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PREMIUM ON SAFETY ISSUE 57 | FALL 2026

IN THIS ISSUE

Cold Weather Tools All Pilots Can Use (+ Quiz) 5 The Organization Matters 8 Keeping Your Head in the Game 9 Lessons Learned: Don't Count on Keeping Secrets 12

More Than a Feeling

Why Train?

How the Best Safety Programs Measure Alertness and Mitigate Fatigue Risk

PAUL RATTÉ USAIG Safety Programs

MATTHEW VAN WOLLEN with contributions from Kate Jaramillo and Sara Coats Pulsar Informatics

very aviation professional has heard some version of the same question: "How tired are you?"

It’s an important question, but also an incomplete one. Fatigue is unique because it is a biological state, and humans are biologically individual. Sometimes we feel exhausted but are still capable of performing duties safely and reliably. At other times, we feel perfectly ne while our alertness, reaction time, and decision-making abilities have already begun to decline. Relying solely on the answer to the question “How tired are you?” leaves a gap that may negatively impact the safety of an operation. A best practice among aviation organizations combines subjective selfassessments with objective alertness testing as part of a comprehensive approach to fatigue risk management. Self-Assessments Measure Feelings No one knows more about how a crew member feels than the crew member. Encouraging crews to report how they feel is sensible, and it’s also important that self-reporting fatigue be viewed as professional behavior rather than a sign of personal weakness.

A few hours in a sim across a few days is unlikely to produce a renaissance in any one—let alone all—of the many competencies involved in ying. But it will allow you to safely explore and hone your abilities in ways you can’t in daily ying. Recurrent training is not about your instructor, the FAA, your employer, or the CFRs. It’s for you.

Perhaps a few familiar sayings can help dial that in:

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“Flying is hours of sheer boredom punctuated by moments of stark terror.” Hopefully that’s not your experience but take the point. More than most professions ying can, at a time not of your choosing, demand

Some people underestimate their fatigue. Others overestimate it. Motivation, experience, personality, and operational pressure can all in uence how someone rates themselves. And then there’s the issue of comparability—two crew members may give the same answer on the KSS, but what that value means to each of them may be completely

A simple self-assessment like the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) allows individuals to honestly evaluate their current level of sleepiness on a scale from extremely alert to extremely sleepy. Other survey questions may be useful to gauge how much sleep a person obtained last night, or whether they feel t for duty. But subjective assessments have limitations.

ecurrent training is part of most pilots’ careers. Your window comes around again and o you go. Do you ever stop to think about what you’re aiming to accomplish? Maybe you see the sim instructor as having the agenda and you’re just there to experience (or endure) it. Across several years of teaching simulator courses, I saw many pilots arrive primed to engage while others had way more intentionality about their gym and dinner plans. Engaged pilots’ skills bene ted more. Staying mindful of why you’re there will help you make the most of your training.

Objective Testing Measures Performance An objective assessment answers a di erent question: “How alert is the brain right now?” The gold standard in objective measures of alertness is the Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT).1 The PVT measures reaction time and attention by evaluating how quickly an individual responds to visual stimuli over a sustained period of 1 to 3 minutes. Research has consistently shown that reaction time slows as fatigue increases—even when people feel alert. This matters because fatigue isn't only caused by lack of sleep. Sleep debt, extended wakefulness, and circadian misalignment can all a ect how someone feels.2 Crew members may not even realize the extent to which these fatigue stressors are a ecting their decision-making abilities. An objective measure such as the PVT helps remove uncertainty from the conversation. Just as important, it protects operators from the opposite situation, providing an impartial assessment that supports fair, consistent operational decisions. Neither subjective nor objective assessments are perfect on their own. But together, they create a far more complete picture. The Power of Using Both Pairing the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale with the Psychomotor Vigilance Test is a best practice to measure alertness and manage fatigue risk.3 The two tools measure di erent, yet equally important, dimensions of wake-state stability: • The KSS captures how the individual feels.

• The PVT measures how the individual is actually performing. Continues next page

Why Train from page 1

immediate, accurate fusion of all your knowledge and skills just to survive. A chance to safely explore dynamic scenarios and practice accessing and applying those faculties at game speed is invaluable to build con dence in what’s working and identify gaps you need to work on. “We do it this way because we’ve always done it this way.” Flying is characterized by required procedures accomplished through technique. Inertia in these can be good or bad. Recurrent training provides a gauge of how well your habits and practices are staying up to date and procedurally sound. The instructor o ers an external check on procedural adherence and a fresh perspective for re ning or enhancing your techniques. If you partner for training with someone you don’t normally y with—a smart idea when possible—you gain another viewpoint and example to observe. It can break you out of a rut, stem procedural drift, trigger ‘ah-ha’ moments, and put new tools in your kit. Approached with an open and engaged mind, every sim recurrent visit will re ne how you y, often in ways unexpected. “Practice until you can do it right, then keep practicing until you can’t do it wrong.” This is a favorite among musicians. I like the commitment and perfectionism themes here—maybe the number of hours spent practicing even becomes a bragging point(?!). But it’s too narrow for ying. If the piano catches re mid-concerto, some of the keys inexplicably stop working, or there’s an unexpected switch to a musical score never seen before, all that repetition of the familiar isn’t especially helpful. In fact, it might help facilitate a big audience let-down. You can’t completely ‘practice the challenge’ out of ying. Sure, sound habits built through repetition free up capacity to improve situational awareness and foster con dence. But full readiness also depends on having a deep well of the right knowledge paired with the ability to uidly and skillfully apply it in demanding scenarios you’ve never rehearsed. Routine ops are designed to avoid exing those faculties. But you know what’s good for doing precisely that…? Stay well, y smart, train with intention. ❖

