Bankable Energies 2026

EIC REPORT | VOLUME I

EIC Bankable Energies Report

EIC Insight Report 2026 | VOLUME I

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Mahmoud Habboush mahmoud.habboush@the-eic.com

EIC (Energy Industries Council)

Mahmoud

89 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7TP Web: www.the-eic.com

LinkedIn: EIC (Energy Industries Council)

Habboush

Author of Bankable Energies Report mahmoud.habboush@the-eic.com

Introduction: The magnet effect

Policy can act like a magnet. It can pull capital into lower-carbon projects by writing credible contracts, putting revenue support in place, and taking on risks the market will not take. In the interviews behind this report, the UK’s strongest examples are in plain sight. Contracts for difference (CfDs) that investors describe as ‘tried, tested, trusted’; regulated approaches that lenders understand; and state support that can cover cross-chain failure risk in complex projects like carbon capture, storage and utilisation (CCUS). When those mechanisms are in place, private capital comes in and projects, especially complex or first-of-a-kind ones, become bankable.

That magnet loses its pull when the signal stops being credible. In practice, that shows up in sudden shifts in direction, tighter budgets, and permitting, grid access and procurement becoming the main sources of delay. That is why executives describe uncertainty ‘on both sides of the energy transition’, and why ‘most things have moved to the right’, often with little warning. In this report’s sample, political, policy and regulatory uncertainty is cited most often as a blocker (32%), followed by permitting delays (18%) and grid constraints (14%).

The lesson is that policy can either push projects to final investment decisions

(FID) or throw them off track.

This situation plays out differently across the market. Many renewables players like the direction of travel because the UK has mechanisms that can underwrite investment, and because clearer signals can create momentum. Yet the same players describe frustration when delivery does not match ambition. The result is planning backlogs, route-tomarket uncertainty, grid delays, and competitive processes that encourage optimistic bids, then punish projects when the real costs emerge. They see activity, but also front-end engineering and design (FEED) fatigue, and a pipeline that can look busy while construction remains limited.

Oil and gas respondents, by contrast, describe a policy environment they see as hostile and unstable. They link this to taxation, approvals, legal challenge risk, and mixed signals about how long domestic production is expected to continue. Several describe capital moving to other basins, with UK projects delayed while others move ahead. That matters because the transition is still being delivered through an oil and gas supply chain, and often with oil and gas balance sheets providing risk capacity. One interviewee put it plainly: cleantech projects have often relied on oil

and gas balance-sheet support; when upstream activity weakens, financing tightens and apparent progress can be driven more by consenting milestones than by work on-site.

The supply chain sits in the middle, acting as an unwilling go-between. The point policy often misses is that there is no neat handover. The same yards, fabricators, marine services, electrical specialists, inspection teams, project managers and engineers work across hydrocarbons, offshore wind, CCUS, the grid and hydrogen. More than 80% of UK energy supply chain companies still do oil and gas work, and many still rely on it as a core source of revenue. If conventional work drops before transition projects reach enough FIDs, capability does not sit idle. Firms protect cash flow, redeploy crews, move capacity overseas, pause investment in tooling, and watch subcontractor networks shrink. Once that happens, restart costs rise and delivery windows close.

This is the bridge problem at the centre of the report. You cannot make a supply

chain ‘busy’ if the work is not there. Policy can set targets and run funding rounds, but it is utilisation that keeps capability intact. The next five years matter because that is when many lower-carbon projects are expected to move from studies and awards into construction. If that change does not happen at scale, the UK risks losing the delivery capacity it will need – and paying to rebuild it later through higher costs, longer lead times, less competition, and more risk-averse contracting.

This does not just hit oil and gas activity. It disrupts the wider energy market. Supply chain firms work across sectors, and many still rely on oil and gas work to keep teams employed and balance sheets sound. When there is too little work coming through, they either chase contracts overseas or shut down. The bigger risk for the UK is that some firms are already relocating, because there is little reason to commit resources to a market with too little work. We should not turn a blind eye to this.

STUART BROADLEY Chief Executive Officer Energy Industries Council (EIC)

Policy foreword: What we are asking for 02

REBECCA GROUNDWATER

Global Head of External Affairs Energy Industries Council (EIC)

Policy has real force in the UK energy market. It draws investment into lowercarbon projects when it puts the basics in place for lenders and investors: stable rules, financeable revenues, credible timelines, and contracts that leave risk with the party best equipped to handle it.

It also makes something else clear. The transition is being built through a supply chain that is still largely tied up in oil and gas work. That is an operational fact

and has little to do with politics. If policy expects the supply chain to switch lanes on command, capacity and skills will leak away, lead times will extend further, and prices will rise. Then the same policy aims will cost more and take longer.

So our policy asks should start from one premise: treat the energy supply chain as one whole. Stop designing policy in sector silos, then acting surprised when the consequences spill across the whole chain.

01 Publish a five-year bridge plan that suppliers can price and staff against

Targets without a credible near-term programme create activity on paper, rather than capacity on the ground. What’s needed is a clear, publishable five-year pipeline that turns ambition into deliverable work that includes auction timetables, business models, procurement rounds, grid connection releases, consenting throughput, and the dates for each.

Suppliers need dates they can plan to while lenders need milestones they can underwrite. That plan should also spell out the assumed level of oil and gas activity, because if baseline utilisation drops away, the transition pipeline will fracture.

02 Stabilise the rules that govern upstream activity during the transition

Many of the firms building offshore wind, CCUS and hydrogen still rely on oil and gas work to keep teams employed and balance sheets sound. If the fiscal and licensing regime for oil and gas becomes hostile or easily reversible, participation falls and financing tightens. Capability then drains from the supply chain, leaving a transition that is weaker rather than cleaner.

We are asking for a stable, legible fiscal and regulatory framework that keeps UK activity investable through the bridge period, with clear decision routes for licensing and approvals, and a predictable approach to legal challenge risk. Only a disciplined, predictable approach like this will deliver a transition that is actually viable.

03 Turn ‘paper pipelines’ into investment decisions

Energy executives interviewed for this report describe a hard-to-ignore pattern: studies accumulate, FEED moves ahead, and then projects stall at FID. The government must back the tools that allow projects to become bankable, namely viable offtake arrangements, credible price

support, and frameworks that cut first-ofa-kind risk. When markets cannot carry long-term performance uncertainty, the government needs to say clearly what it will underwrite and what it will not. That choice should be explicit, not left to inference.

04 Fix consenting and planning so projects can be delivered

Permitting delays do not just slow projects down. They also add costs, freeze investment and push supply chain capacity elsewhere. Consenting targets only matter if they are backed by clear timelines, the right specialist Grid constraints now dictate what gets built and when. We are calling for a grid plan that matches the project ambition. That means faster connection queues, clearer gate criteria, better coordination

staff, and someone clearly accountable for delivery. And if the risk of judicial review is effectively deciding outcomes, government should tackle that head-on by tightening the process.

05 Treat grid as national delivery infrastructure

between new generation and network upgrades, and a willingness to invest ahead of need where the strategic case is clear. Otherwise we are bound to keep missing our deadlines.

06 Stop forcing ‘wrapped’ risk that kills projects

Several interviewees warned that the push for a single, fully wrapped risk position often backfires. This concentrates risk in one party. Owners default to engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) because it looks cleaner on paper. Contractors then load the price to cover risks they cannot control, and the project no longer stacks up.

Policy can reduce that failure mode through clearer procurement guidance, standard contracting principles, and public sector leadership on risk allocation. There should also be room for alliance models, shared risk structures, and insurance solutions where they bring down the cost of capital rather than drive it up.

07 Protect the middle: SMEs, Tier 2 and Tier 3

If smaller suppliers relocate or shut down, that capacity does not rebound easily, if at all. We are asking for practical measures that keep firms here. That includes a clear view of upcoming work, prompt payment across publicly funded programmes, export support in the lean periods, and skills investment that follows

real demand signals. That is industrial strategy at its most concrete.

These asks are the minimum conditions for a transition that can be delivered at pace, at cost, and at scale. If policy is meant to bring new investment in, it also must keep the workshops running until the new work turns up.

Methodological note

This report draws on 50 interviews –with respondents from 44 organisations – conducted from mid-October 2025 to early December 2025. Interviews were carried out remotely and in person using a structured format. Most of the interviewees (47 of 50) are based in the UK. The sample is weighted towards the

Sample profile

supply chain (35 interviewees, or 70%), with financial institutions and investors (14%), insurers (6%) and policy makers (4%) adding other perspectives. Interviewees speak from organisations with a presence or activity across 135 countries, so the UK story is continually compared with what is happening elsewhere.

Interviewees represent a mix of stakeholder types:

Hydrogen

Industrial decarbonisation

Oil and gas

CCUS

Sustainable aviation fuel (SAF)

Nuclear

Electrification

Energy storage

Emission control

Grid and transmission and distribution

Power generation (non-renewable)

Data centres

District cooling

Regions where interviewees’ companies operate:

Company roles in making projects bankable:

Technical due diligence and lender technical advisory

Technical assurance, certification and performance

Cost, schedule and commercial realism

Financing, capital structuring and market sounding

Governance, regulatory and compliance integrity

Risk allocation, transfer and mitigation

Project definition, FEED and early feasibility

Technology provision, efficiency and compliance

Stakeholder and community engagement

and commercial viability

SECTION ONE:

How can government policy be so good and so bad at the same time?

Government actions are accelerating the energy transition and slowing it down at once. It is the actor most able to make energy projects bankable – in other words, financeable – because it can create durable rules, establish revenue mechanisms and serve as a credible counterparty. It is also the actor most able to make projects unbankable, because it can change direction, tighten budgets, keep changing the rules, and fail to clear planning backlogs and grid bottlenecks.

Nearly 50 UK-based energy executives –across supply chain businesses, financial institutions, investors, insurers and policy makers – interviewed for this report say both realities simultaneously. They point

to the CfDs as a ‘very strong vehicle for investor confidence’, ‘tried, tested, trusted’. They also report that ‘most things have moved to the right’, with delays that often come at short notice. They say it largely boils down to ‘uncertainty’ about policy, taxation and the long-term direction of energy strategy.

The critical issue is not whether the UK has targets, ambition, or technical capability, but whether policy becomes something capital can underwrite, and whether different stakeholders can deliver it at pace. When the government works, it reduces the risks that private finance cannot stomach. When it does not, it adds

risks that private finance cannot price. One interviewee captures the effect of that contradiction:

‘There is a lot of regulatory and, should we say, government policy uncertainty. Ironically, governments have managed to mess it up so badly that it is uncertain on both sides of the energy transition.’ Energy executives do not claim this is a question of intent, but rather one of execution. That is, what the government is already doing well in some places, and failing to do in others.

In this report, ‘bankability’ refers to whether a project can secure financing on terms that allow it to proceed, including equity and debt. In practice, debt requirements often set the hardest conditions, because lenders need clear risk allocation, predictable cash flows and credible counterparties. A banker puts the distinction bluntly: ‘Bankability is about debt finance. It is not about project viability.’ Projects can be perfectly viable and still fail bankability tests if risk is allocated to the wrong party, revenue cannot be contracted on terms lenders accept, or the timetable becomes too uncertain to finance.

