Issuu

December 2010-January 2011

SP’s

Volume 7 No 6

AN SP GUIDE

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IN THIS ISSUE

`100.00 (India-based Buyer Only)

INDIAN ARMY SPECIAL

P U B L I C AT I O N

ROUNDUP

T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

PAGE 4 Indian Army Through the Ages The transformation of Indian military for the future, through technological improvements coupled with innovative operational art will give India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE INDIA

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

am pleased to learn that SP Guide Publications is bringing out separate special editions on the Indian Air Force, Indian Army and Indian Navy. Our Armed Forces have rendered invaluable contributions to the nation—both in times of war and peace. We want our Armed Forces to retain the competitive edge and rank among the best in the world. We remain committed to the modernisation of the Forces. However, modernisation must proceed hand-in-hand with indigenisation. The all-around welfare of the Jawans,

PAGE 6 Avoid Delays, Act Fast

>> The sluggishness of the Defence Ministry in equipment procurement could have disastrous results in the future. Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 10 100 Magnificent Years The Corps of Signals recently celebrated its centenary year.

ex-servicemen and their family members continues to be our primary concern. I am confident that the special editions will be liked and read widely. Please accept my best wishes for your future endeavours.

A.K. ANTONY

COV E R STO R Y

‘Indian Army is prepared to play its part in the development and security of our country’ PHOTOGRAPH: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

Lt General P. Mohapatra PAGE 12 ‘Future wars will be intense, swift, non-linear, network-centric with technology intensive weapon systems’

Interview with Lt General Ajai Chandele, Director General, EME, Indian Army PLUS A Key Enabler in Net-centric Warfare Bid for Best Tech Time for Offensive & Defensive Measures

8 14 16 18 19

Tecknow News in Brief

DO YOU THINK INDO-CHINA RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED AFTER CHINESE PM’S RECENT VISIT?  Yes  No  Don’t Know

Join the poll & comment

Addressing a gathering comprising course members including officers from friendly foreign countries and civil services at the National Defence College, New Delhi, Chief of Army Staff General V.K. Singh spoke on the subject— ‘Indian Army: Challenges and Vision’ 6/2010

SP’s LAND FORCES

Global Patriot Combat-Proven Air and Missile Defence

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Patriot is trusted by 12 nations — forming a global partnership that is addressing today’s challenge of integrated air and missile defence with the most proven solution in the world. Patriot simultaneously defends against multiple threats — including tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft and UAVs — even in severe electronic countermeasure conditions. Patriot’s performance in combat, and in over 2,500 system tests, translates into an adaptable, cost-effective and reliable line of defence for an alliance of countries that continues to grow. Global Patriot: trusted today to meet the defence needs of tomorrow.

D I T O R I A

C O V E R S T O R Y << Reports have been appearing in the media regularly and articles have also been appearing in military and security related journals regarding the great drive that has been launched to modernise the armed forces. Reports indicate that the modernisation of the Indian Army includes new helicopters, high technology weapons and new artillery systems, night fighting aids, unmanned vehicles and other advanced systems and munitions. In all a multibillion-dollar induction plan has been drawn by the Indian Army in their long-term integrated perspective plan (LTIPP). The high technology platforms and systems and other assets will enhance the Army’s operational capabilities when integrated with the command, information and decision support system (CIDSS) which is being progressed simultaneously and includes separate projects such as artillery combat command control system (ACCCS), battlefield surveillance system, air defence control and reporting system (ADC&R), battlefield management system (BMS), and future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS ). Integrated together with requisite

efence of a nation and development are complementary. If India aspires to be an economic power, its military power must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests. In this context, the transformation of the Indian military for the future, through doctrinal, organisational, equipment and technological improvements will give India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries. This is vital for preserving India’s sovereignty and furthering its national interests. I intend covering my talk under three broad heads—India’s strategic perspectives; threats and challenges; and the way ahead.

India’s Strategic Perspectives Let me first highlight certain perspectives that provide a backdrop to the threats and challenges that confront us. India’s strategic perspectives have been shaped by geography, history, our own native culture, vision and geopolitical realities. Geographically, a few facts are particularly relevant. First, India is both a continental and maritime nation with a territory of over three million sq km, a land frontier of 15,000 km, a coastline of 7,500 km, and a population of 1.2 billion, the second largest in the world. Second, its location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean gives it a vantage point in relation to both West, Central, continental and South-East Asia, and the littoral states of the Indian Ocean from East Africa to Indonesia. Third, India’s peninsular projection in the ocean which bears its name, gives it a stake in the security and stability of these waters. Nehru once said, “I look at India… .on three sides, the sea, and on the fourth, high mountains….History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean, has in the first instance, India’s sea borne trade at her mercy, and in the second, India’s very independence itself.” Fourth, India shares borders with a large number of neighbours, most of whom do not share borders amongst themselves. The border problems in the North, West and in the North-east are a colonial legacy which we have to deal with. Fifth, the security situation in our neighbourhood, on our western flank, is of concern. Even though terrorism poses a serious internal threat, our neighbour has been selective in combating it; fighting some groups, while sheltering and supporting others it considers as strategic assets. Till the terrorist infrastructure remains intact and infiltration attempts by terrorists into Jammu & Kashmir continue, our relations will remain strained. Sixth, rapid rise of our neighbour in the North and North-east as an economic and military power together with its new as-

communications, these systems will provide near real time ‘sensor to shooter’ links to make the Army a network-centric force. Planning seems flawless but when it comes to execution, to take stock of what has been procured out of the big ticket items such as the artillery guns, light observation and reconnaissance helicopters, night fighting aids for armour and infantry, or even efforts towards network-centricity, our pace is so excruciatingly slow that the results achieved are almost negligible. The Ministry of Defence would have us believe that the delays occurring currently are due to several reasons such as insufficient and limited vendor base, non-conformity of the offers to the request for proposal (RFP) conditions, lengthy field trials, complexities in contract negotiations, limited indigenous capability and long lead time for indigenisation, etc. However, these reasons notwithstanding, the fact remains that we as a nation do not seem to have the political will to equip the armed forces suitably. The media is busy unearthing scams, the political parties are busy protecting their power base and their turf, the bu-

sertiveness give rise to apprehensions about her intentions. At the moment, peace prevails along the border and confidence building measures are in place. However, rapid infrastructure development in the adjoining regions and modernisation of their armed forces has significantly enhanced their military capabilities, which we need to take note of. Seventh, India is an energy deficient country located close to some of the most important sources of oil and natural gas in the Gulf and Central Asia and adjacent to one of the most vital sea-lanes through which about 1,00,000 ships transit every year. Spill-over effects from other neighbouring countries: Conventional military threats from other neighbours are virtually non-existent. However, non-conventional threats from the neighbourhood could manifest in the form of spill-over effects along land border or coastal areas. Some of the concerns relate to the consequences of the prevailing political instability and porosity of our borders with Nepal. Cross border movement of Indian insurgent groups and the actions of Bhupalese refugees in the areas adjoining Bhutan also remain areas of concern. Efforts by Sri Lanka to rehabilitate the war affected people and integrate them into the mainstream have the possibility of bringing lasting peace with positive outcomes for both the countries.

Threats and Challenges India faces a variety of military challenges to national security. These include the threats from traditional adversaries and a variety of additional challenges that need to be factored in India’s planning process for the future. The additional challenges which impact specifically upon the structure and preparedness of the Indian Army are: l Defence of our island territories separated by large distances from the mainland. l Security of our offshore and on shore assets and resources rich areas. l Security of a large and unprotected coastline and the national assets and infrastructure along the coastline. l Internal dissent and claims to autonomy by sub-national entities, who may be supported from outside. l Demographic shifts in the North-eastern region and other non-military threats which may impact upon the military. l The belief of a single powerful neighbour, which views its economic and security interests as more vital than that of the world (Damming of India’s water sources). l The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery platforms such as cruise and ballistic missiles

l l

reaucracy couldn’t care less and the armed forces do not have the financial powers or the freedom to progress beyond a limit. This is happening at a time when the threats and challenges to the nation are increasing and when we should be preparing the armed forces for a possible two front conflict contingency in the future. After the debacle of 1962 war, our citizens and planners should appreciate that plans on paper, political rhetoric and diplomatic parleys cannot win wars. With this issue, SP’s Land Forces completes seven years. The issue also carries a variety of articles focused on the threats and challenges and modernisation of the Indian Army to prepare for future conflicts.

and UCAVs. Overspill of ethnic conflicts in the South Asian Region into India. Internal destabilisation of neighbouring states compelling India to resort to “peace enforcement” initiative either individually or collectively as a part of United Nation or other multilateral initiatives. Global terrorism perpetrated by nonstate actors, which may be aided or supported by other states. Military aid, in internal security, against terrorist activity; narcotics and LWE. Robust economic growth will bestow political power and a global/regional power status in the future which will mandate autonomy in decision-making and safeguarding of sovereignty in a new global order and a new global and regional security environment whose contours are currently hazy and will need to be analysed as we move forward in the 21st century, to ascertain their impact on our security. Defence and protection of Indian Diaspora abroad and India’s energy-related assets located abroad.

Non-Conventional Challenges Ensuring the security of ‘Global Commons’; namely, outer space, cyber space, the oceans, global transport and communication networks has assumed significance. Threats to these transcend national boundaries and a collective effort to ensure the free flow of information and economic opportunities across these ‘commons’ is vital.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

and crushing power. Globalisation and interconnectedness will make wars transparent thus challenging the political utility of using armed forces. Military power is likely to be used selectively, in an integrated and synergetic manner and with increasing discrimination in choosing means as well as ends. There will invariably be an international pressure on warring parties due to the fear of escalation, especially if the nuclear armed states are involved, and hence wars are likely to be short but of high intensity. Two or three generations of warfare will coexist i.e. high technology as well as low technology components. The strategy of global leadership and engagement by the United States, based on the assumption that such a role is natural, will continue for the foreseeable future, though China is building its military capabilities at a faster pace than anticipated earlier and together with its impressive economic clout will prove to be a formidable challenge in the future. Its assertiveness is already being felt in the region. A balance between the measures of active security building and restraint will have to be maintained with a better awareness of their respective strengths and weaknesses. Care will have to be taken to work within the limits of international law including its precepts on the minimum use of force and proportionality of response (this is not applicable to hyper/superpowers).

Nature of Future Wars Increasing economic interdependence as a consequence of globalisation; international opinion, technology and the availability of nuclear weapons have resulted in a major shift in the management of international security. The nature of warfare is changing. Future wars, therefore, are likely to be: l Highly uncertain. l Technology will play a pre-dominant role in designing the conduct of war. l The costs involved and the complexities of war waging may force nations to join allies/coalitions thus requiring expertise in combined warfare methods. l The high costs of waging wars and of individual weapon systems will demand total synergy between various components of national power and between the various elements of the armed forces themselves. l Weaker states will use “asymmetric warfare” to fight more powerful opponents while the more powerful states will use positive asymmetry through C4ISR capabilities to deliver significant lethal and non-lethal effects with precision, speed

The Way Ahead India’s strategic vision is in harmony with our traditional character as a peaceful, responsible nation that has abjured aggression and played a constructive, mainstream role in international relations. We have no extra territorial ambitions and no desire to transplant our ideology on others. It is our considered position that we wish to retain our strategic autonomy and thus need to maintain an independent deterrent capability.

