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YALE EUROPEAN EURASIAN STUDIE

Proceedings Journal from the 6th Annual International Conference of the Yale European Studies Graduate Students at Yale University on May 6–7, 2025

PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPANTS

PANEL I: ECHOES OF WAR: EXAMINING THE IMPACTS OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN EURASIA

PANEL II: ANTI(IMPERIALIZING) MODERNITY IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA

PANEL III: IDENTITY POLITICS AND CULTURAL CO-OPTATION IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA

PANEL IV: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

PANEL V: IDENTITY AND RESISTANCE

PANEL VI: MATERIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

C O N T E N T S C O N T E N T S T A B L E O F

PANEL VII: EUROPE’S ECONOMIC POLICY, TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL LANDSCAPE

PANEL VIII: VARIED DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES ON THE GLOBAL AND LOCAL STAGES

PANEL IX: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE

PANEL X: INVISIBLE NATION: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF BELARUSIAN CULTURAL EXPRESSION

Overview

Youngresearchersfromaroundtheworldgatheredforthe6thannualEuropeanandEurasianStudies bringingearlycareerscholarstosharetheirresearchandengageindialogueaboutthelivedrealities, histories,societies,andpoliticsofEuropeandEurasia.Theconferenceorganizingcommitteeis primarilycomposedoftheMacMillanCenter’sEuropeanandRussianMAstudents,aimingtofoster greaterexchangeofideaswithinYaleandbeyond,whilealsoenhancinginterinstitutionalconnections withotheruniversitiesintheUSandabroad.Theconferencewastheresultofayear-longjointeffort thatbroughttogether37studentsandresearchersfrom17universities.Overthecourseofthetwo days,10panelsexploredawiderangeoftopics,includingthedestructiveimpactsofviolentconflictin Eurasia,imperialhistories,nationalidentityandwartimepoliticsinPutin’sRussia,theEuropean Union’seconomicpolicy,socialtransformationintheSouthCaucasus,globalandlocalchallengesof leadership,Belarusianculture,andtheregionalandglobalimplicationsofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine.

ThisyearcelebratedtheseventhanniversaryoftheEuropeanStudiesstudentaffiliatesnetworkatYale University,aneffortthathasfosteredagrowingcommunityofjuniorresearchersacrosstheinstitution andnowincludesover100students.WehopethisrecentconferencewillstimulatefutureinterdisciplinarycooperationandcooperativeresearchendeavorsonmodernEuropeandEurasia.We appreciatetheparticipationofallpresenters.Wewouldliketoespeciallyextendourgratitudetothe facultydiscussantsandadvancedresearchersfromYaleandsixacademicinstitutionsforgenerously dedicatingtheirtimetodriveconversationofthesesignificantyetchallengingtopics.

Withsincereappreciationtoalltheparticipantsoftheconferencefromthemembersofthethe PlanningCommittee:

CommitteeChair:VitaRaskeviciute,YaleUniversity

TanyaKotelnykova,YaleUniversity

JacobLink,YaleUniversity

DashaMaliauskaya,YaleUniversity

OliverWolyniec,YaleUniversity

LolaShehu,YaleUniversity

LydiaSmith,YaleUniversity

MikeYork,YaleUniversity

ChristinaAndriotis,YaleUniversity

ManagementandstudentsupportoftheESC

6TH ANNUAL YALE EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES

TUESDAY

l h o u s e A v e .

8:45 AM

9:30 AM

9:40 AM

Breakfast | Luce Hall, Common Room

Welcome Remarks | Luce Hall, Room 203

PANEL I: Echoes of War: Examining the Impacts of Violent Conflict in Eurasia

Chair: Oliver Wolyniec (Yale University)

Discussant: Prof David Simon (Yale University)

Rowan Baker (Yale University), “Being Homeland: Indigeneity, Power, Decolonization, and Peacebuilding between Georgia and Abkhazia”

10:50 AM

Alice Mee (Columbia University), “The Enemy Within? Collaboration and the Boundaries of National Identity in Wartime Ukraine”

PANEL II: Anti(Imperializing) Modernity in Late Imperial Russia

Chair: Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

Discussant: Prof. Sergei Antonov (Yale University)

Mariana Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), “Conceptions of Freedom in Serf Memoirs: Imagining Emancipation Before the End of Serfdom”

Roman Osharov (University of Oxford), “Policing and Ethnography in Asian and Russian Tashkent, 1890-1897”

Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University), “Between Nation(s) and Empire(s):

12:05 PM

1:05 PM

Polyethnic Borderland Patriotism in Post-1905 Vil’na Guberniya”

Lunch Break | Luce Hall, Common Room

PANEL III: Identity Politics and Cultural Co-optation in Putin’s Russia

Chair: Dasha Maliauskaya (Yale University)

Discussant: Prof. Peter Rutland (Wesleyan University)

Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), “Decolonizing Russian Identity: Examining the Role of Non-Russian Ethnic Groups in Putin’s Russia”

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University), “Russia’s War Bloggers and the Prospect of Peace: an Assessment of the Perceptions of Ceasefire in Ukraine”

2:45 PM

Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University), “Russia’s Affinity for Immortality” Anonymous (Indiana University), “From Lament to Loyalty: The Co-optation of Chuvash Recruit Songs in Russian Pro-War Propaganda”

PANEL IV: Social Transformation in the South Caucasus

Chair: Lydia Smith (Yale University) | Discussant: Prof Julie A. George (CUNY)

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University), “Managing Displacement: A Policy Analysis of Georgia’s IDP Crisis”

Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles), “The Domestic Violence Law of Armenia (2018-2020): A New Era in the Legislation”

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University), “Rave Against the Machine: Club

4:00 PM

4:30 PM

Cultures and Queer Activism in Georgia”

Break

PANEL V: Identity and Resistance

Chair & Discussant: Lola Shehu (Yale University)

William Sims (European University Institute), “‘A Page of Italian History ’ The March on Rome told through the Coverage of Local, National, and Diaspora Italian Liberal Newspapers”

Filippos Toskas (Oxford University), “Exploring key political concepts through 1970s queer press: redefining political liberation and Marxism” Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam), “Decolonizing Czech Music: Má vlast & the Struggle for Cultural Autonomy from Habsburg Rule to Soviet Influence" H E N R Y R . L U C E H A L L R m 2 0 3 ( 2 n d f l ) | 3 4 H i

GRADUATE STUDENT CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY

8:30 AM Breakfast | Luce Hall, Common Room

9:00 AM PANEL VI: Material Infrastructure and the Building of Socialism

Chair: Jacob Link (Yale University)

Discussant: Dr Nataliia Laas (Yale University)

Jacob Link (Yale University), “Red Networks: Technologies of Power in the Red Army’s Conquest of the South Caucasus”

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin), “Electricity & Socioeconomic Performance: Evidence from the Short Soviet Century”

Nicholas Pierce (University of Texas, Austin), ‘Forcing the Gates of the Future’: Dams as Sites of High Modernity in Roosevelt’s United States and Stalin’s Soviet Union” 10:25 AM PANEL VII: Europe’s Economic Policy, Trade, and Competitiveness in a Changing Global Landscape

Moderator: Lili Vessereau (Harvard University)

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University), “EU Trade Policy in the Era of Protectionism: De-risking from US”

Justine Haekens (Harvard University), “How Does Corporate Wealth Translate into Market Power?”

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University), “Tariff Pass-Through along the Supply Chain: Evidence from Liquor Industry”

:40

Lunch Break | Luce Hall, Common Room

PANEL VIII: Varied Dimensions of Leadership: Challenges on the Global and Local Stages

Chair: Christina Oh (Yale University)

Discussant: Prof. Jonathan Bach (The New School)

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University), “Climate Hybridity: Norway as both Leader and Laggard”

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University), “The Battle for Local Autonomy: Decentralization Processes in Wartime Ukraine”

Christina Oh (Yale University), “Exporting Repression: Russian Influence Campaigns in Mali and Burkina Faso”

2:05 PM PANEL IX: Regional and Global Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

3:30 PM

Chair: Tanya Kotelnykova (Yale University)

Discussant: Prof David Cameron (Yale University)

Valerie Browne (Harvard University), “Accessing National Belonging in Kazakhstan: Russophone Almatyntsy and the Kazakh language learning movment in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”

Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana), “Wartime consequences: The impact of Ukraine war on the Western Balkans”

Łucja Skolankiewicz (University of Oxford), "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and war in Ukraine. Member States reactions to the Russian invasion"

PANEL X: Invisible Nation: The Untold Stories of Belarusian Cultural Expression

Chair: Mike York (Yale University)

4:30 PM

Discussant: Andrei Kureichyk (University of Chicago)

Maryna Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University), “Language Policy in Belarusian

Cinema: Between Russification and National Revival”

Vesta Svendsen (Brown University), “Transgenerational Trauma and Today’s Belarus”

RECEPTION | Luce Hall, Common Room

4:30 4:30

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

PresidentVolodymyrZelenskyisdailyspeechestothenationbetween24February2022and23February2024Inthe secondsection,IexaminecourtcasesagainstcollaboratorsinthesameperiodMycourtcaseanalysisisbasedona datasetofoneintenoftheverdictsdeliveredinthistimeframe,equatingto130cases,whichwereselectedateven intervals. Iarguethatnationalbelonginghascometobepredicatedlargelyonunwaveringloyaltytothenation. Moreover, Ihighlightthedetachmentofthenotionofcollaboration cooperationwithenemyforces, arguingthat collaboratorsarepositionedbyUkrainianauthoritiesasanenemyintheirownright. Assuch, Isuggestthatgreater terminologicalnuancemaybeusefultopolicymakers,lawenforcementandthepublicalike.

OLIVER WOLYNIEC

Oliver Wolyniec is a current M A student in the European and Russian Studies program at Yale He grew up in Minnesota and earned his B.A. in international relations and Russian from Carleton College in 2019. In his junior year, Oliver spent the spring term at Moscow State University on a study abroad program After graduation, he spent several months studying Russian in Nizhny Novgorod through the Critical Language Scholarship (CLS) program before joining the Peace Corps in Montenegro as an English language teacher His time in the Balkans was cut short by the onset of the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020 At Yale, Oliver is focusing on the role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in Russia, East Europe, and Eurasia He is especially interested in the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and resurgent ethnic nationalism in the Balkans

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

David J. Simon is the Assistant Dean for Graduate Education as well as a Senior Lecturer in Global Affairs. He also serves as the Director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University David’s research focuses on mass atrocity prevention and post-atrocity recovery, with a particular focus on cases of mass atrocity in Africa, including those in Rwanda and Cote d’Ivoire He is co-editor of Mass Violence and Memory in the Digital Age: Memorialization Unmoored (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2020, with Eve M Zucker), and co-editor of the Handbook of Genocide Studies (Edward Elgar, forthcoming, with Leora Kahn). He helped launch the Mass Atrocities in the Digital Era initiative within the Genocide Studies Program (with Nathaniel Raymond) The initiative which recognizes that digital technology has brought about sea changes in all aspects of mass atrocity from the commission of it to the efforts to prevent it to the prospects of holding perpetrators responsible and seeks to bring experts from the fields of genocide studies, international criminal law, and internet data governance in conversation with one another to devise appropriate responses

DAVID SIMON

ROMAN OSHAROV

Roman Osharov is a DPhil Candidate at the University of Oxford’s Faculty of History, where his dissertation examines the Russian Empire's production of knowledge about Central Asia in the nineteenth century, its uses and limits. He began studying the history of the Russian Empire and Central Asia in 2019, building on some of his earlier work done while studying at King’s College London Research for his DPhil has taken him to archives and libraries across Eurasia, including Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia, as well as to holdings in the United States and the United Kingdom. During his DPhil Roman has taught on the history of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union course at the Faculty of History and New College, Oxford, and held a teaching fellowship at the Ashmolean Museum of Art and Archaeology

"PolicingandEthnographyinAsianandRussianTashkent,1890-1897" ThispaperexaminestheproductionofknowledgeintheserviceoftheRussianimperialpowerbyfocusingontheroleofethnography, andparticularlycensusdata,inTashkentunderRussianrule ItarguesthatethnographywasoneofthekeywaysfortheRussian EmpiretopenetrateCentralAsiancommunities WhentheRussiansfirsttookoverTashkentin1865theydidnotknowhowmany peoplelivedinthecity,andwerefacedwiththeneedtocountthepeopleinthenewlyconqueredregion,inordertoholdelectionsand setupacolonialadministrationYet,reliableinformationonthesizeofthepopulationonlybegantoemergeinthe1890s,whenNil SergeevichLykoshinbecamethefirstRussianpolicechiefandeffectivelyheadoftheAsianpartofTashkentinasweepingpolice reformthatfollowedthe‘cholerariot’ Lykoshin’sappointmentwasanindicatorthattheRussianimperialpowerwasextendingits footprintbytakingoveranareaoflocaladministrationthatsincetheconquesthadbeenleftlargelyinthehandsofCentralAsians

VITA RASKEVICIUTE

Vita Raskeviciute is currently pursuing an MA in European and Russian Studies at Yale University Born and raised in Lithuania, her interests converge at the crossroads of democratization and the formation of national identity within the post-Soviet landscape Vita obtained her B A in International Relations and Russian and East European Studies from the University of Pennsylvania

"BetweenNation(s)andEmpire(s):PolyethnicBorderlandPatriotisminPost-1905Vil’naGuberniya" TheeraofmasspoliticsandideologicalfermentarrivedinoneofImperialRussia’swesternmostprovincesalmostovernight FollowingTsarNicholasII’sproclamationoftheOctoberManifestoin1905 whichestablishedapopularlyelectedparliament, theDuma,promisedcertaincivilliberties,andeasingofcensorship theethnically,linguistically,andconfessionallydiverse populationofVil’naGuberniyagainedaccess, forthefirsttime, toarelativelyunrestrictedpublicsphereofpolitical organizationandvibrantprintingpressThisnewfoundpoliticalspacepropelledVil’nainhabitantstopubliclynegotiatetheir relationshipwiththeimperialstate,emergingideologies,andtheirneighborsThispaperexaminestheunfoldingoftheDuma electionsinVil’naGovernoratein1905-1912,focusingonhowpoliticalelitesinthisprovinceleveragedimperialreformsand theroomofmaneuvertheyprovidedtoarticulateandpromotecentrifugalpositionalityoftheNorthwesternborderlandwithin theEmpireItarguesthatculturallyPolishelitesinVil’naGovernorateutilizedDumaelectoralcampaignsandpoliticstoassert the distinctiveness and cohesion of the Northwestern provinces of Imperial Russia, constructing a mental map that differentiated these lands from both Congress Poland and the territories deemed primordially Russian (исконно

)

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

SERGEI ANTONOV

Sergei Antonov specializes in modern Russia after 1800, with particular interest in politics, culture, and society in the late imperial and early Soviet period (ca 1850-1927) His research focuses on the history of Russian law, conceived broadly to include not just legislation and legal doctrines, but ways in which legal norms and institutions impacted the daily practices of ordinary persons, rich and poor, men and women, and served to define and protect private interests, resolve (or perpetuate) interpersonal conflicts, as well as to assert (or challenge) social power and authority

Diana Avdeeva is a graduate student in Slavic Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Originally from Moscow, Russia, her research focuses on Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, with an emphasis on nationalism and national identity as reflected in artistic production in Russia under Putin Diana's work particularly examines the Russian opposition, the antiwar movement, and the experiences of Russia’s Indigenous peoples. She also explores creative expression in Ukraine and Belarus as a form of opposition to Russia's influence Beyond academia, Diana is a committed antiwar and decolonization activist, working with several major organizations, including those designated as terrorist and extremist by the Russian government "DecolonizingRussianIdentity:ExaminingtheRoleofNon-RussianEthnicGroupsinPutin’sRussia" Thispaperexplorestheroleofnon-RussianethnicgroupsinshapingRussianidentityunderPutin’sregime, challengingthe dominantnarrativesthatcenterethnicRussianswhilemarginalizingindigenousandminoritypopulationsTheKremlin’snationbuildingprojectpromotesahomogenizedRussianidentity, oftenerasingthecultural, linguistic, andhistoricalcontributionsof non-RussianpeoplesAtthesametime,thestateexploitsethnicminoritiesforpoliticalandmilitarypurposes,disproportionately recruitingthemintothearmedforcesandusingtheirregionsforeconomicextractionThispaperreassessesthesedynamics throughthelensofdecolonialtheory, focusingonthewaysindigenouspeoplesofRussiahaveresistedPutin’sregimeandthe full-scaleinvasionofUkrainein2022 Throughactivism, anti-warmovements, culturalrevival, andtransnationalsolidarity, variousindigenouscommunitiesinRussiachallengestate-imposednarrativesandreclaimtheiragencyByincorporatingthese perspectives, thisresearchhighlightsactsofdefianceagainstRussianimperialismandpresentsalternativevisionsofRussian identitybeyondthestate’scontrolUnderstandingtheseformsofresistanceiscrucialfordeconstructingimperialnarrativesand fosteringamoreinclusiveanddecolonizeddiscourseonRussia’sfuture

KRISTOFERS KRUMINS

Kristofers Krumins, originally from Riga, completed his undergraduate degree in politics and government at Sciences Po, while also spending his last year on exchange at Columbia University Some of his academic interests include politics of emotion, identity, and disinformation, especially focusing on events in the Baltics and Ukraine Despite his studies in the US, Kristofers remains tightly connected with Latvia and has pursued many opportunities there, including interning at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and serving as the UN Youth Delegate of Latvia in 2024

gg g y g g g y monthsof2022(Gerardetal,2024) Withtheonsetofpotentialpeacenegotiationsandastoptothehostilities,thisstudylooks atthemoodamongthetenmostreadRussianTelegramwarbloggingchannelsandassessesthetrendsintheblogospherein late2024andatthebeginningof2025Theresearchpaperanalyzesanoriginaldatasampleanddevelopsacodebooktofilter outspecificemotionalresponsestotheongoingtacticalsituationonthefrontaswellaseventsaffectingthediplomaticrelations betweenRussiaanditsperceivedadversariesImportantly, thepaperaddressesagapinmeasuringthepublicsentimentin RussiatowardsitswarinUkrainebyassessingthepopularityandpublicreactionstothevariouspostssharedbyRussia’swar bloggers

DRIANE LONGHURST

Adriane is an MA candidate at Georgetown University with CERES. After studying both Environmental Biology and Russian in her undergraduate degree, her research concerns the present-day repercussions of the Soviet legacy on science and the region's current environmental, ecological, and bioethical issues, as informed by history, politics, culture and war across Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. "Russia'sAffinityforImmortality"

InFebruary2024, Putinestablishedanewnationalprojectfocusedontransformingthelongevityofitscitizens, aptlytitled “NewHealthPreservationTechnologies” Oneoftheproject'smoreeclecticaimsisextendingRussiancitizens’ lifespans throughthedevelopmentofneurotechnologiesandcellularregeneration. Although, atfirstglance, headlinesaboutPutin’s questforimmortalitymightseemtobeafleetingcuriosityofhisregimeanddesireforpower, Russiahashadaunique obsessionwithimmortalitysincetheearly20thcenturyIconnectRussia’shistoricalrelationshipwiththepursuitofimmortality tothepresent-dayrealityofitsdemographicsandmortalityratestodayRussia’sscientificobsessionwithimmortalitybegana centuryagointhefaceofadevastatingdemographiccrisis, withmillionsdyinginthefewshortyearsofthecivilwarandthe Bolshevikrevolution. Today, asRussia’sbirthratesandadultmortalityspiral, weseeasimilardesiretoextendhumanlife. I investigatenotionsofimmortalityandtheirconnectiontonationalism,withattentiontoparallelsbetweenthe“SovietMan”and whatitmeanstobe “Russian” . ThewayscienceisexploitedtocategorisewhoisandisnotRussianispertinentinthecontext ofRussia’sinvasionofUkraine

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

PANEL IV: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE SOUTH

CAUCASUS

SALOME MAMULADZE

Salome Mamuladze is a master's student in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, where she also serves as a Graduate Fellow at CERES. Originally from Tbilisi, Georgia, she earned a B S in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in Qatar, majoring in Culture and Politics with a minor in Government Salome's undergraduate honors thesis explored modern Georgian nationalism and protest culture Her current research interests focus on security dynamics and nationalism in the South Caucasus and the broader Black Sea region. "ManagingDisplacement:APolicyAnalysisofGeorgia’sIDPCrisis" GeorgiahasfacedongoingchallengeswithinternaldisplacementduetoconflictsinAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiasincetheearly 1990s.Asof2023,approximately311,000internallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)remaininGeorgia,presentingsignificantsocialand economicchallenges.ThispaperexaminestheevolutionofGeorgia’sIDPpolicies,withaparticularfocusonhousingassistance.It traceskeypolicydevelopmentsfromthe1990stothepresent,analyzingboththesuccessesandshortcomingsofgovernment strategies Thestudyhighlightsshiftsinapproach,fromaninitialemphasisonrepatriationtolatereffortsaimedatlong-term integration Whilerecentpolicieshaveprioritizedhousingsolutions,inconsistenciesinimplementation,forcedrelocations,and inadequateinfrastructurehavehinderedprogress Drawingonofficialannualreports,thisresearchprovidesacomprehensive overviewofGeorgia’sevolvingIDPpolicies,offeringinsightsintotheireffectivenessandthegapsthatremainByaddressingalack ofEnglish-languageresourcesonthistopic,thestudycontributestoabroaderunderstandingofGeorgia’seffortstosupportIDPs andunderscorestheneedformoresustainableandinclusivepolicysolutions

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

LYDIA SMITH

Lydia Smith (she/her) is a current Masters Student in the European and Russian studies program Her academic interests include the use of AI in combating disinformation, internal displacement in post-conflict zones, the South Caucasus, and the Balkans Her thesis research is on modern policies of internal displacement in Georgia and Armenia Prior to arriving at Yale, Lydia taught English at high schools in Gotse Delchev, Bulgaria and Joinville, France as part of the Fulbright and TAPIF programs. She is originally from Virginia and graduated from the University of Virginia with a degree in Foreign Affairs and minors in French and Russian literature Her undergraduate thesis research was on the efficacy and impact of COVID-19 border closures

JULIE A. GEORGE

Professor George specializes in comparative politics, focusing on ethnic politics, democratization, and state building Her current research focuses on how states undergoing significant transformation and reform address ethnic minorities. Professor George has conducted research in the former Soviet Union, primarily in the Russian Federation and in Georgia, where she was funded by the Fulbright Association Professor George is the author of The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), as well as articles in Europe-Asia Studies, Post-Soviet Affairs, European Security, and Central Asian Survey She has written chapters for inclusion in The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Enduring Legacies and Emerging Challenges (Routledge, 2009) and Conflict in the Caucasus: Implications for International Legal Order (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2010).

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

YUNI ZENG

Yuni Zeng is currently pursuing her MA degree in European Studies at University of Amsterdam, specializing in the Identity and Integration track Her research interests focus on nationalism in contemporary Europe and the intersection of musical decolonization with identity politics She explores how cultural expressions, such as music, contribute to national and transnational narratives, highlighting the complexities of identity formation and integration With 10 years of experience performing in an orchestra, she brings a unique practical perspective to her academic work, connecting her deep understanding of music to her research on identity. By bridging historical legacies with modern sociopolitical transformations, she seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of identity within the European context "DecolonizingCzechMusic: Má vlastandtheStruggleforCulturalAutonomyfrom HabsburgRuletoSovietInfluence"

Duringthe19thcentury,CzechcomposersfacedtheculturalhegemonyoftheAustro-HungarianEmpire,whereGermanmusicdominated artisticinstitutionsandintellectualdiscourse.Inthiscontext,BedřichSmetana’sMá vlastemergedasapowerfulmusicalstatementofCzech nationalidentity,challengingtheGermanictraditionsthathadshapedCentralEuropeanmusic.Thisarticlechallengesthebinaryofcolonizervs. colonizedbyapplyingpostcolonialandtransnationaltheoriestoCzechmusicalnationalism.RatherthanviewingMá vlastasamerereaction againstGermanculturalcolonization,thisstudyexaminesitscosmopolitanentanglements fromFranzLiszt’ssymphonicpoemmodeltothe roleofHabsburgculturalpoliciesinfosteringCzechidentity.ThisstudyinvestigateshowCzechcomposersaccumulatedmusicallegitimacyand institutionalinfluencetoassertadistinctnationalidentitythroughPierreBourdieu’sconceptofculturalcapital Thisarticlealsoexamineshow Má vlasttranscendeditsoriginalnationalistcontext,becomingasymbolofCzechresistanceunderNazioccupationandapillarofpostHabsburgculturalheritage ExpandingthisperspectivetotheColdWarera,italsoexploreshowMá vlastfunctionedasasubtleassertionof CzechculturalidentityunderSovietculturaldominance,highlightingitsenduringroleinthereclamationofCzechartisticautonomyacross imperialandpost-imperialEurope

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

AGZAMKHON NIYAZKHODJAYEV

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev is a Ph D candidate in Economics at Institute for East European Studies and School of Business and Economics at Freie Universität Berlin. His research primarily focuses on the economic history and development of postSoviet countries, with a particular emphasis on Central Asia Agzamkhon holds a Master of Science in Applied Economics from Westminster International University in Tashkent and has extensive working experience in the energy sector He is also a scholar of the "El-Yurt Umidi" Foundation initiated by Uzbekistan "Electricity&SocioeconomicPerformance:EvidencefromtheShortSovietCentury" ThisstudyexaminestheimpactofelectrificationoneconomicandsocialdevelopmentintheSovietUnion’snon-Russian unionrepublicsthroughoutthe20thcentury Utilizingofficialstatisticalrecords,thispaperprovidesanovelquantitative analysisoftherelationshipbetweenelectricityproductionandkeysocioeconomicindicators, includinghumancapital, employment,andhealthcaredevelopment Toaddresspotentialendogeneityconcerns,Iemployapproaches,leveraging earlySovietelectrificationpolicies,administrativedecentralizationinstitutions,andtheethnicityofMinistriesofelectrification instruments.Additionally,entropybalancingisusedtoensurecovariatebalanceinobservationaldata,improvingcausal inference. Aplacebotestisimplementedtoverifythattheobservedeffectsaredrivenbyelectrificationratherthan confoundingfactors.ThefindingsrevealthatelectrificationsignificantlycontributedtopublicgoodsdevelopmentinSoviet republics,withclearpath-dependenteffectsinfluencedbyhistoricalpolicydecisions.However,theethnicityofpolicymakers inchargeofelectrificationisinsignificant.Incontrast,theethnicityofFirstSecretariesishighlysignificant,withSlavicleaders receivinggreatereconomicbenefitsandprioritizationfromthePolitburoAdditionally,resourceextractionwassystematically observedinseveralUnionrepublics,reinforcingeconomicdisparitiesbetweenregions

NICHOLAS PIERCE

Nicholas Pierce is a second-year graduate student at the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, where he also received his B A in History and Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies in 2023 His research interests include comparative history between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, processes and problems of modernity, comparative frontiers, the history of nomads, and the Russian language His current research is a comparative history of “high modernity” in the 1930s in Roosevelt’s USA and Stalin’s USSR "'ForcingtheGatesoftheFuture':DamsasSitesofHighModernityinRoosevelt’sUnitedStatesandStalin’s SovietUnion"

The1930ssawadecisiveturntostateactionintheUnitedStatesandSovietUnion,wherethestate,buildingonprecedents ofplanningfromWWI,mobilizedphysicalandintellectuallabortoenactfundamentalchange Usingtheframeof“high modernity”asdescribedbyJamesCScott,myworklayoutacomparativeanalysisofthe1930sinthesetwosupposedly opposingsystems,withthegoalofshowingthesimilaritiesandkeydifferencesofAmericanandSoviet“highmodernity”If highmodernitycanbesaidtohaveacentralsymbol,onewouldbehardpressedtopointtoanyotherthanthemassive concreteandsteeldamsthatwereconstructedacrosstheUSandUSSRinthe1930s.FromtheHooverDamtotheTVA,from theDniepertotheVolga,thesestructuresliterallysubmergedthepastintheinterestsofpowergenerationandthecontrolof nature Theyalsochangedthehumangeographyoftheseregions,displacingthepopulationswhowereoftenseenas backwardsorundeveloped Therefore, Ilookatdamsandtheirconstructionsassitesofhighmodernityinpractice, transformingthephysicalandhumanworldtobettersuitanideaofanefficient,modernfuture.

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

PANEL VII: EUROPE'S ECONOMIC POLICY, TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL LANDSCAPE

CARLO GIANNONE

Carlo Giannone is a Master in Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School, sponsored by BCG, Fulbright and Zegna scholarships. He works as Teaching Assistant for Economics Professor Robert Lawrence, former Economic Advisor of President Clinton, and as a Research Assistant for Professor Eric Rosenbach, former Chief of Staff of US Pentagon He is also part of the organizing team of the 2024 EU Conference, one of the most important events on Europe in the US Prior to HKS, he worked as a policy consultant at BCG in Middle East focusing on geopolitics, foreign direct investments, industrial and foreign policy as well as at FleishmanHillard in Brussels focusing on public affairs He holds a bachelor’s in economics from Bocconi University and a master’s degree in international management from the London School of Economics and Bocconi University where he also serves as an elected member of the Board of Bocconi Alumni. Carlo also currently contributes to several Italian newspapers, hosts a top-100 Italian podcast on geopolitics and economics"Finanza, Pizza e Mandolino" , and is a selected ISPI, OECD and Bocconi University Future Leader "EUTradePolicyintheEraofProtectionism:De-riskingfromUS" TheUnitedStatesremainstheEU’slargestexportmarketie, overEUR529BnbetweenNov2023and2024, makingtransatlantictraderelations criticalforEuropeaneconomicstability There-electionofDonaldTrumpandhisadministration'srenewedpushforprotectionistmeasures, includingtherecentlyannouncedtariffsonsteelandaluminum, haveheightenedconcernsacrosstheEUabouttradedisruptions Thispaper evaluatestheEU’sexposuretoUSprotectivemeasuresandassesseswhetherandhowtheEUcouldreduceitsrelianceontheAmericanmarket ThispaperfirstlyanalyzestheextentofEUmemberstates' relianceonUSmarketsforbothgoodsandservicesusingtradedata. Thendrawing fromtheEU’slearningsinreducingdependencyonRussiangas, Iexplorewhethersimilarde-riskingeffortsarenecessaryandfeasibleinthe transatlantictradecontextThroughacombinationofdataanalysisandexpertinterviews, Ievaluatepotentialmarketsandpolicymechanismsto diversifyEUtradeandenhanceeconomicresilienceByexploringthesedimensions,thispaperaimstodemonstratewhethertheEUcanreduceits economicdependenceontheUSmarketandestablishitselfasastrongglobalplayer,regardlessoffuturepoliticalshiftsintheUS

JUSTINE HAEKENS

Justine Haekens is currently pursuing her LL M degree at Harvard Law School while simultaneously working on her PhD at the KU Leuven Her dissertation focuses on the concept of market power in EU competition law, on which she has published in Belgian and European academic journals Justine is involved in the Harvard European Law Association and the Belgian Student Society at Harvard, as well as in the Case4EU Project She holds a masters degree from the KU Leuven and has studied at the University of Edinburgh as part of her degree "HowDoesCorporateWealthTranslateintoMarketPower?" CompetitionlawinEurope, asestablishedintheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion (TFEU) initsTitleVII, Chapter1, iscrucialforpreservingfairmarketconditions, protectingconsumerinterests, andpromotingeconomicefficiencybypreventing anti-competitivepracticesandensuringalevelplayingfieldforbusinessesBuildingoneconomicstudies, thisresearchaimsto understandwhetherfinancialpowershouldbeastand-alonecriterionwhenestablishingdominanceorevaluatingmergersTodo sothelinksbetweenfirmsfinancialwealthandmarketpower, aswellasitsrelevancetoEUcompetitionlaw Thispaperwill thereforeconsiderthe ‘deeppockets’ theory, whichclaimsthatwealthandresourcesareasourceofpowerThistheoryargues thatextensivefinancialandotherresourcesgivefirmsanunfairadvantageovercompetitors, whichtheycanusetosellbelow costsasastrategytodrivecompetitorsoutofthemarketThistheoreticalframeworkwasdevelopedinthesecondhalfofthe20th centuryandwasrefutedrelativelyquickly. Usingnewempiricaleconomicstudies, thispaperwilldeterminewhetherthelegal theoryhaseconomicrelevanceinthecurrentEuropeanmarket

L ABSTRACTS & BIOS

NOVSKIY

s a graduate student in the Economics department broadly interested tariff pass-through in supply chains, d platform markets In his job market paper, he is exploring welfare effects of recent protectionist tariffs that mposed on European food products. His other work is focused on incorporating modern ML methods in ughalongtheSupplyChain:EvidencefromLiquorIndustry" tsofa2018tariffonEuropeanliquorproductsalongthesupplychain.Incontrasttorecentwork,wefind attheborderisincompleteandthatmostofthepriceincidencefallsonforeignfirms.Tariffeffects thedomesticconsumerbutwerefurtherabsorbedbyretailerswhodecreasedtheirmarkups.Surprisingly, fcompletepass-throughattheconcentrateddistributiontierofthesupplychainconsistentwiththeuseof s.Pricewasnottheonlyresponsemechanismthataffectedconsumersasretailersalsoreducedthe ductsaffectedbythetariff PriceeffectsatthestorewerehighlyunevenacrosstheUSevenfor sestatesWeshowthatdifferencesinsupplychainstructureinducedbystatelawscouldexplainsomeof s-throughinneighboringstates

LILI VESSEREAU

Lili Vessereau is the co-chair of the European conference and a Teaching Fellow for Infrastructure finance, Public Finance, and Introduction to Microeconomics at Harvard. She is also a Research Scholar at the Center for International Development, a Research Assistant at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, working respectively on green growth and debt restructuring, as well as a Master in Public Policy candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School She is the former Youth Delegate of France to the Council of Europe and a former OSCE Perspective 2030 Fellow. She previously worked for the French Government, the United Nations, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies She holds Master’s Degrees from Sciences Po Paris, La Sorbonne, and HEC Paris

DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES ON THE GLOBAL AND LOCAL STAGES

WILLIAM HOPKINSON

William Hopkinson is a PhD Candidate at the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne His substantive research interests include climate change politics, comparative politics, and set-theoretic methods. As a long-term climate advocate, his PhD research focuses on domestic political processes and the enabling and constraining conditions that shape climate ambition and its change over time His research aims to help scholars, policymakers, and activists better understand how to accelerate more ambitious climate action to meet international climate goals. His work centres on the domestic politics between fossil fuel and green actors over climate policy within OECD member countries In addition to his research, William also works as a teaching associate and research assistant across environmental and international politics at the University of Melbourne. William has a long-standing interest in multi-disciplinary climate approaches and is a member of a collaborative climate research project between the University of Manchester, the University of Melbourne, and the University of Toronto He holds a Master of Geography from the University of Melbourne and a Master of International Politics from KU Leuven.

"ClimateHybridity:NorwayasbothLeaderandLaggard" TomeettheParisAgreement’sgoals,statesmustincreasetheirambitiontomitigateclimatechangeandacceleratetheireffortsasrapidlyaspossible Pavingthewayforthenet-zerotransition,climateleadershipanditsvariousconceptualformshavebeenheavilydebatedbyenvironmentalscholarsYet, environmentalresearchhasdisproportionatelyfocusedonbinaryunderstandingsofleadershipandlaggardshipwhereintheselabelsformafixed historicalattributionInthisarticle,Iadvanceamoredynamicunderstandingofclimateperformancethroughacloserexaminationofdomesticclimate policiesoccurringovertimethatmaydisruptfossilfuelpath-dependenciesByfocusingonNorway,longregardedasaquintessentialleader,Idrawon originaldataandcontentanalysistoanalyseandexplainNorway’srarepositionasbothaclimateleaderandoneofEurope’slargestfossilfuelexporters Inturn,Ichallengethisleadership-laggardshipbinaryandinsteadofferamorenuancedunderstandinginwhichNorwaysimultaneouslyembodies elementsofleadershipandlaggardshipovertimeBeyondtheNorwegiancase,thishybridcomplexityjustifiesre-evaluatingcommonbinary understandingsofleader-laggardsandtheirwiderapplicationinboththeenvironmentalpoliticsliteratureandthepracticesoftheclimateregime

NOAH LLOYD

Noah Lloyd is a recent graduate of Georgetown University's Center for Eurasia, Russian, and Eastern European Studies and currently works on the South Caucasus team at the National Endowment for Democracy. Before entering his Master's program at Georgetown, he taught in public and private schools across Eastern Europe and worked as a Russian and Ukrainian translator His academic research has primarily focused on modern Ukraine, specifically issues related to separatism and democratic reform. "TheBattleforLocalAutonomy:DecentralizationProcessesinWartimeUkraine" ThefrontlinesofUkrainerepresentnotonlyastrugglebetweenUkrainiansovereigntyandRussiandomination,orthedefense ofdemocracyagainstautocracy,butalsoacontestbetweentwocompetingmodelsofgovernancewithinUkraineitselfThis paperexaminesthecriticalrolethatdecentralizationhasplayedinUkraine’sresilienceamidRussia’sfull-scaleinvasion, highlightingthewaysinwhichempoweredlocalgovernmentshaveunderpinnedstatestabilityandwartimegovernance.The wartimeheroismofmayorsandlocalofficialsillustrateshowself-governingcommunitieshavebecomevitalpartnersin defendingUkrainianindependenceHowever,martiallawandtheexigenciesofacentralizedwartimecommandstructurehave profoundlyalteredthebalanceofpowerbetweenKyivandtheregions.Localgovernments,oncesemi-autonomousand confident,nowfacegrowingdependenceonthecentralstateSimultaneously,nationaldefenseimperativeshaveconstrained localfiscalautonomy,exacerbatingthesevereeconomicpressuresenduredbyfrontlinecommunitiesMoreover,martiallaw hascurtailedpoliticalpluralismandempoweredKyivwiththeauthoritytoredrawthecountry’spoliticalmap.AsUkrainefights foritssurvival,thefutureofitsmostcelebratedpost-MaidanreformdecentralizationhangsinthebalanceThispaper exploresthesetensions,assessingtheirimplicationsforUkraine’sgovernance,sovereignty,anddemocraticdevelopment beyondthewar

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

CHRISTINA OH

Christina Oh is currently pursuing her M A in European and Russian Studies at Yale She holds a B A in Linguistics with a Minor in Russian from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill At UNC, Christina conducted extensive counterterrorism research, co-publishing one of the first comprehensive databases of right-wing extremist crime in the United States During her senior year, Christina spent the months following the Russian invasion of Ukraine helping organize the volunteer effort Berlin Central Station, where she translated for refugees using language skills gained through the Critical Language Scholarship program At Yale, Christina plans to research the ethics of modern-day diplomacy between the West and Russia, and the role of state-sponsored propaganda in the Russian consciousness "ExportingRepression:RussianInfluenceCampaignsinMaliandBurkinaFaso" AsRussianinfluenceintheSahelgrows, Africanjournalistshavebeenforcedtocensorthemselvesorriskretaliation The relianceonsocialmediaplatformsovertraditionalnewsmediaintheSahelhasallowedRussiatoshapepublicperception throughstate-fundedmediasuchasRussiaToday, andPrivateMilitaryCompanies (PMCs) havefurthererodedtheinformation ecosystemintheregionAlthoughtheKremlin’sdisinformationcampaignsoutsideofRussiahavegrown, thereislittleanalysis analyzingtheaimsofPMCsdistinctlyfromthatofPutin, andthesocio-historicaltaxonomyoftheRussiandisinformationnetwork inAfricaisstillnotthoroughlyinvestigatedintheliteratureThisstudyaimstodistinguishRussia’sAfricaPolicyfromtheaimsof Russia’sprivatesector, andanalyzehowRussiahasexporteditsdomesticrepressioncapabilitiesintoAfricannationsinthe Sahel.TheresearchstudiesRussia’sdomesticmediarepressionapparatusandutilizesacomparativeanalysisofcurrentRussian mediacampaignsinMaliandNigertoprovideinsightintothedomesticrepressionapparatiexportedtoAfrica, andthenovel waysinwhichjournalismisrepressedinthesenations. Thisanalysiswillprovideanewopportunitytoassesshowthese campaignsareinformedbythedomesticRussianpersecutionsystem.

JONATHAN BACH

Jonathan Bach is the Interim Dean of SUS and professor of global studies in the Global Studies Program, and faculty affiliate in the Anthropology Department at The New School His recent work explores social change through the politics of memory, material culture, and urban space, with an emphasis on transitions in Germany and China He is the author most recently of What Remains: Everyday Encounters with the Socialist Past in Germany (Columbia University Press, 2017), and co-editor of Re-Centring the City: Urban Mutations, Socialist Afterlives, and the Global East (UCL Press, 2020) with Michal Murawski, and co-editor of Learning from Shenzhen: China’s Post-Mao Experiment from Special Zone to Model City (University of Chicago Press, 2017) with Mary Ann O'Donnell and Winnie Wong His articles have appeared, inter alia, in China Perspectives, The British Journal of Sociology, Memory Studies, Cultural Anthropology, Cultural Politics, Public Culture, Theory, Culture and Society, and Philosophy and Social Science His first book Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989 (St Martin’s Press, 1999) examined questions of normalcy and responsibility in Germany during the early years after unification. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University and has held post-doctoral fellowships at Columbia University (ISERP) and Harvard University (Center for European Studies)

PANEL IX: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

VALERIE BROWNE

Valerie Browne graduated from West Virginia University with a double major in English and Russian studies and a minor in political science As an undergraduate, she served as head research assistant for the West Virginia Dialect Project and was an intern Russian translator with Global Wordsmiths’ Language Access Project Her research centers on the sociolinguistics of the post-Soviet space, exploring ways in which conflict and evolving national identities impact language choices in the region Valerie is a two-time recipient of the Critical Language (Russian) Scholarship, participating in programs online and in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan She spent the 2022-2023 academic year in Krakow, Poland, teaching English and volunteering with Ukrainian refugees as a Fulbright English teaching assistant "AccessingNationalBelonginginKazakhstan:RussophoneAlmatyntsyandtheKazakhlanguagelearning movementinthewakeofRussia'sfull-scaleinvasionofUkraine" Russia'sfull-scaleinvasionofUkraineonFebruary24,2022reverberatedthroughouttheworld,butithitveryclosetohomeformanyinthepostSovietspaceandwaskeenlyfeltinKazakhstanduetoacomplexinterplayoftheBloodyJanuaryeventsprecedingRussia'sattackonUkraine, previousRussianthreatstoKazakhstan’sterritorialintegrity, andSoviet-coloniallegacies. Russia'sinvasionwithinthecontextofKazakhstan's recentpoliticalturmoilwasamomentofprofoundrupture,sparkinga"crisis"ofnationalidentitythatledmanyRussophoneurbanitesinAlmatyto endeavortolearnormasterKazakh Employingdatafrom23semi-structuredinterviewswithlocalKazakhlanguagelearners, teachers, and activistsfrom4Kazakhspeakingclubs, IanalyzethewaysinwhichthiscrisisofidentityledtoanincreasingdemandforKazakhcontentamong RussophoneKazakhcitizensinAlmaty HighlightingtheroleofKazakhspeakingclubsasapowerfullocusforfulfillingthedemandto "feel Kazakh" , IexplorethewaysinwhichRussophoneKazakhcitizens, regardlessoftheirethnicity, areturningtotheKazakhlanguagefornational self-definitioninwaysthatdestabilizepreviouslyexistingethnicandcivicdichotomies(KazakhvsKazakhstani)

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

Tanya (Tetiana) Kotelnykova is currently pursuing an MA in Russian, East European, & Eurasian Studies at Yale University. She holds an M A in Human Rights from Columbia University and a B A in Law from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Tanya's journey began when she was displaced from her home in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 due to the Donbas occupation. In 2022, she was in Kyiv during the city's encirclement by Russian forces and witnessed the full-scale invasion of Ukraine Tanya is the founder of Brave Generation, a non-profit organization based in NYC, dedicated to uniting and empowering young Ukrainians for post-war reconstruction Additionally, Tanya serves as a project coordinator at the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom, where her role involves enhancing democracy promotion workshops, and the Nemtsov forum as well as overseeing the management of the scholarships related to Ukrainian students Also, Tanya manages the “Ideas for Russia” project, exploring Russia in the era of non-transparency and isolation

DAVID CAMERON

David R Cameron is a Professor of Political Science at Yale and the Director of the Yale Program in European Union Studies He received his B A from Williams College, an M B A from Dartmouth, an M Sc from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and his Ph.D. from The University of Michigan. He teaches courses on European politics and the European Union

He has written about the impact of trade openness on government and, with respect to the EU, the operation of the European Monetary System, the negotiation of the Treaty on European Union, Economic and Monetary Union, the eurozone crisis, the creation of democratic polities and market-oriented economies in central and eastern Europe, the crisis in Ukraine and, most recently, Brexit

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

MIKE YORK

Mike York is pursuing an M.A. in European and Russian Studies at Yale University. He earned a B.A. in History from Southwestern University in 2011 and an M A in History from Yale in 2017 Mike retired from the United States Army in 2023, where he deployed in the Infantry, Air Defense Artillery, and as a Civil Affairs officer in Special Operations He served as a civil-military liaison with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and has experience coordinating with humanitarian and non-governmental relief organizations. He is interested in the successes and failures of traditional civil society institutions within the context of mass radicalization in interwar Europe, especially the mechanics of societal transformation in Germany Mike is also interested in the reception of refugees and statelessness, as well as violent extremism, the growing appeal of illiberalism, and the war in Ukraine.

ANDREI KUREICHYK

Andrei Kureichik, a Belarusian dissident and writer in exile known for his opposition to the authoritarian regime in Belarus, will be engaging in a dialogue and discourse centered around Ales Bialiatsky, a prominent Belarusian political prisoner and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize 2022 Bialiatsky is currently being detained by the regime of President Lukashenko in a facility with the highest levels of security. In many nations, the defense of human rights transcends mere activism and instead presents a formidable obstacle to the oppressive machinery of the totalitarian regime Belarus and Russia serve as illustrative instances In this discussion, the focus will be on individuals who actively advocate for the protection and promotion of human rights. This discussion pertains to the establishment of the human rights center “Viasna” in Belarus by Ales Bialiatsky, as well as the human rights society “Memorial” in Russia, which has also been recognized with a Nobel Prize 2022

Papers by Panels

PANEL I: Echoes of War: Examining the Impacts of Violent Conflict in Eurasia

Chair: Oliver Wolyniec (Yale University)

Faculty Discussant: Prof. David Simon (Yale University)

Rowan Baker (Yale University)

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

Paradise

Rowan Baker (Yale University)

A palm gently swayed in the oceanside breeze, which carried the faintest scent of citrus and eucalyptus. Her bedroom window overlooked the Black Sea coastline, as she sat in the cool, freshly furnished apartment of walnut wood and oak. “Abkhazia is the most beautiful place. It is like Europe. The palm trees and the sea. The fresh fruit It’s paradise ” Eko smiled softly, attentively yet gently looking at a photograph of the Sukhum/i from the 1980’s as she recalled her childhood before the war (Figure 1). Gradually, she trailed off in her words, and her interlude into her childhood bedroom stopped. She paused for ten seconds, her face tensed with anger, and still examining the photograph, “But it was stolen from us It was our territory, and they took it all away. It isn’t the Abkhazians They aren’t from there Abkhazia is

Georgia’s” (1). She had now returned to our conversation in a small courtyard café under the Tbilisi summer sun and hot mountain air. While Eko had lived in Tbilisi for over 30 years, she could never see herself as anyone but a Suhkumchanka (woman from Sukhum/i), “You live in a place, but it is a place that is not yours.” In what context did Eko’s conviction that where she lives is “not hers” come about?

Eko’s connection to the “paradise” of Abkhazia following the 1992–1993 Georgia-Abkhazia War was common among the Georgian-Megrelians displaced from Sukhum/i that I interviewed (2). The sight of the palm trees, the smell of eucalyptus and citrus and the resort buildings reminiscent of “Europe” wove together the histories

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

Rowan

Baker (Yale University)

of “homeland.” She could vividly recall her childhood playing along the stoney sand of the Black Sea, and her mother’s childhood garden in Ochamchire/a, Abkhazia, just 53 kilometers south of Suhkhum/i She could even piece together what she believed her grandmother’s life had been, somewhere between the citrus plantations and the kitchen. However, she could not project her histories before the 1930’s, “I think my great grandmother was from Western Georgia, just north of Zugdidi…” another pause, followed by a quick response to her own words, “But it is all Georgia’s anyway. Abkhazia can only be Georgia. So, it doesn’t matter.”

But just as easily as Eko could recount her positive memories of home, as well as the histories of “homeland” that she herself did not experience, she could pinpoint the pain of her displacement from Abkhazia. She accounted the confusion of her weeks long march from Sukhum/i with her mother and grandmother through the winter mountains of Svaneti, as she observed the others “sleeping” alongside the road. She described the sadness of the remainder of her childhood in displacement, first in Zugdidi, then in Tbilisi, as it was engulfed by her grandmother’s wails for her home and for return, by the blackness of her grandmother’s widowers’ clothes, by the deafening silence of her mother, and by the taunts of her classmates as to her identity of being a refugee.

Despite the weight of her stories, instead of immersing herself in her memories as with her description of Sukhum/i, she distanced herself from her status as the displaced, and from her negative experiences through the consistent use of “you.” Her living memories of herself, her mother, and her grandmother among the palm trees and the citrus plantations. Her experience as the settler in Western Georgia and then in Tbilisi, and as someone displaced from Abkhazia, were instead superimposed onto the “settler” of the Abkhaz, “It is our [Georgians’] homeland They are not from here [Abkhazia] ”

Paradise Lost

Contrary to Eko, Adgur, an Abkhazian living in Sukhum/i, could no longer see Abkhazia, or Sukhum/i, as a paradise (Figure 2) (3). While he could recount his childhood bug collection 40 kilometers northeast of Sukhumi at his grandmother’s home near Gudauta, and his youth among the walnut and oak trees, his memories as a young adult in Sukhum/i during the war, and the ensuing environmental and subsequent cultural destruction permeated his accounts of life, and his memories, in Sukhum/i, “Our palm trees are dying,

3 What is recognized as present-day Abkhazians are composed of numerous people groups and religions, with ethnicities within the territory including but not limited to Greeks, Armenians, Estonians, Africans and other Circassian peoples To protect the identity of those I interviewed who do not identify as ethnically Abkhaz, given that their respective populations in Abkhazia were drastically reduced during the war from displacement, I will use the term Abkhazian to describe any interviewee that is currently based in Abkhazia

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

Rowan Baker (Yale University)

and you can no longer smell the sweet oils of the eucalyptus. Our culture is no longer accessible to us.”

Over the span of three decades, he described Sukhum/i’s transformation from a paradise to a paradise lost to war, and then in steady decline from isolation. The onslaught that war brought left the resort buildings burned and in ruin. The sound of the constant fighting and bombing displaced coastal wildlife like dolphins and seabirds from the shores. And the isolation of Abkhazia from the rest of the world system as a separatist state led to massive deforestation in the region’s forests, like those of his childhood, to sustain the local economy after the downfall of the tourist economy. But unlike Eko, Adgur told his story in a linear progression one in which Abkhazia was a paradise of palms and eucalyptus, walnuts and oaks, dolphins and seabirds. This paradise was itself then changed from the war the resorts to disappearing in ash, the dolphins and seabirds to far shores of the Black Sea, the timber exported to Türkiye, and the Abkhazian’s that remained displaced from the only Sukhum/i, the only environment, and only culture they themselves had ever experienced.

These memories and experiences then culminated in the present tense experience of Abkhazians in which their region remained isolated from the rest of the world due to “the mythical idea of Georgian territorial integrity,” and as a result, projected into the future the histories of this decline. Even the downfall of the palm trees and the citrus groves were ultimately felt as an afront to Abkhazians by Georgians, “We now have the palm weevil and that bug [Brown Marmorated Stink Bug]. They are killing our trees [palms and citrus] They [Georgians] do not realize how they have made Abkhazia suffer They killed us, and then they killed our trees We have lost everything What do we have left?” Despite their differences, Adgur and Eko shared a similar lapse in their historical memory: he could not fully account for his family’s histories before the 1930’s. He did, however, draw his connections to the natural environment to his projected memories of village, “The trees have been there for hundreds of years. And my family has been there with them.”

Plantations

Her stories muffled by cracks of thunder, roaring rain, and the rush of water gushing through the streets of Zugdidi, Nino described her life crossing the Engur/i river, and the border of Abkhazia and Georgia, from Gal/i, to Zugdidi, and back again. Growing up isolated from both capitals two hours southeast of Sukhum/i and six hours northwest of Tbilisi, her understanding of Abkhazia and Western Georgia was not that of a paradise, or a paradise lost She did not connect her memories of herself, of the histories of her family, or of her culture to palms or the sea. Instead, her stories intertwined with that of her family’s farm in Gal/i, and her family’s small room in an abandoned schoolhouse in Zugdidi following the war, “In Zugdidi we had no light. No electricity. And we shared our home with 40 other people. … I don’t

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

Rowan

Baker (Yale University)

understand why we are fighting. It is Georgia … ” looking out at the rain, she took a breath, and resumed, “But when we felt it was safe for Georgians to return, we would go at night across the border We would go back to our home in Gal/i ” She vividly described the shade of the cornstalks, the fresh smell of mandarins, and the constant clucking of chickens (Figure 3). However, much like Eko and Adgur, she could not recall her family histories before the 1930’s, “My parents are still there. My grandparents are from there. But before that, I don’t think it matters.”

But Nino also explained the inaccessibility of being able to return to Abkhazia with her children as an adult Crossing the Engur/i river is a double threat for those who make their lives between Georgia and Abkhazia specifically from getting caught by border guards, or from drowning, “I understand now that what we did when I was younger was very dangerous. I won’t put my children through that ” But seeing her parents is worth the personal cost, “I go back for them [her parents] of course. They won’t leave our farm or our house. There are too many memories there for them.”

Much like Adgur, her stories were linear. There was no displacement of time as Nino spoke There was no overt assertion as to what land had been taken and by whom But there were three constants in how Nino viewed the Abkhazia of the past and the Abkhazia of the future Firstly, that while her family had lived in Abkhazia from at least the 1930’s, her concerns were not as concentrated in projecting histories beyond the living memory of her parents. For Nino, the region to her and her family, and her memories of home, were based on understandings of village life and agricultural production. In this respect, Gal/i and Zugdidi were nearly identical, and while she may have been displaced by the war, there were no major changes in the natural environment for her, her children, or her family. And finally, that she did not feel the strong desire to return as Eko She viewed the region, both Gal/i and Zugdidi, as homeland, and did not project return to Gal/i into her children’s future.

Between Palms and Plantations

The histories of Eko, Adgur, and Nino demonstrate their markedly different understandings of the history of Abkhazia They all disagreed with their temporal understanding of Abkhazia and what it represents

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA

AND ABKHAZIA

Rowan Baker (Yale University)

today. Eko understands Abkhazia as a continued paradise, while Adgur views Abkhazia as a paradise only in distant memory Meanwhile, Nino’s view of Abkhazia was one not of paradise at all, rather a region in which agriculture was a feature of everyday life They also converged in how they viewed Georgians or Abkhazian’s respectively. For Eko and Adgur, they view their respective “other” as an unwanted settler of Abkhazia who has taken away their land and culture. Meanwhile, they assert their claims as rightfully indigenous to Abkhazia.

Critically, Eko, Adgur and Nino could not recall their family histories beyond the 1930’s, and all connected their identities to the natural world. Eko and Nino to the non-native species of Abkhazia—the palms and the citrus plantations respectively. Adgur, meanwhile, also connected his identity to nature, but in his case, it was not just an environment for which he was concerned, but also one of native species such as the walnut and the oak. While Eko did connect her memories of home to the walnut – albeit through the furniture of the home she left behind she and Nino instead conceptualized the symbols of their homeland as non-native palms, eucalyptus, citrus, and farmland introduced to Abkhazia by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union only a century ago Their resorts Their palms Their furniture Their plantations

‘SIGNING YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO

YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

‘SIGNING YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

Introduction

Wartime collaborators occupy an inherently paradoxical position, representing an enemy that also internal to the nation It is this paradox, and its ramifications for national identity, which I explore in this paper

Wartime collaborators occupy an inherently paradoxical position, representing an enemy that is also internal to the nation. It is this paradox, and its ramifications for national identity, which I explore in this paper.

The origins of the ‘collaboration’ perhaps surprisingly, fairly recent. Indeed, it only acquired its contemporary meaning, of working with an during the Second World War, when it came be used in reference Vichy France (1). However, the has in ambiguity, with little consensus on the extent of intent implied in its usage or on its connection to the related concept of treason (2) It is, nevertheless, possible to isolate two characteristics of actions most frequently considered to constitute collaboration: firstly, cooperation with an enemy of one’s country; secondly, such actions are carried under occupation (3).

The origins of the term ‘collaboration’ are, perhaps surprisingly, fairly recent Indeed, it only acquired its contemporary meaning, of working with an enemy, during the Second World War, when it came to be used in reference to Vichy France (1). However, the term has remained mired in ambiguity, with little consensus on the extent of intent implied in its usage or on its connection to the related concept of treason (2). It is, nevertheless, possible to isolate two characteristics of actions most frequently considered to constitute collaboration: firstly, cooperation with an enemy of one’s country; secondly, such actions are carried out under occupation (3)

In case of Ukraine, within weeks of Russia’s invasion in 2022, Ukrainian government laws specifically criminalising collaboration: Articles 111-1 and 111-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine While a legal discussion of these developments is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that by the two-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion, the Security Service of Ukraine reported over 8,000 against alleged collaborators registered in Ukrainian (5).

In the case of Ukraine, within weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian government passed laws specifically criminalising collaboration: Articles 111-1 and 111-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. While a legal discussion of these developments is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that by the two-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion, the Security Service of Ukraine reported over 8,000 cases against alleged collaborators registered in Ukrainian courts (5)

President Volodymyr Zelenskyi has long relied on digital means to disseminate his political stances and to speak directly to Ukrainian audiences (6). Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Zelenskyi has published online addresses daily and occasionally more than once daily—to the Ukrainian people on social media and the presidential website. In these videos, Zelenskyi outlines the most pressing issues of the day for the Ukrainian state, including developments in legislation, personnel changes, the status of hostilities and the impact of Russian attacks on Ukraine

Volodymyr Zelenskyi relied on digital means disseminate political stances and to speak directly to Ukrainian audiences (6) Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Zelenskyi has published online addresses daily and occasionally more than once daily—to the Ukrainian people on social media and the presidential website. In these videos, Zelenskyi outlines the most pressing issues of the day for the Ukrainian including developments in legislation, personnel changes, the of hostilities and the impact of Russian attacks on Ukraine.

In forty-six of these addresses delivered in the first two years of the full-scale invasion, he specifically touches upon collaborators. In the same time frame, he made a further eight speeches published on his administration’s website that mention collaborators in contexts other than these daily addresses. However,

In forty-six of these addresses in the first two years of the full-scale invasion, he specifically touches upon collaborators In the same time frame, he made a further eight speeches published on his administration’s website that mention collaborators in contexts other than these daily addresses. However,

1 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Shche potribno borotys’ i zavdati vorohu maksymal’noï shkody na vsikh napriamkakh oborony – zvernennia Prezydenta Ukraïny’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 13 March 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/she-potribno-borotis-i-zavdati-vorogu-maksimalnoyi-shkodi-na-73529>, [accessed December 2023]

>, [accessed 28 December 2023]

2 Jan T Gross, ‘Themes for a Social History of War Experience and Collaboration’, in The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath, ed by István Deák, Jan T Gross and Tony Judt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p 24

3 States’ of apparent even immediate aftermath of the Second themselves in of

3 States’ differing interpretations of collaboration were apparent even in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, when they manifested themselves in varying degrees of prosecution

4 Examples of this common framing of collaboration include philosopher Avishai Margalit, On Betrayal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), p 197, and historian Philip Morgan, Hitler’s Collaborators Choosing Between Bad and Worse in Nazi-Occupied Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 1

4 Examples of this common framing of collaboration include philosopher Avishai Margalit, On Betrayal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 2017), p 197, and historian Morgan, Hitler’s Collaborators Choosing Between Bad and Worse in Nazi-Occupied Western Europe Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 1

5 Shaun Walker, ‘Jailed as Collaborators: the Stories of Ukrainians Who Ended Up in Prison’, The Guardian, 2 February 2024 <https://www theguardian com/world/2024/feb/02/jailed-as-collaborators-the-stories-of-ukrainians-who-ended-up-in-prison> [accessed 20 February 2024]

5 Shaun Walker, Collaborators: of Who Up in Prison’, Guardian, February 2024 theguardian com/world/2024/feb/02/jailed-as-collaborators-the-stories-of-ukrainians-who-ended-up-in-prison> [accessed 20 February 2024]

6 See, for instance, Joanna Hosa and Andrew Wilson, ‘Zelensky Unchained: What Ukraine’s New Political Order Means for its Future’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 1 September 2019 <https://www jstor org/stable/resrep21659>, [accessed 12 January 2024], p 2

6 for instance, Hosa and Andrew Unchained: What New Political for Future’, European on Relations, 1 September 2019 <https://www jstor org/stable/resrep21659>, [accessed 12 January 2024], p 2

‘SIGNING YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

the frequency of Zelenskyi’s allusions to traitors varies over time, with the peak arriving in April 2022, when collaborators were mentioned in seven speeches, perhaps with the de-occupation of northern Ukrainian territories and discovery mass human rights violations, such as in Bucha (7) As well as that, the speeches present dynamic variations in the depiction of collaborators, particularly in regard to their relation to the external enemy itself, the Russian military.

the frequency of Zelenskyi’s allusions to traitors varies over time, with the peak arriving in April 2022, when collaborators were mentioned in seven speeches, perhaps in connection with the de-occupation of northern Ukrainian territories and the ensuing discovery of mass human rights violations, such as in Bucha (7). As well as that, the speeches present dynamic variations in the depiction of collaborators, particularly in regard to their relation to the external enemy itself, the Russian military.

this paper, I conduct a thematic discourse analysis of Zelenskyi’s speeches that mention collaborators from the first two of the full-scale invasion, from 24 February 2022 to 23 February 2024, in order to gain insight into rhetorical patterns of official on the subject, and how they vary over time.

In this paper, I conduct a thematic discourse analysis of Zelenskyi’s speeches that mention collaborators from the first two years of the full-scale invasion, from 24 February 2022 to 23 February 2024, in order to gain insight into rhetorical patterns of official discourse on the subject, and how they vary over time.

Collaborators and the Enemy: A Discourse Analysis

President Zelenskyi frequently equates the enemy and collaborators in his speeches in the period under study, which is reflected his numerous simultaneous references to Russian military personnel and traitors. The many examples include mentions of ‘countering enemy operations and collaborators’ (8), ‘Russian soldiers, mercenaries and collaborators’ (9), ‘the sabotage activities of Russia and collaborators’ (10), and ‘everything that occupiers and collaborators have done in our Ukrainian land’ (11). Zelenskyi occasionally makes the equation of collaborators and the Russian military explicit, such as his parallel of them on 19 September 2022, when he first states that ‘the Russian military in Ukraine has only two options: escape from our land or be captured’ (12), before adding that ‘collaborators similar options’ (13). A comparable sentiment apparent in that ‘for those Russian soldiers, mercenaries and collaborators who were abandoned in Kherson and other cities of the south [ ] Voluntarily becoming a Ukrainian prisoner is the only option for all occupiers’ (14) In this framework, collaborators are also, notably, occupiers. Zelenskyi thus appears to blur any boundary between invading Ukraine and Ukrainians who betray the interests of Ukraine, hinting at an exclusion of the latter from the national community.

President Zelenskyi frequently equates the enemy and collaborators in his speeches in the period under study, which is reflected in his numerous simultaneous references to Russian military personnel and perceived traitors. The many examples include mentions of ‘countering enemy operations and collaborators’ (8), ‘Russian soldiers, mercenaries and collaborators’ (9), ‘the sabotage activities of Russia and collaborators’ (10), and ‘everything that occupiers and collaborators have done in our Ukrainian land’ (11). Zelenskyi occasionally makes the equation of collaborators and the Russian military explicit, such as in his parallel treatment of them on 19 September 2022, when he first states that ‘the Russian military in Ukraine has only two options: escape from our land or be captured’ (12), before adding that ‘collaborators have similar options’ (13). A comparable sentiment is also apparent in his statement that ‘for those Russian soldiers, mercenaries and collaborators who were abandoned in Kherson and other cities of the south. […] Voluntarily becoming a Ukrainian prisoner is the only option for all occupiers’ (14). In this framework, collaborators are also, notably, occupiers. Zelenskyi thus appears to blur any boundary between Russians invading Ukraine and Ukrainians who betray the interests of Ukraine, hinting at an exclusion of the latter from the national community

7 For more detail on the aftermath of the Russian occupation of Bucha see, for example, ‘Ukraine: Russian Forces’ Trail of Death in Bucha’, Human Rights Watch, 21 April 2022 <https://www hrw org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha>

8 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Ukraïna dopovniuie svoïmy sanktsiamy mizhnarodni sanktsiini mekhanizmy – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 23 November 2023 <https://www president gov ua/news/ukrayina-dopovnyuye-svoyimi-sankciyami-mizhnarodni-sankcijni-87229> [accessed 29 December 2023]

9 ‘S’ohodni istorychnyi

8 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Ukraïna dopovniuie svoïmy sanktsiamy mizhnarodni sanktsiini mekhanizmy zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 23 November 2023 <https://www president ua/news/ukrayina-dopovnyuye-svoyimi-sankciyami-mizhnarodni-sankcijni-87229> 29 December

zvernennia Prezydenta Ukraïny’, President of Ukraine 11 November 2022 president gov ua/news/sogodni-istorichnij-den-mi-povertayemo-herson-zvernennya-pre-79101>

9 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘S’ohodni istorychnyi den’, my povertaiemo Kherson – zvernennia Prezydenta Ukraïny’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 11 November 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/sogodni-istorichnij-den-mi-povertayemo-herson-zvernennya-pre-79101> [accessed 29 December 2023]

10 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Tsymy dniamy rosiys’ki vtraty spravdi vrazhaiut’, i same taki vtraty okupanta protibni Ukraïni – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 20 October 2023 <https://www president gov ua/news/cimi-dnyami-rosijski-vtrati-spravdi-vrazhayut-i-same-taki-vt-86493> [accessed 29 December 2023]

Volodymyr syspil’stvo

11 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Ukraïns’ke syspil’stvo ochikuie spravedlyvosti – Hlava derzhavy pid chas uchasti v urochystomu zasidanni Plenumu Verkhovnoho Sudu’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 15 December 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/ukrayinske-suspilstvo-ochikuye-spravedlivosti-glava-derzhavi-79893> [accessed 29 December 2023]

Hlava pid chas uchasti v zasidanni Plenumu of Ukraine Official Website, 15 December 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/ukrayinske-suspilstvo-ochikuye-spravedlivosti-glava-derzhavi-79893> [accessed 29 December 2023]

12 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Temp nadannia partneramy dopomohy Ukraïni maie vidpovidaty tempu nashoho rukhu – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 19 September 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/temp-nadannya-partnerami-dopomogi-ukrayini-maye-vidpovidati-77869> [accessed 28 December 2023]

Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Temp nadannia partneramy Ukraïni maie nashoho rukhu – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Website, 19 [accessed 28 December 2023]

13 Ibid

14 Zelenskyi, ‘S’ohodni istorychnyi den”, 11 November 2022

‘SIGNING

YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

The broad equation of the enemy and collaborators is additionally reflected in Zelenskyi’s statements regarding bringing collaborators to where they consistently suggested merit the same degree punishment as of the Russian He frequently that both Russian soldiers and collaborators will be held accountable, using parallel phrasing, such as his declaration on 13 March 2022 of ‘let the occupiers know, let all the collaborators who they find know, Ukraine will not forgive them

Anyone. For anything’ (15). In this framing, collaborators are positioned as existing outside of the Ukrainian collective; a positioning that also apparent Zelenskyi’s use of the first-person plural ‘we’ to speak on behalf of the nation in his remark that ‘we will identify, find and bring to justice every war and (16). He makes the opposition of and collaborators more explicit still by comparing traitors to artillery and projectiles on 17 July 2022, stating that while it is to count the number of such weapons used against Ukrainians, ‘it is definitely possible to bring all Russian war criminals to justice. Each of the collaborators’ (17). Zelenskyi therefore conveys that collaborators the same punishment as war criminals and soldiers, implying that the damage they have done to Ukraine comparable.

