JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 1986 N.6 "RIVISTA MILITARE"

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FRANCESCO COSSIGA Europe and Culture. Opening up to the Future

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LUIGI POLI What Kind of Army? System Stages

CIRO DI MARTINO Evolution of the Concept of Imperialism from the 19th Century to This Day.

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~ CONTENTS

Number six 1986 ~ November-December

European Military Press Agency

The aim of Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the techn ical an d vocational training of Army Officers and NCOs. _To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military thinking and as a forum of study and debate. Rivista Militare is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and m ili tary matters through the p ublication of ar ticles of current technical and scientific interest

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ffllLITARE BIMESTRALE

Politics, Economics and Strategy 2

0irettore responsab ile Pier Giorgio Franzosi

Europe and Culture. Opening up to the Future. (Francesco Cossiga)

8 Dlrezione e Redazione Via di S. Marco, 8 00186 Roma Tel. 47357373

What kind of Army? System Stages. ( Luigi Poli)

16 Redattore Capo Giovanni Cerbo Tel. 47353078.

Evolution of the Concept of Imperialism 'from the 19th Century to This Day. (Giro D1 Martino)

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Industry Faces the Future. (Cesare Romiti)

Science, Technology and Training 34

Delta Force - The Moment of the Special Forces. (Lucio lnnecco)

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The Portuguese Armed Forces in the Service of NATO. (Giovanni Di Simone)

History 58

The Auxiliary Units in the War of Liberation. (Enrico Boscardi)

Autorizzazione del Tribuna le di Roma a l n. 944 del Regis tro con decreto 7-6-1949. Foto di copertina: Giancarlo De Zanet

© 1986 Proprieta letteraria anistica e scienti fica riservati'3

M ember o f USPI Un ,one Stamoa Per ,od,c a lta liana

Militaria 68

An Eighteenth Century Italian Print.

72

Technical Data.

74

Book Reviews.

Rules for contributors. Anyone can contribute. In the interest of the maxim um objectivity o f information, Rivista Militare allows contributo rs considerable freedom, although it does not necessarily sub scribe to th eir opinions. The articles are publi shed unedited and free of any editorial constraints and are therefore the sole respo nsibility of the Autho r and reflect his personal ideas exclusively. The top ic must be treated in an original way and the articles themselves should not exceed 10 typewritten pages in length. The Author, got his reward, makes over his exclusive article right to Riv ista Militare. Rivista Militare can make over Author's e xcl usive arti c le right to other publicat ions and to the periodicals of EMPA (European Mi litary Press Agency). The articles should be accompanied by any necessary photog raphs, drawings and explanatory tables Each au thor is reques ted to send a photograph of himself, together with his "cu rriculu m vitae" an d a 10-line summary of the article to be published. Rivista M ilitare rese rves the r ight to al ter the article's title and to choose the typeface in which it is set

OPENING UP TO THE FUTURE

"The Fatherland of Petrarch and Machiavelli, of Leonardo and Manzoni, will step up its commitment to ensuring the revival of our common values of art, history and thought" .

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' J 11 .May 1986. The Changing of the Guard has become a public attraction, as it is at Buckingham Palace. These are the "Granatieri di Sardegna", • their historical uniform.

I am delighted and profoundly moved to be here at this ancient and justly renowned University of Louvain, which, in the second half of the mi llenn ium which is now drawing to its close, has made such a great and valuable contribution to the civilization and culture of this noble land, and to our Europe. Louvain's contributions are too numerous to mention: it is a centre of learn ing and spiritual life, that has established the great values which are shared by your people and mine . One only needs to recall that it was within these walls that the word, Europaeus coined by Enea Silvio Piccolomini rang out with its own, original tone, and that it is a term which unites us all today in a living community of history and culture. There are so many names, some well and some less well known, which I shou ld like to recall today: from the many 4

Ita lian scholars who came to Louvain to deepen their knowledge of law and, as they called them in those days, "the arts", to the equally numerous teachers who exhibited their profound scholarship and genius after having refined their learning - as so often happened in those days - in the Italian universities, such as the ancient universities of Bologna and Padua . For the sake of brevity I will merely quote two names. The first, which is particularly dear to me for so many reasons, is the first edition of Thomas Mare's "Utopia" which was printed in this city at the end of 1516. It is not, and cannot be, a coincidence that such an important book began its wonderful adventure here. For me, this is the emblematic testimony of the centuries' old cultural humus of Louvain, which miraculously survived so many barbarian attacks and

continually renewed itself in the name of faith science. The second name is that of an intimate friend of Thomas More, Erasmus of Rotterdam, the champion of humanism and tolerance, who left a major mark on this city (and his most important works were also published at Louvain) . You certainly know Erasm us' work better than I do, and so I will say no more. All I should like to do is to emphasize the fact that the ever-topical lesson to be learned from the doctor universalis, who lived in an age that was terribly difficult for nations and for people's consciences, is his unstinting quest for peace: a brilliant quest. which is often ill-understood, but one which is essential, and which no nation or man must ever weaken or abandon. A complex quest. ¡ which the world of culture must set above al l others. "War is dear only to those who do not know

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it", warned Erasmus. And we echo those words with all our tragic memories and with all our strength. Following these two great men, my thoughts now go out in admiration to other important ages at Louvain. I am thinking of the importance given to neo-Scholastic philosophy and the extraordinary contribution made in general terms to the revival of Catholic culture in a period of isolation, uniting the sense of tradition, the search for truth and openness to the modern world. And I am also thinking of the flourishing of social studies and activities. It was from this land at the beginning of the last century that, urged on by the teaching of the Gospel and Christian solidarity, a current of thought and action spread far and wide, bringing together in freedom huge workers' movements, .leading to advanced legislation which has brought about major

social achievements. It is no the Community's universities: coincidence that Leo XIII, the let us ensure that they are the craftsmen and protagonists of Pope of "Rerum Novarum", was once the Nuncio to this country. an authentic European rebirth. During my visit to Belgium, There is no shortage of and during these few hours favourable opportunities. I am spent here at Louvain, I have thinking, for example, of the been happy to see how much "Erasmus" programme which will cooperation and joint endeavour make it possible for 10,000 is taking place in every area of undergraduates and 350 lecturers cultural life, at Community, to take part in exchange multilateral and bilateral level. It plans between 1987 and is my hope that these 1989. I am also thinking of the relationships, and this research activities of the European and dialogue will grow in quality University in Florence, at which and quantity, and that the more and more young Universities will play a primary ¡ researchers from all the role in this development. Both Community's countries are Europe and the university are an studying, and to which the opening-up towards the future. Italian Government recently gave Both of these - Europe and a new building (in a villa near the university - must be able Fiesole Abbey, the Community's tr) make better use of the archives are currently being common institutions. rapid set up). communications systems and I am sure that during the modern technologies, to break year in which Florence has been down the barriers that still exist given the honour of being the within European culture. There "capital of European culture", are now six million students in the Fatherland of Petrarch and 5

Machiavelli. of Leonardo and Manzoni will not only play its full part but will step up its commitment to ensuring the revival of our common values of art, history and thought. Culture is the sign and the cipher of our civilization - a resource that has perhaps not been fully exploited, even though all of us are aware that an "underground culture" has often sustained us when other beams of the European construction were not in a healthy condit ion. It has sustained us in the past, its sustains us now, and will continue to sustain us in the future. We have a vast. priceless common cultural heritage. Louvain knows this very well, because it has been the crossroads and the melting pot of European culture. But life goes on, and we cannot live on our past or our memories. Europe cannot stop producing 6

culture, and must never miss a beat in a creative process which has to be continuous and constant, in conjunction with the culture laboratories and workshops throughout the world. It is when a man believes he is on the peak of the mountain of knowledge that he begins his descent to the valley below. According to the great Italian historian, Federico Chabod, who conducted a thorough inqu iry into the way the concept of Europe took shape, and the identity and sentiment that stems from it, cultural and moral factors have had "absolute, even exclusive preeminence' in this process. As Europe consolidates itself and smoothes over the various crises, it cannot do without these factors, which are inextricably intertwined. Another distinguished scholar, Fernand Braudel, was

clearly aware of this, and declared that "Europe will only come about if the idea of Europe gets through to the living depth of our history, down to its deepest waters, and to its ultimate depths". Such a penetrating action cannot be left to what Braudel called "surface phenomena". Only cultural and moral factors can have any decisive effect. This is why I have chosen Louvain, a frontier city and ep itome of coherence and mediation, this prestigious cultural and spiritual centre which has such a far-reaching sphere of influence, and which unites a noble tradition with modern scientific activity, in which to make an appeal to European culture, to European intelligence, to European imagination, urging them not to become inward-looking, never faltering in their courageous and generous commitment to

research, ever combining the reasons of freedom and progress, human dignity, justice and peace. Difficulties abound. of ,course. Institutions and the people are asking contemporary European culture to fuel a project and a hope : the rebirth of a new European culture, the foundation of a new common Fatherland: Europe. Th is is the last chance I shall have to address you before leaving your magnificent country in a few hours¡ time to return home. I should like to take this opportunity to thank all the Belgian institutions and people for the friendship with which they have hosted me, the representatives of the Italian -g overnment who have accompanied me, and all the members of my mission. I should like to make special mention of the warmth and friendship with which Their

Majesties, the King and Queen, have welcomed me, with what would call a ¡spirit of Christian fraternity, not only officially but also privately in their own home. setting me an example that I shall never forget of simplicity and profound Christian spirit. This has been an official visit. with all the necessary formal trappings - not here in Louvain, but on previous days which all official visits enta il. But I shall not leave this country, even thoug h I have come here in an official capacity, with that chilliness and - let us admit it - that boredom that one always feels after officialdom has had its way. I shall leave here with my heart warmed by so many memories of this land. in which the traditions or freedom and Christianity, unity and pluralism live together so remarkably, and which ideally link this noble land to ancient Europe, making it a

bridge leading to the Europe of tomorrow. I shall leave here even more convinced that Europe is not a Utopia, or a memory of some ancient, noble legacy that has been lost. I shall leave here even more convinced that I have done my duty as Head of a European State in defending together with all the other Europeans, the cause of our cultural identity, our progress, our life, our civilization, in the certitude that Europe is alive, and that Europe can and must make a great contribution to progress and freedom, and to the freedom of the world. Francesco Cossiga

Text of the address of the President of the of Italy Republic at Louvain University. 22 February 1986. 7

In a previous issue of Rivista Militare, I drew attention to the basic objectives to be pursued if the Army, on the threshold of the nineties, is to achieve greater efficiency. Certain .anomalies in development need

to be ironed out and some attempt made to make up for lost tim e. The structural and organizational shortcomings due to the widening gap between available funds and the financial outlay essential to strengthen, maintain and renovate the Ground Forces in their present form must be made good.

SYSTEM STAGES

It is now clear that a comprehensive reorganization and rationalization of the structures of the Armed Forces can no longer be deferred, above all as regards the organization of logistic support and the territorial and training sectors. The system standard - an indispensable element of long-term reference on which particular and contingent choices must be organically and

consistently based - envisages a highly mobile and operationally flexible structure which optimizes the overal l effectiveness and the efficiency of the individual components in view of the requirements to be met and the foreseeable availability of human and financial resources. The above trends in national defence do not appear to differ from those found in European defence policy, which increasingly calls for integration ot forces on the international level. This may appear utopian when considered realistically in the overall context, but seems

easier to achieve through the creation of special, rapid-deployment forces which would also be suitable for integrated, multinational missions. The methodological approach to the optimum model is the outcome of both detailed analyses and a realistic appraisal of availab le resources . Having established the "system standard" as a pragmatic compromise between tasks, requirements and resources, it is now time to deal with the "system stages", i.e. the concrete planning - largely under way or already carried out - through which the reference model is to be gradually approached.

Priority is given to the operational component, on wh ich the config uration and -d imensions of t he supporting units are strictly dependent. From this standpoint. a critica l appraisal has been made of: - the operat ional structure in its basic elements: • number and type of basic operational modu les, • chain of command, - the territorial, logistic and training organizations. The analys is, carried out with the support of the upper echelons and uti lizing EDP systems, has led to the identification of the basic criteria and the measures to be imp lemented for the reorganization of the structu re. The process of functional overhaul ing and , in various cases, res iz ing, begu n on the basis of this planning, wil l inevitably entail considerable sacrifice, also on the socia l level , but will allow us to economize on the balanced force and give investment priority over run ning costs. The result shou ld be technolog ical and operational

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improvements in the mi litary field as well as positive spin -offs for the national industry. The first system stage must be implemented within the next four years and w ill involve a series of measures defined on the basis of a concrete eva luation of the real situation and its effects on the various sectors .

to deal with threats in any part of the country. The minimum number of "Brigade modu les" necessary to carry out the combined service mission is 27 Brigade-size un its. The above factors point to the need to establish, in time of peace, another 3 light infantry brigades (North, Centre and South) through the existing

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

The present 24 Brigades have proved insufficient as regards hypothetical deployment in the case of " combined services operational missions " provided for in the 1985 Wh ite Paper. The Army is particu larly concerned in the first (defence in the north east) and the fourth (territoria l defence) missions. These involve operations on a vast scale which, together with the traditional deployment in the north east (of primary importance not on ly for national defence but also in terms of NATO policy and strategy), cal l for greater readiness, mobility and versati lity

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Above and right. "Mangusta" A -129 anti-tank helicopter. Can be armed with 8 TOW missiles or 52 high-performance tree-flight rockets. Top speed 250 Km / h, fully armed. Equipped with night flying and aiming device. The "Mangusta" has a ballistic resistance up to 12.7 mm, a reduced thermal footprint and shock-proof fuel tank. It is also ¡ equipped with radar and laser alarm systems, anti-radar and anti-missile disturbance/decoy devices with heat-seeking guidance system.

training schools (Alpine Military School, Infantry and Cavalry School, Armoured Troop School). to be brought up to strength by mobilization in an emergency. The ground forces component ot the Ra pid Deployment Force (FI R) has already been set up, and should enhance capacity for quick reaction in emergency situations. In this overall framework bearing in mind also the duties of the Civil Defence in providing ¡field support - it is clear that the possibility of reducing the composition and quantity of the operational forces and of improving their quality is very limited. However. certain areas have been distinguished where substantial cuts can be made. It is, in fact, both possible and expedient to streamline the present chain of command by reducing the principa l levels from 4 to 3 (battal ion. brigade and corps). eliminating the divisional level. This streamlining presupposes the introduction - already under way - of computerized command and control systems. Such systems would obviously be useful also

in peacetime emergencies. Divisiona l support at battalion level will therefore be reorganized and reduced. Provision has also been made for the quantitative and qualitative balancing of the three Corps, each of whi ch will include from 5 to 7 "brigade modules". for the reorganization of the Arm Commands and of the Corps support units. as well as for the areal organization of the logistic support of the uni ts not su bordinate to Brigades. Because of the far-reaching implications. special reference must be made to Brigade typology.

The renewed interest in " light infantry" - i.e. highly mobile infantry equipped with ligh t but modern weapons effective also against soph isticated vehicles and craft, with emphasis on anti-tank capabi lity, and with the maxim um degree of tactica l and logistic autonomy - corresponds to an up-to-da te evaluation based on the territoria l and environmental conditions in which our Army is requ ired to operate. In fact, leavi ng aside al l questions of budget, it must be

acknowledged that the mass deployment of mechanized and armoured units - the only ones capable of dyna mic reactions, of blocking enemy penetrations and of providing flexibility in defence - will en counter incr~asing ly severe limitations in the future. This is due both to the growing urbanization of the territory and to improvements in target acquisition systems. Rural areas gradually shrink as farm and industrial buildings continue to be constructed. In many critical areas. the various built-up areas have now run together to form one contin uous line. There is also the problem in the event of an emergency in pen insular Italy - of having rapidly to move considerable forces over long distances. For these movements to be effected with the necessary speed and efficacy, less heavily equipped units with greater strategic mobility, which are easier to support logistically, are necessary. Within the Brigade the balance of forces must therefore be shifted in favour of the lig ht infantry vis-a-vis armoured and mechanized units.

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LOGISTICAL AND TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

This is the area where the most work remains to be done. It is also the area where most can be achieved in terms of reorganization and rationalization. The 1975 reorganization almost exclusively affected the operational component, leaving the numerous and long-standing problems involving territorial and support organization basically unsolved. It is therefore obvious that the present reorganization should aim at restoring the necessary equilibrium. This accounts for the importance given to actions in this sector, where considerable rationalization can be achieved with the aid of computers and, consequently, a considerable increase in efficiency. Priority is given to the sector of national service, recruitment and mobilization, also because of its social importance. Here, reorganization takes the form of streamlining and rationalizing all procedures. especially selection and medical examination. and of ensuring

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that the citizen benefits from a more prompt and efficient information and certification service. All the activities related to recruitment, mobilization and registration are therefore to be concentrated in the hands of a small number of organizations. the Regional Districts, while information and certification are to be the exclusive tasks of the Provincial Districts. The national service and selection organizations are also to be cut down and will collaborate with the medico-legal branches in order to serve a large number of users more efficiently. This can only be achieved by continuing with the existing programme of extending automatic data processing to all the component elements. The new structure will facilitate the process of integration between the citizen and the Armed Forces, especially at the moment of the young recru it's first impact with military life. Another sector of priority for the Army is the medical services. The reorganization of

the medical services will entail separating the medico-legal activities. available to all state employees. from the hospitalization and treatment of serving military personnel and the training of medical and paramedical staff over a wider range of diseases. In this framework, the hospitals of Milan. Padua, Rome and Bari are to act as "Polyclinics" on behalf of the civilian and military personne l attached to the Ministry of Defence and their families. These hospitals will cater for a wider range of diseases and specializations, and will also carry out university-level teaching and training of medical and paramedical staff.