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di erent. That's why self-reporting should not be relied upon as the only source of information about crew fatigue.

When both indicate someone is alert and ready, the operator can have greater con dence that the individual is t for duty. When one suggests elevated fatigue, it creates an opportunity for a conversation rather than a judgement. And when both indicators are positive, the organization has clear evidence that risk mitigation is appropriate. The result is a process that is more transparent, more consistent, and more defensible than relying on feelings alone. Fatigue Is Not an Automatic “No-Go” One common misconception is that identifying fatigue automatically means the mission cannot proceed. Fatigue management is about managing risk, not halting operations. Most fatigue risk can be reduced through practical countermeasures that temporarily improve alertness while longer-term recovery is planned. Here are four simple strategies that can help improve alertness before or during a duty period: • Take a Short Nap: A 20- to 30-minute nap can signi cantly improve alertness without creating prolonged sleep inertia.4 When operationally feasible, a brief nap is one of the most e ective fatigue countermeasures available. • Use Ca eine Strategically: Ca eine is most e ective when used intentionally as a tool, not habitually throughout the day. Timing matters. Consuming ca eine before expected periods of reduced alertness can improve vigilance and reaction time, while avoiding excessive intake late in the day helps protect the next night's sleep. • Get Moving: Even a few minutes of walking, stretching, or light physical activity such as squats increase blood ow and temporarily boost alertness. Movement is particularly helpful during long periods of sitting. • Seek Bright Light: Exposure to bright light—especially natural sunlight—helps stimulate the brain's alerting system and supports circadian rhythms. When sunlight isn't available, bright arti cial light tuned to the right color temperature can also provide bene ts. None of these techniques can replace adequate sleep. They can, however, reduce fatigue risk and help crews regain alertness when used appropriately. Building a Culture of Safety Fatigue management works best when it is built on trust, science, and consistency. Subjective self-reporting encourages honest communication and reinforces a just safety culture. Objective performance testing provides measurable data that supports operational decisions and removes unnecessary bias. Together, they help answer two critical questions: "How do you feel?”

and

"How are you performing?"

Neither answer alone tells the whole story. But combined, they provide aviation organizations with a balanced, evidencebased approach to determining tness for duty. This culture of safety protects crew members, supports operational decision-making, and ultimately strengthens safety across every ight. ❖ Matthew van Wollen, B.A.Sc., CFA, is a co-founder of Pulsar Informatics and serves as Senior Project Manager and Chief Financial Officer. Over the past ten years he has created tailored fatigue risk management programs for many aviation organizations, including Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operators. 1. Basner M, Mollicone D, Dinges DF. Validity and sensitivity of a brief psychomotor vigilance test (PVT-B) to total and partial sleep deprivation. Acta

Astronaut 2011; 69: 949-59. 2. Van Dongen H, Maislin G, Mullington JM, Dinges DF. The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: dose-response e ects on neurobehavioral functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation. Sleep 2003; 26: 117-26. 3. Manousakis, J.E., et al., Awareness of sleepiness: Temporal dynamics of subjective and objective sleepiness. Psychophysiology, 2021. 58(8): p. e13839. 4. Dutheil, F., Danini, B., Bagheri, R., Fantini, M. L., Pereira, B., Moustafa, F., Trousselard, M., & Navel, V. (2021). E ects of a short daytime nap on the cognitive performance: A systematic review and meta-analysis. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(19), 10212.

This Fatigue Risk Management-focused safety poster distributes in the October 2026 issue of AIN magazine. Download or request hardcopies of it—along with many others—in USAIG’s safety poster archive

Are you attending? Pulsar Informatics is a participant in USAIG's Performance Vector Program. They develop state-of-the-art technology to help individuals and organizations achieve peak performance and reduce fatigue-related risk. Eligible USAIG policyholders can apply their annual bene t to receive a substantial subsidy toward Pulsar Informatics’ advanced web and mobile tools for ight department fatigue risk management.

Visit USAIG at Booth #2218

Want to assess your fatigue state using the Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS) and the Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT) discussed in the preceding article? Visit Pulsar at booth #2763 on Tuesday October 20 at 2PM to measure your alertness and meet with USAIG’s safety program director.

