Issuu

COMITÉ CIENTÍFICO DE LA EDITORIAL TIRANT LO BLANCH MARÍA JOSÉ AÑÓN ROIG

VÍCTOR MORENO CATENA

Catedrática de Filosofía del Derecho de la Universidad de Valencia

Catedrático de Derecho Procesal de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

ANA BELÉN CAMPUZANO LAGUILLO

FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CONDE

Catedrática de Derecho Mercantil de la Universidad CEU San Pablo

JORGE A. CERDIO HERRÁN Catedrático de Teoría y Filosofía de Derecho. Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

JOSÉ RAMÓN COSSÍO DÍAZ Ministro de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de México

OWEN M. FISS Catedrático emérito de Teoría del Derecho de la Universidad de Yale (EEUU)

LUIS LÓPEZ GUERRA Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos Catedrático de Derecho Constitucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

ÁNGEL M. LÓPEZ Y LÓPEZ Catedrático de Derecho Civil de la Universidad de Sevilla

MARTA LORENTE SARIÑENA Catedrática de Historia del Derecho de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

JAVIER DE LUCAS MARTÍN Catedrático de Filosofía del Derecho y Filosofía Política de la Universidad de Valencia

Catedrático de Derecho Penal de la Universidad Pablo de Olavide de Sevilla

ANGELIKA NUSSBERGER Jueza del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos Catedrática de Derecho Internacional de la Universidad de Colonia (Alemania)

HÉCTOR OLASOLO ALONSO Catedrático de Derecho Internacional de la Universidad del Rosario (Colombia) y Presidente del Instituto Ibero-Americano de La Haya (Holanda)

LUCIANO PAREJO ALFONSO Catedrático de Derecho Administrativo de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

TOMÁS SALA FRANCO Catedrático de Derecho del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social de la Universidad de Valencia

JOSÉ IGNACIO SANCHO GARGALLO Magistrado de la Sala Primera (Civil) del Tribunal Supremo de España

TOMÁS S. VIVES ANTÓN Catedrático de Derecho Penal de la Universidad de Valencia

RUTH ZIMMERLING Catedrática de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de Mainz (Alemania)

Procedimiento de selección de originales, ver página web: http://www.tirant.net/index.php/editorial/procedimiento-de-seleccion-de-originales

BIODERECHO, SEGURIDAD Y MEDIOAMBIENTE BIOLAW, SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT BIODERECHO BIODERECHO BIODERECHO SEGURIDAD Y MEDIO AMBIENTE SEGURIDAD Y MEDIO AMBIENTE SEGURIDAD Y MEDIO AMBIENTE JOSÉ MANUEL SÁNCHEZ PATRÓN BIOLAW BIOLAW BIOLAW MARÍA ISABEL TORRES CAZORLA SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENT DANIEL GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ (Coordinadores)

DANIEL GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ

DANIEL GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ ANDRÉS DANIEL GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ BAUTISTA-HERNÁEZ JOSÉ MANUEL SÁNCHEZ PATRÓN JOSÉ MANUEL SÁNCHEZ PATRÓN JOSÉ MANUEL SÁNCHEZ PATRÓN GENEROSO BEVILACQUA MARÍA ISABEL TORRES CAZORLA MARÍA ISABEL TORRES CAZORLA MARÍA ISABEL TORRES CAZORLA VALERIA EBOLI Coordinadores NADINA FOGGETTI Coordinadores Coordinadores ANDRÉS BAUTISTA HERNÁEZ MAGDALENA KRAMSKA ANDRÉS BAUTISTA HERNÁEZ ANDRÉS BAUTISTA HERNÁEZ JENNY BERGSTRÖM LETIZIA MINGARDO JENNY BERGSTRÖM JENNY BERGSTRÖM VALERIA EBOLI VALERIA EBOLI VALERIA EBOLI ANTONIO GIUSEPPE NACCARATO NADINA FOGGETTI NADINA FOGGETTI NADINA FOGGETTI FRANCESCO SEATZU LETIZIA MINGARDO LETIZIA MINGARDO LETIZIA MINGARDO MAGDALENA KRAMSKA MAGDALENA KRAMSKA MAGDALENA KRAMSKA FRANCESCO SEATZU FRANCESCO SEATZU FRANCESCO SEATZU

INTEREST GROUP

INTERNATIONAL BIO LAW

TIRANT LO BLANCH TIRANT LO BLANCH TIRANT LO BLANCH

Valencia, 2015

Copyright ® 2015 Todos los derechos reservados. Ni la totalidad ni parte de este libro puede reproducirse o transmitirse por ningún procedimiento electrónico o mecánico, incluyendo fotocopia, grabación magnética, o cualquier almacenamiento de información y sistema de recuperación sin permiso escrito de los autores y del editor. En caso de erratas y actualizaciones, la Editorial Tirant lo Blanch publicará la pertinente corrección en la página web www.tirant.com (http://www. tirant.com).