MLRS Artillery rocket-launcher, one of the most advanced fire-control systems. A salvo of its twelve rockets is ¡ enough to saturate an area of 250 x 100 m with 7,728 HE submunitions, an area of 1,000X400 m with 168 anti-tank submunitions or 336 mines.

The remaining hospitals will carry out separate functions of hospitalization. treatment and forensic medici ne. The latter will be functional ly " linked" to the compulsory national service and recruitment org anization . Fina lly, it is planned to build a hospital for long-term pa tients in Anzio and a highly specialized centre for airborne troops in Leghorn . The programme will allow existing shortcoming s in the health services to be made good, also by means of close ¡Collaboration between the military "Polyclinics" and their university counterparts. The Conference on Military Health Services hel d in Florence on 29-30 Ja nuary this year was

Launch of anti- aircraft missile "Aspide", capable of target acquisition at a distance of approx. 20 km. The missile can be launched using the following svstems: "Skyguard" (Army), " Albatros" (Navy) and "Spada" (Air Force}.

a useful opportunity to begin a process of comparison and clarification as regards the future config uration of the fu nctions of the hospita l structures outlined above, the techn ical and profess ional level of the personnel and of the way collaboration with civilian organ ization will be implemented in the framework of the National Health Service . The pa rticipation of many illustrious .university professors, expressing the viewpoi nt of the Italian University, and the presence of high ly qualified military experts ensured that satisfactory results were achieved. The atmosphere of close co-operation was confirmation of th¡e authentic national interest in the subject. As regards the overhauling of logistic support and the technical and administrative area. the Army int ends to rationa lize the whole system by th e full impl ementati on of the 1980 logistic model and by grouping the different organs by user area. Here too, reorga nization is to take place throug h the introd uction, already under way, of automated supply

and spare parts systems and mechanized checking systems for repairs. Greater emphasis is to be placed on preventive mai ntenance and the replacement of componen t parts. which is to be programmed in accordance with a modern policy of motor pool management. As part of this programme, the number of Army Repair Workshops is to be decreased. In the sectors of supply, transport and services. it is planned to merge a number of stores currently scattered over many different places. Th is will be followed . in the medi um /long term. by the creation of multi-purpose regional centres. This new support structure will afford an approx imately 30% reduction in the number of Army 4th deg ree material depots and stores and allow their functions to be transferred to 3rd level su pply orga ns. Th ere will be a furth er red uction in mobilization materia l stores. the aim being to el iminate roughly 50% of the existing ones. Moreover, all territorial depots will be closed and their 13

registration functions handed over to the registration centres of the Military Regions.

TEACHING AND TRAINING ORGANIZATION

In this area, due consideration must be given to the evident continuous overall improvement in the educational level of the Italian people. The training of military personnel can now be simplified and at the same time - particularly for career personnel - made more selective and thorough as regards the professional and technical aspects. A thorough appraisal must be made of the functions of the Recruit Training Battalions. The number and duration of specialist courses can easily be reduced. Further qualitative improvement must also be made in the tra in ing schools, possibly by using civilian staff more extensively. The most significant measures identified so far invo lve the concentration of cadre and specialist training and 14

qua lification, at present spread over 28 schools, in a smaller number of 'Training Schools. In particular, courses for armoured troop personnel, for signals experts, and for those concerned with maintenance and repair of materials are to take place in combined Training Schools in Lecce, Caserta-San Giorgio a Cremano and Roma-Cecchignola. The proposed measures will permit an overall gain of approximately 1,500 Officers, 900 NCOs and 16,200 other ranks. The reorgan ization will also affect a limited number of civilian personnel, who will be employed in their permanent residences. Plans are also being drawn up for the redeployment of Officer and NCO cadres. in which the preferences of those concerned are taken into account. As regards conscripts reduction will mean a decrease in established strength in favour of investments in the modernization of materials and infrastructures. This is the only policy of

Above.

Scale model of the Italian-produced "AHV BxB/105" armoured vehicle. The vehicle is capable of producing a high volume of fire with its 105 mm cannon and has great mobility even over broken ground thanks to its 8-wheel drive and its 520 hp engine. Right.

"Apilas" anti-tank missile system. Its effectiveness lies in two essential features: accuracy and its powerful terminal effect, The "Apilas" uses a rock et with a double -base propellant. The rocket has an initial velocity of 293 metres per second and can perforate homogeneous armour-plating over 700 mm thick.

expenditure capable of opening up concrete prospects for development and increased efficiency in the Army of the 1990's. Once implemented, the proposed reduction in the number of conscripts contained in this first system stage will mean an overall saving of 111 billion lire a year, at current costs. A certain amount of restructuring will, however, be

- the up-dating of the law regard ing the sale of military prem ises; - the revision of the mi litary personnel pay scale.

ind ispensable, above all in the field of infrastructures. The overa ll cost wi ll be approximately 320 billion lire. The whole programme is based on the assum ption that certain legal provis ions will ultimately be approved by Parliament, for instance: - the proposal to increase the established strength of NCOs by 7,000; - the redefinition of the transfer allowance:

The cha llenge facing the Army in the last years of this century is extremely complex. It is not only a question of finding short and medium-term remedies for known shortcomings and delays standing in the way of the optimal employment of men and means. It is also necessary to imp lement an adequate economic pol icy and proceed with renewed vigour towa rds the "system standard", wh ich represents the optima l structure for the Army of the year 2000 vis-a-vis the tasks it has to perform and the social context in which it has to, operate. The period facing us is certainly challeng ing, but also stimulating from the profess ional and social point of view. The fina l goal is an increase in the operationa l capacity of the ground forces which will make the Armed Forces better suited to meet the demands of nationa l security.

In this sense, we are greatly comforted by the commitment of Cadres at all levels, the declared interest of the pol itical authorities and the close and enl ightened participation of the nation in the basic problems of the Army. Luigi Poli

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Left.

The painting shows French troops entering Constantine in 1837 - th rough a breach opened by the artillery in the external fortifications - to put down the revolt of some Algerian tribes. Right.

In 1830, France invaded Algeria and conquered it in a few weeks, but had to fight a long war against some tribes which, under the leadership of Abd-el-Kader, held the French troops In check for more than fifteen years. The print portrays a moment of the fierce clashes in the streets of Constantine (Oc tober 13, 1837 }, during which 1200 French died and more than 2000 were wounded. The Arabs lost about 5000 men.

The gu idel ines set by the great Mongolian leader can still be considered a val uable model up to the threshold of our era. But modern imperialism draws its vitality from very different and innovative motivations, because it does not rely on individual or dynastic sta nding t o consolidate in a nation al pol icy, as collective hegemonic will of a g iven people. The most representative expression of this evolutive form of the imperialistic phenomenon is colon ial ism, wh ich is born out of reasons not always sufficiently justified by the 18

camouflage of assumed "civilizing" missions, being mainly grounded on economic requ iremen ts . The main protagonists are the European nations, which, in the ava ila bi lity of new territories try also to find an outlet for the unbearable, very composite, interna l pressures which threat en the stability of t he social order. It is a fact that the colonial expansion acts as an histor ic catalyst for the evolution of ¡ peoples that are still underdeveloped or who are still at the lowest levels of life, such

as those in centra l-southe rn Africa, but it is also a fact that the ensuing impetuous process of cultural advancemen t of the subjected develops in a context of substantial, skillfully disg uised exploitation. Thi s is the price that mankind pays to progress, a progress often made through di fficulties and pains, but always victorious and bearer of new ethnical and social conquests. Th is mora l and philosophica l foundation of colonialism can be traced bac k to the expansionist policy promoted by the com monly acknowledged founder of modern imperialism, Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberl ain, in view of the difficu lties encountered by the Eng lish free-trade policy, due to the presence of products from competing countries, establ ishes very close bonds with the Bri tish colonies, wh ich obtain preferential prices for the national wares. At the same t ime, du ties are la id on foreign products that could damage the market of the colonial raw materials. As a resul t. the general theory of free exchange is completely upset, due to the techn ical implications and hindrances that invalidate its traditional principles. The interve ntion of political dec isions compulsori ly bends towards the desired directions the autonomous choices and the natural fluctua tions of deman d and supply.

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A new economic area is born, not only for the British Empi re, but for all the colonialist countries. The regime of trade -establis hed by Chamberlain becomes in fact an almost general ru le, which has deep reverberations in every field. The consolidation of t he economic bonds between the mother country and its colonial territories leads to a strengthening of the political ties and demands common defensive lines and "strategies". Other European powers follow the Britis h in this

direction: such as France, which is also encouraged by the enormous development of the technology of the 19th century, which translates into a progressive erosion of the agricultural economy by the newly born industrial system. France indeed finds in its colonies the necessary outlets for t he impelling needs of its transformation enterprises and favourable fields of employment for the large private capitals. One cannot omit the trend of the United States which, with the Cuban war of 1895, starts its expansionist policy, supported

and strengthened by President Theodore Roosevelt. The German penetration in Africa and Oceania starts in 1882, under the impulse of the industria l leadership as well as of political motivations and reasons of prestige which hide urgent demographic problems. This latter aspect - shared by many overpopulated nations. and 'particularly by Italy, Germany and Japan - is one of the main causes of colonial penetration, producing the phenomenon of emigration and the "poor people's imperialism", as Giovanni Pascoli defined it. 19

This hard truth surpasses all other human motivations and cannot be hidden by ideologies thought up in order to justify the conquest of socially and ethically underdeveloped countries. The attempts to find noble and historically acceptable reasons for campaigns made against populations of evident inferior standing are manifold and sometimes degenerate into an exasperated nationa lism, when they do not become inhuman and degrading racism. A most evident example is given by Hitler's conception of psychophysical supremacy of the German race. destined by natural law to excel in all fields. But this is the sunset of the typically colonial imperia lism. which already in the precedent conceptual sperimentation by Marx and Engels has discovered the critical foundations of a deep transformation. The Communist theory, in 20

fact, refuses imperia lism as a product of the capitalist bourgeoisie and sees it as destined to certain ruin when, having taken advantage of the last occasion of conquest, it will be unable to overcome the consequent inevitable crisis. Apart from these catastrophic conclusions. it is evident that the phenomenon's colonialist aspect is gradually overcome in the first half of the 20th century. The first World War destroys the German Empire and promotes, within the League of Nations. the "mandate" concept. which presupposes the possibility of a gradual evolution toward self-government of the subjected peoples. The second World War gives the coup de grace to all forms of actual subjugation of peoples less developed tha n the "colonizers". The idea that the white man is superior to the coloured

man has waned. The latter has assimilated from the civilization of his dominators all he needs in order to understand in full his right to independence; in many instances he has attended universities in Paris or Oxford, has lived in the ferment of the European metropolises, has brought his country's dramatic reality to the political attention of the world through credited representatives, such as Pandit Nehru, Ho Chi Minh. Sukarno and many others. Britain, always endowed with fine political sensitiveness, is the first to understand this grandiose evolutionary process of the peoples and to realize that imperialism must modernize if it wants to su rvive. This gives birth to economic imperialism, with its exciting and dramatic aspects. Exciting, because it is a direct vehicle- of civilization. and dramatic owing to the related and understandable human and social implications.

I

Left.

In the second half of the 18th century, Great Britain expanded its domination to almost all of the Indian subcontinent. But in the 19th century was confronted by Russia, which was pressing on the Afghan b,Nder. To prevent Russia's expansion_ism, the British waged two wars against Afghanistan, winning both of them. The painting shows a British unit attacked by Afghan rebels, near the town of Gandamak (summer 1839). Righi.

After conquering Algeria, France wanted to expand further along the North African coast. Tunisia was occupied without difficulties in 1891, but with Morocco things became involved, due to the rebellion of some nomad tribes and the opposition of Germany, with tears of a possible Franco-German war. Only in 1911 Berlin and Paris signed an agreement which legitimated the French protectorate over Morocco. The illustration from "Le Petit Journal" portrays an episode of the resistance in the Sahara: a clash between Tuareg warriors and a French patrol.

Great Britain is in fact the first to carry out in practice this evolutionary dynamism, making a series of concessions to its Dominions, helping them along their spontaneous ascent. In 1931, the Westminster Statute lays down the foundations -o f new relations between Britain and its subordinate countries, affirming that the laws promulgated by the British Parliament cannot concern the Dominions that do not accept them. Meanwh ile, the Governors become simple representatives of the Crown and assume the function of advisers to the free governments. In 1948, as a consequence of the new blow dealt by the second World War to old-style colonial ism, the Commonwealth includes India and Pakistan among its members, emphas izing its character of association of free nations. A similar transformation

occurs within the American and Dutch "empires" (independence of the Philippines, United States of Indonesia). France is a different case because, intending to exploit the resources of its colonies and hav ing perhaps overevaluated the bonds established with some subjected countries, it has sometimes delayed the inevitable concessions to the emergent nationalist currents. The entry of the non-European free peoples in

international politics is a grandiose phenomenon in modern civilization, but also a problem that demands vigilant caution. As a matter of fact, not all peoples are mature for forms of self-government and there is always the danger that, incited by an opportunistic propaganda, they fall under a new different sort of yoke. This is the democratic powers' main worry, and particularly the United States', 21

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Beginning in 1652, thousands of Dutch went to settle in South Africa. wh ere they founded a new country: the Boers' nation. When Great Britain took possession of the colony, the Boers preferred to emigrate rather than suffer a foreign domination. and moved to Transvaal and Orange, ¡where they discovered many gold and diamond mines. The British threatened them again and they, to defend themselves, declared war on Great Britain in 1899. Against all odds, th e Boers obtained some successes, but were unable to exploit them and surrendered in 1902. The illustration shows British prisoners after the battle of Nicholson's Neck. where the Boers captured more than thousand British officers and soldiers.

whose policy has at present a characteristic function of control over the in ternational situation, with the aim of defending both the principles of democracy and the American economy . The contrast with the Sov iet position is evident; the USSR's policy goes clearly aga inst history, because it tends to obtai n a real ideological, political .and econom ic supremacy over .countries of ancient civil ization, at times when history records the emancipation of less civilized peoples. But most of all the present era records the replacement of sovereignty by a cooperation aimed at defending common interests. It is not f ortuitous that the "San Francisco Charter" perorates the promotion of the political, social and economic progress of the less advanced countries subjected to the international mandate system. in the interest of a superior justice and in view of gradual emancipation. Considering this reality, submitted to uncontainable, evolutionary, and in some ways disturbing dynamics. the on ly possible form of imperialism is - as we have already said - the economic one. The remarkable improvement of the Third World countries' living standard and the ensuing increased demand of consumer goods is not matched by an adeq uate -development of the local technologies and industries. The unbalance between demand and

supply renders the emerging nations subject to the grea t international markets. The producing countries, in constant quest of outlets for the su rplus of their consumer goods, unabsorbed and unabsorbable by the internal markets, find it easy to introduce their wares to extremely receptive populations that need almost everyth ing. No matter if, at this stage, the subject Nations' economy is unable to offer an advantageous com pensation, for the producers envisage the future development of their working and marketing capabilities, which suggest the conquest of a position of privileged partners on the market. In view of this, the weaker popu lations are implicit ly blackmailed by the industrial powers, which impose a given type of products, and . conseq uently, a social custom formed by new habits, sometimes alien to the native traditions of the territories. Economi c imperial ism therefore deeply influences the continuity of the ethnica l components and, from this point of view, it can be seen as an inhumane and subverting phenomenon . But. besides the ethic and social aspects. the willingness to bring the developing countries under industria l subjugation inevitably causes attritions and dissensions among the producing na tions. which quite often lead to deep contrasts, bordering sometimes on open conflicts. These are, in any case, clear manifestat ions of a constant eagern ess for supremacy that embodies the modern form of creeping imperialism. which is as concrete as the past one. Armaments have been replaced by products , the tool s of oppression are now being substituted by coercive means. disguised as unselfish offers in the name of a pacifism. perhaps sincere, but certai nly proclaimed in view of concrete advantages.

In this kind of subjugation of the emerging cou ntries, the big powers include also the friendly countries, which in theory should be on an equal standing. The pla nning of certain products deeply modifies the character of the markets. increasing consumption as an indispensable tool for guiding and adapting demand to the nature and extent of supply. Power relations take part in this psychological game, which can deeply affect the very ganglions of the social organization of the countries less prepared to resist the pressures of the more efficient foreign economies. The progressive adaptation of the population to the fictitious tastes, habits and needs imposed by the "aggressor" country is certain ly a more or less felt form of subjugation. Nevertheless, also the phenomenon of economic imperialism shows signs of decline, because the cultural and social rise of the emerging nations tends to promote a more marked growth of the national industri es and products. The ensuing drop in the outward demand of the less developed countries sooner or later will bri ng about a slackening of the existi ng bonds of "subjection", until new balances are reached, which presumably will revive free exchange. Thu s a century-old cycle will be concluded, which has been o~ real historical importance and has had an enormous civil significance. But the foundations of a new type of imperialism - which, without being rhetoric can be defined as "space imperialism" are already being laid down. The superpowers are already directing their efforts towards the conquest of outer space, for a number of sc ientific, economic, strategic and prestige reasons, that can all be traced back to a common denom inator: the pursuit of supremacy. The environment of the competition and conquest changes, as do the tools and

23

Left. As it was with the conflict against Turkey for the conquest of Lybia, also the war against Ethiopia - started on October 3, 1935 - was, for Italy, more difficult than expected. Officially the Ethiopian campaign ended on May 3, 1936, when the Italian troops from Somalia joined the forces from Eritrea. The tableau by Beltrame, of October 20, 1935, depicts an assault of Italian troops against an Ethiopian position. Right. The superpowers are now pursuing the conquest of outer space with many different motivations: science, economy, strategy, prestige. Nevertheless all can be traced back to a common denominator: the quest tor supremacy. The photo shows an astronaut near the space Shuttle in orbit around the Earth.

prospects, but the hegemonic objective remains unchanged and everlasting. The possibilities to control space, which only a few decades ago belonged to science fiction, seem today more realistic and concrete in the light of t he recent positive tests, and not obscured by episodic and, unfortunately, sometimes dramatic failures, such as the explosion of the Shuttle and its launcher, last January, at Cape Canaveral. The American and Soviet

24

repeated and ever more onerous tests of endurance in space clearly show the intention of establishing there a human working presence; this is due not only t o scientific motivations, but also to strategic and tactica l reasons. One can easily predict that such efforts will be increased both qualitatively and quantitatively, because none of the two superpowers can at the present stage disregard the substantial interests involved, and withdraw from the contest.

