CYPRUS: THE COSTS OF FAILURE By David Hannay ★ The latest round of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement on the divided island of Cyprus are likely to reach a decisive phase in late 2009 or early 2010. After 45 years of on-off talks, it is sensible to contemplate failure. Circumstances have changed, however. Most importantly, (Greek) Cyprus is now an EU member and Turkey’s role in the Cyprus settlement is closely linked with its own EU accession negotiations. ★ The costs of failure of the Cyprus negotiations could range from a breakdown in EU-Turkey relations to bad blood between Ankara and Athens, with collateral damage to EU-NATO co-operation. The benefits of success would not only comprise an economically thriving Cyprus but also wider regional stability and improved prospects for a successful conclusion of Turkey’s EU accession process. ★ A bi-zonal, bi-communal federation – as envisaged in the Annan plan that the Greek Cypriots rejected in 2004 – remains the only viable solution. It is the Turkish and Greek Cypriots themselves who need to shape and own the necessary compromises. The EU, although in many ways central to the prospects of a Cyprus settlement, does not have a strong role to play in the negotiations. Its most positive contribution would be to keep the Turkish accession talks alive and ensure steady progress. No-one has yet lost money betting against the successful conclusion of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. And that despite 45 years of on-off negotiations and at least three major, concerted efforts by the international community to reach a solution. So it seems sensible at least to contemplate the possible failure of the current round of negotiations. These began following the election of Dimitris Christofias as Greek Cypriot president in February 2008, and they are expected to reach their decisive phase later in 2009 or in the early months of 2010. To contemplate failure reflects neither a prediction nor a desire to see that occur. One reason for caution at this stage are the circumstances under which the last round of negotiations failed in 2004. These circumstances have implications for the latest attempt at reaching a settlement. In 2004, both sides of the island voted on a negotiated settlement in a referendum. A hefty majority of Greek Cypriots rejected the so-called Annan plan while the Turkish Cypriots endorsed it. The Turkish Cypriots voted yes although they they felt the plan contained a number of painful concessions from their side which they accepted with a heavy heart and many misgivings: the return of substantial amounts of territory from Turkish Cypriot to Greek Cypriot administration; the displacement for a second time of many Turkish Cypriots; and the return of Greek Cypriot property owners to the north and the gradual removal of the vast bulk of the Turkish military from the island. For the Turkish Cypriots, the idea of making further concessions in order to meet points of particular sensitivity to the Greek Cypriots is not appealing. Nor does it appeal to the Turkish government in Ankara with which the Turkish Cypriots have traditionally maintained close ties. Meanwhile, in the successful ‘no’ campaign of 2004 the Greek Cypriots challenged not just the detail of the Annan plan. They also questioned many of the fundamental features of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation which they had accepted as long ago as 1977. This outline, however, remains the only possible basis for a settlement.
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