José Manuel Sánchez Patrón María Isabel Torres Cazorla, Daniel Ignacio García San José y otros

© TIRANT LO BLANCH EDITA: TIRANT LO BLANCH C/ Artes Gráicas, 14 - 46010 - Valencia TELFS.: 96/361 00 48 - 50 FAX: 96/369 41 51 Email:tlb@tirant.com http://www.tirant.com Librería virtual: http://www.tirant.es ISBN: 978-84-9086-531-6 MAQUETA: Tink Factoría de Color Si tiene alguna queja o sugerencia, envíenos un mail a: atencioncliente@tirant.com. En caso de no ser atendida su sugerencia, por favor, lea en www.tirant.net/index.php/empresa/politicas-de-empresa nuestro Procedimiento de quejas.

Abreviaturas/Abbreviations BOE: CAHBI: CAT: ComEDH: CADH: CCI: CCRE: CDBI: CDI: CDPD: CECIS: CEDH: CEDAW: CERE: CJEU: CoE: CoM: Corte Cost.: Corte EDU: CRPD: CIDH: DNA: DOCE: DOUE: ECHR: EC: ECOSOC: ECHO: EconvHR:

Boletín Oicial del Estado Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Bioethics Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Comisión Europea de Derechos Humanos Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos Centro de Control e Información Centro de Coordinación de la Respuesta de Emergencias Steering Committee on Bioethics Comisión de Derecho Internacional Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre Discapacidad Common Emergency Communication and Information System Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Capacidad Europea de Respuesta a Emergencias Court of Justice of the European Union Council of Europe Committee of Ministers (of the Council of Europe) Corte Costituzionale (Italia) Corte Europea dei diritti dell’uomo Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Deoxyribonucleic acid Diario Oicial de las Comunidades Europeas Diario Oicial de la Unión Europea European Court of Human Rights European Community Consejo Económico y Social Oicina Humanitaria de la Comunidad Europea European Convention on Human Rights

12 ECJ: EEE: EGE: EM: EP: EPO: EU: Euratom: FDA: FFPE: FT: ICH:

ICRW: ICJ: IDRL: IEEE: IPCC: IPR: IUPAC: MCPC: MIC: MPCU: NEC: OECD: OJ: ONG: OTAN: PACE: PNUD: PVS: RNA:

Abreviaturas

European Court of Justice (of the European Union) Espacio Económico Europeo European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies Estados Miembros European Parliament European Patent Ofice European Union Comunidad Europea de la Energía Atómica Food and Drug Administration Tissues ixed in formalin and embedded in parafin Frozen tissues International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling International Court of Justice International Disaster Response Law Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Intellectual Property Rights International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry Mecanismo Comunitario de Protección Civil Monitoring and Information Centre Mecanismo de Protección Civil de la Unión National Ethics Council The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Oficial Journal (of the EU) Organización No Gubernamental Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte Parliamentary Assembly (of the Council of Europe) Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Permanent Vegetative State Ribonucleic Acid

Abreviaturas

RRD: TEDH: TEU: TRIPS: TCEE: TUE: TFUE: TJUE: UCPM: UE: UN: UNESCO:

Reducción del Riesgo de Desastres Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos Treaty on European Union Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Tratado de la Comunidad Económica Europea Tratado de la Unión Europea Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea Union Civil Protection Mechanism Unión Europea United Nations United Nations Educational, Scientiic and Cultural Organization United Nations Environment Programme Fondo de Naciones Unidas para la Infancia United Nations Ofice for Disaster Risk Reduction United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Ofice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs World Health Organization World Trade Organization

UNEP: UNICEF: UNISDR: UNFCC: UNOCHA: WHO: WTO:

