Korean Unification From A European Perspective - Special Report

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

Dear Readers,

It is a great pleasure to present to you the issue of the Korean Unification from a European Perspective: Lessons from Poland and Europe Supporting Korea in Its Path Towards Unification, Special Report of the Korea Monitor project, funded by a UniKorea grant, financed by the UniKorea Foundation.

The goal of the Korean Unification from a European Perspective: Lessons from Poland and Europe Supporting Korea in Its Path Towards Unification, Special Report based on Polish history and Europe’s experience in unification and building a peaceful continent to create a comprehensive outlook on Korean Unification for an open public, researchers and policymakers.

In the Korea Monitor project, owing to the support of the UniKorea Foundation, we strived to contribute to the discourse on Korean unification through the organization of online discussions and the publication of analytical articles. Over the course of the project, we were able to bring together dozens of experts, researchers and journalists from Europe, and the Republic of Korea, who are committed to the issue of Korean unification and the relationships linking Poland and Europe with the Korean Peninsula. By sharing best practices and accumulated experience, we were able to present paths and processes which, based on European experience, may lead to Korean Unification.

With this Special Report, we would like to extend our gratitude to the UniKorea Foundation, for providing us, through the Korea Monitor project, with the opportunity to explore the European perspective on Korean unification and to the UniKorea team, especially Mr. Jin Seok Kwak and Ms. Jihee Lee, for their continued support.

We deeply believe that through initiatives like Korea Monitor project, by working together and supporting Korea in its efforts towards Unification, we can also contribute to the prosperity and peace of the Central European region.

Liliana Śmiech President of the Board

Photo: Dénes Szilágyi

Szymon Polewka Program Coordinator

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

친애하는 독자 여러분,

일과 나눔 재단의 지원으로 진행된 코리아 모니터 프로젝트의 특별 보고

서, “유럽의 관점으로 바라보는 한반도 통일: 폴란드와 유럽이 한국의 통

일 여정에 주는 교훈” 을 소개하게 되어 큰 영광입니다. “유럽의 관점으로 바라보는 한반도 통일: 폴란드와 유럽이 한국의 통일 여정에 주

는 교훈” 이라는 이 특별 보고서는, 폴란드의 역사와 유럽의 통일 및 평화로운 대

륙 건설 과정을 바탕으로 연구직 종사자, 정책 입안자들은 물론 일반 대중을 위 한 한국 통일에 대한 포괄적 전망 제시를 목표로 합니다. 바르샤바 연구소는 통일과 나눔 재단의 지원을 받은 코리아 모니터 프로젝트를 통해, 온라인 토론을 진행하고 연구지를 발행함으로써 한국 통일에 대한 담론에 기여하고자 했습니다. 프로젝트 기간 동안

대한민국의 다수의 전문가, 연 구자, 언론인을 한자리에 모아 한반도 통일 및 폴란드 한국 관계, 더 크게는 유럽 한국 관계를 돈독히하는 자리를 마련했습니다 유럽의 선례와 경험을 공유함으 로써, 한반도 통일로 이어질 수 있는 경로와 과정을 유럽의 경험을 바탕으로 하

여 제시할 수 있었습니다

이 특별 보고서를 통해, 코리아 모니터 프로젝트를 통해 한국 통일에 대한 유럽

의 관점을 탐구할 기회를 제공해 주신 것에 대한 깊은 감사를 통일과 나눔 재단 에 전합니다. 특히 곽진석 선생님과 이지희 선생님을 비롯한 통일과 나눔 팀 여러

분의 끊임없는 지원에 감사드립니다 덕분에 많은 도움을 받았습니다

앞으로도 코리아 모니터 프로젝트와 같은 이니셔티브를 통해서 한국의 통일을

위한 노력을 지원하고, 나아가 함께 협력함으로써 중앙유럽의 번영과 평화에도 기여할 수 있을 것이라고 굳게 믿습니다.

릴리아나 스미치 소장

시몬 폴레브카

프로그램 코디네이터

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

— SPECIAL REPORT —

© Copyright 2025

The Warsaw Institute Warsaw, Poland

Editorial Team:

Szymon Polewka

Translations:

Gaeun ‘Muriel’ Lee

Printing: www.sindruk.pl

Warsaw Institute

Publisher

Warsaw Institute Wilcza 9, 00-538 Warsaw, Poland

www.warsawinstitute.org

The project is funded by a UniKorea grant, financed by the UniKorea Foundation.

CONTENTS

The Kwangju and Poznań Uprisings: Struggles for Freedom and Democracy 9

Professor Grażyna Strnad

Lessons from Systemic Transformation in Poland: Implications for Korean Reunification 25 Sylwia Szyc, Ph.D.

The decommunization of public space as a process of shaping collective memory: the example of the Polish state in the context of the potential unification of the Korean states 42

Karol Starowicz

United in Division: Lessons from German Unification for Korea 58

Monika K. Kwiatkowska

A European model of institutionalization in the process of Korea unification 70 Han-Ul Chang

Grażyna Strnad

Professor, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, The Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Vice-President of the Polish Association of Korean Studies

The Kwangju and Poznań Uprisings: Struggles for Freedom and Democracy

Introduction

The memory of the events of the Kwangju Uprising (May 18-27, 1980) and the Poznań June 1956 Uprising (June 28-29, 1956) is of paramount importance for understanding the political history of Poland and South Korea, shaping their contemporary identity and national memory. Commemorating the events and people who gave their lives in the fight against authoritarian regimes is crucial for understanding the role of rebellion and social resistance during that period. The stories of known and unknown heroes not only remind us of the tragic events, but also have inspired subsequent

generations who fought for freedom, justice, and democratic change in social and political spaces. Monuments, memorial plaques, and museums are among the most visible and lasting ways of commemorating the past. In South Korea and Poland, you can find places dedicated to the memory of these events. For example, the 5-18 Memorial Park in Kwangju, or the Poznań Uprising Museum - June 1956, located in Poznań. These places are a symbolic remembrance of the events and people who gave their lives in the fight for freedom and democracy.

The Poznań Uprising – Poznań June 1956

After World War II, communist ideology was imposed across Central and Eastern Europe. The totalitarian communism built in the “people’s democracy” bloc countries led to the elimination of political pluralism and parliamentary democracy. The Communist Party exercised power in these countries through mass terror and intimidation of society, utilizing a widespread security apparatus. In the economic sphere, private property was abolished, collectivization of agriculture and industrialization were introduced, leading to a significant decline in living standards. In the cultural sphere, the cult of Joseph Stalin was imposed, the dominance of Marxist ideology was enforced, and Christian churches and anti-communist ideologies were combated. The transformation of communist systems occurred both from below and above. The basis of grassroots anti-totalitarian movements was the progressive reconstruction of bonds of social solidarity. This led to social revolts, during which demands were made for improved living conditions and the democratization of political life. This top-down de-Stalinization entailed a condemnation of the cult of personality, amnesty for political prisoners, reorganization of the security apparatus, and the introduction of reforms that were intended to safeguard against the “errors” and “distortions” of communism, but without undermining the system’s foundations. In the first years after the end of the war, throughout Polish society communists propagated the belief that the “new” Poland would be a state built on democratic prin-

ciples, while respecting Polish traditions. This was expressed by the existence of “opposition political parties,” such as the Polish People’s Party (Jankowiak, p. 11). In reality, the communists combated all forms of resistance and civil disobedience against the new government. By the early 1950s, almost all areas of political, social, economic, and cultural life were subordinated to communist ideology and the decisions of a single party – the Polish United Workers’ Party (Makowski, p. 14). A planned and centrally controlled economy was introduced, the spectacular success of which was to be the implementation of the Six-Year Plan (1950–1955). The implementation of this plan ignored the increasingly deteriorating material conditions of the population. From 1953 onward, there was a gradual decline in living standards, caused by reduced wages and increased labor standards. Working conditions deteriorated significantly, and problems arose in the supply of food and consumer goods. Such circumstances led to frustration and dissatisfaction among all segments of society, particularly in Poznań and Greater Poland. The collectivization policy in rural areas caused problems for farmers and owners of medium-sized and large farms. This resulted in reduced agricultural production and food shortages in Poznań’s stores. The newly established craft and supply cooperatives did not solve the problem of food shortages, especially meat (Makowski, p. 22). From August 1955 to May 1956, there was a constant shortage of butter and coal available for sale on the market. From July 1953, the Józef Stalin Poznań Works (then known as the Hipolit Cegielski Metal Industry

Plant) systematically raised labor standards, incorrectly calculated payroll taxes, and inefficiently managed the plants. The deepening problems led to growing dissatisfaction among the plant’s employees. The workers attempted to engage in dialogue with the authorities, including trips by employee representatives to Warsaw. The failure of the talks between the Poznań workers’ delegation and the central authorities, held in Warsaw on June 26, 1956, was the direct cause of the Poznań residents’ decision to take to the streets. The events that unfolded on the streets of Poznań on Thursday, June 28, 1956, resonated widely across the country and beyond. This was achieved thanks to foreign journalists who arrived at the 25th Poznań International Fair (Rybak, Reczek, p. 51). The demonstration gradually took on a national, anti-communist, and anti-Soviet character. Slogans included: “We want bread!”, “We are hungry!”, “Down with the exploitation of workers!”, “We want a free Poland!”, “Freedom!”, “Down with Bolshevism!”, “We demand free elections under UN control!”, “Down with the Russians!”, “Down with the communists!”, “Down with the red bourgeoisie!”, “We want God!”, and “We demand religion in schools!” Religious songs were also sung, which fueled patriotic sentiments (Łuczak, p. 3; Makowski, p. 66). News of the arrest of members of the workers’ delegation caused the previously peaceful crowd to launch a physical attack on a prison in the center of Poznań in order to free the supposedly arrested delegates. The demonstrators then entered the building of the City Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party located on Mickiewicz Street. At the same time, some workers marched on Jan Kochanowski Street to the building of the Voivodeship Office for Public Security, a symbol of citizen oppression and a site of widespread terror. The first shots were fired from the office’s windows, igniting street fighting in Poznań. The demonstrators’ seizure of weapons led to an exchange of fire between workers and communist state officials in front of the Voivodeship Office for Public Security, lasting until late

in the evening. On June 29th, most factories in Poznań remained closed. The authorities decided to suppress the workers’ revolt with military force. The pacification of the rebellious city, which lasted for the next two days, was led by Deputy Minister of National Defense, Army General Stanisław Popławski. On the evening of June 29th, Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz, in his famous radio address to the residents of Poznań, said that “any provocateur or madman who dares to raise his hand against the people’s government should be sure that the people’s government will chop it off [...]” (Łuczak, p. 5). Historians disagree on the actual death toll of the Poznań June 1956 events. In 1981, it was estimated that 74 people died. The latest research indicates 57 victims, while the Institute of National Remembrance estimates the number of victims at 58. Scholarly literature describing these events also reported 100 fatalities, but this has not been fully confirmed by sources. The youngest victim of the Poznań June was 13-year-old Romek Strzałkowski. It is also estimated that approximately 650 people were injured in the fighting (Łuczak, p. 5). Participants in the Poznań demonstration were deemed enemies of the state. On the night of June 28-29, officers of the Office of Security and the Citizens’ Militia conducted an arrest operation against the most active participants. The communist authorities launched numerous investigations, during which confessions were extracted by force, before the “guilty” demonstrators were subsequently tried and punished. In 1957, before the first anniversary of the Poznań June uprising, Władysław Gomułka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, ordered that these events be kept to a minimum in public spaces. Official commemorations of the first anniversary of the Poznań uprising were to be kept understated. However, in June 1957, the Poznań Church, led by the newly appointed Archbishop Antoni Baraniak, commemorated the victims of the Poznań June Uprising during ceremonial services (Zieliński, p. 347). It is also worth emphasizing

POZNAŃ JUNE UPRISING, 1956, SOURCE: HTTPS://UPLOAD.WIKIMEDIA.ORG/WIKIPEDIA/COMMONS/8/8F/POZNAN_1956.JPG

that one of the first initiatives undertaken by members of the newly organized the “Solidarity” Trade Union in Poznań was the project of erecting a monument commemorating the events of 25 years earlier. For this purpose, the Social Committee for the Construction of the Poznań June 1956 Monument was established. The monument was officially unveiled on June 28, 1981, on the anniversary of the events. On June 28, 1981, Archbishop Jerzy Stroba consecrated the monument (the so-called Poznań Crosses), praying with a crowd of the faithful for the victims of communist terror. After martial law

was imposed in Poland on December 13, 1981, the monument became a symbol of remembrance and opposition to the communist regime (Dabertowa, Lenartowski, p. 64). Commemorating the workers’ revolt of June 28, 1956, was one of the most important postulates of the Poznań “Solidarity” Movement. Pope John Paul II, who visited Poznań during his pilgrimage to Poland in 1983, was not permitted by the communist authorities to pray at the Poznań Crosses. Cultivating the memory of the Poznań June 1956 protests became possible only after the fall of the People’s Republic of Poland and the birth of the Third

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

POZNAŃ JUNE UPRISING, 1956,

SOURCE: HTTPS://ARCHIWUM.IPN.GOV.PL/PL/ARCHIW/ARCHIWALIA/ARCHIWALIA1/31594,POZNANSKI-CZERWIEC-1956-NA-ARCHIWALNYCH-FOTOGRAFIACH.HTML

MONUMENT TO THE VICTIMS OF JUNE 1956, SOURCE: : HTTP://MONUMENTS-REMEMBRANCE.EU/ PL/PANSTWA/POLSKA/416-POMNIK-POZNANSKIEGO-CZERWCA-1956

THE POZNAŃ UPRISING MUSEUM, POZNAŃ, SOURCE: HTTPS://WWW.DREAMSTIME.COM/POZNAN-POLANDAPRIL-LARGE-METAL-MONUMENT-OUTSIDE-STONE-MUSEUMBUILDING-COMMEMORATING-POZNA%C5%84-JUNE-PROTESTSOUTDOOR-SCULPTURE-IMAGE374687473

Polish Republic. The struggle of the democratic opposition and the “Solidarity” trade union to commemorate the Poznań June 1956 protests was part of a nationwide process that characterized the years 1976–1989. In the undemocratic state of the Polish People’s Republic, the memory of the past became a site of great political struggle. Ultimately, the Poznań Solidarity Movement, despite adversity and obstacles from the communist authorities, managed to preserve and cultivate the memory of the Poznań June 1956 uprising. The events of 1989 set Poland on a path of fundamental change that forever altered its political, social, and economic landscape. A key event of that time was the Round Table Talks, initiating dialogue between the communist government and the opposition. Representatives from various backgrounds participating in the talks jointly developed a direction for change that would contribute to the construction of a democratic Poland. Over the past three decades, Poland

has undergone a remarkable transformation, from an authoritarian state to a democratic one (Gomułka, p. 7-16). During this turbulent journey to democracy, the memory of the Poznań June 1956 uprisings was preserved, events that became a history lesson for future generations of Poles fighting for human rights, freedom, and democracy. Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, a Polish journalist and political activist, said during his visit to Poznań in 1996: “If there had been no June Thursday in Poznań, there would have been no Polish October. If there had been no revolution in 1956, which without leadership and organization would have limited itself to what could have been won at the time, there would have been neither the workers’ December of 1970, nor August of 1980, nor Solidarity. There would have been no epochal events of 1989–1990, which brought independence, freedom, and democracy to Poland and its neighbors. It all began here” (Kwilecki, p. 276).

The Kwangju Uprising

The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, exposed internal divisions within the military (Strnad, p. 204). It turned out that the South Korean armed forces were divided into two opposing factions. One faction, composed of military leaders, advocated the military’s withdrawal from politics, while the other advocated continuing Park’s policies. The former faction included both officers trained in the Japanese Imperial Army and graduates of the Korean Military Academy (KMA). Generally, these officers shared the inclination of not having participated in the persecution of the opposition during Park’s rule, and therefore, had no need to fear repercussions from the civilian government. The latter faction consisted primarily of politicized KMA officers, most of whom were members of the intelligence and national security services. Most of them had been involved in political repression, investigations, interrogations, and even torture. After Park’s death, fearing reprisals because of their actions, these politicized officers advocated for the continuation of the Yusin system or the introduction of a civilian government under the supervision of military officers. The pro-Yusin group, known as the “New Military,” was headed by Brigadier General Chun Doo Hwan, head of the Defense and Security Command, who was entrusted with investigating Park’s assassination. The New Military also included officers belonging to a private, secret organization known as the One Group (Hanahoe), as well as military commanders loyal to President Park Chung Hee. Ultima-

tely, a surprise coup, orchestrated by Chun Doo Hwan and General Roh Tae Woo, commander of the 9th Army Division, who was based in Seoul, took place on the night of December 12, 1979, ushering in another chapter of authoritarian politics in South Korea. The events of December 12th marked an internal military coup and the seizure of power in the South Korean Army by uncompromising officers. This radically changed the political situation in the country. The pro-authoritarian military faction, led by Chun, staunchly opposed any attempts at democratic change and took actions that perpetuated the continuation of authoritarian system (Strnad, p.

