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STUDI DEL GEN. CdA SALVATORE FARINA

RIVISTA MILITARE EDIZIONE IN LINGUA INGLESE N.1 - 2002 Evolution of the Scenario and Planning of the Land Instrument pag. 40 N. 2 - 2003 The Central Role of the Land Instrument Between Securitv Requirements and New Operational Capabilities pag. 24 N.3 - 2003 Investments and Objectives of the Army pag. 62

What are the factors that have changed the international scenario, and what interventions are necessary in planning and defining the operational capabilities of the land Forces? The following article gives some precise answers to these questions, stressing the need that the emergencies appearing in the new politico-strategic picture be faced with an acceleration of the adjustment process, which is actually being fully developed in our Army and in those of many Western Countries. 40

he events of September 11 , if on the_ 011e hand have striken the feelings of all those who, all over the ,.vorld, share the same values of freedom , constit u tiona l state and respect for human life, on the other have added new parameters to the complex problem of security. It is a conceptual leap in a sector which, for more than a decade, has undergone a geostrategic evo lution , in which the Armed Forces of many Countries, and particularly the Western ones, have been engaged in a transformation process which has been rightly defined as "epochal". In this sense, one of the n10st important events is certainly the crisis in the Balkan area. This crisis accelerated the process of cohesion in the political and security sectors in Europe, prompting NATO to proceed to

a crilical review of its structures, in order to adapt them to the changed security requirements. As a consequence, alrn.ost all Nations of the EuroAtlantic area have been involved in the full development of important programmes of renewal, based on quantitative reductions and on the in crease of the operational ea pabili ties, at both national and multinationa l level. The scenario of reference, however, was antecedent to the terrorist attacks against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. It is therefore logical , today, lo ask ourselves what were the factors that produced substantial transformations in the scenario, and consequently what changes must be introduced in the definition of the forces and in the operational capabilities necessary to meet the new security needs.

EVOLUTION OF THE SCENARIO The general picture confirms the reduced possibility that, in the medium -long term, an international actor could d i rectly threa t en, in a "traditional" way, national and allied vita l interests, such as territorial integrity, with largescale military operations . Nevertheless, as was amply proved by the attack against the United States of America, the future scenarios will be characterized by a long series of risks , different in type and dimensions, with variable means and app lication points, which will also involve governmental and social structures. From a strict ly mil itary viewpoint, the potential enemies will very likely adopt techniques capab l e of neutralizing or decreasing Lhe technological advantage availa b le which seems to be destined to increase 41

of a capability of intervention, using power as a deterrent, but it could be necessary to actually deploy a projection comba t force, in order to achieve, if necessary, a real operational impact. The third consideration to bear in mind ensu es from th e ne,v structure of the NATO forces and from the consequences on th.eir categorization. It is a [a c t that the NATO decision to constitute a number of highreadiness Corps for both Ar t. 5 and CROs (Cdsis Response Operations) requ i res th e presence of Division/Brigadelevel formations capable of playing the role of readily dep lo yable "entry forces ", projectab le also to nonpermissive theatres, and able to create the secu rity framework necessary for the deployment of higher-level Major Units. ln this sense, this type of forces will have to meet requirements of high strategic mobility, and cornmand protection and comba t power helter than th e present immediate-reaction forces, in order to guarantee a high operational impact and an enduring survivability.

considerably in certain more and more frequent recourse sophisticated sectors. to the constitution of "Coal itions In general, at politico-milita,路y of the WiJling", underlines the level, it is necessary advance need that in future the forces will some observations on the have to be in a position to in novato r路y elements in the operate even with a lovv scenario of international interoperability. In view of this, it ,路elations. These innovaLions ,vill will be necessary to evaluate each affect the conduct of mi li tary time the degree of integration of operations, and are now as the military instruments, w ithout important as the strictly techno- accepting tout court the military elements. extension of the "taskThe first consideration derives organizalion" principle to the from the possible fluidity of the multinational sphere but, on the polit ico-mi lit ary coa litio ns in contrary, specifying the which the instrumen Ls will be minimum level below which THE OPERATIONAL called to operate. As a matter o[ "multinationalization" could ENVIRONMENT fact, the framework o[ alliances hamper effectiveness and thus and coalitions will evolve \Vitl1 a be unprofitable. The second The operational environment frequency never observed during consideration derives from the can be characterized bv several th e last fifty years. T his is anly sis of the political variables, fa lling witl1in two confirmed by the trend started institutions ex isting in the areas categories concerning, respectively, with Operation "ALBA", followed of foremost strategic interest, the physical and human sphere by SFOR, KFOR, East Tirnor and and indicates that, in case of and the eme,路ging threat. the international commitment in crisis in these reg ions , the The characteristics of the support o[ the US. application of diplomatic and pro bable future Operation Areas The different sensitivity about economic initiatives \,vould not will be different (Fig. I) from those crisis situations, and the be very successful. 0 n the where the traditional forces have potential diverging interests contrary, lhe enforcement of up to now planned their between partners in formal and diplomatic, economic and ern.ployrnent: greater urbanization, durnble alliances could lead to a informative measures together larger Operation Area s, decrease in the rythm of \,viLh others of lhe military kind, increased subdivision of the operations guided by joint would very likely turn out to be ten-ain, presence of civilians, will politico-military bodies and to a much more effective. characterize the future reduced integration of m ilitary In these areas , il will not be manoeuvring areas . Terrain, capabilit ies. On the contrary, the sufficient to give the impression enemy forces and ci\ilians are the 42

Italian squad at a checkpoint.

three inseparable components of the situation wbere all units wi ll have to operate. \Ve are going to examine each element, in order to determine their impact on the required capabilities. As regards the first classic factor, t;rrain, it is likely that in the future will occur again what happened in Soma lia: Kosovo, Chechnya and Afghanistan : the enemy wiLI rn.ove Lhe fighting to hi gh ly comparted and/or thickly urbanized areas, to counterbalance their vulnerabilitv in the sectors of intell igence and highly techno logica l ~Neapons, thus redressing the force balances. It is therefore possible to say that in planning the future military operations, the involvement in areas with a medium/high density of urbanization cannot be ru led out.

Therefore, in order to develop the type of forces to be employed in urbanized environments, it will be necessary to take into account the following characteristics: • tridimensionality of the space, including the subterranean level; • predominance of structures and buildings, \vhose dimensions will hamper observation, fire, movement and Command-and-Control; • increased indistinctness and protection of the enemy formations or of individual elements , thus making more difficult their acquisition and neutralization; • non -contiguity and large extension of the ba ttlefie.ld and, in particular, of the area of responsibility, in relation to the forces employed; • high physiological stress, due to the high level of atten tion required, the presence of risks on all sides and the impact of

close combat, which arc elements producing a high rate of atlenlion of the personnel. As regards the presence of civilians, it wi ll not be possible anymore to overlook the probable po lit ical implications connected with a military involvement of the centres of gravity located in a urbanized and media-influenced context. As a consequence , the units employed in this type of environment will have to possess a diverse and increased ability to gather and process information. In particular; a lso the lower-level Commanders must be capable of: • detecting the politico -social and psychological implications of the use of force; • confronting possible actions conducted by paramilitary units, such as irregular forces, terror ist organizations and networks, extremist political facLions , transnationa l crime organizations; 43

• acqu iring in re al time th e cl i ,·e ctives on the Ii nes of conduct and the rules of engagement. The presence of inte l'national, governmen Lal and nongovernmental organizations (IOs, GOs a nd NGOs) in the future int e rve ntion a reas wi 11 be an add i liona l cha ll enge for th e military instrument . Relations marked by not always converging .require ments a nd p rogran,mes could result in dyscrasias vvhich alfect the fulfilment of the mission. The c1itical aspects that are going lo impose a re view of the composition o f" the formations are:

