Juvenile Detention SA - Complaint - Grays Harbor County by Stritmatter Law

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR THURSTON COUNTY

A.G., A.H., J.R., M.A., N.A., S.H., and T.G.

Plaintiffs,

GRAYS HARBOR COUNTY, a municipal entity; Defendant.

Plaintiffs allege:

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is about the forgotten youth of Grays Harbor County children as young as twelve who were incarcerated and sexually abused in the County’s Juvenile Detention Facility (the Facility) during the 1990s and 2000s

The County’s duties were to safely house and care for these kids while providing rehabilitation. Instead, it turned a blind eye to the horrific acts of two of its detention officers, Sean Brown and John Parker, who groomed and sexually abused multiple youth for over a decade in cells, showers, and other areas in the Facility.

There is no excuse for the systemic failures and institutional betrayals that led to the unchecked abuse of power these detention officers wielded over their charges. As a result, many

of the Plaintiffs have spent decades avoiding the very institutions that could help them recover: refusing mental-health treatment, declining victim services, distrusting law enforcement, and withdrawing from the civic life most Americans take for granted.

II. PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs

2.1 At all material times Plaintiff J.R. resided at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See

RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining “childhood sexual abuse”). Plaintiff J.R. is a current resident of Elma, Grays Harbor County, Washington.

2.2 At all material times Plaintiff M.A. resided at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See

RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining “childhood sexual abuse”). Plaintiff M.A. is a current resident of Elma, Grays Harbor County, Washington.

2.3 At all material times Plaintiff S.H. resided at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See

RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining “childhood sexual abuse”). Plaintiff S.H. is a current resident of Ocean Shores, Grays Harbor County, Washington.

2.4 At all material times Plaintiff N.A. resided at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See

RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining “childhood sexual abuse”). Plaintiff N.A. is a current resident of Montesano, Grays Harbor County, Washington.

2.5 At all material times Plaintiff A.H. resided at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See

RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining “childhood sexual abuse”). Plaintiff A.H. is a current resident of Hoquiam, Grays Harbor County, Washington.

2.6 At all material times Plaintiff T.G. resided at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining “childhood sexual abuse”). Plaintiff T.G. is a current resident of Elma, Grays Harbor County, Washington.

2.7 At all material times Plaintiff A.G. resided at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining “childhood sexual abuse”). Plaintiff A.G. is a current resident of Hoquiam, Grays Harbor County, Washington.

B. Defendant

2.8 Defendant Grays Harbor County (“Defendant County”) is a county within the State of Washington. Within Defendant County is the Grays Harbor County Juvenile Court Services, which acts in its administrative capacity to operate the Grays Harbor County Juvenile Detention Facility. RCW 13.16.030.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.1 Pursuant to RCW 4.12 et seq. and RCW § 36.01 et seq., jurisdiction is vested with this Court and venue is proper in Thurston County Superior Court because the under RCW 36.01.050, an action against a county may be commenced in the superior court of either of the two nearest judicial districts, as determined by the administrative office of the courts. The administrative office of the courts has determined that Thurston County is one of the two nearest judicial districts for bringing an action against Grays Harbor County.

3.2 Subject matter jurisdiction exists under the Washington Constitution, Article 4, Section 6.

IV. NOTICE OF CLAIM FILING

4.1 Each Plaintiff properly filed a tort claim and waited more than 60 days before filing suit. See RCW § 4.96.020(4) (requiring 60-days to elapse after filing tort claim).

V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

5.1 Plaintiffs filed these claims within three years, or sooner, of when they learned that Defendant County breached the applicable standards of care and/or owed them duties which caused their injuries and/or discovered the causal connection between the childhood sexual abuse that occurred at the Facility and the injuries for which this suit was brought. See RCW 4.16.340.

VI. FACTS

A. Institutional Control and Dependent Status of Detained Youth

6.1 Washington State has long regulated the detention of youth charged with or adjudicated for criminal offenses through statutes that impose affirmative, non-delegable duties on the counties that operate juvenile detention facilities.

6.2 Those duties existed throughout the period Plaintiffs were confined at the Facility.

6.3 As early as 1913, Washington’s Juvenile Court Law provided that “all delinquent and dependent children within the state shall be considered wards of this state and their persons shall be subject to the custody, care, guardianship and control of the court as hereinafter provided.” 1

1 RCW 13.04.135 (codifying 1913 c 160 s 1, emphasis added).

6.4 This law required counties containing more than fifty thousand inhabitants to provide a detention room or house of detention “separated or removed from any jail, or police station.” 2

6.5 That detention space was required to be “in charge of a matron, or other person of good character.” 3

6.6 In 1945, the Legislature declared an emergency arising from the widespread absence of juvenile detention facilities across Washington’s counties. 4

6.7 It declared that the construction, acquisition, and maintenance of juvenile detention facilities for dependent, wayward, and delinquent children separate and apart from adult detention was “a mandatory function of the several counties of the state.” 5

6.8 The Legislature authorized county commissioners to appropriate sufficient funds to provide for the “adequate care of dependent, delinquent and wayward children,” including employment of an adequate staff of juvenile officers and the provision of suitable food, clothing, and recreation. 6

6.9 In 1977, the Legislature enacted the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, declaring among its intent “that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders, as defined by this chapter, be established.” 7