Army Perspective The Indian Army is required to fulfil its roles of protecting India’s integrity and sovereignty—across the entire spectrum of conflict. The present profile of the Indian Army can essentially be described as: l A large standing Army, which is structured, equipped and trained to undertake operations; ranging from sub-conventional to all out conventional war against a nuclear backdrop at the higher end. l The Indian Army has been involved in Continued on page 15

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M I L I TA R Y H I STO R Y

Indian Army Through the Ages The transformation of the Indian military for the future, through technological improvements coupled with innovative operational art will give India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries, which is vital for preserving India’s sovereignty and furthering its national interests PHOTOGRAPH: www.army.mil

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

partition and Punjab migration could have been lessened had Mountbatten been a wiser man and not rushed independence and delayed the announcement of the boundary award. Out of about 14 million people involved in migration, it is estimated that more than half a million died in the violence that erupted on both sides. The strain on the troops of the old Indian Army with the emotional stress of communal differences, personal tragedies and daily exposure to heartrending scenes of murders, rapes and other brutalities, brought their discipline to a breaking point, but it survived because of its leadership. It was the greatest test of the old Indian Army which it passed with flying colours under the most adverse circumstances.

he early military history of India is a history of India’s princely states constantly at war with each other and this motivated their thinking with the resultant lack of unity against foreign invaders. Thus the Indian saga of battles against all invaders including the British is full of tactical level battles of personal bravery of kings and princes which lacked strategic level thinking and planning. From the lessons of these wars, it also becomes clear that the military leaders of India’s princely kingdoms did not understand the importance of battlefield mobility and the need to evolve new concepts and to have new weapons synchronised into a new art of warfare to confront more skillful opponents. The British era of the Indian Army lasted for nearly 200 years. Major Stringer Lawrence was the first army officer appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the East India Company’s forces in 1752. He can thus be deemed as the Father of the Indian Army. The forces then comprised Europeans recruited from England or locals and Indian auxiliaries. These Indians were armed with their own weapons, wore their own dress and were commanded by their own officers. The events of 1857 are too well known to be recounted in detail in this brief focus on the Indian Army. A Royal Commission appointed in July 1858 suggested that the Army in India be composed mainly of Indian troops with the proportion of Indians to British being 2:1. By 1863, the actual numbers were three, 15,500 Indian and 38,000 British troops. The three armies were amalgamated step by step, which was completed by 1895. With the overall control of the Indian Empire being vested in the Crown, the imperial strategy for the defence of India envisaged a wide cordon sanitaire to give depth to this jewel in the crown. Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma were the immediate buffers while the global dominance of the British Navy allowed them even further outposts like Hong Kong, Singapore, Aden and Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea. Pax Britannica was at its zenith and the core was centred in India.

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The Era of the World Wars The final shape and professional restructuring of the Indian Army was carried out prior to World War I under General Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief in India from 1902. During this period, due to a clash between him and Viceroy Curzon over the perceived organisational duality of control of the military in India, Curzon resigned. This issue has had a significantly negative effect on the higher defence control mechanism that evolved after independence and which leaves the Service Chiefs outside the governmental decision-making forums. Till date, this aspect remains an Indian weakness. During World War I, more than one million Indian soldiers served overseas. The Army expanded from 2, 39,511 in 1914 to 1,440, 428 personnel by 1919. While there were no commissioned Indian officers in the Army, the Indian Army fought in all major theatres including France Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine. When Poland was attacked by Germany on September 1, 1939, Britain declared war against Germany on September 3, 1939.

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Operation Gulmarg Operation Gulmarg, which was a deliberately planned operation by Pakistan, aimed at the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). According to its leader Colonel Akbar Khan of Pakistan Army, its planning was done in August 1947. Indian Army’s operations in J&K and the achievement of the Indian Army under its own officers despite logistics constraints, daunting terrain and severity of climate is a proud tribute to its leadership, fighting spirit and patriotic fervour of all ranks. They undertook a task allotted to them as a sacred mission to be fulfilled at whatever the cost.

Indian Army Post-Independence

Indian Army soldiers during a reconnaissance mission training exercise

The Viceroy declared India at War on the same day. World War II (WW II) had started. Congress governments in power in eight provinces resigned, as they had not been consulted. They declared that they would not cooperate with the government. This was not due to love for Nazi Germany, but a matter of principle. In the beginning of the WW II, the Indian Army had a strength of 1, 94,373 personnel which was a little more than the strength available when WW I started. The modernisation planned in 1938 was yet to start and the Indian Army was not intended to fight overseas, but only protect India’s borders and nearby areas. However, before the war ended; the Indian Army had expanded to over 2,000,000 men and engaged in operations stretching from Hong Kong to Italy. In the re-conquest of Burma, it provided the bulk of forces and played important roles in the campaigns in North Africa and Italy. Nearly 6,300 awards were received by the Indian Army in WW II. Awards for gallantry alone were approximately 4,800. It included 31 Victoria Crosses, 4 George Crosses, 252 Distin-

India faces a far greater threat than any other country in the world because of a highly volatile strategic neighbourhood

guished Service Orders, 347 Indian orders of merit, and 1,311 military crosses.

Independence and Partition While the Indian Army did not fight a war of independence, it contributed to it. Among the factors that led to independence, a major factor was the formation of India National Army (INA) by the Indian prisoners of war. Nearly 20,000 officers and men joined the INA. The British were stunned at the defection of officers. They realised that they could not rely on the Indian Army to put down a movement for Independence. This was reinforced by the mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force in January 1946 and an even more widespread one in February 1946, in the Royal India Navy. It was acknowledged that India could not be held by force of arms and this was a major factor in the British decision to grant independence. It was agreed that by August 15, 1947, India and Pakistan should have effective forces mainly non-Muslims and Muslims under their respective control. A large part of the Army had mixed classes and involved a major reorganisation of practically all units. The Navy and the Air Force did not pose a serious problem due to their small size. An Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee under Field Marshal Auchinleck was set to divide the units and stores in the ratio of two to one between India and Pakistan, respectively. Muslims from India and nonMuslims from Pakistan could select which dominion they would serve. The tragedy of partition is a story which deserves separate coverage. The misery of

The strength of the Indian Army in August 1947 was 4,00,000, but the political leadership was keen to reduce the strength to save defence expenditure and hence it was decided to bring down the strength of the Army to 2,00,000 after the J&K Operations which would involve the disbandment of many units. A new Territorial Army Act was passed in 1948 and the infantry and artillery units with a nucleous of regular officers were raised in 1949. Many other changes occurred during the period from 1948 to 1960. The designation of Commander-in-Chief ceased to be in use from 1955 and the three Chiefs (Army, Navy and the Air Force) were made equal and independently responsible for their respective service. Every function of the defence services was duplicated in the Ministry of Defence where civilian bureaucrats not only ensured financial and administrative control but also gradually took over the decision-making powers of the defence services. The standing of the military reached an all time low when Krishna Menon was the Defence Minister and decisions concerning matters of major military importance were taken without consultation of the concerned service.

Nehru’s Bias Nehru’s bias against the military was wellknown in the Services. The clearest example of this was when Cariappa outlined his plan for the security of NEFA, after China had occupied Tibet, Nehru flared up and thumping the table said, “It is not the business of the C-in-C to tell the Prime Minister who is going to attack us where. You mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.” Nehru continued to appease the Chinese and the untimely death of Sardar Patel took away all opposition to Nehru’s views. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of this policy and the

M I L I TA R Y H I STO R Y

www.amgeneral.com

PHOTOGRAPH: Wikipedia

bias against the military. The military also failed by acquiescing to a policy they knew to be militarily and politically unsound.

Indian Army destroyed over 100 Patton and Sherman Tanks (seen in the pic) of Pakistani Army during the 1965 Indo-Pak War

The Period 1961 to 1971 The period 1961 to 1971 was one of the most traumatic periods of the Indian Army. The defeat in 1962 shook the foundation of the nation and the armed forces. The Army began to introspect to overcome its weaknesses. The 1965 War helped the Army to redeem itself, but revealed embarrassing weaknesses in its equipment and its training and even leadership at various levels. These two wars spurred the political leadership to modernise and expand the services. As 1970 came to a close, the Indian Army was now ready to face new challenges emerging on the horizon. The Indo-Pak War in 1971 resulted in creation of a new nation—Bangladesh— and a decisive military victory in which 93,000 prisoners of war were taken. While many books have been written to describe each battle in detail, it is the spirit of the soldiery during this campaign that deserves mention. In the words of Sydney Schanberg of New York Times, who accompanied Indian troops in two sectors, “I don’t like sitting around praising armies. I don’t like armies because armies mean wars—and I don’t like wars. But this [the Indian] Army was something…They were great all the way. There was never a black mark…I lived with the officers and I walked, rode with the jawans—and they were all great … And they were the most perfect gentlemen—I have never seen them do a wrong thing, not even when they just saw how bestial the enemy had been.”

From 1971 to 1998 The period after 1971 War saw the steady

modernisation of the Indian Army with new equipment for modern wars. The Experts Committee under the Chairmanship of Lt General K.V. Krishna Rao submitted its report in 1976. Some of its major recommen-

If India aspires to be a regional/global economic power, its military power must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests

dations started getting implemented in the 1980s. The expansion of mechanised forces was achieved as a result of this report. On April 13, 1984, 34 soldiers of the Indian Army were landed by 17 sorties of helicopters at a point three kilometres short of Bilafond La, a pass on the Soltaro ridge, West of Siachen Glacier. The soldiers occupied the pass. This was the opening move in what is referred to as the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan, which continues till date. This period also saw the Army operation on the Golden Temple on June 5, 1984, at Amritsar, to clear the complex of militants who had based themselves in the temple. The Operation was code named ‘Blue Star’. By June 7, 1984, the Golden Temple complex had been cleared of militants, but it left in its aftermath a wave of anguish and anger among

the Sikh community and the nation faced the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh security guards. The period from July 1987 to March 1990 saw the Indian Army fight Tamil militants in Sri Lanka with one hand tied behind their back. The Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) moved to Sri Lanka to carry out peacekeeping duties as generally assigned during UN operations and to separate the warring factions’ i.e. LTTE and Sri Lankan armed forces, but ended up enforcing peace and conducting military operations against LTTE. What the Indian Army achieved is best described in the words of Rajan Wijeratrie, former Minister of State for Defence in Sri Lankan Government. He is reported to have said, “The IPKF had virtually finished them off. They were gasping for breath in the jungles. It was we who provided that oxygen to them.” This summed up what IPKF had achieved before de-induction. During the 1980s, the Indian Army also conducted the operation in Maldives to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing the Government of Maldives and while it did not involve much fighting, it demonstrated to the world the speed and efficiency with which the Indian armed forces could react. This period (1989 onwards) also saw the start of the terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and deployment of additional troops in J&K.

Kargil War (May-July 1999) Kargil Sector is 168 km along the line of control (LoC) stretching from Kaobal Gali in the west to Chorbat La in the east. The sector was vast with the line of control which runs along the watershed along heights of 4,000 to 5,000 metres high. The frontage and the naContinued on page 15

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>> M O D E R N I S AT I O N

Avoid Delays, Act Fast The sluggishness of the Defence Ministry in equipment procurement could have disastrous results in the future. We need a far greater focus and a firm political will to modernise our military and build the desired military capability for the future. PHOTOGRAPHS: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers from Bofors

our conclusions generally emerge from any analysis regarding the nature of future wars—future wars will be highly uncertain, major state-tostate wars among well armed nations will be rare, low intensity conflict and asymmetric wars will proliferate and technology will play a predominant role in designing the conduct of future wars. Most nations are investing heavily in new and emerging technologies which they feel will confer distinct advantages over the adversary. India faces a variety of military challenges to national security, which include the threats and challenges from traditional adversaries and a multiplicity of challenges which could be grouped under low intensity conflict operation (LICO). Additionally, there are a large number of security parameters due to our geography which are factored in to the military planning process in order to derive the structural and organisational changes and modernisation focus. According to Lt General (Retd) Noble Thamburaj, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, the modernisation focus of the Indian Army in the Eleventh Defence Plan is on “precision fire power, air defence, aviation, future infantry soldier as a system (FINSAS), infrastructure development, network-centricity and achieving battlefield transparency through improved surveillance, night vision and target acquisition… Considering the receding span of technological cycle, right balance has to be maintained between the state-of-the-art, current and obsolescent technologies.” In light of these aspirations, let us examine broadly the progress made so far.

Future Tanks The DRDO has commenced conceptual stage development of future main battle tank (FMBT) and future infantry combat vehicle (FICV). This development is expected to be completed by about 2025. T-90S Russian tanks have provided new teeth to India’s strike formations in the plains and corrected the imbalance that had resulted from Pakistan’s acquisition of T-80 UD from Ukraine and the Al Khalid tanks jointly developed with China.