At this point. also the financial aspects come into play, because the enormous amounts of money appropriated for the experimentation cannot go wasted. In concrete terms, the space undertaking tends, first of all, to prove a technological supremacy which has "terrestrial" goals besides the evident "space" objectives. As a matter of fact, the "sidera l conflict" is still closely linked to t radit ional interests , but presumably, in a not so distant future, it will mostly concern new factors which, at the moment, are still hard to foresee. At t he present time, therefore, we must limit ourselves to the evidence, i.e. to a rapidly and vehemently evolving scientific component, apparently devoted to the exp loration of our solar system but having, indirectly, practical application and psychological effects of high political value. The U.S. experiments have registered from this standpoint an unquestionable technological supremacy over the Soviet Union; this is a fact that demands immediate responses at different levels. The USSR, on its part, has¡ shown the ability to keep pace with the New Continent, but only as far as space is

V

I

concerned, while it shows undeniable symptons of inadequate industrial productive capability as regards social needs. On the contrary; the two superpowers are equivalent as far as nuclear weaponry is concerned, and this is a sector in which it is difficult by now to reach a clear superiority. It is therefore natural that also in the military field the imperialist attempt is made in space, where there are still "virgin" possibilities to be verified and experimented. This is the real truth of "Star Wars", and of the enticing and terrible plans that have already introduced us into the future. The "military" race in outer space appears almost an episode of the Hegelian "shrewdness of reason"; i.e. the artifices that the universal Sp irit devises in order to enab le mankind to proceed along the path of progress and write its dramatic and very exciting history. According to Hegel's epic theory, today we are certainly living in a period of thesis-antithesis of a superior level. albeit necessarily interspersed with human tragedies. Nevertheless we are certain that. beyond the imperialistic intentions and the yearning for hegemony and power, all Nations share the wish for a sinthesis that will give birth to peace, the indispensable condition for real progress in the wonderful vicissitudes of civilization and history. Lt. Gen. Ciro Di Martino

EVOLUTION OF THE CO CEPT OF IMPERIALISM FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THIS DAY 25

26

Twenty years ago, the American economist Galbraith wrote that the difference between a novel and a piece of econom ic analysis is that it i's preferable not to know the plot of the novel beforehand, while in economics it is useful and even necessary to try to predict how things will go. All entrepreneurs know the truth of this statement: choices regarding investments, products and markets are all made on the basis of more or less reliable forecasts. The greater the reliabil ity of these forecasts, the greater the probability of success. But it is not always easy to predict the future. The current trends do not always foreshadow sudden or uncontrollable changes. When Galbraith wrote the phrase I have just quoted, the -economy of the industrialized countries seemed to be proceeding along firm and unchangable tracks. The ba lance of trade and payments was ensured by a system of fixed .internationa l exchange rates . The low and stable price of oil and raw materials made cost forecasting reliable. Technological supremacy ensured wide margins of competitivity. High rates of economic growth made it poss ible to programme the regular and continuous expansion of production. The development of our country benefited greatly from this favourable combination of circumstances. Of crucial importance here was the choice made immediately after the war ir. favour of the free trade area and against isolationism. Thus, in under twenty years, the gap separating us from the advanced industrialized countries was bridged.

Extraordinary economic growth was achieved, an average annual rate of 5%, and centuries of cultura l and economic provincialism were cast off. We also, unfortunately, cherished the illusion tnat the favourable trends would continue indefinitely and that development would allow us to give second place to - or even to re ject - the values of efficiency and productivity. In fact, until the late sixties only a few people realized that these ideal conditions would disappear one after the other in the short space of a few years. The system of fixed exchange rates was abolished in 1971. The dollar could no longer be converted into gold and the Bretton Woods agreements were abandoned. In 1973, oil prices suddenly increased fourfold and went completely haywire after the 1979 crisis. In western countries, economic growth rates dwindled to near zero, and their technological supremacy was eroded by the emergence of new economic powers on the other side of the globe. The result of all these dramatic events was the recession of the early 1980's. Even with the beginning of a new growth cycle which opened in late 1984, the old points of reference had definitively vanished and the new were still fragile and uncertain. Uncertainty is thus the primary characteristic dominating the future of the industrial system. The second is instability: we are forced with incessant technological change and continual market variability. The rate of technological innovation is constantly

27

P ERU

increasing and the lead time for industrial inventions is growing shorter and shorter. It took thirty-five years for the radio to become an industria l product; the transistor took less than five and has already been overtaken by integrated circuits. But the most striking aspect is the capacity of the innovative process to penetrate all products and all production systems, from the simplest to the most sophisticated. Today, electronics is used in the building of space craft, but also in century-old manufacturing processes, such as textiles or paper-making. The computer is used for complicated scientific calculations but also, for example, to design motor vehicle components.

28

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Even the Military Academy, which has been training men and building their characters for over a century, has now become a place in which high-technology experts are produced. Markets are characterized by progressive, world-wide interdependence and by a rapid increase in the number of countries flooding the world with their industrial products. Ten years ago, Japan accounted for 10% of world exports; the figure has now risen to 20% . The contribution of South East Asian countries has risen from 8% to 15%. Europe and America, the traditional industrialized countries, are still stationary at 45%. Demand for consumer goods, but also for industrial products, is continually changing in an unending quest for

C HI Li

innovation, for higher quality and better performance. The average market life of a product such as a car is now no more than five years. This necessitates constant modernization, improvement and changing of models. Some high-technology products actually become obsolete in less than two years. A simple example of what I mean is the watch. Watches used to be expensive items that lasted more than a lifetime and were handed on from father to son. Today, for the most part, it is a consumer product that is changed as often as fashion changes. After remaining practically unchanged for three hundred years, both its appearance and functioning have been transformed by electronics.

Japan now dominates a large part of t he world market for t his item, i.e. a country that was still considered "exotic" thirty years ago. Industry has t herefore now to cope with cor-tditions of uncertainty and instability.and a state of constant change, i.e. a complete reversal of past conditions. If I may suggest another image, it is as though we were no longer running along rails, but forced to sail the open sea, where it is necessary to plot one's course and take into account every wave and gust of wind. Competition is stiffer. Strategies for success have changed radically. In the past, the relative slowness of technological change made it possible to plan long~term investments. The problem was how to obtain funds, rather than how much they cost or how to use them efficiently. Today, a product or production process can be knocked out of the market in a few years. It is necessary to programme investments which offer quick returns. Choices have become critical: there is virtually no way a mistaken investment can be corrected once it has been made. In the past, the relative stability of the market meant that production could be organized in terms of large volumes and long runs. Today, the market obliges one to be constantly ready to modify the product, even to change the model at the drop of a hat on the production line itself. In the past, a large company needed extensive bureaucratic structures. Today, it is especially the large company that needs the flexible and decentralized structures required for rapid decision-making. In the past, overheads were ,considered an inevitable burden. Today, a low break-even point is essential if sudden -drops in demand and sudden price swings are to be withstood with minimal damage . In the past, a position of relative competitiveness allowed

even non-essential costs to be borne. Today, competition is so tough that an inflexible control must be exercised over production costs, efficjency and quality. This, in a nutshell, is the sense of the transformations that have taken place in industry in the last few years. As a concrete example. let us see how Fiat has experienced these transformations. Like most other Italian companies, Fiat had to face up to these changes with structures, plant and mentality that it had inherited from the preceding decades . The lag between company action and change in external conditions created a situation of great risk calling for urgent action. A determined and incisive process of decentralization of company organization was begun with a view to speeding up operational decision-making. Today, the Fiat Group has been divided up into a number of self-contained sectors wh ich operate with a considerable degree of autonomy within the framework of overall group strategy. The production sector has been reorganized completely. Difficult and important decisions have been taken, even at the cost of serious disag reement. such as those regarding surplus labour. These were considered indispensable if we were to ward off the risks threatening the company and, consequently, the jobs it provided. However, the greatest attention was paid to the introduction of innovative techn iques throughout the whole company. This process of renewal has been under way for some years now and will continue in the years to come. Three main areas a re affected. As regards the first of these. production , the factory can be said to have been transformed overnight. More than 1,000 robots are now operating at Fiat. In 1981. there were just

over 200. We estimate that there will be over 1,700 by 1990. The! Termoli plant is run by over 100 computers, for the entire course of the operational cycle, including bench tests. Moreover, t he engine produced at that factory was also designed by computer, just as the plant itself is the result of computer-aided design. The second area of innovation concerns office work. So far we have installed about 2,500 terminals to carry out a vast range of operations, for office work alone (.e. excluding process computers). An integrated system of terminals installed in the branch offices enables us to transmit orders to the headquarters in a matter of seconds so that they can be included in the production schedules. Our ultimate goal is the creation of an integrated logistic system enabling us to regulate the flow of materials from the purchasing of the basic components up to the moment when the finished product leaves the factory. In this way, manufacturing becomes an intermediate stage in a continuous process going from the in itial supplier to the end customer. Tl;lis process enables us to keep stocks, which represent a financial and economic burden incompatible with present requirements, to a minimum. The third area of innovation is design and R & D. We have over 100 CAD/CAM designers and about 50 EDP analysis and testing systems. Design and testing time can thus be reduced and high standards maintained. In recent years, these systems have enabled us to bring out a new model each year. introduce innovative solutions and constantly improve quality and performance. Computerized systems have been used to carry out simulated tests and to develop optimal manufacturing solutions that would have taken years of work using traditional methods. Our research and innovation efforts have been very costly in

29

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terms of human and financial resources: 3,000 billion lire spent on research between 1983 and 1985, 6,000 budgeted for the next three years, 10,000 Group employees involved in research . Fiat is just one of many possible examples of what is involved when a company has to change tack to cope with changing international competition. I could have chosen from a large number of other Italia n companies. What emerges from the results of the last two years is that the effort made by Italian industry is paying off in terms of achievements and future prospects. It must be added t hat these positive results cannot simply be taken for granted . World competition is relentless and growing stiffer all the time. Industry can not let 30

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up for a moment in its quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation. It is certai nly in the interests of the country that its industrial system should ma intain and strengthen its competitive position . Industry will long continue to be the driving force behind the economy. However, it is becoming increasingly clear t hat commitment to innovation of the industrial system is not enough to guarantee adequate development prospects unless the economic system as a whole is overhauled at the same time. It is at this stage, i.e. when recovery is finally beginning after years of crisis, that the shortcomings in the measures of economic policy become glari ngly obv ious.

Ita ly's trade ba lance is expected to show a deficit of 23,000 bi llion li re as against19,000 in 1984 and 12,000 billion in 1983. This means that today approximately 3% of our gross domest ic product, i.e. the work of the country as a whole, will be used to pay the difference between what we import and what we manage to export. Th is means that we are getting deeper into debt with the rest of the world. It also means that we are giving jobs away to other countries so that they can produce what we import from them. Employment is often said to be t he main problem for the future. I am convinced t hat thi s is true, especial ly when I see that our rate of unemployment among young people is far

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higher than that of other industrialized countries . But this probl em is certain ly not going to be solved by actions running cou nter to the requirements of efficiency and productivity, such as the reduction of working hours or the invention of non -productive jobs. The problem of future employment can be tackled seriously on ly be speedi ng up the rate of development. It is a problem that must be tackled at its roots, by reducing the obstacles to our economic freedom. Unti l a few months ago, our level of inflation was steady at 8.5%; some countries have .already dropped below 2% and others are slightly above 3%. Th is means that. all things being equal, internal costs in

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Italy tend to grow more qui ckly and reduce our international competitiveness, in spite of the efforts made to increase productivity. It used to be said that inflation was caused by the pressure of in te rnational prices. Today's plummeting oil prices give us ample marg in for an all-out attack on internal inflation. But wages contin ue to rise in real terms, boosting consu mption and depleting resources that could be used for investment. It should be made clear that arguments over wages ca n no longer be viewed as a return to the old conflict between wages and profits; it is now a question of the choice between development and non -development. of income for the employed and investments to

provide jobs for the unemployed. I should also like to make a brief comment on another crucial theme, public spending. Today, public spending accounts for nearly 65% of the gross national product. This is a considera ble sum but not. in itself, anythi ng scandalous. What is unacceptable is that this enormous amount of resources still cannot be used to make a positive contribution to satisfying the development needs of the country, especially at the present time. It has always been the accepted practice to consider the inefficiency of the public services and the time-consuming red -tape in which the state indulges in its deali ngs with both private individuals and companies as being an inevitable

31

part of the system. I am by no means convinced that this is so. Apart from anything else, it can hardly be considered gratifying for those - the majority - who carry out their work in the civil service with honesty, dedication and profess ionalism. There is talk today of resorting to large-scale publ ic works as a means of giving the economy and employment a shot in the arm, with the added advantage that this would require little in the way of imports and would not be a burden on the balance of payments. All these things are true and desirable. But they all presuppose a decisive shifting of public resources away from consumption towards investment, and a brake on the soaring national debt, which has grown twice as fast as inflation in recent years. This is where the problem lies, despite all the high-sounding but often vacuous declarations on the subject. Unreliable basic public services are a burden for the system and widen the gap between us and our competitors. Useless and costly organisms mean subtraction of funds from necessary and inadequate ones. For years now, there has been talk of reforming the civil service. In my opinion, the best way to start would to improve its efficiency. This reform could possibly be effected simply by applying the same criteria as those used in running a private company: cost effectiveness and product quality, rewarding merit and cutting away the deadwood. am convinced that not only would the services run better, but new employment opportunities would be created. I should not. however, like my criticisms of the civil service to be misinterpreted. The criticisms I am often led to make are intended as an appeal to the responsibility of each and every one of us, whether

32

emp loyed by the state or by private companies. whether a member of the government or simply a private citizen, to contribute towards the improvement of our common lot. Soldiers are subject to military discipline , they are subject to strict regulations. However, I think they will agree with me when I say that following rules is necessary but not sufficient. Respect for the rules must be accompanied by one's personal commitment. Each of us is called upon to do his job with the will to do it as well as possible, to develop and increase his own professionalism, and to coscentiously gauge the efficiency with which the goals assigned are pursued. A good society is based on good laws. But it can improve only if all the citizens take their share of responsibility for its development.

Cadets are, above all, young people. And it is to them, to the young, that I should like to address these final remarks. I have spoken of the future: the future belongs to them; it is the time when they will make their fullest and most complete contribution to the growth of the country. Each time I come into contact with the world of the ycung, I realize how great this contribution can be . I realize that today young people have a seriousness, the training and a will to understand and to act that is far greater than in our day, or even fifteen years ago. Our generation has the duty and the responsibility to remove all the obstacles preventing th is great resource from being usea, above all through an economic policy aimed at development rather than ccnservation. Cesare Romiti

Modena, 21st February 1986. General Giovanni Brugnola presents Dr. Cesare Rom iti, the managing director of Fiat , with a commemorative plaque at th e end of his lecture delivered at the Military Academy.

34

The moment of the special force

On April 25, 1980, while the humilation and the frustrating impotence of the five-month occupati on of the American Embassy in Teheran were stil l present and burning, the news went out that a U.S. Special Force's attempt to free the host ages fai led miserably in the Ira nian desert. Photos illustrated the event. showing pitilessly the charred remains of eight victims strewn among the burn ed down wreckage of airplanes and helicopters. Various explanations were given about this failure; some, rather fantasti c, went as far as attributing it to the Soviet Union. which having "zoomed" everything through its satellites,

within the framework of the by now usual "cosmic voyeurism", had hastened to broadcast, through nonofticial channels, the customary message "yankee go home". The only solid fact known was that a certain "Delta Force" was involved in this action; a force nobody had ever heard of before. The aborted raid in the land of Zarathustra and Firdausi is certa in ly not the only negative experien ce concerni ng "rescue operations" carried out by the U.S. Special Forces in the last decade. As a matter of fact, on November 21, 1970, after over 6 months of tests and political hesitations, a Special Force's heliborne unit landed

at Sontay in North Vietnam, in an effort to free the American prisoners held there or, better, who had been there until July 14, date in which t hey had been transferred to Dong Hoi, a few miles to the east. In that period. the numerous intellig ence agen cies of the United States were probably enjoyi ng their well-deserved summer vacations. Everything is carried out as planned, except, of course, the hostages' liberation. And aga in on May 15, 1975, eleven helicopters with a force of 227 marines on

U.S. Army soldiers on patrol.