6.10 The Act declared as a purpose providing “necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders.” 8

2 RCW 13.04.135 (codifying 1913 c 160 s 13).

3 RCW 13.04.135 (codifying 1913 c 160 s 13, emphasis added)

4 RCW 13.16.020 (codifying 1945 c 188 s 1).

5 RCW 13.16.030 (codifying 1945 c 188 s 2).

6 RCW 13.16.040 (codifying 1945 c 188 s 3).

7 RCW 13.40.010(2)(f)–(g) (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 55 (1).

8 RCW 13.40.010(2)(g) (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 55 (2)(f).

6.11 The Act further required that each juvenile court administrator adopt formal standards for the regulation and government of detention facilities for juveniles within 180 days of the Act's effective date. 9

6.12 Those standards were subject to annual review, and each detention facility was required to be inspected annually by the administrator. 10

6.13 Each detention facility was required to keep a copy of the applicable standards available for inspection at all times. 11

6.14 In 1986, the Legislature enacted RCW 13.40.038, declaring: “It is the policy of this state that all county juvenile detention facilities provide a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment.” 12

6.15 By the time the earliest Plaintiff was detained in approximately 1996 Washington had spent nearly eight decades constructing a comprehensive legal framework governing the care of children in county juvenile detention.

6.16 That framework imposed affirmative, binding obligations on counties, including Defendant Grays Harbor County: to employ persons of good character; to maintain humane and safe conditions; to implement operational standards governing security, juvenile rights, and staff training; and to inspect their own facilities annually.

6.17 This statutory policy has governed the operation of juvenile detention facilities in Washington, including Grays Harbor County, throughout the period relevant to the Plaintiffs.

6.18 Defendant failed to implement and enforce reasonable safeguards required by law. As a result, youth in its custody were physically, emotionally, and sexually abused.

9 RCW 13.04.037 (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 7).

10 RCW 13.04.037 (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 7).

11 RCW 13.04.037 (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 7)

12 RCW 13.40.038(1) (codifying 1986 c 288 s 7).

B. Grays Harbor County Facility

6.19 In Washington, including in Grays Harbor County, youth may be detained after contact with law enforcement or the juvenile court system, in connection with alleged criminal or status offenses. 13

6.20 Many juveniles detained in Grays Harbor County during the relevant period, including many Plaintiffs, entered detention through contact with the juvenile court or programs such as the Youth at Risk program.

6.21 When a youth is incarcerated in Grays Harbor County, they are transported to its Detention Facility, a locked, county-operated facility in Aberdeen (pictured below)

6.22 After arrival at the Facility, the youth is processed through an intake and booking procedure.

13 Status offenses are behaviors that are unlawful only because the individual is under the age of majority (e.g., truancy, running away from home, or minor in possession of alcohol).

14 Locked Up At Age 11: One Truant's Cycle In And Out Of Juvenile Detention | Northwest News Network (2015). https://www.nwnewsnetwork.org/crime-law-and-justice/2015-03-04/locked-up-at-age-11-one-truants-cycle-in-andout-of-juvenile-detention

6.23 During intake, the youth is separated from any parent or guardian , if one is present, and placed under the supervision of detention staff.

6.24 The youth are required to remove their clothing and change into institutional garments issued by the Facility. These typically include a jumpsuit or uniform, socks, and facilityissued footwear.

6.25 As part of intake protocol, staff may conduct a visual body inspection of the youth, sometimes referred to as a strip search or hygiene screening. This procedure occurs in a private area and is intended to identify potential contraband, injuries, or self-harm risks.

6.26 All personal belongings are collected, cataloged, and stored by the facility until the youth’s release.

6.27 The youth is then assigned a room or sleeping unit within the Facility (pictured below).

6.28 These units are locked, monitored, and controlled by staff.

15Grays Harbor County settles ACLU lawsuit over teen solitary confinement | Komo News (2017) https://komonews.com/news/local/grays-harbor-county-settles-aclu-lawsuit-over-teen-solitary-confinement

6.29 The youth may be housed alone or with others, depending on availability and internal classification.

6.30 After placement, the youth is given an orientation to the Facility’s policies, daily schedule, and disciplinary rules.

6.31 This orientation is conducted by staff and typically occurs without the presence of a parent, attorney, or advocate.

6.32 Once there, the youth’s routine is governed entirely by the institution. Meals, sleep, education, recreation, and hygiene are all scheduled and monitored.

6.33 Movement outside the assigned unit is not permitted without staff permission.

6.34 Medical care, mental health services, and behavioral interventions if provided are initiated and controlled by Facility personnel.

6.35 Communication with family members is limited to scheduled and monitored phone calls, written correspondence, or approved visitation, restricted by availability and institutional policy.

6.36 From the moment of intake, Defendant County, through its staff and agents, assumes exclusive custodial control over the youth Defendant County is responsible for the youth’s physical safety, education, emotional wellbeing, and access to basic services including medical care.

6.37 In this capacity, Defendant County and its detention staff act in loco parentis, standing in the place of a parent or guardian for the duration of the youth’s confinement.

6.38 The Facility’s relationship to the youth is defined by full dependency, constituting a special relationship.

6.39 The youth have no practical ability to seek outside help, advocate for themselves, or remove themselves from any situation without the permission of Facility staff.

6.40 Institutional procedures such as clothing removal, body inspections, and housing assignments are designed to be carried out by trained professionals operating within clear boundaries and supervision.

6.41 When those procedures are misused, such as when a staff member conducts a search or inspection for personal, coercive, or abusive reasons, those same structures can be exploited, leaving the detainees unable to report, resist, or otherwise advocate for themselves.

