsuchthat losingitisconsistentwith flourishing.InChapter5,Ishowhow radicalChristianhumilityrequiresadistinctivelyChristianeschatologyandtheologicalanthropologyforitsintelligibility.

EvenifthereisacoherentstatementofChristianhumilityas unselfing,worriesremain.Theearlymonastictraditionenjoined strategiesofself-oppositionthatconflictwithdominantsensibilities aboutpropercareforoneself.Forinstance:lookforopportunitiesto submityourwilltothatofanother;welcomethechancepatientlyto undergophysicalsuffering;makeholyuseofbeingwrongfully accused;consistentlypracticethinkingtheworstofyourself.Clearly thisisbadadviceformany;nolovingparentwouldsoinstructher child.Butisitgoodadviceforanyone?Thedominantcritiqueofthis accountofradicalChristianhumility.Whatevermaybetrueofclassicalethics,Ithink itfairtosaythatAugustine’snotionoftheselfwascloseenoughtoourmodernnotion thatwecan(withRowanWilliams)speakofhisaccountofhumilityasan “unselfing ” one,withoutequivocation.Third,oneofthemostprominentcontemporaryaccounts ofhumility,the  account,leansheavilyonthenotionof “self,” without doinganythingtodefineit.Attheveryleast,IhopemyeffortsinChapter4showhow muchworkisrequiredtogetclearonwhatwemeantodayby “self,” letalonewhatthe ancientsmighthavemeant.

strandofpurportedwisdomonhumilityisthatitundervalueshuman dignityinawaythatmotivatesandreinforcesself-hatred,apathy,and victimization.Chapter6offersaresponsetocritiquesofthiskind. Theresponse,briefly,isthatthecritiquesshow,notthattheradical Christianunderstandingofhumilityiswrong,butthat,likemany virtues,radicalChristianhumilityhasadevelopmentaltrajectory.

Inthe finalchapter,Iconsidertheeffectivenessofthemonastic directivestohumiliation.Contemporarycommentaryonhumility insistsonastrongevaluativedistinctionbetweenhumilityand humiliation:humilityisgood,humiliationbad.Thisdistinctionis notmadebythedesertmothersandfathers,whocommendsuffering, embarrassment,andfalseaccusationaspathwaystohumility.How, then,shouldpersonsinpursuitofradicalChristianhumilitysuffer themselvestobehumbled?Isitsomethingtobesoughtthrough asceticismormerelyawaitedinsenselesshumiliation?Canordinary peopleaimforhumilityinthewaysprescribedbytheseradical monks?And,ifwecanhopeforandactivelypursuesuchhumility inourownlives,canweenjoinitonothers?Chapter7respondsto thesequestions.

ThetitleofthebookindicatesafocusonChristianvirtuetheory, butitwouldbefalseadvertisingtosaythisisanessayaboutChristian virtuetheory.Iwillrarelystepbacktooffercommentaryonmy methodortocanvassthe fieldofvirtuetheory,exceptintheconclusiontothebook.Thisisanessay in Christianvirtuetheory,however, inthesensethatitexemplifiestheconvictionthatChristianitymakes adifferenceforhowwethinkaboutthevirtues.Therearevirtue theorists,includingChristianvirtuetheorists,whodonotthinkthe particularitiesofChristianity(orofanydistinctivereligioustradition) matterforgivingtruthfulaccountsofthenatureandvalueofthe virtues.Eventhosewhoacknowledgethatbackgroundbeliefs do mattertovirtuetheoryoftenfailtodisplayintheirownthinking andwritingjust how and howmuch suchconvictionsmatter.Ihope thisbookwilldisplayhowmuchtheologycanmatterforthinking aboutthevirtues.

