The EU and climate change policy By Stephen Tindale
This article was submitted as evidence by the Centre for European Reform for the review of the balance of competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union (Foreign Policy) The EU negotiates in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and adopts targets and policies such as the 20-20-20 package for 2020 and the Emissions Trading System (ETS).
How does the EU add value? The EU carries more weight in UNFCCC negotiations than the UK would acting alone. The EU delegation did well at the 2011 Durban climate summit, and will play a central role if new targets are to be agreed by 2015, as was promised in the Durban outcome. However, even if there is agreement, UNFCCC is not strong enough to deliver the necessary greenhouse gas reductions, partly because the targets – despite being legally binding – cannot be properly enforced globally. EU targets can be enforced. The 20 per cent renewable energy target has caused a significant increase in
UK renewable capacity, partly by increasing investor confidence. UK energy policy would be helped if the EU set a 2030 renewable energy target.1 The ETS has not been an effective policy instrument. An EU carbon tax would be more effective, but will not be agreed for subsidiarity reasons and because tax requires unanimity from member-states. The ETS should therefore be overhauled to include a rising, Europe-wide price floor and WTO-compatible border tax adjustments.2 Without EU action, a rising price floor for the UK will have little benefit.
The comparative (dis)advantages of working through the EU Climate change is a global problem, so a single country working alone has limited influence. The EU has done well on some aspects of climate policy, such as energy efficiency standards for products.3 Common regulatory policies help promote energy efficiency. They are also necessary for a single market. The EU’s attempt to use market mechanisms to promote energy efficiency has been much less successful. More co-ordination amongst the EU member states on national renewable energy support schemes, would reduce the cost of capital to European governments for renewable energy expansion. This co-ordination would not need to go as far as harmonisation.4 1: Stephen Tindale, ‘How to expand renewable energy after 2020’, CER policy brief, December 2012 http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2012/howexpand-renewable-energy-after-2020. 2: Stephen Tindale, ‘Saving emissions trading from irrelevance’, CER policy brief, June 2012, http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2012/savingemissions-trading-irrelevance.
Would a different division of EU and member-state competence produce a more effective policy? No. The current division of competences on climate policy is sensible. Member-states are able to adopt policies which are more ambitious and progressive than EU policies – as the UK government is doing with the Emissions Performance Standard. But they are not able to ignore or undercut common EU standards, for example on sulphur dioxide. Common EU standards on pollution are essential to protect British people and the British countryside, as pollution does not respect national frontiers.
3: Stephen Tindale, ‘Delivering energy saving and efficiency’, CER policy brief, January 2011, http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/ policy-brief/2011/delivering-energy-savings-and-efficiency. 4: David Buchan, ‘How to create a single energy market – and subsidise renewables’, CER policy brief, April 2012, http://www.cer.org.uk/ publications/archive/policy-brief/2012/how-create-single-europeanelectricity-market-and-subsidise-r. .
The EU and Climate Change Policy March 2013
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