6.42 The County must therefore implement policies and oversight mechanisms that not only establish procedural safeguards but also prevent misuse by individuals in positions of authority.

6.43 These responsibilities include appropriate staff hiring and background checks; training; adequate supervision; and prompt response to any concerns raised by youth or other staff.

6.44 The youth’s status as a juvenile detainee does not diminish their right to bodily autonomy, personal dignity, or protection from abuse. It increases Defendant County’s responsibility to safeguard those rights, given the youth’s isolation and complete reliance on the institution.

6.45 Defendant County knew or should have known of staff’s propensity for and/or actual instances of physical and sexual abuse against the juvenile detainees.

C. Defendant’s juvenile detention officer Sean Brown.

6.46 On November 18, 1994, Sean Brown began his 22 years of employment with Defendant County as a juvenile detention officer at the Facility

6.47 Between 1995 and 2003, Detention Officer Brown sexually abused and exploited youth, including four Plaintiffs.

6 48 Detention Officer Brown’s pattern of sexual abuse included using routine activities such as shower time to isolate and then coerce and sexually abuse the youth. Following the abuse, he would order the victim to clean up his ejaculate Under the false pretense of “strip searches,” he groped and fondled genitals, digitally penetrated his victims, and masturbated in front of them.

6.49 The County had actual notice of Detention Officer Brown’s alleged sexual abuse of minors:

6.50 On August 12, 2002, Defendant through its Sheriff’s Office wrote incident report # 02-006886.

6.51 This incident was reported as a sexual offense.

6.52 A document related to this incident (see Exhibit E) identifies the location of the alleged sex offense as Junction City, the location of the Facility.

6.53 The offender was Detention Officer Brown.

6.54 The victim was a minor at the time of the report.

6.55 The victim provided a witness to their report. This witness was also a minor.

6.56 No further investigation steps were taken by Defendant.

6.57 Defendant County also had actual notice of allegations that Detention Officer Brown had sexually abused his own daughter and another young child:

6.58 On 2007-2008, Defendant County was aware of two referrals involving separate allegations that Detention Officer Brown touched his four-year old child and another five-year-old child in a sexually inappropriate manner. 17

6.59 The Aberdeen Police Department conducted an investigation into both matters. 18

6.60 During this investigation Detention Officer Brown’s child was interviewed. In this interview the 4-year old disclosed that:

6.60.1 She did not feel safe at her father’s house.

6.60.2 That her father was “mean and horrible,”

6.60.3 That her father did “mean things,”

6.60.4 Disclosing that her father “keeps touching [her] tutu,”

6.60.5 Clarifying that her tutu meant her vagina, and

6.60.6 That her father touched her “tutu” with his fingers.

17 Ex. B – Attorney General of Washington Investigation of Sean A. Brown (January 30, 2008).

18 Id.

6.60.7 The child told the interviewer her father said that if she told anyone she would be killed and he would call the police. 19

6.61 Child Protective Services (“CPS”) ultimately entered a finding that the allegation of sexual abuse by Detention Officer Brown were “founded.” 20

6.62 Because Detention Officer Brown’s mother was the Grays Harbor County Clerk, the Grays Harbor Prosecuting Attorney referred the matter to the Attorney General’s Office for consideration of criminal charges.

6.63 The investigation by the Attorney General’s Office stated that the Guardian ad Litem for Detention Officer Brown’s daughter, in a family law matter in Thurston County in which Detention Officer Brown was a party, referenced in a report “past allegations that Brown engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct with female children at the juvenile detention facility where he was employed.” 21

6.64 Before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a public records request to Defendant Grays Harbor County for a copy of Detention Officer Brown’s personnel file.

6.65 Defendant Grays Harbor County produced to Plaintiffs’ counsel a complete copy of Detention Officer Sean Brown’s personnel file.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id

6.66 Detention Officer Brown continued to be employed by Defendant County after these allegations, and after the CPS finding involving his own daughter.

6.67 There is no documentation in Sean Brown’s personnel file that was produced in response to the public records request that Defendant County ever investigated the past allegations that Detention Officer Brown engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct with female children at the Facility.

6.68 Defendant County also had actual notice that Detention Officer Brown abused his authority as a Detention Officer and used excessive violence with youth in the Facility:

6.69 For example, on September 4, 2007, Detention Officer Brown was written up for his discipline of a youth at the Facility.

6.70 Detention Officer Brown was written up for improperly using “corporal punishment” by unnecessarily “resort[ing] to physical force.”

6.71 Detention Officer Brown “refused to give ______ his medication for almost an hour and one-half after the time he was due to take the medication.”

6.72 It “appear[ed] that withholding the medication was part of _______’s punishment for failing to comply with [his] directives.”

6.73 Below is a true and correct excerpt from the report written by Defendant County 22:

22 Ex. C - Notice of Pre-Termination Hearing (September 4, 2007).

6.74 This report is Defendant County’s belief of what happened based on witnesses, including staff witnesses.

6.75 Despite its actual notice of Detention Officer Brown’s unlawful and abusive behavior against its youth inmates, Defendant County did not terminate his employment

6.76 Detention Officer Brown continued overseeing incarcerated youth.

6.77 Defendant County also had actual notice of allegations that Detention Officer Brown engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct with fellow staff at the Facility:

6.78 From 2007-2012 Defendant County conducted multiple internal investigations, including investigations by outside lawyers and consultants, regarding Detention Officer Brown

having sex with a coworker at the Facility during work hours and allegations that Detention Officer Brown sexually harassed female co-workers. 23

6.79 By January 30, 2012, Defendant County had actual and constructive knowledge that a Facility co-worker heard Detention Officer Brown comment that, “if he couldn’t get sex he would probably be a rapist.”

