SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR BENTON COUNTY
R.B., and O.M.
Plaintiffs, v.
BENTON COUNTY, a municipal entity, and FRANKLIN COUNTY, an municipal entity; Defendant
Plaintiffs allege:
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, Washington State law has recognized a fundamental duty: when the government takes a child from the community and places that child behind a locked door, it assumes responsibility for that child's safety. To meet this duty, it should go without saying that every youth detainee must be free of sexual abuse. The child cannot leave and cannot seek protection from anyone other than the institution that holds them captive. This is precisely why Washington has always required that counties staff their detention facilities with persons of good character. It is why the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 required annual inspections, formal operational standards, and accountability.
The youth who came through the doors of the Benton-Franklin County Juvenile Justice Center during the 1980s and 1990s were already carrying the weight of difficult lives: instability and family disruption. They arrived at the Facility not by choice, but by court order, and they trusted, because they had no alternative but to trust, that the county employees with authority over them would honor the obligations the law imposed.
But that trust was violated. And it was violated by employees who recognized exactly what the institution's structure gave them: unsupervised access to isolated, dependent children who had no safe way to say no, no safe way to ask for help, and no realistic expectation that anyone was watching over them or would hear their voices, if they called for help.
This lawsuit is brought by two of those children, now adults, who were sexually abused in Defendants' custody and who carry the consequences of that abuse to this day. They bring this lawsuit because accountability requires defining what happened and placing responsibility where it belongs: with the counties that held these children, employed their abusers, and failed despite every legal obligation and every warning sign to protect them.
II. PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
2.1 At all material times, Plaintiff R.B. resided at Defendant Benton-Franklin County's Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff R.B. was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility. See RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining "childhood sexual abuse"). Plaintiff R.B. is a current resident of Kennewick, Benton County, Washington.
2.2 At all material times, Plaintiff O.M. resided at Defendant Benton-Franklin County's Juvenile Detention Facility. Plaintiff O.M. was a victim of childhood sexual abuse at the Facility.
See RCW § 4.16.340(5) (defining "childhood sexual abuse"). Plaintiff O.M. is a current resident of Richland, Benton County, Washington.
B. Defendant
2.3 Defendant Benton County is a Washington county and local governmental entity, liable to the same extent as a private person. See RCW 4.96.010.
2.4 Defendant Franklin County is a Washington county and local governmental entity, liable to the same extent as a private person. See RCW 4.96.010.
2.5 Pursuant to an interlocal agreement entered into under chapter 39.34 RCW, Benton County and Franklin County jointly established and operated the Benton-Franklin County Juvenile Justice Center (hereinafter "the Facility") located at 5606 W. Canal Drive, Suite 106 Kennewick, WA 99336.
2.6 By and through the Facility, Defendants were jointly responsible for the care and custody of all youth in detention, including Plaintiffs. 1
2.7 At all times relevant, Defendants had a special, custodial relationship with Plaintiffs, which required Defendants to take reasonable steps to protect Plaintiffs from foreseeable harm, including sexual abuse.
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.1 Pursuant to RCW 4.12 et seq. and RCW § 36 et seq. jurisdiction is vested with this Court and venue is proper in Benton County Superior Court because the sexual abuse occurred at the Facility in Benton County, by Benton-Franklin County employees.
1 RCW 4.22.070 (codifying 1986 c 305 s 401).
3.2 Subject matter jurisdiction exists under the Washington Constitution, Article 4, Section 6.
IV. NOTICE OF CLAIM FILING
4.1 Each Plaintiff properly filed a tort claim and waited more than 60 days before filing suit. See RCW § 4.96.020(4) (requiring 60-days to elapse after filing tort claim).
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
5.1 Plaintiffs filed these claims within three years, or sooner, of when they learned that Defendants breached the applicable standards of care and/or owed them duties which caused their injuries and/or discovered the causal connection between the childhood sexual abuse that occurred at the Facility and the injuries for which this suit was brought. See RCW 4.16.340.