• the multiplicity, many-sided nature and unpredictability of the operational options, owing to the possible presence, in th e s am e o perati ona l scenario o r di ve rse types o r conflicts with different levels of intensity ( conflict islands) which will impose a selective manageme nt o f milit a ry capabilities in the same al'ea of operations; • the reversibility and instability of the conflict levels, clue to the continuous "symmetricasymmetric" interaction; • the difficulty in force deployment i n t he areas of intervention ow ing to the

possible interdiction of" the main points of entry in theatl'e, ,,1,foch cou ld also cause a greate1 complexity in the activit ies o f deployment a nd expa nsion o f the formations; • the rapid wearing out of the forces, as a consequence of the strong tendency to d ispers e them, the inc rease of restraints and limitations deriving from public opinion and po li lical power, w ith referen ce to th e gro wing and prope r sens1t 1v1ly towards th e safeguard of human life and natural en vironmenl. The influence of the media on milita1-y operations is growing at th e sa me ral e as th e interest shown by public opinion, which is more and more emotionally invo lved. l n the so-called "global village", the c r ises a nd t he mililary operations for the management of "hotbeds" will occur under the watchful eye of the media, that will amplify, tone down o r· modify every aspect of the crisis, also according Lo the panicular "conditionings" put into effect by o ne or more of the op posi ng pa r·Lies, or by "aim ed" information campaigns. The impact of one's own or enemy losses will have such a large echo arouse such a great deal of interest that it cou ld compromise the perception o f national security objectives. In consequence, pu blic opinion will s imu ltaneously ask for s uccess and reduction of the physical risks, costs and collateral e ffects typi cal of m ilitary ope rations, s u ch as the involvement of civilians and damages caused to th e e nvironm ent by the battle. T he last elem e nt that must be i nserte cl in the mosaic o f lh e future operational environment concerns the nature and the

Laver o( a self-propelled J~u11.

modus operandi of the potential enemies. There are possibilities thaL the adversary rnay have equal or equivalent military capabililies. but very likely t he enemy will consist of non-regular and nontraditional forces. Nevertheless, our forces will have to be able to confront forces with similar operational capabilities in high-intensity conflicts. On the other路 extccme, it is verv likely that irregular military forces with differ路e nt operational capabilities will conduct a number or 11.011.-conventional hostile acts against us, employing surprise and dccci t, with an asymmetric a n d asynchronous approach in order路 to reach their objective. The c ommand ccntr路cs and the logistic and training bases of the enemy could be spread, like a net, on a global scale and this would make the ir identification very difficult. TerrorisL groups

cou ld sLri.ke in n1.0re and more unexpected ,.vays, and in connection with unknown events. Very likely, the potential enemy wi 11 L.ry Lo prevent us fron1. protecting our vital points on the nat ional territory and Crom taking any repressive and preventive action against terrorism, for instance through the interdiction of the air; railway and sea points of embarkation (APOEs. RPOEs and SPOEs), obs.:ructing at the same time the access Lo the points of en trance to remote theatres; such as air, sea and railway points of disembarkation (APODs, SPODs and RPODs). This makes mandatory for us to envisage and/or confirm the availability of forces deployable in a theatre even in absence of port and airport infrastructure, or to organize easily accessible entrance areas. Tn the ruture it m ighL become very difficult to realize a security frarnework using the classic means

Women O/lzcer cade1s during a hreak in a.11 exercise.

of passive protecL ions and hightech nology surveillance devices. whi le greaLer a ttent ion should instead be directed to forms of in telli gence capab le of gathering informa tion directely from the social environment, prisoners, exfighters, exiles or refugees or from normal civilian personnel present in the operations area (HU.MINT). Fina ll y, with referen ce to the spreading out of the instrnments, it wi ll be expedi ent to set up combat groups capable of con ducti ng autonomous actions, centred on a lower-than -usual level such as the company.

ADAPTATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS

The evolution of the scenarios of em ploym en t th u s ou 1. I i ne d c learly has deep impacts on the 45

Rangers of' the ;,Col lv1oschin" 9t h Regiment on training.

p.lanning of the land instrument. At this point it should be em pha sised hovv, from the viewpoint of force planning, the non-conventional attack carried out to the heart of the United St.ates and the consequent reaction of the international community could be seen as a confirmation or the assumptions of the conceptual and organizational analysis, which, during the last fow years, has led to the renewal of the land instrument of the major Western nations. From the capability of confronting la rge numbers of armoured means, typical of the cold war, we have started long ago to orient ourselves towards capabi lities of intervention, of crisis control and management in the areas of strategic interest, considering the high-intensity combat as the most demanding and most important point of referÂˇence. Nevertheless, the dramatic d evel opment of the events of our times has imposed a great acceleration of LhisÂˇ evolutionary prncess and has required more attention towards the sectors that answer the needs

Restoration of a bridge across t 1 river.

connected with the struggle against typically asymmetric and non-traditional attacks. I wish to point out that the updating/improvement process of the military capabilities of the European Nations of the Alliance at present is regulated by the Defense Capa b ility Initiative (DCI), i.e. by th e process o( alignment of the European capabilities to the US ones, according to convergence standards established in the

Washington summit o f 1999 , under the pressure of tb.e operations in Kosovo. Considering the acceleratio n occurred in the programmes o r tb.e US defence and the size of the changes brought in the relevant planning objectives, it is likely that a similar updating, albeit of lower level, will tak e place w ithin the Alli ance in connection with the convergence standards of the abovesaid DCI. Le t us see how the US Army is reorganizing itself. Thanks to a programme started a long time ago, the US Army is tr"ying to employ in the most effective way the considerable funds thaL will be at its disposal to implement the socalled transformation of the land instrument, according to s t andards that meet the new challenges determined by the "Joint Vision 2020" . Considering that these funds are in anv case still insufficient for. the modernization or the entire instrument, it was dec id ed to divide the developrnent of th e forces along three mainlines. The

legacy force, i.e. the force inherited from the cold war, is based on heavy unj ts and • four main weapon-systems: the "Abrams" tank, the "Bradley'' A PC (and deriving families), the "Apache" and UH-60 helicopters and the MLRS/ATACMS rocket launcher. This body of forces, deemed insufficient for the requirements of the totality of the new scenarios of employment, \.Vill be updated only in part, thro ugh the introduction in some units (a Corps) of indispensable systems, such as computerization, the "Crusader" self-propelled gun and the "Grizzly'' pjoneer tank. These units, backbone of the US Army until the end of its transformation, will have to permit to conduct counteroffensives at Corps level for solving high-intensiLy crises. It should be noted that the technological level of such forces is approximately equivalent Lo the objectives of the modernization and renewal progrnmme of the Italian Army up to 2010 (ARIETE -APC DARDO - PzH 2000 - A 129 - NH-90 - ESC - SAMP-T SIACCON 2) . The interim force, destined to be a gap-filler, with the aim of having immediate availability of an instrument oriented towards the nevv tasks, is formed by the body of the said updated legacy (orces and the 6 IBCT (Interim Brigade Combat Team) medium brigades, that are being realized thanks to the acquisition - w ith a sped-up procedure and the choice of offthe-shelf materials, i.e. withol;t idle times for research and development - of 2100 8x8 LAV lll armoured vehicles in 10 different versions. But the final result of the entire process of transformation will be the objective force, which will constitute the radical change of all the organizational components of the US Army. It will be implemented starting from 2008, in successive stages, until 2020 (2010 is the date in which the initial operational capabi lity will be conferred to the first un it

. ,. GUIDELINES OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE US ARMY RESPONSIVENESS: reduced response times to achieve EARLY EFFECT. DEPLOYABILITY: possibility of deploying , everywhere in the w orld, complexes of Brigade-level in 96 hours, Division in 120 hours and Corps (5 Divisions) in 30 days. AGILITY: possibility of conducting the entire range of military activities. VERSATILITY: capability of "dominating" the enemy at all moments of the missions envisaged. LETHALITY: capabilities distributed over the whole traditional range, decidedly superior to those typical of the present heavy forces. SURVIVABILITY: obtained mainly through situational awareness, in order to prevent threats to the safety of the personnel, and by applying forms of active and passive protection based on innovative technologies. SUSTAINABILITY: adoption of measures aimed at reducing the logistic "burden", such as reductions in consumption of fuel (new propulsors) and ammunition (precision attacks, reduction of calibres}, water production (depuration and conversion of combustion products, employment of dehydrated foods, etc. Fig. 2

reorganized and re-equipped in view of the emisaged goals). In this regard, we ought lo point out that the objective of the planning consists in realizing an organ.i,.ational structure aimed at projecting anywhere in the world, also in situations of unavailability of entrance points or in presence of hostile forces, a force capable of acLi ng as deterrent in peacetime, having dimensions and composition suitable for carrying ou l the entire assumable range of operations (from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity fighting). The guiding pr inciples of this transfonnarion are summarized in Fig.2. The main basic concept of all developments is the ·emphasis on personnel at all levels . Such concept, apparently taken for granted, constitutes the real revolution that needs the support of the doctrine, materials and organizations that will have to be developed. 1n short, with a procedure similar in concept to the one which, in the artillery, has led lo transfer the responsibility of fire delivery from the group to the single gun, it was decided to exploit in a coordinated whole the

capabilities that best clrnracter·ize the young Ame1icans: the high level of knowledge, the ope1mes of mind and the skill in using computer systems, which stems from the extremely rapid evolutionary pace that distinguishes theese tools. It ,vas therefore decided to provide the combatants, down to the IO'west possible level (tl) e individual soldier), ,vitb a constantly updated situation in real tin1e, by means or portable monitors that permit them to receive orders in graphic form and to transmit through sin:iplified schemes his own comments and intentions, contributing actively to the decision-making process. Such possibility will permit to make the most of a large pool of intelligences from the viewpoint of "organized" flexibility. As rega rds materials, the US Army is oriented towards the system of systems approach, obtained through the integration in an all-inclusive package, sustained by the Command and Contro l system, of the components necessary to perform all lhe operational functions. The main elements, as regards technological complexity and cost, will be the C4ISR (command, control, communications-and-information, secret and reserved), in such a way

