CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM
policy brief
What comes after Nice • The Treaty of Nice is not a grand plan for the European Union, like the Single European Act or the Maastricht treaty. This treaty revision finally cleared the leftovers from the Amsterdam Treaty, and set the shape of the institutions for the medium term – for better or for worse. The deal is inadequate for integrating all the would-be members, but enlargement will have to start within this framework. • In the Nice summit’s final marathon, most of the leaders’ energy went on establishing the pecking-order between member-states. Now the EU will have to return to fundamental issues. A broad re-think of governance is starting, which will go far beyond the tinkering at Nice. It is a debate in which the members-to-be must participate fully.
THE OUTCOME: OBSCURITY AND COMPLEXITY
WHAT NICE REVEALS ABOUT THE STATE OF THE UNION
Both the outcome at Nice and the methods used to achieve it have left widespread dissatisfaction. Any deal would have been good for enlargement, in allowing the EU to move ahead. But the unseemly spectacle of 15 countries scrambling for position was hardly a shining example of inter-governmentalism at work. And powergrabbing by the large states has caused wariness among their smaller counterparts, both current and future members.
Nice gave the lie to the claim that the EU is rushing towards becoming a super-state. The Commission was sidelined, with intergovernmentalism centre-stage. There was no extension of majority voting in sensitive areas (like tax and social security), and no attempt to bring currently inter-governmental areas into the remit of Community institutions. Moreover, it will actually become harder to pass new laws thanks to the extra hurdles introduced in voting.
The final deal at the end of 2000 was little better than what looked within reach at Amsterdam in 1997, even after many months of deliberation and hours of prime ministerial time (see box overleaf for the key deals). In the post-Nice fatigue, many agreed with Tony Blair that “We can’t go on like this!”. The inter-governmental conference (IGC) format is reaching its limits, with 15 countries in the ring but without a joint Franco-German stand to push for a settlement. More members and greater diversity after enlargement will make the European Council even more unwieldy.
Instead, Nice revealed the divisions between Europe’s leaders about the kind of Union they desire. In particular, it showed that the FrancoGerman couple – always in a marriage of convenience – is increasingly living separately. Far from working as a team at Nice, French and German leaders engaged in a series of acrimonious rows. Unlike at earlier summits, where the agenda was set by a joint FrancoGerman letter, there was no pre-cooked deal to present for agreement. Indeed, Germany presented a joint document with the UK (on institutions) for the first time ever at Nice.
The outcome on institutions will add to the pressure to simplify EU procedures. The rules on decision-making have become even more complex, rather than more streamlined. Now many measures will have to pass a “triple majority”, based on 62% of the population, votes in the Council, and an absolute majority of member-states. This innovation is intended to make decisions nominally more representative of population, while ensuring the small member-states have a voice. But the balance is at the expense of transparency – and the changes hardly bring the Union closer to its citizens. Adding further complications makes the EU even more obscure and difficult to understand, and will not increase its popularity.
France was widely criticised for its ham-fisted diplomacy. Bullying the small countries nearly scuppered the whole deal when several of them threatened to walk out. France’s blatant attempt to force the applicant countries into a bad deal on both votes and number of MEPs did not make Paris any new friends either. Even France’s victory in remaining on a par with Germany in voting power in the Council of Ministers came at a heavy price in deals on population and MEPs.
Centre for European Reform 29 Tufton Street London SW1P 3QL UK
What does a Franco-German divorce mean for the EU? Nice showed how messy decision-making can become in the absence of a driving
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