Turkey’s role in European energy security By Katinka Barysch ★ Worried about its dependence on Russian gas, the EU is looking for alternative sources of supply. Turkey – located between big energy producers and the EU market – can make a substantial contribution to Europe’s energy security. ★ The Nabucco pipeline is the flagship project of the EU’s diversification strategy. It is also crucial to Turkey’s ambition of becoming a Eurasian energy hub. But Nabucco will only be built if Turkey bases its energy policy on open, transparent rules, and lets business interests prevail over political considerations. ★ The EU must work harder to unblock the accession talks in the energy area. Ankara and Brussels should also discuss how Turkey’s own plans fit the EU’s emerging energy policy, not only for pipelines, but also for renewables, energy savings and market liberalisation.
Turkey is different from other countries currently queuing for EU entry: it is big, fast-growing and strategically placed. Turkish politicians like to stress that their country’s accession would add to the EU in many ways: its young, dynamic economy could give a boost to an ageing, sclerotic EU market; it could help the EU to bring stability to the Middle East, the Caspian and the Caucasus; and it could add to the EU’s energy security by acting as a bridge to the resource-rich regions in its neighbourhood. Turkey’s development as a European energy hub looks natural, given its lucky location between countries that harbour 70 per cent of the world’s oil and gas reserve to its east, north and south, and one of the world’s biggest energy markets in the west. However, whether Turkey will in fact be able to fulfil this potential depends on a mind-bogglingly complicated array of factors. Some are within Turkey’s control, such as the speed with which it opens up its own energy market, and how it supports the Nabucco pipeline project (see the map on page 8). But many depend on outside developments, ranging from the cohesion of the EU’s own emerging energy policy to the political and commercial isolation of Iran. At times it seems that Turkey is in the middle of a great European energy game: the EU wants to build new pipelines for importing non-Russian gas, including one (or more) through Turkey; the Russians will do their utmost to keep their grip on the continent’s gas transport; Turkmenistan and other gas producers want access to new markets, but without alienating Russia. Turkey and the EU could benefit a lot from working together in the energy field. The EU would gain a reliable alternative supply route. Turkey would gain transit fees and other energy-related business; and, perhaps more importantly, the opportunity to prove that it is an indispensable partner for, and eventually part of, the European Union. But at the moment, the fact that Turkey is a candidate for EU accession appears to hinder rather than help EU-Turkey energy co-operation. Even technical co-operation becomes politicised because non-energy related issues tend to intrude. So the EU and Turkey need to work out a more strategic plan for collaborating in energy. Otherwise Turkey’s potential as an energy hub may well be wasted.
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