6.80 In this 2012 report multiple co-workers identified Detention Officer Brown as engaging in a class C felony (violation of RCW 9A.44.115) at the Facility by knowingly engaging in the filming of his co-worker in a sexual act without her consent and then sharing it around the Facility to other co-workers.

6.81 Defendant County employed Detention Officer Brown at the Facility for another four years.

23 Ex. D - Investigation of Sexually Inappropriate Work Conduct (January 30, 2012).

D. Defendant’s juvenile detention officer John Parker.

6.82 Detention Officer John Parker was employed by Defendant County at the Juvenile Detention Facility from at least 1987 until approximately 2012.

6.83 He held supervisory authority, frequently worked night shifts, and was instantly recognizable to detained youth as the white, older male officer who wore a fisherman-style vest stuffed with finger and sock puppets.

6.84 Between 2000 and 2005, Detention Officer Parker used his unchecked authority to sexually abuse at least three Plaintiffs (S.H., A.H., and A.G.), across repeated periods of detention.

6.85 Detention Officer Parker’s pattern of abuse occurred during walk-throughs or bookings.

6.86 He conducted late-night “walk-throughs” and ordered detainees to masturbate while he watched through the cell-door window, frequently requiring the males to ejaculate onto the floor and then clean it up.

6.87 He used finger puppets pulled from his vest as instruments of humiliation and control, issuing silent commands, mocking victims, and taunting them during the forced acts.

6.88 On a few known occasions the abuse escalated to direct physical sexual abuse with the victim forced to manually stimulate Detention Officer Parker’s penis over Parker’s clothing.

6.89 Detention Officer Parker coerced compliance by increasing the victims’ inmate rank, providing extra food, threatening demotion, negative judicial reports, or indefinite detention for refusal.

6.90 The County had actual or constructive knowledge of, or should have known about, Parker's predatory behavior

6.91 Defendant County took no meaningful action to investigate or remove Detention Officer Parker from service over his quarter-century of employment.

6.92 Detention Officer Parker oversaw and worked alongside Detention Officer Brown at the Facility As described above, Detention Officer Brown faced multiple documented allegations of sexual misconduct against detained youth, including complaints that were investigated or reported during Detention Officer Parker's tenure, which further put the County on notice of potential systemic issues with supervision and abuse in the Facility.

6.93 Still, Defendant County failed to implement adequate oversight, such as regular audits of night-shift activities, staff-youth interactions, or appropriate reporting mechanisms.

6.94 These failures allowed Detention Officer Parker's abuse to continue undetected or unaddressed despite the long duration of his employment and the high-risk environment involving vulnerable minors.

6.95 Multiple Plaintiffs have now come forward with consistent allegations of Detention Officer Parker's predatory conduct, indicating a pattern that the County should have discovered through reasonable diligence, including employee evaluations, youth feedback surveys, or monitoring of supervisory staff like Detention Officer Parker who had extensive unsupervised access to children.

6.96 Despite these opportunities for discovery and intervention, the County negligently retained Detention Officer Parker in a position of authority over detained youth, and was a proximate cause of the sexual abuse suffered by Plaintiffs.

VII. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff J.R.

7.1

Plaintiff J.R. was born in 1983 in the Grays Harbor area of Washington.

7.2 Plaintiff J.R. grew up in an unstable family environment, with his parents divorcing when he was about one and a half years old.

7.3 Plaintiff J.R. lived primarily with his mother and stepfather, seeing his biological father only sporadically on weekends.

7.4 Plaintiff J.R. was a "mama's boy," maintaining a close bond with his mother despite the family challenges.

7.5 As he got older, Plaintiff J.R. began getting into trouble, often spending time with peers and without close adult supervision.

7.6 Around 1996, at the age 13, J.R. was arrested with a friend for breaking into a home; police apprehended them in the backyard.

7.7 Plaintiff J.R. was placed on probation, but repeated violations such as truancy and failure to complete community service escalated his involvement with the juvenile system.

7.8 Plaintiff J.R. was placed at the Facility by juvenile court order in or around 1996, when he was 13 years old.

7.9 Plaintiff J.R. was in custody on and off from 1996 to 2001, with multiple periods of incarceration.

7.10 Plaintiff J.R. was in custody as described above and all prior allegations are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

7.11 During his time at the Facility, Plaintiff was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by Detention Officer Sean Brown.

7.12 The sexual abuse occurred in isolated settings, such as the shower room during latenight “extra duty” cleaning, his cell, and once outside during trash duty.

7.13 The abuse included Detention Officer Brown exposing himself, forcing Plaintiff to orally and manually stimulate him, and threatening Plaintiff J.R. that his life would be made “hell” if he didn’t remain silent

7.14 Defendant County failed to prevent the abuse against its ward

7.15 Defendant County failed to provide safe and effective ways for Plaintiff J.R. to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.

7.16 The Facility allowed Detention Officer Brown unsupervised access to Plaintiff J.R. and failed to monitor staff conduct, despite the high-risk environment involving vulnerable minors.

7.17 As a result of the sexual abuse he suffered during detention, Plaintiff J.R. has struggled with symptoms of anxiety, depression, and substance abuse, and difficulty forming trusting relationships.