The interviews show the government working most clearly when its policy translates into contracted revenue and bankable risk allocation. Participants most often identify direct support, public funding and state-

backed revenue mechanisms as the main enablers of bankability (38%), with policy clarity, targets and political support close behind (36%). Respondents see this as moving from policy intent to instruments that investment committees can approve. One executive cited counterparty strength as the key mechanism: the government is ‘seen as a credible counterparty with very limited credit risk’. CfDs are referred to as a ‘gold-standard contract’ with features that support bankability, including inflation indexation and qualifying change-in-law clauses. Others point to regulated models and systems design as bankability tools, including the view that ‘the most powerful weapon is the regulated asset base’ and Ofgem’s cap-and-floor approach to long-duration storage, which is described as enhancing bankability by creating predictable, leverageable cash flows.

Interviewees also say the government enables bankability when it takes on risks that private parties struggle to carry, especially in multi-party projects where one missing link can sink the whole investment case. This comes through most strongly in CCUS. As one participant puts it, the government is ‘specifically about addressing risks that are very difficult for a privately structured

network… cross-chain risk’. In other words, it is the party that can step in where risk cannot be cleanly allocated across the chain, and where no single private counterparty can credibly carry it. Another interviewee says projects ‘can only be bankable when the government provides termination compensation or another form of support’, and a third spells out what that protects against: ‘taking away the risk that you have built a big project and you have got nowhere to put your CO2, or you have built a big pipeline and nobody is giving you any CO2.’ Nuclear appears in this category too, with interviewees pointing to how explicit backing shifts investability, including the view that reaffirmed support ‘directly led to FID at Sizewell C’, and the point that the RAB structure ‘gives revenue during construction’, which can attract equity and de-risk debt.

At the same time, energy executives say the government is ‘not working’ when it makes the investment environment harder to understand and navigate. In the interviews, political, policy and regulatory uncertainty is the most cited hurdle (32%), followed by permitting delays (18%) and grid constraints (14%). Funding limits (10%) and tax regime constraints (8%) also feature. They say consenting delays are ‘getting worse’, access to the grid is becoming a bottleneck, and procurement failure is causing the loss of delivery windows: ‘A single failed public procurement can add two years of litigation.’ These issues point to a reality where projects that look active can still prove unbuildable and unfinanceable in practice. Beneath it all lies the fact that uncertainty leads to delay, delay creates time risk, and time risk becomes a financing problem.

What this looks like in practice

The first place interviewees feel the consequences is in the UK’s oil and gas slowdown, which they say is already visible in the workload. ‘For the UK, most things have moved to the right,’ says one executive. Energy executives tie this to uncertainty over policy direction, taxation and approvals, and to the absence of durable commitments that allow capital to commit. One energy leader puts the overriding sentiment as follows: ‘The word that sums it up is uncertainty.’ Another casts it as a choice the government keeps refusing to make: ‘Are we backing hydrocarbons for a while longer, or are we going full tilt into decarbonisation? Right now it is mixed signals.’

This matters beyond upstream. The supply chain does not neatly segment by technology. ‘The supply chain does not just feed into one sector,’ as one respondent puts it. The same executive links this to pinch points in Tier 2 and Tier 3 capacity, where inconsistent delivery in one area can disrupt others. The EICSupplyMap database shows that more than 80% of UK energy supply chain companies still work in oil and gas. In the interviews, 14% of executives say hydrocarbon tailwinds have helped spur investment in other sectors, often through overseas markets. The implication that interviewees draw is that the transition depends on a functioning bridge period, and abrupt instability in hydrocarbons can cause fragility elsewhere.

Across the transition pipeline, interviewees talk about FEED fatigue and projects that do not go beyond concept. ‘We are seeing lots of projects in pre-FEED and FEED, but not reaching FID,’ says one interviewee. For 24% of participants, first-of-a-kind technology or unproven scaling risk is a key blocker to bankability and, in turn, to reaching FID. Alongside that, another gap keeps coming up: ‘Offtake remains the critical gap.’ No matter how interviewees were asked about bankability – blockers, enablers or how bankable projects felt in 2025, up to 34% consistently identified viable offtake agreements as a cornerstone of bankability. Taken together, these gaps – among others identified in the report – help explain why perceptions of progress diverge. Some see more projects moving through early stages, while others focus on the lack of bankable routes to FID. Across the interviews, 19 respondents say bankability

is improving in 2025, while 22 say it is not, and nine say it is unchanged. Several warn of a ‘false sense of progress’, where movement through permitting looks like momentum while delivery remains thin.

A key observation from the interviews is that energy projects are moving at two speeds. Interviewees say more mature ‘electrons’ projects appear to be easier to finance, while many ‘molecules’ projects struggle with offtake and first-mover risk. They say battery storage and solar projects, for instance, come in ‘commoditised modules,’ which give investors comfort: ‘banks and pension funds can see that it works’. On the molecules side, they point to weak or immature markets and buyers unwilling to commit to long tenors amid price uncertainty.

EICDataStream’s UK FID data for Q4 2025, which looks at projects currently under development, supports that

pattern, with an important nuance. Offshore wind reaches FID in 7 of 33 projects (21%), representing 36% of value, while hydrogen reaches FID in 3 of 120 projects (3%) and under 1% of value. Carbon capture reaches FID in 5 of 70 projects (7%) and 16% of value, indicating fewer, larger commitments rather than broad movement to FID. The exception to the rule is floating offshore wind. It is an ‘electrons’ technology, yet 0 of 51 projects reach FID (0%) and 0% of value. This is still consistent, though, with interview evidence that first-of-akind formats can struggle to translate activity into bankable decisions even when the end-product is electricity.

The upshot is a government that can both de-risk and de-rail. It can make

projects bankable by writing bankable contracts, backing cross-chain risk, and reducing time risk through workable rules and faster delivery. It can also make projects unbankable by creating mixed signals, opening and closing windows, and allowing consenting, grid and procurement to become the critical path. That is how policy can be experienced as both good and bad at the same time. At its heart, bankability is a shared outcome. Government sets the ground rules, but it also shows up as a credible counterparty, a backstop for cross-chain risk and, at times, the source of revenue support. Developers, offtakers, lenders and insurers then decide whether the deal is financeable.

‘Electrons’ more bankable than ‘molecules’

Interviewees talk about a two-speed transition. Mature ‘electrons’ assets clear bankability tests more consistently, while hydrogen and other ‘molecules’ projects keep getting stuck on offtake and first-of-a-kind risk. On the power side, respondents point to standardised delivery and proven performance –‘commoditised modules’ in batteries and solar, and formats where ‘banks and pension funds can see that it works’. On the molecules side, the recurring issue is weak demand: ‘the offtake markets are immature’, and buyers ‘will not commit to long tenors’ amid price uncertainty.

Hydrogen is reported in the interviews more often in projects that have not reached FID than those that have (46% versus 26%), while energy storage shows the opposite pattern (20%

reaching FID versus 6% not reaching FID). EICDataStream’s UK FID data for Q4 2025 points the same way, with offshore wind reaching FID in 7 of 33 projects (21%), representing 36% of value, while hydrogen reaches FID in 3 of 120 projects (3%) and under 1% of value. The key exception is floating offshore wind: an ‘electrons’ technology, yet 0 of 51 projects reach FID (0%), indicating that maturity and bankable structures, not the endproduct, are doing most of the work.

Several interviewees say immaturity comes through in bankability mechanics: ‘Lack of market and offtake for hydrogen and derivatives (ammonia, methanol, e-methane, SAF). Buyers will not commit to long tenors amidst price uncertainty and headline noise.’ One respondent explains why early momentum does

not result in projects: ‘Technically bankable projects stall on offtake… Many developers wave MoUs and EOIs, but until the project is engineered and shovel-ready, counterparties will not finalise terms – and design choices depend on those terms.’ Another interviewee flags pricing headlines as a reason tenors are shortening. One participant summarises the lenders’ perspective: ‘If you are talking about “molecules”, it is challenging… It is usually about offtake risk. That is something lenders are not going to be in a position to accept in the near future.’

of Gas

• Trade, Engineering & Project Development Management (LNG & CNG) - UK • Infrastructure Development & Production (CNG) - Nigeria • Fabrication/Procurement (CNG Kits) - UAE

What bankers want the supply chain to hear

Bankers and investors emphasise the same point. A project can be viable, reach FID, and still fail the bankability test because lenders and equity backers look at risk in different ways. In their view, it comes down to a few basics: who carries the offtake risk; what evidence underpins performance claims, warranties and failure response for newer technologies; how cross-chain dependencies are covered in multi-party projects such as CCUS; and whether the deal can attract capital from multiple lenders and partners, rather than relying on a single sponsor to absorb the full exposure.

Some bankers draw a hard line between projects that are viable for equity and projects that are bankable for debt. One banker says: ‘There are plenty of projects getting to FID. They are not necessarily debt financed. Bankability is about debt finance. It is not about project viability. They are perfectly viable projects, but there is a risk allocation there which works for equity, not for debt.

They also stress that risks should rest with the parties best placed to manage them, so that the residual risk is acceptable under bank credit requirements. One participant says: ‘Assess technical, execution, and operating risk – technology, delivery, availability, degradation. Banks can take construction, operating and delay risk in principle,

but new sectors raise calibration issues. The supply chain has become more risk-averse and often resists taking the minimum risk banks expect… Message to OEMs and contractors: take an appropriate share of risk so residual risk fits bank credit parameters.’

Several interviewees warn that the drive for a single ‘wrapped’ risk position can become self-defeating. One participant says banks ‘tend to push projects toward EPC because risk is held and wrapped. But EPC prices are higher because EPCs must take risk they cannot control… Under EPC, business cases often become unviable.’ They add that this approach can encourage risk to be pushed down the chain and priced in, which can make projects uncompetitive. One participant notes that when owners insist on lump-sum turnkey terms, the domestic market may simply refuse:

‘I know specific cases where a client comes out wanting a lump-sum turnkey and everyone in the UK has said no.’

For newer technologies, they say the bankability debate now hinges on longrun performance evidence, warranties and what happens when things fail at scale. One interviewee says: ‘Degradation is real. Long-term performance claims are projected, not proven. Most OEMs have two to three years of operating data. Ten-year life claims lack empirical

backing… Discussion has moved from degradation to unscheduled failure logistics at scale.’

For multi-party, interdependent projects, they argue cross-chain risk remains decisive unless it is explicitly handled. One banker says: ‘Government… is specifically about addressing risks that are very difficult for a privately structured… network… so cross-chain risk… If you have emitters, and you have a transport storage network, you need to take away the risk that one or other of the sides of that does not happen, and governments can do that… But really it is about the termination compensation that you get. That is where the real bankability is enhanced… This is about taking away the risk that you have built a big project and you have got nowhere to put your CO2, or you have built a big pipeline and nobody is giving you any CO2.’

A recurring point among bankers and investors is that a ‘bankable’ project usually means the deal can attract shared capital, not just one lender or one sponsor. One participant says: ‘When something is bankable, it is when it has been banked on syndicated financing. One bank doing a deal does not necessarily mean it is officially bankable. If you get twenty banks seeing a deal, then clearly it is.’ Another points to the role of consortia in getting large projects away: ‘Consortiums of companies trying to bring projects forward. In CCS, we have seen interested parties… with partnerships between several supermajors. That kind of private capital driven by majors is what is making things happen.’