Intheend,thereisnodistinctive fieldofinvestigationcalled “virtue theory.” Accountsofthevirtuesarederivatesofourmetaphysics, includingouranthropology.Weoverlookthisjusttotheextent thatsomemetaphysicalandanthropologicalcommitmentsareso prevalentinouragethatweforgettheymighthavebeenotherwise andcouldbe.Suchcommitmentsareencodedinthosesupposedly

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

universalintuitionsthatanalyticphilosophersaresoskilledatpumping. Theextenttowhichanaccountofanyvirtueseemsintuitiveis,therefore,lessalitmusofitstruththanofitscorroborationwithprevailing metaphysicalassumptions.Icanonlyaskthereader’spatiencewhenthe accountofhumilitypresentedhereseemsbeyondtheboundsofgood sense.Againstthenear-consensusofmoderncommentatorswhointerpretearlyChristianstatementsabouthumilityasareflectionofperverselylowself-esteem,Iwillarguesuchstatementsarestrangetoour earsbecausetheyreflectthestrangenessofathree-personedGodwhose resurrectionlifeistheeternalactofcruciformcharity.

ForgettingChristianHumility

INTRODUCTION

MyaiminthisbookistoclarifyacertainstrandofChristianwisdom ontheconceptofhumility,andtoshowhowthisstrandcanbe developedintoacoherentaccountofhumilitythatrequiresforits fulldisplayadistinctivelyChristianeschatologyandtheological anthropology.Theaccountisdifferentfromanycontemporary accountbuthasinterestingparallelswithoneoftheminparticular. AndtheaccountIdevelopdrawsthelinesbetweenhumilityand Christianitydifferentlythancontemporarycommentatorsdo.Contemporaryhumilitydiscourseoverlookshowthoroughlyhumility wasoncebuttressedbyspecificallyChristianclaims.

Givenhumility’sdistinctivelyJewish–Christianheritage,andgiven howunimaginableitwouldhavebeenforclassicalpaganstoconsider humilityavirtue,itisstrikinghoweagercontemporarythinkersare totranslatehumilityintoasecularidiom.Afterall,humilitywasnot justanyChristianvirtue;itwastheChristianvirtuethatmost decisivelyrepresentedanalternativetoclassicalvisionsofhuman excellence.Aristotle,forinstance,hadonlypityorcontemptfor thehumbleman(tapeinos sometimestranslatedas “thelowly” or “theservile”—see NE 4.3; Pol. 4.11,8.2)andhisparagonofvirtue, themagnanimousman,ishappilyself-assured,self-focused,and self-fulfilled(NE 4.3).Augustine,bycontrast,foundpaganvirtues meresemblancesofvirtuejusttotheextenttheywereunderwritten bythequestforhonorandself-exaltationratherthanbyhumility(civ. Dei 5.12).Indeed,forAugustinehumilitysoopposedthe ethos of Greco-Romanexcellencethatitcontinuallythreatenedtoundermine “virtue” (arête)asameaningfulmoralcategoryforChristians.(Itwas Luther,thatearlymodernAugustinian,whowentallthewayhere,

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

denyingthecategoryofvirtueoutrightinthenameofChristian humility.)Inshort,introducinghumilityintothetableofvirtues triggeredareappraisalandreorientationoftheentiretraditionof thoughtaboutthevirtues.

Andyet,humilityisfashionableamongcontemporaryvirtuetheorists,mostofwhomconfidentlyassumehumilitycanbeextracted fromitsoriginaltheologicalcontext.Mythesisisthatsucheffortsto “modernizehumility” (Sinha2012)dependonwidespreadforgetfulnessabouttheradicalnatureofhumilityasreceivedandtransformed byChristianity.Thischapterdevelopsthatthesisinthreestages.First, Iprovideanoverviewofcontemporaryaccountsofhumility,proposingthattherearereally fivemajoroptionsonthescene.Second, IprovideanoverviewofwhatIcallthestandardaccountofChristian humility.Third,Iprovideseveralreasonstothinkthisstandard accountfalse.