205-207). The New Military quickly began consolidating power. In April 1980, Chun Doo Hwan was elected to be acting director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which sparked a massive wave of student-organized demonstrations demanding Chun’s resignation, the resignation of the prime minister, the lifting of martial law, and a condemnation of the Yusin system. In response to the protests, Chun Doo Hwan accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Sin Hyŏn-hwak and his cabinet and soon established his own government. However, the demonstrations escalated. On May 15, approximately 100,000 students from thirty Seoul universities participated. At the urging of political opposition leaders Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, fearing military intervention, the students decided to cancel the planned demonstrations. Two days later, concerned about public sentiment, representatives of the New Military also imposed

MAY 18, 1980,

SOURCE: HTTPS://WWW.RCPBML.ORG.UK/WWIE-23/WW23-15/WW23-15-02.HTM

martial law on Cheju Island. Political activities were banned, press, radio, and television censorship was imposed, and all colleges and universities were closed. The new military also arrested potential presidential candidates Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil and placed Kim Young Sam under house arrest. Other anti-government opposition leaders were also imprisoned (Plunk, p. 5). The government’s campaign to “cleanse society” of “pro-communist rebels” was based on authoritarian laws: the National Security Act (1948) and the Anti-Communist Act (1961). Kim Dae Jung’s hometown of Kwangju, located in South Jeolla Province, soon became a center of political action. The events were officially described as a communist plot to overthrow the South Korean government. On the morning of May 18th, a small group of students from Jeonam University in Kwangju demanded the release of Kim Dae Jung and the lifting of martial law, while confronting a contingent of commandos sent to the city by Chong Ho-yong, commander of the Special Forces Division. Kwangju residents also supported the student protest (Katsiaficas , Na,

p. 12). Convinced by their commanders that Kwangju had been taken over by the communists, soldiers armed with bayonets launched a brutal attack on demonstrators and bystanders, wounding and killing many. After two days of devastating clashes, students, aided by Kwangju residents, began to take control of the city. On May 21st, student activities escalated, forcing the commandos to retreat. Anti-government demonstrations began to spread to neighboring cities. During an attempt to negotiate a ceasefire, Kwangju was surrounded by a cordon of thousands of soldiers. The stalemate in the negotiations lasted several days, and on May 27th, South Korean Army forces, acting on order from the New Military, finally pacified the citizen army in Kwangju. According to official figures, 200 people died. However, witnesses to the tragedy claim that over 2,000 city residents lost their lives. The New Military gained increasing control over the state. On May 31, 1980, the Extraordinary Committee for State Security was established, headed by Chun Doo Hwan. Generals Roh Tae Woo and Chŏng Ho-Yong became members

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

MEMORIAL HALL. PHOTOS OF THE VICTIMS OF THE GWANGJU MASSACRE, SOURCE: HTTPS://WWW.RCPBML.ORG.UK/WWIE-23/WW23-15/WW23-15-02.HTM

MANGWOL-DONG CEMETERY IN GWANGJU WHERE VICTIMS’ BODIES WERE BURIED, SOURCES: HTTPS://COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG/WIKI/FILE:MANGWOL-DONG-CEMETERY.JPG

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

MAY 18 MINJUNG STRUGGLE MEMORIAL TOWER, SOURSE: HTTPS://COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG/WIKI/FILE:MAY_18TH_MEMORIAL_MONUMENT.JPG

of the committee. The committee’s task was to assume complete oversight of all state functions and authorities. Based on one of its decisions, Kim Dae Jung and other opposition activists were tried in a military court for allegedly planning “treason,” and numerous members of parliament and political parties were also banned from political activity. The Kwangju Massacre was a turning point in the long struggle for democracy in South Korea. It was an expression of civic rebellion, opposition to military dictatorship, and a symbol of the courage and sacrifice of

young Koreans (Hwang, Lee, Jeon, p. 215). The Kwangju Uprising is alternatively referred to as the May 18 Kwangju Democratization Movement, the Kwangju Democratization Struggle, or the May 18 Democratic Uprising. The Kwangju Uprising became a catalyst for a full-fledged democratic movement in the 1980s. The Kwangju Uprising has been depicted in South Korean filmography, as a testament to the tragedy of both the individual and society. The most famous production about Kwangju Uprising is the television series The Hourglass, directed by Kim Jonghak.

The Politics of Democratic Transition: The Cases of Republic of Korea and Poland – Struggles for Freedom and Democracy

Korea is far from Poland, however, despite the significant geographic distance, there are historical similarities. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and Poland on November 1, 1989, initiated a dynamic development of mutual contacts. Poland recognizes the Republic of Korea as one of its main strategic partners in the East Asian region. South Korea is considered a democratic country, with advanced technology, an innovative economy and an attractive culture. In Korea, there is also an interest in Polish culture, folklore and music. Koreans and Poles are two proud nations that have gone from authoritarian rule to democracy. The democratic transitions of the Republic of Korea and Poland at the end of the twentieth century offer political scientists a rich history suited for comparative study. Scholarly literature on modes of transition is very

diverse. Samuel Huntington’s model of transition, called transplacement, describes cooperative democratization as result of joint action by government and opposition groups. This is the variety exhibited in the political behaviors in both the Republic of Korea and Poland. “Pact,” “negotiated transition” or “compromise” describe the central features of this model of transition. In transplacement, change occurs within and outside the incumbent elite and reforms occur through cooperation between the old elites and the opposition (Strnad, p. 36). In this form of democratic transition, within the government, there is often a balance between those who seek reform and those who are uncompromising. This balance results in conflict within the government, which must be contested, that is pushed and pulled into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition.

Republic of Poland

Poland’s democratic transition was precipitated by social reactions to economic conditions in the 1970s. Poland’s government raised food prices while wages stagnated. This and other stresses led to the June 1976 protests and subsequent government crackdown on dissent. Labor unions formed an important group within the opposition. In 1979, the Polish economy shrank for the first time since World War II by 2 percent. The foreign debt reached around 18 billion dollars US by 1980. The labor union Solidarity emerged on August 31, 1980 in Gdańsk at the Lenin Shipyards when the communist government of Poland signed the agreement allowing for its existence. On September 17, 1980, over twenty inter-factory founding committees of free trade unions merged at a congress into one national organization. Solidarity officially registered on November 10, 1980. Lech Wałęsa and other opposition leaders formed a broad anti-Soviet social movement ranging from people associated with the Catholic Church to members of the anti-Soviet left. Democratic transition in Poland revolved around Solidarity, which continuously confronted the communist regime during the 1980s. Solidarity advocated non-violence in its members’ activities (Brzechczyn, p. 172). In September 1981 Solidarity’s first national congress elected Wałęsa as the president and adopted a republican program, the “Self-governing Republic”. The government attempted to destroy the union with martial law in 1981. After several years of repression, the government commenced negotiating with the union. In Poland, the Roundtable Talks between

the government and Solidarity-led opposition led to semi-free elections in 1989. The “Round Table Agreement” was signed on April 4, 1989. The most important demands were: (1) legalization of independent trade unions; (2) the introduction of the office of President (thereby annulling the power of the Communist party general secretary), who would be elected to a 6-year term; and (3) the formation of a Senate. As a result, real political power was vested in a newly created legislature and in a president who would be the chief executive. Solidarity became a legitimate and legal political party. Free elections to 35% of the seats in the Sejm and an entirely free election to the Senate was assured. The 4 June 1989 election brought a landslide victory to Solidarity: 99% of all the seats in the Senate and all of the 35% possible seats in Sejm were won by Solidarity (Kowalski, p. 28). General Wojciech Jaruzelski, whose name was the only one the  Communist Party allowed on the ballot for the presidency, won by just one vote in the National Assembly. The system that allowed only 35% of the seats to be contested was soon abolished as well, after the first truly free Sejm elections. The founding election in the new Polish democracy was held as a two-part ballot on June 4 and 18, 1989. After a deal worked out with Solidarity’s leader, Lech Walesa, the National Assembly, formed by the Sejm and the Senate, elected General Wojciech Jaruzelski as president. Some years earlier, in 1981, Jaruzelski served as Prime Minister and Secretary of the Polish United Worker’s Party. This was the same General Jaruzelski who had resorted to martial law to put a stop to Solidarity

and avoid the Soviet Union from intervening in Poland as seemed likely at the time. The Round Table sessions were of momentous importance to the future political developments in Poland. They paved the way to a free and democratic Poland as well as the final abolition of communism in Poland (Musiał, p. 1-8). By the end of August 1989, a Solidarity-led coalition government was formed and in December Tadeusz Mazowiecki was elected Prime Minister. One of the greatest sources of support for the opposition movement to the communist regime was the Polish Catholic Church, especially after the visit to Poland in 1979 by the former archbishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyla, who was Pope John Paul II by then.

When the strike led by Walesa broke out the following year in the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk, the movement that would give rise to Solidarity with ten million members, owed as much to the importance of the Catholic Church in Polish society as to the unique alliance of intellectuals and workers that had put together the Workers’ Defense Committee, after both sides, in 1968 and 1970, had lived through the bitter experience of isolation in their respective confrontations with the regime (Friszke, p. 11). In 1990, Wojciech Jaruzelski left office, and Lech Walesa was elected as the new president in December with the direct votes of the Polish people.

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

The successful transition to democracy in a country without a democratic tradition made the Republic of Korea one of the more interesting cases of democratic transition among the countries that have undergone the transition to democracy as part of the third wave of global democratization. Historically, despite the trappings of democratic politics during the First Republic, the rather abrupt establishment of a democratic government without significant participation by the South Koreans themselves in 1948 created a superficial character in the representational side of the process (Dziak, Strnad, p. 44-52). The disillusionment with the Rhee Syngman presidency led, in 1960, to a new constitution which provided for a parliamentary form of government with a bicameral National Assembly. With the explicit goal of developing a democratic system that would prevent the abuses of power experienced during the Rhee administration, the new constitution greatly reduced the role of the president while expanding individual freedoms of assembly

and association (Kim, p. 41). The experiment of the Second Republic ended in 1961, replaced by a military junta led by Major General Park Chung Hee, ushering in an extended period of strong military influence in South Korean politics. After a nearly two-year period of transition under the control of a military junta led by Park, the Third Republic was established in 1963. A new constitution with a strong presidential system and a weakened National Assembly was adopted through national referendum. By the end of the 1960s, with Park taking full credit for a rapidly growing economy, a national referendum was held to approve an amendment to the constitution to allow for a third presidential term (Park, p. 110-115). In 1971, Park won the presidential election over Kim Dae-Jung, who was portrayed by the Park campaign as being ‘pro-Communist’. However, the relatively close margin of victory (53.2 to 45.3 percent) was at least a partial motivation for Park to insulate himself, in the name of national security, from ever facing elections again. In October 1972, Park declared martial

law, dissolved the National Assembly, banned political parties and closed all national universities and colleges in the name of “developing democratic institutions best suited for Korea”. Following the declaration of martial law, the constitution was again amended and ratified through a national referendum. The new constitution, which was referred to as Yushin (revitalization), ushered in the Fourth Republic and a new era of repression in which Park became increasingly isolated and indifferent to criticism of the government. By 1979, when Park was assassinated by his KCIA director, the country was once again being torn apart by violent street demonstrations led by students but increasingly supported by a rapidly growing middle class (Dziak, Strnad, p. 145-147). When Park died, there was no viable mechanism to replace him. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite an attempt by the interim government to revise democratic processes and eliminate the more draconian measures of the Yushin system, another military junta, this time led by General Chun Doo Hwan, took control of the central government in the name of ensuring national security. Once again, martial law was declared in the spring of 1980. This resulted in the May 18 Democratic Uprising in the city of Kwangju, which was put down by the New Military. During martial law, the National Assembly was dissolved, and political parties were banned for nearly a year while a new constitution was developed to serve as the basis for the Fifth Republic. With the new constitution completed, a newly formed electoral committee elected Chun as president for a seven-year term and National Assembly elections were held in 1981. In many respects, Chun’s tenure was a shortened replay of the Park era in that the government maintained tight control over both economic development through the conglomerate patronage system and was highly repressive in its attempts to control an increasingly large segment of the population that was resorting to street demonstrations (Suh, p. 109). In the absence of a meaningful system for aggregating political demands, the newly expanded middle class was

more willing to support increasingly violent demonstrations by students and labor unions. One important difference was that from the beginning Chun promised to work towards a peaceful transfer of power at the end of his tenure. Despite attempts by Chun to create a party system that would ensure the ruling party would retain power after the transition, by 1985 the opposition party, the New Democratic Party, led by Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam, was receiving impressive levels of public support. Ultimately, emboldened by growing pressure from assertive street protests during June 1-29, 1987, which became known as the June Democratic Struggle, Chun and his handpicked successor and military academy classmate Roh Tae-Woo recognized the need for change. On June 29, 1987, Roh Tae-woo promised to institute direct presidential elections, among other initiatives; this is considered the defining moment in the transition. Indeed, with its spectacular economic growth under the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan in the 1970s and 1980s followed by the increase in civil protest supported by the new middle class, South Korea served as a textbook example of the economic preconditions theory of democratic transition. South Korea also represented a classic case for those interested in the cultural aspects of democratic transitions (Im p. 7-8). A new constitutional amendment was ratified by the National Assembly on October 12, 1987, and was submitted to a referendum to the South Korean public on October 27. 93% of voters cast ballots in favor of the amendment, which permitted the direct, democratic election of the President of South Korea. The presidential election was held in South Korea on December 16, 1987. This led to the democratization of the country and the establishment of the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae-woo, ending the military dictatorship that had ruled the country since 1981. Roh won the election with 37% of the vote; voter turnout was 89.2%. The transplacement of ruling authoritarian regimes with democratic systems in both Poland and the Republic of Korea share some

interesting similarities: growing demands and assertiveness of civil society, periods of heavy-handed repression followed by liberalization on the part of the authoritarian governments, and finally, negotiated pacts or agreements between

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Lessons from Systemic Transformation in Poland: Implications for Korean Reunification

At the end of the 1980s, Poland embarked on a path of significant political and economic transformation, leading to a peaceful transition from a communist system with a centrally planned economy to a democracy and a free market. This process demonstrated that profound systemic change is possible through negotiation and social compromise, without resorting to violence. However, this transformation came with severe social and economic costs that have shaped the experiences of Poles for decades, with consequences that are still felt today.

The report outlines the origins and progression of Poland’s systemic transformation—from the debt crisis of the 1970s, through the rise of “Solidarity” and the period of martial law, to the Round Table negotiations and the reforms of 1989. The aim is not only to analyze these events within the context of Polish history but also to assess what lessons and experiences might be valuable for the potential process of Korean reunification, taking into account the different political, economic, and cultural realities.

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

Modernization on Credit

In December 1970, following the violent suppression of workers’ protests on the Coast and the resignation of Władysław Gomułka 1, Edward Gierek replaced him as the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). He announced his vision for “the second Poland”—a modern and prosperous nation that prioritized improved quality of life, increased consumption, and industrial modernization. This ambitious plan was primarily financed through loans from Western countries, along with the importation of technology and affordable raw materials from the USSR. The prevailing policy of détente in East-West relations helped facilitate this strategy, although the assessment of Poland’s creditworthiness was rather superficial 2 .

The early 1970s in Poland saw an improvement in living standards, marked by housing development, greater availability of previously scarce goods, and expanding infrastructure. The slogan “for Poland to grow stronger and for people to live more prosperously” captured the optimism of the early Gierek era. Rapid growth in consumption and investment suggested that Poland was beginning to catch up with Western

countries. However, much of this growth was financed through debt directed at consumption and low-yield investments, while the centrally planned economy struggled with low productivity, inefficiency, and inflexibility 3 .

The economic situation deteriorated during the crises of the 1970s, particularly the 1973 oil shock and rising interest rates. Debt servicing costs surged, and access to new credit became limited, creating a debt trap. Reform attempts, such as the 1976 price increases, triggered widespread social unrest, culminating in strikes and protests 4

In October 1978, Polish Cardinal, Karol Wojtyła, was elected Pope, taking the name John Paul II. His election was unexpected by the communist authorities and increasingly alarming, as a fellow Pole with immense moral authority now led the Catholic Church in a country where religion played a central societal role. John Paul II quickly became a symbol of hope and spiritual support for millions, challenging the party’s ideological monopoly and strengthening oppositional sentiment.

The decade also brought significant ideologi-

1. See also: Zbigniew Branach, Grudniowe wdowy czekają (Wrocław: Europa, 1990); idem, Pierwszy grudzień Jaruzelskiego (Torun: Agencja Reporterska „Cetera”, 1998); Grudzień 1970 w dokumentach MSW, selection, introduction, and ed. J. Eisler (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2000); Bogumiła Danowska, Grudzień 1970 roku na Wybrzeżu Gdańskim. Przyczyny – przebieg – reperkusje (Pelplin: Wyd. Diecezji Pelplińskiej „Bernardinum”, 2000); Andrzej Głowacki, Kryzys polityczny 1970 roku (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 2000); Jerzy Eisler, Grudzień 1970. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje, 2nd ed. (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2012).

2. Aleksandra Komornicka, Poland and European East-West Cooperation in the 1970s: the opening up (London–New York: Routledge, 2024), 44, 56-61.

3. See also: Andrzej Karpiński, “Drugie uprzemysłowienie Polski – prawda czy mit?,” in Dekada Gierka. Wnioski dla obecnego okresu modernizacji Polski, ed. K. Rybiński (Warszawa: Uczelnia Vistula, 2011), 13–26; Paweł Bożyk, “Cywilizacyjne skutki ‘otwarcia’ Polski na Zachód,” in Dekada Gierka..., 5–12.

4. Paweł Sasanka, Czerwiec 1976. Geneza – przebieg – konsekwencje (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2006).

cal shifts. A new generation of communists, shaped by post-war realities and more focused on pragmatic governance than revolutionary ideals, rose to positions of leadership. Simultaneously, Marxism-Leninism’s role as a legi-

timizing ideology diminished. Bureaucratization, entrenched social inequalities, and the gap between propaganda and everyday experience further eroded the appeal of the official ideology5 .

The Birth of “Solidarity” (August 1980)

In 1980, in response to a severe economic crisis and rising prices, Poland experienced a wave of strikes, the most significant of which took place at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk 6 . The workers put forward demands that included not only economic issues, such as wage increases, but also political demands. These included the right to create independent trade unions free from government control, the right to strike, freedom of speech and assembly, and the release of political prisoners 7. The prospect of a general strike became increasingly apparent.

A pivotal development was the creation of the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee in Gdańsk, which brought together over 250 workplaces and approximately 700,000 workers nationwide 8. At its head stood the charismatic leader Lech Wałęsa.

On August 29, 1980, during a meeting of the Political Bureau, the I Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR, Edward Gierek, acknowledged that in this situation “one must choose the lesser evil and then try to get out of it.” 9. The party leadership was aware of the seriousness

WAŁĘSA’S SPEECH, AUGUST 1980: SOURCE: SOLIDARITY AUGUST 1980 GATE OF GDAŃSK, WIKIPEDIA: HTTPS://PL.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/WIKI/WYBORY_ PARLAMENTARNE_W_POLSCE_W_1989_ROKU#/MEDIA/ PLIK:WYBPAR1989.JPG

5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 48.