What insurers want the supply chain to hear

Insurers make a practical point that goes to the heart of bankability. Cover is not just something that sits in the background; it secures lender comfort, revenue protection, and how risks get allocated across contracts. In their view, insurance outcomes hinge on process as much as project quality. If insurers are brought in late, given limited data, or approached on price alone, cover tends to narrow at precisely the point projects need it to support leverage and sustain confidence in the next wave.

Insurers say the quickest way to narrow cover is to involve them late and share limited information. One interviewee says: ‘From a risk perspective it is simple. Engage early, share good information, and bring insurers into the process… Supplying high-quality data helps insurers understand the project and build the right programme… When owners understand how to leverage insurance insight early on, they de-risk the project for lenders, particularly on the revenue-protection side. Ultimately it comes down to early engagement, transparency, and good information flow.’

They also warn against buying cover on price alone. In the words of one

participant: ‘The biggest mistake is focusing too much on price. The “cheap and cheerful” product that looks good up front but fails under pressure. If a carboncapture project hits a construction snag and there is no proper loss-of-revenue clause, that can cripple debt servicing and undermine confidence in the next wave of projects.’

Insurers add that underwriting can stall if risk ownership is unclear. The same interviewee says: ‘If a billion-dollar power plant using a [certain manufacturer’s] turbine suffers a major loss, insurers need to know exactly who carries the risk. Without that clarity, underwriting freezes. Engage early, show the full picture, and it becomes a win-win-win across developers, lenders, and insurers.’

SECTION TWO:

‘Schizophrenic policy’ turns off oil and gas; hurts the entire supply chain

Energy executives from supply chain companies, consultancies and insurance firms say UK oil and gas activity is slowing in visible ways. Projects are not progressing or are being paused, and investment is going elsewhere. They attribute this to uncertainty over policy direction, taxation and the approvals process. They also say the current market slump makes it hard for the supply chain to plan, invest and

retain skills. Some argue the transition still relies on conventional inputs and oil and gas balance sheets to fund clean tech.

The numbers reflect the sentiment. Of those interviewed, 20% point to policy as a major hurdle to the development of oil and gas in the North Sea. Among those who say the bankability of energy projects has not improved in 2025, about 32% point to hostile oil and gas policy as a hurdle.

01 UK projects are ‘moving to the right’ while other basins move left. Capital moves elsewhere

Interviewees say UK projects are being delayed, sometimes at short notice, while other markets accelerate. They also point to capital being redeployed out of the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS).

One executive says: ‘For the UK, most things have moved to the right – delays, often at short notice. Projects expected in Q4 were pushed back due to budget constraints. In the rest of the world,

we see projects moving to the left – accelerated… Norway and Scandinavia are now our biggest growth markets… Projects have moved forward elsewhere because capital not used in the UKCS is being deployed in other regions – Danish, Norwegian, Dutch sectors – or to Southwest Africa, the Gulf of Mexico, Brazil and the Middle East.’

Another respondent puts the uncertainty over GB Energy funding down to falling EPL receipts and capital moving offshore: ‘There is uncertainty over GB Energy and what it is there for… The other problem with GB Energy is a complete lack of funding. They said it was going to be funded by the additional EPL receipts from putting the windfall tax up. Those receipts have dropped off a cliff. They were always going to. We are seeing the oil majors taking their capital and migrating offshore.’ Others said large independent oil and gas companies are now following suit.

A third participant extends the risk beyond upstream investment to wider industrial location decisions: ‘Preventing industry from offshoring because of UK policy is absolutely crucial, because if you make everything too expensive here, they will just move refineries, power generation, and heavy industry – cement factories and everything else – to China or somewhere in Africa where regulation is minimal.’

02 The key blocker is policy uncertainty

Energy executives say that policy uncertainty is the central issue affecting oil and gas but also other sectors. They put it down to tax regimes, unclear political direction, and the lack of durable policy commitments that unlock investment decisions. Several go as far as preferring stability even if the rates are not favourable. Participants identify the following policy blockers to bankability: political, policy and regulatory uncertainty and lack of clarity

(32%); permitting delays and approval difficulty (18%); and tax regime constraints (8%).

One energy leader says: ‘For traditional oil and gas, the environment is equally tough, mostly due to the UK’s tax position and uncertain

political sentiment. The word that sums it up is uncertainty: uncertainty about policy, taxation, and the long-term direction of government energy strategy.’

Another participant says predictability is the antidote: ‘If rules were fixed for five or ten years – even with unfavourable rates – it would still provide certainty, and that would pull projects forward.’

One executive ascribes this to planning: ‘Operators and investors need to know what is happening in three months, six months, a year.’

Others point to direct investment impacts from the windfall tax, as the EPL is known: ‘Unfriendly tax regimes, especially the windfall tax. It has deterred

investment and blocked smaller oil and gas developments that would have been viable otherwise.’ To that point, one consultant urges: ‘We could be much cleverer and more strategic with tax incentives for the projects we want.’

One participant adds legal challenge risk: ‘People are worried about investing in oil and gas because they do not know how much longer they will be allowed to operate, or whether someone will challenge it legally. You have seen this already with some of the recent North Sea court cases. So there is a lack of confidence. If I sink a lot of money into a project, will it actually go ahead, or will I end up in court?’

03 ‘Schizophrenic policy’: Oil and gas needed but discouraged

Policy is fundamentally conflicted. Operators are asked to produce domestic energy and sustain jobs, while facing tighter constraints on new development.

As one participant unapologetically puts it: ‘In the UK, there is a schizophrenic policy environment. For years, the government encouraged ‘maximising economic recovery’ of domestic oil and gas – the MER principle introduced after the Wood Review – but now operators face conflicting demands. To get approval for a new project or tie-back, they must prove compliance both with MER and with netzero targets. Those two objectives often contradict each other. Policy makers tell the industry to produce secure domestic energy and keep jobs, while simultaneously

discouraging new developments in the name of decarbonisation. It has become a bureaucratic loop: operators are told ‘keep producing, but do not produce anything new.’

Another interviewee frames the same issue as a lack of clear direction: ‘Are we backing hydrocarbons for a while longer, or are we going full tilt into decarbonisation? Right now it is mixed signals.’ A third pointed to a large independent oil and gas company that ‘has a pretty mature project sitting there, and it still can’t get to FID because the government isn’t giving the right signals. These projects have been in development for a long time.’

04 ‘Perpetual motion’: the bridge argument

Some participants argue that the transition still relies on conventional energy inputs, and that weakening oil and gas activity has knock-on effects on the ability to finance and deliver lowercarbon projects.

One interviewee says: ‘To be able to run an economy that will transition over to a more sustainable economy in the future, the sustainability journey, the step into that path, is difficult and will require energy input. It is naive to think that energy input can be sustained by the stuff that you are building at the time. That is like believing in perpetual motion. It is naive to think that you can cut off using hydrocarbons.’

Another participant connects the oil and gas slowdown to clean tech funding capacity, and to a misleading sense of momentum: ‘In the UK, the way the tax regime is implemented has killed a lot of activity, especially in oil and gas, and renewables are being impacted too. Clean tech projects previously had balance-sheet support from oil and gas. With the current situation, their ability to finance those projects is now challenging. There is a false sense of progress. Many

projects are moving into consenting and permitting, but that movement gives an inflated impression of activity. In practice, the actual level of activity was very low.’

This also becomes a supply chain issue. Interviewees note that the supply chain serves multiple sectors and requires a consistent pipeline of work. They say inconsistent delivery creates backlogs in the system and forces hard choices on capacity. One respondent says: ‘The supply chain does not just feed into one sector. If you go down to Tier 2 and Tier 3, a lot of the fabrication outfits are working in carbon capture, offshore wind, and oil and gas. So one major hitch in the supply chain can have quite a dramatic effect on the overall project.’ To this end, 14% of executives say that hydrocarbon investment tailwinds have helped spur investment in other sectors, especially in companies’ overseas markets. This is supported by EIC data, which tracks, through its EICSupplyMap database, the activities and presence of supply chain companies across different geographies. It shows that more than 80% of UK energy supply chain companies still work in oil and gas.

SECTION THREE: Turning policy into bankable contracts

Energy executives say the government ‘works’ when it turns policy into bankable instruments by providing credible counterparties, durable contracts, predictable revenue and clear risk allocation. They point to models that investors and lenders can underwrite, rather than ambition or targets alone.

Participants most often identify direct government support, public funding and state-backed revenue mechanisms (38%) as a top enabler. Policy clarity, targets

and political support (36%) follow close behind. A further 12% point to direct government coordination with industry and the removal of obstacles.

Interviews point to three ways the government shifts projects from concept to financeability. First, by backing revenue through instruments such as CfDs and regulated models; second, by carrying risks that private parties struggle to take on, especially across multi-party chains; and third, by reducing time risk through clearer rules, permitting and planning.

01 Government as a credible counterparty and government-backed revenue model

Interviewees say the government enables bankability when it becomes a credible counterparty. This is a move from policy intent to contract structures that investment committees can underwrite.

One executive attributed the key mechanism to counterparty strength and contract design: ‘Government involvement is key because government

departments or government-linked bodies are extremely creditworthy and seen as a credible counterparty with very limited credit risk. The government can serve as a counterparty to work with developers to meet the contractual milestones required to enter construction. The CfD has many characteristics that support bankability, including force majeure clauses, inflation indexation, qualifying change-in-law clauses,

features that make it a gold-standard contract in the investment community.’

Another executive captures how that plays out in investor behaviour: ‘The CfD is a very strong vehicle for investor confidence. It is tried, tested, trusted.’

Others stress that the point is durability as much as design. One participant argues this stems from risk reduction through long-term support and clarity: ‘Government-backed incentives through programmes like the UK CfD schemes go some way to long-term financial support and regulatory clarity, reducing investor risk and improving project economics.’

Several respondents broaden the same idea beyond CfDs to the wider set of ‘bankable revenue’ formats. ‘The other factor I think is really important is guaranteed revenue, the equivalent of a PPA or a CfD. CfDs are enabling in that sense,’ according to a participant. Another takes the argument into regulated models: ‘I think the most powerful weapon is the regulated asset base. These are the best from a bankability perspective.’

Interviewees also place nuclear in this category of government-backed investment that moves when support is explicit. One respondent says: ‘That government support was clearly reaffirmed in the summer statement [2025] and directly led to FID at Sizewell C, which we supported.’ Another points to the structure behind that support: ‘Nuclear has an even more powerful RAB model [regulated asset base]. Sizewell C’s structure gives revenue during construction, which attracts equity and derisks debt.’ A third ties government support to situations where viability is weak: ‘These projects are not yet commercially viable; private firms will not fully finance them without support.’

Some interviewees point to regulated regimes as a practical way to make returns predictable and debt-friendly in other sectors too. One cites longduration storage: ‘Ofgem’s longduration energy storage process shortlisted 70 plus projects. It applies a cap-and-floor regime, giving predictable revenue floors (stabilising debt returns) and capped upside for equity, similar to interconnectors.’

02 Government taking cross-chain risk and making multi-party projects financeable

Energy executives say the government ‘works’ when it takes on risks that private parties struggle to take, especially in projects that rely on multiple counterparties delivering in sequence. They say this is most visible in CCUS, where projects can fail because one part of the chain does not happen on time, or at all.