CONTEMPORARYACCOUNTSOFHUMILITY

SinceElizabethAnscombe’ sessay “ModernMoralPhilosophy” (1958),philosophershaveshownrenewedinterestintheancient philosophicaltraditionofreflectiononthevirtues.Twokindsof investigationemergedfromthisrenewedinterest: first,studiesof therelevanceofthecategoryofvirtuetomoral,and,morerecently, epistemologicaltheory;second,carefulconceptualinquiryintoan arrayofspecificvirtues.Amongthelatterareaseriesofessaysin whichphilosophersexplorethenatureandvalueofhumility.Asthe literaturehasgrown,arichconversationamong(mostlyanalytic) philosophershasdevelopedaroundthevirtueofhumility.

Summarizingtheconversationisinevitablysimplistic,butIthink fivemajorviewshaveemerged.Therearedifferentwaysofdistinguishingtheviews,buttwoareespeciallyhelpful.First,viewscanbe distinguishedbasedonwhethertheyofferdescriptiveorrevisionary definitionsofhumility.Descriptivedefinitionsaimtoelucidatethe coremeaningoftheword “humility” asitisusedbycompetent contemporarylanguage-users.Revisionarydefinitions,ontheother hand,aimtochampionanunderstandingofhumilitythat,although perhapsnovel,betterservescontemporarymoralneeds.Second, viewscanbedistinguishedbasedonwhethertheyplaceprimary

emphasisontheaffective,behavioral,orcognitivedimensionsof humility.Almostnoonedeniesthathumility(likeanyvirtue)will haveaffective,behavioral,andcognitivefeatures(theABCsofany virtue,sotospeak1),buttypicallyonedimensionisprivilegedas essentialandasgivingrisetotheotherdimensions.Ishumility primarily aboutwhatyoucareabout(affective),oraboutwhatyou do(behavioral),oraboutwhatyouthink(cognitive)?

Itisstrikinghowcleanlythesedistinctionsmapontothecontemporaryphilosophicalattemptstopindownhumility.The firstwave ofattemptsconceptuallytopinpointhumilityoffereddescriptive, cognitive-focuseddefinitionsofhumility;thesecondwaveoffered revisionary,behavioral-focuseddefinitionsofhumility,andthethird waveoffered,andcontinuestooffer,descriptive,affective-focused definitionsofhumility.Thereareexceptionstothetrend,butthatis thebasicpattern.Here,then,arethe fivemajorviews.Iwillcitethose whosearticulationoftheviewinquestionhasbeenmostinfluential, thennotesubsequentlythosewhoseviewsareinthesameballpark.

Althoughherswasnotthe firstcontemporaryattempttoclarify humility,JuliaDriver’ sessay “VirtuesofIgnorance” (1989)invigoratedthediscussionandprovidedthepointofdepartureforlater efforts.Infact,Driverdidnotsetouttoaddresshumilityatall.Her essaywasaboutmodesty,andsheclearlydistinguishedmodestyfrom humility(Driver1989:378n.5).However,herdefinitionofmodesty hasbecomesoentrenchedintheliteratureonhumilitythatitcounts asanimportantaccountofhumilitynonetheless.2 Onthisaccount, humilityisoneoftheso-calledvirtuesofignorance,avirtuethat requiresanagenttobelievefalsethingsaboutherself.

:Humilityisthedispositiontounderestimate yourworth,skills,achievements,status,orentitlements.

 hasnosupportersbesidesDriver.Twochallenges havebeenlodgedagainstit.First,thereissomethingconfusedabout makingahumandefect errorinjudgment anessentialcomponent

1 IlearnedthishandymnemonicfromDanMcKaughan.

2 WhereasDrivermadeacleardistinctionbetweenhumilityandmodesty,others haveclaimedthetwoconceptsareinterchangeable.Themodesty/humilitydistinction isamessintheliterature.Forexample,Driver(1989),Flanagan(1990),Ben-Ze’ ev (1993),andNuyen(1998)allofferaccountsofmodestytobedistinguishedfrom accountsofhumility,yettheirviewsaretreatedbyothersasaccountsofhumility. Iwillfollowsuit.