6. See: Andrzej Paczkowski, Droga do „mniejszego zła”. Strategia i taktyka obozu władzy lipiec 1980‒styczeń 1982 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2002), 20–62; Anna Machcewicz, Bunt. Strajki w Trójmieście. Sierpień 1980 (Gdańsk: Europejskie Centrum Solidarności, 2015).

7. Krzysztof Brzechczyn, Umysł solidarnościowy. Geneza i ewolucja myśli społeczno-politycznej „Solidarności” w latach 1980-1989 (Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2022), pp. 113–.

8. Tomasz Kozłowski, Anatomia rewolucji. Narodziny ruchu społecznego „Solidarność” w 1980 roku (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017), 425.

9. Zbigniew Włodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego. PZPR a „Solidarność” 1980–1981 (London, 1992), 84.

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

of the threat to maintaining its power, and the “lesser evil” became accepting the strike demand for the creation of independent trade unions. This solution was also tacitly accepted by Moscow 10 .

On August 31, 1980, the Gdańsk Agreements were signed, leading to the creation of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (NSZZ

Martial Law in Poland

The decision to choose the “lesser evil” placed the party authorities in a particularly challenging position. The actions of Solidarity were incompatible with the monopoly held by the PZPR, creating ongoing tensions and undermining the foundation of the existing political order. From the authorities’ perspective, maintaining the status quo required neutralizing Solidarity and reestablishing complete regime control over political and social life.

The domestic situation was further complicated by economic difficulties. By 1981, Poland’s foreign debt had reached levels beyond its repayment capacity, effectively forcing the state to suspend payments to foreign creditors—Poland was, in effect, bankrupt. In 1980, the debt was around $24 billion. In response to the crisis, negotiations with Western creditors were initiated to defer repayment schedules 12

The Soviet Union was determined to prevent events in Poland from spiraling out of control.

Solidarność), the first mass organization in the Eastern Bloc independent of the communist party11. The union quickly gained immense social support, reaching around 10 million members at its peak, including individuals previously associated with the state apparatus.

Moscow exerted political and economic pressure on Warsaw, employing a range of measures— from threatening military intervention and supporting pro-Soviet factions within the PZPR to restricting the supply of raw materials and financial aid. Crucially, the Kremlin’s goal was to compel the Polish authorities to suppress Solidarity and stabilize the country through their own actions, without direct Soviet military involvement, while ensuring that Poland’s political direction remained firmly aligned with Moscow’s interests 13 .

In February 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski became Prime Minister while also serving as Minister of National Defense and, starting in October, as First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee. Under intense pressure from Moscow, the Polish authorities imposed martial law during the night of December 12-13, 1981. Military units were deployed in cities, a curfew was enacted, and thousands of oppo-

10. A. Paczkowski, Wojna polsko-jaruzelska. Stan wojenny, czyli kontrrewolucja generałów (Warszawa: Wielka Litera, 2021), 45-46.

11. The literature on NSZZ “Solidarność” is extensive; see among others: NSZZ „Solidarność” 1980–1989, vols. 1–7, ed. Ł. Kamiński, G. Waligóra (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010); Tomasz Kozłowski, Anatomia rewolucji. Narodziny ruchu społecznego „Solidarność” w 1980 roku (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017); Marcin Zaremba, Wielkie rozczarowanie. Geneza rewolucji Solidarności (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak Horyzont, 2023).

12. Maciej Bałtowski, Gospodarka socjalistyczna w Polsce (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2009), 243.

13. The economic forms of Soviet pressure on Poland in 1980–1981 are analysed in detail in Tomasz Kozłowski, „Banki groźniejsze niż tanki”. Mechanizmy gospodarczego nacisku Związku Sowieckiego na Polskę (1980–1981), Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 40, no. 2 (2022): 487–507.

sition activists were interned 14 . Internationally, Poland faced economic and political sanctions from Western nations, further deepening the crisis. Solidarity was initially suspended and later outlawed, although some activists continued underground activities, albeit with diminished social support 15. Society, exhausted by declining living standards, experienced a sense of stagnation and hopelessness, which weakened participation in opposition movements.

While martial law temporarily enabled the authorities to regain control, Poland’s economic situation continued to worsen. Industrial production steadily declined, and inflation rose significantly. Typically, these trends would trigger strong social unrest. However, martial

law allowed the authorities to implement price increases, including a roughly 2.5-fold rise in food prices. Although minimum wages were partially increased, real wages fell by about 25%.

Martial law temporarily subdued social resistance and restored government control, but it did not solve Poland’s economic or political problems. Worsening living conditions and repressive measures weakened opposition activity and deepened public distrust of the regime. When martial law was lifted in July 1983, the country remained in crisis, with growing social and political tensions that would once again bring the authorities into conflict with the opposition in the following years.

Between Perestroika and Crisis: The End of the PRL

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was sinking deeper into an escalating economic crisis, further exacerbated by the 1986 oil market crash, which deprived the state of a significant portion of its revenues. After assuming the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a process of limited reforms in the USSR, conducted under the banners of glasnost (openness), perestroika (restructuring), and uskorenie (acceleration).

A key element of the new policy was the decision to reduce economic aid to satellite states, so as not to further burden the Soviet economy, already in

recession. In return, Moscow allowed individual countries the possibility of implementing their own economic reforms, while simultaneously emphasizing the need to maintain close political and economic ties within the Eastern Bloc. At the same time, the Kremlin gradually moved away from the Brezhnev Doctrine, limiting the possibility of direct military interventions in bloc countries. Instead of military threats, measures such as tension de-escalation, improvement of relations with the West, and economic pressure— used as a form of leverage over allies—became more common 16 .

The year 1986 is often regarded as a symbolic beginning of the communist system’s collapse in

14. More about martial law in Poland (1981-1983). See: Andrzej Paczkowski, Wojna polsko-jaruzelska. Stan wojenny, czyli kontrrewolucja generałów, Wielka Litera, Warszawa 2021; Antoni Dudek, „Obóz władzy w okresie stanu wojennego,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 2 (2002): 236–239.

15. A. Dudek, Reglamentowana rewolucja. Rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988-1990 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak Horyzont, 2014), 54.

16. T. Kozłowski, „Laboratorium pierestrojki? Generał Jaruzelski na geopolitycznej szachownicy,” Polska 1944/45–1989. Studia i Materiały 20 (2022): 219-244.

KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

Poland. According to Lech Wałęsa, leader of Solidarity, that year “(…) in many ways emerged as a time of breakthrough. The authorities still, of course, bared their teeth, but numerous signs of decay were already visible in them.” 17 .

Amnesty was granted to some political prisoners, a Consultative Council and the office of the Ombudsman were established. In November 1987, a nationwide referendum was held on economic reforms, which included greater enterprise autonomy, the development of commercial banking, and the issuance of bonds 18 . This represented an attempt to introduce elements of a market economy into a centrally planned

system. The West applied conditional financial pressure on Poland, conditioning debt renegotiation and the granting of new loans on steps toward democratization of political life 19 .

The authorities deliberately liberalized certain areas of social life, such as allowing Western films in cinemas and on television and relaxing social norms, in order to reduce tensions and divert citizens’ attention from economic problems 20 Additionally, travel abroad—for work, tourism, and so-called “tourist trade”—was facilitated, improving the material situation of many families and acting as a “safety valve” for the system 21

The “Round Table” and the June 1989 Elections

In 1987, part of the leadership of the PRL increasingly raised alarms about growing social tensions and the catastrophic economic situation, whose real indicators were far worse than those reported in earlier reports, potentially leading to the “collapse of the current leadership team.” 22 . A package of radical economic and political reforms was seen as a way to prevent the impending crisis. Despite mounting pressure, General Jaruzelski delayed making key decisions 23 .

The situation was somewhat stabilized by a balance of power between the communist authorities and the opposition. Neither side

possessed enough strength to seize full control, which allowed the ruling authorities primarily to maintain the status quo and left room for negotiations 24 . The opportunity for this arose the following year.

On February 1, 1988, the communist authorities introduced the largest price increase since 1982, including a 60% rise in food products. Although citizens were offered partial financial compensation, this did not prevent a surge of social discontent. It is worth noting that at the time, Poland was one of the poorest countries in Europe, with the purchasing power of the average Pole amounting to only one-third of that of a German

17. Lech Wałęsa, Droga do wolności (Warszawa: Editions Spotkania, 1991), 50.

18. Paweł Kowal, Koniec systemu władzy. Polityka ekipy gen. Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego w latach 1986-1989, (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Wydawnictwo TRIO 2012), 89-95.

19. Patryk Pleskot, Kłopotliwa panna „S”. Postawy polityczne Zachodu wobec „Solidarności” na tle stosunków z PRL (1980–1989), (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2013); Andrzej Paczkowski , Od sfałszowanego zwycięstwa do prawdziwej klęski. Szkice do portretu PRL, (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1999),135–136.

20. P. Kowal, Koniec systemu władzy, 141-146.

21. Dariusz Stola, “Migracje zagraniczne i schyłek PRL,” in Społeczeństwo polskie w latach 1980-1989, ed. N. Jarska, J. Olaszek (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2015), 65-66.

22. A. Dudek, Reglamentowana rewolucja, 87-89.

23. Daria Nałęcz and Tomasz Nałęcz, Czas przełomu, 1989-1990 (Warsaw: Polityka, 2019), 19. 24. Ibidem.

citizen. Polish incomes were also lower compared to other Eastern Bloc countries, with GDP per capita amounting to only half of that in Czechoslovakia 25 .

In the spring and summer of 1988, two waves of strikes swept across Poland. Although not as large as those in 1980, the authorities feared the outbreak of even bigger protests. This situation forced the PZPR leadership to shift its strategy— from confrontation to seeking an agreement with the opposition. Still, questions remained about the scope of concessions and the future role of the opposition in the political system of the PRL.

As Antoni Dudek emphasizes: “The sense of pervasive stagnation and helplessness battled in the minds of PZPR officials with the fear of a forthcoming large social uprising and entirely real layoffs. In such an atmosphere, despite constant resistance and the perception of no real personal or political alternative to Jaruzelski’s team, the party apparatus drifted toward accepting the controlled transformation scenario promoted by the general’s advisors. The political passivity of PZPR functionaries became—alongside the profit-oriented economic activity of some of them— one of the most significant factors accelerating the disintegration of the PRL political system.” 26 .

The talks in Magdalenka, which began in September 1988, served as an unofficial prelude to future negotiations between the PRL authorities and the opposition centered around “Solidarity.” These meetings, held in a small circle of representatives from both sides, helped overcome mutual distrust and discuss key issues for the later negotiations. They addressed the need for economic reforms, the re-legalization of “Solidarity,” and changes to the electoral system. The

authorities sought a way to implement reforms while retaining full control, while the opposition saw the talks as an opportunity to regain legal status and begin the process of democratizing the country. The Catholic Church acted as a catalyst and mediator, bridging both sides and helping to establish preliminary compromises, laying the groundwork for the subsequent Round Table negotiations 27 .

From February 6 to April 5, 1989, the Round Table talks took place in Warsaw. The name derives from the shape of the table, at which representatives of the communist authorities, “Solidarity,” social organizations, and the Catholic Church as mediator sat. The setup was meant to symbolize equality among all parties.

The talks were conducted in three main teams: for political reforms, economic reforms, and trade union pluralism. Key agreements included the re-legalization of “Solidarity” and the establishment of partially free elections to the Sejm and fully free elections to the Senate. It was also agreed to create the office of President of the PRL and implement economic reforms, involving a gradual transition to a market economy 28 .

The agreement reached in the spring of 1989 did not satisfy everyone, drawing criticism from both the ruling apparatus and radical opposition groups, some of which called for a boycott of the upcoming elections 29. Pragmatic considerations, however, led the opposition to see the results of the Round Table talks as opening previously unavailable opportunities—an opportunity to play for winning cards.

The elections were scheduled for June 1989. According to the adopted electoral law, the op-

25. Marcin Piątkowski, Europejski lider wzrostu. Polska droga od ekonomicznych peryferii do gospodarki sukcesu (Warsaw: Poltext, 2019), 160.

26. A. Dudek, Reglamentowana rewolucja, 179.

27. Ibidem, 153-156; Jan Skórzyński, Revolution of the Round Table (Kraków: Znak, 2009), 163–169.

28. See more: Andrzej Garlicki, Karuzela. Rzecz o Okrągłym Stole (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2004); Jan Skórzyński, Revolution of the Round Table (Kraków: Znak, 2009), 267-348; Paulina Codogni, Okrągły Stół, czyli polski Rubikon (Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka, 2009).

29. P. Kowal, Koniec systemu władzy, 467-482.

ELECTION ADVERTISEMENT OF THE PZPR DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN,

SOURCE: REKLAMA WYBORCZA PZPR W TRAKCIE KAMPANII WYBORCZEJ, WIKIPEDIA: HTTPS://PL.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/WIKI/WYBORY_PARLAMENTARNE_W_POLSCE_W_1989_ROKU#/MEDIA/PLIK:WYBPAR1989.JPG

position could compete for 35% of the Sejm seats and all seats in the newly created Senate. The results of the first round on June 4 were devastating for the PZPR—opposition candidates won almost all available seats, and many prominent communist activists were defeated 30

The agreements made at the Round Table and the discussions in Magdalenka established three key safeguards within the system: a parliamentary majority for the PZPR and its allies, which

ensured their control over the government; the election of the president by a majority vote in the National Assembly; and oversight of the military and police. However, the June 1989 elections cast doubt on the majority needed to elect General Jaruzelski as president and made it impossible to form a government led by the PZPR.

Systemic Tranformation in Poland

In July 1989, the National Assembly elected General Wojciech Jaruzelski as President of the PRL. This was a compromise resulting from the Round Table talks, intended to ensure stability during the transitional period. Although Jaruzelski initially hesitated to accept the nomination 31, his election was supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union, who feared destabilization of the country and the potential for intervention. The White House was concerned that the sudden removal of the entire existing political elite could destabilize the situation. The Soviets allowed limited reforms in Poland, while the United States was uncertain about the limits of its tolerance. The Americans shared the view of some “Solidarity” activists that “if Jaruzelski is not elected president, there is a genuine threat of civil war, which would likely end with a reluctantly but brutally executed Soviet intervention.” 32 . Gorbachev also believed that keeping the current leader in place would bring more benefits than risks. Jaruzelski’s election was therefore part of a transitional political period. He served as president until the end of 1990, when his term ended with the election of Lech Wałęsa in the first fully democratic presidential elections.

According to the agreements, the prime minister was to come from the existing government, but the candidacy of General Czesław Kiszczak 33 faced strong opposition from the opposition. After negotiations, a compromise was reached under the slogan “Your president, our prime minister.” As a result, on September 12, 1989, a government was formed with Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a close associate of Lech Wałęsa, as its head. This was the first cabinet in the Eastern Bloc led by an opposition politician. Mazowiecki’s government included representatives of both “Solidarity” and the PZPR, though the communists retained control over key security ministries34 .

The defeat in the June elections led to a political deadlock within the PZPR. Deprived of popular support, the party lost influence, and its attempts to maintain unity failed. In January 1990, the PZPR was officially dissolved, ending forty years of political dominance 35

However, this did not mean the complete disappearance of post-communists from political life. Many of them established the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), which took over the assets and structures of the former party. SdRP later became the core of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which, thanks to efficient

31. Ibidem, 320-321.

32. Ibidem, 326.

33. Czesław Kiszczak was a communist activist and close collaborator of General Jaruzelski. From July 31, 1981, to July 6, 1990, he served as the Minister of Internal Affairs.

34. A. Dudek, Od Mazowieckiego do Suchockiej. Pierwsze rządy wolnej Polski,(Kraków: Znak Horyzont, 2019), 29-51.

35. Andrzej Boboli, Martwe dusze. PZPR od czerwca 1989 do stycznia 1990. Próba opisu zbiorowości (Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2024).

organization and recognizable leaders such as Aleksander Kwaśniewski, regained significant influence, symbolized by Kwaśniewski’s victory in the 1995 presidential elections.

Poland’s economic transformation involved two main stages of reforms. The first step was the so-called Wilczek Act 36 of December 23, 1988 (still during the PZPR period), which introduced the principle “what is not forbidden is allowed,” enabling free enterprise and liberalizing trade.

The second, more radical stage of reforms was the plan introduced by Leszek Balcerowicz, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister in Mazowiecki’s government, on January 1, 1990. The plan aimed to rapidly transform the centrally planned economy into a market-based one. Key measures included: liberalization of prices, which eliminated shortages in stores but caused a sharp rise in inflation; restrictive monetary policy, which stabilized the złoty, trade liberalization, opening the economy to foreign capital and privatization of state-owned enterprises.

Alongside economic reforms, political changes were implemented. In December 1989, the national emblem with the crowned eagle was restored, and the country’s name was changed to the Republic of Poland. References to the leading role of the PZPR were removed from the constitution. In 1990, the first free local elections took place, followed by the first fully free parliamentary elections in 1991, which definitively confirmed the democratic nature of the state.

The enthusiasm for political freedom soon mixed with economic uncertainty. Public opinion became sharply divided—supporters of reforms emphasized their necessity and lack of alternatives, while opponents criticized their radicalism and social costs. This division influenced political moods in the early years of the Third Republic, contributing to a weakening of support for the “Solidarity” camp by the mid-1990s.

Transformation of the Security Apparatus

The transformation of the communist Security Service (SB) after 1989 was a highly controversial process. In the face of the system’s collapse, officers systematically destroyed documents to conceal evidence of their crimes and the extent of surveillance. Many also removed files from archives, treating them as material for blackmail or as an “insurance policy” for the future – one such file concerned Lech Wałęsa’s alleged cooperation with the SB.