VI. FACTS
A. Washington State’s Statutory Framework for County Juvenile Detention.
6.1 Washington State has long regulated the detention of youth charged with or adjudicated for criminal offenses through statutes that impose affirmative, non-delegable duties on the counties that operate juvenile detention facilities.
6.2 Those duties existed throughout the period Plaintiffs were confined at the Facility
6.3 As early as 1913, Washington’s Juvenile Court Law provided that “all delinquent and dependent children within the state shall be considered wards of this state and their persons shall be subject to the custody, care, guardianship and control of the court as hereinafter provided.” 2
2 RCW 13.04.135 (codifying 1913 c 160 s 1, emphasis added).
6.4 This law required counties containing more than fifty thousand inhabitants to provide a detention room or house of detention “separated or removed from any jail, or police station.” 3
6 5 That detention space was required to be “in charge of a matron, or other person of good character.” 4
6.6 In 1945, the Legislature declared an emergency arising from the widespread absence of juvenile detention facilities across Washington’s counties. 5
6.7 It declared that the construction, acquisition, and maintenance of juvenile detention facilities for dependent, wayward, and delinquent children separate and apart from adult detention was “a mandatory function of the several counties of the state.” 6
6.8 The Legislature authorized county commissioners to appropriate sufficient funds to provide for the “adequate care of dependent, delinquent and wayward children,” including employment of an adequate staff of juvenile officers and the provision of suitable food, clothing, and recreation. 7
6.9 In 1977, the Legislature enacted the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, declaring among its intent “that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders, as defined by this chapter, be established ” 8
6.10 The Act declared as a purpose providing “necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders.” 9
3 RCW 13.04.135 (codifying 1913 c 160 s 13).
4 RCW 13.04.135 (codifying 1913 c 160 s 13, emphasis added)
5 RCW 13.16.020 (codifying 1945 c 188 s 1).
6 RCW 13.16.030 (codifying 1945 c 188 s 2).
7 RCW 13.16.040 (codifying 1945 c 188 s 3).
8 RCW 13.40.010(2)(f)–(g) (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 55 (1).
9 RCW 13.40.010(2)(g) (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 55 (2)(f).
6.11 The Act further required that each juvenile court administrator adopt formal standards for the regulation and government of detention facilities for juveniles within 180 days of the Act's effective date. 10
6.12 Those standards were subject to annual review, and each detention facility was required to be inspected annually by the administrator. 11
6.13 Each detention facility was required to keep a copy of the applicable standards available for inspection at all times. 12
6.14 In 1986, the Legislature enacted RCW 13.40.038, declaring: “It is the policy of this state that all county juvenile detention facilities provide a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment.” 13
6.15 By the time the earliest Plaintiff was detained in approximately 1984 Washington had spent more than seven decades constructing a comprehensive legal framework governing the care of children in county juvenile detention.
6.16 That framework imposed affirmative, binding obligations on Defendants: to employ persons of good character; to maintain humane and safe conditions; to implement operational standards governing security, juvenile rights, and staff training; and to inspect their own facilities annually.
6.17 Defendants failed to implement and enforce those obligations. As a result, children in their custody were sexually abused.
10 RCW 13.04.037 (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 7).
11 RCW 13.04.037 (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 7).
12 RCW 13.04.037 (codifying 1977 ex.s.c 291 s 7)
13 RCW 13.40.038(1) (codifying 1986 c 288 s 7).
B. The Benton-Franklin County Juvenile Justice Center
6.18 Benton County and Franklin County are neighboring counties in eastern Washington, making up the Tri-Cities metropolitan area.
6.19 Benton County and Franklin County entered into an interlocal agreement under chapter 39.34 RCW to jointly establish and operate the Benton-Franklin County Juvenile Justice Center to house youth detainees.
6.20 The Facility served as the sole county-operated secured juvenile detention center for the Tri-Cities region during the period relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, which spans from approximately 1984 through 1994.