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

ofahumanexcellencelikeavirtue.Second,iferringisrequired forhumility,thenhumilitycouldbecultivatedonlythroughselfdeception.Despitethesealleged flaws,  isimportantbecauseitputscenter-stageacuriousfeatureofthevirtueof humility namely,thatthereissomethingodd,ifnotparadoxical, aboutself-assertionsofhumility.Presumably,ifhumilityisavirtue, thepossessorofhumilityonDriver’sviewwouldnotthinkshe possessedit shewouldunderestimatehervirtue.Itwouldbea pointinitsfavorifanaccountofhumilitycouldexplainwhatis oddaboutself-assertionsofhumility.Oneofthestrengthsofthe unselfingaccountofChristianhumilityIwilllaterdevelopisthatit nicelyexplainsthestrangenessofself-assertionsofhumility.

Theotheraccountofhumilityofferedinthe firstwaveofthe humilityconversationisstillfrequentlypresentedintheliterature asthedominantorcommon-senseviewofhumility,despitethefact thatithasonlytwoprominentdefenders,NorvinRichards(1988) andOwenFlanagan(1990).(Itcontinuestobesetforthasthe dominantviewlargelybecauseitprovidesaclearfoiltolaterviews.)

RichardsandFlanagandisagreewithDriver’scontentionthathumilityrequiresanerrorinjudgment,buttheyagreewithherthat humilityisfundamentallyacognitivestate.Thehumblepersonis definedbywhatshethinksofherself.

-:Humilityisconsistentwithaccurateselfestimation;itconsistsofthedispositiontoresistthetemptationto overestimateone’sworth,skills,achievements,status,orentitlements. Both  and - prioritizethe cognitivecomponentofhumility,andthisfeaturesupposedlyexposes bothaccountstocounterexamples.Rogeristhesecond-besttennis playerintheworld,buthedoesnotknowitbecausehiscoachis alwaysputtinghimdown.Hethinksheisaboutthetenth-bestplayer intheworld.Heunderestimateshistennisabilities.Still,histennis gameisallhethinksandtalksabout,andwhensomeonedoesnot acknowledgeheisatop-tenplayer,heobsessesovertheperceived slight.MostpeoplewoulddenyRogerishumble,which,theobjector claims,entailsthat  isnotthecorrectaccountof humility(afterall,Roger does underestimatehistennisabilities).Supposehegetsanewcoachwhoislesssevere.Hecomestorealizeheisin factthesecond-besttennisplayerintheworld.Heisstillobsessedwith histennisstatus,though,andhasevenmoreopportunitytofeelslighted.

Heisnotoverestimatinghistennisgame(afterall,hedoesnotthinkhe isthe best),butthisfactdoesnotseemtosecurehishumilityaboutit, which,theobjectoralleges,entailsthat - isnot thecorrectaccountofhumilityeither.Thussomehavethoughtthat emphasizingthecognitivedimensionofhumilitymisseswhatisessentialinmostcommon-sensenotionsofhumility.ItlookslikeRogeris “fullofhimself,” anditlookslikeneitherunderestimationnornonoverestimationofhisskills,achievements,status,andsoonnecessarily preventsthis.

Orperhapsnot.Maybethecommon-sensenotionthathumilityis inconsistentwithegocentrismisjustahangoverfromwhatDaniel Statman(1992:430)callsthe “pessimisticview” ofhumannature, inheritedbyWesterncivilizationfromJewishandChristianreligion. Statmanarguessuchpessimismmakessenseonlygivenalowview ofhumanworthincomparisontoaGodwhoisworthyofworship, andthus “humilityismostintelligiblewithinareligiousframeof thought.” DoesStatmanmeanthathumilityisnolongerameaningfulvirtueoutsideofreligiouscontexts?Statman(1992:432)answers: “Well,yesandno:yes,ifonemeansbythatavirtueconsistingof acertainkindof(low)self-assessment;andno,ifonemeansa dispositiontowardsacertainkindofbehavior.” Accordingly,the secondwaveofhumilityaccounts,offeredbyStatman(1992), AaronBen-Ze’ev(1993),andAlexSinha(2012),consistsofrevisionarydefinitionsofhumilityaimedatreformingournotionofthe virtueforcontemporary,secularpurposes.Theseaccountspropose thathowapersonthinksofhimselfmattersmorallyonlyinsofaras itissuesinbehavior;thushumilityshouldbeunderstoodasthe virtuethatpreventsegocentricthoughtsorattitudesfromspilling overintoegocentricbehavior.