35

have been mentioned not with the less than noble purpose to underline inefficiency, by because - with their common goa l of rescuing hostages and prisoners, a very unpleasant job, even in peacetime they deservedly place themselves in the genesis of the Delta Force. Nevertheless. to broach the Delta Force subject without a preliminary anamnesis of the Special Forces could produce an incomplete picture, and possibly wrong conjectures on the conceptual plane. In fact, the cop ious literature on the Special Forces usually stresses the romantic, the phantastic, the hypothetica l and the improbable, in that, rather than to inform. they want to produce a superficial enjoyment of the mass media. A short historical outline, completed by an impartial comment, can therefore help reframe the subject within more realistic and acceptable dimensions.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

Olophernes, biblical general of Nabucodonosor's troops, was killed in his sleep by Judith.

board take off heading towards the island of Koh Tang to rescue the crew of the U.S. merchant ship "Mayaquez" captured on May 12, in international waters, by units of the Cambogian revolutionary government. The planned and not carried out diverting air intervention, and the by now customary inconsistencies of the intel ligence bodies, enable the 48 marines who board the "Mayaquez" to make a peaceful entry in a disma lly empty ship but. as a counterbalance, the

36

marines who land on the island are faced by an unforeseen and very strong resistance . At the end, 38 dead and 50 wounded lie on the ground; four helicopters are destroyed, including one lost in an air accident at the beginning of the operation. These not too bril1iant results were then ascribed to the inadequacies of the intelligence framework, t he reluctance to develop concurrent supporting actions, the excessive centralization of the operations. scarce autonomy of the Commanders on the field. In short. all that must not be done when special operations are to be carried out. These incidents

First of all, let us make it clear that special operations do not ¡necessarily require Special Forces. These operations carry the "special" label not because they derive it from the performes, but beca use they often obtain unespected and productive results of great politico-military importance, especially if compared with the type and size of the forces employed . Judith, no member of any Special Force herself. depriving Olophernes of his upper extremity, carried out, without even knowing it, a special operation. And to remain within the unappropriately called "weaker sex", the same can be said about Charlotte Corday who, stabbing to death Marat - descendant of Sardinian emigrants - intent on his sulphureous ablutions, exerted great influence on the Convention, depriving it of its most active and ardent Jacobin. And what shall we say of the Achaeans who, packed

1

' ~¡\ARA T . A .

DAV ID of Katangese gendarmes, inside the ligneous belly of the famous equine, led Troy's long opposed to the central government. had invaded the siege to the celebrated and very rich Shaba region, dramatic epilogue? Or, a few .occupying Kolwezi and capturing centuries later, in May 1940, those 78 Paratrooper Engineers about 2000 Europeans, mostly Belgians. who, jumping on the Eben A combined action of Emsel Fort, keystone of the Belgian, French and Congolese Belgian defensive system on the airborne forces, decided and Canal Albert, with the loss of only six men, cleared the way organized in a very short time, brought, after only five days, for the German armoured the first paratroopers to the troops' penetration in depth, north of Kolwezi, with which was the prelude to the insignificant losses and the full collapse of the entire Western front. And again in May 1978 the success: of the operation . From the examples mentioned above, airborne raid on Kolwezi. As fished at random in our memory, some will remember, following we can deduce that one can the tumultuous events after do special things without Zaire's newly acquired independence, a large contingent being necessarily very special.

The Jacobin Jean Paul Marat was killed by Charlotte Corday in 1793.

The idea of constituting "elite" corps is fairly recent. Historically it is traced back, as a specific trend, to the increasingly techn ical character and stabilization of military operations. The first signs appeared in WWI when, on the Italian front. the in-depth infiltration of small and tough operational ad-hoe groups (Rommel made himself a name in this occasion). created the preconditions for the Caporetto rout. In the second World War, the situation allows further

37

The training of the British Special Air Service pursues the main objective of preparing its members to tackle critical situations in any environment.

the British Special Forces in the Iranian Embassy in London. At this point, it is perhaps convenient to draw up, as a reminder, a synthetic identity card of the main Special Forces currently in service, omitting, of course, as is the host's duty, our brave Army and Navy commandos. We shall therefore mention:

space for the elite Corps and here, next to the airborne forces, the Specia l Force units proper make their first appearance. Let us recall our own glorious early creatures: the Navy Commandos, who forced their way inside the superprotected bases of Suda, Alexandria and Gilbraltar, the 10th "Ard iti ", constituted at S. Severa in May 1941 and, in the same period, the British long range patrols, the German "Brandenburg" Division, and fina lly the first U.S. Ranger Companies established in Great Britain and immediately put to test in the bloody and unfortunate raid at Dieppe. Historical precedents, fu lly in line with evolution and ethology, provide a "humus" for the Special Forces, favourable to those historical and cultural situations which require individual initiative and free enterprise, besides imagination and sportsmanship. Nothing is in fact more negative and obscuring in the genesis and development of these elite Corps than hav ing to submit to the paralyzing

38

schemes of ideologies, policies or bureaucratic control with a sectorial verticality lacking an ultimate synthesis at the top, or to situations where objections are bureaucratic excuses for avoiding responsibilities at all levels. A close scrutiny of the few successes and the many failures witnessed in these last years provides materiat for a clear illustration. Let's recall, for information's sake, among the failures: the Egyptian commandos' massacre in Cyprus in February 1978, with 15 dead and 22 wounded, the raid against the Colombian rebels in November 1985 with over 100 dead, and finally the disastrous Egyptian raid in Malta, in the same month, which cost 60 lives. Among the successes: in 1977, year to be considered lucky in the history of the Special Forces, the model Israeli raid at Entebbe, the Dutch intervention against the Moluccan terrorists at Borensm ilde and that of the German Special Forces at Mogadishu; in 1980, the action of

• Great Britain: SAS (Special Air Service)', created in 1940, they made themselves a name in North Africa, in the Aegean (two SAS members, were reportedly the first to enter Athens in 1944 ... on a bike), then in Rhodes ia, Malaysia, Annam, Borneo and Nortern Ireland, They are unanimously · considered the best in the field, due both to the wide experience acquired along the years and for the possibilities they have had to operate and train themselves in the most varied and tormented operational scenarios, at home and abroad. · • Federal Republic of Germany: GSG 9 (Grenz Schutz Gruppe 9), is a paramilitary unit (border police). It has been constitued after the slaughter of the Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games (August 1972). Clearly, in that event the police forces, although formed by selected men, proved totally inadequate to tackle the situation, mostly for lack of both tra in ing in instinctive, selective shooting and determination in using their arms. GSG 9 is an extremely efficient unit and is often requested to provide advice as well as direct and indirect support in the training and employment 'of other Special Forces. · • Israel: the country does not have units specifically labelled

The Grenz Schutz Gruppe 9 is an extremely efficient unit, often employed in support of the training and employment of other Special Forcet;.

as "Special Forces" . The Entebbe ra id was actua lly carried out by elements chosen mostly from paratroop units. In each of these units a group at compa ny level is selected, subjected to a more intense training , especially for urgent intervent ions, with a wide range of arms and equipment, in order to cover any foreseeable scenario of employment. To these companies. that could be defined as Special Forces, · we can add the commandos of the Navy. Several operations carried out in Lebanon and Syria during the long Arab- Israeli conflict have been credited to these forces. It should be remarked that Israel, with the particular multinational and multiracia l character of a population already undergone a selection during two thousa nd years of Diaspora and forty years of war, represents the ideal environment in which to pick something "special" in any sector. • United States: the ra ngers, constituted in 194 1, have been flanked by the Special Forces (Green Berets) at the beginning ot the '50s, est abl ished at first for employment in the European theatre and subsequen t ly in the Vietnam war. Next to these - which belong to the Army but are under joint command and control - there are the Navy Specia l Forces i. e. SEAL (Sea Air Land)', the UDT (Underwater Demolition Team), the Marines' (Force Recon) and the Air Force's (Air .Commandos), which include pilots and ground mainten ance teams that take pa rt in special actions. • Soviet Union: the Speci al Forces, whose genesis is traced back to the World War in the context of the partisa n warfare,

are organized in the Spetsnaz Brigades, wliich reportedly are 20 for the Army and 4 for the Navy. To give an idea of their size, let us remember that each Brigade con sists of 1200 men who can split into 100 operational detachments. For our peace of mind, not all of

them are complete; furthermore they are mainly manned by conscripts, although It is also a fact that Igor's service lasts three times as much as ours. It is common knowleoge that th ese Brigades, being subord inate to the politicomilitary leadership through t he

39

The U.S. has several Special Force units, from the ArmVs Rangers and Green Berets to the Navy's SEAL and UDT, from the Air Force's Air Commandos to the Marines' Force Recon.

GRU (Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces) have at their disposal all-purpose personnel, with ample possibilities to survey at ease, in time of peace, the objectives to be attained in an emergency. The Spetsnaz have been employed openly, for the first time, in 1968, in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At present several groups of Spetsnaz operate in Afghanistan, apparently with success. • France: there is information that Special Forces were employed in Indochina, at the beginning of the '50s: they were the GCMA (Groupments de Commandos Mixtes Aeroportes), later called GMI (Groupments Mixtes d'lntervention)'. Their tasks, as regards military objectives, have been tra nsferred to airborne units of the Foreign Legion, in Corsica, while the antiterrorism duties have been taken over by a special unit of the Gendarmerie: the GIGN (Groupment d'lntervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale). Before considering the Delta Force and also in order to divest these notes of the anthological atmosphere produced by the abundant mention of data and events, it does not seem id le to make a few considerations on the Special Forces in the contingencies of peace or in a possible emergency of war, more or less localized. There seems to be no doubt in this connection; on the contrary, it appears that the function of t he Special Forces, as well as the elite units (also the Fa lklands' conflict teaches us ¡ someth ing about this) is to be considered on the increase, due to the:

40

• improbability of widespread conflicts, because they are against the interests of the superpowers; this puts the emphasis on the local conflictuality, where the special units can perhaps obtain decisive results with limited involvement of men and equipment and therefore with limited risks of politico-military €scalation; • progressive and unrestrainable sophistication of weapon and command and control systems, also in the armies of the small countries, with subsequent increase of the management's complexity, especially in the technological-logistic field. This inevitably brings out the fighter who. equipped with the suitable armament and properly trained, can be the famous grain of sand that jams the complicated machinery of the opposing forces. The· examples, from Vietnam to Algeria, from Angola to Afghanistan, just to mention the main ones, are under everybody's eyes;

• growing support given by technological advancements to the improvement of the indiv idual's operational capabilities. Suffice it to think what can be accomplished by a well trained operator equipped with a personal ground-to-air missile. with a remote-control device or with a jammer of electronic circuits, not to mention the extremely dangerous panoply of non-conventional weapons, which today can be miniaturized in every way. But the discussion must not be limited to the mere open and conventional conflictuality. There is at present another conflictuality, whose genesis and structure are hidden, at least officially, but which appears in the most disruptive way both in its actions and in its impact on public opinion, as well as on the governments' stability itself (remember the "Achille Lauro" hijacking). One can imagine, and without great effort, what would happen if, for instance, terrorism carried

Special Forces are very important both in peacetime emergencies and in war.

out a rapid series of actions aimed at the most sensitive objectives touching public opinion's emotional stability. In this instance. to avoid a political col lapse, a massive reaction - and therefore undiscriminate would be necessary against the presumed sanctuaries of terrorism. which are generally covered by the direct or indirect protection of one of the opposing great powers. Therefore terrorism seems to provide a further motivation. perhaps a determinant one, for strengthening the Special Forces component, for these are apparently the only ones capable of making rapid and selective interventions. But is it really true? The Egyptian Special Forces' big failure in Malta last December, the serious crisis in the interna l and international relations following 41

the "Achil le Lauro" affair, only to reca ll the most recent events, suggest a closer reconsideration of the problem. As a matter of fact, an element of the Special Forces is rightly trained to operate in a scenario in which he faces a clear and well definable hostile presence, which he will have to eliminate or, if things go wrong, to neutra lize. The scenario of antiterrorism is on the contrary more comp licated and requires selective and distingu ishing interventions, with very swift decision processes under direct responsibility . Everything occurs in circumstances in which a fail ure largely exceeds the immediate operationa l consequences, for it could eventually undermine the credibility, if not the stability of the political body that ordered the operation. From here stems the necessity to have also a Specia l Force that should be the quintessence of the traditional ones. further refini ng and improv ing the typ ical techniques of terrorism's scenario. And it is at th is point that we can at last introduce the Delta Force, not so much because it is being considered an emblematic un it - the SAS wou ld be perhaps more suitable in this regard - but because in its genes is, organization and employment it embod ies and permits to illustrate - the whole range of difficu lt ies, errors and lessons on the subject.

DELTA FORCE

The idea of creating a special force moulded on the British SAS, fit to carry out special operations in any type of emergency, also in peacetime, starts to take shape in 1968. In 1971 , after a labourious conceptual elaboration . General Rogers, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, gives the green light for t.he organ izational deve lopments. These, after alternate events and great difficu lties determined, besides the bureaucratic verticality

42

of the U.S. mi litary structure, also by the open hostility of the special units already in existence, obta in in 1977 the official "go ahead" from the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) spurred mainly by the German GSG 9's success in Mogad ishu . The recruiting is done following a severe selective screening . The tests are in fact very hard . In order to be admitted to the psychological selection, the cand idates must pass difficu lt physica l tests; for instance: 35 m backstroke in 25 seconds, swimming 10.0 m in freshwater wearing fatig ues and boots and, moreover, 37 knee bends and 33 push-ups in one minute, a devi lish obstacle course and a 3 km jogging in less than 16 minu tes. To further prove their agi lity: 16 mi les on the double, followed by a march with full equipment on rugged terrain strewn with all sorts of obstacles: woods, rocks, r ivers, to successive points. for an undetermined distance but lasting at least one day and one night The lucky and exhausted chosen ones are then admitted to the eva luation of psycholog ical fitness based on absolutely unfathomable tests. hav ing apparently nothing to do with the pursued goa ls and protracted also through the successive tra ining cycle. Th is cannot be considered a period in which one can rest upon one's oars because. besides the normal and hard physical tra ini ng and the train ing to instinctive and selective shooting (3-4 hours da ily) with t arget shooting specifications of 100 % from 500 m and 90% from 900 m, it requ ires the ability to: • make use of any type of optical aid for sighting and shooting; • be able to drive any basic type of wheeled and tracked vehicle, includ ing locomotives; • open all basic types of locks, padlocks and fasteners in general; • app ly all techn iques for remov ing and overcoming obst acles on rugged land, high mountains and in an aq uatic

environment, as we ll as the hand-to-·hand fighting techniques; • provide first aid to the injured; emotionally stabi lize hostages for at least 30 minutes; • finally, employ every basic system of communication. For the development) of the abovementioned programme all the necessary struct ures and train ing areas were of course provided, with every kind of typical situation and, moreover. typica l zones were selected for getting the men acquainted with the environment (mountain. desert, jungle, swamps) . No surprise therefore if in 1978 only 53 trainees were engaged , with foreseen operational employment within two years; but it is in November 1979 that, following the occupation of the American Embassy, the emergency in Iran explodes. At this point a short survey of the operation that was destined to misfire in the Iranian desert appears particularly useful for a concrete illustration of the operation's complexity and for providing a more complete and specific picture of the Delta Force. The problems that are apparently more difficult to solve immediately are: the unava ilabil ity of a precise, detai led and updated information picture and the definition of a system of infi ltration . As regards information. the avai lability of a detailed map of the Embassy grounds turns out to be most usefu l: local agents and, above all, a close scrutiny of the Iranian TV broadcasts permit to acquire and update all other necessary elements . As for infiltration, having discarded rather fantastic proposals and hypotheses and excluded an airla nd ing as absolutely unsuitable, the option is for the introduction via air- and land- craft, of the operationa l group, evacuation by helicopter of the hostages to a preestablished assembly point, exit with transport planes. In short the operation is envisaged as follows : • infiltration by night of 6 airplanes "C 130", 3 of wh ich

The emergency caused by the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1979 prompted the first operation in which the men of the Delta Force acted as protagonists.

tankers. and an operationa l force ·Of 132 men, includ ing a Delta Force, assault group, drivers, interpreters and rangers for the security of the landing areas. Landing at "Desert One", where .e ight hel icopters "RH 530", <leparted from aircraft carriers cruising in the Gu lf of Oman, were to fly in at the same time; • refueling, and embarking on the same hel icopters of the task force, arrival in the concealead bivouac area. about 65 miles south of Teheran. Return of the six "C 130s" to their base; • the following night. transport of the assault group to Teheran, with local trucks provided by secret agents. Attack on the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry (where some of the hostages had been moved) and

liberation of the hostages. Estimated duration of the operation: 45 minutes; • landing of the 8 helicopters. embarking at the Embassy and the near sports' ground of hostages and task force, flight to the established zone, embarkation on the "C 141s", exfiltration. All along the phases of assau lt and boarding of the helicopters in Teheran, two C 130 "Gunship" aircraft were to cruise at short distance. The airplanes were well armed with machineguns and 105 mm guns for on-call intervention in case Iranian tanks entered the scene . The "ZSU ", armed with four-barrel 23 mm antiaircraft guns, seen in the area, were particularly feared. Every detail had been accurately taken care of: from communication systems to weaponry (including portable antitank weapons), to a specific training along a similar pattern, with infiltrations carried out with the equipment. times, distances and flight

outline envisaged by the plan of employment. The operation starts on April 20 (more than 5 months after the Embassy's occupation} with the redeployment in Egypt of the operational force. On April 24, at 10 p.m .. the force is on site at "Desert One". At this point a sequence of contingencies starts. Immediately after the aircraft's landing an Iranian truck drives by. Hit by an antitank rocket it bursts into flames and lights up the zone. The drivers manage to get away. Before the rangers get to their places around the area, a bus with 45 unwitting passengers drives in, probably attracted by the unusual light show. The bus is stopped somehow and, while awating for a decision, the passengers are let off the bus and kept under control. But the helicopters, caught in a sandstorm, are reduced to six (instead of the planned eight) and arrive with a 90-minute delay. Six is the minimum number required for the operation. It 43

will be learnt later that of the two missing craft, one was left in the desert, due to rotor troubles (sand in the turbine) and the other, having picked up the crew of the first, was forced to return to the aircraft carrier. due to a malfunction of the navigation instruments. Time is running short. winter is past and it dawns early. The decision is taken to start refuelling; during th is phase another hel icopter breaks down. Five hel icopters are a number below the safety minimum . Feverish consultations start, on the spot and by radio, in the deafen ing roar of the rotors and the flares of the still burn ing tanker truck. At this point, the decision is reached to discontinue t he operation. The helicopters' crews. al l Marines, are still benumbed by hours and hours of flight in an environment and with techniques different from the usual scenario of employment. It is stil l dark and the sand lifted by the rotors further worsens the visibility. A helicopter, while moving away, hits a "C 130" with its blades. In the following explosion and fire 8 crew members die. The surviving crews and the task force (many abandon their arms and equ ipment) jump aboard the "C 130s" with understandable excitement and leave the area. They leave behind two aircraft, burning together with the Iranian tanker truck, eight dead, five intact helicopters and 45 rather puzzled and confused Iranian bus passengers. In the cause of the disaster enter al l the roots of the failure of every complex operation . The men were trained, the communications worked perfectly, arms and equipment were adequate, the organization on location was satisfactory. There had been the possibil ity t<) survey in advance and equip the "Desert ·one" land ing area with a "STOL" aircraft which, in the night of March 31, had landed and delim ited the strip with luminescent markers visible only by night and at low altit ude. Wel l, tlie