"/\lpi11i" 011 mck-climhi11g trainil1f!,.

a s ro a c ti vate, down Lo the individual fighte1~ a fiO\\' of clala of lhe type and size that today charac terize the US Bri gade Commands (in E urnpe, of DIV/ Corps level ), an<l the la nd combat system , a whole of pl a tforms of hig h tactica l a nd strategic mobility. There will be one or more t~Âˇpes of land and air platforms, som e of wh ich unrnanne<l . capable of meeLing the entire range of' taclical requirements, on Lhe s u rface and unde r it, and compatible with the C-130 aircraft (a margin of weight reduction by 25% is conside,-ed op tim al , wi th the co n seq uent objective o f 14 t). Eve,-y platform should perfonn two functions (e.g. indirect fire and C4). Among the unmanned platfo ,Âˇ111s, t he RlSTA (reconnaissance, in lelligence, surveillance, target acquisition) robots and two types of umnan ned aircra ft (UAV), a lighter one (airscrew propulsion, stationing at about 150 m of altitude for some hours) at the disposal of platoons, and a more complex one (hel icopter with 40 hours maximum endurance) for combat groups. T he transfonnation/revolutio n o r the US Army, in the light of the mentioned accelerat ion produced b y the e volution of the even ts, envisages the medium-te1Âˇm availability (10- 15 years) of an instrument cap able of m a king obsolete any system in use today in the Western ,vorld. This assumption, acknowledged by most Western Armies, will entail the necessity to have nnits if not comparable (considering the foreseen complexity and costs) at least compatible with the characteristics of the objective fo1'ce. This in view of being able to cooperate actively in tl1e possible f'u ture combined operations. f n particula1~ the approach fol lowed b y most E uropean Armies is oriented towards conferring to a significant part of the available

forces intervention capabilities including, within the formations of refere nce (Brigade and/or b a ttalion/ regim e nt ), a ll the components necessary for an effective e mployme nt at the first moments of projection in ene my operational theatres, even if with dime nsions, type of means and organizational form s clearly differentiated as regards the diverse range of starting s ituation s . B eg inning from a common factor, the major Countries of th e o ld continent s hould co rn bin e (Fig .3) their operational requirements with the avai lability of personnel, financial

resources and materials. Th e results are obviously paced in time according lo the o bjective reality o[ the individual Armies, but the common line is represented by the a pproach towards rl1 e "average" forces, whose concept has b een o utlin ed in the articl e " T he average force s in asyrn rnetrica l confli c ts" ( Ri v ista Mi litare no. 6/2001).

The European average forces w il l h ave t o po ssess th e characte1istics resulting from the compromi s e between th e traditi onal ch aracteristics of the combal power (protect ion , tactical mobility and fire-power)

and the new characteristics of the expeditionary forces: strategic and operational mo.bility; high tactical mobility; sustainability; survivability in front of new threats and reduced "logistic weight".

THE PRIORITIES IN PLANNING THE NATIONAL INSTRUMENT Now it is important to continue on the way of modernization of the Service, confirm ing, above all, the validity of the "capability" effort for the deve.lopment of the forces. The plann ing model based on the capabilities rocuses on what kind of forces wou ld be required to confront a threat that an adversat"y could bring lo our vital interests rat he r· th an on "who" could do it and "wher·e" it would occur. Wi thi n this framework, the short-and medium-term plann ing objective of the Italian Army confers to the future a verage Brigades , equipp ed with armoured vehicles of the "Centauro"

EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES CONNECTED WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF MATERIALS

RADICAL IMPROVEMENI Technological approach Combat systems PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENT Finalization of RESIDUALS OF SITUATION DERIVING FROM COLD WAR

2000

2005

2010

2015

Fig. 3 family, as well as with 8x8 VBCs, soon to be in service, the possibility to produce an immediate operational impact, once they are in the theatre; this is a characteristic much more important than the mere speed of strategic deployment. For the mediurn-long term, we could envisage a combat system, having a co .n-1n1on platform,

emp loyable for the vario u s operational funct ions (Fig.4) . Thererorc the fundamental capabilities of the average Brigades should be: • high mobility (contemporaneously st rategic, operationa l and tactical) ; "B er saf!,lieri" at a checkpoi111 in Kosovo.

actions (raids and ambushes), developing an ti-terroris m operations and acquiri n g objectives of significa nt strategi.c importance; RISTA-EW • widening of the nuclea r, css RSTA biologic and chemical (NB C) Recovery DRONES R defence capabilities, alread v enti r·ely adequate as regard s quality but probab ly GENERAL insufficient, considering th e DIRECT SUPPORT increased probability that these SUPPORT Artillery weapons could be used; To Engineers • constitution of a psychologica l MANOEUVRE J - -_ ____),_,c.__ _ _~ - - - - - operations (PSYOPS) capability, COMBAT al regiment level, according to On-board combat the guidelines being established On-foot combat within NATO; • creation of a number of average forces corresponding to th e Fig. 4 assumptions of employrnen t directly conn ected w ith the • high comprehension capability • constitution of a varied pool of app lication of the jus t of the monoeuvering space; capabilities for reconnaissance, mentioned future scenarios to • higher combat self-reliance at information, surveillance, the force planning proc es s lower-complex level; targe l acquisit ion, electronic necessary to implement th e • combat superiority in operations war (RISTA-EW), in a position missions assigned to th e on compartmentalized and to help making up a Service; urbanized ground. multidimensional informative • qualitative and quantitativ e picture much more composite updating of the manoeuvre and Therefore, accor·di ng to the than what was considered in logistic support necessary for· n ew scenario, the new forces, the past. The most essential an effective employment of the which will allow us lo complete capabilities are those forces listed in the precedin g the range of capabilities already connected with the survei!Jance paragraphs. Among the latter, envisaged for the professional of the manoeuvering space and of particular importance are model, \,vill have to be developed the acquisition of the objectives the short-range and very-short with a greater rapidity than what functional to in-depth range (SHOR.AD and Vhas been clone up to now. In operations, as well as SHORAD) antiaircraft defence, particular, we shall have to consiclecing the grown the possility of carrying out inpursue the fol.lowing objectives, irnportance of the human d epth fire manoeuvres in already pointed out in the dimension, emphasi1.ed by the synchrony with the airlifted Capability Packages project , operations under way - the units (deep operations) and \Nhich \,vill be given maximum constitution of a HUMINT unit with all the very important priority in order to perrnit a for gathering and processing activities of the engineer units quick irnplementation of the information acquired through in the sectors of mobi I ily, necessary operational the direct contact with people counterrnobility and capabilities: and environment; deployment sup port. Th e • increase of the command and • further revaluation of the adherence logistic component control capabilities, necessary capacities of th e light and must assume the operationa.1 to realize the mentioned ai rliftecl forces, through the capab iliti es necessary for an process of e nlargement of the implementation of the all effective support of all of the pool of minds which weather, clay- and night- combat abovesaid components. participate actively in the capabilities in urbanized and Simultaneously it wi ll be decision-making process, to be particularly compartmentalized necessary lo develop short- and obtained thro ugh the environments; medium-terms p rog ram mes application of the new • strengthening of the component (Fig.5-6) in order to acquire the transmission and information of the pool of special-operation equipment and the weapon technologies; forces for conducting direct systems which contribute in

COMBAT SYSTEM

implementing, wi lb in short times , these capabi litie s. The emerging technologies will be employed in a lo1-1g-term perspective, through a diversified dev e lopme nt plan which, gene rally speaking and if the allotted r e so urc e s will permit it , could fo l low g u idelines conceptua.lly similar to the ones laid down by the US Army, with the correctives suited lo tJ-1 e European cl i rnension of our Service.