6.21 Defendants Benton County and Franklin County, through their respective Juvenile Court Services, jointly administered, staffed, and funded the Facility throughout the relevant period.
6.22 Defendants were responsible for hiring and supervising all detention staff employed at the Facility.
6 23 Defendants were responsible for setting and enforcing operational policies and procedures at the Facility.
6.24 Defendants were responsible for maintaining the physical condition of the Facility.
6.25 Defendants were responsible for providing programming for youth detained at the Facility.
6.26 Defendants were responsible for protecting the safety and wellbeing of all children in custody at the Facility.
6 27 The youth detained at the Facility were among the most vulnerable in the Tri-Cities region.
6.28 They were children and teenagers who had been ordered into secure custody by a juvenile court judge.
6 29 In the cases of the Plaintiffs here, detainees were as young as 14 years old at the time of their first incarceration.
6 30 Many detainees came from unstable home environments and had histories of prior trauma.
6.31 Youth arrived at the Facility not by choice, but by court order, and could leave only when the institution permitted.
C. What It Means to Be Detained: Life Inside the Facility
6.32 The conditions of confinement at the Facility created the structural circumstances that Defendants' staff exploited to perpetrate sexual abuse.
6.33 When a juvenile was ordered into custody, he or she was typically transported directly from the courthouse to the Facility.
6.34 Upon arrival, staff collected the child's personal belongings and civilian clothing.
6 35 The child was issued institutional garments and required to change into them.
6 36 Staff conducted a body inspection of each child upon arrival, ostensibly to screen for contraband, injury, or self-harm risk.
6.37 The body inspection occurred in a private room within the Facility.
6.38 The intake body inspection was the first moment at which a detained child was entirely alone with detention officers, stripped of clothing, and entirely dependent on the Facility.
6 39 From the moment of arrival, every aspect of the child's body and possessions was subject to institutional control.
County Superior Court.
6.40 Female detainees during the relevant period were housed in a maximum-security section of the Facility located behind the control room.
6 41 Each female detainee was assigned to a locked cell, which was occasionally shared with a roommate.
6 42 Male detainees were similarly confined in locked housing units under staff supervision.
6.43 The Facility operated on a rigid, staff-controlled daily schedule.
6.44 Each morning, cell doors were unlocked one at a time to permit detainees to shower.
6.45 Showers lasted approximately ten minutes per detainee, using a push-button water system that turned off automatically.
6 46 Meals were served at set times approximately 7:00 a.m., noon, and 5:00 p.m.
6.47 Detainees who had earned sufficient privilege levels were permitted to eat in the cafeteria; others received meal trays delivered to their cells.
6.48 School was held on-site each weekday morning, conducted by county and school district staff within the Facility.
6 49 Afternoon programming such as gym time, physical education, or limited computer access depended on staffing levels and a detainee's privilege ranking.
6.50 At night, guards performed bed checks by walking the hallways and shining flashlights through cell windows to confirm occupant(s) were present.
6.51 The Facility during the relevant period operated a ranking or privilege level system that determined what each child was permitted to do on a given day.
6.52 New arrivals began at the lowest privilege level.
6.53 Higher rankings unlocked access to out-of-cell time, cafeteria meals, gym, and other basic freedoms within the institution.
6 54 Privilege levels were reviewed and assigned by correctional officers and probation staff on a weekly basis.
6 55 This system placed extraordinary power in the hands of individual staff members to reward or punish children through ostensibly legitimate institutional decisions.
6.56 The Facility operated around the clock in rotating staff shifts.
6.57 The swing shift ran from approximately 4:00 p.m. to midnight and was the most active programming period, typically staffed by three to four officers.
6 58 The night shift ran from approximately midnight to 8:00 a.m. and was staffed by as few as two officers.
6.59 During the night shift, one officer was typically stationed in the control room while the other circulated through the facility.