Cold Weather, Clear Minds Air Carrier Tools That All Pilots Can Use to Help Prepare for a Safe Winter Season

Holdover Times (HOTs) contain valuable information that can be used to enhance levels of safety & compliance. The FAA publishes HOTs and associated data prior to the commencement of each winter season.

HALL LEWALLEN Director of Courseware, Advanced Aircrew Academy

Many air carriers mitigate this threat with holdover times (HOTs), which delineate the estimated period during which deicing or anti-icing uid will prevent frost, ice, or snow from forming or accumulating on treated surfaces. Under 14 CFR 121.629, an air carrier expecting frost, ice, or snow to adhere must operate within the bounds of an FAA-approved ground deicing program built around HOT tables (save for a rarely used alternative in 121.629(d)). Virtually nothing in Part 91 or Part 135 requires such a program. However, nothing prohibits a Part 91 or Part 135 operator from using the same tables and data, at whatever scale ts the operation.

Part 135 already carries some of that structure. Under 135.227(b), when contamination can reasonably be expected, the crew needs the training required by 135.341 plus one of three things: a pre-takeo contamination check within ve minutes of takeo , an approved alternative procedure, or an approved deicing program built to the 121.629(c) standard. The common route for a 135 operator is the ve-minute check, which satis es the rule cleanly and which the FAA authorizes through OpSpec A041. Knowing the holdover window alongside it tells a ight crew earlier in the taxi whether or not this check may illuminate a true possibility of contamination, which then paves the way for more proactive decision making (vs. having to run through all of this at the hold short line after being cleared for takeo , with a long line of other planes waiting behind you).

very winter, business aviation professionals share ramps and runways with some of the largest air carriers, yet the snow falls on everybody and we all crave the comfort of a down jacket while conducting our preight routines. In the same way, a contaminated wing does not check anybody's operating certi cate before it stops ying. Consider this: A Part 121 crew works winter inside a framework of required tools, with an approved deicing program and holdover time tables behind every departure into ground icing conditions. Most Part 91 and Part 135 ying carries no such requirement. The tools are published and free, and the rest of this piece is about what they o er crews that are not obliged to use them. The Clean Aircraft Concept 14 CFR 91.527 and 135.227 prohibit takeo with frost, ice, or snow adhering to the wings, propellers, or any stabilizing or control surface. That prohibition binds nearly everyone reading this, whether or not you hold an approved program of any kind. CFR 91.527 covers large airplanes, turbojet multiengine airplanes, and fractional program aircraft while 135.227 covers every aircraft own under Part 135. Note that one carve-out exists for frost under the wing in the area of the fuel tanks, and only where the FAA has authorized it. Deicing uid removes what has already collected, while antiicing uid a ords protection when frozen precipitation is actively falling or may begin to fall. The critical question is how much time that protection actually lasts.

Three Well-Known Case Studies On November 28, 2004, a Canadair CL-600-2A12 that had arrived from Van Nuys around 0910 sat on the ramp at Montrose Regional Airport in Colorado with snow falling. Temperature was -1°C, dew point -2°C, visibility 1 & 1/4 mile in light snow and mist. During the takeo sequence at 0958, the airplane collided with the ground, departed the right side of the runway, and slid roughly 1,400 feet before coming to rest. The captain, the ight attendant, and one passenger were fatally injured; the rst o cer and two passengers were seriously injured. The NTSB found the probable cause to be the ight crew's failure to ensure the wings were free of the ice Continues next page