POSSIBLE PRIORITY SECTORS OF INTERVENTION OPERATIONAL FUNCTION

COMPONENT CAPABILITIES SHORT·, MEDIUM ·& LONG-RANGE A/T SYSTEMS 3··'GENERAT!ON

MALFUNCTION/1L VEHICLE POOL (IN R£?LACEM ENf OF VM•8 , vru., &. AR)

FUTURE•SOLDIER SYSTEM NIGHT VISION

COMBAT CAPABILl1Y OF MANOEUVRE FORCES

NON·LETMAL WEAPONS LIGHT FORCES (VOL. ov~2065)

MEDIUM FORCES vec axe, UPDATED ·ceNTAURO" & ENG,CP, RECOVERY DERIY HEAl'Y FORCES {VARUO - l.i:Of"Ai<•:i' r-::-pl - ~; :CCONA - i:CS)

AIRMOBILE FORCES (NM90 - E5C - CM-47 re ,I -1.1p~;1t cti A· l ?.~

CONCLUSIONS

SPECIFIC SECTORS

The innovations emerged from the international piclu r e as regards the security problems require an acceleration and an adjustm e nt of the renovation process, already in a phase o[ rull development in many \Nestern Armies and in the Italian Arn1y. The analysis of the scenario, of the risk factors and of t h e possible threats, offer useful hints to focalize the areas whe re it is necess a 17 to intervene. Obvoiusly the US - be it because it has always been in the vanguard of technological a nd doctrine innovat ion an d in the procedur es of force employment,

SPECIA~ FORCES

VARIOUS PROGRAMM ES

PSYOPS

VARIOUS PROGRA MMES

CIMIC

VARIOUS PROG!tA MMES

SIMULATION

VA RIOUS PROGRAMM ES

Fig. 5 or because, today, more than ever before, it is determined to boost its operational ea pa bilities over the ent ire range of possible interventions - it is a poin t of refere nce in thi s process of renewal and strengthening and <vv ill be able to pr-ov id12 usefu l suggestions for the Armed Forces of the Allied Countries. 1f it is not possible to converge to,vards a complete system integration, we shall have to pursue at least a sufficient degree of compatibility

POSSIBLE PRIORITY SECTORS OF INTERVENTION OPERATIONAL FUNCTION COMBAT CAPABILITY OF

MANOEUVRE FORCES SUPPORTS COMMAN D

AND CONTROL

COMPONENT CAPABILITIES F IRE SUPPORT - DIRECT! S UPPORT ARTILLERY (PzH•2000 - ULH C2) FIRE SUPPORT - DEEP ATTA CK A RTILLERY ( MLRS - AT ACMS - POLYPHEM) ENGINEERS FOR GEN ERAL S UPPORT ( MIME CLEARING - ENG COM l'LEXES - Sl'ECIAL VEHICLES) ENGINEE RS FOR G ENERAL S U PPORT (BRIDGES - EARTH MOVING EQUIP) Regt - BRIGATE Div. & HRF(L) HQ INF RASTRUCTURAL COM MUN ICATIONS & COM PUTERIZATION UNITS' COMPUTE RIZATION

INTELLIGENCE

RlSTA· EW ( RADAR - SENS0RS-CRE50 -VBL R5TA- DRONES & MINl· RPV)

AIR

S H ORAD & V-5 H ORAD (STINGER - SIDAM rcpl - S KYGUARD repl)

DEFENCE

within lhe All iance . For w hat co n cerns Italy, a provisional surve y of th e funct ions and operational capabilities of the professional model s hows that what has been planned is in line with the ne w scenarios , at least as r e gards the envisaged components. In particula1~ for some sectors, such as Command and Control, light (paratroopers and "Alpini") and ave rage (Ce ntaurn tanks) forces, combat helicopters and clearing o[ explos ive devices and mines (B OE ), we are in a forefront position , even if, in any case, it will be necessary to strengthen and boost these components. The next step is to complete the instrument as soon as possible, starting from the abovementioned pdorities, improving the existing lines of action, in order to optimize and make even more effective the Italian land forces, in accordance with what is done in the other NATO and E U Countries.

AREA DEFENCE (SAMP • T)

,~colonel,

Fig. 6

!lead, Plans Office, Army General Staff 51

by Salvatore Farina~Âˇ:

- -

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When a soldier is called to intervene, he operates directly among the people and acts in environments often characterized by insecurity. He is the one who consolidates success and provides protection to those who need it. In order to better perform this duty and meet the new challenges, the Army is now equipping itself with sophisticated and technologically advanced tools, including satellite systems. This is done in order to perform the institutional duties as best as possible and, last but not least, to reduce risks.

ith in military operations, the land forces have proved,,Lheir role as a really decisive instrument in solving conflicts, and, predictably, in Lhe future this trend is not going to change. Ther-erore we must keep on strengthening and improving the capabilities of thi s fundamental military component, in order to maintain a balanced instrument, apl to carry out its tasks in the international field. Undoubtedly in the last years the themes of defence and securi ty have been attracting an increasing attention, not only in the expert circles, but also - and mainly - among operato,Âˇs and citizens of every category. The reasons for this grow in g sensitivity are to be ascribed firstly to the grea t anxieties generated by the proxin1ity of the Balkan conflicts of the '90s and, secondly, to the Country's awareness or the risks due to acts of terror or to the use of Âˇweapons of mass destruction by hostile persons or groups, poss ib ly corning from faraway bases.

The consequent, progressive need to settle crises and solve conflicts calls for a growing ernployment of the military, who are requested to bring peace, sometimes imposing it by force, or simply promoting it thn:>ugh their- 1xesence by speeding up the solution of disputes and the return to nocmal. In view of this, the Italian Armed Forces have beco1ne very popular for their professionalism and humanity. ln particular~ the Army has given a remarkable contribution to peace in terms of number and quality of personnel, and by employing its forces in all peace-s u pport missions under NATO, EU, OSCE and UN aegis, with an average emp loyment in the various Theatres of about 7000 men, Âˇw ith peaks of over 10,000, over the last ten years. Considering the ex1)er- ience gained, we can say that the land forces proved to be determinant and cn.1cia l in every circumstance: combat operations, peace enforc ing, uises control, peace support, peacekeeping, humanitarian mission and cooperation for internal security. The ana lys is or the lessons learned from every intervention provides a clear ind icalion a bout the employment of the various components of the military .i nstrurnent which can also be projected into the future. This is a possibility that pe rmits to adjust th e foreseen improve n,eots Lo our operational capabilities, so that the Army may be in a position to carry out its freq u en t missions as best as possible, vvith a view Lo defence and security. THE RECENT LESSONS

In order to fu lly understand the decisive role of the land forces, one has just to procee d to a careful rev.iew of the parameters characterizing th e recent operaLions in which the Army 25

participaled, beginning from lhe period follO\ving the Cold War. In 1991, du ring Op eration "Desert Storm", some observers he ld the view that a certain number or rirÂˇe actions carried out with "smart" sys lems and ammun itio n, launched from air and naval platforrns, would have been s ufficient to neutralize the Iraqi defensive deployment. On t he contrary, facts proved tha t only the action of the land troops cou ld disrupt and outflank the enemy defences and liberate the occupied t.erri tory of Ku\.vait, thus showing the full capability of carrying on their in -depth action. Tbe same situation reoccurred in Kosovo, when it \Vas im mediately evi dent that the lan d lVIajor Units deployed in FYROM (Forn1er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) .h ad achieved, in jusl a fc-w days, a deterrence much more effecti ve than that of the air campaign, paving the way for the successive entry of the allie d troops into Kosovo . It \Vas p rec ise ly the land contingent commanded by Gen. Jackson that, wit h Operation "Joint Guardian'', actually put an end to the fighting between the warring parties, resolving the situation or ethnic cleansing which .h ad been going on fo ,- months in t.hal tormented region. Al so the operations in Afghanistan confirm the decisive role played by the laud components of the Northern Alliance and of the US-led coalition in the collapse of the TaLiban regime. Lastly, an immediate analysis of Operation " l raqi Freedom" shows, even more clearly, that the Anglo-Am erican Arn1y succeeded in neutralizing the enemy only thanks to th e land b at.t ies, incl ud ing those in inhabit ed centres . E qua lly imporlant is the experience gain ed in CROs and PSOs, where con rlicts and risks arc at medium/low level. Suffice it to ment ion operations

"A lb atross" in Mozambique ( 1993 -1994), "Joint Endeavour" in Bosn ia (December 19 95), "Alba" in Albania (April-Augus t 1997 ) and "Interfet" in Eas t Tirnor (l 999) . Jn every mission, t he widespread p res ence of th e land instrument was decisive for ensur in g the security frame necessary for straightening out. the existing conflic L s ituations . Certainly it cannot be denied that in many cases the land forces took advantage of "long range" actions carried out by naval and air instruments, for embargo and interdiction operations. In some ways, the results \vere important, but a lmost always limited. Tndced, in most. cases, the critical conditions persisted, often to the d etr iment oC the socia l and econom ic levels of th e area concerned and, therefore, with prolonged hardships for th e civilian population. l n substance, the land option in the emp loyment of the mi.l.itary

Unloading <1 con tainer o( 1he !SA F Italian contingent fimn a commercial ai17Jlane.