7.18 Plaintiff J.R. did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to him until decades later.

7.19 Detention Officer Brown’s threats worked, and Plaintiff J.R. remained silent until now.

Plaintiff M.A.

7.20 Plaintiff M.A. was born in 1986 in Fresno, California.

7.21 Plaintiff M.A. grew up attending school in Los Angeles until age 11, when Plaintiff M.A.’s mother moved the family to Washington State.

7.22 Growing up, Plaintiff M.A. had an unstable family environment, marked by an abusive parent, which contributed to her behavioral issues.

7.23 Plaintiff M.A.’s early challenges led her to run away back to California, leading to her parents placing her on "youth at risk" status.

7.24 At around age 12-13, Plaintiff M.A. got into a fight with her brother, resulting in an arrest.

7.25 Repeated probation violations and youth at risk infractions escalated Plaintiff M.A.’s involvement in the juvenile system.

7.26 Plaintiff M.A. was placed at the Facility by juvenile court order in or around 2000, when she was approximately 14 years old.

7.27 Plaintiff M.A. was in custody as described above and all prior allegations are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.

7.28 Plaintiff M.A. was not permitted to leave or contact her family freely, and relied on facility personnel for food, clothing, medical care, and safety.

7.29 During her time at the facility, Plaintiff M.A. was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by Detention Officer Brown.

7.30 The abuse occurred in isolated settings, such as the shower, where Detention Officer Brown raped Plaintiff M.A.

7.31 After the rape, Detention Officer Brown threatened Plaintiff M.A. saying she was causing trouble, and to keep quiet or it would happen again.

7.32 Defendant County failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse.

7.33 There were no safe or effective ways for Plaintiff to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.

7.34 The Facility allowed Detention Officer Brown unsupervised access to Plaintiff and failed to monitor staff conduct, despite the high-risk environment involving vulnerable minors.

7.35 As a result of the sexual abuse she suffered during detention, Plaintiff M.A. has struggled with symptoms of anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and difficulty forming trusting relationships.

7.36 Plaintiff M.A. did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to her until decades later.

Plaintiff S.H.

7.37 Plaintiff S.H. was born in 1985 and grew up in Ocean Shores, Washington.

7.38 Early on, he was a strong student making good grades and competing in academic competitions in school but behavioral issues began during his teenage years.

7.39 In 2001 when Plaintiff S.H. was approximately fifteen years old, he was charged in connection with a bomb threat made to try to get out of a school test.

7.40 He has explained that, at the time, he did not fully appreciate the seriousness of the act, though it resulted in significant consequences.

7.41 He spent long stretches in juvenile detention related to that case.

7.42 During these periods, he was confined in a locked facility.

7.43 He recalls being alone for most of the day, with limited out-of-cell time, and describes the environment as intimidating and isolating.

7.44 While detained, Plaintiff S.H. was entirely dependent on Facility staff.

7.45 His movement, daily routine, and access to basic necessities were controlled by others.

7.46 He could not leave freely and had limited ability to communicate with people outside the Facility.

7.47 During his time at the Facility Plaintiff S.H. was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by Detention Officer Parker.

7.48 Detention Officer Parker forced Plaintiff S H to masturbate in his cell while Detention Officer Parker watched from outside

7.49 Detention Officer Parker used finger puppets to degrade Plaintiff S H.

7.50 Detention Officer Parker rewarded Plaintiff S.H. for compliance, by providing extra food, more time out of cell, and faster promotion to a higher level of trustee.

7.51 Defendant County failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse.

7.52 There were no safe or effective ways for Plaintiff S.H. to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.

7.53 As a result of the sexual abuse, Plaintiff S.H. has struggled with symptoms of anxiety, depression, ongoing substance abuse, has difficulty forming trusting relationships, and thoughts of suicide.

7.54 Plaintiff S.H. did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to him until decades later.

Plaintiff N.A.

7.55 Plaintiff N.A. was born in 1985 in Washington where he grew up with his three brothers in a small community in western Washington.

7.56 Plaintiff N.A.’s parents divorced when he was young, and he experienced shared custody arrangements.

7.57 As a teenager, Plaintiff N.A. began experimenting with drugs, which contributed to early involvement with the juvenile system.

7.58 At age 16, Plaintiff N.A. faced charges related to drug possession after being reported as a runaway.

7.59 This led to his placement in juvenile detention for several months.

7.60 Plaintiff N.A. was placed at Defendant Grays Harbor County Juvenile Detention Facility by juvenile court order in 2002, when he was 17 years old.

7.61 While in custody, Plaintiff N.A. was confined in a locked facility where his daily routine was entirely controlled by staff.

7.62 Plaintiff N.A. was not permitted to leave or contact his family freely, and relied on Facility personnel for food, clothing, medical care, and safety.

7.63 During his incarceration in late 2002, Plaintiff N.A. was assigned cleaning duties as a trustee.

7.64 On at least four separate occasions, detention officer Brown subjected Plaintiff N.A. to sexual abuse in an isolated supply closet.

7.65 Detention Officer Brown forced Plaintiff to perform oral sex on him, threatening to extend his time in the Facility or make his stay much harder if he did not comply and remain silent.

7.66 Defendant County failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse.

7.67 There were no safe or effective ways for Plaintiff N.A. to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.

7.68 Defendant County allowed Detention Officer Brown unsupervised access to Plaintiff N.A. and failed to monitor staff conduct, despite the high-risk environment involving vulnerable minors.