6.60 Night-shift officers were responsible for late-night cleaning, preparing laundry for the following day, and restocking personal hygiene supplies on a weekly basis.
6 61 These duties required night-shift officers to move through the facility alone and to call individual detainees out of their cells to assist with tasks during hours when the rest of the population was asleep or confined.
6.62 This staffing structure created predictable, extended windows of unsupervised access to isolated children during overnight hours.
D. The Role and Authority of Juvenile Detention Officers
6.63 Juvenile detention officers employed at the Facility, including Detention Officers Still and Rodriguez, were county employees hired, trained, supervised, and retained by Defendants.
6.64 Detention officers, including Detention Officers Still and Rodriguez, were responsible for the direct supervision of all youth in custody at the Facility, including monitoring their movements, enforcing rules, and maintaining the safety and security of the facility.
6.65 Detention officers, including Detention Officers Still and Rodriguez, controlled every aspect of a detainee's daily life, including when detainees could leave their cells, when and where they ate, when they could shower, and what privileges they were permitted to enjoy.
6.66 Detention officers, including Detention Officers Still and Rodriguez, had the authority to assign, adjust, and reduce detainees' privilege levels, giving them direct power over the quality of each child's daily experience in custody.
6.67 Detention officers, including Detention Officers Still and Rodriguez, were authorized to conduct body inspections and strip searches of detainees, giving them lawful physical access to detained youth in private settings.
6.68 Detention officers, including Detention Officers Still and Rodriguez, performed bed checks, supervised overnight operations, and were responsible for calling individual detainees out of their cells for cleaning and laundry duties during nighttime hours.
6.69 By virtue of their position, detention officers, including Detention Officers Still and Rodriguez, stood in a custodial relationship with every child in their care a relationship of total authority and total dependency.
6.70 Defendants were responsible for ensuring that the officers they employed in this role were of good character, properly trained, adequately supervised, and fit to exercise authority over vulnerable children in custody.
E. Defendants' Correctional Officer Fred Still
6.71 Detention Officer Fred Still was employed as a Detention Officer at the Facility from 1982-1996, including the period during which Plaintiff R.B. was detained.
6.72 Detention Officer Still was known among youth detained at the Facility by a derogatory nickname. A name given to him by inmates who were aware of or had experienced his pattern of sexually abusive conduct during strip searches.
6.73 Detention Officer Still was an older white male, appearing to be in his forties, with dark graying hair and facial hair. He wore a standard correctional officer's uniform.
6.74 Detention Officer Still conducted strip searches of male detainees under the guise of routine institutional procedure. He was reportedly the only officer who regularly conducted these searches, and they occurred primarily without another adult present.
6.75 Detention Officer Still's strip searches were not conducted in accordance with legitimate correctional procedure. Instead, he used them as opportunities to sexually abuse detainees. He required youth to bend over and spread their buttocks for extended periods, far beyond any legitimate search purpose, while he digitally penetrated them anally
6.76 Detention Officer Still performed oral sex on at least one detainee, Plaintiff R.B., on at least one occasion during or immediately following a strip search.
6.77 Detention Officer Still conducted these abusive searches on a frequent basis on at least five to six occasions with Plaintiff R.B. and targeted multiple detainees, including those he pulled from recreational activities or meal times without warning.
6.78 Detention Officer Still coerced compliance by threatening detainees that they would not be released on time if they did not cooperate. He also provided extra food trays as rewards for compliance.
6.79 The pervasive and open nature of Detention Officer Still’s conduct including the nickname given to him by youth in custody demonstrates that his abusive behavior was known or readily discoverable to Defendants through the exercise of reasonable oversight.
6.80 Defendants knew or should have known that Detention Officer Still had routine, unsupervised access to male detainees during strip searches, that he was the sole officer regularly conducting such searches, and that youth in his care were at foreseeable risk of sexual abuse.
6.81 Despite this, Defendants failed to supervise Detention Officer Still, investigate the conduct known among detainees and staff, or protect the youth in their custody from his abuse.