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ADVANCED AIRCREW ACADEMY'S AVIATION CHALLENGE

and snow that accumulated while the airplane sat on the ground, with the crew's limited experience operating in winter weather conditions contributing to the accident. This was an on-demand charter with six people aboard, own under Part 135 by an operator that had an FAA-approved ground deicing and anti-icing program in its General Operations Manual, and whose pilots received company training on the use of holdover times. Twelve years before Montrose, a key piece of the holdover time equation came out of a similar accident. USAir Flight 405, a Fokker F28, was deiced twice at LaGuardia on March 22, 1992, then sat in a long taxi queue while snow kept falling before beginning its takeo roll roughly 35 minutes after the nal application. The airplane stalled moments after lifto and came to rest partially inverted in Flushing Bay. Twenty-seven people died. The NTSB faulted the decision to take o without positive assurance the wings were clean, and it faulted an industry and its regulator for giving crews no usable way to judge how long uid protection lasts. That second nding is where the current HOT guidance begins. On January 2, 2023, a Phenom 300 was pulled from a heated hangar in Provo, Utah and refueled with water droplets visible on both wings. It was outside for about 40 minutes at -1°C in light snow and mist without being deiced before it rolled left and impacted terrain immediately after takeo . The NTSB found the probable cause to be the pilot's failure to deice before takeo in weather conditions conducive to ice accumulation. That was a Part 91 ight in a di erent airframe from a di erent manufacturer, but with similar time exposed to the elements parked on the ramp as the Montrose event. Cold Fuel, Contaminated Surfaces Another consideration is that holdover times assume precipitation is falling, yet contamination does not require it. Frost forms on a cold wing under a clear sky, and a wing cold-soaked at altitude can hold fuel far below freezing long after landing. So, the outside air temperature can read well above freezing while the surface above the tanks stays cold enough to freeze whatever settles on it. Ice that forms there is clear, thin, and nearly invisible from the cabin door. The guidelines address pieces of this dilemma, since Table 1 of the FAA HOT Guidelines carries active frost holdover times for all four uid types and the precipitation tables carry a rain on cold-soaked wing column. But those values are calculated at 1°C and the tables o er no holdover time for that condition at or below freezing. NTSB Safety Alert SA-006 is direct about these facts. Telling a wet wing from one carrying a thin lm of ice by sight alone is, in the NTSB's words, nearly impossible. The above is why the FAA and the NTSB both point to a tactile check, and why Bombardier's ight manuals have required one on the Challenger series since 2005. It has held up for decades because a hand on the surface gives an answer you can act on. For most business jets that means a stand or a ladder and a bare hand on the upper surface near the leading edge, over the fuel tanks, before the rst ight of the day and after any quick turn with fuel still cold. The 2026-27 Package The FAA issued its Winter 2026-27 deicing guidance in August, replacing last season's material with Notice 8900.784 (e ective August 3) and the companion HOT Guidelines (issued August 11). Together they cover current holdover time tables, Degree-Speci c HOTs for ner uid-by- uid resolution, regression data for extending table values, and allowance time guidance. The FAA rebuilds the set each year around the uids and formulations actually in service, so the current edition is the one that matches what the truck will spray this winter. The notice itself is issued to the FAA inspectors who oversee approved programs under Parts 121, 125, and 135. But nothing stops a Part 91 or 135 crew without a program from pulling the same package free from faa.gov and putting it to work. The tables are the part everyone reaches for, and the procedures around them are what give the numbers context. The companion General Information document on the same FAA page covers how uid is applied, when a pre-takeo contamination check is called for, and how a tactile check settles the question once conditions run beyond what any table predicts. Reading it alongside the tables is what turns a holdover number into a decision you can defend. Putting HOTs to Work Each holdover value keys to uid type and concentration, outside air temperature, and precipitation type and intensity with the clock running—by regulatory de nition—from the start of the nal uid application. That clock’s start is where Part 91 and 135 crews are structurally at a disadvantage because nobody is going to hand it to you. The airline crew has a station manager, a company deicing contract, and a trained technician calling the times over a discrete frequency. You have an FBO deice truck and whatever its operator tells you. So what is your remedy? Proactively obtain the uid type, concentration, the application start time, and any other pertinent information before the truck pulls away. And while you have their attention, did you remember to coordinate the bill? Continues next page

Check Your Knowledge!

A departure inside the window means the uid should still be holding, though the tables are estimates. Heavy precipitation, high wind or jet blast, and a wing colder than the outside air all shorten what you actually get. If the window expires or precipitation intensi es beyond what the table covers, you owe yourself and your passengers either another application of uid or a pre-takeo contamination check. For a 135 operator such a check must be approved under its OpSpecs. The tables are built for departure planning and are meant to be used alongside a pre-takeo check. An expired window is therefore a decision point rather than a number that decides for you. I treat it as a hard stop anyway. I recommend working through the tables once on a quiet afternoon, just to see how little time Type I actually buys in moderate snow. The number surprises most people the rst time, and it's best absorbed when you can sit back and think about it rather than during actual ight operations.

(quiz answers on page 11)

1. A holdover time begins: a. At the beginning of the nal deicing/anti-icing uid application b. When the nal uid application is complete c. At the start of taxi d. When takeo clearance is received 2. Which operators are required by regulation to conduct winter operations under an FAA-approved ground deicing program using holdover times? a. All turbine-powered aircraft operators b. Part 135 on-demand operators c. Part 121 air carriers d. Any operator dispatching into known icing conditions 3. Your holdover time expires while you are still number four for the runway, with snow falling. Protection can no longer be assumed. What are your options? a. Take o promptly, before more contamination accumulates b. Increase Vr as a contingency for degraded lift c. Continue as planned if the uid still looks glossy d. Another application of uid, or a pre-takeo contamination check if your operation is approved to conduct one

Modern technology can carry much of this load and it’s easily put to use. I know of at least one EFB app that packages the current tables, pulls the METAR, returns a holdover time, and runs a countdown with alerts. To my knowledge, neither the FAA nor Transport Canada certi es or approves any holdover time app, so keep the published government tables as your authoritative source and use an app for speed. If you do not carry one already, ask your department management which one they recommend, or otherwise explore this option if it could bene t your operations.