7.69 As a result of the sexual abuse he suffered during detention, Plaintiff N.A. has struggled with ongoing fear, anxiety, numbness, isolation, difficulty trusting others, nightmares, physical pains and headaches, suicidal thoughts, and anger

7.70 Plaintiff N A did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to him until decades later.

Plaintiff A.H.

7.71 Plaintiff A.H. was born in 1988 in Washington where she grew up in Grays Harbor County with both parents until she was about 13, when they divorced.

7.72 After the divorce, she moved between her parents' homes and experienced instability

7.73 Plaintiff A.H. ran away at age 15.

7.74 Her father placed her on youth-at-risk status, which led to repeated involvement with the juvenile system.

7.75 Violations of status offenses such as missing curfew and skipping school resulted in multiple periods of detention.

7.76 Plaintiff A.H. was placed at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility by juvenile court order in or around 2003, when she was approximately 15 years old.

7.77 She was in and out of the facility from 2003 to 2006, with several periods of incarceration.

7.78 While in custody, Plaintiff A.H. was confined in a locked facility where her daily routine was entirely controlled by staff.

7.79 She was not permitted to leave or contact her family freely, and relied on facility personnel for food, clothing, medical care, and safety.

7.80 During her periods of incarceration from 2003 to 2006, Plaintiff was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by Detention Officer Parker, the lead staff member on the night shift.

7.81 Detention Officer Parker would visit her cell and use a signal system: one finger meant she should remove her shirt and expose her breasts; two fingers meant she should masturbate while he watched.

7.82 He would leave briefly to make a lap around the facility, then return expecting compliance.

7.83 Additional incidents occurred in the small broom closet after cleaning duties (e.g., mopping the common areas), where he groped her.

7.84 The abuse occurred multiple times per week over the course of her stays, primarily at night.

7.85 Detention Officer Parker threatened to take away Plaintiff A.H.’s trustee privileges (extra time out of cell, more freedom) if she did not comply and if she did not remain silent.

7.86 As rewards, he gave Plaintiff A.H. extra time out of her cell at night and extra snacks.

7.87 Defendant County failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse.

7.88 There were no safe or effective ways for Plaintiff A. H. to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.

7.89 The Facility allowed Detention Officer Parker unsupervised access to Plaintiff A.H. and failed to monitor staff conduct, despite the high-risk environment involving vulnerable minors.

7.90 As a result of the sexual abuse she suffered during detention, Plaintiff A.H. has struggled with symptoms of anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and difficulty forming trusting relationships or maintaining happy partnerships.

7.91 Plaintiff A.H. did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to her until decades later.

Plaintiff T.G.

7.92 Plaintiff T.G. is an only child born in 1988. He grew up in Elma, Washington

7.93 Starting around sixth grade, Plaintiff T.G. began skipping school, hanging out with the wrong friends, and getting into trouble.

7.94 Plaintiff T.G.’s mother placed him on youth-at-risk status to address his truancy and behavioral issues.

7.95 Plaintiff T.G. violated the terms multiple times by continuing to skip school.

7.96 These violations led to repeated periods of detention.

7.97 Plaintiff T.G. was placed at Defendant Grays Harbor County’s Juvenile Detention Facility by juvenile court order in or around 2003, when he was approximately 15 years old.

7.98 While in custody, Plaintiff T.G. was confined in a locked facility where his daily routine was entirely controlled by staff.

7.99 Plaintiff T.G. was not permitted to leave or contact his family freely, and relied on Facility personnel for food, clothing, medical care, and safety.

7.100 During Plaintiff T.G.’s time at the Facility in 2003, he was subjected to sexual abuse by detention officer Brown.

7.101 Detention Officer Brown groomed Plaintiff by taking him out to play basketball after lockdown.

7.102 The abuse occurred twice in an isolated locker room area (normally off-limits to inmates) after lockdown.

7.103 In the first incident, Detention Officer Brown claimed to conduct a strip search, ordered Plaintiff T.G. to remove his clothing, then proceeded to grope and fondle Plaintiff T.G. before demanding oral sex.

7.104 In the second incident, Detention Officer Brown ordered Plaintiff T G to remove his clothing and bend over; Detention Officer Brown then masturbated and ejaculated

7.105 Detention Officer Brown threatened Plaintiff T.G. to remain silent.

7.106 The Facility failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse.

7.107 There were no safe or effective ways for Plaintiff T.G. to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.

7.108 The Facility allowed Detention Officer Brown unsupervised access to Plaintiff T.G. and failed to monitor staff conduct, despite the high-risk environment involving vulnerable minors.

7.109 As a result of the sexual abuse he suffered during detention, Plaintiff T.G. has struggled with symptoms of anxiety, depression, substance abuse, impact on sexual relationships, and ongoing mental health issues.

7.110 Plaintiff T.G. did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to him until decades later.

Plaintiff A.G.

7.111 Plaintiff A.G. was born in 1992. He grew up in a small town in western Washington, where family life was a mix of love and hardship that shaped his early years.

7.112 Plaintiff A.G. has four siblings: an older brother who passed away, two older sisters, and one younger sister.

7.113 Plaintiff A.G.’s father was often away, while his mother stayed home

7.114 When Plaintiff A.G. was 6 or 7, his parents divorced and his mother remarried.

7.115 As a young teen, influenced by his older brother and friends, Plaintiff A.G. started using drugs around age 13–14.

7.116 Plaintiff A.G. was arrested for drug-related offenses and put on probation

7.117 Plaintiff A.G. was placed at the Facility by juvenile court order in or around 2005, when he was approximately 12–13 years old.

