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, OVEMBER ECEMBER 1987

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ANTONIO VIESTI Tasks, Doctrine and Structures of the Army

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RAFFAELLO TETI The Aeronautical Industry Its Role in the new Scenario of · International Cooperation

GHINO ANDREANI Oper~tion "Brassard" the French landing at Elba in June 1944

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CONTENTS European Military Press Agency

Number six 1987 November-December

The aim of Rivista Militare is to broaden ano update tl1e technica l and vocational training ot Army Officers and NCOs. To this end ii funccions as a veh·cIe for the d,ssern inaton of mirtary lh:nk ing and as a forum oi st Jdy and oebate. Rivi sta Mit tare is also inteno ed to be a means o f informing the g eneral p ublic about the Army ano military matters through the oublication ot artic es of current technica l and sc·entiiic intere st.

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Pubblicita A cura della segreteria dell'Ufficio Rivista Militare Tel. 6794200.

Politics, Economics and Strategy 2

Tasks, Doctrine and Structures of the Army

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(Antonio Viesti)

12 The German Army: Interview with Lieutenant General Hans-Henning Von Sandrart 22 The Aeronautical Industry. Its Role in the New Scenario of International Cooperation (Raffaello Teti)

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Science, Technology and Training

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32 The Permanent Crossing of the Straits of Messina. Coefficient "D"

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History

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58 Operation "Brassard" (Ghino Andreani)

Militaria 67 Towards the Unity of Italy. The Soldier in the Nineteenth Century Italian Painting

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(Pier Marco De Santi)

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75 Technical Data

77 Book Reviews

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Rules for contributors. Anyone c an contribute. In t11e interest of the maximum objec tivity of information, Rivista Militare allows contributors consid erab le freed om. althoug h it does not necessarily subscribe to their opinions. The articles are published unedi ted and tree of any editori al constraints and a re therefore the sole responsib ility ot the Author and reflec t his personal d eas exclusively The topic must be treated in an original way a nd the articles themselves shoul(J not exceeo 10 typewritten pages in length. The Aut11or. goi his reward. makes over his exclus ve article ri ght to Rivista Militare. Rivista Militare c an make over Author's exclusive article right to other publications and to the periodicals of EMPA (European Military Press A gency). The articles should be accomp agned by the nec essary photog raphs. d rawings and explanato ry tables. Each Author is reques ted to send a photog raph of himself. together with his ''curriculum vitae" and a 10-line summary of the article to be published. Rivista Militare reserves the nght to alter the artic le's titl e and to choose the type face in which it is set.

TASKS, DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURES OF THE ARMY

The armies o f the '80s are organ isms more vital t han ever and undergoing a c o nt inuous evol ut ion. The Italian Army, in order to guarantee.. the ful fil lment of its in sti t utional tasKs , cannot back out of t he obligations deriving f ro m suc h vi tal ity but m ust meet them , adj usting to the rapid develop ment of the surrounding reality. Its dynamics is in fact connected with multiple aspects, such as the geostrategic picture, the rap idly grow ing scientific and technological prog ress, and t he national soc i al reality. The latter, in particular, must be considered in the recent processes which have caused changes in the order of val ues in the in divid ual and collective sensiti veness. The limited interest in the military in st itutions is, moreover, an aspect of the Italian societ y t hat must be take n into account , considering that it shows a fundamental tendency to stabili ty, wit h the exception of very particular occ asions. The military instrument is a livi ng part of th i s society, from wich it recei ves its ferments of growth, its human element and its fin ancial resou rces, as well as bonds and c o nstraints. The Army must offer the country a clear image of itself, both in its present reali ty and in it s future d imensions, so that its needs be understood, and to avo id being regarded as a foreign body instead of an essential component proportioned to t he role legitimately p layed by Italy in the in ternational arena. The Army, like all o ther organizations, receives d i fferent spurs, wh ich it m ust mediate in a framework of continuous confrontation , al most a fig ht, between w hat is necessary and what is available. Its c o mponents are involved in a process of changes w hic h, in o rder to be correct ly managed, requires that its " centre of gravity" be anchored to a realis ti c med iu m and long term planning, in order to avo id dangerous rushes forward or unexcusab le delays.

In short, it i s a matter of ac hieving, each time, a situation of dynamic balance. But the needs -for c hange cannot be the on ly parameter of evaluation in the pursuit of an effic ient and reliable mi litary instrument. Together w ith them , o ne must also consider the necessity of a relative stabil ity of the structures, in order to avoid repeated and too rap id changes, which can lead to d rops in performance, which are tantamou nt t o drops in operativeness, unacceptable to t he inst itution . The pursuit of balances, therefore, m ust go in two directions: the f irst, of a m anagerial nature, to o btain solutions consist ent with the resources availabl e; the second , of an operational nature, to ensure a fu ndamen tally stable instrument, in which the changes may occur w ithout causing crises. To attain this goal, the structures must constantly be upd ated in order to prevent t heir obsolescence and t he ensuing nec ess ity of a total renewal.

THE TASKS OF THE ARMY The Army's tasks derive from the laws that regulate t he operations and life of the Armed Forces as in stit utions of the State. These normative referen ces have at t heir su m m it the Constitution of the Repub li c itself which, albeit without indicating them expl icitly, entrusts to the Armed Forces strictly defensive tasks. This indication can be desumed by reading art icles 11 and 52, both of the m wel l-known. In the fi rst, t he Constitution " repudiates wa r as an instrument of offence" and as " a means for solv ing internationa l disputes". The second article points out to t he c it izens the sacred duty of "defendi ng the Fatherl and" and establi shes t he principle t hat mil itary service is mandatory. Th is duy is concretely and f ully formu lated in Law no. 382

of 11 July 1978, "Norms of principle o n military discip li ne". Art ic le 1 of the law, in c on f irming the c onstituti onal norm, points o ut two other needs, to the meet ing of wh ich the Armed Forces are called to c oncur: t he "safeguard of the free institutions " and "the w elfare of t he national community in case of public disasters". Article 1 of the Law on p rinciples is therefore t he normative source o f immed iate re ference for t he complete understandi ng of the Army's t asks. The log ic consequence of the defensive choice was Italy's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty w i;)ich, while allowing the development of forms of political, economic, social and cultural cooperation, constitutes, first of all a military alliance of a defensive character, w ith the foremost aim of preventi ng aggressions again st member countries and to repeal them, were they to o ccur. Within the Alliance, Italy represents a h inge between the Central European deployment and the Southern one, pl aying a most important role, both as regards the land defensive li nes and the control of t he Med iterranean . Especially in relation to the land forces, the respons ibility of t he defence of the Northeastern theatre is entrusted to an Italian general, who is in the chai n of command of t he Alliance. Within this normative framework, deriving from national and international norms, the governmf!nt Authorities, in the "Whi te Paper 1985", have further defin ed the tasks of t he Armed Forces, expressing them in fi ve missions: - defence to the north-east; - defence to the south and of the marittime li nes of commun icat ion; - air defence; - operational defence o f the territory; - actions of peace, security and c iv il defence. 3

" Skyguard Aspide" A/A light missile system, for the defence against targets at low and very-low altitude.

Of these missions, the fi rst, third, fourth and fifth are of specific importance for the Army. In particular, the first is the most onerous one, because it is "immersed" in the context of the Alliance and takes as its own the concept of advanced defence, accepted by al I member countries. The third mission refers to the antiaircraft defence of point objectives located on the territory (the requirements of antiaircraft defence of the units in the Northeastern theatre are included in the first mission). The fou rth mission concerns the defence of the

part of national territory not considered in the first. This mission has been receiving particular attention for some years. In fact the factors of instab il ity in the Mediterranean have brought the spotlight on the problems of defence in the southernmost part of the territory. But it shou ld be remembered that these factors, although related to a threat with a high ratio of probability, entail a practically neg ligible risk as far as the territory is concerned. It is appropriate to stress here that, on the technical-mi litary plane, the increased instability in the Mediterranean does not modify

the existing balances in the deployment of the forces. On the contrary, it emphasizes the requirements of strategic mobility of the units assigned to the defence of the territory. Finally the fifth mission refers, as I have said, to the necessities of peace, security and ass istance in case of pub li c calamities. Events llke those in Lebanon and the earthquakes of the last decade are present in the memory of all of us, therefore I believe it would be superfluous to linger on this subject. These are the missions that concern our Army, for which the White Paper points out also the relevant operational mode l; i.e. the requirements in terms of structures and weapon systems. To these req uirements one must add the appropriate "backg round" capable of supplying adequate support, in the widest sense of the word: refer to t raining of personne l, best poss ible employment of resources, doctrinal research, study and testing of new structures, development and experimentation of new materials, acquisition of up-todate weapon systems, etc., bes ides, of course, the actual logist ic support. Therefore, the defin ition of the tasks leads to the identification of the requirements, at least in their main lines But, for the reasons I have said before, the requirements must be compatible with what the country can realistically allocate to defence, wh ich is on ly one of the functions entrusted to the State. The defin ition of the instrument is the result of this comparison between requirements and avai labi lity, on which I want to insist once more with particular force. It is the synthesis of a dialectic process which precisely embodies the national will; a will

that on the one hand assigns the tasks and on the other allocates human and financial resources. To say that the Army is the expression e,f the country is not , therefore, a commonpJace devoid of contents but an objective reality, which becomes even more evident if one considers the human element, not only for its professional values but also as vehicle of the demands, contradictions, yearnings and cultural values that permeate the Italian society. In planning the mi litary instrument these considerations must be taken into account, in order to avoid conceiving an unfeas ib le model. A model which could be superb as a laboratory exercise, but utopian and ch imeric in its realization. The Army General Staff, the body at the summit of the Service, is ful ly aware of the socio-economic situation of the country and is especially engaged in the effort of defining an optimum dimension for th is instrument, outlining valid and realistic structures. The other direction in which it moves is the research of cost-effective methodologies, capable of ensuring a maximum possible benefit from the financial resources available. The finished "product " that the Army General Staff wants to obtain is a credible defensive instrument, adequate to Italy's role within the Atlantic All iance. THE EVOLUTIONARY TREND

Having defined the tasks and outl ined the socio-economic environrmmt in wll icll ll1e Ar111ed Forces live, we can point out the Army's evolutionary trend in the interconnected fields of doctrine and armaments . The ancient dilemma of the relationship between military thought and technology has not been resolved yet, and it is difficult to say whether it is the former that leads the latter of the other way around . In my opin ion, one should "link" scientific evo lution to a

coherent conceptual development accord ing to the relation means/goal. I believe that the technological development must be control led and directed in order to obtain, with the resources at our disposal, the maximum poss ible defensive capability, within the relation cost/effectiveness or cost/ performance mentioned above. The evolution of the military thought has concerned also the doctrinal references known as principles of warfare. This does not mean that they have changed. The principles as such are immutable, but they adjust to the everchanging reality. In their essence they have remained the same, what has changed is their space/t ime dimension and, consequently, their forms of applicat ion . It is sufficient to look back at the second world conflict to observe how, since then, spaces have expanded enormously both horizontally and vertically, together with a drastic shrinking of the times of action and reaction . Th is necessarily modifies the ways in which the immutable princip les of warfare - manoeuvre, concentration of forces, mass, unity of command, surprise - are expressed and realized. Let's consider surprise, for instance. Electronic technologies have practically reduced to zero the time in wh ich information is received. The use of interconnected differentiated sensors permits a real-time control of the entire surface su rveyed. This changes the class ic concept of surprise completely, up to the point of engendering doubts about the possibility of its app lication. The statement that there is no surprise left but the technological one, does not appear exaggerate. Neverthe less this does not change the reality of the battle, which will be won by the Commander who, by any means - psychological, technical or operational surprises the adversary with the "invention" of new ways to operate without being discovered in advance. But also

the other princip les have taken new forms . The employment of highly selective weapons, with sophist icated gu iding systems, gives a new sense to the concepts of manoeuvre and concentration. The forces, in fact, assume some and more dispersed deployments, significantly increasing the necessities of manoeuvre and producing new problems of command, most of them related to the possib ility of exercising it. The transformation of the traditional concept of command into the more modern synthetic expression C3 1 (command, control, communications, information) has not been accidental. Mo reover, information has probably acquired the role of a new principle. Command has ceased to exist in the trad itional sense. Its modern conception requ ires the backing of sophisticated systems capable of managing a large flow of complex information . The shrinking of the times available for reaction demands delegations of command unthinkable just a few years ago. It may happen that the response to certain types of threat are selected at techn ical level by the officer responsible for that spec ific task, who decides and employs the systems deemed more suitable, often based on data supplied by a computer. The commander just mon itors the operation and , in case, puts his veto. These new situat ions entail deep changes, not only in the exercise of command but also in its philosophy. Within this picture of symbiosis, of perfect integration between military thought and technology, the Army performs a gu iding and leading function in many technological sectors. I shall just mention, among the most important: - systematics in general ; - optoelectron ics; - high-performance motors; ultra light alloys; 5

"Scout" 4-w/Jee/ drive light armoured car.

automation of tiring procedures; - advanced propellants; - technology of high-density penetrators for kinetic ammunition; robotics; - fiber optics; - techniques of electromagnetic survival. I have mentioned only some of the most significant technological sectors, but I don't want to forget the socalled "expert systems" and the automation of the Command Posts, which show to what degree research has been spurred on by the Army. I shall not dwell upon this matter any longer because the subject of the integration military thought/technology, i.e. Industry/Army, would lead us too far. 6

Going back to the evolutionary trends of the Army, we must say that these move in two directions: - one, of thought, to adapt the doctrine to the new reality of the battlefield; - the other, organizational, to adjust the structures, strictly correlated with the weapon systems, to the new requi remen ts of ernploy111enl. As far as the doctrinal evolution is concerned, it must be premised that the conceptual assumptions stated by the present circulars of the series 900 are still valid. They develop in conformity with the strategy of the Alliance, which binds the nuclear weapon to criteria that envision its employment as: - limited, as concerns number and power of the weapons ; - selective, i.e. subject to the

adoption of particular criteria in selecting the targets ; - bilateral, meaning that the recourse to nuclear weapons by one of the belligerents will inevitably determine a similar reaction from the adversary. Also our doctrine, adopting these principles, is based on the assumption that the destructive power of t he existing nuclear weapons and the ample possibilities of reta liation, strengthen the conviction that a conflit developed with an un limited employment of armaments will lead to a total depletion of energies and to the destruction of the entire resources of both sides. From this point of view, the possible success of the aggressor is of no significance: no end can in fact justify the risk of jeopardizing the survival of a State as organized community. On the strictly military plane, a conflict of this kind escapes every doctrinal logic ; therefore all our doctrine although not ruling out the possibility of employment of nuclear weapons in the course of a conflict - is practically and almost exclusively aimed at the description of a conventional war. Recently, within NATO, we have seen the emergence of new conceptions such as FOFA (Follow-on Forces Attack), which envisage the intervention, mostly with fire, on the second enemy echelon, before its introduction in combat. This is still a controversial subject and presupposes the availability of extremely sophisticated and expensive means for observation and f ire. Therefo re, in the national sphere it can only be accepted, for the t ime being , as a matter of principle. Nevertheless the near-athand introduct ion of lo ngerrange weapon systems, such as multiple rocket launchers, brings us closer to the implementation, at least partial, of the concept.

The criterium of FOFA will be met only when the Army owns advanced conventional missile systems, with a range of more than 100 ~m. The future acquisition of these systems seems indispensable for the efficiency of the Service. These systems, together with the advanced ones for the management of C3 1, such as CATRIN and SIACCON, will enable us to make decisive steps in this field, giving concreteness to the concept of "conve ntional deterrence", which would derive from the availability of weapon systems capable of preventing the resupplying of the enemy's effort, stopping them long before they enter in contact with the units deployed in defence. In addition to the new concept of "conventional deterrence" - the discussion on which, within the Alliance, has been going on for some years - at home we have been exploiting new possibilities of employment for light, and mostly armoured, infantry. At present and for the immediate future, its employment is foreseen mainly within the 4th and 5th missions. With an improved strategic mobility, they will in fact provide the best answer to the problems posed by the permanent Mediterranean instability. For the distant future new lines of thought are being focused, starting from the following considerations: - the problems in the northeastern area, caused by changes in the natural environment, such as urbanization, increase of manmade structures, the presence of cultivated fields with high obstacle value, lim iting the employment of substantial tank formations; - the need for units which , for their high capability to concentrate and disperse within very lim ited times, are in a position to survive in a battlefield characterized by more and more lethal weapon systems;

- the need for units capable of rapid interventions on wide spaces, also in the rear zone. These needs lead to consider new aggregations of forces in which tank un its, mechanized units and light armoured units could operate together. Besides the traditional tasks of area counterinterdiction, control of the rear zones, combat in inhab ited or wooded areas, etc., the light un its coult.l be charged with the task of res ist ing and destroying penetrations of lim ited size. Seen in this light, the battlefield's architecture would be deeply modified, for in the Resistance Position there cou Id be, side by side, light and heavy formations, in a coherent system of roles, differentiated according to the natural environment and the threat. The light infantry could be employed according to areal criteria, in small groups, fol lowing reticular patterns. They should fil l the "voids" existing between the spaces "filled" by the mechanized formations at the occurrence of specific threats. In short we face an evolution which will engage the General Staff for the next decade, in which the light armoured units will have a more and more significant role.

STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY

Operational Component

The operational component continues to be hinged on 27 Brigades, plus the Missile Brigade; 24 brigades exist already in peacetime and 3 are to be completed in case of emergency. Their characteristics meet the following requirements: • Mechanized brigades, for the conduct of a reactive defence against a prevailingly armoured enemy. These units, therefore, are not very different from the present ones, but notably stronger in the sector of

antitank and antiaircraft weapons; • Armoured brigades, particularly mobile and powerful, capable of carrying out dynamic and resolutive actions; they are equipped with high-technology means, on the same leve l of the equivalent equipment of all modern armies; • Alpine Brigades which, owing to their specific training and "mentality" - besides the weapons with which they are armed - are particularly suitable for operations in the mountain sector of the eastern border. With a stronger antiaircraft self-defence component and better special vehicles for mobility, also on snow, they represen t a completely satisfactory solution; • Light Armoured Brigades, can intervene in the rear ares and on the whole national territory, against airborne units and forces landed from the sea or penetrated in depth. These brigades, obtained through the transformation of those now assigned to the 4th mission, will be equipped with armoured wheeled vehicles for troop transport or armed with guns of considerable power. Special units

A new Rapid Intervention Force (FIR) has been established for employment in distant zones, in peripheral areas or on the islands, whenever the movement on land does not appear expedient. It is centred on the "Fo lgo re" Paratroop Brigade, the "Friul i" Brigade and the Navy's "San Marco" Battalion. It employes aircraft from the Army ("CH-47" helicopters) and the Air Force (transport airplanes of the 46th Air Brigade); the Navy supplies the "San Giorgio" and "San Marco" ships, soon to be replaced. For civi I defence, a sector in which the Army - with a great sense of responsibil ity was the first to act, FOPI (Forza di Pronto lntervento) has been constituted: an operating reality in the service of the 7

" Otomatic" A/A self-propelled 76mm gun.

live nor operate without what called the supporting "background", constituted by the territorial component. Also this component has been subjected to a careful scrutiny which has brought to light the obsolete aspects that need an in - depth renovation, in order to adapt it to the requirements of a modern army. One of leading ideas of the study has been that of improving the

country, which could well be considered very effective, within the 5th interservice mission, if its equipment were further improved. Moreover, we should reorganize: • the command and control structures of the Army Corps, having ample recourse to the emerging technologies (CATRIN and SIACCON systems); • the Army Corps tactical supports, envisaging the acquisition of a saturation-fire component, based on "M LRS" and "Firos"); • an antitank fire component integrated with self-defence and helicopter ("A 129") fire; 8

• a low- and very low-altitude antiaircraft fire component ("Skyguard-Aspide" Systems and 40mm guns); • the artillery units of the Brigades having a marked

services for personnel. With in this framework, the entire structure of the medical support has been reconsidered . In particular, 4 Military General Hospitals have been set up and given the capabi lity to operate over a wide range of pathologies, opening them also to the civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence and their dependents, while the remaining Military Hospitals are only qualified to intervene in the range of the diseases most common among conscripts. Furthermore the conscription-recru itment area has been completely restructured by introducing new technolog ies, by a wide employment of informatics and by reducing its size. Specifically, it has been possible to concentrate the main activities in the Regional Recruiting Centres, leaving to the Provi ncial Centres information and certification functions. In this context, particular attention has also been given to the psychophysical examination of the conscripts, in order to better the qualitative level of the

aulonorny of e111ployr11ent,

µer::;onnel. Therefore, witt1in the

equipping them with a saturation-fire ("Firos") component and with adequate antiaircraft self-defence capability ("Stinger Mist ral" systems and 25mm selfpropelled guns);

rec ru iting boards and the recruit training battalions the diagnostic equipment is being improved, together with the teams of physic ians, which must always include a psychologist. The conscriptionrecruitment area, with its new configuration, will ensure a more accurate service to the entire population, improving also the services of public uti lity, information and certification.