F. Defendants' Juvenile Detention Officer Darin Rodriguez
6.82 Detention Officer Darin Rodriguez was employed as a juvenile detention officer at the Facility from approximately September 1993 through 1995.
6.83 Detention Officer Rodriguez worked swing shift (approximately 4:00 p.m. to midnight) and the graveyard shift (approximately midnight to 8:00 a.m.). Mostly during graveyard shifts Detention Officer Rodriguez exploited the reduced oversight and physical isolation of the nighttime hours to sexually abuse female detainees.
6.84 Detention Officer Rodriguez cultivated his victims through deliberate grooming. He flirted openly with female detainees, offering special attention, extra privileges, and tangible rewards including snacks, extra time outside their cells, and higher inmate rankings to girls he selected for abuse.
County Superior Court.
6.85 Detention Officer Rodriguez used the Facility's level and privilege system as an instrument of grooming and control. Because access to activities and out-of-cell time depended on inmate rank, and because Rodriguez participated in assigning those ranks, he was able to use the promise of advancement and the threat of its removal to gain compliance from his victims.
6.86 Detention Officer Rodriguez exploited routine institutional activities, particularly laundry duty, to isolate female detainees and sexually abuse them. He called girls out of their cells individually never together ostensibly for cleaning and laundry tasks after hours, when oversight was minimal.
6.87 During these nighttime encounters, Detention Officer Rodriguez sexually abused female detainees including Plaintiff O.M. The abuse included: exposing himself; groping detainees during walk-by contact; forcing detainees to expose their bodies at their cell windows during check-ins (not as any legitimate strip search); entering the shower area while girls bathed and opening shower doors to watch them; masturbating while watching detainees perform chores; and forcing oral sex, digital vaginal penetration, manual stimulation, and other sexual contact on detainees isolated in the laundry room and elsewhere.
6.88 Detention Officer Rodriguez rewarded compliant victims with snacks, and with additional out-of-cell time and higher inmate rankings, thereby reinforcing his control and discouraging disclosure.
6.89 Rumors among detainees reflected that Detention Officer Rodriguez "had favorites" and that those on his favorites list received special treatment a pattern consistent with grooming behavior that Defendants knew or should have known about through reasonable oversight of staff conduct.
6.90 Defendants knew or should have known that Detention Officer Rodriguez had unsupervised access to female detainees during after hours, that he was using the Facility's institutional structures to isolate and groom victims, and that youth in his care were at foreseeable risk of sexual abuse.
6.91 Despite this, Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to supervise Detention Officer Rodriguez, investigate reports or indicators of misconduct, or protect the youth in their custody from his abuse.
VII. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS
A. Plaintiff R.B.
7.1 Plaintiff R.B. was born in 1969 and was living with his sister in the Tri-Cities area of Washington State when he came into contact with the juvenile court system.
7.2 Plaintiff R.B. was placed at the Facility by juvenile court order in approximately 1984 when he was approximately 15 years old, for a 30-day sentence.
7.3 While in custody, Plaintiff R.B. was confined in a locked facility where his daily routine was entirely controlled by staff.
7.4 He was not permitted to leave or contact his family freely, and relied on Facility personnel for food, clothing, medical care, and safety.
7.5 During his incarceration, Plaintiff R.B. was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by Detention Officer Fred Still.
7.6 As a Detention Officer, Still’s duties included supervising male detainees, conducting intake body inspections, and performing strip searches of juveniles in custody.
7.7 Plaintiff R.B. first encountered Detention Officer Still at his intake into the Facility.
County Superior Court.
7.8
Detention Officer Still conducted Plaintiff R.B.'s intake body inspection as part of his official duties.
7.9 The intake body inspection took place in a private room within the Facility.
7.10 Although Plaintiff R.B. recalls that a female officer may have been present elsewhere during the broader intake process, no other adult besides Detention Officer Still was present in the room during the body inspection itself.