A key element of the changes was the vetting of SB officers who wished to serve in the newly established Office for State Protection (UOP). This process, intended as a symbolic break with the repressive apparatus, ultimately resulted in a significant portion of the old cadre being admitted to the new services. After appeals were considered, 10,439 out of over 14,000 applicants passed the vetting, representing nearly 75% of all former SB candidates 37

36. Mieczysław Wilczek served as Minister of Industry in Mieczysław Rakowski’s government from 1988 to 1989.

37. Tomasz Kozłowski, Koniec imperium MSW. Transformacja organów bezpieczeństwa państwa 1989–1990 (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2019), 87.

An integral part of dealing with the past was also lustration and the provision of archival access. It was not until 1998 that the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) was established, tasked with collecting SB documents and conducting

lustration proceedings. Despite these measures, the debate over lustration and archive access remained heated for years, dividing both society and politicians.

Social Dimension and Pathologies of the Transformation

The systemic transformation of the 1990s radically changed the daily lives of Poles. Shops began to offer goods that were previously unavailable, and public spaces filled with Western cars, advertisements, and symbols of pop culture. However, not everyone benefited equally from these changes – falling real incomes, rising prices, and growing inequalities worsened the living conditions for many families.

The costs of the reforms were particularly felt in smaller towns and rural areas, where the closure of unprofitable state enterprises led to a sharp increase in unemployment, fostering poverty and social exclusion 38. The 1990s also saw a rise in organized crime and the growth of the “grey economy,” which weakened budget revenues and complicated the stabilization of public finances. Although not directly caused by economic reforms, these negative phenomena were their side effects, deepening a sense of social chaos and uncertainty.

One significant problem of the transformation was the so-called “enfranchisement of nomenklatura”, a process in which former members of the communist elite or individuals connected to the party apparatus took over state assets on preferential terms. Thanks to the radical market reforms –especially privatization and deregulation – these individuals were able to exploit their influence and access to information to acquire substantial state-owned assets. Instead of creating an open and fair market, the transformation contributed to the emergence of a new, privileged economic group, which in turn deepened social inequalities and fostered a sense of injustice among citizens 39

38. More about the social costs of the political transformation. See: Piotr Sztompka, The Trauma of the Great Change: The Social Costs of Transformation (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000); Elżbieta Mikuła, “Społeczny wymiar transformacji,” Nierówności Spoeczne a Wzrost Gospodarczy 2004, no. 4: 261–274; Katarzyna Duda, Kiedyś tu było życie, teraz jest tylko bieda. O ofiarach polskiej transformacji (Warsaw: Książka i Prasa, 2019).

39. Tomasz Kozłowski, ‘Appropriation Mechanisms: the Functioning of “Nomenklatura Companies” in the Period of Economic Transformation’, Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, no. 2 (2020), 509–529.

Lessons from Systemic Transformation in Poland for Korea

The success of Poland’s systemic transformation was based on a combination of several key factors: the mass, pluralistic social movement of Solidarity, the pragmatism of political elites, the mediating role of the Church, and the willingness of both sides to seek compromise. At the same time, the transformation showed that any profound reform carries significant costs. Economic liberalization led to rapid growth but also to job losses in many sectors and a deepening of social inequalities. Similarly, the vetting of the security apparatus was selective and did not fully satisfy society’s demand for justice, demonstrating that even a successful transformation involves difficult compromises and challenges.

The potential reunification of the two Korean states involves challenges on a scale unprecedented in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Among the most serious are the vast economic and technological gap between North and South Korea, the need to integrate millions of people raised under radically different political and ideological systems, and the enormous social and financial costs of the unification process. This process is further complicated by regional security issues and the role of great powers whose geopolitical interests can both support and hinder reunification.

Poland does not serve as a direct model for Korea, but its experience can serve as a point of reference—highlighting proven mechanisms leading to stable change while warning against

potential risks and difficulties.

Despite the internal problems mounting since the 1970s, primarily rooted in the deteriorating state of the Polish economy, it was external rather than internal factors that accelerated Poland’s transformation process. Although the early 1980s saw escalating social unrest, waves of strikes, and revealed weaknesses of the authorities—who were forced to impose martial law—this was not yet a moment of systemic collapse. The Soviet Union remained the glue holding the status quo, ready for possible military intervention and applying various pressures that forced Polish authorities to take radical actions to maintain control. The United States, at this time, adopted a wait-and-see approach toward events in Eastern Europe. Only in the late 1980s, when the USSR became severely weakened economically and politically, and the West increasingly supported democratic processes, did real reforms become possible.

Analyzing the situation in the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK), it can be assumed that any systemic change will largely depend on the stance of the two largest powers in the region: China and Russia. Without at least partial consent or at least neutral tolerance from them, the process of Korean Peninsula unification will be extremely difficult to carry out. The chances of success might increase if one of these states weakens significantly, potentially destabilizing North Korea internally and creating space for political change.

At the root of Poland’s internal problems in the 1970s and 1980s lay a steadily deepening economic crisis, limited social system capacity, and rising social expectations. Openness to Western culture during the Gierek decade, along with independent information channels (for example, Radio Free Europe), helped foster greater civic awareness and gradual growth of oppositional attitudes.

In the DPRK, despite extremely low living standards and periodic famines such as the one from 1995–199940, there have been no mass social uprisings on a scale even remotely comparable to Poland’s experience. This results from a combination of extreme informational isolation, long-term indoctrination, and a broad repression apparatus based, among others, on collective responsibility that includes entire families of those deemed disloyal to the regime.

A significant element of Poland’s transformation was the presence of entities capable of mediating between the communist authorities and the opposition. The Catholic Church played a key role, enjoying considerable social support and—crucially—acceptance from both sides at the negotiating table. Within the PZPR, clear divisions existed between “liberals” willing to seek compromise and the so-called “hardliners” favoring a tough political line 41. The combination of these two factors—the presence of a mediator with strong political and moral authority and the existence of a reformist faction within the ruling structures—created conditions for gradually reaching an agreement.

In North Korea, there is no institution comparable to the Catholic Church in Poland, though informal divisions likely exist within the ruling

elite—for example, between technocrats focused on economic development and representatives of the Korean People’s Army who support the current regime’s direction. A potential factor encouraging some elites toward change might be an attractive economic offer similar to Poland’s “Wilczek reforms” of the late 1980s, which allowed parts of the ruling apparatus to enter the market economy legally and gain privileges and wealth in the new reality.

The role of the military differs fundamentally in both cases. In Poland, the army was an instrument of the party and did not act as an independent political actor after 1989. In North Korea, however, the military is a pillar of power, enjoying significant autonomy. The “army first” doctrine (Songun), established by the North Korean regime not only in response to the mid-1990s economic crisis but also to dynastic changes following the death of Kim Il Sung, when Kim Jong Il assumed power, granted the military the status of regime guardian 42 . The military was essential for consolidating his political position, meaning that any attempts at transformation will require its involvement and guaranteed status in the new political and economic order. Without such guarantees, attempts to block reforms by force could occur.

In Poland during the 1980s, communist ideology already played a limited role in the daily lives of citizens. Despite the formal dominance of Marxism-Leninism, in practice the ideology had little influence on everyday life. In North Korea, the situation is radically different. The Juche ideology—which emphasizes self-reliance and total subordination to the state—forms the foundation of the system, and the cult of personality around the leader, reminiscent of Stalinist

40. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Daniel Goodkind and Loraine West, “The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact,” Population and Development Review 27, no. 2 (June 2001): 219–238; Shay Yeger and Guy Podoler, “The North Korean Famine and Inter-Korean Relations: Disaster Diplomacy Perspective,” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 79 (2022): 103-189.

41. Przemysław Gasztold, Towarzysze z betonu. Dogmatyzm w PZPR 1980–1990 (Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2019).

42. Robert Collins, Marked for Life: SONGBUN, North Korea’s Social Classification System (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012).

LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

patterns, remains pervasive 43. Through constant propagandistic glorification of the leader’s image, celebrating his role in every aspect of social life, and instilling ideology from an early age, North Korean society is profoundly shaped by political indoctrination, which significantly hinders any potential systemic change compared to Poland’s case.

Polish experience shows that a successful transformation requires several key conditions simultaneously: opening negotiation channels between authorities and opposition, ensuring security and protecting the interests of key regime groups, gaining support or at least neutrality from major powers, and offering society quick and tangible improvements in living conditions. At the same time, Poland’s example confirms that radical economic reforms—while effective at stimulating growth—may cause significant social costs, deepen inequalities, and generate feelings of injustice. In North Korea, where developmental disparities between the two parts are much greater than in Germany or Poland in the 1980s, the risk of destabilization would be even more severe.

Although the Polish transformation ended successfully in political and macroeconomic terms, it entailed significant social costs. Economic liberalization caused mass bankruptcies of unprofitable enterprises, sharp rises in unemployment, and impoverishment of parts of society. Income inequalities quickly deepened, and entire regions—especially those dependent on heavy industry—were affected by long-term structural unemployment. An additional problem was the selective nature of settling accounts with the security apparatus.

For North Korea, the scale of potential social costs of unification could be incomparably greater. The economic and technological gap between North and South is several dozen times larger than the differences between the Polish People’s Republic and the West in 1989. In 2021, North Korea’s per capita Gross National Income was recorded at 1.423 million won, which was only 3.5% (one twenty-eighth) of South Korea’s 40.482 million won 44 . Such a huge disparity means that rapid integration of the two economies could trigger massive internal migration, labor market destabilization, housing crises, and pressure on the social welfare system.

There would also be a risk of a profound cultural shock. Millions raised under totalitarian control and isolation would face sudden changes in social norms, political language, and even daily consumer habits. The adaptation process might require long-term educational and integration programs; otherwise, large groups of citizens could face permanent marginalization.

The financial costs of unification would definitely exceed those incurred by Germany after 1990, despite the economic differences between East and West Germany being much smaller. This implies the necessity of broad international support, including from the USA, China, Japan, and global institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

In summary, Poland’s experience may inspire Korea regarding mechanisms for peaceful systemic change, but the scale of social and economic challenges is enormous. For Korea, gradual rather than rapid reforms, alongside stable financing and broad integration programs, will be key.

43. See more: Brian R. Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth (Busan: P’yŏnghwa, 2015); Geir Helgesen, ‘Political Revolution in a Cultural Continuum: Preliminary Observations on the North Korean “Juche” Ideology with its Intrinsic Cult of Personality’, Asian Perspective, 15/1 (1991), 187–213; Grace Lee, ‘The Political Philosophy of Juche’, Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 3/1 (2003), 105–112; Jae Jung Suh, ‘Making Sense of North Korea: Juche as an Institution’, in Origins of North Korea’s Juche. Colonialism, War, and Development, ed. Jae Jung Suh (New York, 2013), 1–32; Gabriela Bernal, The Evolution of Kim Jong Un’s Cult of Personality, 10 July 2024, https://www.peninsuladispatch.com/p/the-evolution-of-kimjong-uns-cult [accessed 11 August 2025].

44. Statistics Korea, 2022 Statistical Indicators of North Korea, online: https://kostat.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20115000000&bid=11772&act=view&li st_no=423589&tag=&nPage=1&ref_bid= (accessed August 9, 2025).

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z Yeger, Shay and Guy Podoler, ‘The North Korean Famine and Inter-Korean Relations: Disaster Diplomacy Perspective’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 79 (2022), 103–189.

Online Sources

z Bernal, Gabriela, The Evolution of Kim Jong Un’s Cult of Personality (10 July 2024), accessed 11 August 2025, https://www.peninsuladispatch.com/p/the-evolution-of-kim-jong-uns-cult.

z Statistics Korea, 2022 Statistical Indicators of North Korea, accessed 9 August 2025, https://kostat.go.kr/board.es?mid=a20115000000&bid=11772&act=view&list_ no=423589&tag=&nPage=1&ref_bid=.

Karol Starowicz 45

Ph.D. candidate, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, The Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (IPN)

The decommunization of public space

as a process of shaping collective memory: the example of the Polish state in the context of the potential unification of the

Korean states

Abstract

The main purpose of the chapter is to present the process of decommunization of public space in Poland after the political changes in 1989. The source basis is ‘the Act of 1 April 2016 on the prohibition of the propagation of communism or any other totalitarian system by the names of buildings, objects and devices of public utility’ and the actions taken by

the Institute of National Remembrance on this issue.

Decommunization is a process that is not only social and political, but also cultural, aimed at removing all influences, symbols, institutions, and names associated with communism from public space. In this case, the communist

45. The PhD student at the Doctoral School of Social Sciences at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (Poland). The ERASMUS+ scholarship recipient at Chonnam National University in Gwangju, the Republic of Korea (March-August 2024). An employee of the Spokesperson’s Office of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) in Warsaw. A member of the Expert Team for International Contacts at the IPN in Warsaw. A representative of the Polish side in contacts with representatives of Korean government institutions. A graduate of Jagiellonian University, Master’s degree in History, Asian Studies and Bachelor’s degree in International Relations (specialization: modern diplomacy).

ideology, so common in the twentieth century, had a definite impact on the lives of the citizens of many countries, especially the so-called Eastern Bloc in post-1945 Europe, as well as some countries of the Asian continent such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although the process of implementing communist solutions in Europe and Asia was different, certain points remained common, including the brutal elimination of political opponents, the pervasive propaganda of success, communist symbolism in the public space, the emphasis on common brotherhood with the Red Army, lofty slogans, etc.

In the context of the Polish state, the process of decommunization, although it began after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has de facto still not been completed, as evidenced by the monuments, street names or other forms of commemoration still in existence, dedicated to communist dignitaries or events from the communist period. In the case of the Korean states — where there are clearly two different state models — communist ideology is interpreted in two distinct ways. In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it

The term “decommunization”

After World War II, Poland was not an independent state. Following the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945, along with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it came under Soviet occupation, which lasted for over four decades 46 . The communist governments in Poland imposed undemocratic solutions on Poland and its citizens, based on force and omnipresent control, combined with the indoctrination of the youngest generations. The introduction and later consolidation of the

46.

signifies liberation from Japanese occupation and is associated with the ‘one and only correct path’ taken by the Kim family, who have held absolute power in North Korea since the end of the Second World War. In the Republic of Korea, on the other hand, communist ideology is treated as a national threat to the state — as reminded each year by the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War — and is subject to legal restrictions, such as the South Korean law prohibiting the promotion of communism.

In this chapter, the author will analyze the decommunization process in Poland and point out similarities and differences in the approach to this issue between Poland and the DPRK. The key issue is whether the decommunization of North Korea is possible at all and how the Polish experience in this matter can help in the mutual rapprochement of the Korean states in the context of the potential unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Keywords: Poland, North Korea, decommunization, political and social transformation, monument.

communist system in political and social life between 1945 and 1989 deprived Poland of the opportunity for independent development.

However, gradual resistance from society, followed by the emergence of democratic opposition and changes taking place both in Poland and abroad, eventually led to the collapse of the communist system in this part of Europe. As a result, the legal order established after 1945 was rejected, and countries that had previously

the Great Powers during World War II, Poland and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe fell under the Soviet sphere of influence.

LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

been under Soviet influence had to undergo not only political and economic transformations but also a process of decommunization – just as Germany, wanting to become part of the democratic West, had to undergo denazification after 1945 47. While denazification was subject to international control by the Allies, in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc 48, the process of decommunization in most cases depended completely on the new authorities and took different forms and courses. This led to the belief that while National Socialism had been brought to justice in Nuremberg, communism and its representatives had never faced a similar trial. As a result, the communist legacy became the subject of numerous debates and then internal disputes in the politics of memory of individual Central and Eastern European countries, with different outcomes.

In the author’s opinion, decommunization is a social, political and cultural process aimed at removing influences, all symbols, institutions and names associated with communism or other totalitarian regimes from the public sphere. This process is particularly characteristic of countries that have undergone political transformation from a communist to a democratic system, or for those countries that want to break with the legacy of the totalitarian period. Decommunization includes a variety of activities, such as legal measures to punish individuals, including officials of the system, responsible for crimes committed against their own citizens during the communist period, as well as historical research aimed at accurately presenting the totalitarian period and understanding its complex aspects. Furthermore, decommunization as a process

also includes changes in the names of streets, public places, institutions, as well as the removal of monuments, symbols and other elements associated with communist ideology.

According to the author, the process of decommunization consists of three stages. The first involves purging the state of totalitarian symbols, while the second focuses on coming to terms with the past (including punishing officials responsible for crimes). Sometimes, the first and second stages are carried out at the same time (e.g. the denazification of Germany after the end of World War II). The final step is to formulate a new historical policy and to cultivate the memory of past events and victims of the totalitarian system 49 To this end, the state may establish an institution dedicated to this task (e.g. in Poland, the Institute of National Remembrance was established) or adopt special legal provisions prohibiting the promotion of any totalitarian system. Using Poland as an example, a specific provision was included in the constitution relating to, among other things, political parties 50 and the 2016 Act, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

There is no doubt that in a totalitarian state, the legal system (i.e. the tool of control) and the accompanying ideology (the central element of legitimising power) play a decisive role. However, art is also an indispensable element, which, in the form of monuments, plaques and other objects, emphasises the nature of the power exercised through its aesthetics and content. In the case of the communist system, it was socialist realism, which became an ideological tool of propaganda and, as the official trend, was mandatory in all areas of art – literature, painting, architec-

47. See also: Perry Biddiscombe, The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1948, The History Press Ltd 2006.

48. These include Poland, East Germany (German Democratic Republic, until 1990), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania (until the 1960s, when it broke with the USSR), Yugoslavia (formally communist, but independent of the USSR after 1948).

49. In the context of legislation see: Piotr Tuleja, Dekomunizacja w prawie polskim, https://www.omp.org.pl/artykul.php?artykul=102 [Access: 28.07.2025].

50. „Political parties and other organizations whose programmes refer to the totalitarian methods and practices of Nazism, fascism, or communism, as well as those whose programmes or activities promote or condone racial or national hatred, the use of violence to seize power or influence state policy, or that conceal their structure or membership, are prohibited”, Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Text adopted on 2 April 1997 by the National Assembly, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm [Access: 28.07.2025].

ture, film, etc. As a result, countries under the influence of the Soviet Union (including Poland) had to adapt to new trends and follow the path that had been laid out for them 51. The situation was no different in Asia, for example in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 52 , where Kim Il Sung (1946-1994) used art for political purposes and established a cult of personality around himself and then his family. It is worth noting here that in the case of North Korea, socialist realism, although derived from the same ideological assumptions, ultimately took on an extreme form, emphasising monumentalism (e.g. the statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang) and socialist symbolism unique to this place 53. Notably, while after the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953 the governments of individual Central European countries gradually moved away from socialist realism (or tried to adapt it to local conditions), in North Korea it not only survived to this day, but was completely subordinated to the cult of the Kim dynasty. As a result, this had a significant impact on the politics of the DPRK and its citizens in the following years.