Artillery Modernisation Artillery modernisation has been plagued by inordinate delays due to many reasons, but the most relevant factor is the convoluted procurement process which has been put into place ostensibly to prevent corruption and to ensure transparency. The result is that in doing so we have tied ourselves in knots. Our procedures are not allowing the modernisation process to move forward. It seems that every segment of the Army and civil machinery asked for its views can stall the process by a seemingly innocuous remark, sometimes just to emphasise their importance in the decision-making process. Moreover, given the mindsets within the civil and military hierarchies and the bureaucratic file pushing that goes on within the MoD, the situation has been made unmanageable. The ultimate sufferer is the Army whose modernisation is stalled at a time when multifarious challenges facing it have started manifesting themselves. There is a real danger that we may have to face a conventional conflict on two fronts, in two different theatres of war (eastern and western), simultaneously.

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Main Battle Tanks On Army Day 2009, the then Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor admitted that a large number of India’s battle tanks are night blind. This reference was obviously pertaining to the T-72M1 (Ajaya) fleet of the Army, which constitutes the majority amounting to approximately 1,800 tanks. Going by the open sources information available, the Army’s armour profile, in the next five years or so, could comprise approximately 1,700 T-90S, 1,800 upgraded T-72M1 and 250 to 500 Arjuns. The indigenously designed Arjun main battle tank (MBT) had been in the pipeline for over two decades. Though the tank has many good features, it had consistently failed to meet the Army’s GSQR for an MBT and orders had been placed for only 124 tanks to be manufactured. After the recent comparative trials of the Arjun with the T-72M1 and the T-90S, additional orders have been placed for another 124 Arjun Mk II, which is an improvement on the Arjun MBT. In the year 2000, India signed a deal with Russia to acquire 310 T-90S tanks and assemble 1,000 in India. In 2008, the MoD decided to acquire another 347, T-90S tanks. The first Indian assembled T-90S (Bhishma) rolled off the production line on January 8, 2004. Ultimately we may have up to approximately 1,700 T-90S tanks. The T-72M1 (Ajeya) tanks are still awaiting modernisation. The upgradation of some tanks has now commenced at the rate of 200 tanks per year. The upgradation package currently includes a thermal imaging standalone night sight (TISAS). An integrated fire

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vehicles for counter-insurgency operations are also being considered.

155mm 52-Calibre, Towed Gun Systems A Tatra mobile launcher with BrahMos supersonic cruise missile

control system has been planned but there seems to be little progress in this direction. New TADIRAN radios have been fitted in all T-72 tanks giving them an effective communication system. Automatic land navigation system (ALNS) and global positioning system (GPS) are being fitted for navigation along with and a laser warning system. Explosive reactive armour (ERA) package is being fitted on all Ajeya tanks which will enhance protection against armour piercing fin stabi-

lized discarding sabot-tracer (APFSDS) and high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds. The feasibility of a new power pack is being explored.

Light Tanks The Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued RFP for 200 light tanks and 100 wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs), including some for the mountain sector in November 2009. Plans to buy light strike

The last major acquisition of towed gunhowitzers was that of about 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. This gun, despite political controversy, proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict. After more than two decades of neglect, during which many other artillery weapons like the 100mm and 122mm field guns of Russian origin and the indigenously developed 75/24 Indian mountain gun joined the long list of obsolete equipment in service with the Army, tenders were floated and trials were commenced for a 52-calibre 155mm gun to replace all field and medium guns. Four sets of trials have been done till date and no gun has been inducted. On July 22, 2010, yet another request for information (RFI) for 155mm/52-Calibre Towed Gun System for the artillery was issued and replies were asked for by August 16, 2010. This is consequent to the cancellation of the existing trials of the two 155mm Howitzers belonging to Singapore Technologies Kinetics (STK) (FH- 2000) and BAE Systems (FH-77 B05 L52), respectively. The MoD spokesman claimed that trials had been abandoned due to the “non-appearance” of STK’s FH-2000 gun. This will result in considerable amount of delay in the induction of any new artillery gun because the decision-making process of choosing a new artillery gun itself may take another two years and the cascading effect will further delay the artillery modernisation plan to the

M O D E R N I S AT I O N << year 2020 as it would take about eight to 10 years to manufacture the chosen weapon indigenously. Artillery is looking for an outright purchase of 400, 155mm Howitzers and another 1,180 howitzers through local manufacture. We are also looking for 120 tracked and 180 wheeled, self-propelled (SP) 155mm guns for the armoured and mechanised formations.

Ultra Light Howitzers The American Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has now notified the US Congress of the Obama administration’s intention to sell 145, M-777, 155mm Howitzers to India, asserting that the sale will boost ‘interoperability’ between Indian and American soldiers and marines. The mandatory notification follows a request from India for the light-weight towed howitzers. The procurement of airmobile howitzers fills a void in the Army’s requirement of heavier calibre artillery for the mountains where the lack of suitable roads and track system precludes the carriage of guns to the forward areas so as to reach out deeper in the enemy’s defences. It will enable the Army to carry out quick intra-theatre movements thus substantially improving its flexibility. How M777 is a 155mm 39-calibre towed howitzer that weighs less than 10,000 lbs (4,218 kg). It has laser inertial artillery pointing system and a 30 km range. This government-to-government deal is worth $647 million (`2,910 crore).

and very low radar cross section and are far superior to subsonic cruise missiles like Pakistan’s Babur. Chile, Kuwait, Malaysia and South Africa have shown interest in acquiring this missile.

Current AD Scenario AAD is holding systems with varying timeframes, ranging from the oldest 40mm L70 gun which is more than four decades old to the youngest Tangushka which is about 15 years old. The majority of the remaining guns and missiles are about 20-30 years old. In fact, the vintage of these systems is much more in their country of origin. Thus in all respect they are either obsolete or have reached obsolescence. Meanwhile, the air threat has been becoming more critical with the fifth generation fighters looming in the horizon and unmanned combat aerial vehicles becoming a reality. Seen in this backdrop, the current AAD picture is rather dismal. L/70 Gun System: L/70 is the mainstay and has been the work horse of AAD since 1964. It was to be completely replaced by 2000. However, there is no progress. DRDO’s development effort also kept its replacement at a limb for about two decades. Not many gun systems are currently available but a possible choice is Skyshield of Rheinmetall Defence which has an effective range of 4 km and rate of fire of 1,000 rounds per minute. It can be matched with any fire control radar and the most redeeming feature is

not succeed and a RFP was issued sometime back, but it seems to have been withdrawn and a fresh RFI has been issued recently. It is very difficult to predict the timeframe of procurement. The possible choices could be Israel’s Spyder, Raytheon’s HAWK XXI, which is a more advanced and compact version of HAWK PIP-3 upgrade integrated with a new 3D MPQ-64 sentinel radar. The missiles are upgraded MIM-23K standard with an improved blast-fragmentation warhead that creates a larger lethal zone. Raytheon’s other system is SLAMRAAM which is the land version of air-to-air missile which has recently been inducted into the US Defence Forces. Other systems are Russia’s TOR M-1 which has a range of 12 km and Aster15 with a range of about 30 km which seem to fall in the category of either less or more range than required. There are reports that DRDO is having a joint venture with MBDA for Mica missile named Maitre (friendship) under a shortrange SAM (SR-SAM) system programme for replacing QR SAM system. Medium-range SAM (MRSAM) System: Kvadrat is the current system which is more than 35 years old and has the technology of the early 1960s. An RFP has been issued but was withdrawn due to poor response. DRDO’s Akash has not succeeded in mobile role. So the Indian Air Force has procured limited numbers to replace the ageing Pechoras and the Indian Army is followPHOTOGRAPH: SP Guide Pubns

Rocket Artillery There has been notable progress on the rocket artillery front. A contract for the acquisition of two regiments of the 12 tube, 300mm Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system with 90 km range was signed with Russia’s Rosoboronexport in early 2006 and the equipment has since been received. This weapon system is a major boost for the long-range firepower capabilities of the Army. Extended range (ER) rockets are being introduced for the 122mm Grad MBRL that has been in service for over three decades. The ER rockets will enhance the weapon systems’ range from 22 to about 40 km. A contract worth `5,000 crore has also been signed for the serial production of the Pinaka MBRL weapon system, another DRDO project plagued by delay in time and completed with help from Larsen and Toubro (L&T) and the Tatas. The Pinaka rockets will have an approximate range of 37 km.

Tangushka mounts have been in service for more than a decade

Artillery Command and Control Systems The “Shakti” project for command and control systems for the Artillery, earlier called Artillery combat command and control system (ACCCS), has reached the stage of maturity and is now being fielded extensively in the plains. Gradually, it will be fielded up to the corps level and the two artillery divisions will be equipped with it.

BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile Efforts are also under way to add ballistic as well as cruise missiles to the artillery arsenal. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (Mach 2.8 to 3.0), with a precision strike capability, very high kill energy and range of 290 km, is being inducted into the Army. A ceremonial induction function of the BlockI version was held in July 2007. Since then, the Block-II version has successfully completed trials. It is a versatile missile that can be launched from Tatra mobile launchers and silos on land, aircraft and ships, and perhaps in future also from submarines. About 50 BrahMos missiles are expected to be produced every year. Efforts are afoot to further increase its strike range. BrahMos Aerospace has orders worth `3,500 crore from the Army and the Navy, which has opted for the anti-ship as well as the land attack cruise missile (LACM) versions. These terrain hugging missiles are virtually immune to counter measures due to their high speed

fructify. Some current systems are Starstreak of UK, Stinger Block 2 of US and the Mistral of France.

Infantry Modernisation The Indian Army is extensively engaged in ongoing proxy war operations in Jammu and Kashmir and internal security (IS) and counter-insurgency operations (CI) in the North-east. Simultaneously, the threat from traditional adversaries demands a high level of preparedness for conventional conflicts. In 2008, during an interview with SPs Land Forces, the Director General Infantry, Lt General Rajender Singh, said, “We have launched major modernisation plans with particular emphasis on improvement in firepower, mobility, surveillance and night fighting capability. These will be inducted as per the perspective plans. Some of these weapons such as multiple grenade launchers (MGLs), automatic grenade launchers (AGLs) have been inducted while the remainder are in the pipeline. We are also in the process of individual soldiers combat capabilities through future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS) programme.” On July 9, 2009, Lt General Jasbir Singh, the next Director General, Infantry, candidly shared his thoughts on a host of important issues affecting the Infantry. He said, “With rapid advancements in the field of science and technology, the nature of warfare is also changing. Future wars are likely to be short, intense and characterised by greater transparency, increased accuracy and lethality with much higher tempo of activities. In these times, while the Army needs to maintain conventional deterrence, it should also be prepared to face the more probable threat of asymmetric war. The technological advancements that would impact future operations of infantry can be categorised as under: (a) Improvement in fire power—both in quantum and accuracy. (b) Sensors to provide day/night all-weather capability. (c) Information sharing through networking and information management by automation. He said that his endeavour was to further enhance the capability of the Infantry soldier and equip him with adequate lethality, protection and situational awareness to meet the challenges of both conventional and the next generation of warfare. He clarified that they were in the process of adopting the above technologies towards meeting the operational objectives set out for the infantry.

Future Infantry Soldier as a System Project

the advance hit efficiency and destruction (AHEAD) technology ammunition which contains 152 heavy tungsten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles and ejected by a time fuse. It is claimed to be very effective against small targets. The same system can replace ZU-23mm twin barrel guns if found suitable and would reduce the inventory. Schilka System: It is a highly mobile system for supporting armour formations and is in service since the early 1970s. Its successor was Tangushka, but only one regiment has been procured so far. The result is that the AAD is stuck with limited equipment which does not meet the current operational requirement. One possibility is to take dispensation for ‘single vendor’, and procure more number of Tangushka mounts which have been in service for more than a decade. Quick Reaction SAM (QR SAM) System: The current system is OSA-AK which is a highly mobile system for the defence of armour formations. This system is more than 20 years old and needs to be replaced. DRDO’s effort to develop Trishul system did

ing suit to buy some for important strategic tasks in static role. Additional procurement appears to be set out through a joint venture of the DRDO and IAI of Israel. The contenders could be Russia’s BUK-M1, Aster30, Patriot Advance Capability-3 (PAC-3). The PAC-3 system incorporates many changes to the ground equipment and the missile and is fielded in incremental steps called Configuration 1, 2, and 3. The ultimate PAC-3/Configuration 3 includes upgrades to the radar (now designated AN/MPQ-65) to increase detection in high-clutter environments and to improve discrimination of closely spaced objects (better decoy recognition). Patriot is the obvious frontrunner as it is war proven; has hit to kill technology; can engage aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, cruise and tactical ballistic missiles. It is currently deployed with 10 nations including the US. Shoulder Fired SAM Systems: The current system is Igla, which is also in service with the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. It was to be replaced with a latest version called Igla-M which had a better ‘approacher mode’ capability but it did not

The Army’s F-INSAS project focuses on enhancing the lethality and survivability of soldiers. It seeks to transform soldiers into fully networked, mobile warriors with a high degree of situational awareness and the ability to operate in all-weather conditions in all types of terrain. The programme envisages equipping infantrymen with light-weight integrated helmets with a ‘head up’ display with a built-in communication system and night vision goggles, hand-held computer display, global positioning system (GPS) and lethal fire power, including laser-guided weapon systems at appropriate levels.