Presentación La Sociedad Europea de Derecho Internacional —European Society of International Law/Societé Européenne de Droit International (ESIL/SEDI)— celebró la Conferencia de su 10º Aniversario titulada “Derecho internacional y Las fronteras del Derecho internacional y los puentes a otros campos y disciplinas” —International law and… Boundaries of International law and bridges to other ields and disciplines/Le Droit international et Les frontiéres du Droit international et les passarelles le reliant à d’autres domaines et disciplines— en la ciudad de Viena (Austria) durante los días 3, 4, 5 y 6 de septiembre de 2014. El Grupo de Interés: Bioderecho internacional —International Bio Law/Biodroit international— aprovechó la celebración de dicho evento para organizar un International Workshop titulado: “International law and… Biolaw. From theory to practice”. Los miembros de la Sociedad Europea de Derecho internacional interesados en estas cuestiones presentaron sus contribuciones a este encuentro académico celebrado en el ediicio de la Facultad de Derecho (el “Juridicum”) de la Universidad de Viena el 3 de septiembre de 2014. La mayoría de aquellas aportaciones han sido oportunamente revisadas y actualizadas con vistas a su publicación en la presente obra colectiva. Aunque todas ellas se exponen sin solución de continuidad en partes o secciones, han sido previamente ordenadas en función de tres grandes grupos o bloques temáticos. El primero de ellos agrupa las contribuciones relativas al Bioderecho internacional y su consideración en el marco de las organizaciones internacionales así como su tratamiento por la jurisprudencia interenacional. A este primer grupo corresponde las aportaciones de Letizia Mingardo —Dialogue among Courts and Biolaw: integration or incorporation?—, José Manuel Sánchez Patrón —Los principios establecidos por la jurisprudencia internacional en relación con el inicio de la vida humana y su protección jurídica— y Magdalena Kramska —European approach to Bioethics: The role of International organizations in International biomedical law—. El segundo bloque temático reúne los trabajos presentados acerca de diversas cuestiones vinculadas con el Bioderecho internacional tales como el consentimiento informado, la discriminación genética, y la investigación biomédica. Sobre estos temas

Manuel Sánchez Patrón / María Isabel Torres Cazorla / Daniel García San José

versan las participaciones de Francesco Seatzu —The United Nations Convention on Disabilities: A useful tool for enhancing the protection of the elderly’s right to be free from non-consensual medical interventions?—, Nadina Foggetti —Bioinformatics, genome codiication and genetic discrimination: International and European Union perspectives—, Generoso Bevilacqua, Antonio Giuseppe Naccarato y Valeria Eboli —The interplay of International law, European Union law, municipal law and Bioethics in the ield of Biomedial research on human tissues—. Por último, la tercera serie de estudios está referida a la problemática suscitada por los riesgos y amenazas medioambientales así como por las catástrofes de origen natural o humano. Estos aspectos son abordados en los artículos de Daniel Ignacio García San José —Seguridad medioambiental y principio de necesidad en bioderecho internacional—, María Isabel Torres Cazorla —¿Lecciones aprendidas? El Papel de la Unión Europea en materia de prevención y coordinación en caso de catástrofe—, y Andrés Bautista Hernáez — Recientes avances en la regulación de la Unión Europea en materia de catástrofes: El mecanismo de protección civil de la Unión—. Con este libro, el Grupo de Interés: Bioderecho internacional suma la segunda publicación de sus encuentros académicos organizados en el marco de la Sociedad Europea de Derecho Internacional. Las aportaciones presentadas al primero de ellos, titulado: “The European Approach to International Bio Law” y celebrado en la Universitat de València en septiembre de 2012, fueron publicadas con el título: “Bioderecho internacional y Europeo. Desafíos actuales”, a cargo, también, de la Editorial Tirant lo Blanch en 2014. Con ello, este Grupo de Interés desea contribuir a la difusión de las investigaciones llevadas a cabo por profesores e investigadores de diversas universidades europeas en torno a un ámbito de innegable actualidad y de creciente interés para la mayor parte de las disciplinas jurídicas; en particular, el del impacto que tienen los avances cientíicos y tecnológicos para el ser humano y sus derechos fundamentales. Los profesores que suscriben las palabras de presentación de esta monografía y que se han encargado de coordinar las contribuciones que iguran en la misma, desean expresar su reconocimiento a la ESIL/ SEDI por la acogida del Grupo de Interés: Bioderecho internacional en su seno y el impulso dado a sus encuentros académicos. La coordinación de dichas contribuciones ha resultado enormemente sencilla

Presentación

gracias al esfuerzo y dedicación de los autores de cada una de ellas. Sin su implicación, esta empresa no hubiese podido llevarse a término. Nuestra gratitud al Grupo de investigación PAI “Bioderecho internacional”, radicado en la Universidad de Sevilla, y a la Facultad de Derecho de la Universitat de València por inanciar la coedición de esta publicación, así como a la Editorial Tirant lo Blanch por las facilidades dadas para que pudieran verse cumplidos nuestros deseos. Y, inalmente, nuestro agradecimiento a usted, estimado lector, por seleccionar esta obra colectiva que esperamos satisfaga sus expectativas y sus contenidos le sean de utilidad. JOSÉ MANUEL SÁNCHEZ PATRÓN, MARÍA ISABEL TORRES CAZORLA Y DANIEL GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ

Coordinadores

Dialogue among Courts and Biolaw: Integration or Incorporation? LETIZIA MINGARDO Junior Researcher in Philosophy of Law University of Verona

SUMMARY. 1. Introduction. 2. The dialogue among courts. 3. The problematical difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ dialogues. 4. The idea of ‘dialogue’. 5. A shift of sovereignty?