The broad equation of the enemy and collaborators is additionally reflected in Zelenskyi’s statements regarding bringing collaborators to justice, where they are consistently suggested to merit the same degree of punishment as members of the Russian military. He frequently specifies that both Russian soldiers and collaborators will be held accountable, using parallel phrasing, such as his declaration on 13 March 2022 of ‘let the occupiers know, let all the collaborators who they find know, Ukraine will not forgive them. Anyone. For anything’ (15). In this framing, collaborators are positioned as existing outside of the Ukrainian collective; a positioning that is also apparent in Zelenskyi’s use of the first-person plural ‘we’ to speak on behalf of the nation in his remark that ‘we will identify, find and bring to justice every war criminal and collaborator’ (16). He makes the opposition of Ukrainians and collaborators more explicit still by comparing traitors to artillery and projectiles on 17 July 2022, stating that while it is impossible to count the number of such weapons used against Ukrainians, ‘it is definitely possible to bring all Russian war criminals to justice. Each of the collaborators’ (17). Zelenskyi therefore conveys that collaborators merit the same punishment as war criminals and soldiers, implying that the damage they have done to Ukraine is comparable

His emphasis on equating collaborators and the Russian military is further underscored when on 13 March 2022 he addresses collaborators directly, casting them as invaders: Zelenskyi declares that by collaborating with Russia, ‘You are signing your own sentence (‘vyrok’)’ (18), which he underlines by directly comparing the fate of collaborators to deceased Russian soldiers, stating that the former are ‘following in the footsteps of more than 12,000 occupiers who failed to realise in time why Ukraine should not be invaded’ (19), in reference to estimates of the number of Russian soldiers killed at that time (20). As such, collaborators as a collective become almost indistinguishable from Russian servicemen, calling into question the extent to which they continue to be perceived as belonging to the Ukrainian nation.

His on equating collaborators and the Russian is further underscored when on 13 March 2022 he addresses collaborators directly, casting them as invaders: Zelenskyi declares that by collaborating with Russia, ‘You are signing your own sentence (‘vyrok’)’ (18), which he underlines by directly comparing the fate of collaborators to deceased Russian soldiers, stating that the former are ‘following the footsteps of more than 12,000 who failed to realise in time why Ukraine not be invaded’ (19), in reference to estimates of the number of Russian killed at that time (20) As such, collaborators as a collective become almost indistinguishable from Russian servicemen, calling into question the extent to which they continue to be perceived as belonging to the Ukrainian nation.

At times, however, Zelenskyi’s discourse offers a different perspective on collaborators’ relationship to the enemy, depicting them as pawns of Russia that lack agency. For example, after the Russian military withdrew from parts of the Kharkiv region in 2022, Zelenskyi declares that Russia was ‘leaving everything behind: its positions, weapons, soldiers and collaborators’ (21). By enumerating collaborators as just one of the items abandoned by Russia, Zelenskyi underscores that both Russian soldiers and

At times, however, Zelenskyi’s discourse offers different perspective on collaborators’ relationship to the enemy, them as pawns of Russia that lack agency. For example, the Russian military from parts of the Kharkiv region in 2022, Zelenskyi declares that Russia was ‘leaving everything behind: its positions, weapons, soldiers and collaborators’ (21) By enumerating collaborators as just one of the items abandoned by Russia, Zelenskyi underscores that both Russian soldiers and

15 Zelenskyi, ‘Shche potribno borotys”, 13 March 2022

> [accessed 28 December 2023]

17 Zelenskyi, Volodymyr, ‘Diï ta bezdiial’nist’ kozhnoï posadovoï osoby v sektori bezpeky i v pravookhoronnykh orhanakh budut’ otsineni – zvernennia Prezydenta Ukraïny’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 17 July 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/diyi-ta-bezdiyalnist-kozhnoyi-posadovoyi-osobi-v-sektori-bez-76529> [accessed 29 December 2023]

16 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Vil’nyi svit maie pravo na samozakhyst i same tomu bude dopomahaty Ukraïni shche bil’she – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 26 April 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/vilnij-svit-maye-pravo-na-samozahist-i-same-tomu-bude-dopoma-74593> [accessed 28 2023] Zelenskyi, ‘Diï ta bezdiial’nist’ kozhnoï osoby bezpeky v pravookhoronnykh orhanakh otsineni – Ukraïny’, Ukraine Official Website, 17 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/diyi-ta-bezdiyalnist-kozhnoyi-posadovoyi-osobi-v-sektori-bez-76529> [accessed 29 December 2023]

18 Zelenskyi, ‘Shche potribno borotys”, 13 March 2022

18 ‘Shche 13 March 2022

19 Ibid

20 See, for example, Reuters’ reporting on Ukrainian estimates of over 11,000 Russian troops killed by 6 March 2022: <https://www reuters com/world/europe/ukraine-says-over11000-russian-troops-killed-war-2022-03-06/>

19 example, on Ukrainian estimates of over troops by March com/world/europe/ukraine-says-over11000-russian-troops-killed-war-2022-03-06/>

21 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Vystup Prezydenta zi shchorichnym Poslanniam do Verkhovnoï Rady pro vnutrishnie i zovnishnie stanovyshche Ukraïny’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 28 December 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/vistup-prezidenta-zi-shorichnim-poslannyam-do-verhovnoyi-rad-80113> [accessed 29 December 2023]

21 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Vystup Prezydenta zi shchorichnym Poslanniam do Verkhovnoï Rady pro vnutrishnie i zovnishnie stanovyshche Ukraïny’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 28 December 2022 president gov ua/news/vistup-prezidenta-zi-shorichnim-poslannyam-do-verhovnoyi-rad-80113> 29 December

‘SIGNING

YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

Ukrainian collaborators are only as as weapons or military positions. Likewise, on 13 September 2022, Zelenskyi that in de-occupied of Ukraine, ‘Remnants of the occupiers sabotage groups are being detected, collaborators are being detained, and is being restored’ (22) In this framework, collaborators appear to be no more than ‘remnants’ of Russian occupation, rather than autonomous individuals In this way, Zelenskyi emphasises perceived traitors’ exploitation by Russia, implying that their betrayal is not one borne of collaborators’ firmly held beliefs or even their own initiative but, rather, a product of the Russian war machine.

Ukrainian collaborators are only as autonomous as weapons or military positions Likewise, on 13 September 2022, Zelenskyi announces that in de-occupied parts of Ukraine, ‘Remnants of the occupiers and sabotage groups are being detected, collaborators are being detained, and full security is being restored’ (22). In this framework, collaborators appear to be no more than ‘remnants’ of Russian occupation, rather than autonomous individuals. In this way, Zelenskyi emphasises perceived traitors’ exploitation by Russia, implying that their betrayal is not one borne of collaborators’ firmly held beliefs or even their own initiative but, rather, a product of the Russian war machine

In addition, President Zelenskyi occasionally presents collaborators as belonging to Russia, referring to them as ‘their[Russia’s] collaborators’ (23), thereby minimising their relevance for the Ukrainian nation by positioning them outside of it. As a result, while Zelenskyi recognises the existence of collaborators in these statements, he at the same time casts traitors as posing only a limited threat to Ukrainian identity and nationhood, by hinting that they are no more than pawns used by Russia The threat that they pose is, in this formulation, merely material, rather than existential

In addition, President Zelenskyi occasionally presents collaborators as belonging Russia, referring to them as ‘their[Russia’s] collaborators’ (23), thereby minimising their relevance for the Ukrainian nation by positioning them outside of it As a result, while Zelenskyi recognises the existence of collaborators in these statements, he at the same time casts traitors as posing only a limited threat to Ukrainian identity and nationhood, by hinting that they are no more than pawns used by Russia. The threat that they pose is, in this formulation, merely material, rather than existential.

The lack of agency of collaborators is further emphasised by the sharp contrast with Zelenskyi’s depiction of civilians loyal to Ukraine living through Russian occupation. His speeches repeatedly highlight the agency of civilians to resist occupying forces, such as when he claims on 19 April 2022, ‘the more principled you are, the more quickly normal life will return’ (24) Central to this emphasis on civilian agency is, importantly, the notion of citizens’ shared responsibility in Ukraine’s war effort; a feature of presidential discourse that Olga Onuch and Henry Hale find to be a fundamental component of Zelenskyi’s articulation of citizenship (25).

The lack of agency of collaborators is further emphasised by the sharp contrast with Zelenskyi’s depiction of civilians loyal to Ukraine living through Russian occupation. His speeches repeatedly highlight the agency of civilians to resist occupying forces, such as when he claims on 19 April 2022, ‘the more principled you are, the quickly normal life will return’ (24). Central to this emphasis on civilian agency importantly, the notion of citizens’ shared responsibility in Ukraine’s war effort; a feature of presidential that Olga Onuch and Henry find to be a component of Zelenskyi’s articulation of citizenship (25)

Furthermore, his encouragement to civilians to take action against perceived traitors in occupied territories again appears to designate collaborators as existing outside of the nation, such as when on 22 April 2022 he specifically instructs Ukrainians to take action against them, with the imperatives of ‘[i]gnore the Do work them. Do not them. Neutralise (‘Zneshkodzhuite’) collaborators’ (26). therefore simultaneously underlines the agency of loyal civilians, suggesting that a form of justice can be achieved even during wartime, and minimises the perceived threat of collaborators to Ukrainian statehood. In this way, he constructs a dichotomy of collaborators and loyal citizens living under occupation, which both a strict opposition and rather ambiguous, as the grounds for being treated

Furthermore, his encouragement to civilians to take action against perceived traitors in occupied territories once again appears to designate collaborators as existing outside of the nation, such as when on 22 April 2022 he specifically instructs Ukrainians to take action against them, with the imperatives of ‘[i]gnore the occupiers. Do not work with them. Do not help them. Neutralise (‘Zneshkodzhuite’) collaborators’ (26). Zelenskyi therefore simultaneously underlines the agency of loyal civilians, suggesting that a form of justice can be achieved even during wartime, and minimises the perceived threat of collaborators to Ukrainian statehood. In this way, he constructs a dichotomy of collaborators and loyal citizens living under occupation, which is both a strict opposition and rather ambiguous, as the grounds for being treated

29 December 2023]

> [accessed

22 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Razom z nashym viis’kamy ta nashym praporom na deokupovanu terytoriiu zakhodyt’ i zvychaine normal’ne zhyttia – zvernennia Prezydenta Ukraïny’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 13 September 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/razom-z-nashimi-vijskami-ta-nashim-praporom-na-deokupovanu-t-77765> [accessed 2023]

23 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘ZSU krok za krokom prosuvaiut’sia v Khersons’kii oblasti – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 23 July 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/zsu-krok-za-krokom-prosuvayutsya-v-hersonskij-oblasti-zverne-76637> [accessed 29 December 2023] Emphasis my own

24 Zelenskyi, ‘Iakshcho nashi partnery’, 19 April 2022

23 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘ZSU krok za krokom prosuvaiut’sia v Khersons’kii oblasti – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 23 2022 <https://www [accessed 29 December 2023] Emphasis own nashi partnery’, 19 April 2022

25 Onuch and Hale, The Zelensky Effect, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp 248-249

Onuch Hale, Zelensky (New 2023), pp 248-249

26 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Zbroini Syly Ukraïny – tse fundament, na yakomu maie stoiaty fortetsia z nashoï natsional’noï yednosti – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 22 April 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/zbrojni-sili-ukrayini-ce-fundament-na-yakomu-maye-stoyati-fo-74489> [accessed 28 December 2023]

‘SIGNING YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO

YEARS

OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

‘SIGNING YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

as a collaborator are not elucidated

a collaborator are elucidated.

Despite Zelenskyi’s rhetoric the agency of civilians, an increasing tendency viewing collaborators concretely as the enemy can be discerned during the second year of the full-scale war

Namely, Zelenskyi first brings up the specific notion of a ‘fight against collaborators’ on 13 January 2023, after which it becomes a relatively common feature of his addresses to the nation, appearing nine times. Likewise, the framework of ‘protection from collaborators’ only begins to feature in Zelenskyi’s addresses 2023, with speeches to this tending focus on the object of such as ‘our state and in Europe’ (27), ‘our people’ (28), ‘democracy in (29), while the enemy is as being located exclusively in Russians, such as in Zelenskyi’s comment on protection from ‘the aggressive ambitions of Russia’ (30) In this way, the dominant paradigm shifts from focusing on what must be protected, to the persons—including Ukrainian nationals from whom Ukraine must be protected.

Despite Zelenskyi’s rhetoric highlighting the agency of civilians, an increasing tendency towards viewing collaborators concretely as the enemy can be discerned during the second year of the full-scale war. Namely, Zelenskyi first brings up the specific notion of a ‘fight against collaborators’ on 13 January 2023, after which it becomes a relatively common feature of his addresses to the nation, appearing nine times. Likewise, the framework of ‘protection from collaborators’ only begins to feature in Zelenskyi’s addresses in 2023, with speeches prior to this tending to focus on the object of protection, such as ‘our state and freedom in Europe’ (27), ‘our people’ (28), and ‘democracy in Ukraine’ (29), while the enemy is presented as being located exclusively in Russians, such as in Zelenskyi’s comment on protection from ‘the aggressive ambitions of Russia’ (30). In this way, the dominant paradigm shifts from focusing on what must be protected, to the persons—including Ukrainian nationals from whom Ukraine must be protected

Conclusions

Although Zelenskyi’s addresses since the start of the full-scale invasion demonstrate variation in the degree of national belonging afforded to perceived collaborators, at times oscillating between depicting them as an internal enemy and as an enemy indistinguishable from Russian troops, striking patterns can, nonetheless, be discerned. Most notably, Zelenskyi overtly alludes to the exclusion of collaborators from the while highlighting their lack of agency and with heightened agency of loyal citizens Zelenskyi’s therefore hint at the re-articulation of the boundaries of the nation amid the full-scale war, not only through the equation of collaborators and the Russian military, but, perhaps most significantly, through the depiction of collaborators increasingly as an enemy in their own right.

Although Zelenskyi’s addresses since the start of the full-scale invasion demonstrate variation in the degree of national belonging afforded to perceived collaborators, at times oscillating between depicting them as an internal enemy and as an enemy indistinguishable from Russian troops, striking patterns can, nonetheless, be discerned Most notably, Zelenskyi overtly alludes to the exclusion of collaborators from the nation, while highlighting their lack of agency and contrasting it with the heightened agency of loyal citizens. Zelenskyi’s speeches therefore hint at the re-articulation of the boundaries of the nation amid the full-scale war, not only through the equation of collaborators and the Russian military, but, perhaps most significantly, through the depiction of collaborators increasingly as an enemy in their own right.

27 Zelenskyi, ‘Iakshcho nashi partnery’, 19 April 2022

28 Volodymyr Zelenskyi, ‘Lend-liz ta inshi prohramy pidtrymky Ukraïny – tse dokaz, shcho svoboda i nyni umiie zakhyshchatysia vid tyraniï – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, President of Ukraine Official Website, 29 April 2022 <https://www president gov ua/news/lend-liz-ta-inshi-programi-pidtrimki-ukrayini-ce-dokaz-sho-s-74669> [accessed 28 December2023]

27 ‘Iakshcho nashi partnery’, 19 April 2022 inshi prohramy pidtrymky Ukraïny dokaz, i nyni umiie zakhyshchatysia tyraniï – zvernennia Prezydenta Volodymyra Zelens’koho’, of Ukraine Website, 2022 ua/news/lend-liz-ta-inshi-programi-pidtrimki-ukrayini-ce-dokaz-sho-s-74669> [accessed 28 December2023]

29 Zelenskyi, ‘My zviln’nymo zemliu i liudei’, 11 May 2022

30 Zelenskyi, ‘Vil’nyi svit maie pravo’, 26 April 2022

30 ‘Vil’nyi svit maie pravo’, 26 2022

Papers by Panels

PANEL II: Anti(Imperializing) Modernity in Late Imperial Russia

Chair: Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

Faculty Discussant: Prof. Sergei Antonov (Yale University)

Mariana Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Roman Osharov (Oxford University)

Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

SERFS

AS INTELLECTUALS

AND

SOCIAL

CRITICS: FREEDOM,

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM,

EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

Mariana Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Introduction

After decades of debates and disagreements during the Great Reform era over how to resolve the “Peasant Question,” it was revealed in 1856 that Alexander II intended to pursue the abolition of serfdom. How the emancipation of serfdom would take place and which conditions for freed serfs would follow topics debated on for the following four years, before a general consensus among nobles was reached, and the statutes enforced in 1861 changed Russian history forever The emancipation of the serfs in marked a significant turning point in Russian history for individuals of all soslovii Whether met with gratitude, disbelief or outrage by newly freed serfs, one thing was clear: suddenly, millions of peasants would begin a transition into society.

After decades of debates and disagreements during the Great Reform era over how to resolve the “Peasant Question,” it was revealed in 1856 that Alexander II intended to pursue the abolition of serfdom. How the emancipation of serfdom would take place and which conditions for freed serfs would follow were topics debated on for the following four years, before a general consensus among nobles was reached, and the statutes enforced in 1861 changed Russian history forever. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 marked a significant turning point in Russian history for individuals of all soslovii. Whether met with gratitude, disbelief or outrage by newly freed serfs, one thing was clear: suddenly, millions of peasants would begin a transition into society.

Scholars have largely examined emancipation from an elite-centric perspective. They have analyzed the and ideas of elite Russian officials and how of emancipation played out on the ground For example, Terrence Emmons analyzed the role of the gentry in shaping emancipation. He argued that the Tsarist regime, seeking to curry their favour, gave the gentry a preferential voice in local rural government and that, ultimately, gentry maintained their privileged position in post-emancipation society. Daniel Field investigated the historical evolution of the to end serfdom, focusing particularly on elite Russian officials and the gentry. Finally, Peter Kolchin explored the debates and conditions surrounding emancipation in comparative perspective with the United States

Scholars have largely examined emancipation from an elite-centric perspective. They have analyzed the plans and ideas of elite Russian officials and how policies of emancipation played out on the ground. For example, Terrence Emmons analyzed the role of the gentry in shaping emancipation. He argued that the Tsarist regime, seeking to curry their favour, gave the gentry a preferential voice in local rural government and that, ultimately, gentry maintained their privileged position in post-emancipation society. Daniel Field investigated the historical evolution of the commitment to end serfdom, focusing particularly on elite Russian officials and the gentry. Finally, Peter Kolchin explored the debates and conditions surrounding emancipation in comparative perspective with the United States.

This paper takes a different approach from these scholars, one which instead centers serf voices and perspectives on emancipation. It uses two serf memoirs from the pre-emancipation period to explore how serfs understood and envisioned freedom and emancipation The paper argues that serf visions of freedom differed sharply from those of elite Russian officials. While Russian officials envisioned emancipation as a top-down project of social engineering that sought to keep former serfs as peasant producers, serf

This paper takes a different approach from these scholars, one which instead centers serf voices and perspectives on emancipation. uses two serf memoirs from the pre-emancipation period to explore how serfs understood and envisioned freedom and emancipation. The paper argues that serf visions of freedom differed sharply from those of elite Russian officials. While Russian officials envisioned emancipation as a top-down project of social engineering that sought to former serfs as peasant serf

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

Mariana Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

visions of freedom were much more comprehensive Serfs maintained that true freedom required access to education, economic stability, and even the opportunity to pursue one’s goals In making this argument, the paper hopes to bolster our understanding of emancipation and the great reform through an analysis of the hopes and dreams of pre-emancipation era serfs, through the experiences of those it impacted the most. Equally important, the paper seeks to recast the place of serfs in narratives of emancipation: far from passive actors, serfs possessed intricate political imaginaries and developed new ideas to meet their needs in a rapidly evolving social context Memoirs provide a particularly opportune source for these kinds of exploration because they give insight into what serfs thought, believed, and hoped for

visions of freedom were much more comprehensive. Serfs maintained that true freedom required access to education, economic stability, and the opportunity to pursue one’s goals. In making this argument, the paper hopes to bolster our understanding of emancipation and the great reform through an analysis of the hopes and dreams of pre-emancipation era serfs, through the experiences of those it the most Equally important, the paper seeks to recast the place of serfs in narratives of emancipation: far from passive actors, serfs possessed intricate political imaginaries and developed new ideas to meet their needs a rapidly evolving social context. Memoirs provide a particularly opportune source for these kinds of exploration because they give insight into what serfs thought, believed, and hoped for.

The paper will proceed by two serf memoirs and the visions of freedom they express It will conclude by briefly reflecting on how serf visions of freedom did not match up to the emancipation that eventually came about.

The paper will proceed by analyzing two serf memoirs and the visions of freedom they express. It will conclude by briefly reflecting on how serf visions of freedom did not match up to the emancipation that eventually came about.

Aleksandr Nikitenko’s about his childhood serf began as a collection of diary entries he wrote between 1818 and 1824, ending when he was freedom by landlord. Wanting to create an he to piece these diary entries together in 1851, though he passed away before completing the task Members of his family published his memoirs in installments 1888 in the history journal Russkaya Starina. A unique case, he was one of the only former serfs to rise to positions of prominence in government as a after receiving emancipation from his landlord.

Aleksandr Nikitenko’s memoir about his childhood as a serf began as a collection of diary entries he wrote between 1818 and 1824, ending when he was granted freedom by his landlord. Wanting to create an autobiography, he began to piece these diary entries together in 1851, though he passed away before completing the task. Members of his family published his memoirs in installments 1888 in the history journal Russkaya Starina. A unique case, he was one of the only former serfs to rise to positions of prominence in government as a censor after receiving emancipation from his landlord.

Nikitenko viewed education and the ability to achieve one’s full potential as a prerequisite for freedom. It was education that initially inspired his desire for freedom and what made him begin to feel bitterness towards his status as a serf. At only thirteen, he already realized that his serf status took his away from his dreams of education, writing, “…more painful than anything else was the knowledge that I would not be allowed to join the boys who were preparing to enter high school For me its doors were inexorably closed Here, for the first time, I had to face the terrible curse that hung over me because of my social status, which later caused me so much suffering and almost drove me to suicide.” For Nikitenko, freedom meant not only the removal of serf status, but also the ability to follow passions and move through life without hindrance.

Nikitenko viewed education and ability to one’s full potential as a prerequisite freedom. It was education that inspired his desire for freedom and what made him begin to feel bitterness towards his status as a serf At only thirteen, he already realized that his serf status took his away from his dreams of education, writing, “…more painful than anything else was the knowledge that I would not be allowed to join the boys who were preparing to high school. me its doors were inexorably closed. Here, for the first time, I had to face the terrible curse that hung over me because of social status, which caused me so much suffering and almost me to suicide.” For Nikitenko, freedom meant not only the removal of serf status, but also the ability to follow passions and move through life without hindrance

Later in life, these desires for freedom and education never left his mind even after he had the more pressing obligation of providing for his family.

in life, these desires for freedom and education never left his mind even after he had the more obligation of providing for his family.

“I labored conscientiously to provide for myself and my family, but, you see, this was only my duty, and not the goal and mission of my entire life. The urge to change course and, finally, to stand on solid ground grew increasingly irresistible At times, my craving for freedom and knowledge and for expanding the range of my activities possessed me to the point of physical pain ”

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

Mariana Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Nikitenko saw freedom and education as inextricably linked. To be denied freedom was to be denied access to education, and thus, the ability to fulfill his dreams and life goals One requirement of freedom, in his eyes, was access to knowledge.

Nikitenko saw freedom and education inextricably linked. To be denied freedom was to be denied to education, and thus, the ability to fulfill his dreams and life goals. One requirement of freedom, in eyes, was access to

That Nikitenko viewed education as necessary for freedom is also evinced in the way he appealed to his landlord for freedom. In Nikitenko’s early attempts to seek manumission he tailored his written appeals to his landlord’s perceived values and sensibilities. Nikitenko held that educated individuals held softer and compassionate views, and hoped that his landlord, Count Sheremetev, would be willing to grant him on the grounds that he wanted to pursue his education. Nikitenko hoped prove his fitness for freedom on the grounds of his intelligence and intellectual capacity, writing, “I decided to write to my master, Count Sheremetev, and ask him to grant me my freedom so I could complete my education, the germ of which he could see in the letter itself.” For Nikitentko, education was a powerful justification for freedom as well as a requirement. His conception of freedom was thus complex and multifaceted, rooted the of education. He did simply demand freedom but constructed sophisticated arguments and appeals to end. This specific attempt was declined by his but Nikitenko would gain freedom years later a combination of a written appeal and networking with elite friends that knew Count Sheremetev

That Nikitenko viewed education as necessary for freedom is also evinced in the way he appealed to his landlord for freedom. In Nikitenko’s early attempts to seek manumission he tailored his written appeals to his landlord’s perceived values and sensibilities Nikitenko held that educated individuals held softer and more compassionate views, and hoped that his landlord, Count Sheremetev, would be willing to grant him freedom on the grounds that he wanted to pursue his education. Nikitenko hoped to prove his fitness for freedom on the grounds of his intelligence and intellectual capacity, writing, “I decided to write to my master, Count Sheremetev, and ask him to grant me my freedom so I could complete my education, the germ of which he could see in the letter itself.” For Nikitentko, education was a powerful justification for freedom as well as a requirement His conception of freedom was thus complex and multifaceted, rooted in the importance of education He did not simply demand freedom but constructed sophisticated arguments and appeals to that end. This specific manumission attempt was declined by his landlord, but Nikitenko would eventually gain freedom years later through a combination of a written appeal and networking with elite friends that knew Count Sheremetev.

Another distinct conception of freedom from the perspective of a former serf may be seen Savva Dmitrievitch Purlevskii’s memoir, originally published in 1905 as a reminder of the injustices faced by peasants and former Purlevskii viewed freedom and stability as inextricably tied. For him, true freedom meant freedom from the arbitrary rule of his landlord and the ability to make decisions for himself

Another distinct conception of freedom from the perspective of a former serf may be seen in Savva Dmitrievitch Purlevskii’s memoir, originally published in 1905 as a reminder of the injustices faced by peasants and former serfs. Purlevskii viewed freedom and stability as inextricably tied. For him, true freedom meant freedom from the arbitrary rule of his landlord and the ability to make decisions for himself.

Purlevskii’s landlord raised obrok - fees Purlevskii was required to pay - to nearly impossibly high prices. This led him to feel lost in his own life and idea of the future, writing “…after the event when the landlord our power over us and the humiliating, slave-like all society made me uneasy all my life How to get rid of this centuries-old entrapment and free my family from it as well? what could a serf do .?” Purlevskii articulates a critique of serfdom based on the idea that it undermines peasants’ stability and sense of financial security.

Purlevskii’s landlord raised obrok - fees Purlevskii was required to pay - to nearly impossibly high prices This led him to feel lost in his own life and idea of the future, writing “ after the event when the landlord forcibly increased our obligations, his power over us and the humiliating, slave-like condition of all society made me uneasy all my life. How to get rid of this centuries-old entrapment and free my family from it as well?... what could a serf do...?” Purlevskii articulates a critique of serfdom based on the idea that it undermines peasants’ stability and sense of financial security.

In another instance of corrupt actions by his landlord, Purlevskii described the event that reignited his desire self-manumission from a former indifference his serf status. After multiple of a local factory manager lying to Purlevskii’s landlord about the factory working peasants being rebellious, the case was moved to the district court which decided the peasants were innocent Despite this, the landlord still sided with the slandering factory manager, “Mistrusting and ignoring the court decision, he instead used his own legal powers as a landlord. ordered that all the discharged peasants, without

In another instance of corrupt actions by his landlord, Purlevskii described the event that reignited his desire for self-manumission from a former indifference towards his serf status. After multiple incidents of a local factory manager lying to Purlevskii’s landlord about the factory working peasants being rebellious, the case was moved to the district court which decided the peasants were innocent. Despite this, the landlord still sided with the slandering factory manager, “Mistrusting and ignoring the court decision, he instead used his own legal powers as a landlord. He ordered that all the discharged peasants, without

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

Mariana Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

further consideration, be sent either into military service or to live in Siberia.” Such situations were terrifying and uneasy for serfs, given that landlords could hold so much direct power over punishment, even holding precedence over a court ruling. For Purlevskii, freedom meant freedom from corruption and arbitrary rule, abusive power from higher social classes, and justice despite social status.

further consideration, be sent either into military service or live in Siberia.” Such situations were terrifying and uneasy for serfs, given that landlords could hold so much direct power over punishment, even holding over a court ruling. For Purlevskii, meant freedom from and arbitrary rule, abusive power from higher social classes, and justice despite social status

Ultimately, the landlord held the final decision over whether serfs could manumit themselves or move to another village on their property. The extent to which a landowner controlled their serfs could drastically vary from village village. Being tied to the land on which they lived, a landlord selling their estate meant that the serfs there would have experienced a new landlord whose dominion may have caused dramatically worse conditions for the serfs These memoirists displayed a desire for control over major decisions in their own lives unattainable under serfdom; freedom for them also implied independence.

Ultimately, the landlord held the final decision over whether serfs could manumit themselves or move to another village on their property The extent to which a landowner controlled their serfs could drastically vary from village to village Being tied to the land on which they lived, a landlord selling their estate meant that the serfs living there would have experienced a new landlord whose dominion may have caused dramatically worse conditions for the serfs. These memoirists displayed a desire for control over major decisions in their own lives unattainable under serfdom; freedom for them also implied independence.

Like Nikitenko, Purlevskii’s manumission attempts were also declined on multiple occasions by his memoir was never completed, known through oral of people that knew him that he eventually ran away from his to protect himself from slander and punishment from being accused of another’s crime He successfully managed to run away to Southern Russia, past the Danube River, and joined an Old Believer group called the Nekrasovtsy. He never achieved a position of prominence like that of Nikitenko, but he eventually would become a merchant and manage a sugar corporation.

Like Nikitenko, Purlevskii’s manumission attempts were also declined on multiple occasions by his landlord. While his memoir was never completed, it is known through oral stories of people that knew him that he eventually ran away from his village to protect himself from slander and punishment from being accused of another’s crime. He successfully managed to run away to Southern Russia, past the Danube River, and joined an Old Believer group called the Nekrasovtsy. He never achieved a position of prominence like that of Nikitenko, but he eventually would become a merchant and manage a sugar corporation

Conclusion

In her important book, Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Late Nineteenth Century Russia, Cathy Frierson explores in great detail how Russian elites imagined serfs and rural peasants more generally Studying the image of the peasant in Russian society she finds that Russian elites viewed peasants as passive, simple and uncritical. What is more, Russian elites saw peasants as backwards and in need of paternalistic guidance.

her important book, Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Late Nineteenth Century Russia, Cathy explores great detail how Russian elites imagined serfs and rural peasants more generally. Studying the image of the peasant in Russian society she finds that Russian elites viewed peasants as passive, simple and uncritical. What more, Russian elites saw peasants as backwards and in need of guidance

The case studies of the serf memoirists we analyzed show that, in many respects, this could not be further from the truth. Serfs could be complex and agentive actors. They could conceptions of freedom that displayed an awareness of their own position, the expectations of the dominant society, and their own hopes dreams for a better future. can especially be seen in Nitikenko’s for freedom: his own status position and the expectations of his landlord, he appealed for his freedom on the grounds that education and freedom were hopelessly interdependent Clearly, Serf perspectives could contain multitudes.

The case studies of the serf memoirists we analyzed show that, in many respects, this could not be further from the truth Serfs could be complex and agentive actors They could construct intricate conceptions of freedom that displayed an awareness of their own position, the expectations of the dominant society, and their own hopes and dreams for a better future. This can especially be seen in Nitikenko’s appeal for freedom: understanding his own status position and the expectations of his landlord, he appealed for his freedom on the grounds that education and freedom were hopelessly interdependent. Clearly, Serf perspectives could contain multitudes.

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

Mariana Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) Kellis (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Taking a step back, what do these two case studies in serf intellectual creativity tell us? First, they force us to reconsider the significance of the Great Reform Era and emancipation through the experiences of serfs: the people whose lives were most impacted. If Nikitenko and Purlevskii”s cases are at all representative then the freedom that serfs were eventually granted was much more narrow, much less liberatory than they had hoped for. This is not to diminish the importance of the emancipation of the serfs but to suggest that more radical visions of freedom were advanced before serfdom was ended from above by state reforms

Taking a step back, what do these two studies in serf intellectual creativity tell us? First, they force us reconsider the significance of the Great Reform Era and emancipation through the experiences of serfs: the people lives were most If Nikitenko Purlevskii”s cases are at all representative then the freedom that serfs were eventually granted was much more narrow, much less liberatory than they had hoped for This is not to diminish the importance of the emancipation of the serfs but to suggest that more radical visions of freedom were advanced before serfdom was ended from above by state reforms.

Second, these case studies help us to recast the role of serfs in the great reform era and in narratives of emancipation. Scholars have tried to recover serf agency by focusing on serf resistance, whether passive or active. Yet serfs as individuals and as thinkers rarely factor into even these stories. This paper has attempted to correct this oversight by conducting a detailed analysis of different visions of freedom among two different individual serfs It suggests that to properly understand the changes going on in the period and what they really meant we need to take serfs seriously as historical actors, and as people with their own thoughts and minds.

Second, these case studies help us to recast the role of serfs in reform era and in narratives of emancipation Scholars have tried to recover serf agency by focusing on serf resistance, whether passive or active Yet serfs as individuals and as thinkers rarely factor into even these stories This paper has attempted to correct this oversight by conducting a detailed analysis of different visions of freedom among two different individual serfs. suggests that to properly understand the changes going on in the period and what they really meant need to take serfs seriously as historical actors, and as people with their own thoughts and

MIKHAIL

CHERNIAEV’S

ADDRESS TO THE RESIDENTS OF TASHKENT AND INDIRECT RULE IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1865 (1)

Roman Osharov (Oxford University)

This source is an address distributed in the Turki language by Russian General Mikhail Cherniaev (1828–1898) to the people of Tashkent in the summer of 1865 after the Russian troops invaded the city, and shows that the Russians initially planned to rule the city indirectly. The abridged version of the address first appeared in print in the memoir of the American diplomat in St Petersburg Eugene Schuyler (18401890), who visited Tashkent shortly after the Russian conquest, the original document in Turki has since been translated in full by the Uzbek historian Bakhtiyar Babadjanov (2). The fall of Tashkent, a key city in the Khanate of Khoqand with a population of nearly 100,000 people, was one of the best known episodes in the Russian conquest of Central Asia (3). Cherniaev had become the first head of Tashkent under Russian occupation and was responsible for setting up the Russian administration in the city before it was formally annexed (4) He had communicated the principles that Tashkent would retain much of its social order and that Islam would retain its primacy in law under Russian rule to the remaining residents of Tashkent (5). As Bakhtiyar Babadjanov notes, the address was written with the help of Cherniaev’s informants of the Russians, who were knowledgeable about the details of religious life in Tashkent (6). In Tashkent, Cherniaev had relied on his previous experience in the cities of Aulie-Ata and Chimkent, which fell to the Russian army earlier and where he had also decided to retain the old order. Cherniaev’s term in newly conquered Tashkent was not long and he was replaced by Dmitrii Romanovskii (1825–1881), although he too was soon replaced by Konstantin von Kaufman (1818–1882), who remained in Tashkent for nearly 15 years (7).

In the two first years since the invasion the Russians were arguing over the status of Tashkent—whether it should be an independent polity under a Russian protectorate, or be annexed. They also argued about how best to administer Tashkent, whatever its future status Most favoured a form of indirect rule in the local administration introduced by Cherniaev and retained by Romanovskii, which involved engagement with the Islamic clergy, or ulama, in Tashkent and some concessions towards them (8). However, the Russians still did not trust the ulama in Tashkent, whom they believed would ‘try to rally the people to their side at

1 I am grateful to Leora Eisenberg and Filipp Khusnutdinov for discussing this source with me

1 grateful Leora Eisenberg and Filipp Khusnutdinov for discussing this with

2 Schuyler, Eugene 1876 Turkistan Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja in Two Volumes, Vol I New York: Scribner, Armstrong and Co., pp 115-116 , Jeff Sahadeo points out that the address could also have been written in Persian , see Sahadeo, Jeff 2007. Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent: 1865-1923 Bloomington: Indiana University Press , p 20

2 Schuyler, 1876 Notes of Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja New York: Armstrong and pp 115-116 , Jeff Sahadeo points out that the address could also have been written in Persian , see Sahadeo, Jeff 2007. Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent: 1865-1923 Bloomington: Indiana University Press , p 20

3 On the Russian conquest of Central Asia see Terent'ev, Mikhail 1903 Istoriia zavoevaniia Srednei Azii S kartami i planami Tom I Sankt-Peterburg: Tipo-Litografiia V V Komarova; Scott C Levi 2017 The Rise and Fall of Khoqand, 1709-1876 Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press and particularly chapter 7, ‘Khoqand Defeated, 1853-1876’; Morrison, Alexander 2021 ‘The Search for a ‘Natural’ Frontier and the Fall of Tashkent, 1863-5’, The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 18141914 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

3 On the of Central Asia see Terent'ev, Mikhail 1903 zavoevaniia Srednei Azii S i planami Tom Sankt-Peterburg: V V Scott C Levi 2017 The Rise Fall of Pittsburgh Press 7, ‘Khoqand Defeated, 1853-1876’; Alexander 2021 ‘The Search for a ‘Natural’ and the Fall of Tashkent, 1863-5’, The Conquest of Central Study in Imperial Expansion, 18141914 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

4 Azadaev, Fattakh 1959 Tashkent vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka: Ocherki sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, pp 86-90

4 Azadaev, Fattakh 1959 vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka: Ocherki i politicheskoi istorii Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 86-90

5 Abashin, Sergei, Babadjanov, Bakhtiyar, Kotiukova, Tatiana, Makhmudov, Oibek, eds 2016 Turkestan v imperskoi politike Rossii: Monografiia v dokumentakh Moskva: Kuchkovo pole, p 34 (hereafter Turkestan v imperskoi politike); Babadjanov, Bakhtiyar 2010 Kokandskoe khanstvo: Vlastʹ , politika, religiia Tokyo-Tashkent: Yangi nashr, pp 521-523

5 Turkestan v Monografiia v dokumentakh Moskva: Kuchkovo pole, p 34 (hereafter Turkestan v imperskoi politike); Babadjanov, Bakhtiyar 2010 Kokandskoe khanstvo: Vlastʹ politika, religiia Tokyo-Tashkent: Yangi nashr, pp 521-523

6 Turkestan v imperskoi politike, pp 36-37

6 v pp 36-37

7 Cherniaev made a brief return to Tashkent as Governor-General after Kaufman’s death, between 1882 and 1884

8 ‘Zapiska Voennogo ministra otnositelʹ no Tashkenta i dalʹneishei nashei politiki v Srednei Azii’ in Serebrennikov, Andrian. 1914 Turkestanskii krai Sbornik materialov dlia istorii ego zavoevaniia, 1866 god Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga (hereafter Turkestanskii krai)

7 a brief return Kaufman’s and 8 ‘Zapiska Voennogo ministra otnositelʹ no Tashkenta i dalʹneishei nashei politiki v Srednei Azii’ in Serebrennikov, Andrian. Turkestanskii krai Sbornik materialov dlia istorii ego zavoevaniia, 1866 god Tashkent: Tipografiia Shtaba Turkestanskogo Voennogo Okruga (hereafter Turkestanskii krai)

MIKHAIL CHERNIAEV’S ADDRESS TO THE RESIDENTS OF TASHKENT AND INDIRECT RULE IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1865

Roman Osharov (Oxford University)

the first sign of displeasure with Russia’ (9). The result of these considerations was the annexation of Tashkent and the introduction of the so-called policy of ignoring of Islam, or ignorirovanie, initiated by Kaufman. The crux of the policy was that the Russian imperial power both restricted Islam, for example by excluding the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan from the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, and tolerated pre-conquest Islamic institutions, such as courts and their judges, or qadi, and police officials, or aqsaqal, chosen through elections controlled by Russian officials. This source provides a translation of the document that marked the beginning of Russian rule in Tashkent.

The Text of Cherniaev’s Address

On the date of the year 1282 [Islamic Hijri Calendar] on the sixth day of the month of Safar on Friday at the command of the Great White Padishah Alexander, we [Military] Governor Cherniaev—address you with these words.

People of Tashkent!

Do your deeds without deviating one iota from the commandments of the Blessed and Most High God and the Prophet Muhammad, the expounder of the religion blessings and salutations of Allah upon him and all his family! and also, without deviating from the injunctions of the noble shari’a of the Prophet and his companions blessings and salutations be upon them! (10). Practise your customs as it has been customary in this land since ancient times. Perform a prayer five times a day together with the congregation and do not disturb the time of the prayer, not even for one minute

Let the mullahs who live in the madrasas teach the students the religion of Muhammad—peace and blessings of Allah be upon him and do not delay providing these students with food for a single hour or a single minute (11). And let them make sure that the young people do not miss a single day of instruction in their schools. Let them gather the boys in the rooms of the schools so that they may study diligently, and let [the mullahs] see to it that they do not sit idle And if the children are loitering in their rooms, let them be beaten [with the rod] and scolded, but do not leave them unattended And if the parents of the children show carelessness towards [their children], then let them be brought to raʾis of the district, qadi al-Islam, and made to answer in accordance with the shari'a of the Messenger of Allah [Prophet]

9 Zapiska Voennogo ministra otnositelʹ no Tashkenta i dalʹneishei nashei politiki v Srednei Azii’, Turkestanskii krai On Russian attitudes towards Islam in the period see Werth, Paul W 2002 At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press and particularly chapter 7, ‘New Discoveries: Islam and Its Containment’; On the Russian Empire and Muslims, as well as the policy of ignoring of Islam see Khalid, Adeeb 1998 The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia Berkeley: University of California Press; Brower, Daniel. 2003 Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire London & New York, NY: Routledge Curzon; Crews, Robert D 2006 For Prophet and Tsar : Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., and in particular chapter 5, ‘Civilising Turkestan’, pp 241-292; Morrison, Alexander 2008 'Qazis and the Judiciary', Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868-1910: A Comparison with British India Oxford: Oxford University Press

10 Shari'a Islamic law

9 Zapiska Voennogo ministra otnositelno Tashkenta i dalneishei nashei politiki v Srednei Azii’, Turkestanskii krai On Russian attitudes towards Islam in the see Paul W 2002 the Mission, Governance, Confessional Politics in Russia's 1827–1905. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Press and particularly chapter 7, Discoveries: Islam and Containment’; the as well as of ignoring Islam Adeeb 1998 The of Reform: Jadidism Central Berkeley: University of Press; Brower, 2003 Fate of Empire London & New York, NY: Routledge Curzon; Crews, Robert D 2006 For Prophet and Tsar : Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., and in particular chapter 5, Turkestan’, pp 241-292; Morrison, Alexander 2008 'Qazis and the Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868-1910: with British Islamic law

11 Mullah honorific title of Islamic clergy, religious leader or teacher

MIKHAIL CHERNIAEV’S

ADDRESS TO THE RESIDENTS OF TASHKENT AND INDIRECT RULE IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1865

Roman Osharov (Oxford University) Muhammad peace and blessings of Allah be upon him! (12).

Let the artisans practise their trade, let the bazaar keepers attend to their bazaars and do not go idle. Let the farmers practise their farming with great diligence Let no one and nothing be left on the streets Let the streets be kept clean

O, our Muslim citizens! Be vigilant, for in your honoured and noble religion of Muhammad—peace and blessings of Allah be upon him it is forbidden to drink boza, drink vodka, gamble and engage in prostitution and homosexuality (13). Let everyone beware of engaging in [religious] novelties and deeds that are contrary to the shari'a Let no one engage in acts that are forbidden and disapproved by the shari'a

And don't let anyone cheat on the scales or when selling firewood. Do not take money for the scales. Butchers and other merchants should not overweight anyone, and should keep watch over their scales. Let the gatekeepers not charge [for entry]. Let the awqaf of madrasas and mosques not be wasted but be used for their intended purpose, and let the administrators of the waqf properties spend the funds according to the dictates of the noble shari'a (14)

The order to the neighbourhood elders, executors of assignments and other officials is as follows (15). Not to encroach on the rights of ordinary people and poor people to their share of grain and water, having rejected the mistakes that were made before and not to create unnecessary red tape around it. And you will not engage in bacha bazi, or organise dances with doyra (16) If I find such acts, I will punish you as much as I can Let everyone be warned about this and be careful from now on.

Let the qadi kalan, qadi al-qudat, aʿlam, muftis and other executors of [legal] affairs perform their affairs according to the dictates of the great and honoured shari'a of the Prophet, and let them be based on the injunctions of the shari'a in every matter. And if they violate this, they will be dismissed (17).

And another instruction is this: be vigilant and careful, do not gather idly in the streets, do not shout at each other, do not swear or fight in the streets. Otherwise the [Russian] soldiers will come and may punish you.

12 Raʾis In Tashkent, this title was effectively held by local police officials, who were also responsible for religious policing, Qadi al-Islam chief Islamic judge

12 In Tashkent, this title was effectively held by local police officials, who were also responsible for religious policing, Qadi al-Islam chief Islamic judge

13 Boza a fermented malt beverage with a low alcohol content

14 Waqf [plural awqaf ] Islamic endowment

15 Neighbourhood elders, or aqsaqal, were local police officials in Tashkent

13 Boza a fermented malt beverage with a low alcohol content [plural ] endowment Neighbourhood elders, or officials

16 On the practice of bacha bazi, or dancing boys, see Zekhni, Malika 2022 “Invisible Bodies: Civilising Mission, Sexuality, and Prostitution in Fin de Siècle Russian Turkestan.” Cultural and Social History 19 (2): 141–159, Doyra is a frame drum originating from Central Asia

16 the of bacha bazi, or dancing boys, see Zekhni, Malika “Invisible Bodies: Civilising Sexuality, and Prostitution Fin de Siècle Russian Turkestan.” Cultural and Social History 19 (2): 141–159, Doyra is a frame drum originating from Central Asia

17 Qaḍi kalan chief judge, Aʿlam a senior jurisprudent

17 kalan chief Aʿlam a senior

MIKHAIL CHERNIAEV’S

ADDRESS TO THE RESIDENTS OF TASHKENT AND INDIRECT RULE IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1865

Roman Osharov (Oxford University)

For the religious consecration of the first marriage, let the qadi al-Islam charge two tselkovyi each, for subsequent marriage contracts, let the raʾis charge one tselkovyi each (18). But you shall not charge anything extra to ordinary citizens and petty servants. And let them not charge for affixing seals [on documents] Let the aʿlam, muftis and raʾis take the fee prescribed by the shari'a, and let them not charge anything extra

Any land that has been confirmed as an inheritance according to the shari'a in the past shall be exempted [from claims], and shall not be charged kharaaj and other [taxes] until the end of life on earth (19). However, if there are other kinds of cultivated land which have been taken over by documents from the former rulers, or if there are documents of inheritance on them, then they will be charged kharaj equal to one-tenth [of the yield] of wheat, barley, melon or other kinds of crops

The elite, the commoners and all the subjects of this region must firmly follow what is said [in this address], and we too will follow what is said firmly and until the Day of Judgement.

One more thing Your yards, with their trees and gardens, are your personal property, and we have no claim on them Nor will any of you be conscripted as soldiers, as is our custom We will make no distinction by nationality [literally: ‘we won't be saying, 'this is a Kazakh and this is a Russian’]. Soldiers will not be allowed to stay [in your homes]. Soldiers will not come to the gates of your houses, if they do, let us know and we will punish them.

We have shown you great kindness Now, you should too pray for the Great White King.

If a man kills another man, or if traders and caravans are robbed, we will judge such criminals according to Russian law. And if one of you dies, his inheritance will be taken by his descendants or his people, we will take nothing from him. Next year it will be as the Great White Tsar wishes, beyond what has been granted [in this address].

Mingbashi [commander of the troops] of the Russian Padishah Mikhail Cherniaev [seal] (20)

18 In Russian, tselkovyi means ruble

19 Kharaj tax on produce

20 The source of the translation: O’zMA (O’zbekiston Milliy Arxivi, National Archives of Uzbekistan) f I-17, op. 1, d 9679, l 116-116ob, in Abashin, Sergei, Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, Kotiukova, Tatiana, Makhmudov, Oibek 2016. Turkestan v imperskoi politike Rossii: Monografiia v dokumentakh Moskva: Kuchkovo pole, pp. 37-39.

19 tax on produce of the (O’zbekiston Milliy Arxivi, I-17, 1, 9679, l 116-116ob, in Abashin, Sergei, Bakhtiyar Makhmudov, Turkestan imperskoi v dokumentakh Moskva: pole, pp. 37-39.

BETWEEN NATION AND EMPIRE: BORDERLAND PATRIOTISM AS ELECTORAL STRATEGY IN

POST-1905 VIL’NA PROVINCE

Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

The short yet turbulent story of Imperial Russia’s constitutional experiment—set in motion by Tsar Nicholas II’s October Manifesto in 1905 has been told, and by now, largely forgotten. The 1905 Revolution and the infamous imperial decree it prompted, which established a popularly elected legislative body, the Duma, and granted limited civil liberties to imperial subjects, was famously described by Lenin as a “dress rehearsal” for the 1917 October Revolution (1) Setting aside Lenin’s teleological reading of history and the conventional textbook narrative of Duma politics as Imperial Russia’s failed attempt at Western-style modernity, the decade of parliamentarism in the Romanov Empire also encompasses a range of local stories. The empire, which is fundamentally a hierarchical and topdown political project, is nevertheless co-constituted by people on the ground who appropriate imperial instruments for their own, often centrifugal, ends In the early twentieth century, Duma elections became the primary avenue for such local agency, enabling political activists across the empire to organize politically, agitate the masses, debate ideologies, and negotiate their relationships with the imperial state, regional identities, and local societies in the process.

This paper tells the story of how Polish political elites engaged in mass politics in Vil’na province. Specifically, this study explores the electoral strategies and political visions crafted by conservative Polish landowners, a socio-economically privileged, yet minority, group during the First Duma elections (2) It argues that confronted with the growing magnetism of nationalist movements, the political elites in Vil’na province promoted regional patriotism as an alternative to ethnonationalist notions of groupness. Challenging the apparent consensus in the literature that ideological differences played only a modest role in the electoral politics of the Romanov Empire’s northwestern borderlands, with “nationalist politics being the rule of the land,” this study shows that polemics over the political meaning of regional identity and the northwest region’s separateness from the Kingdom of Poland and the rest of the Empire were central to the electoral dynamics in Vil’na province (3).

Vil’na province with the city of Wilno emerged as the epicenter of political agitation in this part of the Empire. While Polish elites were the best organized and most endowed with the cultural and financial capital to wield political influence through newspapers and informal organizations like Freemasonry (4), they were neither homogeneous nor the only political actors in the province (5). The Polish-speaking elites

1 Ascher, Abraham (1994) The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray Stanford University Press pp 1–2 ISBN 978-0-8047-2327-5

1 Ascher, Abraham The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray Stanford University Press pp ISBN 978-0-8047-2327-5

2 of the twentieth landowners of the land in Vil’na province, yet only of the according 1897 census See Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej Na Litwie I Białorusi W Latach (Poznan: Mickicwicza, 1983), 19 & “ – вся” in “

2 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Polish landowners held 73 percent of the land in Vil’na province, yet made up only 8 percent of the population, according to the 1897 imperial census See Jan Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej Na Litwie I Białorusi W Latach 1905-1922 (Poznan: Uniwersytet im Adama Mickicwicza, 1983), 19 &

” in “

1897 г., ” Demoscope.ru, 2025, https://www demoscope ru/weekly/ssp/rus lan 97 uezd php?reg=87

1897 ” Demoscope.ru, 2025, https://www demoscope ru/weekly/ssp/rus lan 97 uezd php?reg=87

3 Roman Jurkowski, Sukcesy I Porażki: Ziemiaństwo Polskie Ziem Zabranych W Wyborach Do Dumy Państwowej I Rady Państwa 1906-1913 (Olsztyn: Uniwersytet WarmińskoMazurskiego, 2009)

3 Jurkowski, Sukcesy Porażki: Ziemiaństwo Ziem Wyborach Do Dumy I Państwa 1906-1913 Warmińsko2009)

4 Jan Sawicki, Mykolas Römeris Ir Buvusios Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės Žemių Tautinės Problemos // Mykolas Römeris and the National Problems of the Former Lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Eugrimas, 1999)

4 Jan Sawicki, Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės Žemių Tautinės Problemos // of the Former of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Eugrimas, 1999)

5 Jewish political organization in Vilna included both the Bund and Zionist groups See Jan Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej Na Litwie I Białorusi W Latach 19051922 (Poznan: Uniwersytet im Adama Mickicwicza, 1983), 42 Lithuanians also engaged in political organization in Vilnius See Rimantas Miknys, Lietuvos Demokratų Partija 1902–1915 Metais (Baltos Lankos, 1995)

5 Jewish organization in Vilna included both the Bund and Zionist See Jan Jurkiewicz, Myśli Politycznej Na Litwie I Białorusi W Latach 19051922 (Poznan: Uniwersytet im Adama Mickicwicza, 42 engaged in political organization in Vilnius Partija (Baltos Lankos, 1995)

BETWEEN NATION AND EMPIRE: BORDERLAND PATRIOTISM

AS ELECTORAL STRATEGY IN POST-1905 VIL’NA PROVINCE

Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

fell into three often fluid and overlapping camps conservative landowners, progressive cosmopolitans, and National Democrats (endeky) who sympathized with the ideas of Polish nationalism, pioneered by the National Democratic (Endecja) movement led by Roman Dmowski in the Kingdom of Poland. Conservative landowners in the northwest driven by the great sense of defeat following the 1863 January Uprising became increasingly apolitical In the late 19th century, they abandoned political romanticism and insurrectionary tradition, shifting toward “organic work” within imperial power structures, often drawing inspiration from the Poles in Austrian Galicia and their mutually beneficial cooperation with the state (6). The landowners in the Kingdom of Poland and the Northwestern provinces increasingly adopted positivist attitudes, reframing the preservation of Polishness in terms of maintaining their material wealth (7) In an attempt to safeguard their privileged status, the landed gentry grew more loyal to the imperial state, believing it was their only defense against revolutionary movements that increasingly challenged their socio-economic dominance (8).

The most public display of the local gentry’s loyalty to the Tsarist regime was the 1904 unveiling of the Catherine the Great monument in Wilno. Sixty prominent Vil’na Polish landowners, some later elected to the Duma, attended the ceremony at the personal invitation of the province’s Governor-General, Pyotr Sviatopolk-Mirsky, who became Minister of the Interior that same year (9) The progressive camp, mostly comprised of intellectuals, urban professionals, and small gentry, strongly opposed such overt toadyism. This small yet politically well-organized group, known in the literature as the Krajowcy movement, challenged both the Polish nationalism of the Endecja movement seeping in from the Kingdom of Poland and the imperial loyalism of the conservative gentry. Progressives like Czeslaw Jankowski, who would later be elected to the first Duma from Vil’na province, publicly condemned the landowners’ attendance at the Empress’s monument unveiling, equating it with “renunciation of Polishness” (10) In response to the growing nationalist agitation among Poles, spreading from the Kingdom of Poland, and the strengthening of other national movements in the northwest, the progressive camp sought to counter their essentialist narratives by promoting borderland patriotism as an alternative to exclusionary nationalism. Reinventing the tradition of mythologized cosmopolitanism rooted in the cultural and religious tolerance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, progressive ideologues emphasized the unique regional character of the Northwestern provinces and advocated for reconciliatory multiethnic accommodation among its diverse inhabitants (11) Despite stark differences between progressive and loyalist political visions, conservative landowners often embraced this inclusive regional identity based on civic nationalism. By adopting borderland patriotism,

6 Jan Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej Na Litwie I Białorusi W Latach 1905-1922 (Poznan: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickicwicza, 1983)

7 Glenn Alfred Janus, “The Polish Kolo, the Russian Duma, and the Question of Polish Autonomy” (PhD Dissertation, 1971), https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/polishkolo-russian-duma-question- autonomy/docview/302621537/se-2., 13

8 Jan Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej Na Litwie I Białorusi W Latach 1905-1922 (Poznan: Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickicwicza, 1983), 23.

9 Komitet Wydawniczego w Lwowie, “Głosy Prasy Polskiej : O Udziale Sześćdziesięciu Szlachciców Litewskich W Uroczystości Odsłonięcia Pomnika Katarzyny W Wilnie,” Kpbc umk pl, 2025, https://kpbc umk pl/publication/22370, 14-15 & Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej, 24.

10 Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej

11 Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej, 48

BETWEEN NATION AND EMPIRE: BORDERLAND PATRIOTISM AS

ELECTORAL STRATEGY IN POST-1905 VIL’NA PROVINCE

Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

the landed gentry sought to distinguish themselves from the increasingly assertive national democrats in the Kingdom of Poland, fearing such association with Polish nationalists could strain their fragile relationship with the imperial state. The platform of multiethnic coexistence and civic nationalism also offered a way to deescalate local ethnic tensions, particularly in Vil’na province, where Polish elites were heavily outnumbered by Belarusian and Lithuanian peasants

The first attempt to transform regionalism into a political platform was the founding of the Constitutional Catholic Party of Lithuania and Belarus in January 1906, three months before the elections to the First Duma took place. The central figure of this political formation was Edward Ropp, the bishop of Vilnius. After the Tsar signed the Edict on Religious Tolerance in April 1905, ending the formal persecution of Catholics across the Empire, the Bishop of Vilnius the Empire’s largest Catholic diocese—personally oversaw the reconversion of 32,000 Uniates, members of the Greek Catholic Church who had been forced to convert to Orthodoxy, back to Catholicism (12). Ropp was not only a skilled proselytizer but also a shrewd political strategist. Recognizing the growing appeal of Endecja nationalism among Polish landowners and the escalating hostility of non-Polish national activists toward Polish-led political agendas, he saw the urgent need for a unifying political platform If anything could transcend the deepening nationalist sectarianism, it was the shared tradition of the Catholic faith.

Although Christian social movements had emerged across Western Europe in the nineteenth century and were by no means a novel invention of the political engineers in Vil’na province (13), the Catholic Constitutional Party of Lithuania and Belarus adapted this seemingly foreign tradition to the regional context of the northwestern borderlands Ropp’s party blended the language of socioeconomic justice and equality across social classes, nationalities, and linguistic communities— with the principles of Christian love and tolerance (14). This synthesis allowed the party to recast the political agenda of elite cosmopolitanism in somewhat accessible, faith-based terms that resonated broadly with the electorate in Vil’na. The political program of the Catholic Constitutionalist Party, published in Polish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian newspapers, called for unity among the three national groups, grounded in what it framed as their strongest common bond: the Catholic faith (15) The manifesto pledged to promote small-scale peasant landownership through state financial assistance, protect workers’ rights particularly the demand for an eight-hour workday and defend the interests of the Catholic Church by restoring closed churches

12 Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Polityczne, 41

13 Peter d'Alroy Jones, Christian Socialist Revival, 1877-1914 (Princeton University Press, 2015), 5 & John W Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (University of Chicago Press, 1995)

14 Vilniaus Žinios, “Lietuvos Ir Baltgudijos Konstitutiškai-Katalikiškos Partijos Programa,” Vilniaus Žinios, January 20, 1906, https://www.epaveldas lt/preview? id=C1B0004114124-1906-Saus 20, 4

15 The program was published in Kuryer Litewski, Vilniaus Žinios and Nasza Niva

BETWEEN NATION AND EMPIRE: BORDERLAND PATRIOTISM AS

ELECTORAL STRATEGY IN POST-1905 VIL’NA PROVINCE

Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

and expropriated lands (16). Alongside these progressive socio-economic promises, the Catholic Constitutionalists emphasized their commitment to constitutional rights, including freedom of press and religion, the right to strike, the rule of law, the dismantling of the estate system, and a pledge of cultural and political equality for all nationalities inhabiting the province (17) Ropp’s vision of multiethnic coexistence included support for the development of national cultures, access to education in native languages, and the establishment of national schools (18).

Another key commitment of the Catholic Constitutionalist Party was its promise to form a separate parliamentary group in the Duma, rather than joining the pan-Polish bloc alongside delegates from the Kingdom of Poland The National Democrats in Vil’na strongly opposed this position The question of future bloc formation in the Duma became one of the central issues of the electoral campaign, sparking intense debate in the local press. On March 1st, the front page of “Kuryer Litewski” featured a discussion presenting two opposing perspectives on the matter (19). In one article, Endecja activist Franciszek Jurjewicz argued that, given the imperial state’s continued hostility toward Poles, national unity was essential to strengthen their collective mandate in the Duma (20). In response, Konstancja Skirmuntt, a leading figure in the Krajowcy movement, invoked the mental map of the Northwestern Provinces as “an integral and whole region of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not a satellite or kresy [outskirts] of the Kingdom of Poland” (21). She contended that these lands possessed a distinct character and set of interests that should not be conflated with the political agenda of the Kingdom of Poland. Skirmuntt’s advocacy for a separate parliamentary group representing the Northwestern Provinces stemmed not only from her opposition to Polish nationalism and her hopeful vision of multiethnic coexistence in the region, but also from pragmatic political considerations The formation of a separate parliamentary group—paired with what she described as “a just and deeply thought out agrarian program”—offered the only viable means of drawing “our Belarusian, Orthodox boys” into the regional project of the northwest, rather than allowing them to be swept into the all-Russian nationalist movement (22). Skirmuntt, a native of Minsk Province where Orthodox believers made up nearly eighty percent of the population—understood that political messaging centered exclusively on Polish or even Catholic interests was bound to fail in the new era of mass politics (23) For the time being, Polish-speaking elites in Vil’na largely sided with her, recognizing that sectarianism threatened their influence both within the province and across the Empire

However not everyone in Vil’na province welcomed the universalizing vision of the new political force. The fiercest criticism of the Catholic Constitutional Party came from the Lithuanian national movement. Lithuanian activists accused Ropp’s party of cloaking a continued agenda of Polonization and Polish

20 Kurjer Litewski, “Z Naszej Trybuny,” Nr 49, March 1, 1906

21 Kurjer Litewski, “Z Naszej Trybuny,” Nr 49, March 1, 1906

22 Kurjer Litewski, “Z Naszej Trybuny,” Nr 49, March 1, 1906

23 “

2025, https://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus _ rel_97.php?reg=45.

BETWEEN NATION AND EMPIRE: BORDERLAND PATRIOTISM AS

ELECTORAL STRATEGY IN POST-1905 VIL’NA PROVINCE

Vita Raskeviciute (Yale University)

cultural dominance in the rhetoric of political and cultural equality among all nationalities in the province (24). “Why is it called the Constitutional Catholic Party of Lithuania and Belarus omitting Poland from the title altogether when its leadership is entirely Polish and advocates for Polish autonomy, if not to deliberately mislead voters in Vil’na?” questioned Lithuanian nationalist activists (25) The imperial authorities also grew increasingly alarmed by the rising influence of Ropp’s party, prompting the governor general to suspend the party’s legal activities on March 2, 1906—just one month before the elections (26). Imperial authorities, who had hoped that nationalist and confessional tensions would fracture the province’s mandate among disparate and mutually antagonistic groups, grew increasingly alarmed by the prospect of a strong, united front. Although stripped of legal status, the party remained active. Ropp encouraged its members to continue campaigning individually, “rallying the masses under the symbol of the Catholic Cross and the ideals of justice, love, and unity” (27)

Despite relentless criticism from the Lithuanian national movement and restrictions imposed by the imperial regime, the Catholic Constitutional Party secured a majority in the First Duma elections, winning four of the six parliamentary seats selected at the provincial assembly (28). The elected deputies also fulfilled their electoral promise to promote a regionalist agenda at the Duma level by founding the Belarusian-Lithuanian-Polish Circle a parliamentary group that remained active throughout all four Imperial Duma convocations and operated independently of the Polish Kolo. A more socio-economically conservative reiteration of the Catholic Constitutional Party reemerged as the Regional Party of Lithuania and Belarus for the Third Duma elections, once again achieving significant electoral success. Although, a couple years before the elections to the Fourth Duma, the conservative Polish landowners in Vil’na started abandoning their regionalist agenda and aligning with the National Democrats in response to the rise of state-sponsored Great Russian nationalism, the earlier articulation and success of political programs defined in regional rather than nationalist terms demonstrate that nationalism was not the ‘only game in town’ in early twentieth-century Vil’na province. A political vision centered on accommodating differences and fostering unity among the Empire’s multiethnic population in the northwest proved to be more than a hypothetical utopia—it became a tangible political project that residents were willing to support at the ballot Nationalism, by contrast, emerged only as an ideology of last resort, largely in response to the imperial state’s own nationalizing impulses

24 Vilniaus Žinios, “Rinkimai į Valstybės Duma,” Nr 41, February 21, 1906, https://www.epaveldas.lt/preview?id=C1B0004114124-1906-Vas.21, 1

25 Vilniaus Žinios, “Rinkimai į Valstybės Duma,” Nr 41, February 2, 1906, & Vilniaus Žinios, “Rinkimai į Valstybės Duma,” Nr 46, February 26, 1906, https://www epaveldas lt/preview?id=C1B0004114124-1906-Vas.26

26 Jan Jurkiewicz, Rozwój Polskiej Myśli Politycznej Na Litwie I Białorusi W Latach 1905-1922 (Poznan: Uniwersytet im Adama Mickicwicza, 1983), 46 & Tadas Lovčikas, “Rinkimai Į Pirmąją Dūmą,” Lietuvos istorijos darbai (VU Istorijos Fakultetas, May 12, 2008), https://ltistorija.wordpress.com/rinkimai-i-pirmaja-duma/

27 Kurjer Litewski, “Odezwa: Stronnictwa Konstytucyjno-Katolickiego,” Nr 54, March 8, 1906, https://crispa.uw.edu.pl/object/files/401933/display/Default, 1

28 Edward Ropp, “Kuryer Litewski” editor-in-chief Czesław Jankowski, Bolesław Jałowiecki, owner of one of the Empire’s largest metallurgical enterprises and a railway company, Konstanty Aleksandrowicz, Catholic peasant form the Trokii district

Papers by Panels

PANEL III: Identity Politics and Cultural Co-optation in Putin’s Russia

Co-Chair: Dasha Maliauskaya (Yale University)

Faculty Discussant: Prof. Peter Rutland (Wesleyan University)

Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University)

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

INTERNAL DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE AND IDENTITY

RECLAMATION IN RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN

Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign) Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Over the past two decades, the government has reshaped the Russian national identity to align with its colonial ambitions, which is evident the shift from emphasizing citizenship (rossiiskii) to focusing on ethnicity with the ethnonym russkii (ethnic Russian) (1). President Vladimir Putin, this redefined Russian identity became central to the concept of russkii mir, or the “Russian world,” which underpinned the regime’s actions, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (2). While nationalist movements were mostly suppressed by the 2010s, the Kremlin continued to promote russkii as a unifying term, thus completely disregarding the state’s rich ethnic diversity. This marginalization left Indigenous groups sidelined in national with the expectation from the that they submit to the russkii identity. In response, these communities been working on the reclamation of their identities through cultural expressions revitalizing their native languages, music, and arts as well as through civic engagement and minority advocacy. Additionally, they have actively resisted the state’s policies through protest. These efforts represent a challenge to the state’s homogenizing identity and a push for the inclusion of diverse ethnic highlighting their ongoing struggle for recognition and belonging within the Russian Federation.

Over the past two decades, the Russian government has reshaped the Russian national identity to align with its colonial ambitions, which is evident in the shift from emphasizing citizenship (rossiiskii) to focusing on ethnicity with the ethnonym russkii (ethnic Russian) (1). Under President Vladimir Putin, this redefined Russian identity became central to the concept of russkii mir, or the “Russian world,” which underpinned the regime’s actions, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (2). While nationalist movements were mostly suppressed by the 2010s, the Kremlin continued to promote russkii as a unifying term, thus completely disregarding the state’s rich ethnic diversity This marginalization left Indigenous groups sidelined in national narratives, with the expectation from the state that they submit to the russkii identity. In response, these communities have been working on the reclamation of their identities through cultural expressions revitalizing their native languages, music, and arts as well as through civic engagement and minority advocacy. Additionally, they have actively resisted the state’s policies through protest. These efforts represent a challenge to the state’s homogenizing identity and a push for the inclusion of diverse ethnic voices, highlighting their ongoing struggle for recognition and belonging within the Russian Federation.

Expectedly, the efforts of the Russian authorities to emphasize Russian ethnicity while marginalizing and exploiting the Indigenous communities in the state go beyond the of russkii. The 2020 amendments the Constitution of the Russian Federation have solidified the language as the “the language of the state-forming people, part of the multinational union of equal peoples of the Russian Federation” (язык

Expectedly, the efforts of the Russian authorities to emphasize Russian ethnicity while marginalizing and exploiting the Indigenous communities in the state go beyond the (over)use of russkii. The 2020 amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation have solidified the Russian language as the “the language of the state-forming people, part of the multinational union of equal peoples of the Russian Federation” (язык

and thus highlighting and legally securing the superior and essential position of the ethnic Russians (3). Beyond the attack on languages and civic

) and thus and legally securing the superior and essential position of the ethnic Russians Beyond the attack on languages and civic

1 Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds , The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-15 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 160.