Territorial Logistic Component As I mentioned before, the operational forces could neither

In the maintenance sector, the cornerstone of the logistics immediately connected with the operational units, the Army is starting a reorganiz-ation based on the principle of integration of activiti~s and supported by up-to-date management techniques. The final goal is to establish multiple-service centres conveniently located on the territory. The supplying activity will be more punctual, obtaining at the same time a maximum economy in terms of personnel and stocks. The repair activity will be considered also in its organization, taking into account that one of the characteristics of the layout of modern weapon systems is always their modularity. This ensures simplicity to the logistics of contact in the Combat Zone, limiting it to controls and easy replacement of modules, conveying the actual repai r activity to the territorial logistic support bodies. This activity, carried out by military repair shops of the 3rd and 4th level, is complemented by the industries, wh ich are required to provide their help. Therefore, in the future, as a rule, the actual "repairs" will be carried out on ly at territorial level, while the operational units wil l take care of the replacements of whole modules. Training Component Finally I wish to mention the training component, which has also undergone important innovations. At present it relies on 28 schools which are entrusted with the instruct ion of Cadres, volunteers and specialized conscripts. Apart from the possib le revisions that may occur in some structures, especially in terms of functional unification of similar schools, it is important to underline the new methods that wi ll be introduced soon. I refer to a wide employment of audiovisual devices, simulators, adequately incentivated self-teaching

techniques, the introduction of computers - with teaching and verification functions - and the acquisition of war games with varying degrees of difficulty. Also with in the training component there is an intense activity of study and research which is going to place the Army in the forefront of the teaching and training sectors. Personnel I believe that in my synthet ic "flashes" on the subjects described above it is possible to perceive the dimension of the Army in today's reality and in the very near future. Our Army is an extreme ly complex system in which structures, tasks, procedures, human and financial resources must complement each other in keeping a balance, which I have defined "dynamic" to emphasize the need for a continuous adjustment to the various challenges that a modern Service must face. This entai ls the assessment and the consequent planning of the human resources, together with the evaluation and planning of the technicalfinancial elements. The non-availability of adequate resources, both human and - even more - financial, certainly harms the process of renovation but penalizes even more the technological development of the country, diminishing its industrial competit iveness in the international contest. An organ ization engaged in such a deep process of renewal - particu larly from the cu ltural standpoint - obviously entrusts all possibilities of success to its personnel, which is certainly the most precious among the resources employed. In fact, all would be of no avail - the most advanced doctrines, the reorganization of structures according to models of better effic iency, the introduction of sophisticated weapon systems if the personnel were unable to utilize in the best possible

way all that is placed at their disposal. Therefore I wish to state here that all the innovative elements listed above are nothing but subsidiaries of man, whose centrality within the Service is felt more than ever. We receive from the families these young people who in a few months' time must learn the techniques of combat, at individual level and w ithin the tactical formations to which they belong. In this environment they train as operators of complex systems (tank drivers, gunners, operators of telecommunication systems, etc.) or as commanders of minor units. On the average, in the 12 months of military service, the conscripts acquire an operational level which can be def ined as sufficient. The young are open to learning, receptive and, this may seem odd, they have also a good disposition towards the real ity of military life, which in most cases they see as a necessary moment in the life of a citizen, which must be lived w ith attention and commitment so as to dispel the prejudicial aversion felt before the en lis.tment. But in on ly 12 months it is impossible to reach the desired levels of training, also owing to the wellknown limitations which further reduce the available time. I refer especially to the lack of training areas and shooting ranges. Hence the necessity, mentioned before, to reconsider the training methods, to obviate such limitations as much as possible. In add ition to these measures, aimed at raising the training leve l of the conscripts, it was necessary to ask the legislators to increase the number of volunteers. As a matter of fact, it would have been impossible to plan the introduction of so many new weapons and modern systems, as wel l as the massive employment of automated procedures, without a substantial component of volunteers, ensuring, at enl isted-man level, the necessary professional skills 9

M 109 L self-propelled gun.

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and a m1n1mum of continuity. Parliament has acknowledged this necessity and has responded by constituting a category of extended-service volunteers (VFP). They will certainly solve some of the Army's problems even if they won't be a panacea. The Army is nevertheless getting ready to receive the first contingent and to handle this new phenomenon which, if it attains the desidered dimension, will probably have a socially determinant impact. But the backbone of the Army are the Cadres: the noncommissioned Officers, who take the brunt of the technological modernization and play a leading role, both in the field of employment of the new systems and in that of logistic support. They are operators but also, at the same time, specialized technicians, managers and instructors. Within the organizational dynamics of the Army, they are confirmed in their role as

technicians with, moreover, wider and deeper professional valences in comparison with the past. Finally the Officers, who have the immediate responsibi li ty of manag ing this process of renovation which, as regards depth, dimensions and modes, I believe has no equals in our country. The Officers are requested to make a considerable effort, for most of them are engaged in an activity outside well tested schemes , according to patterns of behaviour directed toward "results", without references or in formation derived form experience. Today the Officers must assume the role of managers who, availing themselves of the professional capability of the technicians, control the evolutionary dynamics, managing it in the most appropriate way, according to the objectives set at the various levels. Nobody can evade this eminently managerial function. The dualism discussed some

years ago about the figures of "commander" and "manager" appear to be out of date. Every Commander, being called to operate in a climate of changes, must have an outlook c learly tend ing towards the future and cannot lim it himself to managing the present. In order to succeed in this new role, an officer must fi nd a strong motivation, which will spur him to assume a propounding attitude vis-a-vis the new reality. The organization must be in a position to back him in this research, by stimulating also his sentiments of identification with the Army, through the acknowledgement of its improved efficiency, of a greater credibility and, above all, a regai ned consensus. I have ins isted on the aspects regarding personnel within the organizational framework of the Army because, convinced as I am of its preeminent role, I did not want to give the impression, here, of an Army in eager pursu it of technology, oblivious of its human dimension. The Army is conscious that - tomorrow like yesterday - man, with his professionalism, capability to act, firmness of purposes and willingness to fu lfill them, will always be the decisive element.

THE IMAGE OF THE ARMY

In the section regard ing the structure of the Army I have pointed out the impo rtance of consensus c:1s r11otivc:1tiny raclor for the Cadres. Consensus and motivation are in a close relationship of reciprocity, so much so that their interactions develop positive or negative spiral processes. An organization that obtains consensus will more easily satisfy the needs of identification of the individual with the organization itself, since he sees it as projection of himself, with the same

projects and goals. The consensus enjoyed by the organization has a positive spin-off on the men, in terms of prestige and acknowledgement. This, according to the theories expounded by Maslow, satisfies the individual's needs of belonging and being esteemed, and leads to the pursuit of "self-realization " , which is placed by Maslow at the summit of the hierarchical scale of motivations. If this sentiment is born, a man takes part to the best of his abilities in the organizational choices, makes them his own, identifies himself with them and has towards them a propounding attitude, the only capable of ensuring success to an organization that considers man its centre. Pursuit of consensus is, therefore, the necessary condition to obtain that the programmes of development of the Army be carried out, on the qualitative plane, in the regained efficiency of the structures, without lett ing ourselves be confined within the merely quantitative dimension of an increase and an improvement of armaments. The best method to obtain consensus is that of managing one's own image in a suitable way. Up to now, the Army has been absent from this arena, where whoever has relations with the public is called to compete. The results of this absence are known to all and sundry. The image of the Army, lacking the glamorous f igu re of the jet pilot or the romantic one of the "sea-wolf", is not perceived for what it really is. One notices mostly its drab khaki uniform , without noticing the values hidden in it. The image of the Army is entrusted to often scarcely informed reports, or to boys who hel p perpetuate obsolete stereotypes. I want to emphasize that these are the same young men who within the organization have a positive attitude but, once they are out, for psychological mechanisms

hard to understand , do not always express a fair judgement of the world in which they have lived for a year, perbaps afraid of going "against the stream ". It is t ime to reverse this image, which, besides being formed, as I have said, by inexistent stereotypes, consists also of commonplaces far removed from reality, and of representations of extreme conditions as normality. The Army is working in this direction, with the purpose of making the collectivity aware of its efforts towards renovation, its progress, its difficulties and successes. It tries to open a sincere and productive dialogue with society, in order to lay the right stress on the positive daily contribution that it offers to our nation in the most different fields. It is impossible to reverse the present situation in a short time. The action taken in this direction will therefore have a medium- and long-term development, tending to propose a new image and to secure and preserve it. We shall have to keep in mind in every manifestation that th is image will be accepted only if the citizens are able to verify its accuracy. We shall have to seize every occasion to prove our efficiency, convinced that this is the best way of advertising a modern Army. "Operation image" is therefore based on the substance of the big and small manifestations, first of all the ones in which the Army comes into contact with the public during the performance of its institutional duties. The trends outlined, devoid of rethoric and strictly pragmatic, will have to make the Italian society realize the renewed function of the Army, which is destined to assume a growing weight in the preservation of balances in the current international reality, prefiguring a denuclearized Europe. This regained function reproposes a twofo ld image for the future Army:

â€˘ the f irst and fundamental one, as a "Producer of Security" which absorbs labour forces; â€˘ the second, as training institute that gives skilled manpower to the nation. But this is not all. The Army, its Cadres, must res ist exploitations which are by nature always one-sided. The Army is also history, the history of the count ry, in its past and in the approach to a better future. A fu ture towards which the Army is looking in order to renovate its operational role, striving to give prominence to the conventional forces and thus be a fundamental tool in the defence of Italy and Europe, in a strategic environment which is also evolving. The Army is the custodian of eternal principles of conduct and is proud to safeguard them for the good of our Country. Antonio Viesti

Lieu te nan t General Antonio Viesti has attended the Military Academy , the Application School, the General Staff and Advanced General Staff Courses, and the Joint General Staffs Institute. He has been Commander of the 10th Battalion, 132nd Tank Reg im ent , Deputy Commander, "Man in" Armoured Brigade, and Commander, "Granatieri di Sardegna" Mechanized Brigade. Lt. Gen. Viesti has served as General Staff Officer at the Headquarters, "Cremona" Infantry Division, the Defence General Staff and the Headquarters 5th Corps. He has held the fol lowing positions at the Army General Staff: Staff Officer at the General Staff Secretariat of the Deputy Chief of Staff; Chief, 1st Section, Planning and Budget Branch; Chief, General Staff Secretariat of the Deputy Chief of Staff; Chief of the Procurement Plans Branch, Deputy Chief of the 4th Division, and Deputy Inspector tor Logistics. Lt. Gen. Viesti has been Chief of the 4th Division of the Army General Staff and Inspector for Logi stics; at present he holds the o ffi ce of Deputy Chief of Staff of th e Army.

The Geneva talks on nuclear armaments in Europe should change considerably the European scenario; would an eventual success of these talks have an influence on the German Army structure and size? believe there is no doubt that to keep the balance between nuclear and conventional armament is an old problem for NATO, and that t11e co11venlional capability has always been one of its weakest points. Against the bac kground of the near d eve lopm ents in the nuclear armament area, t his problem becomes even more pressing, which means t hat the linkage between nuclear and conventional capabilities, in my eyes, rema ins one of the deterrent pillars, but the c onventional pillar gains in importance. And this is not a particular German problem, th is is a problem of the Alli ance and espec ially of its European part as a who le. Then we are definitely not go ing to increase the strength of our conventional Armed Forces, neither in peacetime nor in the wartime post ure. But we are trying, in the limits of t he f inancial framework, to make more out of our money and to use all of our modern technology, and this is a problem which has to be faced by all NATO nati ons. On th is background , you have to see the German-French efforts to improve t he military links, as with all other allies, and we will put all our ef forts to maintain our forward defence capabil ity. How are you going to solve the emerging problem of the decrease in manpower? Is there any plan for the enlistment of women in the German Army? The dec rease in manpower is our major structural problem for the nineties. The ai m is to keep the peacetime Army level as high as possi ble. For that reason our govern ment has taken the decision to increase t he time of military service from

reserve co mponent too and makes the regu lars an important sectoG because we do need them as cadres, we do need them for h ig h technology equ ipment, we do need them as t rai ning personnel for reservists, and therefore th ere will several legal measures to maintain the necessary level of regu lar soldiers. About the women problem, this is at the moment more a political than a mi litary issue; it is boun d t o a nu mber of legal quest ion s because ou r constitution does not allow the service of women in combat and with arms. So our planni ng does not incl ude women in the Army, and we wait for what the polit ici ans wi ll decide in the framework of the legal situat ion w ithi n our constit uti on . A Kraka TOW of a paratroop battalion; the German paratroop units will modify their philosophy of employm ent as soon as the new antitank helicopter enters service.

15 to 18 months, which was no t an easy decision but w ill help us very much to reach our target. There are other legal decisions, like th at of reducing the number of exemptions. But definitely t he num ber of conscripts w ill go down, no matter what, and for that reason we try to make more use of our reservist potent ial: that means that our already relativel y high reli ance on reservists (abo ut two thirds o f our wart ime strength are mobilization un its) will increase. In consequence, we have to find the way, espec ially for th e f ront line units, which, without brin ging the reaction capab ility o f our forces into danger, would allow us to fill into those field un it s mobilizati on components wh ich can be called up very qu ickly, with a high trainin g level. We will increase the days of reservi sts train ing per year, that roug hly means t hat in the nineties we w ill have between 300.000 and 350.000 reservists per year, going t roug h t rai ning exerci ses for about two weeks. This is really a challe nge for the active part of the Army and for t he

Can you highlight the importance of the Territorial Army in wartime, its tasks and the major changes which will take place in its units? "l The German Territorial Army has many tasks and represents th e national part o f ou r defence, not only in second line and support units; it also has to provide freedom of operation and rear area security not on ly for our Corps but also for all NATO forces in Germany. At th e mom ent in the p resent struct ure only 10% of t he wart ime strength of the Territorial Army are act ive so ld iers. In the future structure we will try to increase t he present am ount, desp ite ou r man power shortages, at least in t hose parts of the Territorial Army wh ich will have an early commitmen t and must be able to react qu ickly for traffic control an d secu rity of t he rear area against all k inds of enemy special operations. We try to strengt hen their cadres; for exam ple in the so called Home Defence Reg iments, wh ich consist of t h ree light in fantry battalions and no real cadres at all, we want to increase t heir number and reach a 20 % active strength in peacet ime, by co mbining the Territorial Training Organization wi th un it

German Territorial Army soldiers of a medical unit assist a wounded man during evacuation. Reserve units are also tasked for the defence of rear areas. The Gepard antiaircraft system has been one of the m.ajor German programs of the last decade.

cadres, to give them better training, better "esprit de corps" and better reaction capabilities. The new antitank helicopter

PAH-2 and the MLRS artillery system will become operative in the medium-term. How will they be inserted in the German Army structure and will they change the tactics of your Army, which is one of the most armoured in Europe? In my opinion, both weapon systems and their periphery, although different in character, belong to the area of combat support which will become more and more important; especially in mobile fi repower, which can be switched quickly from one place to another and has not only the capability to hit the enemy in front of the fighting soldiers but to reach the depth of the enemy to cope with its reserves marching to the battlefield. Therefore the helicopter which hopefully will come, and the decision has j ust been taken on the political side, will allow us to fight in a modern environment against tank concentrations by day and night, and the night is most important. From my point of view it comes late; that is why we still try in the meant ime to improve the combat capabilities of the I ight antitank helicopter, and especially its night capabilities. The new aircraft will be deployed at Division or Brigade level; it is part of our structural decisions at the moment. We hope that we will be able to equip th is modern antitank helicopter with modern fire-and-forget missile capability and with self-defence capabilities. Th is new system wi ll be integrated in a new Division or Brigade size unit at

Corps level, together with our airborne troops and with our transport helicopters; these three elements wil l form together a kind of antitank capable operational reserve at Corps level. But, due to the lack of resources, we must find the way to use these three elements both together and separately. Our intention is to issue the light helicopters, improved if possible, to the Divisions, after the new ones will have entered service. In this way, the Divisions will get their own independent antitank capabi I ities. The MLRS is something different, it is an artillery system , hopefully with a potential growth. It is a long

range project which started with the fielding of the launcher and goes over the years with the development and im provement of the ammunitions which shall give, the commander mainly at Division level, the poss ibility to hit especially the enemy art illery. Therefore we must see it as a system, together with the related part of the acquisition command and control system , like drones and modern anti-artillery radars, which have the capabil ity to engage in-depth targets and espec ially, as I said, the enemy artillery. Therefore I be lieve that this is really one of the futu re armament programs which leads us in the right direction , which

German soldiers in action; the main problem is the decrease of young men liable for military service. This has led to an extension of the service from 15 to 18 months.

remarkably increases our firepower and gives us an indepth flexibility. I would not say that these weapon systems will have direct influence on our armoured warfare concepts. The tank is less and less a means which can operate alone. So what we in Germany have called for years "combined battle" becomes more and more important. But we have to cope w ith an enemy who wi ll try to maintain his heavy armoured capability; especially on the background of the increasing importance of conventional warfare, in case of attack he will have to punch quickly through our defenses to gain depth quickly and to conquer strategic objectives. Since our forces have never I.Jee11 numerous enough to face th is enemy, we have to be mobile, we must have the massive capability to react operationally to his main effort, and to put our operational concept against his; here it is where we do need troops and forces capable of wag ing a mob ile warfare. And since the modern battlefield wil l be characterized by heavy fire, by arti llery, and by the threat from above, we

have to protect our soldiers on the move; so the three elements, protection on the battlefield, mob ility combined w ith firepower, will maintain their importance in the future. And if you consider them together, they are more or less the characteristics of a tank, which is not necessarily an offensive system, it can be used it also for defence, and it is what somebody calls a "mobile bunker" . But technology may change the batt lefield, and the tank of the year 2000, which _is roughly the time-frame where we think to introduce a successor of the Leopard-2, may offer comp letely different solutions and a completely different look. The C 31 systems are among the most important materials which are entering service in the modern armies; what is taking place in Germany and how are you coping with the problem of interoperability with the other Allied forces? Reconnaissance, real time transmission of data and capability of delivering ammunitions effective agai nst all types of targets are key elements of the battlefield of the future. The German Army has many projects to improve target acquisition potential and

modern reconnaissance means th rough the procurement of new systems. On the reconnaissance side we have drones, we will field the drone CL-289 at the end o f the eighties, we think about a drone for shorter ranges with real time capabi lities, we think about modern radars for the location of artillery, and all this has to be linked together and therefore we will field, and we are pretty far advanced, an operational tac tical comrr11::111d and control and information system which wil l be called HEROS and will be linked to an artillery system known as ADLER and to its respective subsystems, and to a command and control system fo r antiaircraft defence. Th is has to be linked with the command and control system of our neighbours and to the ACCS, the air command and control system which is being developed within NATO. What will be the effect on the German artillery of the abandonment of the SP-70 project? The replacement of the oldest artillery guns, as M-109s and M-110s, will be delayed . This project has been terminated t rilaterally because all nations agreed that the developments were not as successful as they hoped to be, but this decision does not mean that we have "closed the shop". We wil l work further, the experience gained in th is project wil l be used, and we immediately started to think of a new howitzer. The three nations, as far as I know, agreed that they are still open for cooperation tor a successor and more or less agreed on the tact ical requirements for the future howitzer. I hope that we wi ll continue; it wi ll come later, but we need a new arti llery in the n ineties because in all European nations there are many artillery guns that .are becoming old . What is your opinion about the increasing sophistication of tanks?

We must find the right balance between the necessary sophistication and the usability by soldiers. There are technical conquests you cannot refuse, in f ire control systems, night firing capabi lities,. gun stabilization , modern ammunition, maybe in the future, guns for fighting the threat from the air, capabilities to detect the enemy that cou ld hit the tank from above, modern technologies to decrease the risk of being located; we have to get all this in order to be able to go to the battlefield with the probability of succeeding. But we have a requirement for soldiers and technicians: to ask only for the necessary requirements and to look into the logistic problem, the training problem, and at the possibility of having the equipment employed by conscripts, as wel l as toÂˇ the need to save money. Moreover, what we have learned from many trials is that even the more sophisticated items can be put out of order by a direct or indirect hit, so all these systems must have an emergency solution allowing to fight in, let us say, a "conventional way" , aiming with very simple devices, and the crew must be trained to use them . And the same applies to modern command and control systems. A staff must be capable to handle modern systems, to use their quantity of information, and to exploit their time-saving capabilities; but if the system breaks down, the war and the battle cannot stop , the Staff must take its decisions, and be capable of controlling and direct ing the battle. How does the cooperation between the German Army and the air forces works and how important are on your opinion the combined air-land operations? To a great extent this is a NATO prob lem because the air force structure, especially in Central Europe, is an integrated structure and a German Corps

when calling for air support does not know whose airplane wil l come. So the level of combined ai r-land operations, which are a must and will become more and more a must in the future, in Central Europe is at Army Group level, and we have achieved a lot in this field. For me there is no question: in the future there will be no isolated land warfare especially at operational level, and as long as our special long range air and land assets are scarce, we cannot use them

A vehicle of the Engineer Corps on the move during a snowstorm.

against low priority targets and so the planning of air operations must be closely li nked to ground operations under a single operational idea, at least up to 100 km from the FEBA. Moreover, air space control is no more a question of flying assets only, but also a factor of integration of NATO air defence with the more operational and mobile Army short range air defence, and all 17

The Leopard-2 is the standard tank in seNice with the armoured units. Its replacement is scheduled for the end of the nineties.

battalion, brigade or even division, as what I call a " compartmentalized battle" that means a mobile action in a restricted and given area. But the terrain is never t he same, so how to exp loit forests, swamps, small rivers, vil lages, depends very much on the actual situation you are fighting

together this creates the problem of air space control wh ich is one of the most complex issues of the future. The third dimension is becoming for land forces more and more important, not only because of the helicopters but also because of drones, artillery, antiaircraft means, and we must f ind both a technical and an organizational solution to that problem.

Can you describe better the role of your Airborne Division, which is part of the 2nd Corps? The present structure is a peacet ime solution. The picture is therefore a litt le m isleading, since it seems that the Airborne Division belongs to 2nd Corps. That is true, but the three brigades are located one in the South, one in the Center and one in the North of Germany, so the idea is that

lowest level of operation in combat, which needs a mobile force wh ich allows it to influence t he batt le in an operational way. This is why we keep the Brigades at Corps level w ith the option, if necessary, also to employ them at the border of the area of responsibility. We don't keep them at Staff level because we don't have any rapid employment need in our country, and moreover our Staff does not have in wartime any operational responsibility with the Corps, which pass under NATO command, but mainly with the Territorial Army.

"Grid defence" and "framework defence" are well known tactics used by some allied nations to defend their respective sectors; what is your opinion on this kind of battle and is the German Army using different tactics?

each brigade belongs to a

different Corps. We w ill keep this structure putting them, as mentioned before, in a combined Division , wich wi ll include the modern ant itank helicopters force and the transport helicopter force at Corps level, because the three Corps are fighting at the same time but separately, the 2nd in the South, the 3rd in the Center and the 1st in the North, and we consider the Corps as the 18

Sometimes these words create a difference which is over-emphasized; I bel ieve that especial ly in the last years there have been very close exchanges of conceptions between the British, the Germans and the Americans, and there are really no differences in the real conduct of operations. We consider forward defence at the tactical level, which means re inforced

in. So there are areas where you will have to fight open battles, there are others like the Hessian mountains or urbanized areas where you can fi ght a battle sticking much more to the ground, and you w ill probably have a battle in northern Germany, based very much on the f lexibil ity and mobility of units of reinforced battalion size, exploiting the terrain and the manoeuvre in depth. We believe that we are going in the same direction, the British are becoming more mechanized than in the past, their infantry gets armoured personnel carriers and combat tracked veh icles, so they are com ing closer to our operational concept, while we consider to insert in our armou red and mechanized structure, according to the geographical area of intervent ion of the division, infantry elements capable o f holding thei r posit ions with light weapons.