RESUMEN. En la literatura jurídica contemporánea, la interacción entre los tribunales de los distintos sistemas jurídicos se describe a menudo como “diálogo entre tribunales”. El diálogo entre tribunales es considerado como un posible instrumento nuevo de bioderecho internacional, en el contexto del derecho judicial. Algunos especialistas distinguen entre un diálogo “duro” (interacción obligatoria, obligado por las Constituciones nacionales o Convenios entre los Estados), y un diálogo “blando” (la influencia entre los tribunales cuando el juez nacional se refiere a los precedentes extranjeros para apoyar su discurso). Al referirme a algunos casos italianos, mi objetivo en este trabajo es criticar la distinción entre diálogos “blandos” y “duros” y mostrar su fragilidad. Como conclusión, discuto la provocativa cuestión de si el diálogo entre tribunales ofrece más problemas que soluciones en materia biolegal: lejos de promover un espacio jurídico verdaderamente común, el diálogo entre los tribunales corre el riesgo de ocultar un cambio en la soberanía de los Estados y los tribunales y el fomento de nuevas formas de imperialismo legal. PALABRAS CLAVE. Bioderecho; Diálogo entre tribunales; Fuentes del Derecho; Imperialismo jurídico; Realismo jurídico; Soberanía. KEY WORDS. Biolaw; Dialogue among courts; Legal imperialism; Legal realism; Sources of law; Sovereignty.

1. INTRODUCTION We all know that the term Biolaw is now in common use, indicating rules about life. But, what is Biolaw? The term can stand for a speciic branch of knowledge, according to the original American meaning, that is focused on the relationship between Science and Law. Or it can stand for a particular sector of positive law, according to a

Letizia Mingardo

legal positivistic point of view. But the debate goes further and recognizes in Biolaw a wider contemporary issue. In fact, Biolaw is seen as an interdisciplinary ield, where legal regulation of bios effects scientiic, epistemological, ethical and political matters1. In talking about Biolaw, and not about Bioethics, it is fundamental to seek sources of that law. Many sources, or ‘formants’ (to use Sacco’s terminology)2, are involved. We have, at least: 1) traditional Domestic Law, such as statutes; 2) the so called Political Law, coming from inter-national or metanational institutions, or from national constitutions3; 3) Judge-made Law, such as Bioequity4; 4) Professional Ethics, such as medical ethics5. As Piciocchi says, these formants potentially conlict6. Of course, this is only one of the reasons why Biolaw shows some of the most signiicant contemporary issues about sources. In particular, Judgemade Law is also emerging in Civil Law systems, where courts do not

See PALAZZANI, L., Introduction to the Philosophy of Biolaw, Studium, Roma, 2009; RODOTÀ, S., TALLACCHINI, M.C. (eds.), Ambito e fonti del biodiritto, in Trattato di biodiritto, Giuffrè, Milano, 2010. SACCO, R., “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach To Comparative Law (Installment I of II)”, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, nº 1, vol. 39, 1991, pp. 1-34; ID., “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach To Comparative Law (Installment II of II)”, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, nº 2, vol. 39, 1991, pp. 343-401. In the deinition of ‘political law’, see PIZZORUSSO, A., Sistemi giuridici comparati, 2nd ed., Giuffrè, Milano, 1998. See HOPPE, N., Bioequity. Property and the human body, Ashgate, Aldershot Burlington, 2009. In a study which identiies the ethical principles of respect for autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability as four important ideas or values for European bioethics and biolaw, see RENDTORFF, J.D., “Basic ethical principles in European bioethics and biolaw: autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability. Towards a foundation of bioethics and biolaw” in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, nº 3, vol. 5, 2002, pp. 235-244. The research concludes that the basic ethical principles cannot be understood as universal everlasting ideas or transcendental truths, but they are guidelines and important values in European culture. PICIOCCHI, C., “Le fonti del biodiritto: la complessità del dialogo”, in CASONATO, C., PICIOCCHI, C. (eds.), Biodiritto in dialogo, Cedam, Padova, 2006.

Dialogue among Courts and Biolaw: Integration or Incorporation?

oficially create the law. On the other hand, the multilevel system for the protection of the fundamental rights, which deal so much with biolegal matters, makes decisions of the courts more and more effective7.