An interviewee puts the issue in plain terms. In CCUS, the capture plant, the transport and storage network, and the emitter all have to turn up on time. If one part is late or does not arrive, another party is left exposed, holding cost with no way to operate. Lenders will not take that ‘missing link’ risk, so projects stay unfinanceable unless someone can bridge the gap. ‘That kind of interface risk means that, on a standalone basis, those projects cannot be bankable. They can only be bankable when the government provides termination compensation or another form of support.’

As one participant puts it:

‘Government is specifically about addressing risks that are very difficult for a privately structured network. It is about cross-

chain

risk. You need to take away the risk that one side does not happen, and governments can do that.’

Termination compensation is the safety net if the chain breaks after money has been spent. It stops a developer being stuck with a completed asset that cannot be used – a ‘nowhere to put your CO2’ kind of event – and that is why it is treated as a hard test of bankability. ‘But really it is about the termination compensation that you get. That is where the real bankability is enhanced… This is about taking away the risk that you have built a big project and you have got nowhere to put your CO2, or you have built a big pipeline and nobody is giving you any CO2.’

03 Government as a system enabler: rules, permitting, and planning momentum

Bankability improves when the government reduces time risk and uncertainty through clearer policies and regulations and faster movement through key steps. One participant presents an example: ‘Clean Power 2030 provides a clear trajectory. Government signals are positive and

position this sector as a national growth enabler.’

Another put permitting and licensing at the centre of the issue: a ‘Number one is the regulatory framework – linked to the permitting process and licensing, and backed by policy support.’

Planning decisions can act as a confidence lever. One respondent said: ‘Mid-2024, when there was a change in government, developers were really buoyed and felt like there was going to be a real “yes, yes”. The government came in and approved a load of planning permissions for projects that had been halted for a while, so there was a lot of enthusiasm and hope.’ The same interviewee added a note of caution: ‘Over a year on, they haven’t solved the problems that were causing a lot of negativity… There’s still a bit of pent-up frustration.’

Others describe the government’s role in coordination as being about direct engagement with finance. One participant says: ‘Governments want minimum support while creating bankable models that attract private finance. That requires direct engagement with banks to understand critical risk and credit needs and how policy can bridge gaps.’

One participant adds a constraint that affects delivery choices: ‘Government support… budgets are finite. Few generously supported projects get done, or many thinly supported ones do not.’

A policy participant draws a clear boundary around public funding in the UK context. It is there to cover first-ofa-kind risk and early deployment where private capital

will not move without a public anchor, not to subsidise incremental upgrades in mature sectors. That is also why programmes lean on competitive rounds and tight criteria, since the government cannot be seen to pick winners without a clear rationale.

That boundary on what public funding will cover determines what ‘support’ looks like. It brings eligibility rules, staged payments, technical and commercial milestones, and clear stop points when key conditions are not met. The aim is not to replace private finance. It is to pay for the risky parts that unlock the rest. Once performance evidence, warranties, delivery routes, and offtake commitments tighten, debt and long-term equity can step in. When those pieces stay loose, public money cannot carry the whole capital stack.

Commercial barriers to bankability

What stops projects moving when policy support exists, and what stops them moving even when the technology case looks sound? Energy executives identify a short list of recurring blockers within the commercial deal and delivery system, rather than within government. These are the points where projects most often fail the bankability test late in development, even after years of studies and stakeholder work.

Offtake comes first, by a clear margin. The issue is not basic demand. It is whether price, tenor, indexation, credit support, and termination terms are strong enough for lenders to underwrite. After that, the blockers are familiar and compounding. First-of-a-kind risk and unproven scaling still push capital to the sidelines. Higher financing costs and inflation erode project economics and make earlier cost work stale. Supply chain constraints and long-lead items break schedules and widen contingency. Post-FEED cost uplift can wipe out returns. Social licence and planning friction slow delivery. Skills shortages limit execution capacity. Even when buyers exist, weak counterparty credit can still block debt.

Lack of bankable offtake or revenue model

Several interviewees note offtake is the decisive gap. One participant says: ‘The biggest barrier is still offtake.’ Another adds: ‘We see projects that are fully developed, shovel-ready, but they cannot get final offtake in place. That is the critical missing piece.’

Others stress that the issue is bankable terms, not interest in the product. One respondent says: ‘There is always someone willing to buy the product – hydrogen, fuels, electricity – but the question is at what price, and for how long.’ Another makes the finance constraint explicit: ‘Projects can find offtakers, but if prices are too low or contracts too short, banks will not finance.’ Several also tie the same problem to willingness to pay: ‘Top blockers are willingness to pay and offtake agreements…’

In newer fuels, interviewees describe a market that is not yet real in practice. As one participant puts it: ‘Even for technically bankable projects – hydrogen and its derivatives like ammonia, methanol, e-methane – there is no real market yet.’

First-of-a-kind technology or unproven scaling risk

First-mover risk remains a direct blocker, especially where performance data is limited and scaling is uncertain. One participant says: ‘Risk factor – it may not work; no one wants to be first for new technologies.’ Another adds: ‘Scale risk, too big too soon for novel technologies.’

Several point to a ‘wait for proof’ dynamic. One respondent says: ‘Inability to scale unproven technologies – investors ask for more pilots.’ Another puts it more broadly: ‘Regulators and investors have a no-first attitude.’

Cost of capital and inflation

Interviewees also point to affordability pressures from financing costs and input volatility. One participant lists the blocker plainly: ‘Cost of capital.’ Another says: ‘Volatility in material and logistics costs.’

Supply chain capacity and longlead constraints

Interviewees identify supply chain issues as a practical blocker, particularly where lead times and contractor availability do not match delivery schedules. One participant says: ‘Critical components, for example, transformers and cable, have quite a long lead time.’ Another emphasises that point: ‘Critical components, transformers, panels, MV stations, and cables have long lead times. If procurement isn’t locked early, projects stall. Once projects are “ready to build”, key components must be ordered immediately.’ A related issue is basic queue access. As

one interviewee puts it: ‘I’ve got my design. Can I join a queue, a foundry to get like the castings, the forgings I need. That’s not always the case as well.’

Capacity constraints are also evident in staffing levels and the availability of contractor slots. One participant says: ‘Contractors are booked up for three years, the main issue is finding good contractors.’ Another makes the selection dynamic explicit: ‘Construction companies often have 30 potential opportunities but only the resources for 10. They choose 10 and move on.’ Several connect this to engagement timing. One supply chain participant says: ‘Early engagement is key. If someone gives us a job and says “in two months we want you to start”, that’s the problem. If we have a year to plan and prepare, different story.’

Interviewees also point to market design and external shocks that tighten supply. One warns that competitive processes can force optimistic assumptions before the supply chain is ready, then projects fail in delivery and waste supplier time. Another argues disruption and cost uncertainty are eroding confidence: ‘Cost uncertainty and supply chain disruption, tariffs, manufacturing bottlenecks, and limited capacity increase delivery risk and erode confidence.’ Others add that ports, installation vessels and cables remain constrained, and that overseas manufacturing and scarce materials can stretch timelines beyond what project finance can tolerate.

Underestimated project cost

Cost escalation kills projects after FEED, once execution risk is priced properly. One participant says: ‘Once the project moves through FEED, costs often jump by doubledigit percentages, wiping out investor returns before financing even starts.’ Another summarises it as: ‘Post-FEED cost uplift.’ A third interviewee says: ‘Cost estimates done at pre-FEED and FEED will not hold when books reopen two to three years later.’

Public acceptance and social licence opposition

Some interviewees point to community pushback as a real constraint on delivery. One participant says: ‘Local community opposition.’ Another adds: ‘No one wants it beside them.’

One academic participant urges a more nuanced view of public acceptance: ‘We should look at communities as a resource… They know a lot about the local environment; they know what they want. If we want a more democratic net-zero future, you have to talk to communities – and really consider what they tell you.’

The same participant adds that community engagement is about transparency, not ticking a box: ‘Very often companies choose not to engage because there are uncertainties on big projects – you don’t have the answers to everything… They don’t want to be seen as a stakeholder that doesn’t know everything. For me that is one of the biggest mistakes: you need to recognise uncertainty to have transparency… Most community engagement ends up as a tick-box exercise… It isn’t genuine because they don’t give communities the resources they need to understand the project.’

Skills shortages

Labour constraints, especially in skilled trades, act as a drag on delivery. One participant says: ‘The UK does not have enough skilled workers for the scale of projects being developed.’ Another adds: ‘We are all fighting for resource… there is a significant skilled labour shortage… welding is a good example.’

Offtaker creditworthiness

Even where demand exists, interviewees still cite counterparty strength and contract structure as key constraints on finance. One participant says: ‘Lenders need to see long-term, creditworthy buyers who can pay enough to cover the debt.’ Another adds: ‘The quality of that demand – price certainty, tenor, counterparty strength – is often missing.’

SECTION FOUR:

Government as a blocker to bankability

Energy executives do not treat government underperformance as a question of intent. Instead, they point to execution shortfalls that leave projects stalled. Ongoing policy and regulatory uncertainty makes longterm commitments difficult. Permitting and consenting delays add time risk and cost risk. Grid connection timing and reform add another layer of uncertainty. Some also cite insufficient, time-limited or uneven support across

the market, leaving more projects in development than can progress to investment decisions.

About a third (32%) of participants identify political, policy and regulatory uncertainty and lack of clarity as a hurdle to bankability. Permitting delays and approval difficulty follow at 18%. Grid constraints appear at 14%. Lack of government funding comes through at 10%, and tax regime constraints at 8%.

01 Lack of policy credibility, political durability and institutional clarity

Energy executives say bankability weakens when policy feels reversible, when direction changes too fast, or when the system is hard to navigate while projects are trying to reach FID. They treat this as political and policy risk that is priced into investment decisions and, by extension, timelines.

According to one participant, political risk can create policy uncertainty, making it harder to navigate reforms while trying to get to FID and move into construction: ‘Political risk and the subsequent changes that can result from that can … create risk … We … have some policy uncertainty and trying to navigate that … is quite challenging … even the most minor change can really impact the economics of the project.’

Another interviewee notes that uncertainty affects both sides of the transition: ‘There is a lot of regulatory and, should we say, government policy uncertainty. Ironically, governments have managed to mess it up so badly that it is uncertain on both sides of the energy transition.’

Several participants say the durability of support matters as much as the headline ambition. One interviewee says: ‘Political uncertainty, especially around green subsidies and

whether they will endure. When developers or investors cannot trust the subsidy environment, projects stall.’

A participant puts the same risk in more direct terms: ‘If I commit to doing a large decarbonisation project, will it still have the government backing I need to make it viable in the long term?’

Some interviewees flag a different dimension of policy, namely its complexity. They depict a policy landscape where several big change programmes are running at once, many of them affecting the basics of a project’s investment case – how power is priced, how the system is planned, and what it costs to connect to and use the network. As one respondent puts it, ‘Multiple reforms are occurring simultaneously: REMA [Review of Electricity Market Arrangements], zonal pricing, SSE/PS, strategic planning of assets, network-charging reforms, transmission-cost changes.’ The point is that even if a project is otherwise ready, ‘navigating this while trying to reach FID and move into construction is extremely challenging.’