7.11 Detention Officer Still had complete, unwitnessed physical access to Plaintiff R.B. from the very first moments of his detention.
7.12 As part of the body inspection Detention Officer Still ordered Plaintiff R.B. to get naked.
7.13 While Plaintiff R.B. was naked, Detention Officer Still directed Plaintiff R.B. to bend over and look straight ahead.
7.14 Detention Officer Still then proceeded to digitally penetrate Plaintiff R.B.'s anus
7.15 This conduct had no legitimate search justification.
7.16 Plaintiff R.B. had just arrived at a locked facility, had no adult to turn to, and had no means of seeking help or identifying a safe person to report to.
7.17 Detention Officer Still's conduct during the intake inspection established a pattern that would continue throughout Plaintiff R.B.'s entire 30-day sentence.
7.18 Detention Officer Still pulled Plaintiff R.B. from his cell, or when coming back from mealtimes without warning on repeated occasions throughout his sentence.
7.19 On each occasion, Detention Officer Still took Plaintiff R.B. to the same private room.
7.20 No other adult was ever present during these encounters.
7.21 During these encounters, Detention Officer Still directed R.B. to bend over, spread his buttocks, and look straight ahead.
7.22 Detention Officer Still digitally penetrated Plaintiff R.B.'s anus on each of these occasions.
7.23 These encounters occurred on at least five separate occasions during Plaintiff R.B.'s 30-day sentence.
7.24 On at least one occasion, Detention Officer Still performed oral sex on Plaintiff R.B. briefly during a strip search.
7.25 Defendants failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse of Plaintiff R.B.
7.26 There were no safe or effective means for Plaintiff to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.
7.27 As a result of the sexual abuse he suffered, Plaintiff R.B. has struggled with the ability to trust others and to maintain relationships, has experienced significant trauma affecting his sense of self-worth, and has carried profound emotional and psychological harm throughout his adult life.
7.28 Plaintiff R.B. did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to him until years later, when he was an adult.
B. Plaintiff O.M.
7.29 Plaintiff O.M. was born in 1978 and relocated to the Tri-Cities area of Washington State as a child. After entering the foster care system, she experienced instability and became involved with the juvenile court system as a teenager.
7.30 Plaintiff O.M. was placed at the Facility by juvenile court order on multiple occasions between approximately 1993 and 1995, beginning when she was approximately 14 years old.
7.31 While in custody, Plaintiff O.M. was confined in a locked facility where her daily routine was entirely controlled by staff. She was not permitted to leave or contact her family freely, and relied on Facility personnel for food, clothing, medical care, and safety.
7.32 During her periods of incarceration, Plaintiff O.M. was subjected to repeated sexual abuse by Detention Officer Darin Rodriguez.
7.33 After day seven of being incarcerated, Plaintiff O.M. was promoted to level 1 trustee, which granted her special privileges including being out of her cell afterhours for cleaning and maintenance.
7.34 Once this occurred Detention Officer Rodriguez cultivated a flirtatious relationship with Plaintiff O.M. The conversations began to become much more sexual in nature as her time detained continued.
7.35 Eventually the conduct escalated from simply inappropriate conversations to inappropriate touching.
7.36 Rodriguez called O.M. out of her cell individually never with other detainees when he was on graveyard shift, ostensibly to perform laundry and cleaning duties.
7.37 During these laundry room encounters, Detention Officer Rodriguez sexually abused Plaintiff O.M. The abuse included forcing her to perform oral sex on him, digitally penetrating her vagina, forcing manual stimulation, kissing, and on other occasions masturbating while watching her.
7.38 Defendants failed to prevent or intervene in the abuse of Plaintiff O.M. There were no safe or effective means for Plaintiff to report the misconduct without fear of retaliation.
7.39 As a result of the sexual abuse she suffered, Plaintiff O.M. has struggled with substance abuse and has required counseling and drug treatment. She has experienced significant and lasting emotional and psychological harm.