Facing page. An Italian patrol on swveillanc:e duty

in Kabul.

instrument turned to b e a set pattern, adaptable to the various levels of confl ict and 1.0 the changing characteristics of the national environment of the theatres. Suffice it to consider the highly successful employment of the manoeuvre land-forces in very different operational settings, from the deserts of the Persian Gulf (1991) to the mountains of Kosovo and Afghanistan and the villages of the Bosnian vallevs. A further lesso1~ vvas learned as regards terrain. In a situation of inferioritv - at leas t from the technological viewpoint - the

enemy tend to prefer those asymmetric con f ,Âˇo n ta Lions Âˇwhich progressively push the operations towards compartmented and urban areas, where intelligence and remote -intervention tcch nologi.es are less effective. Precisely in these contexts, the army un i Ls with a marked capability of open,ting in particu l,H environments and situations - such as special forces, mountain troops, air mobile formations and armourÂˇed units - are therefore most apprec iated and requested . The experience on the field has moreover demanded other particular units apt to counter the asym n-1etric threats (NBC attacks and mines), cond uct ing, at the same t ime, an accurate tactical intelligence activity, for the interception, surveiUance and acquisit ion or particularly mobile and shifty targets. Equally important for assessing

how much the land forces arc necessary, is tl1e factor connected with collateral effects, especially at a time when the partic ipation of publ ic opinion in war events has a strong influence on many political and mi litary decisions. It is true, in fact, that the ncvv technologies pcrrnit to strike with a certain effectiveness very distant targets, but unfortunately they do not permit to eliminate the collateral damages, to the detriment or people and structures. The indiv id ua.l fighter's capability of discerning, selecting and evaluating the cornplex real ity on the field, or his ability to give a more accurate intelli gence picture are still there. The new technologies permit effective actions, but the soldier remains the mainstay of the military. Only a combination of tactical skill, excellent recru it ment and techno logical training can give 27

an effective answer to the new threats. If we consider the humanitarian missions and those in support of the internal security of sensitive areas, we cannot but realize that the higher the level o[ distress or need was, the more suited the land units were. Evident examples of this are the humanitarian operations li ke "Airone" in the summer of 1991, in Northern Iraq, "Allied Arbour" in Albania in 1999, as \vell as operations in support of home security, such as "Vespri Siciliani", "Partenope" and the very recent "Domino". The result of these missions \.vas a restored confidence and security among the population, brought about by a military presence expressed in an effective way and without arTogance. This picture clearly shows that the recent and manifold, national and international, operational activities carTied out during the last decade , con-

firmed the fact that there is no substitute for the land com ponent in modern conflicts and in crisis situations and have also emphasized its decisive cha racter. The infantryman's presence on the ground is as n1.uch necessary in medium-high intensity

conflicts as it is in peacekeeping and peace-support situations and in humanitarian and internalsecurity emergencies. It is actually the direct interaction with the enerny, the opposing parties and the civi lian popu lations that permits to achieve the mastery and contro l of the situation and therefore accomplish the miss ion, also and mostly in difficult operational scenarios.

THE FUTURE SCENARIOS AND THE LAND FORCES Having taken note of the indications issued from the recent interventions, we should now have a look al the foreseeable future scenarios and the consequent role of t.be land forces. The security context will be characterized , aL least in the near future, by several parameters which shou Id not be overlooked.

First parameter

Taking for granted that the integration among SerÂˇvices is novv necessary, it is increasingly difficult to i n-rngine nonm ultinational interventions . This implies a series of measures, the most important of which are:

revision process of the NATO force structure; creation of a EU defence p ill a rÂˇ with the relevanl military capabilities; constitution of mu ltinational formations, on bi- and multi-lateral bases, and, finally, the frequent recourse to multinational units w ithin "Coal itions of the Willing" for

An Italian Leam Afghan capiLal.

011

patrol in the

Facing p age. A helicopter o{ the Italian co11.tingent in Bosnia.

carrying o u t various types of operations. All this requires the establishment of mult inational organizational structures, particularly at Headquarters and staff level, as \ve ll as the availabilitv of combat forces Âˇwith a land c;rnponent capable of shouldering considerable burdens.

Second parameter The time a vailable fo rÂˇ inte rv e ntions in areas \.vhich could be very far from the national te rritory is very short, therefore \.Ve need forces that arc ready, mobile, projectable and sustainable. The measures taken by NATO and EU in the last four years concentrate on the availability of high -readiness and rapid-reaction forces. The develop ment of the NATO Response Force (NRF), approved at the Prague Summit last Novernber~ goes precisely in that direction . It is natural that whenever a discuss ion concerns

rapid d e ployment and intro duction of forces into any operat ional Theatre , the land component . assumes a pree minent ro le in preventive deployments and serves as a deterrent in coercive actions. Third parameter One should also consider the marked heterog e n e ity of the threat and the presence of areas w ith differe nt levels of conflict. Although, in the short-medium terrn , the chances that an interna ti onal "actor" could th ,Âˇeaten vi tal national and allied interests (such as territorial

Italian. soldie rs on pat ro l in the Afghan. desert. Facing page. A paratroope r of th e Jtalia.n contingent during the mission in Eas1 Timar.

integrity) using trad i tional methods are very low, the !\ .1ture will probably be c harncterized by more te rrori sm, more ins tabili ty, more conflicts, more proliferation, mo re internal crises . The potential enemies will try again to move their offence, or the Theatre of the action, to almost inaccess ibl e and com partmen ted environrnents, or to urban a r eas (also in o ur Country) , where the selective capability of the smart weapons is less effect ive and there is a greater possibility or offsetting the technological gap. In view of this, it will be necessary to come in contac t \,vi th t he p oten tia l enemy, showing a through knowledge and contro l of the leff itory. It is mo 1Âˇc and more probable that, Âˇwithin U1 e same operntion , t.h e re ,viii b e the simultan eous presence of highconflict situations included in amplerÂˇ but lowe r-conflic t realities a nd the pros p ec t of hav i ng to deal also ,vith humanitarian emergencies. Thus, the cautious , s e lected and reasonable use of force wi ll be even more va luable, because of the existence of areas of confl icts of d ifferent levels and the presence or civilian popula tions. Only the land units can ensure thi s hig h le vel of a cc u rnc y, flexibili ty, sens it iveness an d proportionalit y in the us e o f force . Fourth parameter

Fina lly, we s hould poinL out the g rowing r ol e of public opinion a nd the amplify ing effec L of the mass n-1edia. They 30

are, and are going to be also in the future , a delerminant fac tor, not only for secu 1Âˇing the supporl of the national comm un i ties, but als-o ror influencing the operational decisions during the actions. fn this sense there will be a strong spur towards the selections and dosage of military interventions, limiting the use of force to the bare minimum. Everyth i ng must be clone while avoiding losses within one's o\vn forces, collateral damages and civilian casualties, and reducing to the minimum the duration of the operations by having recourse to precise and decisive actions. In short, in the future it will be difficult to imagine lengthy air campa igns with repeated bombings of civilian structures, or mass-operations of air~ naval and land forces over large areas and for long periods of lirne. Better lo conduct rap id actions

with mob il e crack troops, su ited to the particu lar environment and supported by an .~1dh erent and accurate intelligence fra.rnework. ln b rie f, the picture jus t ou LI i ned confirms that, also in the future, the land forces will p.lay a cenlra l role in l.b e securily context, in confl icts of every l eve l and in any operational environment . At the same time, the various armies are required to have integrable multinational Headquarters and composite , interoperable and proj ectab le forces, equipped \vith advanced weapon systems, \Vith very good protection and f irepower, centred on the professional ski II of the individual soldier, \V ho is the rea l protagonis l of today 's operations. Therefore, in this context, the strengthening and futu re qualification of the Army is more important than ever.