:Humilityisthedispositiontorefrainfromarrogantandboastfulbehavior,especiallyfromactingasthoughone’ s realorimaginedsuperioritygrantsonemoreextensivemoralrights thananyoneelse.

Theproblemwiththisaccount,accordingtosome,isthatitappears tochangethesubjectaltogether.Noonedoubtsthedisposition describedisavaluableone,butdoesithaveanythingtodowith humility?Supposewescratchedhumilityfromthetableofvirtues altogether.Wouldwebeleftwithoutresourcesfornamingthedispositiontoresistthetemptationtotreatoneselfasmorallymore

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

entitledthananyoneelse?Notatall.Thevirtueofjusticeincludes suchadisposition.3 Iftheobjectionissuccessful,thelessonisthat therearelimitstohowfaraconceptcanbepersuasivelyredefined.At theveryleast,thosewhowouldliketodefendarevisionaryaccount like  needtoexplainwhyweshouldredefineanold virtueinsteadofjustnameanewone orredirectourattentionto anotheroldone,likejustice.Inthecaseofhumility,thevirtuehas beenhistoricallyentwinedwiththeinternalquesttosubduetheego. Ifsuchaquestisirrelevantormistaken,thenhumilityisprobablynot avirtue.

Thethirdwaveofaccountsofhumilityhasfocusedmoreintently ontheego-subduingnatureofhumility.Theseaccountssharein commonanattempttoofferadescriptivedefinitionofhumility thatprivilegestheaffective.Ontheseviews,humilityhastodo primarilywithourcareorconcernrelatedtotheself.Hereisthe firstofthethird-waveviews.

:Humilityisthedispositiontohaveunusuallylow concernaboutone’sownworth,skills,achievements,status,orentitlementsbecauseofone’sintenseconcernforotherapparentgoods.

Thereareanumberofaccountsintheballparkof ,and eachrefinesthedefinitionaboveinwaysthatitsauthorthinksbest articulatesthevirtueandavoidscounterexamples.Ihaveputthe definitionintermsof concern,anapproachtakenbyRobert C.RobertsandJayWood(2003),whohaveofferedarguablythe mostinfluentiallowconcernaccount.GeorgeSchlesinger(1993) offeredthe firstlowconcernaccount,buthespellsoutthevirtuein termsof attention ratherthanconcern,asdoesNicolasBommarito (2013).G.F.Schueler(1997)andMichaelRidge(2000)describethe humblepersonasonewhodoesnot care abouthowmuchsheis esteemedbyothers.TyRaterman(2006),J.L.A.Garcia(2006),and JamesKellenberger(2010)alsoofferlowconcernaccounts;however, theythinktheemphasisshouldbeplacednotonalowconcernabout what others thinkbutratheronareluctanceorlackofinterestto evaluate oneself intermsofone’sgoodnessorexcellence.Thereare

3 Tobemoreprecise,oneshouldsay: Givenanegalitarianviewofhumanworth, thevirtueofjusticeincludessuchadisposition.Suchcaveatsarerequiredtogetany definitebehavioralentailmentsfromvirtues,becausevirtuesarealwaysembeddedin largerperspectivesthatdeterminetheirimport.

manydetailsandmuchvarietyhere.Whatisclearisthatlowconcern accountshavebecomethedominantcontemporaryphilosophical viewofhumility.