44

reasons of the fai lure can be detected in the Delta Force.'s genesis itself. A force born laboriously, through successive approx imations. i.e. without a precise strategy, and subsequently developed among all sorts of bureaucratic and environmental problems, among mistrust and resistances from the simi lar formations and the inborn sluggishness of the horizontal exchange between the four Services of the United States (the JCS has only coordination tasks) . The traditional rivalry of the four Services, each jea lous of its share of participation, had led to put together, rather precariously, Army men (Delta Force, rangers and drivers), Air Force aircraft, Navy helicopters (the on ly ones, fit for aircraft carriers. owing to their folding rotor blades) with Marine crews. The same apportionment occurred on the field , where an Army colonel was responsible for the operation on the ground, on an equal standing with the Commanders of the winged and rotor-craft sections . In such a condition , though allowing for the pressure of events and contingencies, obviously one had to expect consultations rather than orders. T he lesson has been very beneficia l anyway. Today the Delta Force is commanded by a General and has at its disposa l all the veh icles necessary for any type of action ("C 130s" for transport, supply, electronic warfare and other heavy loads). The Commander, moreover, can avai l himself, for his movements, of a special plane, equipped for secure communications with the White House from any part of the world. Furthermore. the Delta Force is empowered to directly request the support of al l nava l forces and , if necessary, the integration with other Specia l Forces, particularly SEAL. in case of sea operations . What we have just described has been official ly put to test during the " Ach ille Lauro" crisis. On that occas ion a force of about 400 men. perfectly

armed and equipped for any kind of land or sea operation, was flown to Cyprus w ithin a very short time. The force was completely self-sufficient, having at its d isposa l a group for processing information data as well as a direct link with a "crisis management group" consisting of politicians and civilian and military experts. It must be pointed out that no operation cou ld be started aga inst the "Ach ille Lauro", especia lly wh ile the sh ip was sailing, without the technical support, at least, of the Delta Force. The infiltration by night at low altitude, on the sea, actually requ ires a special and specific train ing, which on ly dedicated pilots, constantly integrated with the emp loyment force, can have. CONCLUSION

In short. the above remarks lead us to conclude that: • the unrelenting and inevitable increase in sophistication of armaments and equ ipment. as we ll as the increment of technology and informatics in the conduct of operations, by emphasizing the vulnerability of the system also emphasize the operational capability of elite units and especially of Special Forces conveniently recru ited, equ ipped and trained; • the bureaucratic verticality, the lack of coordination between the various components of the Armed Forces (and even oi the various armed Corps) produce decidedly negative effects wh ich, if they do not forebode failure, certain ly make the ava ilable instrument scarcely profitable and efficient; • Special Force units cannot be established on the spot. for they require a carefu l basic strategy, long term preparation, constant verification and improvement in a d ialectical relationship with the similar units, fu ll integration with the envisaged auxiliary and support forces. These seem to be obvious considerations. in that they can be applicable also to

other units, but it is appropriate to observe that special operations do not allow to make adjustments "along the way", and link the possibilities of success essentially to the accuracy and soundness of the organizational phase; â&#x20AC;˘ the scenarios of employment in peacetime, which witness a more and more organized terrorism, virulent and dangerous for the quality and quantity of the objectives pursued, make these forces even more precious, indeed indispensable. One must nevertfieless remark that their employment in

peacetime occurs always in a political scenario which is not always foreseeab le but always very de licate, especially if it is influenced bu the moods and emotionality of the mass media. Therefore it is a matter of extracting, from the general forces, operational units in which a particular stress is laid on aspects connected with the ability to select and discriminate as regards break-in techniques, arms employment, and psychological management of terrbrists and hostages. In conclusion, it must be said that even the most

Even the most expert and efficient operational unit is of little or no use unless it is guided by a knowledgeable "crisis management centre".

experienced and efficient operationa l unit is of little of no use if the lack of a "crisis management centre" - wlth the necessary prerequisites of authority, technical know-how and immediacy of access to all sources of information prevents its employment in the appropriate conditions of time and place. Lucio lnnecco

OEllA FORCE

The moment of lhe special force 45

In a previous article published in th is magazine, we have presented a very characteristic component of the U.S. Armed Forces: the "National Guard" . Our aim was not only to make it known as such, but to invite the reader's attention to the American mi litary contribution to the European defence on the Ita lian soil. Having done this, we deem it equal ly fair to speak about the Armed Forces of another nation - th is t ime pa rt of our Continent - wh ich has placed its men in the service of the Atlant ic Alliance, g iving priority to the Southern Region (of which Italy is part) with an option of employmen t: we refer to the Portuguese Armed Forces and especially to the Portug uese Army and Paratroopers (who, as we shall see, are members of the Air Force). We certa in ly do not have the pretension of sayi ng anything new: our press has repeated ly dealt with t hese bri lfia nt sold iers during the entire series of the early NATO t raining exercises "Disp lay Determi nation " , starting from 1980; and precisely "Riv ista M ilitare" (Italian Edition) in 1981 has devoted to them a significa nt "pearl" of the "string" "Conosciamo i Nastri Eserciti" (Meet ou r Arm ies). Neverthe less, there are always readers that are a little ... absentm inded, and, moreover, there are the recru its i.e. t hose who have started to read us ... yesterday; finally, we can provide f resh and first hand news obtained f rom a very authoritative "observation post", LANDSOUTH, which has perm itted us to observe at short distance the Portuguese sold iers, and to appreciate and admire them.

47

"M 113 A2" VTC, armed with an antitank "TOW" missile system.

RECENT HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

We are not willing to tackle "History" in the real sense, both because it would be too long and too complicated a job and because it would be outside the purpose of our writing. Therefore, we are going to retrace the events of the recent years, regarding which it would be more correct to speak about chronicle rather than history. During WWII, Portugal, thanks to its eccentric position in the European continent, was able to remain essentially neutral, so that its Armed Forces were not touched, by the great conflict, which was not "lived" - and this may well be said - not even psychological ly, by the Portuguese. The nation

48

continued to consider itself militarily and commercially speaking - mainly a maritime power, heir to the splendours of the Seventeenth Century, of which, on the other hand, from the economic point of view, only the ... debts remained. As regards the military, they were, so to speak, "confined" to duties of territoria l defence: but who from they had to defend themselves remained a remarkable question mark, considering that the Moors' raids had stopped long before and, thank God, also neighbouring Spain, never excessively loved, had ceased to be a threat, after a Friendship Treaty signed in 1939. The Air Force was a modest thing, since its activity was reduced in practice to sea patrols. All this did not prevent Portugal from joining the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, as soon as it was established. It was obviously a political choice, intended to

underline the Portuguese will to be an integ rant part of the Western World, sharing its historical, cultural and ideological traditions, This participation necessarily entailed, at least on paper, the assumption of military commitments which took concrete form with the earmarking of a Major Unit of low operational readiness. the 3rd Infantry Division, and of part of the fleet. placed under the operational command of a NATO organization, COMIBERLANT, on its turn subordinate to SACLANT. A possible general employment of the 3rd Division was envisaged within the Strategic Reserve of SACEUR; the naval forces were of course assigned the task of taking part in the defence of the ocean lines of communication, On the military plane, everything seemed to run smoothly, following a quiet

.J 20 mm two-barrel antiaircraft gun.

garrison routine. interrupted at most by an occasional exercise on the national territory or in Central Europe. This lasted until 1961, when Portugal (that is. Salazar first. and then the Caetano regime) embarked on a devastating counterguerrilla war in its faraway overseas possession of Angola. Mozambique and GuineaBissau. in the hopeless attempt to stop the course of events. which were gradually condemning most colonial empires to death. In this huge and vain effort, which lasted as many as thirteen years, the Portuguese government engaged almost its entire war potential and a good size of the economic one. bringing the country's internal tension (and among the armed forces, above all, which were

THE RESPONSIBILITY AREA OF PORTUGAL (NATIONAL AND NATO)

!BERLAND

WESTLAND

Porto Santo Is. ~a~era Islands (Portugal)

--- --

--r;;,;~""o,-c---------.1 ancer

49

-"""F'

literally exhausted) to such levels, that in April 1974 it broke into a sort of military "pronunciamento", not devoid of Communist interferences. From the bloodless "revolution of carnations". at it was called, Portugal got through a series of tormented political and structural adjustments, and emerged showing the world a clean, democratic and modern face, _but still bearing the stigmata of the painful past vicissitudes. Portugal has perhaps paid, later than the rest of Europe, the scot that it had precedently evaded by keeping out of the World War! THE RENOVATION PROCESS

In the physical and moral African jungle, the Portuguese soldiers had left behind thousands of dead, and many survivors had left there the delusions of their youth. The ties with NATO had become so thin that they could be considered inexistent. In substance the .Armed Forces emerged from the long colonial conflict with a formidable experience in counterguerrilla warfare, but with empty ranks and consciences and, moreover, isolated from the Atlantic military contest. due both to the obsolescence of materials, organization and structures and, especially for the land forces. to the lack of theoretical and practical links with the operational conceptions and the defence plans in the European contest. There were moreover two other important elements: a considerable and generalized economic crisis, together with a widespread indifference, if not hatred, felt by the people towards everything that smelt of war. But in the storm of political events, not quite subsided yet. the Portuguese Armed Forces have had the luck of having on their side and within their ranks enlightened leaders, who have fully understood that defence is an essential vehicle for foreign policy, and extremely vigorous

50

top Cadres. who have been both nationally and within capable of giving an incessant NATO. impulse to reconstruction . Moreover one must acknowledge that the Country's youth - who, THE ARMY owing to conscription, are the suppliers of the military units' The Army consists of about force - have not lost their 46,000 men (2), 40,000 of which ancient and famed Lusitania n are draftees whose service pride, the innate sense of duty lasts 16 months. and is and discipline and the rigorous organized as follows: respect for the legal authority. • 1 Independent mixed Brigade; All these factors, combined • 1 "Commandos" Regiment together, have promoted, on (raisable to Brigade level) ; the one hand , a clear policy of • 2 Cavalry Regiments; rapprochement. indeed of full • 1 Armoured Regiment; reentry into NATO, and on the other the beginning and • 14 Infantry Regiments, plus an carrying out without delay of a autonomous battalion; radical process of reorganization, • 5 Artillery Regiments (3 field modernization and artillery, 1 antiaircraft artillery strengthening of the Armed and 1 coast artillery), plus 2 Forces as a whole, which are autonomous battalions; today a solid and reliable • 2 Engineer Regiments; bulwark in the defence of the land, sea and air frontiers , both • 1 Signal Regiment; • 1 Military Police Regiment. their own and those of other countries of · the Alliance The main combat equipment (and especially those of the includes: Southern Region of ACE). • Armoured vehicles: sixty-six Unquestionably Portugal needs "M-48" A5 tanks; 125 "Saladin" financial help, particularly in the "AML-60/90" and "Ferret" MK4 military sector: and it makes reconnaissance vehicles; 222 no mistery of it, on the contrary, VTCs of the "M-113", "M-577" it says it loud and clear. A2 and "Chaimite" types; appealing for support to the • Artillery: twenty-four 140 mm other NATO countries, of which guns; twenty "M-101" 105 mm it asks to go beyond the towed howitzers; six 155 mm declarations of intentions, i.e. "M-109" A2 self-propelled the mere payment of fair howitzers; twenty 107 mm compensations for the faci lities mortars; 35 coastal pieces of accorded to some nations at different calibers; bilateral level in terms of bases • Antitank: forty-five 90 mm and and access into Portuguese 106 mm recoi lless guns; 35 territory. These requests have "TOW" missile systems; been openly reitera ted also • Antiaircraft: eighteen "Rh-202" recently by Minister of Defence 20 mm guns; 20 "Bofors" 40 mm Machete. during the 31st Annual guns; 16 "Blowpipe" individ ual Assembly of ATA (Atlantic missile systems. Treaty Association) (1 ), held The units are deployed at Oporto in September 1985. Without this help - it has been within four Regional Military Commands (3) and two Insular said - the effort to give a Zone Commands (Azores and qualified contribution to the Madeira) . Their general task is common defence will risk to become useless in a short time. the defence of the national territory (including interventions In the following paragraphs we shall give a synthetic picture in case of natural disasters) of the three Services' present structure (according to the most updated data) and describe, within the limits of the Moments of the intense training activity permitted divulgement, the of the Portuguese "Commandos" tasks assigned to each service. Regiment.

51

l

1

=

as well as cooperation with the other Armed Forces in the defence of the coast and airspace. The only conventiona l Major Un it (the already mentioned mixed Brigade, on which we sha ll dwell later in detail) is assigned to NATO and, more precisely, it would become a component of SACEUR's strateg ic reserve, to be employed - as we said - in the Southern Region of ACE.

THE NAVY The Navy counts about 14,000 men, including 2000 marines (3 batta lions); the conscripts - in this case a minority - are approximate ly 4,500, with a term of 24 months' service. The fleet includes 7 frigates, 10 corvettes, 1O gunboats, 4 minesweepers, 3 submarines, 13 amphibious craft, 4 support ships. The main bases are in Lisbon and Faro (on the southern coast). 52

Excluding the direct defence of the coastal areas and ports inside the territorial waters which is a preeminently national task - the other traditional and fundamental duty of the Navy, i.e. the protection of the sea lines of communication, has a bivalent character, meaning that both the interests of the nation as such (Portugal draws from the sea 96% of its imported produce) and those of the Al liance converge on it. This protection consists mostly of antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures. In this regard it must be emphasized that the so-called "strategic triang le", formed by continental Portuga l and the Azores and Madeira archipelagos, actual ly delimits an area, the control of wh ich wou ld be of determinant importance for the support of possible war operations in the European theatre. Nevertheless we witness a rather anomalous situation and the Portuguese authorities

insist it should be rectified - in which the zone entrusted to CINCIBERLANT (one of the three Major Subordinate Commands of the Supreme Al lied Command Atlantic of Norfolk, which share that ocean) does not include the Azores! Officially, approximately one third of the naval units is assigned to NATO. Moreover we must mention the participation, to a limited degree, in STANAVFORLANT, a multinationa l maritime task force, with prevail ing ly deterrent tasks in periods of crisis, which can operate anywhere in the Atlantic.

Above.

Portuguese air-naval formation during a NATO exercise in the Atlantic. Right.

A7 "Corsair". The aircraft, which can reach a maximum speed of 1125 Km/h, is armed with a 20 mm "Vulcan" gun with 6 rotating barrels, and can carry bombs or external loads up to 6804 Kg.

T HE AIR FO RCE

With a strength of 14,000 men, only 5,000 of whom conscripts (for 21-24 months). the Air Force has in its establishment 13 combat squad rons, divided into the various specia lities. for a tota l of approximately 140 airpla nes and 50 helicopters. The fixed wing ai rcraft are A-7P "Corsairs", "G91 s", R3/T3s and R4/T3s, "T-38s", "C-212s", "C-130s"; Hie he licopters are "Pumas" and "Alouettes". Paratroops are members of the Air Force. As we have said before, this is on e of the characteristics of the Portuguese military org anization. T he paratroops are now operationally organized into a light Brigade of about 3,000 men, with three batta lions. similar in structure to our "Folgore" Brigade. Regarding the Service's tasks, there is no need to linger mu ch on the, subject, knowing that they are connected

with the aircraft's intrinsic flexibility as well as the specific qualities of the mentioned craft. Let us say that to the good capabili ty of tactical/ strategic transport one can add the excellent performance of the multirole "Corsair", which can be refueled in flight and is able to intervene in any area, both within the strictly Portuguese jurisdiction and within ACE. This flexibility, combined with the already ach ieved sta ndardization of the procedures, permits moreover tc "transfer" without problems the ai rcraft assigned to NATO to the operati onal control of any ATAF. As far as the pa ratroops are concern ed, tak ing for granted, on the one hand, the sca rce likelihood of thei r employment on the nationa l territory and. on th e other, the freq uent participation of their units in NATO exercises, also in Italy, it does not seem unreasonable to foresee that in the short

term. also the Brigade as a whole (which is currently und ergoing organizational adjustments) could be made avail able for interna tiona l operational employment. TH E 1ST INDEPEND ENT M IXED BRIGADE

We deem it most appropriate to consider with particu lar attention this excellent Major Unit - to which we have already referred a couple of times, albe it without naming it precisely . It should be kept in mind, fi rst o1 all, that the Brigade represents the "spearhead" of the Army, is directly subordinate to the Army General Staff, and major efforts and attenti on are devoted to it. As a matter of fact this Brigade is - let us repeat it t he on ly Portuguese elementa ry "conventiona l" Major Unit, and is also the only one assigned to NATO. It is the di rect descendant of t he 3rd Infantry

53

The ''M 48 A5" combat tank is in service with the armoured battalion of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade.