7.40 Plaintiff O.M. did not fully recognize and/or process what happened to her until years later.
VIII. CAUSES OF ACTION
8.1 Under Washington law, including RCW 4.96.010, Defendants are jointly and severally liable for damages arising from their own negligence as well as the tortious conduct of their officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment or authority.
A. Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior
8.2 At all times relevant to this action, individuals including Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and other County employees or agents acted within the course and scope of their employment or agency relationship with Defendants
8.3 Each corrections officer in the Facility owed Plaintiffs the duty to use ordinary care required of a reasonable juvenile corrections officer under the same or similar circumstances.
8.4 The Facility administrators owed Plaintiffs the duty to use ordinary care required of a reasonable juvenile detention facility administrator under the same or similar circumstances.
8.5 All Defendants’ employees that worked at the Facility were required to follow the Facility’s policies and procedures to ensure the safety and wellbeing of Plaintiffs.
8.6 Defendants’ employees including Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and others purported to perform official duties on behalf of Defendants and used their positions of authority and trust to interact with Plaintiffs within the framework of their institutional roles.
8.7 Defendants’ employees including Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and others exercised authority delegated by Defendants to detain, supervise, and care for Plaintiffs and other juveniles housed in the Facility.
8.8 The Plaintiffs and others in custody reasonably understood Defendants’ employees including Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and others to be acting with official sanction and control from the Counties.
8.9 Using their custodial authority, physical access, and physical and psychological control conferred by the Counties exercised in a locked institutional setting, Defendant County employees including Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and others gained direct, unsupervised access to Plaintiffs and other juveniles in detention.
8.10 While purporting to act in their official capacities and under the cloak of institutional authority, these individuals committed acts of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, exploitation, coercion, and related misconduct, as detailed in this Complaint.
8.11 Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and others failed to act with reasonable care for the safety and wellbeing of Plaintiffs.
8.12 The breach of the duties of Defendants’ employees, officials, and agents caused significant physical, mental, and other injuries to Plaintiffs.
8.13 Defendants are jointly vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for torts committed by their employees, agents, and officials acting in the scope of their employment and/or authority and for acts reasonably incidental to their official roles, even if those acts were unauthorized or violated County policy.
8.14 Defendants are vicariously liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries as detailed in this Complaint.
B. Direct Negligence
8.15 Defendants are directly liable for their own negligence in hiring, retaining, and supervising individuals it knew or should have known were reasonably foreseeable to pose a risk of harm to Plaintiffs and other vulnerable youth in its custody as detailed in this Complaint.
8.16 Defendants owed Plaintiffs the duty to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent County would use under the same or similar circumstances in managing a juvenile detention facility in accordance with state law.
8.17 Defendants also owed a duty to Plaintiffs to use reasonable care in the hiring, retention, and supervision of employees working in the Facility
8.18 Defendants are also deemed to have a special relationship under Washington law with Plaintiffs by virtue of its custody and supervision of and control over Plaintiffs.
8.19 Defendants owed Plaintiffs a non-delegable duty to keep them in a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment while Plaintiffs were detained in the Facility.
8.20 As part of their duty, Defendants were required to ensure the safety, health, and wellbeing of Plaintiffs
8.21 As part of their duty, Defendants were required to, among other things, employ persons of good character; to maintain humane and safe conditions; to implement operational standards governing security, juvenile rights, and staff training; and to inspect their own facilities annually.
8.22 It was reasonably foreseeable that Plaintiffs would be vulnerable to abuse by staff members if appropriate safeguards, policies, and oversight were not implemented and enforced.
8.23 Defendants failed to implement effective safeguards, policies, and oversight to ensure Plaintiffs and other residents of the Facility were kept in a humane, safe, and rehabilitative environment
8.24 Defendants failed to enforce safeguards, policies, and oversight to ensure Plaintiffs and other residents of the Facility were kept in human, safe, and rehabilitative environment
8.25 Defendants failed to use reasonable care to act as a reasonably prudent juvenile detention facility to Plaintiffs.
8.26 As a result of Defendants’ failures, Plaintiffs were physically, emotionally, and sexually abused and otherwise harmed.