The finalaccountisalsopartofthethirdwave,inthatitlocates humilityprimarilyintheaffectivedimension,asamatterofhaving therightkindsofconcernsabouttheself.Tounderstandwhat motivatesthis finalaccount,notethat  characterizes humilityasthe absence ofacertainclassofconcernsabouttheself.  seeshumilityasanegativevirtue,onethatemerges wheneveracertainclassofconcernsiseliminated.Admittedly,these concernshavetobeeliminatedfortherightreasons;forinstance, Robertscontendsthatifsomeonegetsalobotomyandlosesallconcern abouthisownworth,skills,achievements,status,andentitlements,he doesnottherebygainhumility.Asthestatementoftheaccount indicates,self-focushastobecrowdedoutbyfocusonotherapparent goodsforhumilitytobeproperlypredicated.Still,criticsmaintainthat theaccountfaltersbyturninghumilityintoanegativevirtue.

Hereisasupposedcounterexampleto ,fromDennis Whitcomb,HeatherBattaly,JasonBaehr,andDanielHoward-Snyder. Thecounterexampleismeanttoshowthathumilitycannotbecast purelyasanegativevirtue thatis,asavirtuewhoseessenceisthe absenceofcertainkindsofconcerns.

ConsiderthecaseofProfessorP,whoisanextremelytalentedphilosopherwhoknowshe’sextremelytalented.Hegenuinelylovesepistemic goods;indeed,hisobsessionwiththemdrownsoutanyconcernhe mighthaveotherwisehadforstatusorentitlement.Hesimplydoesn’t careaboutimpressingothers,nordoeshetakehimselftobeentitledto specialtreatmentortodisrespectingothers.Statusandentitlement aren ’tevenonhisradar.Whileextremelytalented,ProfessorPisnot perfect.Whenconfrontedwithhisintellectualimperfectionsormistakes,hisdefaultresponseistotrytojustify,coverup,orexplainthem away.Heisnotoriouslybadatadmittingwhenhehasmadeamistakeor whenoneofhisargumentsisvulnerabletoseriouscriticism.Professor Pseemstobelackinginintellectualhumilityeventhoughheisdisposed toanunusuallylowconcernforstatusandentitlement.

(Whitcombetal.2017:515–16)

Thecounterexampleissupposedtodemonstratethathumilitydoes notarisesimplywhenthewrongkindofconcernsare absent;the rightkindsofconcernsneedtobe present aswell.Whatkindsof concernsneedtobe present,though?Well,ProfessorPseemstolack

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

theproperkindofconcernabouthisfailures,shortcomings,and limitations;inshort,heseemsconcernedtodenyorignorethem whenhe should beconcernedtoownuptothem.Thisistheapproach behinda finalaccountofhumility.Theaccountwas firstofferedby NancySnow(1995),thoughithasrecentlybeenrefinedbyWhitcomb etal.(2017).4 Snowarguesthatwhatiscentraltohumilityisan appropriateattitudinalorientationtoourlimitationsanddeficiencies. “Tobehumbled,” Snow(1995:207)argues, “wemustacknowledgeand careaboutour flaws. ” Snow’saccountmightbesummarizedasfollows: -:Humilityisthedispositiontobeattentive to,careabout,andrespondappropriatelytoone’slimitations.

Thisaccountisopentocounterexampleaswell,andthedebatebetween  and - isoneofthemoreinteresting debatesinthehumilityliteraturetoday.Theradicalunselfingaccount ofChristianhumilityIseektodevelopsharesthemostincommon with ,butIwilllatershowhowadjudicatingbetween  and - requirestakingastanceona numberofspecificissuespertainingtoultimatehuman flourishing, whichdefendersofneitherviewhavebeenwillingtodo.

THESTANDARDACCOUNTOF CHRISTIANHUMILITY

Most,thoughnotall,ofthetheoristsjustcanvassedarenon-religious. Theyareinterestedinprovidinganaccountofhumilitythatcanbeat homeinsecularsettings.BecausehumilityemergedfromaJewish–Christianoutlook,thevirtuecannotsimplyberepristinatedbutmust berecastasviableandsalutarywithinasecularoutlook.Thechallengeconfrontingsecularvirtuetheoristsistogiveanaccountof humilitythatdoesnotrelyonpresuppositionsuniquetoareligious outlook.The firsttaskfortheirproject,therefore,issimplytoidentify thewaysinwhichhumilitywasatonepointentangledwithChristian presuppositions.