Others say policy design is too vague to turn targets and plans into financeable projects. One

interviewee says: ‘The UK has ambitious low-carbon targets, but policies remain vague… We have high-level roadmaps for carbon capture clusters, hydrogen agreements, and dispatchable power, but little practical clarity. Developers face a trial-and-error process – they’re unsure what milestones or requirements must be met to qualify for government or private support.’

Some participants say new government vehicles can add uncertainty when their purpose and funding are not clear. One interviewee says: ‘The purpose and direction of GB Energy have become unclear. Initially it was framed as a netzero and renewables-focused body, but it now appears to be shifting towards nuclear. That is not a problem in itself, but it was not what was set out at the start.’

02 Funding is limited and inconsistent

Energy executives say government support does not always translate a development pipeline into investment decisions. There are mechanisms that feel limited in scale or availability, leaving projects waiting for the next funding window.

One interviewee says: ‘Access to government support through funding allocation rounds – there is no more

of this now.’ Another attributes this to the practical limits of public budgets: ‘Budgets are finite. Few generously supported projects get done, or many thinly supported ones do not.’ A further respondent makes the point more generally: ‘Without subsidies, renewables – especially innovative ones – often do not get across the line.’

03 Permitting, consenting and grid access keep projects from moving to FID

Energy executives say slow, inconsistent approvals turn into time, cost, and financing risks. One interviewee says: ‘One big factor is the old chestnut of consenting delays – permitting delays. These are often the critical path and are getting worse. It is true across onshore and offshore, whether it is carbon capture or not, especially when you look at the marine environment these structures are going into.’

Another participant ties delay to how rules are applied in practice: ‘You see this in how environmental and permitting

rules are applied. It varies from council to council, region to region. People start applying for environmental permits and planning permissions, and they are not sure what exactly they have to do.’ One respondent also flags the compliance burden: ‘Environmental compliance can also slow approvals, as regulators balance climate optics with national energy needs.’

Interviewees also note that grid access is a critical bottleneck. In fact, 14% of interviewees identify grid constraints as a hurdle to bankability. One participant

says: ‘The National Grid (NISO) connection queue is being reformed. Projects with confirmed connections into 2026 are safe, but anything post-2026–27 has no grid guarantee… We advised on some utility-scale projects in Scotland. They were delayed due to grid availability and planning discharge issues. Those delays prevented FID… The broader grid queue problem, “zombie projects”, remains a major issue. There are still projects holding grid capacity that are not progressing, and

it blocks viable projects…’

Another interviewee reports a pause in market activity, driven by grid constraints and route-to-market uncertainty: ‘There is an awful lot of uncertainty in the UK around route to market, how power is going to connect. If you did not have a grid connection by last year, there has been a year’s hiatus.’ They add: ‘We have seen a number of developers… pull the bridge up, just wait to see where it falls.’

04 The downside of competitive procurement

Competitive processes can create a deliverability problem when bids are forced down and later cost increases wipe out the margin needed to build. One interviewee says: ‘When projects compete for CfDs, hydrogen auctions, or CCS allocations, bidders often underestimate costs to win.

Post-FEED cost escalation… erodes equity returns and kills deliverability… Without established supply chains and cost-learning curves, first movers overcommit, lose margin, and ultimately stall. This deters future investors and supply chain partners.’

FEED fatigue. FEED is not a project

Energy executives report a market busy with pre-FEED and FEED work, but with too little of that activity reaching FID. See Table 1 for a detailed picture of UK FID realities across sectors, and how nascent sectors suffer the most.

They cite first-mover and technology risk as drivers of the weak conversion to FID, which leaves key risks unresolved and slows the move from studies to build. One participant says: ‘Technologies are new – hydrogen, CCUS – which means first-of-a-kind risks. Somebody needs to hold that risk. Banks prefer not to. Banks have money to spend, but they

place it in the easiest place.’ At least 24% of interviewees view first-of-a-kind technology or unproven scaling risk as a key blocker to bankability. Among those who say bankability has not improved in 2025, 26% ascribe that to technology maturity and first-mover risk.

01 The paper pipeline. Lots of FEED work, weak conversion to FID

The UK faces a large pre-FID backlog: 76% of interviewees reported projects that have not reached FID in the past three years, with hydrogen (46%) and CCUS (22%) the most frequently cited sectors. This points to a pipeline that looks busy on paper but delivers few projects.

Interviewees observe projects moving through feasibility, pre-FEED and FEED, before stalling. One participant puts it bluntly: ‘A lot of feasibility studies that don’t go into FEED, or FEED and then fail to FID in both hydrogen and CCS.’ Another points

to projects slowing down midstream: ‘Most of the projects have been delayed or put on hold… pre-FEED and FEED studies are held on pause.’

It’s possible to link this to extended front-end phases and slowdowns after FEED. One interviewee notes: ‘Where projects used to reach FID within six months after FEED, it now takes 12 to 18 months or longer.’ Others see it as attrition and churn: ‘It is a slog to get projects to and through FID… there is churn, and many projects are not getting to that point.’

02 The bankability feedback loops. Offtake, engineering and late finance

It’s usual that projects can look technically advanced but still fail on bankability because offtake is not firm enough, and because key risks stay unresolved until late. In the survey, 34% point to weak offtake and commercial viability as top blockers to FID.

One interviewee says: ‘Offtake remains the critical gap. Several technically bankable projects are shovel-ready but stumble at firm, creditworthy offtake…’

Another identifies a circular dependency between engineering, offtake and residual risk: ‘The bottleneck is residual technical and performance risk that supply chains will not shoulder, combined with offtake that will not firm up until projects are engineered, which in turn depends on offtake – a classic loop.’

Some see this as a consequence of weak market demand in newer sectors: ‘Lack of market and offtake for products – hydrogen

and derivatives (ammonia, methanol, SAF, e-methane).’ Others add that uncertainty undermines long-term commitments: ‘Headline noise… undermines long-term offtake commitments… buyers shorten tenor; projects stall.’

A separate strand is about when financiers arrive. One interviewee

says: ‘… many projects need to be reworked because financiers are being brought in too late.’ Another makes the consequence explicit: ‘Banks or financiers are often involved only after FEED… That forces re-tendering or redesign. A major issue is the triangle between developer, EPC or EPCM contractor, and financing.’

03 Too many technologies, too little focus

Another challenge is that the sheer volume of new ideas creates distraction. Time and attention get pulled towards options that are unlikely to scale or prove economic, which slows progress on the projects that could be built.

One participant says: ‘There are so many wonderful new technologies and startup companies with great ideas. Ninety percent do not work or are not economic. That is a blocker because there is focus on lots of different areas – people chasing opportunities, most of which will not happen. It detracts from the ones that are real.’

04 What breaks the FEED-fatigue loop

The loop breaks when projects move to more realistic offtake structures earlier, with clear rules on what gets fixed, when, and on what basis parties can walk away.

Specific commercial practices can break the FEED-fatigue loop. One participant says: ‘Benign, realistic offtake. Select partners first, then have a defined engineering period to fix cost and

schedule, with cost-share if it fails. Avoid forcing full EPC-level commitments too early.’ Targeted public support is also critical, provided it funds the right stages, rather than stretching limited budgets across too many studies. One interviewee says: ‘Government funding of early study stages [and] the FEED phase is also important.’

SECTION SIX:

When you turn the tap off too fast, the garden dries out

Oil and gas activity is already being dialled down, while replacement investment is not yet reaching sufficient FIDs to keep delivery capability intact.

The concern is less about intent than pace. When activity drops in one part of the market, capacity does not remain available: capital reallocates, suppliers downsize, skills are lost or redeployed, and project timelines extend. The recurring warning is blunt: restarting momentum is harder than keeping it alive.

The interviews also show why this becomes self-reinforcing. Views on bankability are split: a minority expect improvement in 2025 (38%), but a larger group expects no improvement (44%) or no change (18%). Among the sceptics, the drivers recur in the same order: policy uncertainty, financing constraints, weak offtake and a risk-transfer mismatch. That combination keeps projects alive on paper while starving the market of executable work.

01 Shared supply chains mean there is no neat handover

Delivery capacity is shared across hydrocarbons, offshore wind, CCUS, the grid and hydrogen. The same yards, fabricators, marine services, cable and electrical specialists, inspection teams, project managers and engineers get

pulled into multiple sectors. Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers plan around utilisation and cash flow. They cannot keep people and equipment on standby while new markets are still in development.

Interviewees say this is where pacing matters. If the conventional workload drops before transition projects move into construction, firms protect the balance sheet. They redeploy crews to steadier work, even if outside the energy industry altogether, move capacity overseas, reduce shifts, pause investment in tooling, and watch subcontractor networks shrink without being able to do anything about it. Once that happens, lead times extend, suppliers start quoting higher prices, and fewer suppliers will take delivery risk on fixed dates.

This is not a straightforward transfer of capacity from one sector to another. It leaves a smaller, more risk-averse supply chain across the market. Projects then face higher costs, less competition and greater schedule risk just as they need confidence to reach FID. Many UK suppliers still rely on oil and gas to sustain revenues, so a sharp drop in that base can remove the cash flow and utilisation that keeps capability in the market.

02 A ‘busy’ pipeline can still be dry

Many transition projects rest on early-stage intent rather than binding commitments. Letters of intent instead of contracts, conditional offtake, cost estimates that have not been tested through procurement, grid routes without confirmed capacity or dates, and finance that arrives after the commercial structure should be locked.

Interviewees say policy started adjusting to this problem in hydrogen. Early rounds often funded separate components, like vehicles, electrolysers, small pipelines, or fuelling stations, and too many stalled because the rest of the chain was missing. They say the lesson was straightforward. A project only moves when power supply, production, storage, distribution and committed demand are brought together in a single plan, supported by an operator model that can run day-to-day. That is why hub and clusterstyle bids have become more common in the UK, alongside production support that is meant to move projects from award to construction. In their view, the shift is about reducing crosschain failure risk and moving projects from intent to delivery.

Interviewees also see clear single points of failure. Lose the anchor customer, miss a grid connection date, hit a permitting condition, fail to

secure a capacity slot with a critical supplier, or fall short of a lender’s risk tests, and the project can stop pre-FID. In their view, this is the gap. Investment

announcements exist, but they are not yet turning into bankable, executable work at the scale needed to keep capability in the market.

03 Time risk kills delivery windows, and the reset cost is brutal

Delays, procurement failure and disputes do not just slow a project. They disrupt contractor schedules and close delivery windows that cannot be kept open. Installation seasons are fixed; vessel and cable slots are reassigned; factories move to the next order; and key people are redeployed. When a project stalls, it often loses its place in the queue.

That knock-on effect spreads across sectors because the same specialist capacity gets booked years ahead. A

missed window can force a redesign, a re-tender, or a change in contracting strategy. Costs rise as suppliers add contingency, rates move, and the scope gets re-priced to current market conditions. The project then comes back into the queue with more uncertainty around schedule, deliverability and financing, and with less appetite from counterparties to take risk.

Industry-led enablers of bankability

The government can set the runway, but most projects still win or lose bankability on things the market has to deliver. In practice, that comes down to a small set of repeatable enablers that sponsors can control, or at least lock down, well before FID.

Projects move when revenue is contracted on terms lenders can live with, when delivery risk is owned by parties who can actually manage it, and when the supply chain is lined up early enough to stop schedules becoming unrealistic. They also move faster when teams design the deal with a lender’s mindset from the start, rather than bolting finance on at the end. The point is not that these factors replace public support. It is that without them, public support rarely results in projects being built.