Standardization has always been a dream in NATO; what is your point of view on this subject and what are the fields where a common standard should give the greater advantages? This is an old NATO subject: there is no doubt that in a coalit ion Army, especially in Central Europe where we have such a interli nked and integrated defence, interoperability, which is a term I prefer, is a cont inuous demand. We always are behind this requi rement. Interoperability can

be achieved in two ways: either by standardized weapons, which would be probably the most effective way, or at least by realizing it in important elements, i.e. in the logistic field, same ammunition, same calibers, same fuel, same stocks of large consumption materials, as, for example, tank tracks. And what is even more important is the field of command, control and communications, because for example the modern target acquisition systems have wider range than the narrow boundaries of Divisions and Corps, and no Corps can nowadays just look at his limited sector, it must consider threat which may come from the air and from the flanks, it must coordinate its operations, its fire, its electronic warfare, with its neighbours and the air forces, and therefore there must be a quick exchange of data. Generally I would say that we have achieved something, my Staff is engaged in hundreds of NATO as well as

multilateral or bi lateral working groups, either li nked to specific equipment or to the development of standards for equipment, or to harmonize concepts and procedures. We have really to distinguish: I believe that in the field of concepts, tactics and procedures we have achieved a lot; there are common procedures, we apply them on every occasion, and it is really impressive to see how the nations work together at tactical level. In the field of major equipment mostly we rely on international cooperation , and about 60 to 70 per cent of our armament projects are in cooperation. And when we don't come to common equipment, we at least develop common parameters and specifications, so that the systems can work together. There are fields where we have improved, there are fields where we have failed : for instance , the infantry weapons are for me a main concern, we now have the old NATO caliber, the American caliber, the British

Wheeled vehicles are employed by reconnaissance and support units.

caliber, and we, in the long run, will also develop a different caliber. Very often different planning, different requ irements and national interests lead to these differences, but this does not make the task less important and less necessary. Anyway, I think that command and control is one of the weak points, because almost every nation has developed its own system. Therefore in this generation it will probably not be possible to standardize these systems; what we can do is to achieve the necessary exchange of data through tactical interfaces. If we didn 't succeed in standardizing the hardware, we made great progress in the field of common standards which allow the different hardware to communicate with each other. But let me say that in my opinion standardization and interoperability in the field of command, control and

communications are more crucial than hav ing the same t an k. Germany is at the moment the nation with less constraints on training. How do you see the future and what is the importance of the training facilities used by your Army in Canada and Great Britain?

We are t he t raining area o f Europe. We and our Allies have to t rain t he t roops on t he f ield, and we have to reduce t he burden of manoeuvres in the civi lian areas for envi ronmental as well as for economic reasons. In the mean ti me we will also enhance the importance of simulati on to save money also in live

ammunition. We are very glad to have t he Can adian facili ty in Shilo (Manitoba) where we can train a number of Leopard-1 and mechanized in fantry battalion s, especi ally in combi ned actions, with far greater mobility and f iring capabilities that we can have here in Germany. We have in Shi lo 16 armoured battalions and 8 mechanized infant ry battalions every year, for training tours of 3 weeks. We have also a firing range in Great Britain, in Wales, where 12 tank battalions, including Leopard-2 units, t rain every year for two weeks. The reason for that is not on ly th at we want t o "export" our training to o ther countries, but also that we

must clear some space for our allies, here, on Germ an training areas, because they are not large enough for everybody. And I must say t hat nowadays the exp ression "training area" is wrong: they are more or less firing ranges, because from Monday to Friday they are most ly occupied round-the-clock by fi ring exerci ses and th ey are not availab le for tactical t raining, which is mainly carried out during week-ends, when we do not fire. Beside these lim itations t he re is no country in the world where troops can do so much as t hey c an do in Germany; there is no nati on in th e world where you can have a free play mechanized exercise on civilian terrain. And we are consc ious o f the fact t hat this is a severe burden for ou r popu lat ion.

Bio graphy

Gen. Von San drart was born in Argentina on 21 July 1933. He joined the Bundeswehr in 1956. Following training he commanded an armoured field artillery battery from 1959 to 1964. He th en attend ed the Federal Armed Forces Command an d General Staff College in Hamburg . In 1967, after having been promoted to Major, he completed a course at the Statf College in Camberley (United Kingdom). After an assignment as operations offi ce r in an armoured brigade from 1967 to 1969, he served as a member of the Army Study Group of the F ederal Armed Forces Command and Generlll Str1tf C:ollege. He commanded the 25th Armoured Field Ar tillery Battalion from 1971 to 1973. Promoted to Co lonel he served a two-year tour of duty at SHAPE as staff officer in the Nuclear Policy Section. He was Chief, Mili tary Policy Branch, MOD Bonn from 1975 to 19n. After promotion to Bri gadier General , he served as C hie f, M ilitary Pol icy D i vision of the F RG Delegation to NATO from 19n to 1980. After promotion to Major General, Gen. Von Sandrart command ed the 11tli Panzergrenadierd ivision from October 1980 t o April 1983 when he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations at SHAPE. Gen. Von Sandrart became Chief of Staff o f the German Army on 1 October 1984.

THE AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRY ITS ROLE IN THE NEW SCENARIO OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

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TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS AND RESEARCH The role of our country's aeronautical industry in international competition - as it was, on the other hand, the case for nearly al I the other sectors of productive activities - was gradually and deeply influenced by the techno log ical change, that has proved to be a powerful factor of growth of the economies of the industrially advanced countries. It gave birth to new methods and new techniques, which have reduced costs and increased productivity, thus allowing an expansion of productive activities and an ensuing supply of goods never known before in the history of mankind. It is on techno logical innovation that, after all, the ability of Europe and hence of our industry of coping with the world cha I lenge that opposes the United States to Japan, is presently measured. To give just an idea of the "pulling" function of this factor and of its very great influence on economy, suffice it to consider that, according to the resu Its emerged from researches carried out by specialized institutes, 44 % of the productivity increase in the United States is traced back to technological innovation , while at least 2/5 of the increase in the gross product recorded in the last two decades in t he US are ascribed to it. A more thorough examination of this aspect that cannot be done, in view of the short span of this paper necessarily shifts the approach to the field of research (since innovation means research), to the difficulties encountered by this basic sector, that, taken as a whole, has not sufficient means available, and that cannot rely on the resources of the public and private enterprise alone. Left. "A 109" helicopter. The main tasks of the A 129 "Mangus/a" are antitank warfare and armed reconnaissance.

It is, however, to be pointed out that the state intervention in the cooperation with the enterprises chas been increasing all the time, through the growing recourse, for example, to the university laboratories nearly all public ones - which are assigned research themes, whose "spin-offs" ultimately turn to the advantage of the system as a whole. This is a picture that is on the whole inadequate, and that Is llable to push Europe, and our country with it, towards a chronic technological delay, and to confine the European industries to a subordinate role vis-a-vis the American and Japanese competing compan ies. The extent of the European "delay" in this sector can be summed up in a few figures: the United States appropriates for research a little less than 3% of the gross national product, for an amount that is expected to be in 1987 as high as 63 billion dollars, whilst for the other EEC member countries the incidence is, on the average, of about 2%, with considerable variations from country to country and minimum peaks that, as in the case of Italy, are hardly higher than 1%, or about 8.000 billion lire, which inc lude both public financing and self-f inancing of ent erprises. The s ituation of severe inadeq uacy resulting therefrom for our country, at a time when the necessary bas ic corrections are be ing studied by the competent authorities, further increases the importance of the irreplaceable function that our public structures, and the Universities in the first place, are called upon to perform, in order to make the young people ready for the major changes that have taken place in the production activity, and that, even now, give a broad outline of the post-industrial society of the next mi llenn ium. It is essential, if we want this to take place, that we he lp creating a "cu ltu re" of in novation , in the most comprehensive meaning of the word, of ideas, behaviours and

attitudes that concern not only those who work within the enterprises, but that also involve the social t issue in which the enterprises are present. There exist, in Lombardy, the conditions that facilitate the fu ll insertion of the new scenario determined by the technological revolution, chiefly thanks to a well-tested aeronautical tradition. In the small area north of Milan, between the town of Varese and the river Ticino, did in fact originate, early in this century, the first aeronautical industries, such as Macchi, Siai Marchetti , Caproni and Agusta itse lf, whose plants are still located in that area. This permanent link between industry and territory has thus somewhat facil itated the finding of skilled manpower, labourers, techn icians and engineers, even if today, as we shall see later on, the search for personnel to be employed in our plants has become more critical, especially owing to the introduction of new technologies that have broken off from tradition, and have caused new professional figures - whose supply is, in general, not yet qualitatively and quantitatively in line with the industry's requ irements - to emerge. Aerospace, and the aeronautical indust ry for the close li nks of interdependence it has with the former, unquestionably is the drawing and strategical-interest sector, t hat has been capable of giving a decisive impetus to the technological, productive and commercial cooperation among the European and non-European countries. To confirm the weight and the importance that the Italian aerospace industry has acquired in the country's economy, it will be sufficient to mention that the total number of the personnel employed, slightly increased in recent years, as grown from 42,700 units in 1984 to 43,300 in 1985, of whom 33% in the South.

Those in charge of research and development are 16.3%. Technological innovation has influenced the distribution of the professional roles: from 1981 to 1985, the weight of the labour force dropped by 7% , against an increase of over 17% in the number of clerks and managers. Sales increased from 3,900 billion lire in 1984 to 4,500 billion lire in 1985, with a growth of 15% in current values, and of 5.5% in real terms. Exports in 1985 amounted to 53.3% of the sale revenue, for a total of 2,400 billion lire, against a volume of imports equal to 740 billion lire, with an export/import ratio of 3.2. A comparison between these data and the other European economic realities, shows that our country can still do a lot to increase its activities in t his sector. Italy, in fact, has represented, in 1984, 8.6% of the entire turnover of the EEC aerospace sector, against 17.5% for Germany, 36.4% for France, and 34.8% for Great Britain. THE AERONAUTICAL MARKET AND THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE AGUSTA GROUP

Agusta, one of the lead ing groups in the world aeronautical field, that conveys 4/5 of its production to foreign markets, has made research the pivotal issue in the formulation of its strategy; this has allowed its compan ies, in the present international slump period, to stay at the highest level of wurh.J uutÂľut production , thanks to high sophistication of the most advanced part of its realizations. In 1986, t he Group, for all its companies, has appropriated about 300 bil lion lire, or 25% of the sales revenue, for research; this is a sizable effort, of a determining importance for creating the conditions for entering highly prest igious international programs on an equal footing, if not in a

leadership position vis-a-vis the internat ional partners. The firm pursuit of this strategic line of technical advance, in the framework of the whole action performed, has also substantially helped in attaining, late last year, and in advance of the scheduled time, the priority objective of restoring the economic balance of the most part of the enterprises, and in achieving a consolidated resu lt of a noprofit and no-loss balance of the Group. The industrial policy choices that have allowed such a recovery to take place are, in add ition to the strengthening of research and technological in novation, essentially the follow ing: the development of advanced programs with international partners, the diversification of the commercial policy, directed at find ing new outlets in highly interesting geographical areas, although acting with a view to reinforcing the Group' s presence on the trad itional markets. The im plementation of these basic choices would have however proved imposs ible without the radical organizational and functional reorganization made in 1983 and 1984 by the new management. Through it, a stricter industrial coord ination and a rationalization of production was imp lemented, by entrusting some essent ial guiding and control functions to the leadercompany of the group. The present structure has faci litated the pursuit of synergy objectives at group level, through the definition of industrial and market ing strategies consistent with the development of what Americans - who are masters in th is field - call Corporate Business. Also increased is the power of entering the world markets through a coordinated and integrated presence of al l productive sectors: helicopters, aircraft and aerospace systems. Prior to cursori ly reviewing the most significant programs that have allowed to further

improving the prestige Agusta presently enjoys on the world markets, it might be perhaps convenient to briefly analyze the features that make international cooperations a set course for al I enterp rises. The necessity of working on the internat ional market springs, in the f irst place, out of the need of spreading the high development and industrialization costs on cumulative sales volumes higher than those obtainable on the limited home market and on the traditional foreign market of the enterprises. It should be considered, in this regard , that the aeronaut ical industry is a longcycle activity, for no less than 6-8 years elapse from the start of the project of an airplane or helicopter. It is on this basis that the programs and relevant investments should be evaluated. In addition to that, t he participation in international programs allows to keep in touch with the most advanced technological innovations, through the exchange and the integration of the tech nical and scientific knowledge required for meeting a demand that, in the mi li tary sector, will call for means capable of performing more and more soph isticated m issions and, in the civil sector, will impose more and more advanced solutions in terms of operating costs, comfort and respect for the environment. As is obvious, the mass ive presence on the international market, that for Agusta, as we previously hinted, is equal to about 80% of the total output, involves risks that must not be underestimated. Over and above the big fall of the dollar, that has heavily penalized sales the contracts with foreign f irms almost always envisage payment in this currency everyone knows the factors of instability that loom ahead in the polit ical fie ld, almost everywhere in the world. It is in a situation like this, presenting complications in

The AB 412 " Griffon" is capable of performing tactical support missions, operational liaisons, fire cover, as well as transport of logistic and combat equipment. It can be profitably used in medical evacuations, patrols and search operations.

various pheripheral areas, that the search for new markets must be expanded to the utmost. Moreover, new countries are appearing on the market, with a view to developing their industries in the aeronautical field, and this makes it necessary that the traditional lines based on the mere sale of l11e product be accompanied by a strategy of international cooperation, basically aimed at the export of know-how, leaving the poorer work to the industrially less advanced countries. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION$ One of the most qual ified points of the strategies adopted

by Agusta, is unquest ionably the strong characterization, in the international sense, of its activity. A decisive impetus towards this process has come from the new programs, both under way or just launched, through which an attempt was made to pave the way for the cooperation of all those countries - and there are many of them - that may be interested in developing them with us. Among those now in an advanced stage, the A 129 "Mangusta" helicopter, a highly prestigious realization, born for meeting the requ irements of national Defence, for which, just in view of its very high characterist ics, proposals are being examined for produc ing the aircraft in cooperation with European firms; the " EH 101", of which the static tests of the dynamic un its started recently; " the NH 90", a NATO helicopter of the nineties; just recently started, the "Tonal " , the multipurpose helicopter derived from the "A 129", whose

program began with the signature of the agreement, that look place last September at Farnborough, stipulated by the representatives of the companies of the participating countries, namely, Augusta, West land for Great Britain, Fokker for Holland, and Casa for Spain. It is the fi rst time, in the events of the Italian aeronautics of the postwar period, that, starting from an entirely Italian product, a projec t (the ''Tonal") is developed, that is based on the advanced techno logies and systems we have stud ied and realized for the "A 129", and that casts them forward into the next millennium. The Tonal project will benefit - and this is what will have to be defined in the feasibi lity study to be carried out by Joint European Helicopter, the company with headquarters in Rome and already operative - of everything both science and technique, as wel l as our further research , may make avail able, with regard to the

structure of the machine and its propulsion, navigation and control components, and also with regard to the weapon systems (third-generation missiles). Derived from the A 129 "Mangusta", the only anti-tank helicopter in Europe, that has allowed us to be many years ahead of the similar FrancoGerman program ("PAH 2"), still in the study phase, a utility version and another for Batt le Field Support are scheduled to be produced, according to a "fam ily" notion, of which more later on, that is being adopted to an ever increasing extent. Also in the case of the "EH 101" helicopter, developed jointly with the British Westland, besides the basic configuration destined for the British and the Italian Navy, other civil and military versions are foreseen that, through the use of the same complex structures, such as the dynamic units previously studied and realized for the base version, will allow to meet different requirements, thus expanding the market opportunities. The "EH 101" program is now approaching the flight tests, which are scheduled to take place next spring. Still to be mentioned is the "N H 90" program , the NATO helicopter of the nineties , of which we have the leadership for the naval version, and in which the four European helicopter-manufacturing companies participate (besides Agusta, the French Aerospace Company, the German MBB and the British Westland) together with Holland. This is a major opportunity that represents a concrete hypothesis of European integration on the industrial plane in this sector. The compan ies taking part in it have the skill and the experience requi red for carrying it out autonomously. On the other hand, at least as far as we are concerned, the cooperation in other programs with the United States will not be discontinued, for they stil

represent a constant reference point, as well as a source of scientific and technical advance that is almost inexhaustible. Lastly, of special interest for the developments it may have, the Eurofar (European Future Advanced Rotorcraft) for the development of a convertiplane, planned as a part of the larger Eureka program, in which the principal European aeronautical companies take part. This is a newly conceived machine, already amply tested in the United States, that combines the advantages of the helicopter with those of the airplane, and that can expand the scope of helicopter utilization in the civilian as well as in the military field . Other cooperations are under way and they can be expected also in the sector of the trainers and of light cargo

The "NH 90" program envisages the development of a common basic helicopter, in the order of 8.5 tons, from which a version for tactical transport (TTH) will derive, to be developed by Aerospatiale. Another anti-submarine and naval version (NHF), will be developed by Agusta. The new helicopter will be realized, under a joint program, by the aeronautical industries of five European countries: Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany and Holland.

planes, in which the Agusta group works with the airplane division companies, Siai Marchetti, Caproni and 1AM of Brindisi. This production sector feels the effects of the difficulties proper of this specific market segment, where demand dropped to very low levels in recent years and, contrary to what has taken place in the helicopter sector, shows no substantial signs of recovery.

The medium/heavy "EH 101" transport helicopter is an Agusta/Westland joint project that has been brought into life in order to meet the requirements set forth by the Italian Navy and the Royal Navy, to replace the SH 30 "Sea King " naval helicopters. The "EH 101", whose project envisages a civil version and a mixed-transport version, characterized by the adoption of a rear loading ramp, is driVen by three turbines supplying 1600 SHP each.

Agusta is present with the SF 600 "Canguro" of Siai, for which the required certification is nearly completed, with the "C 22J", a light two-jet plane by Caproni, and with the "S 211 ", a two-jet training plane. This mach ine, which has been operative for some years in some air forces of foreign countries, has obtained a significant success and has been already adopted to the users' fu ll satisfaction. A new

version, to be manufactured in cooperation with the industry of the State of Singapore, is the object of a feasibility study. And finally, a few words concerning the activities of the aerospace systems division of the group, that includes the following companies: OMI of Rome, FOMB of Benevento, and the newly born Agusta Sistemi of Tradate, in the province of Varese. It has actively entered the complex reality of a world market that is greatly expanding according to trends that undergo rapid changes and that are, therefore, not easy to identify. The fields of activity have been widened to cover not only the OMl's traditional ones (optics, fine mechanics , photogrammetry), but also a number of advanced sectors (on-board computers, robotics,

artificial intelligence, missi lery, space). The aerospace systems division has assumed a very important position within the Cites Consortium, promoted by us, for the participation in the SDI American program. TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PRODUCT To keep in line with the most advanced concepts of aeronautical technology, applicable to both airplanes and helicopters, it wil I be necessary to study new formulas and new planning criteria, and to apply new technologies, especially in the field of composite materials and electronics; also required is an outstanding ability in the matter of systems integration, utilizing the numberless possibilities afforded by

informatics and avionic, that is to say, by electronics applied to the aircraft. This evolution, wh ile greatly simplifies, on the one hand , the steering and control of the aircraft, is, on the other hand, conducive to the real izat ion of complex systems, i.e., to a growing level of integration of the electronic devices, which have acquired a weight by far prevalent in comparison to the value of the machine. Also from this angle, the evolution of the helicopter that, owing to its operational peculiarities for both military and civil uses, has turned into an irrep laceable means, represents an interesting example. The leader of th is evolution was Agusta, wh ich, starting with the production under licence in the fifties, rapidly succeeded in acquiring the ski ll of autonomously developing its own machines, that are today on the forefront, for the high technological level attained. The "A 109" helicopter, the

first to be planned and realized entirely in Italy, has represented the turning point in this process, for it allowed to be present on the world market with a prestigious machine, whose characteristics have, from many ang les, anticipated the development lines of the products of the most renowned competitors. But the realization that has allowed Agusta to make a true "generational leap", in terms of project philosophy and use of the most advanced technologies, is that relating to the A 129 "Mangusta" helicopter. The development of this machine, realized, as we have previously mentioned, to meet the operational requirements of the Italian Defence, has given the opportunity of identifying the basic technologies utilizable, through suitable adjustments, according to a notion of "family" of machines, also for other realizations. Among these realizations, new versions are being

The development of a "convertiplane", envisaged by the Eurofar program, conceived in the framework of the Eureka program, represents the realization of a machine capable thanks to the adoption of swinging rotors - of combining the advantages of the helicopter with those of the airplane.

developed, for military and civil applications, that have some essential components, such as the dynamic units, in common with the "A 129", and whose conformity with the different operative missions is obtained by integrating the machines with suitable equipment items. The "A 129" helicopter is capable of flying by night, and this is made possible by the installation on board of devices for infrared vision; it is provided with the equipment for completely automatic target identification; the training of weapons is dependent upon the movement of the pilot's head, and sighting takes place by simply observing the target. All these devices and the relevant functions are integ rated

The u tility version of the A 129 represents the most advanced combatsupport helicopter, with extensive capacities o f tactical transport and a very high degree o f sa fety, both active and passive, for t he support of troops, with an ou tstanding capacity of being operat ionally integrated with the " Mangusta".