DEVELOPMENT LINES OF THE ARMY'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Now, if we look at the future developments of the Army, we notice, first of all, that the reorga ni za tion of our Service, started in 1997 , in its main elements, is already in line ,viU1 the parame ters of the future strategic context. The evolu tion of the land instrument w ill certainly lake into account lhe guiding principles of the higher political and military Authorities whicl1 envisage a greater availab ility of eff icient operational uniL s, guided by joi nt command slni ctures and sustained by a schoo l, training and l ogistic organization with no redundancies. The rationalization/opti mization of the general support components is indeed the starting point for the recovery of

the resources necessary for staying within the "professionalArrny limits" (112,000 men and women) and for strengthening the operat ional component, \vhich is the real strategic objective of the renewal. Now, let us try to exam ine the evo lution of the Army's operational ca pabiliLies, on the basis of the three above mentioned directions: multi national integration, develop ment of the general capabilities, further enhancerne nL of the soldier's role. Multinational integration The road taken by the Army in its multinational integration has already achieved very i111po1--tant goals. The Rapid Reaction Corps HQ, which only two yea r·s ago was a mere intention or a paper project, is now a sple ndid Italianled multinational operational reality under NATO's operational command, and is also available to the EU. Also the Multinational Land Force (MLF), an JLalian Slovenian-Hungarian Major Unit, hinged on the "Julia" Brigade HQ, has achieved its full operational capability. In the near future, after a complete revision of the NATO forces' structure and the implernentat.ion of the European defence pillar, the Army \vill start to confer to the projectab le Division HQs ·au the capabilities needed for rnpid deployment and Command/Control in opera.Lions. The proceclur·es will be gradual and similar to those adopted for the constitution of Solbiate Olona's Rapid Reaction HQ. One Division HQ will he completed in 2004: the other will follow in the successive years. In this growth course, the Solbiate Olona HQ will be the guiding beacon as well as a training and amalgamation school for the application of NATO's procedures. This will start a virtuous circle witb repe r·cussions on every ma 32

noeuvre and support Brigade HQ and with indubitable advantages for the entire Service and for the Defence in general. Completion of the necessary operational capabilities Besides the mentioned Command -a nd-Control capabi li ties, the Army of the future will need a composite bu lk of forces, in line with the level reached by the ma.in European Countries, in order to face diverse con rli cL situations in the various operational environments. Considering the ins titutional tasks, the NATO, European and multinational engagements and the si1.e of our Army, it was necessary to envisage: sLrengthen ing the special -operation forces (a component much more in-1 portant today than in the past, since it is in a position to solve the difficult situations prevailing in a complex operational environment); completing and modernizing th e manoeuvre Brigades, making all of them projectable and sustainable (they are divided into light, medium and heavy Brigades, plus an airmobile one, in order to ensure flexibility in the various operational scenarios, and modulate the formations according lo the specific environment and level of conflict) ; shaping of Brigades and Groups (artillery, engineers, AA systems and Air Cavalry) in support to the manoeuvre forces in aU operational s ituations, from the highest-intensity ones to those in support of peace; setting up a Brigade-level bo dy o f forces, group ing together all the RISTAEW units capable of acquiring, in rea.l time, a complete informative picture; completing the equipment of a logistic Major Unit for projection and c lose support of the forces; developing and strengthening the specialistic sectors, including those charged with the secur·ity of contingen ts

Italian ser vicemen conl rolling an impurla.nl crossroads in Kabul.

and populat ion. This group includes the NBC defence uni ts, which are, al r-eacly i10\.v, a showpiece of our Army and of our Defence as a whole, and for which a reinforcement is envisaged. Another special sector, internationally on the forefront and with remarkable capabilities, which is also go in g to be strengthened, is the clearing of

--~--,._;P,.._.,"'i~

explosive devices (removal and neutralization). Finally, in order to beLLer meet tbe parameLers introduced by the presence of civil ians in the operation arÂˇeas, the civilian-military cooperation (ClMlC) is going Lo be expanded, together with the so-called Operational Communications. The former wi ll give Italy a leading role in the Southern Region of NATO, while the later will ensure Lhc support of the local populations to the naLional units in operntions, increasing

-., .. -

.â€˘

the level of prol ec tion o( the contingenLs. To sum up, our S erv ice, accepting the NATO challenges created by tlie so-called Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) an d the more recent New DCI, is now plann ing to strengthen Lhe capabilities of command/control, comrnunications, information, prnjectability, sustainability and prolection of ils contingents in operations. Thus \Ve can say that for all the manoeuvre forces we shall have

to envisage a di fferenL deve lopment or capabilities, following two complementary and converging lines. Jn the sho rt - medium term (2004 -2012) we shall have to complete and update the existing capabilities at Brigade level, and concentrate mainly in Comrnand/Control, vVarning/Surveillance and Nav igation/En gagement systems, in order to make them interoperable with those of the main European Countries. 33

fn Lhe long term (2012-2025), the Army w ill have to envisage the development of future combat capabi li Lies based on new concepts, technologies and systems apt to become completely integrated. Practically, the innovation of the long- term transformaLion will not concern the so-called "platforms" (Lanks, armoured cai·s, aircraft) but a compl ex system, including several assets, c losely .integrated through the Network Centr·ic Warfare" . The concept is therefore to focus on the knowledge of the situation on Lhe ground , in order to keep the initiative and neulralize the enemy, avoiding collateral darnages. This survey shows thal Lhe Army has, and will have, an extremely operational configu ration and a support component with no redundancies. However, the period needed y the Army to become fully professional requires some further temporary changes. Ln Lhis respect, in fact, in order to quickly overcome the moment of the end of conscription - and also expand the recruitment of volunteers - we ·wish and hope that the "Defence Bill", (the socalled Professio nal 3) is approved as soon as possible. The new law, once passed, will guarantee a working future to the personnel serving in the Armed Forces for at least one year. In practice, in order to become a regular volunteer or to join the Police forces , one ,,viii have to serve voluntarily for one year in the Army, Navy or Air Force. Strengthening the human component Precisely the human component, the third direction of the Army's development, is the hinge of the i nslrument's transformaLion. There is no doubt that man, the individual fighter, is the highest expression of operativeness and an irre34

placeable factor in any envisaged capability. The increased heterogeneity of the missions, the high profess ional level required by the complex weapon systerns, together with the lethality and multidimensionality of the manoeuvring space will increasingly affect the preparation of the personnel. The fighte1~ even when included in minor-level formations, will have to be ready to move among the various types of missions and to quickly assimilate the relevant changes. The r·eal key to success is the soJdier on the ground, the man who w alks Lhrough the mindie lcls, who must neutrnlize the enemy and oper-aLes side-byside vvith the population . He is the actual bearer or securily. To

him, our soldier, we must give the best the Country can offer for Lb e performance of his miss ion and the establishment of the values of security and peace. Therefore his prepara tion must be very extensive, because the performances r·equested of him will be wide-ranging. The fighting man will have to acquire, thanks to an appropriate and oriented trnining, the mental flexibility needed to know, at any moment, what to do and how to do i L. In substance, the objective is to give our soldie r- an all around operntiveness. Equipment is a very important aspect in the enhancement of the soJdier's capability. ln this connection, Lhe Administration has planned to acquire the "Future-soldier system" - which

Facing page. A sharpshooter an.d his observer in Bosnia. Right. . A sapper clearing a mined area. AfghanisLan.

will go into service in 2006 - and to adopt the provisional equipment for th e foot -soldi er (waiting for the "Future-soldier system " ) in order lo equip, starting from the current year, complete force -p ackages at Regiment and Brigade level. On the other hand, the lessons learned in this sector indicate that the individual fighter is not going to be rnore effective simply because he is better trained or better equi pped : he wi ll be so only - and mainly - through the enhancemen t of his human dimension, from the cognitive, professional, behavioural, ethical and moral viewpoint. Therefore, a great altcntion will continue lo he paid lo the strengthening of t he reference values, such as loyalty, sense of duty, sharing, cull of traditions, esprit de corps, solida rity, promoting also the improvement of the quality of life and the initiatives in s u pport of the servicemen's families. In short, the Army of the h.itme will maintain and emphasize the human values, the role and the equipment of the fighter. CONCLUSIONS

The lessons learned lead u s towards the b es t solutions, enabl in g the Army to provide operational responses in line with its insti tutio nal tasks and the changing limes. The analysis of the recent military operations, including those in which o ur Service participates in a multinational context, shows that the land forces arc the only component of t he military instr u ment capable of tran -

sforming a tempo rary s u peciority into a .lasting success. The land forces have p roved fun damental because t hey can simultaneously express coercion, co ntrol and a continuous presence on the territory, among the people . Th erefore they are essential in every phase: combat, pacification, and moral and ma ter ial reconstr uctio n. Âˇ Evidently a ll these activities a ,Âˇe necessary for achi eving the objectives of th e mili tary operations of defence, security and peace-s upport. The trend wi 11 also b e confirmed in the foreseeable future scenarios and, in view of this, the strengthening of the I.tal ian military instrument becomes even more important. Thus, it is not only necessary to

have on hand adequate financia l resources and skilled personnel, but also to manage and employ what is already available in th e sectors which give belter returns in terms of effec t iveness an d security. The Army has shown, on the field and in every operational situation, its full capabi lity of carrying out all its rnissions. It is nmN ready to professionali ze all its units, to modernize its \,v ea pon systems a nd to strengthen its soldiers in order to continue being a protagonist of security, boLh at home and in the future international scenarios.