Offtake and contracted revenue certainty

Offtake and revenue certainty are the most repeated enablers. One participant sums it up as: ‘Guaranteed revenue (PPA/ CfD/offtake agreement).’ Another put it as finance visibility: ‘Cash flows, revenue stream, clear visibility.’ The fundamental commercial requirement remains

securing good offtake agreements. Without this, offtake persists as the single biggest barrier to delivery.

Projects move forward only when they have a clear route to market with robust terms on price and tenor. The definition of ‘good’ offtake has shifted towards models that select a consortium first, then allow a refinement period to finalise design and cost. One participant describes the value of this realistic approach: ‘You need a benign offtake… They will select a consortium, then allow a refinement period to finalise design, cost, and schedule… It is still commercial, still tough, but realistic.’

Supply chain readiness and integration

Deliverability improves when the supply chain is involved early and works to shared milestones. One participant says: ‘Early collaboration among manufacturers, OEMs and EPCs, with clear milestones and proactive engagement.’ Another puts it simply: ‘Developers integrating supply chain earlier improves deliverability.’ Others point to project groupings and continuity across the chain: ‘Owners, main contractors and key suppliers forming

project groupings, with early engagement across the chain.’ This continuity transforms the supply chain from a procurement risk into a delivery asset.

External capital availability, debt and private capital

The overall insight is that capital is there when the proposition fits lender and investor requirements. Funders are keen to deploy capital, and there is a strong appetite to get projects off the ground provided they fit lender requirements, interviewees say. The market is characterised by high availability of project finance rather than a credit crunch. As one participant notes: ‘Increasing availability of green finance is positive.’ Some also point to non-bank sources: ‘Then there is access to private funding from industry.’

Risk allocation and de-risking structures

Participants say bankability improves when risk allocation is explicit and credible across parties. One participant says: ‘Risk allocation across all parties is absolutely critical.’ Another focuses on clarity: ‘Clear, transparent risk transfer.’ Some also point to shared structures: ‘Consortium structures allowing shared risk and capital.’

Technology maturity and readiness

Interviewees say proven performance reduces the risk premium and shortens

the bankability debate. For one participant, a key enabler is ‘Proven technology and verified performance data.’ Another stresses the same point: ‘Proven technology is another major factor.’ A third warns: ‘Some of this new tech has not been deployed at scale, so there is still learning.’

Financial literacy and lender readiness

In general, projects move faster when sponsors understand what finance needs and can present the case cleanly. One points to ‘experience and financial capability for the equity investor.’

Another says: ‘Team financial literacy, broad understanding of financial impact improves execution.’

Also, it’s important to mention that this knowledge is spreading into the banking sector and is already bearing fruit: ‘The banking sector is steadily building knowledge and developing financial models tailored to CCUS, hydrogen and industrial decarbonisation projects.’ An interviewee adds technical knowledge to the list: ‘Banks that once relied heavily on external advisers are now building their own internal technical capability, and understanding across the market is improving.’

Lloyd’s Register

Navigating the Complexities of Ageing Petrochemical Assets

Lloyd’s Register bankable energies case study

As petrochemical plant and equipment exceed their original design lives, they face a convergence of technical, safety, financial, and operational hurdles. These challenges range from physical degradation and component obsolescence to escalating maintenance costs, and directly threaten reliability, environmental compliance, and overall profitability.

The challenge - When Lloyd’s Register’s (LR) client approached them, they were grappling with how best to manage their portfolio of 23 ageing plants and thousands of equipment items. With ageing assets, the decisions about replacement, life extension and investment timing are some of the industry’s most complex and strategically important undertakings; it is the point where engineering reality, safety mandates, and business economics collide. Yet, when managed with precision, these projects are transformative, and can unlock a decade or more of profitable operation.

The project’s comprehensive scope covered static, rotating, electrical, instrumentation, civil, structural, and pipeline assets across 23 plants in Europe, the US, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia.

LR recognised that success required a foundation of mutual trust and transparency. By sharing its technical expertise and core business values early on, LR established the confidence necessary to accelerate the relationship and build a truly collaborative environment. This alignment was critical to foster a unified culture, lever innovation and streamline strategic decision-making.

The solution - This collaborative framework enabled LR to support the customer across their global portfolio of 23 petrochemical sites. By delivering a data-driven roadmap for their proprietary assets, LR empowered the leadership team to prioritise investment where capital would yield the greatest returns in safety and reliability. This strategic clarity facilitated a shift from reactive maintenance to proactive operational risk management, allowing the client to precisely optimise asset lifecycles. In an era defined by tightening margins and escalating safety standards, the ability to transform an ageing liability into a resilient, productive asset represents the ultimate competitive advantage.

This project fundamentally transformed daily operations, shifting the organisational culture

towards one of control and data-driven predictability to support operational decision making. Working as a unified team with the client, LR was able to bring the engineering and operations functions together, embedding a shared risk threshold into the decision-making process from the outset. The result was a safer, more predictable and more efficient operation underpinned by a clear strategic asset roadmap for future operations.

Baseline Condition Assessment: The project started with a baseline condition assessment. This initial “health check” combines detailed physical inspections such as Non-Destructive Testing (NDT), corrosion mapping, and RiskBased Inspection (RBI) assessments with a rigorous review of historical operating data. By identifying specific degradation mechanisms and verifying original design margins against current conditions, it’s possible to understand exactly how much useful life remains and where the critical risks lie.

Gap Analysis Against Current Standards: Since infrastructure commissioned between the 1970s and 1990s often doesn’t meet today’s safety, environmental and mechanical standards. This phase identifies the specific technical and regulatory discrepancies that must be bridged to achieve compliance.

Critical Equipment Upgrades or Replacement: This phase addresses the project’s primary capital expenditure by targeting the upgrade or replacement of core infrastructure, including pressure vessels, rotating equipment, electrical systems, and the migration of legacy control platforms to modern DCS/PLC systems.

Process Safety Enhancements: To secure regulatory approval and insurance coverage, the next phase focuses on essential safety modernisations, including updated SIL assessments, the installation of modern shutdown and detection systems, and the comprehensive revalidation of relief systems and human-machine interfaces.

Reliability and Maintenance Strategy

Redesign: Beyond physical repairs, this phase revitalises operational management by implementing predictive maintenance plans, advanced condition monitoring such as digital twins and corrosion sensors, and robust workforce training to fundamentally transform how the plant is run.

Technology type

#asset management and risk #reliability and maintenance #management consulting #classification and compliance #digital solutions

Regions

▶ Global company with presence across all six regions; Europe; Middle East; Asia; Africa and Oceania.

Key findings

For industry

▶ Ageing assets remain strategically vital due to strong demand, established infrastructure and workforce. Structured life-extension programmes offer a cost-effective pathway to secure additional years of safe, reliable, and profitable operation.

Company at a glance:

Key products and services: Lloyd’s Register delivers compliance, assurance, and performance services for energy projects and operations worldwide.

Main industries served:

▶ Maritime

▶ Energy

Headquarters: London, UK

Year established: 1760

Number of employees: 3,600

Economic Evaluation: Every life-extension project must be anchored in financial viability by weighing capital expenditure and risk-adjusted failure costs against the projected value of additional operational years. This evaluation often proves that life extension delivers superior returns with significantly lower capital intensity than building new capacity.

Execution Planning: Execution planning serves as the backbone of a successful life extension, meticulously defining shutdown windows, procurement timelines, and contractor strategies to ensure seamless integration with existing operations. By formalising precise commissioning and start-up plans, this phase ensures that the transition from turnaround to active production is safe, efficient, and predictable.

Reflex Marine

Making JAVELIN Bankable Through Co-financing and Government-backed Innovation

Reflex Marine’s bankable energies case study

Reflex Marine, a globally established OEM with nearly 30 years’ experience, is now applying its offshore engineering capability to the energy transition through a new innovation project: JAVELIN.

This is a next-generation anchoring solution designed to support floating offshore wind, particularly in deepwater, challenging seabed conditions and high-load environments. In these settings, conventional anchoring systems can be technically difficult and costly to install. The project began almost five years ago and has brought together a multidisciplinary team, each contributing extensive global experience.

The challenge - For Reflex Marine, the rationale was clear. While the company has a strong track record in offshore personnel transfer, primarily serving the oil, gas and LNG industries, it recognised that long-term resilience would depend on diversification. Floating offshore wind offered a strategic route into a growing global supply chain, while still enabling the company to leverage the offshore knowledge, operational discipline and engineering standards it has built over decades.

Floating offshore wind is expected to unlock large-scale renewable deployment beyond shallow coastal waters. However, anchoring and seabed interaction remain major constraints. Cost, complexity and uncertainty increases as sites move into deeper and more variable geology.

The solution - JAVELIN is being developed to help solve this challenge. By enabling anchoring in difficult seabed conditions and supporting high-load requirements, the technology could reduce risk and expand the range of viable floating wind locations. This creates a strong bankability story. If floating wind scales as forecast, demand for reliable anchoring solutions will scale with it. Reflex Marine sees JAVELIN as a future commercial product positioned within a market that is both expanding and strategically important — creating the potential for long-term revenue, repeat orders and sustained profitability.

From the outset, Reflex Marine pursued a range of funding pathways. Ultimately, the company chose to co-finance development through reinvestment of business profits, supported

by grant funding. This approach allowed Reflex Marine to accelerate innovation without taking on significant debt repayment obligations or diluting ownership. However, large innovation programmes require sustained investment across multiple years, and Reflex Marine recognised early that grant funding could play a key role in helping JAVELIN progress more quickly through testing and qualification.

JAVELIN aligns strongly with the UK Government’s energy transition priorities, particularly around unlocking floating offshore wind to expand renewable generation and improve energy security. Floating wind is widely seen as an essential technology for accessing deeper waters and supporting long-term net zero ambitions, while also strengthening the domestic supply chain.

This alignment helps explain why government departments chose to co-invest. In 2022, Reflex Marine secured £1 million from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) toward JAVELIN development. In 2024, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) (formerly part of BEIS) awarded a further £880,000, reinforcing confidence in the project’s strategic relevance and potential impact.

Projects like JAVELIN aim to solve real industrial barriers, improve the economics of clean energy deployment, and support innovation-led growth. Co-funding can bring forward technologies that might otherwise take longer to reach market, helping the UK maintain competitiveness in offshore wind and accelerate transition outcomes.

Beyond funding itself, government support carries credibility. Being awarded grants through competitive processes signals confidence that the technology is technically viable and strategically aligned. That credibility can strengthen discussions with future customers, partners and investors, helping to differentiate JAVELIN within a fastevolving floating wind supply chain.

Despite its benefits, grant funding brings potential challenges. Applications can be time-consuming, highly competitive, and can place strain on internal resources. Once awarded, grant programmes also require structured reporting, compliance and

Technology type

#floating offshore wind #anchoring systems

#offshore personnel transfer #deepwater technology #offshore engineering

Regions

▶ Global Key findings

For industry

▶ Reflex Marine specialises in developing advanced technologies for the offshore industry, particularly in anchoring and personnel transfer.

For government

▶ Reflex Marine have made significant contributions to the UK governments effort in advancing offshore technologies.

Company at a glance:

Key products and services: Offshore access specialists with their personnel transfer carrier range, and innovative Javelin anchoring system.