2. THE DIALOGUE AMONG COURTS We all know that globalization has increased contacts between nations and legal systems as never before. The phenomenon has led and can leed to legal conlicts. A possible solution could come from the interaction of courts, across national borders, known as ‘dialogue among courts’. In effect, Western States share common constitutional principles. These principles converge in a ‘common constitutional core’, which the courts can draw on to interpret the constitutional text in a reasonable and uniform manner. This common core is a common language among the courts of different legal systems, creating a sort of legal cosmopolitanism8. More precisely, the expression ‘dialogue among courts’ describes the interaction among courts based on the circulation of interpretations of constitutional law concerning fundamental rights9.

See CASONATO, C., “Judges and rights: activism, restraints, and legitimacy” in CASONATO, C. (eds.), The protection of fundamental rights in Europe: lessons from Canada, Università degli Studi di Trento, Trento, 2004, pp. 27-56. About ‘cosmopolitanism’, see DALLMAYR, F., “Cosmopolitanism: in search of cosmos”, in Ethics and Global Politics, nº 3, vol. 5, 2012, pp. 171-186; CALI, B., “On Legal Cosmopolitanism: Divergences in Political Theory and International Law”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, nº 4, vol. 19, 2006, pp. 11491163; critically about the case of the EU, see AMTENBRINK, F., “The multidimensional constitutional legal order of the European Union. A successful case of cosmopolitan constitution-building?”, in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 39, 2008, pp. 3-68. In Camerlengo’s opinion, “Through dialogue among foreign courts, which consists of comparing interpretations of constitutional law, elements taken from the jurisprudential experience of other states can be used in interpreting the safeguarding of constitutional rights. Traditional constitutions are the outcome of original processes and they inevitably feature unique contents. Equally clearly, experience shows that constitutional texts are extensively circulated. As a result, textual differences in constitutions are not so outstanding as to prevent comparison among interpretations. In particular, constitutional systems share an essen-

Letizia Mingardo

Actually, much of the interaction of the courts across national borders has been analyzed through the metaphor of ‘dialogue’10, including the citation of foreign legal authority, transnational coordination of complex litigation, and the enforcement of foreign judgments. First, we have to distinguish, as some scholars do, between a ‘hard’ sense and a ‘soft’ sense of the dialogue among courts11. In its ‘hard’ sense, this expression indicates the compulsory interaction among courts of different legal systems, obliged by national Constitutions or Conventions among States (such as for the relation between the national courts and the ECHR or the ECJ). As an example, I would like to mention the Italian case of heterologous fertilization, prohibited in the Law nº 40/2004. In 2012, the Constitutional Court passed the decision back to the irst tier tribu-

tial constitutional core deriving from their common constitutional roots, and include some fundamental principles: the safeguarding of fundamental rights and principles of the rule of law; equal protection of the laws; democracy; pluralism; separation of powers; and supremacy of the constitution. The sharing of the common essential core is expressed through a dialogue among courts from different states. The set of rules deriving from dialogue between national courts and taken, in the interpretative sense, from the common essential core can be deined as Cosmopolitan constitutional law” (CAMERLENGO, Q., Dialogue among courts: towards a cosmopolitan constitutional law, Pavia University Press, Pavia, 2012). In a philosophical study on legal metaphors, see SARRA, C., Lo scudo di Dioniso. Contributo allo studio della metafora giuridica, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2010. As an example, Piana and Guarnieri distinguish “between what is to be considered as a compulsory dialogue among courts and a voluntary use of foreign law”. In their opinion, the dialogue among high courts will be voluntary and non-compulsory since it does not depend on a formal obligation to refer to other (and higher) jurisdictions (such as in the case of the reference to the ECJ’s case law). They believe that “in a way, exactly because of its voluntary nature, this dialogue should be considered both as a phenomenon to be explained and as a process that can account for the profound transformation which law-making and law-enforcing processes experience in the contemporary world” (PIANA, D., GUARNIERI, C., “Bringing the Outside inside. Macro and Micro Factors to Put the Dialogue among Highest Courts into its Right Context”, in Utrecht Law Review, nº 2, vol. 8, 2012, pp. 139-157, in particular p. 140).

Dialogue among Courts and Biolaw: Integration or Incorporation?

nals, with the instruction to make their own decision within the framework of the ECHR rulings about the reproductive rights12. In its ‘soft’ sense, the dialogue among courts indicates the inluence among courts when the national judge refers to foreign precedents only to support his discourse. For example, in Italy, in 2007 the Supreme Court decided the Englaro case, about the right of self-determination, referring to the American Quinlan case and Cruzan case. For the irst time in Italy, using these foreign ‘precedents’, the withdrawal of artiicial feeding was authorized for a patient in a permanent vegetative state13.