4. As required by 135.227(b) and OpSpec A041, a pre-takeo contamination check must be completed within what period before beginning takeo ? a. 1 minute b. 5 minutes c. 15 minutes d. 30 minutes 5. The FAA's Winter 2026-27 deicing guidance is written for operators holding an approved program. What prevents a Part 91 crew from using the same tables? a. A letter of authorization from the local FSDO is required b. Nothing. The guidance is published and free to anyone c. Only Part 121 certi cate holders may access the tables d. The tables must be purchased from the uid manufacturer

Final Thoughts

6. Degree-Speci c Holdover Times (DSHOTs) provide:

None of this requires a new manual or an FAA approval. The 2026-27 guidance is published and current for the uids in service this winter. A current tablet app will carry the same charts and tables. The uid type, concentration, and application start time are all available from the truck operator for the price of asking.

a. Runway braking coe cients for contaminated pavement b. Recommended deicing truck maintenance intervals c. Generic holdover times covering all uid types at once d. Expanded snow-condition holdover times resolved by speci c uid and temperature 7. Your airplane lands after a long ight at altitude and sits on the ramp with an OAT of 2°C and light rain falling. Nothing is forecast to be falling at your departure time. What is the primary contamination concern?

The exciting aspect about all of this is that many lessons have already been learned and incredibly useful tools are already published and available to all. What remains is to use them and ensure they're correctly scaled to your operation. Have a safe and enjoyable winter season. ❖

a. Clear ice on the upper wing surface above cold-soaked fuel b. Frost on the lower fuselage c. Slush accumulation in the wheel wells d. None, because the temperature is above freezing Quiz answers on page 11

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One underwriter’s aviation journey (so far) highlights telltales of organizational best practices HUDSON MERRICK, USAIG Underwriter

have been a general aviation underwriter with USAIG for the past three years but have always had a strong passion for the aviation industry. I surrounded myself with it growing up. My father would often take me to Gravelly Point Park, just short of runway 19 at Reagan National Airport, to watch airplanes. It was a captivating showcase of skill, professionalism and coordination focused on getting people into the air and back on the ground safely.

to y on days with challenging weather were spelled out. It was clear a lot of thought and e ort had gone into addressing every scenario and it enabled a ight department with nearly 70 airplanes to run smoothly. Despite the distinctions—including one having twenty times as many daily takeo s and landings as the other— these two operations had a similar goal to safely and successfully operate as a Part 141 ight school. They both probably believed they were doing the right things, but clearly there were institutional di erences in their approaches. This variation between my ight training experiences shows how it is truly up to each operator to determine how issues like operational e ciency, risk, and safety get addressed within their organization.

This led me to start private pilot training at a small ight school in Virginia while still in high school. The ight school was primarily an FBO that had ve Cessnas. They didn’t have much in the way of written standard procedures and many of the instructors were full-time airline pilots who o ered CFI services on their o days. I didn’t have comparative experience then, but looking back, every instructor taught a di erent way of doing things. This inconsistency, paired with the challenges of operating in DC area airspace, hindered my learning and progression. The loose organizational structure left training gaps I had to nd ways to ll in.

The contrasts I’ve experienced serve me well in aviation insurance. Aviation is a dynamic and sometimes di cult industry in which to operate. Risk—and ultimately success—is in uenced by how organizations structure themselves. Under-writers look at obvious things like aircraft types, where they are being own, and pilot quali cations when evaluating risk. But understanding the priorities of the operation is also important. If the end goal is a safe ight from point A to B, what is being done to support and enable that goal? How much e ort has gone into developing standards and preparing for contingencies to lower the chance of an accident? Each operation is di erent and there are many ways of interpreting the path to the goal. A key underwriting question, though, is whether people in the organization are uni ed around a sensible and consistent operating model, or if they’re just ‘getting it done.’

It was quite a change moving to Florida to attend Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. While focused on my Aviation Business Management studies, I also continued ight training and earned my instrument rating and commercial multi-engine add-on. EmbryRiddle was very di erent from my rst ight school in eet size and daily operations. A notable change was a focus on training people for a career in aviation rather than getting them a certi cate. The ight department ran like an airline, using dispatch tools, ight risk assessments (FRATs), daily internal messaging for important NOTAMs or operational changes, and safety newsletters. A full sta ensured the ight department ran smoothly and safely. There were SOPs for normal ight operations, including standard callouts for every phase of ight, and details on potential cross-country airports. Protocols for a downed aircraft situation and requirements for higher pilot quali cations and experience

Many of us at USAIG are pilots and use aircraft to support our roles. Flying to client visits is a great way to stay pro cient while enabling a rsthand view of policyholder operations. A colleague and I y a C182 based in the Atlanta area. He ew Part 121 for several years and we are both former students of Embry-Riddle. We implement many of the same practices instilled from our training and used by airlines, such as company