4 Theirsisanaccountspecificallyof intellectualhumility,butitiseasytoseehowit wouldbeextendedasanaccountofhumility simpliciter,andinfactitisbeingtreated intheliteratureasanaccountofhumility simpliciter.

Thereisstrikingagreementamongcontemporarysecularphilosophers whoattempttodescribetheentanglementofChristianityandhumility.Eachisconvincedtheessenceofhumilityasunderstoodwithin Christianityisalowself-estimate.NorvinRichards(1988:253),for example,claimsthat,accordingtothetraditionalChristianview, “to behumbleistohavealowopinionofoneself.” DanielStatman(1992: 432)claimshumilityenteredWesterncivilizationthroughtheJewish andChristianreligions,bothofwhichtookthevirtuetoconsistin “ a certainkindof(low)self-assessment.” G.F.Schueler(1997:470) claimsthe “Christianviewofthevirtuecalled ‘humility’ acceptsa ‘low-opinion’ account.” StephenHare(1996:235)saysofhumilitythat “thetermformanydenoteslowself-regard” andnotessuchan understandingofthetermisconnectedtoChristiantheological assumptions.Throughoutthesecularliterature,everyattemptto tracetheoriginsofhumilityendsuppositingalow-estimateaccount ofJewish–Christianhumility.Mostoftensuchadepictionofhumility

Christianlyunderstoodthenbecomesafoilforthetheorist’ smore enlightenedcontemporaryview,whichis,onesuspects,partofthe attractivenessofthedepiction.

Moreover,thereissurprisingagreementaboutwhatfeaturesof Christianitymotivatethelow-estimatedefinitionofhumility.There areinfactthreerecurrentnarrativesintheliteraturesupposedto explainwhyhumility-as-low-self-estimatefollowsfromChristian convictions.Icallthesethreestoriesthedivineperspectivestory, thesinstory,andthegracestory.Herearerepresentativesamples ofeach.First,thedivineperspectivestory:

BecauseGodandHisworksaresomagnificent,whateveryouareor havedoneistrivialbycomparison,andyourhumanprideinitis laughable.(Richards1988:255)

Accordingtothedivineperspectivestory,alowself-estimateis appropriatebecauseoftheasymmetrybetweendivinityandhumanity.Nomatterwhatweareorhaveaccomplished,ourbeingand doingpaleincomparisontoGod’s.Christianitymadehumilityall aboutlowself-estimateinpartbecauseChristianitywasobsessedwith oursmallnessincomparisontoGod’sgreatness.

Second,thesinstory:

Ifhumilityislowself-esteem,wheredoesthisleavetherather splendid amongus?...Oneansweristhatactuallythere are nosplendidhuman

Humility,Pride,andChristianVirtueTheory

beings....LutherbelievedthatweareallsocorruptedbyAdam’ s originalsinastobebeyondredemptionbyanyapparentvirtues.

(Richards1988:253)

Accordingtothesinstory,alowself-estimateisappropriatebecause wearequitebad.Whenwearehonest,werealizethereisnothing goodinus.Accurateself-assessmententailsalowopinionofoneself. Christianitymadehumilityallaboutlowself-estimateinpartbecause Christianitywasobsessedwithhowdespicableweallare.

Finally,thegracestory:

Nothingthatisgoodaboutyouistoyourownpersonalcredit:such thingsareonlytheparticulargiftsGodchosetogiveyou,forwhichyou shouldbegratefulbutofwhichyoucannotproperlybeproud.

(Richards1992:578)

Accordingtothegracestory,whenyoudosomethinggood,itisonly becauseGodhelpedyoudoit.Thustobeproudofanygoodyouhave “done” oranyvirtueyouhave “developed” isfoolish.Christianity madehumilityallaboutlowself-estimateinpartbecauseChristianity wasobsessedwithhowincapableweallare.