3. THE PROBLEMATICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘HARD’ AND ‘SOFT’ DIALOGUES My question is whether these cases are real examples of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ dialogue among courts. Let us consider the Englaro case. The

Corte Cost., ord. 22.05.2012, nº 150. The Italian law regulating Artiicial Reproductive Technology, approved in 2004, has always been at the centre of a heated debate, because of its several prohibitions [see PAROLIN, L.L., METZLER, I., SCHUSTER, A., “(Not) Making ‘Hexternologous’ Fertilization. The Italian ART Law and its paradoxes”, in Italian Journal of Science & Technology Studies, nº 1, vol. 4, 2013, pp. 133-144; BENAGIANO, G., GIANAROLI, L., “The new Italian IVF legislation”, in Reproductive BioMedicine Online, nº 2, vol. 9, 2004, pp. 117-125; FINESCHI, V., NERI, M., TURILLAZZI, E., “The new Italian law on assisted reproduction technology (Law 40/2004)”, in Journal of Medical Ethics, nº 9, vol. 31, 2005, pp. 536539]. Cass. Civ., sez. I, sent. 16.10.2007, nº 21748. Eluana Englaro, a 38 years old woman in a permanent vegetative state (PVS), died in February 2009 following the withdrawal of her feeding tube. At the time of her death, she had been unconscious for 17 years. For many years, her father had been seeking permission to allow her to die. His request was rejected by the courts several times on different grounds, until the Italian Supreme Court inally granted it. The case caused considerable political turmoil. The government, the president, the Constitutional Court, and the ECHR got involved. In an account of the history of the case, enriched by personal communications with the people directly involved and a memoir by the father of Eluana, see MORATTI, S., “The Englaro Case: Withdrawal of Treatment from a Patient in a Permanent Vegetative State in Italy”, in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, nº 3, vol. 19, 2010, pp. 372-380.

Letizia Mingardo

Italian Supreme Court said that you may stop artiicial feeding in the case of 1) PVS and 2) clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s will (by means of his/her previous declarations or his/her personality, lifestyle and beliefs, way of thinking). The Court of Cassazione used the American precedents about substituted judgement, to ind a surrogate decision maker about health care decisions when the patient is unconscious or non-competent. But it created a new biolegal rule, mixing the rules of the precedents. In fact, in the Quinlan case (1976), the Supreme Court of New Jersey required the surrogate decision maker to infer the patient’s will from his/her personality. In the Cruzan case (1990), the US Supreme Court required the surrogate decision maker to prove the patient’s will by means of a clear and convincing evidence. In the Englaro case, the Cassazione required the surrogate decision maker to reconstruct the patient’s will from his/her personality or form his/her previous declarations14. Let us consider the heterologous fertilization. Since 2010, the irst tier tribunals asked the Constitutional Court if the prohibition contained in the article 4 of the Law nº 40/2004 was constitutional. In 2010, the First Section of the ECHR, deciding against Austria, said that such a prohibition violated the rule of non-discrimination and the respect for private and family life15. In 2011, the Grand Chamber established that the prohibition was in the margin of appreciation of each contracting State16. Because of this decision, the Italian Consti14

See MINGARDO, L., “Quinlan, Cruzan ed Englaro. La giurisprudenza americana in tema di substituted judgement attraverso gli occhi di un giudice italiano: la (ri)costruzione della volontà del paziente incapace”, in CASONATO, C., PICIOCCHI, C., VERONESI, P. (eds.), Forum BioDiritto 2008. Percorsi a confronto. Inizio vita, ine vita e altri problemi, Cedam, Padova, 2009, pp. 399-427. The case concerned the prohibition under the Artiicial Procreation Act of ovum donation for the purpose of artiicial procreation and sperm donation for the purpose of in vitro fertilisation. The right of couples to have recourse to medically assisted procreation techniques in order to conceive a child was found to attract the protection of Article 8, as this choice was an expression of private and family life (ECHR, S.H. and others v. Austria, no 57813/00, 1 April 2010). In the Court’s view, this ield, which was subject to particularly dynamic development in science and law, had to be kept under ongoing review by the Contracting States. The Convention always had to be interpreted and applied in the light of current circumstances (ECHR, S.H. and others v. Austria [CG], no 57813/00,

Dialogue among Courts and Biolaw: Integration or Incorporation?

tutional Court passed the decision back to the irst tier tribunals, with the instruction to make their own decision within the framework of the ECHR rulings17. However, the irst tier tribunals referred the decision back to the Court yet again. In 2014, the Court inally annulled the prohibition, but… without referring to the ECHR18. Ruggeri explains the peculiarity of the case concisely, saying: “The Constitutional Court consents to heterologous fertilization but closes the dialogue with the ECHR, after having announced it”19. Therefore, we have an example of soft dialogue (the Englaro case) that has a normative value much stronger than a hard dialogue (the heterologous fertilization), in which the ECHR rules are inally omitted. ‘Soft’ is ‘hard’ and ‘hard’ is ‘soft’, and the distinction reveals its fragility20.