Division (which was. as we have seen, earmarked for the Alliance since its very constitution}; the Division ceased to exist as such after the upheavals of 1974, and the new unit was not officially established until 1978. Nevertheless, contrary to its mother-unit. which was always kept at rather low operational readiness, the heir was created with the declared intention of establishing a constantly updated and effective instrument. At present the Brigade has almost completed its organization as regards personnel and equipment although it has not yet reached the optimum - and, above all, it maintains a high standard of efficiency and combat capability. It has been termed "mixed" 54

owing to its in termediate characteristics, between those of a motorized unit and those of an armoured unit. It is in fact organized as follows: • 2 motorized batta lions; • 1 tank battalion ("M-48" A5); • 1 mechanized battalion (armed with TOW missiles); • 1 field artillery battalion (105 mm, part towed and part self-propelled); • 1 reconnaissance company; • 1 Eng in eer company; • 1 Signal company; • 1 Logistic battalion. Its strength is about 5,000 men stationed in the northcentral sector of the country; its centre is Santa Margarida Base. an imposing in frastructure that can lodge several units and perm its any type of training, even for the whole Brigade. Certainly the Portuguese authorities lay a lot of stress on training. The author of these li nes has had the opportunity

to see Commanders and soldiers at work, in non-demonstration activities, both at their locations at home and on the field here in Italy, in the Friuli, and he can assuredly say that leaders and subordinates have acquired an outstanding technical and professional preparation. Another sector that deserves high praise is the materials' maintenance : the very low rate of inefficiency is, at the same time, a distinction and a point of honour of the entire Brigade. A feature common to all units must moreover be unde rlined: the remarkable esprit de corps and discipline. Referring specifically to Italy's North-Eastern Operational Theatre, we can say that the Brigade started to "show its face" in our country with some observers in 1978. With time the Major Unit's presence has become increasingly regular and substantial: starting from the first massive participation in the NATO exercise "Display

~

..

-'·

·;;:,;.·

.,

:.

.- :

---~.,._.,

-'

,___.,,

Determination" '80, the Brigade has placed alternatively under the operational control of COMLANDSOUTH, Command Posts and Troops of various size and nature, obtaining an ,excel lent level of " interoperability" with other NATO forces, Italian and others, both on the operationa l doctrines and conceptions plane and on the equal ly important plane of human relations. With this unit Portugal not only shows its flag but, above al l, affirms with concrete facts its determination to fulfil l the obligations taken within the Atlantic Alliance. In concluding these notes on the 1st Mixed Brigade we wish to mention briefly the other Portuguese sold iers whom we have seen in action here in Italy: we refer to the paratroops of the recently established Brigade (recent at organizational level, of course) who, as we said before, are integrant part of the Air Force. We do not want to

paraphrase a famous comparison attributed to a well-known German Marshal of the '40s, also because comparisons can be unpleasant; nevertheless it is not inappropriate to say that the Portuguese . paratroops have amazed the Ita lian paratroopers for their excellent level of training, their grit and their versati lity, which has permitted them to operate, without problems, even on the Dolomites, side by side with the Alpini paratroopers. THE PROSPECTS

The Portuguese Armed Forces strive - and in this striving there is also a remarkable moral tension - to perfect their reorganization as well as update and increase their infrastructure and materials: Portugal considers these prerequisites indispensable in order to keep pace with the times and offer Europe a worthy

The field artillery battalion of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade is armed with 155 mm guns, both in the towed version and on " M 109 A1" self-propelled hulls.

mi litary cooperation. Referring again to the words said by the Portuguese Minister of Defence, the ma in short-term goals can be listed, in order of priority, as fol lows: • construction of three frigates suitable for antisubmarine warfare; • completion of the equipment of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade (especially antiaircraft weapons and battlefield surveillance equipment); • operational establishment of an airborne light Brigade; • acquisition of new aircraft for maritime patrol; • improvement of the transport air fleet; • introduction of interceptors {air defence).

55

Left, from top.

"MPDR 45" antiaircraft field radar system. Class 1'60" floating drawbridge.

it of its allies: in substance, it promises solidarity in exchange for solidarity. Is the Alliance going to show confidence in this very worthy member, not forgetting that the common liberty, for which the Portuguese soldiers are more than ready to fight. is of priceless value and deserves therefore a few pecuniary sacrifices? We would like to have a crystal ball and see in it the answer that logic alone seems unable to give. For our part, we can only express to the Lusitanian soldiers our best wishes! Col. Giovanni De Simone

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• "Nacao e Defesa", published by lnstituto da De fesa Nacional, no. 35, July-September 1985. • "Baluarte", Rivista das Forcas Armadas Portuguesas, no. 29/30, September-October 1980. • "Military Balance 1985-86", published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. • "NATO's Fifteen Nations", no. 2/1982. • "Naval Forces " , no. 4/1985. • Various papers published by the General Staffs of the Portuguese Armed Forces. NOTES

This is understandably a financial effort of great dimensions, which Portugal finds very difficult to bear with its sole resources; it should be remembered, in this connection,

56

that Portugal's GNP currently does not exceed 3,000 billion Escudos (4), 3% of which is allotted to defence. The country has an impelling need of financial assistance, and asks

(1) ATA is a non-governmen tal international body which integrates private international organizations represen ting NATO countries. (2) The country's population is a little more than 10 million. (3) For territorial operations, the Lisbon Command takes on the role of an Army Corps Hqs., and the other th ree th at of Brigade Hqs. (4) 1 Escudo = 10 Lit. = U.S. $ 0.006. The inflation rate is approximately 15% per year.

't

OF40Mk2

OTO MAIN·BATTLE TANK Crew: Weight:· Armament: main gun: fire control system: 7.62 MGs: smoke grenade launchers: Road speed: Range:

4 men 43 tons 105/52 stabilized one coaxial, one AA 8 cal 66 mm 60 km/h 600 km

rIHE AUXILIARY UNITS IN THE WAR OF LIBERATION

AUXILIARY UNITS? The auxiliary un its, which were constituted by the SMRE (State Magg iore del Reg io Esercito) at the end -of 1943, were widely employed b,y t he Allies during the entire Italian campa ign but, to th is day, their activity is scarcely or only superficially known. Their denomi nation of "Auxil iary units', appropriate accord ing to some, not very appropriate accord ing to others. has been the sub ject of contrasts and discuss ions. In fact, among the ma ny problems that, in that distant year, confronted the It alian military leadersh ip regarding these un its, whose establ ishment was urged by the Allies, one, perhaps the f irst, was precisely what to call them: "labouring"?, "workers"?,

" logistic"?, "aux iliary"? . The most appropriate name shou ld have been "logistic units" mostly due to the wide range of tasks, mainly logistic, _ entrusted to and carried out by t hem. Instead, the name was changed from the in it ial "labouring" to the f ina l denom ination of "auxil iary units". "Rivista Militare", in the immed iate post-war period, reappearing after a period of interruption, among the first four articles on the Campaign of Liberation and the un its that took part in it, devoted as many as three articles to the 210th Infantry Division, an auxi liary Major Unit of the American 5th Army, and the first book on the Italia n Campaign, published by Rizzoli in 1945, titled "Dalle Pugl ie alla Valle¡ Padana" was also devoted to th is Division (1}.

Later, after 1945, the auxiliary Divisions fell into oblivion, perhaps due to the tasks carried out - unappropriately called also by the official military press "Second level duties" (2) - or for lack of supporters at the higher levels of the reconstituted Ita lian Army, to the point of being ignored altogether and, only in some instances, barely mentioned. Moreover even when they were mentioned in writings, commemorations and meetings - they were neither given the merit they deserved, nor was there an acknowledgment of their real weight in the Campaign of

Auxiliary Divisions personnel engaged in the recovery of materials.

59

7

Liberation, and the Ang loAmerican appreciations for their contri bution was never made known. Above all, the just emphasis has never been given to the way t hey influenced (when the Ar mistice clauses were enforced by the Al lies) the improvement of conditions in favour of It aly, owing t o the work of 200,000 men belong ing to these divisions. It is a fact that the Hist ory Offi ce of the Army Genera l Staff in 1977 publis hed a volume entitl ed "The Auxi liary Units of the It alia n Army in the War of Liberation" , but it is also a fact that for years th e book's data were never stud ied, through a compa rison between the so-cal led operational units and the auxiliary units, withi n the

" I believe that only few ful ly rea lize how well the Italian Army behaved. With our assistance, an Army of over 300,000 men has been organized from chaos, with personnel recovered from disbandment. with ex POW Generals brought back from England, etc. The Italian Liberation Corps has fought well and suffered many losses. The logistic and auxiliary units have carried out a huge task repairing roads, working in ports, etc., thus permitting us to spare: Allied personnel. The Italian Army has loyally cooperated as cobelligeren t, in a practical way, silently, without any at trition . I would like that all real ize that. and that the Italian Army be given the just and deserved ack nowledgement, both in the press and in the Allies' minds, for the precious contribution given to the Allied cause " . From a letter by General Langley Browning, Head of the Army Subcom mittee of the Allied Control Commission, dated August 24, 1944.

general framework of the Campaign an d the Li beration Army, in order to objectively ascertain the respective role played by them. Moreover. speaking of th e " Liberation Army" and in order to evaluate the importance that the Italian

Army as a whole had in the country's liberation. we most not forget the auxi liary un its : the Italian Army, in the War of Li beration , was form ed - it must be underl ined - by combat units (1st Motor ized Group , Italian Libera tion Corps. Combat

Table A

STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF THE ITALIAN UNITS DURING THE LIBERATION CAMPAIGN AUTUMN 1943-SUMMER 1945 Deployment on End of front line or operational start of activity or employment employment

UNITS

Losses

Time in front line or in emplqyment

Strength

5500

w

M

57 14

132 50

159 9

6.XII.'43 5.II.'44

20.XII.'43 17.IV.'44

4 months

18.IV.'44

24.IX.'44

5 months

24000

377

880

105

"Cremona" Combat Group

24.I.' 45

8.V.'45

4 months

10500

178

605

80

"Friuli" Combat Group

9.Il.'45

8.V.'45

3 months

10500

245

657

61

"Folgore" Combat Group

3.IIl.'45

8.V.'45

2 months

10500

164

244

14

"Legnano" Combat Group

23.Ill.'45

8.V.'45

1 month ½

10500

55

279

-

1090

2847

428

160000

744

2202

109

from 9,000 to 24,000

260

640

132

1st Motorized Regt.

[

• at Montelungo ~tter reorgan 1zat1on

•

I.L.C.

Total Losses Combat Units Auxiliary Divisions: 205th, 209th, 210th, 227th, 228th, 230th, 231st, Italian Hqs. 212th

210th Division

60

D

Various dates ~rom a min imum from autumn '43 Summer '45 of 4 months for the 231 st Div. tc to 20.Xl.'44 a rnax. of 16 months for the 210th

8.X.'43 15.IV.'44

15.VUI.'45

16 months

Groups) and by the Auxiliary Divisions (as mariy as eight). The combat units (table A) during the Campaign of Liberation were represented on .the front line by about 5,000 men (1st Motorized Group) in the. period December 1943 - April 1944, by .no more than 24,000 men (Italian Liberation Corps) in the period April - September 1944, and, in the period January April 1945, by a minimum of 10,000 at the end of January to a maximum of 40,000 men at the end of April (Combat Groups). On the contrary, the auxiliary units in April 1945 numbered as many as 200,000 men. But there is more to say. At the end of 1944 the only Italian units in the operations zone were the 210th and the 228th Div ision, both auxiliary divisions, respectively cooperating with the American 5th Army since December 1943, the former, and with the 8th British Army, since March 15, 1944, the latter. Moreover we must add the 231st Division establ ished only in December 1944, in order to lighten the .210th Division by absorbing all the Italian units cooperating with the British units of the 5th Army (3). Strangely enough, for as many as four months, from September 24, 1944 - date in which the Italian Corps of Liberation ceased its activity and was disbanded - to January 24, 1945 - date in which the "Cremona", first employed of the four Combat Groups, went to the line (4) - the Italian Army was represented in the operations zone only by three auxiliary Divisions (over 50,000 men). The auxiliary Divisions rightly deserve therefore to be presented in the light and with the importance due to them, considering that their contribution was determinant for the development of the operations and for the favourable outcome of the Campaign, but. above all, their intervention was decisive, due to the positive influence that they exerted on the Allies' attitude towards Italy, when the time

came to enforce the clauses of the armistice. GENESIS On September 8 Marshal Badoglio broadcast the announcement of the armistice, signed at Cassibile a few days before (September 3) by General Castellano. The armistice conditions were at the time only military; t he political, economic and fina ncial ones were to be made known later. The Allies, moreover, assured General Castellano that for Italy the Memorandum of Quebec (August 15, 1943) would be applied, meaning that the conditions would be liable to be modified in favour of Italy, to t he extent of the contribution given by the Italian government and the Ita lian people to the Allied Nations in the rest of the war against Germany. After the armistice's conclusion, when t he time of cobell igerency came, there was from the very beginning a certain divergence between the intentions of the Ita lians and those of the Allies: the Italians wanted to participate immediate ly and directly, with their own forces. in t he war against the Germans; the Allies

were firmly determined to limit this type of participation as much as possible. The SMRE, on September 18, forwarded to General McFarlane, Head of the Allied Military Mission (5) the proposal to start the cooperation in battle of the Italian forces with the Allies against the Germans. The proposa l was rejected. General McFarlane let it be known that, according to the needs of t he moment. Italy should supply transportations and labour forces to the Taranto port. in order to speed up the Allied un loadings. On September 29, during a meeting in Malta between Marshal Badoglio (6) and General Eisenhower, the Italian side again insisted in proposing a direct participation in the war, side by side with the Allies. General Eisenhower, although appreciative of the Italian aspirations, said that at the time it was impossible to supply adequate armament and equipment, and consequently the SMRE should just set up a few particularly selected units, which would be employed later di rectly by the Anglo-Americans. After the declaration of war on Germany (October 13, 1943), Italy, again through' Marshal Badoglio, persisted in requesting a direct participation of Italian

ADDRESS OF H.E. MARSHAL MESSE TO THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES May 28, 7944 While the troops of th e Italian Liberat io n Corps partecipate together with the comrades of the Al lied Nations in the great battle fo ught in the name of Rome, my Commander's heart does not fo rget all the Italian soldiers, sailors and airmen who, alo ng the co mba t lines, immed iately behind the front , in ports and airports, as welL as along the maritime and air commun ication lines, give, silently, their contribution to the bat tle in progress. A grateful thought goes. above all, to the mule-train units and porter units who, in the most tormen ted zones of the front, carry to the advanced units, both ours and Allied, the supp lies indispensable for the battle. These troops, mingled with the most advanced units, have often spontaneously taken up arms an d gallantly fought, and have alrea dy given to the Country, in doing their hard wo rk, numerous dead and wounded. This new Italian blood is generously shed to redeem the new Italy's right to live. Let these real fighters know that thei r sil en t sacrifice is known and appreciated by all Italians: they must d raw new strength f rom this ce rtainty, continuing to carry out tenaciously, till victory, their fru itfu l work. Giovanni Messe Marshal of Italy Chie f of the General Staff

61

units with t he Allied force s. Also this proposal was t urned down. Moreover , precisely in those days, General Mcfarlane received inst ruct ions from the Mediterra nean Command (7) t hat lim ited t he Ita lian con t ingent, to be employed in c ombat side by side wi th the Allies, t o a sing le unit at Brigade leve l (8) . These instructions moreover provided t hat the Italia n t roops were to be employed mainly

as labour force in ports. in t he defence of rear areas. naval bases and roads, in repairing t he dest ru ct ions made by the Germa ns and in the delivery o f supplies t o the Allied un its on the front -¡line. The Ita lian Supreme Comma nd, though continuing with its repeat ed req uests, finally acknowledged t ha t t he cooperat ion wit h the Ang lo-Ameri cans unfortunately could not be achi eved in

accorda nce w ith the Ital ian w ishes . but, as a c onsequence of t he needs and req uests of the A llies. to t he extent and in the way req uired by them . As a consequence t he SM RE . having decided, on Sept ember 22, the esta blishment o f the 1st Motorized Group, on September 23 decided the constitut ion of t he aux iliary Divisions, by t ransforming t he already existing coasta l divisions. On Decem ber 24 the " Labourers' Inspectorate"

Table B

MAJOR AUXILIARY UNITS SEPTEMBER 1943-MAY 1945 -"

Major Units

Commander

205th Div. Gen. Casula

209th Div.

Category (1)

Strength

US ITI 5000

16000

Tasks

I.45

Auxiliary duties in airports for the, USAAF.

1.45

Rear line duties for the British Major Units. In 1945, also duties on the from line.

Gen . Properzi Gen . Olmi

BR ITI 19000 II-III.45

Gen. Colonna Gen. Cortese

US ITI

Losses (2)

D

w

M

(3) (3) (3) 46 113

-

22000

IV.45

13000 24000 18000

I.45 XIl.45 IV.45

Front and rear line duties for the U.S. 5th Army.