ThesethreemotivationalnarrativesaredrawnfromdifferentwritingsofNorvinRichards,thecontemporarysecularphilosopherwho haswrittenmostabouthumility,buttheyrecurthroughoutthe literature.JustasthereisnocontemporaryoriginstoryofChristian humilitythatdivergesfromthelow-estimatedefinition,neitheris thereanyaccountofthereasonsgroundingChristianhumilitythat tellsastoryotherthanthedivineperspectivestory,thesinstory,or thegracestory.Callthiscontemporaryphilosophicalmemoryofthe natureandmotivesofhumilityChristianlyunderstoodthe “standard account.” Accordingtothestandardaccount,Christianhumilityisa lowself-estimategroundedbyourrecognitionthatwearesmall, despicable,andincapable.

Clearlytheaccountiscognitivistinorientation;itlocatesthe essenceofChristianhumilityinappropriateself-estimate.Indeed,it lookslikeaversionof -

,withreligiousbeliefs settingtheparametersofwhatwouldcountasoverestimation.Itisnot coincidentalthatthe first(cognitivist)waveofhumilityaccountsinitiallyprovidedthestandardaccountofChristianhumility.Theysetup thestandardaccountasaheuristicofsorts.Thestandardaccount providedtheproblemthatsecularredefinitionsofhumilitywould needtoovercome namely,ifhumilityisachastenedself-estimate,

butwenolongerholdtheviewsofhumannatureanddivineagency thatmadelowself-estimateseemappropriate,thenwhatcould humilitybeforustoday?Thiswastherecurrentbackgroundproblemin fi rst-wavecontemporarydebatesabouthumility.Ontheone hand,wehavetheworrythatlowself-estimateisonlytruthfulgiven certainquestionablereligiouscommitments.Ontheotherhand, manysecularphilosopherswanttomaintainthereissomething morallyvaluableaboutachastenedviewofhumansigni ficanceand achievement.Forinstance,suchachastenedviewaidsselfrealization(Newman1982:283–4);makesusmoreforgiving,better judgesofothers,andbetteratsettingrealisticexpectationsforourselves(Richards1988:259);reducesjealousyintheserviceofcivil interaction(Driver1989:381);helpsusovercomeself-servingattributionalbiases(Flanagan1990:426–7);moderatesunsubtleattributionsofpraiseandreward(Nuyen1998:108);andmakesliberal democracypossible(Button2005:851).Wecannottruthfullybelieve ourselvestobelowly,yetinsomesenseweneedsotobelieveifweare tobeappropriatelymoral.Thecontemporaryphilosophicalliterature onthequestionofhumilitycanbereadasaseriesofattemptsto resolvethisparadox.

Themostcommonresponseamong first-wave,cognitivistaccounts ofhumilitywassimplytoprovidedifferentstoriesaboutwhyitmay stillbeaccurateforhumanpersonstoholdachastenedviewoftheir goodqualitiesandaccomplishments,nomatterhowrelativelysplendidtheyare.NorvinRichards,OwenFlanagan,andA.T.Nuyenall developavariantofthisresponse.Thechallengetheyconfrontishow tomakehumannatureandachievementseemmodestwithoutfalling backondivineperspective,sin,orgrace.Theytacklethechallenge bysubstitutingsecularanaloguesforeachofthesenarratives.Thus thestoryofdivineperspectiveistranslatedintothestoryofcosmic perspective.

Itiseasytoimaginethattheworld’sfastestrunnermightbemodestand knowthatheis....Hemightthinkthatbeingtheworld’sfastesthuman isnotsoimportant subspecieaeternitatis.(Flanagan1990:425)

Thestoryofsinistranslatedintothestoryofhumanlimitation.

Beingmerciful[means]reactinginatolerant,sympatheticwayto behaviorwhichwasfaultyandwouldordinarilymakeoneresentful andinclinedtoretaliate.Onlythehumblewillreactinthisway....