17 18

3 November 2011). In a study on the margin of appreciation in International Law, see LEGG, A., The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; with speciic regard to the ECHR, see O’DONNELL, T.A., “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, in Human Rights Quarterly, nº 4, vol. 4, 1982, pp. 474-496; with speciic regard to the respect for private life, see WESTKAMP, G., “Private life and the margin of appreciation, introductory note to the European Court of Human Rights: Alex Springer A.G. v. Germany and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2)”, in International Legal Materials, nº 4, vol. 51, 2012, pp. 631-684; with speciic regard to S.H. and others v. Austria, see VAN HOOF, W., PENNINGS, G., “The consequences of S.H. and Others v. Austria for legislation on gamete donation in Europe: an ethical analysis of the European Court of Human Rights judgments”, in Reproductive BioMedicine Online, nº 7, vol. 25, 2012, pp. 665669. Corte Cost., ord. 22.05.2012, nº 150. Corte Cost., sent. 10.06.2014, nº 162. In Vallini’s opinion, this decision reveals a power to review legitimacy in biolegal matters much stronger than the one of the ECHR, see VALLINI, A., “Sistema e metodo di un biodiritto costituzionale: l’illegittimità del divieto di fecondazione eterologa”, in Diritto penale e processo, nº 7, 2014, pp. 825-844. RUGGERI, A., “La Consulta apre alla eterologa ma chiude, dopo averlo preannunziato, al ‘dialogo’ con la Corte EDU (a prima lettura di Corte cost. n. 162 del 2014)”, in Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, 14.06.2014, http://www. forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/giurisprudenza/2014/0023_nota_162_2014_ruggeri.pdf. The distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory dialogues is deeply debated in BOBEK, M., Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. For another critical point of view, see

Letizia Mingardo

4. THE IDEA OF ‘DIALOGUE’ For Ahdieh, the characterization of transnational judicial interaction as ‘dialogue’ is not surprising, because of the idea of international relations as shaped by ‘passive virtues’, including respect for national sovereignty and reliance on diplomacy. However, as he notices, there is a growing pattern of interaction between international tribunals and national courts, for which dialogue is “an illsuited analogy”, such as for those interactions based on review or appellate21. In effect, in its common sense, the word ‘dialogue’ indicates the conversation between two or more people, or an exchange of opinions on a particular subject with a view to reaching an agreement. Thus, it is dificult to see relationships based on hierarchy, obligation and enforcement, as real ‘dialogues’. From this point of view, the so called ‘soft’ dialogue among courts is nearer to the general meaning of dialogue. However, as some scholars say, the citation of foreign legal authorities is just a monologue of each judge with himself, rather than a real dialogue among parties22. I think that the word ‘dialogue’ is used because its common meaning is far from the original one, deriving from ancient Greek. According to its original meaning, dia—logos

DE VERGOTTINI, G., Oltre il dialogo fra le corti. Giudici, diritto straniero, comparazione, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010. The author aims to show that there is no real dialogue between State Courts, while there is a dialogue only between State Courts and the Courts of Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. He also intends to highlight that the use of legal comparison does not always accompany the dialogue among courts. For the author, the so-called dialogue and the use of comparative law are two myths in contemporary legal literature. See AHDIEH, R.B., “Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts”, in New York University Law Review, nº 6, vol. 79, 2004, pp. 2029-2163. See DE VERGOTTINI, G., Oltre il dialogo fra le corti. Giudici, diritto straniero, comparazione, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010; SARRA, C., “Dialogo tra corti e circolazione delle giurisprudenze. Ancora sull’uso ‘dialettico’ del precedente giudiziario”, in BIANCHINI, M., GIOIA, G. (eds.), Dialogo tra corti e principio di proporzionalità. Atti del I Convegno dei Colloquia dei Ricercatori della scuola di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Padova, Cedam, Padova, 2013, pp. 477-501.