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The Organization Matters

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SOPs, SMS, and CRM. These are things that can be scaled and adapted as standard practices, even in a small operation like ying our Cessna. However, USAIG implemented them across our small and dispersed ight operation to boost safety through standardization. It requires a team e ort where tools and methods for safe operations are de ned and implemented by company leaders, and pilots individually commit to using them to guide successful ights. I’m grateful for the way my training ultimately worked out. I was pushed by a unique ight school in di cult airspace, which was then followed by a structured program with consistent standards. That forged a habit when I y to try and understand all relevant hazards and leave no question unanswered about foreseeable contingencies. While every policyholder is di erent, I take a similar approach when evaluating risk with our insureds. It’s important to gauge the extent to which they’ve worked to understand their own risk and what’s being done to manage it. Safety is not just a worthy goal, but also an ever-evolving part of the industry. Whether through technology or organizational re nements, it’s something that can always be improved. Being a safe and smart operation at any level demands skill, forethought, and professionalism both individually and organizationally. It requires staying aware of and open to advancements in industry practices. It means getting and keeping everyone on the same page. Operators that put in the work and do those things lower their risk from an insurance perspective while at the same time raise their reputation, dependability, and safety. ❖

Keeping Your Head in the Game When Life Gets in the Way

Humans In the Loop

JENNY SHOWALTER Founder, Showalter Business Aviation Career Coaching

magine being at FL 400 over the Atlantic, returning from an international trip with the boss, when he walks into the cockpit and delivers some unexpected news. He's sorry to say that the airplane’s being sold and you’re losing your job. Talk about terrible timing! There are still hours left in the ight and you're responsible for getting everyone safely home. But now your mind is racing, making it much harder to focus on the task at hand. The boss says he's going to "take care of you" and not to worry, but when will the airplane sell? How much time do you have? What does this mean for your family? Where will you work next? What does "take care of you" really mean? And how are you not supposed to worry? All legitimate questions; and not one of them can be answered from FL 400. For now, there is still an airplane to y and you have to keep your head in the game. As crazy as this story sounds, it really happened. Compartmentalization In aviation, especially for pilots, we are taught to compartmentalize distractions in the name of safety, but sometimes that is easier said than done. My husband, a pilot, says he has a “nothing box” in his head. A place where his mind goes to escape stress, overwhelm, discomfort, or anything else that is bothering him. A place where there is literally nothing. Continues next page

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As a female, wife, mom, business owner, and classic Type A control freak and over-thinker, the concept of a “nothing box” is totally lost on me. There is always something on my mind, especially at 3 a.m. While I believe men and women generally are built and think di erently, I wonder how much of his “nothing box” is gender-related versus the result of years of pilot training and a checklist-oriented mindset. Either way, while I may occasionally be jealous of his ability to tune things out, I also know that some distractions are easier to tune out than others. I work with clients dealing with ill spouses, aging parents, uncertain job security, toxic work environments, nancial stress, and so much more. Ideally, those distractions get compartmentalized in the name of safety, whether you are ying, wrenching, towing, or providing other essential services in aviation. But we are all human, and sometimes that just isn’t possible. The Mistake Remember the pilots who learned at 40,000 feet that their airplane was being sold? They did what they were trained to do. They put the news aside as best they could, focused on the ight, and safely completed the trip. But the distraction had a ected him more than he realized. During the ight, the pilot had switched COM 3 from data mode to voice and later missed the routine step of switching it back to data. He didn't realize his mistake until the next ight, when he called for his clearance and didn't get a response. While troubleshooting, he discovered that COM 3 was still in voice mode and realized his error. This wasn't a pilot who was new to the airplane. He had thousands of hours in type and knew the aircraft and its systems extremely well. That's why missing the step surprised him. It was a small mistake, quickly corrected with no serious consequence. But when the pilot later told me what happened, he knew exactly why he'd missed something so familiar. His mind had been somewhere else. We can tell ourselves we're ne. We can believe we've sequestered something in a mental box and moved on. But that doesn't necessarily mean the distraction is gone. This time, he was lucky. The distraction showed up in a small, easily corrected mistake. But distractions don't always show up in little ways, and the consequences aren't always so forgiving. Managing Distractions My mom always said the only things certain in life are death and taxes. I might add distractions to that list. Try as we may, sometimes life has a way of ‘li ng’ at the worst possible moments. So how do you manage distractions in the name of getting the job done safely? First, acknowledge that the distraction is there. Telling yourself not to think about something rarely makes it disappear. Instead, recognize when part of your attention is somewhere other than where it needs to be. If you are part of a crew or team, it can also help to let others know when you're dealing with personal stress or distraction. You don't have to share the details. Simply communicating that you're having an o day gives others a chance to be more aware. Then, slow down. Way down. Go back to the checklist. Double-check something you might normally do from memory. Ask another crewmember to cross-check you. If you're tired, overwhelmed, or carrying something particularly heavy, acknowledge it rather than assume you can simply push it into a mental box and move on.