by means of computers on board, that allow the real-time process ing of all the data needed for carrying out the missions. Last ly, the convertiplane, as previousl y mentioned, might p ro ve to be a turning point in the helicopter's progress, in that it allows to overcome tile handicap caused by the helicopter's rather poor translation speed. It is provided with a w ing to t he ends of which two engines are fixed, that can perform a 90Â° rotation , thus providing the drive required for takeoff when they are horizontal , and the propulsion needed for translation when the rotor's p lane is vertical. Maximum speed might exceed 275 knots (510 km/h), the

maximum overal l weight might exceed 20 tons. Clearly evident are the possibilities afforded by thi s machine for civil uses: connection of town centres, or between airports and cities, that would allow to reduce by a remarkable extent t he time required for covering the distance, thanks to the practical abolition of unnecessary stoppages. All th is does , however, im ply a revolution in the townplanning structure of our metropolitan areas as we know them now, and a suitable body of ru les, that today is Âľ ra<.;lically nonexistent. THE NEW PROFESSIONAL FIGURES As I previously said, the deep changes that have resulted from the technological advance and from the int roduction of new techniques , ranging from informatics to electron ics, to telematics, not on ly in the production process

but also in corporate management, have made the recruitment of personnel capable of performing the duties requ ired by the new professional figures that have emerged, an exceedingly difficult task. This critical problem has already made itself felt in the d ifficu lties the companies of our group are experiencing in finding qualified technic ians, especially at the middle management level, capable of providing an im mediate operational contribution in the implementation of the demanding programs that we have just mentioned. The development of these programs and, more generally, of the act ivity in the aeronautical and space field, in the next decade, is liable to undergo an involutive process, with Âˇ unpredictable consequences if a qualitatively and quantitatively adequate staff is not avail able; all the more so, because the training of aeronauti cal and aerospace 29

technicians requires long periods of time, no less than 6-8 years. As is obvious, technological development has not only involved the planning and production sector, but it has also influenced, to a considerable extent, the corporate management itself, and it has provided new working opportunities for graduates in economic and juridical disciplines, thus expanding the traditional employment sector. The social and organizational industrial context, that used to draw its human resources from the areas with a deeply-rooted aeronautical tradition, is today no longer in a position to cope - as Agusta has experienced in Lombardy - with the requirements linked with the deep changes that have taken place; it is actually impossible to deal with them using the traditional conceptual methods and categories, but a totally new approach is instead necessary. Alongside the already known professional specializations, others have emerged; in the workshops: specialists in informatics and avionics, in numerical control machines, and those in CADCAM (Computer Aided Design Computer Aided Manufacturing), who allow continuous dialogue between the designer and the computer, as well as an immediate utilization of the project data for production purposes; in the offices: office automation, and plenty of others. A "cu lture" of change, capable of providing a more adequate awareness - rather scarce, indeed, except among the experts - of the intervened changes, thus becomes imperative, as we have already pointed out earlier in this article. In the achievement of this culture, the school at all its levels, and the University in the first place, can make a basic contribution. In particular, a

closer and systematic cooperation is needed between the school structures and the labour world, capable of better finalizing the study courses with a training harmonized with the impetuous growth of activities which call for exceedingly high qualification levels in all sectors, economic, financial, scientific, technical. The training in the strict sense of the word of technicians in the various spec iallzatlons Is not, broadly speaking, a duty that schools are called upon to carry out; it is, however, necessary that the training received may harmonically combine with that required for facing the immediately successive period, namely, the starting of the working activity within the firm. These are intentions easy to set forth, but they prove much more complex when they are to be practically imp lemented; also because specialistic training in a strict sense, particularly for what concerns our activities, is a duty that only specialized enterprises or institutions are in a position to carry out. However, much can be done by schools to make the programs f it for the new real ities brought about by the technological changes. The competitiveness of our enterprises, stimulated by the strong international competition, is a community asset, in which all must concur: Universit ies, industries, research institutes and laboratories, both public and private. Even the relations with the unions have changed in the eighties, and they have allowed to entertain an exchange o f views on such subjects as productivity and corporate efficiency, in view of the unquestionable incid ence they have on the future of the enterprises. As far as we are concerned, to the need for the managers and for the operative cadres to adjust themselves to the new realities-also in connection with the corporate

reorganization performed in recent years - the leader of the Group, Agusta-S.p.A., has answered by organizing a number of training courses, availing itself, for the purpose, of the cooperation of consultants and specialized institutes. Similar actions have been carried out in order to acquire new technical know-how in all sectors, with the obvious inc lus ion of the administrative field, so as to improve the level of training existing in the Company, and to bring it in line with that of the major competing companies. Raffaello Teti

Raffa e ll o Tet i, 60, has a degree in Ju r isprudence and is a specialist in Navigation Law. He is thoroughly acquainted with the reality and problems of aeronautics, and he is also an expert pilot with many thousands of flying hours. He was the Pres ident of Aereo Club d'ltalia from 1967 to 1978, and reo rganized and gave furt her impetus to the manifold activities of the Club, of which he is now the Honorary President. Vice-President of Alitalia from 1977 to 1981 , a member of its Board of Directors and Executive Commitee until May 24, 1983, Dr. Teti was a member of the Commission for the Reform of the Navigation Code, and is also a member of other important bodies in the aeronautical field. He was the rotat ion Chairman of AIA Association of Aerospace Industries - from July 1983 to July 1984. He has been with the Agusta Group since April 1981 and he has taken the office of Managing Director on June 1983. Since July 1984, he has been t he President and Managing Director of the Group.

PERIODICO DELL'ESERCITO ITALIANO FONDATO NEL 1856

E IN EDICOlA L. 4.000

T.HE PE-RM CÂˇROSSING STRAITS 0~ Constructing it shelving Co--.., During the last few years, the issue o f Straits of Messina has been the subject of press, on te levi sion, at conferences, in par.lWfli,frilt,jrflA situation which often occurs, the presen good standard, well informed and well~1~1JN111ltiti:ld which did not fail to make an appe been "contained" within entirely a supplying very a detailed knowl

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So how was the situation and how, more or less, are things now? This time we can quite easily skip the over three thousand years of rather wel ldocumented past history which, as a matter of fact, have nothing very interesting to tell us about the permanent cross ing of the Straits of Messina: ju~t a few odd stories of questionable reliability, some plans for an undersea tunnel between the second half of the nineteenth Century and the f irst half of this one, and, lastly, several studies and geological prospecting results from the period following the Second World War. It is necessary to come as far as the international competition for ideas announced by ANAS in 1969 (1) to see the first broad range of

possible solutions. The designideas subm itted numbered almost 150, many of them rather wel l-planned, even if on ly a few received prizes. Later, in 1971, Parliament passed a law (2) by wh ich it was established that the permanent crossing of the Straits of Messina - a work of national interest should be by both road and rail and that the study, des ign and construction as well as the road faci li ties should be entrusted to an ad hoe stock corporation set up mainly with cap ital from IRI, ANAS, FS (State Railways) and the regional local authorities involved. However, the actual foundation of the company which took the name "Straits of Messina", was to occur only in 1981. With an interm inisterial decree dated December 27, 1985 came the settlement of the

Preceding page. Suspension bridge, a permanent link typology considered feasible (1st solution).

Above Siting of the crossings in the proposals which have more likelihood of being built. Right Seabed tunnel, another typology for the permanent crossing (2nd solution).

question regarding the financing and "regulation" of the work by the company for completion of a technical/econom ic feasibility study and the typological decisions regarding the work necessary to cross the stretch of sea which - at its narrowest point - spanned

three t housand meters. In 1986 t he Company formal ly submitted the feasi bility study it had carried ou t on three possible solut ions (3) all envisaged in t he same area of the Straits corresponding to the min imum distance between the two banks. All t hree solu t ions: • triad of sub-seabed t unnels side-by-side (t wo roads and a railway with relative service tunnel); • :;i ngle road and rail t unnel o n

the seabed; • ?in gle-span road and railway suspension bridge; were declared feasible but t he " sing le-span road and railway suspension bridge" was indicat ed as the "optimal typological sol ut ion from the various techn ical, envi ronmental, ent repreneurial and socioeconomic stand points". At t his poi nt, the Higher Cou ncil for Public W orks and the two organisms most involved, ANAS and FS were called in, each nomi nat ing t heir own commission o f experts to give an assessment. Their opin ion on the viabi lit y of t he work done by the Straits Company, on both t he technical and economi c planes, was expressed to t he respect ive Admi nistration Boards in the early months of this year. In partic ular, the FS Comm ission recommended that the general design be com menced with the preliminary exam inat ion of the questions regarding the c ompetence o f the Ministries of Defence and Civi l Protection, in add it ion to those relating to defence agai nst sabotage. The Com mission has also ascertained that for the " suspension bridge " solution the dreaded problems of railway practicabi I ity do not exist. From the techni cal viewpoi nt, many dou bts have been overcome even t hough several further checks of a

Facing page Sub-seabed tunnel, a further alternative for t he permanent crossing (3rd solution).

TECHNOLOG Y As re_gards the sub-seabed tunnel, the experi ence gained with the great railway and road tunnels built through the Alpi ne and Apennine reg ions enables an easy assessment and handling of any technological aspect. For the single-span suspension bridge, techno logies which are equ ally well-Known are avai lable but they have been applied t o structures which are far less imposing (13) an d in any case not in Italy. Moreover, t here are only very few examples of large suspension bridges built for railway traffic (the " George Washington" in the United States, the " Salazar" in Portugal and the "AKashi Kaykyd ' in Japan), but in no case has tra in passage actually been activated, although it is said that the Japanese brid ge was not open ed to rai l traffic merel'y for reasons of an economic rat her than technical nature. On the other hand, for the seabed solution there are no significant precedent s , but in off-shore tech nology (1 4) our firms are world leaders. Suffice it to t hink of the underwater natural gas pipeline laid between Tunisia and Sicily precisely in correspondence with the Straits of Messina, or of the large platforms for sea o il prospecting. In addition, the study of an early const ruct ion of this type in the Norwegian fjord of Hogs was entrusted to three companies from the ENI group (SAIPEM, SNAM PROG ETTI and TECNOMARE) which have a vast experience in o ff-shore works in all seas. All things consid ered, the seabed choi ce would have the advantage of acquiring a record in a new sector, which would definitel y afford w orldwide exportation of genuinely Italian technolo gy. The Straits Company has, however, decided upon the " su spension bridge" solution, more tested, even if on a far smaller scale, and not entirely translatable for application to the specific case. Nevertheless, the image effect for the Italian technical-industrial world wou ld most definitely be significant in both cases. INFLUENCE ON SEA ANO AIR NAVIGATION DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE AND IN OPERATION Everyone agrees that none of the three solutions affec\s, at least not to a signi ficant extent,. sea and air navigation when in operation (15), wh ile for con struction there are con flic ting opinions regarding the su spension bridge and the seabed tun nel. The ''Strai ts of Messina" Company estimates that the construction of the seabed tun nel might entail the closu re of the Straits

to navigation, in the longitudi nal sense for eight years, whi le for the suspension bridge the interruption would be limited to a year. However, it seems that these indications are r\Ot entirely convi ncing in that the seabed solution " favo ured" by the Company is not the only possible and, on th e co ntrary, those preferred by others or under stud y do not involve any interruption to navigation. So it does not seem ras h to th ink that in regard to this parameter it would be difficult for the suspension bridge to gain favour; far from it. Concerni ng the possible impact of sinking ships o r of submarines on the seabed structure, one has the feeling that the problem has not been thoroughly stu died as ye t. However, in a fi rst approxi mation, it does not appear to have a potentially determinant or discriminant va lue.

DEPEN DENCE ON METEOROLOGICAL AND SEA FACTORS For this parameter too, opinions regarding the absolu te independence of the sub-seabed solution from the w inds and current s evidently match, but, for the suspension bridge, wind constitutes a serious problem. Often quoted is the famo us episode captured in a impressing documentary film - of the collap se of the Tacoma suspension bri dge in th e United States, whi ch occurred in 1940 because the span wen t into resonance, owing to a wind of only 16.6 meters per second. Nevertheless, it does seem that all the problems posed by the wi nd have been reso lved, in the sense that the inevitable oscill atio ns will be cont ained wi th in limits such as to never (or almost never) involve the closure of t he road and, above all, rail traffic. However, a very wide structure wi ll have to be built in order to enable rail use as we ll as road traffic. As regards c urren ts, which in the Straits are strong - maximum recorded value 3.1 meters per sec ond - probl ems arise instead for the seabed solution but, according to som e, simply because the Straits Company has mainly considered a layout-- corresponding with the point of least width, where the currents are stronger. The true supporters of th is type of solution, on the other hand, have always proposed an d envisaged building the crossing - even if mainly for reasons other than currents - in an area where the Strai ts are far less "strai t" and the c urrents far less " current " . Nevertheless, th e tech nicians including those of the Straits Company - agree that, in essence, sea currents - whic h, inter alia, are of an intensity less rapid ly variable than air currents and therefore intrinsically less dangerous - do not constitute a discriminant problem for the cho ice of the best typology.

geological nature must be performed. There was also some reservation regard ing the p rofitability of the undertaking. However, preference for the "suspension bridge" solution was confirmed even if the general plan was postponed pending the final decision for either the single-span solution or that of two spans with an intermediate pier. Following the opinions and typological decis ion given by the two Administration Boards and the Ministry of Transport (4), the Straits of Messina Company will be called upon to prepare the general design already financed w ith the '87 financial law. Work could be deferred for a certain period, of the order of six months or perhaps longer, so that the outcome of the studies independently commenced by a working group from the University of Pisa together with several companies, comm issioned by ENI - but with the consensus of IRI (SAIPEM - SNAM PROGETTI SPEA - TECNOMARE), may be known; these studies are for a seabed tunnel solut ion arranged differently from the one chosen by the Straits Company. In any event, it is to be believed that within a couple of years the difficu lt final decision which will give the go-ahead to a virtually irrevers ib le process will be reached. Parallel to the technical-economical debate there will no doubt be a heated political debate, such as the issue merits. Judicial delays and "additions" and even "shelving", temporary or otherwise are, therefore, to be considered among poss ible hypotheses. Once the final design has been made ready, the Parl iament in office - let us say before the end of 1990 could vote on the financing (5) for the preparation of the executive plan and then for the setting underway of the works. After that... after that it is frankly of little use to give any indications, however vague, save perhaps for an order of magnitude of less than a decade for the comp letion of the work.

THE SEISMIC RISK Thi s is a serious danger which perhaps will command additional investigations whatever the typological decision taken, and the Ministe r of Civil Defence has already made ment ion of it. We all remember encountering in our at lases at school our first "fault" which corresponded exactly to the Straits of Messina; one expert in the field has been heard to cla im that one of the pylons of the suspension bridge would be exactly rn line with it. Perhaps this is just "spite", but it is difficu It to escape the fascination of the incredible, particularly since further "checks" will most likely be made on the geological aspects and they could remove the charac teristic of "malice" and give to the rumor that of "credibility". In any case, everyone seems to be in agreement as far as regard s the risk assessment for the sub-seabed tunnel, a risk which is quite considerable because any moderate slide of the fault, which would be crossed by the tunnel, could cause its

THE TYPOLOGICAL CHOICE CRITICAL ASPECTS The typological choice is, after all, the fundamental choice from which all the others are to follow and indeed it is the first and most important response which - as said earlier - the Straits of Messina Company has actually been called upon by Parliament to give. However, the choice will be made, and it would be difficult to do otherwise, by means of a series of relative comparisons on the basis of the attribution of ponderable values to the various parameters in order to arrive at a numerical evaluation. The most effective way to illustrate the three fundamental typologies may be, therefore, to attempt an identification of the positive and negative features of each one as compared in the appendix. To put it briefly, the most critical aspects, those which have been questioned the most, concern - for the suspension bridge type solutions - the three thousand-meter length which hitherto has never been crossed with one single span and mainly the particular

irremediable and complete loss. The re are conflicting opinions on this point, since solutions with te lescopic sleeves and joints do exist, which allow the effects of seism ic movements to be effectively absorbed. The condemnation (16) for this one parameter appears difficult to avoid, even thou gh there are others ' which contribute to putting precisely the most trad itional solution out of the runn ing. On the other hand, the .,-':.] suspen sion bridge appeals to its inbuilt elasticity, which allows it to stand tremors 9 degrees Richter with no catastrophic damaqe. In essence, these capabilities are also recog nized in the seabed tunnel which some suspect, nevertheless, to be less resi stant to the seaquake effect, almost always connected to earthquakes even though, to tel l the truth, i t is I ittle known. Nevertheless, it must be said that some reckoning can be done on thi s subject and th erefore the technicians can put in a decisive an d convincing word, albeit within human limits.

difficulties in guaranteeing the regular transit of trains at a useful velocity. For each type of solution the following should be highlighted: â€˘ difficult ies in the natural environment, chiefly the wellknown feature of the Straits area, namely that it is somewhat subject to seismic events and active faults are present, but also, with the exception of the sub-seabed tunnel solution, the hazards from strong sea currents and winds; â€˘ aspects relative to the environmental impact linked primarly to the bridge solution, which requires huge railway and road access ramps and, to a lesser extent, to the seabed tunnel solution in regard to the impact on the sea ecosystem; â€˘ economic aspect: the necessary investments - there is talk of figures of around eight thousand billion lire to be invested over a period of approx imately ten years could, accord ing to some, "not be recovered", since not even the most optimistic of hypotheses on the maximum volume of traffic wou ld cover the charges incurred by the

Seabed tunnel proposed by Tecnomare as a variation on the 2nd solution.

maintenance and management of the work. Added to this is the evaluation that, in any case, with a sum of that size many other more serious and pressing problems of Sicily and Calabria could be solved and probably create more local long-term employment (6); â€˘ lastly, something which has mainly come to the fore recently, the aspect of vulnerability and the relevant defence requirements. On this latter subject, whi ch is the one of greatest interest to us, very little has been said so far. There have been only a few statements made by executives from the Strai ts o f Messina Company, according to whom - as reported in the press the suspension bridge, besides

being able to come out unharmed from a tremor of grade 9 on the Richter scale and being able to bear winds of up to 200 km per hour, cou ld even resist a nuclear explosion (of undefined power, by the way) at a distance of 500 meters. Moreover, there have also been some signs of response to the so-called strategic questions with the statem ent (7) that "once t he typology was chosen, there would be talks with the military, even if problems should not arise because the ' bridge' has also been designed to be crossed by tanks". Someone who became involved in this some time ago is Elio Matacena who, on contacting the Chiefs of Staff to su bmit his own plan for the "Archimedes Bridge", had taken care to guarantee this possibility. The permanent cross ing of the Straits of Messina, however, involves the construction of something which, whatever the

typology chosen, will become a "sensitive point" of strategic dimensions probably incomparable - from this viewpoint - with any other target existi ng today on Italian soil. Firstly, since it is an essential link for t he economic life and nourishment of an island with around 5 million inhabitants, representing a portion of the order of 10% of the Nation. Secondly, it is by nature a paying target with respect to the results which can be achieved in relation to its vulnerability. In other words, there is an exceptionally favourable relationship of cost (offence)/effectiveness (of resu Its attainable) for every potential hostil e element. The outcome of an attack against this infrastructure would be "momentous", not only because of the practical consequen ces deriving from the possible physical interruption of a connection which, once built, would soon become practically

AER SOLUTION

SEABED SOLUTION

AER SOLUTION

SEABED SOLUTION

vital, but also in regard to its value as a "symbol", not to mention the political and psychological implications that a serious demage to the construction would assume. Furthermore, the eventual "collapse" of the infrastructure, whatever the causes might be, may even lead to prolonged interruptions of shipping on the Strait in addition to the almost total loss of the construction. Owing to these features, the in fra::;tructure in it::;elf is destined to "catch the eye" o f all possible attackers, even minor ones. The above negative aspects, although common to each of the hypothesized typologies (suspension bridge, seabed tunnel, subseabed tunnel), are present to varying degrees an attempt will be made below to clarify this - in all three solutions. VU LN ERABI LITY

The suspension bridge is the most vulnerable, in that the entire infrastructure is exposed to any kind of attack carried out with sea and air carriers or missiles and each point is vital for survival. No type of electronic masking can be surmised for a target destined to give a radar echo which may be picked up from a very great distance even with apparatus not particularly sophisticated; therefore, also a protection from attacks conducted with nonballistic means would require a continual survei llance of a vast area of the sky, sea and ground. In any event, a substantial, permanently activated antiaircraft and antimissile protection - and t his is probably the heaviest burden, the running cost - should be set up with multiple air, missile and artillery systems, both on land and on board. On the other hand, the power of any device eventually used by the attacker would have to be quite considerable in order to inflict irreparable 42

ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

For the sub-seabed tunnel there are many advantages, or at least fewer problems, even if they do not serve in compensating for the definite drawbacks in other sectors. Nevertheless, the areas to be expropriated are very small and the influence on the landscape is not significant, limited as it is to the access ramps. There is, on the other hand, the problem of the greater quantities of material dug out, which may be difficult to dispose of on land. It could be thrown into the sea, provided this is done in the open sea and in a non concentrated fashion, but the costs would be much increased. In any event, the situation with the suspension bridge is the opposite, because the areas to expropriate are very large and the impact on the environment is evident and macroscopic, even though the views on this are primarily of an aesthetic nature. It is not true to say, however, that every construction which is to be inserted into the environment in a traumatic fashion will only have negative effects. In fact, many claim that the bridge - quite a feat for man to accomplish - would harmoniously blend with the magnificent ambience of the Straits and actually even become a world attraction. I think that one cannot but agree with this statement. Less evident at first glance is, instead, the environmental impact of the road and rail access ramps; since the bridge is 80 meters above sea level the ramps extend for many kilometers: altogether 18Km for the roads and 28Km for the railway. These ramps really could not pass unnoticed and it is difficult not to fear that they would completely upset a land whose immense charm lies in its natural condition. The problem of the ramps and of the areas to be expropriated also exists for the seabed tunnel solution, but to virtually the same extent as the favourable one of the sub-seabed tunnel, in that they immediately go

damage, since it would be necessary to either seriously damage the towers or shear at least two main cables to cause collapse; it only one cable or some anchorages were sheared, th is would perhaps allow the resumption of operation within a reasonable length of time. Possible damages to the floor system alone could be repaired even faster. In any case, the "suspension bridge" solution really seems to be the least sound from the point of view of defence. It would, in tact, entail considerable costs in

underground and the differences in level - among other things - are more contained since they do not exceed 60 meters. For this solution though, there is the accusation - rather heavy at that - that the marine ecosystem may be seriously damaged, with the risk of the migration of many fish species, including tuna and swordfish which are so important in the South. Furthermore, the system of currents would also be altered with unpredictable effects on the coastlines. The doubt that these are real dangers exists, even if the obstacle does not seem to be high enough (27 meters over at least 100 meters of depth) to cause extensive damage. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND TOURISTIC IMAGE

Regarding these aspects, no difference seems to emerge in the assessments and this time the classic underground tunnel finds itself in the " bad" company of the undersea one: no attraction for tourists and little sympathy from the users, especially those on tires. For the bridge, instead, the interest for tourism of the work itself is evidently very great and in all likelihood, because of the prestige of such a construction, will be the deciding factor in the possible choice in its favour. Economically speaking, the positive effects, are, indeed, of great import for the whole South even if there are, as is always the case when one is dealing with something which attracts much attention, negative effects too. Nevertheless, there will be many who will want to photograph the bridge from the banks but will be less eager to scale the ramps in their own cars; for all these people it will be necessary to continue the traditional ferry service and not only - as ' people will no doubt be saying later on - so that they can continue to take pictures of the bridge from the sea.

setting up an effective protection system. On the whole, the seabed tunnel is less vulnerable - but not by very much - owing to the natural protection offered by the water, also with respect to the technical means for the acquisition of targets. Nevertheless, advantage may also be taken of this by possible "attackers" to approach the target with devious means. It would appear,Âˇ however, that point damages, by torpedoes, mines or other devices, although capable of creating an even prolonged

Plastic of the suspension bridge

interrupt ion of traffic, do not impose the need for total demolition and rebuildi ng, since ind ividual segments o f the "tube", or better, of one o f the t ubes, could in any case be recovered. Reconstruc tion times would defini tely be long, but the ri sks of prolonged interruption o f navigation t hrough the Straits do, nevertheless, appear to be mi nor. The solution is, therefore, of intermediate validity: w ith respect to t he bridge it is less vulnerable and less " psycho logically" attract ive since it does not possess "visibi Iity" chi3.racteristics. At any rate, it involves lesser costs, albeit sti ll considerable, for a possible protection. Last ly, the sub-seabed t unnel is marked by a far lower vulnerability in that it is well-

protected in regard to all types o f threat known today and defence may be limited to strict protection of accesses. On t he other hand, it does present the drawback that any possible serious damage inside t he tun nel - always poss ible even owing to natural events cou ld entai l considerable problems for restoration and, at the worst, the compl ete loss of the infrastructure. Costs for protection would be very contained anyway. COEFFICIENT "D"

