From drift to strategy: why the EU should start accession talks with Turkey The prospect of membership has been the EU’s single most effective foreign policy tool. In their desire to join the EU, countries across the European continent have consolidated democracy, opened up their economies, strengthened their public administrations, and improved relations with their neighbours. The accession process has worked wonders in Central and Eastern Europe, helping these countries to move from chaotic postCommunism to orderly EU membership in a decade and a half. The EU could do the same for Turkey, provided it stops dragging its feet. Turkey has been trying to move closer to the EU for 40 years. If EU leaders postpone the start of accession talks once more this year, they risk undermining the usefulness of accession as a foreign policy tool. If the EU cannot offer a credible timetable for accession to a key partner like Turkey, it will lose its leverage, not just in Turkey but also in the many other countries aspiring to join the EU. At the moment, the EU’s influence in Turkey is considerable. In 1999 the EU formally declared Turkey a candidate for membership and defined the political conditions it has to meet to start accession talks: the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities. Since then, successive governments in Ankara have made great efforts to fulfil these criteria and the Turkish parliament has passed highly controversial measures bolstering democracy and human rights. It is clear that the EU’s steady pressure has empowered modernisers in Turkish politics. But the modernisers will only be able to keep the upper hand if the EU offers Turkey visible and measurable progress towards accession. Turkey’s people and politicians know that it will take many years before their
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country meets all the criteria for EU membership. But they need an assurance that it will happen, eventually. In the absence of clear progress towards membership, the fragile consensus favouring reform in Turkey could quickly crumble. In December 2004, EU leaders will decide whether and when to begin accession negotiations with the Ankara government. They will probably say ‘yes’ to a start in 2005 or 2006, in part because the EU has run out of plausible reasons to say ‘no’. The EU will then ask Turkey to fulfil all the other ‘Copenhagen criteria’. These include a functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with competition in the single market, and the effective implementation of EU rules and regulations, known as the ‘acquis communautaire’. If applied strictly and consistently, these criteria for membership could spur the kinds of reforms in Turkey that are needed for a smooth accession process. This policy of ‘conditionality’ is the EU’s traditional way of exerting influence internationally. But there is a risk that the EU will not use its power effectively and thus pass up the opportunity to help Turkey to modernise its political and economic systems. To avoid this outcome, the EU needs to deepen its economic and political integration with Turkey well in advance of eventual membership, for the benefit of both sides. This essay explains what is at stake in the EU’s decision on negotiations. It explores three potential scenarios for December, and argues that a postponement of accession negotiations would not help to resolve the problems that many people cite as obstacles to Turkey’s accession. The essay concludes with five recommendations for the EU and five for Turkey in preparing for the December decision.
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