Main industries served:

▶ Oil & gas

▶ Offshore renewable energy

▶ Others (non-energy)

Headquarters: Truro, UK

Year established: 1992

Number of employees: 29

Revenue: £6m

clearly defined deliverables. This can limit flexibility if development priorities shift, and it can increase administrative workload for engineering and business teams.

Co-financing through sales also comes with pressure. Match-funding requirements can create cash flow challenges, particularly when grant payments are staged or delayed. Maintaining consistent reinvestment from profits requires strong forecasting and financial discipline, especially in offshore markets where customer activity can fluctuate.

JAVELIN has now reached the pre-open sea testing phase, an important step toward proving real-world performance.

By combining disciplined co-financing, targeted grant support and decades of offshore engineering experience, Reflex Marine is positioning JAVELIN as both a commercially bankable innovation and a practical contribution to the energy transition.

Sterling Thermal Technology

Engineering the Impossible: Sterling and the World’s First Floating Hydrogen Cracker

Sterling TT’s bankable energies case study

When a major Tier One supplier needed to build the world’s first floating ammonia-to-hydrogen cracker, they turned to Sterling Thermal Technology. With over 120 years of experience designing and building heat exchangers for extreme conditions, the UK-based company enables national hydrogen strategies. Sterling acts as an engineering partner for groundbreaking projects, offering complete consultancy and materials expertise to support energy security and demonstrate excellence in emerging sectors.

The challenge - In 2021, a major global OEM operating in the marine and energy markets approached Sterling to design heat exchangers for the world’s first floating ammonia-to-hydrogen cracker. This was a key component of Europe’s hydrogen economy infrastructure, funded through the EU Horizon 2020 and the Norwegian government’s Green Platform Programme (€5.9m total).

The technical requirements were extreme, demanding equipment capable of operating at 900C and 10bar to facilitate the thermocatalytic cracking of ammonia into hydrogen.

Few European suppliers could meet these requirements, especially as the client provided only basic process parameters–pressure, temperature, and chemical composition. The project required a complete engineering solution. This first-of-a-kind maritime application involved adapting technology from other industries and selecting materials capable of withstanding unprecedented operational conditions.

“We chose Sterling to assist us with our ammonia cracking process for producing green hydrogen because of their ability to customise the shell and tube heat exchangers to our specific requirements.”

Peter Zürcher, Project Manager, Wärtsilä

The solution - Sterling’s response demonstrated its ability to support the growing hydrogen sector. Led by Dr Mile Vujicic, the engineering team became a vital design partner. When the original design concept using plate heat exchangers proved unsuitable, Sterling redesigned the system using its specialised shell-andtube technology. Working collaboratively with the Norwegian Institute for Materials, they selected and validated Alloy 617 as the optimal material for the extreme conditions.

While the client’s original concept involved a single high-temperature heat exchanger, the required solution expanded to include five heat exchangers, four reactors for ammonia cracking, waste heat recovery units, and associated piping systems.

This project successfully delivered the world’s first floating ammoniato-hydrogen cracker and helped the EU move towards its target to import 10m tonnes of hydrogen annually. The work significantly improved hydrogen transportation capacity. By successfully validating Alloy 617 for extreme 900C and 10bar pressure environments, the team proved the technology’s readiness for full-scale commercial deployment. This comprehensive strategic partnership established Sterling as a global industry leader, directly enabling major international green hydrogen targets.

As Peter Zürcher, Project Manager at Wärtsilä, noted:

“The design team at Sterling ensured they understood our needs thoroughly and delivered a solution to our expectations. Sterling’s expertise and dedication to customer satisfaction make them an invaluable partner in our journey towards sustainable energy production.”

Technology type

#heat exchangers #thermal technology #hydrogen product equipment #hightemperature engineering #pressure vessels

Regions

▶ Global

Key findings

For industry

▶ Partner with specialists who engineer solutions from basic parameters to extreme-condition manufactured equipment.

For government

▶ Support UK engineering excellence, enabling critical hydrogen infrastructure and European energy security targets.

Company at a glance:

Key products and services: Engineering partner for extreme-condition heat exchangers: delivering complete design-to-manufacturing capability. Solving challenges others can’t in energy transition and critical applications.

Main industries served:

▶ Oil and gas

▶ Conventional power

▶ Nuclear power

▶ Offshore renewable energy

▶ Onshore renewable energy

▶ Hydrogen

▶ Carbon capture

▶ Energy storage

▶ Others (energy)

Headquarters: Aylesbury, UK

Year established: 1904

Number of employees: 110

Revenue: £20m

Revenue from exports: 75%

RSM UK

Leveraging tax policy to reinstate competitive advantage in UK Freeports

RSM UK’s bankable energies case study

Tax policy unlocks financial viability in clean and low carbon projects, yet recent changes have undermined the competitive advantage of freeports. In the Humber – a major carbon producing industrial clusters, cohesive fiscal incentives are critical to attracting investment, supporting decarbonisation and meeting the UK’s net zero targets.

The challenge - The introduction of full expensing on capital expenditure in 2023 presents an opportunity for all businesses but effectively removed the freeports’ biggest competitive advantage. Previously, enhanced capital allowances offered in freeport zones provided a meaningful differential compared to the rest of the UK; now, freeports like the Humber face a diluted value proposition.

Investment decisions in high value sectors –such as carbon capture and hydrogen – are heavily influenced by tax structures and fiscal incentives. When businesses assess where to deploy capital, even marginal differences in tax treatment can significantly shift the balance in favour of one location over another. Without a distinctive incentive regime, freeports risk losing out to other regions, or even other countries, that offer more attractive fiscal terms.

If the tax environment does not meaningfully support innovation and low carbon development, there is a risk that investment flows will dissipate or migrate elsewhere, slowing progress at a time when the UK needs to accelerate clean growth and industrial competitiveness. The challenge is, therefore, not merely financial – it is strategic, environmental and reputational.

T he solution - To address this pressing issue, a renewed approach to fiscal incentives is required – one that reinstates freeports’ competitive position and encourages business investment aligned with the UK’s

net zero objectives. In discussions with the Humber Freeport, RSM identified a solution that would be relatively easy to implement (piggy backing off previous tax legislation) which could reinstate the Freeport’s competitive advantage.

A targeted super deduction would re establish a clear differential between freeport zones and the rest of the UK by providing significantly enhanced tax relief on qualifying capital expenditure. This incentive directly influences corporate investment decisions, making major projects more financially viable and more appealing to undertake within freeport areas. By reinforcing the fiscal advantage of locating in a freeport, the policy could stimulate growth, support industrial decarbonisation and attract long term investment that is essential for transforming high carbon regions like the Humber. RSM has assisted the Humber Freeport senior leadership team to present this proposal to the Chancellor.

Full expensing has diluted the impact of the enhanced plant and machinery allowances available in a freeport. The introduction of a super deduction specifically available to freeports could provide the solution. This would re-introduce the competitive edge, giving an actual tax incentive to base business within the Freeport zone especially for those sectors with high capital expenditure.

Tax policy has the potential to unlock greater financial viability across clean and low carbon projects. RSM is proud to support the Humber Freeport to address the issues arising from a positive change in tax policy. To be effective tax policy must be cohesive, strategically aligned and designed to support the full lifecycle of investment and development. A freeport

Technology type #tax #audit #consulting Regions

▶ North America, Europe, UK

Company at a glance:

Key products and services: RSM UK is a leading audit, tax and consulting firm to the middle market with 5,300 partners and staff operating from 29 locations throughout the UK.

Main industries served:

▶ Industrials

▶ Tech & media

▶ Real estate and construction

▶ Consumer markets

▶ Financial services

▶ Healthcare

▶ Life sciences

Headquarters: London, UK

Year established: 1988

Number of employees: 5,300

Revenue: £600m

specific super deduction offers exactly that: a targeted, impactful mechanism capable of restoring competitiveness, attracting green investment and supporting the UK’s broader decarbonisation ambitions.

Sheena McGuinness, Co-Head of Energy and Natural Resources at RSM UK

Turner & Townsend

Making First of a Kind Low Carbon Projects

Turner & Townsend’s bankable energies case study

Delivering first-of-a-kind (FOAK) lowcarbon and clean energy technologies, including carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), hydrogen, and small modular reactors (SMRs) requires more than technical innovation. To achieve a bankable project, developers must align policy with market insights to make informed decisions and meet investor scrutiny, lender due diligence and government assurance requirements.

We work alongside our energy clients to turn complex, policy-led concepts into bankable, investable projects that progress confidently through final investment decision (FID), financial close and into delivery. As many projects continue to face challenges that result in delays or cancellation, we are combining policy and market insight with deep technical, commercial, supply chain and regulatory expertise to strengthen investment cases and de-risk delivery.

The challenge - Developers are navigating a unique combination of challenges that can delay approvals, weaken investment narratives and increase the cost of capital. These include novel and untested risk profiles paired with high costs and economic pressures, alongside complex blended funding models that combine public funding, private capital, regulated frameworks and grant conditions. Furthermore, evolving policy and regulatory frameworks, such as licensing, environmental consenting and government assurance, often develop in parallel with project design. Significant interface and supply chain risks involving multiple operators, technology licensors, regulators, utilities and construction partners, as well as intense assurance pressure from boards, government and financiers, can lead to inconsistent or incomplete investment cases. This slows progression and makes competitively priced capital harder to secure.

The solution - To navigate government funding and policy, Turner & Townsend helps clients translate policy into practical funding strategies and build Green Book-aligned business cases. This support includes value for money (VfM) assessments and evidence packages, end-to-end support through application, negotiation, contract award and monitoring, and managing the pathway to FID, including engagement with the Department

for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and HM Treasury. This enables developers to address cost and economic challenges, move confidently through government approval gateways, and secure the right level of public funding.

To attract private capital and achieve bankability, the company supports clients to meet investor and lender expectations. It aligns technical scope, risk, contracts and delivery models into a cohesive investment narrative, conducts early market testing to refine risk-sharing mechanisms, and supports commercial and financial due diligence through FID and financial close. The ‘Five Pillars of Bankability’ framework covers construction risk, financing structure, sponsorship risk, counterparty risk, and delivery certainty. It identifies gaps, directs remediation, and demonstrates bankability to investors, supporting financing structures that are robust, efficient and competitive.

Finally, to mobilise the supply chain and manage interfaces, the company draws on multi-disciplinary expertise in cost, planning, risk, and project and commercial management. It helps clients map supply chain capability and capacity across tiers, structure contracts and incentives to support repeatability and scale, and manage interfaces across regulators, technology licensors, and delivery partners.

Across the UK and internationally, Turner & Townsend has helped developers and investors to deliver investable, approvalready low-carbon projects by addressing bankability, assurance and delivery strategy early. This work has strengthened investment cases where early designs, delivery models or governance arrangements were not yet financeable, enabling projects to progress through FID and financial close. The team has unlocked blended funding structures by aligning public and private financing requirements and provided independent assurance that has underpinned decisions by boards, government approval processes and lender due diligence on FOAK projects.

Working with public and private sector developers including bp, ENI, Santos and SSE, as well as energy investors, Turner & Townsend delivers compliant, evidencebased business cases and delivery strategies that secure internal and governmental approval. This work involves enabling public

Regions

▶ North America

▶ Latin America

▶ United Kingdom

▶ Europe

▶ Africa

▶ Middle East

▶ Asia

▶ New Zealand

▶ Australia

Key findings

For industry

▶ Working in partnership makes it possible to deliver the world’s most impactful projects and programmes.