D *Colonel,

Chief; Plans Office, Army General Staff

Professionalism and technology are necessary in order to maintain the land instrument at the highest operational levels and to cooperate as best as possible in joint and international environments Accurate planning studies have permitted to prefigure the evolution of the Italian Army also in a long-term perspective, i.e. up to 2025. This was made possible by defining three key-elements: completion of the capabilities through Force Packages geared to the mission, gradual and balanced modernization of the forces, programme burden of the objectives as equal as possible for all Services. 62

,,.

--. _. v,,

i lliin the ini ti al iv.es taken by the Army Genera l Staff in the area of lnvestment Planning, the Army's development and programming ac ti vities have been recent ly investigated. These objectives have been expre!:ised only in terms of comp le te capabilities to be acquired, thus integraLing and turn in g to account the old method based only 011 the definition o f single programmes. The results of the study have been collected in the "ForceiCapability Packages and Operatio-

nal/Programmatic Objectives of the I talian Army", a document providing the basic elements of the Service's contribution lo the investment -planning process concerning th e highest level of the Defence organi,.ation.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING

Medium and long-term planning are essential components of any organization having to deal with very long acquisition Limes and wi t h bu dget limit ations .

AILhough these characteristics have always been typical of the Defence sector and therefore the requirernent is not a novelty, only recently the .radical politico strategic changes have imposed a new ap p roach , much more effeclive and aLLentive to t.he process of integrated planning. Moreover, undoub ted ly a rnoclern an d credible rnilitary ins trument must possess com plete capabi lities in every segmen l, expressible in t he prefigured operational context and employable in join t and mu lti national environments. 63

Kosovo. Transporl of' riflemen by helicopter.

ln a number of instances, even very "blazoned" armies have had to give up employing cenain assets or units , owing lo shortages ensuing from delays in the acquisition of modules for ensuring protection, effectiveness or any other runction of vital importance for the operat ions. The introduclion of the emerging techno logies and their su d den evolution further emphasizes t.be need to acquire a "packagesystem" capable of guaranteeing the desired effects, wit.b synchronous times of introduction for all components of the systern. Therefore the planning or investments for the rnodernization of t.h e Armed Forces should not be limited to the acquisition of assets or weapon systems in the basic sense of the term. H we rerer to the Army

Seg.m ent, the introduction of a line of mechani1.ed or armoured vehicles, the relevant plann ing \.viii have to cons ider not only all poss.ible versions (basic veh icle, antitank, mortar carrier~ etc.) but also the internal and external fittings, such as Command-and Contro l, RISTA and all that is necessary to ach ieve the desired outcome (at p latoon, con1pany, Regiment and Brigade level) .

THE PRESENT SITUATION With reference to the standards of the weapon systems now in service, the Army is capable of expressing good levels of effectiveness and efficiency for PSO/CRO operat ions (peace support and crisis managen1ent). On the contrary, the effectiveness in high-i ntensity combat contexts ('where high degrees of pro tection , engagement, command and control mob ility are neces-

sary) are barely s u fficient and limited to a small nurn ber of units. What is more, the expressible operational level in most cases refers to weapon systems Lhat ace to be considered a "legacy}!, i.e. not equipped with modern C4I and navigation systems. For this reason, o ur land instrument is not in point of (act in line with the mai n European CountrÂˇies'. The critical elements which weighed on the process of acquisition of assets and systems for the Army are t,.vofold . One is the "dragging forward" of program mes which, for different technical/financial reasons, were not completed in due time. As a matter of fact, they lost their initia l operational value , since they were either technologically and fu nctionally o b solete or replaceable w.ith more effective and cheaper new systems. The second factor is the clisharmonic balance between programmes, in

REQUIREMENTS The requiremenls lhe Anny is called upon to meel are practically included within three main areas: • defence of the State, which is by far the most important commjtment, for which the Senice obviously envisages the employment of e very availa ble force, a ppropriate ly developed and organized to this end; • defence of the E uro-Atlantic s paces, which includes: •• NATO e ngagem e nts, within the level e nvisaged by the Alliance; this is, in fact, the heaviest load of requirements; •• contribution to the crealion of a common European de fence, fixed within the Headline Helsinki Catalogue. It musl be noted that the contribution made available for the EU d epends on the assets made available for NATO, in order to avoid redundancies (double sets of forces which, on the other hand, could not be afforded); • contribution to the realization of international peace and security, consisting in the participation, within the management of international crises, in out-of-the-borde r c1isis-prevention and crisis-management operations, with lhe aim of ensuring p eace, security and stability; • contributions for specific tasks in cases of extraordinary necessity or urgency. In this context, the offer of forces to NATO is the guiding beacon in the seJection of the requirements to be met, as well as a reference for the organizational development of the capabilities of the land instrument.

Lerms or allocations a nd returns : also beca use of the rap id change in the reference scenarios, we have seen Lhe introduction or systems who se c h aracte r·i st ics were devised for the e mblerna t.i c situalion of bipol ar confrontation. On the other hand, Lhe1·c was an evi d e nt l ac k of pro grammes a imed a l developing Lhe capabilities Lyp ical of the projection forces (openuional mobilit~,, man oeu vre, in te gra Lecl C4 J, s upport LO depl oy ment and ad he1·cn ce l og i stics). In thi s picture one should also situaLe a numbe r oF r es trai nts deriving fro m the long-term co mmitrne nLs in progress an d the inclusion or new programmes, financ i ally s ignific ant b u t no t of fundamental value for i mplemen li n g the most important capabilities. As a rinal synthesis of the present situat ion, espec ially refe rred to material s a nd \.veapon systems, the image of' the servi ce appears li ke a mosaic lacking some tesserae which do not pe rmi t Lo obtain the final r·esult e nvisaged by the p roject. If one wants Lo go lo the extremes and make a com p a 1·iso n w ith the N a vy, it would be like - in a p rogramrne of acq ui s ition of an a ircraft carrier and owing to technical-

f in ancia l im p li ca tion s - deli b era t e ly for go ing som ~ ve r y important capabilities, such as approach systems, air-control racla1·s, missile-defence or commu n icaLion systems, consi dering on ly hu ll , propulsion svsterns and ai 1·c raft, and then wailing, in vain, f'or the acqu is it ion of the oth e r modu les necessary for a full operational capability. \l\lhat has been outlined so far substan Lially imp lies the absol ute need to concentrate on complete packages based o n fixed priorities. Possible reshaping processes due Lo changes in the financial siLuat io n slioulcl nol be made by amend ing the single progra mmes but by g i ving up the ent i re specific capability.

FORCE PACKAGES AND PRIORITIES Th e c ompl e Li o n and modernization of the Force Pac kages depend on the requirements to he m er. They can b asically b e ascrib ed to the defence or the S late, the . ATO com rnitments, the cooperation for establishing a common European defence and, fina ll y, to the s upport o l' peace and internat ional secur itv (see box).