1 Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds , The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-15 (Edinburgh: University Press, 2016), 160.

2 Kolstø and Blakkisrud,

2 Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 160

3 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, art 68 1, https://www consultant ru/document/cons doc LAW 28399/3ed9a4d68072c2f9d74767edb4d4d2ea1def6e9f/

3 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi 68 1, https://www ru/document/cons doc LAW 28399/3ed9a4d68072c2f9d74767edb4d4d2ea1def6e9f/

INTERNAL DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE AND IDENTITY

RECLAMATION IN RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN

Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

status, the Russian authorities actively exploit the native communities extracting natural resources in nonRussian regions the profits for which are accumulated in the Russian capitals, official and cultural Facing the shortage of manpower during the first few months of the full-scale invasion against Ukraine, the Kremlin announced a “partial mobilization,” and research has demonstrated that the mobilization disproportionately targeted Indigenous populations (4). Relying on the Russian language as the core of the state-constructed Russian identity, in February of this year, the Russian State Duma adopted the bill on the “protection of the Russian language,” which significantly limits the use of non-Russian words (5) While being advertised as a law against anglicisms, the new legislation has the power to virtually prohibit the use of the numerous languages of the native populations of Russia without translations into Russian, says Gasan Guseinov, a professor at Free University (Svobodnyi Universitet), in an interview on TV Rain (6). It comes as no surprise that the Kremlin regime would undermine the status of Indigenous languages, as Vladimir Putin has openly mocked the Tatar language (7). The Russian regime’s efforts to erase diverse identities suggest that the adoption of this bill aimed at ‘purifying’ the Russian language by eliminating non-Russian words could serve to further undermine Indigenous identities by restricting their languages Moreover, the use of Indigenous languages by those opposing the war against Ukraine and the Kremlin’s regime as a whole indicates that this bill may also be intended to further suppress resistance within Russia.

status, the Russian authorities actively exploit the native communities extracting natural resources in nonRussian regions the profits for which are accumulated in the Russian capitals, official and cultural. Facing the shortage of manpower during first few months of the invasion against Ukraine, the Kremlin announced a mobilization,” and research has demonstrated that the mobilization disproportionately targeted Indigenous populations (4) Relying on the Russian language as the core of the state-constructed Russian identity, in February of this year, the Russian State Duma adopted the bill on the “protection of the Russian language,” which significantly limits the use of words (5). While being advertised as a law against anglicisms, the new legislation has the virtually prohibit the use numerous languages populations of Russia translations into Russian, says Guseinov, a at Free University (Svobodnyi in an interview on TV Rain (6) It comes as no surprise that the Kremlin regime would undermine the status of Indigenous languages, as Vladimir Putin has openly mocked the Tatar language (7). The Russian regime’s efforts to erase diverse identities suggest that the adoption of this bill aimed at ‘purifying’ the language by eliminating non-Russian words could serve to further undermine Indigenous identities by restricting their languages. Moreover, use of Indigenous languages by those opposing war against Ukraine and the Kremlin’s regime as a indicates that this bill may also be intended to further suppress resistance within Russia

The most immediate and intuitive form of resistance to the state-imposed russkii identity among Indigenous communities in Russia has been language and its incorporation into art. The ethnicization and politization of the Russian language, combined with the introduction of harsh censorship laws, further encourage ethnic minorities to turn to their native languages as a means and political resistance. In contrast to the Kremlin’s claims that being a native Russian inherently makes one an ethnic Russian, the use of another language actively rejects this narrative, distinguishing and separating an individual from the russkii identity the state seeks to impose. Moreover, speaking another language serves a safer form of protest: while Russian law prohibits calling the war what is—a war (voiina) or its antonym, peace ( ), no such restrictions apply to Russia’s other languages. Many in Russia have successfully integrated languages other than Russian into art. For artist Alisa (@alicehualice), a native of the Urals, created a costume of an angel the word peace written in thirteen languages of Russia’s ethnic minorities (8) She titled the piece “I’m Hearing the Voices of Russia” and posted it on her Instagram account on May 1, 2022 (9). The Chuvash artist Polina Osipova produced a digital artwork with the caption “We’re Against the War” in Chuvash, incorporating

The most immediate and intuitive form of resistance to the state-imposed russkii identity among Indigenous communities in Russia has been language and its incorporation into art The ethnicization and politization of the Russian language, combined with the introduction of harsh censorship laws, further encourage ethnic minorities to turn to their native languages as a means of cultural and political resistance. In contrast to the Kremlin’s claims that being a native Russian speaker inherently makes one an ethnic Russian, the use of another language actively rejects this narrative, distinguishing and separating an individual from the russkii identity the state seeks to impose. Moreover, speaking another language serves as a safer form of protest: while Russian law prohibits calling the war what it is—a war (voiina) or its antonym, peace (mir), no such restrictions apply to Russia’s other languages Many artists in Russia have successfully integrated languages other than Russian into their art. For instance, the artist Alisa Gorshenina (@alicehualice), a native of the Urals, created a costume of an angel with the word peace written in thirteen languages of Russia’s ethnic minorities (8). She titled the piece “I’m Hearing the Voices of Russia” and posted it on her Instagram account on May 1, 2022 (9). The Chuvash artist Polina Osipova produced a digital artwork with the caption “We’re Against the War” in Chuvash, incorporating

4 Sonia Savina and Katia Bonch-Osmolovskaia, “Kakiie regiony otdali bol’she vsego muzhchin na voiny,” Vazhnyie istorii, October 5, 2022, https://istories media/stories/2022/10/05/kakie-regioni-otdali-bolshe-vsego-muzhchin-na-voinu/

5 “Deputaty priniali v pervom chtenii zakonoproekt o zashchite russkogo iazyka,” Gosudarstvennaia Duma Federal’nogo Sobraniia Rosskiiskoi Federatsii, February 11, 2025, http://duma gov ru/news/60887/

4 Sonia and Katia Bonch-Osmolovskaia, “Kakiie regiony otdali bol’she vsego muzhchin na Vazhnyie istorii, October 5, 2022, https://istories media/stories/2022/10/05/kakie-regioni-otdali-bolshe-vsego-muzhchin-na-voinu/ 5 v chtenii o zashchite russkogo iazyka,” Gosudarstvennaia Duma Federal’nogo Sobraniia Rosskiiskoi Federatsii, 11, 2025, http://duma gov ru/news/60887/

6 “Samolet Trampa v Moskve Karlson Rabotaiet Na Putina? Vyveski Na Angliiskom Zapretiat” (TV Rain, February 11, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/live/lQAdR8PYyCw? si=4YEF6qpDvfGaOuYm

6 “Samolet Na Putina? Na Zapretiat” (TV Rain, February 2025), https://www.youtube.com/live/lQAdR8PYyCw? si=4YEF6qpDvfGaOuYm

7 Nail Bainazarov, “«Aipad Khaliava»: Kak Vladelets Zavedenii Tataro-Bashkirskoi Kukhni Pogovoril s Putinym,” Tatar Inform, April 21, 2022, ttps://www tatarinform ru/news/mne-poslysalos-aipad-xalyava-kak-vladelec-zavedenii-tataro-baskirskoi-kuxni-pogovoril-5863457.

7 Nail Bainazarov, “«Aipad Khaliava»: Kak Vladelets Zavedenii Tataro-Bashkirskoi Kukhni Pogovoril s Putinym,” Tatar April 21, 2022, ttps://www tatarru/news/mne-poslysalos-aipad-xalyava-kak-vladelec-zavedenii-tataro-baskirskoi-kuxni-pogovoril-5863457.

8 “‘Ia Vybiraiu Govorit’’ Khudozhnitsa Iz Nizhnego Tagila Prevratila Natsional’noe Iskusstvo v Antivoiennoie Vyskazivaniie.,” “7x7” Gorizontal’naya Rossiia, June 2, 2022, https://semnasem org/amp/articles/2022/06/02/ya-vybirayu-govorit-hudozhnica-iz-nizhnego-tagila-prevratila-nacionalnoe-iskusstvo-v-antivoennoe-vyskazyvanie

9 “‘Ia Vybiraiu Govorit’’ Khudozhnitsa Iz Nizhnego Tagila Prevratila Natsional’noe Iskusstvo v Antivoiennoie Vyskazivaniie.”

8 “‘Ia Govorit’’ Khudozhnitsa Nizhnego Tagila Prevratila v “7x7” Gorizontal’naya 2, 2022, 9 “‘Ia Vybiraiu Govorit’’ Khudozhnitsa Iz Nizhnego Tagila Prevratila Natsional’noe Iskusstvo v Antivoiennoie Vyskazivaniie.”

INTERNAL DECOLONIZATION:

INDIGENOUS

RESISTANCE AND IDENTITY

INTERNAL DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE AND IDENTITY

RECLAMATION IN RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN

Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

a figure in a traditional Chuvash headpiece called tukhia (10) The figure’s eyes reflect the colors of the Ukrainian flag, while part of the face is covered by an image of a white dove, a symbol of peace (11) Similarly, Sui Yumzhana, a visual artist and designer of Buriat-Chinese origin, encrypted the phrase “Let There Never Be War” on a canvas depicting a human hand holding a flower (12). Like other artists, she also uses yellow and blue in her work, signaling her support for Ukraine (13). Despite the neglect of the Russian government toward Indigenous communities and widespread loss of native languages, antiwar artists manage to find advantages to the existing situation—precisely the fact that the Russian authorities do not understand other languages and thus cannot police them as fiercely as Russian Sonia Ian, the founder of the online magazine Agasshin that posts antiwar art in Indigenous languages, comments: “This is Russia, [the authorities] can ban anything if they want […] But they might struggle to type out the words they want to ban [in minority languages]—I doubt they’ve even got the right letters downloaded onto their keyboards” (14). Along with art, music has served as another productive outlet for reasserting ethnic minorities’ identities Although they avoid direct political messages, the Tatar bands Aigel and Dyshatʹ , the Bashkir band AY YOLA, and the Chulym band OTYKEN, among many others, have been highly successful in producing songs in languages other than Russian. The themes of these songs vary among artists: bands like AY YOLA and OTYKEN incorporate historical figures into their music, while Aigel and Dyshatʹ appear to be paving the way for Tatar-language songs to enter mainstream culture. The increased use of minority languages in Russia, along with clear popular support for such artistic expressions, signals Indigenous peoples’ active efforts to reject the state-imposed russkii identity and reclaim their authentic identities

a figure in a traditional Chuvash headpiece called tukhia (10). The figure’s eyes reflect the colors of the Ukrainian flag, while part of the face is covered by an image of a white dove, a symbol of peace (11). Similarly, Sui Yumzhana, a visual and designer of Buriat-Chinese origin, encrypted the “Let There Never Be War” on a canvas depicting a human hand a flower (12) Like other artists, she also uses yellow and blue in her work, signaling her support for Ukraine (13) Despite the neglect of the Russian government toward Indigenous communities and widespread loss of native languages, antiwar artists manage find advantages to the existing situation—precisely the fact that the Russian authorities do not understand other languages and thus cannot police them fiercely as Russian. Sonia Ian, the of magazine that posts antiwar art in Indigenous languages, comments: “This is Russia, [the authorities] can ban anything if they want [ ] But they might to type out the words they want to ban [in minority languages]—I doubt they’ve even got the right letters downloaded onto their keyboards” (14). Along with art, music has served as another productive outlet for reasserting ethnic minorities’ identities. Although they avoid direct political messages, the Tatar bands Aigel and Dyshatʹ , the Bashkir band AY YOLA, and the Chulym band OTYKEN, among many others, have been successful in producing songs in languages other Russian. The themes of these songs vary among artists: bands like AY YOLA and incorporate historical figures into their music, while Aigel and Dyshatʹ appear to be paving the way for Tatar-language songs to enter mainstream culture The increased use of minority languages in Russia, along with clear popular support for such artistic expressions, signals Indigenous peoples’ active efforts reject the state-imposed russkii identity and reclaim their authentic identities.

Indigenous communities in Russia have also been actively involved in civic organization and minority advocacy. Although many of these initiatives were established prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, they gained significant prominence due to their vigorous advocacy for minority rights, particularly in response to the disproportionate mobilization of people from ethnic regions of Russia Organizations such as Asians of Russia (Asiaty Rossii), Indigenous of Russia, Free Yakutia Foundation, Free Buryatia Foundation (the first ethnic antiwar initiative), and numerous local groups have been at the forefront of protesting Russia’s recent imperialistic ambitions while also working to protect ethnic minorities from forced mobilization (15). These initiatives have also played a crucial role as mass media, disseminating fact-checked information about Indigenous peoples’ involvement in the ongoing war, debunking myths like the portrayal of “Putin’s fighting Buriats,” and focusing on journalistic efforts that highlight the issues and experiences of their regions (16) Additionally, these organizations have been tackling the issue of the cultural decolonization of ethnic minorities by implementing educational initiatives aimed at raising

communities in Russia also been actively involved in civic organization and minority advocacy Although many of these initiatives were established prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, they gained significant prominence due to their vigorous advocacy for minority rights, particularly in response the disproportionate mobilization of people from ethnic regions of Russia. Organizations such Asians of Russia (Asiaty ), Indigenous of Russia, Free Yakutia Foundation, Free Buryatia (the first antiwar initiative), and numerous groups forefront of protesting Russia’s recent ambitions while also working to protect ethnic minorities from forced mobilization (15) These initiatives have also played a crucial role as mass media, disseminating fact-checked information about Indigenous peoples’ involvement in the ongoing war, debunking myths like the portrayal of “Putin’s fighting Buriats,” and focusing on journalistic efforts that highlight the issues and experiences of their regions (16). Additionally, these organizations have been tackling the issue of the cultural decolonization of minorities by initiatives aimed at raising

10 Katie Davies, “Censored in Russian, Anti-War Activists Turn to Indigenous Languages,” The New Statesman, April 20, 2022, newstatesman

10 Katie Marie Davies, “Censored in Russian, Anti-War Activists Turn to Indigenous Languages,” The New Statesman, April 20, 2022, https://www newstatesman com/world/europe/2022/04/censored-in-russian-anti-war-activists-turn-to-indigenous-languages

15 “About Foundation,” Free Buryatia Foundation (blog), n d , https://www freeburyatia.org/about?lang=en.

16 “Buriaty v Buche - Glavnyi Mif Voiny,” @freeburyatiafoundation (Instagram) (blog), August 15, 2022, https://www.instagram com/p/ChRtvUzsJnU/?igsh=NHdjazRpZ2tzcG1n.

15 “About Foundation,” Free Buryatia Foundation (blog), n d , freeburyatia.org/about?lang=en. - Glavnyi @freeburyatiafoundation 15, 2022,

INTERNAL DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE AND IDENTITY RECLAMATION IN RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN

INTERNAL DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE AND IDENTITY

RECLAMATION IN RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN

Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

awareness and promoting cultural preservation. 2214, All-Buriat Association for the Development of Culture, in collaboration with the TV channel Buriad TV, launched a new reality show “Learn the Language,” in participants are tasked with basics of spoken Buriat within two months (17) Through these efforts, Indigenous communities in Russia have not only resisted but have also contributed significantly to the cultural and political discourse surrounding their rights, fostering greater awareness, solidarity, and the reclamation of their identity both within and outside their regions.

awareness and promoting cultural preservation In 2214, All-Buriat Association for the Development of Culture, in collaboration with the TV channel Buriad TV, launched a new reality show “Learn the Language,” in which participants are tasked with mastering the basics of spoken Buriat within two months (17). Through these efforts, Indigenous communities in Russia have not only resisted marginalization but have also contributed significantly to the cultural and political discourse surrounding their rights, fostering greater awareness, solidarity, and the reclamation of their identity both within and outside their regions.

Another powerful, the least safe, avenue for Indigenous resistance to the Russian regime has been direct action, specifically protest. Between August 3 16 , 2020, three hundred residents of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Russia, vehemently opposed the local authorities and their plans to quarry Kushtau shihan (hill) (18) The protests began as a response to the environmental and cultural threat posed by the proposed milestone extraction, which was seen as a violation of Indigenous rights and desecration of a sacred landmark (19). The protest was widely supported across Russia by local communities and Indigenous and environmental activists (20). Thankfully, Bashkorts managed to protect their land, and the extraction were halted (21). Yet, dozens protesters were arrested, many were injured, and several were sentenced to prison time for their involvement in the demonstrations (22) Another chain of protests, also in Bashkortostan, erupted on January 15 and 17 , 2024, in the cities of Baimak and Ufa, which became known as the Baimak case (Baimakskoie delo)

Another powerful, yet the least safe, avenue for Indigenous resistance to the Russian regime has been direct political action, specifically protest. Between August 3 and 16 , 2020, approximately three hundred residents of the Republic of Bashkortostan, Russia, vehemently opposed the local authorities and their plans to quarry Kushtau shihan (hill) (18). The protests began as a response to the environmental and cultural threat posed by the proposed milestone extraction, which was seen as a violation of Indigenous rights and a desecration of a sacred landmark (19) The protest was widely supported across Russia by local communities and Indigenous and environmental activists (20) Thankfully, Bashkorts managed to protect their land, and the extraction works were halted (21). Yet, dozens of protesters were arrested, many were injured, and several individuals were sentenced to prison time for their involvement in the demonstrations (22). Another chain of protests, also in Bashkortostan, erupted on January 15 and 17 , 2024, in the cities of Baimak and Ufa, which became known as the Baimak case (Baimakskoie delo) (23).

The local communities reacted strongly to the arrest of Failʹ Alsynov, a Bashkort activist, who was detained for his participation in a citizens’ gathering in the village of Ishmurzino, located in the Baimak district of Bashkortostan (24). The gathering had been organized to protest geological exploration work near the village (25). On January 15 , a court hearing took place for Alsynov’s case, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 individuals gathering in support of him (26). Next day, on January 16 , the activist was added to the list of extremists, and on January 17 , peaceful protesters gathered by the court building where Alsynov’s case was heard, faced a harsh crackdown from the local law enforcement (27) Over the next several days, clashes occurred between protesters and security forces, resulting in numerous detentions, and two protesters died (28). Estimates suggest that around 10,000 people took part in the protests, a significant number considering that the population of Baimak is approximately 17,700 (29).

The local communities reacted strongly to the arrest of Failʹ Alsynov, a Bashkort activist, who was detained for his participation in a citizens’ gathering in the village of Ishmurzino, located in the Baimak district of Bashkortostan (24). The gathering had to protest geological exploration work near the village (25) On January 15 , a court hearing took place for Alsynov’s case, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 individuals gathering in support of him (26) Next day, on January 16 , the activist was added to the list of extremists, and on January 17 , peaceful protesters gathered by the court building where Alsynov’s was heard, faced a harsh crackdown from the local law enforcement (27). Over the next several days, clashes occurred between protesters and security forces, resulting numerous detentions, and two protesters died (28). Estimates suggest that around 10,000 people took part in the protests, a number considering that the population of Baimak is approximately 17,700 (29)

17 “V Ulan-Ude Zapustili Realiti-Shou Po Izucheniiu Buriatskogo Iazyka,” Infpol, April 22, 2024, https://www.infpol.ru/261847-v-ulan-ude-zapustili-realiti-shou-po-izucheniyuburyatskogo-yazyka/

‘Sacred’ Russian Hill Halted Protests, Clashes,” Moscow Times, August 17, 2020, com/2020/08/17/mining-at-sacred-russian-

18 “Mining at ‘Sacred’ Russian Hill Halted After Protests, Clashes,” The Moscow Times, August 17, 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes com/2020/08/17/mining-at-sacred-russianhill-halted-after-protests-clashes-a71170

19 “Bashkortostan Court Sentences Kushtau Protester to 9 Years in Prison,” The Moscow Times, November 20, 2024, https://www themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/20/bashkortostancourt-sentences-kushtau-protester-to-9-years-in-prison-a87079

19 “Bashkortostan Court Sentences Kushtau to 9 Years in Prison,” The Moscow Times, November 20, 2024, https://www themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/20/bashkortostancourt-sentences-kushtau-protester-to-9-years-in-prison-a87079

20 “Mining at ‘Sacred’ Russian Hill Halted After Protests, Clashes.”

20 “Mining at ‘Sacred’ Russian Halted After Protests, Clashes.”

21 “Bashkortostan Court Sentences Kushtau Protester to 9 Years in Prison.”

“Bashkortostan Protester Years

22 “Bashkortostan Court Sentences Kushtau Protester to 9 Years in Prison.”

“Bashkortostan Protester to Years

23 Leyla Latypova, “The Baymak Case: Modern Russia’s Largest Political Trial,” The Moscow Times, December 26, 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes com/2024/12/26/thebaymak-case-modern-russias-largest-political-trial-a87355

24 Latypova

25 Latypova

26 Latypova

27 Latypova

28 Latypova

INTERNAL DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE AND IDENTITY

RECLAMATION IN RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN

Diana Avdeeva (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

These protests showcase the growing resilience of Indigenous communities in Russia, who resist state-led environmental degradation, the violation of their cultural heritage, and the erasure of their identities, despite the risks and harsh consequences they face.

These protests showcase the growing resilience of Indigenous in Russia, who resist state-led environmental degradation, the violation of their cultural heritage, and the erasure of their identities, despite the and harsh consequences they face.

The goal of the present research extends beyond a mere analysis of Indigenous peoples’ resistance to the Kremlin’s regime and the commendable efforts of ethnic minorities to reclaim their identities and restore their agency While the author recognizes the power of research in itself, this work aims to highlight, showcase, and further elevate the position of minority communities in Russia, contributing to their visibility and amplifying their voices in the ongoing conversation. This paper also calls for a more thoughtful and deliberate use of terms such as russkii (ethnic Russian or related to ethnic Russians), rossiiskii (belonging to Russia as a state) and rossiianin (a Russian citizen), and russkogovoriashchii (Russian-speaking). Furthermore, given that this discussion is conducted in English, it is important to advocate for a more conscious use of the term “Russian” as well Due to the unique ethnic and cultural diversity within Russia, it would be correct and just to treat the term “Russian” in a manner similar to how the term “American” is used to refer to individuals namely, as a designation of citizenship rather than ethnicity. This distinction, the author argues, is essential for fostering a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of the population of Russia, one that emphasizes and amplifies Indigenous voices within the broader national context.

The goal of the present research extends beyond a mere analysis of Indigenous peoples’ resistance to the Kremlin’s regime and the commendable efforts of ethnic minorities to reclaim their identities and restore their agency. While the author recognizes the power of research itself, this work highlight, showcase, and further elevate the position of minority communities in Russia, contributing to their visibility and amplifying voices in the ongoing This paper also calls a more thoughtful and deliberate use of terms such as russkii (ethnic Russian or related to ethnic Russians), rossiiskii (belonging to Russia as a state) and rossiianin Russian citizen), and russkogovoriashchii (Russian-speaking). Furthermore, given that this discussion is conducted in English, it is important to advocate for a more conscious use of the term “Russian” as well. Due to the unique ethnic and cultural diversity within Russia, would be correct and just to treat the term “Russian” in a similar to how the term “American” is used to namely, as a designation of rather than ethnicity This distinction, the author argues, is essential for fostering a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of the population of Russia, one that emphasizes and amplifies Indigenous voices within the broader national context.

Indigenous communities in Russia have faced a prolonged and multifaceted struggle to assert their identities in the face of a state-imposed homogenizing russkii identity. The Russian government’s efforts to consolidate ethnic Russian nationalism under the guise of russkii mir have marginalized Indigenous populations, limiting their cultural, linguistic, and political expression. However, these communities have persistently resisted by revitalizing their native languages, engaging in political advocacy, and producing art and music that asserts their distinct identities Despite state-sponsored efforts to suppress minority languages and further consolidate power, these forms of resistance continue to be powerful tools for asserting Indigenous rights and autonomy. The protests, legal battles, and cultural revitalization efforts provide a crucial counter-narrative to the Kremlin’s attempts to erase ethnic diversity within its borders. Moreover, the struggle for recognition and agency extends beyond cultural revival; it encompasses direct political action, which exposes the deep-rooted issues within the regime’s treatment of its diverse population As the Russian government pursues an increasingly oppressive agenda, Indigenous communities’ resilience highlights the significance of reclaiming their identities and demanding equal representation. This paper not only underscores the importance of Indigenous resistance within Russia but also calls for a broader understanding of Russian identity that acknowledges and embraces the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity. The reclamation of Indigenous voices, through language, art, activism, and protest, challenges the Kremlin’s vision of Russia in which ethnic Russians are considered essential for the state, offering a more inclusive and diverse narrative that reflects the true nature of Russia

Indigenous in Russia have faced a prolonged and multifaceted struggle to assert their identities in of a homogenizing russkii identity. The Russian government’s efforts to consolidate ethnic Russian nationalism under the guise of russkii mir marginalized Indigenous populations, limiting their cultural, linguistic, and political expression. However, these communities have persistently resisted by revitalizing their native languages, engaging in political advocacy, and producing art and that their distinct identities. Despite state-sponsored efforts to suppress minority languages and further consolidate these forms of resistance continue to be powerful tools for asserting Indigenous rights and autonomy. The legal battles, and revitalization efforts provide a crucial counter-narrative to the Kremlin’s attempts to erase ethnic within its borders Moreover, the struggle for recognition and agency extends beyond cultural revival; it encompasses direct political action, which exposes the deep-rooted issues within the regime’s treatment of its diverse population. As the government pursues an increasingly oppressive agenda, Indigenous communities’ resilience highlights the significance of reclaiming their identities and demanding equal paper not only underscores importance of Indigenous resistance within Russia but also calls for a broader understanding of Russian that and embraces the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity The reclamation of Indigenous voices, through language, art, activism, and protest, challenges the Kremlin’s vision of Russia in which ethnic Russians are considered essential for the state, offering a more inclusive and diverse narrative that reflects the true nature of Russia.

RUSSIA’S WAR BLOGGERS AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University) Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

Russia’s war in Ukraine is one of the most documented invasions where the potential of social media is realized to an extent previously unseen before (The Economist 2022). With the ubiquity of social media commentary of the war, it is increasingly important to pay attention to how disinformation spreads in untraditional networks, thus, escaping the macro sphere of official state communication and rather coming into contact with individuals on a seemingly personal micro level (Bjola and Papadakis 2020, 644–645) Russian state-backed media are well known for their particular attention to Ukraine in recent years, disseminating scrupulously crafted narratives, for example, about biological weapons labs in Ukraine and an illegitimate nazi government in Kyiv (Jowett and O’Donnell 2015, 330). However, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, another actor in the information environment has appeared which was not so popular during the events of 2014 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea: Russia’s military bloggers or voenkory. The aim of this study is to see what reaction to the potential peace prospects in Ukraine the Russian war bloggers have shown, if any, through the analysis of topics, narratives and emotion in their Telegram posts.

Context

Russian military bloggers or war correspondents are not part of the state media ecosystem as they respond to the barrage of information one can see online regarding the events on the frontline in Ukraine, thus, sometimes reacting faster than the propagandists can. Sometimes they contradict or criticize the state purported narratives. A prominent example of this was the rise and fall of Igor Girkin who rose to fame as a blogger in 2015, but after criticising the apparent Russian military weakness in 2022, was later arrested in 2023 for deviating too much from the state narrative (Osborn 2023) Their rise can be partially tied to the emergence of Telegram as an alternative social media platform to Facebook or X, because it has evaded bans, despite a brief period of being off limits in 2018-2020 (Oleinik 2024). According to polls 19% Russians consider Telegram channels to be the principal source of their information regarding the war in Ukraine (Levada 2023) and 39% of Ukrainians do so (KIIS 2023). It is likely to remain an alternative channel to traditional media and is gaining popularity in comparison to alternatives like VKontakte, because Telegram is much harder to censor or limit by design The channels and chats are set up in a way that makes it impossible to algorithmically search, filter and easily find links between messages (Urman, Ho, and Katz 2021).

However, there is not much academic literature investigating the relationship between voenkory and the Kremlin. Several war bloggers have ended up writing posts on Telegram and sharing stories there after some exposure to journalism in conventional media agencies in Russia, like in the case of Boris Rozhin or Anastasia Kashevarova (Propastop 2024) Moreover, there is some doubt over the meaning of treating them as anything else than journalists sharing posts on social media, for example, given a study that shows

RUSSIA’S WAR BLOGGERS AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University) Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

how consumption of social media in Russia is associated with even greater support towards state-backed narratives and implying that consumers of social media do not sway towards criticising the Kremlin more (Oleinik and Paniotto 2024).

Some parallels can even be drawn between war correspondents and Russian state media in terms of how they operate. Russian news channels in 2014 shared what Grene and Robertson have called the “Crimea moment” where news became entertainment and people chose to watch Soloviev over reality TV (Greene and Robertson 2022, 41). One could see war correspondents in a similar manner providing engaging content in real time, thus creating the perceived effect of being present on the battlefield. Moreover, in the traditional media, the Kremlin carefully curates content so that it emotionally affects the audience in a way that makes them more supportive of the existing regime (ibid 44) Hence, this paper borrows the idea from Greene and Robertson about emotional affects in Russian pro-war narratives and aims to analyze various Telegram channels belonging to Russian military bloggers in order to establish the main topics of discussion, narratives, and their emotional effects.

Methodology

In order to assess the topics, narratives and emotions associated with each post, a limited number of posts for 5 Russian war-blogging channels were selected for this research (Table 1). More specifically, the paper assesses 500 most popular messages by views in February and January. Only messages containing text by the author of the channel were taken into account and no direct re-posts were counted. The data were collected from tgstat ru, where the appropriate channels were chosen by the number of followers and their function as war blogging sites (Tgstat Ru 2025) Arguably one exception to this rule is Soloviev, who is a TV news anchor, however, his channel was selected to see if there are notable differences and due to his high membership numbers, as well as the similar nature of his posts.

RUSSIA’S WAR BLOGGERS AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University) Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

The problem with larger quantitative studies looking at narratives over larger periods of time is that they do not account for the fluid and changing nature of narratives and their subtle references to past or current events (Gerard et al. 2024, 3). To avoid this issue, this study focuses on a smaller sample of posts and manually labels them based on an inductive and evolving approach, rather than a deductive one In other words, narrative and cluster numbers are adjusted after analyzing messages several times and seeing how they relate to each other as time goes on. A similar approach, although with a larger sample size, has been undertaken studying the media coverage of the war in Ukraine in 2014 (Nygren et al. 2018, 5).

To establish what topics and narratives are discussed in each message, rather than coding just a few words or phrases, the idea is to look at the whole text in each post and then ascribe topic, narrative and emotion codes to it, which utilizes an idea used in similar studies where shorter media messages are analyzed (Miranda et al. 2018; Pu et al. 2019). Where it was not possible to link any narrative, topic or emotion, the data cells were left empty. Certainly one of the drawbacks of this paper is that it does not consider visual files often associated with the text messages on Telegram, which should be addressed in future studies.

There is a growing field of analyzing emotions and states of affect that are expressed through language in social media posts (Geronikolou, Drosatos, and Chrousos 2021) Choosing an emotional model by which the messages are coded is up to the authors of each study, although many can be traced to Ekman’s six basic emotions (Ekman 1992). However, Robert Plutchik’s wheel of emotions allows for a more fine grained understanding of how the six basic emotions (insert) are related to other models in terms of their affect (Plutchik 1991, 110). The wheel is based on the assumption that texts can express more than just one emotion and the level of intensity of these emotions also matters to how they should be coded in a study such as this one (Molina Beltrán et al 2019) In this paper the following eight emotions are observed: joy, trust, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, and anticipation.

Results

The Russian military bloggers discuss a variety of topics related to the war and the political front (Fig. 1) As expected, most posts, which were simply coded as discussing “war”, mentioned the tactical situation on the front and shared footage on war outcomes, as well as maps and other information. However, a significant number of the posts went on to characterize the Trump-Zelensky relationship, discussed Zelensky’s authority and delved into Ukraine’s war crimes and alleged Nazi status (1).

RUSSIA’S WAR BLOGGERS AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University) Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

When it comes to the specific narratives purported, Russian war bloggers most frequently referred to tropes like “Russia is winning the war” or that there had been a “war victory”, which in this dataset were coded as narratives in more specific geographic terms to better signal what the posts were focused on (Figure 2). Visibly, most attention was dedicated to Russia’s success in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk. The narratives correspond to what one would expect in what turned out to be the most frequently encountered emotions in the posts (Figure 3) Most often the bloggers would focus on positive coverage of events, celebrating events on the battlefield in a joyful manner or anticipating more “liberation” to come.

Interestingly, when looking at the sheer number of posts concerning potential peace prospects or a ceasefire, one does not find that much discourse surrounding that. The war bloggers were more likely to discuss narratives vaguely linked to that, like pointing to Europe’s irrelevance in peace talks, angrily pointing to Zelensky’s supposedly authoritarian status and voicing concerns about Ukraine’s lack of willingness to a ceasefire. In other words, nothing in the Telegram posts pointed to a willingness to sincerely accept peace proposals. What is more, many of the posts mimicked language or directly cited factually false information purported by the US president Donald Trump or the Vice-president J.D. Vance.

Lastly, to try and see what the audience not only views most but also engages with more, a simple regression with dummy variables was run, each of them denoting one of the eight emotions analyzed in this study or a mention of leaders like Trump, Zelenksy or Putin, and peace talks. Interestingly, while not statistically significant, one can at least discern an either positive or negative trend in the likelihood for the post to be reacted with in the form of likes and emojis Notably, the most statistically significant effect on reactions to posts at the 0.05 level concern joy as an emotion and

RUSSIA’S WAR BLOGGERS AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

the mention of Zelensky. While statistically significant only on the 0.10 level, fear seems to have the largest positive effect on the likelihood of reactions.

Discussion

The lack of a serious contemplation about peace prospects in Ukraine or the cessation of hostilities alongside the joyful language in Telegram posts by the Russian war bloggers provides at least a glimpse into the public opinion of those who follow the war in Russia most closely. The evidence presented in this paper does not show any dissent towards the way the Russian government is conducting the war at this stage This paper also confirms some findings in previous studies that point to the topics of discussion on these channels to mostly stick to just the topic of war itself and not necessarily deeper introspections about the reasons behind it or its effects on the domestic situation in Russia (Oleinik 2024, 374). Future studies could build on some of the findings regarding how the bloggers’ use of the US information sphere and reflect it in their own terms that are useful for either mocking the West or Ukraine. Due to the limited nature of this study, the differences in coverage by the voenkory between Trump’s administration and Biden’s could not be compared, although, that is a relevant question, given the prominence and positive attitude towards the US evidenced in the analysis of emotions and narratives concerning Trump’s and Zelensky’s relationship.

Bibliography

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Bjola, Corneliu, and Krysianna Papadakis. 2020. “Digital Propaganda, Counterpublics and the Disruption of the Public Sphere: The Finnish Approach to Building Digital Resilience.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33 (5): 638–66 https://doi org/10.1080/09557571 2019.1704221

RUSSIA’S WAR BLOGGERS AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University) Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

Ekman, Paul. 1992. “Are There Basic Emotions?” Psychological Review 99 (3): 550–53. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.99.3.550.

Gerard, Patrick, Svitlana Volkova, Louis Penafiel, Kristina Lerman, and Tim Weninger 2024. “Modeling Information Narrative Detection and Evolution on Telegram during the Russia-Ukraine War.” arXiv https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2409.07684.

Geronikolou, Styliani, George Drosatos, and George Chrousos. 2021. “Emotional Analysis of Twitter Posts During the First Phase of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece: Infoveillance Study.” JMIR Formative Research 5 (9): e27741 https://doi.org/10 2196/27741.

Greene, Samuel A., and Graeme Robertson. 2022. “Affect and Autocracy: Emotions and Attitudes in Russia after Crimea.” Perspectives on Politics 20 (1): 38–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720002339.

Jowett, Garth S , and Victoria O’Donnell 2015 Propaganda & Persuasion. 6th ed. Thousand Oaks (Calif ): Sage

KIIS. 2023. “Прес

2023. https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1132.

Levada 2023 “Conflict with Ukraine: Assessments for February 2023.” Levada March 13, 2023. https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/03/13/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-february-2023/

Miranda, Sebastião, Artūrs Znotiņš, Shay B. Cohen, and Guntis Barzdins. 2018. “Multilingual Clustering of Streaming News.” arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.1809.00540.

Molina Beltrán, Carlos, Alejandra Andrea Segura Navarrete, Christian Vidal-Castro, Clemente RubioManzano, and Claudia Martínez-Araneda. 2019. “Improving the Affective Analysis in Texts: Automatic Method to Detect Affective Intensity in Lexicons Based on Plutchik’s Wheel of Emotions.” The Electronic Library 37 (6): 984–1006. https://doi.org/10.1108/EL-11-2018-0219.

Nandwani, Pansy, and Rupali Verma 2021. “A Review on Sentiment Analysis and Emotion Detection from Text ” Social Network Analysis and Mining 11 (1): 81 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-021-007766.

RUSSIA’S WAR BLOGGERS AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN UKRAINE

Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University) Kristofers Krumins (Georgetown University)

Nygren, Gunnar, Michal Glowacki, Jöran Hök, Ilya Kiria, Dariya Orlova, and Daria Taradai. 2018. “Journalism in the Crossfire: Media Coverage of the War in Ukraine in 2014.” Journalism Studies 19 (7): 1059–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1251332.

Oleinik, Anton 2024 “Telegram Channels Covering Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: A Comparative Analysis of Large Multilingual Corpora.” Journal of Computational Social Science 7 (1): 361–84. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42001-023-00240-9.

Oleinik, Anton, and Volodymyr Paniotto. 2024. “Propaganda Channels and Their Comparative Effectiveness: The Case of Russia’s War in Ukraine.” International Sociology 39 (3): 217–40. https://doi org/10 1177/02685809241232637.

Osborn, Andrew. 2023. “Pro-War Nationalist Putin Critic Girkin Charged with Inciting Extremism.” Reuters, July 22, 2023, sec. Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-investigators-detainpro-war-nationalist-puti n-critic-igor-girkin-wife-2023-07-21/.

Plutchik, Robert 1991 The Emotions 1st ed Blue Ridge Summit: University Press of America, Incorporated

Propastop. 2024. “Who Are Russian War Bloggers and Why Is It Worth Reading Them? – Propastop.” April 11, 2024. https://www.propastop.org/en/2024/04/11/who-are-russian-war-bloggers-and-why-is-itwor th-reading-them/.

Pu, Xiaojia, Gangshan Wu, and Chunfeng Yuan 2019. “Exploring Overall Opinions for Document Level Sentiment Classification with Structural SVM.” Multimedia Systems 25 (1): 21–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00530-017-0550-0.

“Tgstat.Ru.” 2025. Telegram Channels and Groups Catalog. tgstat. March 2025. https://tgstat ru/en/politics

The Economist. 2022. “The Invasion of Ukraine Is Not the First Social Media War, but It Is the Most Viral,” April 2, 2022. https://www.economist.com/international/the-invasion-of-ukraine-is-not-the-firstsocial-me dia-war-but-it-is-the-most-viral/21808456.

Urman, Aleksandra, Justin Chun-ting Ho, and Stefan Katz 2021 “Analyzing Protest Mobilization on Telegram: The Case of 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong.” Edited by Chang Sup Park. PLOS ONE 16 (10): e0256675. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256675.

RUSSIA’S

RUSSIA’S AFFINITY

AFFINITY FOR IMMORTALITY

FOR IMMORTALITY

Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University) Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University)

In February 2024, Putin announced in his annual State of the Nation address a series of projects geared towards improving quality of life and birth rates (1). Alongside projects titled “Family” and “Long and Active Life” (2), the “New Health-Saving Technologies” project was announced (Reiter et al. 2024). The vision is that the “government would invest in technology that prevents cellular ageing, neurotechnologies, and other innovations aimed at ensuring longevity” (3) The initiative would fund the “development of medical products aimed at reducing the burden of cellular ageing (sarcopenia, asthenia, osteoporosis, etc.)” alongside “new neurotechnologies and related medical projects aimed at the prevention and development of cognitive and sensory impairments” (4).

According to scientists interviewed by Meduza and Systema (5, 6), news of the project came without warning More alarmingly, the same experts struggled to understand this new national goal: “Sarcopenia and asthenia are very important medical problems in countries where people live to old age, but in Russia, unfortunately, many people, especially men, don’t even make it to pension age.”

What on the surface appears to be a meaningless national project is rooted in over a century of Russian and Soviet science and history. Moreover, the similarities between the conditions in which this research surged in popularity reveal how Russia has responded to the demographic crises it has experienced over the last century, and how it has now turned to war and the exploitation of science and genetics.

Origins of the National Project

Sources close to the Kremlin (Reiter et al. 2024) have suggested that Mikhail Kovalchuk is responsible for this project (7) Mikhail Kovalchuk (b 1946) is a Russian physicist and Director of the Kurchatov Institute. He oversees Russia’s genetic research programme, and a propagator of conspiracy: he claimed the existence of biological weapons exclusively designed to target Russians, has warned Russian lawmakers of a “new subspecies of humans, purportedly created in the US”, and launched a project to decode “the mysteries of the Russian genome” (8). He has also had a lifelong obsession with immortality.

In Kovalchuk’s 2011 paper Convergence of Sciences and Technologies, he spells out his vision of the future of science, calling for a “return to the united perception of nature”. This call to return is a callback

1 TASS “Putin Announces Launch of New National Projects in Annual Speech to Parliament.” Accessed December 16, 2024. https://tass.com/politics/1753909

2 President of Russia “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, ” February 29, 2024 http://en kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73585

3 Reiter, S , Titov, S , Panyushkin, V , & Systema (2024, September 5) Bridges, roads, education Immortality! Russia’s newest national project Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty https://www rferl org/a/putin-russia-immortality-aging-science-health/33104121 html

4 ibid

5 Reiter, S , Titov, S Who wants to live forever? Inside the Russian authorities ’ plan to develop anti-aging technology even as they keep sending soldiers to die in droves (2024, September 3 ) Meduza Retrieved December 14, 2024, from https://meduza io/en/feature/2024/09/03/who-wants-to-live-forever https://meduza io/en/feature/2020/04/29/putin-seldest-daughter-is-set-to-become-the-curator-of-a-russian-genome-project-rosneft-could-inv est-up-to-a-billion-dollars-in-the-venture

6 Reiter, S , Titov, S , Panyushkin, V , & Systema (2024, September 5) Bridges, roads, education Immortality!

7 Reiter, S , Titov, S Who wants to live forever? Inside the Russian authorities’ plan to develop anti-aging technology even as they keep sending soldiers to die in droves

8 Reiter, S , Titov, S Who wants to live forever? Inside the Russian authorities’ plan to develop anti-aging technology even as they keep sending soldiers to die in droves

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AFFINITY FOR IMMORTALITY RUSSIA’S AFFINITY FOR IMMORTALITY

Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University) Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University)

to the philosophy of science within the Soviet Union. Kovalchuk’s obsession with the Russian genome, with a united perception of nature, and longevity is evidence of the continued legacy of Soviet science today. Understanding Russia’s obsession with immortality and the plethora of published utopian scientific theories, inventions, and promises speaks to the unique role that science has played in the creation of national identity both within the Soviet Union and Russia today. His national longevity project acts as a portal into science that took place nearly a century ago, under conditions that are not so different from the past.

Immortality: Soviet Style

During and after the Bolshevik revolution, every aspect of life was transformed: Russia's scientific body was not immune to this. How science was conducted in the State could not have changed more radically, distancing itself from its past and neighbours.

The Bolshevik revolution coincided with a revolution across Western Europe in life sciences and, more importantly for science generally, a revolution in scale. As coined by De Solla Price, it was in the early 1920s that the world started to transition from ‘Small Science’ into ‘Big Science’, moving away from the individual conducting experiments towards institutions of scale, with substantial funding from wealthy patrons or government institutions (9). The combination of well-educated scientists and an ambitious state would transform the nation from a modest scientific community to one of the great scientific research centres. It was the foundation of Russia’s reputation for its physics, mathematics, chemistry, and biology prowess. The unique role of science in the state differentiated the Soviet Union materially from Europe, where trending or more eclectic scientific research was more likely to be pushed along by private patrons (10). What made the case of the Soviet Union so unique was the cultural landscape in which this fascinating development was taking place: one with dreams of a “new world” in the face of mass destruction and universal, militant atheism and materialism. While scientists in the rest of the world had to navigate the religious sensibilities of those supporting their work and the public, science replaced religion in the Soviet Union.

The Decade of Death

During World War I, an estimated 5.5 million Russian soldiers were killed and wounded, alongside 3 million imprisoned and 1.1 million disabled. An estimated eight to ten million, predominantly civilians, would then go on to die in or as a consequence of the Civil War (1918 - 1920) (11). Following the civil

9 Price, D J D S (2019) Little science, big science Columbia University Press https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7312/pric91844/html? lang=en&srsltid=AfmBOorbJsc4tkUfaO6xnr8hZ0dVTCFSFfJz3FHAIA 8gW4rxFkCGUG3j

10 Krementsov, N L (2014) Revolutionary experiments: The quest for immortality in Bolshevik science and fiction. 26 11 War Losses (Russian empire) / 1 0 / handbook (n d ) 1914-1918-Online (WW1) Encyclopedia Retrieved December 14, 2024, from https://encyclopedia 1914-1918online net/article/war-losses-russian-empire/

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RUSSIA’S AFFINITY

AFFINITY FOR IMMORTALITY

FOR IMMORTALITY

Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University) Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University)

war, the breakdown of infrastructure and a drought that ripped through Russia created a famine that resulted in the deaths of millions more. Within a decade, fifteen to twenty million, out of a population of 140 million, died of unnatural causes. Hence, the name ‘the decade of death’ (12). It was in the shadow of death that the pursuit of immortality blossomed under a shared vision of renewal and revival.

Immortality

Almost every aspect of research into immortality before Stalin rose to power sets a precedent for almost all the iconic technologies we associate with immortality today. The iconic cryogenic chamber finds its origins in the research of Soviet Zoologist Petr Schmidt, who was the first to witness anabiosis (suspended animation) in worms (13, 14)

Like in the rest of Europe, the immortality craze gripped the new Bolshevik state. However, unlike many nations in Western Europe, it would lay the foundation for the key role of science in the construction of national identity in the coming decades. As research in genetics exploded, mankind saw a future in which they could control life itself (15). In the Soviet Union, under the belief that the environment shaped the person and their traits, the New Soviet Man was born.

The New Soviet Man

As the life sciences experienced a revolution, scientists were seen as holding the keys to improving the human race. As summarised by Fritzsche and Hellbeck; “At the turn of the twentieth century, it was technological and scientific advancement, rather than revolutionary virtue, that invigorated the construction projects of collective subjectivity. Engineers, scientists, and intellectuals assembled an array of efficient and eugenic bodies designed to overcome degenerative cycles of history” (16). The wave of ideas about the new man sweeping across Europe cannot be separated from the rapidly proliferating field of eugenics; the Soviet Union was no exception to this. Soviet scientists thought that only the experimental life sciences with their “gigantic successes” were capable of discovering “true” human nature and means to better it (17)

12 Krementsov, N L (2014)

from http://www kamchatsky-krai ru/biography/shmidt html

14 Krementsov, N L (2014) Revolutionary experiments: The quest for immortality in Bolshevik science and fiction. 18

15 “Genetic Timeline ” NIH, n d https://www genome.gov/Pages/Education/GeneticTimeline pdf

16 Fritzsche, P , & Hellback, J (2009) The New Man in Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany In S Fitzpatrick and M Geyer, Beyond Totalitarianism Stalinism and Nazism Compared (pp 302–341) Cambridge University Press

17 Howell, Yvonne, and Nikolai Krementsov The Art and Science of Making the New Man in Early 20th-Century Russia Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2021. 91

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Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University) Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University)

The concept of the “Soviet man” has a dramatic history. The Soviet Man was the protagonist of Socialist Realism: his muscular physique and piercing gaze graced countless medals, paintings, and statues. As Soboleva describes, “ the ‘New Man’ concept did not refer to the individual, but rather to the working class and society as a whole. The social body was supposed to be renewed according to new, progressive, communist ideas The New Man was a collective product: positive features were consequently added and compounded in the distinct portrait of the new Soviet human being” (18). Although conceptions of what the New Man should be like were grounded in ideology, science played a key role in forming the New Man.

In Moscow, a key driver of this movement was Nikolai Koltsov (1872-1940). Koltsov spearheaded research in rejuvenation in Russia and founded the Institute for Experimental Biology. The Institute was also a hub for eugenics research in the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that the same institute that housed research on longevity housed eugenics research. The role of eugenics in Russia and the Soviet Union, across imperial and socialist rule, was fused to specific local and national factors, especially the unique demographics issue, which differentiated it from other countries (19). As Bardzinski describes, “imperial Russia lacked the demographic conditions that launched eugenic policies in Western Europe. Hundreds of thousands of casualties of the Great War and then the Bolshevik revolution aggravated Russia’s demographic situation” (20). Notions of ethnic purity that were foundational to eugenics in Western Europe found little appeal in Russia. In fact, after the First International Eugenics Congress in London (1912), Isaac Shklovski wrote:

“All those, purportedly scientific, data, upon which the doctrine of higher and lower races is based, cannot withstand criticism, for the very simple reason that anthropology knows of no pure race” (21).

This gap between eugenics in Western Europe and Russia would only grow after the Bolshevik Revolution. Where the idea of the New Man would recede to the intellectual margins of Europe, “the notion of fashioning new beings out of nature acquired more and more urgency (22)

Russia’s Demographics Today

Russia and the Soviet Union have been defined by their demographic issues for the last century. Low birth rates, combined with high adult mortality rates, have resulted in Russia’s present-day crisis. Not only is there high adult mortality, but Russia also has one of the greatest gender imbalances in the world, with

18 Soboleva, M (2017) The concept of the “new soviet man” and its short history Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 51(1), 64–85. https://doi org/10.1163/22102396-05101012

19 Пчелов, Е В (2022) Н К Кольцовирусскоеевгеническоедвижение, “природа ” Priroda, 7, 18–25. https://doi org/10.7868/S0032874X22070031

20 Bardziński, F (2013) The Concept of the “New Soviet Man” As a Eugenic Project: Eugenics in Soviet Russia after World War II Ethics in Progress, 4(1), 57–81. 61

21 Krementsov, N 1996 Stalinist Science Princeton: Princeton University Press , (2010) “Eugenics in Russia and the Soviet Union” In: A Bashford and Ph Levine (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press

22 Fritzsche, P , & Hellback, J (2009) The New Man in Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany In S Fitzpatrick and M Geyer, Beyond Totalitarianism Stalinism and Nazism Compared (pp 302–341) Cambridge University Press 305

RUSSIA’S

AFFINITY FOR IMMORTALITY

Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University) Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University)

nearly 15 per cent more women than men. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine is only set to increase this discrepancy (23). As Goble described in The Eurasian Daily Monitor at the Jamestown Foundation, “those Russian men who do indeed manage to return will experience enormous problems,” due to PTSD and health issues incurred by war, and this mental health crisis will likely lead to an increase in substance abuse, domestic abuse, and a “proliferation of crime waves similar to those that followed the Afghan and Chechen wars.” Russia’s war in Ukraine has already led to a measurable surge in alcohol consumption in Russia, with 2.3 billion litres sold of hard alcohol this year, breaking the previous record of 2.2 billion in 2022 (24). Russia has had a demographic crisis for the last century, and the current war will exacerbate it further.

Decoding the Russian Genome

In March 2020, Rosneft agreed with the Russian government to create a “comprehensive research in genetic technologies " centre. ” BBC Russia reported that Rosneft plans to invest in the project until 2027, and spend between $500 million and $1 billion on the research center. The “Genome of Russians” project aims to create a complete genetic analysis of Russia’s residents. According to the report, researchers behind the project are interested in identifying any “genetic defects” that could be typical of the Russian ethnic group, with the idea that these could then be corrected.

The creation of this project took place shortly after Putin decreed in an address in 2019 that all Russians are to be assigned “genetic passports” by 2025 under the national chemical and biological security strategy (25). The reasoning that Putin offers is to improve management of public health and create “conditions for conducting genetic passportization of the population, developing technologies for screening the gene pools of humans, animals and plants” (26).

Ahead of the 2019 St Petersburg International Economic Forum, the head of the Academy of Sciences, Alexander Sergeyev, said that “the most important and interesting project considered by representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Military Academy, is the so-called Genetic Passport of a soldier (27) “The project is far-reaching, scientific, and fundamental Its essence is to find such genetic predispositions among military personnel, which allow them to be properly oriented according to military specialties.”

23 “Ukrainian War Increasing Gender Imbalance in Russia, Threatening Future ” Accessed December 16, 2024 https://jamestown.org/program/ukrainian-war-increasing-genderimbalance-in-russia-threatening-future/

24 “Russia Faces Spike in Crime and Alcoholism as War Nears Two-Year Mark ” Accessed December 16, 2024. https://jamestown.org/program/russia-faces-spike-in-crime-andalcoholism-as-war-nears-two-year-mark/

25 УказПрезидентаРоссийскойФедерацииот 11.03 2019 г № 97 (2019) ПрезидентРоссии. http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/44066

26 Уроссиянмогутпоявитьсягенетическиепаспорта (2019, April 9) РБК https://www.rbc ru/society/09/04/2019/5ca72ca29a7947fd6d24a96f

27 Doffman, Z (2019) Russia will genetically test soldiers to identify the best fighters and thinkers Forbes https://www forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/06/08/russias-newgenetic-military-passports-will-sort-the-fighters-from-the-thinkers/

RUSSIA’S AFFINITY FOR IMMORTALITY RUSSIA’S AFFINITY FOR IMMORTALITY

Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University) Adriane Longhurst (Georgetown University)

Today, genetics' role in Russia is multidimensional: it is being used to define the ‘true Russian’ and create and mold the ‘new Russian’ just as the ‘New Man’ was made. Although Putin may not be setting out to produce immortal soldiers, much of the same thinking and research that stemmed from research into immortality plays a role in today’s exploitation of biology in Russia. Science should not be underestimated in its role in national identity, especially in Russia Picking at the loose thread that this national project first appeared as has revealed a web that interconnects Russia's past and present, through the people who wanted to live forever.

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

William Faulkner: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”

William Faulkner: “The past is never dead. It’s even past.”

Ethnic minorities of the Russian Federation have taken heavy toll in the wake of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as the war mobilization disproportionately 2023) Research has been focused on the study of the propaganda at the national overlooking the ethnic republics and the pro-war propaganda toolkit based on the identities of indigeneity. This paper attempts to examine the case of the co-optation of the recruit songs in the context of the Chuvashia Republic.

Ethnic minorities of the Russian Federation have taken a heavy toll in the wake of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine as the war mobilization disproportionately affected them. (V’yushkova, 2023) Research has been focused on the study of the propaganda at the national level overlooking the ethnic republics and the pro-war propaganda toolkit based on the identities of indigeneity. This paper attempts to examine the case of the co-optation of the recruit songs in the context of the Chuvashia Republic.

Recruit (soldier) songs [in Chuvash: “nikrut (saltak) yurrisem”] a special genre of songs performed during farewell ceremony of the for the service. In the Czarist army, recruits had to serve twenty years Thus, the had a funeral-like atmosphere full of lament The conditions changed significantly through the course of history, but the lament signing traditions took deep roots in the Chuvash folklore. (Kiss, 1998)

Recruit (soldier) songs [in Chuvash: “nikrut (saltak) yurrisem”] constitute a special genre of songs performed during the farewell ceremony of the departure for the military service. In the Czarist army, recruits had to serve twenty years. Thus, the departure had a funeral-like atmosphere full of lament. The conditions changed significantly through the course of history, but the lament signing traditions took deep roots in the Chuvash folklore. (Kiss, 1998)

According to the social anthropologist, Zhanna Kormina, the army farewell rites are intrinsically intertwined with the economic situation in this rural area, official propaganda, aimed at constructing a new identity for the government objectives. (Kormina, 2004: 317) In the overall Russian context, the military service was not a prestigious life path in the pre-World War I period. However, by 1960s it became a mandatory step for any able-bodied males, especially from rural areas due to a combination of reasons. The ways of interpreting this rite (the morphology of the rite) are changing through the history, but folklore components and the overall objective of this rite remain unchanged until present The Chuvash recruit songs with their customs do reflect this trend. The omnipresent feeling of the eternal departure is filling the content of the songs. Being a niche folk tradition in the recent history, these songs have been primed by the regional mass media with the federal government funding after the start of the Russian fullscale invasion of Ukraine.

According to the social anthropologist, Zhanna Kormina, the army farewell rites are intrinsically situation in this area, official propaganda, aimed at constructing a new identity for the government objectives (Kormina, 2004: 317) In the overall Russian context, the military service was not a prestigious life path in the pre-World War I period However, by 1960s it became a mandatory step for any able-bodied males, especially from rural areas due to a combination of reasons. The ways of interpreting this rite (the morphology of the rite) are changing through the history, but folklore components and the overall objective of this rite remain unchanged until present. The Chuvash songs with their customs do reflect this trend. The omnipresent feeling of the eternal departure is filling the content of the songs Being a niche folk tradition in the recent history, these songs have been primed by the regional mass media with the federal government funding after the start of the Russian fullscale invasion of Ukraine.

This genre is marked by the clear identities of gender and indigeneity. They are performed predominantly by male singers about the tragic and unknown fate of soldiers and are only in the Chuvash language. Every song evokes the feelings of tragedy, an inevitable end, loneliness and loss of hope. (Rekrutskaya, 2017)

This genre is marked by the clear identities of gender and indigeneity. They are performed predominantly by male singers about tragic and unknown fate are only in the Chuvash language. Every song evokes the feelings of tragedy, an inevitable end, loneliness and loss of hope (Rekrutskaya, 2017)

The existing research has studied these songs from the historical perspective analyzing their development and symbolism (Fedotova, 2024), but not their contemporary treatment Due to the repressive laws, it is impossible to conduct this research on site.

The existing research has studied these songs from the historical perspective analyzing their development and symbolism (Fedotova, 2024), but their contemporary treatment. Due to the repressive laws, is to research on

Research

Research Question

The paper explores how traditional recruit folk songs are appropriated for pro-war propaganda purposes

The paper explores how traditional recruit folk songs are appropriated for pro-war propaganda purposes.

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

Given current the study employs virtual ethnography as the primary research method.

Given current constraints, the study employs virtual ethnography as the primary research method.

The data was collected from the Chuvash republic official media – Natsional’naya teleradiokompaniya En” (National TV and radio company “Chăvash En”) – [https://www ntrk21.ru/] and the State TV and Radio Corporation of Chuvashia [https://chgtrk.ru/]

The data was collected from the Chuvash republic official media – the Natsional’naya teleradiokompaniya “Chăvash En” (National TV and radio company “Chăvash En”) – [https://www.ntrk21.ru/] and the State TV and Radio Corporation of Chuvashia [https://chgtrk.ru/].

Background

The “nekrut” in Russian folklore was used to describe those departing for military service Kormina states that its etymology is in the change of the status of a person that is connected to dressing differently (Kormina, 2004: 73) I posit the term “nikrut” in Chuvash is stipulated by the Chuvash phonetic rules where the letter never occurred in the beginning of the words. (Phonology, 2007)

The term “nekrut” in the Russian folklore was used to describe those males departing for the military service. Kormina states that its etymology is in the change of the status of a person that is connected to dressing differently. (Kormina, 2004: 73) I posit the term “nikrut” in Chuvash is stipulated by the Chuvash phonetic rules where the letter “r” never occurred in the beginning of the words. (Phonology, 2007)

Recruit military duty was a prestigious pathway. Those chosen by draft to serve were considered to be a despised group. It was common among reject proposals The general perception of soldiers was the mental state of recruits due to their routine tasks being every day of service (Nikolskiy, Prior to their departure recruits were treated as useless in households They did not perform chores, but were only indulging in entertainment. The departure process was akin to the funeral, in the sense it was not clear whether that recruit would ever return. (Kormina, 2004:15)

Recruit military duty was not a prestigious pathway Those chosen by draft to serve were considered to be a despised group. It was common among brides to reject proposals from soldiers. The general perception of soldiers was the stupid mental state of recruits due to their routine tasks being performed every day of service. (Nikolskiy, 1905) Prior to their departure recruits were treated as useless in households. They did not perform chores, but were only indulging in entertainment. The departure process was akin to the funeral, in the sense it was not clear whether that recruit would ever return. (Kormina, 2004:15)

The Soviet government turned the military service into a point of pride, as young males preferred to leave their households to avoid economic hardships in rural areas, frequent famines, strict registration system and lack of upward social mobility. Recruit songs were usually a compulsory element of the ceremony in rural areas. In urban areas Russian-language songs were often heard. Thus, the tradition was largely preserved in its authentic environment, rural settlements, while the scholarships on this genre were a niche topic focusing on ethnomusicology (Fedotova, 2024)

The Soviet turned the service into a point of pride, as young males preferred to leave their households to avoid economic in rural areas, frequent famines, strict registration system and lack of upward social mobility Recruit songs were usually a compulsory element of the ceremony in rural areas. In urban areas Russian-language songs were often heard. Thus, the tradition was largely preserved in its authentic rural settlements, while the scholarships on this genre were a niche focusing on ethnomusicology. (Fedotova, 2024)

During the wake of the partial mobilization campaign in the fall of the growth of the popularity of these songs became a concern for the government of Chuvashia Window-dressing measures for the care of the families, the appeal to the identity of indigeneity via the Chuvash embroidery elements on soldier’s handkerchiefs and the official rhetoric did not seem to achieve the desired effect. (Chuvashia provodila, 2022) The deep memory of the tragedy was growing stronger with each month of the military campaign in

The rising death toll contributed to sinister sense these recruit songs. An had to be taken in the domain of the language songs to co-opt this ethnic narrative According to the concept of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, the recruit songs were packaged as an “invented tradition”. (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1) The newly created multimedia products labelled as “recruit songs” were supposed to establish a bridge between the idealized image of the past and the uncertain present.

During the wake of the partial mobilization campaign in the fall of 2022 the growth of the popularity of these songs became a concern for the government of Chuvashia. Window-dressing measures for the care of the families, the appeal to the identity of indigeneity via the Chuvash embroidery elements on soldier’s handkerchiefs and the official rhetoric did not seem to achieve the desired effect (Chuvashia provodila, 2022) The deep memory of the tragedy was growing stronger with each month of the military campaign in Ukraine. The rising death toll contributed to the sinister sense of these recruit songs. An action had to be taken in the domain of the Chuvash language songs to co-opt this ethnic narrative. According to the concept of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, the recruit songs were packaged as an “invented tradition”. (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1) The newly created multimedia products labelled as “recruit songs” were supposed to establish a bridge between the idealized image of the past and the uncertain present

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

Attempts to Co-op

This research has yielded several instances of the recruit songs being turned into a pro-war propaganda tool.

This research yielded several songs being turned into a pro-war propaganda tool

The Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives supported through its grants the production of two major musical projects based on the Chuvash recruit songs.

The Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives supported through its grants the production of two major musical projects based on the Chuvash recruit songs

The first was the titled musical film “Uĭ varrinche” [Eng.: “In the middle of the (Uĭ varrinche, 2023) The song tells the story of a soldier returning home after many years of military service only to find trees instead of his family members He is left crying for the loss of his home and family. (Zaitseva, 2020)

The first was the officially titled musical film “Uĭ varrinche” [Eng.: “In the middle of the field”]. (Uĭ varrinche, 2023) The original song tells the story of a soldier returning home after many years of military service only to find trees instead of his family members. He is left crying for the loss of his home and family. (Zaitseva, 2020)

It was also produced with the financial support from the federal government, i.e. the grant of the Presidential fund initiatives. The gender roles have shifted in newly created video. The protagonist is not the classical male recruit, but the Chuvash lady The film narrates the story of a female warrior from the Middle Ages who returned to her home only to find memories of her late family In the black and white footage her family members are shown and the household still intact. As the film director stated herself in the the gender shift of the protagonist was nothing special, as it was a reflection of the hard times. (Zhenshchina-rezhissyor, 2024) The song is playing in the background with the lyrics given in Russian subtitles. In lyrics the words “yvlăm (Chuv.: “my son”) were substituted for “khĕrĕm” (Chuv : “my daughter”) In order to confirm this point, I like to cite the line and its redacted version

It was also produced with the financial support from the federal government, i.e the grant of the Presidential fund for cultural initiatives. The gender roles have shifted in the newly created video. The protagonist is not the classical male recruit, but the Chuvash lady. The film narrates the story of a female warrior from the Middle Ages who returned to her home only to find memories of her late family. In the black and white footage her family members are shown and the household still intact. As the film director stated herself in the interview, the gender shift of the protagonist was nothing special, as it was a reflection of the hard times (Zhenshchina-rezhissyor, 2024) The song is playing in the background with the lyrics given in Russian subtitles. In the lyrics the words “yvlăm (Chuv.: “my son”) were substituted for “khĕrĕm” (Chuv.: “my daughter”). In order to confirm this point, I would like to cite the original line and its redacted version.

Original: “Килях, ывлăм, айтемерĕ” (“Kili akh, yvlăm, aĭ temerĕ”) [“Come to me, my son, it did not say”].

Redacted: “Килях, хĕрĕм, айтемерĕ” (“Kili akh, khĕrĕm, aĭ temerĕ”). [“Come to me, my daughter, it did not say”].

In the end she cuts her hair with the dagger and leaves for the war The sign at the end states: “They have laid their heads in the past, so that we today can lead lives.” (Uĭ varrinche, 2023)

In the end she cuts her hair with the dagger and leaves for the war. The sign the end states: “They have laid their heads in the past, so that we today can lead lives.” (Uĭ varrinche, 2023)

The video was filmed in October 2022 during the wake of the partial mobilization and released in March 2023.

In September 2024 the regional mass media primed a multimedia project glorifying the “recruit songs” topic and funded from the same source under the Russian President. As it was stated in the news

In September 2024 the regional media primed a multimedia project glorifying the “recruit songs” and funded from the same source under the Russian President. As it was stated in the news

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) broadcast, “in order to preserve this unique genre of the song folklore, to revive the tradition of farewell and return of the homeland defenders, the multicultural project “Soldier songs” was created in Chuvashia.” (V Chuvashii sostoyalos’, 2024) The multimedia exhibit with modern versions of old paintings on the military farewell ceremony accompanied by songs were inaugurated in the capital of Chuvashia. In addition, the music album of the Chuvash recruit songs was released under the name “çăлтăрвитĕр çолкорăнать” (“śăltăr vitĕr śol korănatʹ”). (Eng.: “Road is seen through stars”). (śăltăr vitĕr śol korănatʹ , 2025) It is the name of a popular recruit song that refers directly to the departure metaphor in the title (V Chuvashii vossozdali, 2024)

рвитĕ ç ăнать” (“śăltăr vitĕr śol korănatʹ”). (Eng.: “Road is seen through stars”). (śăltăr vitĕr śol korănatʹ , 2025) is the name of a popular recruit song that refers directly to the departure metaphor in the title. (V Chuvashii vossozdali, 2024)

Contrary to the military service-related narrative of the album, the leader of the group “DIVA Ethno Future Sound”, Ruslan Solov’yev, stressed in social media the peaceful character of the project. “It is the story of several generations of the peaceful Chuvash people, loving their family and native land, respecting nature and ancestors, valuing life and the joy of common living.” (Chuvashskaya etno-popgruppa, 2025) The notions of a peaceful life contradict the objective of the project, i e to be able to bid farewell to soldiers departing for the deadly war according to the Chuvash indigenous traditions.

Contrary to the military service-related narrative of the album, the leader of the group “DIVA Ethno Future Sound”, Ruslan Solov’yev, stressed in social media the peaceful character of the project “It is the story of several generations of the peaceful Chuvash people, loving their family and native land, respecting and ancestors, valuing life and the joy of common living.” (Chuvashskaya etno-pop2025) The notions of a peaceful life contradict the objective of the project, i.e. to be able to bid the deadly war according to the Chuvash traditions.

The printed version of lyrics for twelve songs was provided with the translation into Russian, English and Chinese. The overall narrative was the cultural preservation of this genre as these songs were used to bid farewell in the ancient times, as well as now while departing for the Special Military Operation. (V Chuvashii sostoyalos’, 2024)

The printed version of lyrics for twelve songs was provided with the translation into Russian, English and Chinese. The overall narrative was the cultural preservation of this genre as these songs were used to bid farewell the ancient times, as well as now while departing for the Special Military Operation. (V Chuvashii sostoyalos’, 2024)

The lyrics of one of the songs in this collection were amended on purpose to re-focus from the local story into a Chuvash-wide narrative In the original version the song “Ăsatărakh, tăvansem” had the reference the name of the village “Ăsapuҫ” where it was performed.