For government

▶ Clear policy, balanced incentives and faster approvals are essential to build investor confidence in low carbon projects.

Company at a glance:

Key products and services: Working closely with clients and partners, Turner & Townsend delivers the world’s most impactful projects and programmes.

Main industries served:

▶ Energy and natural resources

▶ Infrastructure

▶ Real estate

Headquarters: Leeds, UK

Year established: 1946

Number of employees: 20,000

Revenue: £2.5m

funding and attracting private investment on competitive terms, reducing interface risk and strengthening delivery certainty, lender confidence, and accelerated progression to FID and financial close. Ultimately, the company helps mobilise multi-billion-pound FOAK low-carbon programmes into delivery.

As the energy transition accelerates, FOAK technologies such as SMRs, CCUS and hydrogen will play a critical role in delivering secure, low-carbon power and industrial decarbonisation, but overcoming the challenges that lead to cancelled or stalled projects remains a concern. By integrating policy and market insight, commercial rigour and delivery expertise, Turner & Townsend supports developers and investors to make informed investment decisions, attract capital and progress projects with confidence.

TÜV SÜD

Establishing Traceability for CCUS Applications with a New Liquid CO2 Flow Calibration Facility

TÜV SÜD’s bankable energies case study

Accurate measurement of captured, transported, and stored CO2 is essential for carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) projects. Reliable, traceable calibration standards are needed to ensure measurement integrity, regulatory compliance, and stakeholder confidence, underpinning the success and expansion of CCUS initiatives worldwide.

The challenge - CCUS is built on a framework of government subsidies, regulations and commercial contracts which all require precise measurement of the quantity and quality of CO2 captured, transported and stored. To maintain confidence in the accuracy of these measurements, calibration of the custody transfer flow meters and composition analysers is crucial. However, no traceable calibration test laboratories exist globally for liquid and supercritical CO2 (i.e., dense phase).

This absence undermines confidence in custody transfer flow meters and composition analysers, increasing the risk of measurement inaccuracies, contract disputes, and regulatory non-compliance. Without SItraceable calibration, industry stakeholders face uncertainty in validating and certifying their measurements. Addressing this gap is important for the long-term viability and growth of CCUS projects, as it directly impacts the ability to meet regulatory and contractual requirements with confidence.

The solution - TÜV SÜD National Engineering Laboratory, through the ENCASE Project and the Flow Programme funded by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT), has pioneered the world’s first primary standard flow calibration facility for liquid and supercritical CO2. The state-ofthe-art facility, in East Kilbride near Glasgow, will provide SI-traceable flow calibrations and R&D testing to address the industry’s need for measurement reliability and traceability.

The facility features a DN80, ANSI#1500 stainless steel closed-loop flow calibration

system, equipped with an inline heat exchanger for precise temperature control of flowing liquid CO2, operating at pressures up to 200 bar.

Its reference measurement system comprises a piston prover primary reference standard, DN25 and DN80 Coriolis secondary references, and direct density measurement at reference measurements. Initial validation tests were conducted with the prover against a DN50 transfer standard in TÜV SÜD’s accredited water calibration facility. The DN50 Coriolis meter, previously calibrated in both TÜV SÜD’s water facility (uncertainty U = 0.15%, k=2) and EPAT oil facility (U = 0.08%, k=2), as well as used for liquid CO2 research, demonstrated a maximum error of just 0.06% above 5 t/h, with no bias relative to the water reference. Below 5 t/h, the meter zero effect becomes a dominating factor in the results.

These tests validate the operational performance of the prover and show excellent agreement between the prover and TÜV SÜD’s existing primary and secondary flow reference standards.

Measurement uncertainty sources, including prover volume, fluid density, and fluid composition, were evaluated early using methodology aligned with the BIPM Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM). This approach informed facility design and operation, minimising key uncertainty contributors. For each test point, a ‘live’ measurement uncertainty is calculated. This ensures the facility’s traceable flow measurements can be reviewed, interrogated and updated using the most current data. This approach supports continuous improvement in the facility’s Calibration Measurement Capability (CMC) and the systematic reduction of overall measurement uncertainty of the Liquid CO2 flow facility.

The new facility’s construction and operational protocols ensure direct traceability to the SI,

Regions

▶ Global

Key findings

For industry

▶ Confidence in the performance of their CCUS measurement innovations in a developing market.

For government

▶ Development of measure standards similar to other energy markets for trading and taxation purposes.

Company at a glance:

Key products and services:

UK’s Designated Institute for Flow Measurement supporting global commercial and research metrology requirements in flow meter development, testing, and calibration.

Main industries served:

▶ Oil and gas

▶ Hydrogen

▶ CCUS

Headquarters: Munich, Germany

Year established: 1860

Number of employees: 30000

Revenue: £3.4bn

underpinning trust in every measurement. Gravimetric calibration of the volume between detectors, combined with precise timing of piston movement, guarantees the integrity of results. The facility can accommodate pure CO2 and mixtures, with flow rates from 0.7 to 70 m³/h, pressures up to 200 bar.g, and temperatures between 5–50°C, across line sizes from DN25 to DN100 (nominal DN80). This comprehensive capability enables industry partners to meet regulatory and contractual demands with confidence, supporting the broader adoption and success of CCUS technologies.

By establishing this facility, TÜV SÜD has filled a critical gap in global measurement infrastructure, providing the traceability and confidence required for the future of CCUS.

Testing slots are available for 2026.

Add value. Inspire trust.

Liquid & Supercritical CO2 Flow Measurement

GLASCO2

World-first primary standard flow measurement, calibration and research facility for dense phase CO 2. SI-traceable ensuring measurement reliability. Can be configured flexibly to suit the equipment under test.

• Piston prover primary reference standard

• DN25 and DN80 Coriolis secondary reference

• Direct density measurement at reference measurements

Supported by ENCASE and Department for Science, Innovation & Technology (DSIT).

Wood Group

Engineering the Future: How Wood supported the transformation at VAROPreem’s Landmark Renewable Refinery

Wood’s bankable energies case study

Wood served as the engineering partner for VAROPreem’s US$450m Synsat refinery overhaul and upgrade in Lysekil, Sweden. Originally commissioned in 2000 to produce low-sulphur diesel, the facility now produces high-quality, co-processed diesel made from renewable feedstocks, primarily used cooking oil and animal fats. This complex project increased renewable content to 40%, delivering nearly 1m cubic metres of renewable fuel annually, while maintaining operational continuity. For the engineering, procurement and construction management (EPCM) of this complex transformation, VAROPreem turned to Wood, a trusted, longstanding engineering partner for both FEED and EPCM projects. Wood’s role was critical in ensuring the successful delivery of their client’s investment, whilst maintaining operational continuity at one of Europe’s most advanced refineries.

The challenge - This ambitious project delivered a fundamental shift in production processes and integrated renewable feedstocks into a refinery originally designed for fossil fuels. Renewable raw materials are inherently more corrosive than fossil oils: it required careful material selection and engineering to ensure both reliability and safety.

The project also presented key logistical and operational challenges. At peak activity, a task force of 1,500 personnel, including contractors from 12 different nationalities, worked on site, demanding meticulous coordination to maintain stringent safety standards. Crucially, construction and installation work had to proceed without disrupting ongoing refinery operations – a high-stakes requirement, given VAROPreem’s critical role in Sweden’s fuel supply. Existing hydrocracking and hydrogenation units had to be adapted to handle renewable feedstocks without compromising product quality. This required

highly detailed engineering to integrate the new facilities into the existing refinery.

The delivery culminated in a major seven-week turnaround, including extensive underground works and the installation of process modules to finalise the refinery’s conversion, all whilst ensuring upgrades remained within existing environmental permits.

“For complex and strategic projects, you need an open and collaborative partner. That’s why we chose Wood.” Magnus Heimburg, Deputy Chief Executive Officer and EVP Markets & Customers, VAROPreem

The solution - As EPCM provider, Wood delivered a comprehensive engineering design, procurement, and construction management solution to support VAROPreem in achieving this major milestone in their climate strategy. With safety as top priority, Wood enforced rigorous protocols across all workstreams. This included comprehensive contractor coordination and close engagement to create a safety culture that prevented incidents.

Wood developed detailed plans to retrofit existing units and construct new processing facilities for hydrogenation and hydrocracking. This included designing systems capable of handling diverse renewable feedstocks, whilst integrating new facilities into an ageing refinery.

To manage the complexity of simultaneous refurbishment and new construction, Wood implemented robust scheduling with construction execution strategies. These ensured alignment to the client’s phased transition strategy and minimised downtime during the turnaround.

The Wood team worked closely with VAROPreem’s project team throughout engineering and construction, bringing

Technology type

#refining #renewable feedstock processing #engineering #procurement & construction management #industrial infrastructure and processing technologies

Regions

▶ Europe, The Middle East, Africa, The Americas, Asia Pacific and Australia

Key findings

For industry

▶ Appointing the right EPCM partner is key to project success in complex, innovative engineering projects.

For government

▶ For safety, compliance and integrity, world class engineering and design stands the test of time.

Company at a glance:

Key products and services: Wood Group is a leading global engineering consultancy, which delivers critical solutions across the energy market.

Main industries served:

▶ Energy and renewables

▶ Mining and materials

▶ Life sciences

Headquarters: Aberdeen, Scotland

Year established: 1982

Number of employees: 35,000

technical and project management expertise to the partnership.

Wood played a central role in delivering the transformation at Synsat, which is now among the few refineries globally capable of producing high-quality co-processed diesel.

Appendix: Bankable Energies Report data

Are you seeing project bankability improving in your main market since the beginning of 2025?

Yes - Project bankability has improved in 2025 (19 answers)

No - Project bankability has not improved in 2025 (23 answers)

Unchanged - Project ankability remained unchaged in 2025 (9 answers)

ENABLERS: What are the top three factors or conditions that are currently enabling projects to move forward and reach bankability?

BLOCKERS: What are the top three factors that most often prevent energy projects from reaching bankability in your experience?

Blocker (strict merged)

State of FID over the past three years

Reached/Have

Projects that have not

Projects that have reached FID

Projects close to reaching FID (next 12 months)

Hydrogen (23), CCUS (11), Oil & Gas (7), Offshore Wind (6), Energy Storage (3), Ammonia (2), Grid (2), Power Generation (2), Solar (1), Floating Wind (1), Nuclear (1), Hydropower (1), Wave and Tidal Power (1), SAF (1), Electrification (1)

Hydrogen (13), CCUS (11), Energy Storage (10), Oil & Gas (8), Offshore Wind (7), Nuclear (7), Renewables (7), Solar PV (4), Industrial Decarbonisation (2), Hydro (1), Wasteto-Fuels (1), Electrification (1), Data Centres (1)

CCUS (16), Hydrogen (11), Battery Storage (9), Oil & Gas (8), SAF (7), Offshore Wind (6), Nuclear (4), Data Centres (3), Renewables (3), Solar (3), Alternative Fules (2), Emission Control (2), Grid (2), Floating Offshore Wind (1), Industrial Decarbonisation (1), Waste-to-Fuels (1)