Taking the offer o r forces Lo NATO a s a guid e for the orga nizational developmenL of the lancl-instrnment capabilities, we c an ou tline Lhree F orce Packages. The first package is the NATO Hi gh R eadiness Force (L) HQ (HRF) i.e. a land high-readiness, rap id -reac tion fo rce at Co rps l evel , supported by a Force Package hinged on a Division I IQ and 4 Manoeuvre Brigad es, in addition LO the norm al, s pec ia list, laclical and logistic supports a l. the various levels . This package incl udes also the Spec ial Force~ and those for Spec ia l Operat ions, p lu s a number or unit s a l. reinforced-Brigade level, for the establ ishmenL of an "In iLial En try' Capability" and in a position to prov id e also Lhe n a tional contribution Lo the "NATO Response Force" (:-.JRF) with a very short reaction Li me . The seco nd P ac kage a lso belongs to the H R F catego i-y and consists of a Division HQ, rour Brigades, plus th e s pec iali st. tac tical a nd logistic s uppor ts o f the Briti sh -l e d ACE R apid Reaction Corps. The thi rd F Mce .Package includes a Division I IQ, several rnano e uvre Brigades a nd some Combat Support (C S ) and

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RE-EQUIPMENT WITH A NEW SYSTEM OF COMBAT «FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM»

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Combat Service Support (CSS) units, in a pool or lov-1-readiness forces (i.e. with a reaction time longer than 180 days). Obviously, because or the repeated fi11ancial adjustments and owing to the restraints deriving from programmes already contracted or under way, it will be impossible to promptly remodel the whole planning in order to give a complete capability lo every Package. Tb erefore, taking into account the international operational comrn itments, it was necessary to space out the capabilities still to be completed or upgraded, giving the highest priority to th e first Package,

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followed by the second and the third. THE OPERATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC OBJECTIVES

The recent provisions issued by the "Internal Control Service" (SECIN) for defining the degree of achievement of the objectives set by the Ministry of Defence, point out a logical and sequential route for attaining strategic and operational goals and impl e mental programmes. The strategic objectives are established by the Defence Chief of Staff according to the political

2014.

priorities decided by the Minister on the basis of the geostrategic reference scenario. Th e Service's operational targets configure, at programmatic and instrumental level, the capabilities necessary for the land component, and must be consistent with the strategic objectives. The implemental programmes arc instead composing and concreting cornponen ts of the operational objectives, and provide elements about '\vhat" must acquired and the relevant Lim es, phases and procedures. ln terms of programmes, this system permits to harmonize the process of objective-achievernent

with the r es ource s mad e availabl e, through care ful and periodic reviews and updates of the congruen ce of t h e raLi o between r equiremenLs Â· and possibilities. A prog ram rnatic p aper ha s been drafLecl on tbe basis of the SE CIN direc tives . Th e docum ent, ti tled "Operational and P rogrammatic Objec tives or the Army" (OBOE ), a sse mbles in a single texl the main present and future operat ion al requireme nts of the Service, dividing them in Lo a who le of ma c roobjectives (sec Table), comparabl e Lo th e co ncept of "Bri gade system or systems", which can be likened to as many "Ship sysLems" . As we said, eac h Programmatic-Operational objective, in its turn, con s is ts o[ a w hol e of assets that can be acqui red t hrou g h impl e mental programmes a nd mus L b e introduced in service synchronica lly, arLer m o d e rnizat ion or recapita lization. Failing this, th e objective might not b e achieved al the appointed time. The inLrocluction of OBO ES noL only does not change, but indeed strengthens the conceptu al route direct ed towards the ful l implem e ntatio n of comp rehensive capabiliLi es; nevertheless it should not be regarded as a list of pri orities. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE NEW APPROACH

T he OBOES are a clear and unambiguous gu ide for se lecting the rnain sysLems necessa ry for the achievement of the future des.ired ca pabilities . T he a doption o[ this m e thod h as al so pos i ti ve impli ca tion s for t h e ent ire Defence organi zation. firs L of all, for the tec hnical operational area, an d ror the Army in parlicular, it guarantees the graviLation of resources on certain macro-o bjectives (com parable lo o ne or more Brigade

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT -- FUTURE-SOLDIER SYSTEM COMPLETION, MODERNIZATION AND RENEWAL OF PROJECTABLEHEAD DARTERS COMPLETION, MODERNIZATION AND RENEWAL OF SPECIAL FORCES & SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES COMPLETION AND MODERNIZATIO~ OF 3 "LIGHT" BRIGADES COMPLETION AND MODERNIZATION OF 3 "MEDIUM" BRIGADES COMPLETION AND MODERNIZATION OF 3 "HEAVY" BRIGADES CONSTITUTION OF RISTA-EW BRIGADE COMPLETION, MODERNIZATION AND RENEWAL OF "FRIULI" AIRMOBILE BRIGADE & AIR-CAVALRY GROUP IN SUPPORT OF Affi MOBILITY COMPLETION OF CAPABILITIES OF PROJECTION LOGISTIC-BRIGADE COMPLETION OF CAPABILITIES OF ENG BRIGADE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF OPS-COMMUNICATIONS REGT & CJMICUNIT COMPLETION AND ADAPTATION OF CAPABILITIES OF A/A ARTY BRIGADES, ARTY BRIGADE JN GENERAL SUPPORT & NBC DEFENCE COMPLETION AND ADAPTATION OF C4IEW COMMAND CAPABILITIES ADAPTATION AND MODERNlZATION OF THE ARMY INFRASTRUCTURE ADA PTA TI ON AND MODERNIZATION OF COMPUTERJZATION OF THE SERVICE BODIES, UNITS & HQS ... OTHER OBJECTIVES OF THE FUNCTIONAL SECTOR system s) sp ace d ou t in tim e, beginn ing with those or the First Force-Package. In this way, the haph azard inc re ment.a l effect on all Ar my u nits, whi c h usuall y requ ires long periods o f time, would be annu lle d and on e cou ld procee d to the complete modernization, in the shortmedium-term, of every sector concern ing the abovesaid objective: from col lective weapons lo indi v idual equ ipm ent, from corn bat vehicl es to co1T1p uterized systems, from a larm systems to protect io n asse ts , etc . T h is \Vould not imp ly \Vea kening or free z ing tb e ot her pac ka ge s , si n ce thev already ha ve

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4 5 6

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opera tional ca pabil'iti es su ited to th eir employment i n medium an d lovv - int e ns iLy confl icts. Actua lly, fo r som e of thes e capa biliti es, variou s progra m mes of partia l m odern izati on and reca pi ta lizati on have a lready been starred, according to previous p lans. As re gard s OBO ES no l imrn c cliately c ons id ered h y the inves tmen L p lans, it wil l be necessary to appropriate some of the budgetary resources in order to mai ntai n Lhe in s trurn e n t's functionality at hi g h leve l. E qually important is the fact tha I. , shou Id the finan c ial situ a tion c hange dur in g the 67

u nderlaking, lhe modernizatio n of that specific "Brigade system" should be given u p enlirely. Finally, it would be convenient for lbe ÂˇTechnical-Admin istrative a rea to consider - as is already the case (or naval procurernents, which are handled excl usively by the General Direclorate for l\aval Armaments - t he necessity to entrus t a General Directo rate ( for example, t he G en era l Di rectorate (o,- Land Armarnents) \Vith the full responsibility for achiev ing the capa b ility objectives, an d therefore the ag g rega t ion of tl1e var io u s pro grammes, o n the bas is o f the priorities fixed by Lhe operational a rea . CONCLUSION S

In t h e lig ht of the above descri ption, we c an s ingle o ut

t hre e m ain e lements tha t characterize the prop osed method: completi o n of the capabilities wilh Force Packages suitable for th e missi ons ; h om ogeneous and ba lan ced u pgrad in g of th e forc es ; equa l p rogramm at ic weight o f t he Army objectives vis-a-vis those of the other Services. Only by referring to these three guidelines it w ill be possi ble, also in a long-term perspec tive (2025), Lo ac h ieve Pac kages o f one or m ore Brigades, modern and cornplete, in a pos ition to be full y in tegrated in a joint envir on rne n t an d wit h t he mos t ad vanced a llied Armies , in k eeping wit h th e e m ergin g model of the so-called "Future Com bat Systerns". l n anot her arti cle \Ve sha ll poss ibly deal w ith the evol ution o f th e Service in the mediu m long-ler m, bu t at present we can

Paratroopers in Easl Timor.

say Lhal the aggrega t io n of complex capabilities into Brigade Pac kages and i.n Di vis ion an d Corp s Pa ckages, is the most s ui ta b le way for reac h ing t he final goal of a renovation aimed at c. ,-eat i ng hom ogene ous an d co m p lete comb at forces, optim ised fo r hi gh - inten sity conflicts and fit for employment in any type of operation . This approac h also helps an d suppo r ts the a cti vit ie s o f the Defence General S taff, in tha t, by comparÂˇing the resources Âˇw it h the desir ed capabilities, it facili tales th e S t a ff's eva lu at ions and decisions .

D -., Colonel, Chief, Plans Office, Army General StafT