Jenny Showalter is a third-generation business aviation professional and founder of Showalter Business Aviation Career Coaching (SBACC). With nearly 30 years of experience, she helps industry professionals strategically elevate their careers through individualized coaching, resume writing, interview preparation, LinkedIn optimization, and outplacement services. Learn more at www.showalter.com or email jshowalter@showalter.com.

It also helps to separate what is important from what is immediate. Losing Continues next page

your job is incredibly important. But at 40,000 feet over the Atlantic, there was nothing those pilots could do about it. Safely ying the airplane was the immediate need. The questions about what came next were still there once they were safely on the ground.

After many years and thousands of hours ying an airplane he loved, my friend recently accepted a new position. He'll y a new airframe, earn better pay, and, most importantly, his family can remain where they want to live. That forced change opened possibilities he couldn't have seen coming when his boss walked into the cockpit that day.

You can't always control the distraction. Those pilots certainly couldn't control when their boss chose to deliver life-changing news. What they could control was how they responded to it and where they directed their attention in that moment.

The other pilot made a di erent choice. He decided the sale of the airplane was the nudge he needed to retire. Two pilots faced with the same unexpected news, and two very di erent, but equally positive, outcomes.

There is a lesson here for the rest of us, too. If you're a leader, a spouse, or anyone in a position to deliver di cult news to someone whose job requires their full attention, choose your timing wisely. Some conversations can and should wait until the airplane is on the ground.

I'm continually amazed by our capacity as humans to be resilient. But resilience doesn't mean we stop being human. We worry, get distracted, and feel overwhelmed when life changes without our permission. Resilience is what allows us to keep moving forward anyway.

Forced Change

At 40,000 feet, my friend couldn't solve what was happening to his career. He just needed to keep his head in the game and y the airplane. Once he was safely on the ground, he could gure out what came next. And sometimes, what comes next is even better than what we left behind. ❖

As a career coach, I talk a lot about forced change. Sometimes we choose change, and sometimes change chooses us. That's exactly what happened to my friend and client at 40,000 feet. But here's the thing about forced change. It can open doors we never imagined.

Quiz Answers

ADVANCED AIRCREW ACADEMY'S AVIATION CHALLENGE

1. (a) The clock starts when the nal uid application begins, so the protection window is measured from that point rather than from when the truck nishes or drives away. 2. (c) In ground icing conditions, 14 CFR 121.629(c) requires air carriers to use an FAA-approved ground deicing/anti-icing program built around holdover times; a rarely used alternative in 121.629(d) permits an outside-the-aircraft check within 5 minutes of takeo instead. Parts 91 and 135 impose the clean aircraft requirement (91.527, 135.227) without mandating a HOT program. 3. (d) An expired holdover time means protection can no longer be assumed. The options are another round of uid, or a pre-takeo contamination check (where the operator holds the approval to conduct one). Part 135 operators are authorized through OpSpec A041. Part 91 has no equivalent approval, though nothing prevents a Part 91 crew from physically checking the surfaces before takeo . 4. (b) 135.227(b)(1) sets the check at within 5 minutes of beginning takeo , and OpSpec A041 is the authorization that lets a Part 135 operator use it. The check con rms the wings and control surfaces are free of frost, ice, or snow. 5. (b) Nothing prevents it. The notice and the HOT Guidelines are written for operators with an approved program, but it is published free at faa.gov and any crew can download and apply it, or simply read it to learn how the system works. 6. (d) The DSHOT database expands the snow-condition holdover times, resolved by individual uid and by degree of outside air temperature, giving ner resolution than the standard tables. Note that operational use of DSHOTs may require speci c approval under the regulations applicable to your operation.

Advanced Aircrew Academy is a USAIG Performance Vector-participating service provider offering comprehensive eLearning modules and curricula for business aviation professionals. Customized online courses, training materials, and scenario-based training improve crew skills in areas such as crew resource management, emergency procedures, and operational effectiveness. Their extensive and adaptive training catalog has eLearning for every person in your ight department.

7. (a) Air temperature above freezing o ers no protection when the fuel in the wing is still well below freezing after descent. The resulting ice forms clear and thin on the upper surface and is nearly impossible to identify by looking. A tactile check may be the only reliable veri cation, and the rain on cold-soaked wing column in the HOT tables shows how little protection even fresh uid buys here, with values calculated at plus 1 degree Celsius and none provided at or below freezing.

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Don’t Count on Keeping Secrets

Lessons Learned

DAVID JACK KENNY

nvestigations of aircraft accidents usually begin somewhere near the place and time the accident actually occurred. The FAA and NTSB are noti ed by various parties on the scene: rst responders, witnesses, the aircraft’s operator, and the pilots themselves if they escaped serious injury. The severity of the crash, the size of the aircraft, and the impact on local communities are among the factors that determine the scope of the response. A report by an FAA inspector might be enough to resolve a pranged landing on a student solo, while an NTSB ‘go team’ is likely to be scrambled if a jet goes down in a populated area.

corporate jet tucked into a hangar at the Airlake Airport in Lakeville, Minnesota (KLVN) was being repaired after damage that strongly suggested it had su ered an accident – one which had never been reported to the NTSB as required by 49 CFR Part 830. Photographs taken by the responding FAA inspector documented that the outer pane of the jet’s left windshield had been shattered; the leading edges of both wings were severely dented and had been removed; and small impact craters pockmarked the radome and vertical stabilizer. The radome had also been removed; it was photographed resting on a shelf above a personnel door.