" Defence" is undoubtedly one of t he most important components in the organ ization of the life of a count ry and the spec ific parameter must t herefore be considered alongside t he techni cal and financial ones when large works, desti ned to challenge the centuries and to condition the Iife o f future generations (8) to

a significant extent, are t o be carried through. Nevertheless, " defence" itself, as an essential presu pposition of deterrence and detente, is a cultural problem unresolved by our society (9), one wh ich, like several others, security and the environment for instance, on the contrary shou ld involve everyone personally and constitute for each citizen a defi nite commitment wh ich cannot be delegated to anyone else. Fortunately, the world of the operators in the transportation and industry sectors, be they tech nicians or academics, operational or adm inistrative staff, is generally showi ng greater interest in t he "D" coefficient, and the State legislation assists everyon e in not neglecting it beyond permissi ble limits. Essential points o f reference in this regard are the unhappily named " law on military servitude" of 1965

which at article 17 subordinates the building of large infrastructure for transportation to the op inion of the appropriate Territorial Military Command, and the Prime Minister's Decree of April 10, 1986 - better known as General Plan for Transportation (PGT) - which in article 39, with reference to the bui lding of large infrastructure for transportation, stipulates that prior agreement be sought with Defence from the preparation phase of the general design and, at article 60, draws attention to the question of the vulnerability of the transportation system. The latter is a call which goes for everyone, including the Defence Administration itself, which often seems to fail to remember that with regard to transportation , the Armed Forces are practically dependent - in our country just like in all others - upon the commercial transportation system. Nevertheless, in considering coefficient "D" in the transportation sector, one cannot do other than award a fair amount of attent ion to the way in which it operates as regards the financial aspect. The PGT also provides its backing here and states (documentation referred to by article 39): "The additional costs consequential to co.nstraints imposed by the National Defence requ isites which could be called for, primari ly in the completion of new works, cannot in any case be borne by the regular budget of the Ministry of Defence". Regarding the issue of the permanent crossing of the Straits of Messina, Defence ha::; already formally stated its case in general terms and will of course thoroughly examine the study underway on the general plan, with reference to a definite typological choice and location so that the final opinion envisaged by the law may be drawn up. Whatever the typological decision, three precautionary requests from the Defence must be guaranteed:

ADVANTAGES RELATIVE TO THE TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE TWO BANKS

For the railway, but also for the roads, all three solutions do not involve speed limits of any significance but the length of the ramps, imposed by the need to avoid penalizing gradients, is such to complete ly esclude any profitable use for the local links between the cities of Reggio, Villa and Messina. In particular, for these localities there would not be any advantage anyway in either the underwater tunnel or the suspension bridge hypotheses: the beginning of the railway ramps - for instance in Calabria - would hP. placed around Gioia Tauro. From the point of view of benefits to traffic, there is no doubt that the ideal solution is the seabed tunnel. In fact, thanks also to the fewer constraints on placement unlike the suspension bridge situation, one is not forced to chose the narrowest poin t - and, above all due to the lesser differences in levels, it can guarantee better service, both to long distance transit traffic and to local traff ic in the straits area. SENSITIVITY TO SABOTAGE AND POSSIBILITIES OF ASSISTANCE

This kind of question has been tackled but, to be frank, it does not seem as though it has been examined closely enough. Anyway, both the sub-seabed tunnel and the seabed tun nel have been deemed more vulnerable to sabotage and terrorism and it is difficult to fall in with this opinion (especially in regard to the sub-seabed tunnel). In point or fact, should a catastrophe occur, it really does not seem as though the suspension bridge can boast any advantage. More acceptable, on th e other hand, seems the idea that the "greatest" difficulties - with respect to the suspension bridge - may be those of access for rescue and of evacuatlon in case of breakdowns and non-catastrophic accidents. These topics are discussed more thoroughly in the text of the article. COST, CONSTRUCTION TIMES, EMPLOYMENT

As often happens, these parameters which are to be dealt with last are, after all, the most important, also bearing in mind that the minimum operational life of the work has been

â€˘ the continuation of a ferry service - albeit reduced ensu ring the permanent use of the launching ways and hence the possibility of immediate restoration of an efficient alternative service, in the case of interruption of the permanent crossing (10);

fixed in 200 years. The Straits Company assessments have all been to the detriment of the " lower" solutions, which would entail "higher" costs. The cost and times of construction for the sub-seabed tunnel would be greater and they would also - but immediately some contradiction arises - be difficult to determine. This uncertainly leaves one a little puzzled, bearing in mind that for years, in Italy, we have done nothing else but build dozens and dozens of kilometers of railway and road tunnels in all kinds of geological situations although, to tell the truth, not under the sea. There are also claims that the risks of accident and unexpected factors during the course of the work would be greater and the cost for management and maintenance would also be greater, because of the ventilation and lighting systems. The effects on manpower specialization are limited and, after all, the socio-economic advantage of the investment would not hold good owing to the unacceptably low level of returns. Worse still is the assessment for the seabed tunnel where the cost is not defined as higher but, together with the times, extremely aleatory (17). Added to the higher cost for maintenance and ventilation are those for cathodic protection against sea corrosion, which actually seems to constitute a far greater restraint (or the seabed solution than the meteoric one for the air crossing. In regard to the duration of construction, it must also be remarked that the longest experience here - referring to the offshore platforms - is limited to 40 years. One further point which seems to be holding out is the uncertainty on the installation technologies, at the limits of current and foreseeable possibilities with a high risk of accident and unexpected factors during construction. The spin-offs on manpower specialization would be positive. In short, less socio-economic benefits, considered, however, at an acceptable limit and not at a "definitely inacceptable" level. At this point, everything seems to lean towards the suspension bridge for which cost and construction times, together with operating and maintenance cost (simple and safe servicing) would be less problematic and the synergies for the development

â€˘ setting underway the arrangements necessary to guarantee swift restoration of navigation of the Straits of Messina and of the road links between the northern Calabrian coast on the Tyrrhenian and Reggio Calabria in the event of "collapse" of the construction,

of the national industry, in addition to the obvious positive effects on manpower specialization, would be greater. The re are, however, still many "ifs and buts" and it seems that, also with regard to this aspect, tt:ie seabed solution is far from being out of the question. CRITICISMS AND FEARS They were bound to materialize and, apart from anything else, many different people contributed to quite a number of detailed studies. In truth, according to some who have read the summary report by the Straits Company, it even seems that this document was rather inadequate, precisely since it was not very convincing, owing to the obvious "slant" in favour of the suspension bridge solution. Certainly, a far different matter is the whole mass of documentation reviewed and on which the technicians alone have given their opinion or will do so, but for the decision-makers the summaries are the only readable documents and hence the ones upon which decisions will be based. So here we have the old controversies coming back into the picture again, controversies linked to the tact that the men who count in the Straits Company are in part originally from the pre-existing ''Bridge Company'' (from which the new Straits Company acquired the studies) and, therefore, they would operate essentially in a "preconceived" .t: manner, constructing arguments a v posteriori in favour of an already "selected" solution. The important thing though, is that the data collected have all been processed and that the studies have been conducted most thoroughly. The technicians from the Railways, from ANAS and from the Universities are the people who must later communicate their final assessments, the only ones which real ly count.

OTHER ALTERNATIVES

~-v-),,~

One has already been mentioned, the one which "throws into the sea" any other innovative solution and aims at a concrete, rapid and "safe" intensification of the current ferry service. The Bridge Company has entirely discarded this, but perhaps its validity remains all the same, even if it has the serious drawback of hindering the important longitudinal open-sea, traffic. In the first place, since the actual crossing only takes 35 minutes, the frequency of the service is very high and the operations for boarding vehicles on to private ferry boats are very fast. Since the permanent crossing would involve crossing times of no less than 20 minutes, one can see at once that the advantages

tor motor vehicles would be significant but not exceptional. For the railway the matter is a little different - but not so much also bearing in mind that boarding and disembarking operations can be rationalized and shortened and that technological shortening margins also exist for the crossing time. Secondly, as will be seen later on, even if the permanent crossing were to be built, a reduced ferry service will also have to remain in operation. More interesting, however, is the fifth alternative - this has also been mentioned in the text - which began taking shape recently, to the point where it received a subsidy of several billions from ENI, significant in many ways, for the completion of a feasibility study on a seabed tunnel alternative to the one prepared by the Straits Company, consisting in one single road and rail structure situated in the narrowest area of the Straits. Here, instead, t~ree tunnels are envisaged, two road tunnels for the two directions and one tunnel fo r the two tracks. Its location is envisaged more to the South, in an area similar to the original Matacena design for the Archimedes' Bridge (18) and considers two different alternatives for the rail tunnel which could also be non

parallel to the remaining two. Th is is a brillant solution since it optimizes Matacena's ideas by moving the location of the infrastructure to an area of the Straits which allows minimization of the ramps and maximization of the benefits for local traffic between the two banks without affecting, and in actual fact even improving, the short-distance traffic. Moreover, the subdivision in three cylindrical tunnels of dimensions which are obviously smaller than one single road and rail tunnel, facilitates construction and, above all, enables work to proceed gradually by using the first tunnel immediately and constructing - or not - the others also bearing in mind the earlier construction and operational experience. Lastly, the availability of three separate structures would give a far greater guarantee of security and continuity of connection, since the risk of having the three "passages" out of order at the same time, owing to natural or artificial catastrophes (17), would actually be smaller- To sum up, one could say that certainly at the moment one would not bet on this solution as favourite, but in the end ii cou Id emerge as an outsider, bearing in mind that the "road" still to be covered stretches out far before us.

due to natural or artificial causes; â€˘ increased allocation to the Defence budget to meet the higher expenses which will no doubt be incurred - within the framework of the joint missions involved (11) - in order to ensure a minimum of permanent protection from the most dangerous threats. The amount can be decided upon and inserted into the financial calculations for the building of the permanent crossing once the typology has been finalized and the methods and minimum means needed to complete the project can be defined, and once the actual objective has been determined in terms of level of protection which is to be reached . Certainly, coefficient "D" may have a lesser "bearing" upon the typological choice (12). Nevertheless, it can be said that, all other technical, economic, functional and political aspects being equal, the choice should be geared towards the solution which is least vulnerable and entails lower defence costs, which is actually the sub-seabed tunnel. However, since this equality does not exist in point of fact and, indeed, the sub-seabed tunnel does seem to be out of the running, the matter also becomes more complicated since, while it is easy to establish an order of vulnerability, it is difficult to classify the typological choices on an exact scale of overall values. In particular, with regard to the two above-ground solutions, opinions may also conflict and it does not seem possible to differentiate the vulnerability values to any great extent. After all, the best direction to follow would be to seek a diversified solution in which the rail crossing is separate from the road; this would permit, together with the reduced ferry service, the attainment of a lesser overall vulnerability with equal defence means, through the availability of several alternative solutions.

Of course, this divers ification could entail greater costs but should the differences in expenses not be found to be prohibitive, there should be no hesitation in aiming, for instance, at a seabed tunnel solution for the railway and suspension bridge or "spaced out" seabed tunnels for the road. Once again the difficult final decision cannot resu lt from an imposs ible pondering analysis of the various factors but only from an overall political decision. Brig. Gen. Gualtiero Corsini NOTES (1) According to provisions made by law no. 384 of March 28, 1968. (2) December 17, 1971 , no. 1158. (3) A parallel study is also being done on a fourth hypothesis, namely, on keeping a suitably reinforced ferry service. This solution has been judged, however, not su itab le and not econom ically viable. (4) Following a recent reform of the State Railways, the Minister of Transport no longer heads the Administration Board but still holds the powers of surveillance and d irection over the new rail Agency. The ANAS Administration Board is instead headed by the Minister of Public Works. (5) In regard to possible external contributions to cover construction costs, the EEC has hitherto restricted itself to a statement declaring that it is "on the whole, in favour". (6) Furthermore, the whole question is overshadowed by the danger that the Ma fia sniffs the possibility of big "business" and stretches its te ntacles. (7) "II Mattino" September 22, 1985 Âˇ Interview to Gianfranco Gilardini Deputy Manager of the Straits of Messina Company, by Oreste Barletta. (8) Everyone agrees upon this, although on public occasions we are witnessing a sort of "dismissal" of the matter or, in the best of cases, complete delegation of the subject to others - in the case in point inevitably to the military - in the hope of lasting peace and the imminent universal disarmament or, more likely, only because people are aware that it is not a very popular subject. (9) Th is is something which has, unfortunately, been discussed mainly by the military. See among others General Cappuzzo ("Quale Esercito?", published by Dino, 1985), even if recently some wise intellectuals and politicians have started to seriously look into the matter. (10) Traffic for this service can be ensured - for instance - by favourin g with an appropriate fare policy those who do not wish to use the permanent crossing, owing to alternative touristic

reasons, or fear, or in order to gain l ime (local traffic in the sub-seabed or suspension bridge hypothesis) and banning tran sit of dangerous goods on the permanent crossing. (11) 2: Defence to the South, 3: Air Defence, 4: Operational Defence of the Land, 5: Peace, security and Civil Defence Actions and also 6th, requirements package: Infrastructure, Logistic support and Transportations. (12) Some "bearing" it has already had, since the well-timed first formal opin ion from Defence compelled everyone to reflect a little more upon the critical aspect of security and upon its related costs and perhaps it was not the last reaso n to encourage to wait to r the outcome of other studies and better examination of certain solutions before embarking upon the final road. (13) The longest spans constructed to date have been those related to the Akashi Bridge (Japan) 1.780 m, the Verrazzano (New York), 1,298 m, the Golden Gate (San Francisco) 1,280 m, the Bosphorus (Istanbul) 1,074 m and the Salazar Bridge (Lisbon) 1,013 m. (14) Technical activity by which works are carried out in the open sea without direct operational and logistic support from the coast. (15) Different, naturally, is the argument in the case of the double-span suspension bridge with intermediary pier. (16) The Japanese are build ing, however, an underwater railway tunnel of no less than 54 km in a seismically active area to link the island of Honshu with that of Hokkaido. It is also envisaged that cables will be laid in the tunnel for telecommunications, the trans port of electricity and, in a certain sense, it is to function as a road crossing by means of special rail cars. The work should be brought to completion by the end of 1987. (17) When one says that the traffic across the Straits would be halted for around 8 years, it should also be pointed out that the works would take longer than B years. (18) In 1984, the Archimedes' Bridge Company in the Straits of Messina, represented by Dr. Elio Matacena, drew up a plan for the permanent link between Sicily and the Continent, known as the "Archimedes' Bridge". The proposed solution of the permanent road and rail crossing over the Straits of Messina is constituted by a submerged structure of hexagonal section subject to a vertical upward thrust and anchored to the sea-bottom by a system of cables distributed along its entire length. The construction incorporates two three-lane roadways, in addition to an emergency lane in each direction and two strips destined to take the ra ilway traffi c. (19) It is true that these studies began late but among the Companies carrying them through is SPEA, the same company which was entrusted by SEALINK with the preparation of a competitive project (Channel Expressway) for the construction of the Channel tunnel, arriving second place in the competition launched by the British and French Governments.

6TH

DRAGOO N S.

ANTIRADIATION MISSILES A DEADLV THREAT TO MODERN ANTIAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Ifâ€˘ THE

ORIGIN OF THE ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS

A radar may be described as an apparatus which utilizes a band of electro.magnetic waves to explore the surrounding space. This operationeil mode affords the achievement of performances otherwise inconceivable with alternative sensors 1 althoug tf it does entail the presence of a radar station which may be easily discovered by anyone able to intercept transmissions. This information may be put to use by the adversary in an attempt to destroy the transmission source, thus counteracting any eventual threat associated with it. The brief but intense history of electronic warfare demonstrates that attempts have been made in this sense since the dawning of radar. In 1944 many German night fighters were fitted with suitable devices to intercept signals emitted by the radars of the Royal Air Force bombers engaged in the air attacks over Germany. One type of apparatus, with the code name Flensburg, was tuned into the transmission frequency of the Monica radar, instal led in the tail of the bombers to give early warning to the crew of the approach of an attacker. A second device, known as Naxos, was able to survey emissions from the HS2 radar, used during navigat ion and to identify targets. This apparatus, used in conjunction with the board radars Lichtenstein, permitted the German fighters to infl ict heavy losses on the British formations. Their existence was kept carefully secret, and it was only in Ju ly 1944, when RAF technicians had an opportunity to exam ine the Flensburg apparatus of a captured Junkers 88 night fighter, that it became clear that the Monica, rather than protecting the bombers, faci litated the attack manoeuvres of the German p lanes. Other attempts followed these, but only around twenty years after the airborne clashes in the German sky was a definite leap in quality achieved, by util izing an apparatus to survey radar signals, not to give an operator sighting indications, but to directly provide guidance information for missile-type arms. This development was made possible by the advanced process of electronic component

source operating in the frequency band of interest. These frequencies may be those typical of surveillance radars but also those found in target acquisition and tracking radars. The ideal sensor must therefore be able to explore a vast portion of the electromagnetic spectrum and , furthermore, must have sufficient sensitivity to perm it the identification of a radar station before the weapon system linked to it is able to enter into action. Only recently

miniaturization and was accelerated by the new need to counteract anti-aircraft missile systems guided by radar. This threat had become a reality on July 24, 1965 when an F4 Phantom plane of the USAF, engaged in a bombing mission in North Vietnam, was downed by a Soviet-made SA-2 surface-toair missile. Technical resources were rap idly mobilized against this fearsome opponent and . one of the results of the effort made was the AGM-45A Shrike missile, able to gu ide itself into the enemy radar stations, using their electromagnet ic emissions as guiding signals. Arms of this type, generally ind icated by the abbreviat ion ARM, init ials of the expression Anti Radiation Missile, today figure in the inventory of many air forces and in the recent past have been used on several occasions. After Vietnam, antiradiation missiles were in fact used both during the ArabIsraeli war and in the Falklands Campaign and played a foremost role during the course of the Sidra incidents in the spring of 1986. With a view to

has it been possible to satisfy this ensemble of requisites, with the setting up of large band receivers, of high sensitivity and o f sufficiently contained dimensions that they may be installed into a missile. On the other hand, the early ARMs used interchangeable narrow band receivers, mounting the one considered most suitable for the electromagnetic scenario envisaged for the mission. The availability of a sensor of high performance in terms of sensitivity and wavelength does not, however, suffice in providing a good antiradiation missile. In fact , the arms must be capable of discriminating among the transmissions surveyed, singling out hostile ones and identifying those which are potentially dangerous. The receiver must therefore be connected to a system for signal processing and most important ly to a data bank containing the parameters characteristic of the radars of in terest. Among the parameters to be considered, in addition to frequency of transmission, are the impulse repeti tion period, its du ration and the speed of

better understanding the threat

antenna rotation. A comparison

represented by these arms, their main characteristics will be examined be low and the ARMs currently in service will be reviewed.

among the measured values of these parameters and t he values contained in the data bank allows rapid identification of the station surveyed. At the same time, by identifying the direction of signal origin, the weapon is able to determine its position in terms of angular survey and of performing the calculations necessary to the solution of the guidance problem. This set of operations,

CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ANTIRADIATION MISSILE The distinguish ing feature of an antiradiation missi le is the sensor which is able to identify an electromagnetic

F 15 "Eagle " plane, armed with Sparrow radioguided missiles and with infrared guided Sidewinders.

instead of being effected from the missile receiver, may be carried out by an electronic surveillance system instal led on board the vehicle, either airplane or helicopter, which then goes about act ivating the weapon by transferring the necessary information to it. In both cases, the analysis of the signals intercepted must take into account a priority scale which, in the event of several radar stat ions be ing identified, determines which one is to be attacked. The logic adopted is such that maximum priority is always attributed to the radars associated to weapon systems which may represent a direct and immediate threat. The ent ire sequence of discovery operations, identificat ion, location, definition o f priorities, occurs automatically so that the reaction time is reduced to a minimum . Excluded from the

sequence is the decis ion on whether or not to launch the miss ile, a decision which is always left to the operator. COUNTERMEASURES AND COUNTER-COUNT ERM EASU RES

The appearance of ant iradar arms was immediately fol lowed by the development of techn iques and contrivances aimed at reducing their effectiveness and, according to a scheme familar to the specialists of electronic warfare, th ese countermeasures were at once opposed by counte~ countermeasures. Traditional electronic countermeasures have little likelihood of success against an antiradiation missi le o f modern design. Once the frequencies of interest are identified, the receiver accurately tunes in them, preventing entrance to disturbing signals wh ich could confuse the gu idance system. Furthermore, recognition of the duration and period of repet ition of the impulses transmitted by

the radar attacked allows only signals with the correct values of the parameters to be accepted, thus considerably reduci ng possibilities fo r deception. In the past, a special countermeasure technique suggested by the characteristic of the ARMs was found to be more effect ive: that of using the attacked stat ion' s transmission to lead one to it. The simple trick of turning off the transmitter has on several occasions enabled to lim it the effectiveness of an attack carried out with antiradiation missiles. Th is technique, which among other lhi11y:; allows the attacker to achieve a resu lt anyway, since the radar is temporarily forced into si lence, was largely used in South-East Asia. It was a question of a simple and immediate solution , wh ich allowed to effectively counteract the USAF and US Navy Shrike Âˇ missiles. The ARMs of later generations incorporate special devices aimed at obviating a

sudden interruption of the guiding sig nal. These devi ces may be of two types: frequency memory and navigat ion memory. In the first case, as. soon as the attacked radar station interrupts its transmission , the missile sensor embarks upon a searc hing phase, exploring in sequence a certain number of frequencies, chosen from among those memorized. Navigation memory, on the other hand, is constituted by an inertial, simpl e and low-cost navigation system, which is su pplied with the estimated coord inat es of the target before launch. This position inform ation is updated by the missile during f light, by means of su ccessive angle surveys. In the event that tran smission is in terrupted, the navig ation system is thu s able to take over control of th e trajectory, guiding the missile towards the presumed target position. The precis ion of the weapon is nevertheless red uced , since the accuracy of the inertial guiding system is lower t han that of the passive radar gu iding system. This drawback may also be partially overcome by combini ng frequency memory and navigation memory: the second device is en gaged in keep ing the weapon on a correct path, wh ile the radar sensor carries out a search on a programmed frequency, assuming once agai n the ro le of primary gu iding system in the event t hat the search has a positive outcome. Against ARMs of this type the expedient of temporarily interrupting transmission loses much of its effectiveness, and it is necessary to adopt soph isticated techniq ues fo r t he man agement of frequency and of t ransmission power in order to have some chance of success. A further possible defence lies in the use of " decoy" transmi tters, not linked to any receiver and havi ng t he purpose of attracting t he ARMs far from t he real radar stations . It is easy to envisage that in the near future the abiliti es of antiradiation missiles to autonomou sly guide themselves,

plus their resistance to countermeasu res, will be improved by integrating passive rad ar sen sors with sensors operating in other regions of t he electromagnetic spectrum. Of t remendous interest, in particular, is the integ ration with an infrared t erm inal gu iding system able to ident ify "hot" spots, such as transmitters and feeders, or even to const ruct a thermal pict ure of the scene, then using target recogn ition algorithms. In t his way, the task of the defence wou Id be rendered extremely di fficu It, since it would al so be necessary to adopt adequate countermeasu res in the infrared region at the same time. ANTIRADIATION MISSILES IN SERVICE

Development of this missile began in 1961 at t he Naval Weapon Centre and production was started two years later by a consortium of indu stries led by Texas In struments and by Sperry. The arm entered into service in 1961 and was

AMX aircraft, armed with Sidewinder airto-air missiles.

immediately employed in Vietnam by t he F 105-G planes of the USAF and EA 6-A o f the US NAVY. The Shrike is a missile of around three meters in length, with a diameter of 20 cm and a launch weight of almost 180 kg. The warhead, weighing over 60 kg , makes use of the combined effect of the explosion jolt and of the shell fragmentation. The sensor used is a crystal video receiver which allows coverag e of relatively narrow frequency bands and th is has brought about the development of at least 18 vP.rsions, diversif ied by the radar frequenc ies to wh ich the receiver is tuned . The Shrike, which is accredited with a range of 15-20 miles, is t he antirad iation mi ssi le wh ich has accumu lated the greatest mass of operational experience. Indeed, it was widely used in Vietnam where, although brin ging to t he fore restrict ions linked to the technical solutions adopted, it contributed considerably to the drop in 51

Left.