Dialogue among Courts and Biolaw: Integration or Incorporation?

is intended as a structural human dimension of potential and actual relatedness and not just any situation of communication. In order to reach the truth, everyone needs to listen and speak to others23. In this way, to quote Reggio, “dialogue is both a value and a source of other —complementary— values, since it requires the recognition and the protection of a condition of mutuality and reciprocal respect” among parties24. But this is not the mainstream, as shown by contemporary argumentation-theories. In effect, authors as Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, Walton, van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Feteris assume a particular concept of rhetoric and dialectic25. In their point of view, dialectic is “a rather pure and theoretically sound method aimed at a cooperative search for cognitive truth”, while rhetoric is “a seriously tainted and practically compromised knack serving a competitive quest for persuasive success”26. In Sarra’s opinion, despite the citation of classical authorities as Aristotle, this understanding comes from the mediation of the Middle Ages. These theories reveal a sort of neoplatonic hierarchy between the superior level of the ‘rules of the ideal discourse’ and the inferior

See CAVALLA, F., La verità dimenticata. Attualità dei presocratici dopo la secolarizzazione, Cedam, Padova, 1996; ID., Alle origini del diritto al tramonto della legge, Jovene, Napoli, 2011; ZANUSO, F., “Incontrare l’altro nel dialogo, oltre la tolleranza: inibulazione rituale e tutela dei diritti umani”, in ZANUSO, F. (eds.), Il ilo delle Parche. Opinioni comuni e valori condivisi del dibattito biogiuridico, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2009, pp. 193-212; MORO, P., La via della giustizia. Il fondamento dialettico del processo, Libreria Al Segno, Pordenone, 2001. REGGIO, F., “Dialogical Justice: Philosophical Considerations for Re-thinking the Reaction to Crime in a Restorative Way”, in BLAD, J., CORNWELL, D., WRIGHT, M. (eds.), Civilising Criminal Justice. A restorative Agenda for Penal Reform, Waterside Press, Hook, 2013, pp. 315-345, in particular p. 333. PERELMAN, C., OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, L., The new rhetoric: a treatise on argumentation, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame (IN), 1969; VAN EEMEREN, F.H., GROOTENDORST, R., A systematic theory of argumentation: the pragma-dialectical approach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004; FETERIS, E.T., “A dialogical theory of legal discussion: Pragma-Dialectical analysis and evaluation of legal argumentation”, in Artiicial Intelligence and Law, nº 2-3, vol. 8, 2000, pp. 115-135; WALTON, D., The new Dialectic. Conversational Context of Argument, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1998. HOHMANN, H., “Rhetoric and Dialectic: some historical and legal perspective”, in Argumentation, nº 3, vol. 14, 2000, pp. 223-234, in particular p. 223.

Letizia Mingardo

level of ‘actual argumentative practices’. By assuming the existence of a unique model of linguistic rationality, these authors consider rhetoric as a servant of dialectic. While the maximum of rationality is granted by formal logic and the minimum by rhetoric, the medium of rationality is granted by dialectic, seen as a method using dialogue27. From this point of view, the concept of dialogue weakens: if everyone knows universal rules of rationality, you do not need a real debate to resolve the confrontation between a thesis and its objections. The dialogical model turns easily into a monological one. This has effects on the idea of the adversarial principle, regulating the confrontation of the two parties in front of the judge. In this way, this principle just ensures the formal presence of the parties before the judge, thus giving “a scene, or setting—namely, a theatrical presentation in which the parties must place themselves in front of the judge as a homage to the principle of equality”28.

5. A SHIFT OF SOVEREIGNTY? For many scholars, the interaction of courts across national borders offers solutions for legal conlicts29. This is true, in general. But

SARRA, C., “Dialogo tra corti e circolazione delle giurisprudenze. Ancora sull’uso ‘dialettico’ del precedente giudiziario”, in BIANCHINI, M., GIOIA, G. (eds.), Dialogo tra corti e principio di proporzionalità. Atti del I Convegno dei Colloquia dei Ricercatori della scuola di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Padova, Cedam, Padova, 2013, pp. 477-501. SOMMAGGIO, P., “The Socratic Heart of the Adversarial System”, in University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper Series, nº 14-21, 2014, pp. 1-15, in particular p. 5. As the author shows, only a different idea of dialectic, closer to classical literature, is able to give new strength to a genuine concept of dialogue. Likewise, in a theory of legal reasoning that can be labelled a dialectical approach informed by standards of discursive rationality, see SARRA, C., BERTEA, S., “Foreign Precedents in Judicial Argument: A Theoretical Account”, in University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper Series, nº 14-20, 2014, pp. 1-29. For Benvenisti and Downs, the transjudicial dialogue among national courts promotes the balance between legislative and executive power: “This dialogue enables national courts to coordinate the interpretation of shared or similar texts —either domestic law or international— law and thereby to resist attempts of their respective executives to evade responsibility. Such coordination also helps