Can EU-UK defence negotiations be positive-sum? by Sophia Besch
It is clearly in Britain and the European Union’s mutual interest to continue working closely together on defence after Brexit. Nevertheless, negotiating defence co-operation will not be pain-free; there are obstacles to a quick and easy deal. First, many aspects of the future defence relationship will be heavily dependent on British access to the EU’s internal market. UK defence firms that rely on international supply chains would like barrier-free market access and migration schemes for skilled workers. The UK is also concerned that its firms will be excluded from bidding for European defence contracts – either because projects are supported by the Commission’s new Defence Fund, designed to boost industrial co-operation between EU member-states, or because the EU is wary of allowing non-EU-member-states to access sensitive technology. The spat over British participation in the EU’s ‘Galileo’ space programme shows how difficult it will be to disentangle economic and security interests during the Brexit negotiations. Second, the draft withdrawal agreement allows for a defence agreement to be implemented during the transition period, without waiting for finalisation of the post-2020 relationship. But such an agreement would be limited to activities covered by Title V of the Treaty on European Union. Agreements on UK participation in the EU’s satellite programmes, or on access to the defence fund, would fall outside any defence deal. Therefore, the more the British government wants to include in an
agreement on defence, the less likely it is that there will be an early agreement. Third, the UK government wants a defence partnership that goes beyond any of the arrangements the EU has with third countries. For example, the UK wants to continue to be part of EU military operations only if it is allowed to participate in detailed operational planning. But the EU wants to protect its autonomous decision-making process. And it also wants to ensure that the settlement with the UK does not disturb defence relationships with other third countries. The EU’s defence partners, like Norway, are already fretting about the possibility that Britain might be given more rights than they have, or that fall-out from the Brexit negotiation process might put at risk what they have secured for themselves over the years. In the medium term, it is likely that Brexit will prompt the EU to re-assess its relations with third countries: first, to ensure that the UK continues to play a full part in EU missions and operations; and second, because the discussion with Britain will show up anomalies and shortcomings in existing agreements. Britain can encourage these reform efforts, but not force them – any sense that Brussels is ‘tailoring’ its new arrangements to the UK would be counterproductive.