7.118 Plaintiff A.G. was in-and-out of custody at the Facility from 2005 to 2009, with multiple periods of incarceration.

7.119 While in custody, Plaintiff A.G. was confined in a locked facility where his daily routine was entirely controlled by staff.

7.120 He could not leave, could not freely reach out to his family, and depended completely on the staff for food, clothing, medical care, and safety.

7.121 During the periods when he was in custody at the Facility, Plaintiff A.G. was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by Detention Officer Parker.

7.122 The abuse began early in Plaintiff A.G.’s incarceration when Detention Officer Parker ordered him to masturbate while he watched, then offered to promote him to a higher trustee level if he kept allowing it.

7.123 Detention Officer Parker gave Plaintiff A.G. the highest trustee level that same day

7.124 Detention Officer Parker regularly forced Plaintiff A.G. to masturbate while he watched on his walk-throughs, demanding that Plaintiff A.G. ejaculate on the floor then clean it up.

7.125 If Plaintiff A.G. did not ejaculate, Detention Officer Parker became openly angry.

7.126 On other occasions, Detention Officer Parker oversaw Plaintiff A.G. changing into facility clothes in the locker room after booking, forcing him to masturbate while Detention Officer Parker watched and fondled his own penis over his clothing.

7.127 Detention Officer Parker forced Plaintiff A.G. to manually stimulate his own penis over his clothing multiple times.

7.128 Detention Officer Parker threatened that if Plaintiff A.G. did not remain silent, no one would believe him.

7.129 Defendant County failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse.

7.130 There were no safe or effective ways for Plaintiff A.G. to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.

7.131 The facility allowed Detention Officer Parker unsupervised access to Plaintiff A.G. and failed to monitor staff conduct, despite the high-risk environment involving vulnerable minors.

7.132 As a result of the sexual abuse he suffered during detention, Plaintiff A.G. has struggled with anxiety, depression, and addiction ever since struggles that started small but grew heavier over the years.

7.133 Plaintiff A G did not fully recognize or process what happened to him until decades later.

VIII. CAUSES OF ACTION

8.1 Under Washington law, including RCW 4.96.010, Defendant County is liable for damages arising from its own negligence as well as the tortious conduct of its officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment or authority.

A. Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior

8.2 At all times relevant to this action, individuals including Detention Officer John Parker, Detention Officer Sean Brown, and other County employees or agents acted within the course and scope of their employment or agency relationship with Defendant County.

8.3 Each corrections officer in the Facility owed Plaintiffs the duty to use ordinary care required of a reasonable juvenile corrections officer under the same or similar circumstances.

8.4 The Facility administrators owed Plaintiffs the duty to use ordinary care required of a reasonable juvenile detention facility administrator under the same or similar circumstances.

8.5 All Defendant County employees that worked at the Facility were required to follow the Facility’s policies and procedures to ensure the safety and wellbeing of Plaintiffs.

8.6 Defendant County’s employees including Detention Officer Parker, Detention Officer Brown, and others purported to perform official duties on behalf of Defendant County and used their positions of authority and trust to interact with Plaintiffs within the framework of their institutional roles.

8.7 Defendant County’s employees including Detention Officer Parker, Detention Officer Brown, and others exercised authority delegated by Grays Harbor County to detain, supervise, and care for Plaintiffs and other juveniles housed in the Facility.

8.8 The Plaintiffs and others in custody reasonably understood Defendant County’s employees including Detention Officer Parker, Detention Officer Brown, and others to be acting with official County sanction and control.

8.9 Using their custodial authority, physical access, and physical and psychological control conferred by the County exercised in a locked institutional setting, Defendant County’s

employees including Detention Officer Parker, Detention Officer Brown, and others gained direct, unsupervised access to Plaintiffs and other juveniles in detention.

8.10 While purporting to act in their official capacities and under the cloak of institutional authority, these individuals committed the multiple acts of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, exploitation, coercion, and related misconduct, as detailed in this Complaint.

8.11 Detention Officer Parker, Detention Officer Brown, and others failed to act with reasonable care for the safety and wellbeing of Plaintiffs.

8.12 The breach of the duties of the County’s employees, officials, and agents caused significant physical, mental, and other injuries to Plaintiffs.

8.13 The County is vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for torts committed by its employees, agents, and officials acting in the scope of their employment and/or authority and for acts reasonably incidental to their official roles, even if those acts were unauthorized or violated County policy.

8.14 Defendant County is vicariously liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries as detailed in this Complaint.

B. Direct Negligence

8.15 Defendant County is directly liable for its own negligence in hiring, retaining, and supervising individuals it knew or should have known were reasonably foreseeable to pose a risk of harm to Plaintiffs and other vulnerable youth in its custody as detailed in this Complaint.

8.16 Defendant County owed Plaintiffs the duty to exercise reasonable care to anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers and to take precautions so as to protect Plaintiffs and other children in the custody of its juvenile detention facility from such dangers in managing the juvenile detention facility in accordance with state law.

8.17 Defendant also owed a duty to Plaintiffs to use reasonable care in the hiring, retention, and supervision of employees working in the Facility.

8.18 Defendant Grays Harbor County is also deemed to have a special relationship under Washington law with Plaintiffs by virtue of its custody and supervision of and control over Plaintiffs.