BFSRs and sensors Battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs) with practical ranges of up to seven to eight km where clear line of sight is available have been inducted along with hand-held thermal imaging devices (HHTIs) with ranges up to 2,000 metres for observation at night and stand-alone infrared, seismic and acoustic sensors with varying capabilities. These have enabled the infantrymen to dominate the line of control (LoC) to bring down infiltration by terrorists from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK). The newly acquired weapons, which Continued on page 18

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SP’s LAND FORCES

SEMINAR REPORT

A Key Enabler in Net-centric Warfare Inaugurating the two-day Defcom India 2010 in Delhi, Minister of State for Defence M.M. Pallam Raju said that the tactical communication system is under way and that this offers an excellent opportunity for the Indian industry to seek its share of defence production PHOTOGRAPH: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

n R. CHANDRAKANTH

he Minister of State for Defence, M.M. Pallam Raju informed that the tactical communication system (TCS) is under way and that this offers an excellent opportunity for the Indian industry to seek its share of defence production. “The government is exploring options to increase private sector participation in the defence sector through joint ventures, consortia, etc,” he said. Inaugurating the two-day Defcom India 2010 in Delhi, the Minister said that such efforts were directed towards creating indigenous capabilities and achieving self-reliance in the defence sector. Defcom India 2010 has attracted quite a number of players from the private industry, showcasing their communication capabilities. Defcom India 2010 is jointly organised by the Corps of Signals and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). Stating that armed forces will remain a demanding customer, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the Minister said that the industry will have to invest substantially in research and development. “The government will facilitate greater private participation in defence production and the defence procurement procedure (DPP) is evolving,” he said. Talking about the importance of communication in the present-day battlefield, Raju said mission critical programmes cannot be left to chance and that networking of modern weapon systems would be the key. “While the soldier will require smaller and lighter equipment, efforts should be made to integrate the existing legacy systems. As cyber security was an area of concern, the stakeholders had to guard against leakage of information and also of disabling of networks by subversive elements,” he said. The Chief of the Army Staff, General V.K. Singh said that with more technology infusion, the Indian Army would become a better

force. The transformation was from a threatbased structure to capability-based force. With asymmetric warfare the norm now, the shift was from platform-centric to networkcentric warfare and here the networks have to be robust, resilient and secure.“Transformation of the force takes time and sometimes there is resistance,” he said and added that it is achieved with the least possible disruption to the mindsets that prevail. The Signal Officer-in-Chief, Lt General P. Mohapatra outlined the importance of the theme “Converged Infostructure for a Transformed Force”. “In a non-linear battlefield, precision by information becomes crucial from the command centre to the shooter. The Army had embarked upon creating a robust and scalable network and that convergence remained a challenge. Technology is a catalyst as well as inhibitor. Security will be a key factor,” he said. The Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, Lt General V.S. Tonk said that there had to be seamless connectivity between the Army headquarters and the tactical battle area (TBA). The programme was to empower the commanders to act decisively and in quick time. He also spoke on the importance of interoperability between the forces and intraoperability within each service.

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he private sector has distinct strengths in Information and Communication Technology. Since the armed forces are at the threshold of an exciting new era of net-centricity in which they hope to network all sensors, shooters and commanders on converged infostructures, they expect substantial participation by the private sector. While accepting the necessity, we must appreciate that providing connectivity for strategic and tactical networks is a challenge as dispersed forces operate over a large geographical areas with diversities in terrain, weather, local conditions and operational uncertainties. There is also a need to factor in existing and legacy systems which cannot be wished away. The Indian industry will have to create infrastructure, research and development facilities and quality control procedures to become successful system integrators for defence systems. The government has recently allowed private sector participation in the defence industry up to 100 per cent and with foreign direct investment permissible up to 26 per cent both subject to licensing, for manufacture of all types of defence equipment within the country. This is expected to add to the investment already made in the public sector. —Minister of State for Defence M.M. Pallam Raju

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Ajai Chowdhary, Founder & Chairman of HCL Infosystems, said that the defence communication industry was a multibilliondollar sector and it required participation from different sources, primarily the private sector. Many defence communication programmes such as network for spectrum, defence communication network and ASCON Phase-4 are being implemented, coping with the increased demand for reliable communication. The Indian hardware and software sectors had earned a reputation and for the defence sector it could be a viable hub. During a panel discussion, Major General A.K. Srivastava, Assistant Director General Tac C, said that improved situational awareness, robust and resilient networks, net-centricity, supremacy of information and empowerment of the soldier were essential in the changing scenario of today’s battlefield. In the communication realm, the main challenge was interfacing diverse and heterogeneous networks. The Indian Army had initiated a number of projects with the aim of developing network infrastructure and tactical communications applications. Some of the projects such as Sanjay, Shakti, etc were in various stages of development. The Army sought from the industry new technologies which integrated

his year the Corps of Signals is celebrating its centenary. The Corps has a rich heritage of technological excellence, innovation and communication achievements. Their contribution during operations, internal security and disaster relief efforts both in India and overseas in the last one hundred years has been noteworthy. During the last 100 years, the Corps has done well to migrate from flags, pigeons and Morse code to networking and information warfare. They are now on the verge of ushering in a new era in strategic communications with the NFS project, in tactical communications with TCS and also spearhead the strategic defence network with DCN. They have skillfully showcased their communication capabilities, physical fitness and adventurous spirit well by organising various activities at all-India levels during the year. I wish the Corps great success in all their future endeavours. Finally, I wish the Corps of Signals and CII great success in the conduct of Defcom India 2010. —Chief of Army Staff General V.K. Singh

with hybrid legacy systems; robust communication; convergence; integration and interoperability; secure and scalable networks; and lifetime support for equipment. Giving a perspective of the Indian Air Force, Air Commodore Hemant Sharma, Principal Director, Signals (Air) mentioned how there had been significant growth in bandwidth with induction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), radars, airborne warning and control systems (AWACs), etc. In six months, the IAF would roll out the mobile network (WCDMA) wherein all IAF personnel would be connected through mobile phones. The IAF recently introduced Air Force Network (AFNET), indicating the shift from coverage of western-eastern sectors to a pan-India approach. The plan is to integrate radars of civil, Army and Navy through the AFNET. The road ahead, he said, was virtualisation and capacity expansion in terms of bandwidth may be up to 10 gigabytes. Captain S.K. Chhetri, Director, Naval Systems, said the Navy was posed with challenges on sea, in air and land and called for integration of platforms for effective intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. The Indian ocean was vast and with the curvature of the earth, it was difficult to track all vessels traversing the sea and there were about 1,000 ships passing every day through the Malacca straits. There were about 55,000 fishing vessels only in Gujarat and Maharashtra. The Navy, he said, had embarked upon a programme of identification of vessels through automatic identification system (AIS). Lt General J.P. Singh, Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Planning and Systems), summed up stating that the transformation of the Indian Army to an agile network-centric and knowledge-based force is imminent. Information dominance, achieved through information infrastructure, would help majorly in compressing decision-making time, crucial in a command-sensor-shooter hierarchy.

ransformation in the technological domain requires the ability to acquire battlefield transparency; process information; make decisions; and distribute information over wide areas, at high data rates, on the move, and across all echelons. These capabilities are the enablers of network-centric warfare. NCW is all about moving from the industrial age model where information is collected at the edges and moved to the centres for decision-making to an information age model where the edge is empowered to make decisions based on command intent and self synchronisation derived from high quality shared awareness. Falling in the centenary year of the Corps of Signals, Defcom India 2010 has a special significance for the Corps. I am glad to declare that we have got a very enthusiastic response from the industry, academia and service officers. Technical papers received from young technically proficient service officers carry many original and novel ideas and will help us to define the user’s communication perspective in a very effective manner. I compliment their effort. —Signal Officer-in-Chief Lt General P. Mohapatra

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100 Magnificent Years The Corps of Signals recently celebrated its centenary year. Lt General P. Mohapatra, the Signal Officer-in-Chief at the Army Headquarters and Senior Colonel Commandant of the Corps of Signals, speaks out nostalgically about the sacrifices made by the information warriors. PHOTOGRAPHS: PIB

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n this historic occasion of our centenary year, it gives me immense joy to wish all combatants, civilian staff, veterans and their families the best of health, happiness and prosperity. As we relive history, my heart also reaches out to all information warriors, who made the supreme sacrifice and whose courage and indomitable spirit continues to propel us to greater heights. Ours has been an epic journey, an inspiring saga of enterprise and endeavour, of courage, commitment and accomplishment. From modest beginnings, the Corps has grown over the last 100 years into a versatile and vibrant force, matching the best in the world and making its mark in operations, both in pre- as well as post-independence era; its achievements intimately intertwined with those of the glorious Indian Army. The fledgling Signallers, first blooded during World War I, repeatedly proved their mettle, in various overseas operations. Battle hardened through the World War II, the Signallers were tested for the first time, post-independence, in the 1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) operations, where communications were set up in record time, in an area devoid of infrastructure. This very impassioned spirit and innovative zeal has seen the Corps surmount all odds adroitly combining technology with indefatigable human will, to meet the demands of communications in all operations including the conflict with China, wars with Pakistan, OP Pawan, OP Vijay, OP Parakram and countless other operations, disaster relief aid to civil authorities and so on. Some invaluable major pioneering efforts have been the Army radio engineered network (AREN) area grid systems, the Army static communication network (ASCON) which provides backbone connectivity to vital areas panIndia, the Army wide area network (AWAN), an enterprise wide messaging network and the mobile cellular communications which is of immense value especially for counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism (CI/CT) operations. Our challenges have been inclusive, ranging from creating a potent electronic warfare and signal intelligence capability,

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1. Defence Minister A.K. Antony presenting the first copy of the commemorative brochure to President Pratibha Devisingh Patil on the occasion of inauguration of Corps of Signals Centenary Year, in New Delhi on February 15, 2010. The Minister of State of Defence M.M. Pallam Raju and the Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik are also seen. 2. President Pratibha Devisingh Patil lighting of the lamp on the occasion of inauguration of Corps of Signals Centenary Year, in New Delhi on February 15, 2010. Defence Minister A.K. Antony and the then Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor are also seen. 3. Lt. Gen. P. Mohapatra paying homage at Amar Jawan Jyoti on the occasion of the Corps of Signals Centenary Year, in New Delhi on February 14, 2010. 4. Lt. Gen. P. Mohapatra handing over flags to the Centenary Mountaineering Expedition team leader Colonel Vivek Dogra, in New Delhi on September 7, 2010. 5. The Dare Devils of Indian Army performing at 33 Corps HQ Sukhna during the Corps of Signals Centenary Year celebration on May 26 & 27, 2010

which constitutes a national asset to building up a vibrant cyber security establishment, creation of data centres for the Indian Army and steering mammoth inter-service communication projects. The annals of history will also record the commendable performance of our Corps in adventure activities and sports. We have two Arjuna awardees on our rolls. Several of our players have found a place of honour in Olympics. The “Daredevils” have several notable world records to their credit. Our mountaineers have been part of the noteworthy expeditions; the Corps has been a pi-

oneer in micro-light flying while our representation in the scientific mission to Antartica has won wide acclaim. Woven into this splendid tapestry are our Centres of Excellence, the Military College of Telecommunication Engineering and Signal Training Centres, our concern for our brethren which finds reflection in the War Widows Boys Hostel and several benevolent endeavours. Ours is a Corps bristling with dynamism, proud in its being, but never content, forever aspiring to further the objectives of the Indian Army. We owe our achievements, great and small, to the dedicated Signalmen—an epit-

ome of diligence and commitment, who have striven consistently and tirelessly for perfection. Our illustrious forbearers have nurtured the Corps assiduously and with a vision— “setting course by the stars, not by the lights of every passing ship”, giving us our sense of purpose. On this day, reverence of those who helped shape the destiny of this Corps is both our responsibility and our honour. On this historic occasion, we rededicate ourselves to the cause of our great Army and this incredible nation and solemnly pledge to carry forward the legacy bequeathed to us. Teevra Chaukas! Jai Hind!

