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ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES

ANNUAL REVIEW 2024

Estonian Defence Forces

ANNUAL REVIEW 2024

EDF Photo by Robin Saul

table of contents

annual review 2024

table of contents

Foreword / Major General Andrus Merilo

4‒5

Russia’s Preperations for the Next War / Military Intelligence Centre

6‒19

The Rapid Development of Unmanned Systems / Military Intelligence Centre

20‒21

A Thousand Times in Spotlight / Second Lieutnant Kaur Parves

22‒25

The Anchor That Rocked Security / Navy Captain Johan-Elias Seljamaa

26‒31

An Unclear Future for Offshore Wind Farms / Risto Saimla

32‒35

EML Ugandi Hunted Mines in NATO Mine Countermeasures Group / Lieutenant Commander Janno Lauri

36‒37

Exercise Okas of the Young Coastal Defence Squadron / Corporal Maria Tammeaid

38‒39

New Approach to Recruitment at the Estonian Military Academy / Eleri Lillemäe, Sergeant Kristjan Paavo

40‒47

The Estonian Division is Committed to Victory / Major General Indrek Sirel

48‒53

Renewed 2nd Infantry Brigade / Second lieutenant Hannes Parmo

54‒55

Modern Arms, Stonger Forces

56‒59

Fresh Armour for the Estonian Defence Forces / Major Wolfgang Lang

60‒63

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Estonian Skies / Arbo Probal

64‒67

Comprehensive National Defence During Exercise Decisive Lancer / Colonel Janno Märk

68‒73

French Allies at Exercise Pikne / Captain Laurine Crichton

74‒75

Supporting Ukraine Through Operation Interflex / Lieutenant Colonel Valjo Tooming

76‒79

Estonia’s Mission in Iraq / lieutenant Hans Lehepuu

80‒83

Military Aviation Oversight in Estonia / Major Lauri Leet

84‒85

Conscripts in the Special Operations Forces / Colonel Rivo Meimer

86‒89

Multidimensional Work of the Cyber Command / Captain Valdur Tammets

90‒93

New Horizons for NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia / Major Merle Norit

94‒95

annual review 2024

foreword

DEAR READER

ast year, the Estonian Defence Forces were in the spotlight of society, largely due to our actions and achievements. But even more so because of the heightened expectations from the public, driven by the deteriorating international security situation. The Annual Review describes the developments of the mi litary threat in more detail. The diverse media coverage over the past year has played a key role in stimulating and satisfying public cu riosity about the Estonian Defence Forces and the events unfolding around us. The Estonian Defence Forces Annual Review adds further depth to these discussions, especially regarding matters of public interest. An overview of how we have actually prepared for defence could also be of in terest. Estonian people have entrusted the Defence Forces with the responsibility of being ready to win a war in or der to preserve the country and its way of life. This is a clear and achievable mandate. Paradoxically, fulfilling this mandate is currently the only viable path to maintaining peace in the years to come. Our future is in our hands, provided we systematically and swiftly prepare our na tional defence for the most challenging scenarios. Si vis pacem, para bellum. Through their decisions last year and this year, the Parliament and the Government have con firmed their commitment to taking the military advice of the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces seriously, allocating the resources necessary for this purpose, which we have used wisely.

n many ways, we laid the foundations in 2024 for the military capabilities that will come to fruition this year, filling the entire formula of victory with substance. This means multiplication of the resources of society and the Defence Forces with our will to fight and the authorities entrusted to us and to our allies. Military impact is effec tive when the system that generates it is comprehensive. For the Estonian Defence Forces as a reserve force, the most important asset is its people: both those who have taken the military oath, including conscripts who ensure defence readiness, and the reservists who, as equals, will join our ranks without hesitation when called upon. In 2024, we made plans to ensure the day-to-day defence readiness in all domains, this year, we are focusing on preparations, and next year, we will conduct retraining. By 2027, we will be fully ready for the new situation. We

annual review 2024

have recognised the tasks of generating fighting power, the higher demands placed on each of us, the shortcomings in filling our ranks and we openly acknowledge this in the Annual Review. To recruit and retain the personnel need ed to maintain our will to fight, we must align the higher demands, the existing environment and the balancing re wards into a sound personnel strategy.

eapons, ammunition and plans are indispensable. As you, dear reader, will notice, we have not lowe red our standards in any area. We cannot afford to prioritise comfort, vanity or aesthetic considerations in our infrastructure or actions. This is especially true in a si tuation where, due to a very serious security threat, the expectations of other societal groups for financial support from the state are not fully met and our fellow citizens must endure the constant, sometimes frustrating, pre sence of the ‘voice of freedom’ in our skies or near our backyards. In 2024, we trained military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – a bulwark currently standing in defence of the democratic world. Estonia and the Estonian Defence Forc es continue to support the fight of Ukraine in every feasi ble way. At the same time, we are actively fulfilling NATO’s defence plans with real substance and have successfully carried out our mission in Iraq. Allies are important and all sides are working to keep the alliance strong. The Estonian Defence Forces Annual Review highlights the highly practi cal combined exercises PIKNE and DECISIVE LANCER, con ducted with both international and domestic allies, carried out in the steadfast spirit of how we would genuinely act in the event of a real need, even as soon as tonight. Last year brought both expected and unexpected chan ges to the Estonian Defence Forces. Yet it is our flexibility in the face of change, our genuine will to fight and the de dication of the entire nation that will ensure the survival of Estonia. Let the review in the following pages serve as an inspiration for smart changes in the Estonian Defence Forces, prepared for victory.

ANDRUS MERILO Major General, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces

EDF Photo by Karl Alfred Baumeister

foreword

annual review 2024

Security Environment

More than three years of high-intensity war of aggression in Ukraine have profoundly changed the Russian Armed Forces. Russia has suffered significant losses in both equipment and soldiers. This has compelled the political and military leadership of Russia to initiate a reform of its armed forces, as announced by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu at the end of 2022.

RUSSIA’S PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT WAR

annual review 2024

Security Environment A Russian soldier's helmet at the Ukrainian war trophies exhibition in Kiev on October 29, 2024.

Photo by Shutterstock

annual review 2024

Security Environment Military Intelligence Centre

here has been considerable spec ulation and analysis in Western media as to what the Armed Forc es of Russia will look like after the war. One thing is certain: Russia has identified NATO as its primary threat and justifies the expansion of its Armed Forces as a response to NATO’s aggressive actions, eg its support for Ukraine and the acces sion of Finland and Sweden, which has sig nificantly extended NATO’s borders. The escalated rhetoric of Russia is underscored by the statement made last December by the Russian Defence Minis ter Andrey Belousov, saying that a military conflict between Russia and NATO could be possible within the next decade. Opinions on the implementation of the military re form of Russia vary, from assessments of ti ming to evaluations of military capabilities, but they have so far been fairly consistent in one aspect: the Russian Armed Forces continue to pose a threat to the security of Europe as a whole and this threat will increase significantly with the implementa tion of the reform. In other words, Russia still has resources that it can reorganise and invest in military readiness. In a public statement at the end of 2022, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced plans to restructure the military-administrative organisation of the Russian Armed Forces, reform the military command and control, form addi tional military units and formations across nearly all armed services and increase personnel to 1.5 million service members by 2026. Although the military reform was presented as a response to NATO enlarge ment, it serves multiple purposes. Russia aims to implement the ongoing reform for four reasons: • it directly addresses the needs of the on going war of aggression against Ukraine; • Russia plans to expand and adapt its Armed Forces for a potential military confrontation with NATO and Western countries; • it justifies the continued mobilisation of Russia’s war economy and, by extension, society;

annual review 2024

Security Environment • it seeks to create the impression in the West that Russia retains its autonomy in decision-making and action, as well as its military strength.

DIRECT MILITARY NEED FOR REFORM During the war, the leadership of the Rus sian Armed Forces has been reaffirmed of the fact that the country’s conventional military strength relies primarily on its Land Forces, while other domains play a suppor ting role. The Russian Armed Forces consist of three branches: Russian Land Forces, Rus sian Navy and Russian Aerospace Forces. In addition, there are four special branches: Russian Airborne Forces, Air and Missile Defence Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces and Special Operations Forces. In 2025, an un manned systems force (commonly referred to as the drone force) will be created as an additional special branch.

Each branch conducts independent operations, often without the need for regional co-ordination or integration into a unified battlespace.

Russian special forces soldiers at a checkpoint in the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine searching cars on February 19th, 2024.

Photo by Sergei Nikonov / Shutterstock

The ongoing war has demonstrated that each armed branch conducts inde pendent operations, often without the need for regional co-ordination or integra tion into a unified battlespace. As a result, each service has effectively fought its own ‘service-specific war’ on Ukrainian and Russian territory as well as in internatio nal waters and airspace. The exception to this has been joint deep strike operations, which remain synchronised at the highest level by the General Staff of the Russian Ar med Forces. Consequently, it became logical to eliminate the role of Strategic Joint Com mands (Oбъединенное стратегическое командование военного округа) assig ned to military districts. According to a presidential decree, the military districts have now been reclassified as Strategic Territorial Formations (стратегическое территориальное объединение). They oversee and organise the activities of the Land Forces (army, army corps, individual units) as well as mobilisation preparations. annual review 2024

Security Environment The transition was made easier by the fact that the joint commands based on mi litary districts never developed true com mand structures, and internal rivalries led to strained relations between the staffs of armed services and special branches. In 2024, separate operational com mands were reinstated within the Russian Navy and the Russian Aerospace Forces, restoring their full control over their respective resources (fleets, air and air defence armies) and the planning of acti vities within their areas of responsibility. Paradoxically, the independence gained also implies that significant restructuring of the Navy and the Aerospace Forces is unlikely in the near future. These branches are expected to maintain their existing capabilities, except for those that directly support the operations of Land Forces or are already included in prior capability re newal plans. For example, the army reform within the Aerospace Forces includes the crea tion of an additional mixed aviation divi sion and an army aviation brigade for each combined-arms army of the Land Forces. This will increase the number of air force units and aircraft, particularly in the wes tern strategic direction. An increase can also be seen in the naval infantry units: the five naval infantry brigades of the fleets (including the Bal tic Fleet) are being reorganised into di visions. This is particularly notable given that the fleets of the Russian Navy lack the amphibious capabilities required for full-scale landing operations involving a naval infantry division. The establishment of the 104th Guards Air Assault Division – the fifth airborne division – can also be seen as a reinforcement of the capabili ties of the Land Forces. Similarly, in 2023, an additional airborne regiment was crea ted within each of the four pre-existing airborne divisions. As with the Navy, Russia does not have the air movement capacity for a full airborne division. This means that these developments are primarily aimed at rein forcing Land Forces in the war in Ukraine. At the same time, it is clear that even if the confrontation ends in a ceasefire or Russia is defeated, these war-hardened units will 10

annual review 2024

not simply disappear. If necessary, they could be used to launch new acts of agg ression – even against NATO countries.

SHORTCOMINGS IN THE RUSSIAN LAND FORCES

A solution is seen in the reestablishment of divisions as the primary planning and support structures within armies and army corps.

The war in Ukraine has revealed a num ber of shortcomings, challenges and new requirements in the Russian Land Forces. This has forced Russia to change the struc ture, tactics and equipment of its Land Forces to adapt to evolving combat condi tions and prepare for future conflicts. Abo ve all, the Land Forces have had to adapt to the unconventional and high-intensity warfare driven by unmanned systems. The war has demonstrated that Russia is unable to sustain the operational effec tiveness and sustainability of independent brigades or the tactical groups of the batta

Security Environment bat tasks, as larger and less agile military units are often more exposed to unmanned systems and precision strikes. This has led to the deployment of smaller, faster-manoeuv ring units to the line of contact, but has also increased disparities in the equipment and quality of the military units. A solution is seen in the re-establish ment of divisions as the primary planning and support structures within armies and army corps. In turn, under their command, regiments are viewed as the main level of tactical control. In addition to simplifying and streamlining command and control, this approach also helps raise the prestige of military leadership and, to some extent, address the shortage of qualified person nel by allowing the few capable officers to command larger formations. It also reduces the likelihood and temptation of a brigade commander personally leading a manoeuv re battalion in an attack, which is then dest royed by the enemy during the battle. Division commanders would typical ly not put themselves in this role and the loss of regiment commanders would be more acceptable. The re-establishment of divisions and regiments is also well-suited for the mass formation of standardised infantry units with a low level of technical proficiency.

DESTROYED ARMOUR lion formed on their basis. The most likely reason for abandoning brigades was their relatively low number and the dispropor tionate complexity and rigidity of their ma noeuvres compared to their actual combat effectiveness. Managing a combined arms battle at too low a tactical level (ie batta lion tactical group level) proved too chal lenging for the Russian Land Forces. This highlighted the clear need for improved command and control of ground units as well as a more flexible and layered structure. This is the result of the centra lisation of tactical control and command above the battalion level and a lack of con fidence in delegating independent respon sibility to tactical subunits. At the same time, the changing battles pace has forced smaller, dispersed military units (up to company size) to carry out com

New Russian conscripts standing in formation for the first time at the Tomsk military commissariat on November 22, 2024.

Photo by Dmitry Kandinsky / Shutterstock

The war in Ukraine has also highlighted the necessity for the Russian Armed Forces to upgrade their equipment and armaments, particularly for mechanised units, as out dated military equipment and logistical shortcomings result in heavy losses. Af ter abandoning the failed strategy of ma noeuvre warfare in the autumn of 2022 and shifting focus to attrition warfare, Rus sia has been forced to use older armoured vehicles in the war, such as the T-64, T-72 and T-80. These vehicles have proven vul nerable to modern anti-tank systems, par ticularly unmanned systems. According to Western public sources, the losses of Russia – destroyed, damaged or captured by Ukrainian forces – are esti mated at around 3,700 battle tanks, with approximately 2,600 of them believed to have been destroyed. Losses in 2024 are estimated to be around 1,400 tanks and annual review 2024

Security Environment

A man sits on a park bench in Moscow on September 26, 2024. The bench has an advertisement calling for voluntary contract service with the Russian armed forces.

Photo by Oleg Elkov / Shutterstock

475%

450 400 350

Russia's military equipment production growth

300 250

215%

200%

200

141%

150

149% 100%

100 50 0 Tanks

Armoured vehicles

Artillery

more than 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. According to the same source, this significant increase is attributed to the fact that 80% of Russia’s production of armoured vehicles and tanks comes from the modernisation and repair of existing equipment, rather than from the produc tion of new vehicles. The condition of the equipment remaining in storage has likely deteriorated over time, which may result in a slower pace of equipment renewal and a reduction in production volumes in Russia in the future. However, it can be assumed that these stocks will be taken 12

annual review 2024

Short-Range Air Defence

Medium and Long-Range Air Defence

The pace of Russian military equipment production is expected to remain steady in the near future.

Loitering Munitions

into use by 2026 at the current produc tion pace. According to official Russian data, a total of 1,530 new and modernised tanks and 2,518 infantry fighting vehicles and ar moured personnel carriers were delivered to the Ground Forces in 2023. Supporting estimates suggest that Russia maintained a similar production rate in 2024, repairing and producing more than 1,500 battle tanks and approximately 2,800 infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. Other public data indicates that, in 2024, Uralvagonzavod may have produced and delivered nearly 200 T-72B and T-72B1

Security Environment

tanks, modernised to the T-72B3 standard. Additionally, the Russian Armed Forces are estimated to have received around 60 to 80 new T-90M tanks. In 2026, Russia plans to produce at least 350 modern tanks, even if it does not open new production lines. The pace of Russian military equip ment production is expected to remain steady in the near future, even if Soviet-era equipment is fully depleted. If hostilities in Ukraine cease or if Russia intentional ly avoids further armoured losses, it will be able to repair or produce by 2026 the same amount of armoured equipment it has lost so far. After that, growth may slow,

but it is likely to continue at a pace of pro ducing new equipment at around a third of the current output. In other words, in the coming years, Russia will have enough equipment for at least one more military operation comparable to the aggression against Ukraine, but without the additio nal reserve to form new armoured units as part of a general mobilisation.

THE LAST SOCIO-ECONOMIC OPTION FOR THE PUTIN REGIME

Russian soldiers service a Yars RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile ahead of a parade in Moscow on May 2, 2024. The missile can carry three to ten separately-targeted nuclear warheads.

Photo by Oleg Elkov / Shutterstock

In December 2023, Russian President Vla dimir Putin signed a decree to increase the permanent strength of the Russian Ar annual review 2024

Security Environment

Russia's military spending (billion euros) 135

140

128

122

131

120

100

64 55

2021

2022

2023

med Forces to 2,209,130 personnel, with 1,329,000 being service members. A new decree was signed in September 2024, rai sing the permanent strength to 2,389,130 personnel, with 1,500,000 of them being service members. Russia has already increased the size of its Armed Forces twice since 2022: initially by 137,000, followed by another 170,000 (through mobilisation), bringing the to tal number of service members to 1.32 million. The figure of 1.5 million is clearly declarative in nature and even the current level is proving challenging to sustain. To maintain personnel, the Russian Armed Forces have sought to recruit volunteers for a fee, attempting to avoid other met hods such as additional mobilisation of reservists or expanding and prolonging conscription. The personnel losses in the Russian Ar med Forces have been steadily increasing. For instance, while the average daily loss in July 2023 was around 600 combatants, in 2024 the figure had doubled, reaching an average of 1,200 combatants per day. It should be noted that while in 2023 Russia was able to recruit nearly 1,500 contract soldiers per day, according to its own data, in 2024 this number decreased to 1,000 14

annual review 2024

2024

2025

2026

2027

A tank crewman looks out of the hatch of a T-72B3 tank during training near Krasnodar in the Southern Military District, Russia, on December 3, 2024. Russia is estimated to have lost more than 10,000 tanks in Ukraine.

Photo by Sergei Pivovarov / Sputnik / Scanpix

Russian MiG-29 and Su-30SM fighter jets of the "Russkiye Vityazi" (Russian Knights) fly in formation over the State Historical Museum during the 79th anniversary of Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9, 2024.

Photo by Shamil Zhumatov / Reuters / Scanpix

Security Environment

Enlargement of NATO 1949 1952 1955 1982 1990 1999 2004 2009 2017 2020 2023 2024

Russian Armed Forces engineers during training near Moscow on July 25, 2024. The car bears the inscription in Russian: "NATO will not pass!".

Photo by Maksim Blinov / Sputnik / Scanpix

A BTR-80 armored personnel carrier of the Russian Armed Forces near the Hmeimim air base in Syria on December 16, 2024.

Photo by Leo Correa / AP Photo / Scanpix

annual review 2024

Security Environment

Russian flags at a military cemetery in St. Petersburg on April 4, 2024. The Ukrainian Armed Forces estimate that more than 200,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war.

Photo by Shutterstock

annual review 2024

recruits per day. The pressure to accelerate the increase in the number of contract combatants was further highlighted by the rising one-time rewards offered by Russia for recruiting soldiers under contract. These rewards vary by region and can reach as high as 5 million roubles (€50,000) per recruit. If in the second half of 2022, a contracted soldier in Leningrad Oblast was offered around 200,000 roubles (€2,000), by 2024 this amount had increased to 2.1 million roubles (€21,000). However, it is pos sible that Russia will further raise these amounts to meet the publicly announced recruitment targets. After the reform, the Russian Armed Forces will almost certainly continue to rely on a the mixed principle of professio nal and conscripted personnel and a re

serve-based mobilisation system that can ensure a steady supply of personnel even during a prolonged conflict. However, the number of men of military age (19–54 years old) is expected to decrease by nearly 8% between 2022 and 2035 (from 35.2 million to 32.5 million) and will continue to decli ne rapidly in the following years. Measures to compensate for the personnel needs in combat-ready military units may include extending conscription and relaxing recruit ment or service requirements. Criminal and disciplinary issues in the Russian Armed Forces continue to worsen.

CAPACITY TO CONSOLIDATE RESOURCES The mobilisation of personnel has also brought about changes in the military industry. Increased funding for military

Security Environment

People stand in front of a poster reading "Our Defenders" at an arms exhibition in Moscow on May 1, 2024. The exhibition featured Western weapons captured by Russia from Ukraine.

Photo by Yuri Kochetkov / EPA / Scanpix

industrial enterprises has been accompa nied by the recruitment of additional emp loyees and the reorganisation of work into multiple shifts. This approach involves only some enterprises and does not extend across all sectors, but it highlights Russia’s ability to mobilise resources and produc tion capacity to meet priority demands where necessary. At present, the primary focus is on re pairing older military equipment stored in reserve bases, making it ready for use. At the same time, resources are also being di rected towards the production of high-im pact weapon systems and battle-tested equipment. This shift is facilitated by a formal 25% increase in the Russian federal military budget for 2025. The Russian govern ment plans to allocate a total of 41.5 tril lion roubles (€415 billion) to the military complex next year, with the military bud get itself set at 13.5 trillion roubles (almost €135 billion). In May 2024, it was declared that spending on defence, security and law enforcement accounted for 8.7% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Russia. Remarkably, according to estimates from public sources, nearly a third of all federal spending remains closed to public scrutiny. According to the official draft budget of Russia for 2025–2027, military spending is expected to decrease slightly. From 2026, the budget level will be 12.8 trillion roub les (€128 billion), and in 2027, it will rise to 13.1 trillion roubles (€131 billion). For

Members of the Russian youth organization Junarmiya with a World War II veteran in the town of Khartsyzsk in the Donetsk region of Russian-occupied Ukraine on May 9, 2024. Junarmiya, or Young Army (an all-Russian military-patriotic public movement), has over 300,000 members.

Photo by Aleksandr

Yermochenko / Reuters / Scanpix

comparison, while a total of 10.4 trillion roubles (€104 billion) had initially been al located for national defence for 2024, the supplementary federal spending budget in September raised the military and security budget by nearly 2 trillion roubles, bringing it to 12.2 trillion roubles (€122 billion). In simple terms, the military budget for 2024 was likely increased by at least 2 trillion roubles compared to the original plan. Whether the war against Ukraine ends in the near future or not, not even the of ficial level of spending will return to the pre-war level of 3.6 trillion roubles (€36 bil lion) or to the levels of 5.5 trillion roubles (€55 billion) in 2022 and 6.4 trillion roubles (€64 billion) in 2023. The militarisation of society and the economy will continue. Russia is increasingly jeopardising its own domestic stability and the functioning annual review 2024

Security Environment

Location of Russian units in the Leningrad Military District 1. 76th Assault Airborne Division, Pskov 2. 2nd Special Purpose Brigade (Spetsnaz Brigade), Pskov 3. 68th Motor Rifle Division (formerly 25th Motor Rifle Brigade), Luga 4. 26th Missile Brigade (Iskander), Luga 5. 69th Motor Rifle Division (formerly 138th Motor Rifle Brigade), Kamenka 6. Leningrad Military District Headquarters and 6th Combined Arms Army Headquarters, Saint Petersburg 7. Leningrad Naval Base (Baltic Fleet), Saint Petersburg 8. 44th Army Corps, Karelia 9. 80th Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade, Alakurtti 10. 200th Motor Rifle Brigade, Pechenga 11. 61st Naval Infantry Brigade, Sputnik 12. 14th Army Corps, Murmansk 13. Northern Fleet, Severomorsk (Russian Navy) 14. 403rd Composite Aviation Regiment, Severomorsk-1; 830th Independent Shipborne Anti-Submarine Helicopter Regiment, Severomorsk-1 15. 279th Shipborne Aviation Regiment, Severomorsk-3; 100th Shipborne Aviation Regiment, Severomorsk-3 16. 40th Composite Aviation Regiment, Olenegorsk 17. 98th Composite Aviation Regiment, Monchegorsk 18. 159th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Besovets 19. 33rd Independent Transport Composite Aviation Regiment, Levashovo 20. 332nd Independent Helicopter Regiment, Pushkin 21. 334th Transport Aviation Regiment, Pskov 22. 15th Army Aviation Brigade, Ostrov 23. 790th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Khotilovo 24. Baltiysk Naval Base (Baltic Fleet), Kaliningrad Oblast 25. 11th Army Corps, Kaliningrad Oblast 26. 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, Kaliningrad Oblast 27. 689th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Chkalovsk 28. 4th Composite Aviation Regiment, Chernyakhovsk 18

annual review 2024

N O R WAY

10 11

13 12 14

16 17 9

SWEDEN

FINLAND

18 8

5 19

HELSINKI

7 TALLINN

1 21

4 2

L AT V I A

LITHUANIA

24 26 25

27 28

POLAND

VILNIUS

RUSSIA

ESTONIA

RIGA

BELARUS MINSK

Security Environment of its economy, as military spending is being prioritised at the expense of all reserves and spheres of life. Therefore, the reform must at least appear successful and ensure that both the military and the economic struc ture remain at a high level of militarisation. Demobilising a military economy and restoring a normal national economy in a country of this scale is a delicate process, the failure of which would trigger a deep and prolonged economic crisis and likely lead to the collapse of the political regime. It is therefore improbable that the current regime will undertake such a course.

REFORM AS DETERRENCE With the reform, the Russian Armed Forces have chosen to restore their dominant po sition particularly in the Baltic Sea region. Russia tried to create the impression that the re-establishment of the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts was a necessary response due to the accession of Finland to NATO. The same applies to the establis hment of the 44th Army Corps, which is in tended for operations towards Finland and to cover the 1,300 km shared state border. The public was also told that the Leningrad Military District holds particular impor tance, as it is tasked with countering both Finnish and Estonian activities. In reality, the re-establishment of the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts is directly linked to experience gained from the war in Ukraine, which revealed that the previous structure and scope of the Western Military District were insufficient to carry out its assigned tasks. The dissolution of the Unified Strategic Command of the Western Military District and its division into the Le ningrad and Moscow Military Districts enab les a more focused approach to the specific nature of different operational directions. It also facilitates a more flexible increase in military forces in a given direction and al lows for swifter decision-making. This coinci des with the reasons given earlier, according to which Russia is moving towards a ‘divi sion–regiment–battalion’ structure, which will eventually reinforce all armies and army corps currently composed predominantly of brigades. The Russian Armed Forces can just choose when – and in which army – this reinforcement will take place.

Uniform of a Russian Armed Forces soldier.

Photo by Shutterstock

At present, the reform is primarily focused on the formation of the 68th and 69th Motorised Rifle Divisions of the 6th Army in the Leningrad Military District, the 72nd Motorised Rifle Division of the 44th Army Corps and the 71st Motorised Rifle Division of the 14th Army Corps, based in the Kola Peninsula. At the same time, the 27th Motorised Rifle Division of the 2nd Army of the Central Military District and the 73rd and 74th Motorised Rifle Divi sions of the 41st Army are also being for med. The formation of the newly created 25th Army forces for the Moscow Military District is also taking place on the territory of the Central Military District. Therefore, the Russian Armed Forces are simultaneously establishing regional military superiority in the Baltic Sea region, while also creating a rapidly deployable re serve in the central part of the country, ca pable of being deployed to any of the stra tegic directions of Russia if needed. Most likely, these formations are the ones the Russian Armed Forces are determined to complete during their reform, regardless of how turbulent Russia’s domestic politics or its position in the international security environment may become. ‖ annual review 2024

Unmanned Systems

The development of unmanned systems, in particular unmanned aircraft systems, has significantly influenced modern warfare in recent years.

UNMANNED SYSTEMS:

PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

he Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 marked the first large-sca le use of these systems, with Azer baijan successfully deploying Tur kish-made Bayraktar TB2 systems to strike Armenian targets. This conflict demonstrated the effectiveness of these systems in both intelligence operations and precision attacks, establishing them as an essential component of modern warfare. Unmanned systems are now employed on the battlefield by both Ukraine and Rus sia, with the latter planning to establish an Unmanned Systems Command in 2025. It is likely that similar commands will be estab lished in the armed forces of other countri es in the near future. The war in Ukraine has elevated the use of unmanned systems to an entirely new level. Both sides, Russia and Ukraine, have employed a variety of unmanned systems, ranging from small commercial systems to larger military platforms. Particularly no table has been the ability of Ukraine to de

annual review 2024

4000 3500 3000

Geran/Shahed attacks on Ukraine October 2022 – March 2025

2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 240 63 117 95 45 91 60 406 200 241 169 503 282 365 619 352 377 513 283 357 328 424 787 1334 1908 2373 1850 2628 3902 3535

Military Intelligence Centre

velop and manufacture long-range attack systems (systems that can fly thousands of kilometres). Projections indicate that Ukrai ne’s monthly output of long-range attack systems could surpass 800 units by the end of the year. Russia has also expanded its unman ned systems capabilities, primarily through

Unmanned Systems

the use of Iranian-origin Shahed systems. Between February 2024 and February 2025, Russia launched more than 15,000 Shahed systems in attacks against Ukraine. The increase in the use of Shahed systems from August 2024 is attributed to the launch of mass production of the systems for the Rus sian Armed Forces. The development of unmanned systems has progressed rapidly in both the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces. Both countries have introduced new technologies, such as fibre-optic-guided systems that reduce the impact of radio interference. Such unman ned combat aerial systems are equipped with a 10–20 kilometre fibre-optic cable that maintains a continuous connection with the operator. However, this limits the range of movement of the system, makes it vulnerable to physical obstacles and allows for rapid identification of the operator’s location. Given the continuous and extremely rapid development of unmanned aircraft systems, where significant innovations can occur within months, it is difficult to predict

Given the continuous and extremely rapid development of unmanned aircraft systems, where significant innovations can occur within months, it is difficult to predict the future of these systems with certainty.

the future of these systems with certainty. However, we can say that autonomous tar get selection, swarming capabilities and improved survivability against electronic warfare are expected in the near term. The use of unmanned underwater and surface systems in maritime operations has increased significantly. Ukraine has used unmanned vessels to attack Russian naval units and infrastructure in the Black Sea. These systems enable risk-free attacks on enemy vessels and port facilities, minimi sing casualties and enhancing operational effectiveness. In the future, unmanned systems are expected to become increasingly in tegrated into a wide range of military operations. More autonomous, artificial intelligence-based systems capable of inde pendently identifying and engaging targets will be developed. There is also a growing focus on developing counter-unmanned systems technologies, such as electronic warfare and anti-drone systems, to defend against the increasing threat posed by un manned systems. ‖ annual review 2024

headquarters

Photo by Mari Luud / Õhtuleht / Scanpix

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headquarters

The interest of the Estonian people, and thus the local media, in the activities of the Estonian Defence Forces shows no signs of waning and remains at a record high.

A THOUSAND TIMES IN THE SPOTLIGHT

igging deeper into the numbers, it becomes clear that the total num ber of media coverages, which in creased in 2014 and again more significantly in 2022, remained almost unchanged last year compared to the previous year. Specifically, the Estonian Defence Forces were featured in headlines, lead paragraphs, photos or other central el ements a total of 9,403 times. The annual figures leave little doubt about the primary cause of heightened interest – Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to underpin the defence discourse, fuelling the call for ex pert assessments from those in uniform. The public’s need for information is most clearly met through direct commentary on frontline news. Although the annual award of the Estonian Public Relations Association was granted for actions in 2022, the Asso ciation’s justification at the time still seems relevant: ‘Since the outbreak of the war, the spokespersons of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Ministry of Defence have gone significantly beyond their official duties or the public’s reasonable expectations in explaining the situation to the Estonian peo ple and media, and in publishing analyses.’ Statistics also indicate that the Friday press conferences of the Ministry of De fence and the Sunday/Monday Ukraina stuudio programme on ETV, which regularly features senior officers of the Estonian De fence Forces, have become an integral part of the media routine. While concerns about war fatigue might be anticipated after three years of full-scale conflict, such concerns seem unwarranted: commentary by service

KAUR PAVES Second Lieutenant, Junior Staff Officer, Joint Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces

Of particular significance is the fact that the media have long moved beyond merely showing photos of the customary military line-up alongside festive gatherings or Midsummer bonfires.

members on frontline developments con tinues to be widely disseminated in the me dia, with no noticeable drop in readership. At the same time, sustained interest has also been directed at the current state and future plans of our own army. While it is no surprise that the Independence Day parade and the Victory Day parade (along with the accompanying Territorial Defence Day events across the country) rank among the most covered events of the year, the scale of attention remains noteworthy: more than one hundred news items per day (23–24 June) represent an exceptional level of coverage. Of particular significance is the fact that the media have long moved beyond mere ly showing photos of the customary mili tary line-up alongside festive gatherings or Midsummer bonfires. The speeches of the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Commander of the Defence League are regularly quoted and elaborated upon across all levels of media, including in edi torials. As anticipated, the exercises that gar nered the most attention were Spring Storm, which concluded the training year, and Pikne, which focused on the addition al deployment of allied forces, along with the additional reservist training Okas that supported it. Compared to coverage from previous years, it is clear that articles, vid eo and audio stories no longer focus on the exercises as an isolated event (although striking battle footage still proves popular), but instead highlight the direct connections between the training and wartime tasks. annual review 2024

headquarters Naturally, critical assessments in re sponse are not lacking, primarily due to the inevitable impact on the civilian envi ronment. However, in essence, positions in traditional media questioning the necessity of organising the exercises have become vir tually nonexistent. Alternative media, which operates on entirely different motives, is not included in our sample here, although it demands increasing attention each year. The need for additional armament and ammunition, coupled with the resulting sharp increase in defence spending, has

Independence Day Parade

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remained a focal point of media interest throughout the year. It can be predicted with a fair degree of certainty that the conclusion of any significant defence pro curement will attract diverse coverage, not to mention, for instance, the arrival of the CAESAR self-propelled howitzers. Interest in the topic has been particularly height ened by heated exchanges at the political and administrative levels. However, there has been widespread support for the needs clearly articulated by both current and former Commanders of the Estonian

Media coverage of the Defence Forces

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headquarters Defence Forces (notably the €1.6 billion for ammunition). While at the beginning of the last decade, some leading publications criticised the two percent ratio of defence spending to GDP as an unjustified ‘sacred cow’, it is now clear to the public that even five percent may not be the upper limit in a worsening security environment. However, amidst all of the above, we cannot overlook a purely human aspect – the enduring fascination of the press with the inner world of those in uniform. A signif icant portion of the total coverage consists

The resulting sharp increase in defence spending, has remained a focal point of media interest throughout the year.

of profiles from regional publications featur ing men and women from the area, wheth er it be an actor who has recently joined the Estonian Defence League or Naiskodukaitse (women’s voluntary defence organisation), or a long-serving male or female service member who has received notable recog nition. These stories may never make it to na tional publications, but they serve to show the local audience that the Estonian De fence Forces are not a distant, abstract con cept, but something that we all share. ‖

100 Victory Day Parade

and National Defence Day Celebrations

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Exercise Pikne and Additional Training Gathering Okas

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THE ANCHOR

THAT ROCKED SECURITY

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estonian sea Finnish Coast Guard vessels escort the tanker Eagle S suspected of breaking an underwater cable near Porvoo.

Photo by Lehtikuva / Reuters / Scanpix

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On the 25th of December 2024 at 12:49 the Navy Operations Centre received a notification from Elering AS that the Estlink 2 power cable was experiencing an outage. JOHAN-ELIAS SELJAMAA Navy Captain, Deputy Commander, Estonian Navy

lthough the cause of the outage was unknown at the time of noti fication, it later emerged that this was the third instance of damage to underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea in the last two years caused by the dragging of an anchor along the seabed. Such incidents represent a real threat to critical infrastructure in Estonian waters. While similar occurrences are not rare glo bally, underwater cables in Estonian waters, particularly in deeper areas and outside the anchorage area, have not been subjected to damage in this manner until now.

Through the sea surveillance system, the Navy can trace the history of vessel traffic in time and space if necessary and use databases to investigate the background of vessels. As of 2023, the Estonian Navy is res ponsible for maritime situational aware ness in Estonia. On average, around 500 vessels transit the Gulf of Finland each week. It is the responsibility of the Esto nian Navy to know at any given time which ships are in our maritime areas, why they are there and where they are going. The purpose of the sea surveillance of the Es tonian Navy is to monitor activities in the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea and inland maritime waters of Estonia and to share the information collected with other state agencies. 28

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In co-operation with the Vessel Traffic Management Department of the Trans port Administration, the Navy ensures navigational safety in the Gulf of Finland as well as in the vicinity of underwater infrastructure. The monitored parameters include vessel speed and course, and in the event of any deviations, the vessel is contacted. Where necessary, a patrol ship is deployed to conduct a visual inspection. Through the sea surveillance system, the Navy can trace the history of vessel traf

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fic in time and space if necessary and use databases to investigate the background of vessels.

IDENTIFYING THE RESPONSIBLE VESSEL As no significant deviations in vessel traf fic were observed, the Estonian Navy set out to identify which ships had crossed the Estlink 2 cable following its outage on 25 December. By reviewing vessel traffic data, it was determined that the vessel closest

to the Estlink 2 cable at the time of the ou tage was the tanker Eagle S flying the flag of Cook Islands, built in 2006. The ship had undergone a change in ownership and flag in 2023, its operator was based in Dubai and the ship was en route to Egypt. The vessel’s record shows that it was involved in several cargo transfers at sea in 2022–2023, making it one of the ships Rus sia is using to circumvent sanctions. Since the imposition of European Union sanctions in 2023, the nature of vessel traf

The oil tanker Eagle S was built in China, is owned by a company from the United Arab Emirates and sails under the flag of the Cook Islands.

Photo by Heikki Saukkomaa / Lehtikuva / SIPA / Scanpix

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The EML Sakala was sent to patrol the area above Estlink 1 runs.

EDF Photo by Kaimar Tauri Tamm

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fic in the Baltic Sea has changed. To keep its economy running, Russia uses ships through operators, which often sail under flags of convenience. These flag states typically have weak oversight: they are formally responsible for ensuring vessels meet technical and environmental standards, but actual su pervision is often lacking. These ships often travel directly from Russian ports to India or Africa, without any possibility of checking

their technical condition or documentation in European ports. Naturally, not all vessels sailing under flags of convenience in the Gulf of Finland have malicious intent, and the majority do not even enter Estonian territorial sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea grants vessels the right to freedom of navigation in international waters, inclu ding exclusive economic zones, meaning their movements cannot be restricted wit

estonian sea mental inspections in co-operation with other state agencies or to deny the vessel entry into Estonian territorial waters.

A WATCHFUL EYE AT SEA Eagle S crossed the Estlink 2 cable without any obvious deviations. It was only later, during a visual inspection by the Finnish Border Guard, that it was found that the vessel’s anchor was down – suggesting a potential link to the cable damage. This incident aptly illustrates the chal lenges of protecting critical infrastructure. Firstly, the maritime area of Estonia is vast, making it impossible to visually monitor all vessel traffic over critical infrastructure. Secondly, detecting intent or receiving ad vance warning of such activity is extremely difficult.

As the nature of vessel traffic and the background of seafarers are changing, co-operation between surveillance and state agencies has become important.

hout a clear legal basis established by the Convention. Unfortunately, factors such as a the vessel’s flag state, age, past navigation record, ports of call, cargo transfers at sea and in ports, operator and owner details or inclusion in sanctions lists do not constitu te grounds for stopping a vessel. However, an analysis of the above provides an overall picture of a vessel, which makes it possible, for example, to carry out on-board environ

Although the Eagle S remains under investigation, the damage may have been caused by the technical condition of the vessel, poor seamanship or errors in anchor securing and ship handling. However, from a professional standpoint, these explanations appear unlikely and the overall circums tances still suggest a deliberate act. The Navy is the primary institution in Estonia responsible for ensuring maritime situational awareness and shares this res ponsibility with other agencies. When it comes to protecting critical infrastructure, identifying potential threats and preven ting further incidents is essential. As the nature of vessel traffic and the background of seafarers in our waters are changing, co-operation between sea surveillance and state agencies has become more im portant than ever. It was once said that ‘the observer on the bridge is the eye of the ship that never sleeps.’ The same can be said of the sea surveillance system of the Estonian Navy – it is the ever-watchful eye of the Estonian state at sea. ‖ annual review 2024

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estonian sea RISTO SAIMLA Adviser to the Commander, Estonian Navy

A THOUSAND TV TOWERS IN THE SEA – BALANCING COSTS AND BENEFITS

he news about the impact of offs hore wind farms on the sea sur veillance systems of the Estonian Defence Forces reached the wider public through Estonian Public Broadcasting in November 2024 when the Commander of the Military Intelligence Centre and the Commander of Navy gave a dedicated interview on the topic. Howe ver, the Commander of Navy had presen ted the issue to the Commander of the Defence Forces already in early autumn 2023. As a result, in 2024, the Ministry of Defence contracted an independent expert assessment company to model the impacts of offshore wind farms and map compensation measures. The issue came up for public debate for the second time in November 2024, fol lowing news from Sweden, where the go vernment suspended offshore wind farm development in its maritime areas for an indefinite period due to security concerns.

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

The wind turbines at the Aidu wind farm have been a concern for the Ministry of Defence for some time. Photo by Ken Mürk / ERR / Scanpix

Looking at the recent past, the Govern ment of the Republic issued an order on the Estonian maritime spatial plan on 17 May 2022. Why is this important? At the time the maritime spatial plan was es tablished, the Police and Border Guard Board was responsible for the operation of the sea surveillance system located on state-owned coastal infrastructure. As a result, the Defence Forces had no direct means to influence the maritime spa tial planning process based on military defence requirements. Responsibility at sea was shared and the development of offshore wind farms has consistently been driven primarily by energy interests. So, what is the issue? It stems from differing perceptions of threat and mari time space. During the discussions held in the preparation of the maritime spatial plan, the prevailing view was that poten tial threats at sea were primarily limited to the Gulf of Finland, while the Baltic Fleet stationed in the Kaliningrad Oblast and its maritime activities were not considered a annual review 2024

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threat. Therefore, the military argument for imposing restrictions on the develop ment of offshore wind farms in the mari time areas of western Estonia did not re sonate. In terms of maritime rescue and mariti me safety, the requirement for fairway(s) in wind energy development areas was consi dered sufficient. The impact was assessed in the context of shore-based radars, with the baseline assumption that seafarers would follow the established regulations.

A THOUSAND TALLINN TV TOWER According to the Estonian maritime spa tial plan, the designated development area covers approximately 1,900 km2: Of this area, 500 km2 is located in the Gulf of Riga and 1,400 km2 in the maritime area west of Saaremaa. At the same time, app lications for superficies licences have been submitted at different times for a total of approximately 2,700 km2 of maritime area, of which approximately 1,100 km2 is located in the Gulf of Riga, 200 km2 in the maritime area north of the island of Hiiu maa and 1,400 km2 west of Saaremaa. 34

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The proposed offshore wind turbines, as outlined in superficies licence applica tions, are expected to have rotor diameters between 250 and 300 metres (for compa rison, the Tallinn TV Tower is 314 metres in height). Based on common practice, this would allow, for example, the maritime area west of Saaremaa to be covered with approximately 1,000 turbines with a rotor diameter of 300 metres, which is compa rable to erecting 1,000 Tallinn TV Towers in the area.

The public discussion has largely centred on the societal benefits of these developments, with less emphasis on the investments and resources needed to realise them. Understandably, this has implications both for military defence – from active and passive above-water surveillance systems to underwater surveillance systems, who se interoperability as a whole forms the basis for effective use of weapons – and more broadly for maritime safety, mariti

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me rescue, response to marine pollution, etc. The protection of offshore wind farms as additional critical infrastructure is a se parate issue.

COST AND BENEFITS The main arguments in favour of offsho re wind farms relate to achieving natio nal energy policy goals, ensuring security of supply and meeting climate targets. However, the construction of such wind farms also introduces a significant amount of critical infrastructure at sea that will require protection. Up until now, the pub lic discussion has largely centred on the societal benefits of these developments, with less emphasis on the investments and resources needed to realise them. There has been a lot of talk about compensatory measures. In the case of offshore wind farms, some of the impacts can be partially compensated, but the risks cannot be fully eliminated. It is possible to establish additional radar positions within or along the perimeter of wind farms and to install local underwater sensor sys tems to protect the submerged parts of

the wind farm. These measures would in part mitigate the impact of wind farms on underwater surveillance systems. Howe ver, the biggest challenge is offsetting the impacts of offshore wind farms on passi ve underwater sensor systems, where no good solutions currently exist. The Estonian Defence Forces have ne ver questioned the energy and climate policy objectives of the state or the expec ted economic benefits linked to the crea tion of infrastructure and jobs supporting the wind farms. However, the Estonian Defence Forces have pointed out that com pensatory measures have their limits and that offshore wind farms – as critical inf rastructure in terms of security of supply – require additional investments in protec tive measures. A working early warning system is an important factor for defending Estonia. While developers may be willing to co-ope rate with the state to some extent, from a military defence, security and safety pers pective, the presence and capacity of the state at sea must be addressed in a more comprehensive manner. ‖

A wind farm in Paldiski.

Photo by Maria Kilk / Õhtuleht / Scanpix

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From 10th January to 5th July last year, the minehunter EML Ugandi served as part of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1. JANNO LAURI Lieutenant Commander, Commander, EML Ugandi

SERVICE OF

EML UGANDI

IN NATO MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP

ollowing the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, NATO increased the readiness of its rapid reaction forces and launched its joint self-defence operation Brilliant Shield. The mission of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 is to be among the first rapid reaction forces. The group consists primarily of mine countermeasu res ships from allied countries that regular ly participate in the exercises of different countries. For EML Ugandi, this was only the second time participating in the group, although the Estonian Navy has been cont ributing its expertise and knowledge to the Mine Countermeasures Group since 2005, both with staff ships and minehunters.

PREPARATIONS Preparations for the operation began about a year in advance for Ugandi. It was an exceptionally busy year, with the ship spen ding approximately 125 days at sea. In ad dition to crew recruitment, the year began with a quick onboard training, culminating in the Baltic MCM Squadex 2023 exercise or ganised by the German Navy in mid-March. With the new crew, the first ship-to-ship co-operation exercises, such as towing, replenishment at sea and the first more complex communications exercises, were carried out. As the year progressed, the crew partici pated in all exercises held in the Baltic Sea during that time: the Swedish-led mine hun ting exercise Aurora 2023, the mine counter measures operation Open Spirit 2023 in Lat vian waters and the year’s largest exercise BALTOPS 2023. At the same time, conscripts on board were actively undergoing training. After the summer break, their final test came with the Minehunters Operational Sea 36

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Membership in the NATO Group offers Estonia a valuable opportunity to develop its military capabilities and strengthen alliances.

Training (MOST) in Belgium, which evalua ted the overall operational readiness of the ship and crew, putting everything learned over the past year to the test. The MOST team conducts a thorough assessment of the ship’s compliance with NATO standards, checking everything a capable minehunter must be able to do. From crew completeness, ship cleanli ness and technical readiness to different mi nehunting procedures, firing at sea, stand-to procedures and abandon ship drills. In the case of EML Ugandi, communications, ar mament and the performance of the diving team were assessed as very satisfactory. The ship also performed satisfactorily in the or

estonian sea tunity to practice navigating through a mi nefield in co-operation with larger NATO vessels. The primary objective of Steadfast Defender was to practise the movement of Allied forces from America to Eastern Euro pe through Europe and the abovementio ned associated exercises focused on organi sing major landing operations in Norwegian fjords. In such a scenario, minehunters play a crucial role in clearing the designated lan ding areas of mines. One of the most significant events of the half-year was the participation of EML Ugan di in the Sea Breeze 2024 exercise, jointly organised by the United States, the United Kingdom and Ukraine. During the exercise, the crew provided both moral and technical support aboard the ship to Ukrainian sailors who had recently acquired Sandown-class minehunters.

VALUABLE EXPERIENCE

ganisation of navigation and minehunting exercises. During the six months of Operation Brilliant Shield, the crew took part in se veral exercises and visited 20 ports across nine European countries. The first exerci ses – Historical Ordnance Disposal Opera tions (HODOPS) – took place in French and German waters, where the ship was tasked with conventional minehunting. The largest exercises were Nordic Response 2024 and Joint Warrior 2024 in Norway, both part of NATO’s largest exercise in decades – Stead fast Defender. While the main task was minehunting, a valuable additional element was the oppor

EML Ugandi.

EDF Photo by Maria Tõkke

Overall, the operation can be considered a success. While there were the occasional day-to-day challenges, team spirit remained high and the ship performed well technical ly. We learned a great deal and saw growth both individually and as a team. Feedback from allies on crew communication was very positive and the official assessment of the ship’s commander and the crew’s overall performance was equally commendable. Membership in Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 offers Estonia a valuable opportunity to develop its military capabilities and strengthen alliances. In ad dition, it allows us to demonstrate to our al lies the skills and knowledge we have acqui red over the years, and at the same time, to learn from our allies. This year, Estonia and the Estonian Navy were set to be represented in Stan ding NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 by the minehunter EML Sakala. However, recent attacks on our underwater infrastruc ture have taken priority, and as a result, the deployment of the crew of Sakala has been postponed for the time being. Moreover, the personal connections for med between us and our allied crew mem bers cannot be underestimated. Aside from flying our flag, the greatest benefit of par ticipating in this operation is the direct rela tionships we build with our allies. ‖ annual review 2024

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estonian sea A reservist of the Coastal Defence Squadron fires an Instalaza disposable anti-tank weapon at the Klooga shooting range.

EDF Photo by Reio Soikka

Reservists provide first aid to a fellow soldier wounded during training battles.

EDF Photo by Renor Õige

COASTAL DEFENDERS ARE COMBAT-READY MARIA TAMMEAID Corporal, Public Affairs Specialist, Estonian Navy

rom 9th to 11th October last year, flash exercise Okas 24-1 took place. On a proposal from the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, 59 reservists from the Force Protection Company of the Coastal Defence Squadron were invited to participate in the additio nal reservist training. The purpose of the additional reservist training was to assess the combat readiness of the reservists, ac tive service members and conscripts of the Coastal Defence Squadron in accordance with the combat readiness plan of the Squadron and the fulfilment of its primary combat mission. This time, the focus was on maintaining the firing readiness of the missile battery and ensuring its security by the Force Pro tection Company. During the training, the unit conducted a variety of exercises, inclu ding refreshing the basics of positioning in the terrain, practicing position defence and

The primary responsibilities of the Squadron unit include antisurface warfare from land, defence of ports, military units and infrastructure, sea and coastal surveillance and ensuring overall security.

engaging with the enemy. The application of medical skills and providing first aid on the battlefield were also key components of the training. The reservists also refres hed their shooting skills with the R-20 au tomatic rifle and the Negev and Instalaza crew-served weapons. The Coastal Defence Squadron is a rela tively new military unit within the Estonian Defence Forces, having been founded in 2021, but it has already established an im portant role in the defence of the Estonian state. The primary responsibilities of the Squadron unit include anti-surface warfare from land, defence of ports, military units and infrastructure, sea and coastal surveil lance and ensuring overall security. The purpose of additional reservist training is to assess and verify the achie vement of combat readiness of military units by monitoring the functioning of the national defence chain of command, from the decision-making of the Government of the Republic to the mobilisation of reser vists and members of the Defence League within the rapid reaction structure. ‖ annual review 2024

Recruiting

The changed security situation has created a need for the Estonian Defence Forces to rapidly and efficiently address new capability developments.

A NEW APPROACH TO RECRUITMENT AT THE

ESTONIAN MILITARY ACADEMY ELERI LILLEMÄE Researcher and Head of the Defence Analysis Group at the Department of Applied Research, Estonian Military Academy KRISTJAN PAAVO Sergeant, Public Affairs Officer, Estonian Military Academy

very capability development is ac companied by the need for corre sponding human resources, placing the Estonian Military Academy – the only national defence higher educa tion institution in Estonia that trains officers and non-commissioned officers – at the centre of this effort. The Estonian Military Academy is faced with complex challenges due to intense competition in both the edu cation sector and the labour market.

ADMISSION TRENDS To better understand recruitment to the Es tonian Military Academy (EMA), the associ ated challenges and potential solutions, it is helpful to first examine the general trends in admissions to the EMA. In particular, we will focus on the first level of education at the EMA, as the educational path of young officers and non-commissioned officers be gins here.

Starting in 2020, EMA set an annual admissions target of 90 cadets to meet the broader human resource needs of the Estonian Defence Forces Looking at data from Estonian educa tion information portal HaridusSilm on the number of cadets admitted over the past decade, we can observe that the number of cadets admitted during the academic years 2014/15 to 2019/20 remained in the range of 50 to 60, with a slight increase in 2016/17 and a dip in 2017/18. Starting in 2020, the 40

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EMA set an annual admissions target of 90 cadets to meet the broader human resource needs of the Estonian Defence Forces. As a result, a noticeable increase in the number of admitted cadets can be seen from that academic year onward. While the academ ic years 2020/21 to 2022/23 came close to meeting the admissions target, or even slightly exceeded it, the past two academic years have seen a more significant shortfall. Admissions to the EMA are directly linked to the completion of conscription and the overall recruitment of the Estonian Defence Forces. A comprehensive study of conscripts, conducted jointly by the Estoni an Military Academy and the University of Tartu, revealed that, based on data from 2017 to 2024, around one tenth of con scripts would be highly likely to join active service each year, while a quarter would consider it depending on the opportunities offered. However, actual recruitment into active service has fallen short of this. According to data from the Defence Resources Agency, only around 5–6% of conscripts enter active service directly after conscription. The year 2020 was an exception: 8% of conscripts completing their service went on to active service. This spike was due to the abolition of special pensions for active service mem bers as of 1 January 2020. As a result, many young people who began their conscription in 2019 were motivated to continue with active service in order to receive the bene fits of the special pension.

Recruiting

A cadet revising a battle plan during the staff excercise Combined Effort 2024.

EDF Photo by Mari-Liis Päären

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Recruiting However, in the last two years of 2023 and 2024, a higher proportion of conscripts have transitioned directly from conscription to active service than previously, with fig ures reaching approximately 7–8%. Overall, this marks the highest number of conscripts entering active service in the past decade. However, this data reveals a discrepancy when compared to admissions to the EMA, which have nearly halved over the past two years compared to the 2020–2022 period. The data suggest that this gap is largely the result of structural changes in the Esto nian Defence Forces. Although more active service members have joined the Estonian Defence Forces in the past two years than previously, most have been assigned to the Estonian Division, established in 2023. The new structure needs to be staffed and the number of new recruits entering the EMA directly from conscription has declined in recent years.

Opening of the new EMA building at Raadi, Tartu in October 2024

IMPROVEMENT OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS

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Cadet shooting exercises in Nursipalu.

Number of cadets accepted 91 90

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In 2024, the employer branding and em ployment agency Instar conducted a study to assess the current activities of the EMA and develop an action plan for the future. The survey identified three key findings and proposed three lines of action. First, in co-operation with EMA manage ment, students and alumni, new recruitment messages were developed to resonate with today’s youth and address different target groups. Second, the experience of the ap plication process needs to be streamlined to ensure it is smooth and efficient, preventing potential candidates from losing motivation to come to the EMA due to a lengthy pro cess. Third, it is important to focus not only on direct recruitment efforts but also on en hancing the learning experience of current cadets who, by sharing their personal expe riences, help shape the image of EMA. Additionally, positioning the EMA within the broader landscape of higher education is also essential. A 2024 survey by Kantar Emor on the reputation of professional higher ed ucation institutions shows that, compared to academic higher education, only 29% of Estonian society considers professional high er education to be excellent or very good, while the majority (43%) view it as good.

Recruiting

EDF Photo by Ardi Hallismaa

Therefore, one of the challenges for the EMA is the overall reputation of professional higher education in Estonian society, which tends to favour academic higher education. Additionally, the EMA is less well-known compared to other Estonian universities and institutions of professional higher educa tion, with only 58% of people being familiar with it. This places it second to last in terms of public awareness. However, the EMA dif fers in that its enrolment requirement is the completion of conscription, which is pre dominantly male-centric. The Kantar Emor survey also reveals that more men than women are familiar with the EMA, which partly explains its lower profile. At the same time, it was more recognised by residents of the Tartu-Lõuna region, highlighting the need to increase the visibility of the school in other regions of Estonia as well.

Active service members highlight the diversity of opportunities, specialisations and activities, which makes it possible to find an occupation that aligns with their specialty and profile.

EDF Photo by Aleksandr Pavlyuchenko

The survey also highlighted several ad vantages of the EMA, including the secure career path it offers, the practical nature of its education and its reliability. While a secure career path is generally viewed positively, a previous study on the attrac tiveness of the Defence Forces, conducted by the University of Tartu, revealed that the Defence Forces are often perceived as somewhat monolithic, ie the multiplicity of occupations and activities is not perceived. At the same time, active service mem bers highlight the diversity of opportunities, specialisations and activities, which makes it possible to find an occupation that aligns with their specialty and profile. Therefore, associating the EMA predominantly with a single career path could be a factor that ac tually reduces its attractiveness.

AMID THE WINDS OF CHANGE To further improve the recruitment process, the EMA and the Defence Resources Agen cy developed a comprehensive process description last year, outlining all activities annual review 2024

Recruiting 8341

7507 7604

Number of men aged 18 – 20 Source: Statistics Estonia 6635

6096

required during the admission process to prevent inconsistencies like those that oc curred in 2023. The timeframes covering the entire admission period – from the submission of documents to the announce ment of test results – were also thorough ly reviewed. As a result, the entrance test schedule was adjusted to avoid overlapping with those of other universities, with the aim of increasing the number of applicants to the EMA. Another important step is the change in the admission requirement made in 2024: during spring admissions, the top 30 applicants in the ranking receive early confirmation of admission, providing them with timely assurance of a student place at the EMA. A completely new speciality – aircraft piloting – was also introduced in the field of study of the Air Force. It quickly proved pop ular, attracting a high number of applicants. The decision to launch a new pilot study programme was made at the request of the Air Force, which highlighted the need to in crease its personnel, including the number 44

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Recruiting of pilots. In the past, both the Air Force and the Navy have recruited graduates from the Estonian Aviation Academy and the Estonian Maritime Academy. However, the Estonian Defence Forces have noted that, in terms of service, these graduates often lack uniform of ficer education, a set of behaviours and attitudes. A graduate of a civilian higher education institution may not fully grasp the requirements and expectations the Estonian Defence Forces have for their officers. This is why it is important for such study programmes to be integrated into the Estonian Military Academy, where most of the studies are carried out alongside cadets from other armed services. Compared to 2023, the number of cadets enrolled in 2024 increased by nearly 10%, but still fell short of the target of filling all 90 available study places. Over the years, surveys of students admitted to the Estonian Military Academy have shown that most cadets come from the Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, followed by the Viru Infantry Battalion of the 1st Infantry Brigade (in 2019–2020), the Reconnaissance Company (in 2021) and the Air Defence Battalion and Military Police (in 2022).

FUTURE OUTLOOK Future recruitment to the EMA is influenced – and will in creasingly be influenced – by socio-demographic trends. Since conscription has been a prerequisite for joining the EMA, any forward-looking analysis must begin with an ex

amination of conscription completion. wAccording to the comprehensive study of conscripts, nearly 80% of conscripts are between the ages of 18 and 20. When we examine the population data from Statistics Estonia on the average number of men in this age group over the past decade and the projections for the next two decades, we can see that the birth cohorts are increas ing, indicating that the recruitment pool is likely to expand in the coming years. A downturn is anticipated between 2029 and 2033, followed by a period of stabilisation and then another decline. The 2040s will present more challenging times, as the birth cohorts born in the early 2020s come of age – a time that has stood out for its historically low birth rate. While the coming years indicate some demographic growth, which offers a pos itive outlook, several factors must still be considered. One of the most notable factors being the year-on-year decline in the phys ical fitness of today’s youth. On average, 64% of conscripts pass the physical fitness test at least once during their service. How ever, as passing the test and maintaining good physical condition are prerequisites for active service, the recruitment pool is already significantly limited.

A downturn is anticipated between 2029 and 2033, followed by a period of stabilisation and then another decline.

Map exercise during exercise Combined Effort 2024. EDF Photo by Mari-Liis Päären

Another important factor is the intense societal competition in the youth workforce. Recruitment to the EMA also means recruit ment into the Estonian Defence Forces as an organisation, which assumes that the young person is interested in national defence and ready to commit to it long-term. In the 2023 employer attractiveness ranking conducted by the employer branding and recruitment agency Instar among students, the Estoni an Defence Forces ranked 64th out of 267 companies, placing it in the top 25% of em ployers, which is a very positive result. However, only 7% of respondents ex pressed strong interest in working for the Defence Forces and 18% indicated moder ate interest. For young people, the most annual review 2024

Recruiting

The new academic year of the Estonian Military Academy will be opened in Tartu with a traditional procession.

important factors when considering an employer are the internal climate of the organisation, how engaging the work is and work-life balance. Job security, which was highlighted as an advantage of the EMA, is also a priority, though it ranks below these top factors. The meaningfulness of work, which could be seen as a key strength of a career in the national defence sector, is only ranked 20th in the priorities of young people. Looking further into the future through the lens of statistics, the National Defence Development Plan sets a target of enrolling 4,000 young people into conscript service 46

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More information about the admission to the Estonian Military Academy

annually. This would account for approxi mately 50% of the male population in a sin gle birth cohort. According to reports from the Defence Resources Agency, the dropout rate from conscription has averaged 4.8% in recent years, meaning that approximately 3,800 conscripts would complete their ser vice each year. The data from the comprehensive sur vey of conscripts indicates that 10% of con scripts are fairly confident in their desire to enter active service, while 25–30% would consider it depending on the conditions of fered. Therefore, a comfortable recruitment pool (10% of conscripts) could be around

Recruiting 380 young people, with an additional 1,000 who might consider service if the offer is appealing. This is where competition comes into play. As recruitment over the past two years has shown, competition for limited human resources exists not only between the mili tary and civilian sectors but also within the Defence Forces itself, as new capabilities require additional human resources. There fore, it is becoming increasingly important to focus on young people who, while uncer tain about their interest in active service, would be open to considering it. Additional ly, it is essential to broaden their perception of the Defence Forces as an organisation offering diverse jobs and opportunities.

CHANGES IN THE COMING YEARS

EDF Photos by Mari-Liis Päären

Front center, Commander of the Estonian Military Academy Brigadier General Viktor Kalnitski.

Considering the prerequisite of completing conscript service to enter the Estonian Mil itary Academy, along with the associated challenges and the need to expand human resources due to the capacity development of the Defence Forces, the EMA will adjust its cadet admission conditions in 2025. In stead of the current 90 study places, a total of 150 study places will be available annu ally, distributed across the fields of study of the land forces (120 places), air force (15 places) and the navy (15 places). To fill the required study places, new admission requirements will be introduced, available on the websites of the Defence Resources Agency and the EMA. Young people who began conscript ser vice in January 2025, or will do so in the summer of 2025, will have the opportuni ty to apply for a cadet position at the Ba sic Officer Training Course of the Estonian Military Academy during or after their basic training, provided they successfully pass the entrance tests. This means that completing the full 8- or 11-month conscript service is not re quired: after completing the basic training and passing the entrance tests, it is possible to continue with professional higher educa tion at the Estonian Military Academy start ing in September. If this change proves effective in in creasing the number of cadets without re ducing qualitative indicators, it is planned to be continued in the coming years. ‖ annual review 2024

Estonian Division

ESTONIAN DIVISION –

MORE THAN JUST A STAFF

The purpose of the Estonian Division is to defend Estonia in Estonia.

INDREK SIREL Major General, Commander, Estonian Division 48

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e are the largest land force unit and the largest military unit of the Estonian Defence Forces in terms of personnel and equipment. We are a link between territorial defence forces, the Estonian Defence Forces and allies, while also acting as a key executor of multi-do main operations. There may not be many

Estonian Division

duties, but each one is significant and plac es a heavy burden of responsibility on the Division. An important conceptual capability introduced with the creation of the Es tonian Division is the ability to conduct multi-domain and deep operations. What does this mean? Drawing on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, we need

to extend our maximum range from a few dozen kilometres to several hundred. The adversary must clearly understand that any decision to attack Estonia and NATO would result in unacceptable con sequences for it on land, at sea and in the air. The adversary must not be allowed to achieve its objectives through military

Tanks from the United Kingdom were also present at the Pikne exercise. Combat equipment was demonstrated to the media in Sirgala. EDF Photo by Maria Tammeaid

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Estonian Division means. To ensure this, we must enhance our early warning and targeting systems, as well as our indirect fire capabilities and the ability to command and control them.

DEVELOPMENT THROUGH EXERCISES In order to be able to deliver deep strikes and co-ordinate multi-domain operations, continuous practice of synchronisation, leadership and decision-making is essen tial. The Estonian Division has prioritised this since its inception. In 2024, we com pleted the nearly year-long United States Army Warfighter programme, the final ex ercise of which took place in March 2024. The Estonian Division participated in War fighter together with the US 1st Infantry Division, with both divisions having the op portunity to practise unit-level operational planning under US V Corps. Completing the extensive training pro gramme of the United States Army was a significant milestone for the Estonian Divi sion in developing the skills and gaining the experience necessary to organise largescale combat operations. Closer co-operation between the US 1st Infantry Division and the Estonian Di vision began in late 2022, when US ser vice members visited Estonia to train the staff members of the Division being estab lished. We are committed to continuing this co-operation and participating in the Warfighter programme in the future. Taking into account the experiences of Ukraine, the Warfighter programme placed significant emphasis on rear protection and division support. Warfighter offered an op portunity to combine classical warfare tech niques with innovative solutions in a low er-risk environment than real life, allowing us to test new approaches and tactics. The Estonian Division successfully com pleted the final exercise module in March 2024, thereby demonstrating its readiness to conduct combat operations.

SPRING STORM Spring Storm 2024 took place from 6th to 17th May, primarily in West Estonia. The aim of the exercise was to practise the imple mentation of defensive operations in co-op eration between the Estonian Division and 50

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Fighters of the Viru Infantry Battalion setting up their battle plan.

EDF Photo by Ott Aro

allies under conventional war conditions, involving other services and commands as well. The main training units of Spring Storm 2024 included the 2nd Infantry Brigade and Regional Command West. On the islands, the territorial defence units of the Estonian Defence League practised the defence of their home region in collaboration with the Estonian Defence Forces and allied units. During our exercise, the Swift Re sponse deployment exercise of the United Kingdom also took place, which focused on

Estonian Division As part of Spring Storm, artillery reserv ists had the opportunity to train with the HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system – soon to be introduced into Estonia’s arma ment – this time operated by a US military unit. The reservists received an overview of the fire-control system of the rocket system and completed launcher-specif ic training. During the exercise, they also gained practical experience in reloading the weapon system and executing fire commands. The command and communi cation procedures of the rocket unit were practised in a simulated environment. During the HIMARS military training pro gramme, the Artillery Battalion of the Esto nian Division, in co-operation with US allies, trained the necessary reserve and active service members of the Estonian Defence Forces to enable the rapid deployment of the new weapons systems. The Spring Storm exercise provided an opportunity to further expand the pool of trained service members.

NEVER ON OUR OWN AGAIN

the rapid deployment of allied forces to Es tonia in the event of a potential escalating crisis. During this year’s exercise, the 16th Air Assault Brigade Combat Team of the British Army deployed its forces in co-op eration with allied forces from the United States, France, Poland and Estonia. A variety of hybrid threats were incor porated into the spring exercise to simu late challenging, realistic threat situations and enhance our ability to address them in co-operation with allied forces.

The multinational military exercise Pikne, held from 2nd to 15th December, focused on enhancing Allied deployment and in teroperability capabilities in the Baltic Sea region. The exercise practised the rapid deployment of additional allied forces to Estonia – by sea and air – to support the NATO Multinational Battlegroup stationed here, as well as the Estonian Defence Forc es in a wartime scenario. In the second phase of the exercise, live fire exercises were conducted in Sirga la by military units from the Estonian De fence League, France, the United Kingdom and Latvia. As part of Pikne, an additional reservist training exercise Okas was also held. It is crucial for us that, in the event of an escalation, our allies are prepared to rapidly deploy their military units to Esto nia. While the allies are operating in areas close to the border, we are able to mobilise our own forces. Combining the two exer cises allowed us to test both capabilities. Last year, our artillerymen had the opportunity to test themselves in an in ternational environment, across multiple countries and to combine live fire exer cise in Estonia with a larger multinational annual review 2024

Estonian Division exercise. The Dynamic Front exercise, led by US Army Europe and Africa and involv ing NATO allies, was held from 4th to 24th November in Finland, Germany, Poland, Romania and Estonia. As part of the exercise, the artillery of the Estonian Division conducted live fire exercis es at the Defence Forces Central Training Area. During the exercise, the military units of the Artillery Battalion of the Estonian Di vision were deployed across three countries. In Estonia, the fire exercises of the self-pro pelled howitzer K-9 Kõu battery were held, led by the Staff of the Artillery Battalion from beyond the polar circle in Lapland.

MORE THAN JUST A STAFF The Estonian Division of the Defence Forc es is more than just a staff. At the same time, a staff is essential for co-ordinating and integrating subunits into a cohesive

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combat element. The development of the staff has been rapid and intensive, bringing with it new lessons learned and changes. The most notable change in the staff of the Estonian Division is the addition of British Brigadier General Giles Harris, Com mander of Operation CABRIT and NATO Multinational Battlegroup, who has served as Deputy Commander of the Estonian Di vision since November. This development marks a significant step in further integrat ing the NATO Multinational Battlegroup with the Estonian Defence Forces. Previously operating under the 1st In fantry Brigade in Tapa, its command ele ment is now also directly part of the staff of the Estonian Division. The number of of ficers and non-commissioned officers from

Siil will feature the 4th British Brigade as a new subunit, assigned by the United Kingdom to strengthen the defence of Estonia. Loading and unloading ammunition.

EDF Photo by Kaur Kantsik

Estonian Division allied countries in the staff of the Estonian Division has also steadily increased. In addition to participating in exercis es and introducing new capabilities, the military units of the Estonian Division also continued their day-to-day work, ensuring operational readiness and the defence of Estonia. Our largest exercises in 2025 will be Siil and Griffin Lightning. Siil will feature the 4th British Brigade as a new subunit – as signed by the United Kingdom to strength en the defence of Estonia – alongside the NATO Battlegroup units already serving

with us. In the year ahead, our task is also to integrate the new capabilities, both those already introduced and those still to come, into our daily activities in the de fence of Estonia and NATO. The Estonian Division is committed to defending and achieving victory. ‖

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Estonian Division

RENEWED 2ND INFANTRY HANNES PARMO Second Lieutenant, Public Affairs Officer, 2nd Infantry Brigade

he 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Es tonian Division, which celebrated its tenth anniversary last year, pre pared for major capability upgrades in 2024, commissioned new infrast ructure facilities and strengthened co-ope ration with allied units. In addition to maintaining the opera tional readiness of the reserve brigade and training new military units, the past year was marked by preparations for the arrival of new armoured vehicles at the Taara Army Base. The first Turkish-made Otokar Oto motiv Arma 6 × 6 and Nurol Makina NMS 4 × 4 armoured vehicles arrived in Estonia at the end of last year. These new vehicles will provide all three infantry battalions of the brigade with better protection and ma noeuvrability. By the beginning of 2025, a sufficient number of armoured vehicles for one bat talion will have arrived, and by the end of the year at the latest, the remainder should be delivered. Instructor training began im mediately after the vehicles arrived and the new armoured vehicles were already integ rated into conscript training earlier this year.

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE AT SPRING STORM Nearly 3,300 combatants, including about 700 reservists, participated in the Spring Storm in South Estonia as part of the 2nd Infantry Brigade. The 2nd Infantry Brigade was the main military unit trained during the exercise, meaning that both tactical operations and procedural conduct were closely monitored by evaluators. During the active phase of the exercise, the task of the 2nd Infantry Brigade was to conduct defen sive operations and set the conditions for a large-scale counterattack by an allied unit. Not all military units of the brigade were mobilised during Spring Storm, allowing for the inclusion of two allied battalions: the 54

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A 6 x 6 Arma armored vehicle arrived from Turkey. Photo by Kermo Pastarus / EDRA

Danish XIII Light Infantry Battalion (which also included an American infantry com pany) and the NATO Forward Land Forces battlegroup based in Latvia. The involve ment of allies provided an excellent oppor tunity to practise how to align our com mand levels, ensure situational awareness and make sure we understand each other in the same way. It also allowed us to de monstrate to our allies that the concept of reserve service truly works. The addition of the NATO battlegroup to the 2nd Infantry Brigade was particular ly significant, as the subunit equipped with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles brought greater aggressiveness and flexibility to the battle plans. The presence of armoured units also forced the adversary to proceed

Estonian Division

BRIGADE

Over the past year, the expansion of defence-related infrastructure continued steadily. New warehouses were constructed in Luunja and Meegi, which will provide imp roved conditions for the dedicated storage of equipment, armament and ammunition, as well as enable their ra pid relocation when necessary. In addition to armoured vehicles and ammunition, the 2nd Infantry Brigade will also receive anti-tank systems in the coming years and the new supply warehouses are better equipped to store these new weapons. In addition to the supply warehouses, a new ad ministrative building was completed at the Raadi in Tartu, where the staff of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, who were pre viously located in Luunja, have now moved. In the autumn, the Reedo Reception, Staging and Onwards Movement (RSOM) area was opened near Võru, providing additional conditions for the reception of allies, which had previously been lacking in South Estonia. The reception area is suitable for accommodating the military units of both allies and the Estonian Defence Forces during peacetime exercises and in crisis situations, supporting the se units in achieving operational readiness. Thanks to its proximity to the Taara Army Base of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and nearby training areas, the Reedo home base offers outstanding opportunities for organising training and facilitating the technical and procedural integ ration of allied forces with the structures of the Estonian Defence Forces. The Estonian Defence Forces and the 2nd Infantry Brigade practise defending Estonia together with allies every day. With the completion of the Reedo home base, the defence capability of the NATO Eastern Flank is further strengthened.

ALLIES IN SOUTH ESTONIA

with greater caution, adding complexity to both their offen sive and defensive manoeuvres. Thanks to its transition to the new armoured structure, the 2nd Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion has developed a clear understanding of its strengths and weaknesses, as outlined in the National Defence Development Plan 2031. At the same time, conscripts gained valuable experience in how to fight and manoeuvre as part of an armoured unit. The 3rd Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion will be able to apply the les sons identified during Spring Storm on the new armoured vehicles in the exercise Siil in 2025. In addition to the new vehicles, the 2nd Infantry Brigade has contributed to enhancing anti-tank capabilities, impro ving night-vision systems and strengthening training against drone threats. Spring Storm confirmed the effectiveness of the anti-drone measures in use and, to further enhance the security of military units, increasing attention will be devo ted to this area also in the future.

Last year, the integration of allies into the peacetime opera tions and readiness plans of the 2nd Infantry Brigade conti nued. The 1st Battalion of the US 187th Infantry Regiment, which arrived in South Estonia at the end of 2023, was highly motivated and significantly boosted the number of fire exercises compared to previous rotations. In February, conscripts from the Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion took part in a joint air assault exercise, during which they received safety instruction from allied soldiers and learned how to approach, board and disembark from a Black Hawk (UH-60) helicopter. The interoperability of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and al lied units has increased each year. In the summer of 2024, the 30th Battalion of the US 2nd Infantry Regiment arrived at the Taara Army Base and, in addition to maintaining a demanding firing schedule, they also demonstrated strong initiative in seeking co-operation opportunities. In 2025, co-operation between the Estonian Defence Forces and allies in South Estonia will continue with the 5th Battalion of the US 7th Cavalry Regiment, which is already stationed at Reedo home base. ‖ annual review 2024

Defence Investments

MODERN ARMS, STRONGER FORCES Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, Estonian defence investments and the procurement of new weapon systems have been significantly accelerated. Below is an overview of the most important acquisitions.

Mobile anti-ship missile system Blue Spear 5G SSM

IN JANUARY, the Estonian Defence Forces acquired the Piorun short-range air defence systems. Developed in Poland and adopted into service in 2019, the Piorun system can engage targets at distances of up to eight kilometres and enables 24/7 operational capability. IN FEBRUARY, the mobile coastal defence missile system Blue Spear 5G SSM arrived in Estonia. This high-tech system is a key component of Estonia’s integrated coastal defence solution, offering a maximum ran ge of 290 km. The weapon uses an active ra dar seeker for target acquisition, advanced navigation, and a robust communications system resistant to electronic warfare. IN MARCH, the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) delivered the first batch of modern night vision devices to the Estonian Defence Forces. Produced by the Greek company Theon Sensors, the devices significantly improve combat effec tiveness in low-light conditions. Compared to previous equipment, the new devices are lighter, more light-sensitive, and offer hig her resolution, providing a tactical advanta ge to the user. 56

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Short-range air defense missile system Mistral

Defence Investments

Short-range air defense system Piorun

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Defence Investments

IN JUNE, Estonia, together with France, Belgium, Cyprus, and Hungary, signed a joint procurement agreement for Mistral short-range air defence missile systems. Estonia will primarily use the opportunity to bolster its ammunition stocks. The new weapon systems and missiles will be delive red over the next three years. IN SEPTEMBER, new 8.6 mm sniper rifles were delivered to Estonian units. The rifles were supplied by Finnish manufacturer SAKO, whose weapons Estonian snipers had already used. IN OCTOBER, the ECDI signed framework agreements with 15 companies for the procurement of electro-optical devices. The se contracts enable the Estonian Defence Forces to acquire electronic targeting and identification systems, weapon-mounted laser sights and sensors, as well as smart devices incorporating ballistic solutions. IN DECEMBER, the ECDI launched a se ven-year framework procurement for loi tering munitions to meet the needs of the Estonian Defence Forces in both short- and long-range categories. ON 20 JANUARY 2025, the U.S. defence company Lockheed Martin handed over six newly manufactured HIMARS multip le launch rocket systems to Estonia at its headquarters in Arkansas. The systems will enter service with the Estonian Defence Forces in the summer. ON 30 JANUARY 2025, the Estonian Defence Forces received the first CAESAR MK1 155 mm self-propelled howitzers mounted on a 6 x 6 chassis. These systems will form part of a third self-propelled ar tillery battalion, which will operate directly under the command of the Estonian divi sion. The remaining units will be delivered over the course of the year. ‖ 58

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Multiple rocket launcher HIMARS

Defence Investments

Mobile artillery CAESAR MK1

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New Armour

NEW ARMOURED VEHICLES

PROVIDE ENHANCED AND MORE FLEXIBLE PROTECTION

he procurement was highly competitive, with nine Estonia has taken significant steps tenderers from six countries taking part. Platform to enhance its defence capabilities compliance was evaluated against the baseline re through the acquisition of new 4 × 4 quirements established by the Estonian Defence and 6 × 6 armoured personnel carriers. Forces. The winners were selected based on price and delivery speed, with both contracts awarded to Turkish The acquisition of new armoured companies. In October 2023, the Estonian Centre for De vehicles for the Estonian Defence fence Investments signed contracts with Nurol Makina and Forces is part of a broader strategy Otokar for the delivery of 100 pieces of 4 × 4 NMS and 133 pieces of 6 × 6 Arma armoured personnel carriers, respec aimed at improving the overall capabilities of the Defence Forces and tively. The total cost of the armoured vehicles is approxi mately €200 million. Deliveries began in the second half of acquiring modern equipment. 2024 and are expected to be completed by autumn 2025. WOLFGANG LANG Major, Staff Officer at the Analysis and Planning Department, Armoured Manoeuvrability Project Manager, Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces 60

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The Estonian Centre for Defence Investments has exten sive experience in preparing procurement. The definition of requirements involved close co-operation with representa tives of the units of the Estonian Defence Forces. To avoid the use of manufacturer-specific critical components, it was

New Armour

4 x 4 tactical wheeled armored vehicle Nurol Makina.

ensured that the key assemblies of the ar moured vehicles are widely used across NATO armed forces. Contractors noted that they had never before encountered such a professionally structured procurement process, technical specifications and super vision. The structure of the procurement process put pressure on price, demanded high quality standards and required a fast production process. There are few procure ments at this level in the world where proto types were delivered just one year after the contract was signed, and deliveries and ac ceptance procedures were completed and the vehicles were put into service less than two years after the contract was signed. This is the first time the Estonian De fence Forces have procured completely

The purchase of new platforms offered an opportunity to tailor them to Estonian conditions and the specific needs of the Estonian Defence Forces.

Photo by producer

new armoured personnel carriers. This is partly due to the reality of life today where the availability of used armoured machin ery has significantly decreased compared to the past. Over the years, the Estonian state has also matured. The purchase of new platforms offered an opportunity to tailor them to Estonian conditions and the specific needs of the Estonian Defence Forces. Where necessary, innovations and improvements were implemented to en hance task efficiency, improve ease of use and ensure greater alignment of the plat form with our environmental conditions. Although Turkey is considered a warm country in Estonia, its eastern region expe riences harsh, snowy winters. The selected platforms have been tested in a climate annual review 2024

New Armour chamber and are also used in other cold regions, effectively mitigating the risk of potential climatic non-conformity. The armoured vehicles are also fitted with el ements of the Arctic package, such as a parking heater and electric heaters for mirrors and windows. In the procurement, a strong emphasis was placed on ensuring that the maintenance of the platforms is as simple as possible. Suitable solutions have also been developed for the long-term storage of the vehicles. The 4 × 4 and 6 × 6 armoured person nel carriers enhance the survivability of the military units of the Estonian Defence Forces and provide greater flexibility in carrying out operations. The 2nd Infantry Brigade will have significantly better con ditions. Up to now, service members were shielded only from wind and precipitation by truck tarpaulins and low temperatures severely limited the operational capability of military units. The new platforms take combat capabil ity to an entirely new level: after the tran sition, service members will be protected not only against indirect fire and small arms fire but also against mine threats. The plat forms are certified and fully compliant with modern standards. It is important not to underestimate the value of teams being in a temperature-controlled environment be fore heading out on a mission, as it enhanc es the sustainability of the military unit. The 6 × 6 Arma is similar in both ap pearance and operational principles to the Pasi XA armoured personnel carriers already in service with the Estonian De fence Forces. In terms of technical charac teristics, it is also very similar to the 4 × 4 NMS, which could almost be mistaken for a civilian SUV when seated inside, but with a much higher mass. The controls of the armoured personnel carriers are intuitive and easy to master. Naturally, all axles are drivable and all armoured vehicles have a winch. Protection is provided by a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, while a 76 mm smoke grenade launcher can be used when mov ing away from enemy fire. The tyres op erate on a run-flat principle, enabling the vehicle to continue driving even in the event of a tyre blowout. The backpacks are 62

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The new 4 x 4 and 6 x 6 armored vehicles of the Estonian Defence Forces protect infantry from indirect fire, small arms and also from mine threats. Photo by Kermo Pastarus / EDRA

mounted on the sides of the vehicle but are protected from the weather. Several innovations compared to the platforms used up to now enhance both capability and sustainability. Driving per formance is improved by independent sus pension and an automatic tyre deflation and inflation system. Mine protection is ensured by a solution in which none of the internal elements are fixed to the floor, not even the floor. The seats are very comfort able and the seat belts are multi-point.

New Armour

The automatic fire extinguishing system increases surviv ability. Safety is enhanced by modern features such as LED lighting, driving and reversing cameras and a high-sensitivity night vision camera. One of the biggest adjustments with the 6 × 6 Arma is the absence of a traditional windshield; instead, the armoured vehicle is operated using periscopes, similar to those found on tanks. This requires regular prac tice during training. For longer logistical movement, drivers can install a windshield, which is included in the equipment of the armoured vehicle, to enhance road safety. At the time of writing this article in 2025, both plat forms are scheduled for serial deliveries. The manufactur

ers have successfully covered the distance using both land and sea transport. There have been no unpleasant sur prises during the acceptance procedures. Necessary user training has already been completed and regular training for conscripts is underway. In the coming years, the units will also conduct refresh er training for reservists on the use of the new platforms. It is clear that this is a vital capability development that will support the national defence of Estonia for decades to come. This procurement has provided the Estonian De fence Forces with the highest level of capability for every euro spent. ‖ annual review 2024

Drones

According to the Estonian-English National Defence Terminology Database Militerm of the Estonian Military Academy, an unmanned aircraft is an aircraft that does not carry a human operator, is operated remotely and is generally designed to return to its point of origin.

ESTONIAN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

IN A MULTILEVEL AIRSPACE ARBO PROBAL Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program Manager, Joint Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces

owever, the NATO definition also includes a clause stating that an unmanned aircraft is character ised by the use of varying levels of automated functions. There fore, we are referring to an aircraft that is remotely piloted, may be single-use under certain conditions and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. In recent decades, unmanned aircraft systems have been adopted by militaries worldwide, ranging from micro-sized un manned aircraft that can be launched by hand to medium-sized tactical systems and full-scale remotely piloted aircraft. Unmanned aircraft have changed the dynamics of warfare around the world, providing an affordable, flexible and effec tive alternative to conventional armament. While 10–20 years ago unmanned sys tems were primarily used for intelligence and surveillance, they have now become essential tools for combat elements – ca pable of performing a range of tasks, from identifying targets to delivering precision strikes.

BIRDS IN THE ESTONIAN SKY For Estonia, as a small country, unmanned aircraft systems offer an asymmetric re sponse to symmetric problems. While Es 64

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A demonstration flight of the Puma fixed-wing unmanned reconnaissance vehicle in May 2021. Puma drones are used by infantry battalions in Estonia to collect intelligence information within a ten-kilometer radius.

Drones tonia cannot match the conventional mil itary capabilities of larger powers, it can employ drones in a smart way. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that different types of drones used against the enemy constitute an effective and cost-efficient weapons system, capable of destroying ar moured vehicles, disrupting enemy logis tics and applying pressure to enemy forces. The Estonian Defence Forces have been actively working on integrating un manned aircraft into military units at dif ferent levels. Traditionally, the focus has been on using these assets for intelligence and situational awareness. However, by incorporating current lessons learned, the Estonian Defence Forces are now planning to integrate attack drones into a number of their structures.

EDF Photos by Kaimar Tauri Tamm

The small unmanned aircraft Puma is capable of gathering intelligence relevant to the battalion from distances of at least ten kilometres. Today, military units employ small multi-rotor drones to support their op erations. These drones provide real-time video feeds, enhancing situational aware ness for group and company commanders. Forward observers also employ them to support their own operations, enabling the observation of targets that would other wise be too dangerous to monitor directly. In infantry battalions, intelligence is gathered using fixed-wing intelligence equipment. The small unmanned aircraft Puma is capable of gathering intelligence relevant to the battalion from distances of at least ten kilometres and, where neces sary, even a little further. The unmanned aircraft can gather intelligence for more than an hour before it has to return to its point of origin. The unmanned aircraft systems sec tions of brigades currently operate a slight ly larger platform, most commonly the Threod Systems Stream C. This system is capable of providing the intelligence sec tion of the brigade with information from a significantly broader intelligence and interest area and can operate beyond 30 annual review 2024

Drones kilometres while remaining airborne for several hours. Such battalion and brigade intelligence assets provide commanders with a con tinuous overview of activities within their area of interest, enabling decision-making based on real-time intelligence.

Clear rules and guidelines are being established, which consolidate and describe common standards, procedures, technical requirements and best practices. Additionally, they can send unmanned aircraft to monitor key terrain or areas of interest. In the near future, a division-lev el unmanned aircraft-based intelligence system will be established, the aircraft of brigades will be upgraded and the intel ligence capability will become more ad vanced and diverse.

PILOTS OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS In the future development of unmanned aircraft systems, it is essential to ensure that their use is consistent and standard ised across the organisation. Clear rules and guidelines are being established, which consolidate and describe common standards, procedures, technical require ments and best practices. Military training will also be harmonised to ensure that all parties receive consistent and systematic training in accordance with the require ments of the Military Aviation Regulation. At the end of 2024, basic training for military aviation Category I unmanned air craft remote pilots was launched, which is available for everyone to complete in the Estonian Defence Forces e-learning por tal ILIAS. In the first half of 2025, the pilot course for the basic training of military avi ation Category II unmanned aircraft remote pilots will be organised. As a result, from the second half of 2025, the training of military aviation Category I and II unmanned aircraft remote pilots will be transferred under the authority of the area of government. The Estonian Military Academy has in corporated topics on unmanned aircraft 66

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A soldier launches a Puma unmanned reconnaissance vehicle in an open area. It can remain airborne for two hours at a time.

EDF Photo by Kaimar Tauri Tamm

Drones systems into its study programmes, equip ping future leaders with the foundation al knowledge needed to effectively plan and manage these systems in their future work. The curriculum also addresses the threats posed by aircraft systems and how to counter these threats.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES, NEW THREATS As we continue to develop our capabilities, so too does our enemy. However, unlike us, this enemy has a ‘testing laboratory’ where they can test new technologies and tactics under realistic conditions. That is why we must also be ready to adapt constantly, re spond quickly and keep searching for our own formula for success to stay ahead in this field.

Unlike us, this enemy has a ‘testing laboratory’ where they can test new technologies and tactics under realistic conditions. Electronic warfare plays a critical role in modern warfare, allowing for the jamming of enemy drone signals, disruption of their communication channels and neutralisa tion of their navigation systems. Alongside the development of our own drone capa bilities, it is equally important to establish systems capable of detecting all types of hostile unmanned aircraft. We must also develop and integrate autonomous detection and countermeas ure systems capable of neutralising enemy unmanned aircraft systems both on the battlefield and near and above infrastruc ture. Unmanned aircraft capabilities are evolving rapidly, moving towards auton omous warfare and asymmetric tactics. If Estonia can successfully keep pace with these developments – advancing a diverse range of drone and electronic warfare solu tions as well as autonomous control sys tems – we will be well-equipped to counter even the most formidable adversaries. The future is autonomous and Estonia must be prepared for it. ‖ annual review 2024

Exercise

From 18th to 22nd November last year, the Estonian Division of the Defence Forces led the command post exercise Decisive Lancer 2024 – one of the most important annual joint exercises alongside Spring Storm.

PUTTING COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL DEFENCE TO THE TEST JANNO MÄRK Colonel, Chief of Staff, Estonian Division

n addition to the Estonian Defence Forces, the Defence League, regional commands and allied units stationed in Estonia, the exercise also involved other state struc tures, in particular, the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB), Estonian Rescue Board and Health Board. The participation of the Ministry of the Interior and local go vernments was also significant, as the exercise focused on practising the practical aspects and procedures of comp rehensive national defence. More than 1,300 people took part in the multi-level, complex command post exercise.

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The aim of the exercise was to practice co-operation and information exchange between Estonian agencies at all levels in different crisis scenarios. The purpose of the Es tonian Division of the Defence Forces was to drill defensive operations within the operational framework of infantry brigades and regional commands.

EVERYONE PLAYS A PART By practising the actions of different agencies in a variety of crisis situations, we can better define the support requi rements and capabilities of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Defence League during both crises and wartime. In a real situation, this will allow the Estonian Defence Forces

DECIS IV

Exercise

N CE R LA

2024

The purpose of the Estonian Division of the Defence Forces was to drill defensive operations within the operational framework of infantry brigades and regional commands.

to focus primarily on their constitutional mission of military defence of the state and the people. At Decisive Lancer, the Estonian Rescue Board was tasked with planning and le ading civil protection operations and practising co-operation with the Estonian Defence Forces and the Defence League in both crisis and war situations. The sce nario-based activities focused primarily on threat alerting, large-scale population evacuation, sheltering and associated code of conduct as well as rescue work and exp

The Decisive Lancer exercise is a training exercise for cooperation between civil authorities and the Estonian Defence Forces.

EDF Photo byReio Soikka

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Exercise losive ordnance disposal. The Estonian Rescue Board invol ved 76 local governments in the exercise, practising regio nal crisis resolution. During the exercise, the PBGB focused on different hybrid threats, strengthening border security against migration attacks, safeguarding facilities, managing mass disorder and ensuring public order in situations of different levels of escalation. The police officers and border guards of the PBGB practised operations and planned resources for different legal orders involving different levels of force and coercion. During the exercise, the Health Board focused primarily on providing emergency medical care in civil crises and war time. It also co-ordinated the relocation of hospital staff, pa tients and equipment, and managed crisis communication with the public, health care providers and other agencies. Allies serving at the Estonian Division staff also partici pated in the exercise, contributing their knowledge and experience to military operations planning, while gaining va luable experience unique to Estonia regarding the activities and roles of regional commands and the Defence League in crisis and war situations. The staff of the Estonian Division was further reinforced by members of the allied TF Cabrit staff based in Estonia, whose crisis and wartime role is clo sely tied to the Estonian Division. The exercise also fulfilled the objective of integrating the Estonian Division staff and TF Cabrit. This integration enables the Estonian Division, in co-operation with its allies, to more effectively plan and execute deep operations – one of its most important duties.

UNDERSTANDING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS The primary channel of co-operation between the Esto nian Division and the main learning units of the exercise were regional commands, which play a key role in suppor ting the area of government of the Ministry of the Inter ior. The regional commands also co-ordinate co-operation with regional crisis staffs, the Estonian Rescue Board, re gional units of the PBGB and local governments, providing support where necessary. At the same time, the regional commands also car ry out important military duties as part of the wartime composition and operational framework of the Estonian Division. Therefore, the role of regional commands in balancing its peacetime and wartime resources between military defence and internal security is highly important. The commander and staff of the regional command have the best understanding of the tasks arising from the war plan of the Estonian Division, the intent of the Comman der of the Estonian Division and the scope of preparation required to implement their plan. Based on the assessment of the commander and staff of the regional command, a calculation is made to deter mine what resources and at what point in time can be pro vided for civilian support to other agencies and local go 70

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Exercise vernments. All of this was simulated during the Decisive Lancer 2024 exercise, helping to build a clearer understanding of support requirements and capabilities at the level of regional commands, the Estonian Divi sion and civilian partners. At the level of regional commands, the transition of peacetime management res ponsibility from the Defence League to the wartime composition of the Estonian Divi sion was practised. This situation is further complicated by the fact that regional com mands must be capable of managing both the wartime territorial defence subunits and those elements of the Defence League that are not part of territorial defence. This, in turn, places specific demands on the struc ture, equipment and training of the regional command staffs. Such a management solu tion also requires good co-operation and co-ordination between the Estonian Divi sion staff and the command element of the Commander of the Defence League formed on the basis of the Headquarters of the Es tonian Defence League.

Regional commands must be capable of managing both the wartime territorial defence subunits and those elements of the Defence League that are not part of territorial defence.

Major General

The goal of the Commander of the Es tonian Division was to reach a level with this exercise where every participating staff and commander clearly understands their role in different phases of the conf lict and can share this knowledge with su bunits or individual soldiers and persons in service. A clear understanding by each person of their responsibilities in any given situation enables better comprehensive defence and ensures national security in both crisis and full-scale military conflict.

Indrek Sirel

MULTIFACETED SCENARIO

instructing

In the exercise scenario, we incorporated elements that were as realistic as possible, at times featuring complex events made up of multiple incidents. Both the experiences of Ukraine and the recent hostile incidents

the participants in the exercise.

EDF Photo

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in our region have demonstrated that the scenarios practiced during Decisive Lancer 2024 were highly relevant and that it is always best to be prepared for the worst. For a country committed to comprehensi ve national defence, it is crucial to ensure the security of its citizens, the functiona lity of the state and its infrastructure, and the resilience of the population to hostile influence activities, regardless of whether we call them hybrid or military attacks. The staff led by the Estonian Division and the exercise control centre proposed realistic cases and situations, closely mo nitoring and evaluating the actions of each participating military unit or element and how they resolved the situations. In the exercise scenario, the crisis was preceded by hostile activities consisting of multiple 72

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The simulation of different scenarios enabled the identification of gaps in information exchange, battle rhythm, use of force and command authority.

elements that could not be treated direct ly as a crisis and therefore had to be add ressed without altering the existing legal order. From the perspective of peacetime law and crisis definition, it was a complex situation involving multiple constraints. During the initial days of the exercise, such activities were practised by regional com mands, the PBGB, Estonian Rescue Board, Health Board and crisis staffs of local go vernments. The exercise command staff then escalated the situation, allowing for a change in the legal basis for action and the introduction of additional measures to manage the crisis. In the final days of the exercise, a ‘time jump’ was introduced and the Estonian Division primarily practised

Exercise

the defensive operations of infantry briga des and regional commands in the context of a large-scale conventional military conf lict within the operational framework of the Estonian Division. The simulation of different scenarios enabled the identification of gaps in in formation exchange, battle rhythm, use of force and command authority. The exerci se created a good environment to assess whether the existing legal framework and planned measures align with the demands of modern conflicts and situations, and to evaluate how well each participating agency or military unit understands its duties in different phases of a conflict. In addition, it helped to understand which institutions have the leading role and which ones have a supporting role, who

co-ordinates everything and whether the necessary communication and information systems are in place to carry out the requi red tasks. The annual exercise Decisive Lancer helps the Estonian Defence Forces, the Defence League, partner agencies and re gional crisis committees to better unders tand their roles in the different stages of a crisis or war situation and to strengthen co-operation. The new elements and events added to the scenario challenged the participants and offered an opportu nity to find the best solutions and met hods of interoperability to ensure seam less co-operation between agencies. I am confident that we have taken a huge step forward in the development of national defence and crisis management. ‖

All kinds of crisis scenarios were played out during the exercise.

EDF Photo by Reio Soikka

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British and French officers setting up a battle plan.

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Photos by French Armed Forces

Exercise

The PIKNE exercise, held from 2nd to 15th December at the Sirgala training area, was the major joint and combined exercise of 2024.

STANDING AS ONE AGAINST THE STORM LAURINE CRICHTON Captain, Public Affairs Officer, French Mission in Estonia, NATO Forward Land Forces

n an international context marked by increased tensions in the Baltic re gion, this exercise was part of a large sequence of NATO exercises in the three domains to train and demonstrate the Alliance’s cohesion and unity. Bringing together the allied countries with Estonia, such as the United Kingdom, the USA and France, exercise Pikne was con ducted in three phases (deployment, oppo sition of forces and fires), and featured a scenario allowing Estonia to activate its na tional defence plan and request the support of its allies under the NATO Response Force. This intervention by our allies was no tably aimed at gaining time in the face of a possible enemy incursion by ensuring the gradual achievement of the combat readi ness of the First Estonian Division. The main objective was to affirm NATO’s deterrent and defensive posture, and to illustrate the ability of the Alliance forces, and France in particular, to quickly deploy a reaction force into a complex and demanding Estonian battle space. France dispatched a battalion-sized air borne reaction force that rapidly and decisi vely deployed in less than 12 hours. The sol diers of the Third Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment formed the core of this battalion and were directly subordinated to the First Estonian Division. These soldiers were col lected by the parachute commandos, and were infiltrated beforehand in order to es

The main objective was to affirm NATO’s deterrent and defensive posture, and to illustrate the ability of the Alliance forces, and France in particular, to quickly deploy a reaction force into a complex and demanding Estonian battle space.

tablish liaison with the French light infant ry company, already present in the combat area. In addition to the airborne unit and the light infantry company, the territory’s defence was organised around the French combined arms company, which has been permanently deployed in Tapa. In addition to the joint aspect, this exercise also required combined arms cooperation. Air and maritime resources were deployed. The tripartite mine hunter Croix du Sud and the high-seas patrol boat Commandant Blaison took part in opera tions in the Baltic Sea. The mine hunter and Estonian patrol boat successfully carried out a mine-neutralisation mission in Narva Bay. In the air domain, two A400Ms and a C130-J provided transport and logistical support for the forces. Dutch F35s and French Rafa les were also present to provide close air support. On the Estonian side, the exercise enab led testing of the mobilisation system for volunteers grouped together within the Es tonian Defence League, who are intended to reinforce the Estonian forces as part of the emergency defence plans. The part nership between the French light infantry company and the Estonian Defence League embodies, from this perspective, a unique form of cooperation between France and Estonia. The cooperation highlighted the cohesion of the allied forces and their ability to jointly defend the Estonian territory and its population. The PIKNE exercise was a great success and highlighted the ability of Estonian forces, supported by the allied armed forces, to deploy quickly and effectively in order to defend the Estonian territory. ‖ annual review 2024

I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s

Giving aid to a wounded person during Interflex training in Great Britain.

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I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s

SUPPORTING

UKRAINE

UNTIL VICTORY VALJO TOOMING Lieutenant Colonel, Senior Staff Officer at the Training Department, Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces

EDF Photo by Mihkel Leis

stonia has supported the Armed Forces of Ukraine since the early weeks of the war. While in the initial months we donated large amounts of equipment and provided military training to Ukrainian service members, it became clear as time passed that the war would not end any time soon. Consequent ly, it became necessary to strike a balance between supporting Ukraine and main taining Estonia’s own operational readi ness and military training. The capacity of our military training areas has been designed with peacetime needs in mind, making it difficult to find suitable military training areas for Ukrain ian soldiers. As a result, in autumn 2023, a decision was made to concentrate efforts on three specific avenues for the contin ued training of Ukrainian soldiers: 1) organisation of courses in Estonia, fo cusing on areas where Estonia possesses greater know-how and experience and where the impact would be most ben eficial for the Ukrainians, while at the same time ensuring that the operational readiness of Estonia remains unaffected; 2) participation of Estonian combat engi neer instructors in training courses in Poland; 3) participation of instructors in courses in the United Kingdom (UK). annual review 2024

I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s

Shooting training under the guidance of an Estonian instructor.

The United Kingdom has assumed a leading role in organising the basic mili tary training for Ukraine. Joining Opera tion Interflex was therefore the optimal solution for Estonia to balance domestic resources with continued support for Ukraine. Operation Interflex is a British-led training mission that provides Ukrainians with instruction in weapons handling, battlefield first aid, Law of Armed Con flict training, patrol tactics and urban warfare training. Particular emphasis is placed on marksmanship and managing combat stress. The military training is based on British training materials adapt ed for Ukrainians. In addition to the basic course, junior non-commissioned officer and instructor courses are also organised. The training mission was launched in 2022 and has since been joined by sever al countries, including Canada, New Zea land, Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, 78

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To date, approximately 45,000 Ukrainian soldiers of varying ages, physical capabilities and levels of motivation have received training.

EDF Photo by Mihkel Leis

Finland, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Kosovo and Estonia. To date, approximately 45,000 Ukrainian soldiers of varying ages, phys ical capabilities and levels of motivation have received training. Estonia joined Operation Interflex in January 2024. This was followed by the signing of an implementation agreement with the United Kingdom, the determi nation of the instructor pool size and the definition of the duties of the Estonian contingent. According to the directives of the Commander of the Defence Forces, a total of 30 instructors will take part in the training mission: ten active service mem bers and 20 reservists. The first rotation was established in March 2024. Active service members had the opportunity to participate in the mis sion on a rotational basis upon the sub mission of a personal request. Reservists were recruited by the Defence Resources

I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s Agency, with no limitations placed on their partic ipation in rotations. Before heading to the United Kingdom, instructors underwent additional training in Estonia, during which they conducted trial lessons for one another, refined their terminology in English and developed teamwork skills. To provide logistical support for the 30-member instructor team, the Estonian Training Delivery Unit (EST TDU) operates within the training framework coordinated by New Zealand. By the beginning of this year, six rotations of Estonian instructors, total ling approximately 130 people, had participated in Operation Interflex. The expertise of Estonian instructors has been greatly appreciated by Ukrainian soldiers. In true Es tonian style, our instructors place significant empha sis on the quality of training and explain why things should be done in a certain way. Good military train ing increases the confidence of soldiers and reduces fear of war. Operation Interflex is important to Estonia be cause, firstly supporting military training enhances our relationship with the British Armed Forces, with whom we share a long-standing alliance. Many of the British officers involved in Interflex have previ ously served in Estonia and are well-acquainted with our Defence Forces and culture. Secondly, participation provides valuable les sons identified from the experiences of the Ukrain ian Armed Forces. During the initial rotations, there were instances where the combat experience of Ukrainian soldiers, particularly in drone-related combat tactics and battlefield first aid, was more current than the instructors’ own knowledge. Therefore, the instructors approach the students as equals. The involvement of Estonian reservists, who served as volunteers in Ukraine, as instructors has also become a part of our standard operating procedure, supporting both the training needs of Ukraine and the development of our reserve forces. Thirdly, Operation Interflex provides Estonian instructors with valuable international instructor ex perience. This is beneficial not only for active service members who later train conscripts, but also for re servists, many of whom are active members of the Defence League. The international environment re quires adaptation to varying levels of physical condi tion and language barriers, which, in turn, improves the quality and efficiency of military training in Es tonia. Ukraine needs our help and Estonia has prom ised to support Ukraine until victory. Estonia will continue its participation in Operation Interflex throughout 2025. ‖

hen the British asked how best to construct a prop er trench line, the Estonian response was simple: there are two ways – either with infantry shovels (brute force) or with a backhoe loader – whichever suits the situation. – Both were needed: digging by hand so that the Ukrainians could practise constructing a trench line, and completing one with a backhoe loader in the same area for practising movement. According to Estonian estimates, digging a trench line with a backhoe loader takes one to two days, depending on the backhoe loader operator’s experience. – We will not receive the backhoe loader for another three months. – Why not request one from your combat engineer regi ment? It might be faster. – We did, but the processing time for a decision is at least 90 days. In the end, the hand-dug trench was completed well before the backhoe loader arrived.

he breakfast offered at the camp is a classic English breakfast. When some of our instructors requested a slightly healthier breakfast (balanced micro- and macronutrients, nutritious, healthy, etc) we were generally accommodated and efforts were made to find a solution. However, when the Estonian instructors were temporarily transferred to another military unit, they managed to get into a quarrel with the kitchen staff on the very first day. When our instructors returned to their home unit, they gained a new appreciation for their ‘own’ kitchen.

he Estonians wanted to set up a sauna at the home base, because what mission or operation is complete for Estonians without a sauna? I suppose it makes us better soldiers. Who knows – but a sauna is essential. Thus, a plan was drawn up to make it happen. It was known that a container sauna at the Tapa home base in Es tonia was sitting unused. After presenting to the Interflex staff the national specificities of Estonians and the desire to bring a sauna from Estonia to the camp, the Interflex G4 officer began analysing the request through the lens of fire safety and other potential risks. The request was subjected to prolonged processing. Meanwhile, the Estonian side remained eager to send the sauna, and the instructors were just as eager to enjoy the heat and steam. During the process, the Estonian Defence Attaché in the UK paid a vis it to the instructors. He explained that, early in his service, he too searched for a sauna near London, as it is almost a given in Estonia that saunas are everywhere – sports clubs, spas, etc. However, in the UK, saunas are typically found only in certain types of clubs. As for the Estonian instruc tors at Interflex, they are still waiting for their sauna…

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I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s

For over two decades, Estonia has contributed to both its own security and that of its allies in the Middle East, beginning with its participation in international military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003.

OUR MISSION IN IRAQ Estonians and Finns in the middle of a combined shooting exercise in Iraq.

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EDF Photo by Hans Lehepuu

I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s HANS LEHEPUU Lieutenant, Public Affairs Officer, Estonian Contingent in Iraq

n 2024, a total of 110 service members from the Estonian Defence Forces par ticipated in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and NATO Mission Iraq (NMI). These are two separate operations in the Middle East that follow different paths but share the same goal: to enhance Iraq’s independent security capabilities in the fight against terrorist Islamic extremism.

NATO MISSION IRAQ (NMI) NMI is a NATO-led, non-combat training and advisory mission focused on longterm objectives in Iraq and training and advising Iraqi state agencies, including the Ministry of Defence of Iraq, the Iraqi Ar med Forces and educational institutions in the field of defence. The aim of NMI is to enhance governance in the security sector of Iraq, improve logistics, cyber defence and support the reform of the security sector as a whole. Additionally, it provides training to instructors of the Iraqi Armed Forces who then organise and implement military training in their own structures. NMI was launched at the NATO Summit in Brussels on 11–12 July 2018, following an invitation and request from Iraq. Cur rently, Estonia contributes to the operation with one staff officer, although in previous years, Estonia has also supported it with training teams and the Estguard-4 force protection group.

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) Unlike NMI, Operation Inherent Resolve is an international military operation led by the United States, with a participating coa lition consisting of both NATO and non-NA TO countries. While NMI is a non-combat mission focused solely on advisory and training support, OIR was established in 2014 to counter the rapid expansion of the terrorist group Da’ish, also known as the Is lamic State, through co-ordinated combat operations. Following the collapse of the Isla mic State Caliphate, OIR has increasingly shifted its focus to counter-insurgency

by disrupting Islamic State operations, recruitment efforts and networks. The mission has also broadened its scope to include building and developing the Iraqi Armed Forces, which has now become its primary objective. This shift reflects both the growing capabilities of the Iraqi secu rity forces and the evolving nature of the threat of the Islamic State.

National Support Element NSE-4 in action.

EDF Photo by Hans Lehepuu

Estonian company plans and supports personal protection operations for advisors and performs rapid reaction force tasks within the framework of force protection. As of 2023, Estonia contributes to OIR with a contingent of 110 service members. It includes an infantry company formed from the Scouts Battalion called Estcoy, a national support element and staff officers and non-commissioned officers serving as military advisors. annual review 2024

I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s

The main duty of the Estonian infant ry company in Iraq is to plan and support personal protection operations for military advisors and to perform rapid reaction force tasks within the framework of force protection. The national support element ensures that the Estonian infantry com pany and the Estonian service members in the advisor group of the operation have all necessary resources to perform their du ties, including transport, accommodation, medical and technical support, equipment and ammunition.

MILITARY ADVISORY SERVICES IN IRAQ Within OIR, there is a Military Advisor Group (MAG), which is split into MAG-N (Military Advisor Group – North), focusing on Northern Iraq, and MAG-I (Military Ad 82

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visor Group – Iraq), focusing on the rest of the country. Estonian staff officers and non-com missioned officers serving as military ad visors are stationed across Iraq, with the majority based in Erbil where they acti vely assist in implementing the reform of the Peshmerga. The MAG-N international personnel consist of military advisors or ganised by joint functions. The main objective of the Peshmerga reform is to bring military units formed on the basis of tribal and political affiliations under the central control of the Kurdistan Regional Government to better prepare for the fight against terrorism. The development of the Peshmerga is in many ways similar to the rebuilding of the Estonian Defence Forces after the restoration of independence. Until the sp

Discussion between Estonians and Iraqis after a successful cooperation exercise. EDF Photo by Hans Lehepuu

I n t e r n at i o n a l O p e r at i o n s

ring of 2025, Colonel Andres Hairk serves in Iraq as the commander of the Estonian contingent and as a military advisor in command and control (C2). According to Colonel Hairk, the experience of Estonia in building national defence is highly va luable, which is why both the Kurds and the Iraqis greatly appreciate the contribu tion of Estonians. ‘Being an advisor in Iraq often evokes a sense of déjà vu. The strong will, limited resources, ambitious goals and numerous possible paths bring to mind the early days of the newly independent Estonia,’ said Colonel Hairk, drawing parallels with the rebuilding of the national defence of Estonia after the Soviet occupation.

IMPACT OF SYRIA The transition of power in Syria, which began in December 2024, presents signi ficant challenges to both regional security and the OIR. The uncertainty and instabi lity in Syria and the Syrian-Iraqi border regions is beneficial for extremist groups, including the Islamic State, who can move combatants, armament and money more freely, enabling them to regroup and plan new operations. An additional concern is the worse ning humanitarian situation in Syria cau sed by ongoing instability. Large-scale displacement, the influx of refugees and the release of prisoners from Syria place added strain on Iraq. This, in turn, could exacerbate political tensions in Iraq and create a breeding ground for extremist recruitment. Finally, the fragmented and complex political and security landscape in Syria hinders the implementation of a unified strategy against extremist threats. This fragmentation not only undermines the coherence of operations, but also adds to the unpredictability of the security situation in the region. From Estonia’s perspective, this could mean that the terrorist threat is drawing closer and our allies’ focus becomes increasingly divided among multiple threats. ‖

Flag ceremony in Iraq.

EDF Photo by Marina Loshtshina

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Air Force

MILITARY AVIATION

UNDER SCRUTINY

LAURI LEET Major, Commander, Military Aviation Authority

he Military Aviation Authority was established with in the Estonian Air Force in 2020, following the rec ognition that military aviation activities in Estonian airspace – and all related operations – require reg ular monitoring for compliance. Whether manned or unmanned, Estonian military aviation adheres to the requirements established by the Minister of Defence and NATO STANAGs. In August 2018, a Spanish fighter pilot accidentally fired an air-to-air missile during a routine training exercise near Otepää. Following this incident, the Ministry of Defence decided to establish more specific rules within its area of government for the overall organisation of military aviation in Estonia. It was primarily this incident that highlighted the need for special attention and systematic supervision of the armed air policing missions of NATO allies and mili tary aviation in Estonian airspace. Until then, civil aviation was regulated by the then Es tonian Civil Aviation Administration, but military aviation,

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by its nature, was not subject to civil supervision. Military aviation is based on national defence needs and has always been mission-oriented, which sets it apart from the oper ating logic of civil aviation. Until now, Estonian military avi ation has operated on the principle of commanding, plan ning, executing and supervising its own operations.

WRITTEN IN BLOOD In September 2006, a British Royal Air Force Hawker Sidde ley Nimrod MR2 reconnaissance aircraft tragically crashed in Kandahar, killing all 14 persons on board. The cause of the accident was found to be serious shortcomings in both the technical condition of the aircraft and aviation supervi sion. After this lesson ‘written in blood’, NATO accelerated efforts to establish uniform requirements for aviation su pervision. A decade later, NATO introduced a requirement that each allied country must establish functioning military aviation oversight, which must receive formal recognition through the NATO recognition process. In the autumn of 2018, under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence, development of a framework of re quirements for regulating military aviation began, which

Air Force

US F-15C and F-15E fighters at the Ämari airbase during exercise Baltic Trident 2021. EDF Photo by Sigrid Paula Pukk

was formalised in 2019 by the Minister of Defence in the Aviation Regulation of the Estonian Defence Forces. The regulation initially applied only to the Defence Forces, but in 2023 it was amended and renamed the Military Aviation Regulation. It now applies across the entire area of govern ment of the Ministry of Defence. With the introduction of a set of requirements for mil itary aviation, the need to establish aviation oversight be came immediately apparent. Preparations were initiated to set up an oversight unit within the Estonian Air Force. The Military Aviation Authority was officially established on 1st of October 2020. Four positions – Commander, Aviation Op erations Inspector, Aircraft Inspector, Infrastructure Inspec tor – were filled by experienced specialists who underwent the required professional training to carry out their duties.

INDEPENDENCE OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY The position of the Military Aviation Authority in the struc ture of the Estonian Defence Forces is fundamentally dif ferent from other units, as the supervision it carries out is not subject to command authority. The commander of the Military Aviation Authority is not subject to the chain

of command in terms of reporting, and may report directly to the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces or the Minister of Defence. Supervision over the activities of the Military Aviation Authority is carried out solely by the Min istry of Defence. This position is essential to ensure independence, as the main tasks of the Military Aviation Authority include su pervision over military aviation in Estonian airspace and in spection of the technical condition of both manned and un manned aircraft and the supporting military infrastructure. In short, the purpose of supervision is to ensure the safety and quality of operations and equipment, as well as com pliance with the regulations governing these activities. The supervision exercised by the Military Aviation Authority ex tends without exception to the entire area of government of the Ministry of Defence, ie to everyone engaged in aviation activities, including the Estonian Defence Forces, Estonian Defence League, Estonian Military Academy and other units. According to the Statutes of the Estonian Air Force, the main task of the Military Aviation Authority is to ensure regulated and safe military aviation. To achieve this, an in tegral part of the activities of the Military Aviation Author ity involves overseeing compliance with the regulations governing military aviation in the area of government of the Ministry of Defence, regardless of the service. A key aspect of this work is verifying the compliance of the air craft production or maintenance organisation, the contin uing airworthiness management organisation, the training organisation, the aerodrome operator and the personnel and facilities involved in military aviation with the require ments set out in legislation.

NATO RECOGNISED The Military Aviation Authority of the Estonian Air Force re ceived the corresponding NATO recognition certificate last year, following a thorough audit and conformity assessment conducted by the NATO Commission. In addition, the Military Aviation Authority has also received recognition from the USA and Sweden, with their recognition including some special el ements. The essence of the NATO recognition principle is that if all allied countries have recognised aviation oversight, allied aviation transitions smoothly from one controlled environ ment to another. This is necessary knowledge for our allies, providing assurance that our aerodrome and the personnel and aircraft equipment used in joint exercises meet the uni form requirements of NATO and are properly supervised. The Military Aviation Authority also plays an active role in drafting legislation in its area of activity and maintains a register of both manned and unmanned aircraft used in military aviation. Its responsibilities further extend to issu ing and approving airworthiness certificates and permits, recognising certificates issued by other countries and com petent authorities, and participating in the work of avia tion accident or incident investigation boards. ‖ annual review 2024

S p e c i a l O p e r at i o n s

KÜTID OF THE ESTONIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

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S p e c i a l O p e r at i o n s

The Estonian Special Operations Forces (ESTSOF) has trained its conscripts, known as kütid in Estonian, since 2021. RIVO MEIMER Colonel, Commander, Estonian Special Operations Forces

he initial idea to establish a reser vist element within ESTSOF origina ted from Major General Riho Ühte gi during his tenure as Commander of ESTSOF. The ongoing war in Uk raine has only reinforced the validity of this idea and the need for reservists. Before the establishment of the EST SOF conscript service, ESTSOF personnel visited its Finnish counterparts at the Utti Jaeger Regiment, who have been training conscripts (parachute jaegers) since 1968. Inspired and encouraged by what we saw, we began training our own conscripts. Close co-operation with the Finns has continued, and in 2024, the Utti parachu te jaegers participated for the first time in an exercise outside Finland – Spring Storm 2024 – alongside ESTSOF conscripts.

FOR THOSE WHO LIKE A CHALLENGE It does not necessarily matter in which mi litary unit or specialty conscript and sub sequent reserve service are completed; what matters most is complete dedica tion and personal development. Conscript service in ESTSOF, becoming a kütt and serving as a kütt is likely one of the most demanding and effort-intensive forms of conscript and reserve service in Estonia. Therefore, conscript service in ESTSOF is best suited for those who enjoy facing and overcoming challenges and who want to test their limits. Our instructors are very demanding of the conscripts, as the trai ning is intensive and packed with new in formation. While this certainly challenges the jae gers, it also instills commitment, discipline and the importance of being studious and attentive, both during conscript service annual review 2024

S p e c i a l O p e r at i o n s

A conscript from the Special Operations Command takes the oath. The moment when the conscript became a kütt.

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S p e c i a l O p e r at i o n s All cohorts of ESTSOF conscripts can be defined by a single word – unity. While instructors and the Estonian Special Ope rations Forces provide the conditions for this to happen, it is ultimately a phenome non that cannot be manufactured by out siders. It is something the kütid achieve on their own. They themselves say that they wanted to challenge themselves and make the most of their conscript service. They seek opportunities for self-development and aim to improve their communication and leadership skills. Since the kütid often have no one to rely on but themselves in real-life situations, the same principle app lies during military service – the closer they get to the end of their service, the more in dependent and responsible they become.

A LASTING BOND

and in later life. At the end of their consc ript service, the Estonian Military Academy conducted an opinion poll with the kütid who started their service in July 2023. The results confirm that the kütid found the training to be intense but entirely manage able and engaging. The kütid are tasked with operating behind enemy lines, typically in small teams, for extended periods and wit hout external support. As a result, the demands placed on them are high. Skills such as teamwork, tactics, weapon hand ling and survival abilities, among many others, must all be at the highest level. Therefore, those who wish to become a kütt must meet strict requirements and undergo intensive training.

All kütid undergo intensive and thorough shooting training.

EDF Photos

All Estonian citizens entering conscript ser vice who have completed secondary educa tion, have no criminal record and are in good physical shape can apply to become a kütt. To do so, an application for conscript service must be completed in the military service online environment, with the Esto nian Special Operations Forces requested as the unit of assignment. As the number of applicants has exceeded the number of available spots each year, we have been or ganising one-day trials since 2024. The goal of these trials is to identify the most mental ly and physically suitable future candidates. In the spring of 2024, a total of 150 people registered for the trials, 135 showed up and 40 conscripts began their service in ESTSOF. The trials last one day and include a physical fitness test, a swim ming skills test, an individual interview with each potential kütt and psychological tests. Conscript service in ESTSOF begins in July and lasts for 11 months. All undergo junior non-commissioned officer training and are promoted to the rank of Junior Sergeant. After completing their conscript service as a kütt, they continue their duty in the reserve. In addition to their service in the reserve, we encourage all kütid to take part in the selection process for a special ope rations group or to join a suitable Estonian Defence League battle group. Whatever path a kütt chooses, their connection with ESTSOF will endure for years to come. ‖ annual review 2024

Cyber Command

‘Interoperability’ means the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives of the alliance and the Estonian Defence Forces.

THE CYBER COMMAND DEVELOPS MORE THAN JUST TECHNOLOGY

nteroperability encompasses three di mensions: people, processes and tech nology. For every ICT solution used in warfare, all three dimensions are pre sent. A deficiency in one dimension can, to some extent, be compensated by a hig her level of performance in another. Intero perability serves as a kind of glue between combat-ready and combat-capable military units, enhancing both readiness and overall capability. First and foremost, it is encouraging to see that international exercises and projects, once considered the exclusive domain of the Cyber Command, have now expanded to in volve the entire Defence Forces. As mentio ned before, interoperability consists of three dimensions, but first and foremost – people. Over the past year, although we have focu sed on advancing the technical dimension, it is the human dimension that has seen the most significant development. Knowledge and skills have grown considerably.

EXERCISES AND TEAM SPIRIT Locked Shields is the world’s largest cyber defence exercise, with all member and part ner nations of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) stri ving for the best result. In 2024, we were able to achieve the best result thanks to the combined efforts of active active service members, officials, workers, conscripts, re servists, volunteers of the Estonian Defence League, public sector employees, private sector volunteers and allies. Getting such a heterogeneous group of people to work together is no easy task, but with a tre mendous collective effort, we succeeded. 90

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VALDUR TAMMETS Captain, Cyber Command Staff Officer, ICT Interoperability Manager

Interoperability serves as a kind of glue between combat-ready and combatcapable military units, enhancing both readiness and overall capability.

Both personnel and operational capabi lities were significantly developed in the framework of Locked Shields. Notably, for the first time in the history of the Estonian Defence Forces, a unit was formed virtual ly using the instant messaging platform Discord. Such activities are only possible when there is trust between people. This trust can only be built through a high level of leadership by example and participation – something that the representatives of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Cyber and Information Operations Centre of the Cyber Command have demonstrated through ye ars of expert work. The same level of expertise was also evident in our relations with allies. A prime example is our excellent collaboration with the US Army Maryland National Guard. Additionally, technical specialists from the French Cyber Command also contributed to the efforts of the Blue Team. Both allies provided highly positive feedback, praising the effectiveness and capabilities of the Es tonian team.

WHERE THE IT SECTOR MEETS THE ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES Blue Team 12 (BT 12) of Locked Shields brought together a large number of repre sentatives and companies from the IT sec tor of Estonia. For example, the network team was led by Pipelife, the web services team by Bolt, the Windows team included banks, the specific information systems team (industry, 5G, SAT, etc) was led by Eesti Energia and the preparation of pre sentations was headed by the Information System Authority. Locked Shields provided

Cyber Command a unique environment where top specialists from different fields came together to apply their expertise toward a shared objective. At the same time, the Estonian Defence Forces do not have the capacity to inde pendently manage and control the full spectrum of services involved, making the contributions of both the public and private sectors truly invaluable. Unfortunately, the re is not enough space here to name every authority, organisation and company invol ved, but the Cyber Command would once again like to express its sincere gratitude to all who participated.

The Estonian Mission Network has established itself as a fully operational system used on a daily basis. CWIX 2024 was a similar effort. For the first time, we officially put our systems through formal testing to demonstrate that they are suitable for official use, and in the process, we learned that we have the world’s best experts, who advised allied participants every day. The contributions of the personnel supporting our exercise were also highly appreciated. Although the Cyber Command played a leading role, specialists from the infantry brigades and the Support Command were also involved. Bringing this kind of experience to the Estonian Defence Forces allows us to signi ficantly improve the quality of planning and conducting our own tests. Moreover, par ticipation in the Federated Mission Networ king (FMN) provides analysts with a wealth of new knowledge and skills, which can be later used in the management of the Esto nian Mission Network (EST MN). Looking ahead, participation in CWIX as an analyst is recommended for battalion and brigade communications commanders and serge ants. CWIX also serves as an important plat form for the development of the Estonian defence industry. In 2024, companies such as SensusQ, Vegvisir and Cybernetica were represented. In 2025, even greater priva te sector involvement is expected. Cyber Command always offers an opportunity for annual review 2024

Cyber Command

Reservist and reporter Sergeant Rauno Põld (center) of the Cyber Command Strategic Communications Center interviews a Canadian Forces fighter during the Crystal Arrow exercise at the Ādaži training ground in Latvia. EDF Photo by Mark-Erik Tölpt

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the Estonian private sector to develop its products and collaborate across all three dimensions of interoperability. This brings us to the Estonian Mission Network, which is used in the Warfighter exercise series. The EST MN has establis hed itself as a fully operational system used on a daily basis. For example, the Estonian Division currently regards it as its primary information system. The relocatable system designed for processing classified informa tion provides us access to all core services, including email, text messaging, as well as voice and video calls. KOLT and Tooru are also full members of EST MN. The inclusion of these two ser

vices enhances the exchange of information on operational situational awareness and engagement operations between the Esto nian Defence Forces – in particular, the Divi sion – and allied forces. We are also able to share the recognised air picture within EST MN, and with the addition of the LOGFAS service, most of the services are available in EST MN for combat functions to carry out their tasks. In 2023 and 2024, the process of con necting EST MN to other networks was ini tiated, and this work will continue in 2025. In the longer term, the goal is for EST MN to remain the central system for processing classified information within the Estonian

Cyber Command Defence Forces. In other words, this means that we will interface EST MN with NATO or allied networks based on operational needs, with everything done unnoticeably to the user. This approach also brings invaluable experience gained in international settings and contributes to the development of high-level expertise.

JOINT EFFORT OF THE ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES Finally, a few words about the Black Box exercise – the only exercise that involves the entire Estonian Defence Forces from a tech nical standpoint. In the 2024–2025 cycle, approximately 85 command post elements from across the Estonian Defence Forces and the Defence League took part. On the technical side, we currently do not have the same capabilities to design, manage and implement tests as CWIX. However, thanks to the leadership of the Cyber Serviceman of the Year, the best possible solution was developed using the available technical resources – a standardi sed test suite that can be used in the futu re to ensure operational readiness as new persons in service or equipment are added. Black Box has made a significant qualitative leap over the past year, particularly in terms of personnel skills, and future cycles will int roduce an international dimension to the exercise. If you ask a service member what the cyber branch is about, it might initially seem that the focus is primarily on (information) technology. However, as this article highlig hts, the development of human resources and procedures is equally vital. The latter two dimensions are developed every day at the Cyber Command in addition to tech nology. However, the complementarity of these three dimensions should never be overlooked. The best opportunity for self-develop ment and effective implementation of sys tems domestically lies in an international environment where we are increasingly trying to engage our most valuable resource – people – from across the entire Estonian Defence Forces and the country. Valuable human resources help us lay the foundation for strong technological and procedural di mensions. ‖

Crystal Arrow of Military Public Affairs RAIKO JÄÄRATS Lieutenant, Deputy Commander, Strategic Communications Centre

he Strategic Communications Centre of the Cyber Com mand organised a reservist training exercise in Latvia dur ing the exercise Crystal Arrow in March 2024. It was the first time the Estonian Defence Forces de ployed a company-sized military unit, primarily composed of re servists, to an exercise in a foreign country. Crystal Arrow also served as an evaluation exercise for the NATO Battle Group in Latvia, led by Canada. A Brigade Public Affairs Detachment of the Stra tegic Communications Centre is designed to support a military unit of at least a brigade size with strategic communications capa bilities. This military unit must be capable of assembling at short notice to support both the Esto nian Defence Forces and allies. ‘Convening a Brigade Public Affairs Detachment for reservist training requires the organisation of major exercises, allowing all specialist groups within the de tachment to refine and develop their skills,’ explained Captain Marina Loštšina, Commander of Brigade Public Affairs Detach ment No 1. ‘The only exercise that indirectly met our needs took place in Latvia in 2024.’ Negotiations therefore began as early as autumn 2023 with the Latvian Mechanised Infantry Brigade of the Land Forces and the allied battle group serving alongside it, which did not have a military unit equivalent to the Bri

gade Public Affairs Detachment. Loštšina says that including the new unit in the exercise scenario initially raised some questions and concerns during the planning phase, which later proved to be unfounded. ‘Taking part in an exercise of a NATO ally with the Brigade Public Affairs Detachment for the first time represents a significant responsibility for both the leader ship of the military unit and the reservists,’ said Loštšina. ‘Estab lishing contacts, building trust and working together within a very limited timeframe in a way that ensures that everyone achieves their objectives without com promising those of other military units is a considerable challenge when encountering an unfamiliar military unit for the first time.’ Participation in the exercise gave the Strategic Communica tions Centre an opportunity to identify gaps in skills and harmo nised activities as well as bottle necks that require improvement. Many of these issues would likely not have emerged during an exer cise held in Estonia. The lessons identified are invaluable for the further development of the Bri gade Public Affairs Detachment. ‘The Estonian Strategic Communications Unit provided the battle group with a capability we would not otherwise have had,’ said Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Cox of the Canadian Armed Forces and Commander of the Latvian Battle Group on the last day of the exercise. ‘I am extremely pleased with the participation of the military unit in the exercise and look forward to future co-operation.’

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N AT O

For the NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia (NFIU EST), 2024 was a year of profound change. The NFIU was transferred from the authority of the Multinational Corps Northeast to that of the Joint Logistics and Support Group Brunssum (JLSG BS). It was not just a change in the chain of command, but also a shift in the broader role of the NATO Force Integration Unit, with a significantly stronger focus on logistics.

RENEWED RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR THE NATO FORCE INTEGRATION UNIT ESTONIA MERLE NORIT Major, NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia, Communications Adviser

focus on enhancing deterrence and defence capabilities. The establishment of NFIUs along NATO’s eastern border is just one of several measures taken in this regard. Logis tics as a whole, for example, has been no tably strengthened as part of these efforts. To better facilitate the deployment and lo gistical support of NATO troops, the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) was established in 2018 and achieved full opera tional capability in 2021. Joint Logistics and Support Group Headquarters (JLSG HQ) were established under the authority of the Joint Force Com mands (JFC) Brunssum and Naples. These headquarters can be deployed to different countries, where necessary, to better co-or dinate logistical operations. As a natural continuation of this development, from 1 January 2024, the NFIU in Estonia, along with those in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slo vakia and Hungary, was placed under the authority of the Joint Logistics and Support Group Headquarters Brunssum.

he establishment of NFIUs, currently located in eight countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), was decided at the Wales Summit in 2014 in response to the evolving security environment on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Since its inception, the primary task of the NFIU EST has been to facilitate the reception of NATO rapid reaction forces, to support the preparation of deployment operations and to contribute to the organisation of exerci ses on Estonian territory. In essence, the NFIU is an outpost of the NATO Command Structure that exchan ges information and situational awareness between NATO and Estonia. The primary mission of the NFIU is to support NATO’s defence planning, playing a role in ensuring the feasibility of the defence plans.

AMID THE WINDS OF CHANGE Since the annexation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2014, NATO has significantly increased its

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Preparation of Allied heavy equipment for participation in Spring Storm on May 9, 2024.

EDF Photo by Linda Maria Saar

N AT O While the core functions of the NFIUs remained unchanged, they are now integ rated into NATO’s broader logistics network and help to coordinate logistical activities also beyond the host countries. From the perspective of Estonia, this promotes in tegration with the NATO joint logistics and support network and enhances readiness to receive and support allied units during crisis.

NFIUs are integrated into NATO’s broader logistics network and help to coordinate logistical activities also beyond the host countries. In May 2024, NATO members approved the Logistics Action Plan that expanded the duties of host nations in supporting allied units. Host nations must ensure that allied forces can enter and transit the country swiftly and smoothly and operate effecti vely throughout the alliance territory for the purpose of collective defence.

STEADY SHEPHERD A tabletop exercise on Host Nation Support (HNS) was conducted at the NATO Force In tegration Unit Estonia in the same month, under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence. The aim was to discuss compre hensive support for allied forces arriving in Estonia during a crisis. In addition to the Go vernment Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Estonian Defence Forces and the NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia, the exerci

se also included other Estonian ministries and state agencies that are members of the HNS Steering Committee, chaired by the Ministry of Defence. The exercise also invol ved private sector companies, which play a key role in hosting allied units. At this level, it had been a long time since a public-pri vate co-operation exercise on Host Nation Support had taken place. Launched in autumn 2024, the Steady Shepherd exercise is a direct continuation of the Host Nation Support tabletop exerci se held in the spring. It is organised by the NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia in co-operation with the Ministry of Defence and the Estonian Defence Forces. The aim of the exercise is to play out in theory the deployment of allied troops to Estonia to ensure a common understanding of the process details among all parties. At the first Steady Shepherd exercise, members of the NATO Force Integration Unit Estonia, the Ministry of Defence, the Estonian Defence Forces and the Gover nment Office, along with representatives from several ministries, state agencies and NATO units, discussed the planning of a UK brigade deployment to Estonia. In total, 48 people from 18 organisations participated in the exercise: such broad participation allowed for a variety of observations to be made on how the process of hosting allied units could be further improved. ‖

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Impressum

Published by the Strategic Communications Department of the General Staff of the Defence Forces Produced by the Strategic Communications Center of the Cyber Command Compiled and edited by Second Lieutenant Jan Robert Janson Translated by Toimetaja Translation Bureau Designed by Ivo Sokka Printed by Joon Printing House ISSN 2613-3334

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