8.19 Defendant Grays Harbor County owed each Plaintiff a non-delegable duty to keep them in a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment while Plaintiffs were detained in the Facility.

8.20 As part of its duty, Defendant was required to ensure the safety, health, and wellbeing of each Plaintiff

8.21 As part of its duty, Defendant was required to, among other things, employ persons of good character; to maintain humane and safe conditions; to implement operational standards governing security, juvenile rights, and staff training; and to inspect their own facilities annually.

8.22 It was reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiffs would be vulnerable to abuse by staff members if appropriate safeguards, policies, and oversight were not implemented and enforced.

8.23 Defendant County failed to implement effective safeguards, policies, and oversight to ensure Plaintiffs and other residents of the Facility were kept in a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment

8.24 Defendant failed to enforce safeguards, policies, and oversight to ensure Plaintiffs and other residents of the Facility were kept in a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment.

8.25 Defendant failed to use reasonable care in its operation of the Facility.

8.26 As a result of Defendant’s failures, Plaintiffs were physically, emotionally, and sexually abused and otherwise harmed

8.27 Defendant County knew or should have known that its employees including Detention Officer Brown, Detention Officer Parker, and others had access to Plaintiffs in private or unsupervised settings.

8.28 Defendant knew or should have known that Facility staff exercised coercive authority and control over Plaintiffs, including control over housing, movement, privileges, discipline, and access to medical care or outside communication.

8.29 Defendant County knew or should have known that placing Facility staff in such positions of unchecked authority created a foreseeable risk of harm, including grooming, coercion, and sexual misconduct.

8.30 Defendant County knew or should have known that Detention Officer Brown, Detention Officer Parker, and others were physically, emotionally, and sexually abusing youth in the Juvenile Detention Center.

8.31 Despite this knowledge, Defendant failed to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to Plaintiffs and others in its custody.

8.32 Defendant Grays Harbor County breached its duties by, among other things:

8.32.1 Retaining employees at the Facility who posed a known risk of harm to minors;

8.32.2 Failing to adequately train and/or supervise staff who interacted with juvenile residents;

8.32.3 Failing to develop, implement or enforce appropriate policies, procedures, training, and other safeguards designed to protect against physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, including but not limited to video monitoring, staffing ratios, same-sex supervision, closed-door restrictions, or reporting protocols;

8.32.4 Failing to respond to, investigate, or escalate complaints or reports of sexual abuse of minors;

8.32.5 Failing to monitor the behavior and movement of staff and residents within the facility; and

8.32.6 Failing to create an institutional culture in which residents could safely report misconduct without fear of retaliation or disbelief.

8.33 As a result of these systemic failures, Defendant failed to exercise ordinary care as required under Washington law.

8.34 As a result of these systemic failures, Defendant failed to ensure the safety, health, and wellbeing of Plaintiffs required by virtue of the special relationship between Defendant County and Plaintiffs.

8.35 Defendant’s conduct also constituted gross negligence, meaning a failure to exercise even slight care in circumstances requiring heightened vigilance due to the vulnerability of minors in Defendant’s care, custody, and control.

8.36 Plaintiffs were harmed as a result of Defendant’s negligent and grossly negligent acts and omissions.

C. Failure to Report

8.37 Washington law, throughout the time Plaintiffs were detained at the Facility, required numerous professionals including corrections officers and detention personnel to report suspected child abuse “to the proper law enforcement agency or to the department” at the first opportunity and no later than 48 hours. 24

24 RCW § 26.44.030(1)(a)(3) (codifying 1991 c 111 s 1).

8.38 Defendant’s employees, agents, and officials had reasonable cause to believe Plaintiffs and others were being abused and/or harmed but failed to make the required reports, thereby breaching their duty

8.39 Defendant Grays Harbor County failed to create, implement, or enforce reasonable policies, practices, and procedures to ensure compliance with mandatory reporting obligations.

8.40 Defendant Grays Harbor County failed to act on reports of abuse when they arose.

D. Negligent Investigation

8.41 Law enforcement including county correctional officers and the Facility had a duty to investigate reports of sexual abuse against minors. 25

8.42 Defendant, through its Sheriff’s Office and other departments, received reports, complaints, and indicators that triggered a duty to investigate but failed to do so with reasonable care.

8.43 Specifically, Defendant County failed to:

8.43.1 Timely open and complete investigations;

8.43.2 Interview victims and witnesses;

8.43.3 Separate and protect victims;

8.43.4 Remove perpetrator-employees from positions of power over the youth;

8.43.5 Preserve and review evidence; and

8.43.6 Make mandatory referrals to prosecutors and child-protection authorities;

8.44 Defendant County breached this investigative duty directly through its policies, practices, and omissions.

25 RCW § 26.44.050 (codifying 1977 ex.s. c 80 s 28); See also Tyner v. DSHS, 141 Wn.2d 68, 71 (2000).

8.45 Defendant County breached this investigative duty vicariously through the acts and omissions of its officers, employees, and agents acting within the course and scope of employment.

IX. DAMAGES

9.1 As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant County’s negligence, Plaintiffs each suffered sexual abuse including rape, molestation, voyeurism, and other forced acts by Detention Officer Brown and Detention Officer Parker over a ten year or more period of time at the Facility, resulting in severe emotional and psychological injury, damage to their social and societal functioning, and other injuries that will continue for an indefinite period into the future and constitute permanent, irreparable, and indivisible injuries.