s the DCOAS (P&S), my responsibility is principally related to coordinating the modernisatgfggion, equipping and capability development of the Indian Army, both for immediate and future requirements, through respective directorates. This also includes updating of short-term and long-term perspective plans in keeping with the changing security perspective, equipment availability, fiscal parameters and formulation of General Staff Policy Statements. SP’s: Despite the changes in the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2008, the procurement procedure of new weapon and other defence systems takes inordinately long which, apart from resulting in increased costs, may also result in procuring systems which are technologically outdated. What are the measures being taken to overcome this drawbac ime frame for each and every activity involved in procurement, right from the stage of acceptance of necessity till the contract is signed. The entire duration of the process now ranges from 20 to 34 months. In order to achieve these timelines, preventing increased costs/cost overruns and achieving technology updatedWhat are the measures being taken to overcome this drawbac ime frame for each and every activity involved in procurement, right from the stage of acceptance of necessity till the contract is signed. The entire duration of the process now ranges from 20 to 34 months been put into place for formulation of explicit and technically achievable.SP’s: Despite the changes in the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2008, the procurement procedure of new weapon and other defence systems takes inordinately. What are the measures being taken to overcome this drawbac ime frame for each and every activity involved in procurement, right from the stage of acceptance of necessity till the contract is signed. SP’s: Despite the changes in the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2008, the procurement procedure of new weapon and other defence systems takes inordinately long which, apart from resulting in increased costs,takes inordinately long which, apart from resulting in increased costs, may also result in procuring systems which are technologically outdated. What are the measures being taken to overcome this drawbac right from the stage of acceptance of necessity till the contract is signed. n

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SP’s LAND FORCES

INTERVIEW

‘Future wars will be intense, swift, non-linear, network-centric with technology intensive weapon systems’ The professional and institutional ethos of the Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (EME) Corps and the multifaceted support service provided by EME helps Indian Army maintain its operational readiness. In an interview with SP’s Land Forces, Lt General Ajai Chandele, Director General, EME, Indian Army spoke about the engineering support challenges in the service. PHOTOGRAPH: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

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SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): The Indian Army is modernising and the state-of-the-art equipment is in various stages of procurement. As an organisation providing engineering support what are the major challenges faced by Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (EME) Corps? Lt General Ajai Chandele (DG): The Indian Army today is in a major modernisation drive to upgrade its weaponry and technological capabilities. Major procurements are under way which include the T-90 and MBT Arjun for the armoured corps, upgrades in night fighting capabilities for the mechanised infantry, mediumisation of the artillery, induction of air defence missile and gun systems and the future infantry soldier as a system (FINSAS) for the infantry. Stateof-the-art electronic warfare and communication systems are being planned, while simultaneous enabling for network-centric warfare (NCW) is in progress with battlefield surveillance systems and tactical command control communication and intelligence system (TAC C3I) in various stages of induction. Advanced state-of-the-art helicopters, UAVs, ballistic and cruise missile systems have been inducted into the Army. Ideally the Indian Army aims to maintain a three generations weapon system mix of state-of-the-art technology, current technology and mature technology (in the ratio of 30:40:30). However, due to financial compulsions, exhaustive procurement procedures and other related issues, the ratio today is 5:25:70. This I feel is the biggest challenge facing the EME—the task of maintaining a large percentage of vintage equipment. SP’s: What are the major hurdles in maintaining vintage equipment? DG: Maintaining an equipment profile where more than 60 per cent equipment are living an extended life and in some cases having gone through three to four overhauls is a big challenge. The challenge is further compounded by drying up of foreign sources of supply of spares as they have graduated to more advanced technologies. While the modernisation under way will result in much improved capabilities for the Indian Army in the future, the equipment management challenges of maintaining obsolete equipment alongside modern technologies should engage the attention of the Army. With more and more sophistication in technology and induction of these advanced systems at each level of the armed forces organisations, there is a requirement to increase the technical threshold of the individual soldier and also increase the technical competencies of the engineering support organisation and echelons within the armed forces. Also, proliferation of these modern systems poses enormous challenges to the commanders in terms of operational techniques as well as the way armies are administered and maintained. The current engineering support organisation of the Army, although suitable for the battles till date, needs to be restructured and strengthened to meet these new challenges of the future.

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needs to be more responsiveness in availability of spares. OEMs should integrate into the system to ensure that spares are available at rate contracts at their outlets spread all over the country.

SP’s: The ‘womb to tomb system’ of equipment management is followed the world over. How well is this implemented in our Army? DG: This system of equipment management is the established best practice in armies across the world with strict coordination between all agencies involved with equipment management. The system in our Army, on the other hand, has two of the involved agencies i.e. the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) outside the control of the Integrated Defence Staff which makes them less responsive to service requirements. What is needed is a systems approach that smoothly integrates the functioning of these agencies to ensure that ambitious weapon upgrades or new weapon systems procurements do not get riddled with low availability concerns in the future, due to inadequate safeguards in the contracts with the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for lack of provision of spares and other engineering support essentials. SP’s: There has been a focused drive in the Army to increase the ‘teeth to tail’ ratio. How does this impact the EME? DG: The concept of the ‘teeth to tail ratio’ has been confused in the Army leading to large manpower cuts in the engineering support organisation, especially at a time when complex state-of-the-art weapon systems are being inducted while mature ageing systems still need to be maintained in the interim. The teeth to tail ratio has been interpreted to mean different things ranging from ‘ratio of bayonet strength to non-bayonet strength in a combat unit’ to ‘ratio of combat troops to support troops in a force’. As per the US Marine Corps, the teeth is everything that delivers combat power and the tail includes all the support to maintain its strength such as support staff, from the Pentagon-based command structure right down to the janitorial staff in the Department of Defence. In Indian Army, it has been used to determine the relationship between the numbers of soldiers in combat arms to those in the support services. Let me examine this tooth

to tail ratio in greater detail as defined by the Indian Army. Every armoured squadron or combat team has two vehicle repair teams (AVTs), one from the LRW and the other from the workshop that operate with it for in situ repairs. These operate ahead of the essential vehicles column, the B Echelon and the rear parties of the regiment, but yet get counted towards the tail and not the teeth. There are some schools of thought who maintain that war is just a fight between soldiers in combat arms. But this is not the case. It is true that the Army is a fighting machine, but there are three basic needs which needs to be fulfilled if it is to achieve its full potential in battle—leadership, equipment and training. Wars involve the employment of a great deal of modern and sophisticated equipment and the EME plays a major role in assisting the Army’s posture of operational preparedness and combat effectiveness to win any war. If combat arms are the teeth of the Army, then EME has a vital function of keeping them sharp and it is certainly not the tail. SP’s: What do you feel is the manner in which the engineering support provided by the EME, perceived by the environment? DG: The question is a difficult one to answer as my perspective will always be biased towards the EME, but let me make a fair and frank attempt at this answer. There are concerns in certain quarters of the Army that the echelon repair system is rigid and there is limited provision of repair and recovery cover on real time basis during actual combat phase. I think there is a need for seamless integration of the repair and recovery echelons with the fighting echelons. There is also a feeling that procurement of non-standardised equipment is leading to vast and unmanageable inventory with poor engineering support and spare part support. Standardisation is the need of the hour. In addition, certain low population high-tech equipment could be outsourced for maintenance and repair as it may not be cost-effective to train the personnel on the equipment. Most users want a single window responsibility for engineering support as well as spares support and that these need to be integrated at Division level and below. There

SP’s: Can you highlight the model of engineering support in other armies of the world? DG: The engineering support being provided by the Corps of EME will need a constant review with change of technology and in the future battlefield. The conceptualisation of this change will be ably benefited by analysing the models of existing armies of developed nations of the world. It is seen that the philosophy of ‘replace forward and repair rearward’ and echelon system of engineering support, as is the backbone of our repair system, is also prevalent in most of the armies. Moreover, most armies have dedicated repair support agencies for army outfits maintaining high technology weapons and equipment. The primary focus of maintenance resources in the combat zone is directed towards weapon systems. The maintenance work is performed as far forward as possible. Testing equipment, recovery equipment and higher mechanic skills have been placed at the lowest possible levels, so that the equipment can be returned to fully mission capable status. SP’s: What restructuring can we do to improve our engineering support? DG: The Army is inducting complex and state-of-the-art equipment. This essentially needs the maintainer to be integrated with the equipment thus necessitating dedicated and intimate engineering support at unit level. We need to diagnose and make replacements in the forward echelons, and repair the echelons in depth due to high cost of facilities for repair of this type of equipment. Another challenge is that while the equipment has become complex, no additional manpower is available. The answer lies in outsourcing low technology/civil enduse equipment and enhancing technical threshold of the user. We also need to look at the intake level of our EME mechanics. We need to lay greater emphasis on brain and have intake of soldier (Technical) on an allIndia merit or better still have a common entrance exam model like the IAF and Indian Navy to get better technically competent intake at least for the technical arms and services. We also need to enrol diploma holders (ITI graduates) directly. To make our engineering support more responsive, we need to ensure no movement of equipment behind Corps zone. Responsive and integrated spares and supply chain management is essential. A dedicated communication set up for EME and better mobility for its repair teams is of utmost importance. (Views expressed and suggestion made in the articles are made by the author in his personal capacity and do not have any official endorsement) To read the complete interview log on to: www.spslandforces.net/interviews

MASTER IN STRATEGY

Design and production of electronic defence systems by ELETTRONICA S.p.A.

T EC H N O LO GY

S I X T H O F A SE R I ES O F S I X A RT I C L ES O N BATT L E F I E L D M A N A G E M E N T SYST E M

Bid for Best Tech The procurements must ensure a level playing field, providing equal competition to all players including the DRDO and PSUs ILLUSTRATION: Anoop Kamath

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

hough India is a democracy, the decisions taken are often not by consensus. Net-centricity in the Indian Army too has progressed based on individual understandings, perceptions and decisions. These too have been hampered by the lack of a netcentric warfare (NCW) philosophy and levels of understanding of technology by crucial appointments in the decision-making chain. When the Directorate General of Information Systems (DGIS) was established couple of years back, the need for a battlefield management system (BMS) for the fighting units was not felt necessary. Net-centricity was planned at Brigade and above levels. Despite knowing that the key to success will lie in attaining higher levels of net-centricity, harnessing of information technology for effective command and control across the battalion/regiment level forces for an accelerated decision-action cycle and an ability to conduct operations simultaneously within an all arms group was not planned. This understanding dawned at a later stage. To that end, the Indian Army is already late in even commencing the process to acquire a BMS.

Operational Necessity Operational necessity of the BMS constitutes the vitals for having a faster decision process by commanders at all echelons, better decisions based on reliable operational information provided in real time and the ability to quickly close the sensor to shooter loop. Overall scope of the system is to integrate, test and field a BMS duly integrated with other components of the tactical command, control, communications and information system (Tac C3I). For such a system to be customised to meet Indian Army’s specific requirements, it will need to be first integrated and tested in a controlled environment in a test bed laboratory followed by validation trials in field conditions. It is only after successful validation of the system in field that the process for equipping will begin. The concept of the BMS is to have an ideal system which should be able to integrate the means of surveillance and engagement through an automated decision support and command and control system. Exploitation of technology would aim at rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information, enhanced situational awareness, and capacity to react to information and sharpen ability to synchronise and direct fire, thereby establishing and maintaining overwhelming operational tempo. This is very relevant at the cutting edge as well, where decisive contact battles will be fought.