According to the intentions of the communist authorities in Poland, monuments and symbols referring to communist ideology erected in public spaces were supposed to express the power and glory of the Soviet Union. In this context, the myth of the soldier-liberator played a leading role in both political and social life in the official communist narrative. In most cases, these monuments were dedicated to Red Army soldiers, the imaginary Polish-Soviet brotherhood, communist dignitaries such as Vladimir Lenin and Felix Dzerzhinsky, and local communist

leaders. It is worth noting that the monuments erected simultaneously denied the crimes committed by the Red Army against the Polish civilian population. In light of current research, the Red Army, while ‘liberating’ Polish territory from German forces, committed looting, rape and other acts of violence. 54 . Furthermore, the initiators of the monuments deliberately failed to distinguish between ordinary soldiers and active enforcers of the new regime, who are today regarded in Poland as criminals and communist-era war criminals. As a result, these monuments quickly became symbols of brutal force, tools of propaganda and communist domination 55 .

Thus, citizens of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries had to wait over 40 years before this issue became the subject of public debate and was regulated, although with different results. As it soon turned out, not all countries of the former Eastern Bloc underwent decommunization on the same scale and in the same manner as, for example, Poland after 1989. In some cases (e.g. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), it was only the Russian Federation’s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that finally led to decisions to completely remove or dismantle communist monuments, formerly known as ‘monuments of gratitude’. In this context, it was not only an expression of solidarity with Ukraine in its struggle, but also a desire to put its own memory policy in order and come to terms with the past.

51. See also: Evgeny Dobrenko, Political Economy of Socialist Realism, Yale University Press 2007.

52. In the rest of this chapter, the author will use the abbreviation DPRK or the term North Korea.

53. B. R. Myers, Najczystsza rasa: Propaganda Korei Północnej, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2011, s. 57-64.

54. See also: Armia Czerwona na ziemiach polskich po 1944 roku, https://archiwum.ipn.gov.pl/pl/straszy-w-miescie/armia-czerwona-na-ziemiach-pol [Access: 28.07.2025]. It is worth noting that the Red Army, which also entered the territories of Romania, Hungary, and other countries previously under German occupation, committed numerous crimes against the civilian population.

55. M. Pszczyński, Communist monuments: Cultural heritage or cultural nuisance?, https://czasopisma.bg.ug.edu.pl/index.php/gsm/article/ view/6247/5490 [Access: 26.07.2025].

The Polish experience with decommunization in the years 1989–2025

Unlike Romania, where the freedom revolution took a bloody turn, leading to the overthrow of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime (1965-1989) and his death, the transformation in Poland was a peaceful process. The compromise reached at the so-called Round Table Talks in 1989 between representatives of the democratic opposition and the communists marked the beginning of the end of the communist system in Poland after 45 years of Soviet oppression. As a result, in the early 1990s, Poland faced numerous political and economic challenges within the country, as well as geopolitical challenges resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among the priority issues was the question of decommunization – specifically, the elimination of communist symbols and heritage from public spaces – which also gained considerable importance. It soon became clear that Polish society not only demanded the punishment of high-ranking officials of the previous system, but also sought to settle accounts with the politics of memory practised by communist dignitaries, who had appropriated the memory of World War II — its victims and its heroes.

However, before this happened, the first significant step was the amendment of the constitution by the Polish parliament and the introduction of a number of changes. First of all, the name of the state was changed from the Polish People’s Republic to the Republic of Poland, party

pluralism was ensured, and the participation of local government in the exercise of power was restored. The provision on the ‘leading role’ of the Polish United Workers’ Party and ‘friendship and cooperation’ with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was removed 56 . As a result, states in which the socialist system remained in place downgraded their relations with Poland e.g., The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accused Poland of ideological betrayal, and the Polish government’s recognition of the Republic of Korea as its leading Korean partner led to the decline in the importance of its previous relations with North Korea.

The political changes that took place in the former Eastern Bloc countries did not only concern issues of a political, legal and economic nature. As it soon turned out, coming to terms with the communist legacy was also a priority, especially for the democratic opposition, which had fought an unequal battle against the communists in the past. However, it turned out that bringing former security apparatus officers to justice would not be a simple task, mainly due to their political ties with the new democratic authorities (this was the case in Poland, among other countries). As a result, communist symbols became the main target of attacks by citizens –from the perspective of Solidarity movements in Poland, communist monuments were de facto symbols of Soviet enslavement and domination.

56. D. Czarnecka, „Pomniki Wdzięczności” Armii Czerwonej w Polsce Ludowej i w III Rzeczypospolitej, IPN Publishing House, 2015, p. 333.

MONUMENT OF BROTHERHOOD IN ARMS – A MONUMENT THAT STOOD AT PLAC WILEŃSKI IN WARSAW’S PRAGA-PÓŁNOC DISTRICT FROM 1945 TO 2011, SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS.

Therefore, removing this symbolism was intended to be the first step towards cleansing Poland of the system of symbols associated with the totalitarian communist narrative.

It is worth noting that practically every major city in Poland had monuments or names of streets, squares, housing estates, workplaces, etc. referring to communist symbolism (e.g. Aleja Gwardii Ludowej [People’s Guard Avenue], Osiedle im. Bohaterów Stalingradu [Housing Estate named after the Heroes of Stalingrad], etc.). Both the names and the monuments were created immediately after World War II. In the case of the second, they were often simple obelisks or sculptures of soldiers with rifles, e.g. the Monument of Brotherhood in Arms (see photo 1), which stood

in Warsaw from 1945 to 2011 and portrayed soldiers of the Red Army and the Polish Army. In addition, the inscription on the monument read: ”Glory to the heroes of the Soviet Army, comrades-in-arms who gave their lives for the freedom and independence of the Polish nation. This monument was erected by the residents of Warsaw in 1945” 57 .

The communist authorities in Poland also sought to highlight totalitarian symbols – such as the hammer and sickle, the red star and figures associated with the communist movement – in representative parts of selected cities. For example, a monument to Feliks Dzerzhinsky (1951–1989) was erected in Bankowy Square, one of the most central locations in Warsaw. In addition to monuments, workplaces also took the names of great communist proponents. For example, in Kraków, the Vladimir Lenin Steelworks was established 58

In addition, many buildings were erected in Poland that reflected the aesthetics of the previous era, e.g., the Palace of Culture and Science (known until 1956 as the Joseph Stalin Palace of Culture and Science, see photo 3) was erected in Warsaw in 1955 as a gift from the Soviet Union to the Polish people. It represented Soviet domination, even though it was not formally a monument to the Red Army. To this day, it remains a subject of controversy – for some, it is an architectural icon of Warsaw, while for others, it is an unwanted relic of communism. In 2007, it was added to the list of historic monuments 59. Another ideologically marked site, also located in Warsaw, is the Mausoleum Cemetery of the Soviet Soldiers. This monumental memorial, built in 1949, contains the graves of 21,000 Soviet soldiers who died fighting on Polish soil. In accordance with the agreement signed in

57. W. Głębocki, Warszawskie pomniki, PTTK „Kraj” Publishing House, 1990, p. 99-100.

58. Subject terms: Lenin Steelworks, Kraków, https://encysol.pl/es/encyklopedia/hasla-rzeczowe/24296,Huta-im-Lenina-w-Krakowie.html [Access: 30.07.2025].

59. Wpisanie Pałacu Kultury i Nauki do Rejestru Zabytków, https://nck.pl/szkolenia-i-rozwoj/projekty/kongres-kultury/aktualnosci/wpisanie-palacukultury-i-nauki-do-rejestru-zabytkow-jaroslaw-trybus [Access: 30.07.2025].

1994 between Poland and the Russian Federation, it still exists today as a war cemetery and is under international protection 60. It is worth noting that the monuments and other artistic forms were accompanied by an appropriate historical narrative, in which the Soviet Union played a leading role, and the Germans were held responsible for all crimes committed during World War II on Polish soil e.g., for the Katyn massacre – its initiators and perpetrators were in fact representatives of the USSR authorities, led by Joseph Stalin. The Soviet and communist authorities in Poland maintained this view practically throughout the entire existence of the Soviet Union 61. As a result, the fight against the communists was not only about regaining independence but also about defending historical truth.

It was not without reason that the prevailing view held that between 1945 and 1989, Poland was trapped in a communist lie — an ‘ideological concrete’ that solidified in public spaces through monuments, portraits of false leaders, and street names glorifying oppressors who had nothing to do with Polish identity. After 1989, communist monuments were in most cases classified as so-called ‘monuments of shame’ and became part of the new historical and identity policy 62 In accordance with the principle that they should be removed in the interests of future generations and to honour the true heroes and victims of communism. In Poland, as in the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, it was decided to dismantle the most visible monuments in public spaces, which symbolize the oppression and domination of the totalitarian system.

Although some of the monuments have survived to this day, this does not change the

fact that in the first years after ‘liberation’ from the communist system, citizens of individual countries (including Poland) took justice into their own hands. Without waiting for a decision from the state authorities, they began to cleanse public spaces of communist symbols, which in a way represented the difficult-to-accept legacy of the past. The so-called wave of democratization brought with it a desire to organise the sphere of memory, that is, to clean the public space of totalitarian symbols and to honour the true heroes and victims of the communist system.

60. Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Federacji Rosyjskiej o grobach i miejscach pamięci ofiar wojen i represji, sporządzona w Krakowie dnia 22 lutego 1994 r., https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19941120543 [Access: 30.07.2025].

61. W. Wasilewski, Kłamstwo katyńskie – historia i współczesność, https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/historia-z-ipn/200122,Witold-Wasilewski-Klamstwokatynskie-historia-i-wspolczesnosc.html [Access: 30.07.2025].

62. D. Czarnecka, op.cit., p. 176.

PALACE OF CULTURE AND SCIENCE, WARSAW 1981,

SOURCE: INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL REMEMBRANCE ARCHIVES.

As a result, the demolition of monuments was intended to serve as a metaphor for the fall of the regime and a demonstrative confirmation of the end of Soviet control and domination, as well as a return to full sovereignty and national renewal. The dismantling of monuments was followed by other actions, such as debunking history and erecting monuments to heroes who had been forgotten or degraded by the communists. As might be expected, this also caused an immediate reaction from the Russian Federation, which, as the successor to the Soviet Union, has always protested when communist monuments were dismantled in Poland or other former Eastern Bloc countries. This was due to the fact that Russia’s historical policy adopted the narrative of the USSR’s ‘liberating’ mission towards the countries

of Central and Eastern Europe. Over time, this narrative became Russia’s official mission towards the countries of the former Soviet Union, which became most evident after Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999 and decided to exploit the legacy of the USSR.

In view of the above facts, four key periods in Poland’s recent history after 1989 should be mentioned, during which decommunization was an important topic of public debate. This was influenced not only by the aforementioned political transformation and the attitude of citizens demanding change, but also by the lack of appropriate legal regulations. In the author’s opinion, each stage of decommunization in Poland began with a key event that served as a symbolic cornerstone of the process.

The first stage of decommunization took place during the socio-political changes at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s and, in the author’s opinion, lasted until 1998, when a series of decommunization measures were carried out (sometimes spontaneously, on the initiative of citizens) aimed at removing influences and symbols associated with communism. The dismantling of two monuments can be considered a symbolic beginning: the monument to Feliks Dzerzhinsky in Warsaw, dismantled on November 16-17, 1989, and the monument to Vladimir Lenin in Nowa Huta, dismantled on December 10 ot the same year. The dismantling of certain monuments was followed by other measures aimed at cleaning public spaces of communist symbols. As a result, decommunization affected many aspects of political and social life, including:

1. Vetting, i.e. disclosure of persons holding public office who were associated with the security services 63 .

63. T. Kozłowski, Koniec imperium MSW. Transformacja organów bezpieczeństwa państwa 1989–1990, IPN Publishing House, Warszawa 2019, s. 161-187.

2. Changes in education , i.e. reforming Polish history programs. It was recommended to teach a more objective view of the history of the Polish state, eliminating the one-sided and positive image of communism that was propagated between 1945 and 1989.

3. Changes to the names of streets, squares, housing estates and workplaces. The new names often referred to figures from pre-communist Polish history or figures associated with the struggle for independence or the Solidarity movement, etc.

4. Media reform. Reforms were introduced in the media sector, particularly with regard to moving away from censorship and opening up space for free and independent media. These measures were aimed at creating a pluralistic media environment.

5. Removal of monuments and other propaganda objects. In some public places, especially in areas of historical significance, monuments and plaques commemorating figures associated with communism were removed. Many of these actions were aimed at symbolically cleansing public spaces of symbols of the previous regime, but as political practice showed, this was not immediately successful everywhere.

In the case of the monuments mentioned above, there was often a lack of political will and a low level of historical awareness regarding past events. Additionally, legal regulations –or rather, the lack thereof – posed a separate issue. Although the constitution adopted in 1997 prohibited “the existence of political parties and other organisations whose programmes refer to the totalitarian methods and practices of Nazism, fascism and

communism” 64, the legal provisions did not cover public spaces, where propaganda objects referring to communist symbolism were still present.

The second stage of decommunization was connected with the establishment of the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation in 1998 65 . The IPN was established as an institution dedicated to researching and documenting communist and Nazi crimes committed on Polish soil in the 20th century. These activities represented a breakthrough in research into Poland’s recent history, as little was known about the communist security apparatus, and there was a lack of critical studies on the so-called Polish People’s Army and the era of the Polish People’s Republic. Many Polish heroes were completely forgotten, including the Soldiers of the Anti-Communist Underground, distinguished Solidarity activists, etc. The Institute also began investigating crimes committed by totalitarian regimes, including communist crimes. Furthermore, the establishment of the IPN marked a breakthrough, as it created an institution dedicated to all those who suffered under the communist regime. Despite this, the process of decommunisation in Poland between 1999 and 2016 proceeded relatively slowly due to several interrelated factors, namely:

1. Lack of unanimity in society and in the political sphere. After 1989, Poland was divided in its assessment of communism. Part of society had a moderate or positive attitude towards the communist era, which resulted in a lack of unanimity on issues related to decommunization. For this reason, the introduction of radical measures met with resistance and controversy from certain socio-political groups (often associated with former communi-

64. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm [Access: 30.07.2025].

65. 25 lat temu Sejm przyjął ustawę o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej, https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/195288,25-lat-temu-Sejm-przyjal-ustawe-oInstytucie-Pamieci-Narodowej.html [Access: 30.07.2025].

sts). In this context, the so-called amnesty for former communist activists was a separate issue. As a result of political negotiations after 1989, many of them avoided punishment. This amnesty limited the effectiveness of the decommunization process, as not all individuals associated with the communist regime faced legal consequences for their actions.

2. Economic challenges and the so-called costs of transformation. After the political transformation in the 1990s, Poland faced economic and social difficulties related to the transformation of the system. Economic issues became a priority, which ultimately slowed down progress in the area of decommunization.

3. No clear legal regulations. Despite the existence of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) during this period, there were still no clear decommunization regulations that would effectively regulate the removal of communist symbols from public spaces.

The third stage of decommunization was related to the adoption by the Polish parliament on 1 April 2016 of the Act on the Prohibition of Propagation of Communism or Any Other Totalitarian System through the Names of All Public Buildings, Structures and Facilities 66 . The timing of the enactment of the law was not accidental; it was linked to the rule of the so-called United Right (2015–2023), whose leaders had been demanding similar solutions as early as the 1990s, but did not have sufficient political power at the time. A separate issue is the fact that the above-mentioned law was the result of a growing interest in Polish history and the maturity of citizens demanding historical truth

and reckoning with the difficult past. The law was applicable, among others, to monuments dedicated to the Red Army, activists of the Polish Workers’ Party, members of the People’s Guard/People’s Army, monuments dedicated to the suppression of the Polish Independence Underground after 1944 by the institutions of the People’s Republic of Poland and the USSR, monuments dedicated to officials of the Polish People’s Republic or communist activists from other countries, monuments dedicated to the Communist Party of Poland, and monuments commemorating important anniversaries whose content referred to the history of communism and the socialist movement. It is worth noting here that the above law does not apply to monuments:

1. not on public display;

2. located in cemeteries or other places of rest, e.g. the aforementioned Mausoleum Cemetery of the Soviet Soldiers in Warsaw;

3. exhibited to the public as a part of artistic, educational, collecting, scientific or similar activities, for purposes other than promoting a totalitarian regime;

4. registered – independently or as a part of a larger whole – in the register of monuments 67 .

The 2016 Act marked a fundamental shift in the process of cleansing public spaces of relics of the former system. It also introduced a new element – the protection of public spaces, education and an appropriate attitude towards criminal systems that took the lives of millions of Poles. Over the following years, a number of measures were taken to remove symbols of communism and the communist past. Further changes were made to the names of streets and squares, and symbols

66. Ustawa z dnia 1 kwietnia 2016 r. o zakazie propagowania komunizmu lub innego ustroju totalitarnego przez nazwy jednostek organizacyjnych, jednostek pomocniczych gminy, budowli, obiektów i urządzeń użyteczności publicznej oraz pomniki, https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails. xsp?id=wdu20160000744 [Access: 31.07.2025].

67. Ibidem

associated with communism were removed or changed in various public places. These decisions were often made at the local and regional level 68 . It might seem that the Polish state already has sufficient tools and resources to complete the process of decommunization, but once again, it turned out that not all local authorities decided to remove communist objects, which was dictated by financial costs and a lack of political will.