The lyrics of one of the songs in this collection were amended on purpose to re-focus from the local story into a Chuvash-wide narrative. In the original version the song “Ăsatărakh, tăvansem” had the reference the name of the village “Ăsapuҫ” where it was performed.

The key two lines of the featured the most notable natural feature of the surrounding environment. “Ӑсапуҫӗнехҫырми, ҫичҫырма” (“Ăsapuҫĕnekh ҫ ҫich ҫyrma …”) [Eng.: “Seven ravines of Ăsapuҫ, seven ravines ] (Pesni, 1982: 134)

The key two lines of the song featured the most notable natural feature of the surrounding environment “Ӑсапуҫӗнехҫырми, ҫичҫырма” (“Ăsapuҫĕnekh ҫyrmi, ҫich ҫyrma …”) [Eng.: “Seven ravines of Ăsapuҫ, seven ravines…]. (Pesni, 1982: 134)

The amended lyrics do not have this language, as the song itself seems to address all the Chuvash speakers, not just the residents of that village. (Starinnaya pes’nya, 2025) Consequently, the sober rite is primed as a “reinvented tradition”.

The amended lyrics do not have this language, as the song itself seems to address all the Chuvash speakers, not just the residents of that village (Starinnaya pes’nya, 2025) Consequently, the sober rite is primed as a “reinvented tradition”

On the one hand, the album is appealing to the identities of indigeneity. On the other hand, it sets a clear role model behavior of the military service for the colonizing state

On the one hand, the album is appealing to the identities of indigeneity. On the other hand, it sets a clear role model behavior of the military service for the colonizing state.

This example established a trend on performing the recruit farewell ceremonies as a part of the youth

This example established a trend on performing the recruit farewell ceremonies as a part of the youth broadcast, “in order preserve this unique genre of the song folklore, to revive the tradition of farewell and return of the homeland defenders, the multicultural project “Soldier songs” was created in (V Chuvashii 2024) The multimedia exhibit modern versions old paintings on the military farewell ceremony accompanied by songs were inaugurated in the capital of Chuvashia In addition, the music album of the Chuvash recruit songs was released under the name “çăлт

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

stage productions Students at the Chuvash State University majoring in the Chuvash language and culture prepared and presented a complete recruit ceremony accompanied with songs (Provody soldata, 2025)

stage productions. Students at the Chuvash State University majoring in the Chuvash language and culture prepared and presented a complete ceremony accompanied with songs. (Provody soldata, 2025)

Discussion

This research yielded the following results. Firstly, the state-sponsored interpretation of songs became evident, as government-funded projects have been trying to rebrand them align with patriotic narratives, framing them as honorable rather than tragic. Secondly, the was implemented through media Examples include a film, an and a multimedia exhibit that adapt Chuvash recruit songs, altering lyrics and contexts to emphasize and national pride Thirdly, the state uses these songs to create a historical continuity that supports modern military campaigns, drawing on the concept of “invented traditions”.

This research yielded the following results. Firstly, the state-sponsored interpretation of songs became evident, as government-funded projects have been trying to rebrand them to align with patriotic narratives, framing them as honorable rather than tragic Secondly, the process was implemented through media transformations. Examples include a musical film, an album and a multimedia exhibit that adapt Chuvash recruit songs, altering lyrics and contexts to emphasize duty and national pride. Thirdly, the state uses these songs to create a historical continuity that supports modern military campaigns, drawing on the concept of “invented traditions”.

I that the ethnic Chuvash on the grassroots level perceived these co-optation attempts in the positive light as an opportunity to preserve language these songs. No or protest activity were in relation to these government-funded projects The inauguration ceremony of the virtual exhibit was attended by the Chuvash language activists, which testifies to their approval (V Chuvashii vossozdali, 2024)

I posit that the ethnic Chuvash on the grassroots level perceived these co-optation attempts in the positive light as an opportunity to preserve the language through these songs. No criticism or protest activity were registered in relation to these government-funded projects. The inauguration ceremony of the virtual exhibit was attended by the Chuvash language activists, which testifies to their approval. (V Chuvashii vossozdali, 2024)

Despite the considerable progress in observing the mass media narratives, is very challenging to measure impact of the co-optation among the ethnic Chuvash. As of present, the Chuvash community are priming the preservation of culture and and ignoring the war-related narrative in public statements

Despite the considerable progress in observing the mass media narratives, it is very challenging to measure the impact of the co-optation among the ethnic Chuvash. As of present, the indigenous Chuvash community are priming the preservation of culture and language and ignoring the war-related narrative in public statements.

Conclusion

The transformation of Chuvash recruit songs from expressions of lament and loss into tools of pro-war propaganda highlights the flexibility of cultural traditions within state-driven narratives. Historically, these songs encapsulated the sorrow of separation, reflecting the personal and communal grief of military conscription. However, in the contemporary context, government- sponsored initiatives have reinterpreted them to align with a patriotic, duty-bound ethos that supports the ongoing military campaigns The adaptation of these songs, particularly through modern media productions, illustrates the strategic repurposing of folklore to reinforce state objectives while preserving an illusion of cultural continuity. This case underscores the broader phenomenon of “invented traditions,” where historical elements are selectively reframed to serve present-day ideological needs. As the Chuvash community navigates these shifts, the evolving role of recruit songs raises questions about agency, authenticity, and the impact of state intervention in shaping collective memory.

The transformation Chuvash songs expressions of lament and loss into tools of pro-war propaganda highlights the flexibility of cultural traditions within state-driven narratives Historically, these songs encapsulated the sorrow of separation, reflecting the personal and communal grief of military conscription. However, in the contemporary context, government- sponsored initiatives have reinterpreted them to align with a patriotic, duty-bound ethos that supports the ongoing military campaigns. The adaptation of these songs, particularly through modern media productions, illustrates the strategic repurposing of folklore to reinforce state objectives preserving an of cultural continuity. This case underscores the broader of “invented traditions,” where historical elements are selectively reframed to serve present-day ideological needs As the Chuvash community navigates these shifts, the evolving role of recruit songs raises questions about agency, authenticity, and the impact of state intervention in shaping collective memory.

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

The war launched by Russia against Ukraine is heavily relying on the colonial narratives This paper presents a case from the Chuvashia Republic that adapts the pro-war narrative to the identities of indigeneity to make it appealing to the ethnic Chuvash, the colonized nation.

The war launched by against Ukraine is heavily relying on the colonial narratives. This paper a from the Chuvashia Republic that adapts the pro-war narrative to the identities of make it appealing to the ethnic Chuvash, the colonized nation.

Note: The Chuvash was transliterated via the ALA-LC system

Note: The Chuvash was transliterated via the ALA-LC system.

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Ismagilova, E. I. "Rekrutskiye pes’ni v fol’klornoy traditsii sibirskikh Chuvash” [“Recruit songs in the folklore traditions of the Siberian Chuvash”]. In Chuvashi I ikh sosedi: etnokul’turniy dialog v prostranstvenno-vremennom kontinuume, pp. 263-275. 2012.

Ismagilova, E I "Rekrutskiye pes’ni v fol’klornoy traditsii sibirskikh Chuvash” [“Recruit songs in the folklore traditions of the Siberian Chuvash”] In Chuvashi I ikh sosedi: etnokul’turniy dialog v prostranstvenno-vremennom kontinuume, pp. 263-275. 2012.

Izhetnikova A. A., and Vladimirova O.G. "Rekrutskaya obryadnost chuvashey." [Recruit customs of Chuvash]. Bogatstvo finno-ugorskiykh narodov, 2017. pp. 223-224.

Izhetnikova A A , and Vladimirova O.G "Rekrutskaya obryadnost chuvashey." [Recruit customs of Chuvash]. Bogatstvo finno-ugorskiykh narodov, 2017. pp. 223-224.

Kiss, Gabriella, and László Klima Ünnepi könyv Bereczki Gábor 70 születésnapja tiszteletére Budapest, 1998.

Kiss, Gabriella, and László Klima. Ünnepi könyv Bereczki Gábor 70. születésnapja tiszteletére. Budapest, 1998.

Kormina, Zh. V. Provody v Armii u v Poreformennoĭ Rossii: Opyt ėtnograficheskogo Analiza. Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2005.

Kormina, Zh V Provody v Armii u v Poreformennoĭ Rossii: Opyt ėtnograficheskogo Analiza Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2005.

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

Nikolskiy N V Vzglyad Chuvash na voinskuyu povinnost Central publishing house, Kazan, 1905 http://elbib nbchr ru/lib files/0/kpch 0_0000366.pdf, accessed: August 10, 2024

Nikolskiy N.V. Vzglyad Chuvash na voinskuyu povinnost. Central publishing house, 1905. http://elbib.nbchr.ru/lib files/0/kpch 0_0000366.pdf, accessed: August 10, 2024.

Pesni nizovykh chuvashey Sbornik pesen [“Songs of lower Chuvash Collection of songs”] Book 2 Cheboksary, Chuvash kn Izd-vo, 1982

Pesni nizovykh chuvashey. Sbornik pesen. [“Songs of lower Chuvash. Collection of songs”]. Book 2. Cheboksary, Chuvash kn. Izd-vo, 1982.

Phonology (CV Manual), Chuvash People’s Website, June 23, 2007. https://en.chuvash.org/wiki/PHONOLOGY%20(CV%20Manual), accessed: January 10, 2025.

Phonology (CV Manual), Chuvash People’s Website, June 23, 2007. https://en chuvash org/wiki/PHONOLOGY%20(CV%20Manual), accessed: January 10, 2025.

Semenova, T I rekrutskiye pesni: Obscheye I lokal’no-osobennoye." [Chuvash recruit songs: general and locally specific] In Fol’klor narodov Povolzh’ya I Urala: zhanry, poetika, problem izucheniya, pp. 173-184. 2021.

Semenova, T. I. "Chuvashskiye rekrutskiye pesni: Obscheye I lokal’no-osobennoye." [Chuvash recruit songs: general and locally specific]. In Fol’klor narodov Povolzh’ya I Urala: zhanry, poetika, problem izucheniya, pp. 173-184. 2021.

Starinnaya pes’nya sela Smol’kino poyavilas’ na muzykal’nykh servisakh.” [“Old song from the village appeared on music platforms”]. Sotsial’naya Gazeta, 12, 2025. https://www socgaz ru/novosti/36-kultura/8172-starinnaya-pesnya-iz-sela-smolkino-poyavilas-namuzykalnykh-servisakh, accessed: March 14, 2025.

Starinnaya pes’nya iz sela Smol’kino poyavilas’ na muzykal’nykh servisakh.” [“Old song from the village of Smol’kino appeared on music platforms”]. Sotsial’naya Gazeta, March 12, 2025. https://www.socgaz.ru/novosti/36-kultura/8172-starinnaya-pesnya-iz-sela-smolkino-poyavilas-namuzykalnykh-servisakh, accessed: March 14, 2025.

“V Chuvashii vossozdali 12 pesen, kotorymi provozhali soldat-novobrantsev v XVII-XIX vekakh.” [“12 songs re-vived in Chuvashia, with which soldier-recruits were seen off in XVII-XIX centuries.”]. 24, 2024. https://chgtrk.ru/novosti/kultura/v-chuvashii-vossozdali-12accessed: 30, 2024

“V Chuvashii vossozdali 12 pesen, kotorymi provozhali soldat-novobrantsev v XVII-XIX vekakh.” [“12 songs were re-vived in Chuvashia, with which soldier-recruits were seen off in XVII-XIX centuries ”] ChGTRK “Chuvashiya”, September 24, 2024. https://chgtrk.ru/novosti/kultura/v-chuvashii-vossozdali-12pesen-kotorymi-provojali-soldat-novobrancev-v-xvii-xix-vekah/, accessed: September 30, 2024.

“V Chuvashii sostoyalos’ otkrytiye multikul’turnogo proyekta “Saltak i urrisem”. [“The multi-cultural project “Soldiers’ songs” was launched Chuvashia”]. NTRK “Chăvash En”, September 24, 2024. https://www.ntrk21.ru/news/%d0%b2-%d1%87%d1%83%d0%b2%d0%b0%d1%88%d0%b8%d0%b8%d0%bc%d1%83%d0%bb%d1%8c%d1%82%d0%b8/, accessed: September 30, 2024.

“V Chuvashii sostoyalos’ otkrytiye multikul’turnogo proyekta “Saltak i urrisem”. [“The multi-cultural project “Soldiers’ songs” was launched in Chuvashia”] NTRK “Chăvash En”, September 24, 2024. https://www ntrk21 ru/news/%d0%b2-%d1%87%d1%83%d0%b2%d0%b0%d1%88%d0%b8%d0%b8%d1%81%d0%be%d1%81%d1%82%d0%be%d1%8f%d0%bb%d0%be%d1%81%d1%8c%d0%be%d1% 82%d0%ba%d1%80%d1%8b%d1%82%d0%b8%d0%b5%d0%bc%d1%83%d0%bb%d1%8c%d1%82%d0%b8/, accessed: September 30, 2024.

Vyushkova, Mariya, and Evgeny Sherkhonov. "Russia’s Ethnic Minority Casualties of the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: A Data Story from the Free Buryatia Foundation", Inner Asia 25, 1 (2023): 126-136, doi: https://doi-org.proxyiub.uits.iu.edu/10.1163/22105018-02501011

Zaitseva, Elena. "Natali’a Mokeeva: "U nas, U Chuvashei, mnogo pesen o tom, kak my vozvrashchaemsia domoi". [“We, Chuvash, have many songs on how we return home”]. Sovetskaia Chuvashiia. No. 46, March 26, 2020 https://dlib-eastview-com.proxyiub.uits iu.edu/browse/doc/58200358.

Zaitseva, Elena "Natali’a Mokeeva: "U nas, U Chuvashei, mnogo pesen o tom, kak my vozvrashchaemsia domoi". [“We, Chuvash, have many songs on how we return home”]. Sovetskaia Chuvashiia. No. 46, March 26, 2020. https://dlib-eastview-com.proxyiub.uits.iu.edu/browse/doc/58200358.

FROM LAMENT TO LOYALTY: THE CO-OPTATION OF CHUVASH RECRUIT SONGS IN RUSSIAN PRO-WAR PROPAGANDA

Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University) Aleksei Rumiantsev (Indiana University)

Zheshchina-rezhissyor o Chuvashskom kino (Intervyu s Ol’goy Palan I Sergeyem Shcherbakovym) [Female film director (Interview with Olga Palan and Sergey Shcherbakov)] “Grani mirov” Youtube channel, Youtube video, February 23, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LcMXxiIX-rw&t=1544s, accessed: February 10, 2025.

Zheshchina-rezhissyor o Chuvashskom kino (Intervyu s Ol’goy Palan I Sergeyem Shcherbakovym). [Female film director (Interview with Olga Palan and Sergey Shcherbakov)]. “Grani mirov” Youtube channel, Youtube video, February 23, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LcMXxiIX-rw&t=1544s, accessed: February 10, 2025

Multimedia

“Uĭ varrinche” – fil’m po motivam chuvashskoy narodnoy pes’ni, ispolnitel’ – Ol’ga Osipova” [“In the middle of the field” – film inspired by the Chuvash folk song, performer – Olga Osipova”]. Youtube video, March 10, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iors Fz-0QQ, accessed: March 11, 2023.

“Uĭ varrinche” fil’m po motivam chuvashskoy narodnoy pes’ni, ispolnitel’ – Ol’ga Osipova”. [“In the middle of the field” – film inspired by the Chuvash folk song, performer – Olga Osipova”]. Youtube video, March 10, 2023 https://www youtube.com/watch?v=iors Fz-0QQ, accessed: March 11, 2023.

“Provody soldata – postanovka studentov chuvashskoy filologii ChGU”. [“Soldier farewell – performance by students of the Chuvash philology of the Chuvash State University”]. Vkontakte video, February 18, 2025. https://vk.com/video-175721657 456239089?t=6m6s, accessed: February 20, 2025.

“Provody soldata – postanovka studentov chuvashskoy filologii ChGU”. [“Soldier farewell – performance by students of the Chuvash philology of the Chuvash State University”] Vkontakte video, February 18, 2025 https://vk com/video-175721657 456239089?t=6m6s, accessed: February 20, 2025.

“Traditsionniye chuvashskiy provody v armiyu”. [“Traditional Chuvash farewell to the army “]. Vkontakte video, May 24, 2022. https://vk.com/search/video? q=%D1%87%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%88%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%B F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%8B%20%D0%B2%20%D0%B0%D1%80%D0 %BC%D0%B8%D1%8E&z=video-191629825 456240725, accessed: February 02, 2025

chuvashskiy provody v armiyu” [“Traditional farewell to the army “] Vkontakte video, May 24, 2022 https://vk com/search/video? q=%D1%87%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%88%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%B F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%8B%20%D0%B2%20%D0%B0%D1%80%D0 %BC%D0%B8%D1%8E&z=video-191629825 456240725, accessed: February 02, 2025.

“śăltăr vitĕr śol korănatʹ” [“The road is seen through stars”] DIVA Ethno Future Sound. Vkontakte Music, 2025 https://vk com/music/album/-2000442940_23442940_638de84df38b2f23c4, accessed: February 02, 2025.

“śăltăr vitĕr śol korănatʹ” . [“The road is seen through stars”]. DIVA Ethno Future Sound. Vkontakte Music, 2025. https://vk.com/music/album/-2000442940_23442940_638de84df38b2f23c4, accessed: February 02, 2025.

Papers by Panels

PANEL

IV: Social Transformation in the South Caucasus

PANEL IV: Social Transformation in the South Caucasus

Chair: Lydia Smith (Yale University)

Faculty Discussant: Prof. Julie A. George (CUNY)

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University)

Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles)

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University)

GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF GEORGIA’S IDP POLICIES

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University)

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown

Introduction

Georgia has faced internal displacement challenges due to recurring conflicts since the USSR's dissolution. As of the end of 2023, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reports approximately 311,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Georgia, a significant figure for a with a population less than 4 million (1). Notably, Georgia's displaced population is generally categorized into two main groups: the "old IDPs" and "new IDPs" (2) The first wave of displacement in the early 1990s was caused by ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with 20,000 Georgian civilians killed and over 300,000 displaced, mainly to regions near Abkhazia or Tbilisi. The second wave occurred during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, displacing 135,000 people and resulting in 2,000 deaths (3). Therefore, recent history, Georgia has endured three conflicts that displaced thousands, worsening its economic and social after the USSR's dissolution.

Georgia has faced internal displacement challenges due to recurring conflicts since the USSR's dissolution As of the end of 2023, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reports approximately 311,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Georgia, a significant figure for a country with a population of less than 4 million (1). Notably, Georgia's internally displaced population is generally categorized into two main groups: the "old IDPs" and "new IDPs" (2). The first wave of displacement in the early 1990s was caused by ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with 20,000 Georgian civilians killed and over 300,000 displaced, mainly to regions near Abkhazia or Tbilisi. The second wave occurred during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, displacing 135,000 people and resulting in over 2,000 deaths (3) Therefore, in recent history, Georgia has endured three major conflicts that displaced thousands, worsening its economic and social challenges after the USSR's dissolution.

This paper explores the evolution of Georgia's IDP policies, focusing on housing assistance from the 1990s to the present. It examines key policy developments, their outcomes, and recent efforts to address both immediate and long-term needs. analyzing official reports, the study highlights progress and challenges in housing quality and reporting. It seeks to fill a gap in English-language resources and provide a clearer understanding of the Georgian government's evolving approach to this critical issue.

This paper explores the evolution of Georgia's IDP policies, focusing on housing assistance from the 1990s to the present. It examines key policy developments, their outcomes, and recent efforts to address both immediate and long-term needs By analyzing official reports, the study highlights progress and challenges in housing quality and reporting It seeks to fill a gap in English-language resources and provide a clearer understanding of the Georgian government's evolving approach to this critical issue.

Overview of the Policies

To understand Georgia's approach internally displaced (IDPs), is essential to examine the chronological evolution of its policies, as well as the humanitarian assistance received. In 1993, Abkhazian War, government, unable to address the crisis alone,

To understand Georgia's approach to internally displaced persons (IDPs), it is essential to examine the chronological evolution of its policies, as well as the humanitarian assistance it received. In 1993, following the Abkhazian War, the Georgian government, unable to address the crisis alone, requested the

1 Country Profile: Georgia (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2024), https://www internal-displacement org/countries/georgia/

1 Country Profile: Georgia (Internal Displacement Centre, 2024), https://www internal-displacement

2 Omari Nishnianidze, “Integration inequality among compact IDP settlements of Georgia: Settlement design and its impact on sustainable generation,” Uppsala Universitet, (2021): 26

2 Omari Nishnianidze, “Integration inequality among compact IDP settlements of Georgia: Settlement design and its impact on sustainable income generation,” Uppsala Universitet, (2021): 26

3 Nishnianidze, 25

GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF GEORGIA’S IDP POLICIES

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University) Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University)

UNHCR to establish a presence and assist with the protection and support of IDPs In 1996, following the CIS Conference on Refugees and Migrants in Geneva, Georgia established the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, which initially focused on emergency cases and immediate needs rather than longterm strategies (5). Moreover, the same year, Georgia adopted the Georgian Law on Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted from the Territories of outlining IDPs' rights to allowances, education, housing, healthcare, and temporary employment The law has been amended in 2001, 2005, 2006, and 2014 to better meet IDPs' evolving needs (6).

UNHCR to establish a presence and assist with the protection and support of IDPs (4). In 1996, following the CIS Conference on Refugees and Migrants in Geneva, Georgia established the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, which initially focused on emergency cases and immediate needs rather than longterm strategies (5). Moreover, the same year, Georgia adopted the Georgian Law on Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted from the Occupied Territories of Georgia, outlining IDPs' rights to allowances, education, housing, healthcare, and temporary employment. The law has been amended in 2001, 2005, 2006, and 2014 to better meet IDPs' evolving needs (6).

Despite all these progressive developments, in 2005, Dr. Walter Kälin, the UN Special Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs, issued a highlighting "miserable conditions" IDPs in collective centers (7) Collective centers in Georgia, originally intended as temporary housing for IDPs, are typically repurposed buildings like schools, former hospitals, and factories While meant for short-term use, these centers have become permanent residences for many, particularly "old IDPs" displaced by conflicts in the 1990s (8). The UNHCR report from 2009 states that 44% of Georgia’s IDP population resided in collective centers that failed to international housing standards (9). This highlights the inadequate infrastructure of facilities, worsening the economic hardship and social exclusion faced by IDPs. A UN report revealed that 52,837 IDP families were still waiting for while the government could only accommodate around 2,000 families annually (10) This discrepancy highlights limitations in financial resources and policy implementation, making it crucial to trace the development of Georgia's IDP policies to understand their foundations and trajectory.

Despite all these progressive developments, in 2005, Dr Walter Kälin, the UN Special Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs, issued a report highlighting the "miserable conditions" of IDPs in collective centers (7). Collective centers in Georgia, originally intended as temporary housing for IDPs, are typically repurposed buildings like schools, former hospitals, and factories. While meant for short-term use, these centers have become permanent residences for many, particularly "old IDPs" displaced by conflicts in the 1990s (8) The UNHCR report from 2009 states that 44% of Georgia’s IDP population resided in collective centers that failed to meet international housing standards (9) This highlights the inadequate infrastructure of these facilities, worsening the economic hardship and social exclusion faced by IDPs. A 2017 UN report revealed that 52,837 IDP families were still waiting for housing, while the government could only accommodate around 2,000 families annually (10). This discrepancy highlights limitations in financial resources and policy implementation, making it crucial to trace the development of Georgia's IDP policies to understand their foundations and trajectory

The inefficiency of IDP policies, especially in providing durable housing, can be traced to President Shevardnadze’s (1995-2003) focus on return rather than integration, viewing IDPs as temporary settlers expected to return to their homes (11). The government prioritized short-term diplomatic efforts for IDPs' return to Abkhazia and South Ossetia over long-term integration. Despite agreements with separatist authorities, return provisions were rarely implemented, as these authorities obstructed the return of ethnic Georgians, viewing them as a demographic and political threat (12)

The inefficiency of IDP policies, especially in providing durable can be President focus on return rather than integration, viewing IDPs as temporary settlers expected to return to their homes (11) The government prioritized short-term diplomatic efforts for IDPs' return to Abkhazia and South Ossetia over long-term integration. Despite agreements with separatist authorities, return provisions were rarely implemented, as these authorities obstructed the of ethnic Georgians, viewing them as a demographic and political threat (12).

Notably, When Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003, national policy on IDPs shifted. His

When Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003, national policy on IDPs shifted. His

4 Julia Kharashvili, 20 years of internal displacement in Georgia: the international and the personal (FM Review,) https://www fmreview org/es/kharashvili/#: :text=In%202008%2C%20a%20new%20war,total%20destruction%20of%20their%20villages

5 Kharashvili

6 Georgia:Transitioning from Status to Needs Based Assistance for IDPs, A Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (Europe and Central Asia, 2016), 14 https://documents1 worldbank org/curated/en/493981468030331770/pdf/IDP-PSIA-Georgia-revised-Feb-2016 pdf

6 Georgia:Transitioning from Status to Needs Based Assistance for IDPs, A Poverty and Social Impact (Europe and Central Asia, 2016), 14 worldbank org/curated/en/493981468030331770/pdf/IDP-PSIA-Georgia-revised-Feb-2016 pdf

7 Kharashvili

8 Erin Koch, “Protracted Displacement in Georgia: Structural Vulnerability and ‘Existing Not Living.’” Human Organization 74, no 2 (2015): 136. http://www jstor org/stable/44127082

9 Nishnianidze, 23

8 Erin Koch, “Protracted Displacement in Structural Vulnerability and Not Living.’” Organization no 2 (2015): 136. http://www jstor org/stable/44127082

9 Nishnianidze, 23 of Commissioner for Rights, (2017), 2, org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Housing/HousingStrategies/States/Georgia

10 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, (2017), 2, https://www ohchr org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Housing/HousingStrategies/States/Georgia 1 pdf

11 Koch, 138

12 Nishnianidze, 23

GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF GEORGIA’S IDP POLICIES

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University) Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University) government reduced diplomatic engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and implemented liberal economic reforms, including privatizing collective buildings used for temporary IDP housing (13) As a result, many IDPs were forcibly relocated to remote areas, far from families and jobs In 2004, IDPs were evicted from hotels used since the 1991 war, which were converted into casinos. They were offered $10,000 for housing, an insufficient amount that led to further displacement (14). Moreover, under Saakashvili, authorities criticized international organizations for promoting IDP integration, viewing it as a challenge to their goal of facilitating the return of displaced persons to their original homes (15). Thus, Saakashvili’s policies also contributed to the continued marginalization of IDPs, highlighting the lack of long-term solutions for their integration

government reduced diplomatic engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and implemented liberal reforms, including privatizing collective buildings used for temporary IDP housing (13). As a result, many IDPs were forcibly relocated remote areas, far from families and jobs. In 2004, IDPs were evicted from used since the 1991 war, were converted into casinos. They were offered $10,000 for an insufficient amount that led to further displacement (14) Moreover, under Saakashvili, authorities criticized international organizations for promoting IDP integration, viewing it as a challenge to their goal of facilitating the return of displaced persons to their original homes (15). Thus, Saakashvili’s policies also contributed to the continued marginalization of IDPs, highlighting the lack of long-term solutions for their integration.

The 2005 UN Special Representative’s assessment pushed Georgia to act on internal displacement. With UNHCR's support, the government began developing a State IDP Strategy in 2006. By 2007, the government shifted its focus from temporary measures to a greater emphasis on the long-term integration of IDPs, most notably in its commitment to providing durable housing solutions (16) As the scale of displacement became clearer, the government adopted an updated action plan in 2009, which not only focused on housing solutions but also introduced economic measures to address the needs of the growing IDP population. The plan prioritized moving from temporary shelters to permanent housing and legal homeownership for “new” IDPs from the 2008 conflict. However, despite being the most vulnerable, many “old” IDPs from the 1990s remained in deteriorating collective centers, as resources were largely directed toward newly displaced populations While new IDPs received more comprehensive support, including compensation, housing, and immediate recognition of their status, the needs of older IDPs have yet to be adequately addressed (17).

The UN Special Representative’s assessment pushed to act on internal displacement With UNHCR's support, the government began developing a State IDP Strategy in 2006. By 2007, the government shifted its focus from temporary measures to a greater emphasis on the long-term integration of notably in its to providing durable housing solutions (16). As the scale of displacement became clearer, the government adopted an updated plan 2009, which not only on solutions but also introduced economic measures address the of the growing IDP population The plan moving from temporary shelters to permanent and legal homeownership for “new” IDPs from the 2008 conflict However, despite being the most vulnerable, many “old” IDPs from the 1990s remained in deteriorating collective centers, as resources were largely directed toward newly displaced populations. While new IDPs received more comprehensive support, including compensation, housing, and immediate recognition of their status, the needs of older IDPs have yet to be adequately addressed (17).

In response to the 2008 conflict, Georgia received $4.5 billion in international aid, which funded the construction of 36 new IDP settlements, including cottages and land plots for agricultural use (18). The initiative was as a success, as the cottages became the property of the living them. It included the of cottages and the refurbishment of apartment blocks, housing around 7,000 families and benefiting approximately 30,000 IDPs (19). By February 2009, under Ministry of Internal Affairs, additional houses and flats were built or rehabilitated, 18,000 newly individuals in settlements across eastern Georgia (20)

In response to the 2008 conflict, Georgia received $4.5 billion in international aid, which funded the construction of 36 new IDP settlements, including cottages and land plots for agricultural use (18). The initiative was seen as a success, as the cottages became the property of the IDPs living in them It included the construction of cottages and the refurbishment of apartment blocks, housing around 7,000 families and benefiting approximately 30,000 IDPs (19). By February 2009, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, additional houses and flats were built or rehabilitated, resettling 18,000 newly displaced individuals in settlements across eastern Georgia (20).

13 Nishnianidze, 24

Responsibility-to-Response-Nov-2011 Georgia pdf

14 Erin Mooney, From Solidarity to Solutions: The Government Response to Internal Displacement in Georgia, 219, https://www brookings edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/FromResponsibility-to-Response-Nov-2011

David in and Policy,” SSRN 17,

15 David Gogishvili, “Urban Dimensions of Internal Displacement in Georgia: The Phenomenon and the Emerging Housing Policy,” SSRN Electronic Journal (2015): 17, https://doi org/10 2139/ssrn 2591291

16 In the Waiting Room: Internally Displaced People in Georgia, Index: EUR 56/003/2010 (Amnesty International, August 2010) https://www amnesty org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/eur560032010en pdf

16 the Room: Internally Displaced People Index: EUR 56/003/2010 International, 2010) https://www amnesty org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/eur560032010en pdf

17 Nishnianidze, 11

18 Nishnianidze, 25

17 Nishnianidze, 11 Nishnianidze, 25

19 Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia: A Gap Analysis, (UNHRC, 2009), 43, https://www unhcr org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/4ad827f59 pdf

Internally Displaced Persons in A (UNHRC, 2009), https://www unhcr org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/4ad827f59

20 Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia: A Gap Analysis, 44

20 of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia: A Gap Analysis, 44

GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF GEORGIA’S IDP POLICIES

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University) Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University)

However, the 2009 strategy also had significant downsides, especially the relocation of IDPs from collective centers to remote areas In August 2010, IDPs from Abkhazia were evicted from Tbilisi and moved to distant regions, disrupting their social networks, employment, and education. Many IDPs protested outside the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons, with some staging hunger strikes, sewing their mouths shut, or resorting to self-immolation in desperate opposition (21). This resistance highlighted the harm of forcibly relocating IDPs without their input. In 2014, the policy was reversed when the law was amended to protect IDPs from forced evictions, recognizing the need for more stable and humane solutions

However, the 2009 strategy also had significant downsides, especially the relocation of IDPs from collective centers to remote areas. In August 2010, from Abkhazia were evicted from Tbilisi and moved to distant regions, disrupting their social networks, employment, and education. Many IDPs protested outside Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons, some staging hunger sewing their mouths shut, or resorting to self-immolation in desperate opposition (21) This resistance highlighted the harm of forcibly relocating IDPs without their input In 2014, the policy was reversed when the law was amended to protect IDPs from forced evictions, recognizing the need for more stable and humane solutions.

in the policy implementation was lack of transparency around criteria select locations for new settlements Essential factors such as infrastructure, geological flood risks, agricultural viability, and income-generating potential appear to have been inconsistently applied Consequently, the 36 settlements established with international aid funds varied significantly in terms of basic amenities. Some lacked basic resources such as plumbing, drinking water, access agricultural land, resulting differing living standards (22). Together, all these issues highlighted the of IDPs in decisions about their own resettlement and support. Although eventually shifted to protect IDPs from forced relocation, the harm caused by earlier policies underscores the decisions were made through a strictly top-down approach, with little input from the affected populations

Another flaw in the policy implementation was the lack of transparency around the criteria used to select locations for new settlements. Essential factors such as infrastructure, geological stability, flood risks, agricultural viability, and income-generating potential appear to have been inconsistently applied. Consequently, the 36 settlements established with international aid funds varied significantly in terms of basic amenities Some lacked basic resources such as plumbing, drinking water, or access to agricultural land, resulting in differing living standards (22) Together, all these issues highlighted the importance of involving IDPs in decisions about their own resettlement and support. Although the policy eventually shifted to protect IDPs from forced relocation, the harm caused by earlier policies underscores how the decisions were made through a strictly top-down approach, with little input from the affected populations.

Methodology

This paper provides an overview of Georgia's approach to IDPs following the conflicts of the 1990s and 2008, focusing on housing policies. It examines government strategy plans, analyzing their successes and shortcomings. Given the lack of reports on recent housing developments, this study fills that gap by reviewing the latest data on Georgia’s evolving approach to IDP housing. To do so, it draws on official annual reports from the website of the Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency which worked under the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Health, Labour and Social Affairs of Georgia, the entity responsible for IDP rights and relocation policies (23). As much of the information on these websites is only available in Georgian, the following section includes a discussion of the translated data to complete the overview of the evolution of IDP policies regarding housing assistance provided by the government to IDPs from 2019 to 2023. This is important because such data from the most recent annual reports, especially about housing allocations to IDPs, may only be available in Georgian on official websites, which limits access to this information for the broader Englishspeaking community.

This paper provides an overview of Georgia's approach IDPs the conflicts of 1990s and 2008, focusing on housing policies It examines government strategy plans, their successes and shortcomings Given the lack of reports on recent housing developments, this study fills that gap by reviewing the latest data on Georgia’s evolving approach to IDP housing. To do so, it draws on official annual reports from the website of the Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency which worked under the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Health, Labour and Social Affairs of Georgia, the entity responsible for IDP rights and relocation policies (23). As much of the information on these websites is available in the following section includes a discussion of the translated data to complete the overview of the evolution of IDP policies regarding housing assistance provided by the government to IDPs from 2019 to 2023. This is important because such data from the annual reports, especially about housing allocations to may only be available Georgian on official websites, which limits to this information for the broader Englishspeaking community.

21 Georgia:Transitioning from Status to Needs Based Assistance for IDPs, A Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (Europe and Central Asia, 2016), 26. https://documents1 worldbank org/curated/en/493981468030331770/pdf/IDP-PSIA-Georgia-revised-Feb-2016.pdf

22 In the Waiting Room: Internally Displaced People in Georgia, 2

23 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood accessed November 12, 2024 moh gov ge/index php?lang=1

23 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency, accessed November 12, 2024 https://idp moh gov ge/index php?lang=1 Georgia:Transitioning Status Needs Based for A and Social Impact Central 2016), 26. worldbank org/curated/en/493981468030331770/pdf/IDP-PSIA-Georgia-revised-Feb-2016.pdf

GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF GEORGIA’S IDP POLICIES

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University) Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University)

Findings

2019 Report (24):

In 2019, the Georgian government allocated 1,047 new apartments to 927 IDP families, with 707 in Tbilisi and 120 in Mtskheta. An additional 1,050 homes were purchased for IDPs in various regions. The government also provided 120 apartments to veteran families in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, and Kutaisi and closed 31 collective centers Ownership rights were finalized for 803 IDP families The total investment in IDP housing amounted to over 12 million GEL

In 2019, the government allocated 1,047 new apartments to 927 IDP families, 707 in Tbilisi and 120 in Mtskheta An additional 1,050 homes were purchased for IDPs in various regions The government also provided 120 apartments to veteran families in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, and Kutaisi and closed 31 collective centers. Ownership rights were finalized for 803 families. The total investment in IDP housing amounted to 12 million GEL.

2020-2021 report (25):

The 2020-2021 reports were combined, showing housing support for 7,000 IDP families. Of these, 2,905 were resettled in new apartments, while 3,028 received agricultural homes. To reduce temporary housing, 118 collective centers closed, and 1,176 families gained property ownership. Special provisions included 161 apartments for veterans in and Kutaisi and 60 in Tbilisi. An additional million was allocated for housing construction, though total spending remains unspecified

The 2020-2021 reports were combined, showing housing support for 7,000 IDP families. Of these, 2,905 were resettled in new apartments, while 3,028 received agricultural homes To reduce temporary housing, 118 collective centers were closed, and 1,176 families gained property ownership. Special provisions included 161 apartments for veterans in Zugdidi and Kutaisi and 60 in Tbilisi. An additional 5 million GEL was allocated for housing construction, though total spending remains unspecified.

2022 report (26):

In 2022, Georgia had 292,887 registered IDPs across 92,000 families. Housing assistance reached 3,530 240 new and 438 gaining property ownership. A record number of 2,588 families were also provided homes specifically for agricultural use, marking the highest annual distribution of such housing to date. Total IDP support spending was 104 million GEL

In 2022, Georgia had 292,887 registered IDPs across 92,000 families Housing assistance reached 3,530 families, including 240 receiving new apartments and 438 gaining property ownership. A record number of 2,588 families were also provided with homes specifically for agricultural use, marking the highest annual distribution of such housing to date. Total IDP support spending was 104 million GEL.

2023 report (27):

In 2023, over 9 million GEL was allocated for IDP with total support reaching 230 million GEL The government committed 900 million GEL for new initiatives from 2023 to 2025. Construction of new apartments for IDP families began in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Rustavi, Kutaisi, and Borjomi as part of this investment.

In 2023, over 9 million GEL was allocated for IDP housing, with total support spending reaching 230 million GEL. The government committed 900 million GEL for new housing initiatives from 2023 to 2025. Construction of new apartments for IDP families began in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Rustavi, Kutaisi, and Borjomi as part of this investment.

24 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency, accessed November 12, 2024 https://idp moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718032756-angarishi2020.pdf

The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and 12, moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718032756-angarishi2020.pdf

25 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency, accessed November 12, 2024 https://idp moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718033011-angarishi2021.pdf

26 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency, accessed November 12, 2024 https://idp moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718033141-angarishi2022.pdf

26 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency, November 12, 2024 https://idp moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718033141-angarishi2022.pdf

27 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency, accessed November 12, 2024 https://idp moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718033141-angarishi2022.pdf

The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood accessed November 12, 2024 moh gov

GOVERNING DISPLACEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF GEORGIA’S IDP POLICIES

Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University) Salome Mamuladze (Georgetown University)

Discussion

and Conclusions

Discussion and Conclusions

The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants, and Livelihood Agency’s 2019–2023 reports highlight evolving IDP housing in Georgia. Key trends include a shift temporary to sustainable evidenced by collective center closures and increased property ownership grants to IDP families

Additionally, a notable development is the government’s efforts to grant property ownership rights, with hundreds of IDP families receiving finalized ownership rights each year. This shift from short-term accommodation to long-term integration reflects a meaningful policy evolution focused on durable IDP solutions which previous plans post 2008 war had intended to prioritize. A significant change is the focus of new allocations, particularly in urban centers. Newly apartments are consistently located in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Kutaisi, and, starting in 2023, other cities like Rustavi and Borjomi (28) This shift indicates that the Georgian government now values urban locations for IDPs to provide better access to jobs, education, social networks, and healthcare. Another positive trend in the reports is the diversification of housing types provided to IDPs, which now include standard apartments, veteran housing, and agricultural plots. The allocation of agricultural land also demonstrates a tailored approach that encourages IDP self-sufficiency through farming and other agricultural activities.

The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants, and Livelihood Agency’s 2019–2023 reports highlight evolving IDP housing strategies in Georgia. Key trends include a shift from temporary to sustainable housing, evidenced by collective center closures and increased property ownership grants to IDP families. Additionally, a notable development is the government’s efforts to grant property ownership rights, with hundreds of IDP families receiving finalized ownership rights each year. This shift from short-term accommodation to long-term integration reflects a meaningful policy evolution focused on durable IDP solutions which previous strategy plans post 2008 war had intended to prioritize A significant change is the geographic focus of new housing allocations, particularly in urban centers. Newly built apartments are consistently located in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Kutaisi, and, starting in 2023, other cities like Rustavi and Borjomi (28). This shift indicates that the Georgian government now values urban locations for IDPs to provide better access to jobs, education, social networks, and healthcare. Another positive trend in the reports is the diversification of housing types provided to IDPs, which now include standard apartments, veteran housing, and agricultural plots The allocation of agricultural land also demonstrates a tailored approach that encourages IDP self-sufficiency through farming and other agricultural activities.

These reports show a shift from emergency responses to long-term IDP support but reveal gaps in standardization and transparency. Housing allocation data is inconsistent, and key financial details are often missing For example, the 2020-2021 report mentions a 5 million GEL allocation for construction but fails to clarify overall spending for the period. Similarly, while the 2023 report forecasts a 900 million GEL commitment through 2025, no detailed breakdown is provided, creating confusion about how funds will be distributed or monitored.

These reports show a shift from emergency responses to long-term IDP support but reveal gaps in standardization and transparency. Housing allocation data is inconsistent, and key financial details are often missing. For example, the 2020-2021 report a 5 million GEL allocation for construction but fails to clarify overall spending for the period. Similarly, while the 2023 report forecasts a 900 million GEL no detailed breakdown provided, creating confusion about how funds will be distributed or monitored

In conclusion, this paper does not aim to commend the Georgian government’s IDP policies but to trace their evolution and implementation Limitations remain in assessing housing quality and IDP satisfaction, beyond this study’s scope However, it highlights that without involving IDPs in decision-making—a key shortcoming the government may struggle to meet their needs effectively.

conclusion, this paper does not aim to commend the Georgian government’s IDP policies but to trace their evolution and implementation. Limitations remain assessing housing quality and IDP satisfaction, beyond this study’s scope. However, highlights that without involving IDPs decision-making—a key the government may struggle to their needs

28 The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood Agency, accessed November 12, 2024 https://idp moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718033141-angarishi2022.pdf

The Internally Displaced Persons, Ecomigrants and Livelihood accessed November 12, https://idp moh gov ge/editor/upload/20230718033141-angarishi2022.pdf

THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW OF ARMENIA (2018–2019): A NEW ERA IN THE LEGISLATION

Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles) Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles)

On November 16, 2017, the Government of the Republic of Armenia passed a law entitled “On the Prevention of Family Violence, Protection of Persons Subjected to Family Violence, and the Restoration of Family Cohesion," which came to be colloquially known as the domestic violence law (hereafter DV law). My doctoral research centers around the evolution of the DV law in Armenia over roughly the past decade I have concluded that Armenia’s DV law consists of three eras from 2012–2024 which demonstrate its gradual ideological move from a traditional, conservative law that favors reconciliation over the individual rights of the survivor to one that centers the victim and her rights, care, and protection.

From 2012–2017, human rights vernacular had recently entered Armenia which resulted in a DV law which received a great deal of backlash from conservative groups who continue to deliberately manipulate the discourse around the law claiming that it goes against traditional Armenian family values and aims to break up families Following a number of major political events, an incredibly conservative law was passed in 2017 that ignored international precedent, favored the perpetrator, excluded criminalization, and focused on family reconciliation rather than the victim’s right to her own bodily autonomy. In 2018 and 2019, following the Velvet Revolution which resulted in a political shift toward democracy, the law’s amendments began to turn toward a human rights focus that concentrated on the victim and her survival. From 2020–2024, this turn toward a representative government continues, culminating in amendments passed in April 2024 that center the victim and her rights by increasing the types of victims who are protected, including unmarried and LGBTQ individuals

In this paper, I focus on the middle stages of the law from 2018 – 2019. In 2018, Armenia’s Velvet Revolution marked a period of transition for the domestic violence law. While this was largely considered to be hopeful for advocates of the law – marked by increased funding from the EU to Armenia for civil society projects – the new government made clear that it would prioritize the rights of women and children but largely ignore those of the LGBT community I will demonstrate this through first discussing a brief history of the Velvet Revolution, then unpacking the continued increased funding from the EU to Armenia and finally discussing NGO employees’ sentiments after the revolution.

Part I: The Velvet Revolution

Armenia’s Velvet Revolution took place over a 5-week period from April to May of 2018 (Broers 2021, 1). What likely sparked an event of this size was the December 2015 constitutional referendum in which the Armenian government changed in structure to parliamentary from presidential. In this new system, the Prime Minister to be elected by Armenia’s Parliament in the National Assembly— would be the highest position of power, rather than the president as it previously was. The passing of this referendum was widely considered as a loophole for then-President Serj Sargsyan, who was finishing his second and last term, to serve in office at the highest level for more years to come. The public feared that Sargsyan would

THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW OF ARMENIA (2018–2019): A NEW ERA IN THE LEGISLATION

Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles) Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles)

become their “forever” ruler after a new constitution, which is widely known to have been written personally for Sargsyan, had several lasting promises. This new constitution not only promised to transform the state into a parliamentary republic, but it also deemed the Republican Party as the perpetually ruling party of the state.

Since Sargsyan was unable to run for a 3rd term as president, rumors spread at the time claiming that he made these changes in order to become prime minister himself and remain in power (Abrahamian and Shagoyan 2018, 511). Although he had agreed not to nominate himself as incumbent prime minister while these changes were first proposed in 2014, he was later elected Prime Minister and took the position on April 17, 2018. Already by this time, protests had begun, as lead by journalist, activist, and member of the National Assembly, Nikol Pashinyan (Shirinian 2020, 326)

In the days prior, protesting against this upcoming parliamentary shift, Pashinyan began a two-week march from Vardanantz Square in Armenia’s second largest city, Gyumri, and ending in Yerevan – the country’s capital city. Pashinyan encouraged others who were against this change to join him along the way (Broers 2021, 3). On April 13th, when Pashinyan arrived in Yerevan, an emerging protest movement that had begun the day before welcomed him (Broers 2021, 4) Over a 10-day period, from April 13th to 23rd, 2018, following Pashinyan’s open call for civil disobedience, thousands of local Armenians participated in the action (Shirinian 2020, 327).

By April 23rd, with the momentum of the movement reaching roughly 200,000 participants, Sargsyan resigned (Shirinian 2020, 327). It was a time of great excitement and a newfound hope for the future of the country (Shirinian 2020, 327) The main players of the revolution were noticeably the country’s youth who had grown up in the post-Soviet era (Broers 2021, 5) Although the 2018 Revolution was not the first attempt at eliminating the oligarchs from positions power in this country (Shirinian 2020, 327), it was the first step in its success.

Part II: Increased Funding from EU to Armenia

Following the revolution, local NGOs in Armenia received increased funding from several European embassies and global aid entities like USAID in order to continue to spread democratic ideals and to mitigate the historic Armenian corruption (Baldrian 2025, 10). I will briefly describe two examples of this. First, by 2019, the Swedish government had announced an intention to “increase financial support to Armenia in response to the strong political will to undertake democratic reforms following the “Velvet Revolution of 2018” (Swedish Embassy 2019) Peter Eriksson, Sweden’s Minister for International

THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW OF ARMENIA (2018–2019): A NEW ERA IN THE LEGISLATION

Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles) Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles)

Development Cooperation at the time, stated that:

An active democratization process has started in Armenia after the ‘Velvet Revolution’ and the shift of power during 2018. We see a strong political will to undertake necessary reforms and strengthen democracy, freedom of expression, as well as other fundamental rights and freedoms. The fact that the number of women in the newly elected National Assembly has increased is one of the many signs of a progressive movement towards change in the country. Therefore, this is the right moment for Sweden to increase its support and contribute to the positive developments in Armenia (Swedish Embassy 2019)

Eriksson also outlined three of the main goals for Swedish support of Eastern European democratization, which include: creating strong institutions and combatting corruption, assisting in the creation and maintenance of varied democratic societies, which include robust involvement from civil society and public organizations, and reinforcing independent media and journalism to foster more diverse media in the region (Swedish Embassy 2019).

Second, on a broader scale, through the EU-Armenia Partnership Implementation Report which was signed in 2017 but later put into force in 2021, Federica Mogherini, the then High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice- President of the European Commission, stated that: “The European Union has been and will continue to be the biggest supporter of the Armenian government's ambitious reform plan, which is consolidating democracy, the rule of law and promoting human rights in the country” (EU-Armenia Partnership Implementation Report). It became clear in 2018 that, moving forward, EU-Armenian relations would increase As a result, with more funding from the EU to Armenia came greater expectations of conforming to their ethos of spreading democracy and a human rights agenda.

Part III : NGO Employees’ Sentiments after the Velvet Revolution

The early years following the Velvet Revolution were characterized by a great deal of hope, particularly for those working in the NGO sector Following the administration change, the new government began accepting a new influx of donor funds (Baldrian 2025, 11). After 2018, the women’s NGOs also began to benefit from this increase in “democratization aid” (Baldrian 2025, 16). These changes were characterized not only by an increase in funds but also by a reshuffling of leadership.

It became clear to me during my fieldwork interviews that there is a stark contrast in the way different groups speak about these changes On the one hand, the women’s organizations like the Women’s Support Center and the Women’s Resource Center—speak very positively of the new government, which

THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW OF ARMENIA (2018–2019): A NEW ERA IN THE LEGISLATION

Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles) Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles)

is a stark contrast to how they spoke about the country’s oligarchic leadership before 2018. However, those involved in LGBT rights organizations describe what was once hope for the new administration feels like a sharp return to “business as usual” soon after the revolution. Here I will provide two examples. First, in an interview with Sona (1) from PINK Armenia, the country’s first LGBTQIA+ NGO, she explains:

After 2018 a few people from civil society moved to the government to work. It is not helping a lot, because there are still people in the government who can bring thousands of arguments against the suggestions we offer But it is still very important to bring their attention to the problems It would be easier if changes in laws are done based on our recommendations, but in most of the cases it doesn’t work that way. After that, advocacy becomes much more complicated in order to make amendments in the law.

Second, Margarita, of Right Side NGO, Armenia’s first and only trans rights organization, elaborates: “We thought that after the Velvet Revolution in 2018 all will change, and it will be very inclusive for LGBTQ people. But it didn’t happen, instead it became more difficult. ” In contrast, when asked about the difference in cooperation before and after the revolution, Hayk, a longtime advocate of the DV cause, speaks of the ease of working with the government after the revolution, “After 2018, considering the fact that people in the government were members of civil society, the work with them and making changes to the law was easier. The government has taken responsibility for this and is carrying it out.” These stark differences in experience demonstrate what was perceived as the government’s initial openness to a great deal of reform which was quickly confined to only include the rights of women and children rather than the LGBT community

Conclusion

Throughout this paper, I have demonstrated the various fluctuations of this period of transition in Armenian politics. While Armenia has seen an increasingly close relationship with the EU in recent years, it is no secret that the global far right has also grown significantly in this time It will be important to track how this effects geopolitical relations between Armenia and its allies moving forward.

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Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles) Lori Pirinjian (University of California, Los Angeles)

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Astourian, Stephan H 2000 “From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia ” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series http://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/u4/bps /publications_/2000_04-asto.pdf.

Baldrian, Sona. 2025. “Interweaving Story and Theory: Confronting Anti-Feminism and Anti-Genderism in the NGOized Women’s Movement in Armenia”. Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 59 (1) Online:10-32 https://doi org/10 22151/politikon.12025.1.

Broers, Laurence, and Anna Ohanyan, eds. 2021. Armenia’s Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World . London, UK; I.B. Tauris.

Derluguian, Georgi, and Ruben Hovhannisyan. 2018. “The Armenian Anomaly: Toward an Interdisciplinary Interpretation ” Demokratizatsiya (Washington, D.C.) 26 (4): 441–464.

Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. “EU-Armenia Partnership Implementation Report: The EU Is a Crucial Partner for Armenia’s Reform Agenda.” Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, May 21, 2019. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-armenia-partnershipimplementation-report-eu- crucial-partner-armenias-reform-agenda-2019-05-21_en.

Eastern Partnership 2017 “Fact and Figures about EU-Armenia Relations,” 24 November 2017, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44397/685-annex-5-a-armenia-factsheet.pdf. Shirinian, Tamar. 2021. “The Illiberal East: The Gender and Sexuality of the Imagined Geography of Eurasia in Armenia.” Gender, Place & Culture 28 (7): 955–974. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2020.1762545.

Shirinian, Tamar 2020 “Love and the Liminality of Revolution: Interpersonal Transformations In Between the April–May Events in Armenia.” Anthropology and Humanism , 45 (2), 322–338. https://doi.org/10.1111/anhu.12303.

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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW OF ARMENIA (2018–2019): A NEW ERA IN THE LEGISLATION

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Swedish Embassy in Yerevan. 2019. “Sweden Intends to Steps up Its Assistance to Support Armenia’s Reform Agenda.” Sweden Abroad. March 18, 2019. https://www.swedenabroad.se/fr/ambassade/armeniayerevan/current/news/ahead-of-ministerial-visit-to-yerevan-sweden-steps-up-its-assistance-to-supportarmenias-reform-agenda/.

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RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University)

This paper is part of my Master’s thesis on the politics of techno in Georgia, exploring the role of clubs as civil society actors. Based on interviews with DJs, queer activists and other scene members, the paper examines how Georgian club culture offers an alternative form of queer activism, moving away from visibility approaches. Queer techno activism operates through corporeal politics rooted in embodied collective presence on the dance floor It draws from and roots itself in Georgia’s tradition of dance and music, prioritising genuine inclusion over the need for external recognition of the country as progressive and European.

The realities of techno-queer activism were best captured by Keto, a young queer activist, recounting her first experience in Success, one of Tbilisi’s only openly queer bars: “The first time I walked into Success, I saw a disco ball in a penis shape and that changed me.” Her memory encapsulates the positioning of the clubs, where queer identities are not seen as deviant but quite literally at the centre of the spaces, sparkling up the rooms.

To contextualise the need to shift away from Western frameworks of queer activism in Georgia, it is key to talk about why Western campaigning was adopted and the issues associated with it. In Georgia, LGBTQ+ rights advocacy is embedded within broader efforts to align the country with Western political institutions This geopolitical transformation necessitates greater societal acceptance of queer people (Kahlina, 2015; Slootmaeckers, 2017) because Western governments use LGBTQ+ rights as a civilisation marker and a measure of progress (Puar, 2007). Subsequently, to become ‘more European’, Georgia needs to be more accepting of sexual minorities and adopt Western models when achieving this acceptance (Luciani, 2023). Yet adopting Western frameworks enforces perceptions that queer rights are a foreign imposition (Luciani, 2023), creating a disconnect between the use of LGBTQ+ strategies as a requirement of Europeanisation and actual benefits to queer people in Georgia This is most evident in the case of Pride parades. While Prides are used to signal belonging to the European community (Gruszczynska 2012) through the adoption of Western visibility-centred activism, they fail to improve people’s lives meaningfully. Instead, they make queer people hyper-visible to the forces opposing the community, leading to violence.

In Georgia, all attempts to organise Pride have ended disastrously as described by Dato, a queer multimedia artist: “They just always turned into this horrible fucking aggression festival.” Subsequently, queer members of the scene that I interviewed emphasised the need to adopt more strategic, context-specific approaches to queer rights explained both by Dato and David, who is a member of a notable queer rights NGO in Tbilisi. As Dato put it, “We are not Europe. I mean, we pretend to be, but this is not Europe.” David echoed this sentiment, saying: “It’s like playing chess with the queer problems here because if you push it too hard, the pushback puts you back three steps away from what you achieved.” What emerged as

RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University)

a viable strategy was the shift away from visibility, which renders queer communities highly susceptible to reactionary scapegoating (Rekhviashvili, 2018) to strategic non-visibility. In practice, this entailed finding spaces where queer people could find solace from the heteronormative public and forget about the requirement of displaying the progress of queer rights for the external Western gaze.

Night clubs emerged as the ideal place in this search, thanks to their temporal dimensions and spatial location. Firstly, most night club events take place at night, which offers invisibility for those marginalised during the ‘heteronormative daytime’ (Halberstam, 2005). Secondly, non-visibility is achieved through the physical locations of clubs, specifically their occupation of abandoned industrial spaces. These spaces hold little value for the government (Andersson, 2023; Martin, 1999), as they do not contribute to capitalist production (Light and Young, 2001) Yet this lack of governmental interest is key for marginalised communities who seek refuge from scrutiny Subsequently, in Georgia, most clubs are located in abandoned industrial objects, such as Bassiani, a club in a defunct pool underneath a football stadium, a venue frequented by hyper-masculine hooligans (Bolloten, 2023). Yet, underneath lies a queerfriendly club.

This presence of counter-publics (Warner, 2002) informs a distinct form of activism, which diverges fundamentally from Western visibility-focused approaches Instead, it embraces an embodied activism, reconstituting conservative notions of Georgian culture, which seek to erase queer communities. This resistance is carried out by linking the queer experience and their existence within the clubs to the strong tradition of dance and music in Georgia, expressed by Lila, a Tbilisi-based DJ and a former music teacher: “And this techno music is exactly what Georgian people are. It’s part of our cultural identity.” By positioning techno as a continuation of Georgia’s strong musical tradition, the queer community has utilised dance to fight against the country’s strict conservative values This is exemplified by Bassiani’s second dance floor, Horoom, which was established as a space for explicitly queer parties, that directly roots queer existence within Georgian traditions. Its name links to the traditional Georgian dance Khorumi, a highly ritualistic dance symbolising battle on the dance floor, a metaphor for the ongoing struggle queer individuals face in the country. Integrating prominent musical traditions with queer resistance against the country’s heteronormative political order helped undermine the narrative of queer rights as something foreign Instead, the queering of the dance floor created new references rooted in Georgian culture, integrating the community with Georgian cultural production and wider identity, a right denied to them by the country’s conservative forces.

Besides cultural belonging, the dance floor also plays a crucial role in fostering queer communities built on personal connections As noted in literature on nightlife, clubs allow queer individuals to explore their identities (Valentine and Skelton, 2003) by connecting with others and finding reference points for their experience (Moran and Skeggs, 2004). In Georgia, this dynamic was highly evident in the chance to learn

RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) about what it means to be queer, ranging from more abstract ideas about queer identities and histories to more ‘day-to-day’ relevant information, such as about safe sex practices.” This non-biological kinship links to the concept of chosen families (Weston, 1997), which emerge as key support systems in Georgia, given the marginalisation of queer experience in public discourses. The legal definition of kinship in Georgia is highly exclusionary, understood as a heteronormative union designed for procreation: “Marriage, as a union of a woman and a man for the purpose of founding a family” (Constitution of Georgia, art. 30, sec. 1). Subsequently, queer club communities are not only relevant for cultural production. Instead, they work on a deeply personal level, creating immediate support networks for LGBTQ+ people, which is otherwise systematically denied to them.

Given the widespread nature of homophobia in Georgia, a question remains of how the clubs managed to emerge as inclusive spaces for queer communities The explanation lies with the emergence of Georgia’s club scene as the acceptance fostered on the dance floor was not incidental but fundamental to the very inception of the club scene in Georgia. Unlike the grassroots origins of Western club cultures, Tbilisi’s club scene was initiated by individuals with existing connections to other club scenes, who sought to replicate such culture in Georgia, a story recounted by Lasha, owner of a vinyl store in Tbilisi: “Usually underground develops in a city through bottom-up. In Georgia, it was exactly the opposite, it was topdown ” However, this meant that the scene lacked authenticity, a key requirement to legitimise it as more than just a commercial venture, precisely by positioning itself against commercialism (Thornton, 1995). Since the Tbilisi scene could not rely on such opposition, it had to find a different notion against which to position itself to attain authenticity. That element became the opposition to the country’s conservative values. Giorgi, a music journalist who has been in the scene since its inception, recalls how club organisers read about the histories of global scenes and their emphasis on support for marginalised people and decided to adopt this ethos: “From the very beginning, the clubs had a specific agenda about freedom that they’re offering to the community members.” Thus, a symbiotic relationship developed: queer people authenticated the club scene, and the club scene provided queer people with a safe space. Importantly, this process of authenticating the scene was not a façade as the clubs have genuinely played a key role in prioritising the safety of queer people, sometimes even at the expense of commercial gains.

This commitment was evident during the country’s recent anti-government protests when clubs remained closed to encourage political mobilisation instead of offering hedonistic escapism. Similar prioritisation of values over profit has been present in the sustained support of the queer community, significantly influencing broader scene attitudes towards LGBTQ+ people. As Rati, a crew member of one of Tbilisi’s leading clubs, describes, this commitment has been highly impactful in making the scene more tolerant: “It has become more accepting Before that, it was a much more male-party kind of thing. I’ve seen that change towards other sexual orientations.” The clubs achieved this transformation by strategically

RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University)

leveraging their door policies, only letting in those, despite the rising popularity of the scene, which was sure to generate profit, who agreed to respect the club’s ethos of inclusivity. These club spaces, built on clear values of respect and tolerance towards marginalised individuals, enabled non-queer individuals not merely to perform tolerance but to experience a deeper, organic transformation. This was particularly evident among straight men, for whom “sharing the dancefloor with the queer community became a completely normal part of their clubbing experience” (Lasha) Therefore, by fostering a culture of genuine acceptance, the clubs played a crucial role in reshaping social norms.

Central to this process is dancing, as an act of fostering intimacy even among strangers. As Tiko, a crew member of one of Tbilisi’s leading clubs, explained: “Dancing together and the experience of being together in this one space does something to create community and unite people.” On the dance floor, individuals see each other in very human states, sweating, moving and losing themselves in the music, which allows them to connect without any barriers. Or, as Giorgi put it, the embodied experience of clubbing allows you to see: “that, in the end, we are all human”. Subsequently, straight people who were taught to demonise queer people found out that, in reality, they were all quite similar. The mechanisms through which this transformation occurs can be linked to Victor Turner’s (1969) concept of communitas. In his research on rituals, Turner described deep bonds that happen thanks to sonic assemblies and corporeal experiences, which bear similarity to raves This gut understanding between strangers emerges in liminal moments of rituals where social hierarchies are temporarily suspended, which creates space for spontaneous, unspoken connections. In the club, this suspension allows for connections free from rigid gender and sexual norms. Subsequently, pressures of toxic masculinity dissipate, allowing for interactions with individuals who might otherwise be perceived as a threat to the heteronormative order. Crucially, as these encounters are repeated weekly on the dance floor, they gradually become one’s normal part of a night out Subsequently, what begins as a temporary shift in club spaces extends into everyday life and the wider society one envisions for Georgia.

To conclude, while the framing of raves as sites of personal empowerment has recently come under criticism as mere individualism reinforcing the status quo, in Georgia, the club scene has played a genuinely transformative role for queer communities By bringing queer activism onto the dance floor, it both offered alternatives to Western paradigms by rooting its activities within Georgian cultural traditions and fostered actual support networks among queer individuals. More importantly, it allowed queer people to reclaim their agency, not as pawns in the debate over Europeanisation but as active participants in activities that do not seek external validation but focus on lived experiences and solidarity-building.

RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University)

Bibliography

Andersson, J. (2023) ‘Berlin’s queer archipelago: Landscape, sexuality, and nightlife’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 48(1), pp. 100–116.

Bolloten, J (2023) ‘Rare look inside the violent world of far-right football ultras in Tbilisi, Georgia ’ Huck Magazine. Available at: https://www.huckmag.com/article/john-bolloten-rare-look-inside-theviolent-world-of-far-right-football-ultras-in-tbilisi-georgia(Accessed: 2 February 2025).

Buckland, F. (2002) Impossible Dance: Club Culture and Queer World-Making. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press

Cattan, N. and Vanolo, A. (2014) ‘Gay and Lesbian Emotional Geographies of Clubbing: Reflections from Paris and Turin’, Gender, Place & Culture, 21(9), pp. 1158–1175.

Constitution of Georgia (1995) Article 30, section 1.

Franck, K A and Stevens, Q (2007) Loose Space: Possibility and Diversity in Urban Life, Routledge: London.

Gruszczynska, Anna. (2012) ‘Parades of Pride or Shame: Documenting LGBTQ Visibility in Central and Eastern Europe’, Sextures Special Issue, 2, pp. 1–6.

Halberstam, J (2005) In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives New York, NY: New York University Press.

Kahlina, K. (2015) ‘Local Histories, European LGBT Designs: Sexual Citizenship, Nationalism, and “Europeanisation” in Post-Yugoslav Croatia and Serbia’, Women’s Studies International Forum 49, pp. 73–83

Leksikov, R. and Rachok, D. (2020) ‘Beyond Western Theories: On the Use and Abuse of “Homonationalism” in Eastern Europe’. In: R. Buyantueva and M. Shevtsova, eds., LGBTQ+ Activism in Central and Eastern Europe: Resistance, Representation and Identity. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 25–51.

RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University)

Light, D. and Young, C. (2001) ‘Reconfiguring Socialist Urban Landscapes: the ‘Left-Over’ Spaces of State-Socialism in Bucharest’, Human Geographies, 4(1), pp. 5–16.

Luciani, L. (2023) ‘Where the Personal is (Geo)Political: Performing Queer Visibility in Georgia in the Context of EU Association’, Problems of Post-Communism, 70(2), pp. 197–208.

Martin, D. (1999), ‘Power Play and Party Politics: the Significance of Raving’, Journal of Popular Culture, 31(4), pp. 77–99.

Moran, L.J. and Skeggs, B. (eds) (2004) Sexuality and the Politics of Violence and Safety. London: Routledge

Puar, J.K. (2007) Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Rekhviashvili, A. (2018) ‘Tracing the LGBT Movement in the Republic of Georgia: Stories of Activists’. In: M Barkaia and A Waterston, eds , Gender in Georgia: Feminist Perspectives on Culture, Nation, and History in the South Caucasus New York, NY: Berghahn Books, pp 205–223

Rekhviashvili, L. et al. (2019) ‘Limits and Potentials of Tbilisi’s Youth Culture: Field Report’, Johann Wolfgang Goethe - Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich 11, Institut für Humangeographie.

Skeggs, B (1999) ‘Matter out of Place: Visibility and Sexualities in Leisure Spaces’, Leisure Studies, 18(3), pp 213–232

Slootmaeckers, K. (2017) ‘The Litmus Test of Pride: Analysing the Emergence of the Belgrade ‘Ghost’ Pride in the Context of EU Accession’, East European Politics, 33(4), pp. 517–535.

Thornton, S (1995) Club Cultures: Music, Media, and Subcultural Capital Cambridge: Polity.

Turner, V. and Abrahams, R.D. (1969) The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. London: Routledge.

Valentine, G., and T. Skelton. (2003) ‘Finding Oneself, Losing Oneself: The Lesbian and Gay “Scene” as a Paradoxical Space’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(4), pp. 849–866.

RAVE AGAINST

THE

RAVE AGAINST THE MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

MACHINE: CLUB CULTURES AND QUEER ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA

Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University) Eliška Vinklerová (Oxford University)

Warner, M. (2002) Publics and Counterpublics. New York, NY: Zone Books.

Weston, K. (1997) Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Wilkinson, C (2020) ‘LGBT Rights in the Former Soviet Union: The Evolution of Hypervisibility.’ In: M.J. Bosia, S.M. McEvoy and M. Rahman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 25–51.

Papers by Panels

PANEL V: Identity and Resistance PANEL V: Identity and Resistance

Chair & Discussant: Lola Shehu (Yale University)

William Sims (European University Institute)

Filippos (Fil) Toskas (Oxford University)

Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam)

“A PAGE OF ITALIAN HISTORY.” THE MARCH ON ROME THROUGH THE COVERAGE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND DIASPORA ITALIAN LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS

“A PAGE OF ITALIAN HISTORY.” THE MARCH ON ROME THROUGH THE COVERAGE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND DIASPORA ITALIAN LIBERAL

NEWSPAPERS

William Sims (European University Institute) William Sims (European University Institute)

“A Page of Italian History,” read the opening title of La Stampa’s editorial of 31 October 1922 (1). Just one day prior, Benito Mussolini had been appointed to form the next government of the Kingdom of Italy after he and his Fascist blackshirts had organised their infamous March on Rome. What this paper argues is that across varied geographic levels and the entire spectrum of the Italian liberal press that is local, national, and diaspora newspapers whose essence can be distilled into a support for the established liberal, capitalist, parliamentarian status quo there was a ready acceptance of the March on Rome as a fait acompli, rather than as a threat to oppose. Instead of mounting a defence of Parliament and/or democracy, liberal newspaper editorials at best issued weak critiques of Mussolini’s methods while endorsing the underlying substance of his new coalition. An eclectic mixture of interpretations followed the March; from those which drew comparisons to the Italian risorgimento, claimed it was something completely new, or reinterpreted and reframed the extra-legal pressure of the Fascist squads into an vaguely ordered transfer of power from one administration to the next which supposedly preserved certain formal continuities in the state.