227th Div. Gen. Chatrian Gen. Silvio Rossi

BR ITI 10000 ITI ITI 30000

1.45 VII.45

Services for British Hqs. west of the Apennines, from Calabria to Rome.

29

.228th Div. Gen . Tomaselli

BR ITI

14000 16000

III.45 V.45

Front and rear line duties for the British 8th Army.

62 202 (4)

13

230th Div. Gen . Vivalda

BR ITI 15000 ITI ITI 16000

I.IV.45

(3)

(3)

(3)

231st Div. Gen. Nannei

BR ITJ

14000 20000

1.45 IV.45

Front and rear line duties for the British units of the 5th U.S. Army (13th British Corps) .

40

73

29

US ITI 50000

I.IV.45

Rear line duties for the bases of Naples, Anzio, Civitavecchia, Piombino and Leghorn .

210th Div. -

Gen. Reisoli Italian Gen. Ferone Hqs. 212th Div. Gen. La Feria

I

Territorial duties (Puglia, Lucania, Molise).

260 640 132

55

128 237

-

-

(1) The units of the "Regio Esercito", d uring the War of Liberation, were d ivided into the fo llowing categories: U.S. ITI (direct cooperation with the U.S. Forces), BR ITI (direct cooperation with the British forces). ITI ITI (indirect cooperation with the A llied forces). Furthermore, there were units w ith no special denominatio n, which performed territorial duties. (2) The data on losses are mainly f rom the volume published by the Army General Staff - History Office. For all units - wi th the excep tion of the 210th Div. - data for 1943 are not available. (3) Unknown. (4) On ly for 1944, Data for 1945 are not available.

62

was created, which became successively the "Inspectorate of Auxiliary Troops". EMPLOYMENT

There were eight divisions that participated directly in the Italian Campaign (table B). with a force fluctuating between 150,000 and 160,000 men (9) in the 1945, equivalent to about 25% of the effectives of the XV Army Group. Some of the units were subordinate to the Americans (US ITI units). other to the British (BR ITI units). Some were employed on the front and behind the front-lines , others only in the rear areas, others still were employed in territorial services. Some were stationed at air bases, some others at naval bases. Their establishment (table C). contrary to what had happened with the operational units, neither was decided beforehand by the SMRE - as had been the case with the Combat Units - nor did it have a character of uniformity. Each auxiliary Division was constituted according to the specific tasks that were assigned to it, and underwent frequent transformations. This was done so that it could fulfil! its tasks in connection with the evolutions of the situation and the development of the operations. The employment was undoubtedly massive and decidedly a varied one: guard to depots, military police, traffic control. escort to rail and road convoys, workshop activity, transportation of supplies to the front-line and the rear areas (mule and motor transportations). construction and repair of road and railway bridges, setting up of oil pipelines, construction and maintenance of telephone lines, minefield clearance, .setting up of waterworks,

The Allied military successes would not have been achieved so soon without t he cooperation of the Italian sold iers. operating behind the lines of the 5th and 8th Army. The All ied Commanders co nfirm their highest appreciation to these units. which have ceaselessly ensured the supply of ammunition and victuals to te Allied fighting men, repairing military bridges and keeping the vital lines constantly open. Today, on the high-mountai n f ronts. the Italian soldiers with their mules carry munitions fo r the artilleries. p rovisions, water and medicines to the Allied soldiers. It has been impossible to estimate the to ns transported by these un its. It was thanks to th em tha t the supply lines were ke pt open. T hey have dearly paid for doing their d uty. The losses in battle of th ese units have not been I ight. From ÂŤBasic NeWSJ> (Allied Nations News Service), October 24, 1944.

A soldier of the auxiliary Divisions on

MP and traffic control duty.

63

ORGAN IZATION OF THE JANUARY Divisions

Date

205,

1. 1.45

209

1. I.45 IV.45

0

0

Infantry

Artillerv

3

227

1. 1.45

1

228

9. IIl.45

230

1. 1.45

231

1. 1.45 30. Il.45 30. 111.45

Mule EngAir Force Rgt ineer Rgt Group (combat) (combat)

Infantry

0

0

Artillery

0

0

Engineers Railway Labour Engineers Engineers

2 2 1

1

1

I

I 2

2

1

2

1

2

1 (2)

2

3

1

1

1

3

4 4

1

t. I.45

( 1) Regt. level;

Guard

3 4

1. IV.45

Notes:

Labour Engineers

5 (t)

210

Ital ian (4) Hqs. 212th Dlv.

CJ CJ CJ CJ CJ 0

(2) Grenad iers;

(3) Clubs, messes, shops, wa rehouses:

electric insta llations, loading and un loading of sh ips, trai ns and airplanes, camouflage work, medica l evacua ti ons . Particu larly outstanding was the contribution given by the Engineers in their various specializations. and by the mu le-train units. Suffice it to think that. in Apri l 1945, as many as 5 Battalions of Railway Eng ineers, 83 Companies of Engineers and 31 mule-tra in units operated for the Allies in the auxiliary Divisions. The losses suffered (table A). besides the work done and the operations carried out, are the most convincing w itness of the Auxiliary Divisions' commi tment in the whole Campa ign. The 21 0th Division, for instance, as regards losses, is second on ly to the Liberation Corps. On the whole the auxiliary Divisions suffered 774 dead, 2202 wou nded, 109 missing (10) . There has been no

64

lack of acknowledgments for the work done by these divisions, from Ital ian civil and mil itary leaders and from the Allies. General La ngley Brown ing , Head of the Army Subcommittee of the Al lied Control Comm ission , already on August 24, 1944 had declared: "I t hink that few people fu lly rea lize how we ll the Ita lian Army behaved ... The log istic and auxi liary un its carried out a huge task, repairing roads, working in ports ... thus enabl ing us to spare All ied personnel. T he Ital ian Army has loyal ly cooperated as cobel ligerent. in a practica l way, si lently and without any attrition. I would like that all realize that. and the Italian Army be given the just and deserved acknowledgment, both in the press and in the All ies' mind, . for the precious contribution g iven to the All ied cause". These words actually took on a particular significance, due to

the position of the man who sa id them . Among the All ies. General Browning was, in fact. the ma n who best knew what the Italian Army as a whole, and the auxi liary units in particu lar, had done in those months. Not only tha t. At the time of his statement, the operations on the Gothic Line had not yet started and the auxil iary Divisions, wh ich had al ready distingu ished themse lves on the Garigliano, at Anzio and in the battle of Rome, had still not done the best part of their job. It is actual ly on the Gothic Line that the 20th Mu le Train Group and the 210th Engineer Group - both belong ing to the 210th Auxiliary Divis ion, a unit of the 5th Army - were awarded the "Combat" denomination. exactly equ iva lent to that given to the Groups that were ¡ then be ing established. With only a difference: the "Combat" denom ination was not awa rded

I

Tab le C

AUXILIARY DIVISIONS APRIL 1945

0

0 Mu le Trains

2

Security and Guard

.

0

0 Port units

LJ 0

0

Technica l Transportation Engineers

Services

MP

0

Quartermaster

Clearing station

(3)

Reserve Join ing station

3

1

I

4

I

I

Reorga nization & Transit station

LJ LJ LJ Engineers

Smoke Unit

"Folgore" Squadron

1 1

1

I

Mule Tng. Center

1

I I

I

2

5

8

2

4

1

l

3

1

4

t 1

4 (41 Orgamzed

3

on :

~

3 Zone

Commands.

s

5 10

38

2

1

l

3

Regt. Hqs.. 10 811 . Groups, 4 log ist, c tn,ses .

to these un its as a consequence of a decision taken by the General Staff in drawing up tables of establishment and in assign ing tasks, but after a t_rying operationa l employment in the decis ive hours of t he Campaign .

REGIO ESERCITO GENERAL STAFF Febr uary 10, 1945

Order of the Day to the Army CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

The "cobell igerent" quality, ment ioned by Genera l Brown ing , was given to the Army, and t here fore to Italy, main ly thanks t o the aux iliary units . The Italian people, first of al l, cooperat ed with the Allies, beca use on the one hand, the diffused hostility towards the Germans in the North, and particularly the partisans' guerri lla war, forced the German Command to withdraw a number of combat units from th e front-line whi le, on the other, in the South, due to t he

I assume today the offic e of Chief of the Army General Staff. I am awa re that the respo nsibili ty en trusted to me is heavy. I am con fi dent I shall be able to build fo r Italy, for I feel around me a reborn w illingness to act. From the painful exper ience of the recen t events each of us has derived a more consc ious desire to help our Country rise again: fi rst in the war against our t raditional enemy, then in a fru i tfu l peace. On the tiri ng line, the Combat Groups, wh ich revive a never ex tinguished trad i tion of heroism; o n the other side o f the front , the pa tr iots reaffi r m with their blood the ir generous w ill of liberation; on this side of the front. the auxiliary troops, who silently confirm a deep attachment to their duty; we are all an Army, on its way, co nsumed by one fi re: our love tor Italy. In fron t o f us - to s how us the way - are all our dead. Just because we are ready to m ake any sacr ifice for our Country, we are sure that our Country will resurge.

Long live Italy General Ercole Ronco Chief o f Staff

65

Soldiers of the auxiliary Divisions engaged in the handling of supplies.

widespread popularity of the Anglo-Americans, the Allies did not have to take a similar measure. In the military field, especially, t he cobe lfigerency was expressed by the 5,000 men of the 1st Motorized Group at t he end of 1943, t he 23,000 of the Liberation Corps in 1944 and the 40,000 men of the Combat Groups in 1945. Nevertheless we can irrefutably affirm that the most important contribution given by t he Italian Army to t he Allies is t he substant ia l cooperation of the 200,000 men of the auxiliary Divisions, in accord ance, moreover, to the Allies' needs and expectations at that part icu lar time. The supply of such a remarkable bul k of auxiliary un its was undoubted ly a fundamenta l aspect of our pa rticipation in the War of Liberation. The cooperation given by t hese units to t he Al lies, though rather unconspicuous and obscure, brought about excellent results. We do not deem it superfl uous, therefore, to stress once more that, thanks t o t hese forces - made up by a substantial number of specialists, among others - t he All ies were able to withdraw

66

from their logistic organization in Ita ly a large contingent of troops, that were sent either to other operational theatres or to the advanced zone of the Italian Peninsula itse lf (11) ; the Italian political leaders, at the end of the war, could rightly claim bette r armistice conditions and insist that Italy be rei nstated in its role as a free and independent country in t he assemb ly of the nations of the world.

3 March 1945; "Legnano", 23 March 1945 (table A). (5) The Allied Military Mission (A.M.M.) attached to the Itali an Supreme Com mand , had the tas k ot implementing the armistice clauses and coord inating the ac ti on ot the Italian A rmed Forces and people wi th the Alli ed operations. (6) Also Gener al Ambrosio parti ci pated in the meeting. (7) It was Gen. Eisenhower's Headquarters, located in A lgiers. (8) The First Motorized Group, which was being con stituted under the com mand of General Vincenzo Cesare Dapino (Chief o f Staff was the Ma jor of the Alpini Luigi Vis mara). (9) To reach the number of app roximately 200,000 men (196,086 to be exact; thi s figure is g iven at page 143 of the volume on the auxiliary units, published by the Army General Staff, History Offi ce} we must cons ider also the units of t he Internal Security Divisions "Sabaudia" and "Aosta" in Sici ly, of the "Calabria" Divis ion in Sardinia, plus the 25 "alien" comp anies in Corsica. (10) General Mario Puddu. in his book "Tra due invasioni" - note (1), page 66 pu ts the losses of the auxi liary Divisions at 897 dead, 2283 wounded and 109 missing. (11) "Le unita ausiliarie dell'Esercito Italiano nella Guerra d i Liberazio ne". Army General Staf f, History Office, ed. 1977, page 219.

Enrico Boscardi

NOTES

(1) The book was ready on Sep tember 1, 1945 and could have been published even two months earlier if Rizzoli, the only publisher of a certain level wo rking at that time in Milan, had not g iven precedence - upon America n request to the 5th Army's book "Finito" . The thre e articles on "Rivista Mi litare", as we ll as the book, were written by an o fficer of th e "Regia Marina", who attended th e War College in Turin in 1935 an d 1936. (2) A rti c le from the book "L'Esercito Ital iano nella Guerra d i Liberazione" by Luciano Lollio, from "Guerra di Liberazione - Scrit ti nel Tre ntennale" - Army General Staff, History Office, 1979, 145 pages. (3) The 210th Division in December 1944 had in fact reach ed th e leve l of almost 24,000 men. (4) There we re six Combat Groups. "Mantova" was not employed. "Piceno" operated as Training Cen ter. The other fo ur arrived on the front line at the follow ing dates: "Cremona", 24 Jan. 1945; "Friuli", 9 Feb. 1945; "Folgore",

Gen . En rico Boscard i has attended the Reserve Officer School, the Armoured Cava lry School, the Service Branch School , the War Coll ege and the British Arrny Staff Co llege at Camberley. He has been a uni t Commander in the "La ncieri di Montebe llo" and "Genova Cava l · ler ia". Commande r of the " Lancieri d i Aos ta" , and Deputy Com mander of the "Aosta" Motor· ized Brigade. As Sta ff Officer. Gen . Boscardi has served in the Headquarters o f the "Man tova" Division, the Northwestern Mili tary Region Command and the Army General Staff. Gen Boscardi has been Assistant M ilita ry Attache at the Italian Embassy in Wash ington - accred ited also in Mexico City - and has held the positions o f Ch ief, Internationa l Logist ic Plans Section and Chief. Logistic Plans Branch at the Defence Genera l Sla lf. He has afso been Ita lian Representative to EUROLOG and to the NA TO Senior Log ist icians· Conference. Gen. Boscard i is at present the Director ol the Wa r College Centre for the Ana lys is of Con flicts and Situations of Cr isis, and holds a Degree in Political Science.

j

---

An eighteenth century Italian print In 1778 the Paris Mondharre printing works, in 4, Rue Saint Jacques, published a copperplate engraving, printed in black and white and coloured by hand, entitled "French and foreign Cavalry uniforms according to the latest 1778 regulations" (size of the cavalrymen 7 x 9 cm) . The uniforms reproduced in this plate were in fact those prescribed by the regulations of 31 May 1776. The Mondharre printers specialized in large format prints depicting the uniforms of French and foreign troops accord ing to the various regulations and thus the prints were brought up to date at regular intervals. Thus in 1789 the printers, now cal led Mondharre and Jean, with new premises at 4, Rue Saint Jean de Beauvais, published a similar engraving

entitled "French and foreign infantry uniform as it is today according to the latest 1789 regu lations" (size of print 80 x 60 cm}. The uniforms depicted in this second plate are those of the 1786 regulations : the plate shows a grenadier from each line infantry regiment and a "chasseur" from each battalion. Both these prints are now in the International Museum of Images at Epinal {France). This particular kind of plate, apart from its artistic va lue, was very practical and useful for consultation purposes and was widely circulated. It was soon imitated abroad by various printers - in England it was called Schematic chart. There are three of these large plates today in the Collection of H.M. the Queen of England, in the Royal Library: they relate to the Prussian Army,

the Austro-Hungarian Army and the Sardin ian Army, respectively. We wil l dwe ll briefly on the latter, which is reproduced here for the first time in Italy. It bears the following title in French "State of the Officers of H.M. the King of Sardinia according to the new regulations and uniforms" of 1774 (added in pen): it includes 61 uniform sketches of the whole of King Vittorio Amedeo lll's Army. The date 1774, also quoted in some Eng lish publications, is not exact in that, looking carefully at the plate, the last sketch in the fourth row, i.e. the "Town Guard" can be clearly seen to bear the date 1782. And in fact the Turin "Town Guards" were established with "Instructions" from the Royal · Secretary of War on 11 March 1782. They were drawn from the "Invalids Battalion" and the 15

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However, given the style of these sketches, the overall layout of the plate and other details, the author may be assumed to be Antonio Stagnon (or Stagnone} who published in Turin, on September 15, 1789, a collection of plates of uniforms, title of "Etat general des

title of "Etat general des uniformes des troupes de S..M. le roi de Sardaigne ". The book is now in the Library of the Royal Armoury of Turin and is available for consultations. Alessandro Gasparlnetti

Maria Stagnon court engraver

Antonio Maria Stagnon (in some books Stagnone) was born in Mondelli, a hamlet of Prequartero in Valle Anzasca (Novara), on the 2nd July 1751, only child of Pietro Antonio Stagnon and Giovanna Dalla Longa. His father, also a native of Mondelli and whose family can be traced back to 1435, moved to Milan and then, in about 1735, to Turin where he opened an engravers' and sigil/ography worksriop, obtaining commissions first from private customers and later also from public offices as well as from the court of Savoy. Antonio Maria, after a period of apprenticeship in the family workshop, was sent by his father to Paris to improve his knowledge. At the end of 1772 he returned to Turin and his father made over the workshop to him, retiring to Mondelli. Stagnon depicted numerous sub;ects in his engravings: heraldry, geography, insignia, costumes and uniforms. With the royal patent of 4 April 1774 he obtained the title of " graveur des sceaux" (engraver -of seals).