U.S. Air Force F-4 aircraft, armed with AGM 45 Shrike. AGM 78 Standard and AGM 88-A HARM missiles. Right.

Mirage 2000 armed with two Aâ€˘A Magic 2 and two Super 530 D missiles. For air-to-surface missions, the Mirage 2000 can be armed with laser-guided bombs and missiles, as well as with antiradar missiles.

American plane losses, from 160 in 1965 to the 40 of 1966. Later, during the Yom Kippur war, Shrike missiles were used by the Israel i air force to neutralize the SA-2 and SA-3 antiaircraft missile stations. Nine years later, in the Falklands Campaign, RAF Vulcan bombers attempted on two occasions, 31 May and 3 June, to destroy the AN/TPS 43 F surveillance radar installed at the airport o f Port Stanley. The outcome was not as hoped: after the f irst attack the radar began operating again after a few hours, wh il e on the second attempt the operators, on noticing the approach of the attacking plane and having learned from previous experience, were quick to disactivate the apparatus in time. Having lost its guiding signal, t he weapon missed the target, showing itself again to be vulnerable to this simple countermeasure. Although it can no longer be considered a recent weapon, the Shrike is still in service wi t h several air forces and was also emp loyed in the Sidra incidents in Apri l 1986. On that occasion at least a dozen Shrike missiles were launched by the A7-E of the aircraft carrier America against the antiaircraft defences of Tripoli and Benghazi, apparently with good resu lts. AGM-78 STANDARD ARM

The operat ional use of the Shrike highlighted its limits in terms of range, performance and dimens ions of the warhead. In the autumn of 1966, General Dynamics Pomona Division was entrusted with the task of constructing a new ant iradiation missile. The surface-to-ai r

missile (naval) RIM 66-A Standard missile, widely used by t he western navies, was taken as a poi nt of departure for the programme. The new ant irad iation missile, named Standard ARM, was much larger than the Shrike, w ith a length of 4.50 m, a diameter of 34 cm and a launch weight of over 600 kg. In the test campaign of 1967, the Standard ARM demonstrated that it could reach a maximum range of 35 miles. The AGM 78-A model was the first to be produced and was f itted wit h t he same Texas Instrument sensor as the one used for the Shrike, but in later versions a new large-band receiver was employed and the miss ile was given the abilit y to make use o f the data shown by an electronic surveillance system which could be fitted on the launchi ng aircraft. Production of the Standard ARM ceased in 1978, after around 700 of them had been built, but since then the existing missiles have been the object of various modernization programmes. The weapon is sti ll in service with the USAF and the US NAVY.

AGM-88-A HARM

The antiradiation missile HARM, from t he initials of the expression High Speed Anti Radiation Missile, is the result of a development programme started in 1972 which intended to combine the low cost and versatility of the Shrike with the sensit ivity and range of the Standard ARM. Furthermore, the operational experience in SouthEast Asia suggested that the new missile should have been able not only to swiftly engage the target, but also to bring the attack to a close in the event that the transmission is interrupted. The HARM, produced by a consortium led by Texas Instrument, has a length of a little over 4 metres, a diameter of around 25 cm and a launch weight of 360 kg. The missile, which has a maximum range of 20-25 mi les and uses a large-band sensor, has t hree different operating modes: - Self-protect ion mode, in which it operates together with the launch-aircraft alarm radar receiver, receiving from it the data relative to a possible sudden threat, whose gravity is 53

Left, from top. An A IM-132 ASRAAM. This missile is due to replace the Sidewinder.

Two AIM-9L Sidewinders.

hours of the following day. Attacked once again, it finally ceased to transmit, but it is not clear whet her this was due to a hit or to a simple p recautionary measure. HARM m issiles were also used on the night of Ap ril 15 against SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-8 sites in the Benghazi area. AGM-122-A SIDEARM

assessed on the basis of a preestablished priority scale; Âˇ Pre-planned mode, wh ich provides for launch in the direction of a known station before its transm ission has been received; when that occurs, the arm acquires the signals and attacks the radar station, otherwise destructs itself; Âˇ Opportunity target mode, in which it assumes the functions of signal analyzer in order to identify unknown stations. Frequency coverage of the HARM includes the X band in which the majority of air borne radars operate. One may thus hypothesize an air-to-air mode in the near future, for wh ich it would be necessary, among other th ings, to adopt a different proximity fuse and an antenna of contained dimensions, so that it cou ld be mounted on a Cardan frame in order to allow smoother acqu isition and easier tracking of the target. The m issile is the 54

object o f development programmes aimed at improving their performance as regards radars wh ich operate in agi lity of frequency or fo llowing transmission power-management techniques. In particular, according to some sources of the US Navy, in a new version the ab ilities of the guiding system wi ll be augmented by adding to the passive radar sensor an infrared system of the image - construction type or a mi llimetric - wave passive sensor. The AGM-88-A-HARM entered into production in 1982 and after a lengthy and not always lucky test campaign was employed operationally in the spring of 1986. On March 24, two A7-E aircraft of the Saratoga ai rcraft carrier launched HARM missi les against an SA-5 miss ile station in t he Gu lf of Sidra. After the attack the site's radar remained sil ent for some time, but began operating again in the early

The weight an d dimensions of missiles like the Shrike an d the HARM prevent their use by helicopters and also in the case of fixed w ing aircraft they have a significan t effect on the loading capabil ity. The US Navy is engaged upon the development of an antiradiation missile of smaller dimensions and weight no greater than 100 ki lograms. This weapon, known as AGM-122-A Sidearm, was built by modifying the semiactive guide version of the airto-air Sidewinder, in the infrared-guided version. The AIM-9-C Sidewinder, w ith semiactive radar guide, was developed by Motoro la at the beg inn ing of the '60s to equ ip the F 8 Crusader plane. This miss il e, produced in about 1,000 specimens, was soon to be found unsatisfactory and was withdrawn from service. The transformation into Sidearm requires the rep lacement of t he gu iding system with a pass ive radar sensor. If the assessment under way has a positive outcome, the Sidearm w ill be f itted in attack helicopters and planes like the AV-88 of the Marine Corps. The characterist ics of the missile lead one to believe that the p rimary operat ing mode, if not the only one, wi ll be one of self-protection . The extreme ly small dimensions do in fact pose precise limitations in terms of range, warhead and signal processing ability.

Right, from top. A Luftwaffe IDS Tornado armed with four Kormoran missiles.

The Sea Chaparral naval system, equipped with a version â€˘of the Sidewinder AIM-9.

MARTEL AS 37

The MARTEL miss ile is the result of a joint Anglo- French programme begun in 1964, which represented one of the firnt examÂľ le::; or European cooperation in the field of arms. The MARTEL was bu ilt in two versions: ant iradiation AS 37 and television-guided AS 168. The AS 37 version, deve loped under the responsib ility of the French firm Engine Matra, has a lengt h of just over 4 metres and a diameter of 40 centimetres. The missile may be equipped with an antenna-receiver complex tuned in the operating frequency of the radar which has to be attacked. Should this not be known exactly, a different sensor is fitted and the MARTEL conducts a frequency search prior to launch. Once the transmiss ion in question has been identified , the antenna carries out a sweep to determine the direction of origin. At this point, having gathered all necessary information, the missi le can be launched. Production of the MARTEL ended at the close of the '70s; the missile is still in service with the RAF and the Armee de l'Air.

ALARM

The ALARM missile (Air Launched Anti Radiation Missile) may be considered the first representative of a th ird generation o f ant iradiation missiles, whilst t he second is represented by the HARM and the main exponent of t he first is the Shrike. The weapon was developed by British Aerospace on request by the British Ministry of Defence. The ALARM uses a sensor made up

of four spiral antennae, housed in the nose, linked to a fourchannel receiver of the heterodyne two-stage type and a signal processor. Information is not available on the wavelengt h of the system, but it is reasonable to think that it is such to include the operating f requency of the majority of

surveil lance and t racking radars in service (2-18 GHZ). The signals received are analyzed in terms of frequency, period of repetition and duration of impulse, level of power and direction of origin. This information is memorized and used both to ident ify the station and t o pinpoint its

position by means of a series of regularly performed triangul ation s. In this way, the attack may be ended even in the event that the transmission is interrupted, in that the calculated position data are used by an self-piloting system employing a "strapdown" type reference pl atform. The attack is concluded with a rap id dive on th e target and the proximity fuse acts as a precision altimeter, regulating the altitude of explosion in relation to the characteristics of t he radar attacked , in order to attain the maximum destructive effect in regard to its antenna systems. The ALARM has dimensions similar to those of the HARM and , like this missile, it has several operating modes: - Direct Mode This is the most sim ple operating mode, it provides for high speed direct attack against irradiating targets; - Waiting Mode. The missile, launched during the approach to an area defended by guided radar antiaircraft systems, rises to 40,000 feet before starting a search phase. This takes place during a descent slowed by a parachute and can therefore last long enough to cover the transit of the plane. Once a hostile radar transmission is received, the missile unhooks the parachute and heads at high speed towards its source, using the thrust of a second stage of the rocket engine: - Double Role Mode Thi s combination of the previous two envisages direct attack agai nst a station of known position and, as an

alternative, a searching phase in the target area; - Corrido r Clearing Mode The missile proceeds at a high altitude conducting a freq uency search, then attacks any located hosti le radar station. The simultaneous use of several missiles enables a corridor to be opened in the air defence system in front of the launching aircraft_ AS-5 KELT

This large missile (length 8.6 m, diameter 50 cm , wing span 4.6 m), with a launch weight of no less than 3,000 kg, figures in the inventory of the Soviet and the Egyptian air forces. The Kett, whose existence has been known since 1968, is a missile designed for high altitude and high speed flight wit h a maximum range of 150 miles. The launch carrier is the TU 16 Badger G bomber. Alongside terminal radar guide and i nfrared versions, there exists one which is capable of guiding itself onto the sources of radar tran smission. During the Yorn Kippur war, some of the 25 AS-5 missi les used by the Egyptians were certainly passive-radar guided and at least two succeeded in bypassing the Israeli defences , striking radar sites. AS-6 KI NGFISH

This is a Soviet missile of considerable dimensions which instead of a conventional warhead of around 1,000 kg , can carry a nuclear charge of 350 kilotons. The weapon entered int o

service in 1976 and can be used by TU 16 Badger and TU 22 Backfire planes. The Kingfish can follow a high altitude flight profile with terminal dive, or approach the target at very low altitude. A passive radar system is one of t he possible choices for its guide system. CONCLUSIONS

The effectiveness of the antiaircraft systems in servic.;e today leads to an everincreasing number. of air forces equipping themselves with antiradiation missiles. These weapons can in fact integrate deception and jamming devices very wel l and constitute the natural complement to the selfdefence systems of the attack ai rcraft. Employed en masse, after carefu l planning , they also constitute the most effective means for the suppression of the opponent's defence. By exploiting the progress made in electronics, t he more recently designed missiles have overcome the limitations of the ARMs which entered into service during the early '60s and, havi ng more modes of operation at their disposal, are able to satisfy very diverse operational requ irements . It is easy to forecast that in the near future these weapons will also acquire the ability to efficiently engage air targets and that their performances will be improved by the combined use of other types of sensors. These realities and these prospects must be taken into account both by the radar designers and by the air defence operators. Capt. Basilio Di Martino

ANTIRADIATION MISSILES 56

OPERATION <<BRASSARD>> THE FRENCH LANDING AT ELBA IN JUNE 1944

OPERATION "BRASSARD" THE FRENCH LANDING AT ELBA IN JUNE 1944 In February 1944 the front on the Italian peninsu!a was stabilized on the Garigliano river, while between th& river itself and the city of Rome file beachhead at Anzio was under heavy counterattacks by the . German forces. The Allied High Command decided to proceed to the conquest of the Island of Elba and entrusted the operation to the French forces. The Âˇ directives for the development of the operation explained in short the strategic reasons that made it necessary: - to stop the shipping of supplies to the 14th German Army through the Piombino channel; - to establish a base from which amphibious disturbing operations could be conducted on the Ligurian coast; - to threaten the German rear lines, so that the adversary would have to engage forces which, as a consequence, could not be employed elsewhere. Thus operation "Brassard" was born. THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT Elba, the third largest Italian is land and the largest in the Tuscan archipelago (map "A"), has a surface of 223 square kilometres. Located between the promontory of Piombino and Corsica, at a distance of 10 and 50 km respectively, it dominates the area between the middle and upper Tyrrhenian, and is important for the maritime comm unications between Corsica and the Continent. Together with its eight municipalities, it falls under the administration of the province of Leghorn . Its chief town, Portoferraio, has the only port suitable for relatively large ships. After the census of 1936, its population resulted to be 30,384. The island , shaped like an irregular triangle with its basis faci ng the Italian peninsula and its vertex towards Corsica, represents the larges t remnant of Miocene Tyrrhen ia. Five inlets, the roadstead of Portoferraio and the gulf of Procchio on the northern side, and the gulfs of Stella, Locana and Campo on the south, narrow the island in two points to a minimum width of 3.5 km and divide it into three distinct orographic sectors. Th e western one, formed by the complex of Monte Capanne (1,019 m) and its ramifications, is granodioritic and consists of metamorphic zones; the central one, formed by the two hilly alignments of Monte San Martino (370 m) and Monte

Orello (377 m) is of a porphyritic nature; the eastern sector is constituted by the schistose complex of Monte Calamita (413 m) and by the northern calcareous ridge. From the main mountain groups, several spurs branch out and encircle the valleys, open to the sea, which represent the island's plains: S. Giovanni, Magazzini, Marciana, Campo, Lacona and Mola. On the whole, it is a prevailingly mountainous terrain, and this is reflected by the 118 kilometres of its coasts, two thirds of which are steep, and one third - where the short p lains face the sea - low and sandy. Therefore there are few straight coastal stretches and the littoral is considerably indented and uneven, with numerous is lets. Streams are insignificant. THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY The Intelligence Office (Deuxieme Bureau) of the French First Corps (Gen . Martin) stationed in Corsica, which c1.lrec1.c..ly i11 November 1943 had sent agents to the island , towards the end of February 1944 started a methodical search of information, in order to put together an accurate picture of the enemy situation. The assumption was that the enemy would defend the island and that their possible evacuation could be determined only by unfavourable events on the Peninsula. Moreover, this assumption was confirmed by a 59

visit of Marshal Kesselring and Gen . Von Mackensen (Commander of the 14th Army) to the defensive instal lat ions of the island, on April 18, 1944. The insular character of the objective made the intel ligence search very difficult. It was actually impossible to organize a system of rad io interceptations; the sources available, which were re fugees and agents landed on the island (five groups altogether), gave a modest contribution in piecing together a picture of the German situat ion. Furthermore, the agents, although they had been landed on the western side of t he island, never made it over the Procchio-Campo isthmus, due to the German survei llance, and could only observe the area of interest from a distance. Considering therefore the scarse resu lts obtained, recourse was made to the only sure and adequate source, i.e. ai r reconnaissance, both photographic and visual (USAAF), making, from April 23 to June 13, 1944, four photographic coverings and several partial surveys. The results of the investigative activity carried out between November 1943 and June 16, 1944 perm itted to draw a map of the situation, from wich it could be assumed that: - the defence was mostly concentrated on the beaches, particularly in the bays of Procchio and Campo, and was almost nonexistent between them and in the interior; · the artillery positioned on the promontories and on the main ridges was in a position to Intervene on the beaches; · predisposed destructions as well as active and pass ive obstac les complemented the barrage on the beaches, especially in the southern part of the island; - the reserve units were scanty; · the defender's force numbered about 1,500 men. The picture turned out to be particu larly accurate and was confirmed by the notes found in a German Command 60

after the landing. The only discrepancy worth mentioning was in the numerical force of the garrison, which turned out to be about 3,200. THE OPPOSING FORCES The French To carry out the operation, the landing force no. 225 was formed , constituted by (1): • 9th Colonial Infantry Division (Gen. Magnan) consisting of: • 13th Senegalese Infantry Regiment; • 4th Senegalese Infantry Regiment ; • two 105 mm arti llery bns; • two battalions of the 101 st Engineer Reg iment; • one antiaircraft art ii lery un it; • 2nd Moroccan Infantry Regiment (Lt. Co l. de la Tour); • assault battalion (Maj. Gambiez); • " Commandos d'Afrique" battalion (Maj. Bouvet); • four British armed ships; • two gunboats; • British and US vehicles; • French naval units; for a total of approximately 12,000 men and 600 vehic les. Some American airplanes and two French fighter groups took also part in the operation. The Germans The island was defended by units of the 14th Army under the Command of Gen. Gal l. The units were organized as follows: • two infantry battalions for the defence of the coasts; • one infantry battalion; • one 149mm howitzer battalion (3 batteries); • one 88mm arti llery battal ion; • six Navy coastal batteries (one 76 mm, three 102 mm and two 155 mm); • four armed boats for a total of 3,200 men.

THE LANDING PLAN The French landing plan envisaged the following tactical actions:

• initial neutralization o f the batteries at Monte Poro, Punta Sardella, Eufola, Capo della Stella and of the Command Post of San Pietro in Campo, carried out by units of the assau lt battalion , which were due to land at H-3 hours (1 a.m. June 17) and, having completed the task by 3.45 a.m., start a disturbing action against the Command Post and the lines of communication; • main landing, on the beach o f Marina di Campo, of the 13th Infantry Regiment, the assault battalion, two arti llery battalions, two Engineer battalions for the first echelon (4 a.m., June 17), and of the 4th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Infantry Regiment for the second echelon, after the preparation fi re from the ships armed with rocket launchers, starting at 3.45 a.m.; • secondary landing, simultaneous with t he main one, of the "Commandos d' Afrique" battalion in the area of Monte Tambone, in order to protect the right flank of the deployment; • penetration as far as t he northern coast, then turn to the east, towards Portoferraio, by the 13th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd In fantry Regiment; • penetration t owards the western coast, with occupation of Rio nel l'Elba, Rio Marina and Porto Longone (now Porto Azzurro), by the 4th Infantry Regiment. THE SURPRISE ELEMENT Given the imposs ib ility to conceal the concentration in Corsica of the troops dest ined to the landing, the French command was compelled to rely on the surprise element by keep ing secret the date o f the landing itself. To t his end, in order to deceive the ._e nemy, on June 6 and 12 two police operations were organized with the intent to isolate the presumable ports of embarkation, Portovecchio and Calvi. Traces of th is activity were later found in the journal

On June 17, 1944, a commando of volunteers of the " Assault Battalion" makes a surprise landing on the Island of Elba, and is engaged in very hard fighting, contribut ing to the success of operation "Brassard" .

~ Assault battalion

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9th Col. lnf. D. & 2nd Nor lnf Rgt.