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Present Status Not only are the bureaucratic processes and the labyrinth of Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) time consuming, the Services bureaucracy matches the pace as well. As part of the pursuit for a BMS, a feasibility study for the BMS with members from the private industry, was ordered by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and completed in early 2009. Simultaneously, the DGIS drew a Draft Provisional Staff Qualitative Requirements (PSQR) for the BMS. A PSQR has more flexibility than the General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR), the former being better suited for a project like the BMS

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The acquisition route should be ‘Buy and Make’ with adequate scope for customisation that requires time and induction of technology. By the time the Draft PSQR was approved at the Indian Army level, more than one year had elapsed— proving the oft quoted point that the Services bureaucracy is worse than the bureaucracy at the Ministry level. This led to a second feasibility study to be ordered by HQ IDS under a strange rule that the feasibility study accompanying the PSQR should have been held within one year. The first feasibility study was to establish whether the BMS could be acquired indigenously, and it did. Why then the requirement of a second study? It reminds me of a lady who after a family planning operation applied for the much publicised cash incentive but was told she cannot get it as she had only one child whereas the incentive was for women who underwent such operation after two/three children. Well rules are rules and the Services adhere to them strictly.

Acquisition What acquisition route should we be looking at? Should it be ‘Buy’, ‘Make’ or ‘Buy and Make’ and whom should Project BMS be offloaded to? These are questions on the minds of people who are affiliated/want to be affiliated to the project, especially since the stakes are pretty lucrative. The shortest route to any system obviously is ‘Buy’, but considering the Indian requirements, buying a

BMS off the shelf really is not the answer. The longest route is the ‘Make’ procedure, which not only implies starting from the scratch, but is also the longest haul against bureaucratic procedures. The ‘Buy and Make’ route has been used in the past, very successfully in the artillery command, control and communications system (ACCCS), which has already been fielded in the Indian Army. While globally, the BMS caters for joint service net-centricity from the tri-service apex all the way down, in the case of Indian Army it implies only Battalion/ Regiment and below, down to the individual soldier/weapon platform. Considering that almost 90 per cent of technology required for the BMS is already available in the market and not only the Indian Army but those paramilitary forces (PMF) and police units fighting terrorism/ insurgency also require it, there is a need to accelerate its acquisition and consider a ‘Buy and Make’ route over the ‘Make’ only route. However, considering the current dispensation, the ‘Make’ route is more likely to be adopted, which may actually be worded ‘Make India’. Should this happen, it will actually amount to indirect ‘Buy and Make’, as indicated by past experience. Couple this with the question to whom should Project BMS be off loaded? Logically, a level

Fielding of the battlefield management system will be an important facet of capability building in the Army

playing field should be ensured with all players including the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and public sector undertakings (PSUs). But will this happen? A report in SIPRI asks, “Is the Indian Government willing to put a stop to its protectionist policies that continue to favour the Government’s own companies?” Further, critics’ question the offset procedure by saying it is a relatively inflexible approach; a system under which suitable private sector partners for foreign firms have to be vetted in the first instance by state-owned industries; and arguably the relative inexperience of Indian firms in positioning themselves to benefit from offset obligations. The relevant issue is not whether what SIPRI says is untrue, partially true or true but that the Indian Army needs the best technology. This is something the Indian Army will have to fight for.

Best Technology Bid Situational awareness existing in the Indian Army is at present on ad hoc basis whereas the requirement is of an integrated network system. Fielding of the BMS will be an important facet of capability building in the Army. Delay in fielding of the BMS will give an avoidable advantage to our adversaries. We need to get our act together in order to prepare adequately for the 21st century challenges. Project BMS needs to be accelerated. The acquisition route should be ‘Buy and Make’ with adequate scope for customisation. The procurements must ensure a level playing field, providing equal competition to all players including the DRDO and PSUs. Additionally, we must graduate from the ‘best price bid’ to the ‘best technology bid.’ (Concluded)

C O V E R S T O R Y / M I L I T A R Y H I S T O R Y << Continued from page 3 sub-conventional operations for the past 50 years, of which, the last two decades have been intense. This has provided the Army with rich combat experience. The Indian Army possesses the requisite capability to be able to effectively deal with internal conflict situations in coordination with civil agencies mandated for this purpose. l Equipping a large-standing Army with such varied challenges is a difficult and dynamic process. Our equipment profile thus caters for meeting these challenges. l The Indian Army remains one of the best organised, structured, equipped and disciplined organisation to react both to natural and man-made disasters. Our record in this field has been well appreciated, both within and outside the country, our concept being “First Responders—Last Resort”. It has the requisite capabilities and wide experience to fulfill international peacekeeping obligations, under aegis of the United Nations. l The Indian Army soldier is infused with a set of traditional regimental values. The ethos of naam, namak and nishan i.e. ‘name, honour and dignity’ is ingrained in all soldiers with an unwavering will to succeed. With its diverse multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural composition, the Indian Army remains a shining example of ‘unity in diversity’. Vision for the Army: The vision of the Indian Army is to ‘be a well motivated, operationally prepared, well-equipped force capable of meeting the security challenges faced by the nation. It also caters to the transformation process to function in a networked joint services environment to leverage technology and the human resource capital in consonance with the rich values and traditions of the Indian Army’. Force Structure Imperatives: Considering the diverse demands on the Indian Army, we need to possess the following capabilities: (a) Deterrence: A strong conventional deterrence backed by an appropriate strategic capability, to deter any potential adversary from undertaking inimical activities or initiating hostilities against India. (b) Conventional War Fighting Capability: To cater to the possibility of failure of our deterrence strategy, the Army needs to possess the capability to prosecute decisive conventional operations against a nuclear backdrop. (c) Sub-conventional Capability: The Army should possess the requisite capability to

be able to effectively deal with internal conflict situations, and function in subconventional environment. (d) Contingent Capability: The Army needs to possess credible capabilities to deploy the land component of a joint task force, for out of area operations/contingencies should the need arise. (e) Peacekeeping Capability: The Army has to possess capabilities to fulfill international peacekeeping obligations, under the aegis of the UN, preferably in areas of our strategic interest. (f) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: The region being prone to natural disasters, there is a requirement to create an humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capability to provide relief to the affected people.

Areas of Focus Modernisation and Technology Infusion: Our defence capability planning is based on upgradation of our operational capability, through modernisation, force restructuring and technology absorption. Rapid advances in technology have altered the way wars are fought. In particular, advances in surveillance, night vision, longrange precision weapons and computer supported networks provide asymmetrical advantages to a technology enabled force. Modernisation of our Army and infusion of technology is thus our prime focus. We have identified information warfare, surveillance, night fighting, long-range firepower, rotary wing capability, network-centricity and development of a future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS) as our priority areas. Defence Procurement: Modernisation of armed forces wholly depends upon the capital acquisition plan. While there has been a significant increase in the budgetary support over the years; several major modernisation programmes have failed to materialise for one reason or the other. We are taking a host of in-house measures to optimise internal processes to streamline the acquisition procedures. There is always a dilemma between indigenous production and imports. While we wish to induct the latest technology, it is in our long-term national interest to achieve self-reliance in the field of critical defence equipment. To that extent, we are optimising the capabilities of our Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the private industry with technical support from foreign companies. Concurrently, diversification of defence sourcing must form another important ingredient in

Continued from page 5 ture of terrain ensured large gaps between defended areas. The deployment included one infantry battalion at Dras; two infantry battalions, and a BSF battalion covering Kargil and Chorbat La held by Ladakh Scouts. As indications of Pakistani intrusion came on May 3, 1999, it became clear that armed intruders had occupied heights in the gaps between all defended areas in the sector. It became apparent that India was facing an attempt by Pakistan to change the LoC using its regular troops. The complacency of the local army formations in not conducting even routine surveillance in the winter months is clear. The initial reactions were unsatisfactory leading to poorly planned patrols and attacks. While these did fix the enemy, success came their way only when the whole act was put together. Air and artillery (155mm Howitzers) was employed with devastating effect to allow the Indian soldier, the infantry man to live up to his reputation of fortitude under adversity and courage and determination in the attack.

Operation Parakaram Operation Parakram, which means “valour” was a momentous event which could have unleashed a major war on the subcontinent. It involved a massive build-up Indian Army ordered in the wake of the December

our forward looking defence planning. Human Resource Development: While we may get all the technology and resources, the integration of technology with the systems, upgrading aptitude and threshold level of the soldiers and leaders and enmeshing them to operate with other Services is another task that needs focused attention. Here we face the same challenges as everybody else. Better job opportunities in the civil street means that we do not always get the best. Continuous commitment of the Army in internal security tasks, vast variety of operational roles and shrinking training areas are the other challenges we have to overcome to develop our human resource capital. Leadership Challenges: The changing face of 21st century conflicts will call for adaptive leaders who are dynamic enough to foresee the diverse range of challenges, some of which are yet elusive and undefined. These adaptive leaders will need to be responsive, decisive and highly motivated. While this will warrant junior commanders to be able to undertake independent actions and operations within the higher commander’s overall intent; the development of strategic culture and operational art amongst our senior leadership is imperative. To train senior leadership to orchestrate and manage change is a key focus area. In low intensity conflicts, success will have to be achieved with restricted and surgical use of combat power, calling for the development of even higher leadership skills. In today’s transparent age, the Army cannot escape media scrutiny and thus the challenges of ‘media glare’ will have to be tackled. Senior officers therefore have a particularly onerous responsibility to lead by example and set the standards by maintaining a high level of personal and professional integrity. Transformation of the Indian Army: Recognising the need to change, the Army has concluded a comprehensive study aimed at enhancing operational effectiveness. We are also examining ways to enhance efficiency of our headquarters, ensure cost effective and responsive logistic support, improve financial management and upgrade training standards. I am confident that the implementation of the recommendations of the study will result in a modern Army that is prepared for the emerging security environment and the complex and uncertain challenges of the 21st century. Jointmanship: Today, it is an accepted fact that no single component of military power—be it land, maritime or air—can win wars alone. Success in modern war will hinge

on the formulation of a joint military strategy based on political and military aims. Synergy is an operational imperative. We have to enhance the levels of jointness to optimise our war-fighting potential. A primary area of focus would be to develop as a force capable of operating in a joint network-centric environment. The Army is fully committed to jointmanship and the ‘purple’ approach. Inter-Agency Coordination: Armed forces are a potent tool of comprehensive national power. Towards this end, the National Security Council (NSC) and its associated organs need to develop a focused strategic vision to take a long-term view of national security. Establishment of institutionalised mechanisms and processes for greater interagency coordination in handling security issues between various government agencies is an imperative. Such an approach has become absolutely essential to enable coordinated reactions to emerging threats and realities that prevail in our immediate neighbourhood. I must admit that our current approach is somewhat compartmentalised and needs comprehensive focus. Defence Cooperation: Military diplomacy is an effective instrument and a wellorchestrated and calibrated employment of the soft power of the armed forces needs to be exploited to further the nation’s foreign policy. The positive spin-offs of such endeavours are numerous; apart from contributing to image projection, they are of great utility in improving the capability to operate together and foster mutual understanding. This is also the basis for addressing shared concerns over threats like terrorism, extremism and militancy. Defence cooperation with friendly foreign countries thus remains an area of priority focus.

Conclusion To conclude, I would emphasise that instabilities on our periphery will have spill over affects on our security. The Indian Army has been the guarantor of peace and stability for the nation. Induction and absorption of technology, development of adaptable leadership and ability to function effectively in a joint services, multi-agency and multinational environment is absolutely essential. We need to constantly evolve and transform, assimilating the best knowledge and experiences we gain through our interactions with the civil sector and other foreign militaries. I can say with confidence that the Indian Army is fully prepared and motivated to play its part in the growth, development and security of our great country. Jai Hind.

PHOTOGRAPH: Wikipedia

The Way Ahead

Indian soldiers firing the Bofors gun during Kargil war in 1999

13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Parliament House. This 10-month-long mobilisation from January to October 2002, along the border with Pakistan generated high levels of tensions in the relations between the two South Asian neighbours and raised the prospects of a major war. The operation was a major effort in coercive diplomacy by New Delhi, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament on December 13,

2001, and while the government claims that their strategic objectives were met by mere posturing which avoided a war, military analysts are of the view that gains were not commensurate to the mammoth exercise in coercive diplomacy by India. However, it led to some positive changes in India’s military doctrine and it hastened military modernisation together with organisational changes.

Indian Army as it moves through the first quarter of the 21st century is likely to face three types of challenges and threats. These include traditional threats, contemporary threats in the form of terrorism, and insurgencies and contingency threats. In essence, India faces a far greater threat than any other country in the world because of a highly volatile strategic neighbourhood. Moreover, with India’s vibrant economic growth, it would naturally have to assume additional responsibility as a stabilising force in the region. It is encouraging to note that India’s security concerns have for the first time converged with international security concerns which makes global community understand the need for India to develop and modernise its military capabilities. Defence of a nation and development are complementary. If India aspires to be a regional/global economic power, its military power must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests. In this context, the transformation of the Indian military for the future, through technological improvements coupled with innovative operational art will give India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries, which is vital for preserving India’s sovereignty and furthering its national interests.

6/2010

SP’s LAND FORCES

TECHNOLOGY

Time for Offensive & Defensive Measures A holistic assessment of cyber threats is urgently required followed by defining a National Cyber Security Policy leading to a Cyber Security Roadmap, which needs to be implemented in a time bound schedule n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

nformation age multiplication is a necessity of modern times. However, such multiplication leads to a host of vulnerabilities. Penetration, theft, interference, injecting viruses, jamming of networks, C4I2SR, UAV data, radio, microwave, cellular and satellite communications, interfering and jamming of satellite/missile launches and programmes are all possible today. What are our cyber defences in such environment and what are we doing to upgrade them? Past experience shows that habitually we counter such threats with the “ostrich approach” and tend to douse curiosity under shrouds of secrecy. Applauding the “Emperor’s Clothes” may give short-term pleasure to some, but despite the veil of secrecy, the writing on the wall is clear—the Emperor is pretty much naked. Even the intercepts of former President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf ’s conversation from Beijing with his men in Islamabad during the Kargil intrusions were obtained through outsourcing and technically not done by our own agencies.

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The Threat Talk of cyber security and the focus at once goes to hacking, viruses, embedded malware and the like. In 1995, Japan’s Ministry of Defence and Headquarters of the three self-defence forces cut off regular power supply and switched to generators. The reason was advances in technological advances that enabled plugging into the electricity supply to extract data from computers five kilometres away. Look at the distance from our North and South Blocks to the Embassies in the diplomatic enclave astride Shanti Path in New Delhi. Should WikiLeaks then surprise us? Recent news of cyber attacks on the Commonwealth Games networks and Stuxnet attacks on INSAT 1B, pointing to the source inside China, are perhaps just a tip of the iceberg. The damage caused globally by “Ghostnet” and “Stuxnet”, unleashed by China is well researched and documented—Ghostnet penetrating more than 1,200 systems in 103 countries including India and “Stuxnet” infecting some 60,000 computers in Indonesia and 6,000 computers in India. Global reach of the expanding Bot Armies of China are also well known. The Chinese Government in addition to employing its own hackers manages massive teams of experts from academia and industry, organising them as Cyber Militias with support and direction of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In Pakistan, the Pakistan Hackers Club (PHC) and the G Force are notorious for hacking and operating under the ISI. Little surprise if they have been trained by the Chinese. Several cyber warfare (CW) units have been formed in China, hiring best IT graduates and culling manpower from some 25,000 software companies. PLA’s network warfare (NW) Battalions, electronic warfare (EW) Battalions, intelligence and psychological warfare Battalions have all been networked into the cyber warfare conundrum. Web Defacement Groups, spearheaded by PLA, were formed over a decade back and national level cyber defence and offensive exercises rehearsing pre-emptive cyber strikes have been held over the years. Focused research is being undertaken to take control of

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national networks of countries like Taiwan, India, Japan and South Korea. Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure can simply paralyse a country, bringing it to a standstill. Havoc can be wreaked on the banking system, stock exchanges, transportation—railways, airways and the like. Its coupling with asymmetric warfare can artificially inflate/crash stock markets, plunging a country into grave economic crisis. In war, a networked army can be rendered without information and with non-functional/dysfunctional weapon systems. The enormity of the threat is simply gigantic.

Indian Scene The annual percentage increase of ‘bot’ infected computers in India has already reached alarming proportions. No surprises as almost all computer parts of our so-called “indigenous computers” are manufactured in China and Indian companies are simply assembling them and certifying that they are free of malware, while virtually they are without means to undertake such checks. This is a happy situation for our adversaries as embedding malware at the manufacturing stage itself is an easy process. To top it, the modern bot in comparison to the earlier version is difficult to detect and does not raise suspicion as it does not slow down the speed of the computer. Indian websites of the Ministry of External Affairs, Bhaba Atomic Research Centre, National Informatics Centre, Ministry of Defence, National Safety Council, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Dalai Lama’s office and Indian embassies abroad have been hacked/defaced by Chinese web defacement groups. Data from Defence Research and Development Organisation, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, naval dockyards, nuclear installations, military bases, defence HQs, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and other think tanks have been stolen by Chinese hackers. Considering the finesse and pattern, cyber attacks in India have Chinese government patronage though China would like us to believe these are courtesy criminal gangs based in Sichuan and Guangdong. Recent WikiLeaks exposé that the US has been indulging in cyber espionage should not come as a surprise. Talk of cyber warfare in civil sector in India and the response you get is that any measures that need to be instituted should be defence driven. This is a defeatist approach. Actually, we have a Catch-22 situation in place. First, because defence is only one of the cyber war targets and there is no reason the civil sector raises the issue as forcefully to protect critical infrastructure. Second, because our MoD is sans an institu-

We need to ensure a fundamental shift from individual entity for overview, control and assessment of cyber security measures

India’s cyber defences are in the nascent state. Our adversaries’ cyber warfare capabilities pose a potent threat to India.

tionalised strategic thinking mechanism and the bureaucracy has not moved much despite noises on the issue being made by the Services in recent years. Third, because our nine odd major intelligence agencies operating on varied wavelengths and control have not come up with an overall cyber threat assessment, highlighting the extreme urgency for chalking out a National Cyber Security Policy. Fourth, there is no hue and cry to shake up the powers to be mainly because of lack of public awareness. Fifth, the media prioritises sensationalism and scams above national security and is apparently engaged in more profitable activities (remember Radia Tapes) rather than devoting time for ‘mundane’ issues like cyber security. Currently, the National Talent Research Organisation (NTRO) is the focal point for cyber defence. However, this organisation is inadequately organised, staffed and equipped to deal with such gigantic responsibility in addition to its other tasks, especially when the country is importing almost 90 per cent of computers, telecommunication equipment and critical software without requisite testing facilities in place to undertake cyber checks. Though the NTRO is pushing for indigenisation, it has little effect due to lack of government focus on the issue. Besides the much publicised establishment of Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at the national Services levels, they have a restricted role and do not constitute ‘information assurance’ which is the need of the hour.

Requirement Absolute cyber security undoubtedly is a myth. However, complacency can put us back by many years if we are subjected to sustained cyber warfare—that our adversaries are vigorously preparing for. We need to holistically assess the cyber threat, appreciate what our comfort levels are and find means to upgrade them. The following issues merit urgent attention at the national level: l A holistic strategic appraisal is required to define the cyber threats we are likely to face in future. The initial appraisal could cover a period up to 2020, which should then be reviewed annually/biannually. This exercise needs to be undertaken at the national level by a suitable committee comprising nominated representatives from the military, intelligence agencies, agencies/organisations charged with critical infrastructure, research and development organisations, IITs, private industry and academia. Such appraisal should be undertaken in a time bound schedule. l Based on the above appraisal a National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) should be speedily formulated. l The NCSP should lead to the Cyber Security Roadmap 2020. This should include

the organisations that are required at various levels to deal with future cyber threats and the measures that need to be adopted, research and development and fiscal back up that will be required including prioritisation. As part of the national cyber security set up, establishment of a National Cyber Command and a Tri-Service Cyber Command should be considered. Concurrently, a holistic appraisal should be undertaken to establish our short-, medium- and long-term requirements of hardware, software and security solutions. Based on this, the government should enunciate a policy for their indigenisation. This will require issue of a specific government directive nominating a group of industries responsible for the same coupled with the DRDO, IITs, etc. For developing security solutions, the policy should take into account COTS solutions (including their possible customisation) and development by specifically chosen and nominated indigenous private industry having administered an oath of secrecy akin to a government organisation. There should be reason for mistrust as these Indian nationals under oath would be no different from personnel of CAIR. Action needs to be initiated for establishing adequate facilities for undertaking cyber checks of all hardware and software, commencing critical networks. Facilities need to be established for speedy certification of security solutions, to accelerate net-centricity at all levels simultaneously. Defensive measures can hardly cope with the requirements of cyber warfare. We must adopt a parallel defensive and offensive approach. Offensive cyber capabilities must be developed as a deterrent. We also need to develop the national will to establish credibility of such deterrent which may require its selective demonstration against a rogue adversary. A National Cyber Security Awareness Programme needs to be launched to educate the masses on the issue. Cyber security requires a national effort in which all citizens need to be involved. Finally, the government needs to be as transparent as possible on the issue, as national security permits.

Cyber Deterrent As any developing nation, India’s cyber defences are in the nascent state. Our adversaries’ cyber warfare capabilities pose a potent threat to India. Much needs to be done, which will require a national effort. We need to ensure a fundamental shift from individual entity for overview, control and assessment of cyber security measures. A holistic assessment of cyber threats is urgently required followed by defining a National Cyber Security Policy leading to a Cyber Security Roadmap, which needs to be implemented in a time bound schedule. A simultaneous defensive and offensive approach is required, latter as a “cyber deterrent”, ensuring its credibility. Much ground needs to be covered and we need to act fast. (The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the writer.)

PHOTOGRAPH: US Army

T E C K N O W

Fight Smart XM25 ‘individual airburst weapon system’ is fitted with a chip that receives a radio signal from the gun sight which uses a laser range finder to determine the exact distance of the obstruction

he US Army is all set to use the XM25, a futuristic rifle capable of firing radio-controlled smart bullets, for the first time in Afghanistan. The XM25 has a range of 2,300 feet and has been designed to fire 25mm grenades, which can be set to explode right in mid-air after having travelled a particular distance. The XM25 ‘individual airburst weapon system’ developed by Heckler & Koch, is an effective airburst grenade launcher rifle derived from the XM29 OICW. The XM25 rifle has been developed with the aim to address all the existing capability gaps when it comes to defeating the defilade targets. The system has extra features to increase its potential battlefield deployment, an attraction for armies across the world. This system offers improved fea-

tures that can increase the soldiers’ efficiency when engaged in combat. It has an increased ability to hit every type of point target at a distance of almost 500 metres. The XM25 has 25mm munitions including the highly effective high explosive air-burst (HEAB), door breaching, armour piercing and anti-personnel munitions together with two types of munitions that are not lethal—the agent and blunt dispersing airburst. The weapon was initially designed to provide the soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan increased ability to set the necessary fuse of every round in

order to have it explode over the chosen target. After placing the aim point of the XM25 on the target, the soldier will be able to activate the additional laser range finder in order for the weapon to evaluate and calculate the necessary range to that particular target. The weapon will convert this to the necessary time of flight requested by the fuse setting. The XM25 has been designed to enable the soldier to utilise the existing XM116 integral fire control system. This highly effective system includes night and day channels thus increasing the battlefield adaptability of

the weapon. The system includes a ballistic computer, a laser rangefinder, a compass, a fuse setter and an internal display. XM25 ‘ weapon weighs just 12 pounds and is thus easy to use for soldiers who can carry it for longer distances without getting tired. The weapon will weigh as much as the traditional M16 with the common M203 grenade launcher attached to it. XM25 is a semi-automatic weapon that can be used to fire the airbursting round from almost 600-700 metres. The accuracy of the weapon was already proven by the initial tests and the manufacturers estimate a constant increase in the effectiveness of the weapon. The latest versions of XM25 ‘individual airburst weapon system’ have a wide range of smart military equipment that can be used in order to increase its effectiveness in battlefield deployment. This equipment can include the laser range finder, the thermal optic and even the highly effective infra-red and fire-control system. This system can be used in order to wirelessly transmit the accurate distance between the target and the rifle right into the round’s fuse just before firing. This rifle control can increase the efficiency of the troops because they will be able to evaluate the real time conditions and targets without being prone to making mistakes and exposing themselves to unnecessary risks.

Continued from page 7 complement these surveillance and observation devices, include 84 mm rocket launchers, including some disposable ones, anti- material rifles (AMRs), under-barrel grenade launchers (UBGLs), new generation carbines, bullet proof vehicles, and accurate sniper rifles. However, the numbers acquired and the ammunition stocks are still inadequate and need to be made up more rapidly. The INSAS 5.56mm assault rifles have now been in service for over 10 years and also needs replacement. New 5.56mm assault rifles of bull-pup design with an integrated laser range finder and grenade launcher are under development. Efforts are also being made to provide infantry platoons and sections with integrated GPS-based navigation system, secure lightweight walkie-talkie radio sets and better protective gear with a helmet that incorporates a built-in head-up display.

curately destroy critical targets quickly as well as to minimise collateral damage. During the Gulf War I in 1991, PGMs formed less than 10 per cent of the total high explosive dropped over Iraq and were rather inaccurate. The “collateral” destruction of an air raid shelter harbouring women and children has been too well documented to bear recounting. The coalition forces did not destroy a single Iraqi Scud missile launcher. In Kosovo, PGMs accounted for about 30 per cent of the ordnance dropped and the accuracies had improved considerably by 1999. In the post-9/11 retribution

control, communication and information (TacC3I) system is under development. Under this mother system, various other systems such as command information decision support system (CIDSS), artillery combat command and control system (ACCCS), battlefield surveillance system (BSS), air defence control and reporting system (ADC&R), and battlefield management system (BMS) are being developed. Efforts are also under way to finalise a networkcentric warfare (NCW) philosophy. A triservice defence communication network (DCN) is in the stage of advanced planning. PHOTOGRAPH: US Navy

Mechanised Infantry The mechanised infantry is now equipped with BMP-1 and BMP-2 ICV Sarath. The variants include 81mm carrier mortar tracked vehicle (CMTV), a command post, an ambulance, armoured dozer and engineer and reconnaissance vehicles. Reconnaissance and support battalions (mechanised) need better surveillance radars, fire-and-forget ATGMs and effective night fighting capability.

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UAVs for Infantry Battalions

Micro UAVs like Elbit’s Skylark, among others, will improve the surveillance capability in conventional conflict and asymmetric conflict situations

The Army’s infantry battalions also need mini or micro UAVs like Elbit’s Skylark or Rafael’s Skylite, among others, to improve their surveillance capability in conventional conflict and asymmetric conflict situations. These UAVs could have a range of about 10 to 15 km, be light-weight (less than 10 kg), hand-launched, carry a single payload, for example a daylight video camera or infra-red camera for night operations, and should be inexpensive enough to be dispensable. A mini ground control station should be authorised at battalion headquarter (HQ) for planning and control. Ideally, these should be indigenously designed and developed and locally manufactured.

inflicted on the Taliban militia and its AlQaeda supporters in Afghanistan, the share of PGMs rose to nearly 60 per cent. During Gulf War II in Iraq, the ratio of PGMs went up to nearly 70 per cent. The Indian Artillery does not have PGMs in quantities large enough to matter. Only limited quantities of the Russian Krasnopol PGM have been imported for the Bofors 155mm howitzer. Among others, the Bofors Bonus PGM is a suitable candidate, subject to successful trials in the deserts and the mountains.

Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)

TAC C3I

PGMs are increasingly gaining currency as weapons of choice in conflict on land, to ac-

According to Lt General (Retd) Prakash Katoch, former DG IS, tactical command,

However, little progress has been made towards addressing inter-service interoperability challenges in the communications field. An RFP for the DCN system is expected to be issued in 2010. Cyber security and offensive cyber warfare are other areas that do not appear to have received the attention that they deserve. With China moving rapidly towards creating “one million laptop warriors”, neglecting this field could prove to be very costly in the long term.

Army Aviation

SP’s LAND FORCES

6/2010

Modernisation of Army aviation is also not making much headway. The aviation fleet continues to be based on vintage Chetak and

Cheetah helicopters. The long-pending acquisition of 197 light helicopters has been mired in controversy. The only addition has been that of small numbers of Dhruv light utility helicopters for logistics duties. Upgradation of India’s attack helicopter capabilities is also pending, though a tender has been issued for 24 attack helicopters for two squadrons of the IAF. Medium and heavy lift capability also must be enhanced for effective troop transportation and logistics support in the mountains and in the plains.

Comprehensive planning Modernisation and capability building involves a comprehensive planning process which considers a large number of factors. Broadly speaking, it is based on threat perception, technological changes and available resources. India’s modernisation process is primarily driven by the government and the armed forces has been streamlined over the years with preparation of a long-term integration perspective plan (LTIPP). The five-year perspective plans and yearly action plans flow from the LTIPP. The equipment procurement and manufacturing are derived from these plans and the induction is done by strictly following the defence procurement procedure (DPP). The delays occurring currently are due to several reasons such as insufficient and limited vendor base, non-conformity of the offers to the request for proposal (RFP) conditions, field trials, complexities in contract negotiations, limited indigenous capability and long lead time for indigenisation, etc. Further, the market for state-of-the-art defence equipment and platforms being circumscribed by denial regimes, limited availability of required type of material, complexities in construction and manufacturing involving integration of large number of systems, assemblies and sub-assemblies also cause delays. The procurement procedure itself needs to be reviewed in light of the above reasoning. The lethargy of the Defence Ministry in equipment procurement could have disastrous results in the future, bearing in mind that our adversaries are preparing at a rapid pace. We need a far greater focus and a firm political will to modernise our military and build the desired military capability for the future.

News in Brief JAPAN SHOULD IMPROVE DEFENCE CAPABILITY “Japan should improve its defence capability in the south-west where it shares a maritime border with China,” said Japan’s Vice Defence Minister Jun Azumi. The country has traditionally allocated its heavy defence capability to the north to respond to potential threats from former Soviet Union. However, Japan now seems to be shifting its focus to the South West. Japan is likely to boost its capability on land, sea and in the air in the future. The country is updating its National Defence Programme guideline for release by the end of this year.

tract signed in February and will continue through the second quarter of 2011. The US Army will conduct additional verification testing prior to the capabilities’ Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in 2011 and will be deployed to Afghanistan in 2012.

INDIAN ARMY TO GET ADDITIONAL AKASH MISSILES

BOEING DELIVERS MODERNISATION CAPABILITIES TO US ARMY

Boeing has begun delivering brigade combat team modernisation (BCTM) Increment 1 hardware to the US Army. The hardware includes network integration kit-equipped mine resistant ambush protected vehicles and Humvees, unattended ground sensors and unmanned ground vehicles. BCTM increment 1 capabilities will provide soldiers with enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as increased survivability and lethality. The deliveries are part of the low-rate initial production con-

Bharat Electronics (BEL) in India is expecting contracts worth `100 billion ($2.2 bn) from the Indian Army and Indian Air Force to produce several squadrons of the Akash missile system in the next few months. BEL military radar business unit General Manager P.C. Jain said that the Indian Army was eyeing two regiments of the surface-to-air area defence guided missile system. Each squadron of the missile system consists of 48 missiles, surveillance radar, tracking radar and a flight control centre. The missile system has a range of 25 km and can reach an altitude of 18 km and is capable of engaging four targets simultaneously. The Indian Army is in the process of finalising the configuration of the system to meet its requirements.

GD AWARDED SAUDI ARABIA TANK CONTRACT

31 January-3 February Soldier Technology US Marriott Gateway, Arlington, Virginia, USA www.soldiertechnologyus.com

7-10 February International Armoured Vehicles ExCeL Centre, London, UK www.internationalarmouredvehicles.com 9-13 February Aero India 2011 Air Force Station Yelahanka, Bengaluru, India www.aeroindia.in 15-16 February DWT-Unmanned Vehicles III Bonn/Germany www.dwt-sgw.de 20-24 February IDEX 2011 Abu Dhabi National Exhibition Centre, UAE www.idexuae.ae/ 14-17 March Soldier Modernisation Asia Amara Sanctuary Resort Sentosa, Singapore www.iqpc.com/Event.aspx?id=344996

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

INDIAN ARMY TO GET TWO NEW RIFLES The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in India is developing two indigenous Future-INSAS rifles for the Indian Army. Indian small arms system (INSAS) is a family of infantry arms consisting of an assault rifle, a light machine gun and a carbine. Army soldiers will use the new weapon, which can be operated effectively in urban or jungle environments, instead of the standard INSAS rifle. The DRDO is also developing a modern submachine carbine with a 5.56mm/30mm calibre, incorporating a pistol and a rifle design so that it can be fired with one hand. Armament Research and Development Establishment director Anil M. Dattar said the new rifle is designed to provide night vision through integrated thermal imaging sensors. The rifle and carbine of the future infantry soldier project will be completed in three phases, with the first phase expected to be completed in three years.

THALES, NEXTER AND SAGEM TO SUPPORT SCORPION PROGRAMME The French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA) has awarded a two-year contract to a consortium of Thales, Nexter and Sagem to handle the architecture phase of the Scorpion programme for the French army. The €21million (`126 crore) contract will create a dedicated company, Mars, which will ensure the capability and programme coherence of current and future equipment for combat units. Mars is a vehicle through which the consortium will provide the French land forces with a range of skills, expertise in combat equipment, and a detailed understanding of current and future operational needs. Scorpion is a project that unites several programmes to modernise the French Army’s eight combined arms brigades.

DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN FMBT

>> SHOW CALENDAR

1-3 February Soldier Modernisation India 2011 Venue to be confirmed, New Delhi, India www.soldiermodindia.com

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal

GD Land Systems has been awarded a contract to convert 15 of Saudi Arabia’s M1A1 tanks into the M1A2S model. The contract is an addition to a $58 million (`261 crore) contract originally awarded in 2008 to design, develop, convert, implement and test a hybrid configuration of the M1A1, M1A2 and M1A2 system enhancement package tank variants. The M1A2S vehicles will possess defined capabilities that increase lethality while limiting obsolescence. Work will be carried out at the company’s Joint Systems Manufacturing Centre in Lima, Ohio, US, with an estimated date for completion by March 31, 2012. The US Army TACOM lifecycle management command awarded the $19 million (`86 crore) contract on behalf of the Royal Saudi Land Forces.

RUSSIA TEST FIRES INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE Russia has successfully test-fired the RS 12M Topol intercontinental ballistic missile from Kapustin Yar landfill in Russia’s Astrakhan region, according to the country’s Defence Ministry. The RS-12M Topol is a single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile with a maximum range of 10,000 km (6,125 miles) which can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of 550kt, according to RIA Novosti. Russia’s strategic missile forces (SMF) commander Lt General Sergei Karakayev said SMF will be rearmed with multiple-warhead RS-24 missiles instead of the RS-12M TopolM missile systems.

Preliminary Staff Qualitative Requirement (PSQR) of future main battle tank (FMBT) has been formulated by the Army. Feasibility study on FMBT is being carried out by the Defence Research and Development Organisation. FMBT is likely to be developed by the year 2020. This information was given by Defence Minister A.K. Antony in a written reply in the Indian Parliament.

>> APPOINTMENTS

Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Assistant Correspondent Abhay Singh Thapa Assistant Photo Editor Abhishek Singh Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Administration & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers. Printed in India by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2010 Annual Subscription Inland: `600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com Letters to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: guidepub@vsnl.com neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD POSTAL ADDRESS Post Box No 2525, New Delhi 110 005, India Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: guidepub@vsnl.com

Lt General A.S. Lamba

Vice Admiral D.K. Joshi has been appointed Chief of Integrated Staff to COSC, Indian Army. Similarly, Lt General Chetinder Singh as Quarter Master General, Lt General M.C. Badhani as Engineerin-Chief, Lt General I.J. Singh as Director General Electronics and Mechanical Engineers, Lt General D.S. Sidhu as Director General Mechanised Forces, Lt General Jitender Singh as Director General of Rashtriya Rifles, Lt General A.S. Lamba Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Lt General D.S. Thakur as Director General Military Intelligence and Lt General N.B. Singh has been appointed as Director General (IS), Indian Army.

Representative Offices BENGALURU, INDIA Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey 534, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kammanhalli Main Rd, Bangalore 560043, India. Tel: +91 (80) 23682534 MOSCOW, RUSSIA LAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri Laskin Krasnokholmskaya, Nab., 11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia. Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260 www.spguidepublications.com www.spslandforces.net RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

6/2010

SP’s LAND FORCES

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