8.27 Defendants knew or should have known that their employees including Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and others had access to Plaintiffs in private or unsupervised settings.
8.28 Defendants knew or should have known that Facility staff exercised coercive authority and control over Plaintiffs, including control over housing, movement, privileges, discipline, and access to medical care or outside communication.
8.29 Defendants knew or should have known that placing Facility staff in such positions of unchecked authority created a foreseeable risk of harm, including grooming, coercion, and sexual misconduct.
8.30 Defendants knew or should have known that Detention Officer Rodriguez, Detention Officer Still, and others were physically, emotionally, and sexually abusing youth in the Juvenile Detention Center.
8.31 Despite this knowledge, Defendant failed to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to Plaintiffs and others in its custody.
8.32 Defendants breached their duties by, among other things:
8.32.1 Retaining individuals who posed a known risk of harm to minors;
8.32.2 Failing to adequately train and/or supervise staff who interacted with juvenile inmates;
8.32.3 Failing to develop, implement or enforce appropriate policies, procedures, training, and other safeguards designed to protect against physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, including but not limited to video monitoring, staffing ratios, same-sex supervision, closed-door restrictions, or reporting protocols;
8.32.4 Failing to respond to, investigate, or escalate complaints or reports of sexual abuse of minors;
8.32.5 Failing to monitor the behavior and movement of staff and residents within the facility; and
8.32.6 Failing to create an institutional culture in which residents could safely report misconduct without fear of retaliation or disbelief.
County Superior Court.
8.33 As a result of these systemic failures, Defendant failed to exercise ordinary care as required under Washington law.
8.34 As a result of these systemic failures, Defendant failed to ensure the safety, health, and wellbeing of Plaintiffs required by virtue of the special relationship between Defendant and Plaintiffs.
8.35 Defendant failed to ensure the safety and health of the Plaintiffs and other residents of the Facility.
8.36 Defendant’s conduct also constituted gross negligence, meaning a failure to exercise even slight care in circumstances requiring heightened vigilance due to the vulnerability of minors in Defendant’s care, custody, and control.
8.37 Plaintiffs were harmed as a result of Defendant’s negligent and grossly negligent acts and omissions.
C. Failure to Report
8.38 Washington law required numerous professionals including corrections officers and detention personnel to report suspected child abuse “to the proper law enforcement agency or to the department” at the first opportunity and no later than 48 hours. 14
8.39 Defendant’s employees, agents, and officials had reasonable cause to believe Plaintiffs and others were being abused and/or harmed but failed to make the required reports, thereby breaching their duty.
8.40 Defendants failed to create, implement, or enforce reasonable policies, practices, and procedures to ensure compliance with mandatory reporting obligations.
14 RCW § 26.44.030(1)(a)(3) (codifying 1991 c 111 s 1).
8.41 Defendants failed to act on reports of abuse when they arose.
IX. DAMAGES
9.1 As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ negligence, as enumerated above, Plaintiffs each suffered acts of sexual abuse including rape, molestation, and other forced acts by Detention Officer Still and Detention Officer Rodriguez over a ten year or more period of time at the Facility, resulting in severe emotional and psychological injury, damage to their social and societal functioning, and other injuries that will continue for an indefinite period into the future and constitute permanent, irreparable, and indivisible injuries.
X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs request judgment against Defendant Counties as follows:
10.1 For general and special damages in amounts to be proven at trial;
10 2 For taxable costs;
10.3 For statutory attorneys’ fees;
10.4 All other damages available under law; and
10.5 For such other and further legal or equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2026.
STRITMATTER LAW FIRM
/s/Furhad
Sultani
Gemma Zanowski, WSBA#43259
Shannon Kilpatrick, WSBA#41495
Furhad Sultani, WSBA#58778
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs