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THE ARMY AND VOLUNTEER SERVICE An analysis of the aspects relative to the establishment of a professional operational component

GENERAL GOFFREDO CANINO

General Goffredo Canino was born on 25 ]111.y 1931 at Riva di Trento. He graduated from Classical High School in 1950 and embarked on a military career the same year, entering the Military Academy at Modena) from which he was commissioned as Second Lieutenant of Infantry in 1952. After attending the Infantry Branch Course, he was assigned to the 114th Infantry Regiment "Mantova" in Gorizia. General Canino's military educational curriculum included technical training with the Artillery Tech nical Service; General Staff courses at the Army Staff College in Civitavecchia) at the Air Staff College in Florence) and at the Spanish Army Command and General Staff College in Madrid. General Canino 's command assignments are particula1ly noteworthy. After a short period as platoon leader in. the 114th Regiment, he was given the vacant command of a company as a lieutenant. From 1957 to 1959 he commanded the Cadet Platoon of the Military Academy, where he was also a Weapons Instructor and an Assistant Instructor of Military History. He then commanded arifle company in the 59th Infantry Regiment "Calabria" in Palmanova. In 1970, he commanded the 1st Battalion, 82nd Infantry Regiment "Torino" in Trieste) and in 197{ he became the commander of the same Regiment. In 1979, promoted to General Officer, he commanded the Mechanized Brigade "Legnanon in Bergamo, then from 1983 to 1984, General Canino commanded the "Folgore" Mechanized Division in Treviso. Immediately after this period) he became the Deputy Commander of the Central Military Region in Rome and, in 1987, he assumed command of the Tosco-Emiliana Military Region in Florence. General Staff experience includes various assignments in major units: as Operations and Traimng Staff Officer in the "Mantova" Division in Udine (1961) and in the 3rd Army Corps in Milan (1965); and as Chief of Staff at the Military Academy in Modena from 1971 to 1974. At the Army General Staff in Rome, he served as Staff Officer in the Plans section, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (1967-1970); as Chief of the Protocol, Public Relations and Social Affairs office (1975-1979); and as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (1981-1983). From 1985 to 1987 he was Director General of the Army's officer Directorate and, on 1 April 1990, General Canino was appointed as Chief of'Staff of the Italian Army.

Roma, 21 dicembre 1990

I am pleased to send you a copy of the article "The Army and Volunteer Service" (An analysis of the aspects relative to the establishment of a professional operational compo~ent) which I have written for Military Review. It is my intention to give my contribution of thought, personal and as Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, to the ever increasing debate on a subject which, for the breadth of its content and the vastity of possible consequences, assumes added relevance in the framework of the definition of the new defense model. I feel , in fact, that the problem of volunteer service is on its way to becoming the true keystone of Army reorganization . To be sure, my writing does not carry the connotation - nor does it want to have it - of an exhaustive treatise on the problem, rather that of an "opinion" which , through confrontation with other, just as valid opinions of civilian and military scholars, might produce an "idea" having, as such, uncontested objective value and, therefore, fit to be translated first into a legislative proposal, then into a political decision. Still in the context of the ongoing debates and studies on the configuration of the new defense model, I am also sending a special issue of Alere Flammam, our Service's Command and Staff College review, where the preliminary results of the Operational Conference 1990 have been summarized. This activity - taking place at the same institution which, as is well known , is t he Army's institutional research laboratory on military thought - has the task of examining the defense situation which has surfaced following the well-known events in Eastern Europe. The publication concerns, in particular, the general examination of the new politico-strategic-military situation and the subsequent configuration of future defense requirements. It constitutes the first notebook of a trilogy which will be developed in a second volume containing the systematic analysis of the dimensions of the problem, and a third study w hich will illustrate a possible "proposal" for the organization of the land deferise of our country. With the hope that these works might be interesting to you and offer some useful hints for reflection, 'I send, with my esteem and consideration, my warmest regards.

PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK

The politicaJ and social realities in our country and the changed international situation lead us co hope for an increasingly "profes sional" Army. Recently, much has been written and said about the possibility / opportunity/ necessity to establish a volunteer Army. Many formulas have been presented, more or less original and interesting; however, all are characterized by a superficial examination of the situation. Outside of a few praiseworthy exceptions, the ideas most frequently expressed on 't he subject have four fundamental shortcomings : 1. They do not focus on the basic reasons which can lead to the adoption of a volunteer system. 2. They are unable to insert their proposed formulas in a well defined politico - strategic framework. 3. They do not set forth serious, practical, and realistic proposals to organize the volunteer component. 4. They disregard the time, the resources, and the various actions

needed to change the system from its actual form into that which they for esee or hypothesize. To confront the problem in a serious and realistic manner, it is necessary, as a first step, to consider: the threat, in light of the altered strategic situation and of the experiences drawn from the Persian Gulf crisis, in a framework of ever decreasing availability of financial resources; the prospects relative to compulsory draft, to the institution of an alternate national civic service; and to the recruitment of women; the availability of personnel for voluntary military service. In fact , it is now clear that these very factors make the institution of voluntary service no longer a desirable option, but a functional necessity. Moreover, because of legislative, organizational and regulatory reasons; it becomes the keystone to the new ÂŤArmy SystemÂť. We cannot then speak of a defense model without considering the establishment of a professional

component. Neither can we formu late any technical/operational proposals without considering the effect that such a component will have on the social and economic fields. In any case, the first major questions to consider before examining the various aspects of volunteer service is to determine where it fits in with respect to the compulsory draft system in Italy. In my opinion, it is neither desirable nor advisable to eliminate the draft. I do not want to take excursions into the possibilities of a reduction in the draft period which, even though possible to a reasonable degree, requires a price to be paid in terms of costs, effectiveness, operational readiness and efficiency of today's Army. A price which someone will have to quantify clearly before making or imposing a decision. I also do not feel that this is the moment to show analytically all those technical and operational aspects which suggest the validity of maintaining the compulsory draft system. For now, I base my conclusions on a recent study done by the Military Center for Strategic Studies

which unequivocally affirmed: "There i no possibility in Italy, not even in the long term, to give up compulsory military service and to constitute Armed Forces based on volunteers and professionals." For the purpose of our analysis, therefore, I beli ve that just a few consideration s o n the ethical-moral aspects of the draft sh ould suffice to justify the conceptual framework of voluntary service. I consider maintaining compulsory draft a unavoidable, because I believe in defense by the people, in the involvement of all citizens in safeguarding our institutions and the physical integrity of our country. I firmly believe that this involvement must be personal and direct, not only requiring the material commitment, but also the spiritual obligation of each citizen. Only through the draft can we maintain and reinforce the national ideal of unity which we see every day threatened by Regional "Leagues" , faction s, and parochialisms. The draft system is an act of faith: in democracy, in &eedom, in the right of all citizens to defend themselves. It is true that the current system no longer guarantees social equality. For this re ason iL needs to be changed. Today, the draft needs to be reconsidered radicaJly. The formation of a smaller force, in keepi ng with the everdecreasi ng draft pool, can and must bring back equity not so much as a duty, but as an inalienable righ t of every citizen co be trained and prepared to meet emergencies . To do this, it will be necessary to reappraise and reorganize the mobilization system, which presupposes the availability of trained reserves . li the draft, in a size which brings back equity is an act of faith, the volunteer system, on the other hand, i a rational act. But between the foll act of fai th, all encompassing and permeated by national values by which compulso-

Front page.

Russian Spetsnaz on drill. Above. British commandos of the Roytif Pioneer Corps armed with antitank system.

In fact, it is now clear that these very factors make

thein-

stitution of voluntary service no longer a desirable option, but a functional necessity. Moreove1·, because of legislative., organizational and .tegulatoty reasons, it becomes the «keystone» to the new «Army System». ry draft is inspired, and the cold , rational calculation which lead to a professional or volunteer Army, there is a balance point whi ch currently can be perceived only on a "philosophical" plane, but which becomes very clear as all aspects of the problem are examined. For an analytical demonstration, i.c's understood that a certain cartesian reference syste m is needed. In fact, the volunteer service concept has to be related to two precise references: the international situation, and human resources. The first b eca use it imposes ne w global orientation s and new organizational requiremen ts; the second because fr concerns the men which sh ould fill che organization itself.

THE INTERNATIONAL

SITUATION The politico-military changes in Europe with the end of the " cold war"; the continuing instability in certain strategic regions such as the Mid dle East and the Balkans, added to the unforeseeable turns in North-So uth relations make evaluation of the threat more difficult and complex. In fact, the current geostrategic framework is characterized by considerable and sudden changes in international relatjons . Therefore , it isn't possible to identify immediately a clearly recognizable type of threa t which presents multiple aspects. For this re as·on, we mL1St refer, with a global vision, to tl,e entire political, economic, military and cultural context which characterizes it. With

A physician of a SAS patrol disinfecting a wound.

The questions relating to the reorganization of the Soviet military apparatus shift the pole of attraction from geostrategic to geopolitical arena, and in any case, do not seem to create the premises for a reassuring stability. such a perspective, the evaluation of the threat, to determine the deter rent/defensive responses to oppose it, cannot be limited solely to that directed against national territory, but must consider the threat to "national interests'' which may exist outside the territorial limits themselves. Fortunatdy, but not by chance, in the current it].ternational situation, the threat which interested our territory has diminished and changed. The dozens of tank and motorized divisions which pushed against our borders or which in a few hours could break through in the Po Valley are now being moved to more rearward positions . Trends in international politics seem to eliminate the danger of a direct confrontation between the Eastern and Western Blocs. Even if this state of affairs should change suddenly, the large and powerful war apparatus of the Warsaw Pact does not seem to have

at this time the cohesive force necessary to sustain a direct Âˇe ngagement within conventional or theater nuclear limits. This permits L1S to rethink in global terms the type of defense we want without the weight of the direct threat bearing down on our borders. However, we also cannot be superficial in our evaluations. The Soviet military apparatus has not disappeared . Neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor nationalist aspirations have made it vanish. In operational terms, the large force reductions announced by the Soviets at internation~l conferences, when carried out, will produce three significant collateral effects. Specifically, they will permit the Soviets to: eliminate obsolescent material and equipment, thereby increasing overall effectiveness; win internal popular consensus necessary for socio-economic reforms;

gain breathing space in international relations, taking away from the West the reasons to justify any milit ary improvements. This relief can be used to begin a new politico-~conomic strategy. Clearly, we are not confronted with a deliberate attempt to lower the West's -guard in order to launch an offensive, but neither are we in a climate of general demobilization. Moreover, t,vo important questions which weigh heavily on the outcome of detente arise specifically from those factors which Soviet military power has always pursued . The first of these factors is the intrinsic strength of the bureaucraticmilitaty apparatus . Drastic reductions will affect it numerically, leaving out and antagonizing the least professional cadre , rougher and backward, therefore more easily influenced by the opposition . The questions relating to the reorganization of the Soviet military apparatus shift the pole of attraction from geostrategic to geopolitical arena, and in any case, do not seem to create the premises for a reassuring stabiiity. T he second factor is the pressure vis-a-vis the satellites or allies and the outlying republics. A more rearward positioning of the Red Army could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, favoring aspirations of independence or rekindling old claims. It could also be interpreted as an abandonment on the world scene, and from this, those countries -w hich still uphold revolutionary ideologies could be led to adopt independent solutions without feeling tied to Soviet directives, as in the past. These are questions that shift the focus from geostrategic to geopolitical and which, in any case, do not seem to create the premises for a reassuring stability. A very serious unknown is also represented by the Soviet nuclear

Paratt0opers of the "Fotgore" Brigade on an operative readiness drill.

force component which, so far, does not appear to have been touched by any reductions. On the contrary, it seems to be constantly improving in power and reliab ility, by the elimination of old delivery systems and the production of new warheads. The recent explosion of a nuclear device is dramatic proof of this . W ith the repositioning of conventional forces to the rear, artillery and tanks are no longer the fron t-line force; cruise and ballistic missiles are. And these systems, as is well known, do not deliver just a few pounds of

T.N. T. The entire European theater is

now becoming a huge buffer zone which, if it is on the one hand a fac-

tor of psychological security thanks to the physical reduction of military presence, on the other hand it raises the risk that a fu ture conflict will escalate immediately to the strategic level (See table 1). One can say that this risk is mitigated by the different attitude of the superpowers. Fortunately yes, but here we are debating a technical aspect, not political intentions. The geographic region which makes up the ex-satellite countries constitutes a buffer, but it is an unstable buffer, replete with la tent conflict

potential and militarily ill-grounded.

The decrease in the perception of the threat from the East has generated an excessive emphasis on the socalled "threat from the South" which - from a classic operational point of view - is characterized by irrelevant military capabilities and is often only the result of mental gymnastics .

One gets the feeling that, ciften, defense models proposed in recurring seminars of this period are the fruit of the emotional impact of the moment (peace has broken out in E urope, war is breaking ou t in the Mediterranean area) . The movement

A French legionary.

The problem of European and Italian security cannot find an adequate solution outside of NATO, the only organization capable of absorbing in a non-traumatic manner GermanÂˇ unification and guaranteeing Europe, in an emergency, the necessary reinforcements as well as the still indispensable nuclear umbrella. to the Sou rh oi the security cent er of gravity . cannot be taken for granted. It can't be denied that the Mediterranean represents an extremely delica.te area. Fortunately, we cannot speak of a clear threat to be met with military forces. There is, however, a high degree of instability in the social, economic or military balances, which is still not such to justify the assertion, or poorly veiled aspiration, expressed by Admiral Alfred Mahan, in 1902 and which seems the creed of many: "The Mediterranean will belong to a single master, or it will be the center of perennial conflicts". The statement has not been valid for a long time. Specifically, the last 40 years demonstrate that, even in sit8

uations of delicate balances, diverse realities can co-exist without necessarily being in conflict. Pot Europe and for our country, the threat from this area is more to our lifestyle than to life itself. lslamic religious ferment, influx of immigrants from outside the EEC, the ups and downs in the flow of energy resources can influence considerably the way the nation is led, but not its posture as an advanced democrat-ic and industrialized country.

THE ECONOMIC COMPONENT From a grave but crystallized and understood situation of Cold War,

we are headed for an expanded Europe in constant social and economic ferment. Another potential instability factor is that in the acquisition of new markets, which form the basis of the Western economic system, Europe will soon be relegated to a subordinate or intermediary role between the great West, powerful and advanced, and the great East, just as powerful but depressed. Europe, without an active unified policy, risks becoming a huge supermarket where the East buys at low prices goods, know-how and technologies which come from the American continent or Japan. Europe is countering this economic offensive completely unprepared. Politically, there are no immediate unification possibilities and in the marketplace, strong economies will have the best over weak ones, and the weak economies will find themselves battling competition from the East. The only way to attempt a common stabilization strategy is to "Europeanize" to a greater degree the Atlantic Alliance; integrate geostrategic concepts; and find agreement over defense policy. The problem of European and Italian security cannot find an adequate solution outside of NATO, the only organization capable of absorbing in a non-traumatic manner German unification and gu~ranteeing Europe, in an emergency, the necessary reinforcements as well as the still indispensable nuclear umbrella. Moreover, no other institution seems able to substitute for the Atlantic Alliance : not the UEO, up to now relegated to a role of mere auxiliary organism to NATO; not the CSCE conference, permanent forum for high level political dialogue among too many and diverse sides; not the EEC, at least not until political union will have been completed and extended to security issues . From this general framework, a

fact alrea,e.y discussed becomes even more evident. Europe does not present itself for the next 10-20 years as a stable region as long as the threat is neither declared nor imminent and clear, but still present. The absence of a direc t threat, however, does not justify the absence of a strategy.

CHESSBOARDS FOR STRATEGIC GAMES The security problem of our times comes from a new global situation . We are passing from a world dominated by a single boatd (strategicdiplomatic), to one dispersed in a variety of boards. And those in the academic community who study strategy and arms control are al most completely separated, in ideas and language, from those who apply economic analysis to international relations . Today we must not repeat the error committed by the Carter Administration in 1977, when it proposed as central politico-strategic problems the North-South ques tion and human rights. At that time the concept floundered i mmedia tely in the face of the enormity of the importance of East-West relations . The mistake then, was not one of concept. The North-South question was and remains important . The error was one of method. At that time the North-South question should have been added to the list of priorities and still needs to be - even today, 14 years later and despite momentous historical events - but it cannot take the place of East-West relations. 1£ until 1989 the fundamental politico-strategic problem was that of Soviet military power (with its political influence throughout the world), today the East-West axis has even higher priority, specifically be-

Soldiers of the Special Detachments during their drilling activity.

With the advent of detente and East- West cooperation, one of the basic p1·emises which legitimated direct and heavy-handed intervention by the supe1·powers - the Area of Influence is now lacking.

cause of the socio-economic view with which we must analyze international relations. Clearly, the North-South relationships are increasing in impor tance and their sphere of competence is ex tending from the traditio nal socioeconomic to politico-military, but it is not yet time, regre ttably , to set aside the diplomatic-strategic chessboard on which, for decades, the destiny of the world was played. If anything, new pieces need to be added (in particular knights, bishops, and rooks) to the Socio-economic North-South chessboard, where up to now the struggle seemed to be fought only among pawns, kings and queens . With the advent of detente and E ast-West cooperation, one of the basic premises which legi timated direct and heavy-handed interven-

tion by the super powers - the area of influence - is now lacking . Now, the legitimation of intervention must come either from the threat to real vital interests or from the consensus of supranational organizations.

MULTINATIONAL INTERVENTION AND "OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS" The Gulf crisis is the first massive superimposition between the EastW est polit ico-strategic chessboard, in the new configuration where politico-economic considerations prevail, and the North-South chessboard where the "fighting pieces", up to now non-existent or overlooked , have made their first moves.

The artillery of the 82nd air-born Division bombing enemy stationings.

Whatever the conclusion of the Ira- ternal aggression directed against qi question, it is sure that from it a anyone of the member states could lesson can be learned. Clearly, we be applied even in case of threats to have a new framework of relations "interests" or violations of internawhere: tional rights, yet, legitimacy of ''out the super powers search for of area operations" ·is still open to legitimacy in supranational fora; question. all nations are involved in a varWhat is legitimate is the possiiety of missions (from diplomat· bility of intervention in international ic to military) for any event peacekeeping missions in the framewhich could be interpreted as a work of initiatives·generated or sancthreat to international security tioned h/ the United Nations and by or as a violation of rights. supranational organizations of which In this new situation each nation Italy is a member. Having said that, must dispose of the necessary tools even intervention under U. N. aegis for such purposes. Above all there is a sort of legal minefield. is the constitutional tool, i.e. the It is one thing to send a mulability to intervene legitimately in tinational force under U .N. resoluareas not strictly connected to nation, accepted by interested countional territory. Then, the interven- tries, to verify or observe the fulfilltion tool in its two components ment of permament or temporary acdiplomatic and military. cords; it is- one thing to protect one In Italy ·today there are no serious of the sides of a dispute from violaproblems in achieving these means. tions of a treaty; it is another thing No doubt, the current constitution, entirely to carry out armed intervendoes not permit armed intervention tion to enforce any resolution, not outside of the national territory and only from a legal stand point, but outside of strictly defensive opera- also for consequences internal to the tions. Membership in NATO could country. have given the impression that, by As far as the second method is extension, measures counter.ing ex- concerned - the intervention 10

there is no problem with the diplomatic element, which institutionally and by definition has the task to manage international crises . There are, instead, problems associated with the military component. In a framework in which armed intervention outside the country is legitimated, it is necessary to· have available armed forces technically capable of patticipating in missions which: can take place immediately outside the borders as well as at the far corners of the globe; - foresee the use of arms jointly with other forces under an integrated or unified command, with common strategic, tactical and logistical support; risk to involve the entire nation in military operations. Since the logic of the super powers has transferred the determination of legitimacy to the supranational fora, it is no longer possible to spealc of national armed forces participating in common undertakings. It becomes necessary to foresee multinational forces which can be or already are integrated, under a common aegis outside the organization of a single nation, and which can intervene where necessary. This statement already determines two fundamental things: First: involvement in supranational organizations is not necessarily tied to interests, even vital, of the single nations. In fact, the common good prevails over these interests. Preferential intervention zones could be established for,groups of nations; but to limit the risk that the employment of "constabulary forces" could involve a participating country, it would be appropriate to assign to various groups of nations intervention zones not near their borders, better the farthest away possible. Second: the armed forces of in-

terest~d countries need to oe organized on standardized models, with . interchangeable logistic support. They should be manned by highly trained, highly motivated, highly professional personnel. It goes without saying that, for operations of this type, a true "Expeditionary Corps" is required and needs to be constantly ready. It is also natural that the best force mix would be made up of land forces supported by medium and long range transport aircraft, close air support aircraft, and attack helicopters. The naval component, needed only if the area is suited to its employment, should be made up of fast sea lift and aircraft carriers. Using these broad analytical criteria, the conclusion reached is the following: once the legality issue has Carabinieri of the Special Intervention Group. been resolved, international intervention becomes feasible if conduct- ment and arms should be staned outside the local geostrategic area, dardized with the other mission parwith forces specially prepared and ticipants. The Navy would have to organized for the task. Therefore, in guarantee transportation with 2 or the case of Italy, any proposal which 3 sealift ships and ensure naval cornlinks the organization of such a force . bat support with an aircraft carrier to its employment in Italian territo- and some frigates. The Air Force, once satisfied tactical and logistic air ry is out of the question. To plan for out of area require- transportation requirements, could ments while building forces for oper- carry out satisfactorily its combat ations in the Gorizia Gap or in the missions with about 50 fighters and Mediterranean is absolutely faulty. about 20 close air support (CAS) If, however, the international com- aircraft. But we have seen that Italy canmunity should decide to delegate to a supranational organization such not give up the operational readiness tasks, there would be a division of of its national forces because of all labor and tasks among the various the European instability factors I nations, assigning, for example, have already mentioned. For this, it transportation to one nation, com- becomes necessary to have either an munications to another, etc. Obvi- additional number of Brigades of ously, the "combat" element would volunteers, or bring to operational have to be provided equally by the readiness conscript units. participants. In any case 1 if Italian military forces were to he structured solely for effective and demanding interna- FOCUS tional missions, they would have to ON THE REQUIREMENTS he manned entirely by professionals The foregoing purely politicoorganized in 4 or 5 Brigades. Equip-

military analysis does not surface any technical motive to design a military force suited to fight a specific "enemy". However the requirement for stability, which is, in essence, the defense of extremely delicate balances, remains. Once upset, these balances can compromise world economic, political and soda! development. In Europe, these equilibriums are very delicate and still run on the East-West axis, heavily weighted toward continental Europe and no longer marginal in the peripheral areas to the South and North. The potential risk is especially high in the Balkans and in the Baltic Republics . In this part of the world all traditional means are used to maintain the balance, including the military element of power. The presence of formidable arsenals and the changes in alignments still present the greatest danger to security and physical survival. For this reason, Europe must search for a real integration, and military integration can be the fundamental rallying point. 11

Above.

Members of ihe Central Security Operative Nucleus (NOCS) on their hard drill. Front page.

Patrol of the 9th paratroopers assault battalion on drill.

The balance is also highly unstable in North Africa and the Middle East and it is here where we see the intersection poirit of the East-West - North-South axes. However, the repercussions are limited or can be easily limited. Thanks to the recourse to the supranational forum, only the politico-strategic balarice between the par.ties directly involved is at stake, not the very existence of the world. It is necessary, though, to be present in every respect and everywhere, and most of all over the national territory, so that liberalism not be interpreted as a weakness. With regard to multinational requirements, it is primarily a question o! presence, which must not be limited to being symbolic. Thâ‚Ź credibility of our political position in the international arena is measured by the type of intervention we can assure. Showing the flag is no longer 12

enough. We need to show something more, represented by a real force tailored to the role' assigned the nation by the international community'. This kind of intervention should be legally justified, decided by recognized international bodies, provided for by treaties, and requested l;,y the interested parties. Without grandiose desires or imperialistic dreams. In essence, the threat: in its traditional aspects will continue to come esdusively from the North-East, even if it has been transferred from the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Union, characterized by a smaller size and greater warning times. Let's not forget that, even with fully successful disarmament treaties, the Soviet Union will maintain a net conventional superiority and more favorable geostrategic conditions vis-a-vis the US (concentration of forces east of the

Urals, ready to be employed more rapidly than US forces across the Atlantic). The impossibility of a surprise attack in force permits a decrease in ready operational units and greater recourse to mobilization; in its ideological, religious and economic aspects (islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, etc), will continue to come from the South and South-East even if not initially in significant military form. From this, it becomes necessary to have forces appropriate to the defense of national interests, even out of area, in an international and/or European/ NATO / WEO (UEO) framework, and available for immediate employment under these conditions. From this, certain precise operational directions for the Army surface: there is a need to organize drafted personnel into training and mobilization units for territorial defense in all types of emergencies. Such units require sufficient operational capability to guarantee rapid and forceful employment over national territory (see Table 2) ; there is a need for special units with high professional content which can guarantee the initial defense of critical sectors and rapid intervention anywhere in the country. Their arms and equipment must be compatible with the standard of the rest of the Italian Army; there is a need for other special units available for intervention in the international arena. Arms and equipment must be standardized with those of other participating forces which may be designated as partners. It is also evident that such equipment must be suited for operations in the environment and in the various operational situations of expect-

ed employment. It's one thing to operate in the desert dnd another in a tropical forest. Just as it's one thing to free hostages, it is another to conduct missions of peacekeeping, observation, elimination of opposing forces, neutralization of militarily significant installations, clefense of key positions, security of diplomatic missions, protection of and assistance to refugees, evacuation of threatened areas and so on, just to name a few possible missions. It goes without saying that, since these highly professional units should be aligned with international standards, there is an obviously heavy fallout on organizational and support costs.

THE PROFESSIONAL COMPONENT When I cite the requirement for a force component with a high professional profile, I do not mean to dodge the term ''volunteer'' using a high sounding euphemism. I mean, instead, to distinguish between these and the volunteers to whom we usually refer. There is a substantial difference between long term "enlistment", "volunteer military service", and "professional forces". The first is a continuation of the draft period and can be useful for certain skills which require further specialization. Volunteer military service has to do with separate recruitment which, beside requiring special psycho-physical characteristics and motivation, imposes sttessful missions which can be carried out only at a relatively young age. A professional forces system, finally, requires the adoption of a very special way of life by men who choose it, and well defined regulations and commitments on the part of those who propose it.

defend the cause he has been called to uphold, even with arms. As a "fighter", he is subject to heavy and rapid wear and tear, and his employment is limited over time. - Even in the "fighter" category, he still has to be the elite.

He does not have a specific job. He is multifaceted horizontally. He knows his own arms and equipment and is capable of optimizing their use at the best time; he also knows the men and equipment of potential adversaries. Within his general speciality, he can replace any other team member. For example, if he is a tanker, he can be the driver, the gunner, or if need be, even the mechanic. - To perform such tasks, he unSoldiers of the Canadian Special Se1vice Force anned with a C-1 rifle.

The volunteer needs to recognize that he could die in the defense of the country, as all citizens, but always ahead of them. He must recognize that he can die for peace and security wherever the nation decides to intervene. This double availability, so as not to be confused with mercenaries, must b'e supported by exceptional motivation,The three types of recruitment are not necessarily in conflict with each other. In fact, if there weren't

problems related to the overlapping of organizations, it would be possible to have the various types side by side with theÂˇ compulsory draft, as long as each kept to its specific role. The professional component of the Army, as stated above, must be constantly ready to.intervene in Italy and abroad, not necessarily across national borders, but in areas even at the opposite ends of the earth in a land, air-land, air-land-naval theater. For such a component, it is out of the question to think of the old "technical operator volunteer", nor of its direct descendant the ''long enlistment volunteer". We are speaking of a serious

professional component to conduct external intervention. Devoid of any wishful thinking, we are speaking of a professional component whose basic element is a multifunctional volunteer. As we usually do when deter-

mining the technical-operational requirements of equipment, so the volunteer must be seen as an "operational system". Naturally it is a

"system" whose purely technical part is important, but not as much as its human counterpart. This system must be a man, not a robot and not a "Rambo". He has to be a mili-

tary professional in whom technicalope~ational skills must blend with maturity and conscience. - The volunteer, then, becomes a security professional who is first of all a fighter. Not a photographer, a driver, or a cook, but a man who can

dergoes a continuous, intensive training cycle . His performance, as

his psyco-physical state, are subjected to stringent, periodic controls. -

The preparation and training,

geared to agreed upon international standards, have to be of a higher level, perhaps even leading to an academic degree.

- But where this volunteer of the future needs to excel is in the human arena. He must be instilled with an ideal motivation wider and more mature than that of any other citizen soldier. He needs to recognize that

he could die in the defense o_f the country, as all citizens, but always ahead of them. He must recognize that he can die for peace and security wherever the nation decides to intervene. This double availability, so as not to be confused with mercenaries, must be supported by exceptional motivation. The volunteer must realize that he is an Italian citizen and a citizen of the world in the true sense of the word, and not by mere rhetoric. He must know how to act in his first role with the special conscience required by the second and must operate in the second one with a humanity typical of the first. Obviously, it is

Parachuting of paratroopers of the 9th battalion "Col Moschin" of the "Folgore" paratroopers Brigade.

neither easy to recruit, nor to train, a11d even less to sustain such an "operational system" . However, this is the objective to strive for, if we want to pursue seriously the approach I have tried to present. At this point, though, it is appropriate to take another step. I stated initially that recourse to voluntary service is no longer an option or a possibility to foresee or consider. It is, instead, a functional necessity. Now is the time to reinforce this concept with regard to the availability of manpower and to the structural characteristics of the current military apparatus. These conditions lead to the conclusion that Volunteer service is not only necessary, hut it is a requirement which will be upon us in the short term. Compared with other countries, the Italian military personnel situation is anomalous (see Table 3). While a mix of an 18-month draft and a volunteer system covering 50% of the total requirements could be considered optimal, the Italian Army has a 12-month draft and less than 20% volunteer personnel, including Officers and Non Commis-

sioned Officers. The volunteer cotnponent could increase to 35% if we could recruit against all the authorized spaces, but this goal seems wishful thinking, after seeing the poor results of the long-term enlistment program. Other Italian peculiarities result from: the negligible importance given to mobilization; the massive recourse to junior reserve officers as commanders and medical personnel in small units; the small number of officers in regular Academy courses, the lack of Non Commissioned Officers, especially in squads and platoons, of the field units (30.000 NCOs in the Italian Army, against 60.000 and 80.000 in the French and German Armies respectively). We are reducing the strength of the Army and are bringing it to quantitative levels barely sufficient to perform missions which no one has yet modified. For another two or three years, the draft will be able to feed the units but, starting already in 1994, the drop in birth rates (which began in 1975) will no longer permit us to man the Army adequately (see Chart

4). To have an idea of the size of the problem, by the year 2000 we will experience a 30% shortfall, increasing to more than 40% by the year 2010. The eventual reduction in the draft period would lower even more our operational capability. Moreover, havingÂˇto share manpower resources with various National law enforcement agencies makes the decrease in availability from this pool even more conspicuous. It becomes necessary, therefore, to plan now to guarantee with volunteers the operational readiness of some brigades. Given this shortfall, we need to evaluate all the implications which surface from the examination of the resources available for volunteer service. That is to say, what human resources are available and able to accept this challenge.

HUMAN RESOURCES To have a Volunteer Army you need volunteers. This may seem a classical "nonsense" phrase, but it is one of those obvious facts of ten

eight percent of all volunteers come from Southern Italy and the islands, but this would be irrelevant if this were the best part, or at least the average part of the youths. The fact is that only those with less education and in the lower socio-economic scale are interested in volunteer service. This is evident by Âˇthe analysis of the reasons for involuntary separation. Only 2.3% of the separations are for normal termination of the two-year enlistment. For the remaining 77% who are involuntarily separated, the reasons are sobering: - 10% for serious disciplinary reasons; - 20% for inability to pass specialization courses; - nearly 50% for lack of Mountain equipment for the membel! of the Special Corps. overall fitness for promotion to the next higher grade. This is a defeat of great proporWe are reducing the strength of the Army and are bringing tions which begins with faulty motiit to quantitative levels barely sufficient to perform missions vation, is developed in an even faultwhich no one has yet modified. ier social climate, and ends up in the For another two or three years, the dr1;1ft will be able to feed lap of the Army. In fact, the social the units but, starting already in 1994, the drop iri birth rates . climate is not foreign to this (which began in 1975) will no longer permit us to man the Arphenomenon. Who are the young men of the 80's, those we have tried my adequately. Âˇ to recruit? They are the children of the 60's and d1e teenagers of the forgotten by those who delight in exinternal obstacles, especially in 70's. pressing opinions without having ex- training commands, to promoting This statement seems of incrediamined all the facts. After the un- recruitment; ble obviousness, but on reflection we satisfactory results of the Technical - economic incentives inade- realize that in these last few years the Operator Volunteer Program and of quate to compete with law enforce- Army has been offered a youth the current Long Term Enlistment ment agencies; grown-up first with the illusion of Program, the recruit~nt system be- limited possibilities for even- easy progress and free good living; comes a fundamental issue. In fact, tual employment in the public and then with radicalism and the masssince volunteer service will become private sectors after discharge; media revolution; and finally in the a vital necessity in short order, the - even more limited possibilities disenchantment and in the crisis of solution to this dilemma becomes to be promoted into permanent Non all institutions. also the key to the Army's ongoing Commissioned Officer ranks. The youths of the 80's have been reorganization. Analyzing the lack of These reasons have resulted in an unknowing pawns and have had no success in the recruitment of volun- insufficient quantity of volunteers, opportunity to react. At home they teers to this point, the following but, most of all, have caused a were raised on the exhaltation of fugeneral causes surface: ' meager qualitative level of those who tility, resignation, rage, class envy, - historical aversion, which can volunteered (see Table 5). dissension. In society they saw be removed only with considerable Today, the number of volunteers values fall, and false values arise. In incentives; in long term enlistment is less than school they had teachers who passed - bad public image of Army 9.000, and of these, only 2.000 are students automatically, who advolunteer service; under a .3-year enlistment. Seventy- ministered group exams, denigrated 16

Paratrooper of the "folgore " onÂˇ a target-practice w ith individual weapon.

institutions with a vengeance, and who retained only the negative aspects of the experiences they had had growing up. In politics also they saw the most deleterious aspects; and in the Armed Forces they saw little or nothing of value. Most of all

they were ground down by a system of mass communications which has always been indifferent or adverse to the problems o f Defense. Therefore, these young men of the 80's conceived a vision of military service as a "drag", as time los t. Let's not be taken in by the statistics we hear! When we are told that the values professed by the great majority of today's young people are positive and traditional, we need to analyze the problems very carefully.

Values relating to family, friendship, honesty, work and solidarity are proclaimed by young people between the ages of 20 and 25 years to the tune of 70% to 90%.

also more fragile, uncertain, superficial and less consistent. O n the other hand, in a society

But are family and friends seen as values or as protection? Is work a challenge or a job from which one cannot be fired? Is solidarity love for

where the value of freedom has degenerated into permissiveness it should come as no surprise that young people lean toward a hedonistic view of llie and of their role in society.

those less fortunate or a means to vent one's own anxieties and frus trations? Is a handicapped person one who needs help or is he a therapeutic tool for other maladjusted people? The young volunteers from the 80's whom we recruited were certainly shrewder, more open, more sincere and more educated than previous generations, but they were

The failure in the recruitment of volunteers follows this general situation, in which the Armed Forces have not been able to take an active par t in correcting or addressing, because they were and are among the first institutions to be ignored and challenged. This lack of success, then, derives in turn from the lack of incentives commensurate with the new

Russian paratroopers.

The volunteer service for defense would not need particular, privileged treatment if defense itself were an intangible value, universally accepted and recognized. It would suffice to assure the candidates a basic dignity.

false values which h'ave emerged. Let's be sure we. understand, volunteer service for defense would not need particular, privileged treatment if defense itself were an intangible value, universally accepted and recognized. It would suffice to assure the candidates a basic dignity. In other countries, the volunteer is not overprotected and overpaid, but he is adequately defended and holds his own specific place on the social scale (see Table 6). But when money and a soft job are the generally accepted values, any attempt at recruiting which does not make reference to these values is destined to fail. Such an attempt also becomes a manifest swindle which lowers fur-. ther the prestige of those who put it into practice. Recruitment of Long Term Enlistees has been insignificant, just as it was for the Technical-Operator 18

Volunteers, but .the effects on the Institution have been increasingly negative. ÂˇWhat's new, then, in the 1990's which can lead us to think that recourse to volunteer service does not become again another failure? First of all, the figure of the volunteer we shall need is completely different &om the traditional one. It will probably offer nothing enticing to the young man who aspires to a safe, soft job, but it can be seen as an interesting choice by that young man who already feels life's responsibility ana has not given up accepting challenge. I am not speaking of the young manual laborer from the South who is used to 14 hours of work per day at pittance wages. Nor of the spoiled brat from Lombardy who pays millions of lire to spend a weekend of survival training in Switzerland dressed as "Rambo". I refer

to the thousands of young men all over Italy who could be interested in an honorable profession, tiring but tied to solid prospects and, most of all, to ideal motivations which represent true values. The potential volunteers of the 1990's.are our youngsters of today. They have seen the good life and the false expectations which it creates, but they have seen the debade of the Communist ideology, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the hope of union among peoples, and the frustration of seeing that such an objective could not be reached because of parochial interests. They are practical and pragmatic young men, but with ideals no longer tied to provincialism. They are already living Europe as their country, and the world as their common house . In any case, they are disenchanted and know very well what they want. With them, there will be little enticement necessary. They will choose on the basis of what they will consider most appropriate in ideal and practical terms. If the Army is able to build a credible system, attuned tci the international environment, many psychological barriers to volunteer service will fall.

GUARANTEES TO RECRUITMENT However, even in the presence of a high quality "raw material" and of potential assent to a quite respectable organizational and ethical model, the requirement to have a voluntary component is so binding as to leave no room for risks. There is also a basic limitation related to the pool of young men fro m which to draw. As shown by the data in Table 7, not all of the annual contingent can be considered

available. for recruitment. The actual available poof is 77% of the theoretical, and of this (on the basis of 100%) only 54% is available because of the losses due to educational deferments (anyway, it will be difficult to count on students for volunteer service), and due to failure to meet educational requirements. Additionally, the qualitative requisites of the future volunteer are so high that it will be necessary to aim at the recruitment of the best group of young men, that is, less than half of the available pool. That is why mechanisms and measures will be necessary to favor or, at least, to not penalize those who commit to active service. The solutions can be the most diverse and since there will be a need to update the current body of regulations, a few, not completely orthodox hypotheses are in order. That which has been set forth by Prof. Mortillaro at the Military Center for Strategic Studies (Table 8) is particularly interesting and balanced. Still, for example, we could consider resorting to changes in the various entry levels for all military personnel. Applying the criterion of compulsory military service for everyone, and with the real activation of an alternative National civic service as a complementary tool to guarantee an equal obligation even for those who object to military service or with profiles less adept to face the rigors of military service itself, we can foresee the following flow: 1. The Armed Forces draw on the year groups called up for the draft (this requirement could also be extended to cover women). 2. The Armed Forces draw on the trained year groups (or during the training phase, after 4 to 8 months) for volunteer service, which can last up to 5-7 years, and for regular and reserve Officers.

llrmoured troops of the Royal Hussars drilling with the tank "Challenger".

The qualitative requisites of the future volunteer are so high that it will be necessary to aim at the recruitment of the best group of young men. Equally, the national labor force can hire young men for permanent work only after the training period (military or alternative). Considering the substantial decrease in the output of the draft in the next years, moreover, we cannot exclude the hypothesis of a length of volunteer service in excess of 5-7 years, along with, if necessary, the introduction of a sort of "permanent service" for all volunteers or for some of them. 3. Law enforcement agencies, which actuaUy utilize auxiliaries, or other organizations which could be added (municipal police, museum guards, protective services) can draw exclusively from honorably discharged volunteers, Reserve Non Commissioned Officers and Officers. Parallel with this, the system

could be applied to Alternative Service units. Their intermediate cadre could be recrnited on a voluntary basis as with the military. Social and Civil Protection Organizations, Environmental Organizations, Health, Public Assistance, etc., could draw from these to fill their permanent positions. This way, the Armed Forces would really become the basic step in the social education of citizens and would constitute a filter for society. Additionally, with such a system, those organizations charged with Law Enforcement or with social tasks of public interest would have available already mature personnel, 23 to 25 years old, responsible and disciplined. Finally, beyond eliminating competition in the accessions, it would

Military man ofthe paratroopers battalion "Col Moschin" wearing a modern optical apparatus.

no longer be necessary to overpay Every closed sluice-gate will find volunteers for whom the certainty of the only by-pass in 'financial incenpermanent placement in the Non tives, with an obvious increase in Commissioned Officer cadre of the costs. Armed Forces or as agents in the orThe basic pay of a volunteer with ganizations cited above, would con- a high professional profile, as sugstitute sufficient incentive to volun- g~sted by the characteristics indicattary enlistment. ed, cannot, however, be insigAll of these constraints constitute nificant. again as many regulatory steps over If nothing else, there is a need to which volunteer service can "stum- recognize tangibly the quality of the ble" and fall. .They are also the var- service rendered. ious sluice-gates which, only if they As a minimum, it should be are all open, will allow the system to equivalent to the basic pay of a flow. Carabiniere (constabulary and miliIf we do not eliminate the numer- tary police) or a customs agent, net ical and qualitative drain of nation- of hazardous duty pay for certain al Law Enforcement agencies, if we types of 0perations. do not regulate and harmonize seriously Alternative Service, if we do. not oblige public administrations anc;l employers to hire honorably dis- FORCES - COSTS charged personnel, if we do not INTEGRATION guarantee adequate social security, and if other dozens of "ifs" are not The analysis developed up to now taken in consideration, then volun- on the themc:tical plane has led only teer service will remain a pious wish. to the inescapable requiment to have

a volunteer component alongside the Army of draftees. On purpose, no specific indication of the size and structure of the organization to be established has been given. However, in order to proceed with the examination of some of the principal problem areas which the establishment of such a force, as sketched, entails, it becomes necessary to formulate a basic assumption which considers all of the possible limitations. If, insofar as the volunteer component is concerned, the concept is to guarantee rapid intervention on national tertitoty and in foreign countries in any operational environment, we can theorize the organization of at least as many major units as there are technical / operational requirements. Therefore, limiting the requirement to unit values, which is the absolute minimum, we might need: Âˇ 1 Mechanized Brigade 1 Armored Brigade 1 Light Armored Brigade (Armored Cars) 1 Mountain Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade for a total of a minimum of 24,000 enlisted and 6000 between Officers and Non Commissioned Officers. The enlisted portion also includes those not available for basic training and for various instructionaJ/specialization courses. With a 5 to 7 year service commitment, this requirement translates in the need to recruit all those statistically predisposed to volunteer service, about 15% of the total draftable, with the best psycho-physical characteristics, (profiles 1 and 2) . In any case, there is a need to manage an annual accession of at least 6000 volunteers in the Army and (theoretically) as many in the labor market. As concerns the drafted component, if the criterion is to guarantee

eguity o( service, taking away the requirements of volunteer service and alternative service (around 15 % of the total) as many units would be necessary as are needed to organize and train an average of 200,000 men each year, at least for the next 10 years . Obviously such an organization, while there is constant discussion of budget cuts, is not sustainabJe. To reduce the number of units, then, we have two ways: either we maintain inequality of the draft by not calling into service all able bodied individuals, or we shorten the time to be served. With the first, we create great social disparities, with the second, there is an overall loss of efficiency proportionaJ to the reduction in mandatory service. This is purely a political knot which will have to be loosened. In principle this does not prejudice the formulation of the basic theory which, if it is referred to economic parameters instead of social and functionaJ considerations, is aJready constrained. This year's defense budget, which assigns the Army 9,000 billion lire, does not offer many possibilities to manage a professionaJ Army even of reduced size. Fixed expenditures, for salaries and not-compressible management cos.ts, could not be faced. Even in the organizational assumptions formulated, the major concerns come from financial resources. The cost estimate for the volunteer brigades must be made on the basis of a "basket" for enlisted personnel made up of: - pay and allowances not less than about 26,000,000 Lire per year; - severance pay in relation to length of service and the pay at time of discharge; - up to date social security contributions. If it is necessary to consider for volunteer soldiers a pay base which

ltalian paratroopers patrol on drill.

This year's defense budget, which assigns the Army 9,000 billion lire, does not offer many possibilities to manage a professional Army even of reduced size.

offers an adequate incentive related at least to the "pay" of a normal Carabiniere or customs volunteer, an equivalent reference relationship needs to be also adopted for Officers and Non Commissioned Officers. In 1 able 9, an example is given for the calculation of costs, for personnel only, for a Volunteer Brigade. The calculation starts from the following fundamental assumptions: - to have a good probability of success in recruiting, it's necessary to use as base of reference an existing professional military pay system, already tested; - the value of the pay package of the Army Volunteer must in any case be greater than that reference

amount, if we hope to have a comparable level of motivation; - the total pay package of the volunteer should constitute the base of reference for the caJculation of the pay of permanent service cadre in volunteer units as well as in conscript units. In fact, it is not acceptable that a volunteer receive a higher pay than anyone of his superiors; - to calculate the cadre pay package we need to fix a factor for every grade, as a function of the base pay of the volunteer. Again such a proportion could be drawn from an already existing and tried system; - while the pay package of the volunteer refers automatically to his employment in a specific type of 21

"Chieftain" tanks during operations on muckly ground.

It is evident that these parameters imply much higher costs than those of the current Armed Forces. But we a1Âˇe talking about a completely new Army, more flexible and ready! operational unit, the pay base for cadre personnel refers only to their "status". With assignment to a volunteer unit, once fitness has been ascertained, the pay will have to be increased by appropriate allowances. If we want to add the professional component to the volunteer component, it's n~cessary to consider additional costs, not only in pay and allowances, but in benefits provided. As an example, while it's reasonably easy to limit the possibility of marriage for a volunteer who, in any case, is discharged at 23-25 years of age, for the professional there arises a series of family problems which affects the financial plan, the logistic plan (with requirement t9 provide military housing) and the employment plan (with foreseeable limitations in mobility and duty assignments). The greater the percentage of 22

professionals, obviously the greater are the management resources necessary. Above and beyond the costs related to personnel, noticeable increases in training and supplemental costs must be considered. A multiskilled volunteer can reach full operational capability after 3 or 4 different courses, or after a single course which in length and content is equivalent to them. The two solutions are not in conflict, but each of them entails a different training philosopby. In the first instance, the trainee is available periodically at gradually increasing levels of skill, while in the second, the volunteer reaches his assigned operational unit later, but fully trained. The different approach brings the same results, but in different times and with methods differing even in

the costs. This because in the first instance training can be conducted in the assigned units, either by formal courses or by "imitation" (on the job training), in the second insta~ce it's more useful to have a consolidated course at specialized schools. To the "horizontal" multi-skill developments, that is to say a widening of the interconnected operational jobs, we need to acid, especially for the professionals, a "vertical" multiskill developtnent. As age, maturity, and experience increase, a professional needs to be assigned diverse tasks not necessarily related to the original operational function. If a professional began his career as a "mechanic" at a certain age he could be called upon to carry out one or more assignments of a logistic, administrative or training nature as "instructor" in draftee or even volunteer units, requiring " technical retrainingÂˇ", in a different operational skill and/or position. It is evident that these parameters imply much higher costs than those of the current Armed Forces. But we are talking about a completely new Army, more flexible and ready! There are a few more aspects worth discussing. First of all, those relative to the coexistence of a volunteer component made up of large units, with the system of compulsory draft. The principal risk is the creation of two armies operating at different speeds, motivation, efficiency, and organization. There is no question that the two Army components cannot be the same. The tasks themselves would be different, requiring a differentiated force. This criterion, however, must be clearly stated ahead of time. While the volunteer and professional component is des tined to develop a permanent operational capability for intervention in crises/combat anywhere on the national territory or

abroad, ~e drafted component identifies itself only with requirements on national territory. It will not be a question of lesser or greater importance, but of greater or lesser projection capability and different reaction times. For national requirements the two components are inescapably destined to be complementary, as nothing would be achieved by an immediate intervention (in any emergency, even environmental) if it were not supported by a force capable of prolonging the effort in time and extending it in space. Even for international requirements it is necessary for the two components to be complementary. External interventions, even multinational, aim essentially at affirming national will. Still today, and the Gulf crisis demonstrates this, nothing is more effective than a general mobilization to demonstrate political will. In any situation, as it has always been, the very start of a mobilization action, with reserve call-up, is still the method most used to communicate to allies and adversaries the real weight of the commitment. The difference in tasks leads, then, to the difference in organization, but the operational complementary relationship between the draftee and the volunteer components leads us to foresee training and operational mechanisms which favor interdependence. First comes command and control. Each volunteer brigade must belong to a different territorial command. These large units must constitute the nodal centers of a territorial unit distribution system to which certain large draftee units are assigned and which ensure Army presence over all the national territory. Cooperation among the various specialties and the operational integration of the volunteer brigades

Incursors of the ''Teseo Tesei'' COMSUBIN Group.

will be assured by a separate joint and/or multinational control, depending on the expected potential use. Within the framework of such possibilities of employment, the necessary integrated training and exercises will be conducted. Where it will not be possible to have volunteer units, draftee brigades at higher levels of manning will have to be used. Assuming a total force of 5 volunteer and 14 draftee brigades (to stay within the current limit of 19 brigades), each of the 5 peninsular Military Regions can have 1 volunteer brigade and 2 draftee brigades,- while to the insular Military Regions would remain 2 draftee brigades, of which at least 1 would be at 120% to 150% strength. For training purposes, the volun-

teer brigades must become the prime mover for the entire system. A grave risk run by all armies made up exclusively by volunteers is "self presumption". By always training alone, without critical comparison, individuals and organizations develop a sort of "self-sufficiency syndrome" which, added to the inevitable repetitiveness of the tasks leads to: - self-evaluation in terms of absolute, not comparative values; - considering useless, as experience increases, certain elementary operational activities, which, in any case, are still very important; - placing individualism ahead of the unit; - favoring and preferring only those tasks considered "appropriate and enhancing".

nation. The very internal communications code does not follow the external code, and the two realities end up not understanding one another in the best of cases, or in conflict in the worst case. In this sense also, the presence of a draftee component, with the continuous problems and social challenges it brings, becomes fundamental to maintenance of a permanent force - trained, yes, but not estranged from the national and international social systems. In these situations, integration can be achieved onJy with a continuous exchange, almost an osmosis, of training and real life experiences.

Canoist-frogmen of the Royal Marines.

Self-sufficiency usually leads to boredom and the danger in boredom is that it brings a frantic search for side activities to provide soldiers

with physical outlet. The "Mister Universe" musdes which volunteers or professionals in other armies put on display do not derive from training or operational activities. And, in that size, are not even useful to these activities. They come, instead, from hours of "body building" in gyms, using weights and bars. Body development is no longer a function of the task, but the stereotype image of what one wants to represent. The lower the educational

level, the greater the attention paid to external aspects. Large biceps are not developed during survival exercises, in guiding missiles, or in controlling a radar. On the contrary, as has happened to all of us to see dur~ ing some area counter-interdiction exercise, a thin special forces master sergeant or one with a small tummy is capable of eluding the most hardy capture plan. On the other hand, it

is also not realistic to think that for 7 years (or for 16-20) a volunteer/professional can be constantly on exercises. Ther~ would not be sufficient training areas or funds to support him. It becomes a fundamental organizational requirement to achieve the integration of the two realities in a coordinated training/formative context.

The periodic comparison with draftee units rebalances, on the one side, the sufficiency syndrome, and on the other it stimulates emulation. The smaller volunteer units then become real teaching instruments: to teach and measure, but also to learn and evaluate oneself. On the social plane, volunteer units tend to early sclerosis. The

longer the active service period, the smaller the renewal of people and ideas. A constant risk in professional military units is the same as that run, in biological and social terms, by any small, isolated community. There develops a reality which little by little becomes more estranged from the

In all this, cadre training becomes fundamental. This brings forth another question: what "type of cadre personnel" will be selected to command units of the two components. There is no question that for both components all the Officers and Non Commissioned Officers will come from a sole source, the first from the Academy, the second from the Non Commissioned Officers Academy, even for those who have come up from the draftee ranks. The employment criteria in the various units will likely be different. We can expect that volunteer units will receive young men who have already been exposed, at least briefly, to initial experiences in draftee units and who add to outstanding physical and professional attributes a strong ideal motivation and full availability for totally unconstrained employment. Naturally, it will be necessary to adopt specific "rotation" criteria for Officers and Non Commissioned Officers in volunteer units, so that the highest operational commitment - because of an unavoidable repetitiveness - not end up being considered "routine", taking away from the "cadres" action the necessary emotional "elan". To ensure an ade-

quate economic treatment, it is also reasonable to expect that the peri-

od spent by these personnel in those units with the highest training and operational readiness be compensated - since there is parity in pay grades - by a substantial operational allowance. It is also to be hoped that a more intense professional commitment - characterized by risks, hardships and responsibilities of greater importance - be rewarded with a visibly weighted consideration by promotion hoards.

SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Enough has been said on requirements and resources to bring us to the following brief conclusions: the volunteer component of the Italian Army, organized in agile units, with high technology and professionalism, is not an option, but a necessity. The determination of the parameters of the component is "sine qua non" condition for any study or proposal be it on the defense model or on the force structure to he adopted. The major problems to he faced relate to recruitment of the volunteers and to the legal-regulatory measures which will govern the personnel fill of units and their use abroad. These.are obstacles which need to he overcome because we cannot do without volunteer service and reorganization. The last fundamental aspect concerns the timing and the ways and means of effecting passage from the current to the future force structure. The experience of other countries teaches that the transformation phase always holds surprises. In the British case the law authorizing the transition from the draft to volunteer service took 6 years instead of 3; in the American case the costs increased threefold over what had been budgeted; in the Belgian case, it became necessary to suspend the law, three years after initiation, due to the inability to recruit all the necessary

Italian lagoon-troopers during !anding operations.

volunteers. From 40%, volunteers rose to 65% of the force, but it then became impossible to increase further after the draft period was reduced from 15 to 8-10 months. It then became necessary to bring it back to 10-12 months. In the American and'British cases, the volunteers expected to be available with the end of the draft were already there. The elimination of the draft, however, brought about a decrease in volunteer service requests. This is why it is necessary to use caution and proceed in eventual revisions of the length of the draft period only after having put into operation volunteer accessions. In Italy there has never been nor will there ever be such political stability to permit a return to a more demanding system once an easier one has been adopted. In any event, reducing the length of compulsory service without considering the outcome of the volunteer recruitment campaign is an endeavor too dangerous to be taken lightheartedly. The same goes for all those meas-

uressetuptoreduceArmyunitsorto takeaway their personnel, equipment and supplies, operational capability and motivation. Until such time as the "recruiting campaign" for volunteers will not have given stable and positive results, and until the absorption of discharged volunteers in the national productive cycle will have become accepted practice, any reorganization designed to reduce forces will he very risky. Beyond verifying individual consensus which could induce young men to embrace volunteer military service, the lawsandregulationswhichconstitute the guarantees of opportunities and prospects offered will have to be tested. It will be necessary to determine how the laws and regulations will be interpreted and applied, and what will be their effects on the social and economic fiber of the nation. Next to the requirement to verify the results of the recruitment campaign, there is, then, the need to revamp and check the mobilization system, on whose effective functioning depend, in large measure: the effectiveness of the compul-

Discipline is the basis for the drilling of the Royal Marines. /

sory draft as the production system of trained reserves in the Officer, Non Commissioned Officer and troop component for national requirements; - the validity of volunteer service as an independent system capable of dipping in its own reserves to provide replacements during national as well as international emergencies. This is a basic condition of credi-

bility. To adopt drastic force reduction measures without verifying these factors means risking to be left without any deÂŁense apparatus acceptable and consistent with the requirements of a country which, rightfully so, is among the world's first economic powers. The bottom line is that, today, the

compulsory draft-volunteer service alternative does not exist. Those who consider this solution as viable, those who believe that measures on the draft can be taken immediately, compensating them with the planned passage to volunteer service, are perhaps expressing a wish, but not a rational alternative. It is a solution which needs to be implemented by serious planning and progressive enactment of specific measures requiring years to produce the desired effects. If we start the system along well-defined conceptual lines and clefend their rationale over time, we will then be able to adjust progressively the draftee/volunteer proportion based on the security requirements and the resources. These are some of the aspects of

the complex issues which I submit to our owrt attention and to the attention of those institutions which will draw-up the legal and the political framework in which the Army will have to operate. The weight of these arguments, moreover, let us hope for a new and positive commitment even by the ''media'' and communications operators. The sensitivity demonstrated by some information media in facing the problems of the new Army is praiseworthy, but the information action risks being lost in indifference, if not conducted with the necessary depth and continuity. Instead, it is important that public opinion receive the most objective and complete information possible. The reorganization measures of an Army which is founded on the active participation of the citizens, on their material and personal contribution, individual or collective, cannot overlook that the citizens themselves have to know the reasons for the measures, and their consequences. The analysis made, and the possible solutions that I presented are not exhaustive of the subject. Neither were they meant to be. I intend to provide answers to the questions that still come up, and to those which will surely surface as the reorganization process heads toward completion, only after having understood clearly the corporate thought of the Officer and Non Commissioned Officer corps of the Army and of the experts who are very close to the problem. It is a commitment I make, and I hope that at this moment when unity of intent is fundamental, all Army personnel will contribute with thought, action, and consensus to the total renewal of our Army. Chief of Staff of the Italian Army Gen. Goffredo Canino

Table N. 1

SOVIET OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS . OLD AND NEW DOCTRINE (Source «Soviet Military Power» · 1990)

Soviet Operational Concepts Traditional Offensive Strategy and New Declared Defensive Doctrine

~'""............._

__ __....._..................

~~~'!';~~~~::~

Table 2

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS (Source: Military Center for Strategic Studies Research Report CE.MI.S.S. «Recruitment in Italy»)

The current operational concepts for conventional forces in reality swing between two extremes: • high technology solutions, (so called high-tech) based on extremely sophisticated and therefore costly weapon systems, available only in small numbers; • low technology solutions, (so called low-tech) based on light infantry, fortifications, wide use of mobilitazion units, even modelled after militia or "national guard" units. There is always a mix between the two. However, even in front line NATO countries, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, there is an increased tendency to give more importance to "lowtech" components which provide abundant room for mobilization, hence to compulsory draft, the preferred recruitment system for the constitution of trained masses of reserves. Such a tendency, still followed by neutral European states, has been also stimulated by the growing sophistication of more advanced weapon systems with the following consequences: • increase in unit costs and decrease of their marginal operational capability; • excessive increase in vulnerability of "high-tech" solutions due to a too high concentration of capital in a small number of systems; • difficulty in finding the skilled personnel necessary for the operation and most of all, the maintenance of such systems, with consequent rapid wear and tear, high rates of down time and lower (eadiness overall. The structure of the Bundeswehr 2000 is characteristic of this; it entails: · ap. overall decrease from 90% to 60% in the operational readiness of the field Army Divisions; - a partial "de-mechanization" of the Army, with an increase in infantry and "blocking forces"; · a recourse to mobilization by unit affiliation at battalion level, in accordance with the well-tested mechanism of Holland's RIM system; · the increase in reserve units for emergency mobilization (three reservists for every peacetime active duty soldier). Quality can replace quantity only within certain limits. Numbers are beginning to regain importance mostly for territorial defense and for areas of low trafficability (urban areas, hilly as well as mountainous and wooded terrain) . This renewed importance is also due to the fact that new weapons (for example anti-tank / antihelicopter missiles using fiber optic guidance (FOG-M) or the new generation mines) give light infantry units and decentralized combat (less vulnerable because less dependent on sophisticated systems of command, control and communications) a new effectiveness, at the same time freeing them from complicated large unit training requirements, essential for the operational readiness of highly sophisticated units. With a heavier recourse to "low-tech" solutions, the Bundeswehr feels confident to be able to face the decrease in the draftable manpower pool 'imd, on the other hand, the so-called structural disarmament due to the inflation in per-unit costs of more sophisticated weapon systems.

Table N. 3 STRUCTURAL PECULIARITIES OF ITALIAN DEFENCE (Source: CE.MI.S.S. Research Report «Recruitment in Italy») COUNTRY

ARMY STRENGTH

ITALY

265.000

50.000

18,87

USSR BULGARIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA EAST GERMANY POLAND HUNGARY

1.900.000 115.000 145.000 120.000 230.000 77 .000

600.000 45.000 45.000 48.500 62 .000 32 .000

31,58

39,13 .31,03 40,42 26,96

24 24 18 24

41,56

BELGIUM FRANCE WEST GE~MANY

42.500 97.700 156.200 23.000

65,28 34,78 47,03

10-12 12

HOLLAND

65. 100 280.900 332 .100 66.000

AUSTRIA YUGOSLAVIA SWEDEN SWITZERLAND

50.000 114.000 47 .000 (2)

25.000 49 .500 9.300 (2)

50,00 34,37 19,80

LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS % number

34,85

LENGTH OF DRAFT

15 14-16 6 (1) 12 8-15 (1) (2)

AVERAGE WARSAW PACT

35,11

NATO AVERAGE (Excluding Italy)

45,49

AVERAGE OTHERS IN EUROPE

34,72

10 (.3)

(3)

(1) With periodic recalls. (2) National militia: mobilization capability 1,100,000 in 48 hours (including 460,000 from Civil Defence). Service conditions: 17 weeks of training at age 20, followed by 24 weeks of refresher during an 8 year period as Auszug (age: 21-32); 40 days during a 3 year period as Landwehr (age: 33-42); 13 days durin·g a 2 year period as Landsturm (age: 43-50). (.3) Less Switzerland.

Table 4

â€˘

REVIEW OF THE DRAFT AND VOLUNTEER SERVICE SITUATION 1. Objective: - verify the adequacy of existing legislation on the subject of dra(L and volumeer service against the quanti tative and qualitative requirements for personnel in the Armed Forces - particularly the Army - as the year 2000 approaches. - promote changes to current regulations, if above requirements cannot be satisfied. 2. The basic parameter taken as a reference point is the presumed annual "availability" of young men who, in the 20-year period 1991-2010 could be potentially able to wear the "uniform" in any grade (Officer and/or Non Commissioned. Officer, active and reserve, Carabiniere, Customs, National Police, Fireman, draftee, etc.) in the various Institutions (Armed Forces, Customs Guards, National Police, Security Guards, Forestry Service, Fire Department (Chart 1). 3. Said "availability" has been matched to the corresponding annual requirements (Chart 2), also taking in consideration the recent reorganization which reduced the operational forces . The following initial results have been obtained (Chart 3): a. from a purely "quantitative" point of view, total requirements (Armed Forces less the Carabinieri 24.3,800, other agencies .31,700, total 275,500) will not be able to be sat isfied beginning with 1995; b. if we also consider the "quality" of the accessions - derived from statistical data - said requirements will be satisfied only through 1992-1-.993, including, moreover, young men which up to now have been " rejected" for insufficient physical-psychological and aptitude qua lities (about 8500), with obvious impact on military readiness and personnel utilization. Beginning in 1994, the requirements will no longer be satisfied (25,500 fewer accessions against the 1994 needs, 93,500 in the year 2000, 128,500 in 2010) (Chart 4). lt has surfaced t~at "':'ithout ade~uate "corrective action", and considering tha t .the requirements o~ Law Enforcement i\gencles will probably be met, the Armed Forces (therefore the Army) will have to reduce their strength (Chart 5) : by the year 2000: from 243,800 to 150,300, i.e. almost 40%; - by the year 2010 to 115,300, i.e. to less than one hflf of todays'.s strength.

4. Among the possible "corrective actions" the following were examined closely (Chart 6): elimi nation of "au.xiliary" service . Result: improvement in the quality of accessions (greater "choice") but the "crisis" (requirements greater than availability) is only moved co 1995 (one year later). elimination of "auxiliary" service and introduction of the "obligation" that to enter permanent service with the Carabinieri, Customs, Police, Security Guards, National Forestry Service, Fire Department, it is necessary to have first completed draft or volunteer military service. Result: noticeable increase in "quality", but the "crisis" is only postponed to 1996 (2 years later); - elimination of "auxiliary" service and extension of above "obligation'' to cover regular Officers and Non Commissioned Officers. Resulr: the "crisis" remains at 1996.

ln short, whar has surfaced is that the measur,es propose<) above could only postpone the effect of the reduced availability of young men and therefore could be adop ted only while waiting to resolve defini tely the problem. 5. In this framework, the only solution to be pursued seems that of increasing consi~ bly the r,?iUtnber of voh1r1teers. To this end, realizing that the requirement/availability shortfall of young men in the next 20 years will be considerable, it is unthinkable to maintain the "criteria" followed up to now on volunteer service. Moreover, there is a need to point toward possible t:l}odification of such "criteria", and to pursue this by promoting specific changes ro current regulations. Particularly, one can envision: an increase in the length of the current volun teer program and, if necessary, the establishment of a '.'regular volunteer" program; a definition of a new "description" of t he volunteer, i.e. "fighter" (aU skills} rather than "specialist", and as such pushed toward a choice of military life for reasons o ther than simply civilian jobelated skills; access to the ranks of Law Enforcement Agencies regulated by prior completion of volunteer military service; a "guarantee" of absorption in the public/private lahor force - at the end of a tour - in continuing career military service (as Officer or Ndn Commissioned Officer) and with other governmental agencies. To chat end, the percentage of jobs set aside for entry by (irsc term volunteers in law enforcement agencies should also be increased.

Table N. 4 chart 1

ANNUAL QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE AVAILABILITY OF 19 YEAR OLDS (thousands)

YEAR OF AVAILABILITY

(0) (0 0)

TOTAL AVAILABILITY N. (o)

10% REDUCTION FOR «QUALITY>> QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS AVAILABILITY (00)

1991

307

276

1992

297

267

1993

297

267

1994

278

250

1995

259

233

1996

245

220

1997

235

211

1998

216

194

1999

207

186

2000

202

182

2001

197

177

2002

193

174

2003

188

169

2004

183

165

200.5

179

161

2006

174

1.57

2007

183

165

2008

177

159

2009

170

153

2010

163

147

5 YEAR AVERAGE

AVERAGE FOR YEARS 1991-2010

259

199

196

169

156

Live-born males, subtracting the «decreases» (natural, reform, deferments, conscientious objectors, etc.); Statistical values extracted from the evaluation of data relative to those called-up in 1989.

Table N. 4 chart 2

CURRENT ANNUAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMED FORCES· AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (young men who have yet to satisfy draft requirements)

ACTIVE DUTY

OFFICERS

--- r

NCOs

440

750

NAVY

180

1.650

TOTAL ARMED FORCES

-- . '

- --

2,3.500

24.00Q

25.830

1480

800

27.500

28.300

29.780

239.300

231.000

250

2.100

2.400

250

,15.500

380

680

100

500

2.480

J.080

460

15.500

15.960

250

400

700

- ... .~

3.500

110

182

FORESTRY SERVICE

TOTAL OTIIBR LA\Y/ ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES .-::i

GRAND TOTAL

--I

I= 90

450

190

!I -.

1.090

1 11

•,

620

950 4.550

.,. .

•

I ,.

,-,

8.740

1.160

3.100 -

4.240

3.100

8.740

4.000

4162

4.180

,, I

12.560

,---1 J

ff 27.000 (d)

27.460

8.760

L 258.ooo

266.760

31.700

-~ -.-

._.- __,,.

275.500

- - - - -/-

--.

11.500

1::::i

460

---+

- -T --.

-~ -r

4.000

11.500

.,•

4.200

\. -

lnb 1r

l'I\

19.040

4.000

..-

890

( --

4.000

180

I•

24?-800 18.150

210

SUB-TOTAL

250

210 (b)

15. 750

188.190

8.300

100

I.J

500

4.500

1830

FIRE DEPARTMENT

187-000

SECURITY GUARDS

,_ 180.000

3.600

GRAND TOTAL

7.000

900

--,

.....,

1.190

STATE POLICE

TOTAL LA\Y/ ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

• 5 ~ ."1 TOTAL rI

LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS

1200

280

FINANCE POLICE

DRAFT

RESERVE OFFICERS

TOTAL

ENLISTED

CARABINIERI

TOTAL CARABINIERI FINANCE POIJCE

I I

- .._-

ARMY (except Carabinieri)

AIR FORCES

•

..-

,_ ~

•

-•

Table N. 4 chart J

• -

I ...... 1

GENERAL COMPARISON REQUIREMENTS V s AVAILABIL_ITY (thousands)

II II

r -

9....,-

QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON

YEAR OF AVAILABILITY

:::,_

1991 1992 1993

j--

b-c

275,5

+31,5

(

1994

307

297 278

275 ,5

1996 3

1997

.,-

1::

1998 1999

2002

245 235 216

2000 2001

259

• •

: .:..

275,5

2003 2004

-r

2005

275 ,5

197

183 ,

177

2009

170

163

275,5

lj=

275,5 275,5

250

-16,5

233

-30,5

220

+ 2,5

-25,5

-42,5

-64,5

194

-81,5

186

-73,5

·--

182

177

-89,5 -93,5

174

-87,5

169

-92,5

165

,II

-96,5

161

.:-

-- -114,.5

-101 ,5

~ ~

-98,5

-82, 5

-55,5

-68,5

-101,5

157

-106,5 -110,5

-118,5

275,5

'275,5

-- - -

-8,5

-8.5

-59,.5

-78,5

+ 0,5

.::..:1

275,5

-92,5

-l05,.5

,. .....,,,c::L="

-98,5

-:::::

16.5

) 53

159

•

-116,5

-122,.5

-112,5

-110,5

147

-128,5

d-c

211

275,5

267

-40,5

276

•

275,.5

·-

--=

267

..:.

174

::..,

275,5

2008

2010

275,5

202

179

2006 2007

275,5

183

+21,5

275,5

188

DIFFERENCE FROM TOTAL REQUIREMENTS No

::::;

275,5

207

193

+21,,5

275,5

1995

QUALITATIVE AVAILABILITY No

297

QUALITATIVE COMPARISON

TOTAL DIFFERENCE CURREN_! FROM TOTAL REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS No NO

QUANTITAJIVE AVAILABILITY NO

~ I

Table N. 4 chart 4 AVAILABILITY

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AVAILABILITY Vs TOTAL REQUIREMENTS Total requirements 275.500

-25.500

SHORTFALL -93.500 -128.500

147.000 100.000

1991

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01

02 03 04 05

06 07 08 Â·09 2010

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AVAILABILITY Vs REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL ARMED FORCES AVAILABILITY Armed Forces Requirements (except for Law Enforcement Agencies) 24.3.800

REQUIREMENTS

[s"HORTFALL

-93.500 -128.500

1991

92 93

94 95

96 97 98

99 2000 01

02 03 04 05

06 07

08 09

2010

Table N. 4 chart 5 PARTIAL COMPARISON REQUIREMENTS Vs AVAILABILITY FROM 1991 TO 2010 (thousands)

~\~~l~NF~~~tt:;~~~:;~~

Dl1CR£MENTS FOR I.AW F,NFORCE.MENT AGENCIES OVERALL QUALl'J'ATIVE

RF.SERVE OfFICF.RS

AUXIUARIES

A\'AIL,\RJU TY

ACilVE OUTY PERSONNEL

276 276 267 250

4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4 ,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4 ,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2

0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5

27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27

233 220 2 11 194 186 182 177 174 169 165 161 157 165 159 153 147

NET NET AVAIL~.Bl~TY ,IRMF.l) 1 - - - . . - - - - ' -- , - --l/lV,AILABILITY TOTAL ARMY FOR rHE FORCES DIFFERENCE NAVY AIR FORCE TOTAL IOR ARMY DIFFERENCE M\MED . (!.".SS RF.QUJRF.Mf.NTS , FORCES il£SS REQUJR£M£~'TS r. CAR.ASINIF,RI) CM\ABINIERJ)

TOTAL

31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 3 1,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7

b-f

i = g-h

244,3 235,3 235,3 218,3 201,3 188,3 179,3 162,3 154,3 150,3 145,3 142,3 137,3 133,3 129,3 125,3 133,3 127,3 121,3 115,3

243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 2l!3,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8 243,8

+ 0,5

-8,5 -8,5 -25,5 -42,5 -55,5 -64,5 -81,5 -89,5 -93,5 -98,5 -101,5 -106,5 -110,5 -114,5 -118,5 -110,5 -116,5 -122,5 -128,5

24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24

28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3 28,3

52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3 52,3

g-n

192 183 183 166 149 136 127 110 102 98 93 90 85 81 77 73 81 75 69 63

188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2 188,2

q = o-£ + 3,8

-5,2 -5,2 -22,2 -39,2 -52,2 -61,8 -78,2 -86,2 -90,2 -95,2 -98,2 -103,2 -107,2 -111,2 -115,2 -107,2 -113,2 -119,2 -125,2

Table N. 4 chart 6 POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

OVERALL

VF.AR

QUAI.IT.~TIVf. AVAILABILJTY

CURRENT SITUATION

F.l,IMINAT!ON OF AUXILIARIES F.XCEl'T CARARINIERI

1 - - - - ~- ----1--

EUMJNATION OF ALL MJXILIARJES

DIFFERENCE

ANNUAL REQUIRE~!ENT

DIFFERENCE ~)

ANNUAL REQUIREMENT

DIFFF.RF.NCE

<b-c)

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

276 267 267 150 233 220 211 194 186 182 177 174 169 165 161 157 165 159 153 147

275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5

275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5 275,5

+ 0,5 -8,5 -8,5 -25,5 -42,5 -55,5 -64,5 -81,5 -89,5 -93,5 -98,5 -101,5 -106,5 -110,5 -114,5 -118,5 -110,5 -116,5 -122,5 -128,5

VOLUNTE£RS AND AUXII.IARIE~ OFriJi~~~~s : ~~%~\1;!1::>\N IN J.'\W ENFORCEMENT AGENClt S I.AW ENFORCEMENT AGF.NCIF.S

- - , - - - - + - - - - ~ - - --l--

ANNUAL REQUIREMENT

ELIMINATION OF PROFESSIONAL ELIMINA'rl0"1 OF PROFESSIONAL

264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264

+ 12 +3 +3 + 14 -31 -44 -53 -74 -78 -82 -87 -90 -95 -99 -103 -107 -99 -105 -111 -117

248,5 248,5 248,5 248,.5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5 248,5

(b.g)

+ 27,5 + 18,5 + 18,5 + 1,5 -15,5 +28,5 -37,5 + 54,5 -62,5 -66,5

-71,5 -74,5 -79,5 -83,5 -87,5 -91,5 -83,5 -89,5 -95,5 -101,5

- - - , - - - -+--- - ~ - - - - - l

ANNUAL REQUIREMENT

240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240

DIFFl:RENCE

ANNUAL REQUIREMENT

))JFfERENCF.

(b.;)

+ 36 + 27 + 27 + 10 -7 -20 -29 -46 -54 -58 -63 -66 -71 -75 -79 -83 .75 -81 -87 -93

234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5 234,5

(b.m)

+ 41,5 + 32,5

+ 32,5 + 15,5 -1,5 -14,5 -23,5 -40,5 -48,5 -52,5 -57,5 -60,5 -65,5

-69,5 -73,5 -77,5 -69,5 -75,5 -81,5 -87,5

Table N. 5 DATA ON LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS GEOGRAPH IC REGION OF ACCESSION OF LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS (as of 10 August 1990) REGIONS

ACCESSIONS

Piemonte e Valle d 'Aosta Liguria Lombardia Trentino Alto Adige Veneto Friuli Venezia Giulia Emilia Romagna

268 104 158 53 207 172 32

3.0 1.2 1. 7 0.6 2.4 1.9 0.3

TOTAL NORTH

994

11.1

Toscana Umbria Marche Lazio Abruzzi

34 42 32 65 1 182

0.4 0.5 0.4 7.3 1.9

TOTAL CENTER

941

10.5

Molise Campania Basilicata Puglia Calabria Sicilia Sardegna

70 2181 219 1732 263 1645 915

0.8 24.4 2.4 19.3 2. 9 18.4 10.2

TOTAL SOUTH AND THE ISLANDS

7025

78.4

GRAND TOTAL

8960

100

Table N. 5 BREAKDOWN OF DISCHARGED LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS LTVs discharged

23% discharged due to end

77 % discharged for good

of the Service

LTVs discharged on request of the Service 10% by request in

10% for serious disciplinary reasons

first 30 days 5 % for compassionate family reasons 5 % for permanent lack of psycho-physical aptitude 20% for fai]ure to complete basic specialization or advanced individual training course

50% for lack of aptitude for promotion to next higher grade

Table N. 5 LONG TERM VOLUNTEER PAY PACKAGE 1. Monthly pay. From 1 October 1990, gross monthly pay for long term volunteers is as follows:

MONTHLY PAY

GRADE 1

UP TO 12 h MONTH Enlisted Corporal (E-4)

Senior Corporal (E-.5)

OPERATIONAL

FROM 13

ALLOWANCE

MONTH

L. 737,000

L. 1,032,000

L. 72 ,OOO (1) (2)

L. 88.5,000

L. 1,032,000

L. 72,000 (1) (2)

L. 9.58,000

L. 1,032,000

L. 1,.509,000

L. 144,000 (3)

Staff Sergeant (E-6)

72,000 (1) (2)

(1) Monthly operational allowance remains the same for the entire volunteer period in relation to the type of duty. The amounts include the 20% increase recently granted with new contracts (Law 231, 8 aug. 1990). (2) The amount shown is for the basic operational allowance. The base amount changes according to operational employment as follows: field units L. 84,000; mountain units Lire 96,000; airborne units L. 204,000. (3) The amount shown is for the basic operational allowance. The base amount changes according to operational employment as follows: field units L. 165,000; mountain units L. 180,000; airborne units L. 201,000. 2. Severance pay. GROSS AMOUNT CATEGORIES 2 YEAR ENLISTMENT

3 YEAR ENLISTMENT

Enlisted, Caporal, Senior Corporal

L. 4,1,2 8,000

Sergeant

L. 6,976,000

L. 10,464,000

6,192,000

MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITIES AVAILABLE TO ARMY LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS 7/B 17/217 18/A-218/A 18/C 19 20 22 24 25 26 28 29 .37 39 43/A 43/B 44 50 54/A 54/C 54/D 54/F 54/G 56

C-E technician's assistant SWB operator/crew chief Driver/transportation squad leader Heavy vehicle operator Heating/cooling system operator Earth moving equipment operator Cook Drafts man Electrician Carpenter Welder Refrigeration specialist Body work/painter Electrical equipment repairman Wheeled vehicle mechanic Tracked vehicle operator Plumber Generator operator Tracked vehicle operator Amphibious vehicle operator Tracked recovery vehicle operator/mechanic Special purpose vehicle operator IFV operator Radio/TV electronic technician's assistant

71/271 72

103 104 106 108/B 117 117/A 118/.318 120/B 124 212 216/B 260/C 2 4 5/A 8 41/A 79/M 31/B 15 21/B

TTW operator/TTW crew chief ADP technician's assistant Typesetter/printer Cameraman Mountain warfare specialist Air defense missile technician/missile repairman (FOG-M) Computer operator ADP operator Radiorelay operator/crew chief Fire control technician high air defense Fire fighter Construction site supervisor Tracked vehicle crew chief Finance and accounting specialist Medic Armorer Veterinary assistant EDD specialist Radio announcer Musician Military stockade guard Waiter Animal groom

Table 6

VOLUNTEER SERVICE IN SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES (Source: Military Center for Strategic Studies Research Report CE.MI.S.S. «Recruitment in Italy») UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Enlistment:

On request, at age 17. Educadon requirement is the completion of the 8th grade; alchough about 90% of the young men in recent years ha~e had a high school diploma.

Pay and Allowanc.es:

Varies according to grade and family status. In particular: · recruit: 639 pay per month plus 165 for rations and 1.37 (245 if married) housing allowance if these are not provided by the government . · E-3 , E-4: 790 pay per month, plus the above allowances (with an increase in housing to 18.3 for single and 26 7 for married personnel)

Length of Enlistment:

Severance/retirement pay and civilian employment

Minimum length is fixed at 3 years with an obligation to pass to the Reserves for a like period (the Navy and the Air Force require 4 years of active and 2 years reserve service). The service member may request to rcenlist for three year periods up to a maximum of 35 years (retention is based on psychophysical fitness). About 20% of personnel reenlist for an additional term beyond initial enlistment.

Severance pay is equal to the last month's pay multiplied by the number of years of active service. With 20 years service (the minimum required for retirement) the service member draws a pension equal to 50% of his basic pay. With regard to civilian employment, it's necessary to keep in mind the unusual na-

ture and ,mobility of the U.S. labor marker. Many specialties acquired in the Armed Forces are recognized in the civilian sector; but individual skills and "military credentials" still remains in the key co effective entry in the work force. Promotions:

Assistance and Social Services:

Housing and rations:

Promotion ro Corporal cannot come before completion of one year of service and has no other fixed time requirements; performance of the service member is the only factor considered . Non Commissioned Officers are promoted from the enlisted ranks for career prngression. Enlisted personnel can also take advantage of about a 10% sed-aside of positions in the officer corps.

The organization of these services is considerable and embrances the families. In face, it gives priority to the families since service members arc in continuous training. In particular, it provides: - free medical care (even after retirement); - counseling in various family needs (administrative, educational etc.); - associations which, by virtue of their ties with influential political figures, act as true interest groups and are capable of influencing poIi tical decisions related to the military establishment .

see pay and allowances.

GREAT BRITAIN Strength (*):

Enlistment and length of commitment:

226,000 (Non Commissioned Officers and enlisted); during 1985 there were 20,326 enlistments. (*) data refer to 1 Jan 1986 The following are the enliscmenc possibilities: - 22 year enlistment for those who are at least 17-1/2 years old. The sei:vice member may ask to be released at the end of the first three years or any successive three -year period (the request must be submitted six months in advance and he is obligated to serve in the resei:ves for a varying number of years (this requirement does not exist for those

who have completed 12 years of service); at the end of the 22-year period the service member may be retained on request for an additional 4 years; - enlistment for 9, 6 and .3 years: its characteristics are essentially the same {accession at ages between 17 and 17-1/2) except for the service obligation in the REGULAR RESERVE at the erid of the enlistment. The service member may leave before completion of his enlistment by paying a sum from 20 to 250 pounds. The Non Commissioned Officers rise from the enlisted ranks, identified and selected by the chain

of command, and sent to a course (of variable length depending on specialty) at che branch or service schools. Pay and allowances:

Civilia~ employment at end of enlistment:

Enlistment:

Pay and Allowances:

Length of Volunteer Service:

Assistance and Social Services:

Service members leaving the service are required to be counseJed by the career transidon office and obtain useful information on their transidon before discharge; additionally, they are sent to special courses (4-6 weeks) at selected training cemers to adapt their military skills to the civilian job lll;lrket. Within the MOD, there is a cell which maintains a data bank which permits to: - compare in real time personnel availability and job openings; · provide up to date information to

• Housing and rations:

Rcentry into labor force at end of enlistment:

Tbere are two types of volunteer service in France: - case A; extension of compulsory military service; · case B: voluntary reenlistment (only for specialists) For both c,ases voluntary enlistment is requested before the initiation of or during the compulsory service period. Minimum age is 18 years, maximum 29 years with the possibility of selection of Armed Force, speciality, or the region of assignment.

Case A; 6 months, 12 months or 24 months on request. Case B: 3 years renewable to a maximum of 18 years.

Enlisted members are required to pay a modcst"!I sum for fo6d and quarters. Man:ied members are provided with government housing (fully furnished). Military administration encourages service members to buy a t bargain prices surplus government housing. At some foreign locations, when service members are .forced to go into the open housing market, the Mifitary Administration reimburses a considerable parr of the rem.

LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS

34.6.36 expected for 1986, equal to 20% of total enlisted strength under arms.

Case A; for the first 12 months the monthly basic pay of the draftee is equal to about L 080 francs times 2 and for the remaing 12 months times 2.5 Additionally, the various other allowances are also multiplied by 2 or 2.5 At the end of the enlistment, severance pay equal to the last amount paid. Rations a~d housing free. Case B: for the first 24 months as for cas~ A, then: · 3. 900 francs up to 5 years; · 4. 900 francs up to 6 years; · 5.600 francs up to 8 years. At the end of the enlistment, severance pay under the prevailing conditipns as any other worker. Rations and housing free.

officers.

Milirary personnel enjoy the following benefits: - free medical and dental care · 50% discount on rail transportation even for family members · considerable aid by the MOD toward the ex,Penses of attendance at Colleges l;>y sons/daughte,rs of service members.

Gross pay for enlisted soldiers is: Corporal: 9.289 pounds Lance Corporal: 7,428 pounds - Private: 6.081 pounds.

FRANCE Strength:

career transi~

Promotions:

Possibility to enter the "Gendartnerie0; Priority emp,Joyment listing: - with the National Employment Agency; with the Trade Skills Agency; - with the Chamber of Commerce; - with regional Industrial and Agricultural Agencies; Preparatton during the enlistmer;it period through National correspondence courses for competition for employmnet in certain special skills. Preparation, during the enlistment period, for ex:ams to complete education, or receive a professional diploma for t hose wh o do not' possess one. Case A.; opp9rrunity to compete, if performance dming enlistment period has been satisfactory, fo1· access to the Non Commissioned Officer Academy; for those with a }Iigh School diploma, op(>ortuniry to compete for select:ion to the active Reserve Officer Academy. Case B: at the end of the .3rd year, access for the best q11ali(ied to the Non Commissioned Academy, or promot:ion to Corporal, followed by promotion to Sergenat a(ter 9 years.

Social Assistance:

(Case A and B): Same as draftees

Housing and rations:

(Case A and B): Same as d raftees

Duties:

All types, with preference for those with special skills (only special skills for case B).

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Strength:

67,300, equal to 33% of enlisted force.

Enlistment:

By request, after the 17th and before the 29th year of age; Candidates must have at last an eighth grade education {for duties requiring high specialization) or at least a sixth grade education for other skills.

Pay and allowances:

Monthly pay, including housing allowance equal to 1650 DM, plus a vacation allowance, a special skill allowance, family allowance and overtime after 56 hours per week.

Length of Enlistment:

Employment at end of enlistment and severance pay:

Minimum 4 years (confamed after 6 months based on aptitude and performance); maximum 8 years (15 for Non Com· missioned Officers).

The right to acquire, at the State's expense while on active duty, a skill which will be recognized in the pub· lie and private sectors after discharge. A second skill may be acquired (or the first one for those whose specialty does not have a civilian counterpart) in special schools after duty hours for short enlistments, during duty hours for longer enlistments. All regional and district military commands are available to help discharged personnel in their search for employment.

LONG TERM VOLUNTEERS

Severance pay, tax free for the foJ. lowing enlistment periods: - 4 years, equal to 4 times the amount of the last month's pay plus 6 months of allowances equal to 75% of monthly pay; - 6-7 years, equal to 4 times the amount of the last month's pay plus 12 months of allowances equal to 75% of monthly pay; · 8 years, equal to 6 times the amount of the last month's pay plus I 8 months of allowances equal to 75% of monthly pay. The State guarantees for 2 years from the start of the enlistment the member's old employment. Promotions:

After 6 months Corporal, after 12 months Senior Corporal, after 24 months the possibility to become a Non Commissioned Officer in non permanent service (Sergeants and Staff Sergeants, and the option to extend enlistment to a maximum of 15 years),

Social Assistance:

Health and social secudty payment made by the State during all the years of service.

Housing and rations:

During the first 15 months in 2-.3 man rooms; After 15 months same privileges as Non Commissioned Officers {single room or government housing if married). Rations are provided at the rate of 5 DM per day.

Duties:

All types, combat and non combat special ties .

~-· •

Table N. 7 AVAILABILITY FOR VOLUNTEER SERVICE (Source: Ce.Mi.S.S. Research Report ÂŤElimination of the draft and constitution of volunteer Armed ForcesÂť)

Reasons for losses in enlistment for long term volunteer service (q = 100) Failure to respond to call-up

3,2

Not examined (rejected for legal motives, citizenship, prior convictions)

0,3

Rejected (during medical exam, without medical exam, after enlistment)

5,9

Scheduled for further evaluation

9,5

Deferments (Law number 191, 1976)

1,3

Approved requests for conscientious objection (*)

2,4

Availability for draft (% )

77,1

Availability for draft (100%) Educational deferments (**)

32,8

Possible long term enlistment loss due to lack of education

13,2

Remaining for long term enlistment (q = 100)

53,9

Long term enlistment sources (100%) Expected profile 1.1.1.1.

25,9

Expected profile (1.1. 1.2. + 1. 1.2.1. + 1.2.1.1. + 2.1.1.1)

21,2

Expected profile (1.1.2.2. + 1.2.2.1. + 1.2.1.2. + 2.1.1.2. + 2.2.1.1.)

17,4

Expected profile (1.2.i.2. + 2.1.2.2. + 2.2.1.2. + 2.2.2.1.)

2,7

Exp~cted profile 2.2.2.2.

0,1

Other profile categories

32,7

(*) Empirical figure; it presupposes double the 6,000 requests approved for the years 1981, 1982, 1983. ("*) Results obtained from the sample of army draft only. The possible theorical availability for the long term

volunteer program has not been considered for precautionary reasons and because of the foreseeable low quantity output.

Table 8

PROPOSAL BY PROFESSOR MORTILLARO ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES (Source: Military Center for Strategic Studies «Recruitment in Italy» Research Report) NOTES FOR THE WORK GROUP ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE AR.t\.fED FORCES

Premise

The outline which follows has been developed using the assumption that the particular geo-political structure of our contty, its socio-economic conditions, the international initiatives taken, render impractical the transformation of the Armed Forces either toward the volunteer-professional, or in the direction commonly refered to as "nation under arms". On the other hand, this is a very old and recurring debate (it even took place at the moment of the constitution of the social republic in 1943 between those who theorized a small but extremely efficient army similar to the "Weimar" - supported by Canevari - and those who favored a politicized army · supported by Ricci) wh ich usually ends up in favor of universal conscdption. In any case, the important transfor mations which have taken place in Italy in the last 20 years need to be considered: the greater independent judgement practiced by "young people"; the enormous increase in exchanges both within and outside the country which weakened the "initiation" function heretofore performed by military service; last, but not less important, the strong and growing participation of women in the work force and in the profession. All this requires consideration of military service no longer as an undesirable task imposed on a minority, but as a generalized and egalitari.an service performed by all citizens according to their physical and intellectual capacities. The period of service can even be greater than that required by compulsory draft and does not have to be strictly related to military activities, but encompasses a larger range of common interests, directed at the defence of country from external and internal enemies, the latter represented by natmal disasters, health and environmental preventive measures, and lack of care: from environmental degradation to socio-economic disadvantage. What is envi.s ioned is the integration of the citizen, by obligation for a certain period of time and voluntarily thereafter, in a series of initiatives where he gives freely or almost freely of his time, but from which he receives a precise return in terms of specific recognition which could be for mandatory service related to a professional skill, while for the volunteer phase a mix of professional and civil ski lls, with emphasis on the latter. It is clear, then, that this assumption requires a strong integration among Defense, Civil Defense, other nat ional agencies and Industry, and that it is founded on mandatory service, without distincition as to sex, and allowing very few exemptions for truly objective reasons, while requiring alternativ<.' service for those ex· empted. Obviously, a system with thl'sC:- ,harnCt<·ristics requires a relatively long start-up period, given aho tlw 11,wclty of mandatory service by women; the incegrared usl' ,,f h11dgc•cs from different ministries· and the need co use j11dit-in11sh- th,· ,1vailable free or semi free ~ork force so as not to disrupt ·the· normal tabor market. A large degree of consensus towards na cional institutions, whose scarcity or absence is the face which ,foringuishes negatively Italiy from other industrialized countri,·s, partkularly Great Britain, France, the United States, less from Germanv, would be therefore necessary. . The proposal which follows attempts to answer the need tor specific professional skills required.for the use of particularly ad-

vanced weapon systems, considering at the same time the relationship between the training investment and the period of availability of the individual.

Mandatory draft:

Long-term volunteet service 3. 5 years:

for all men and women at age 17 with selection at the time of induction between mandatory alternative service (women and conscientious objectors) and military (men) for an equal duration of 12 months. Men: using current standards. Women: hospitals, hospices, social work, environment, agriculture, urban renewal, etc. , and short term voluntary service for two years, with the possibility of employment in military activities. Tangible benefits compared with those who, for any reason, do not perform military or alternative service: professional skill development, set-aside for civil service jobs, preferential employment in the private sector, social security and pension credit for military service, etc.

accession only through the short term volunteer program or at the complerion of mandatory service (maximum age 21 years). I t is divided between: . technical specialisrs, and those with administrative and coordination functions (Non Commissioned O fficers); - training and operations specialists. Women are admitted to all three groups in predetermined maximum percentages. Set-aside of jobs in the National Police, Carabi.nieri, Customs Police, Fire Department, Ministry of Defence, of the Interior, of Health, Culture, and Environment, at the end of their service. For the Non Commissioned Officers, set-aside of spaces at the academies for active dmy officers, with absolute parity in treatment and career progression. A special office is established within the M inistry of Defence to monitor those near the end of their terms in liaison with private industry, government agencies, and other economic entities.

Table 8

FLOW CHART OF "DEFENCE FORCE" RECRUITMENT

Mandatory draft

for all men and women at age 17

Volunteer Service

short term 3 years (then 2) alternative-military 10% 15%

military (men)

) J·

Ecology Health Culture Environmental Renewal Social Services

Reserve Officers and Non Commissioned Officers

J I

·-

Coordinators and Managers

_, I

Professional Development

Specialists men and women (5% of whom: 20% women) Non Commissioned Officers

access to

and access to women in technical fields: communications, armaments, supply, medical, services, military justice

Private Sector Police Carabinieri employment Fire Department Customs Police Forestry Service Civilian Employment in Defense, Health Culture Ministries

'11

Territorial defense corps

coordinated by Defense and Civil Defense in concert with Health and Culture Ministries. Admits volunteer men and women from mandatory military and alternative service, and long and short term volunteer service with duties of: • defense against natural disasters

I Employment assistance in public and private sectors

professional development

alternative (women and objectors)

Army, Navy Air Force (Excluded: Carabinieri, Police, Fire Department)

only military 5-10 years (then .3)

I Mandatory Service 12 months

Current regulations applly, except: reserves spaces for long term Non Commissioned Officers if otherwise qualified

(Selection at induction at age 18) h

long term

Active duty

(coordination between state and private organizations, employment rosters, etc.)

• environmental protection • social and health assistance • emergency communications nets • electoral service

Military tax in relation to income produced by individual

• territorial defense reserved for those who completed military service, with annual refresher.

Table N. 9 ANALYSIS OF PERSONNEL COSTS 1. PREMISE a. As an example, the following data refer to the current pay and allowance of the Carabinieri and Customs Police both in absolute terms and in terms of the different pay grades. b. The basic pay package of the volunteer would be established at L. 26,4 million, slightly higher than that of the initial pay package of a Carabiniere L. 25,2 million.

COMPARISON BETWEEN CURRENT MONTHLY PAY AND ALLOWANCE(*) FOR ARMY - CARABINI ERI/CUSTOMS POLICE VARIOUS ARMY BRANCHES

GRADE

Yrs of service

CARABINIERI/CUSTOMS POLICE

GROSS PAY

GRADE

Yrs of service

GROSS PAY

Colonel (Brigadier)

5.612

Colonnello (omog. Gen . B.)

5.933 4.576

5.933

Lieutenant Colonel

4. 968

Ten. Col.

Major

3.558

Maggiore

Captain

2.949

Capitano

3.245

3.029 2.823

Firs Lieutenant

2.668

Tenente

Second Lieutenant

2.408

Sottotenente

Command Sgt Major

3.301

Mar. Magg. «A»

3.391 -

Sergeant Major

3.120

Mar. Magg.

3.167

Master Sgt/First Sgt

2 .939

Mar . Ca.

3.017

Sergeant First Class

2.629

Mar. Ord.

2.778

Staff Sergeant

2.429

Brigadiere

2.704

Sergeant

2.111

V. Brig.

2 .543

Senior Corporal

168

Corporal

154

140

Private

Appuntato

2.496

CC scelto

2 .299

Carabiniere

2.158

NOTE(*): Gross amounts in thousands of lire, including allowances (operational, social security, etc.) and excluding overtime pays which for the Carabinieri goes from a monthly minimum of 7 hours for all Non Commissioned Officers to a maximum of 70 hours for officers and Non Commissioned Officers on special assignments. Overtime average L. 700,00 for month (gross).

- 45

Table N. 9 CALCULATION OF THE RATIOS OF MONTHLY GROSS PAY RECEIVED BY OFFICERS AND NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS REFERRED TO THE PAY OF THE CARABINIERI YEARS OF SERVICE

GROSS PAY

RATIO

Colonnello (omog. Gen. B.)

5.933

2,75

Ten. Col.

5.933

2,75

Maggiore

4.576

2,12

Capitano

3.245

1,50

Tenente

3.029

1,40

Sottotenente

2.823

1,31

Mar. Magg <<A»

3.391

1,57

Mar. Ca.

3.017

1,40

Mar. Ord.

2.778

1,29

Brigadiere

2.704

1,25

V. ·Brig.

2.543

1,18

Appuntato

2.496

1,16

CC scelto

2.299

1,07

Carahiniere

2.158

GRADE

EXAMPLE OF VOLUNTEER PERSONNEL COSTS OF THE PROFESSIONAL COMPONENT a. Gross pay by grade on current ratios for the Carabinieri VOLUNTEER GROSS PAY: L. 2,200,000 FOR MONTH

GRADE Private Corporal Senior Corporal Sergeant Staff Sergeant Sergeant First Class Master Sergeant/First Sergeant Sergeant Major Command Sergeant Major Second Lieutenant First Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant Colonel Colonel/B. G.

RATIO CARABINIERI

MONTHLY GROSS PAY

1 1,07 1,16 1,18 1,25 1,29 1,40 1,47 1,57 1,31 1,40 1,50 2,12 2,75

2.200.000 2.354.000 2.552.000 2.596.000 2.750.000 2.838.000 3.080.000 3.234.000 3.454.000 2.882.000 3.080.000 3.300.000 4.664.000 6.050.000 6.050.000

2.75

.Table N. 9 EXAMPLE OF PERSONNEL COSTS FOR VOLUNTEERS OF THE PROFESSIONAL COMPONENT b. Current Brigade costs GRADE

AUTHORIZED

Colonel Lieutenant Colonel Major Captain First Lieutenant Second Lieutenant Command Sgt Major Sergeant Major Master Sergeant Sergeant First Class Staff Sergeant Sergeant Senior Corporal Corporal Private

MONTHLY GROSS PAY X 1,000

TOTAL X 1,000

1 5.612 5.612 23 4.968 114.264 35 3.558 124.530 61 2.949 179.889 65 2.688 174.720 91 2.408 219.128 30 3.301 99.030 50 3.120 156.000 40 2.939 117.560 47 2.626 123.422 213 2.429 517.377 140 2..111 295.540 65 168 10.920 100 154 15.400 3.672 140 514.080 TOTAL 2.667.472 c. Comparison of personnel costs for a draftee Brigade and a volunteer Brigade operating at the same time in the two components (*)

GRADE

AUTHORIZED

MONTHLY GROSS PAY DRAFTEES X 1.000 EACH

;

TOTAL

MONTHLY GROSS PAY VOLUNTEER X 1.000 EACH

TOTAL

Colonel

6.050

6.550

Lieutenant Colonel

6.050

139.150

6.550

150.650

Major

4.664

163.240

5.164

180.740

Captain

3.300

201.300

3.800

231.800

First Lieutenant

3.080

200.200

3.580

232.700

Second Lieutenant

2.882

262 .262

3.382

307.762

Command Sgt Major

3.454

103.620

3.954

118.620

Sergeant Major

3.234

161.700

3.734

186.700

Master Sergeant

3.080

123.200

3.580

143.200

Sergeant First Class

2.838

133.386

3.338

156.886

Staff Sergeant

213

2.596

363.440

3.096

433.440

Senior Corporal

168

10.920

2.552

165.880

Corporal

100

154

15.400

2.354

235.400

3.672

140

514.080

2.200

8.078.400

Private

TOTALS

2.983.698

11.320.978

NOTE(*): Assumes an increase of lire 500,000 for Officers and Non Commissioned Officers assigned to volunteer units.

bilPRIVlnA

mLITARE

ÂŠ

1992

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