It was only the Russian Federation’s armed invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the resulting full-scale war and the Russian government’s return to the worst traditions of the Soviet Union, that accelerated the process of decommunization in Poland and some other Central and Eastern European countries. In this context, the fourth stage of decommunization began after the appeal by the President of the Institute of National Remembrance, Dr Karol Nawrocki, on March 4, 2022, to remove from public spaces all names and symbols still commemorating persons, organisations, events or dates symbolising communism 69 . The appeal by the President of the Institute of National Remembrance resulted in 42 out of the 60 remaining communist propaganda objects in Poland being dismantled by January 2025. It should be emphasised that the dismantling of communist propaganda objects was positively received by Poles. A survey conducted by Kantar Public in early November 2022 on behalf of the Institute of National Remembrance confirmed that the dismantling of these objects was considered appropriate by the public (49% of Poles confirmed this). Only 11% of respondents considered it to be definitely inappropriate. Public opinion polls and

media coverage confirmed that the decommunization of public spaces in Poland was received positively 70 .

The IPN’s actions in the field of decommunization were not isolated and sparked similar initiatives in other countries of the former Eastern Bloc. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many countries, especially the Baltic states, decided that the dismantling of the so-called ‘monuments of gratitude’ should be completed. The Estonian government announced at the time that it would remove 400 monuments. In July 2022, the Latvian government issued a permit to remove 69 monuments and memorial plaques glorifying the Red Army. Lithuania also took similar action 71 As a result, the actions of the Polish state served as an example for other countries in the region and confirmed the thesis that coming to terms with the communist legacy is necessary and, regardless of time, still relevant.

In summary, as Dominika Czarnecka, a Polish researcher on this subject, rightly pointed out, the process of decommunization in Poland was extended over time and, in the author’s opinion, has not yet been completed – the best example of this is the dismantling of another Soviet monument in the town of Płoty on 18 August 2025 72 . According to preserved estimates, there are approximately 20 key propaganda objects remaining in public spaces (according to the Institute of National Remembrance), whose artistic vision refers to the past era of communism. However, due to opposition from some local authorities, which is related to the aforementioned lack of political will or the high costs

68. Samorządy przygotowują się do dekomunizacji nazw ulic, https://www.portalsamorzadowy.pl/polityka-i-spoleczenstwo/samorzady-przygotowujasie-do-dekomunizacji-nazw-ulic,80190.html#google_vignette [Access: 30.07.2025].

69. Oświadczenie Prezesa Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej w sprawie dekomunizacji przestrzeni publicznej, https://archiwum.ipn.gov.pl/pl/dla-mediow/ komunikaty/160756,Oswiadczenie-Prezesa-Instytutu-Pamieci-Narodowej-w-sprawie-dekomunizacji-przestr.html [Access: 31.07.2025].

70. Komunikat prasowy IPN – badanie opinii publicznej na temat demontażu komunistycznych obiektów propagandowych poświęconych Armii Czerwonej w Polsce, https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/dla-mediow/komunikaty/174016,Komunikat-prasowy-IPN-badanie-opinii-publicznej-na-temat-demontazukomunistyczny.html [Access: 31.07.2025].

71. Polacy nie chcą pomników Armii Czerwonej. Połowa z nas popiera ich demontaż, https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1483586%2Cpolacynie-chca-pomnikow-armii-czerwonej-polowa-z-nas-popiera-ich-demontaz [Access: 31.07.2025].

72. For more information, see the news section on the website of the Institute of National Remembrance.

of dismantling, the decision to remove/relocate the object remains postponed. Of the numerous measures implemented between 1989 and 2025 as a part of decommunization, the most commonly adopted was one of the following:

y Spectacular or ‘quiet’ removal of the object from public space;

y Dismantling from central locations and transfer to cemeteries, where, for example, Red Army soldiers are buried;

y Transferring them to museums, warehouses, or putting them up for sale to private individuals, e.g. the aforementioned monument to Vladimir Lenin in Nowa

Huta was purchased by Swedish millionaire Bengt Erlandsson, who placed it in his amusement park; 73

y Leaving them in public spaces with an updated historical description explaining the circumstances surrounding the monument’s creation;

y Transforming Red Army monuments into ‘new’ monuments to commemorate new heroes. To this end, so-called hybrids were created, with only the five-pointed star and other elements of Soviet uniforms being retained. This solution was not always accepted by the local community 74

Decommunization in North Korea: Prospects and Final Conclusions

In North Korea, all monuments were built in honor of the Kim family, symbolizing a specific system of values and power. As noted by Prof. Waldemar Dziak (1952-2019), ”in the DPRK, the activities of the state, the army, the party, social and professional organisations, contemporary art, literature, film, theatre, opera and sculpture have been harnessed to the great chariot of ideological education of society” 75

In the capital of North Korea alone, there are many symbols and monuments referring to the communist revolution, such as the Tower of the Juche Idea or the aforementioned 20-metre monument to Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il on Mansu Hill, The Monument to Party Founding, where a hammer, sickle and brush

are displayed. In propaganda terms, it symbolizes the three social classes, i.e. workers, peasants and the intellectuals. In addition, there are huge murals and paintings depicting the Kim family, working people in heroic style, etc. Another issue is the Kumsusan Memorial Palace, which serves as a mausoleum – the bodies of North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il are stored there. In this context, North Korean symbolism is unrivaled, as North Korea is the only country in the world ruled by a communist dynasty. It is no coincidence that the entire socio-political life of its citizens is subordinated to a system that ultimately benefits the Kims and North Korea’s ruling elite 76

73. „Włodek Urwipięta”. Pomnik Lenina w Nowej Hucie i jego burzliwe dzieje, https://historia.dorzeczy.pl/301198/pomnik-lenina-w-nowej-hucie-ijego-burzliwe-dzieje.html [Access: 31.07.2025].

74. D. Czarnecka , op.cit., s. 337.

75. W. J. Dziak, Korea Północna. U źródeł rodzinnej sukcesji władzy, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 2009, s. 171.

76. See more: Nicolas Levi, Kto rządzi w Korei Północnej?, Academic Publishing House Dialog, 2015.

The biggest problem for DPRK citizens is that they know no other life than the one they lead – widespread indoctrination, the lack of internal democratic opposition, ignorance of foreign realities and many other factors have caused irreversible damage to the DPRK citizens’ awareness of how the world looks. In the case of European countries that found themselves under brutal Soviet occupation after 1945, the memory of freedom and of a different way of life was preserved and passed on to subsequent generations. On this basis, it was possible to build a future democratic opposition and gradually engage in an unequal struggle against the communists. As a result, their removal became only a matter of time. However, when analyzing the North Korean case, the difference between the experience of Central and Eastern European countries and that of the DPRK is clearly visible, and this is probably one of the many reasons why the North Korean system has not liberalized or changed significantly in recent decades.

Despite the passage of time, the issue of reunification of the two Korean states remains a pressing challenge. The process of future political and economic transformation – including decommunization and the removal of propaganda symbols associated with the Kim dynasty – is one of the most serious challenges for both the Republic of Korea and the citizens of North Korea themselves. In North Korea, simply removing propaganda objects may not be enough. The Kims have held absolute power practically since the very beginning, and North Korea has been in existence longer than the Soviet Union. The greatest challenge in the process of decommunization may be the de-Kimization of the North Korean state itself, i.e. the removal of all influences of the Kim dynasty (i.e. Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un) from the political, social and cultural systems, followed by making the citizens of the DPRK aware that they have been living in a permanent lie.

By comparison, in Poland, the imposed communist regime met with resistance from society. As a result, the collapse of the communist system in Poland was a process that progressed and culminated in the aforementioned Round Table Talks, where a compromise was reached between the democratic opposition and the communists. The so-called decommunization was the next stage. However, due to a lack of political will and appropriate legal solutions, this process has been prolonged and is currently limited to the removal of propaganda objects from public spaces. It is worth noting here that between 1989 and 2012 alone, a total of 156 ‘monuments of gratitude to the Red Army’ were dismantled, which accounted for 1/3 of their total number of 476 77. Then the 2016 law and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 accelerated the process of decommunization in Poland. Although there are still monuments commemorating the previous regime in public spaces, their number is decreasing every year.

In view of the prospect of Korean reunification, the process of decommunization should be carefully planned and implemented by the relevant state authorities to prevent social groups — including former regime officials, often holding radical views — from causing unrest. The future decommunization law in a unified Korean state should include solutions adopted by Central and Eastern European countries, which effectively abandoned the communist system and became part of Western civilization, among other things by following the values of liberal democracy. It is possible that in order to clean up public space in North Korea, the best solution would be to establish an appropriate institution and legal provisions prohibiting the promotion of totalitarian symbols. The next step should be to develop an appropriate historical policy covering education and those areas of shared memory (e.g. the Korean War) that have been distorted by the North Korean regime. In the author’s opinion,

only such actions could effectively make the citizens of the DPRK aware of the scale of crimes committed by the Kim clan against the Korean people.

In summary, although Poland and the countries of the Korean Peninsula are geographically and culturally distant from each other, there are certain characteristics that can unite the Polish and Korean nations. These include, among others, similarities in history – in the past, both Poland and Korea were victims of aggressive policies pursued by neighbouring powers. Both countries also experienced brutal autocratic rule, especially in the 1980s, when martial law was imposed in Poland and the Republic of Korea. Despite being in two opposing political camps between 1945 and 1989, Poland and the Republic of Korea ultimately developed relations that grew into a strategic partnership. In the case of the DPRK, however, although relations between Warsaw and Pyongyang were friendly after 1945, they became cooler after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this state of affairs continues to this day (as of 1 August 2025).

It is possible that Poland’s experience with political transformation and the process of decommunization could serve as a point of reference for a future unified Korea, but it should be remembered that any actions will require a well-thought-out strategy and time – any solutions implemented by force may have the opposite effect to that intended. In Poland, the process of decommunization would never have begun without the voice of the people. In this context, national awareness that communist symbols and their leaders were alien to the Polish love of freedom played a decisive role. As a result, over time, appropriate legal regulations and institutions responsible for the process of decommunization in Poland were established. In the case of North Korea, any political, social and cultural changes must go hand in hand with an understanding of the mentality of its inhabitants. Only then will it be possible to carry out a peaceful political transformation, in which decommunization, combined with the de-Kimization of North Korea, will be one of the stages in restoring respect for the victims of the North Korean regime and returning the stolen freedom to the citizens of the DPRK.

Bibliography

Selected Literature

z Biddiscombe Perry, The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1948, The History Press Ltd, 2006.

z Czarnecka Dominika, „Pomniki Wdzięczności” Armii Czerwonej w Polsce Ludowej i w III Rzeczypospolitej, IPN Publishing House, 2015.

z Dobrenko Evgeny, Political Economy of Socialist Realism, Yale University Press 2007.

z Dziak J Waldemar, Korea Północna. U źródeł rodzinnej sukcesji władzy, Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 2009.

z Głębocki Wiesław, Warszawskie pomniki, PTTK „Kraj” Publishing House, 1990.

z Kozłowski Tomasz, Koniec imperium MSW. Transformacja organów bezpieczeństwa państwa 1989–1990, IPN Publishing House, Warszawa 2019.

z Levi Nicolas, Kto rządzi w Korei Północnej?, Academic Publishing House Dialog, 2015.

z Myers Reynolds Brian, Najczystsza rasa: Propaganda Korei Północnej, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2011.

Internet sources

z 25 lat temu Sejm przyjął ustawę o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej, https://ipn.gov.pl/ pl/aktualnosci/195288,25-lat-temu-Sejmprzyjal-ustawe-o-Instytucie-PamieciNarodowej.html [Access: 30.07.2025].

z Armia Czerwona na ziemiach polskich po 1944 roku, https://archiwum.ipn.gov.pl/pl/ straszy-w-miescie/armia-czerwona-na-ziemiach-pol [Access: 28.07.2025].

z Komunikat prasowy IPN – badanie opinii publicznej na temat demontażu komunistycznych obiektów propagandowych poświęconych Armii Czerwonej w Polsce, https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/dla-mediow/komunikaty/174016,Komunikat-prasowy-IPN-bad anie-opinii-publicznej-na-temat-demontaz u-komunistyczny.html [Access: 31.07.2025].

z Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., https://www. sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm [Access: 30.07.2025].

z Oświadczenie Prezesa Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej w sprawie dekomunizacji przestrzeni publicznej, https://archiwum.ipn. gov.pl/pl/dla-mediow/komunikaty/160756,Oswiadczenie-Prezesa-Instytutu-Pamiec i-Narodowej-w-sprawie-dekomunizacji-pr zestr.html [Access: 31.07.2025].

z Polacy nie chcą pomników Armii Czerwonej. Połowa z nas popiera ich demontaż, https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1483586%2Cpolacy-nie-chcapomnikow-armii-czerwonej-polowa-z-naspopiera-ich-demontaz [Access: 31.07.2025].

z Pszczyński Mateusz, Communist monuments: Cultural heritage or cultural nuisance?, https://czasopisma.bg.ug.edu. pl/index.php/gsm/article/view/6247/5490 [Access: 26.07.2025].

z Samorządy przygotowują się do dekomunizacji nazw ulic, https://www. portalsamorzadowy.pl/polityka-i-spoleczenstwo/samorzady-przygotowuja-siedo-dekomunizacji-nazw-ulic,80190.html#google_vignette [Access: 30.07.2025].

z Subject terms: Lenin Steelworks, Kraków, https://encysol.pl/es/encyklopedia/hasla-rzeczowe/24296,Huta-im-Lenina-w-Krakowie.html [Access: 30.07.2025].

z Tuleja Piotr, Dekomunizacja w prawie polskim, https://www.omp.org.pl/artykul. php?artykul=102 [Access: 28.07.2025].

z Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Federacji Rosyjskiej o grobach i miejscach pamięci ofiar wojen i represji, sporządzona w Krakowie dnia 22 lutego 1994 r., https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap. nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU19941120543 [Access: 30.07.2025].

z Ustawa z dnia 1 kwietnia 2016 r. o zakazie propagowania komunizmu lub innego ustroju totalitarnego przez nazwy jednostek organizacyjnych, jednostek pomocniczych gminy, budowli, obiektów i urządzeń użyteczności publicznej oraz pomniki, https:// isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu20160000744 [Access: 31.07.2025].

z Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r., https:// isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/ WDU19970880553/U/D19970553Lj.pdf [Access: 31.07.2025].

z Wasilewski Witold, Kłamstwo katyńskie – historia i współczesność, https://ipn. gov.pl/pl/historia-z-ipn/200122,WitoldWasilewski-Klamstwo-katynskie-historiai-wspolczesnosc.html [Access: 30.07.2025].

z „Włodek Urwipięta”. Pomnik Lenina w Nowej Hucie i jego burzliwe dzieje, https://historia.dorzeczy.pl/301198/pomniklenina-w-nowej-hucie-i-jego-burzliwedzieje.html [Access: 31.07.2025].

z Wpisanie Pałacu Kultury i Nauki do Rejestru Zabytków, https://nck.pl/szkolenia-i-rozwoj/projekty/kongres-kultury/aktualnosci/wpisanie-palacu-kultury-i-naukido-rejestru-zabytkow-jaroslaw-trybus [Access: 30.07.2025].

Monika K. Kwiatkowska

Ph.D. candidate, Jagiellonian University

United in Division: Lessons from German Unification for Korea

Abstract

This comparative analysis examines the parallel trajectories of German and Korean national divisions, focusing on the lessons Korean unification efforts can derive from the German experience. Through qualitative research methods including historical analysis, comparative case study methodology, and document analysis, this paper explores the structural, political, economic, and social factors that facilitated German reunification in 1990 and their applicability to the Korean context. The study reveals that while both cases share fundamental similarities, including Cold War origins, ideological divisions, and economic disparities,

Introduction

Tsignificant differences in geopolitical contexts, domestic political systems, and cultural factors create distinct challenges for Korean unification. Key findings suggest that successful reunification requires three critical preconditions currently absent in Korea: institutional stability in both states, economic capacity to manage massive integration costs, and sustained cultural engagement across the division. The German experience demonstrates that even under optimal conditions, reunification generates profound and lasting economic, social, and cultural challenges that persist decades after formal political integration.

he division of nations represents one of the most profound and complex political phenomena of the twentieth century, with Germany and Korea serving as paradigmatic cases of Cold War-induced state fragmentation. While Germany successfully achieved reunification in 1990, Korea remains divided after more than seven decades, making the German expe-

rience a crucial reference point for understanding possibilities and challenges in Korean unification discourse.

This paper employs comparative historical analysis to examine structural parallels and divergences between German and Korean divisions. The main research questions guiding this analysis are:

1. What lessons can Korean unification efforts derive from the German reunification process?

Methods

This study employs qualitative research methods combining comparative historical analysis, document analysis, and interpretive case study methodology. The research design follows examining two cases with similar origins but different outcomes to identify causal factors and transferable lessons. The sources include academic literature, journalistic articles, and policy reports from relevant non-governmental organisations. The temporal scope covers the division period (1945-1990 for Germany, 1945-present for Korea) with particular focus on unification processes and contemporary policy discussions. Cross-case comparison iden-

2. How do contextual differences between the cases shape the applicability of these lessons?

The significance of this comparative study lies in its potential to inform Korean unification policy and related scholarship by providing empirically grounded insights from German successes and failures. By examining both convergent and divergent factors, the analysis also aims to contribute to broader theoretical understanding of divided nation reconciliation processes.

tifies convergent patterns and divergent trajectories, enabling assessment of transferability and limitations of certain policies and approaches.

Methodological limitations include potential selection bias toward successful unification models and challenges in accessing sources on North Korea. Additionally, different historical circumstances of the German reunification may affect the relevance of certain policy lessons to contemporary Korean situation, requiring careful consideration of changed geopolitical and economic contexts.

Historical context and division origins

Both German and Korean divisions emerged from World War II’s aftermath and subsequent Cold War dynamics, creating structural parallels that provide the foundation for comparative analysis. Germany’s division between western part and eastern part resulted from Allied occupation zones that

gradually transformed into separate states by 1949 (Knowles, 2014; Turner, 1992). Similarly, Korea’s division followed Japanese colonial liberation and Allied forces occupation stemming from great power competition, which resulted in creation of separate states by the same year as in the abovementioned case of Germany (Cumings,

2005).

POLITICAL MAP OF DIVIDED GERMANY,

SOURCE: ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA. GERMANY: FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. HTTPS://WWW.BRITANNICA.COM/PLACE/GERMANY/FORMATION-OF-THE-FEDERAL-REPUBLIC-OF-GERMANY.

The ideological dimension of Cold War proved crucial in both cases. The bipolar rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, therefore between communism and capitalism, created distinct political cultures in each occupational zones in Germany and Korea. Within short period of less than five years, both nations became parallelistic victims of opposing visions (Kelly, 2011). However, crucial differences between the cases emerged in the post-division period. Korea was drawn into an armed conflict that served as both a civil war and proxy international confrontation, while Germany remained relatively stable despite Cold War tensions in Europe (Jacqué,

1991). This divergence fundamentally influenced reunification prospects. Moreover, twenty years after the division, chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik normalised inter-German relations (Fink, 2009; Hagemann et al., 2020), whereas Korea developed into a extreme mutual antagonism with minimal contact across the DMZ (Lankov, 2013; Bleiker & Hoang, 2006).

The European situation provided a more favourable multilateral institutional framework for German unification prospects, with established supranational structures facilitating integration through the European Economic Community and evolving security arrangements. The end of the Cold War created unprecedented opportu-

nities for German reunification within existing European institutions, as the Federal Republic’s established membership in NATO and the EEC provided legitimacy for incorporating East Germany (Anderson, 1999). Meanwhile, the Northeast Asian regional architecture limited Korean unification options to bilateral negotiations dominated by great power interests, with revisionist states, China and Russia, influence over North Korea and the US-Japan-South Korea security alliance on the other side of the Korean Peninsula (Cumings, 2005; Pietrewicz, 2022).

The aforementioned historical foundations reveal that both divisions originated from similar Cold War dynamics, yet their subsequent paths

differed significantly. Understanding these differences is essential for assessing the transferability of German unification experiences to the Korean context.

Source: borders, important cities, rivers and lakes. English labeling and scaling. Illustration. Adobe Stock. https://stock.adobe.com/pl/images/ korean-peninsula-political-map-with-northand-south-korea-and-the-capitals-pyongyangand-seoul-national-borders-important-citiesrivers-and-lakes-english-labeling-and-scaling-illustration/98318278

Comparative analysis of division characteristics

z Political systems and governance

It should be noted that the political evolution of divided Germany and Korea reveals fundamentally different approaches to state-building and governance that would ultimately shape their respective unification prospects.

Germany: German division produced two states with distinct but relatively stable political systems that, despite their ideological opposition, developed to some extend coherent institutional frameworks. East Germany, officially known as the German Democratic Republic, developed a one-party socialist state under Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED) leadership. While authoritarian, the SED system maintained a degree of institutional predictability and centralized control that allowed for governance within its ideological constraints (Turner, 1992). The SED established clear hierarchical structures, developed comprehensive social welfare systems, and created mechanisms for citizen participation that, though limited, provided channels for engagement with the state apparatus (Port, 2009). Meanwhile, West Germany, formally the Federal Republic of Germany, established a robust parliamentary democracy. The Federal Republic’s political system was deliberately designed to avoid the institutional weaknesses that had contributed to the Weimar Republic’s collapse prior to the Nazi system (Turner, 1992, Benz, 2014). This system proved remarkably stable and legitimate,

and created strong ties to Western institutions that would prove crucial during reunification (Anderson, 1999).

Korea: Korean division, by contrast, created far less stable political dynamics that would complicate any future unification efforts. North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, developed a highly authoritarian system under Kim family leadership that transcended traditional communist party structures. Beginning with Kim Il-sung’s consolidation of power in the 1950s, North Korea evolved into a unique form of hereditary socialism that combined Marxist-Leninist ideology with Korean nationalist themes and Confucian hierarchical concepts (Lankov, 2013; Collins, 2012). On the other hand, South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea, experienced decades of military authoritarianism before finally democratizing in the late 1980s. Unlike West Germany’s immediate transition to stable democracy, the US-allied Korean state endured a series of military coups and political upheavals that prevented the establishment of stable democratic institutions. The nondemocratic governments of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo-hwan shared a commitment to strong anti-communist discourse that prioritized security concerns over democratic development (Kim, 2004; Cumings, 2004; Son, 2021). Due to the nature of both North and South Korean systems’ instability, mutual antagonism was used as a tool to create an existential threat that would help the dictators control respective societies.

z Economic development patterns

Economic inequalities played crucial roles in both cases but manifested themselves differently.

Germany: The economic conditions of the two German states in 1990 presented a stark contrast that would fundamentally shape the unification process. While the US Central Intelligence Agency had once considered East Germany the Eastern Bloc’s economic powerhouse, the reality revealed at unification was far different (Akerlof et al., 1991). It was found that 80% of East German industrial output was uncompetitive when valued at world prices, and within a year of unification, physical production had collapsed by more than 50% while joblessness rose from zero to over 20% (Akerlof et al., 1991; Burda & Weder, 2017). The gap between Eastern and Western German states was striking, with the Eastern regions producing only about a third as much as the least productive regions in the West (Burda & Weder, 2017). On the other hand, West Germany possessed not only economic wealth from its post-war Wirtschaftswunder but also the substantial institutional capacity. Such economic asymmetry meant that from the very beginning of political integration, the Eastern part of Germany required enormous support in the form of governmental transfers, estimated cumulatively at more than €2 trillion, covering direct subsidies, investment financing, and crucially, social safety net provisions including retirement benefits, health insurance, and unemployment support that East Germans could not finance themselves (Burda & Weder, 2017; Sinn, 2002).

Korea: The economic disparities between North and South Korea present even more demanding challenge to Korean reunification. Highly developed Republic of Korea, after the Miracle on the Han River, with GDP of $1.71 trillion and GDP per capita $36,024 (Asia News, 2025; Worldometer, 2025) stands in sharp contrast to socialistic North Korea’s estimated GDP of only

$43 billion and GDP per capita $1,700 (Georank, 2025). Estimates of the cost of reunification range from $50 billion to more than $3 trillion. The enormous differences in Korean economies stand as one of the key reasons for South Korean ambivalence about rapid reunification, especially under scenarios in which the South would have to absorb a collapsing North Korea (SPICE, 2011; Phillips, 2015). Although past administrations have proposed strategies to ease this burden, such as the “Denuclearization, Openness, and 3000” initiative aiming to raise the North’s GDP per capita to $3,000 within a decade, progress has been limited due to political factors (Yun, 2008). Ultimately, the significant economic imbalance reinforces the argument for a gradual, long-term process of integration, rather than an abrupt reunification (Burda & Weder, 2017).

z Social and cultural factors

Social and cultural factors turned out to be critical division indicators for both of the nations.

Germany: Despite shared linguistic and historical foundations, the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany pursued divergent state-building strategies and therefore developed distinct socio-political identities among their respective populations. West Germany pursued democratic reconstruction, systematically confronting its National Socialist past. The East, by contrast, built its political legitimacy around socialist transformation narratives that foregrounded antifascist resistance traditions (Herf, 1997; Berdahl, 1999). However, informal cultural transmission mechanisms persisted despite official restrictions. Western media penetration, underground literary circulation, and unofficial cultural exchanges functioned as counterhegemonic forces that preserved cross-border social connectivity and alternative identity frameworks (Balbier et al., 2011). Additionally, Ostpolitik normalization process during the 1970s, which included development of inter-German

economic relations, facilitated diplomatic engagement and controlled interpersonal contact, maintaining social bonds that subsequently enabled relatively peaceful reunification processes in 1989-1990 (Fink, 2009).

Korea: The Korean situation presents far greater cultural divergence after seven decades of separation. North Korea’s Juche ideology has created a fundamentally different worldview from South Korea’s market-oriented, globally integrated society. Social values have diverged substantially, with North Korean emphasis on collectivism, militarism, and state loyalty and South Korean individualism and highly competitive capitalistic culture. North Koreans have very limited exposure to global culture, technology, or consumer goods (Lankov, 2013; Collins, 2018), while South Koreans embrace internationalism,

modernity, capitalism, and, in consequence, consumerism (Son, 2021; Westra, 2006). Moreover, due to prolonged division. Korean language evolution shows these gaps clearly. While both Koreas speak Korean, vocabulary has diverged significantly. North Korea has purged many foreign loanwords and created new terminology for modern concepts, while South Korean has incorporated extensive English and other foreign terms (Terrell, 2007; Rüdiger, 2018; Fuqua, 2011). However, traditional Korean cultural practices, Confucian family structures, respect towards ancestors, and historical memory of unified Korea remain embedded in both societies, even under different political systems (Shin, 2006). As for now, both North and South Korea have built their own version of national history and identity that justified their right to exist while presenting the other side as the illegitimate one.

Nation Germany Korea

Political Systems

FRG: Stable parliamentary democracy; strong federalism; in NATO and EC.

GDR: One-party socialist regime under SED; authoritarian but institutionally coherent with predictable governance.

Economy

Society & Culture

FRG: Rapid growth (Wirtschaftswunder); strong institutional capacity for integration.

GDR: Mostly outdated industrial base; undeveloped.

FRD: Liberalism; individualism; denazification.

GDR: Socialism; collectivism; antifascism; Eastern-bloc aligned.

ROK: Prolonged military authoritarianism until democratization in late 1980s; marked by political instability and coups; possesses soft power; internationally engaged.

DPRK: Hereditary dictatorship under Kim family; Juche; revisionist; isolationist.

ROK: Rapid industrialization (Miracle on the Han River); now a global economic power.

DPRK: Early growth stalled after Soviet collapse; famine and economic isolation.

ROK: Globalisation; individualism; consumerism.

DPRK: Juche ideology; isolation; state loyalty; militarism.

This comparative analysis demonstrates that successful reunification requires three critical preconditions that Germany possessed but Korea lacks. First, political legitimacy and institutional stability in at least one divided state creates a foundation for integration, as West Germany’s democratic consolidation contrasted with South Korea’s prolonged authoritarianism before the democratisation. Second, economic capacity to absorb integration costs proves essential – while Germany’s disparities were manageable through

Germany after reunification

The reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 marked the formal political and territorial consolidation of the West and East, following the peaceful revolution in the GDR and the subsequent collapse of the socialist regime. Driven by both domestic pressure and international diplomatic negotiations, reunification was achieved with remarkable speed. While reunification fulfilled a long-standing national aspiration and symbolised the end of the Cold War order in Europe, it simultaneously exposed and generated a range of profound political, economic, and social challenges.

With regard to economy, the rapid integration proved deeply disruptive due to the economic differences mentioned above. East Germany’s outdated industrial base, lack of competitiveness, and underdeveloped infrastructure necessitated massive public investment from the West. The introduction of the West German Deutsche Mark to the East at a 1:1 conversion rate, though politically popular, distorted the value of Eastern assets and accelerated the collapse of local industries, leading to widespread unemployment. The economic burden on the FRG was immense and even decades later, significant discrepancies

West German institutional strength, Korea’s economic gap appears excessively expensive and potentially politically destabilizing. Third, sustained cultural connectivity preserves reunification possibilities, as it should be noted that German cross-border ties through media and diplomacy maintained social bonds, whereas Korea’s complete separation has created incompatible societies with competing national narratives and strong mutual antagonism.

persist in income levels, employment rates, and economic productivity between the former East and West (Akerlof et al., 1991).

Socially and culturally, reunification exposed identity divisions. The experience of authoritarian socialism in the GDR had shaped different attitudes towards state authority, individual freedoms, and social cohesion. The sudden imposition of West German institutions, laws, and norms did replace Eastern values, which still differ from the Western ones (Welsch, 2022). The concept of Ostalgie (Johnson, 2022), nostalgia for aspects of life in the GDR, illustrates the persistence of a divided historical memory.

The abovementioned social and economic inequalities contributed to alienation and disillusionment, and eventually to support for populist and extremist parties (Zeng, 2024; Hildebrandt & Trüdinger, 2021). Cultural dissonance was further reinforced by the predominance of West Germans in leadership roles in both the public and private sectors during the early years of reunification, which some even call “colonisation” (Knight, 2017).

German lessons for Korean unification

The case of Germany is widely recognised in the studies of Korean reunification, and scholarship offers wide range of policy recommendations. This analysis presents three main and most critical lessons.

Lesson 1: Economy

One of the most striking lessons from Germany is the critical importance of managing economic integration with care and strategic foresight. The abrupt introduction of a unified currency and market economy in the former East Germany led to the collapse of uncompetitive industries, mass unemployment, and long-term economic dependency on state subsidies. A parallel scenario in Korea, where the North’s planned economy would face immediate exposure to the highly developed South Korean market, could result in even more severe disruptions, given North Korea’s far greater economic isolation, underdevelopment, and lack of infrastructure. Gradual integration, potentially involving transitional economic zones or phased monetary and regulatory harmonisation, would likely be essential to prevent systemic collapse and social unrest.

Lesson 2: Identity

Social, cultural, and essentially psychological integration poses another crucial challenge. In post-reunification Germany, many East Germans experienced a sense of cultural marginalisation, as West German norms and institutions dominated the new national framework. This led to resentment, identity crises, and the phenomenon of Ostalgie. In the Korean context, these dynamics could be even more pronounced.

Decades of ideological division, mutual antagonism, and vastly different socialisation experiences have created two distinct national identities on the peninsula. Reconciling these identities would require not only legal and institutional unification but also inclusive narratives of shared history and nationhood, alongside long-term investments in civic education and cultural institutions focused on reconstruction of Korean collective memory.

Lesson 3: Equality

The German case demonstrates the enduring nature of regional inequalities and political discontent. In eastern Germany, dissatisfaction with reunification outcomes has contributed to higher support for populist and radical parties. If Korean unification were to generate similar patterns of uneven development and perceived second-class citizenship for North Koreans, it could undermine social cohesion and democratic stability. Policymakers would need to anticipate and mitigate these risks through inclusive governance, decentralised decision-making, and meaningful participation in shaping the post-unification order.

While the German model cannot be directly implemented on the Korean peninsula, it serves as a cautionary tale against overly rapid or technocratic approaches to unification. Any successful Korean unification process would need to be carefully staged, context-sensitive, and guided by principles of equity, mutual respect, and reconciliation, while recognising that unity is as much a social and emotional process as it is a legal or territorial one.

Conclusions

The comparative analysis of German and Korean divisions reveals both the potential and the limitations of applying historical events to contemporary unification challenges. The German experience provides valuable insights into the mechanics of reunification, yet the Korean case still demands unique approaches and solutions.

The process of reunification of Germany illustrates that even under optimal circumstances, including Cold War’s end, European institutional support, and relatively stable political systems, reunification generates profound and lasting challenges. Economic disparities, cultural divisions, and social inequalities persist decades after formal political integration, suggesting that unification is better understood as a long-term process rather than a singular event. For Korea, these lessons carry particular significance given the far greater disparities between North and South. The economic gap between the Koreas greatly exceeds that which existed between East and West Germany, while seven decades of almost complete separation have created incompatible social systems. Unlike Germany, where cultural connectivity was to some extend maintained through media penetration and regular di-

plomatic engagement, Korea’s hermetic division has produced two societies that operate according to fundamentally different principles despite shared linguistic and historical foundations. Moreover, East Germany, though authoritarian, was not isolated from other socialist states, while North Korea remains the most isolated country in the world, which significantly impacts its national mentality, consequently making the unification prospects more complicated.

Eventually, the analysis reveals three critical prerequisites for sustainable unification that Korea currently lacks: institutional stability in both states, economic capacity to manage integration costs, and sustained cultural connectivity. These findings suggest that Korean unification, if it occurs, must follow a gradual, carefully managed process that prioritizes these areas.

Finally, Korean unification must also develop its own path that addresses specific regional dynamics. Future research should focus on developing Korea-specific integration models that account for distinctive regional challenges while building upon the procedural lessons learned from German reunification.

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KOREAN UNIFICATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE LESSONS FROM POLAND AND EUROPE SUPPORTING KOREA IN ITS PATH TOWARDS UNIFICATION

Han-Ul Chang

Head of the South Asia, Pacific and Oceania Department at Institut d’études de géopolitique appliqué (IEGA)

A European model of institutionalization in the process of Korea unification

“European construction, like all peaceful revolutions, needs time - time to convince, time to adapt minds and adjust things to great transformations”

Jean Monnet

EUROPEAN UNION FLAG

SOURCE:WIKIPÉDIA, HTTPS://COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA. ORG/WIKI/FILE:FLAG_OF_EUROPE.SVG?LANG=FR

KOREAN UNIFICATION FLAG

SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA, HTTPS://COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA. ORG/WIKI/FILE:UNIFICATION_FLAG_OF_KOREA_ (PRE_2006).SVG

Introduction

It has been more than 75 years since the Korean Peninsula was divided but seven decades of separation ought not to erase 5,000 years of common history. The hope to witness the two Koreas becoming one again remains, but the process of the reunification is still challenged. The Sunshine Policy introduced by former President Kim Dae Jung was a spark that made a breakthrough in the inter-Korean relationships by opening up the possibility of a dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang. The principles of this policy have become a heritage to Koreans who yet believe in reunification.

The Ostpolitik 78 established by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, in the 1970s, was the main inspiration in the conception of the Sunshine Policy. The scheme had succeeded to grant a peaceful coexistence between West Germany and East Germany, before they finally reunified in 1989. Today, however, it seems like a comparison with German reunification has become less accurate on account of the different dynamics taken by both Koreas; while South

Korea has risen as one of the biggest economies in the world, North Korea’s economy has crumbled and has decided to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, unlike Germany, a sudden reunification would not be desirable for the Peninsula as the political, economical and social gap between the two sides is significant.

Thus, as a potential response to the current obstacles and the upcoming difficulties, Korea could develop an union whose model would be drawn on European construction. Europe was indeed for centuries a land of warfares; and yet European countries, despite the ashes of World War II and resentment, have reached to build a community based on peace and economic cooperation. Then, what if South Korea and North Korea learnt from the European Union’s lessons to develop its own union: a Korean Union.

78. C.I Moon, The Sunshine Policy in Defense of Engagement as a path to peace in Korea” (2012), Yonsei University Press

SOURCE: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, HTTPS://WWW.EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU/ABOUT-PARLIAMENT/EN/IN-THE-PAST/THE-PARLIAMENT-AND-THE-TREATIES/TREATY-OF-PARIS

The establishment of the European Community

In 1950, the European nations were under a pill of ruin and were facing the disastrous outcomes of World War II. In this particular context, that on the 9th of May 1950, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, delivered his famous Declaration to propose the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), whose main aim would be building peace in Europe by “a de facto solidarity 79”. It means a solidarity based on material interdependence of European people and European nations. One year later, the Treaty of Paris was signed, and officially established the ECSC which will be composed of 6 Member States: France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Belgium. Immediately, the ECSC was willing to create a common market of coal and steel in order to make the purpose of war materially impossible.

Those efforts of maintaining peace in Europe will be awarded by a Peace Nobel Prize in 2012.

The ECSC laid the principal foundations of the European community. Gradually, new fundamental treaties such as Treaty of Rome (1957), Maastricht Treaty (1992) or Lisbon Treaty (2007) have provided evolutions that have crafted the European construction to deepen and broaden the European Union (EU) and its affairs:

y There are now 27 Member States (6 Member States in 1951)

y The common market has seen its prerogatives expanding as all the goods (not only coal and steel), the services, the capitals and people can circulate freely.

y The European citizens are also able to live,

79. R. Schuman, Schuman Declaration, (1950), Salon de l’Horloge at Quay d’Orsay (Paris)

work and study freely within the Schengen Area

y The European Union has introduced the Euro (€) as a currency (today 21 Member States are using Euro as their national currency)

Regarding the European institutional frame, the EU is composed of three main institutions: the Parliament, the Council and the Commission. They assure the functioning of the EU by leading different missions.

The European Parliament

Since 1979, the members of the European Parliament are elected in direct universal suffrage, and their mandate lasts five years. The prerogatives of the Parliament are:

y Political control: the Parliament elects the President of the Commission et investigate the whole Commission members; it may also withdraw its political trust towards the Commission with a vote of no confidence

y Legislative participation: the Parliament has the right to propose a text to the Commission, but it has not the legislative initiative. The Parliament is able to amend a text and the right to decide the final result through a vote

y Budget participation: the Parliament votes the annual budget in cooperation with the Council

The European Council

The European Council is composed of the Member States’ head of state and governments, and a president of the Council. The Council’s activities are:

y Council meetings: the Council organizes meetings two times per semester, and extraordinary meetings when the situations require it. The meetings are held in Brussels.

y Impulsion: the Council gives the political guidelines that the other institutions have to translate

y Reexamination: the Council can reexamine an act to correct it

The European Commission

The European Commission is composed of 27 members (1 member per Member States) who are nominated by their own Member State before being investigated, or not, through a vote from the European Parliament. Before Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the Commission was a member elected from the European Parliament (generally from the biggest political group). The prerogatives of the Commission are:

y Monitoring: the Commission prepares reports and monitors the good application of European law. The Commission can then sanction a wrong application of the European law from a Member State

y Right of the initiative: the Commission adopts the legislative acts. The institution has the monopoly regarding this right

y International representation: the Commission represents the EU at the international level. The institution negotiates international agreements by opening the negotiations and its signature

SIGNATURE OF THE PANMUNJOM DECLARATION IN 2018 BETWEEN LEADER KIM JONG UN AND PRESIDENT MOON JAE IN, THE LAST TIME THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION

SOURCE: SIGNATURE OF THE PANMUNJOM DECLARATION IN 2018 BETWEEN LEADER KIM JONG UN AND PRESIDENT MOON JAE IN, THE LAST TIME THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION

The European Union as a model of inspiration for a Korean Union

The conception of a Korean Union might draw the same layout by adapting to its proper situation and history. First of all, the establishment of a formal Korean Union will be achieved through the ratification of a Treaty. It will be a necessity because that will guarantee international recognition, and it is more binding than an agreement or a mere declaration. Within this new institutional framework, the Korean Union would integrate a “Korean Common Market” similar to the European Single Market. That would put in place a free trade system between North and South Korea, and facilitate

the movement of - at the beginning - specific goods (agricultural, textile, industrial), services and people (separated families). Hence, it would ensure fair competition, and promote cooperation and solidarity by strengthening a common Korean integration and development 80 . The market should have the will of reducing the socio-economical and technical gap between the two Koreas with a comprehensive approach. However, the Korean Common Market would meet some limitations in comparison with the European Market as the freedom of goods and people would not have the same scale.

Likewise, the denuclearization of North Korea remains a delicate issue; then Korea could institute its proper version of the EURATOM (K-ATOM). In fact, the EURATOM - established with the Treaty of Rome - has several purposes such as promoting the research, uniforming the norms to protect population and laborers from nuclear hazard, and ensuring that nuclear power is not used for other finalities like military 81 . Therefore, the Korean Union could have a better management and control of the nuclear resources on the peninsula; even though it would be unlikely to see North Korea withdrawing its nuclear arsenal easily.

Then, the Korean Union would need institutions to assure its functioning. The Union could introduce three main institutions inspired upon their European equivalents: a Korean High Authority, a Korean Common Assembly and a Korean Council.

The Korean Common Assembly (based on the European Parliament)

The Korean Common Assembly would hold a similar role than the European Parliament. Their members would be either elected directly by the citizens, or would be a delegation from national parliaments nominated by the government like the previous ECSC Common Assembly’s members. However, there is a risk with the delegation rather than an election, as a lack of democratic legitimacy from people’s perspective, especially if the institution became the warrantor of the legislative power. The prerogatives of the Korean Common Assembly would be:

y Legislative power: unlike the European Parliament, the Common Assembly would detain the right of initiative in making laws82 (unless their members are nominated and not elected)

y Political control: the Assembly would exercise a supervisor role toward the High Authority, with the capacity to destitute their members through the vote of a motion of non-confidence. Following auditions, the institution could also institute or not the High Authority’s members

y Budget participation: by voting the budget, the Assembly would give its agreement or not

The Korean Council (based on the European Council)

The members of the Korean Council would be the heads of state and governments from North and South Koreans governments. Unlike the European Council, a president of the Council would not be necessary as there are only two Member States. Its prerogatives would be:

y Council meetings: the Council would organize meetings two times per semester, and extraordinary meetings when the situations require it. The meetings would be held in Panmunjom

y General politics: the Council would define the general politics and guidelines of the Korean Union

y International representation: the two Korean heads of state would represent the Korean Union

81. D. Fuchs, Future Tasks of EURATOM, (1967), Inter-economics, Review of European Economic Policy, Vol. 02, pp. 332-334

82. R. Corbett, The Evolving Roles of the European Parliament and National Parliaments, (2012), Oxford Academic Books

The Korean High Authority (based on the European Commission)

The members of the Korean High Authority would be nominated by their respective governments before being approved by the members of the Common Assembly through a vote. Regarding the president of the High Authority, he or she would be elected amongst the members of the Korean Common Assembly. The prerogatives of the High Authority would be:

y Executive power: the High Authority would hold the executive power. Hence its powers would be independent and supranational, and its responsibility would be under the control of the Common Assembly as a counterweight force.

y Leading the goals from the Treaty: the High Authority ought to conduct the objectives disposed of by the Treaty and permit a sustainable functioning of the Korea Common Market 83. The institution would provide expertises and politics, financial resources and, at the same time, ensure the normal conditions of economical competition

y Monitoring: the High Authority would prepare reports and monitor the good application of unified Korean law. The High Authority can then sanction a wrong application of the law from a Member State

There is a genuine hope of thinking about the institutionalization of the inter-Korean relationships through an Union, as the two Koreas already succeeded in the past to build materially an economic cooperation. One of the major successes of the Sunshine Policy was the construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The complex located in the city of Kaeson in North Korea, just across the Demilitarized Zone, was one of the best visible representations of inter-Korean mutual cooperation 84 . The main vision behind the initiative was to improve cooperation, and to help North Korea start to reform its economy. Even though the complex got shut down in 2016, under the Park Geun Hye Administration 85, the current South Korean Minister of the Unification, Chung Dong Young, has expressed his desire to reopen the complex. Despite its closure, the Kaesong Industrial Complex was a real proof of the capacity of the two Koreas to institutionalize mutual cooperation.

If Kaesong had to reopen its cooperative activities, the city eventually might acquire a notable status in the Korean Union as a capital, similar to Brussels and Strasbourg in the European Union. Furthermore, Kaesong is a historical and symbolic city as it was the former capital of the realm of Goryeo (918-1392 CE). It was under their reign that a ‘true national unification’ of Korea occurred.

83. K.J. Alter and D. Steinberg, The Theory and Reality of the European Coal and Steel Community, (2007), Northwestern University, pp. 89-104

84. K.N. Seung, K.Y. YI, 개성공단의 국제경쟁력 강화방안 연구, (2014), Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

85. K.G. Kim, Reopening a Door to Peace: the Kaesong Industrial Complex, (2018), 동아시아재단

KAESONG COMPLEX (SOURCE: REUTERS/JO YONG-HAK, SOURCE: HTTPS://WWW.LEMONDE.FR/ASIE-PACIFIQUE/ARTICLE/2013/03/31/ MALGRE-LES-MENACES-LE-PARC-INDUSTRIEL-INTERCOREEN-KAESONGFONCTIONNE-TOUJOURS_3151076_3216.HTML

The challenges of the European construction as a mirror of a Korean Union’s limits

“ What is the European Union?” A simple question, but an intricate answer. The European Union (EU) possesses the judicial personality, that means the Union has rights and obligations towards its engagements. This capacity allows the EU to conclude international agreements within the framework of the European Treaties. However, in the absence of a formal Constitution, the EU does not possess sovereignty, and cannot be deemed as a State. Therefore, it is difficult to give a proper definition of the European Union: some German scholars have proposed the concept of Staatenverbund (a Constitutional order of States), while some other scholars are thinking of a federal conception or an international organisation. Finally, the European Union is an original concept that does not draw its existence from existing forms of organization, the Union follows its proper

rules. Then, the natural question is: “what would be a Korean Union?” The honest answer would be the Korean Union could also be a sui generis organization. In other words, an organization that would be deemed as unique in its conception. Thus, the Korean Union, like the European Union, would acquire the judicial personality, but could acquire sovereignty. But, where the EU failed to establish a Constitution, the Korean Union could succeed to establish one in order to achieve reunification.

Euroscepticism is one of the biggest challenges that the EU has been facing for some years. The apex of this sentiment was even reached in 2016 with Brexit. The United Kingdom became the first Member State to have decided to leave the EU. Afterwards, despite the aftermath of the British departure and regrets, the euroscepti-

BREXIT, A TURNING POINT IN THE EU HISTORY (CREDIT: JILKO,

SOURCE: HTTPS://WWW.ISTOCKPHOTO.COM/FR/VECTORIEL/BREXIT-GM1128944566-298056547

cism remains strong and the trust towards the EU is falling down, especially from the populist movements in Europe 86. Moreover, even though the European Union has strong symbols such as the twelve golden stars flag, the ‘Ode to Joy’ as an anthem or a common currency, amongst the European population, it is difficult to perceive a real European belonging as they often do not understand its prerogatives and its functioning. Regarding the development of a Korean Union on the EU prism, “Korean identity” - no distinction between North and South - might become

a crucial factor. Because a chance of reunification also lies on comprehensive cultural infrastructure transcending political boundaries 87 .

Nowadays, there is a significant generational gap regarding the inter-Korean relationships issues. Most of the elders, who have known or have a familial heritage of the Korean War, are encouraging peace; they even wish for reunification. On the other hand, there is less interest from the younger generation, regarding the stakes of reunification. Peace and reunification are no longer one of their top priorities as they are used

86. S.G. Gabriel, Europe and Euroscepticism today, (2022), Annals - Economy Series, Vol. 1, pp. 152-158

87. M.K. Kwiatkowska, Maintaining National Identity through division: What Korea may learn from Poland, (2025), Warsaw Institute

to living in a divided Peninsula. Young Koreans seem more in favor of a status quo. This stance could be explained by the current socio-economic circumstances like job market and precarity, which put young Koreans into a laborious and stressful condition. Hence, there might be a reluctance from the youth to see potential jobs taken by “North” Koreans or their taxes to finance the functioning of the Union. The success of a Korean Union in bringing sustainable peace on the peninsula could nonetheless permit the end of mandatory military service for every South Korean male citizen for a period of 18 months. Hence, the budget allocated to the service could be transferred onto other priorities like education, medical system or even youth policy. Moreover, the access to the North Korean natural resources through the Korean Common Market could be as well beneficial for the South Korean economy and development. Seeking for peace could be seen as a mere symbolic purpose, but it could also open the doors for new human, agricultural and technical potentials. Brexit’s lesson could raise another concern to a Korean Union; even though a Korean Union is established, there is a risk that one of the two Koreas withdraws unilaterally from the Union. In fact, the inter-Korean relations have demonstrated their inconsistency, which is related to the divided political stance from South Korea towards North Korea.

The funding of the Korean Union is a relevant interrogation. There is an existing risk of reluctance from Korean citizens regarding the financial

impact on the national budget about a project whose success is not a guarantee. A solution could be found in the European construction: during the European Coal Steel Community (ECSC) period, its activities were financed directly from coal and steel companies (levies) and from its funders (loans) 88 . Hence, if the Korean Union does not wish to financially imply its citizens to the funding, an agreement with major Korean firms must be essential in order to develop the functioning of the Union and its future measures. Nevertheless, negotiations with those companies would be possible as they could be favorable to be actors of the project. Often, during the previous inter-Korean summits, representatives from prime South Korean companies like LG or Hyundai were included in the discussions. They have always evidenced an incentive of helping socially, economically and technically North Korea in order to strengthen Korean cooperation.

The neighboring nations of the Peninsula like China, Russia, Japan and the United States will want to play a significant role within the negotiations and the establishing process as the Korean Peninsula remains a strategic place in the Indo-Pacific area. Therefore, it will be essential that the influence of other nations is not coercive. Otherwise, in regards to the political history of Korea, there is a high chance that their participation will not go in favor of peace and the institution of a Korean Union as most of them are favorable to a status quo situation.

88. A. Rossignol, Les finances de la C.E.C.A. et le développement financier des institutions européennes, (1954), Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger

The culture as an international vector of interest

The motto of the European Union is “United in diversity”; this phrase well qualifies the general incentive of European integration. The EU encourages the respect of cultural diversity within its institutions as well as towards its citizens. For instance, in the European Parliament, every Member has the right to speak in its mother tongue (there are 24 official EU languages); the ERASMUS+ Program allows the students to have the opportunity of studying in another European country; or the absence of border control facilitates the freedom of movement and travelling. Hence, European integration emphasizes on its cultural diversity, but it is balanced with common shared principles like Human Rights or peace; this combination could explain the overall stability of the EU for decades, even if they are facing some nationalist challenges. Nevertheless in terms of cultural binding, Korea should adopt a different strategy than the EU did. Because the EU is composed of 27 Member States, cultural variety is definitely acquired, which binds European nations to share common principles to develop the same goals. Although the two Koreas have different political and economic views, they both share the same language, the same history and the same culture. Therefore, Korea integration ought to focus on cultural unity as they are the same people: the Korean people.

The success of the establishment of a Korean Union lies also in the capacity of Korea to develop a genuine interest on peace and reuni-

fication issues beyond its own frontiers. Because international recognition will be essential for its approval. Furthermore, international support from the people and international organizations could contribute to popularizing the acceptance of a Korean Union. Thus, Korean soft power could become a message-bearer in regards to these issues. For a decade, whether people like it or not, Hallyu (the Korean Wave) has been submerging worldwide, consequently of the performances of its K-pop groups, the qualities of its Drama and movies, and the appetite for its gastronomy, which bring millions of visitors every year (16.37 millions in 2024, 48% higher than 2023 89). Therefore, cultural actors, through their global influence, might have the opportunity to (re)open general interest in inter-Korean relations. A couple of years ago, two juggernaut K-pop groups BTS and Seventeen gave respectively a speech at the UN General Assembly and at the UNESCO about mental health and education. That showed they have an influential force on the international stage, especially upon the youth.

Hence, the Korean cultural actors could hold a significant role in the support of a Korean Union, they would be able to spread the message about the relevance of such a project on a global scale because the purpose of peace and reunification of the Korean Peninsula will definitely have an echo worldwide. But, they could also refuse to bear that kind of responsibility regarding the political consequences of such a stance upon their career and image.

89. J.H. Moon, South Korea tourism surges in 2024 with record spending and arrivals, (2025), Korea Herald

GIVING A SPEECH AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

SOURCE: UNWEBTV LIVE STREAM, HTTPS://WWW.UNICEF.ORG/PRESS-RELEASES/WE-HAVE-LEARNED-LOVE-OURSELVESSO-NOW-I-URGE-YOU-SPEAK-YOURSELF

Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter was to write down a vision of a Korean Union. Beyond a mere utopist character of this study, those previous lines wanted to be at least accurate, regarding the socio-economic stakes, by emphasizing some samples of hope without forgetting the likely limits and difficulties that faced such an Union. A Korean Union would be a demanding and difficult project to elaborate, whose existence has yet no tracks. But, there is a pure, insouciant and noble intention of shaking the world with an innocent persuasion, while the reality is otherwise different. The relations between North and South Korea are built on ups and downs mixed with provocations and

arguments. Nonetheless, sometimes disputes are necessary in order to strengthen the bonds and the relations, especially when they share the same familial history. The best victory is the one obtained without fighting.

Though the aspiration of peace is tossed and blown, Korean people have shown throughout their History their incredible resilience through many challenges (colonization, war, rebuilding, authoritarianism, martial law, economical crises…), but never they step back, they walk on always with hope, hard work, and determination; that is why, even though they do not know when a reunification will happen, but it will happen, and they need to be prepared for it.

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The project is funded by a UniKorea grant, financed by the UniKorea Foundation.

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