:::;-+, Groupe Commandos d'Afrique \ \ Main beachhead

of the emplacement of Capo della Stella, in the records of the alert states issued by the German Command. On June 16, the actual embarkation day, t,he French units, instead, headed towards the port o f Bastia without taking any precaution. THE EVENTS The transport fleet, formed by about a hundred vessels, leaves from the area of Bastia on June 16 at 12 o'clock. The crossing proceeds on a calm sea and is disturbed, around midnight, by a clash, without consequence, w ith a German ship returning from the island of Pianosa. At 1 a.m. the units of the assault battalion, tasked w ith the neutralization of .t he batteries and the Command post , disembark in six sites without any incident. On the whole, the preventive action obtains a large success, albeit at the price of considerable French losses and later than it was fo reseen; the battery on Monte Poro, in fact, is silenced only 62

at 5.30 a.m. Besides the battery of Monte Poro, also those of Punta Sardella, Enfola and the Command Post of San Pietro in Campo are knocked out. The success is confirmed by the archives of the German Headquarters on the island, which record that no unit has been sighted and that the destruction of the batteries has facilitated the main landing. At 3.45 a.m. the preparation fire from the ships starts and at 4 a.m. the first wave of the first echelon (I and II battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment and un its from the assault battalion) lands on the Marina di Campo beach, about two ki lometres wide. The units disembarked on the left succeed in overcoming the first and second defence line, while those engaged on the right - as a consequence of the errors made by the pilots of the landing craft, due to the violent and immediate German reaction - land on a minefield; as a consequence, a company of the 13th Infantry Regiment is completely destroyed and the remaining un its stop under the f ire of the defenders. The

landing craft, deeming that the disembarkment of the second wave and of the units of the 2nd echelon (third wave) would be imposs ib le, reverse their course. At the same time, the "Commandos d'Afrique" land at the foot of Monte Tambone under a violent reaction f ire. The initial plan, due to the unfavourable events on the beach of Marina di Campo, must be adapted to the new situation. The Ill Battalion of the 13th Infantry Reg iment and the 2nd and 4th Infantry Regiment are landed in the wake of the "Commandos d'Afrique" on the beach of Fonza, wh ich is small and inadequate to the needs. Thus the subsidiary operation becomes the main o ne. Nevertheless at 7 a.m. Monte Tambone is occupied and the progression continues towards San Martino (Commandos), Spiaggia Grande and Capo della Stella (4th Infantry Regiment}. At 10 a.m., after liberat ion of the beach of Marina di Campo, the 1st battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment takes Monte Baci le and the 2nd battalion of the same Regiment occupies Monte Castello. At 12 o'clock,

THE FRENCH ASSAULT BATTALION On May 23, 1943, at Staoueli, Algeria, General Giraud constitutes the Bataillon de Choe, an elite corps formed by highly selected and top-trained volunteers. Th is assault battalion, whose first Commander is Major Gambiez, con.sists of three combat companies and a servic e detachment; its task is to operate in depth into the e'nemy deployment, particularly in French territory, making attacks and sabotages in cooperation with the resistance organizations, as well as to gather useful information for the operations organized by the special services in Algiers . Already in October 1943, squads and single elements were infiltrated into occupied France. From September 12 to October 4, 1943, the assault battalion takes part in the liberatio n of Corsica, and d uring the winter performs various commando actions on the Italian coast. From June 17 to June 19, 1944, th e battalion participates in the land ing on the Island of Elba, and later, in August, takes part in th e liberation of Grenoble. Sixteen men commanded by Capt. HeriardÂˇDubreuil take part an the landing in Provence, side by side with the American paratroopers; then the battalion lands at Saint Tropez and, in September fights in Toulon. In Oc tober, the battalion is in the Haute Sa.one and, commanded by Capt. Lefort, is employed in the Vosges, at Belfort and in Northern Alsace. In January 1945 the unit is officially named "1st Assault Battalion" and, togeth er with French commandos trained in Algeria and men of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI), constitutes the 1st Assault Group. Employed in Alsace, Germany and Austria, the Assault Battalion reaches the Arlberg Pass. The scarcity of effectives and equipment, together with the evolution of the conflict itself, d iverted the battalion from its original tasks: suffice it to mention that, after the landing in Provence, the battalion was employed as assault infantry. In this role, the lack of heavy armament and specific training was compensated by the indomi tabl e courage of the men.

General de Lattre hugs Lt. Jacobsen, after awarding him a decoration. Jacobsen, nicknamed "the Dane", had taken part in the landing of June 17.

FERNAND GAMBIEZ the first Commander of the "Assault Battalion" Fernand Gambiez, born in 1903 in a modest family, attends the Saint Cyr Military School and from 1925 to 1927 serves with the 17e Bataillon Chasseurs Alpins. Until 1932 he is stationed in Morocco with the 2e Regiment Etranger d'lnfanterie (REI) for operations on the AlgerianMoroccan border. Promoted to Lieutenant, he is wounded and awarded the Leg ion d'Honneur. In 1932, Lt. Gambiez is transferred to the 51e Regiment d'lnfanterie and, as Captain, attends the War College and the Military School of t he 20e Chasseurs Alpins. In 1940, he takes part in the campaign of France with the 30e Bataillon Chasseurs. After the defeat, he is assigned t o the General Staff of the Vichy Army and remains there until the end of 1942, when he crosses the Spanish border. Until May of the following year, he is interned in Barcelona and then reaches North Africa, where he joins Gen. Giraud. As a Major, he assumes command of the Assault Battalion, which he leads in the liberation of Corsica (1943) and in the land ing at Elba (June 1944). One month later he constitutes the French Commandos in Algeria and in November, together with the Assault Battalion he establishes the Assault Brigade, which will be employed in the Vosges, in Alsace, in Germany an d in Austria. In 1945, promoted to Colonel, Gambiez i s assigned to the sector in charge of the general inspection of the Armed Forces and, subsequently, is appointed Director of the School of Saint Maixent, where he remains until 1948.

once the beach is cleared, the first vehic les and artilleries are unloaded. The road to Portoferraio is open. At 5 p.m. the II Battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment occu pies Procchio, the assault battalion takes Monte Perrone and Marciana, wh ile the Commandos battalion takes Monte Puccio, thus control ling the ridge that cuts the island in two parts. The western area of the island therefore is liberated on the evening of June 17. The same evening , a tank company is landed and the logistic f low between Bastia and Marina di Campo is activated. The losses of t he 13th Infantry Reg iment and the "Commandos d'Afrique" have been heavy. On June 18, at daybreak, the Frenc h units, whose task is made eas ier by the withdrawal of the German forces, are again on the move. The II battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment decimated by the action o f the day before, stops near Procchio and sends scouting patrols eastwards. The I Battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment takes possession o f Vil la Napoleone, followed by the I Battalion o f the 13th Regiment, transferred to t he 2nd echelon, wh ile the Ill Battalion of the 13th Regiment, inserted between them, occupies Portoferraio and at 12 o'clock concludes t he mopping up. On its turn, the 4th Infantry Regiment tu rns east and, after heavy fi ght ing, conq uers Monte Reciso and Monte Orello, reaches Monte Puccio and occupies, through Volterraio, Rio ne ll'Elba. The 2nd Infantry Regiment, following t he coastal plains of Lacona and Mola, reaches Capoliveri and the heights that surround Porto Langone, together with the " Commandos d'Afrique" and units of the assau lt battal ion. The resist ance of the German garrison is obstinate, and only on June 19 does t he stronghold fall, under the pressure of the French units. The island is conquered. The French have lost about 500 men, the Germans around 600, and 2,500 are taken prisoners.

CONCLUSIONS

NOTE

The study of t he operations carried out by the French forces for the conq uest of t he island has evidenced the followin g aspects, whic h could be seen as teaching elements: • necessity of a preventive and capillary informative research, in order to obtain t he widest knowledge of the enemy defensive situation; • impossibi lity, for amph ibious operations of rel at ively large proportions, to conceal the concent ration of forces and the size of the units; possibility to exploit the surprise factor as regards t he date of the landing; • need to envisage alternative landing areas, to avoid del ays in the operations in case the main land ing zone t urns out to be unemployab le by the subsequent waves; • convenience for the defender to intervene rapid ly and ti mely with the reserves, to prevent the forces disembarked from consolidating their position and strengthening the beachhead; • necessity, by the defensive side, to quickly locate the main land ing zone, in order to prevent coups de main and diverting secondary landings from scattering and fractioning the reaction of t he mobile forces. Moreover, it is important to underli ne that operations of this type seem to always require extreme flexib ility of planning, due to the different and numerous difficulties that cou ld come up and the unforeseeable mishaps that can decis ively affect the favourable outcome of t he operations. Finally, interesting p rospects are offered by the present availability of helicoptertransported forces, the emp loyment of wh ich, thanks to their extreme mobi li ty, permits to accomplish manoeuvres of vertical outflanking and prevents the adversary from detecting beforehand the points where t h e effort is going to be applied.

(1) The units had been located in Corsica since 1944, after the liberation of the island, but were reestabl ished in French West Africa and reorgani zed in Algeria, with French and colonia l personnel stationed in Africa and personnel escaped from occupied France.

Ghino Andreani

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents and reports of the I French Corps. Library of the Ecole Militaire, Poric.

" Resurrection de l'Armee Francaise" Nouvelles Editions Latines, Paris, 1955. G.R. Bouvet: "Ouvriers de la premiere heure". Berger-Levrault Ed., 1959 M. Guernier: " Bataillon de Choe", Durand Ed., Paris, 1946. " Revue Historique de l'Armee", no. 4/1970. Bulletin Trimestriel de !'Assoc iation des Amis de l' Ecole Superieure de Guerre, no. 49/1971 (artic le by Col. Rocaboy). Prof. Alberto Mori: "Studi Geografici sull'lsola d' Elba" , Libreria Goliardica, Pisa, 1960-1961, Publications of the Institute of Geography of the University of Pisa. Manfredo Roncioni: "Studi Sulla situazione economica e sociale dell' l sola d'Elba" - " II Telegrafo" Ed., Livorno 1967.

Maj. Gen. Ghino Andreani has attended the Mil itary Academy, the Application School and the War College. Assigned to the Tank C'.or11is, he has been comm ander of tank units of the " Ariete" Armou red Division, as we ll as a General Staff offi cer at the 3rd Corps Hqs. and at the Army General Staff. Gen. Andreani has also been Commander of the 7th Tan k Battal ion, " A ri ete" Armoured Division, and Deputy Commander, " Curtatone" Armoured Brigade. He has attended vario us cou rses at the German Armoured Troops School and taken part in bilateral exchanges with the French Army and the Turkish Army. Gen. Andreani has held the offi ce of Chief, Personne l Employment Office, Army General Staff, and has been Commander of the " Manin " Armoured Brigade. Since May 1986, he has been Chief of the 3rd Division of the Army General Staff.

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THE SOLDIER IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY ITALIAN PAINTING

TOWARDS THE UNITY OF ITALY i I

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Carlo Bossoli, Re Vittorio Emanuele II, accompanied by Count Camillo di Cavour and the Court, descends the great staircase of Palazzo Madama after the opening of the V Subalpine Parliament ( 1853), tempera on paper, cm 71 x 56, Turin, Gallery of Modern Art

The subject is a vast one. In fact, it is pract ically imposs ible to delineate briefly the irregular out line, from the first War of Independence to the Un ity of Italy, wh ich makes up the pictorial illustration of the various events of the Risorgimento, the portraits of the protagonists, the intimate representation o f facts seen in the light of daily li fe and of trepid hope. There is no Gal lery of Modern arl, 110 civic.: pi<.:turegallery, which does not retain , and show to great advantage in specific spaces, that great patrimony of visual cu lture and ideals which t he major artists of the Italian n ineteenth century, and also m inor personages of lesser techn ical and expressive ability, represented in their canvasses and tables. The Museums of the Risorgimento by themselves offer hundreds of pictures of very different kinds and qualitative levels. In this sense, to make a drast ic selection becomes a necessity, in order to stop our attention to the significant samples of historicoart ist ic work which is an integrated part o f our memory of sacrifice of blood and a need for civic acquisitions that cannot be disregarded. Also from this substantial skimming of t he works inspired by the history of the central events of the Risorgimento, it is clear t hat art has not on ly performed a celebrat ive function, not merely complied w ith narrative and descriptive solicitations, but - as Palma Bucarell i affirms in the presentation cards of the catalogue o t the Galleria Nazionale d'Arte Moderna of Rome - that the yearning after political freedom has been interwoven with the tendencies to pictorial renewal. There follows a just considerat ion, according to which the Risorgimento was no less a cultural movement than a political one. The best artists, in their aspirat ions as combatants and patriots, placed their ideological sentiments,

aimed at ridding Italy of foreign rule and to bu ild a united and independent country, side by side w ith the need for a renewal of pictorial research, which would be f ree from the curbing ru les of the co ld academic approach. In general we cou ld say that the historical painting of the Risorgimento provided remarkable hints for the evolution of a style of representation which - though it remained w ithin the main features of a pu rely realistic taste - broke away from t he fetters of the academic conformism of allegory, just because it was openly figh t ing against the contem porary

Antonio Pag/iano, Porta it of Giuseppe Garibaldi, Milan, Museo de/ Risorgimen to.

political conformism. It is beyond doubt that, in the general situation of the articulate and progressive p rocess towards freedom, the Garibaldian ep ic has played a fu ndamental role. The crushing impact of the event, the climate of confidence and expectat ion, the charisma of the hero ic personality, the vitality of the strategist, the insp iring force he exerted upon the most disparate members o f soc iety, the enthusing resu lts on the mil itary level, have been urg ing artists of various cu ltural origins and

social and ideological extraction to t he representation - often free from encomiastic rituals of t he whole creative journey of Garibaldi towards the Unity of Italy. Even a painter like Giacinto Gigante, one of the main Neapolitan artists of the Scuola di Posillipo, a famous "vedutista", whose tendency to scenographical schematization surpassed any need for documentation , could not escape the attraction of the myth of Garibald i. Gigante as is known - had been long contended for - such was his fame and mastery - by the Bourbon Parthenopean nobi lity and went habitually to the Cou rt of Francis II, often accompanying the sovereigns in their stays at Gaeta. After the Un ity o f Italy "bon gre mal gre" , while be ing much afraid of falli ng a victim to the Garibaldians, he planned in 1861 a monumental composition representing t he Garibaldi entering La Maddalena bridge. Th is work remained only as a plan , but there is a splendid watercolour sketch of it, vibrating with light and col ours, in the National Museum of San Mart ino. In it the painter interprets . the Neapolitan landscape in an openly lyric way and lets Garibaldi's carriage triumphant ly advance among a wh irling waving of tricolour flags. It is the 7th of September, 1860. The same event - but pictorially aimed at reaching a result of il lusive evidence - has been put on

canvas by Antonio Licata, whose undoubtedly minor artistic gifts have been balanced by patriot ic enthusiasm to such an extent that the representation turns out to by made fussy by an excess of realistic notations. One thi ng is certain: here, more than in the preceding picture,

Top. Giacin to Gigante, Arrival of Garibaldi in Napoli, Naples, National Museum of San Martino.

Above

Daniele Ranzoni, Portait of the Garibal dian Major Filippo Erba (1872), Oil on canvas, cm. 71.5 x 57.5, Milan, private collection.

the figure of the Hero of Two Worlds, "the man who represents the most beautiful ideal of the Italian nation" (Carducci), plays, at the centre of the composition, the role of the ''condottiero" who, above al l, fascinates the masses and the humble. Leaving out this celebrative and monumental vision of the heroic figure - of which there is obviously an immense iconography - it seems to be more proper to call our attention to those attributes of Garibaldi's personality which emerge also from the portraits from life: pride, loyalty, introversion, humanity. Among this kind of pictures we choose those painted by Eleuterio Pagliano and Vincenzo Cabianca, though they greatly differ from each other in their pictorial bases

and quality. The Giuseppe Garibaldi by Pagliano, painted the 15th of December, 1859, is a small-sized oil painting portraying the General wearing the Sardinian Army uniform, half bust and in a th ree quarter sitting. It perfectly suits the description of Garibaldi by Giuseppe Guerzoni: "knight errant of justice and freedom, simple, upright, always ready to bend every thought, every personal propensity to the ideal he had bound himself to since his early youth . He had no other laws but those of his conscience". Really, here we are not confronted by a mannered portrait, but by a strong introspective penetration, very emotional, which offers the spectator a temperament of great intens ity and expressive weight.

Also Vincenzo Cabianca succeds in giving us these same qualities, though by means of the technique of the Florentine impressionists (Macchiaioli). The democratic faith of Cabianca, proved by his adventurous biography of conspirator, especially in his youth, leads the artist to conceiving the painting Garibaldi at Caprera (circa 1880) as a sign of homage and gratitude towards the man who is by now tired and weighted down by disillusion and embitterment. Here Garibaldi is coming to the end of his earthly existence; he is staring at the ground, absorbed; the foot, wounded at Aspromonte, and the crutch, are well in evidence. Although there is no apotheosis, the wise choice of the pose, still heroic even in

the absolute informality, contributes to a representation of the character cought in an atmosphere of deep meditation. The art of the portrait in the historical Garibaldian painting is studded with other masterly examples, also related to minor personalities. It is the case of the Portrait of the Gariba/dian Major Filippo Erba painted by Daniele Ranzonl circa 1870. This work, which shows traces of the influence of Tranquillo Cremona, of whom Ranzoni was a friend, tends towards a search for atmosphere rather than facial features, melting the image in the light of a chromatic fading, and becomes a painting of feeli ngs. The austere countenance of the person in the portrait, the look full of melancholy, the twilight tonality of the red shirt, the

weak glitter of the decoration, combine to cause the picture to be regarded as one of the most refined of its kind. We could go on for a long time speaking about Garibaldi 's iconography and Garibaldian portraits, citing, for example, the paint ings by Filippo Palizzi or Francesco Saverio Altamura. The subject of this brief notation, however, calls for a pause in order to seek fro those examples wh ich are more closely linked to the events of the Risorg imento, both relevant to the enterprises of the Hero of Two Worlds and to the ch ief military vicissitudes of the second War of Independence. After 1860, the exploits of Garibaldi's juvenile years became a myth, as is w itnessed by one of the most renowned painting by Pietro Bouvier,

Garibaldi and Major Leggiero carry dying Anita during their flight. Painted in 1864, th is picture is the most famous and evocative translation of an episode which was deeply loved by the popu lar literature and the hagiography of the Garibaldian ep ic. Being a pup il of Hayez', Bouvier was essentially a drawing-room painter, with a refined mark and prevai ling light Facing page. Vincenzo Cabianca, Gari baldi at Caprera (1870-80). Oil on canvas, cm. 72 x 87.5, Florence, Gallery of Modern Art of Palazzo Pitti. Above.

Pietro Bouvier, Garibaldi and Major Leggiero carry dying Anita duri ng their flight (1864), Oil on canvas, cm. 146 x 108, Milan, Museo de/ Risorgimento.

colours. In this historical picture, the painting tends towards strong chiaroscuro effects and plays of light in a way to suggest the artist's emotional participation in the illustrated fact which represents the hero in the moment of utmost grief. The structure of the painting is dramatic, though formally classical in its general lines. As is noted, the picture has inspired some tercets of Rapsodia Garibaldina, composed by Giovanni Marradi in 1899. In these tercets, Garibaldi, together with Anita and Legg iero, is caught in the tension of fl ight, hunted down in the maize field of the Cornacchio marsh, while he desperately t ries to help h is sick and extremely exhausted wife. Continuing to deal with t he feats of Garibaldi, there are many pictures, also famous, wh ich depict the whole course of the "Mille" enterprise. Let's quote some of them: Victor Emmanuel II and Garibaldi meet at the Teano Bridge, described with topograph ic scruple and not without emotion by the Piedmontese Carlo Ademollo; Garibaldi at Capua, an episode of the battle of Volturno represented by Fattori, belonging to the first period of his patriotic painting; The "Mille" depart from Quarto, magnificently fixed in the crepuscular image by Gerolamo lnduno. The number of painting and litog raphies representing the main phases of the battles of t he second War of Independence is also great. Among these, The battle of Magenta, which was depicted, be::;ide::; Fattori, by Luigi Bellangee and Gerolamo lnduno, and The 24th of June at San Martino, a vigorous illustration by Michele Cammarano. Being a true follower of the realism of the Posillipo school and of Palizzi's naturalism, Cammarano, with a strong narrative and dramatic vein, but also with a substantially rhetoric inspiration, realized this grand canvas in order to illustrate a historicopatriotic event with a particular 72

realistic taste and not without some strong popular hints. The painting is rich in beautiful details, which interact with the impetuous movement of the whole composition, whose background is a landscape which is as glittering as the battle celebrated in the painting. No event of the Risorgimento has been neglected by the hand of the artists, who, through their images, enable us to reconstruct hour by hour all the facts of Italian history of the whole 1850's. Naturally, among these, there is no lack of triumphal moments such as: Victor Emmanuel II leaving Palazzo Madama after the opening of the Subalpine Parliament, a tempera by Carlo Bossoli, in which the protagonists of the event are scattered in the wonderful perspective of the great staircase by Juvarra, or as Victor Emmanuel II and Napoleon Ill in Milan, a sketch by Giuseppe Bertini in which the triumphal entrance of the 8th June 1859 is realized with happy improvisation but still with respect to the chronicle of the event. Lastly, let's have a glance at those represen tat ions of history which are looked upon with the intimate eye of everyday life: in these, history is mixed with emotions and trepid waitings in home were the echoes of battles and heroisms are filtered in images of the ideals so craved tor and now almost within reach. This reference is openly addressed to the paintings of the "macchiaioli" and is mostly related to: The first Italian flag carried to Florence by Francesco Saverio Altamura; 26th April 1859 and women sewing red shirts by Odoardo Borrani; The masked boys by Adriano Cecioni. The painting by Altamura shows clear traces of the contacts the artist from Foggia had with the "Macchiaioli". In it, the theme of the Risorgimento can only be detected in the central figure of the young man bearing the great Italian flag

and in the sunny background of the landscape of San Martino al Monte, which illuminates the close link existing between past and present. The painting refers to the popular uprising in Florence, which obliged Leopold 11 to leave the city and to decree the end of the House of Lorraine's Grand Duchy (27 April 1859). Altamura, a fervid patriot, gives us an inward and symbolic interpretation of the event, quite analogous to the one given by Odoardo Borrani, who, in his very famous 26th April 1859 shows a serene interior with a young woman

Above. Gero/amo lnduno, The "Mille" depart from Quarto. Right. Giuseppe Bertini, Victor Emmanuel II and Napoleon Ill in Milan (1859), sketch, Oil on canvas, cm. 39 x 69, Milan, Museo de/ Risorgimento.

Left, from top. Odoardo Borrani, Women sewing red shirts (1863), Oil on canvas, cm. 66 x 54, Florence. Francesco Saverio Altamura, The fi rst Italian flag carried to Florence in 1859 (1859); Oil on canvas, cm. 51 x 75, Turin, Museo Nazionale de/ Risorgimento Italiano.

sewing the Italian flag. With a daring image, we could say that, from the time-space point of view, Borrani's interior preceds Altamura' s exterior stance, and this woman represents an ideal mother of the young man on his way to Florence. With Women sewing red shirts (1863) Borrani takes up and continues with the happy intuition of the preceding picture. This masterpiece, one of the artists' best and most poetic works, is imbued and animated by ethical and sentimental contents and constitutes an irreplaceable reference point to understand how the "macchiaio li" painting interprets the climate of fervour and democratic hopes of the Risorgimento. Women sewing red shirts is a painting of rare cordiality and delicacy, where civi l aspirations are closely bound to the absorbed intimacy of the domestic walls and to the silent devotion of the women, who are participating in the need for an improvement of the social and political conditions in a renewed Italy. Finally, as if the scene was happening in a room adjoining that where the women are intent 011 sewi11y the red shirts,

it is pleasant to conclude our "excursus" with the wonderful ambience sketch The masked boys, by Adriano Cecioni, in wh ich the children, who are playing soldiers, are themselves, in their way, protagonists, not at al l irreverent, of a history which the "real Country" was living with a sense of optimism and hope. Pier Marco De Santi

TEC H NIC A L

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D A TA

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TECHNICAL

'90 COMBAT VEHICLES The Swedish defence industry has designed a new series of light armoured vehicles called "'90 combat vehicles". They will have a basic hull, suitable for tracked armoured vehicles, antiaircraft and recovery vehicles, and will be armed with the new antitank BILL missiles. The project has excellent possibilities of development, due both to the protection of the vehicles and the effectiveness of their main armament. The '"90s" are in fact the first combat vehicles protected against infrared weapons, and this gives them the highest security coefficient. The first model can be adapted to 5 basic hu lls, with a turret for a 40mm automatic cannon. The other versions will be produced by the end of 1993. The basic vehicle is called "G armoured tracked vehicle", weights less than 201 and is armed with an automatic cannon which can be employed against ground and air targets, as well as in combat against similar vehicles.