Previous historiography on Mussolini’s seizure of power had dismissed the March as little more than a farce which could have been easily suppressed by the government had King Victor Emanuel III accepted Prime Minister Luigi Facta’s request for the imposition of martial law (2) However, more recent studies by the likes of Giulia Albanese have noted that there was a genuinely concerted, subversive Fascist uprising that took place in numerous towns and cities across the country (3). Violent tactics of intimidation by Fascists against newspapers were also far from uncommon in the period, though their

1 “Una pagina di storia italiana,“ La Stampa, 30 October, 1922, 1

2 See amongst others: Paolo Alatri, Le origini del fascismo, (Rome: Riuniti Editore, 1963); Christopher Seton Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925, (London: Meuthen, 1967); Jonathan Dunnage, The Italian Police and the Rise of Fascism: A Case Study of Bologna, 1897-1925 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997); Mario Isnenghi, L’Italia in Piazza: I luoghi della vita pubblica dal 1848 ai giorni nostri, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2004)

3 Giulia Albanese, The March on Rome, (Oxford: Routledge, 2019), xi

“A PAGE OF ITALIAN HISTORY.” THE MARCH ON ROME THROUGH THE COVERAGE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND DIASPORA ITALIAN LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS

William Sims (European University Institute) William Sims (European University Institute)

primary focus had been against left-wing papers such as Avanti! (4). However, while accepting Albanese’s argument that, in practice, the March was a genuinely violent act rather than a mere transfer of power, I sustain that, in the imagination of the Italian liberal press, the March was presented as an action which contained the potential to bring about benefits to the ailing and sclerotic liberal political order Violence and intimidation alone cannot justify why newspapers from across the broad spectrum of liberal opinion failed to mount defences of the institutions that were being rapidly undermined and seized by Mussolini. Rather, I posit that as liberal political forces had essentially accepted the necessity of Fascists composing part of the next government, they had already walked themselves into a compromising bind where to oppose the Fascists at this critical juncture would have further weakened their power and influence. Ultimately, liberal newspapers which had not already wholeheartedly signed on to the Fascist cause deluded themselves into the belief that fascism was either a force with which they could collaborate, or an integral part of their national historical tradition and a movement within which they could eventually find accommodation.

For newspapers at the local level, praise and mythologising were dominant themes. In the Tuscan town of Pistoia, the reformist-liberal weekly Il Popolo Pistoiese greeted the March on Rome with an editorial that served not only to translate the national events into the local context, but which also connected the actions of Mussolini directly through a long line of liberal nationalist figures stemming from the Risorgimento. With allusions cast not only to the great unifying national figure of Garibaldi, but also much further into the Roman antiquity, the paper accepted and adopted Fascist mythologising and repackaged it to its audience. Far from interpreting the March as a break with tradition, Il Popolo Pistoiese placed it within the historical lineage of Italian nation-building glories of the previous centuries (5) As the paper of record for the petite bourgeoisie of Pistoia it undoubtedly was reflective of this class’s own opinions towards the March and their predisposition towards the new government (6).

Other liberal papers sought to portray the March as a positive break from the country’s recent past. High in the Italian Alps, another reformist-liberal paper, La Tribuna Biellese, claimed the four thousand cardcarrying liberals it sought to advocate for as allies of the Fascists Reflecting in its editorial the seeds of what had driven many liberal papers into a de facto alliance with the Fascists, it claimed that Mussolini was rescuing a land that “for two years had been in the throes of the Bolsheviks” (7). Meanwhile, in the

4 See for example, Mauro Forno, Informazione e Potere: Storia del Giornalismo Italiano, (Rome: Laterza, 2012), 135

5 “Rinnovemento,” Il Popolo Pistoiese, 4 November, 1922, 1

6 See for example, Giorgio Petracchi, Storia di Pistoia vol IV: nell’eta’ delle rivoluzioni 1777-1940, (Florence: Casa Editirce Le Monnier, 2000), 399-400; Paul Corner, Fascism in Ferrara 1915-1925, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 232

7 “L’Ora presente,” La Tribuna Biellese, 31 October, 1922, 1

“A

PAGE OF ITALIAN

HISTORY.” THE MARCH ON ROME THROUGH THE COVERAGE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND DIASPORA ITALIAN LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS

“A PAGE OF ITALIAN HISTORY.” THE MARCH ON ROME THROUGH THE COVERAGE

OF LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND DIASPORA ITALIAN LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS

William Sims (European University Institute)

south, the previously more liberal-conservative Corriere delle Puglie argued that fascism shouldn’t accept power unless it came with the dissolution of parliament, editorialising that “the country doesn’t want any more words, but deeds” (8). What both of these newspapers represented were, in essence opposites in both the geographic but also political spectrum In the case of La Tribuna Biellese, the paper maintained convicted in its advocacy for political liberalism and parliamentarism, to the point that it was eventually forced to close by the Fascists in 1925, and is representative of both the cautious optimism of many liberals, and also of the quiet concern not to rock the boat too much in the face of a degree of Fascist intimidation. On the other hand, the Corriere delle Puglie is an example of a newspaper which had begun to quietly fascistize its content in the months prior to the March itself, and that navigated a path from liberal-conservative paper into Fascist true believer as it bounced around from various financial difficulties and changes of editorial staff (9) Where both agreed was that there was little left to defend of the Facta administration. The government, which had already failed a confidence motion, was out of energy and seemingly incapable of addressing the numerate crises facing the Italian public. In the eyes of many Italians, the government had been so ineffectual and impotent, it had rendered itself little deserving of any strenuous defence.

At the national level, newspapers such as the Corriere della Sera and La Stampa were certainly less oblivious to the violent nature of Mussolini’s march. Indeed, Nicola Tranfaglia and Luciana Giacheri Fossati argued that of the Italian liberal press, it was only these two national papers which correctly warned of the dictatorial threat to the nation from Mussolini’s fascism (10). La Stampa correctly identified the actions of the Fascists as amounting to an insurrection against the form and substance of parliamentary government, while the Corriere della Sera highlighted how the Fascist military command of Milan had impeded the publication of their issue in the previous days (11) However, in these same issues, both newspapers sought to play down and normalise the events of the March with La Stampa arguing that the Monarchy and Parliament had their formal continuity preserved while the Corriere claiming that Mussolini himself had interceded on their behalf to praise their independence and ensure their continued publication. Perhaps this was cautious optimism, perhaps it was self-censorship fearing punitive sequestration once the new government was in place What it also represents is the initially widespread view of many Italian liberal parliamentarians who believed that the March on Rome did not mark a watershed moment in Italian history, and that were confident that Mussolini’s government would soon fail

8 “Il fascismo al Potere,” Corriere delle Puglie, 31 October 1922, 1

9 Matteo Pizzigallo and Mario Spagnoletti, Un Giornale del sud: Dal ‘corriere delle puglie’ alla ‘gazzetta del mezzogiorno’ 1887-1943, (Milan: Francoangeli, 1996), 103; Nicola Mascellaro, 1887-1928 Una Finestra sulla Storia: Dal Corriere delle Puglie a La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, (Bari: Edisud, 1988),

10 Nicola Tranfaglia and Luciana Giacheri Fossati “Dalla grande guerra al fascismo,“ in La Stampa Italiana nell’eta Liberale, edited by Valerio Castronovo, Luciana Giacheri Fossati, and Nicola Tranfaglia, (Rome: Editori Laterza, 1979), 428

11 “Una pagina di storia italiana,“ La Stampa, 30 October, 1922, 1; “Il Nuovo minister costituito da Mussolini,” Corriere della Sera, 31 October, 1922, 1

“A PAGE OF ITALIAN HISTORY.” THE MARCH ON ROME THROUGH THE COVERAGE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND DIASPORA ITALIAN LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS

William Sims (European University Institute)

or be forced to compromise upon its first taste of executive power (12). While the national papers were closer to the mark in their comments on the subversive nature of the March, it was the local press which seemed to first recognise that Mussolini and his blackshirts were here to stay. Finally in the politically liberal newspapers of the Italian diaspora press, the March was largely seen as a positive development L’Italia of San Francisco wrote that “everything has returned to its place,” on the 31 October, one day after Mussolini had been appointed Prime Minister, and that “it was natural, it was logical that Mussolini should have come to power” (13). In Rio de Janeiro, the Fanfulla included a proclamation to all Italians living abroad which urged them to be cautious in their consumption of foreign news sources and announced that a peaceful revolution with the support of the king had taken place (14). As with many newspapers in the locality, the embrace of a deluded vision of a “legalistic and pacific” transition of power was a common theme, and accession of Mussolini to power was marked not as a dark cloud or threat, but as an opportunity for Italian rebirth (15).

The liberal press of Italy had, during the twilight of the constitutional state, largely failed to heed the warning signs posed by Mussolini and the Fascists. Even though the March on Rome was a nakedly violent seizure of power which flew in the face of parliamentary government, Mussolini’s appointment by King Victor Emmanuel III gave even sceptical members of the liberal press just enough ammunition to delude themselves into believing the liberal state they supported was intact, and that the constitutional order they purported to support could be preserved. For papers further down the road of embracing fascism, the March on Rome was a glorious revolution, a restoration of order after the chaos of the ‘red years,’ and an opportunity to try and claim a space within fascism for their kind of liberal vision. What united them all was a lack of resistance Either through design, delusion, or cowardice, no member of the liberal press was brave enough to decisively oppose the Fascist takeover in 1922.

It would be negligent of me to conclude this piece without briefly mentioning the historical warning this provides us. Whether it be self-censorship in the form of a noted liberal newspaper having its owner pull its election endorsement for fear of repercussions, or liberal politicians celebrating the ‘peaceful transition of power’ to the man who led an ill-fated attempt to forcefully seize control of the presidency four years prior, the echoes of the March on Rome, and cowardly, insufficient liberal responses to it live on in present-day America, and through reckoning with how supposedly constitutional institutions such as the

12 Albanese, The March on Rome, xi; Giuseppe Farinelli, Ermano Paccagnini et al Storia del Giornalismo Italiano: Dalle origini a oggi, (Turin: UTET, 2004), 226-236 Both Alberto Frassati and Luigi Albertini – directors and editors of La Stampa and Corriere della Sera respectively had themselves been made senators in 1921

13 See L’Italia 31 October, 1922, 1

14 “Un proclama agli italiani all’estero,” Fanfulla, 31 October, 1922, 1

15 Tranfaglia and Giacheri Fossati “Dalla grande guerra al fascismo,“ 428

“A PAGE OF ITALIAN HISTORY.” THE MARCH ON ROME THROUGH THE COVERAGE OF LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND DIASPORA ITALIAN LIBERAL NEWSPAPERS

William Sims (European University Institute)

liberal press failed the Italy of the 1920s, we can and must demand better of contemporary political and media class in resisting this present administration (16).

Primary Sources

Corriere della Sera

Corriere delle Puglie

Fanfulla

Il Popolo Pistoiese

L’Italia

La Stampa

La Tribuna Biellese

ABC News

New York Times

16 Alexander Nutzler, “Biden sees to peaceful transition of power with Trump after bitter campaign: ANALYSIS,” ABC News, January 19, 2025; Kate Robertson and Benjamin Mullin, “Jeff Bezos Defends Decision to End Washington Post Endorsements,” New York Times, 28 October, 2024

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERATION IN EARLY 1970S QUEER BRITISH PRESS

Filippos (Fil) Toskas (Oxford University) Filippos (Fil) Toskas (Oxford University)

Introduction

The 1970s are often remembered as a decade of radical queer liberation, with the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) portrayed as its defining force (1). Yet this familiar narrative flattens the ideological complexity of the period and obscures the evolving meanings of ‘liberation’ Early articulations were closely linked to Marxist, anti-capitalist, and New Left perspectives, but these frameworks were neither static nor universally accepted.

The 1970s are often remembered as a decade of radical queer liberation, with the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) portrayed as its defining force (1). Yet this familiar narrative flattens the ideological complexity of the period and obscures the evolving meanings of ‘liberation’. Early articulations closely linked to Marxist, anti-capitalist, and New Left perspectives, but these frameworks were neither static nor accepted.

Throughout the decade, activists and commentators within the queer press grappled with competing interpretations of liberation, shaped by both internal disagreements and changing political circumstances. By the end of the 1970s, the term had come to embody new and sometimes conflicting connotations, increasingly tied to discourses of personal freedom and civil rights, particularly as the movement faced the rise of conservatism and a mounting moral backlash.

Throughout the decade, activists and commentators within the queer press grappled with competing interpretations of liberation, shaped by both internal disagreements and changing political circumstances. By the end of the 1970s, the term had come to embody new and sometimes conflicting connotations, increasingly tied discourses of personal freedom and civil rights, particularly as the faced the of conservatism a mounting moral backlash.

This paper focuses on the first half of the decade, when Marxist and New Left thought still provided a central framework for how liberation was debated and disseminated especially within the pages of the queer press It argues that liberation was less a fixed concept than an unstable signifier, continually redefined in response to shifting political and cultural dynamics

This paper focuses on the first half of the decade, when Marxist and New Left thought still provided a central framework for how liberation was debated and disseminated especially within the pages of the queer press. It argues that liberation was less a fixed concept than an unstable signifier, continually redefined response to shifting political and cultural dynamics.

Queer periodicals and particularly the GLF’s newspaper Come Together were crucial sites where these ideological contests were worked out Liberation was framed not as a call for sexual rights but as a challenge to broader structures of oppression, including capitalism, imperialism, and gender norms.

Queer periodicals and particularly the GLF’s newspaper Come Together were crucial sites where these ideological contests were worked out. Liberation was framed not as a call for sexual rights but as a challenge to broader structures of oppression, including capitalism, imperialism, and gender norms.

While much existing literature treats liberation as if it had a singular, radical the story traced through the queer press is more Rather than following a linear trajectory, idea of liberation was marked by contestation and transformation, gradually shifting from Marxist and structural critiques to a stronger emphasis on individual freedoms and civil rights By tracing these debates, this paper shows how the very concept of liberation itself became a site of ideological struggle, shaped both by internal tensions and external shifts.

While much existing literature treats liberation as if it had a singular, radical meaning, the story traced through the queer press is more complex. Rather than following a linear trajectory, the idea of liberation was marked by contestation and transformation, gradually shifting from Marxist and structural critiques to a stronger emphasis on individual freedoms and civil rights. By tracing these debates, this paper shows how the very concept of liberation itself became a site of ideological struggle, shaped both by internal tensions and external shifts

Liberation

Queer politics was fundamentally transformed by the concept of liberation, which permeated activist movements at the end of the 1960s, including the American Gay Liberation Front (1969) (2). Rooted in the

1 See for instance: Lisa Power, No Bath But Plenty Of Bubbles: An Oral History of the Gay Liberation Front 1970-73, Kindle, n d.; Lucy Robinson, Gay Men and the Left in PostWar Britain: How the Personal Got Political, Reprint edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); Jeffrey Weeks, Coming out: Homosexual Politics in Britain, from the Nineteenth Century to the Present, Rev ed (London; Quartet Books, 1990) 2 Weeks, Coming Out, 187

1 See for instance: Lisa Bath But Plenty Of Bubbles: Oral History of the Gay Liberation 1970-73, Kindle, n d.; Lucy Robinson, Gay and the Left PostWar Britain: How the Personal Got Political, Reprint edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011); Jeffrey Weeks, Coming out: Homosexual Politics in Britain, from the Nineteenth Century to the Present, Rev ed Books, 2 187

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERATION IN EARLY 1970S QUEER BRITISH PRESS

Filippos (Fil) Toskas (Oxford University) Filippos (Fil) Toskas (Oxford University)

civil rights movements of the 1960s, liberation was transposed into gay lesbian while retaining its broader radical aspiration of challenging the status quo Its influence on women’s and gay movements was already acknowledged by second-wave feminist scholars such as Sara Evans, who noted that earlier activist groups operated under rigid membership protocols, whereas women’s liberation movements had no formal membership: ‘[t]here was no way to join; you simply announced or felt yourself’ (3). identifies this shift as a key characteristic of liberation movements, whose blueprint originated in the civil struggles and New Left (4). The American context is crucial here, as it laid the British GLF, founded in 1970 Jeffrey Weeks, echoing Evans’s refers to the British GLF simply as ‘the movement’ (5)

civil rights movements of the 1960s, liberation was transposed into gay and lesbian politics while retaining its broader radical aspiration of challenging the status quo. Its influence on women’s and gay movements was already acknowledged by second-wave feminist scholars such as Sara Evans, who noted that earlier activist groups operated under rigid membership protocols, whereas women’s liberation movements had no formal membership: ‘[t]here was no way to join; you simply announced or felt yourself’ (3) Evans identifies this shift as a key characteristic of liberation movements, whose blueprint originated in the civil rights struggles and the New Left (4). The American context is crucial here, as it laid the foundations for the British GLF, founded in 1970. Jeffrey Weeks, echoing Evans’s language, refers to the British GLF simply as ‘the movement’ (5).

Drawing on scholars like Evans, this paper examines the early 1970s conception of liberation through Marxist lens an ideological underpinning often overlooked in existing scholarship. Several of gay liberation’s influences, recognised by as Lucy Robinson including Yippies, for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and the counterculture press had affinities with Marxism (6) Yet, neither Marxism nor the New Left is explicitly foregrounded in Robinson’s account of early gay liberation.

Drawing on scholars like Evans, this paper examines the early 1970s conception of liberation through a Marxist lens an ideological underpinning often overlooked in existing scholarship Several of gay liberation’s influences, recognised by scholars such as Lucy Robinson including the Yippies, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and the counterculture press had affinities with Marxism (6). Yet, neither Marxism nor the New Left is explicitly foregrounded in Robinson’s account of early gay liberation.

Lisa Power offers a potential explanation for why radical actions and ideas have often been understated In discussing illicit activity undertaken by some GLF members, she argues that oral histories typically underplay radicalism (7). She attributes this to a retrospective ‘embarrassment’ regarding what, in the late 1970s and the Thatcherite 1980s, came to be seen as unrealistic utopian dreams (8). This, she suggests, tamed how the GLF is remembered, distancing it from its more radical ideological roots. Although Power’s work has been essential in highlighting links with both the Left and the counterculture as foundational to liberation politics, she, too, sidelines Marxism as a guiding ideology

Lisa Power offers a potential explanation for why radical and ideas have often been understated. In illicit activity undertaken by some GLF members, she argues that oral underplay radicalism (7) She attributes this to a retrospective ‘embarrassment’ regarding what, in the late 1970s and the Thatcherite 1980s, came to be seen as unrealistic utopian dreams (8) This, she suggests, tamed how the GLF is remembered, distancing it from its more radical ideological roots. Although Power’s work has been essential in highlighting links with both the Left and the counterculture as foundational to liberation politics, she, too, sidelines Marxism as a guiding ideology.

Yet Marxism itself was being reimagined during this period, as New Left thinkers worked to expand its boundaries beyond traditional class analysis. A similar dynamic unfolded within the queer press, where Marxist language was reshaped through engagement with sexuality, gender, and personal identity. This paper examines the British GLF’s Come Together as a New Left platform, treating liberation as an inherently Marxist though evolving concept In its early years, Come Together served as the primary vehicle for articulating and negotiating the contested meaning of liberation.

Yet Marxism itself was reimagined during this period, as New Left thinkers worked to expand its boundaries beyond traditional class analysis A similar dynamic unfolded within the queer press, where Marxist language was reshaped through engagement with sexuality, gender, and personal identity. This paper examines the British GLF’s Come Together a New Left platform, treating liberation as an inherently Marxist though evolving concept. In its early years, Come Together served as the primary for articulating and negotiating the contested meaning of liberation.

3 Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left Sara Evans

3 Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in Rights Movement and Left Sara Evans

4 Ibid

5 Weeks, Coming Out, 187

6 Robinson, Gay Men and the Left in Post-War Britain, 65–92

6 Robinson, Men and the Left in Post-War Britain, 65–92

7 Power, No Bath But Plenty Of Bubbles, 213

7 Power, Bath But Bubbles,

8 Ibid

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERATION IN EARLY 1970S QUEER BRITISH PRESS

Filippos (Fil) Toskas (Oxford University)

New Left Influences

The New Left paved the way for rethinking how Marxist analysis could be expanded and reconfigured, and its influence was particularly evident within gay liberation. Weeks notes that both the New Left and the counterculture were influential forces for British GLF members, with founding figures such as Bob Mellors and Aubrey Walters and later, key contributors to Come Together emerging directly from New Left spaces (9). Mellors was especially involved with groups like the CND and the Peace Pledge Union, grounding his activism in the New Left’s anti-imperialist and anti-establishment ethos (10)

The concept of liberation was inherently ambiguous, and it was precisely this ambiguity that made it a fertile ground for reworking Marxist ideas. While drawing clear parallels with Marxist thought, liberation’s openness enabled activists to broaden its scope, integrating sexuality, gender, and personal identity alongside traditional concerns with class and oppression. Some immediately dismissed as excessively leftist Paul Temperton, General Secretary of the reformist gay group CHE, criticised the GLF’s perspective in a 1971 Guardian letter titled ‘Nothing Queer About CHE,’ accusing it of being overly Marxist (11). However, a 1986 study by lesbian activists and former GLF members Elizabeth Wilson and Angela Weir revealed that within the movement, liberation functioned as a broad and flexible signifier, far from rigid or doctrinaire.

In the word “liberation” were encapsulated both the notions of “sexual liberation” in circulation in the 1960s and also the inspiration that Western radicals, and particularly the youth and student movements, drew from the national liberation struggles of developing countries, above all Vietnam (12).

Wilson and Weir further observed that even when the rhetoric of the Left was employed, traditional Marxism was often regarded with caution (13). Yet, its ideals especially solidarity and the critique of oppression remained influential.

These themes echoed the early New Left, whose arenas of struggle appeared explicitly in Come Together issue two, listing five groups with whom the GLF sought to ally:

a) The women’s liberation movement

b) Black people and other national minorities

9 Weeks, Coming Out, 189–90

12 Elizabeth Wilson, Hidden Agendas: Theory, Politics, and Experience in the Women’s Movement, Social Science Paperbacks 326 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1986), 96

Ibid; Reed, ‘Bob and the Liberation at LSE’, LSE History - LSE’s Story 6 2017, https://blogs lse ac uk/lsehistory/2017/02/06/gay-liberation-front-bob-mellors/ Weeks, Coming Out, 207 Wilson, Hidden Agendas: Politics, and Experience in the Women’s Movement, Social Science (London: Tavistock Publications, 1986), 96 Celia Struggle Self: New and His Diary’, The of British 54, no. (2015): 898–925, https://doi org/10 1017/jbr 2015 118

10 Ibid; Hayley Reed, ‘Bob Mellors and the Gay Liberation Front at LSE’, LSE History - Telling LSE’s Story (blog), 6 February 2017, https://blogs lse ac uk/lsehistory/2017/02/06/gay-liberation-front-bob-mellors/ 11 Weeks, Coming Out, 207

13 Celia Hughes, ‘The Struggle of the Male Self: A New Left Activist and His 1961 Diary’, The Journal of British Studies 54, no. 4 (2015): 898–925, https://doi org/10 1017/jbr 2015 118 9 189–90

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c) The working class, i.e., all productive manual and mental workers

d) Young people rejecting the bourgeois family and societal roles

e) People oppressed by imperialism (14)

Come Together’s engagement with these interconnected oppressions reflected key concerns of the British New Left. Imperialism, for instance, featured prominently in New Left Review articles throughout the 1970s, including Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of U.S. power in Argentina (15). Come Together’s adoption of anti-imperialist positions signalled a clear ideological continuity, placing gay liberation firmly within a broader radical critique of Western societies. Equally significant was Come Together’s alignment with youth movements rejecting traditional social structures Within the New Left, the politics of youth were closely tied to cultural expressions, particularly rock music. The New Left Review, notably through the writings of Andrew Chester, framed rock music as a site of political rebellion (16). For Chester and others, rock represented the youth movement’s challenge to bourgeois norms, its ability to foster alternative communities, and its anti-authoritarian aesthetics all of which resonated strongly with the New Left’s wider critique of capitalist culture (17).

In other countries, such as France, the intersection between the New Left and gay liberation was even more pronounced. The founding aims of the French equivalent of the Gay Liberation Front Le Front Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire (FHAR) were published in the Maoist newspaper Tout! by radical philosopher Guy Hocquenghem, calling for the complete destruction of society, the family, and imperialism (18).

Engagement with Traditional Marxist Politics

Apart from the New Left’s influence, traditional Marxist concepts remained integral in Come Together. Class struggle was emphasised, particularly through engagement with the working class. When articulating its fundamental principles, Come Together asserted that “while existing social structures remain, social prejudice and overt repression can always re-emerge,” signalling that the struggle against oppression required systemic change (19). This underlined the movement’s determination to engage with Marxist ideals, albeit through a more flexible lens than traditional economic determinism.

This engagement became especially visible during the GLF’s debate over whether to join protests against

14 ‘Principles’, Come Together 4, 5-6

15 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Argentina--Imperialist Strategy and the May Crisis’, New Left Review, no. I/62 (1 August 1970): 3–21.

15 Laclau, ‘Argentina--Imperialist and the Crisis’, Review, no. I/62 3–21.

16 Andrew Chester, ‘Second Thoughts on a Rock Aesthetic: The Band’, New Left Review, no I/62 (1 August 1970): 75–82; Andrew Chester, ‘For a Rock Aesthetic’, New Left Review, no I/59 (1 February 1970): 83–87

17 Ibid

18 The original passage: ‘Nous voulons détruire la famille et cette société parce qu’elles nous ont toujours opprimés [ ] Nous revendiquons notre statut de fléau social jusqu’à la destruction complète de tout impérialisme’; Sibalis, Michael “L’arrivée de La Libération Gay En France Le Front Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire (FHAR) ” Genre, sexualité & sociéte 3, no 3 (2010)

The passage: voulons la famille cette société qu’elles nous ont toujours opprimés Nous de fléau la destruction complète de tout impérialisme’; Sibalis, Michael “L’arrivée de La Libération Gay En France Le Front Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire (FHAR) ” Genre, sexualité & sociéte 3, no 3 (2010)

19 Come Together

19 ‘Principles’, Come Together Together

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the Industrial Relations Bill. Come Together demonstrated strong solidarity with working-class struggles, aligning itself with broader anti-establishment critiques:

The Government, together with big business and the mass media have combined to make the trade unions out to be the villains of the peace, but as gay people, we realise that there is also another side to the coin, because have we not often suffered from the same sort of misrepresentation? (20)

Ultimately, the GLF participated in the demonstrations, despite resistance from some protesters (21). Lucy Robinson identifies this moment as pivotal, marking the GLF’s formal entry into radical left-wing politics and revealing a deeper tension between the GLF and the broader Left especially concerning the marginalisation of feminist and queer perspectives within male-dominated spaces (22).

In response, Come Together began to articulate a more critical stance towards the Left It reframed its solidarity with trade unions, stressing not just shared oppression but also its critique of the Left’s gendered and exclusionary tendencies. This marked an important shift, reflecting frustration with the patriarchal structures of leftist organisations.

By positioning itself both inside and outside leftist politics, Come Together consistently asserted that solidarity did not require subordinating sexual politics to class struggle Instead, it advanced a politics of liberation that saw sexuality as central to social justice, integrating Marxist analysis without being confined by it.

Conclusion

Although Marxism and the New Left strongly shaped 1970s queer politics, liberation politics did not constitute the complete rupture from previous activism, as often assumed. Instead, liberation adapted and reworked concerns inherited from the homophile movement, even while publicly distancing itself from reformist politics. The queer press makes this continuity clear, revealing how preoccupations of earlier homophile organisations remained embedded in liberationist discourse.

Reformist publications like Arena Three shared several preoccupations with Come Together, regarding the medicalisation of homosexuality, the role of psychiatry, and debates around the pathology of same-sex desire. Throughout the 1960s, Arena Three explored how social hostility, rather than homosexuality itself,

20 ‘FEB 21 KEEP ON TRUCKIN’, Come Together 4, 14

21 Robinson, Gay Men and the Left in Post-War Britain, 82–86

‘FEB 21 KEEP TRUCKIN’, Together Robinson, Gay Men the Left 82–86

22 Ibid

23 See Come Together 2

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caused psychological harm. Similarly, Come Together, despite their Marxist and liberationist rhetoric, engaged with familiar questions Articles such as Homosexuality and Therapy and What is a Homosexual? revisited these concerns, challenging medical orthodoxy while incorporating critiques of capitalism and patriarchy.

Yet, Come Together expanded these debates beyond the homophile agenda. Rooted in New Left thought, the paper located oppression within wider systems of capitalism, imperialism, and patriarchy. Liberation was no longer solely about decriminalisation or social tolerance but became a demand for structural transformation Come Together selectively retained and radicalised earlier discourses, blending them with Marxist and New Left perspectives.

Acknowledging both continuity and rupture helps clarify how liberation’s meaning evolved throughout the 1970s. Scholarship has often avoided framing GLF politics through a Marxist lens, partly because the GLF itself rarely presented its project as explicitly Marxist Instead, ‘radical’ is often used as a catch-all descriptor Yet, the Marxist framework provides greater analytical precision, revealing how the early queer movement adapted and reshaped Marxist and New Left vocabularies to articulate liberation.

What began as a project tied to critiques of capitalism and social oppression, by the decade’s end, incorporated more liberal and rights-based perspectives. This shift was not simply a retreat from radicalism but a strategic response to political realities, including the rise of conservatism and the limits of revolutionary activism As queer activists navigated these shifting terrains, the very meaning of liberation became more flexible, contested, and pluralistic. Understanding these ideological shifts, rather than reducing the period to a static narrative of radicalism, spotlights the ideological underpinnings of queer politics and the evolving genealogy of the term ‘liberation’ itself.

DECOLONIZING CZECH MUSIC: MÁ VLAST

AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL AUTONOMY FROM HABSBURG RULE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE

Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam)

Introduction

During the 19th century, Czech composers navigated a fraught cultural landscape dominated by the AustroHungarian Empire, where German language and musical traditions structured artistic institutions and intellectual life. Within this context, Bedřich Smetana’s Má vlast (My Fatherland) emerged not merely as a patriotic statement but as a multidimensional cultural project. While often interpreted as a sonic embodiment of Czech nationalism, Má vlast is also a cosmopolitan composition deeply embedded in the transnational currents of its time This essay challenges the simplistic binary of colonizer versus colonized by examining the formation of the Czech musical canon through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu’s cultural capital, Antonio Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, and Terry Eagleton’s postcolonial-cultural perspective on canon formation. Rather than viewing Má vlast solely as resistance to Germanic hegemony, this essay investigates its hybrid position: simultaneously affirming Czech identity while borrowing institutional and formal conventions from the Germanic musical tradition. Drawing on a model of canon formation that integrates top-down institutional authority with bottom-up audience reception, the study examines how Má vlast accumulated legitimacy across historical periods: under Habsburg cultural dominance, during Nazi occupation, under Soviet rule, and into the post-Cold War era. This longue durée perspective reveals Má vlast as a dynamic cultural artifact whose enduring national status is the result of strategic negotiation between authenticity, authority, and cultural hybridity.

Canon Formation and Cultural Capital: A Theoretical Framework

The process of canon formation in music is shaped by both institutional authority and audience reception, creating a dynamic interaction between top-down cultural policies and bottom-up participation. At the highest level, government institutions and the state hold significant power in determining what is considered “good” or “bad” music through formalized cultural policies and financial control over major cultural organizations Yet canonization is never a unilateral process Once music enters the public sphere, the roles of academic elites, concert institutions, critics, and patrons become equally vital

Following Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital, institutional recognition facilitates the conversion of artistic prestige into broader social legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1984). Musical value is not intrinsic but mediated through a system of symbolic capital. In 19th-century Central Europe, German was the dominant language not only of administration but of aesthetic authority At the administrative center in Vienna, the culture of this Central Europe was German, which referred not to Germany, but rather to the functions of language to shape and record the arts and politics at the center (Weber, 2016). This linguistic-cultural infrastructure privileged German musical forms as universal, casting local traditions as peripheral.

DECOLONIZING CZECH MUSIC: MÁ VLAST AND

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Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam)

However, canon formation is not strictly top-down. The rise of the urban middle class and the increasing availability of concert life enabled wider social participation in defining musical value This dialectical process becomes particularly significant in the formation of national canons in semi-peripheral nations such as the Czech lands. As the symbolic power of the state interacted with intellectual discourse and elite patronage, the canon became a site of negotiation over national identity, class legitimacy, and cultural autonomy.

The model of canon formation adopted here integrates institutional power, elite critique, public reception, and economic support In this structure, organizations like the Umělecká beseda (UB) represent the critiquing class, legitimizing works like Má vlast through intellectual discourse, artistic patronage, and institutional recognition. Founded in 1863, UB brought together writers, musicians, and visual artists committed to building Czech national culture (St. Pierre, 2017). Its musical section, in particular, served as a key node of symbolic validation, promoting Smetana’s work not only through performance but through public discourse and publication Simultaneously, the commissioning class Czech-speaking elites and patrons financed performances and supported institutions like the National Theatre, while the expanding urban audience validated musical works through concert attendance and civic engagement. Together, these elements shaped the Czech canon as a product of layered negotiations between power, identity, and aesthetics.

Figure 1 Musical Canon Formation (1)

DECOLONIZING CZECH MUSIC: MÁ VLAST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR

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German Influence and Czech Cultural Awakening

In the early 19th century, the Bohemian lands were deeply embedded in the Austro-Hungarian cultural matrix. German was the primary language of education, science, and music. The Prague Conservatory, for example, modeled its curriculum on German institutions, and leading Czech composers were often educated in German-speaking contexts.

Bedřich Smetana himself was initially a German speaker and steeped in the German Romantic tradition His admiration for Franz Liszt, particularly the symphonic poem form, is evident in Má vlast Rather than rejecting Germanic musical structures, Smetana reappropriated them, using them to articulate a distinctly Czech thematic content. This synthesis aligns with Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony, wherein subordinate groups achieve legitimacy by embedding their counter-hegemonic messages within dominant forms (Gramsci, 1973). It also exemplifies what Eagleton describes as the colonized artist’s double bind: the need to appropriate the dominant culture’s formal repertoire in order to legitimate a counter-hegemonic, national narrative

Smetana’s use of folk motifs and national myths in Má vlast such as the legends of Vyšehrad and the flowing journey of the Vltava reflects the bottom-up logic of national music that must capture some measure of the nation’s quintessence, frequently turning to folk music, laying claim to its authenticity (Bohlman, 2004) In this sense, Má vlast operates as a musical palimpsest, translating peasant identity into national identity through art music While folk music plays a pivotal role in the construction of national identity, it often occupies an ambiguous position within the hierarchy of musical legitimacy, frequently regarded as less serious or refined. In the Czech context, this tension is reflected in the longstanding use of the German term Musikant to describe Czech musicians distinguishing them from the more esteemed and institutionally legitimized Musiker, a term reserved for professional, elite practitioners of art music (Nettl, 2002)

Canonization under Oppression: Nazis and Soviets

The legitimization of Má vlast continued well after Smetana’s death, particularly under regimes that sought to appropriate or suppress Czech cultural identity. During the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, Má vlast served as a symbol of quiet resistance While the Nazi regime often tolerated performances of Czech music for propagandistic purposes, it simultaneously suppressed any overt expressions of Czech nationalism. Cultural policies were governed by the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, which sought to Germanize cultural life and eliminate the plurality of ethnic voices (Hermand, 2013). Despite occasional performances being permitted, Má vlast was understood by Czech audiences as a

DECOLONIZING CZECH MUSIC: MÁ VLAST AND

THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL AUTONOMY FROM HABSBURG RULE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE

Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam)

coded assertion of national pride and spiritual endurance.

Nazi ideology treated Slavic cultures as inferior, but it recognized the strategic value of co-opting certain cultural products to maintain a façade of tolerance. Thus, Smetana’s music occupied an ambiguous position: it was at once repressed and strategically showcased. The Prague German Opera, under Nazi control, avoided programming Czech works, while underground concerts and private gatherings became spaces for the symbolic reaffirmation of Czech identity through music. In these moments, the canonized status of Má vlast, reinforced by decades of recognition from critics and institutions like UB and the National Theatre, gave the work its power as a site of cultural resilience (Ther, 2014)

Under Nazi rule, the institutions that had long served as the foundation of canon formation the state theatres, academies, and music societies were either co-opted or dismantled. In this cultural vacuum, informal networks of musicians, critics, and audiences played a crucial role in maintaining continuity. These actors aligned with what Bourdieu would describe as the bearers of cultural capital continued to validate and circulate Má vlast in semi-private contexts The work’s symbolic potency was sustained through the very mechanisms of canon formation: its presence in the collective memory, its performative rituals, and its association with a sense of endangered national authenticity.

After 1948, under Soviet rule, the cultural landscape shifted again. Czechoslovakia’s communist regime promoted Socialist Realism as the official aesthetic, emphasizing accessibility, heroism, and national themes filtered through Marxist-Leninist ideology (Hudson, 1997) Má vlast was co-opted as part of this project: its epic structure and folk elements aligned with the state’s ideals, yet its deeper nationalist content was often domesticated or reframed within class struggle narratives. The work was frequently performed in state-sponsored events, and Smetana was celebrated as a progressive figure who could be aligned with the people.

However, the very processes that defined canon formation critiquing elites, state support, and middleclass reception also made Má vlast a complex artifact within Soviet cultural policy. The state co-opted Umělecká beseda and similar institutions as ideological mouthpieces, repurposing their authority to reinforce a socialist canon. Although UB continued to operate in a limited form during the early Communist years, it was officially closed in 1972, during the period of ‘Normalization’ the post-1968 crackdown following the Prague Spring This closure was part of a broader strategy of cultural repression, as the regime sought to consolidate ideological control and eliminate venues for autonomous artistic expression (McAdams & Monta, 2021). The forced shutdown of such a historically important organization reflects the regime’s unease with institutions that embodied a longer, pre-socialist cultural memory rooted

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in national identity. Yet, despite the ideological filters applied, the canonical aura of Má vlast endured. The Czech Philharmonic, for example, continued to perform the piece annually, maintaining its symbolic role while embedding it within official culture This duality reflects Bourdieu’s insight that cultural capital can be transposed across fields even when the rules of legitimacy shift.

The persistence of Má vlast in the conservatory curricula, concert programming, and critical discourse demonstrates how canonization, once achieved, resists ideological redefinition. While the Soviet regime attempted to reframe Czech musical nationalism within a broader socialist brotherhood, the foundational narratives of Má vlast rooted in landscape, myth, and national memory could not be entirely re-scripted Instead, the work became a palimpsest: a national symbol that could be read both through and against the ideological lens of the time (Eagleton, 1990).

While Má vlast was officially embraced and performed during the Communist period, this canonization occurred in tension with broader patterns of exile and repression The case of conductor Rafael Jeroným Kubelík a key figure in the international promotion of Czech music illustrates this paradox Despite being one of the most celebrated interpreters of Smetana’s work, Kubelík refused to return to his homeland after the Communist coup of 1948, stating he would not come back “until freedom returns.” His absence underscored the dissonance between the regime’s instrumental use of the national canon and the intellectual and moral resistance of those who saw art as inseparable from freedom.

The Czech Philharmonic continued to perform Má vlast under state auspices, but without Kubelík’s presence, many felt the music’s emotional core had been exiled as well. Only after the Velvet Revolution did Kubelík return to conduct Má vlast at the opening of the 1990 Prague Spring Festival marking a powerful moment of cultural and political reconciliation (Vojtíšková, Poláková & Patočková, 2016). His return symbolized not just a personal homecoming, but the reclamation of the canon from ideological constraint It was a reaffirmation that Má vlast belonged not only to a state narrative, but to a broader vision of Czech cultural autonomy shaped by individual conscience and diasporic memory

Post-1989 Reinterpretations and Decolonial Approaches

The Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the fall of the Iron Curtain brought new possibilities for reclaiming and reinterpreting Czech cultural heritage In the decades since, Má vlast has retained its symbolic centrality, but its meanings have become more contested and pluralistic Performances at the Prague Spring Festival continue to honor its canonical status, yet contemporary artists and scholars have increasingly interrogated its nationalistic undertones.

DECOLONIZING CZECH MUSIC: MÁ VLAST

AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL AUTONOMY FROM HABSBURG RULE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE

Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam)

From a postcolonial perspective, the Czech lands may be considered a semi-peripheral or internally colonized space within the Austro-Hungarian and Soviet empires Eastern and Central Europe are sometimes neglected in the postcolonial studies focused on the Global South, but within the terms the Second World postcolonial (Moore, 2001), Czech cultural nationalism can be seen as both an act of resistance and an internalization of imperial aesthetic frameworks. Applying these theories to Má vlast, it can be seen how Smetana engaged in mimicry using the master’s tools (in this case, German symphonic form) to articulate a distinct identity that nonetheless remains entangled with the dominant discourse (Bhabha, 2004) The journey of Vltava from its folk source to the grandeur of Prague represents not only a national narrative, but an epistemic one: a bid for inclusion in the European canon from a historically peripheral culture.

Institutions and critics continue to play a role in preserving this legacy but also increasingly face calls to revise the canon to include more diverse and transnational perspectives. Recent academic debates in Czechia, such as the publication of the 2020 Manifesto for Decolonization, illustrate the generational and ideological divides over how cultural memory should be constructed and challenged (Průchová Hrůzová & Kárníková, 2024). As it has shown, resistance to decolonial thinking in the Czech context often stems from the region’s ambiguous place in Europe’s colonial imagination. Nevertheless, such interventions have begun to question whether the canon itself needs to be democratized not dismantled but expanded beyond nationalist nostalgia.

Echoing the insight that cultural nationalism often outlives the political contexts that first gave rise to it, Má vlast remains a potent site of identity negotiation in post-authoritarian Czech society revered, contested, and continually reimagined. Thus, Má vlast remains relevant not just as a historical document, but as a living artifact within the ongoing politics of memory, identity, and heritage in post-socialist Europe.

Conclusion

By tracing the canon formation of Má vlast across multiple historical regimes and theoretical frameworks, this essay has argued that Czech musical nationalism cannot be adequately understood through the binary of colonizer and colonized. Instead, it must be situated within a broader field of cultural production where power is negotiated through symbolic capital, institutional mediation, and aesthetic form.

Smetana’s Má vlast exemplifies how national identity in music is not only declared but constructed through the appropriation of folk motifs, the engagement with hegemonic forms, and the strategic navigation of political contexts. It is both a product of its time and a work that transcends time, continually

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MÁ VLAST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL AUTONOMY FROM HABSBURG RULE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE

Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam)

reinterpreted by the forces that seek to claim it. In this light, the Czech musical canon emerges not as a static archive of resistance or pride, but as a palimpsest of cultural entanglement one that continues to reflect the complexities of nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and the enduring power of music to shape, contest, and reaffirm collective identity.

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DECOLONIZING CZECH MUSIC: MÁ VLAST AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL AUTONOMY FROM HABSBURG RULE TO SOVIET INFLUENCE

Yuni Zeng (University of Amsterdam)

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Ther, Philipp, Center Stage: Operatic Culture and Nation Building in Nineteenth century Central Europe, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2014

Průchová Hrůzová, Andrea, and Kárníková, Lydie, “Imagining the Postcolonial in Central Eastern Europe: Controversies of the Czech Manifesto for Decolonization.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 2024. DOI:10.1007/s10767-024-09478-1.

St Pierre, Kelly, Bedřich Smetana: Myth, Music, and Propaganda, Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2017

Vojtíškov, Kateřinaá; Polákov, Markétaá, and Patočková, Věra. “Cultural Planning: New Inspiration for Local Governments in the Czech Context.” The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society, 2016. DOI: 10.1080/10632921.2015.1121183.

Weber, William, Music and the Middle Class: The Social Structure of Concert Life in London, Paris and Vienna. London: Croom Helm, 1975.

Papers by Panels

VI: Material Infrastructure and the Building of Socialism PANEL VI: Material Infrastructure and the Building of Socialism

PANEL

Chair: Jacob Link (Yale University)

Faculty Discussant: Dr. Nataliia Laas (Yale University)

Jacob Link (Yale University)

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

Nicholas Pierce (University of Texas, Austin)

RED NETWORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS’ CIVIL WAR, 1920-1921

Jacob Link (Yale University)

In his pioneering work Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, media theorist Marshall McLuhan famously made the case for medium as message. Technological media, he argued, are not neutral vehicles for delivering content, but are instead inherently meaning-bearing practices that alter the nature of human association through the change of scale, pace, and pattern they introduce into human affairs (1) This effect is especially pronounced in contexts where a few modes of communication predominate: “If the formative power in the media are the media themselves,” he argued, then it makes sense to think of technological media as the cultural equivalent of staple goods. Just as “a society configured by reliance on a few commodities accepts them as a social bond” that then become “‘fixed charges’ on the entire psychic life of the community,” so too do predominant media alter the social patterns of organization in the society in which they operate (2)

Given the region’s place as one of Eurasia’s great cultural crossroads, McLuhan’s analysis has particular bearing on the South Caucasus and its infrastructure networks. In the context of the Russian Civil War, the South Caucasus was one of the major points of political contact between the emerging Bolshevik state and outside actors. Infrastructure is an element often elided as a meaningful structural force in political histories, treated as a neutral or secondary element providing the means by which a polity realizes its more significant objectives The Bolshevik experience in the South Caucasus in the late stages of the Russian Civil War provides a compelling example of the interpretative opportunities made possible by treating infrastructure as a serious causal force in its own right. Even in an environment where strategic decisions were shaped strongly by ideological outlook, infrastructure remained an essential factor in Bolshevik political behavior, guiding both the aims of the party and the manner by which it effectuated its pursuit of those aims

1 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 8-9

1 Marshall McLuhan, Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 8-9

2 Ibid , 21

RED NETWORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE

AND DECISION-MAKING

PROCESSES

IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS’ CIVIL WAR, 1920-1921

Jacob Link (Yale University)

This project, a condensation of work from a larger research project, aims to analyze the role of infrastructure not only in shaping Bolshevik strategic aims in the South Caucasus during the Russian Civil War, but also in shaping the behavior of regional actors. This analysis primarily utilizes the correspondence of Sergo Orjonikidze, a Georgian Bolshevik and close ally of Stalin’s who served as the head of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee during this period Focusing specifically on Orjonikidze’s correspondence in the period between the conquest of Baku by Bolshevik forces in April 1920 and the fall of Tbilisi in February 1921, I make a three-part argument regarding the impacts of the region’s telegraph, railway, and pipeline networks on the political outcomes in the South Caucasus’ World War-Civil War continuum. First, control of regional infrastructure motivated a substantial amount of strategic thinking by the polities involved in the conflict. Accelerating processes of exchange and rendered more useful by cooperative utilization, regional infrastructure could serve to promote cooperation or, alternatively, drive further conflict, depending upon how a given actor intended to utilize said infrastructure. Secondly, as a critical medium for conveying information up and down the Bolshevik chain of command, the telegraph served to structure internal Bolshevik relationships, empowering wellconnected regional leaders at the expense of the political center. Thirdly, these two complementary forces that is, strategic interest in transportation infrastructure and the telegraph’s localization of power in the Caucasus enabled Orjonikidze to execute one of the most significant acts of insubordination of the Civil War, directly contravening orders by Lenin and the Politburo by ordering the 11th Army’s invasion of the then-independent Democratic Republic of Georgia.

From its inception the transportation infrastructure of the South Caucasus was understood to be critical to the economic exploitation of the region’s natural resources. Established to connect the maritime shipping infrastructure of the Black and Caspian seas, the Transcaucasus Railway was an early and profitable section in the larger tsarist railway network. This profitability would only increase in the last decades of the 19th century, as the region’s railways became tightly intertwined with Baku’s emerging petroleum industry amid increased demand for oil conveyance. In 1893, the Transcaucasus Railway was among the most profitable lines in the empire on a per-verst basis, earning the Ministry of Internal Communication more than 12 thousand rubles for each of its then-981 versts, a figure surpassed only by heartline rails like Moscow-Kursk and Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod (3) While the development of the Caspian oil tanker fleet permitted much of Baku’s production to be transported up the Caspian coast for distribution to central Russia via Astrakhan, oil conveyance nonetheless served to push up prices along the westward route to the Black Sea coast. This would be supplemented by the completion of a kerosene pipeline to Batumi in 1906, which added 55 million puds of capacity to the regional system. Despite its inefficiencies,

3 Ukazatel’ pravitel’stvennykh rasporyazhenii po ministerstvu putei soobshcheniya, vy 51, December 22, 1894, in Zhurnal ministerstva putei soobshcheniya (Sankt-Peterburg: tipografiya Imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1895), inserted table at 1429

RED NETWORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS’ CIVIL WAR, 1920-1921

Jacob Link (Yale University)

oil transit by rail continued to serve a critical role in the tsarist period, occupying 230 million puds of capacity in 1905 and 299 million in 1911 (4).

It should come as no surprise that control of Baku’s petroleum production was viewed as a vital strategic end by the kaleidoscope of Central, Entente, and revisionist actors active in the region from 1914 onwards Though stunted by the 1905 Revolution and a shadow of its former self by 1917, Azerbaijan’s oil fields remained critical to meeting short-term fuel needs in the region. For the independent Azerbaijani republic, oilfield development was considered a potential source of national vitality in the long term, capable of driving industrial modernization. While this sort of control seems at first to be zero-sum, the how and where of Baku’s oil flows reveals a more complex underlying incentives structure. The deep integration of Baku’s oil conveyance with the surrounding, strained transit networks meant control of the city was not enough to fully realize its potential either further conflict or compromise was often necessary in order to effectively utilize the rail, maritime, and pipeline networks capable of moving Baku’s oil to where it was needed.

5 From Russia, Ministerstvo Putei Soobshcheniya, Otdel statistiki i kartografii, and kartograficheskoe zavedenie A Ilina, Karta putei soobshcheniya Rossiskoi Imperii [SanktPeterburg: Otdel statistiki i kartografii Ministerstva putei soobshcheniya, 1916] Map https://www loc gov/item/2003630522/

RED NETWORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS’ CIVIL WAR, 1920-1921

Jacob Link (Yale University)

This was a problem faced by the Bolsheviks following the city’s fall to the 11th Red Army. Even amid reduced output following years of pogroms, civil conflict, and supply shortages, Baku produced 236 million puds of oil in 1920, far more than regional maritime and rail transit was capable of handling (6). This lent increased importance to the Baku-Batumi kerosene pipeline, which provided an outlet for additional capacity through the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia Such shared incentives led some regional actors, otherwise hostile to continued Georgian independence, to seek pragmatic settlements with the DRG. Negotiating a transit agreement in the fall of 1920, Aron Sheinman, the RSFSR’s ambassador to the DRG, was amenable to a number of sizable concessions to get oil flowing again, including the free distribution of 16 million puds of oil annually to meet Georgian needs, However, Sheinman was firm on the point of reserving the pipeline for exports: “We insist that the oil due to Georgia be delivered exclusively by rail, using their own resources If we satisfy their requirements, we would completely deprive ourselves of the pipeline and the very point of conducting trade through Georgia” (7). Even between actors distrustful of one another, the structural conditions of oil conveyance served to foster space for collaboration.

In addition to its impacts on the conscious strategic thinking of regional polities, the South Caucasus’ infrastructure networks also had a meaningful impact on internal Bolshevik communication processes Throughout the Civil War, Russia’s telegraph network was a pillar of Bolshevik power and a contributor to its eventual victory in the conflict. Lenin would spend days in the central telegraphic station in this period, which his secretary Fotieva called “the principal nerve in the life of the country” (8). In spite of the dire state of RSFSR finances, ROSTA, the state telegraph agency, benefitted from substantial financial support, with a budget that grew rapidly from 9 million rubles for the first half of 1919 to 63 million for the second half, ultimately reaching a sum of 857 million rubles for the year of 1920 (9)

However, rather than contributing to the construction of robust institutional relationships, the telegraph enabled the cultivation of personal connections and exchanges that functioned without respect to the formal command structure. Beyond connecting the political center to local plenipotentiaries like Orjonikidze, they also permitted the flow of information and requests upward from key stakeholders in Orjonikidze’s power vertical This served to benefit regional actors who served as a bottleneck for the transmission of information between the center and its regional apparata In network analysis terms, actors with a high degree of betweenness centrality disproportionately reaped the gains of a telegraph-centric command structure.

8 Larissa Zakharova, “Electrical Signaling: Telegraph,” in Media and Communication in the Soviet Union, 1917-1953: General Perspectives, ed Kirill Postoutenko, Alexey Tikhomirov, and Dmitri Zakharine (Cham, Switzerland: Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 288

9 Jon Smele, The “Russian” Civil Wars, 1916-1926: Ten Years That Shook the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 248; M.I Babyuk, “Khozyaistvennye aspekty funktsionirovaniya telegrafnogo agenstva ROSTA v usloviyakh voennogo kommunizma,” Moscow University Journalism Bulletin 2021, no. 1 (January 2021), 88

RED NETWORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE

AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS’ CIVIL WAR, 1920-1921

Jacob Link (Yale University)

Already well-placed to influence political outcomes owing to his leadership of a powerful regional plenipotentiary body, Orjonikidze, with the help of the telegraph, was able to maintain important relationships with superiors, peers, and subordinates, of crucial importance in a context where overlapping competencies between state and government organs sometimes obscured who held final authority to make significant decisions The existence of an open channel of communication with the center, coupled with a wide-ranging remit that included foreign policy, increased Orjonikidze’s authority relative to his superiors, enabling him act relatively autonomously in pursuit of his aims while providing reports to the Central Committee that accounted for developments in other regions and policy spheres.

This finding reinforces and expands a thread in the existing historiography of Soviet governance in the Caucasus regarding the role of ethnic patronage networks Rather than bureaucratic, the structure of state administration in this period was patrimonial: in the absence of deeply-rooted institutions, Bolshevik officials achieved political ends via a robust trade in favors, with loyalty offered and services provided in exchange for political advancement (10). Orjonikidze’s correspondence illustrates a similar process in the early stages of development, albeit with the marked lack of an ethnic dimension. If patronage networks would develop along ethnic lines as a result of korenizatsiya in the years to come (11), then the multiethnic patronage of Orjonikidze’s Kavbyuro in this period should be understood as an outcome of the contingent political circumstances of the time and place a mode of exercising power that grew to fit the dimensions of the container in which it was placed.

Empowered by his critical place in the Bolshevik command infrastructure, Orjonikidze continued to beat the drum on the issue of Georgian annexation in 1920, which, following the invasion of Armenia, gained additional advocates in the region On December 12, Sheinman telegraphed Orjonikidze to inform him that the relationship with the Georgian government had “sharply changed” and request a number of aggressive actions be taken towards the DRG (12). A few months later, in February, Commander of the 11th Army Anatolii Gekker wrote to both Sheinman and Orjonikidze expressing his frustration with the delays in the delivery of materiel along the Azerbaijani-Georgian border. Stakeholders in a variety of significant positions were converging on the position for which Orjonikidze had long advocated, enabling him to begin informal efforts, contra orders from the Politburo, to instigate conflict in the Borchaly neutral zone between Georgia and Armenia Orjonikidze said as much explicitly to Gekker on February 3, ordering him to “Provide comprehensive assistance to Armenian rebels expelled from Georgia in the neutral zone” (13).

10 Gerald Easter, Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13-16; Timothy Blauvelt, Clientelism and Nationality in an Early Soviet Fiefdom: The Trials of Nestor Lakoba (London: Routledge, 2021), 1-5

11 Blauvelt, Clientelism, 8-13

12 RTsKhIDNI, f 85, op 15, d 13, l 3-4

13 RTsKhIDNI, f 85, op 15, d 71, l 1-2

RED NETWORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS’ CIVIL WAR, 1920-1921

Jacob Link (Yale University)

Though a variety of plausible explanations exist regarding why Orjonikidze was ultimately able to get away with such insubordination, they are all greatly aided by an understanding of the role played by the Bolshevik’s telegraphic command structure This structural explanation has even more explanatory power when considered alongside regional transportation infrastructure as a conscious concern for Bolshevik leaders. Infrastructure, in essence, served as a combined how and why for the invasion, contributing to both the substantive motivation for the invasion as well as the structural conditions necessary for Orjonikidze to take action.

The South Caucasus’ rail and telegraph networks are rightly called technologies of power, enabling the Bolshevik consolidation of regional control that would continue for the next seventy years However, the unauthorized invasion of Georgia illustrates that these networks were far from inert tools awaiting use by a historical agent. Initially produced by social exchanges, infrastructure acted in a dialectical manner to structure the social exchanges it reproduced, shaping its users even as they used it to advance their own ends. The fusion of rail and telegraph to the Bolshevik apparatus would result in a party that operated in a manner particular to those media in McLuhanian terms, they heard and clearly responded to the message of the medium

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

Introduction

In this paper, I explore how electrification influenced the socioeconomic progress in non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, shedding light on its long-term effects. Al- though the positive impact of electricity on development has been extensively studied worldwide,(Magazzino 2014, Kassem 2024, Rud 2012, Sarkodie & Adams 2020, Mensah 2024), empirical research focused specifically on the Soviet Union remains limited. Particularly, qualitative and historical studies highlighted the importance of electrification. Still, the scarcity of data under the Soviet regime has hindered comprehensive analysis, despite being one of the most expansive and ambitious states of the 20th century.

The current study aims to fill the existing gap by exploiting official statistical data from Soviet republics and is a first-of-its-kind empirical investigation on the role of electrification in the Soviet Union’s economic growth and social transformation up to its dissolution.

Main findings suggest that electrification had the largest impact on human capital and employment growth, while its effect on the healthcare system was relatively limited. The ethnicity of First Secretaries played a key role in shaping socioeconomic outcomes during the early Soviet period. The analysis also highlights the importance of path dependence where early electrification initiatives and central planning decisions continued to influence long-term socioeconomic trajectories. However, by the final decades of the Soviet period, the expansion of infrastructure projects was primarily driven by entrenched bureaucratic institutions. During this phase, the role of individual electricity policymakers became negligible in determining the pace and pattern of electrification.

The paper is structured as follows Section 2 briefly reviews the history and literature Section 3 details the dataset and methodological framework. In Section 4, I discuss the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes the research. The appendices include Tables A, a placebo test and matching results with diagnostics A.4, Maps B and Figures C.

Brief Historical Background and Literature

The advent of electricity in the 20th century fundamentally transformed socioeconomic development worldwide. As a general-purpose technology (GPT), electricity spurred unprecedented increases in productivity, enabled technological innovation, and contributed to improvements in living standards (Berg 1985, Gordon 2017).

The groundwork of electricity rollout in the USSR lies in the period of Vladimir Lenin, where he

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

famously emphasized the importance of electrification in building socialism, coin- ing the phrase, "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country" (Coopersmith 2016). To achieve these goals, the Soviets had developed the State Commis- sion for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) plan to construct an extensive network of power plants in Soviet Russia (Makarov & Mitrova 2020) The GOELRO plan was the first initiative for societal and economic progress in the Soviet Union and had "A" and "B" phases with a projected duration of 10–15 years (Cummins 1988)

Extensive literature has documented the socioeconomic impacts of electrification in different contexts. In the US, rural electrification positively influenced employment, agricultural productivity, household welfare, and regional economic growth (Kitchens & Fishback 2015, Gaggl et al. 2021, Lewis & Severnini 2020) Similar findings emerge from studies in developing economies Electrification has been shown to enhance industrial output, increase firm entry rates, boost household income, and improve overall economic performance (Rud 2012, Burlig & Preonas 2016, Lan & Cong 2023, Kassem 2024). Moreover, access to electricity plays a pivotal role in shaping labor market dynamics. It facilitates increased female labor force participation by reducing domestic burdens and enabling engagement in formal employment (Dinkelman 2011, Dasso & Fernandez 2015, Vidart 2024). Conversely, power shortages and unreliable supply constrain productivity and employment, especially among micro-firms and skilled workers (Alby et al 2013, Hardy & McCasland 2021, Mensah 2024)

Beyond economic effects, electricity access is also associated with improvements in publicservicedelivery, includingeducation, healthcare, andqualityoflife. Studiesconducted by Niu et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2019), Lewis (2018) show that a reliable power supply enhances school performance, reduces infant mortality, and improves overall health outcomes However, these benefits are conditional on the presence of complementary investments in infrastructure, finance, business training, and institutional capacity (Lee et al. 2020, Pelz et al. 2023).

In general, the literature concludes that electrification is a catalyst for socioeconomic development. Therefore, I anticipate positive support for this assumption under the Soviet Union case. Additionally, I explore key factors which influence electrification distribution in Soviet republics, including path dependence allocations (GOELRO plan), electricity institution roles, and ethnic diversity among policymakers.

Data & Methodology

I employ a panel dataset which covers 14 republics of the Soviet Union for the periods 1940, 1950, 1952, 1956-1985, and 1987-1990 (ISTMAT 2013). RSFSR is excluded from the dataset due to its unique size

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

and political influence.

The education institutions variable is utilized as a proxy for human capital. The average number of workers and employees serves as an indicator of overall economic activity, while the number of hospitals is used to assess healthcare development

The primary independent variable is electricity production. Toaccountfortheimpact of natural resources, I include oil, natural gas, and coal production controls. Raw cotton purchases are added to capture agricultural relevance. Due to the high collinearity between oil and gas (A.23), the principal component analysis is applied to combine them into a single standardized index (Jolliffe & Cadima 2016).

Additional political controls include the ethnicity and tenure of the First Secretary of each Soviet republic (Great Russian Encyclopedia 2024, n.d.). I also control for geographic and demographic characteristics of each republic. Detailed data description is given in Table A.26.

To address the potential endogeneity issue, I implement the two-stage least squares with instrumental variables (2SLS IV) approach using four IVs separately. The first is the Electricity Hierarchy Index (EHI), which captures early electrification priority based on central planning under the GOELRO Plan:

(1) where:

The second IV is the electricity institution variable, and the third is the ethnicity of ministers of electrification. The fourth specification interacts institutional authority with ministerial ethnicity to test conditional effects on electrification.

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

I start with a basic ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model:

(2)

where Yi represents the dependent variables, xi is electricity production, β is the vector of coefficients, zi represents the control variables and ϵi is an error term. To control for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity between entities, I test the fixed effect (FE) model.

The model is given by:

(3)

where Yit represents the dependent variables for republics i at time t, Xit is electricity production, β is the vector of coefficients, Zit represents the control variables, µi represents unobserved, time-invariant individual effects and ϵit is an error term. (Borenstein et al. 2010).

To test the robustness of models to omitted variable bias, the Oster (2016) test is employed, where a high δ (equal or above 1.00) value suggests that unobserved factors would need to be implausibly strong to overturn the result.

Next, I apply the 2SLS IV method. The model consists of two stages:

(4)

where Xit is the predicted value of the endogenous variable Xit, Zit is the instrumental variable, Wit represents the control variables, λt are time-fixed effects and νit is the error term in the first stage.

(5)

where Yit is the dependent variable in the second stage, α is the intercept term, β is the coefficient of interest, Xit is the predicted value obtained from the first stage, which corrects for endogeneity in Xit, Wit are the control variables, λt is time-fixed effects and ϵit is the error term in the second stage.

To assess the validity and the robustness of the IVs, I report the Sanderson & Windmeijer (2016)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE

FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

F-statistic and Cragg & Donald (1993) Wald F statistic in conjunction with the critical values (2) proposed by Stock & Yogo (2005).

For further robustness, a placebo test is utilized where original IVs are substituted with alternative IVs such as EHI-20, regime turnover and distance to Moscow Afterwards, I apply propensity score matching (PSM) using Nearest Neighbor and Kernel-Based algorithms (Garrido et al 2014), and validate outcomes with Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis (Rosenbaum 2005). Finally, I utilize entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012), which reweights control observations to match treated units on covariate distributions, enhancing causal inference reliability.

Results & Robustness Check

In estimating the regression models, I maintain a uniform structure in all specifications to ensure comparability and robustness. First, I run a regression to examine the sole effect of electricity production on the dependent variables. Thereafter, I introduce additional control variables stepwise.

In Tables A 1, A 2, A 3, A 4, A 5, A 6, I present the results for the impact of electricity on human capital Bringing together all the findings, the evidence strongly emphasizes that electricity production was the primary driver of human capital growth in the Soviet republics. Initially, the path-dependent allocation of electrification under the GOELRO plan influenced human capital development through its impact on electricity production, with the ethnicity of the republic leaders playing a more prominent role in shaping educational outcomes during the early years. This is concordant with Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) theory of political alignment influencing resource allocation in early state-building efforts Over time, as electricity institutions became more structured and centralized, their influence on electricity rollout surpassed the effects of early path-dependent channels. Moreover, bureaucratic decision-making gradually supplanted political patronage, transforming education into a centrally managed public good. Additionally, it is important to mention that Soviet regions reliant on agriculture and extractive sectors lingered trapped in lower-development equilibria, where the central government deprioritized broader human capital formation Despite the economic significance of natural resources, there is limited proof that resource-rich regions experienced extensive educational expansion unless they were also prioritized in early electrification efforts. This underscores that electrification, as a GPT, was a more decisive factor in driving human capital growth than natural resource endowments. These results are similar to resource curse literature, (Sachs & Warner 1995, Ross 2012), which highlights the disadvantages of relying on natural resources for sustained development.

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

In the same direction, Tables A.7, A.8, A.9, A.10, A.11, A.12 display the results for the relationship between electricity and employment growth. In general, the result is parallel to human capital outcomes; however, its effect on employment is higher. This indicates that employment growth was more sensitive to the state industrialization process driven by electrification. As previously noted, early political dynamics and path dependence played their role in early periods, but institutional centralization ultimately became the primary force which shaped employment indicators While natural resource production showed a modest positive association with employment in certain periods, its overall contribution was limited compared to the transformative effect of electrification.

The Tables A.13, A.14, A.15, A.16, A.17, A.18 demonstrate the results for healthcare development. To sum up, the impact of electrification on hospitals is less robust than on employment and human capital development The influence level of natural resources was very low, which once again verifies the resource curse theory. Slavic First Secretaries were an important factor in healthcare allocation throughout the Soviet period, which is the main difference compared to the previous results. Even in the post-1962 era, when electricity institutions became more formalized and bureaucratic, Slavic-led republics continued to benefit from preferential healthcare expansion.

In Table A 19, I present placebo test results with alternative proxies that should, in theory, be unrelated to Soviet-era electrification and its effects on socioeconomic development. Indeed, the results are insignificant in all outcomes.

Table A.20 presents PSM results for all three dependent variables. The results are in line with the assumption that electrification was a major determinant of Soviet economic development The critical level of hidden bias (Γ) from Rosenbaum’s sensitivity analysis depicts that results are robust to the levels of omitted variables.

Finally, I run entropy balancing in Table A.21. The influence on human capital and employment is within the coefficients of the two PSM algorithms, while the effect on hospitals is relatively inferior.

The coherency of the matching model results with the main estimates further corroborates the robustness of the findings.

Conclusion

This research contributes to our understanding of how major technologies, such as electrification, diffuse under varying governance regimes While centralized direction accelerated technological adoption, it also

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

introduced political favoritism and regional disparities, highlighting the critical role of governance and institutional frameworks in infrastructure development.

The findings have contemporary policy relevance, demonstrating the importance of coupling large-scale infrastructure investments with effective institutions to ensure equitable and efficient resource distribution. Lastly, this study identifies several avenues for future research, including deeper archival investigation at micro-level scales, comparative studies of post Soviet period or with other centrally planned economies to further understand the complex dynamics and long-term impacts of electrification policies.

