Appalled by strategic autonomy? Applaud it instead by Sophia Besch
The EU’s ambition of reaching ‘strategic autonomy’, put forward in the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy, means different things to different people. For some Europeans it is the holy grail; for some Americans it is the devil incarnate. Europeans and Americans should stop asking whether strategic autonomy is good or bad for the transatlantic relationship – it is a sign of the relationship’s inevitable progression. They should also worry less about whether Europe’s defence efforts should take place within NATO or the EU. European states should be able to determine for themselves what their interests are, what they want to be able to do on their own or with the United States, and what arms, equipment, personnel and decision-making structures they need to develop. What matters is whether Europe’s defences are adequate to meet the threats it faces. The EU’s increased defence efforts have been motivated by the security crisis in Ukraine, the global threat of terrorism and the opportunity to make European defence spending more efficient. The rhetoric of US President Donald Trump and the doubts he has cast over US security guarantees have also been a factor. So too has Brexit, which will remove the UK veto over European defence integration. Trump’s view that NATO is a net negative for the US remains an outlier in US politics, but there is bipartisan consensus in Washington that Europeans should spend more financial and political capital on defence. At the same time, however, the US has
been critical of the EU’s recent defence initiatives, and the European Defence Fund in particular. Europeans and Americans should make more effort to ensure that changes in the transatlantic defence relationship do not lead to a rift. Europeans need to explain to Americans how the EU’s initiatives serve US interests, but also be honest about where US and European interests might diverge in the future. Americans should take the long view, accept that more equal burden sharing implies more European independence, and tolerate the growing pains that will accompany Europe’s ambitions, including fewer purchases of US arms. Europeans will need US nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future, but they should work to strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrent posture in Central Europe. They should invest in the readiness of their forces, in their ability to move across the continent, and in the capabilities needed to deploy small and medium-sized operations in their immediate neighbourhood – in North Africa and the Sahel for example. And they should prepare to counter future ‘hybrid’ challenges such as disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, and cyber threats by government-sponsored hackers and