NEW IMAGE-INTENSIFIER BINOCULARS Surveillance and identification of potential targets are of cruc ial im portan ce for military activities. A precision team of the British aerospace industry has recently completed the development of image-intensifier hand binoculars, with stabilized sight. The new scope has made possible to overcome the numerous problems connected with night vision and with the observation from helicopters, ships, motor vehicles and other self-propelled platforms. The binoculars use the well established tecnology of the "Steadyscope" stabilizing lens, which has been successfully employed in more than 40 cou ntries. The magnification in standard optics is 12.5 x 10, or x 14 with spares. The scope, weighing 2.3kg, has a 40mm len s wit11 a field of view of 5Â°. The eyepiece adjustment is -4 to + 4 dioptres. The correct sighting is established by the control mirrors, which rotate on two axes; their rotation is guided by a small DC motor, driven by two dry batteries, with an operational duration of 10 hours. The stabilized mirror incorporates a guiding mechanism which follows the movements of the target, in order to take the exact aim.

DATA

BOOKS

REVIEWS

Giovanni Spadolini: "The Idea of Europe" between Enlightenment and Romanticism, Published by "Le Monnier", 294 pages with 408 plates, 40,000 Lire.

SPADOI.TNl

L 'IDEA D' E UROPA frn iUuminismo e roman1 icisrno

The idea of Europe between Enlightenment and Romanticism. Spadolini's latest book reconstructs the birth of the idea of Europe th ro ugh th e pages of Vi eu sseux's Antologta , In wh ich the legacy of the Enligh ten ment and the Romantic experience meet. It i s both a study of the probl ems and a selection of texts: a foretaste of i t was published in the same series under the title Fra Vieusseux e Ricaso/i, and others wil l be fo llowing. The book's main purpo se is to red iscover the roots of a cultural Europeanism, whic h ru ns throughout the book wit hou t ever man i fest i ng itse lf in a declamatory, grandiloquent or ostentatious manner. The cult ural Europeani sm of the Antologia is in the philosophy o f Vi eusseux, in his system for handling relations with the

whole of Europe. It was in the tec hnique of th e culture industry based essentially on Swiss or French schemata th rou gh his avant-garde c ultural en terprise in Florence: initially th e " Gabinetto" for reading and conversation, then t he magazine, then the publication of p erio dicals in various mon ograph ic disc iplines. It is th e indirec t, res trained Europeanism of the "society of minds" of which Voltaire had an insigh t in the second half of the eighteenth century. That idea of the literary Republic wh ich, in the peri od bet ween the Enlightenmen t and Romanticism symbolized by Giuseppe Mazzini became the poli ti cal Republic, or rather th e plan for a republican c on federa tion of Europe. The idea of Italy stem med from its language and its cu lture, and started with t he rediscovery of Dante. In the same way, t he idea of Europe stemmed from the ins ight of a Europe seen as a cultural unity. It was no coi ncidence that Giuseppe Mazzini began his controversial collabo ration with the Palazzo Buon delmonti magazin e w ith an artic le on "Dante's love of his fatherland" wh ich wa s rejected because of the fear that the Grand Duchy's censor might be upset by it. " Dante' s love of his fatherland " was o nly th e preface to the w ork, which is essenti al readi ng for th e history of the Anrologta and European cu lture, w hich Mazzin i submitted to t he magazine in 1828, to be published the fo llowing year under the startlin g, prop hetic pseu donym " an Italian". It was enti tled "D'una letteratura europea". The book followed and carefully examined the passage from the essentia l c ultural idea of 18th cen tury Europe toward s a view in whic h culture and politics meet, a lbeit w ith all the diplomatic caution and prud ence of the fou nder-editor of Antologia. The balance between Enlightenment and Romanticism is preserved in all the pages of the magazine. Th e magazine itself thrived in the roman tic cli mate but did no t forget the great values of mankin d, pro-

gress, and the brotherh ood of man whi ch went along with the parable of the "Encic lopedi a" . Europeanism means "that ce rtain idea of Europe" . It is no coinci dence that th is is the ti tle chosen for t he first part of the book, whi ch is d ivided into 4 chapters: "Cultural Europeanism: from the Enlightenment to Roman ti ci sm"; "From 'Le tteratura Europea ' to 'Giovine Europa"'; "Vieusseux, th e European", and "The Europe of th e anci ents and th e mod em s". These are the ti tles of the an thology of works: Italy and Europe, The protorisorgimento, The idea of European civilization, European literature, For a European legal system, For a European economy, For a European education, Europea n society, The European arts, The emerging European nations, Europe through travelling, The Europe of the ancients and the modems. The an thology comprises extracts by N iccolo Tommaseo, Pietro Colle tta, Gino Capponi, Giuseppe Montani, Giuseppe Montane/Ii, Raffael/o Lambruschini, Em anuele Rep etti, Cos i m o Rido lfi, Leopoldo Cicognara, Giusepp e Pecchio, an d the unabridged version of Mazzini's essay. "D 'una letteratura europea". " Italy and Europe" . This was the thread that linked a history for a century and a half - the history which leads us to An tologia an d Nuova Antologia. This was th e thread t hat ran th rough all the Flore ntine experience s th at may be summarized in the name of Giovan Pietro Vieusseu x. This was th e thread that remained intact between the first literary "Gabinetto Vieusseu x" fou nded in 181 9 in Florence and the "Gabine tto Vieusseu x" in the years under Fascism in which it was under the leadership of a poet who was not even a c ard-carrying Fasci st - one Eugenio Montale. It is no coincidence that the last words o f the preface are ded icated to Montale: " In this spirit, w ith thi s fra me of m ind, I dedicate thi s vol ume t o the memory of Eu genio Montale, a "citizen of Europe" as Giovan Pi etro Vie usseux was in his day" .

BOOKS

MARZI ANO BRIGNOLI

~voye.Bonnes Nouvelles ~ .SJ:ORIA DEL REGGIMENTO

SAlf91A CAVALLf:RIA --~~ K""- , 1s92-191s . ' 4.

M. Brignoli: "Savoye Bonnes Nouvelles. La storia del Reggimento Savoia Cavalleria (1692-1975)" ("Savoye Bonnes Nouvelles. A History of the 'Savoia' Cavalry Regiment (1692-1975)"), Mursia Publishers, Milan, 216 pages with b/w photos, 30,000 Lire. Following the publication of Giorgio Pugliaro's fine volume "I Lancieri di Novara" , an event which took place just a few years ago, the Mursia publishing house had added another regimental history to its prestigious "Uomini ed armi" collection: " Savoia Cavalleria", written by Marziano Brignoli, a wise and conscientious military historian who writes in an habitually restrained and concise manner and has a passion for things equestrian. The author's long acquaintance with General Raffaele Cadorna, the fifty-second Commander of the "Savoia" - and the men to whose memory this book is dedicated has allowed him to enrich the narrative with episodes closer to our own experience, as well as a good many little-known details which prove especial ly interesting. In addi路 lion, the ready cooperation of quite a few veterans of the Reg iment, together with the assistance provided by the director of the National Cavalry Museum, have made it possible to complement the text with a large number of stirring photographs whose documentary value is beyond question. "Savoia Cavalleria" was founded on July 23, 1692 by Vittorio Amedeo II. The new regiment - composed of nine compan ies with fifty men each and an equal number of horses - was placed under the command of Count Gian Michele de Rossi di Piossasco. It received its baptism of fi re on October 4th of the following year at Mar-

REVIEWS

saglia, where it provided valuable assistance in covering the withdrawal of the Duke's army to Moncalieri, an action during which it repeatedly, and with selfless vigor, charged the advanced positions of the French forces commanded by Catina!. Thus began the nearly three路centuries long history of this magnificent unit, wh ich through the years, in good times and bad, has always remained true to the spiritual values contained in a brief, but finelysculpted paragraph which summarizes a venerable ve rsion of the cavalry's rules of engagement: "The cava lry defends itself by attacking and dies galloping towards victory". These spiritual va lues have been amply demonstrated and reaffirmed by the Italian Cavalry, which, despite period ic changes in uniform, weaponry and tactics, has maintained its own particular approach to life over a centuries-long span of time. The conclusion of the War of the League of Augusta - a conflict which saw Piedmont regain Pinerolo from the French - was followed by the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, an event which marked the beginning of a difficult but glorious period for the "Savoia Cavalleria"; glorious, because Vittorio Amedeo II almost always managed to preserve his cavalry's freedom of action. Even following the inva路 sion of Piedmont, the Regi ment continued to launch its valorous incursions. Always meeting th e enemy w ith firm resolve, it did its best to slow his progress, inflicting con tinual losses through daring raids on his rear and flanks. The episode which gave rise to the motto whose words still are below the coatof-arms used by the "Savoia Cavalleria" took place in the course of this long war on September 7, 1706 at the Battle of Turin. As Brignoli writes: " The Savoia Cavalleria distinguished itself for its outstanding valor during the Battle of Turin, and on that day was born the motto ' Savoye, bonnes nouvel les'. Once the French counterattack at Madonna di Campagna had been repelled, a messenger was sent off to carry the news to Duke Vittorio Amedeo and Prince Eugenio, both of whom had been watching the battle from the vantage point of the Superga Hill. With the blood fro m a wound suffered moments earlier staining the whi t e tie around h i s throat, the messenger cri ed out: 'Savoye, bonnes nouvelles!'. In honor of this horseman, the Duke adopted his cry as the Regiment's motto, declaring that from that point forward, the horsemen of th e 'Savoia' would all wear red ties in memory of their heroic companion". The narrative continues, ever precise and convincing, fol lowing the Regiment through the wars of the Austrian and the Polish successions, the campa igns against revolutionary France, the wars for national independence and the two world wars: right up through the present day and the 1975 reorganization plan which dictated the contraction of the glorious Regiment into a battalion. At this point, the author stops, for, as he writes: "What fo llows is no longer history, but something closer to a news

story, and news is an area where the historian hesi tates to enter, preferring the perspective of time - an ever necessary factor which lends men and things their just importance - to the narratio n of the present, a form in which the sentiments and resentements of the moment often combine to distort one's judgement". Among the many heroic episodes taken fro m the Regiment's past, special mention should go to the engagement at lsbusenskii, less because of the fact that it marked the last cavalry charge in military history, than because of the manner in which the "Savoia Cavalleria" acquitted itself on th is watershed occasion, offering an e m bl ematic glo rification of the "esprit" which has always inspired the horsemen with the red ties: a "spirit" composed of ideals, traditions, solid moral discipline, a sense of duty and an unquestioning fidelity to the sworn oath. In August of 1942, the "Savoia Cavalleria" , which had arrived in Russia the preceding summer, was assigned to patrol the ample stretch of undefended territory between Jagodny and Tsebotareskij, two strongholds under the control of the 53rd and 54th Regiments of the " Umbria" Divisions. On the morning of August 24th, two battalions of Siberian infantry, having deployed themselves in camouflaged positions in o rder to take the squared bivouac of the " Savoia" by surprise, opened fire. At first, their attack was met by the precise and violent fire of machine guns and antitank cannons; this was fo llowed by the mounted action of the troops. Without a moment's hesitation, the 2nd troop - under the command of Colonel Alessandro Bettoni - courageously charged the flank and the rear of the enemy's forces. Meanwhile, the 4th troop, fight ing on foot, attacked the enemy head on. This first attack, during which the horsemen used hand grenades and sabers, was followed by further charges on the part of the 3rd troop, fightin g on horseback. Once both troops had run up and down the entire length of the Soviet formation, making use of their sabres all the way, the enemy forces were put out of action. Conducted with great energy and admirable dispatch, the engagement cost the Russians 250 dead, 300 prisoners and a large number of heavy weapons. The tact ical result was a lessening of the enemy pressure on the stronghol d of Tsebotareskij as well as the total liberation of the lsbu'$enski j position; at the same time, the regiment cont inued to pose a threat to the flank and the rear of the enemy formation. Considering the result achieved, the losses on the Italian side were not excessive: 32 dead, including 3 officers; 52 wounded, includ ing 5 officers, and 100 horses out of action. "It seems only right that the horses also be remembered writes Brignoli - because the re lationship between cavalry soldiers and the ir horses goes beyond that between a man and his means of transpo rtation; it is the bond be路

BOO KS

REVIEWS .

tween a man and his companion in arms, with the horse itself rep resenting a weapon, indeed, the primary weapon, of the cavalry soldiers: not an inanimate metal tool, but a weapon made of blood and muscle, with its own deeply-rooted inst incts and - why not? - its own generous spirit of self. sacrifice. Only those who come into regular contact with horses, and know the animals well, can truly appreciate and love all the traits of this noble beast, an invaluable assistant in the tranquil tasks of peacetime and a valiant warri or in times of conflict. The narrative does not deal exclusively wit h heroic episodes. Technica l matters are also given adequate treatm ent, and the book includes accurate research on weaponry, trai ning and tactics, from the seventeenth-centu ry "caracol e" to the "charge" of Frederick the Great; indeed, all the way up to the mechanizat ion of the present day. The book also lists the citations for the decorations awarded to the regimental Stan dard, plus the names of all those who either fell in battle or rece ived mili tary decorations during the Second World War, as wel l as the names of the horses who took part in the Russian campaign betwee n July 1941 and May 1943 and the names of the Regiment's commanding officers. In short, the work is to be recommended not only as a piece of history, but also as a study of cu stoms and tradition, given t hat the author has succeded in placing th e regi ment's deeds w ithin an historico-social framework wh ich rounds off the narrat ive, making it unfailingly exciting and alive.

Oreste Bovio

r ESPOSIZIONE

To commemorate the 120th anniversary of the Battle of Bezzecca (21 st July 1866), an interesting Garibaldi exhibition was held at Att imis, designed and organized by the 52nd 'Alpi' Infantry Battalion - successor to the "Corpe dei Cacciatori delle Alpi" which , under the leadership of the Hero of Two Worl ds, fo ught gloriously in the Risorgimen to campaigns. Th e idea was to recall a particularly ex· citing phase i n the third war of i ndependence, and some of Italy's leading collectors took part: Renato Artesi , Silvano Bonetti, Mauro Va<.:<.:ali, Mario Capuano, Bruno Fontana, Giuseppe Marraffa, Enzo Montecchi , Attili o Snidero and Gian Carlo Torcel li with objects of excep tion al historical interest. A special edition of only 500 numbered copies was subsequen tly published, not for sale, with articles of interest for historians, stamp collectors and co llectors in general, most of them written specially for the occasion. The book contains some of the most important aspects of the cu lture of the Risorgimento, a legacy of a historical period that is not only for students learning about memorable heroic moments of history for the first time, but above all for anyone who is interested in finding out more about this st age in our h istory and the general background to it. Recalling such an important period in our history in this way has certainly been a fortunate 'cultural moment', and has helped to stren gthen the bonds that exist in Friuli between the military community and t he civil ian population.

Massimiliano Angelini

IISS @

·'-~=.:'~;; · t .

STRATEGIC SURVEY

1985-1986

120° AN NIVE RSARIO di BEZZECCA

AITIMIS Miscellaneous authors: " 1st historical, military, philatelic and post card exhibition", 52nd 'Alpi' Infantry Battalion, Attimis, 1986. Not for sale. 500 numbered copies published.

J International Institute for Strategic Studies: "Strategic Survey 1985-1986", London 1986, 238 pages, £ 12. " Strateg ic Survey" i s the twin publication that complements the other well known annual IISS publication, " Military Balance",

and provides an overv iew of the developments of the world strategic situation, and for each geopolitical area i t examines the main themes of relevance to the political and military authorit ies, and to experts and scholars of strategic problems. The book also provides a detailed chronological list of t he main events of 1985, wh ich it defines as a year of uncertainty and strategic wait-and-see as a result of the changes in the Soviet leadership and the tech nological instability in the arm s sector. Once again, the staff of the ln terna· tional Institute for Strategic Studies has not let its readers down, publishing an excellent and acute overvi ew of th e main strategic facts and problems. Obviousl y, it is impossible to mention all the subjects discussed, and so we will merely exam ine the points whi ch the editors themselves focus on: in· tern ational terrorism, the military use of space, improvi ng convent i onal NATO defence, and the debate on t heatre antimissile defence in Europe. The problems of international terrorism are dealt wi th in an extremely cautious manner, leaving th e options open. The au tho rs emphasize the dan ger of technological terrorism (not only chemical and nuclear, but also terrorism using the very latest precision weapons, particu larly portable ground-to-air missiles), and also the di ff iculties faced by the great powers in trying to combat it effectively. The military use of space is being stepped up all the time. Strateg ic te lecomm unications, survei llance and targe t acqui sit ion syst ems an d weapons guidance systems are coming to depend increasingly on space. Meanwhile, increasingly effective antisatellite weapons are being developed, at least as far as their effectiveness against low orbiting satellites (up to 1,000 kms} i s concerned. Antimissile strategic defence weapon systems will also be deployed in space. Particul ar stress is placed on stepping up the conventional defence of Europe. The constraints relate to the dec lining birthrate, the limited defence budgets of the NATO countries, and the low level of integration of the western arms industries. Because of these limitations, it is highly unlikely that NATO's de fences w ill be separated from the direct support of nuclear weap ons, even though the new technologies are offering new solutions that were impossible in the past. A large amount of space is also devoted to the problem of theatre mlsslles, wh ict1 are absolutely essential to Europe and NATO. Towards the m iddle of th e Nineties, there will be a real threat of a Soviet missile attack using conventional warheads, wh ich cou ld destroy the West's air bases and forces in their peacetime locations. On the other " side of the hill", meanwhile, the fact that the Warsaw Pact has cons iderably stepped up its antimissile and an ticruise capab ility cou ld make the flexible response strategy impracticable, neutralizing the selective and limited nuclear strikes whi ch i t entails. This clearl y shows the challenge of an enhanced strategic and technol ogical in-

BOOK

stability, wh ich might co nsiderably alter the present balances and the conditions of European and world security. Stability can only stem from a new ro und of arms limitation negoti atio ns between the two superpowers, not only in re lati on to nuclear and strategic weapon s, but also conven tional and chem ical weapon s.

Carlo Bess

Vittorio Rebuttal: "Code of the Administration and General Accounting of the State", Giuffre, Milan, 1986, Volume I

REVIEWS

pp. XL VIII + 2,328, 65,000 Lire: Volume II pp. LII + 3,086, 150,000 Lire . Anyone wh o has to venture in to the maze of general government adm inistration and accou nting for research or for profess ional purposes often loses the th read of Ariadne and gets lost in th e vast, fragmentary jungle of rules and reg ulations. To help the people who, day by day, run the risk o f getting lost in the incredil.Jle La11yle uf leyi:;lative µrovi:;ions and regulations, Giu ffre has published the second volume of "Code of the Adm inistrat ion and General Accounti ng of the State", Giuffre , Milan, updated to 1st September 1986 by Vittori o Rebuffat, head of th e financial inspectora te of the General Accounting Office. These two volum es the first of wh ich was published by the same author in 1982 for Giuffre - stand out on accoun t of their partic ular features: th ey are highl y polished works and the fruit of punctil ious research, and they offer a complete account o f the sources of laws and regulati ons, a ll carefully coordinated. Th is task was made d iffi cu lt by the inc reasing con fusi on in the legislation in th is f ield. The second volume is both an update of the f irst, and a complement t o it. It comprises 42 sections, each containing provisions that are coord inated and accom panied by cross-referen ces t o the many p ro vis ions of c ase -l aw and j ud icial precedents. It also contains the fu ll texts of a ll the financia l legislati on ever enacted, wit h copious details of the judgments of the ad-

ministrat ive tribunals, on the work and structure of the 'State Counci l', the regional adm nistrative tribunal s, th e Court of Audit, and the State Attorney's Office. The accounti ng of the military admnistration , which i s num ber forty one, conta ins the new "Ad· m inistrative Regulations of the Guardia d i Finanza" - Presiden tial Decree no. 189 of 10th March 1986, wh ich ca n be used for a comparative analysis with the " Regulations for the Ad ministration of the Accou nts of the Arm y, Navy and Air Force" - Presid ential Decree no. 1076 of 5th J une 1986, to get a cl earer Idea of tile organic structure, the equi valent and different legal aspects, an d the new law s and provi s io ns that have developed. In over 3,000 pages, the book contains about 400 laws, 100 circu lars and 4,000 obiter dicta, and thanks to the selection and listing of sources, th e reader c an immediately find the leg al provisions on any subject. Th ere are three indices (by subject matter, c hro nological, a nd g eneral analyti ca l/alphabetical) whi c h make the work easy to handle. It is a va luable aid to an yone work ing with the law, civi l servants, researchers and anyone else having dealings wi th the c ivi l servi ce, who can rap idly find ou t anything th ey need regardi ng g overn men t ad m in i strat i on , fin anc i al managemen t and accounting. In conclusion, it i s a unique t ool for study and work, because i t manages to recon cil e, at the highest level, scientific rigour, conc rete util ity and easy con sul tat ion as a resul t of the way the author has wisely and carefu lly selected th is huge collectio n of documents.

Raffaele Pugliese

M A is a flexible c ompan y foun ded in 1943. Since 1948 has been aciive in design, development and production o f elect ronic equipment for defence. M ain activities are radars for ground, sipborne, airborne, missile applications and related d ispla y system s . The company

broa d spectrum permits the supply of turnkey systems tailored to the end-user n eeds.

5€GNALAMENTO MARITTIMO ED AEREO

MA's basic oroduct ines and bl.1smcss sectors include. Hig h definHion and discn 'Tlination coastal radar control stations . bo~h 'or manurr e lratf,c m;:;n;;gcmcnt systems and military application (anti in:,usicn . coastal cefenc~. rmn~ s:,lash detecuon}: Ship borne navigation / search r adars de·101ed w low . very-low an coverage (ant, sea skirnmeTs}: Missile active homing h eads, orovided with a vane1y o f EC M de.;ces, for SSM (OTO MA T MK2) and ASM (Marte M K2) applica tions: 360" coverage search and navigation airborne radars for helicoplers and maritime

~'ltr0I ;;ircr<1i1, Standard Pod contai ned search radars for hxed w ing a r crafi: to be emplo;·eC:: u1 ccnium ion ;•:.1h .t..SM . Integrated search and t racking radars for A /A d efence to be emolove:.t bot~ o n specialized truck s (OTO t·AA TIC) o r o n semi-mob,1e/!1.xec statio n fa~noinr def<:nce . applied research a ,med m\"/a<d n dlim etric waves fo::i :o I 00 GH z! m active and passive sensors (rad1omete,): Duct analisys and elecrromagne;ic p ropagation fo· ecast.

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