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Burlig, F & Preonas, L (2016), ‘Out of the darkness and into the light? development effects of rural electrification’

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Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

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Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

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Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

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ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

ELECTRICITY & SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE SHORT SOVIET CENTURY

Agzamkhon Niyazkhodjayev (Free University of Berlin)

“FORCING

THE GATES OF THE

FUTURE”:

DAMS AS SITES OF HIGH MODERNITY IN ROOSEVELT’S UNITED STATES AND STALIN’S SOVIET UNION

Nicholas Pierce (University of Texas, Austin)

In imagining a symbol of high modernity (1), dams stand out titans of steel and concrete literally rising from the earth, burying the past under millions of gallons of water High modern ideology was central to their planning and construction, as the head of the TV A David Lilienthal acknowledged when he spoke about his project in 1941: “we were building not for our time alone, but structures that would stand for centuries, a thousand years or more perhaps… These monuments would reflect for centuries the standard of American culture and the purpose of American life of our time” (2). Not to be outmatched in heroic self-references, a Soviet publication on Dnieprostroi described it as a place “where the antediluvian splinter has been supplanted by the electric bulb… a splendid monument to the greatest epoch in history” (3) It is unsurprising that rivers played such a large role in the high modernist imagination – few things presented as much of a challenge to the idea of an ordered, rational world than the primordial and unpredictable nature of rivers. Floods, seasonal changes in water flow, and impassible rapids were only a few of the expressions of this challenge to high modernity’s aim to shape the natural world. Yet there was also an element of society itself as the primitive object to be transformed. The waters that rose behind these dams not only buried forests and meadows, but also submerged entire communities The advancement of technology and the newly expanded role of the state and its emerging administrative elite meant that now the dreams of the past had become reality in titanic, concrete forms, exemplified by the TV A and Dnieprostroi dam construction projects.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A) was built as an enormous complex of dams and locks in the Appalachian highlands of the Tennessee Valley, described by arguably the most important figure in its construction and management: David E Lilienthal:

This is an entirely different region from what it once was the grey bulk of the dams, stout marks across the river now deep blue, no longer red and murky with its hoard of soil washed from the eroding land… And marching toward every point on the horizon you can see the steel crisscross of electric transmission towers, a twentieth-century tower standing in a cove beside an eighteenthcentury cabin, a symbol and a summary (4).

For figures like Lilienthal, the promise of the dams was the promise of the high modern future, the promise of a sweeping away of a decayed rural landscape to be replaced by new, rational construction and

1 In using the term “high modernity,” I use the definition put forward by James C Scott: “a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws It originated, of course, in the West, as a by-product of unprecedented progress in science and industry no respecter of traditional political boundaries; it could be found across the political spectrum from left to right but particularly among those who wanted to use state power to bring about huge, utopian changes in people's work habits, living patterns, moral conduct, and worldview.” James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 4-5

1 In “high modernity,” I definition put forward James C strong, of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws It of course, in the West, as a by-product of progress in science and respecter of boundaries; it could found across political spectrum from left right but particularly those who use power bring utopian changes in people's work habits, living worldview.” James Scott, How Certain Improve the Human Failed Haven, Yale University Press, 4-5

2 David Lilienthal, “Remarks made by David E Lilienthal, Director of TV A, at the members preview of the exhibition of TV A architecture and design at the Museum of Modern Art, Tuesday, April 29, 1941 ”

2 David Lilienthal, “Remarks made by David E Lilienthal, Director of TV A, at the members preview of the exhibition of TV A architecture and design at the Museum of Modern Art, 29, 1941 ”

3 D Saslavsky, Dnieprostroi: The Biggest Dam in the World (Moscow: International Press, 1932): 19, 62

3 D Dnieprostroi: The in World International Press, 19, 62

4 David E Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1944): 8

4 Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on (New Harper Publishers, 1944):

“FORCING THE GATES OF THE FUTURE”: DAMS AS SITES OF HIGH MODERNITY IN ROOSEVELT’S UNITED STATES AND STALIN’S SOVIET UNION

Nicholas Pierce (University of Texas, Austin) a newly educated and elevated citizenry. This absolutely high modernist outlook was shared by FDR:

This power development of war days leads logically to national planning for a complete river watershed involving many States and the future lives and welfare of millions It touches and gives life to all forms of human concerns… Many hard lessons have taught us the human waste that results from lack of planning… It is time to extend planning to a wider field, in this instance comprehending in one great project many States directly concerned with the basin of one of our greatest rivers (5).

The construction of the dam brought in laborers and engineers who had been made idle by the Great Depression into the Tennessee Valley, tying into the larger New Deal project of mobilizing both skilled and unskilled labor in large-scale projects that would provide an explicit benefit to the local population and the region as a whole In the planning of the TV A high modernity’s tendency towards large scale plans was on full display, involving integrated planning up to the national level. The historian and contemporary supporter of the New Deal Henry Steele Commager summarized its impact as such:

The TV A was a philosophical and historical as well as a political and social laboratory… Here were tested the broad construction of the Constitution, large-scale planning, the recasting of federalism along regional lines, new techniques of administration and new standards of civil service, the alliance of science and politics, and the revitalization of democracy through a calculated program of economic and social reconstruction (6).

The TV A itself portrayed itself in this way, its planners and engineers as stewards or agents in opposition to private control, officially stating that “A job such as the taming of the Tennessee River… must be managed by the agents of the people if it is to be done at all” (7). Nevertheless, besides dam construction, social reorganization was a central policy of the TV A a book from 1939 noted the relocation from 1933-1938 of 5,002 families from their homes to be covered by the reservoirs (8) A Dutch observer interpreted this in civilizing terms: “the TV A is wrapped heart and soul in the evolution of the mountaineers. How to transform their thinking and their agricultural customs and adapt them to present conditions… teach them responsibility to society and give them a significant and useful role in the community” (9) These relocations were attended by sheathes of paperwork filled by the TV A administrators, precisely cataloguing families and their belongings along with their monetary value (10). This cataloguing accorded exactly to Amir Weiner’s idea that “The modern state aspired for and gathered ever more knowledge about its subjects and terrain with the stated goal of transformation, and it exuded abundant confidence in its ability to do so” (11). To do this work of cataloguing the administration the

5 David E Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1944): 8

5 David Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March York: Harper Brothers, Publishers, 1944):

6 Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880’s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950): 342-343

7 Tennessee Valley Authority, To Keep the Waters in the Rivers and the Soil on the Land: The Story of TVA (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1938): 6

7 Tennessee Valley To Keep the Waters in the Rivers and the Soil on the Land: The Story of TVA (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 6

8 Willson Whitman, God’s Valley: People and Power Along the Tennessee River (New York: The Viking Press, 1939): 309

8 Willson Whitman, God’s and Power Tennessee River (New York: Viking Press,

9 Odette Keun, A Foreigner Looks at the TVA (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937): 78

9 Odette Keun, Foreigner Looks TVA (New York: and 1937):

10 Tennessee Valley Authority, “Family Removal and Population Readjustment Case Files, 1937–1948,” National Archives. Link

11 Amir Weiner, Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003): 2

“FORCING

THE GATES OF THE FUTURE”: DAMS AS SITES OF HIGH MODERNITY IN ROOSEVELT’S UNITED STATES AND STALIN’S SOVIET UNION

Nicholas Pierce (University of Texas, Austin)

To do this work of cataloguing the administration expanded to 9,173 by 1934 (12), and reached 13,000 by 1938 (13) These administrators presided over tens of thousands of construction workers whose “human energies [were] released in furtherance of a common purpose” (14) The TV A was imbued by its founders with a high modern ideology, intent on bending both the natural and social worlds to the needs of the state and industry.

The Dnieper Hydroelectric Station (DneproGES), known during its construction as Dnieprostroi, was built to power the Soviet Ukrainian industrial heartland and to submerge the impassable rapids of the Dnieper River Directed from the center as a key project of the First Five-Year Plan, this dam in particular was meant as both the foundation for new heavy industry and as an expression of Stalin’s famous exhortation: “There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot capture” (15). Central to this was the idea of a Soviet “tempo,” based on competition with and success against American precedents, such as the world record in concrete pouring 500,000 cubic meters in a single day (16). As prominent Bolshevik Sergo Ordzhonikidze said, using the militarized, existential language of high modernity,

The whole question was: what tempo was to be adopted… It was not an easy task. A vacant spot outside Kharkov or outside Gorky, somewhere near the Magnitnaya Mountain, in Kuznetsk or Zaporozhye, on the banks of the Dnieper, an absolutely empty lot such were the sites on which he had to erect enormous factories and plants, install the most modern technical apparatus and master this technique This had to be done at the greatest possible rate of speed (17)

What was clear, both from its borrowing from the American experience and from the character of Soviet “socialist modernity,” is that the dam construction project at Dnieprostroi was itself tied to their shared high modern projects. Beyond Col. Hugh L. Cooper and other American technical advisors, the turbines for Dnieprostroi were built and provided by General Electric (18), whose president Gerard Swope was a strong advocate for central planning and high modern ideology in America (19) The American architecture historian Carl W Condit specifically equated the American and Soviet projects: “[Dnieprostroi] embodied the fundamental principles of the TV A and the concept of “total design” which underlies the forms of its physical plant” (20). This “total design” reflected the very centralized nature of high modernity, emanating as it did from national leadership, but it was also driven by local stakeholders.

12 Tennessee Valley Authority, Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority and Appendixes (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1935): 47.

13 Marguerite Owen, The Tennessee Valley Authority (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973): 39

14 Lilienthal, TVA, 11, 93-95

12 Tennessee Valley Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority and DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1935): 47. Owen, The Authority (New York: Publishers, 1973): 39 TVA, 11, 93-95

15 Josef Stalin, “Rech tov Stalina,” Pravda, 5 February, 1931

15 Josef Stalin, “Rech tov Stalina,” Pravda, 5 February,

16 Anne Rassweiler, The Generation of Power: The History of Dneprostroi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988): 163

17 Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Completion of the Reconstruction of the Entire National Economy (New York: International Publishers, 1934): 13-14

18 Oksana Chabanyk, “Foreign Specialist in Soviet Industry: The Case of Eastern Ukraine,” in Detroit-Moscow-Detroit: An Architecture for Industrialization, 1917-1945, eds Jean Louis Cohen, Christina E Crawford, and Claire Zimmerman (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2023): 68, 78-81

17 Sergo Ordzhonikidze, of the Reconstruction of the Entire National Economy York: International Publishers, 13-14 Oksana “Foreign Specialist in Soviet Industry: The of Eastern Ukraine,” in An for Industrialization, 1917-1945, Jean Cohen, Crawford, Claire Zimmerman (Cambridge, The 2023): 78-81

19 See Swope’s article in Charles Beard, America Faces the Future Gerard Swope, “Stabilization of Industry,” 160-185.

19 See Swope’s article Charles Beard, America the Future Gerard Swope, “Stabilization of Industry,” 160-185.

20 Carl W Condit, review of Town and Revolution: Soviet Architecture and City Planning, 1917-1935, by Anatole Kopp, Technology and Culture, V ol 12, no 3 (July 1971): 521

20 Carl W review of Town and Revolution: Soviet Architecture and City Planning, 1917-1935, by Anatole Kopp, Technology and V ol 12, no 3 (July 1971): 521

“FORCING

THE GATES OF THE FUTURE”: DAMS AS SITES OF HIGH MODERNITY IN ROOSEVELT’S UNITED STATES AND STALIN’S SOVIET UNION

Nicholas Pierce (University of Texas, Austin)

Just as in the case of the TV A Southern leaders had been key in advocating for the development of the region, leaving room for a high modernist intervention at unprecedented scale, Dnieprostroi was a product of the demands of Ukrainian Bolshevik leaders, who saw a chance to transform their own region (21) The site grew during construction to above 125,000 workers, technicians, and administrators, with thousands of workers supplying the site with everything from lumber to machined components (22). The rising waters created by this dam also meant the displacement of thousands of people, and the submerging of the “villages and towns of ancient Rus,” the clearest symbol of the succession of the old by the new (23). One report stated that 56 villages were partially or fully flooded, with millions of rubles allocated for the relocation of displaced families, though this by no means enumerated all of the disruption caused by the relocations (24). Nevertheless, this fit perfectly with the Soviet idea that the projects were sites of not only titanic construction and the physical transformation of the landscape, but also places of social transformation. Stalinist leader Vyacheslav Molotov stated this explicitly in his comments on the First Five-Year Plan:

The importance of our work of construction, however, lies not only and not so much in the number of the working, the equipped and the new factories, as in the inner life which is going on in these factories, and the new construction under the proletarian dictatorship… our workshops are living a new life, are breathing another air than the old… In them the old workers as well as the new employees, engineers, and finally also the managers, who have only recently come from various strata in the towns and villages, are being re-educated (25).

Though plans had existed even under the Russian Empire, the drive to unprecedented “socialist tempo” in construction, the incessant comparison with and adoption of American precedents, and the advocacy of Ukrainian Communists meant that the “absolutely empty lot” along the Dnieper was but the first of many displays of Sovet high modernity. The American roots of Soviet high modernity, though now largely overlooked, did not go unnoticed even in America, as shown by an American engineering publication’s bold claims that

[Dnieprostroy] is practically the only major part of the five-year plan that went through on schedule is largely due to American initiative, methods and equipment joined to the strength of purpose of the government leaders and the enthusiasm—or fanaticism, some may say—of all who had a part in the construction operation On the Dnieper, at the great hydro-electric development that is one of the show places of the country, American methods and machines succeeded where others failed (26)

21 Rassweiler, The Generation of Power, 49-58

22 A A Kovalevskii, Dneprovskaya gidroelektricheskaya stantsiya (Moscow: State Energy Publisher, 1932): 54

23 Saslavsky, Dnieprostroi, 18

24 M N Iordanskii, ed “Otdel otchuzhdenii,” Khronika Dneprostroya, May 1, 1930, 22-23

25, V M Molotov, “The Technical Intelligentsia and Socialist Construction,” in Technocracy and Marxism, William Z Foster and Earl Browder (New York: Worker’s Library Publishers, 1935): 18

26, F E Schmitt, “The Significance of Dnieprostroy,” Engineering News-Record, V ol. 108, no 25 (June 23, 1932): 876

“FORCING

THE GATES OF THE

FUTURE”:

DAMS AS SITES OF HIGH MODERNITY IN ROOSEVELT’S UNITED STATES AND STALIN’S SOVIET UNION

Nicholas Pierce (University of Texas, Austin)

Another American publication imagined that, “unless the Soviet Union’s vast colonization and industrialization scheme falls through, a total area larger than the entire United States will be converted into a whole series of Garys, Niagara Falls, Muscle Shoals, and Boulder Dams” (27)

These dam construction projects symbolize high modernity in practice—the confidence in the ability of central planning to achieve “the hope of tomorrow for men everywhere” (28), the belief in a mechanized and electrified future where the power of nature was to be bent to human will as determined by the state, and social transformation through large-scale intervention and the turning-away from “backwards” practices FDR was clear about this drive: “Power is really a secondary matter What we are doing there is taking a watershed with about three and a half million people in it, almost all of them rural, and we are trying to make a different type of citizen out of them…” (29). High modernity was not value-neutral it actively perceived itself as a step forward into a more rational social order and therefore inherently good. In this way, the constant comparison between the two emerging great powers also functioned to drive an understanding of high modernity, embodied in those titans of steel and concrete lighting vast swathes of formerly agricultural hinterland an understanding that high modernity was also a contest to be won by new methods and the expression of collective will and leadership. As this comparison shows, American and Soviet high modernity, beyond being comparable experiences, can be seen as parts of a shared experience which would define the 20th century.

27 William Philip Simms, “Gigantic Power Projects are Visioned For Siberia,” Long Branch Daily Record, May 23, 1934

28 Lilienthal, TVA, xxi

29 Roosevelt, “One Hundred and Sixtieth Press Conference, November 23, 1934,” in Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D Roosevelt, 3:466

Papers by Panels

PANEL VII: Europe’s Economic Policy, and Competitiveness in a Changing Global Landscape

PANEL VII: Europe’s Economic Policy, Trade, and Competitiveness in a Changing Global Landscape

Moderator: Lili Vessereau (Harvard University)

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

Justine Haekens (Harvard University)

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

Introduction

The US remains the EU’s largest export market, making transatlantic trade relations critical for European economic stability. The re-election of Donald Trump and his administration's renewed push for protectionist measures have heightened concerns across the EU about trade disruptions This paper evaluates the EU’s exposure to US and assesses whether and how the EU should reduce its reliance on the American market This paper firstly analyzes the extent of EU member states' reliance on US markets for both goods and services using trade data. Then drawing from the EU’s learnings in reducing dependency on Russian gas, I explore whether similar de-risking efforts are feasible in the transatlantic trade context. Through a combination of data analysis and expert interviews, I evaluate potential policy mechanisms to diversify EU trade and enhance economic resilience This paper aims to demonstrate the EU can reduce its economic dependence on the US market and establish itself as a strong global player, regardless of future political shifts in the US.

The Status Quo—Analysis of EU countries’ Trade Balance

EU Trade Balance in Goods and Services

With the exception of the period Q4 2021 – Q2 2023 in goods, when the invasion of Ukraine by Russia triggered an international energy crisis, the EU has consistently witnessed a positive trade balance in goods and services over the last 10 years. The trade surplus has originated mainly due to the dominance of specific sectors, notably food & beverage, chemicals and related products, other manufactured goods (1).

Looking at the data of 2023 for goods, the six main trading partners, at both export and import level, for the EU are China, the US, the UK, Switzerland, Turkiye, Norway (Figure 1). Out of these countries, the EU

1 https://ec europa eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index php?title=EU international trade in goods - latest_developments

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) njoys a positive trade balance with all of them, except for China and Norway. The exposure of the EU towards Asia, including Middle East, and Latin America remains very limited as of now.

Figure 1. Main trading partners for exports and imports of goods, 2023, Eurostat.

The picture changes when looking at services’ data with the US, the UK and Switzerland as key target markets Half of the total imports are instead attributed to the US and the UK (2) (Figure 2)

Figure 2. Main trading partners for exports and imports of services, 2023, Eurostat.

2 https://ec europa eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index php?title=International trade in services#:~:text=From%202010%20to%202019%20the,1%20427

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

The majority of goods’ trade takes place within the borders of the EU (61.5%) while the extra-EU trade accounts for 38.5%. The most exposed EU countries to the extra-EU trade in goods, defined as an higher level than the EU average, are Ireland, Cyprus, Greece, Slovenia, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Malta, France, Denmark, Sweden with values ranging from 59.4% in the Irish case to 39% in the Swedish one When it comes to services, 50 2% of trade happens at the extra- EU level with Ireland, Cyprus, Greece, Denmark, France, Germany and Sweden above this level, ranging from 75 6% to 51 5%

The Relationship Between EU and US in Trade

The EU and the US share the world's largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, boasting the most integrated economic partnership globally When considering goods and services, the EU and the US are by far each other's largest trading partners, reaching an amount of EUR 1 6T in 2023 Currently, over 1 2M jobs in the US are supported by EU trade in goods and almost 1M in services (3).

While the EU enjoys a surplus in goods (EUR +156B in 2023 with a 2% annual fall from 2021), it consistently presents a negative trade balance in services (EUR –109B in 2023 with a growth of 7.9% from 2021) (4) The goods surplus with the US is mainly due to chemicals, machinery & vehicles, food & beverage, other manufacturing goods Yet, the EU remains heavily dependent from the transatlantic relationship when it comes to energy and raw materials; the first saw an annual increase of 51.7% between 2013 and 2023 (5). The negative trade balance in services derives from a massive import, half of it concentrated in professional, scientific & technical services, charges for IP (other than those falling in information) and finance & insurance.

While the most exposed EU countries to trade with US in absolute goods’ value are Germany, Italy, Ireland, France, Netherlands and Belgium, multiple countries have an exposure higher than 20% out of their total global export, making them highly sensitive to tariffs (Figure 3). When it comes to services, most of European countries are highly exposed to the US in both imports and exports (Figure 4).

Despite the deep partnership, the EU and the US never signed a free trade agreement The recent negotiations of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (6) began in 2013 but stalled in 2016 and officially ended in 2019 due to disagreements over labor, consumer protection, competition, and environmental issues. Meanwhile, President Trump’s “America First” trade policy further strained relations. In 2021, Presidents von der Leyen and Biden launched the EU- US Trade and Technology Council (TTC)

https://trade ec europa eu/eu-footprint-us/home

4 https://policy trade ec europa eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/united-states en

5 https://ec europa eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index php?title=USA-EU - international trade in goods statistics

6 https://policy trade ec europa eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/united-states/eu- negotiating-texts-ttip_en

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) to enhance cooperation on technology, trade, and investment. However, the Council has yet to significantly reduce trade barriers.

Figure 3. Goods’ export exposure of EU countries to US, 2023, Eurostat.

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

Figure 4. Top 3 trading partners of EU countries for import and export of services.

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

Conversely, trade tensions have frequently emerged. In 1963, the “Chicken War” caused lasting trade disruptions (7). The 1990s saw disputes over banana imports (8) while the early 2000s brought disagreements over EU bans on hormone-treated US beef (9). Between 2004 and 2021, both sides imposed tariffs in response to the Airbus-Boeing subsidies dispute (10). In 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs of 25% on EU steel and 10% on aluminum, citing national security, and recently signaled willingness to apply wider and tougher tariffs in 2025 (11)

Since the establishment of the WTO in 1994, most disputes had been settled through its mechanisms. However, during Trump’s presidency, the US frequently bypassed WTO rules, invoking national security concerns to impose targeted tariffs, thus undermining the core "Most Favored Nation" principle (12).

Diversification Strategies: Lesson Learnt from Russian Gas Imports to EU

The energy relationship between Russia and Europe began in the 1970s when West Germany, Italy, and Austria built closer ties with the Soviet Union to tackle the unprecedented energy crisis. After Vladimir Putin took power, purchases of Russian gas surged, bolstered by his strong relationships with leaders like Angela Merkel in Germany and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy Russia used energy trade as a political tool to influence European and Eastern European decisions Before the invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, Russia supplied 40% of Europe’s imported gas, with Germany and Italy as the main buyers (13).

In an unprecedent move in terms of speed and political consensus, this figure declined to around 15% by 2023. The transition has come at a high price for European economies: severe hits to energy-intensive industries, controversial subsidies and beggar-thy-neighbor policies, and heightened political tensions within and between European countries (14) Yet, the partial de-coupling from Russian gas supply showcases the ability to challenge historical habits and diversify economies in light of geopolitical disruptions.

Europe managed to diversify its gas sourcing through three main categories of actions: Diversification of suppliers The EU increased imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from various global suppliers (growth of 70 billion cubic meters (bcm), with an additional 60 bcm expected to become operational between 2025 and 2030 (15)) In parallel, there has been a significant increase in the intra-Europe energy trade with Norway, already a significant supplier, maximizing its export capacity to the EU to help to offset reduced Russian supplies.

11 https://www theguardian com/us-news/2025/feb/26/trump-european-union-tariffs

12 https://www nytimes com/2025/02/14/business/trump-tariffs-world-trade-organization.html

13 https://www weforum org/stories/2022/11/europe-gas-shortage-russia/

14 https://www brookings edu/articles/europes-messy-russian-gas-divorce/

15 https://energy ec europa eu/topics/carbon-management-and-fossil-fuels/liquefied-natural-gas en

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

Renewable energy expansion

The EU accelerated investments in renewable energy projects, such as wind and solar power, to reduce reliance on fossil fuels. This transition not only enhanced energy security but also aligned with the EU's climate goals (16).

Infrastructure enhancements EU countries undertook several investments in energy infrastructure, including interconnectors and storage facilities, that improved the resilience and flexibility of the EU's energy system, enabling better management of supply disruptions (17)

Path Forward

Short-Term Recommendations

Given its significant economic power, the EU has leverage to respond to aggressive US trade actions Depending on the intensity of US measures, the EU can progressively implement responses under its AntiCoercion Instrument (ACI), passed in 2023 and allowing the EU Commission to enact tariffs, outright restrictions on exports and imports, measures affecting trade in services, access to public procurement, foreign direct investment and intellectual property rights until even sanctioning directly foreign individuals linked to the government (18)

Ongoing Mild Retaliation Case Retaliatory Tariffs on Key Goods for Trump’s Electoral Base

Donald Trump gathered a large consensus within the rural areas of the US in 2016 and 2024 presidential elections (19). The EU represents the fourth largest market for the export of US agricultural products (20), notably soybeans (USD 3 6B), tree nuts (USD 2 2B) and distilled spirits (USD 0 8B) 70% of soybeans (21), 10% of tree nuts (22) and 70% of distilled spirits’ sales come from Republican-leaning states and support over 40,000 US jobs (23). The EU could impose targeted tariffs on multiple goods like the ones above, already under discussion, to apply political pressure. Such measures, especially if coordinated with similar moves by China (24), could undermine support for Trump in key regions and push the US toward a more cooperative trade stance.

16 https://ec europa eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index php?title=Natural gas supply statistics

17 https://www brookings edu/articles/europes-messy-russian-gas-divorce/

18 https://www cer eu/insights/trumps-tariffs-how-should-eu-react

19 https://www cnn com/election/2024/results/president?election-data-id=2024-PG&election-painting- mode=projection-with-lead&filter-key-races=false&filterflipped=false&filter-remaining=false

20 https://www fas usda gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/2023%20Ag%20Export%20Yearbook%20Final.pdf

21 https://www cropprophet com/soybean-production-by-state-top-11/

22 https://www nass usda gov/Publications/Highlights/2024/Census22 HL FruitNutBerry pdf

23 https://trade ec europa eu/eu-footprint-us/download/infographic 2023 US EU pdf

24 https://www brookings edu/articles/chinas-retaliatory-tariffs-will-hurt-trump-voting-counties-most/

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

Mild + Moderate Retaliation A Tariff Regime on IP

Beyond agricultural goods, the EU could target major US consumer brands in Europe such as Starbucks, McDonald’s, and Apple by introducing a "Brand Use Levy" on franchise fees, royalties, and licensing agreements This would reduce the profitability of these companies in the EU without directly burdening European consumers Additional tools could include tighter regulations on food safety, advertising, and sustainability, raising operational costs for these firms. The aim is to pressure US multinationals with strong lobbying power to influence policy in Washington. While this strategy avoids the consumer backlash associated with tariffs, it may trigger WTO challenges and provoke countermeasures against EU industries.

Severe Retaliation Targeted Suspension of IP Protections

The US is the EU’s largest services exporter, heavily dependent on intellectual property protections. Over 2023, the US charged approximately USD 48B to the EU for IP fees (25). In an extreme scenario, the EU could suspend IP rights for selected US firms as a form of proportional retaliation, using the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Article 22 of the DSU) a tactic previously employed by the US in the AirbusBoeing case (26) The EU could narrowly tailor the suspension to US companies headquartered in states that voted for Trump in 2024 e g , pharma patents of Texas, Indiana, Pennsylvania companies However, this would be a high-cost response for the EU and should only be considered in the face of severe US aggression. The measure is already part of the EU’s ACI toolkit and could be activated only with unanimous member state approval (27).

Long-Term Recommendations

Beyond immediate political measures, the EU must strategically ensure long-term economic security and stability by diversifying trade and reinforcing global trade governance.

A Different Relationship: Diversifying From the US

Reducing economic dependence on unpredictable US electoral outcomes is crucial The EU should actively diversify trade, deepening intra-European trade (EU, EFTA, UK, Switzerland) and enhancing engagement with emerging markets. Finalizing agreements with Indonesia, Australia, and ASEAN nations could pave the way for closer EU-CPTPP cooperation, enhancing ties with the world's fastest-growing region. The countries involved in the CPTPP represent 13% of global GDP with huge potential gains for the EU. A free

25 https://trade ec europa eu/eu-footprint-us/download/infographic 2023 US EU pdf

26 https://www wto org/english/tratop e/dispu e/dsu e.htm

27 https://ec europa eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip 23 6804

EU TRADE POLICY IN THE ERA OF PROTECTIONISM: DE-RISKING FROM US

Carlo Giannone (Harvard University) Carlo Giannone (Harvard University)

trade agreement with India could be a significant move considering the share of exports to India remains still limited (12.5%) (28). Yet, it would demand significant flexibility on both sides. Deepening existing agreements with Canada (29) and Mexico (30), two target markets for Trump’s tariffs, could represent an additional wise move to open new opportunities for EU exporters and strengthen soft power. Beyond market access, an EU-CPTPP partnership could support WTO reform In Africa, Clean Trade and Industrial Partnerships, as proposed by Ursula von der Leyen, could boost local value creation, attract European investment, and diversify EU supply chains, particularly in the green economy. These efforts will enhance Europe’s resilience and global economic leadership (31).

EU as New Global Leader of Trade Multilateralism

The EU should proactively champion the preservation and modernization of a rules-based multilateral trading system, prioritizing comprehensive WTO reform. Given the current impasse largely driven by US obstructionism, the EU must deepen and expand existing coalitions, notably the Ottawa Group (32) and the interim Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) (33). Specifically, the EU should enhance MPIA effectiveness by broadening participation to influential emerging markets (e.g., India, Brazil, Indonesia), institutionalizing stronger enforcement mechanisms, and offering clear economic incentives such as preferential market access to coalition members Diplomatic campaigns emphasizing the success of initiatives like the Japan-led CPTPP and China-backed RCEP could also bolster confidence in multilateralism independent of US involvement. Such proactive coalition-building can effectively insulate the EU from US unilateralism, preserving Europe’s economic interests and reinforcing its global leadership in transparent, equitable trade governance.

Conclusions

The proposed actions may come at a significant short-term cost for many European countries. However, Russia’s case underscores the importance of reducing over-reliance on any single partner. The European Union, as the world’s third-largest economy, cannot allow its future to be held hostage by the shifting political winds in Washington D C In line with its founding values, the EU should strive to be a friend to all but a subordinate to none

28 https://policy trade ec europa eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/india/eu-india- agreement en

29 https://policy trade ec europa eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/canada/eu- canada-agreement en

30 https://policy trade ec europa eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mexico/eu- mexico-agreement en

31 https://www bruegel org/policy-brief/how-european-union-should-respond-trumps-tariffs

32 https://www international gc ca/world-monde/international relations-relations internationales/wto-omc/ottawa- group-groupe.aspx?lang=eng

33 https://www cambridge org/core/journals/world-trade-review/article/wtos-multiparty-interim-appeal-arbitration- arrangement-mpia-whatsnew/B279E8A106380A510AAA28F4E1A4130F

FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW

Justine Haekens (Harvard University) Justine Haekens (Harvard University)

Introduction

Concentration and consolidation have increased in both the US and the EU (1) Powerful firms have given rise to a variety of concerns related to rising inequality, lower wages, reduced competition, and even threats to democracy (2). The need to address these issues is pressing, and competition law plays a vital role in doing so (3).

Competition law was designed as a safeguard against excesses of economic power (4). However, the law can only address power if it understands what power is A proper understanding of power requires looking into multiple aspects of power This paper focuses on how corporate wealth translates into economic power, and on the role financial power can play in competition law.

Part I—Economic Research

A. Deep Pocket Theory

The ‘deep pockets theory’ asserts that wealth and resources are sources of power (5) Financial resources give firms an advantage over competitors. This can be an unfair competitive advantage when firms use their financial strength to overproduce and lower their prices to a level that competitors cannot bear. Competitors with less financial resources will not be able to absorb the losses of such low pricing and could be pushed out of the market (6).

More so, when smaller firms emerge, they can be acquired by the wealthy firm as a way to eliminate future competitors and consolidate their position, a practice known as killer acquisitions (7). Large companies can even threaten smaller competitors with a predatory price war as a strategy to force that firm to sell (8). Hence, there appears to be a link between predatory pricing and predatory (or killer) acquisitions.

1 Matej Bajgar and others, Industry Concentration in Europe and North America CEP Discussion Paper No 1654 (2023); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism 61 International Journal of Industrial Organization (2018) 714; William A Galston and Clara Hendrickson, A policy at peace with itself: Antitrust remedies for our concentrated, uncompetitive economy Brookings (2018)

2 Jan Eeckhout, The profit paradox: How thriving firms threaten the future of work (2022); Anthony Pahnke, Neo-Brandeisians and Marxists Unite!: Reevaluating the Nature of Power and Markets in Competition Policy, 44 New Political Science 361 (2022); Eric A Posner and Cass R Sunstein, Antitrust and Inequality, 2 American Journal of Law and Equality 190 (2022); Herman M Schwartz, Mo’ Patents, Mo’ Problems: Corporate Strategy, Structure, and Profitability in America’s Political Economy in The American Political Economy Politics, Markets, and Power (Jacob S Hacker, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Paul Pierson, and Kathleen Thelen, 2021); Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout, Gabriel Unger, The rise of market power and the macroeconomic implications, 135 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 561 (2020); Tommaso Valletti and Hans Zenger, Increasing market power and merger control, 5 Competition Law & Policy Debate 40 (2019); Sean F Ennis, Market power: The inequality connection, 3 CPI Antitrust Chronicle (2019); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 International Journal of Industrial Organization 714 (2018)

3 Sean F Ennis, Market power: The inequality connection, 3 CPI Antitrust Chronicle (2019); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 International Journal of Industrial Organization 714 (2018); Adi Ayal, The market for bigness: economic power and competition agencies’ duty to curtail it, 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 221 (2013); James Brock, Economic Concentration and Economic Power: John Flynn and a Quarter-Century of Mergers, 56 The Antitrust Bull 681 (2011); Vindelyn Smith-Hillman and Adam Scott, Economic Power: Competition Law, Economic Evaluation and Policy Implications in The Role of Large Enterprises in Democracy and Society 76 (2010)

4 Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness, Columbia Global Reports, 2018; Giuliano Amato, Antitrust and the bounds of power: the dilemma of liberal democracy in the history of the market, 1997

5 Corwin D Edwards, Policy toward Big Business: What Lessons after Forty Years? 9 Journal of Economic Issues, 343 (June 1975); R Shyam Khemani and Daniel Shapiro, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, (1993), note 55

6 Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing in Industrial Structures in the New Industrial Economics 112 (Giacomo Bonanno and Dario Brandolini, 1990)

7 Lester G Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J.L & ECON. 259 (1966), 268

8 Lester G Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J.L & ECON 259 (1966), 268; Friso Bostoen, Abuse of Platform Power: Leveraging conduct in digital markets under EU competition law and beyond, 238 (2023)

FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW

Justine Haekens (Harvard University) Justine Haekens (Harvard University)

However, the theory lacked nuance and economic evidence to support its claims. Thus, it has been rather quickly refuted in the past by the ‘Chicago School’ (9). The Chicago School argued that pricing below costs was an irrational strategy for companies, as they could use their resources to obtain more profit through other strategies (10) Furthermore, economists believed that when capital markets work well, less wealthy firms can easily secure funding to place themselves at the same level of resources as their wealthier competitors (11). This paper reevaluates these arguments.

B. Predatory Practices

Predatory pricing may only be an irrational strategy for an already dominant firm, as that firm can already set prices above competitive levels (12) A dominant company would only achieve small, marginal gains from the additional market power it would acquire, and it might achieve higher profits without predation (13).

Predatory pricing can be rational and harmful when set by a non-dominant firm as a strategy to become dominant and be able to gain monopoly profits in the future (14) Indeed, it is more interesting for a company to rely on this strategy when the additional market share it would gain is bigger, and the prospects of future profits are higher. Furthermore, predatory pricing is more harmful to consumers and competition when the conduct is set by a non-dominant firm, as this can change the market structure in a more permanent and profound way (15).

Predatory pricing may be a rational and successful strategy for non-dominant firms This depends on the financial strength of both companies, access to capital markets, and uncertainty in the market (16)

C. Capital Markets

The Chicago School correctly argues that when firms have easy access to capital, predation is less likely

9 Jean-Pierre Benoit, Financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information, 15 RAND Journal of Economics, 490 (1984); John S McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N J ) Case, 1 J L & ECON 137 (1958); Anush Ganesh, Predatory pricing in platform markets: a modified test for firms within the scope of Article 3 of the DMA and super-dominant platform firms under Article 102 TFEU, European Competition Journal (2024); Richard Posner, Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust Policy: An Introduction, 44 St John’s Law Review, 529-532(1969)

10 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law, 780 (10 ed 2021); Robert Bork, Antitrust Paradox 148 (1978); Roland H Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 Antitrust L and Econ Rev 105 (1971); Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 Chicago Law Review 263 (1981) th

11 John S McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 Journal of Law & Economics, 297 (1980)

12 Michael Funk and Christian Jaag, The More Economic Approach to Predatory Pricing, 14 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 295 (2018)

13 Louis Kaplow, Recoupment, Market Power, and Predatory Pricing, 82 Antitrust Law Journal, 189 (2018); Michael Funk and Christian Jaag, The More Economic Approach to Predatory Pricing, 14 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 295 (2018); Nicola Giocoli, When low is no good: Predatory pricing and U.S antitrust law (1950–1980), 18 The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 780 (2011)

14 Louis Kaplow, Recoupment, Market Power, and Predatory Pricing, 82 Antitrust Law Journal, 189 (2018)

15 Louis Kaplow, Recoupment, Market Power, and Predatory Pricing, 82 Antitrust Law Journal, (2018); Michael Funk and Christian Jaag, The More Economic Approach to Predatory Pricing, 14 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2018); Nicola Giocoli, When low is no good: Predatory pricing and U.S antitrust law (1950–1980), 18 The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, (2011); Migual De la Mano and Benoît Durand, A Three-Step Structured Rule of Reason to Assess Predation under Article 102, Office of the Chief Economist, Discussion Paper, DG Competition (2005)

16 Maria N Lavrutich and Jacco JJ Thijssen, Predatory Pricing under Uncertainty: Revisiting the Deep Pocket Argument, SSRN (2016); Louis Kaplow and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Handbook of Law and Economics 1073 (Volume 2, A Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, 2007); Lester G Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J.L & ECON 268 (1966)

FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW

Justine Haekens (Harvard University) Justine Haekens (Harvard University)

to be successful, and financial power is less relevant (17). However, predation makes access to capital markets more difficult. During a predatory attack, the prey’s profits fall as it must sell at a lower price. The prey needs capital to bear those losses If its own cash pile is rather small, the prey takes recourse to financial markets to sustain the attack However, external financers are less likely to provide funding to a company whose profits are declining, and they are not able to tell whether the decline is due to a predatory attack or because the predator outcompetes the prey on the merits (18). Moreover, large firms firms with multiple units also benefit from internal capital markets and ‘redeployability’ (19). This allows them to fund new ventures quicker and easier than when one must rely on external capital markets (20).

Modern corporate finance theory furthermore argues that extensive financial resources of large firms make smaller firms believe that their access to external funding is limited. The perceived risk of lending money is thus impacted by the financial strength of their competitors (21).

Part II—Competition Law Framework

A. Abuse of Dominance

The EU competition law framework includes financial resources to some extent, but it only recognizes the financial resources of ex ante dominant firms. Moreover, in practice, the role of capital and access to capital markets appears to be limited (22). Predatory pricing is recognized as an abuse of dominance. However, since predatory pricing is likely to be arational strategy to become dominant, the framework is currently poorly adjusted

Financial resources and capital markets should be considered when examining a company’s market position. Authorities should be able to detect firms that have small market shares but large capital, as predatory practices are more rational for such companies. This does not mean that having large financial resources is seen as an issue of its own. The analysis still examines whether the behavior is abusive, for which the below-cost pricing test can be employed

B. Mergers

The merger control framework already recognizes (an aspect of) financial power as notification is required based on turnover thresholds. However, killer acquisitions do not trigger merger review as the smaller firm that is being bought often does not have a large enough turnover.

17 Juliane Mendelsohn, Reconsidering Conglomerates – How are digital conglomerates different from those in the past? Theory and implications, 15 The Competition Law Review 83 (2023)

18 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F Brodley & Michael H Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO L J 2239 (2000)

19 Ibid

20 Marc Bourreau and Alexandre de Streel, Digital Conglomerates and EU Competition Policy, Social Science Research Network (2019)

21 Juliane Mendelsohn and Macarena Viertel, Financial Power in Competition Policy and as a Key Component of Modern Bigness, 2024 (unpublished, on file with the author); Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta and Claudio Calcagno, Exclusionary Practices: The Economics ofMonopolisation and Abuse of Dominance, 14 (2018)

22 Juliane Mendelsohn, Reconsidering Conglomerates – How are digital conglomerates different from those in the past? Theory and implications, 15 The Competition Law Review 83 (2023)

FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW FINANCIAL POWER IN EU COMPETITION LAW

Justine Haekens (Harvard University) Justine Haekens (Harvard University)

Killer acquisitions are a fairly easy way for dominant companies to consolidate their position. Moreover, these acquisitions often hinder innovation as an innovative firm is eliminated from the market, although the larger firm can also add skills and resources to the smaller firm’s work (23) Such efficiency gains should not be ignored, but neither should the anticompetitive concerns

Conclusion

Market power is one of the fundamentals of competition law. However, competition law does not detect all forms of power which causes certain anticompetitive harm to go unaddressed

One such source of power is financial strength. Companies can use their resources in ways that harm competition. Non-dominant firms can rely on predatory pricing to push less resourceful competitors out of the market, or they can buy future rivals and secure their position in the market. In both situations, companies use their financial clout to buy market shares and alter the market structure. This may cause anticompetitive harm and decrease consumer welfare

The issue is that competition law is unable to detect these companies. Without being able to see certain harm, the law also cannot address it. I argue to broaden the notion of market power to a new concept of economic power that covers different ways in which companies can be powerful. Enabling the framework to detect powerful companies is necessary to address anticompetitive harm.

23 Anna Gerbrandy and Pauline Phoa, The Power of Big Tech Corporations as Modern Bigness and a Vocabulary for Shaping Competition Law as Counter-Power in Wealth and Power (Michael Bennett, Huub Brouwer, and Rutger Claassen, 2022); Marc Bourreau and Alexandre de Streel, Digital Conglomerates and EU Competition Policy, Social Science Research Network (2019) Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 International Journal of Industrial Organization 714 (2018); Carl Shapiro, Competition and innovation: did arrow hit the bull’s eye?, The rate and direction of inventive activity revisited 361 (2011)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Introduction

Following a prolonged period of globalization and the endorsement of free trade, a significant shift toward protectionism began in 2018. The United States introduced multiple rounds of tariffs on a broad range of products from China and Europe. By the end of 2019, the average tariffs on US imports from China had escalated to 17.1%. In 2025, the trade tensions have escalated further as the federal government is considering new tariffs ranging from 25% to 200% on a vast array of products (e g cars and car parts) from Canada, Mexico, and China (1) Recent work in trade economics has examined the effects of such policies on the domestic economy using border-level data from the 2019 trade war and found evidence of complete tariff pass-through. The accompanying welfare analysis in that work suggests that most of the tariff burden was borne by the US import buyers (Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2022)). What is less well understood is how much of the border price increase is passed through to the domestic consumer and whether American consumers or American businesses involved in the supply chain ended up bearing the costs of tariffs

A typical imported consumer good will go through multiple tiers of the supply chain before reaching the domestic consumer. Economic theory suggests that tariff incidence depends on demand curvature and the nature of competition along the supply chain (Weyl and Fabinger (2013)). Standard demand systems and commonly assumed modes of competition predict incomplete pass-through with firms reducing their markups in response to cost shocks If the tariff effects are absorbed in the supply chain, then large effects at the border could result in little impact on domestic consumers with domestic firms bearing most of the tariff burden. On the other hand, if firms in the supply chain adhere to fixed markup rules, we should expect complete pass-through to consumer prices, making border effects informative about the effects of tariffs on domestic consumers.

This paper investigates empirically how tariff-induced price increases are transmitted along the supply chain, using 2019-2021 tariffs on European wines and single-malt whiskeys, which were a part of a broader policy targeting European agricultural and luxury products in retaliation for Airbus subsidies. We focus on a specific industry since the historical peculiarities of the American liquor laws allow us to construct a dataset that tracks product prices throughout the entire supply chain, which by law consists of just three disjoint tiers: retailers, wholesalers, and suppliers/importers. With these data, we first assess tariff pass-through at the border In contrast to recent findings of complete pass-through of tariffs on a broad range of Chinese products, our border-level estimates suggest that pass-through was incomplete (Fajgelbaum et al (2019), Amiti et al. (2019), Cavallo et al. (2021)). Specifically, we do not find significant changes in import prices (tariff-inclusive) of wines relative to the control group, implying 0% tariff pass-through (2),

1 https://www nytimes com/article/trump-tariffs-canada-mexico-china html

2 This does not imply 0% pass-through at the store since the composition of products at the store and in the border HS-10 code might differ

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

and a 5% increase in import prices of whiskeys, implying 20% tariff pass-through After the tariff suspension in March 2021, relative prices of wines returned to their pre-tariff levels within 2 months, while whiskey prices remained persistently higher than prices of control products suggesting the existence of nominal rigidities in whiskey pricing.

Initially, the tariff only affected wines with an alcohol by volume (ABV) of 14% or less, leaving a potential loophole for winemakers to avoid the tariff by increasing the amount of alcohol in their wine if they are below the threshold In the data, we find evidence that suppliers exploited this loophole as import quantities of ”regular” wine declined by more than 100%, while import quantities of 14%+ ABV wines soared, increasing by more than 250% relative to control products in the midst of tariff policy (3). The presence of tariff avoidance is further corroborated in our store-level data, as we find that consumer prices for wine varieties that are further from the 14% threshold, for which we expect higher adjustment costs, experienced more pass-through The finding that firms are willing to pay some cost in order to avoid the tariff is in line with recent results in Flaaen et al (2020) who argue that antidumping duties on washing machines from South Korea and China were accompanied with production relocation and only minor price changes while the import restriction was discriminatory.

Next, we investigate how border cost shocks translate to store-level prices. In line with our findings at the border, we find that prices of treated wines increased by about 2% relative to the control group The treatment effects are heterogeneous by country of origin: for German wines that have low ABV and, as a result, were unlikely to avoid the tariff without dramatically changing the flavour, we find a price increase of 4%, while for Spanish wines that are among the highest in terms of ABV and were mostly exempt from the tariff, we find a price increase of less than 1%. For whiskeys, we find that prices of treated products increased by 6% relative to the control group of all non-treated whiskeys including domestic ones. We also found that if we restrict the control group to only foreign products, the treatment effect rises to about 7% suggesting that as retailers increased prices for single-malt scotch, they also increased prices for American bourbon. Price was not the only response mechanism that affected whiskey consumers as retailers also reduced the assortment of UK scotch by about 20% and replaced it with American bourbon.

Surprisingly, we find that retail price effects on whiskeys were highly uneven across the US even for geographically close states, ranging from a 4% price increase in the lowest pass-through state to an 8% price increase in the highest one We find that the median household income is positively correlated with regional pass-through and explains more variation in pass-through than other factors outlined in the literature, such as transportation costs (Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013)) or market power (Genakos and Pagliero (2022)).We rationalise the observed correlation in the following way: expensive whiskeys experienced

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

higher pass-through in the data and they were more likely to be on the shelf in states with wealthier households We do not find any correlation between proxies for market power in the supply chain and regional pass-through. However, we find cases of neighboring states, similar in observed demographics and product assortment, that differ significantly in pass-through and market power of distributors.

Finally, we examine the price incidence of whiskey tariff along the supply chain (4). We restrict our sample to NY state where we observe retail, wholesale, and supplier prices The domestic supply chain did not absorb the border cost shock We find that retail prices increased by 5- 7%, depending on the choice of the control group, while supplier prices increased by at most 5%, implying a pass-through above one in the domestic supply chain. When we decompose price incidence between wholesalers and retailers, we find that the wholesale tier magnified the border cost shock as wholesale prices increased on average by more than 7% suggesting pass-through above one at the wholesale tier. At the retail level, we find that prices increased by 5-7%, suggesting that retailers reduced their profit margins on certain products in response to the price increase of wholesalers Such high levels of pass-through were unusual for this supply chain Pass-through regressions estimated on all cost changes suggest that: 1) pass-through is, in general, significantly lower than one both at the retail and wholesaler tiers; 2) not all the upstream cost shocks are passed through downstream as regressions that condition on price changes yield significantly higher pass-through coefficients. The majority of treated products belong to distilleries that are owned by large multinationals (eg Diageo) We suspect that downstream prices for products of those multinationals were mandated by some form of vertical contracts that allows firms to coordinate on how certain cost shocks are passedthrough. For instance, a percentage markup rule on tariff- induced cost shocks would explain pass-through close to one that we observe for treated products. It could be justified by the idea that consumers would be understanding of such price increases as they would blame tariffs instead of firm market power.

Our results contribute to the literature studying the effects of recent protectionist tariffs on US economy (Amiti et al (2019), Fajgelbaum et al (2019), Flaaen et al (2020), Cavallo et al (2021), Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2022) for a review). This work found complete pass-through at the border for a vast array of products from different industries (5). In contrast, we find evidence of incomplete border pass-through suggesting that the majority of tariff incidence was borne by foreign exporters. Our finding is in line with the earlier empirical work on tariff and exchange rate pass-through that primarily found incomplete passthrough (Feenstra (1989), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Campa and Goldberg (2005), Irwin (2014))

We also contribute to a stream of work that attempts to assess how incidence of tariffs is split along the supply chain. Cavallo et al. (2021) finds a significant gap between complete pass-through at the border

4 We could do the same exercise for wines but since most of the tariff was absorbed at the border, we decided to focus on whiskeys to reduce the amount of data work

5 With a caveat that the finding is for prices of products aggregated across quality tiers Jaccard (2021) points out that ignoring substitution effects might have led to upward bias in passthrough calculations

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

and limited pass-through at the store on products subject to recent tariffs, suggesting that the cost of tariffs fell on US firms This finding is related to a large body of work documenting limited pass-through of cost shocks to consumer prices (Peltzman (2000), Engel (2002), Sangani (2024), Butters et al. (2022)). Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) and Nakamura and Zerom (2010) use structural approach to demonstrate that a high share of non-tradable costs can explain incomplete pass-through to store prices. We contribute to this work by constructing a unique dataset that matches store, wholesale, and import prices which allows us to compute price effects along the supply chain empirically (6) Our finding of complete pass-through in the domestic part of the whiskey supply chain is surprising as it would require high demand curvature (7) to generate pass-through close to one in models with market power within the framework of Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013), assuming that the share of non-tradeables is as high as in the existing work.

This finding also implies that the tariff burden primarily fell on foreign exporters and American consumers. We interpret our results as an argument for industry-level studies of the effects of trade policy as the differences in demand and supply chains can result in very different pass-through and incidence across industries.

Tax PT: Genakos and Pagliero (2022), Dimitrakopoulou et al. (2024), Miller et al. (2017), Conlon and Rao (2020).

Liquor Demand: Miller and Weinberg (2017), Miravete, Seim, and Thurk (2020), Conlon and Rao (2023)

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide some background regarding the specifics of the tariff, liquor supply chains and the dataset that we constructed. In Section 3, we first compute the effects of tariffs on whiskey and wine at the border. We then analyze the price and assortment response to tariffs at the store. Finally, we document how border cost shock was split among liquor retailers and wholesalers Section 4 summarises our findings and concludes

Background

In this section, we provide some background on the tariff policy and describe its scope and timeline. We also describe the specifics of the liquor industry that could be relevant for how a border cost shock propagates to consumer prices Finally, we explain how we combine data from multiple sources in order to track the cost shock along the supply chain

6 The only paper, that we are aware of, with a similar dataset is Alvarez-Blaser et al (2025) They study how retailer and total markups in the supply chain evolved over time

7 Mrazova and Neary (2017) and Miravete, Seim, and Thurk (2025) provide extensive analysis on how

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Tariff

Beginning in 2004, the United States and the European Union (EU) were embroiled in a long- running dispute at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over alleged subsidies provided by the EU to Airbus that harmed Boeing. After multiple rulings and appeals, in October 2019 the WTO authorized the United States to impose countermeasures on $7.5 billion worth of European goods, the largest penalty ever approved by the organization The United States implemented retaliatory tariffs, targeting products from countries including France, Germany, Spain, and the United King- dom, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 The initial round of tariffs included a 25% duty on certain European single-malt whiskeys and wines with less than 14% alcohol by volume (ABV), along with tariffs on other luxury goods such as cheese and olive oil. In response, the EU imposed a 25% tariff on U.S. rum, brandy, and vodka.

In Table 1, we highlight the scope of affected imports at the border for the liquor market We observe that liquor products captured about 50 4% of the permitted countermeasures Interestingly, not all European countries were affected by the tariff and the set of treated countries varied across products. The tariffs aimed to pressure the European Union into compliance with WTO rulings in order to negotiate an end to the subsidies. Despite complaints from both US and EU stakeholders (8), the tariffs were expanded in October 2020 to include higher-alcohol-content wines and other spirits. These measures remained in place until a temporary suspension agreement was reached in March 2021

Table 1. Tariff Summary

Liquor Supply Chain

To reach the domestic consumer, a bottle of liquor will go through a tightly regulated supply chain. The post-Prohibition Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 established the three-tier system, which separates the supply chain into distinct tiers: suppliers (such as distilleries and wineries or importers for

8 https://www wsj com/articles/europe-wine-tariff-high-alcohol-content-11605754161?page=1&mod= article inline

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

foreign products), distributors, and retailers (such as bars, restaurants, and liquor stores) The act also delegated some authority over alcohol regulation to the states, resulting in a legal landscape that varies widely across states (9). Variation across states is particularly pronounced due to the distinction between “open” and “liquor-control” states. In “liquor-control” states, the government directly manages some or all aspects of liquor distribution and retail, often operating a public monopoly. In contrast, open states allow private firms to compete in distribution and retail tiers. This legislative aspect can create significant differences in supply chain even between neighboring states For example, Iowa is a “liquor-control” state where Iowa Department of Revenue has a monopoly in liquor distribution, while in Nebraska the distribution layer is less concentrated with several national wholesalers distributing liquor.

The supplier tier is dominated by multinationals that either own distilleries and wineries or manage the import of liquor. Notable suppliers include Diageo, which owns the distillery producing Macallan scotch, ($20 3 billion annual revenue), Pernod Ricard ($12 8 billion annual revenue), Beam Suntory ($23 8 billion annual revenue), and EJ Gallo ($5 3 billion annual revenue) The wholesale tier consists of several national distributors and a few local wholesalers that operate within one state. Wholesalers typically maintain exclusive distribution contracts with suppliers for a specific brand of liquor, own warehouses where they store their inventory, and manage deliveries to retailers. The two largest wholesalers in the US are Southern

Glazer ($26.0 billion annual revenue) and RNDC ($11 billion annual revenue). Both of them operate in more than 30 states, distribute thousands of brands and have a combined market share of 53% according to industry research Table X highlights key properties of the liquor supply chain based on NY state data: (i) high concentration in supplier and wholesaler tiers; (ii) slow price adjustment upstream, as prices in supplier and wholesaler tiers change on average every 20 months.

Figure 1 Frequency of Price Changes in Supply Chain

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Datasets

For most of our border-level analysis, we use publicly available publicly available administrative U.S. import data from the U.S. Census Bureau that reports import values and quantities for each country of origin at the HS-10 code level. By dividing import values by quantities we are able to construct unit values, which serve as border price in our analysis (10). Unfortunately, this data does not distinguish between quality tiers and finer product categories such as single-malts vs blended whiskeys In order to avoid biases from composition effects, we use NY state supplier prices in our analysis of border pass-through for whiskeys

We use Nielsen Scanner data for store-level analysis, which consists of weekly UPC-level sales data from grocery chains and liquor stores. The quality of Nielsen coverage varies by state since certain states do not allow liquor sales in grocery stores and Nielsen primarily covers grocery chains. We restrict our attention to K states that have good coverage We complement Nielsen data for NY state with supplier and wholesale prices that we obtained via a FOIA request NY state is one of the states where suppliers and wholesalers are obliged to post their prices to the liquor authority at a monthly frequency (11). This data includes prices, product descriptions, warehouse of origin, and price schedule, allowing for quantity discounts. We were able to match the posted price data with Nielsen data using product descriptions. First, we matched brand names across datasets algorithmically and verified those matches by hand. Within each brand match we then matched UPCs algorithmically using product descriptions and product characteristics provided in both datasets (eg alcohol content) Our matched data allows us to observe store, wholesale, and supplier price for each UPC in NY state. One caveat of the matched data is that we do not observe the actual purchase price for which the downstream agent acquired the product. For instance, if retailers store inventory then using the contemporaneous wholesale price to compute retail markups might lead to biases. Based on the instantaneous adjustment of wholesale price to supplier price changes, we do not think that it is a concern in the wholesale-supplier link of the supply chain analysis For our analysis of pass-through of wholesale prices to retail prices, we test different assumptions on the average frequency of replenishment

Our analysis requires identifying whether a product was affected by the tariff. Whenever we use Census data, we define product as country*HS-10 code. For Census data, identifying whether the product is straightforward with the exception of whiskeys, since the granularity of the data does not allow us to distinguish between single-malts and blends For retail, wholesale, and supplier data we define product using its UPC For non-Census datasets, we are able to identify if a particular product is affected by the tariff using product descriptions. We run an LLM that searches for product’s country of origin and if it is a whiskey checks whether it is single-malt.

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Main Results

Border

In this section, we examine the response to tariffs at the border. For this analysis, we will primarily utilize publicly available US import data from the US Census Bureau that records values and quantities at the HS10 level, which we refer to here as product We will estimate the tariff impact on ex-tariff prices, quantities, and import values Since the publicly available Census data does not distinguish between single-malt and blended whiskeys (both are part of the same HS-10), we will use the NY state supplier data to assess the border price effects for whiskeys which should be representative of import prices since New York City has the largest whiskey importing port in the US. In that data, we use UPC to define product. We use the event study framework to describe the tariff impact following Fajgelbaum et al. (2019). In this framework, nontargeted products serve as controls for those targeted by the policy, which allows us to separate the effect of tariffs from the effect of other changes happening simultaneously with the policy We use the following regression equation for our event study: (1)

here yb jct is an outcome variable of interest for product j, country c, time t (measured in months) Djc is a treatment group indicator which is equal to one for products from countries targeted by the tariff policy. Xjct is a vector of control variables which includes commodity prices associated with the product category of interest and exchange rates. δjc are product-country fixed effects, δct are country-time fixed effects, and δjt are product-time fixed effects. βt are the parameters of interest, which measure the average difference between treated and control groups in period t in the outcome variable For identification, we normalise βt to 0 three months before the tariff imposition The regression coefficients are identified through differences between outcomes of treated and non-treated products within country. As non-targeted products we use other products within the same HS-8 category that were unaffected by the tariff. If such products do not exist in the data or have a negligible trade volume compared to the treated group, we expand our selection to HS-6 level (12).

For the first thirteen months of the tariffs, winemakers could avoid the tariff by increasing the alcohol content of their wines, since the policy did not affect wines with 14% ABV and above. White wines are generally low on alcohol content and for them we do not expect significant tariff avoidance as that would

12 In the Appendix, we also consider adding Canadian imports to this regression, which can serve as additional controls since Canada did not implement any new tariffs for the products of interest in 2019-2021

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

require drastic changes to the taste of wine product However, certain varieties of red wine (eg Pinot Noir) are typically close to the ABV threshold, making the costs of tariff avoidance low (13) In Figure 2A, we present evidence of tariff avoidance. Import quantities of high ABV red wines expanded by a 175% (14). At the same time, import quantities of low ABV red wines shrank by a 110% as shown in Figure 2B.

In Figure 3A, we report the estimated βt for ex-tariff wine prices (15). We find evidence of a 20% reduction in ex-tariff price suggesting very little border pass-through with prices returning to pre- tariff levels within 2-3 months of the policy repeal This finding is surprising given that the recent work on China tariffs almost exclusively finds complete pass-through for a broad set of products. We hypothesize that this finding can be explained by the unique shape of the retail demand for wine. From conversations with industry experts we have learnt that ”price-points” play an important role in wine markets. If an existing 12$ wine raises its price to 13$+, a typical retailer would replace it with a different 12$ wine, instead of passing-through the price increase to consumers In that case, a winemaker might prefer cutting their profit margins instead of shrinking exported quantity and bearing a major increase in inventory costs from the unsold wine In the Appendix, we show that there was a 30% decline in import quantity but the estimates are noisy.

Figure 2. Wines: Border Quantity Effects

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

In Figure 3B, we report the estimated βt for tariff-inclusive whiskey prices We find that ex-tariff prices of targeted products declined by only 16%, resulting in a significantly larger pass- through (20% vs 0%) than in the wine market. We attribute large differences in pass-through between wine and whiskey to differences in retail demand in these two markets. Whiskey market is more concentrated with a few well-known brands capturing the majority of sales and assortment of retailers; therefore, we do not expect the product replacement threat to limit pass-through. Instead, we expect the extent of pass-through to primarily depend on the demand curvature As we show in the Appendix, a simple pricing model where whiskey distilleries set retail prices with logit demand that has low price elasticity (generating large markups) and low curvature (generating pass-through in units below one) will generate similar magnitude of percentage pass-through to the one observed in the data. In Figure 12 in the Appendix, we present descriptive evidence that the price increase of single-malt whiskeys potentially induced switching to non-targeted foreign whiskeys as the import quantities of Canadian whiskeys increased by more than 250% during tariff. It is puzzling that the price increase was persistent even after the tariff was repealed This could be explained by nominal rigidities in this industry As we showed in Section 2, supplier prices of whiskey adjust once every 20 months Moreover, we will show in Section 3 that price decreases in this industry occur less frequently than price increases and are significantly smaller in magnitude.

Figure 3. Border Price Effects

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

In this section, we documented pass-through at the border for wines and whiskeys Tariff inclusive prices increased by 0% and 5% for wines and whiskeys accordingly given the 25% tariff In contrast with recent work, our results indicate little pass-through to prices in domestic economy suggesting that most of the policy price effects were borne by foreign firms. One potential concern with our results for wines, which are based on Census data, is that there might have been compositional effects (Jaccard (2021)). HS-10 codes of Census can include products of very different quality. Suppose pass-through was similar for low and high quality wine If the importers reallo- cated some of their purchases to lower quality wines, then we would underestimate pass-through We expect future research with better border data to correct for the role of compositional effects in pass-through estimates.

Store

In this section, we examine the response to tariffs at the store We are primarily interested in documenting how much of the border cost shock was passed through to the domestic consumer We use the same event study methodology to describe the tariff impact with a minor change to our definition of product: now we define product as UPC which automatically contains the information about its treatment status. Our regression equation for the store data is as follows: (2)

where yr jlt is an outcome variable of interest for product j, store l, time t (measured in quarters), and g(j) is a product category (eg. French wines). Dj is a treatment group indicator which is equal to one for products from countries targeted by the tariff policy. Xjlt is a vector of control variables which includes commodity prices associated with the product category of interest and exchange rates δjl are product-store fixed effects and δlt are store-time fixed effects βt are the parameters of interest, which measure the average difference between treated and control groups in period tin the outcome variable. For identification, we normalise βt to 0 one period before the tariff imposition [will change to 3]. The regression coefficients are identified through differences between outcomes of treated and non-treated products within a store. We use all nontargeted products as control group. In the Appendix, we report the results for only domestic products and only foreign non- targeted products as control group To mitigate the effects of changing assortment, we select a basket of products that were in stock before the policy and remained in stock until after the policy repeal.

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Figure 4 Store Price Effects

In Figure 4, we report the estimated βt for retail prices. In Panel A, we compare the response the response in whiskey and wine markets. In line with our results at the border, we find that store prices for wines increased by around 2% (16). For whiskeys, we find that prices increased by 6% relative to the control group of all non-treated whiskeys while if we restrict the control group to only foreign whiskeys, the treatment effect rises to about 7% suggesting that as retailers increased prices for single-malt scotch, they also increased prices for American bourbon This is equivalent to more than a 100% pass-through of the border cost shock for both wines and scotch whiskeys. In Panel B, we show that price effects for wines were heterogeneous by country of origin (17). We find that the price response for German wines is more than double the response for Spanish wines, which can be explained by heterogeneous costs of tariff avoidance. If most Spanish winemakers were able to avoid the tariff, we should not expect much retail pass-through for those wines As expected, the price response at the store was slower than at the border both in terms of responding to tariff introduction and to tariff repeal This can be explained by the ability of retailers to accumulate inventory. The border cost shock becomes relevant for them only when they restock their pretariff liquor supplies.

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Our results so far are based on a fixed basket of products that were in stock before and after the tariff However, retailers could adjust their assortment in response to upstream price increases and substitute away from targeted products. To investigate changes in retail assortment in response to tariff, we define product category shelf share as the total number of category products relative to the total number of products at the store , where Jlt is the set of products in store l at time t and g is a product category. As above, we can use the event-study framework, now at the product category level, to assess the tariff impacts on assortment with the following regression equation:

(3)

The estimated βt are reported in Panel A of Figure 5. We find a 10-20% decline in the shelf share of scotch whiskeys relative to non-targeted product categories (Bourbon, Irish, and Canadian) We do not find any significant changes in the shelf share of the targeted wines, which is expected given that the cost shock upstream was small in magnitude and that there might be some fixed costs of adjusting assortment (Hristakeva (2022)). The decline in shelf share of treated whiskeys occurs with a lag compared to the changes in price and persists well after the policy repeal. This can be explained by infrequent changes to product assortment in this industry. The retailers would be able to replace or return the targeted products only after they run out of the existing stock In Panel B, we show evidence that retailers substituted away from treated scotch to bourbon and not other imported whiskeys We are not aware of other work exploring the relationship between tariffs and assortment but believe that it could be an important channel when measuring the effects of trade policy on welfare of domestic consumers if consumers have a preference for variety. Given the simultaneous increase in prices of single-malt scotch and a decline in their presence on the shelf, we explored the response of quantities of products that remained in stock after the tariff. In Figure 6, we show that initially quantity decreased relative to the control group by about 10% However, after the tariff repeal, relative quantities returned to pre-tariff levels even though prices of singlemalts were persistently higher. This could be explained by substitution from treated products that were removed from the assortment.

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE

FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

5 Store Whiskey Assortment Effects

6 Store: Quantity Effects

Figure

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

In Figure 7, we report the estimated βst for whiskeys from a similar to (2) regression but allowing the coefficients to vary by state for the last period of tariff policy The regression is estimated on a national basket of 150. products that are present in the majority of states in our data (18).

We observe large-scale difference in regional pass-through with price effects ranging from 4% in the lowest pass-through state to 8% in the highest one. Differences in transportation costs could explain some variation in pass-through, as it can be seen that pass-through is on average lower in West South Central states Those states are further from the border and transportation costs should constitute a larger share of retailer marginal costs. On the other hand, there are pairs of geographically proximate states with large differences in pass-through, such as Nebraska, a state with state monopoly on liquor distribution, and Iowa, a state with competition in the distribution tier (19). We assess the correlation between pass-through and state characteristics in the following type of regression: (4) where βs are estimated coefficients from the event study. DistToPorts is the distance to the nearest port from the state capital, StateMonopolys is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is state monopoly in any tier of the supply chain, MarkupRules is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state monopoly follows a fixed markup rule, and Incomes is the median household income in the state

Figure 7 Regional Variation in Pass-Through

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

We report the results of the regressions in Table 3 of the Appendix We find that the median household income is positively correlated with regional pass-through and explains more variation in pass-through than other factors outlined in the literature, such as transportation costs (Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013)) or market power (Genakos and Pagliero (2022)). We explain this correlation in the following way: expensive whiskeys experienced higher pass-through in the data and they were more likely to be on the shelf in states with wealthier households. We do not find any significant correlation between proxies for market power in the supply chain and regional pass-through

Supply Chain

Our comparison of price effects at the border and at the store suggests that the domestic supply chain did not absorb any of the tariff-induced cost shock. In this section, we use our NY state data to assess what exactly happened in the retail and wholesale tiers of the supply chain in response to the tariff shock In Figure 8, we repeat the event study from the previous section to highlight the price response in each tier of the supply chain, making sure products in the sample or each regression are similar. The results suggest that passthrough at the wholesale tier was above one, with wholsalers increasing their markups on treated products. We also find that retail pass-through of wholesale price response was not significantly different from one.

Since our sample includes matched supply chain whiskey prices outside of the tariff policy, we can examine if pass-through of approximately one is normal in this supply chain Following a large empirical literature on pass-through of excise taxes (Conlon and Rao (2020)), we estimate the pass-through rate from a linear regression of price changes in the downstream layer of the supply chain on price changes in the upstream layer of the supply chain where j denotes product, l denotes store, t denotes month (or quarter). We allow ρ to depend on product-level observables X such as product price, and ∆ log p to account for potential non-linearities in pass-through k ∈{0, ,12}is the lookahead window in months, which we introduce due to potential rigidities in pass-through We also introduce product, store, and time fixed effects. This leads to two regressions of future wholesale price changes on current manufacturer price changes and future retail price changes on current wholesale price changes with the following specifications:

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Figure 8 Store Price Effects

We summarise our findings in Figure 9 and Table 2 First, we find that certain cost shocks are not passedthrough downstream by both wholesalers and retailers since pass-through rates estimated on the data that conditions on price changes are significantly higher than estimates on all data. Second, we find that the timing of price response is different between the two tiers of the supply chain. While wholesale passthrough rate is the highest for the month of the supplier price change, retail pass-through rate is significantly lower for the first several months after the wholesale price change Third, for both tiers of the supply chain pass-through rate is below one: 0 6 for wholesalers and 0 15 for retailers (20) Fourth, in (3) of Table 2 we find nonlinearities in the pass-through rate: the rate for price increases is significantly higher than for price decreases. Finally, in (4) we show that the pass-through rate for treated products is significantly higher than for other products. At the wholesale-level, it is statistically indistinguishable from 1, which is in line with our earlier findings of complete pass-through between retail and border prices.