It’s understandable that pilots aren’t keen to have accidents on their records, and not just because it’s obviously better not to have had one. Even aviators who deserve (and receive) great credit for managing emergencies not of their own creation would likely just as soon not have to spend time explaining it, whether that’s to investigators or in some future job interview. And naturally, pilots who were the authors of their own misfortunes will be even less eager to publicize that fact. If no one was there when it happened and the aircraft made it back to base, it can be tempting to pretend the whole thing never happened – tempting, if not necessarily wise.

In a Memorandum of Record, the NTSB Senior Air Safety Investigator tasked with pursuing the case noted that the required Pilot/Operator Accident/Incident Reports (Form 6120) “… were received from the pilots and operator months after the accident and only after requests for its submission.” Between December 21 and December 24, his agency nally received formal statements detailing the events of the previous June 13. The Citation had taken o from Harry Reid International Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada (KLAS) on a Part 91 IFR ight plan to KLVN at about 15:30 Mountain Daylight Time. One passenger was in the cabin. The left seat was occupied by a 58-year-old male airline transport pilot with 13,400 hours of accumulated experience, holder of seven civilian type ratings and authorizations to y two models of military jets registered in the experimental exhibition category. He also held a ight instructor certi cate with single-engine, multiengine, and instrument airplane ratings.

In September 2025, someone who chose to remain anonymous noti ed the FAA that a Cessna 650

NTSB docket photos documented considerable skin, windscreen, and leading edge damage.

In the right seat was a 26-year-old female commercial pilot with privileges for single-engine and multiengine airplanes and 1,172 hours of ight time. She also held an instructor’s certi cate with single-engine and instrument airplane ratings. In subsequent discussions with the NTSB senior investigator, both she and her attorney took pains to point out that she was not type-rated in the Citation and was receiving dual instruction rather than Continues next page

By both pilots’ accounts, the rst hour of the ight was uneventful. The pilot receiving instruction recalled having been in visual conditions until they approached the area of a convective SIGMET near the Colorado-Nebraska border, where a line of severe thunderstorms had formed. The pilot in command tried to cross above the storms at FL 430 only to encounter severe turbulence; his student reported that they’d own into “another layer above the presumed top.” He descended to FL 410, where the turbulence continued unabated and was accompanied by “heavy hail” that caused the damage shown in the photographs. In response, he slowed the aircraft from Mach 0.75 to Mach 0.68 and descended further to FL 350, where archived ight track data suggest that conditions may have improved. Rather than land to inspect the aircraft, he decided to continue for about another hour – some 495 nautical miles – to the airplane’s base at KLVN, where they landed safely. There were no injuries to either pilot or the sole passenger. For readers lucky enough never to have seen a copy of Form 6120, the last block on page 8 requests “OPERATOR/OWNER SAFETY RECOMMENDATION (How could this accident/incident have been prevented?)”. The pilot receiving instruction, whose account of the accident sequence states that she “was unaware of a storm cell in front of us,” responded: “Stay away from convective weather systems along our path [and] be aware of all weather related to our ight.” Sound recommendations both, but the PIC’s were at least as sound and more speci c. He acknowledged that “This could have been prevented by diverting 80-100 miles north instead of attempting to over y.” The professional embarrassment of that admitted miscalculation – echoed by the NTSB’s citation of “The pilot’s improper judgment” in its nding of probable cause – would not have made most of us more eager to bring it to the attention of the authorities, especially after the airplane made it home with nobody hurt. But there might have been a second reason in this case. The Cessna 650’s type certi cate requires a two-pilot crew, and as the pilot in the right seat and her attorney went out of their way to emphasize, only one quali ed airman was in the cockpit. The NTSB noted that fact in its report – without citing it as having contributed to the accident. The safety recommendations in the PIC’s report – led more than six months after the fact and three months after the FAA followed up on the anonymous tip of an unreported accident – go on to state that “We have debriefed the incident with the pilots, operator, and FAA.” The right-seat pilot’s attorney advised the senior NTSB investigator that “My client and I have met with the FAA, which has closed its le on this matter.” Any disciplinary action that might have resulted is not a matter of public knowledge – but it’s not hard to imagine that the discussions during that “debrief ” could have become uncomfortable. ❖

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acting as a required crew member. This was apparently not the rst time she’d done so, as her ight experience grid on Form 6120 listed 7.8 hours in the accident make and model.

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