Russia, the EU and the common neighbourhood By Dmitri Trenin ★ Through its new ‘neighbourhood policy’ the EU seeks to forge closer ties with the countries beyond its eastern border, namely Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Caucasus states. Russia has traditionally taken a strong interest in this region, although it has been retreating reluctantly in recent years. ★ Both the EU and Russia have an interest in their neighbourhood becoming more stable and prosperous. The current lack of warmth in EU-Russia relations will make it more difficult for them to work together to achieve this objective. But it also offers them an opportunity for reflection and learning from past mistakes. ★ The EU needs to engage more constructively with its eastern neighbourhood. And Russia has to develop a more enlightened view of its ‘national interest’ in countries such as Ukraine and Belarus, and in the ‘frozen’ conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. Throughout the 1990s, Russia tended to underestimate the impact of the EU’s forthcoming eastward enlargement. Compared with NATO’s expansion into post-Communist territory, EU enlargement looked like the lesser evil. However, over the last two or three years, Russia has been reversing its views. While Moscow has been fairly happy about its co-operation with NATO, it has become increasingly concerned about EU policies. Russia has now woken up to the fact that the EU-25 is markedly different from the EU-15, and not only because of its size. Eight of the newcomers (as well as soon-to-be members Bulgaria and Romania) were once dominated by Moscow. The 100 million or so ‘new Europeans’ tend to have a different, and often a dim, view of Russia, past or present. Their governments “watch like hawks”, in the words of a senior European diplomat, how the EU-Russia relationship develops. Some hope that being part of the EU will give them additional leverage in their relationship with Russia. Moscow, meanwhile, fears that its frictions with the new EU members could spill over into its bro a d e r relationship with the Union. In part i c u l a r, Russia is suspicious of Poland’s attempts to nudge the EU towards a more pro-active eastern policy. The Kremlin clearly resented Polish involvement in the Ukrainian election crisis in late 2004. And it has warned Poland against getting involved in its disagreements with the Baltics or becoming more active in Belarus. Russia also continues to have a difficult relationship with the Baltic states. Russia has long accused Latvia and Estonia of mistreating their large Russian-speaking minorities, many of whom still do not have citizenship of the country in which they live. The absence of historical reconciliation was brought into stark view in the spring of 2005, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, and the support of some Balts for the Nazi regime all re s u rfaced during the 60th anniversary of the end of the second World War. On the long-standing issue of border treaties, Russia and its Baltic neighbours have gone back to the drawing board. Although Russia finally agreed on border treaties with Estonia and Latvia in May 2005, it then refused to ratify them when both countries added re f e rences to bilateral treaties that date back to 1920-21.
Centre for European Reform 29 Tufton Street London SW1P 3QL UK
T: 00 44 20 7233 1199 F: 00 44 20 7233 1117 info@cer.org.uk / www.cer.org.uk