One way to explain the unusually high pass-through for treated products, would be through heterogeneous pass-through rates for products of different price categories. However, our estimates in (2) show that it is not sufficient to generate complete pass-through as the estimated pass-through rate for a $60 bottle of whiskey would only be 0.559. Alternatively, there might have been some coordination between suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers on how certain large shocks are passedthrough. If firms know that consumers are less responsive to price increases that are ”justified” and not being driven purely by market power, we could observe such drastic differences in pass- through at normal times when changes in costs are driven by small changes in commodity prices that consumers are unaware of versus the tariff period when a major public outcry made consumers more sympathetic to potential price increases.

20 We believe that the retailer pass-through is underestimated due to potential measurement error that could arise in our matching of wholesale and retail prices

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE

FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Figure 9 Supply Chain Pass-Through Timeline

Table 2 Supply Chain Pass-Through Function

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

TARIFF PASS-THROUGH ALONG THE SUPPLY CHAIN: EVIDENCE FROM LIQUOR INDUSTRY

Vanya Klenovskiy (Yale University)

Papers by Panels

PANEL VIII: Varied Dimensions of Leadership: Challenges on the Global and Local Stages

Chair: Christina Oh (Yale University)

Faculty Discussant: Prof. Jonathan Back (The New School)

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University)

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

Christina Oh (Yale University)

BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University)

Numerous indices and metrics have been developed to determine what makes a leader or laggard (Dolsak 2001; Knill et al 2012; Schaffrin et al 2014; Scruggs 1999; Wurzel et al 2019; Wurzel et al 2021) A concurrent branch of scholarship has paid disproportionate attention to understanding the former over the latter (Wurzel and Connelly 2011; Eckersley 2016; 2020; Parker and Karlsson 2018). But why do we have a leader-laggard typology and what real-world implications do these labels have for policy and policymakers? At its simplest, the leader-laggard typology aims to accurately portray and better understand actors’ climate performances vis-à-vis others to accelerate overall climate action. In this regard, common metrics such as the Climate Change Performance Index and conceptual understandings of leaders and laggards are useful for scholars and policymakers across local, regional, national, and global scales.

These leader-laggard labels are used to endorse climate positive actions or “name and shame” those that present barriers to wider climate objectives such as the infamous ‘Fossil of the Day’ at climate regime negotiations. Much International Relations and environmental politics scholarship (Young 1994; Bernstein 2001; Johnston 2001) examines the role of these normative judgments in shaping global climate politics, particularly focussing on how reputational costs/incentives and peer pressure influence state behaviour. These climate labels impact states’ standing and power at global negotiations (Dimitrov 2016), while simultaneously affecting domestic political processes. Political parties may leverage international praise or criticism to justify or legitimate climate policy decisions and affect the overall trajectories of their climate action.

Yet, while the leader-laggard typology offers valuable insight into climate performance, if its purpose is to accurately understand actors’ performance then scholars and policymakers must address several critiques. First, scholars often lack a temporal understanding of performance and the capacity for states to improve/backslide either rapidly or gradually. Recent examples include Australia’s climate improvements and critical mineral developments while retaining its laggard label or Germany’s leadership which is under strain from its recent announcements delaying coal plant closures (Hopkinson 2025) Second, these labels oversimplify the dynamic relational aspects in which the constitution of these labels remains in flux against

BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University) (University of Melbourne & Yale University)

a broader universe of metrics or conceptual understandings. Third, the leader-laggard typology assigns too much coherence to state performance which fails to account for actors’ significant internal contradictions. While these critiques hold across various climate actors, this article will focus on state behaviour and utilise the Norwegian case to illustrate the setbacks of the leader-laggard typology I begin by outlining the leaderlaggard typology, then I turn to the Norwegian case study that demonstrates these three core weaknesses. To conclude, I draw out the implications of misappropriating these climate performance labels for scholars and policymakers alike.

Leader-Laggard Typology

There exists conceptual variation around what is meant by a “leader”. Many studies, such as Tobin (2017) simply understand a leader to be the highest scoring actor on a given scale of ambition or performance. In contrast, Wurzel et al. (2019) differentiate climate leaders from pioneers, in that the former seeks to attract followers, while the latter does not. Eckersley (2020) elaborates further on this distinction. She suggests that, first, front-runners are actors that are first movers in a performance field, either competitively (to win the race or performance) or cooperatively (to induce collective action) Second, substantive leaders have an asymmetric influence over gaining consent in ways that enable collective actions towards the achievement of a common purpose. Yet while the leadership literature recognises the relational nature between leaders and those that follow, laggardship itself has received little academic attention (notable exceptions are Torney 2018; Wurzel et al. 2021; Busby and Urpelainen 2020). Although explicitly focussing on leadership, Eckersley’s (2020) identifies three core components of substantive leadership: asymmetrical influence over directing action to followers, a commitment to a common purpose, and consent This framework provides the foundation for a complementary understanding of laggardship in its relationality to leadership. While leaders possess an asymmetric influence over other actors in terms of directing action towards more ambitious climate policy, laggards are instead largely subjected to this disproportionate influence.

In this vein, laggards play similar defining roles in structuring these dialectical processes First, laggards may seek to follow front-runners or substantive leaders but struggle to achieve sufficient ambition or action Second, laggards may seek to undermine leaders, “win a different race” such as fossil fuel profitability, or undermine cooperation and refuse to provide consent to substantive leaders. Third, negative climate leaders wish to lead but in a negative direction such as an expansion of fossil fuels (Tobin et al. 2023). Laggardship also requires a common, albeit varied, commitment to addressing climate change in line with prevailing international environmental norms stemming from the UNFCCC (Falkner 2016) Yet despite this common commitment, laggards complicate it by challenging the ambitiousness, feasibility, and timescale of policy responses.

In short, rather than offering a reductive account of leadership or laggardship, environmental scholarship

BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University) (University of Melbourne & Yale University) has, as demonstrated in Figure 1, developed several identifiers for relational environmental behaviours. Yet there is an overarching binary between those who act first (pioneers, first-movers, frontrunners, leaders etc.) and those who drag their feet (followers, laggards etc ) This makes for fertile ground to develop a richer conceptual understanding of this leadership-laggardship, by alighting upon the existence of a more granular and complex position wherein states adopt mixed responses that borrow dimensions across leaders and laggards. Endeavouring to unpack this complexity offers an understanding of climate performance that is less reliant on these narrower climate policy assessments. For example, China, whose unmatched renewable technology production is starkly contrasted by the expansion of fossil fuel production (Meidan 2020). Such instances are indicative of a logically present, though rarely defined or made explicit, complex position combining elements of ideal-typical leaders or laggards

Figure 1. Leader-Laggard Typology

Position Definition (Liefferink and Wurzel 2016; Eckersley 2020; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2017)

Leader

High external (international facing) and internal (national) climate ambitions Leaders induce followership.

Front-Runner

Pioneer

Follower

High internal ambition and low external ambition may entail followership if a cooperative front-runner (seek to induce cooperation), but not if it is a competitive frontrunner (seek to win against others)

High internal ambition and low external ambition May induce followership but does not seek to attract followers

Emulate policies of leaders/front-runners. The follower must in some meaningful way adopt the same or a substantively similar approach to a particular environmental problem.

Laggard Low internal and external ambitions. Laggards are potential followers.

Spoiler/ Negative Climate Leader

Actively trying to derail or obstruct internal and/or external climate action Through noncooperation, spoilers exist beyond the leadership-laggardship dynamic

BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University) (University of Melbourne & Yale University)

Temporal Dimensions of Norwegian Leadership

There is, of course, great empirical and conceptual value in these leader-laggard metrics to understanding climate governance Yet, they often lack a temporal understanding changes in relative performance over time, specifically the fact that leaders can get worse, and laggards can get better. Instead, the literature tends to frequently refer to a country's label as simply a descriptive, even uncontested, feature of environmental politics. This, I argue, has produced what can be termed a “fixed-historical attribution” in that once states gain a given title, scholars rarely revisit this understanding to check its ongoing empirical accuracy. This fixed historical attribution speaks to the environmental governance literature’s focus on static and sweeping claims of leadership or laggardship

Adopting a carbon tax in 1991, an emissions trading scheme in 2005, and ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, Norway has been widely considered a climate leader since the 1990s (Eckersley 2016; Farstad 2020; Harrison and Bang 2022; Hopkinson 2025). In line with these high-profile international commitments and Norway’s substantial diplomatic and financial efforts to enhance global climate action, Norway enjoys the reputational benefits bestowed onto climate leaders (Anker 2016; Eckersley 2016). These reputational benefits can be self-reinforcing with Norwegian policymakers often citing their leadership status and environmental credentials to legitimise their role in climate negotiations and promote further climate action domestically (Rosendal 2007). Yet, while frontrunning carbon pricing policies and landmark NDC ambitions indicate sustained leadership over time, Norway has benefitted from its historical fixed attribution as a leader which contravenes its negative-climate leadership actions In the early 2000s, Norway’s greenhouse gas emissions rose largely due to increased energy production and transport emissions. To meet its Kyoto Protocol targets, Norway relied on international carbon markets to offset its rising domestic emissions – demonstrating global compliance without the requisite substantive action of climate leaders. Likewise, Norway continues to approve new oil and gas licenses, especially in ecologically vulnerable Arctic areas. This expansion undermines the IPCC’s 2018 Special Report that warned against the establishment of new fossil fuel projects Thus, Norway’s leadership remains, at the very least, partially symbolic with significant backsliding Together this demonstrates that Norway’s leadership label is temporally sticky and has masked its inconsistent climate performance. In turn, critically interrogating temporality in Norway’s climate performance helps recognise the normative role of these labels and their capacity to facilitate complacency or a false sense of action.

Norway’s Climate Contradictions vs Coherence

This static use of leader-laggard labels also obfuscates the contradictory nature of state climate action and assigns a sweeping sense of coherence for states under a form of leadership or laggardship. Reflecting the climate’s knock-on effects across governance domains, climate policy is fragmented and contested. States

BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University) (University of Melbourne & Yale University)

often exhibit contradictory ‘dual-track’ approaches that exacerbate or help mitigate climate change across different sectors and time periods. In this vein, Critical Political Economy scholars highlight the structural constraints and strategic dilemmas that capitalist states face in navigating contestations of power as they respond to the climate crisis (Meadowcroft 2011; Newell, Paterson, and Craig 2021; Newell and Johnstone 2018; Malm 2016). These opposing forces among social agents and structures produce subsequent contradictions that are not exceptional but rather constitutive of climate governance under capitalism. As such, states’ inability to reconcile capitalism with climate change creates contradictory climate performance that challenges the analytical and normative utility of static leadership typologies.

Despite Norway’s ambitious climate policies and its world-leading uptake of electric vehicles at more than 27 percent of registered cars in 2024, it is the fourth largest exporter of gas and twelfth largest exporter of oil (Norway Offshore Directorate 2025). Indeed, claims of Norway’s leadership often focus on Norway’s domestic climate performance with caveats for its laggardship in fossil fuel production. In other words, these leader-laggard labels are often applied at the net-level, which overlooks that states, such as Norway, may lead in a sector like transport, follow in EU carbon markets, and lag in fossil fuel production This pattern demonstrates how sectoral successes in transport can mask broader structural inertia and dependence on fossil fuels, and how a state can maintain forms of leadership while materially undermining climate objectives. As such, Norway remains a major beneficiary of the climate regime’s prioritisation of territorial emissions accounting rather than supply-side emissions (Harrison and Bang 2022). These inherent contradictions between Norway’s extreme fossil fuel dependence and climate leadership label are further exacerbated by geopolitical tensions from the Russian invasion of Ukraine which expanded Norway’s energy supply for the European Union (Jackson et al 2025) Europe’s heightened period of energy insecurity fragmented and challenged Norway’s identity as both a reliable European trade partner and a climate leader. In effect, encouraging Norway to simultaneously pursue fossil fuel projects while legislating for increased emission reduction targets. Such contradictions are not merely the result of policy incoherence but speaks to strategic governance in which performative ambition substitutes for disruptive action. While scholars acknowledge that Norway’s climate performance has inherent contradictions, this has done little to prevent Norway’s leadership status and its remarkably high status in leader-laggard metrics This oversight reveals the limitations of static typologies in capturing the complex and contested nature of state climate performance.

Norway’s Relational Climate Performance

The leader-laggard typology in turn overlooks the everchanging relational aspects of climate performance Specifically, the relationship between states, as shaped by an expanding universe of various conceptual or empirical variables used to determine their differences. It is not just how state climate performance changes over time, but its relation to other actors and their climate trajectories. What once constituted leadership,

BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University) (University of Melbourne & Yale University)

may now be considered followership or even laggardship as other states continually progress or regress. Setting ambitious climate objectives can draw into question notions of laggardship without necessarily making them a substantive leader There is also relational tension between leader-laggard claims based on state policy outputs such as targets, laws, over policy outcomes such as emission reductions Of course, state ambition is a necessary condition for climate action, but it is not a sufficient condition. Many states are rewarded with leadership labels despite significant gaps between climate policy outputs and climate outcomes through uneven implementation.

The Norwegian case demonstrates these tensions For instance, landmark climate policies such as the 2017 Climate Change Act, internalised the Paris Agreement’s NDC and pledge-and-review architecture This Act set emission reduction targets of 55 percent of 1990 levels by 2030 and net-zero by 2050. While this Act continues to be cited as a marker of Norwegian leadership, and it has since updated its NDC and Climate Change Act towards a reduction target of 55 percent of 1990 levels by 2030, its significance must be understood relationally to other states. Indeed, there has been significant policy convergence for net-zero targets by 2050 and more ambitious 2030 targets worldwide, which contextualises claims of Norwegian leadership Further, the implementation gap persists with substantial doubt that Norway will meet its 2030 target (CAT 2025). Through shifting state trajectories and climate actions, the utility of the laggard-leader typology remains dependent on the capacity for scholars to accurately unpack complex, intersecting, and relational movements of state behaviour. Without such nuance, leading states such as Norway may strategically enjoy a performatively ‘good’ climate identity, shielding themselves from scrutiny and reducing the incentives to engage in ecologically required decarbonisation

Improving Climate Typologies for Policy Utility

Accurately capturing contradictory and shifting climate actions is indeed a difficult task, yet the leaderlaggard typology should nonetheless strive to be more flexible and empirically grounded. For policymakers, inaccurate and misleading labels can warp their utility For instance, Australia continues to be considered a climate laggard both rhetorically and in climate performance indices (CCPI 2025; CAT 2025), yet significant parts of its climate platform have improved and indeed may be considered followership since the change of government in 2022 (Hopkinson et al. 2025). Although there is value in policymakers ‘naming and shaming’ bad climate actors to spur action, the fixed historical attribution and its temporal lag may disincentivise further action from these very same actors when their improvements are not accurately recognised Conversely, Norway continues to receive reputational benefits for upholding pro-climate norms, despite its ongoing contradictions between climate leadership and its expanded oil and gas production This paradox demonstrates that while the leader-laggard typology is a useful heuristic, it risks oversimplifying complex and evolving national trajectories. To prevent perverse incentives for these ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’, scholars must be more responsive to policy shifts over time and more attuned to the complexities

BEYOND LEADERS-LAGGARDS: NORWAY IN CONTEXT

William Hopkinson (University of Melbourne & Yale University) (University of Melbourne & Yale University) of climate performance through state behaviour. In turn, policymakers should approach these labels critically as provisional starting points rather than definitive judgments. Dynamic and contextualised evaluations of state behaviour, grounded in discursive positioning, policy changes, and material outcomes, are critical to ensure that accountability and peer-pressure mechanisms around climate norms align with current realities rather than anachronistic reputations. In this vein, scholars must endeavour to provide policymakers with robust, timely, and contextualised climate performance assessments. In turn, climate governance frameworks avoid reinforcing false reputations and instead foster more effective climate action.

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THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY:

DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

The frontlines of Ukraine represent not only a struggle between Ukrainian sovereignty and Russian domination, or the defense of democracy against autocracy, but also a contest between two competing models of governance within Ukraine itself. This paper examines the critical role that decentralization has played in Ukraine’s resilience amid Russia’s full-scale invasion, highlighting the ways in which empowered local governments have underpinned state stability and wartime governance The wartime heroism of mayors and local officials illustrates how self-governing communities have become vital partners in defending Ukrainian independence. However, martial law and the exigencies of a centralized wartime command structure have profoundly altered the balance of power between Kyiv and the regions. Local governments, once semi-autonomous and confident, now face growing dependence on the central state. Simultaneously, national defense imperatives have constrained local fiscal autonomy, exacerbating the severe economic pressures endured by frontline communities Moreover, martial law has curtailed political pluralism and empowered Kyiv with the authority to redraw the country’s political map. As Ukraine fights for its survival, the future of its most celebrated post-Maidan reform, decentralization, hangs in the balance. This paper explores these tensions, assessing their implications for Ukraine’s governance, sovereignty, and democratic development beyond the war.

My Town Is Dying

Okny, a village of 5,000 near Ukraine’s border with Transnistria, exemplifies the challenges and hopes of rural Ukrainian communities. Despite its location in the Odesa region, Okny suffers from isolation and underdevelopment. As a Peace Corps volunteer, I experienced firsthand its vibrant community life but also the stark realities of economic stagnation and depopulation Youth increasingly migrate to cities to escape its crumbling infrastructure while only the most steadfast residents remain Yet, Ukraine’s decentralization reforms have offered hope, empowering communities like Okny with budgetary control and elected leadership to address local problems directly.

These reforms, inspired by examples in post-communist countries like Poland, aim to increase efficiency and reduce corruption by delegating power to those most familiar with local conditions Since the Maidan Revolution and Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions, such local governance has become essential to the nation’s resilience amid deep political insecurity and existential threat. As such, decentralization has allowed communities to respond flexibly to crises while acting as a bulwark against centralized overreach, critical to Ukraine’s democratic transformation.

This study investigates how decentralization has evolved since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022 and draws from secondary literature on decentralization processes in Europeanizing postSoviet states, legislation and rhetoric surrounding the post-Maidan reforms, and open-source statistics on

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

municipal budgets. I was lucky enough to interview several current mayors serving along the southeastern frontline, whose testimony has been incredibly valuable in providing essential background information on the everyday realities of local governance and humanizing leaders' struggles during the full-scale invasion. As such, the research below represents a case study of a series of hromadas on and off the frontlines rather than a comprehensive analysis of self-government across Ukraine

Figure 1. A map of hromadas interviewed. “Frontline” communities are colored in blue. Google Maps.

Decentralization involves redistributing administrative, fiscal, and political power to “hromadas, ” or “amalgamated territorial communities,” formed by merging smaller towns and villages into a single municipal body (1). This unitary approach has ensured Kyiv retains control over national policy while empowering localities to manage resources At the same time, local elections have replaced centrally appointed officials, enhancing public trust and local accountability Devolving Ukraine’s heavily centralized power structures was discussed long before 2014 and its proponents were heavily influenced by postcommunist states that undertook reform as a condition for EU membership and tempering regionalism (2). Poland, for example, struggled with devolving powers to its territorial units, or voivodships, while preserving the integrity of its strong unitary state (3). As such, local elections were introduced while

1 Ilyniak, Sophia “Decentralization in Ukraine: Reorganizing Core–Periphery Relations?” Urban Planning 9 (2024) https://doi org/10 17645/up 7642

2 Parolari, Francesco Palermo And Regional Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe: New Approaches to Decentralization. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2013

3 Holesch, Adam “The Decentralization of Poland 1989-2018: From Partisan Disagreement to a Vehicle for Successful Absorption of EU Cohesion Funding.” Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, 2018 https://doi org/10 2436/20 8080 01 30

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown

University)

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

regional governors maintained their Warsaw-appointed positions to ensure steady democratization amid the potential for a communist revival (4). For these reasons, post-Maidan reformers in Kyiv looked upon their Western neighbor as “a benchmark” to unify Ukraine against regional strife and take concrete steps towards eventual EU membership (5)

Regionalism, Revolution, & Reform

The ouster of President Yanukovych in 2014 ushered in a new generation of reformers determined to align Ukraine with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Emphasizing Ukrainization and democratization, they sought to dismantle the top-heavy structures that had enabled oligarchic control and foreign influence Key reforms included decentralization laws granting regions budgetary autonomy and shifting power from central authorities to local governments.

Before 2014, oligarchs like Rinat Akhmetov and Ihor Kolomoisky dominated Ukraine’s political and economic spheres, using media holdings, banks, and public office to reinforce their control (6). At the same time, their decisions during the Donbas crisis significantly influenced whether separatist forces succeeded Kolomoisky armed militias in Dnipro to resist, while Akhmetov’s inaction in Donetsk allowed separatists to seize power (7). As such, post-Maidan reformers saw decentralization as a strategy to reduce oligarchic influence and more reactively respond to regional instability through empowering local governance.

Reformers, such as then Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, put forth legislation on decentralization to give regions “the right to budgetary autonomy” (8) Yet, it answered two of the country’s greatest domestic needs after the Maidan Revolution: empowering local economic development to lessen dependence on the central government and flattening Ukraine’s steep power vertical to limit the influence of the country’s band of self-interested oligarchs. In practice, this meant allowing democratically elected city councils to leverage their knowledge of their respective communities to resolve constituents’ concerns. Decades-old crumbling roads and dilapidated schools would then become the responsibility of the towns and villages that had struggled with them rather than bureaucrats in Kyiv or oblast centers that needed to be persuaded with favors or bribes

4 Ibid

Youtube Accessed November 16, 2024 https://www youtube com/watch?v=F4NwJ5HOmY

6 The Kyiv Independent news desk “Akhmetov Exits Media Business, Says Doesn’t Want to Be Labeled Oligarch ” The Kyiv Independent, July 11, 2022 https://kyivindependent com/akhmetov-transfers-media-empire-to-state-says-doesnt-want-to-be-labeled-oligarch/ ; Gontareva, Valeria “The Era of Zombie Banks in Ukraine Is Over ” Wsj com, April 5, 2017 https://www wsj com/articles/the-era-of-zombie-banks-in-ukraine-is-over-1491418122

7 Taub, Amanda “We Just Got a Glimpse of How Oligarch-Funded Militias Could Bring Chaos to Ukraine ” Vox, March 23, 2015 https://www vox com/2015/3/23/8279397/kolomoisky-oligarch-ukraine-militia

8 Espreso T V “Законопроект

Accessed November 16, 2024. https://www youtube com/watch? v=Hq9nWX8wrhw

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

At the same time, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk promoted decentralization to strengthen democracy and counter Moscow’s calls for federalization, embedded in the Minsk Accords. The agreements, pushed by Russia, called for broad autonomy for occupied regions- a move seen as legitimizing de-facto separatist control Ukrainian decentralization reforms instead emphasized elections, fiscal control, and civic engagement to address grievances in the country’s eastern regions without ceding sovereignty

Early reforms allowed municipalities to voluntarily amalgamate, reducing Ukraine’s 490 rayons into 1,500 hromadas. The first phase (2015–2019) saw over 4,000 communities amalgamate, leading to increased local revenues and infrastructure improvements (9). Teachers and medical staff received higher pay, and international aid bolstered reform momentum However, voluntary amalgamation created disparities between empowered and passive regions The second phase, begun in 2020, mandated amalgamation to equalize administrative capacity nationwide. This shift made rayon administrations increasingly obsolete, suggesting the need for post-war constitutional reform to reflect Ukraine’s transformed governance landscape.

Figure 2 Results of the first stage of amalgamation as of 2019 Chatham House

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

Though decentralization progress has slowed under martial law, it has proven crucial during wartime. Hromadas’ responsiveness and trust from constituents enabled them to act decisively in the war’s early days. Yet, regions under military administration, especially in the East, lack electoral representation, which raises concerns about Ukraine’s democratic trajectory As the war persists, the central government’s reliance on local resilience must not erode the autonomy that proved essential to state survival

Answering the Call

In the final months of 2021, as Russian military build-up escalated, Ukraine braced for an invasion. Despite Western warnings, President Zelensky urged calm, and on February 24, 2022, nearly 200,000 Russian troops entered Ukraine (10) Within hours, Zelensky addressed the nation, while hromadas took immediate, independent action to maintain order and defend their communities where central coordination was overwhelmed. Years of decentralization had built strong ties between local leaders and citizens. Even under martial law, local governments replaced Kyiv as de facto security guarantors. One example is Mayor Yevheny Velichko of Voznesensk, who led the town’s defense with 160 civilian volunteers, successfully halting a Russian advance toward Odesa (11) His actions underscore how local leaders mobilized communities independently while still aligning with the national defense effort

Hromadas reacted quickly to support the nation’s defense as Kyiv struggled against the Russian onslaught. For example, local communities supported Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), composed of local volunteers, by providing shelter and meals to TDF units with local funds while the Ministry of Defense focused on broader military strategy (12) They also facilitated humanitarian aid thanks to Zelensky Administration’s easing of import regulations for humanitarian aid For example, legislative amendments and the creation of the Coordination Headquarters for Humanitarian and Social Affairs allowed for more effective aid delivery to communities in need, amounting to almost 900,000 tons from various international donors by October 2022 (13). Hromadas like Mostove, under direct Russian fire, organized evacuations, provided medicine, and built shelters, filling critical gaps the state could not address in real time (14).

10 BBC News 2022 “Ukraine Crisis: Don’t Create Panic, Zelensky Tells West ” BBC, January 28 9 Форд, Лукас “Розумінняреформидецентралізаціївладив Україні ” Voxukraine org, June 22, 2020 https://voxukraine org/rozuminnya-reformi-detsentralizatsiyi-vladi-v-ukrayini ; Kirby, Paul “Has Putin’s War Failed and What Does Russia Want from Ukraine?” BBC Februaryl 24, 2023 9 Форд, Лукас “

Voxukraine org, June 22, 2020 https://voxukraine org/rozuminnya-reformi-detsentralizatsiyi-vladi-v-ukrayini

11 Harding, Andrew “Ukraine: The Small Town Which Managed to Block Russia’s Big Plans ” BBC March 22, 2022 9

” Voxukraine org, June 22, 2020 https://voxukraine org/rozuminnya-reformi-detsentralizatsiyi-vladi-v-ukrayini 12 ПроLAND “ГромадиТаОборона ” Youtube Accessed November 16, 2024 https://www youtube com/watch?v=MZg6tHUKm4o

13 НаціональнеАгентствозПитанькорупції “

” www nazk gov ua, June 1, 2022 https://nazk gov ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Mehanizmy-nadannya-derzhavnoyu-gumanitarnoyi-dopomogy-v-umovah-voyennogo-stanu pdf

14 МостівськаТериторіальнаГромада

February 25, 2022

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

Even non-frontline communities, such as Kopychyntsi in the Ternopil Region mobilized to support the war effort by raising funds and sending supplies to the front. In just three months, Mayor Bohdan Kopychyntsi raised $60,000 for military and humanitarian support (15). In addition, the All-Ukrainian Association of Hromadas launched the "Hromada to Hromada" initiative, directly linking safer communities to those in need, bypassing slow or absent state mechanisms (16)

Polls from April 2022 that show 84% approval of local authorities are unsurprising given how hromadas in the most threatened parts of the country found means to protect themselves and minimize harm to their constituents (17). This is a dramatic change when compared to the year before- when local government was viewed less favorably than Russia (18) This shift reflects how hromadas became pillars of stability by building shelters, organizing evacuations, and rerouting aid where the state could not Hromadas became vital, trusted actors that both complemented and substituted for central authority during Ukraine’s darkest hour. Their actions demonstrated that decentralization had laid the groundwork for resilient, responsive local governance, able to sustain state functions and protect lives under fire.

Shoigu’s Regrouping & Zelensky’s Great Retreat

In the initial months of Russia’s invasion, Ukrainian hromadas demonstrated substantial autonomy and resilience, independently organizing evacuations, building shelters, equipping military units, and defending their communities. However, as frontlines stabilized and Kyiv began full-state mobilization under martial law, central authorities reasserted control over local governance. The Zelensky Administration implemented measures that increased local fiscal responsibilities and restricted expenditure, leveraging market-driven tax revenues for national defense priorities

Before the invasion, decentralization successfully enabled hromadas to allocate resources effectively towards essential services. The Okny Hromada notably increased education investment twelvefold from 2019-2024, addressing historical underinvestment (19). Conversely, the Shevchenkove Hromada near Mykolaiv’s suburbs, in contrast, decreased its historically high investment in education, approximately 70%

15 Kelichavyi, Bogdan “ГуманітарнийШтаб ” www notion site, May 24, 2022 https://playful-tern-701 notion site/English-Version-b2c1e131c023440782ecbade60ff1f34 16

’єднані

com, March 24, 2022 https://www facebook com/otgrivne/posts/721701172540216

цьогопотребують ” www koretska-gromada gov ua, March 25, 2022 https://koretska-gromada gov ua/news/1648197260/

17 International Republican Institute “National Survey of Ukraine | Sept-Oct 2024,” November 12, 2024 https://www iri org/resources/national-survey-of-ukraine-sept-oct-2024/

18 International Republican Institute “Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine: March 13-21, 2021 ” www iri org Accessed December 2, 2024 https://www iri org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/public - 03 2021 national eng- public pdf

19 This accounts for fluctuations in the dollar OpenBudget ua

” https://openbudget gov ua/, 2024 https://openbudget gov ua/local-budget/1552800000/info/indicators?year=2019&month=12

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

of all spending before the war, to allocate greater resources towards stimulating “economic activity” after 2022 (20). Wartime pressures, including extensive mobilization (950,000 Ukrainian men by July 2024) and displacement (nearly 10% internally displaced), severely strained local economies, especially in frontline communities where investment diminished significantly (21)

Unpredictability, mobilization, and destruction already threaten balanced budgets in self-governing communities. However, the current scheme of registering military personnel has become an increasingly acute problem that undercuts initiatives to increase revenue through entrepreneurial and innovative means. For example, as of March 2024, the average mobilized Ukrainian soldier earns between 30,000 UAH ($723) and 50,000 UAH ($1,205) per month depending on their rank and position (22) This often doubles the average Ukrainian salary of 21,000 UAH per month or about $500 (23) All soldiers continue to pay personal income tax at 18%, resulting in approximately 65,000 UAH of tax revenue per frontline soldier every year (24). This scheme affords hromadas in which frontline soldiers are registered 64% of this sum, or 41,600 UAH per soldier each month (25). This may ultimately seem like a net benefit to hromadas considering that soldiers’ monthly income exceeds the average salary by several hundred dollars. But, once mobilized, a soldier no longer pays taxes to their place of residence but to whichever community in which their unit is registered (26)

Naturally, this current system gives an overwhelming advantage to a handful of locales that host military units, many of which have been able to make up losses in tax revenue thanks to this disbalance. The Dnipro, Donetsk, Odesa, and Kharkiv Oblasts are all located in Eastern Ukraine and have seen either heavy fighting or serve as logistic hubs for the Ukrainian Armed Services At the same time, four out of the five regions garnered the most tax revenue from military servicemen between February 2022 and July 2023 (27) Taxes revenues collected by hromadas in each of these oblasts also exceeded their respective oblast budgets between four and six times (28). On the other hand, many other regions deeply scarred by the war, such as the Kherson and Luhansk Oblasts were in the bottom three recipients of military tax revenues, receiving at most 25% of compared to their neighbors.

20 “БюджетШевченківськоїСільськоїТериторіальноїГромади ” https://openbudget gov ua, 2019 https://openbudget gov ua/local-budget/1451900000/info/indicators? year=2019&month=12

, July 8, 2022 https://glavcom ua/country/incidents/minoboroni-nazvalokilkist-mobilizovanih-ukrajinciv-859153 html

https://www unian ua/economics/finance/minimalna-zarplata-2024-roku-dlya-viyskovih-skilki-budut-otrimuvati-zahisniki-12502800 html

and

https://forbes ua/news/serednya-zarplata-v-ukraini-zrosla-na-221-u-drugomu-kvartali-derzhstat-09092024-23496

, January 6, 2024

” Forbes ua, September 9, 2024

24 Piddubnyi, Igor, Serhii Tytiuk, and Andrii Darkovich “‘Military’ PIT: How the Tax Allocation System Can Change and What It Will Lead To ” Voxukraine org Accessed November 16, 2024 https://voxukraine org/en/military-pit-how-the-tax-allocation-system-can-change-and-what-it-will-lead-to

25 Піддубний

Voxukraine org Accessed November 16, 2024 https://voxukraine org/vijskovyj-pdfo-yak-mozhe-zminytysya-systema-spryamuvannya-podatku-ta-do-chogo-tse-pryzvede 26 Ibid

Accessed December 2, 2024 https://nashigroshi org/2023/08/22/mistsevi-biudzhety-pid-chas-vtorhnennia-otrymaly-vid-viys-kovykh-podatkiv-na-132-mil-iardy/

28 Ibid

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

Despite some public support for prioritizing national defense, central government-imposed restrictions limit local budgetary autonomy significantly. Laws enacted in November 2023 mandate surplus funds towards defense-related expenses, constraining local investment capabilities. Frontline hromadas, heavily reliant on state subsidies due to wartime destruction and economic paralysis, now face substantial constraints in financial independence

Figure 3 & 4. Percentage of local tax revenue collected from military units (2021–2022). VoxUkrraine.

Similar investigations point to an intense concentration of military tax revenue into just a handful of locales from 2021-2022, pointing to a larger battle over control of military tax revenues. Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate how just several communities are able to leverage military registration as a significant percentage of their local budgets over the course of a year Not only does this scheme increase the potential for underhanded deals to register military units in exchange for promised support (29) But, it undercuts hromadas that have lost essential breadwinners and consolidates the benefit of their membership in the Armed Forces in only a handful of lucky locales. Hromadas are thus forced to find alternative sources of income in an already economically depressed environment deprived of any real notion of foreign investment. Solvency, therefore, becomes contingent on direct subsidies from Kyiv, which undermines hromadas’ fiscal autonomy Moreover, the influx of state spending on defense has disempowered the vast majority of hromadas that are not direct beneficiaries of this system It also demonstrates how national security and its economic dimensions have a direct effect on the potential for growth at the most local level.

Ultimately, while Kyiv’s support stabilizes frontline hromadas, it simultaneously creates dependency, weakening local governance autonomy and shifting power dynamics toward central control. Increased state

29 Gaidai, Yurii “Ukraine’s Desperate Search for War Funding Hits Local Budgets ” Opendemocracy net, October 26, 2023 https://www opendemocracy net/en/odr/ukraine-wardefence-budget-local-authorities-hromadas-spending/

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

subsidies, military tax revenue imbalances, and restrictive budget policies challenge the long-term viability of local self-government. This centralization threatens Ukraine’s democratic gains and raises critical questions about balancing local democratic autonomy against national defense imperatives under wartime conditions

Redrawing the Map

The introduction of martial law significantly altered the relationship between Kyiv and hromadas, imposing budgetary constraints and delegating defense responsibilities to local governments. However, the greatest threat to local autonomy has been the expansion of presidential powers to establish military administrations in frontline communities unable to respond effectively during emergencies These administrations streamline defense and civil order but increase central control, bypassing traditional democratic processes, and allowing presidential appointees significant power over local budgets, fostering corruption and diminishing democratic accountability (30).

Figure 5 The distribution of local administrations (LMAs) in blue across Ukraine as of Sept 2024 Kyiv School of Economics

” Accessed November 16, 2024 https://zakon rada gov ua/laws/show/38919/print ; Pavchuk, Ihor “The Administrative and Legal Status of Military Administrations in Ukraine Depending on the Order of Their Creation ” Uran ua, November 2, 2024 https://journals uran ua/journal-vjhr/article/view/308540/300117

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

Former Chernihiv Oblast Military Administration head Valentyn Reznichenko exemplifies these risks. Initially appointed due to political favor, Reznichenko oversaw substantial military tax revenue in Dnipro oblast, leading to disproportionate public spending. Investigations revealed excessive expenditures and alleged embezzlement involving close associates and questionable subcontractors, ultimately resulting in his removal and corruption charges (31) His case highlights how martial law has enabled corruption, reversing decentralization successes and reinstating pre-Maidan centralization practices.

Furthermore, military administrations have been systematically utilized to disenfranchise elected officials linked to pro-Russian political groups, illustrated by the career trajectory of Ivan Bilokon, Deputy Head of the Voznesensk District Despite extensive local governance experience, Bilokon’s prior affiliation with pro-Russian "Our Land" party has limited his advancement, reflecting Kyiv’s strategic move to consolidate political control and prevent potential collaboration in occupied areas (32). Research from the Kyiv School of Economics has also revealed significant use of military administrations in communities previously governed by pro-Russian parties, underscoring Kyiv’s prioritization of loyalty over democratic processes (33).

The political use of military administrations extends beyond national security Chernihiv’s mayor, Vladyslav Atroshenko, experienced political targeting after refusing alignment with President Zelensky’s party. Despite becoming a symbol of local resilience during the invasion, Atroshenko faced restrictions, accusations of corruption, and eventual removal from office, replaced by a Zelensky-appointed military governor (34). Critics argued this undermined local autonomy and democratic processes, reflecting broader concerns about Kyiv’s suppression of political heterogeneity under martial law conditions

In summary, martial law and military administrations have significantly increased Kyiv’s influence, eroded local democratic autonomy, enabled corruption, and facilitated political control. These developments raise critical concerns about Ukraine’s democratic integrity and the sustainability of local self-governance in wartime and beyond.

[31

December 2, 2024 https://nashigroshi org/2023/08/22/mistsevi-biudzhety-pid-chas-vtorhnennia-otrymaly-vid-viys-kovykh-podatkiv-na-132-mil-iardy/; Українська

мільярд ЯккомпаніяблизькоїподругикерівникаДніпропетровськоїОДАсталанайбагатшоюпідчасвійни ” Українськаправда, November 2, 2022 https://www pravda com ua/articles/2022/11/2/7374579/

32 Nashkray mk ua “ «Нашкрай» наВознесенщиніочоливІванБілоконь ” Accessed November 16, 2024 https://nashkray mk ua/5004

33 Darkovich, Andrii, Ostap Hnyda Reviewers:, Oleksandra Keudel, and Olha Kram “(De)Centralisation? https://kse ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Full-version -English pdf

34 BBC News Україна “

, February1, 2023 https://www bbc com/ukrainian/features-64455878

president gov/ua, February 7, 2023 https://www president gov ua/documents/692023-45769;

” Chesno org Accessed December 5, 2024 https://www chesno org/politician/211285/

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

A United Front

Despite state encroachment, the struggle for local self-government in Ukraine continues through cooperation with international donors and the European Union, lessening Kyiv's centralizing influence Due to an 88% drop in foreign investment between 2021-2022, local leaders have proactively sought external support (35). For example, Mayor Vadym Tokar of Makariv in Kyiv Oblast, a community heavily damaged during the initial invasion near Bucha, appealed internationally for assistance, emphasizing humanitarian needs and infrastructure reconstruction following severe devastation by Russian forces (36).

Hromadas have increasingly developed municipal partnerships globally, diversifying funding streams and supporting Ukraine's path toward European integration According to Decentralization ua, Ukrainian cities established 2,097 "twin city" agreements across 779 hromadas, a 160% increase since January 2022, primarily with European Union states (37). Voznesensk exemplifies such engagement, maintaining nine twin city agreements, six within the EU. Activities, such as meetings with its German twin city Geldern, led directly to humanitarian aid following rocket attacks, demonstrating concrete benefits of international municipal cooperation (38) Mykolayiv Oblast has also notably benefited from Danish partnerships, receiving substantial financial aid, including €44 million in 2024 to aid winter preparations, alongside longterm commitments to rebuild energy infrastructure through agreements with cities like Aalborg until at least 2028 (39).

These municipal ties provide more than financial support; they strengthen local governance through mandated transparency and anti-corruption measures required by international donors Such oversight complements the Zelensky Administration’s anti-corruption efforts, reinforcing accountability at local levels and promoting rule of law. International programs, including USAID’s DOBRE and HOVERLA and the EU’s ULEAD, have also provided significant support without additional local fiscal strain, empowering local administrators to champion democratic reforms.

35 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ukraine ” 2024 Lloydsbanktrade com Accessed December 13 https://www lloydsbanktrade com/en/market-potential/ukraine/investment

Decentralization Ua October1 https://decentralization ua/uploads/library/file/960/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%96%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B3 %D0%86%D0%86% D0%86 %D0%BA%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB 2024 pdf

38 Pütten, Martin van der 2023 “Geldern: Infoabend zur Gründung von Ukraine-Partnerschaft mit Voznesenk ” RP ONLINE October 18 https://rponline de/nrw/staedte/geldern/geldern-infoabend-zur-gruendung-von-ukraine-partnerschaft-mit-voznesenk aid-99751437

39 Хаіндрава, Нікіта 2024 “КоролівствоДаніяВиділилаНовіПакетиДопомогиДляМиколаївщиниуРозмірі 44 МільйониЄвро ” Suspilne Media September 17 https://suspilne media/mykolaiv/838445-korolivstvo-dania-vidilila-novi-paketi-dopomogi-dla-mikolaivsini-u-rozmiri-44-miljoni-evro/

/986074993546482/

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

Additionally, the All-Ukrainian Association of Hromadas (AUAH) significantly advances decentralization efforts by supporting nearly 850 hromadas through training, capacity building, and reform advocacy (40). Interviewed mayors such as Nadiya Babanska and Ihor Hnatusha have utilized AUAH resources for governance and healthcare reform (41) Bohdan Kelichavyi, on the other hand, has leveraged international contacts made through AUAH to attract foreign investment, demonstrating local governments' critical roles in Ukraine’s democratic and economic development independent of Kyiv (42). These international and inter-municipal collaborations maintain autonomy and promote reform, crucially influencing Ukraine’s democratic resilience and integration ambitions amidst ongoing conflict.

Conclusion: The Future of Ukraine’s Democracy

Given the conditions of a full-scale war, Ukraine is an increasingly consolidated state that is not considering any possibility for democratic reform. The Zelensky Administration has made it clear that internal stability takes precedence over maintaining any conceivable form of active, grassroots democracy while it will likely not be organizing presidential elections in the near future given the millions still living abroad, concerns about safeguarding their integrity, and the constant threat of attack (43) When coupled with Russia’s historical desire to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty by targeting its historically Russophilic regions or strategically buying off political and business elites, the current and future governments will in all probably maintain this course. At the same time, the rise in far-right politicians across Europe and the second Trump Administration do little to inspire hope in stable financial support to Ukraine. This will only strengthen Kyiv’s influence over local autonomy as it enacts further constrictions on spending and contracts its expansion of state subsidies Such trends will deepen the dependence felt in frontline communities, which have most keenly felt the war’s devasting effects

Their continued existence will remain predicated on the state’s direct support but, it is unclear as to whether subsidies can sustain life amidst innumerable threats. Continued outward migration, hesitant investors, and limited grassroots policymaking will continue to contain the initiative and entrepreneurialism that have epitomized the country’s drastic shift toward democratic governance If a stable peace is not found in the coming years, these problems will only exacerbate the looming threat of extinction that many communities face and weaken the few checks and balances to Ukraine’s historical regionalism and powerful presidential system.

40 Pilipenko, Oleh Interview by Noah Lloyd, December 10, 2024

41 Babanska, Nadiya Interview by Noah Lloyd, November 1, 2024 ;

https://hromady org/management/

42 Kelichavyi 2024 “

Jean-Noël Barrot ” Instagram com November 21 https://www instagram com/p/DCpFWV9tczN/

43 United States Institute of Peace 2023 “Expanding Ukraine’s Democratic and Electoral Progress during War ” Youtube October 23 https://www youtube com/live/uJmIe2C2i5o? si=Z7BCYAG7yOJuR5TY

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

Assuming peace is found, several underlying questions remain about the state of Ukraine’s post-war democracy as it is currently structured. Firstly, Russia will likely maintain efforts to destabilize any notion of a democratic and sovereign Ukraine, whether through kinetic or non-kinetic means, including outright armed conflict, exacerbating ethnic and linguistic tensions, or cyber operations As such threats have been historically sufficient to establish military administrations, it is still unknown whether this form of governance will persist in the post-war period. Will Ukraine’s leadership be able to rely on self-government to again hold the line or will presidential decree be the deciding factor? Secondly, the integrity of the next election is already under question considering that the current political makeup of the country’s eastern borders has been determined by the Zelensky Administration. The fact that only loyal members of Servant of the People have received positions under martial law while many other parties have been disenfranchised points to the abuse of administrative resources for political gain, which undermines any semblance of a level playing field. At the same time, if military administrations are to be dissolved, the current government has not made any hints at whether displaced officials would resume their positions, such as former Mayor Atroshenko of Chernihiv, further Servant of the People’s political domination.

Lastly, the central government’s appointment of oblast governors remains one of the few appendages of the Yanukovych Era that decentralization has yet to address While current legislation has brought forth a radical transformation in Ukraine’s democratic space, Kyiv’s residual powers in oblast centers act as a veto for continued reform and truly representative government. Conversations with several mayors highlighted in this project reveal their discontent with this system as governors can stymie amalgamation efforts or simply enforce unpopular presidential decrees. Even while war rages, hromadas have begun to advocate for the establishment of “prefects” that would replace oblast governors Their implied responsible powers would oversee the constitutionality of local government’s decisions and represent Kyiv at the regional level (44) However, the President’s Office would be required to hold open, transparency competitions for their selection and terms would be limited to three years. Whether or not these reforms will be implemented, it is clear that efforts for continued democratization are still underway and that the current structure of governance is still up for negotiation.

Ukraine is facing the largest existential crisis in its few decades of independence Daily barrages of rockets, bombs, and drones have killed and maimed tens of thousands of civilians. Many more have been killed on the battlefield defending their homeland. Ukrainians, despite these incalculable losses, have managed to

40 Pilipenko, Oleh Interview by Noah Lloyd, December 10, 2024

41 Babanska, Nadiya Interview by Noah Lloyd, November 1, 2024 ;

https://hromady org/management/

42 Kelichavyi 2024 “

Jean-Noël Barrot ” Instagram com November 21 https://www instagram com/p/DCpFWV9tczN/

43 United States Institute of Peace 2023 “Expanding Ukraine’s Democratic and Electoral Progress during War ” Youtube October 23 https://www youtube com/live/uJmIe2C2i5o? si=Z7BCYAG7yOJuR5TY

44 “Префекти ” 2023 Decentralization Ua February 23 https://decentralization ua/prefect

THE BATTLE FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY: DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES IN WARTIME UKRAINE

Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University) Noah Lloyd (Georgetown University)

unite in order to preserve their sovereign state and slowly march towards Europeanization. Yet, their immense sacrifice unfortunately does not ensure a robust, post-war democracy. Martial law and the residual effects of total war will continue to hang over Ukraine and its leadership long after the peace process as it seeks to find its own understanding between national security and accepted notions of on-the-ground autonomy What this compromise will ultimately be is not clear but, it is only Ukrainians’ to make

EXPORTING REPRESSION:

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION IN MALI AND BURKINA FASO

Christina Oh (Yale University) Christina Oh (Yale University)

Introduction

In recent years, Russia has significantly expanded its footprint in Francophone West Africa, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. Through a combination of state media outreach, private military partnerships, and online influence campaigns, Moscow has positioned itself as a patron of embattled military regimes seeking to distance themselves from Western powers While much attention has been paid to the proliferation of Russian disinformation characterized by anti-Western, pro-sovereignty narratives, less scrutiny has been devoted to how these information operations facilitate the transfer of a broader authoritarian toolkit. Disinformation, thus, is not merely an instrument of narrative warfare but a strategic gateway to deeper political and coercive alignment (1).

This paper argues that Russian disinformation campaigns in Mali and Burkina Faso are intimately connected to the exportation of Russian repression strategies These strategies, honed through decades of domestic control and battlefield experimentation, are not imposed from above but adopted and adapted by local elites who find in the Russian model a politically expedient and ideologically resonant alternative to Western liberal norms (2). The transfer is thus not only tactical but relational: military juntas and Russian actors converge around shared logics of regime preservation, anti-imperial rhetoric, and the prioritization of stability over democratic accountability (3)

Background

Russian Disinformation Infrastructure in West Africa

Russia’s influence in West Africa has grown rapidly through the strategic deployment of disinformation campaigns across digital and broadcast media ecosystems State-affiliated outlets such as RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik Afrique have expanded their operations in the region, producing French-language content tailored to resonate with anti-colonial sentiments and local frustrations with Western actors (4). These outlets are supplemented by a constellation of unofficial Telegram channels, Facebook pages, and WhatsApp groups that amplify pro-Russian narratives and disseminate conspiracy theories targeting France, the United Nations, and democratic civil society organizations (5)

In Mali and Burkina Faso, these narratives serve to legitimize military rule, frame external criticism as neoimperialist interference, and portray Russia as a benevolent and reliable partner in security (6). A key theme

1 Shelby Grossman, "Russia’s Influence Operations in Africa," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022.

2 Samuel Ramani, Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 121–145.

3 Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, "Authoritarian Learning and the Future of Democracy in the Sahel, " Journal of Democracy 34, no 1 (2023): 69–83

4 Shelby Grossman, "Russia’s Influence Operations in Africa," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022.

5 Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, “Digital Soldiers: How Pro-Russian Disinformation Campaigns Target Francophone Africa,” 2023

6 Benjamin P Nickels, “Russian Disinformation and Influence in the Sahel, ” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2022

EXPORTING REPRESSION:

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION IN MALI AND BURKINA FASO

Christina Oh (Yale University) Christina Oh (Yale University)

is the contrast between Western "hypocrisy" allegedly promoting democracy while enabling instability and Russia's portrayal as a guarantor of sovereignty and stability. Russian-affiliated channels often glorify the Wagner Group’s activities, depicting the mercenaries as saviors of national integrity despite credible reports of human rights abuses (7). The information campaigns are carefully localized, drawing on antiFrench historical memory and presenting the military juntas as part of a broader “liberation” struggle from Western domination (8)

These disinformation efforts are not simply propagandistic; they are political technologies designed to build popular support for authoritarian governance, shield military elites from accountability, and pave the way for deeper strategic alignment with Russia.

Political Context in Mali and Burkina Faso

The domestic political landscapes of Mali and Burkina Faso are critical to understanding why Russian influence has gained traction. Both countries have experienced recent coups Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 resulting in military-led transitional governments with tenuous popular legitimacy (9). These regimes have capitalized on widespread public disillusionment with Western-backed counterterrorism efforts and international institutions, particularly in the wake of persistent violence from jihadist groups and perceived failures of UN and French missions (10)

In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta has systematically distanced the country from former Western allies, expelling French troops and UN peacekeepers while strengthening ties with Russia through both official state channels and security contracts with the Wagner Group (11). Burkina Faso, under Captain Ibrahim Traoré, has followed a parallel path: severing ties with French forces, restricting international media, and openly expressing interest in Russian military cooperation (12)

The military juntas in both countries face similar governance dilemmas: how to maintain control without democratic legitimacy, how to manage deteriorating security conditions, and how to consolidate power without incurring international isolation. In this context, the Russian model offering security assistance, disinformation infrastructure, and repression strategies without demands for political liberalization presents an attractive and adaptable alternative (13) Together, these factors have created fertile ground for the fusion of Russian-style information warfare and domestic authoritarian consolidation, setting the stage for the co-development of a shared authoritarian repertoire.

7 Human Rights Watch, “Massacre by Wagner Forces in Mali, ” 2023

8 Lina Benabdallah, “Russia’s Strategic Messaging in Africa, ” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2023

9 International Crisis Group, “Avoiding the Worst in Burkina Faso, ” 2022

10 Judd Devermont, “The Unintended Consequences of Counterterrorism in the Sahel, ” CSIS Briefs, 2021

11 Pauline Bax and Katarina Höije, “Mali Seeks Russian Help as France Ends Anti-Jihadist Operation, ” Bloomberg, 2021

12 France 24, “Burkina Faso Seeks to Deepen Military Ties with Russia, ” 2023

13 Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, "Authoritarian Learning and the Future of Democracy in the Sahel, " Journal of Democracy 34, no. 1 (2023): 69–83

EXPORTING REPRESSION:

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION IN MALI AND BURKINA FASO

Christina Oh (Yale University) Christina Oh (Yale University)

Disinformation as a Gateway to Authoritarian Learning

Information Operations as Legitimizing Tools

Russian disinformation in Mali and Burkina Faso does not merely aim to shape public opinion; it functions as a legitimizing infrastructure for military regimes seeking to entrench power. By reframing coups as acts of “sovereignty” and positioning Western criticism as neo-colonial interference, these narratives provide discursive cover for authoritarian consolidation (14). Russian-linked messaging ecosystems regularly portray military leaders as patriotic defenders against foreign subjugation, elevating them as symbols of national renewal rather than unlawful usurpers (15)

This legitimizing function is particularly powerful in contexts of political vacuum and legitimacy crisis. Following the coups in both countries, official transitional roadmaps toward elections have been repeatedly delayed, often with vague promises of eventual democratic restoration (16). In this liminal period, Russian disinformation fills the void by offering a ready-made ideological justification for indefinite military rule emphasizing order, stability, and the rejection of foreign tutelage

Moreover, these campaigns do more than speak to the public; they shape elite discourse. Local political actors, media commentators, and security officials increasingly adopt Russian-style rhetoric about “foreign meddling,” “sovereignty,” and “strategic autonomy,” normalizing a political grammar that stigmatizes dissent and privileges centralized authority (17) In effect, disinformation becomes a language of power that not only disorients public debate but also aligns elite narratives with authoritarian logics

From Narrative to Practice: The Export of Repression Tactics

While narratives legitimize power, repression enforces it and it is here that Russian influence deepens beyond discourse In both Mali and Burkina Faso, there is growing evidence that disinformation has opened the door to authoritarian learning: the appropriation and localization of repressive techniques drawn from the Russian playbook. Key elements of this export include control of the media environment, the paramilitarization of coercion, and framing dissent as a foreign-sponsored subversion. Transitional authorities have banned or restricted several international news outlets (e.g., RFI, France 24) while promoting state-aligned or Russia-friendly platforms (18). Journalists and independent media have faced growing intimidation, surveillance, and criminalization reflecting tactics commonly used in Russia to neutralize critical voices (19) Both countries have enlisted irregular armed forces such as the Volunteers

14 Lina Benabdallah, “Russia’s Strategic Messaging in Africa,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2023

15 DFRLab, “How Disinformation Fuels Anti-French Sentiment in Mali,” Atlantic Council, 2023

16 International Crisis Group, “Mali: Avoiding a Return to Authoritarianism,” 2023

17 Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, “Authoritarian Learning and the Future of Democracy in the Sahel,” Journal of Democracy 34, no 1 (2023): 69–83

18 Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Shrinking in Mali and Burkina Faso,” 2023

19 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Mali and Burkina Faso Country Reports

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Christina Oh (Yale University) (Yale University)

for the Defense of the Homeland in Burkina Faso which, while ostensibly citizen militias, often operate outside of legal constraints and are deployed against perceived internal threats (20). This mimics Russia’s use of Wagner and other non-state actors as flexible tools for repression with plausible deniability Echoing Kremlin practices, opposition figures, civil society activists, and independent media are increasingly framed as agents of foreign destabilization (21). This strategy not only delegitimizes dissent but also justifies expanded surveillance and legal repression under the guise of national security.

These tactics are not simply borrowed wholesale; they are selectively adopted, adapted, and integrated into local authoritarian strategies What is exported is less a fixed blueprint than a set of modular techniques that local elites can customize to fit their own political ecosystems (22). The critical point is that disinformation provides the cognitive and symbolic infrastructure through which these techniques become intelligible, desirable, and deployable.

Leadership and Elite Convergence

Military Elites as Strategic Actors

The diffusion of Russian-style disinformation and repression in Mali and Burkina Faso is not simply a function of top-down influence or passive absorption. Rather, it is enabled and accelerated by the agency of domestic military elites, who selectively adopt authoritarian strategies to serve their own political agendas. Figures such as Colonel Assimi Goïta and Captain Ibrahim Traoré are not merely consumers of Russian support they are co-producers of a political project that blends localized military rule with transnational authoritarian repertoires (23).

These leaders operate within a strategic calculus shaped by legitimacy deficits, security crises, and declining Western engagement. In this context, the Russian model offers a compelling template. It provides a playbook that does not demand democratic performance, offers plausible deniability for repression, and supports sovereign narratives that resonate with the public (24). Goïta and Traoré have thus forged partnerships that are less ideological than instrumental deploying Russian discourse and tactics as tools to stabilize their regimes, consolidate internal control, and reframe their domestic and international positions.

This instrumentalism is visible in both their foreign policy choices and domestic messaging. Both leaders have praised Russia’s support while portraying France and Western institutions as exploitative or complicit

20 Alexandre Capron, “Burkina Faso’s Self-Defense Militias Raise Alarming Human Rights Questions,” France 24 Observers, 2023

21 Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Civil Society Targeted Under Pretext of Countering Terrorism, ” 2023

22 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

23 Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, “Authoritarian Learning and the Future of Democracy in the Sahel, ” Journal of Democracy 34, no. 1 (2023): 69–83

24 Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, "The Evolution of Autocracy: Why Authoritarianism Is Becoming More Sophisticated, " Survival 60, no 2 (2018): 57–68

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Christina Oh (Yale University) Christina Oh (Yale University)

in regional instability (25). Simultaneously, they have positioned themselves as sovereign leaders reclaiming national autonomy, mirroring President Vladimir Putin’s own use of anti-Westernism as a legitimation strategy. This calculated alignment with Russian strategic culture demonstrates a form of “elite convergence” not based on coercion or dependency, but on mutual benefit and symbolic resonance (26)

The Role of Personalist Rule and Symbolic Politics

The personalization of rule in Mali and Burkina Faso has also shaped how Russian strategies are internalized. Both Goïta and Traoré have cultivated strongman personas emphasizing discipline, order, and anti-imperial defiance (27) This echoes a hallmark of Russian authoritarianism: the cultivation of charismatic authority through state-controlled narratives and performative nationalism The media environments in both countries increasingly revolve around the image of the leader as protector, decisionmaker, and embodiment of national destiny.

Disinformation here plays a double role: it amplifies the leader’s symbolic capital while simultaneously undermining alternative sources of legitimacy, such as civil society, opposition parties, and international monitors In Burkina Faso, for instance, Traoré has positioned himself as the “leader of a new generation” while sidelining democratic institutions and asserting control over the transitional timeline (28). His messaging closely tracks Russian-produced content that frames authoritarian leadership as necessary for post-colonial renewal and national security.

In both cases, military elites are not simply reacting to Russian overtures they are actively shaping and localizing a model of governance that is authoritarian, militarized, and media-driven The result is a political fusion that is both endogenous and exogenous: grounded in local political realities but facilitated through transnational authoritarian learning.

Implications

The Limits of Technical Fixes

Current international responses to Russian disinformation in West Africa have focused heavily on technical and tactical interventions fact-checking initiatives, social media monitoring, and media literacy campaigns (29). While important, these measures often fail to address the broader political conditions that make disinformation effective and authoritarian convergence possible The entrenchment of military regimes in

25 Pauline Bax, “Russia Expands Clout in Africa as France Fades in Sahel,” Bloomberg, 2023

26 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2010)

27 Nic Cheeseman and Jonathan Fisher, Authoritarian Africa: Repression, Resistance and the Power of Ideas (Oxford University Press, 2019), 99–117

28 Reporters Without Borders, “Burkina Faso’s New Strongman and the Media,” 2023

29 Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti,“Fighting Disinformation in Africa: Lessons from the Russian Playbook,” ISPI, 2023.

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Christina Oh (Yale University) Christina Oh (Yale University)

Mali and Burkina Faso is not simply the result of information manipulation; it reflects deeper structural alignments around governance models, strategic autonomy, and elite self-preservation (30).

Attempts to counter disinformation through narrowly defined digital interventions risk treating the symptom rather than the cause They overlook how disinformation is embedded in broader political strategies of repression, legitimacy-building, and elite cooperation (31). Without confronting these underlying dynamics, technical approaches may have limited or even counterproductive effects especially if they are perceived as foreign interference or neocolonial paternalism.

The Need for Political Engagement and Normative Alternatives

The international community including the European Union, ECOWAS, and democratic partners must move beyond reactive counter-disinformation measures and engage more seriously with the political and normative terrain in which authoritarian learning occurs. This includes centering elite agency, supporting credible alternatives, and reframing normative appeals. Rather than treating military rulers as pawns of external powers, international actors should recognize their strategic autonomy Incentives for reform, accountability, or democratic transition must be tailored to local political calculations, not imposed through abstract conditionality (32). Civil society, independent media, and democratic opposition groups remain vital, but often lack protection, resources, or visibility. Bolstering these actors requires long-term engagement that prioritizes safety, sustainability, and local ownership. Messages about democracy and human rights need to be decoupled from Western exceptionalism. Effective democratic messaging must emerge from within African political traditions and anti-imperial frameworks, not simply as imported doctrine (33)

Authoritarian Learning and Transnational Risk

Finally, the convergence between Russian and West African authoritarian actors underscores a broader risk: the formation of a transnational ecosystem in which coercive strategies, legitimizing narratives, and tactical knowledge are exchanged across borders (34) This ecosystem is not geographically limited it represents a model of governance that could appeal to other fragile or transitional regimes worldwide. Recognizing the emergent nature of this threat means adopting a longer-term strategic lens, one that sees disinformation not as an anomaly, but as a gateway to a new authoritarian normal.

30 Judd Devermont and Marielle Harris, “Beyond the Coup: West Africa’s Authoritarian Turn,” CSIS Briefs, 2022

31 Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance (Oxford University Press, 2021)

32 Nic Cheeseman, “How to Deal with Coups in Africa,” African Arguments, 2023

33 Moses Khisa, “Democracy on Africa’s Terms,” Foreign Affairs, 2022

34 Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “Authoritarian Alliance: Autocracy’s Global Diffusion,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 4 (2020): 16–30

EXPORTING REPRESSION: RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION IN MALI AND BURKINA FASO

Christina Oh (Yale University) Christina Oh (Yale University)

Conclusion

The cases of Mali and Burkina Faso show that Russian disinformation is not simply an external intrusion, nor merely a tool of digital warfare It is a gateway to a broader political process: the localization and adaptation of authoritarian strategies through elite convergence, repression technologies, and symbolic legitimation. Disinformation serves not only to shape narratives but to transform political possibilities empowering military rulers to reframe their coups as acts of sovereignty, and enabling the adoption of Russian-style governance models that blur the lines between state and propaganda, security and repression.

What emerges is a dynamic of authoritarian learning in which military elites are not passive recipients of foreign influence, but active agents shaping their own versions of strongman rule. Russian support discursive, material, and symbolic does not implant an ideology so much as it provides tools for political survival, domestically legible and regionally exportable.

This convergence has profound implications for the international order It challenges liberal assumptions about democratic diffusion and reveals how regimes can share technologies of control even in the absence of formal alliances. It also calls for a strategic rethinking of how to engage with transitional governments that actively resist democratic norms while building parallel legitimating frameworks.

Ultimately, addressing the rise of authoritarian governance in West Africa will require more than countering disinformation It demands an honest reckoning with the political desires, historical grievances, and elite incentives that make such models attractive Only by grappling with this deeper terrain can democratic actors hope to offer compelling alternatives not just to misinformation, but to the futures that authoritarianism seeks to build.

30 Judd Devermont and Marielle Harris, “Beyond the Coup: West Africa’s Authoritarian Turn,” CSIS Briefs, 2022

31 Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Technology is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance (Oxford University Press, 2021)

32 Nic Cheeseman, “How to Deal with Coups in Africa,” African Arguments, 2023

33 Moses Khisa, “Democracy on Africa’s Terms,” Foreign Affairs, 2022

34 Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “Authoritarian Alliance: Autocracy’s Global Diffusion,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 4 (2020): 16–30

Papers by Panels

PANEL IX: Regional and Global Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Chair: Tanya Kotelnykova (Yale University)

Faculty Discussant: Prof. David Cameron (Yale University)

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana)

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING IN KAZAKHSTAN: RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

In this essay, I delve into the national identity crisis sparked by the January 2022 protests and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. I analyze the ways in which this identity crisis led to an increasing demand for Kazakh national belonging among Russophone Kazakh citizens in Almaty. Highlighting the role of Kazakh speaking clubs as a powerful locus for fulfilling the demand to "feel Kazakh," I explore the diverse ways in which Russophone Kazakh citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, are turning to the Kazakh language for national self-definition in ways that destabilize previously existing ethnic (Kazakh) and civic (Kazakhstani) dichotomies.

A Break in Consciousness

"A break in consciousness "is the way that Alina described the fall-out of the Russian invasion to me as we watched traffic speed by the bench we had chosen for our interview A professor at a local institute of art and a person of mixed Kazakh and Russian heritage who witnessed the latter end of the Soviet Union, Alina, like many Russified Kazakhs in Almaty, did not give much thought to seriously learning the national language. Because Russian has, since Soviet times, remained "the language of prestige and class," many urbanites didn't feel a need to possess fluency in Kazakh, which like other titular Soviet languages was viewed as bezpesperktiniy, without a future (1) But conceptions of national identity began to shift with the January events and came to a head with Russia's invasion of Ukraine During our interview, Alina framed the war as a moment of profound "awakening" for many of the urban Kazakhs in her circle–one which led to them deciding to double down on learning Kazakh. When describing her and her friends' motivation for

1 Kudaibergen 2019 "Mankurts, Kazakh "Russians", and "Shalah" Kazakhs: Language, National Identity, and Ethnicity Revisited" in Laruelle's The Nazarbayev Generation, p 91 Interview on June 7 2

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING IN KAZAKHSTAN: RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

learning Kazakh, she stated "We sort of woke up and were like, we're Kazakhs, we're not Russians" (2) This break in consciousness, "slom soznaniia, " was also a break with ambivalence regarding the regime's nationalizing initiatives, what Diana Kudaibergen (3) (2020) refers to as "depoliticization on issues of national identity" in her book, Nationalizing Regimes.

Projecting Ambivalence: Nazarbayev's Nationalities Policy

Kudaibergen (2020) writes that the Kazakh government pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity when it came to nationality policy. Projecting differing messages to the Kazakh speaking and Russian speaking societies in Kazakhstan and emphasizing economic development over national issues, the regime managed to maintain political stability in its multi-ethnic population by proponing a policy of what Kudaibergen refers to as "modernizing nationalism " One of the effects of this policy, which emphasized economic concerns over "nationalization demands,” was a "general depoliticization of the population" on issues of nationalism (4). The "depoliticization" on national questions that Kudaibergen references in her study could be described as a continuation of the status quo, which preserved the sociolinguistic disparities observed by Smagulova (2021). Kazakh speakers, who tend to live in more rural areas and whose living standards were severely impacted by the economic fallout of the Soviet Union's collapse "are more likely to be less welleducated and more likely to be socially disadvantaged in comparison with their Russian-speaking compatriots” (5)

Although Kazakhization, a collection of policies, "aimed at Kazakh maintenance and restoration of Kazakh in official domains," was formally propounded by the government, there was no real incentive for Russian speakers to change behavior or dwell much on national belonging, since Russian remained the language of prestige and economic opportunity (6) If anything, English was in higher demand, since it opened more doors to travel and socioeconomic advancement (7)

2022 Ruptures

This more cosmopolitan outlook seemed to be the case for many of my interviewees until the occurrence of two destabilizing events that remained entwined in their minds: the January protests (referred to in Russian

2 Interview on June 7

3 Kudaibergen changed her name from its Russified form of Kudaibergenova after 2023 Because of this, I refer to her throughout this chapter as Kudaibergen, even though references in the Bibliography will contain both forms of her name

4 Toward Nationalizing Regimes: Conceptualizing Power and Identity in the Post-Soviet Realm, p 173

5 “When Language Policy Is Not Enough,” p 266

6 Smagulova, Juldyz 2008 “Language Policies of Kazakhization and Their Influence on Language Attitudes and Use," p 446

7 When Language Policy Is Not Enough,” p 266

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING IN KAZAKHSTAN: RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN

THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie Browne (Harvard University) Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

as Yanvarskie Sobitiia and in Kazakh as Bloody January, Qandy Qantar) and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine just a month later.

