Beyond European strategic autonomy? by Luigi Scazzieri
European strategic autonomy in security and defence will remain a controversial subject, but leaving aside labels, the Ukraine war is giving fresh momentum to Europeans’ defence efforts. When EU countries set up what would later become the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy in the late 1990s, the Union's ‘capacity for autonomous action’ was a stated aim. Despite this long-standing goal, the concept of ‘European strategic autonomy’ has been ambiguous and divisive. For its proponents, chiefly France, Europeans need strategic autonomy to protect their interests better, in case the US proves unwilling or unable to do so. Conversely, opponents of strategic autonomy, mainly in Europe’s eastern member-states, think it a dangerous idea. In their eyes, strategic autonomy risks undermining NATO, wasting finite resources through duplication, and driving a wedge between the US and Europe. The renewed threat from Russia has underscored how, despite NATO’s internal disagreements, there is no viable alternative to the alliance and its integrated command structure when it comes to organising deterrence and defence against Moscow. In particular, Russia’s attack on Ukraine has starkly underscored the degree of Europe’s reliance on the US for security in both conventional and nuclear terms. The US forces stationed in Europe, which have grown by tens of thousands since Russia's invasion, form the linchpin around which deterrence is structured, and commit
America to defending its European allies. Meanwhile, the US’s nuclear arsenal serves as the ultimate guarantee of European security in a way that the British and French nuclear arsenals could never do on their own. Proponents of European strategic autonomy worry about Europe’s reliance on the US for security, and see the war as yet another reason why Europeans should redouble their efforts to be able to act alone if necessary. Conversely, for opponents of strategic autonomy, the conflict in Ukraine means that keeping the US committed to Europe’s defence is more important than ever, while strategic autonomy seems even less realistic and desirable than before. Most eastern member-states do not trust the big western European countries, especially France and Germany, when it comes to dealing with Russia. The latter are generally seen as too soft on Russia, unwilling to live up to all their promises to support Ukraine, and inclined to doing a deal with Putin that would undermine Ukraine’s interests. The perception that Western Europeans are dovish towards Russia has only enhanced the perceived importance of the US as a security guarantor in the eyes of eastern EU countries. Russia’s invasion has also highlighted the UK’s important contribution to European security.