The January Events encompassed countrywide protests which began as a criticism of surging fuel costs and a demand for democratic reform and later devolved into rioting, as other unidentified groups joined the fray. Political intrigue hangs over the events, as the violent bands who infiltrated the protests were thought to have been hired by a faction of the former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s political circle who wanted to overthrow the sitting President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (8). The protests were violently put down by Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) forces–many of whom were Russian–called in by Tokayev to restore order. The protests and rioting that occurred were especially intense in Almaty and involved citywide power and internet blackouts (9)

The euphemistic use of the vague term "events" in the Russian underscores the uncertainty which still marks that period of instability. Many of the exact details of who exactly was responsible for the violent outcome of the protests, which started out peacefully and ended with over 200 Kazakh citizens dead, are still not known, although there was evidently a power struggle between elites of the Nazarbayev and Tokayev clans as Tokayev took power (10) What is clear, however, is the fact that the events of January instilled a feeling of profound fear and vulnerability in many Almatyans and people across Kazakhstan The January events were especially significant for my Kazakh interlocuters and almost always made an appearance in their chronologies of the events that brought them to the language learning clubs.

The presence of Russian military personnel in Kazakh cities and the predominantly Kazakh speaking makeup of the protests they were sent in to quell raised issues of language, national loyalty and national sovereignty for many Kazakhs It also made the subsequent outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, with its similar images of Russian soldiers occupying Ukrainian land, hit very close to home–especially in the context of later threats to Kazakhstan’s own territorial integrity (11). The war was the proverbial final nail in the coffin for many of my interviewees and prompted intense reckonings with identity.

8 Diana T Kudaibergenova and Marlene Laruelle, 2022 “Making Sense of the January 2022 Protests in Kazakhstan: Failing Legitimacy, Culture of Protests, and Elite Readjustments,” p 442

9 BBC “Kazakhstan Unrest: Internet Returns to Almaty Following a Five Day Outage ” January 10, 2022 https://www bbc com/news/world-asia-59927267

10 Diana T Kudaibergen and Marlene Laruelle, “Making Sense of the January 2022 Protests in Kazakhstan: Failing Legitimacy, Culture of Protests, and Elite Readjustments,” PostSoviet Affairs 38, no 6 (November 2, 2022): 441– 59, https://doi org/10 1080/1060586X 2022 2077060, p 442

11 Lillis, Joanna 2022 “Kazakhstan-Russia Frictions over Ukraine War Go Public | Eurasianet ” June 20, 2022 https://eurasianet org/kazakhstan-russia-frictions-over-ukraine-war-gopublic Pannier, Bruce 12:08:18Z “An Old Refrain: Russian Lawmakers Question Kazakhstan’s Territorial Integrity, Statehood ” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12:08:18Z, sec Qishloq Ovozi (Archive) https://www rferl org/a/russia-lawmakers-question-kazakhstan-territorial-integrity-statehood/31003732 html

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING IN KAZAKHSTAN: RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN

THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

This was especially evident in my conversation with Natalia, a woman of Russian heritage who began learning Kazakh after the outbreak of the war and who now helps lead her own Kazakh language club (Oide Soile) dedicated to fostering Kazakh language practice spaces in apartment communities. She describes a "painful" process of self-reckoning:

I remember that period when this identification was taking place well, this determination of "what sort of Russians are we?"... It was painful for us; it was also painful for us to go through this process. Because you understand, this question–I even remember I printed out a test for myself–who am I? What's my identification? I had to answer these questions to draw out my identity (12).

Natalia's story testifies to an identity crisis of sorts experienced by the Russian speaking population-especially by ethnic Russians David Laitin (1998) in his exploration of identity formation among postSoviet Russian speakers defines a “crisis of identity” as being "when a person fails to fit easily or comfortably into any social category" (13). In light of Russia's violence in Ukraine and the potential threat it presented to Kazakhstan's own security, being associated with Russians and simply being "Russian" with no qualifier became socially undesirable and uncomfortable, leading to a reorientation of identity. The RussoUkrainian war compounding on top of the anxiety generated by the January events destroyed the ambivalent status quo among Russophone Kazakhs and Kazakhstanis alike, creating a demand for self-definition

In Natalia's case this meant seeking out a Kazakh tutor and setting out to prove that it is possible to learn Kazakh as an adult with a full-time job and little free time. A burgeoning Kazakh language activist, she is involved in multiple language clubs and widely publishes her foray into Kazakh on social media. As she proudly told me, she has already achieved Kazakh language level of B2 Last year, she organized a Kazakh language fair which allowed people interested in learning Kazakh to meet with various language club leaders and tutors to see which learning style might work best for them.

National Authenticity in Kazakhstan

It is significant to note that this identity crisis manifests in various ways among the urban Russian speaking population and is divided along ethnic lines For ethnic Kazakhs who are not fluent in Kazakh, the anxiety of the January events and the outbreak of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war clarified an ethno-national belonging that demanded to be reinforced. This sense is embodied in Alina's claim that "We're Kazakhs, we

12 Interview on August 3, 2024

13 Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the near Abroad Cornell University Press, 1998 https://hdl handle net/2027/heb32407 0001 001 p 15

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING IN KAZAKHSTAN:

RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie

Browne (Harvard University)

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

are not Russians " This seems to be an obvious statement, but as Kudaibergen (2019) explains, because of the language divide among Kazakhs, new definitions of ethnic authenticity have arisen. There are Shalah (asphalt) Kazakhs (also called Mankurts),urbanite Kazakhs who are assumed to have forgotten their language and traditions, and then there are Nagyz (real) Kazakhs, who are fluent in Kazakh and maintain a strong connection to the culture. And these definitions seem to have broad acceptance in Kazakh society, where conceptions of nationality are influenced by Soviet ideas of what a true Kazakh looks like As Fierman (2015) observes, in the USSR, there was a "widely held belief that somehow language is inherent to national identity" (14). These ideologies of national purity and authenticity are broadly accepted among Russified Kazakhs and many of my own ethnic Kazakh interlocuters–especially those who grew up in the Soviet Union– uncritically spoke of "real Kazakhs" (nastoiashchie kazakhi) or "pure Kazakhs" (chistye Kazakhi) who fluently speak Kazakh and are well-versed in Kazakh traditions (15).

Kazakh language clubs, however, become a place where Russified Kazakhs can lay claim to that part of identity (Kazakh language) which, aside from ethnicity, is viewed as prerequisite for being a "real Kazakh” (16). Because notions of ethnicity are still heavily influenced by the Soviet legacy in Kazakhstan, language continues to be very much tied to ethnicity. Kazakh language acquisition is a difficult but direct means of accessing this Kazakh group belonging. Gaining fluency in Kazakh also allows them to distance themselves from (or at least not be completely defined by) a now stigmatized and socially charged association with the Russian language and Putin's "Russian World "

Defining the Self in Kazakh Terms

However, the growing popularity of Kazakh among non-ethnic Kazakhs complicates its status as solely a marker of ethnicity Natalia and Alina's cases demonstrate the rising demand for Kazakh language content among non-ethnic Kazakh citizens, and not just that, but also a desire to define the self in Kazakh terms When I asked Natalia to describe her associations with the Kazakh language, she replied that the first word that came to mind was Jerui’yq the Kazakh word for home, settled place. And then following up on her earlier discussion of identification, she continued:

I found a determination for myself, by the way. These are really important words that I found, that describe identity. It turns out that there is this expression in Kazakh, ‘kindik qany tamg’an jer’ it

14 Fierman, William 2015 “Russian Language in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Persistence in Prestige Domains ”

15 Interview on June 29th, 2025

16 Kudaibergen, 2019 "Mankurts, Kazakh "Russians", and "Shalah" Kazakhs: Language, National Identity, and Ethnicity Revisited" in Laruelle's The Nazarbayev Generation, p 89

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING

IN KAZAKHSTAN: RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

means the place where blood dripped from the cut umbilical cord So, you can be Russian, German, Ukrainian, Jewish. But the blood from your umbilical cord fell onto this land, into this soil. And here it is your motherland (17).

These Kazakh expressions have clearly taken on personal meaning for Natalia, giving her the ability to articulate a national belonging that transcends ethnicity one that understands being a native to the land differently. This process of defining the self in Kazakh terms to access a greater sense of belonging complicates the simplistic ethnic (Kazakh) civic (Kazakhstani) binary present in the Kazakh regime's messaging

The Ethnic-Civic Dichotomy

The existence of both Kazakh and Kazakhstani as parallel terms of national belonging ethnic and civic respectively reflects the dilemma the titular elite of Kazakhstan faced after the dissolution of the USSR, when Kazakhs still did not represent a majority in their country (18) On the one hand, as Kesici (2011) argues, "the creation of the independent nation state of Kazakhstan after the fall of an empire required that its governing elite exhibit ethnonational representativeness" (19) In other words, the elite had to provide an ethnic basis for their independence. On the other hand, the presence of other ethnicities in Kazakhstan, which in 1989, made up more than half the population, was too large to ignore (20). Rather than assimilating the population into the dominant group (Kazakhs) or "excluding non-Kazakhs fully from the national boundary and declaring them to be national minorities " Kesici explains that Kazakh elites "instead defined two nations the Kazakh nation and the Kazakhstani nation" (21). Constrained by demography and shaped by Soviet legacies which afforded special status to the titular nationality, Kazakh elites developed these two group memberships–Kazakh and Kazakhstani–both to "legitimize Kazakhstan as a nation state and as the homeland of ethnic Kazakhs... [and] to expand its national boundaries to include all other ethnic groups and nationalities within a civic Kazakhstani nation” (22)

Yet as much as Kazakhstan has attempted to create a civic, Kazakhstani identity for its non-Kazakh compatriots, ethnicity still looms large. The emphasis on Kazakhstan's ethnic core as the key to its legitimacy as a nation state also perpetuates ethnicity as a primary identifier in Kazakhstan one which often supersedes civic identity in daily life. Kesici maintains that the existence of "the Assembly of

18 Kazakhs did not make up the majority of their titular republic’s population until 1999 Cameron, Sarah I 2018 The Hungry Steppe: Famine, Violence, and the Making of Soviet Kazakhstan, p 2

19 The Dilemma in the Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh or Kazakhstani Nation?” 44

20 Fierman, William 1998 “Language and Identity in Kazakhstan: Formulations in Policy Documents 1987–1997,” p 173

21 “The Dilemma in the Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh or Kazakhstani Nation?” 44

22 “The Dilemma in the Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh or Kazakhstani Nation?” 54

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING IN KAZAKHSTAN: RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN

THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

People[s] in Kazakhstan demonstrates that boundaries between ethnic groups remain a salient concept within the civic nation of Kazakhstan" (23). In many ways, Kazakhstan's elite, who were mostly members of the communist diaspora, continued Soviet practices, which conceived of Soviet republics as being structured around an ethnic (titular) core nation.

Although a Soviet legacy is evident in perceptions of ethnicity in Kazakhstan, ethnicity is also very much shaped by distinctly Kazakh traditions Kesici demonstrates that in official documents, the Kazakh nation is defined territorially, linguistically and ethnically/ethnopolitically, but in many ways it is also defined genealogically, " mak[ing]... a connection to khanates that existed before the fifteenth century" (24). As Kesici explains:

Belonging to one of the three hordes is tied to a commonly accepted idea of genealogy.. In order to be included in the Kazakh ethnic group, one has to be Kazakh ‘by blood’. This is the main criterion of Kazakh boundary making, next to common language, Kazakh traditions and customs, and a common history (25).

Although not ethnically Kazakh, Natalia lays claim to facets of Kazakh national identity, appealing to both territoriality (Natalia's mention of the land where the blood fell from her umbilical cord) and knowledge of the Kazakh language. Some of my interviewees also appealed to genealogical belonging by asserting the existence of a new 4th horde in Kazakhstan thus claiming a national belonging with a valence that the official "civic" label, "Kazakhstani," fails to provide.

Moving Away from the Ethnic-Civic Binary

This move away from the ethnic-civic dichotomy projected by the Nazarbayev regime is not a new phenomenon, although its rising popularity has been driven by the geopolitical ruptures of 2022. As Kudaibergen (2024) notes, there are other movements in Kazakhstan that have championed an inclusive "civicness" since 2019 (26). In fact, in many ways, their activism and "de-Sovietization and denazarbayevization" of national identity can be said to have laid the groundwork for the inclusive ideas of "Kazakh" that I encountered in the Kazakh language learning community in Almaty

23 The Dilemma in the Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh or Kazakhstani Nation?" 51

24 The Dilemma in the Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh or Kazakhstani Nation?" p 50

25 The Dilemma in the Nation-Building Process: The Kazakh or Kazakhstani Nation?" p 38

26 The Kazakh Spring: Digital Activism and the Challenge to Dictatorship, p 175

ACCESSING NATIONAL BELONGING IN KAZAKHSTAN:

RUSSOPHONE ALMATINTSY AND THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE LEARNING MOVEMENT IN THE WAKE OF RUSSIA'S FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE

Valerie Browne (Harvard University)

Although there is a growing movement to reconfigure national belonging in Kazakhstan and to break down the dichotomy between Kazakh and Kazakhstani, that is not to say there is collective consensus on the question of national belonging. One of my respondents preferred to define himself as a "Kazakhstani patriot" because he believes that non-Kazakh peoples in Kazakhstan do not appreciate or understand Kazakh culture enough to define themselves as such. He thinks Kazakh may become a civic, rather than ethnic, label in the future, but believes this will change gradually and should not be forced Another interviewee hesitated to define himself as Kazakh, even though he has Kazakh heritage, because the people he meets perceive him as being ethnically Korean. Therefore, he defaults to Kazakhstani since claims to Kazakh ethnicity (or nationality, as it was configured in the Soviet Union) would need to be explained.

As is evident from the included interviews, practices and conceptions of national identity are mixed in the language clubs, but it is clear that there is an increasing demand to "feel Kazakh" that is being met by language learning clubs Russophone Kazakhs access group belonging by attempting to learn Kazakh and through this, become "Real Kazakhs", while some Slavic respondents, by defining themselves in Kazakh terms, challenge the Kazakh-Kazakhstani binary. If anything, my research demonstrates that people participating in Kazakh language learning clubs are reaching for Kazakh national belonging within previously defined categories of ethnic authenticity while also expanding the definition of what it means to be Kazakh

WARTIME CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE WAR ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana) Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana)

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has impacted the geopolitical order and created a multifaceted political-economic confrontation between global states, following the relationship between Russia and the Western Balkan states and influencing the Western Balkans’ stance towards their EU integration efforts. Since the Thessaloniki declaration in 2003, has passed more than two decades and only Croatia has joined the EU. The integration slowdown of the Western Balkans faces internal and external factors which impact their EU membership Thus, there are external issues rooted in the past, including ethnic conflicts, the issue of Kosovo's recognition as an independent state, the lack of cooperation between regional countries (i e , in the political, economic, and socio-cultural spheres), lack of trust in states and external geopolitical influences. In addition to these problems, the Western Balkan states continue to have internal issues stemming from poor governance of political elites and recurring cyclical crises such as high-level corruption, organised crime, money laundering, and other phenomena that, from time to time, provoke instability as well as crises of various formats in the region These issues disturb the cooperation between states and regional development and regional integration However, one of the repeated criteria of the EU towards the regional countries is particularly the above problem. For instance, the 2022 EU’s statements noted corruption and criminality as the main problems of the Western Balkans (1). Meanwhile, the EU has been actively involved in the region for a long time, through the initiative known as the Berlin Process (2). The Berlin Process was established to provide the EU’s enlargement policy agenda with additional impetus, to improve political and economic cooperation, and to encourage market integration in the Western Balkans Indeed, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the challenges and opportunities of EU integration prospects for the EU Western Balkan candidates which will be discussed further below.

The Ukraine War and the Western Balkans

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has influenced the relationship between the Western Balkan states and Russia, and the Western Balkans' approach to the EU's policies Since 2014 Russia annexed Crimea, the Western Balkans have been continuously asked to act diplomatically and economically against Moscow, whether by implementing sanctions or not. Nonetheless, the sanctions taken against the Kremlin were not performed equally by all Western Balkan countries, then and now, due to their political stance. For instance, the war in Ukraine has underscored the division in the region maintaining the pro-Western and pro-Russian.

1 2022 Enlargement package: European Commission assesses reforms in the Western Balkans and Türkiye and recommends candidate status for Bosnia and Herzegovina, https://ec europa eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip 22 6082

2 Berlin Process, https://www berlinprocess de/

WARTIME CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE WAR ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana) Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana)

In this regard, the pro-western countries, namely Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia (3) have taken a strong pro-Western stance, demonstrating strong alignment with EU and NATO policies and have imposed continuous sanctions on Russia Additionally, they have demonstrated firm commitment by banning Russian airspace access, blocking financial transactions with Russian banks, and limiting Russian state-owned media (4). This alignment has strengthened their profiles as reliable partners of the EU and NATO, enhancing their strategic importance within the European security framework. However, in response, the Kremlin has put them on the list of “unfriendly states” (5).

In contrast, some Western Balkan political leaders and citizens openly support the Kremlin Serbia is historically characterised as a pro-Russian state due to deep-rooted cultural, religious, and political ties. There is no doubt that Serbia, an EU candidate country, under the Kremlin's presence, has recently emphasised its foreign policy based on two key vectors, which can be called “Euro-Russian Serbia” (6), which it is not an established diplomatic concept, but Serbia avoids aligning fully with EU foreign policy on Russia In this context, the two-vector Euro-Russian policy by Serbia can be seen from the official visits of senior leaders of the Serbian and Russian governments, where such visits at a high state level consolidate the cooperation between Belgrade and the Kremlin, as well as cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic, commercial, cultural, and religious fields. The signing of a mutual consultation agreement with Russia in December 2022 (7) highlights Serbia’s reluctance to fully align with EU foreign policy, a move that complicates its accession prospects. However, Russia has traditionally viewed itself as a protector of Slavic nations, and since many Balkan countries share Slavic heritage, a sense of kinship and mutual understanding has been fostered Thus, Moscow is perceived to be leveraging Balkan Orthodox nations as tools for amplifying its influence in the region (8).

Beyond Serbia, pro-Russian sentiment is also prominent in Republika Srpska, an autonomous entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnia leader, Milorad Dodik, has openly supported Moscow in resisting EU sanctions Having closer ties with the Kremlin, Dodik awarded Putin with the highest medal of honour in January 2023 (9), and Putin returned this favour in June 2023 (10) This close connection with the Kremlin

3 Note: Kosovo is not included here, since between Pristina and Moscow there is no diploatic relationship due to non-recongnation of Kosovo as an independet state by Russia

4 Ministrja Xhaçka prezanton sanksionet e Shqipërisë ndaj Rusisë MPJE 2022 https://punetejashtme gov al/ministrja-xhacka-prezanton-sanksionet-e-shqiperise-ndaj-rusise/ ; Russia

Adds Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia to the Enemy List Balkan Insight, March 7 https://balkaninsight com/2022/03/07/russia-adds-montenegro-albania-and-northmacedonia-to-enem y-list/

5 КакиеГосударстваВходятВСпискиНедружественныхРФСтран ” [in Eng TASS “Which States Are Included in the List of Unfriendly Countries of the Russian Federation], n d https://tass ru/info/18435143

6 Mahmutaj, Noela “Russian Government Policy in the Western Balkans Securitization an Democracy in Eurasia 2022:125–35 https://doi org/10 1007/978-3-031-16659-4 8

7 ВыступлениеиответынавопросыСМИМинистраиностранныхделРоссийскойФедерацииСВЛавровапоитогам 30-гозаседанияСМИДОБСЕ, Скопье, 1 декабря 2023 года [in Eng Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions following the 30th OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, Skopje, December 1, 2023], https://www mid ru/ru/maps/rs/1918688/

8 Stent Angela Putin’s World Hachette UK 2019:38-39

9 EU Strongly Condemns RS’s Decision to Award Vladimir Putin 2023 European Western Balkans, January 9, 2023 https://europeanwesternbalkans com/2023/01/09/eu-stronglycondemns-rss-decision-to-award-vladimi r-putin/ 10 EU, US Slam Bosnian Serb Leader for Awarding Putin Highest Honor POLITICO, January 9, 2023, https://www politico eu/article/eu-us-slam-bosnia-serb-leader-molorad-dodikawarding-putin-honor/

WARTIME CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE WAR ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana) Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana)

can also be seen from the statements of Dodik, who expressed interest in joining the BRICS group as an alternative to the EU (11), which illustrates the fragmentation of geopolitical loyalties Furthermore, those stances (pro-western and pro-Russian) in the Western Balkans have been present even before the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022; but today is more sensitive since this crisis has put states face a new geopolitical reality (with us or not) and powers like the EU and Russia are strengthening their influence in the region using the momentum.

Hence, public sentiment across the Western Balkans further illustrates the stance regarding EU membership and relations with Russia Based on the 2023 Balkan Barometer Public Opinion (polled 6,000 people in the region) (12), Albania remains the most enthusiastic about joining the EU, with 92% (or 3 points higher than in 2022) of the population in favour. While Serbia has the lowest support at 34% (or 4 points lower than in 2022), 45.5% of Serbs believe the country should remain neutral regarding the Ukraine conflict, reflecting the deep ambivalence toward aligning with the EU’s sanctions on Russia. According to a survey, enthusiasm in Kosovo and Montenegro is not as high as in Albania, even though 66% and 60% of the population want to join the EU In addressing the challenges they face, one in every five respondents associates the Balkans with hope or cooperation, indicating a willingness to collaborate. Except for Serbia, other Western Balkan countries still have a higher trust level in the EU, and more than half of the population believes that joining the EU would be their future. This internal divide within the Western Balkans further complicates the region’s integration and gives a clear picture that a collective path towards EU membership as a regional bloc is unlikely to happen

Following this, the conflict has also created new challenges for EU enlargement. The Brussels relationship with the Kremlin has become more strained, making it more difficult for the EU to engage with Russia on issues of mutual concern. Particularly, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and evident EU-Russia tensions have reshaped the EU’s enlargement policies and broader strategic priorities. Hence, in an unexpected turn of geopolitical events, the countries in the Western Balkan region shifted from being security consumers to security providers Two significant moments demonstrate how geopolitical shifts influenced the EU’s enlargement policy. Firstly, the Ukraine war refocused the EU’s attention on Western Balkans candidate countries, which have been waiting years to advance their EU membership. While Serbia began EU accession talks in 2014 and Montenegro started negotiations in 2012, Albania and North Macedonia officially launched accession negotiations in July 2022; and Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted EU candidate status in December this year, which is awaiting the EU’s decision on the formal opening talks

11 Bosnian Serb Leader Says Bosnia Should Join BRICS, Not EU ” POLITICO, August 29, 2023 https://www politico eu/article/bosnia-herzegovina-serbia-milorad-dodik-bricseuropean-union/

12 Balkan Barometer 2023 https://www rcc int/balkanbarometer/key findings/2/

WARTIME CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE WAR ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana) Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana)

The same year, the EU made strides towards implementing visa liberalization for Kosovo (13) , which came into effect on January 1, 2024, allowing Kosovars to travel visa-free within the Schengen Area At the same time, in October 2024, Albania’s opening negotiation chapters, particularly in the Fundamental Chapter addressed the rule of law and democracy. The Albanian leader, Edi Rama, has attributed these advancements, somewhat ironically, to the geopolitical urgency sparked by the war in Ukraine. Those actions show the refocused EU towards the Western Balkans, strengthening its presence, which is visible. Hence, fast and unpredictable actions by the EU came after almost a decade of stagnation in EU accession and even lost its importance on the EU’s priority list soon after Croatia’s accession in 2013 The refocused EU following the actions in Eastern Europe is also a clear picture For instance, in June 2022 EU leaders decided to grant the two former Eastern Partnership countries, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova candidate status, a few months later, in December 2023 another historic decision to open EU accession talks with both states, while Georgia was granted candidate status (14). In this regard, the EU’s decisions, which were unthinkable before February 2022, have recalibrated the policy on EU enlargement and its future evolutions Another piece of evidence is the changing position of the EU members Concretely, France blocked enlargement in 2019 due to concerns over the accession process and President Macron pushed for a revised EU enlargement methodology, which was adopted in 2020. However, this action affected the opening of negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in 2019, justifying that it needs to focus more on economic investments during the accession talks and better political engagement.

While the Ukraine war increased geopolitical urgency, the French position changed by accepting the open negotiation with Albania and North Macedonia in July 2022 In this regard, the Ukraine war has highlighted the strategic importance of the Western Balkan region, showing renewed EU efforts to strengthen ties and counterbalance Russian influence. The accelerated accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, visa liberalization with Kosovo, and sanctions alignment illustrate the EU’s shift toward the Western Balkans and highlight EU enlargement talks that seem more political.

Albania’s EU Integration Path: A Reality Soon?

The path to EU membership requires candidates to meet criteria before entering detailed chapters of negotiations, known as the chapters of the Acquis; and there are 35 chapters for Albania, all of which must be negotiated and agreed upon by the 27 EU member states. Indeed, while this process is time-intensive, its pace largely depends on Tirana’s political will and reform efforts However, today, the country is closer to

WARTIME CONSEQUENCES: THE IMPACT OF UKRAINE WAR ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana) Noela Mahmutaj (University of Tirana)

fulfilling its European dream than ever before. Hence, Tirana has openly supported Ukraine, and actively imposed sanctions on Russia, distancing itself diplomatically from the Kremlin

A significant milestone in Albania's EU accession process was the formal opening of the First Cluster, which includes critical areas like the rule of law, justice, and fundamental rights, which are crucial for Albania itself. The European Commission has recognized Albania’s progress, indicating that 2030 could be a realistic target for Albania’s EU integration. Concrete reforms, particularly in justice and anti-corruption, illustrate Albania’s commitment to EU membership Recently, the arrest of former President Ilir Meta, and other high-level government officials for corruption, has sent a strong signal that the country is serious about rooting out corrupt practices. Croatia’s experience offers a compelling model in this regard. Croatia, during its EU accession process, demonstrated a paradigm shift by prosecuting high-ranking officials, such as former Prime Minister Ivo Sander from the Croatian Democratic, for corruption (15). The reforms in Croatia have benefited from the work of independent watchdog organisations and professional prosecutors, who have all aided in implementing the reforms in their country Thus, Albania can draw valuable lessons from Croatia’s successful path, particularly in fostering political unity and prioritizing judicial independence.

However, establishing the College of Europe campus in Tirana in 2024 is another key step in Albania's integration journey. The institution, known for educating future EU leaders, signifies Albania’s commitment to fostering a European mindset among its youth Such educational initiatives promote European values and strengthen further diplomatic and professional contacts with the EU member states Questioning if Albania’s EU membership in 2030 is a reality, it may be clear that Albania’s progress is undeniable, the prospect of EU membership by 2030 remains an ambitious goal. Hence, there is significant optimism about Albania’s EU future, especially with support from key EU leaders and governments. Joining the EU by 2030 is a key political priority also for the Albanian government and an objective of Rama’s campaign, used as a main pillar of the local election on 11 May 2025 However, it is more likely an opportunity rather than a guarantee, since it depends not only on fully-fulfilling criteria by Albania but also on the political will of EU member states.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION AND WAR IN UKRAINE.

MEMBER STATES REACT TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University) Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Key Issues

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has evolved from a regional body focused on security and counterterrorism into a broad alliance with ambitions of promoting a multipolar world order that challenges Western dominance, particularly that of the United States and NATO. Formed initially by China, Russia, and several Central Asian republics to resolve border disputes and combat terrorism, the Organisation has expanded both in membership and scope. This transformation has inevitably influenced the SCO’s collective stance on major international crises, most notably the war in Ukraine According to its Charter, the SCO is committed to principles such as mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful dispute resolution, and territorial integrity.

Although the SCO formally endorses peace and conflict resolution, it has stopped short of condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Instead, its member states have largely refrained from criticizing Moscow. Observers suggest that this unified silence stems from a desire to preserve internal cohesion and maintain beneficial economic and political ties with Russia As a result, critics argue that the Organisation is more aligned with Russia’s geopolitical goals than with universal adherence to international law.

Declarations and Policy Trends (2008–2018)

Between 2008 and 2018, the SCO issued multiple declarations emphasizing sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful conflict resolution Yet, these statements have not always translated into consistent action For example, in 2008, during the Georgian-Russian war, the Dushanbe Declaration was generally sympathetic to Russia’s military actions in South Ossetia, despite Russia’s overt support for separatist movements (1).

In 2014, after conflict erupted in Donbas, the Organisation again emphasized the Minsk agreements and diplomatic channels It did not, however, address Russia’s unilateral annexation of Crimea or its role in stoking separatism in eastern Ukraine In parallel, the SCO championed Syria’s sovereignty under the Assad regime while effectively ignoring similar principles in Ukraine, revealing a pattern of selective application of its own norms (2).

Reactions to the 2022 Invasion

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United Nations General

1 The Dushanbe Declaration of Heads of SCO Member States, 2008

2 The Tashkent Declaration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2016

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION AND WAR IN UKRAINE.

MEMBER STATES REACT TO

THE RUSSIAN INVASION

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University) Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

Assembly convened six emergency sessions over the course of a year, resulting in multiple resolutions condemning the invasion None of the SCO member states voted in favor of these resolutions; they either abstained or were absent This uniform avoidance of condemnation underscores Russia’s influence within the Organisation and the strategic calculus of member states, who appear reluctant to jeopardize ties with Moscow.

This stance contradicts the SCO’s charter commitments to maintaining peace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity Defenders of the Organisation argue that member states prioritize diplomatic engagement and dialogue, thereby refraining from actions that could escalate tensions Regardless of the rationale, the conflict has exposed the SCO’s complex balance between rhetorical support for sovereignty and pragmatic deference to Russia’s interests.

China

China’s position on the war in Ukraine is shaped by its longstanding strategic partnership with Russia and its own broader ambitions in reshaping the global order. In January 2024, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun assured Russia that Beijing would continue supporting the Kremlin’s efforts in Ukraine, emphasizing that Western sanctions or external pressure would not dissuade China from its chosen path. Previously, in March 2022, Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming to reinforce the importance of unity among SCO members and to criticize Western sanctions as illegitimate (3)

China is helping Russia circumvent sanctions by also supplying various military components (semiconductors, ball bearings, and machine tools). This enables the rapid refurbishment and adaptation of old Soviet military equipment to modern requirements (4). PRC has maintained robust economic ties with Russia, expanding trade in energy, technology, and other sectors. China’s official statements often blame NATO expansion for provoking the conflict, reflecting a shared Sino-Russian narrative of opposing Western hegemonic structures

India

India occupies a unique position within the SCO, balancing ties between Russia and the West. When the invasion began, Prime Minister Narendra Modi called for dialogue and an immediate cessation of violence during a conversation with President Vladimir Putin on February 24, 2022 Yet India carefully avoided

3 Wang Yi Meets with SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming; 17 03 2022 [http://is chinaembassy gov cn/eng/zgwj/202203/t20220321 10653669 htm]

4 Max Bergmann et al Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, CSIS 2024

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION AND WAR IN UKRAINE.

MEMBER STATES REACT TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University) Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

condemning Russia or supporting sanctions against it (5). Instead, New Delhi significantly increased imports of Russian oil, capitalizing on the market opportunity created by the withdrawal of Western buyers After China, India remains the second biggest importer of Russian fossil fuels (6)

By 2023, bilateral trade between India and Russia reached unprecedented levels. India also became a vital exporter of refined petroleum products, reprocessing Russian crude oil before selling it to countries that had imposed sanctions on Russia. This arrangement yielded substantial economic gains for India while maintaining its strategic autonomy (7) Furthermore, Russian interests hold stakes in several Indian energy firms, entrenching the partnership economically (8) For India, the SCO serves as an arena to showcase its ability to maintain multiple alliances simultaneously.

Iran

Iran is the SCO member state most openly endorsing of Russia’s military endeavours in Ukraine Having formally joined the Organisation in 2023, Iran systematically aligns with Russia in UN votes Its support is not limited to diplomatic channels, Iran has provided Russia with Shahed drones, widely deployed in Ukraine, and ballistic missiles from 2024 onwards - although these transfers are officially denied (9).

In addition, Iranian and Russian cooperation on a drone production facility in Tatarstan solidifies a growing military-industrial partnership (10) Both nations share a deep-seated mistrust of Western influence and perceive the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to challenge the existing U S -led global order Iran’s active role in the SCO grants it international visibility and a strategic forum for broadening its regional networks, despite enduring Western sanctions.

Pakistan

Pakistan maintains a carefully neutral or non-aligned stance on the war in Ukraine On October 5, 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement reiterating Pakistan’s engagement with both Russia and Ukraine and calling for peaceful negotiations (11). While Islamabad abstained from critical UN votes on

5 Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi speaks on telephone with His Excellency Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, 24 02 2022 [https://pib gov in/PressReleasePage aspx?PRID=1800925]

6 Payments to Russia for fossil fuels since 24 February 2022, Russia Fossil Tracker [https://www russiafossiltracker com]

7 Brief on India-Russia Economic Relations, Embassy of India in Russia [https://indianembassy-moscow gov in/overview php]

8 CREA, The Laundromat: How the price cap coalition whitewashes Russian oil in third countries, 2023

9 Fabian Hinz, Iranian missile deliveries to Russia: escalating military cooperation in Ukraine, IISS, 18 09 2024

10 Vlasti SSHA: Rossiya sovmestno s Iranom stroit zavod dronov v Tatarstane, on mojyet zarabotat v sleduyushchem godu, 2023 [https://www currenttime tv/a/vlasti-ssha-rossiyasovmestno-s-iranom-stroit-zavod-dronov-v-tatarstane-on-mozhet-zarabotat-v-sleduyuschem-godu/32451887 html]

11 Pakistan's Policy Towards Eurasia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [https://mofa gov pk/balkan-and-eurasia]

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION AND WAR IN UKRAINE.

MEMBER STATES REACT TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University) Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

the conflict, its economic engagement with Moscow has flourished. Trade volumes soared in 2023, reaching record heights (12)

Ambassador Khalid Jamali has emphasized the national priority of strengthening ties with Russia (13). This inclination toward Moscow is consistent with Pakistan’s broader foreign policy goals of diversifying partnerships and counterbalancing its historically tense relationship with India, another major SCO player. As a result, Pakistan’s neutrality in international forums does not preclude deeper, pragmatic cooperation with Russia

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s response to the invasion has been relatively cautious yet revealing of broader trends within the SCO. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called for diplomacy early in the conflict, reflecting Kazakhstan’s traditional stance of balancing interests between Russia and the West (14) While Kazakhstan abstained from most UN votes regarding Ukraine, it did not shy away from opposing certain resolutions critical of Russia’s actions.

At the same time, Kazakhstan has refused to recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics or the annexation of Crimea, theoretically adhering to principles of territorial integrity (15) Yet, Kazakhstan has emerged as one of Russia’s most important trading partners since 2022, facilitating the transit of goods targeted by Western sanctions (16) From electronics to microchips and drone components, Kazakhstan’s role in supporting Russia’s war effort whether wittingly or unwittingly has prompted scrutiny and, in some instances, sanctions from Western governments (17).

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan, like Kazakhstan, has officially advocated diplomacy in Ukraine but has become a significant conduit for sanctioned goods headed to Russia. Its location and relatively porous borders enable re-exports of Chinese-origin products with dual-use or military potential. Imports of Chinese ball bearings, for

12 Pakistan, Russia expand economic ties amid Western sanctions, 2024 [https://www voanews com/amp/pakistan-russia-expand-economic-ties-amid-western-sanctions/7789779 html]

13 Pakistan expresses desire to expand cooperation with Russia, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 2023 [https://moib gov pk/News/56846]

14 President Participates in Extraordinary Congress of Amanat Party, Urges Russia and Ukraine to Reach Agreement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1 03 2022 [https://www gov kz/memleket/entities/mfa/press/news/details/334747?lang=en]

15 Kazakh official: We will not risk being placed in the same basket as Russia, 2022 [https://www euractiv com/section/central-asia/interview/kazakh-official-we-will-not-risk-beingplaced-in-the-same-basket-as-russia/]

16 Marcin Popławski, Kazakhstan: heading towards uncertainty, OSW, 2023

17 OCCRP, Nesmotrya na sanktsii, Rossiya poluchayet bespilotniki i mikroskhemy cherez Kazakhstan, [https://www occrp org/ru/rassledovanie/nesmotria-na-sankcii-rossiia-polucaetbespilotniki-i-mikrosxemy-cerez-kazaxstan], 2023

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION AND WAR IN UKRAINE.

MEMBER STATES REACT

TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University) Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

instance, have spiked by over 1,500% since 2021, raising concerns about their eventual deployment in Russian weapon systems (18)

Although Kyrgyz leaders have refrained from openly supporting Russia’s invasion, their silence and continued economic engagement effectively align them closer to Moscow. U.S. sanctions on certain Kyrgyz companies highlight the extent to which external powers now view Kyrgyzstan as instrumental in Russia’s sanctions-evasion strategies (19). This underscores the limits of smaller SCO states attempting to remain neutral in a large-scale geopolitical standoff

Tajikistan

Tajikistan’s response can be characterized by near-total silence. It generally abstains from UN votes related to the war in Ukraine, with one notable exception: opposing Russia’s suspension from the Human Rights Council This passive approach aligns with Russia’s interests, reflecting Tajikistan’s dependence on Russian security guarantees and labour markets for migrant workers

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has taken a marginally more vocal position. Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated in March 2022 that Uzbekistan would not recognize the DPR, LPR, or Crimea as sovereign entities, reiterating a commitment to diplomatic conflict resolution (20) Nonetheless, Uzbekistan abstained or was absent in various UN votes on Ukraine.

Through re-exported household appliances and electronics with potential military applications, Uzbekistan plays a role in sustaining Russia’s logistical chains despite sanctions. Consequently, Western governments have sanctioned several Uzbek companies for alleged involvement in bolstering Russia’s defence industries (21) However, precise data is lacking to determine the exact quantity

18 Joseph Webster, The Kyrgyzstan route facilitating Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lovy Institute, 2024

19 US Department of Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Impede Russian Access to Battlefield Supplies and Target Revenue Generators, 2023 [https://home treasury gov/news/pressreleases/jy1636]

20 Uzbekistan does not recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent republics, 2022 [https://kun uz/en/news/2022/03/17/uzbekistan-does-not-recognize-donetsk-and-lugansk-asindependent-republics-fm-kamilov]

21 Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Notice of OFAC Sanctions Action, Federal Register, Vol 88, No 72; 2023 [https://publicinspection federalregister gov/2023-07840 pdf] U S Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) – Detail for Entity ID: 13087

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION AND WAR IN UKRAINE.

MEMBER STATES REACT TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University) Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

Belarus

Belarus stands out as Russia’s closest ally and a direct participant in the Ukraine conflict Allowing Russian forces to use Belarusian territory to launch attacks from the north, President Alexander Lukashenko openly endorsed Moscow’s position. As early as February 24, 2022, Lukashenko demanded Ukraine’s demilitarization and non-alignment with NATO, essentially echoing Russia’s core war aims (22).

Belarus consistently opposed UN resolutions condemning Russia Economically, it is deeply intertwined with Russia, which accounts for more than 70% of Belarus’s trade (23) Their security cooperation is equally robust. In 2023, the two leaders agreed to station Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, moving the relationship toward deeper military integration (24). Though Belarus is slated to officially join the SCO in July 2024, it already participates in its meetings as a de facto member, signalling firm alignment with Russian interests.

Deepening Geopolitical Realignment

These varied yet convergent positions illustrate a broader geopolitical shift among SCO members. Many of these states rely on Russia for trade, security, or political backing, pushing them to sidestep outright condemnation of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine. Others, like China and Iran, share Russia’s broader aim of contesting Western-led global norms, thus finding alignment with Russia’s military pursuits

Likewise, the war in Ukraine has highlighted how economic interests among SCO members can supersede concerns about international law violations. Countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have benefited by becoming conduits for goods destined for Russia, boosting their domestic economies while risking Western sanctions. India’s massive increase in energy trade with Russia also underscores the Organisation’s broader capacity to reshape global commerce, especially when its members refrain from participating in Western punitive measures

Conclusion

Despite foundational principles championing sovereignty, non-interference, and peaceful resolution of disputes, the SCO has collectively avoided condemning Moscow This reflects a pragmatic assessment by

22 BelTA, Lukashenko nazval usloviya peregovorov Rossii s Ukrainoy, 2022 [https://belta by/president/view/lukashenko-nazval-uslovija-peregovorov-rossii-s-ukrainoj-486663-2022/]

23 Kamil Kłysiński, Towards a dependence with no alternative: Russia’s increased role in the Belarusian economy, OSW, 2023

24 Anna Maria Dyner, Belarus and Russia move to the next stage of Integration, PISM, 2023

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION AND WAR IN UKRAINE.

MEMBER STATES REACT TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION

Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University) Łucja Skolankiewicz (Oxford University)

its members, who are either economically or politically aligned with Russia, ideologically opposed to Western dominance, or seeking to walk a delicate middle ground without provoking conflict with major powers

The reactions of the SCO member states, though largely neutral and balanced, do not translate into reality. By strengthening economic ties, assisting in circumventing sanctions, and directly supplying military support, every member of the Organization remains a silent ally of the Kremlin in its military efforts, thereby contributing to the tragedy unfolding in Ukraine In this paper, I aimed to present a vivid study of indifference or what is perceived as indifference Most of the states have officially supported or condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet all have remained within Russia’s sphere of influence.

The values the Organization supposedly adheres to have, in this case, proven to be pro-Russian indifference. Ultimately, it is not the declared ideals but rather the straightforward political interests of the member states that drive the institution’s actions

Papers by Panels

PANEL X: Invisible Nation: The Untold Stories of Belarusian Cultural Expression

Chair: Mike York (Yale University)

Discussant: Andrei Kureichyk (University of Chicago)

Maryna Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University)

Vesta Svendsen (Brown University)

LANGUAGE POLICY IN BELARUSIAN CINEMA: BETWEEN RUSSIFICATION AND NATIONAL REVIVAL

Maryna

Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University)

The state-run film industry in Belarus, deeply rooted in Soviet traditions, has long functioned as a tool for ideological dissemination and cultural homogenization. Since the founding of Belgoskino in 1924, Russian has dominated cinematic production. Early silent films such as Lesnaya byl’ and Prostitutka (1926) featured Russian intertitles, establishing cinema as an instrument of soft power that reinforced Russian as the lingua franca in the multiethnic Soviet republic. Even Kastus Kalinovskiy (1927), a film about one of the most prominent Belarusian national heroes, was produced in Russian, despite the contemporaneous policy of Belarusization

This apparent dissonance between cinematic practice and state language policy is particularly evident in light of the 1927 Constitution of the Belarusian SSR, which formally affirmed linguistic pluralism and emphasized the primacy of the Belarusian language in public life. It stated: “Due to the significant preponderance of the population of Belarusian nationality in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Belarusian language is designated as the preferred language for interactions between state, professional, and public institutions and organizations.” At the time, four official languages were recognized: Belarusian, Yiddish, Russian, and Polish (Constitution 1927, Articles 21–23).

Scholars argue that during the Soviet period, cinema operated as a mechanism of ethnocultural substitution, replacing national identity with Soviet identity and sterilizing Belarusian national consciousness (Ahafonava, 2013, p 305; Šarojka, 2018, p 37) Leading roles were frequently assigned to Russian actors with no command of Belarusian. A striking example is the biopic Ja, Francysk Skaryna, about the first Belarusian printer who published the Bible in Belarusian yet the film was shot entirely in Russian, with the title role performed by Russian actor Oleg Yankovsky.

Even cinematic adaptations of Belarusian literary classics works by Vasil Bykau and Uladzimir Karatkevich were produced in Russian (Historyja kinamastactva Bielarusi, 2001, p 39)

LANGUAGE POLICY IN BELARUSIAN CINEMA: BETWEEN RUSSIFICATION AND NATIONAL REVIVAL

Maryna Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University)

In some films, Belarusian appears sporadically, used by specific characters. For instance, in Elem Klimov’s Come and See (1985), the protagonist Flyora, a Belarusian boy, and other local characters speak Belarusian (sometimes with dialectal features and trasianka a Belarusian-Russian code-mixing variety), grounding the narrative in local identity and emotional depth. Multilingualism is used skillfully here, with each language adding an extra layer of meaning that Soviet-educated audiences could decode. The partisan commander speaks standard Russian, reflecting wartime practice; a recruiter speaks Russian with a Georgian accent, evoking associations with Lavrentiy Beria and the NKVD; the occupiers speak German and Russian with a German accent; and Ukrainian is spoken by a collaborator These nuanced linguistic choices intensify the film’s psychological impact and underscore the scale of the tragedy

While rare exceptions like Liudzi na Balocie (1981) and Čužaja Baćkaŭščyna (1982) were produced in Belarusian, the overwhelming majority of feature films remained in Russian. Belarusian was more frequently used in documentary cinema.

Perestroika and the early 1990s marked a significant turning point Following Belarusian independence in 1991, a short-lived cultural revival began. Belarusian was declared the sole state language. Many schools transitioned to Belarusian, scientific terminology was developed, and the Belarusian language gained visibility in media and public administration (Antaniuk-Prouteau, 2022, pp. 163–165).

Public attitudes shifted: census data show that the share of citizens identifying Belarusian as their native language rose from 65 6% in 1989 to 73 7% in 1999 (National Statistical Committee, 2019)

Amid these developments, efforts were made to integrate Belarusian into cinema. Examples include Kryzh na ziamli i Luna ŭ niebie (1993) and Na chornych liadach (1995), based on works by Vasil Bykau. However, these initiatives often faced financial challenges. According to Ahafonava (2013), Belarusian feature cinema entered a prolonged crisis in the early 1990s Cooperation began with Russian film studios producing predominantly Russian-language films

Following the election of Alexander Lukashenko in 1994, language policy changed sharply. Belarus adopted a policy of integration with Russia, and the 1996 constitutional amendments granted Russian and Belarusian equal official status (Constitution of Belarus, 1997). However, in practice, Russian retained dominance The Law “On Languages” provides no enforcement mechanisms for balanced bilingualism As a result, official documents, state media, and public education overwhelmingly use Russian (Zakon Respubliki Bielaruś).

LANGUAGE POLICY IN BELARUSIAN CINEMA: BETWEEN RUSSIFICATION AND NATIONAL REVIVAL

Maryna Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University)

Although Belarusian is taught in schools, it is marginalized in public spheres. Unofficial norms in administrative practices discourage its use Public attitudes remain complex: while 54% of the population consider Belarusian their native language (down from 73 7% in 1999), only 26% use it daily (National Statistical Committee). Nevertheless, 86.1% of respondents consider it “the most important part of Belarusian culture that must be preserved” (Arnejski & Rudkoŭski, 2022).

State language policy directly affects the film industry. An analysis of Belarusfilm’s filmography from 1996 to 2025 reveals no Belarusian-language feature films (Belarusfilm) Russification created a stable Russianlanguage market within the country Economic considerations also influence language choice: using Russian expands potential audiences to Russia and the broader post-Soviet space.

State support for Belarusian-language feature films, including translations and subtitles, remains limited. Translation of foreign films into Belarusian is primarily the work of private initiatives. The Belarusian Weekends project, supported by Velcom and Atlant-Telecom, demonstrates a demand for Belarusianlanguage content

Case Study: Kupala (2020)

A major milestone in contemporary Belarusian cinema was Kupala (2020, dir Vladimir Yankovsky), a biographical film about the national poet Yanka Kupala This was the first state-funded feature film in decades shot predominantly in Belarusian.

The film covers Kupala’s life during the Belarusian national revival, Stalinist repression, and the destruction of the Belarusian cultural elite. The film opens with the poet’s mysterious death he fell down a stairwell at a hotel in Moscow Although the case files should have been declassified by now, the circumstances surrounding his death remain unclear Through the poet’s life, this film reveals a suppressed history, previously excluded from official narratives, making it a unique production.

The primary language of the film is Belarusian, but it also features Russian, Polish, and Yiddish, reflecting the multilingual and multicultural atmosphere of early 20th-century Belarus. Each language carries symbolic meaning: Belarusian symbolizes national consciousness, cultural revival, and resistance; Polish reflects cultural influence and intellectual discourse, as well as the Polish-Belarusian identity conflict;

LANGUAGE POLICY IN BELARUSIAN CINEMA: BETWEEN RUSSIFICATION AND NATIONAL REVIVAL

Maryna Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University)

Yiddish emphasizes Belarusian-Jewish coexistence and shared cultural space; Russian represents authority and repression, but also cultural ties to the Russian intelligentsia

Characters switch to Russian when addressing authorities, driven by fear, the need to be understood, or instincts of self-preservation an echo of sociolinguistic patterns that persist to this day. In contemporary Belarus, Russian continues to function as the "safer" language in official and public interactions.

The film also employs silence as an artistic technique a powerful symbol of the suppression of the national voice The moment the protagonist loses his voice metaphorically represents the destruction of Belarusian culture.

Despite being state-funded, Kupala did not premiere in Belarus. It was shown only at a festival in Moscow, where it won the "Event of the Year" award. Its scheduled screening at the Eurasian Film Festival in the UK in 2021 was canceled two days before the showing when Belarusfilm withdrew the film Juror Michael Daniel Sagatis described this as politically motivated censorship in his article Kupala Falls Once Again: "Given the film’s clear message that resists the silencing of the Belarusian language and condemns the oppression of Belarusians by an authoritarian power, its unannounced withdrawal remains consistent with the state action of the current Belarus regime that seeks to deny the propagation of any nationally sponsored media content that supports themes of independence." (OCA Magazine, 2021: 31).

Strikingly, the events depicted in Kupala were soon echoed in the country’s political reality The film’s release coincided with the mass protests of 2020, which were met with sweeping state repression. Once again, Belarus’s cultural intelligentsia writers, filmmakers, and artists became targets of political persecution. Imprisonments, forced exile, and censorship reemerged as instruments of control. In parallel, Russification policies were reinvigorated, further eroding the public presence of the Belarusian language.

The film remains absent from the official Belarusfilm website, a silence that speaks volumes about the state’s attitude toward its content. Despite the ban, however, Kupala circulated online in the form of a leaked draft. Although the director emphasized that it did not reflect the final cut, Belarusians watched it nonetheless as their only available access to a suppressed chapter of their history

Conclusion

The history of Belarusian cinema mirrors the country's shifting language policy: from Soviet-era Russification to short-lived national revival and recent renewed suppression. Despite constitutional

LANGUAGE POLICY IN BELARUSIAN CINEMA: BETWEEN RUSSIFICATION AND

NATIONAL REVIVAL

Maryna Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University)

recognition of both state languages, Russian holds a monopoly in cinema. Assimilationist policies have been reinforced by legal, institutional, and cultural mechanisms

Kupala stands as a powerful example of how language in film can become a symbol of cultural resistance and national identity. Its censorship underscores the persistence of language discrimination in Belarus. However, grassroots interest in Belarusian-language content and the rise of independent film initiatives indicate that demand for national cinema endures. Cinema remains a vital platform for preserving language, articulating memory, and shaping cultural identity

Bibliography

Ahafonava, N. (2013). Bielaruski kiniematohraf: Stratehija nacyjanaĺnaj deidentyfikacyi [Belarusian cinema: Strategies of national deidentification]. In Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Belarusian Researchers (Vol 2, pp 305–309) Kaunas

Antaniuk-Prouteau, M. (2022). Status moŭ u Bielarusi: histaryčny ahliad [The status of languages in Belarus: a historical overview]. Acta Albaruthenica, 22, 159–168. Uniwersytet Warszawski. https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/29520984

Arnejski, S , & Rudkoŭski, P (2022) Dvuchmoŭnaje adnamoŭje [Bilingual monolingualism] Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies https://belinstitute com/be/article/dvukhmounae-adnamoue

Belarusfilm. (n.d.). Retrieved June 7, 2025, from https://belarusfilm.by/fimlagraphia-final/

Belarusian National Statistical Committee. (n.d.). Census data. Retrieved June 7, 2025, from https://census belstat gov by/

Historyja kinamastactva Bielarusi [The history of Belarusian cinema art]. (2001). Minsk: Bielaruskaja Navuka.

Kanstytucyja Respubliki Bielaruś 1994 h. (sa zmianienniami i dapaŭnienniami, pryniatymi na respublikanskim refierendumie 24 listapada 1996 h ) [Constitution of the Republic of Belarus of 1994 with amendments adopted at the republican referendum on November 24, 1996] (1997) Minsk: Belarus

LANGUAGE POLICY IN

BELARUSIAN CINEMA: BETWEEN RUSSIFICATION AND NATIONAL REVIVAL

Maryna Antaniuk-Prouteau (Stanford University)

Konstitutsiya Belorusskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Sovetskoy Respubliki [Constitution of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic] (1927) Minsk https://pravo by/pravovaya-informatsiya/pomniki-gistoryi-pravabelarusi/kanstytutsyynae-prava-belarusi/kanstytutsyi-belarusi/konstitutsiya-1927-goda/

Sagatis, M. D. (2021). Kupala falls once again. OCA Magazine, October, 30–31. https://mfa.tj/uploads/main/2021/10/OCA-Magazine-UK-23-10-2021.pdf

Šarojka, A (2018) Etnakuĺturnaja identyčnasć: Da pastanoŭki prabliemy sučasnaha bielaruskaha ihravoha kino [Ethnocultural identity: A statement of the problem of the contemporary Belarusian feature films] https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=35170591

Zakon Respubliki Bielaruś "Ab movach u Respublicy Bielaruś" [Law of the Republic of Belarus “On Languages in the Republic of Belarus”] National Legal Internet Portal, July 17, 2023. Accessed June 7, 2025 http://world of law pravo by/text asp?RN=V19003094

TRAUMA AND FANTASY: THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM IN ANDREI KUREICHIK’S LIBERTÉ

Vesta Svendsen (Brown University) Vesta Svendsen (Brown University)

A verdant dreamscape of a film, Andrei Kureichik’s Liberté (1) was the director’s last work shot in Belarus before his abrupt flight in 2020 under threat of political persecution and imprisonment Filmed in a crumbling aristocratic chateau nestled in the fecundity of the forested Belarusian-Polish borderlands, the setting is as central as the protagonist Anna, the home’s reclusive occupant. A series of memento mori stilllifes and sweeping landscapes, Liberté’s imagery is heart-stoppingly haunting, alluding to a darkness beneath its seductive aesthetics. Following a summary of Liberté, the film is dissected psychoanalytically, defining mass psychic trauma and fragmentation, illustrating the portrayal of these concepts through Anna’s maternal world, and probing the film’s definition of freedom, to extend the metaphors to Kureichik’s statement about the Belarusian psyche Kureichik posits that true freedom lies in subjectivity, even that of self-delusion.

Anna’s world is stylized and solitary: she moves through painterly scenes within and without the chateau: over-ripe fruit juxtaposed with autumnal foliage and fog dancing atop rivers and fields. The landscape shots are reminiscent of the opening boat scene of Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (2), in which as if crossing the River Styx to the world of the dead, Lanzmann transports a Holocaust survivor on a slow-moving boat back to the site of his torment. Lanzmann’s rendering is breathtaking, until the viewer learns of the context of the journey. Bereft of temporality, the Belarusian landscape of Liberté is similarly achingly gorgeous, cradling Anna in her mysterious seclusion. Reminiscent of psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott’s “holding environment theory” (3), in which a mother provides an infant a space of safety between the psychological and the physical, facilitating for the child’s transition to autonomy - a liminal threshold between an inner and outer world, the forest is a holding environment for Anna However, her solitude is disturbed by Leon, a German Interpol investigator hunting for Anna’s husband (4). First appearing in Anna’s peripheral vision within the forest mist, Leon hands Anna her son’s Belarusian passport (5), introducing concrete reality into Anna’s dreamscape, and akin to Lanzmann, taking Anna on a journey into her abyss.

The audience learns that Anna holds her son Igor captive in the chateau’s basement until mother and son can depart to a place of liberté, égalité, fraternité (6) Fashioning a holding environment for Igor, Anna seeks to cure him of drug addiction. With Leon’s visits, the investigator questions Anna on her husband and son’s whereabouts, to which she responds with artistic flourishes devoid of temporality. Leon is seduced into Anna’s world of mythology and ritual, fantasizing himself into Anna’s primeval rendering of her marriage and motherhood. After Leon submits Anna to a polygraph test and interrogates her final meeting with her

1 Liberte, directed by Andrei Kureichik (2025), 1:45:20, https://www youtube com/watch?v=qq8FiN446Rw

2 Shoah, directed by Claude Lanzmann (1985), 9:26:00 United States: New Yorker Films

3 Stephen Seligman, “Holding and Containing: ‘The Metaphor of the Baby’ in Winnicott, Bion, and Klein,” Psychoanalytic Dialogues 35:1 (n d ): 46–54, https://doi org/10 1080/10481885 2024 2444197

4 Liberte, 11:20

5 Ibid 20:00

6 Ibid 33:22

TRAUMA AND FANTASY: THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM IN ANDREI KUREICHIK’S LIBERTÉ

Vesta Svendsen (Brown University) Vesta Svendsen (Brown University)

husband and son, Anna kills Leon during a love scene (7), shattering her reverie. The audience learns that her husband is a drug trafficker, upon discovery of whose stash, Igor developed his addiction Following Anna’s maternal failure to extract her son and cure him, Igor has committed suicide, spurring Anna’s sevenmonth seclusion in the forest chateau.

Psychoanalyst Samuel Gerson states that psychoanalysis centers upon “engagement with the fate of the unbearable – be it a wish, affect, or experience” (8). Since Freud’s early work, psychoanalysts have defined trauma as an experience of excessive excitation that overwhelms an individual’s psychic defenses and eludes symbolization and representation Psychoanalyst, Holocaust survivor, and founder of Yale’s Fortunoff Archive, Dori Laub invokes Lacan to describe trauma as “the real, nonassimilated experience that resists symbolization and language, experience that has not become speech and thus has not been historicized within the symbolic network of signification” (9). The victim struggles to put words to the experience in an internal narrative, for in Laub’s formulation, “One comes to know one's story only by telling it to oneself, to one's internal “thou”” (10) Laub quotes Melanie Klein: "not only does symbolism come to be the foundation of all fantasy and sublimation, but more than that, it is the basis of the subject's relation to the outside world and to reality in general" (11). Traumatic experiences skirt representation, including within one’s own internal narrative, resisting chronological integration into one’s story of oneself. Laub posits that traumatic events are encoded as a sort of external “movie,” splitting the survivor’s world into two:

… occurring "out there," not as an event related to an experiencing subject, the "I." It is likened to an external event dissociated from the narrator who has gone through it… they indeed live in two separate worlds, that of their traumatic memories (which is self-contained, ongoing, and ever-present) and that of the present Very often they do not Wish, or are completely unable, to reconcile these two different worlds (12).

Leading to the extremes of retention and forgetting, unintegrated traumas lead to gaps within the psyche, between the event and its representation, creating absences where distancing strategies defend against grappling with the unthinkable reality of the traumatic event.

In his 1914 work Remembering, repeating, and working through, Freud describes psychoses and maladaptive behaviors resulting from traumas as “repetition compulsions,” replaying the aspects of the

7 Ibid 1:31:00

8 Samuel Gerson, “When the Third Is Dead: Memory, Mourning, and Witnessing in the Aftermath of the Holocaust,” E International Journal of Psychoanalysis 90 (June 23, 2009): 1341, https://doi org/10 1111/j 1745-8315 2009 00214 x

9 Dori Laub, “Traumatic Shutdown of Narrative and Symbolization,” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 41:2 (2005): 316, https://doi org/10 1080/00107530 2005 10745863

10 Laub, “Traumatic Shutdown,” 315

11 Ibid 314

12 Italics added Ibid 311

TRAUMA AND FANTASY: THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM IN ANDREI KUREICHIK’S LIBERTÉ

Vesta Svendsen (Brown University) Vesta Svendsen (Brown University)

the trauma that elide representation, struggling to work through them, sometimes grasping for a different outcome: “ we may say that the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (13). Gerson argues, “with these patients, resistances are better understood as aversion to facing uncontainable pain, rather than as repression of unacceptable wishes” (14). To these individuals, “truth often resides in the reality of the absence, or, put another way, absence itself may become the abiding presence” (15).

Gerson expands André Green’s formulation of the “Dead Mother Syndrome” to encompass not just the loss of a mother, but the loss of the “good object,” a beloved being that gave an individual’s life meaning, without whom meaninglessness prevails. Green asserts that the loss of the good object is “a fundamental moment in the structuring of the human psyche, at which time a new relation to reality is introduced.”[1] He elaborates upon a vampiric dynamic in which the lost good object is maintained as a sort of phantom an absence that becomes a presence:

Dead and present, but present nonetheless. The subject can take care of her, attempt to awaken her, to cure her. But in return, if cured, she awakens and is animate and lives, the subject loses her again, for she abandons him to go about her own affairs, and to become attached to other objects—with the result that the subject is caught between two losses: presence in death, or absence in life Hence the extreme ambivalence concerning the desire to bring the dead mother back to life (17)

To process trauma, the survivor must not only overcome resistances to feeling and symbolizing the unthinkable but dislodge “whatever he has fabricated or taken in to fend off the terror of these inner voids:” (18) the stories we tell ourselves in order to live, whether ghostly attachments or idealized fantasy worlds. “What may even be far more difficult than overcoming resistances is to dislodge and evacuate the internalized empty world and pseudonarrative” (19)

In Liberté, Anna has not only experienced the mass psychic trauma of her son’s death and her husband’s abandonment, but the loss of her own identity as a wife and mother. In her fragmented psychic state, rather than symbolizing the reality of the trauma and her complicitous guilt in her son’s death, she lives out a fantasy, a repetition compulsion in which she fulfills the maternal function of caretaking Kureichik cites

13 Italics added Ibid

14 Italics added Gerson, “When the Third Is Dead,” 1344

15 Italics added Ibid 1346

16 Italics added Andre Green, “Chapter 7: The Dead Mother,” in On Private Madness (Taylor & Francis Group, 1996), 143, http://ebookcentral proquest com/lib/brown/detail action? docID=690114

17 Italics added Ibid 164

18 Italics added Laub, “Traumatic Shutdown,” 324

19 Italics added Ibid

TRAUMA AND FANTASY: THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM IN ANDREI KUREICHIK’S LIBERTÉ

Vesta Svendsen (Brown University) Vesta Svendsen (Brown University)

Descartes in stating, “I close my eyes, I plug my ears, and I am freed from all feelings,” describing Anna’s flight from the symbolization of her trauma into fantasy Truth, to Anna, resides in rehabilitating her phantom son’s ability to grow into a “free man ” Temporality is lost in her psychic fragmentation In her fantasy, Anna fulfils the maternal role in which she failed, nurturing Igor in a holding environment. Her phantom “good object,” she infantilizes Igor, and by holding him captive in the basement in her psuedonarrative, Anna prolongs his “presence in death” (20). It is not that she has forgotten reality, but rather that Igor’s presence as a phantom is real to her post-traumatic fragmented psyche. Her fantasy has filled the void between the experience and its representation When Leon threatens her pseudonarrative by forcing Anna to admit to having left Igor with his father, she kills Leon to defend against unbearable reality (21). In murdering Leon, Anna fulfils the maternal role of guarding her son as a phantom, in a way that she had not shielded Igor in reality.

Akin to Winnicott’s theory of the “holding environment” is Bion’s theory of containing (22), an infant projects intolerable feelings upon the mother, emotions that he or she screams rather than verbalizing, and rather than reacting, the mother contains the feelings, regurgitating the emotions back to the child in a tolerable manner, as words. Seeking containment within the landscape, a forest cannot put language to Anna’s pain, and she lives within a repetition compulsion, seeking a different outcome to her maternal story. The barrel of water, a motif throughout the film, embodies Anna’s longing for containment. When Leon tries to empty the barrel by stabbing it, Anna reacts frantically. A young boy the imago of a pre-addiction Igor, sits beside Anna at her barrel as she grieves the assault (23) Because in Gerson’s framework, for Anna, “truth often resides in the reality of the absence, or, put another way, absence itself may become the abiding presence” (24), Leon’s questioning and imposition of reality are intrusions against which Anna defends: they threaten her maternal world, forcing her to grapple with the loss of her son. Notably, throughout the film, both characters speak their mother tongues, she Russian, and Leon German, illustrating that while they can understand the surface meaning of one-another’s words, his rational mind cannot grasp Anna’s fantasy-reality and its necessity to her existence Nor can Leon serve as an effective witness to Anna’s trauma, containing the experience and feeding it back as language

Winnicott writes, “Between the mother who is physically holding the baby and the baby, there is a layer that we have to acknowledge which is an aspect of herself and at the same time an aspect of the baby” (25), describing a tertiary entity within any relationship, which Green dubs the “third.” To build a new construct

20 Green, “The Dead Mother,” 164

21 Liberte, 1:30:00

22 Seligman, “Holding and Containing ”

23 Liberte, 1:10:51

24 Gerson, “When the Third Is Dead,” 1346

25 Andre Green, “Thirdness and Psychoanalytic Concepts,” The

TRAUMA AND FANTASY: THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM IN ANDREI KUREICHIK’S LIBERTÉ

Vesta Svendsen (Brown University) Vesta Svendsen (Brown University)

of oneself after a trauma, the survivor requires a sympathetic witness who will provide a “live third,” helping to contain and symbolize the victim’s experience, making meaning of loss Gerson asserts: “In this seeming paradox it is not the relinquishments of mourning that ensure future life, but rather a courageous engagement with loss, absence, and death that does not aim toward an illusory end of ‘working through’ but toward the continuous challenge of living with” (26). It is symbolization through a new language that engages the phantoms, rather than banishing them, that creates a “live third.” In imposing external reality rather than engaging with the language of Anna’s pain her phantoms Leon fails as a witness.

In dubbing the film Liberté, Kureichik raises the question of defining true freedom Describing liberty, Anna relates a stylized rendering of Igor’s birth, relishing her pseudonarrative (27). Leon recalls the sense of peace he experienced in relinquishing objective truth for religious mythology beneath a tree in Jerusalem: freedom in delusion. Ultimately, in Liberté, freedom lies in subjectivity, even that of Anna’s fragmented fantasy in the wake of mass psychic trauma. Extrapolated to the Belarusian population, Kureichik’s formulation of freedom empowers the individual to grapple with liberté, égalité, fraternité, or alternative not to Freedom can exist in fantasy, cocooned in the fecund lushness of a primeval forest atop unintegrated layers of history.

26 Gerson, “When the Third Is Dead,” 1351

27 Liberte, 44:00

Yale European & Eurasian Studies Graduate Student Conference Journal 2025

YALE EUROPEAN EURASIAN STUDIE

Overview

6TH ANNUAL YALE EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES

TUESDAY

GRADUATE STUDENT CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

OLIVER WOLYNIEC

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

DAVID SIMON

VITA RASKEVICIUTE

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

SERGEI ANTONOV

KRISTOFERS KRUMINS

DRIANE LONGHURST

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

PANEL IV: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE SOUTH

CAUCASUS

SALOME MAMULADZE

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

LYDIA SMITH

JULIE A. GEORGE

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

YUNI ZENG

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

AGZAMKHON NIYAZKHODJAYEV

NICHOLAS PIERCE

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

PANEL VII: EUROPE'S ECONOMIC POLICY, TRADE, AND COMPETITIVENESS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL LANDSCAPE

CARLO GIANNONE

JUSTINE HAEKENS

L ABSTRACTS & BIOS

NOVSKIY

LILI VESSEREAU

DIMENSIONS OF LEADERSHIP: CHALLENGES ON THE GLOBAL AND LOCAL STAGES

WILLIAM HOPKINSON

NOAH LLOYD

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

CHRISTINA OH

JONATHAN BACH

PANEL IX: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

VALERIE BROWNE

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

DAVID CAMERON

PANEL ABSTRACTS & BIOS

MIKE YORK

ANDREI KUREICHYK

Papers by Panels

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

Paradise Lost

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

Plantations

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ABKHAZIA

Between Palms and Plantations

BEING HOMELAND: INDIGENEITY, POWER, DECOLONIZATION, AND PEACEBUILDING BETWEEN GEORGIA

AND ABKHAZIA

YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

Introduction

Collaborators and the Enemy: A Discourse Analysis

Collaborators and the Enemy: A Discourse Analysis

YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

YOUR OWN SENTENCE’ (1): UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE ON COLLABORATORS IN THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF RUSSIA’S FULL-SCALE INVASION

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

Alice Mee (Columbia University)

YEARS

Conclusions

Papers by Panels

SERFS

AND

CRITICS: FREEDOM,

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM,

Introduction

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES

SERFS AS INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL CRITICS: FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND STABILITY IN PRE-EMANCIPATION SERF NARRATIVES