Although he worked very hard, business did not go very well because he¡ also had to maintain a rather large family: he married twice, in fact, the first time to Marianna Ferroni and the second time to Teresa Antonino. The most important of his works are: an image of Clotilde of France, Queen , of Sardinia, married to Carlo Emanuele IV in 1775, an engraving which he signed "M.A. Stagnon de Travel/one", many ex-libris, two plates of mythological sub;ects and, above all, the already cited "Etat general des uniformes des troupes de S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne", comprising 88 colour plates and published in Turin on the 15th September 1789. This publication, although without great artistic merit, is the most complete and detailed representatipn of the uniforms of the Army of the Kingdom of Sardinia at that time. Other works by Stagnon worth mentioning are: a "Recueil general des modes d'habillements des femmes des

Etats de S.M. le Roi de Sardaigne", presumably printed in 1780, which consists in 43 colour plates, and an "Acknowledg-ement", i.e. a kind of patent of honour for the Turin Voluntary Militia, published in 1796. The Voluntary Militia had been established in Piedmont on 26 April 1793 to fight the French and were disbanded on 11 May 1796. The Turin Militia distinguished itseff in particular: in a very troubled period it provided all the city's military services and bore the title of "Royal Corps". It was disbanded on 27 June 1796 but its members had the right to wear the uniform. Antonio Maria Stagnon died in Turin in 1805 and his work was carried on by his son Giuseppe, born in Turin on 13 December 1777. Giuseppe is the author, amongst other works, of a collection "Uniforms of the troops of S.S.R.M. executed by Giuseppe Stagnon engraver of royal seals and of S.A.S. Prince of Carignano", published in 1821 and made up of 90 colour plates.

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TECHNICAL

DATA

PORTABLE VHF/FM RADIO SET The Defence Adm inist ration has recen tly decided to acquire several thousan d portable VH F/FM ra dio sets for commun ications at p latoon/company level; in the years 7987 - 7989 they w ill replace the CPRC 26 se ts, wh ich are still in service. The new se t has been designed acco rding to the Army Gener al Staff's specifications. and built employing modern technologies. t herefore it p laces itself at the fo refron t of the equipment of its c lass The eq uipment fea tures: • long operating life; • ease o f oper ation ; • h igh reliability; • easy main tena nce. A n important novelty is the development. along with the basic set, of a co mp lete range o f add -on subsystems [universal ba ttery-change r, microprocessor-controlled test stands for repa irs of 2nd and 3rd level), wh ic h. toge ther, constitute th e com ple te "system" for the new RV -2 radio set. Above.

CBU 825 universal ballery-charger, with lid tor transport. Below.

RV 21400 transceiver, with BCA 40012 automatic test stand.

,.

SPECIFICATIONS Mode of opera tion : Freq uency:

Channels: Power supply: Operating life: Outpu t: Weight and d imensions:

Voice (FM). simplex. Standard pre-set frequenc ies in the 47-57 MHz band, o r any 70 MHz within the 30-80 MHz band. 400 (25 kHz spacing) . 10-ce ll N I-CD recha rgeable 0.8 Ah batteries. Approx 24h w ith Tx/Rx 1.1.8 ra tio at +20"C. 400mW. • 1.5 Kg, with batteries. antenna and headse t- microp hone • 24 cm x 10 cm x 4 cm.

t'

l

'1

72

TECHNICAL

DATA

.I'/// "MAF" ANTI-TANK MISSILE SYSTEM Th e "MAF" system has been developed by a consortium o f Italian fi rms. starting from a critical study o f the present weapon systems. The basic criteria for its design have been d ictated by the need to find a solution that would conciliate various parameters, such as weight of th e weapon. range and cruise speed, paying special attention to the need of maximizing the system's performance at dis tances between 500m and 2,500 m. The missile is subson ic and is launched by a propellan t booster which ends its action before leaving the launcher tube, thus affording maximum safety to the operator; a rocket-engine propels the missile at a maximum ve locity of 260m/sec. Its effective ran ge depends on visibiltiy, conditions of transmission and speed; the 3,500m maximum range is determined by the minimum of the manoeuvre capability. The evolution o f the th rea t w ill bring about a massive employment of helicopters on the battlefield, for combined actions with ta nks. The design of the " MAF" system has taken into account the pos sibility of engaging these targets. in case of attack against o ne's own or nearby posi tions. Two operators can hand -carrv the missile. The system can be mounted on a vehicle.

SPECIFICATIONS Concept of th e sys tem:

Optica l beam, with transmitter on the launcher and receiver on the missile.

Primary target : Fire--no fire contro l: Trave rse: Elevation:

Tank. Automat ic in th e firing sequence. 360«. 5,, + 15" (present) - 10" + 25" (under study}.

Firing from around w ith 10% g ra dient:

No correctio n by the operator.

NEW 40mm L/60 AMMUNITION The Swed ish industry has designed and introduced a new type of 40mm ammun ition. It can use: • the "PFHE" (Pre Fragmented High Explosive) ro und. whose minimum engagement distance is 6 5m against aircraft and 4.5m against missiles, with a highly impact-se nsitive device in the fuze. a self-des troying mechanism. reduction c ircu its for very low altitudes. an d a double-walled container holding hund reds of heavy-metal pellets and an extremely power ful explosive: • the APHC-T (Armo ur Piercing High Capacity Tr acer). with a penetration 25-30% g reater than that of the normal AP· T rou nds.

73

BOOK

REVIEWS

r.1.1.1

CAHlF.RS 0 ' ÂŁTUDF.5 Sl' RATF.GIQUtS

La dissuarion par les embargos Les embargos americains contre fURSS ef leurs con.fefjuences stu les reh1lio11s

transnllantiques

C: I R. p F.$

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~

Yves Perez, "La dissuasion par les embargos" ("Dissuasion by Embargo"); Cirpes, Paris 1985, 134 pages, F. 50. This volume examines the rece nt U.S. embargoes against the U.S.S.R. the grain embargo fo llowing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the em bargo on the t rans -Ur al gas pipeline following the events in Poland - in o rder to arrive at general considerations on the effectiveness and limita tions of using trade as a politica l-s trateg ic weapon. The inquiry dwells into the problem o f East-West re lations and re lations bet ween Europe and the United States in the con text of NATO an d into the debate over restrict ions on exporting "critical" techno logies to Soviet--block countries. It is an ex treme ly important problem. It involves fundamental interests and can cause divergence arid tens ion throughout t he West wh ich are in turn exacerbated by the existing imbalance and by the d ifferent interests and perceptions on the two sides of the At lantic. In practice. use of the economic weapon as an instrument of defense policy cou ld do more damage to t he West. namely the countries and the cohesiveness itself of NATO. tha n to the Soviet Union. The author attempts to sketch a strategic theory of embargoes. He makes a funda mental distinction between the "rupture embargo" , or a sudden and tota l ban on exportation of particular products such as cereals, and t he "con-

tainmen t embargo", consis ting in trade controls and limita tions on critica l tech nologies in particular. but extendable to credit systems, to a cei ling on the level of dependency, to systema tic reduct ion of trade wh ich would conso lidate the economy of the Soviet bloc, and so on. As for rupture embargoes. the stra teg ic ca lcu lation to measure its impact should be based on the " trade rat io" between importer and exporter. The damage suffered by the exporter is measured by multiplying the d irect cost by a Keynesian multip lier of income or activities. The cost to the importer is measured w ith the aid o f intersectorial interdependency matrices. by the reduction in supply or internal production that follows the embargo and with so c io-economic models that measure the consequences of a reduction in con sumption and the level of prosperity. As always, psychological factors and the inevitable approximation of the models distort the ¡ rea l picture Embargoes often produce results that are quite d ifferent from those intended. especially in the context of NATO. An embargo must be multilateral to be effective. But cohes ive action presupposes e ither a consensus, and hence similar interests. or an overriding au thority that imposes the embargo. Neither one exists in the Wes t. There is no economic NATO It can be shown that U.S. embargoes have be en essentially fa ilures and that at times they have been coun terproductive, as in the case of the Yama l gas p ipeline. As for the con tainment embargo, the author believes with re fe rence to tran sfers of critica l military tec hnologies that the measures can only be effec tive i f the embargoes are highly selec tive. If they are not. there is the danger th at restrictive measures proposed by the Ame ricans will be dispu ted by the Europeans. as has happened. because they are seen as an attempt to sub jugate the European export system ra ther than as a means of containing Soviet military aggression. The problem of transfering technologies to the Soviet bloc arose at the beginning of the fifties, during the cold war. It became crucia l with the qualitative and quan titative trans fo rmation of the Soviet th reat - still in progress. American efforts to induce the Al lies to take a hard line by stricter and tighter contro ls have doubtless added to Europe's awareness that it is of fundamental importa nce to the West's securi ty to maintain a techno logica l advantage over the U.S S R. No state disputes the principle that tighter contro ls are needed even if dif ferences remain over the extent of such contro ls and lim itations, due in part to the fact that trade in much o f such strategically critical techno logy is indispensable to Europe's trade balance with the Soviet bloc. The au thor suggests a very interes ting methodologica l approach to

examining th is delicate problem: he suggests coupling d issuasion models w ith reciprocal vulnerability models derived f rom the interdependence es tablished between importer and exporter.

,.

E. Luttwak, "II Pentagono e I' Arte della Guerra" ("The Pentagon and the Art of War"). Rizzoli, Milan 1986. This vo lume analyzes the presen t structure of the U.S. Armed Forces for the purpos e of suggesting ways to make them more efficient through optimal use of the fi nancial and human resources at their disposal. The author, a strategic expert. attem pts to identi fy the reasons why the U.S. Armed Forces have not been able to express the ir fu ll operative potential in spite of the money and effort expend ed to that end. The author believes that the areas o f greatest concern, requi ring prompt intervention. are: the lack of inter-service integrat ion and co rporatism of the individual services of the military fo rces; the "mate rialistic" mentality that automatically transposes managerial and economic approaches to the military sphere; the absolute preeminence given to tec hnology; and a cumbersome organization that drains resources in support structures at the expense of tt)e operative sectors. The lack of inter-service integration is was teful in effort and resources by

'â&#x20AC;˘ 74

BOOK

duplicat ion in some sec tors and deficiency in others. In partLcular, there is no organic operative concept' for each of the strategic missions assigned to the u·.s. Arm ed Forces. The services are in competition with one another. Instead of integrated planning in term s of " m ission effec tiven ess" , weapon sys tems are evaluated in terms ot "platforms". It i s thus practica lly impossible to define sector tactica l s ubconcepts or to d efi ne the op tim al mix of m ilitary forces and weapon systems to effect them and , under o pera tive con dition s, achieve inter-servi ce unity. The ma tter is complicated by the effect of true industr ial lo bbies associat ed w ith each branch of the military, which are capable of in fl uencing, if not determining, proc urement planning. Dis torsio ns are thus created that are further amplified by the interven tion of cong ress ional fi nancing co mm ittees that reexamine each p rogram in detai l thus divesting the military leadership of responsibility and

REVIEWS

authority. The remedy to this p ro bl em, accord ing to Luttwak, is · to constitute an inte r-service "corps" ot officers wh ich the best officers o f the military fo rces would join at a certain po int in their careers. The second p robl em identi fied concerns the "materialistic prejudi ce, "which i gnores the " intang ible" factors o f war. It takes into account only quantifiable elements at the expense of the global view. The problem is particu lar ly serious in the research and developmen t and p roc urement sectors. Th e enormous increase in the cos t of weapon systems sterns in great part from a perfectionist men tal ity that neglects the overall operative output that c an be achieved by full use of ma tu re tec hnology and wh ich favors constant research on new sys tem s and the use of innovative tec hnologies still at the developmental stage instead of innovations in p roduction, wit h the resul t that production is not serialized enough and logistical support

is more burdensome. Third, the co mman d organization is cumbersome and bureaucr atic. It attend s to details . It weakens the lower ranks by removing all discretion. It has tr an sformed a liv ing, dyinamic organism capa ble of reacting to the unfo reseen and making immediate dec isions into an inanimate bureaucratic body with m arginal deci sion -making capacity and adap tability to t he necessarily unforeseeable real operative conditions. Only a "deregulation" which puts a premium on inventiveness and personal qualities and wh ich finds the r ight measure in the balance between authority and responsibility can restore this essen tial component of opera tive cap acity. These are not p roblems unique to the United States, bu t common to all m ilitary forces infl uenced to some degree, even culturally, by the U.S. This is why the considera tions set out by Lu ttwa k are of c urrent, g rea t interest even for our own m ilitary institutions.

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75

BOOK

UMBERTO CURI

:;

PENSARE LA . GUERRA

L-

PER UNA CULTURA DELL A PACE

EDIZIONI OEDALO

Umberto Curi, "Pensare la guerra, per una cultura della pace" ("Studying War as a Way to Peace"), edited by Dedalo, Bari 1985, 117 pages, L. 8,000. There has always been a relation of continuity and a good deal of intermingling between politics and war. The "Clausewitzian" concep t of war as an instrum en t to pursue political ob jecti ves has been known s ince ancient times and many Greek philosophers had already laid down more or less explicitly the ideas of Karl Schmitt to the effect tha t conf lict an d war are the foundation and essence of the political". Even in Marxist tradition - in spite of certain s uperficial assertio ns to the con trary - a pacifist interpreta tion is not envisaged: in fact , the military basis of every politica l s truggle is con stantly underscored. Every pac ifis t movement must take into account the predominance of the "politica l" lest its ob jectives rema in theoretica l or romantic aspiration to good sentiments instead of translating into political an d operative real ity and prospects. Only the existence of weapons of mass destruction can lend validity to th e contempor ary pacifist movement. s ince their effects tar surpass any po litica l objective a state might set tor itse lf. Their effectiv e. massive use wo uld spell the death of the "political" . A solution of continuity w ith respect to the pas t hc1s th erefore developed th at has modified the relation between war and politi cs and that p revents the re versibility and · translation of one to the other. Thi s produces an unprecedented situation. Where until the presen t war has always shaped politics. help ing to

76

REVIEWS

make it dynamic and crea ting the conditions for needed transformations, now milita ry force b locks politics and solidifi es th e existing s ituation. There is a convergence of results between nuclear threat and pacifist submiss iveness. Even pacifism must be po litical to be effective. It cannot limit itself to an ethical imperative. By becoming apolitica l - by association w ith various ecological movemen ts. etc. - it risks increasing the ri g idity of the system and crea ting the cond itions fo r a disaster. It is essential, therefore. that pacifism acquire greater awareness of reality and, in part icular, that it recognize the constructive as well as the degenerative nature of con fl ict, w ith a full understanding of its histo rical political and techno logical dimensions. This vo lume does not set out to reach co nc lusions or propos als. It attempts to uncover underlying probl ems. It fo rmulates questions ra ther than g ive answers. Yet it is a very usefu l co ntribution to defining concretely the te rm s of the p roblems. the world being what it is and not what one wou ld wis h it to be. It also constitutes a stimulus for fu rth er analysis of these fundamental problems and an implicit invitation to the pacifist movement to study the p roblems of war to identify, to use an expre ssion of No rberto Bobbie, the ways to peace. XXX COLLAN,\ DOCUMENT£

INIZIATIVA DI DIFESA STRATEGICA Vt\LUTAZIONl POLIT!CHE E NEGOZJATO Dl GINEVRA

C/a.o DI 7AV0Ll'. ROTO~oe SI.I 1'ru.!t ,:rr MTI!GIC-1 PATI\OClNAW t>AU'ON.LE Pl\£ S lt)E~'T?. O!!UA

OOMu.lSSlO~ra DlJ'E$,\ oeu.-1, CAME.ft.A. Olll OBJ'VTAl'f ROMA • APRU,e - GJUCSO 19S5

1.s,it'~t<> sw~u e !licc:n:he Di!en. ISTRU>

"lniziativa di difesa strategica" ("Strategic Defense Initiative") , edited by SIOI (International Society for International Organization) - ISTRID (Institute for Studies and Research on DefenseL Rome 1985, 399 pages, L. 30,000. This vo lume is the fi rst re sult of a very interes ting in itiative promoted by

SIOI and !STRID. two of the most presti· g ious insti tu tes concerned w ith security p roblems in Italy, with the s upport of the Defense Commission of the Chamber o f Depu ti es. Th e initiative consists in an organic col lection of the mos t significant documentation concern ing the p rin c ipal themes of cu rrent strateg ic interest. The undertaking is carefully prefaced by an essay that sets out the pri ncipa l aspects that characterize it and furn ishes a key to reading the documents. an explanation o f t he terms used and a synopsis of the principal positions and opinions on a given sub ject by the various pro tagon ists an d political and strategic experts. The strategic defense initiative of the United States constitutes one of the greatest efforts ever undertaken to coordinate scientific and technological research, some of wh ich is already under way in the various U.S. military resea rch and deve lopment faci lities. and others wh ich are who lly new. especially w ith reg ard to the general architecture o f a stra tegic an timissile system and certain speci fic sectors of techno logy. The introductory essay by Virg ilio llary se ts out the problems of active strategic defenses in politico · s trategic evolution as they affe ct bipolar rel ations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.. · multi lateral transatlantic relations and with rega rd to the impact of SDI on arms contro l and disarm ament negotiations. Of pa rt icular interest is the chrono logy of facts and even ts from which one ca n see order and legibility in apparently disorgan ized ma terial accord ing to rec · ognizable patterns. The s trategic defenses underwent positive and negative judgements during their development with regard to tec hnologica l evolu ti on, global rela tions between the s uperp owers and tra nsformations in the global st rategic sta tus. Of cou rse, there are no va lue judgments or definitive judgments concerning the concrete p rospects for SDI and its impact on the geopolitica l and geostrategic situation, on security and o n internatio nal balance. It is limited to record ing th e facts and it is done with commendable d iscern ment and efficacy. The documentation collected is comp rehensive. Th is volume. therefore, is intended as a valuable refe rence source tor those interested in an in-depth s tu dy of a very important contemporary issue wh ich may be determinant in se ttlin g futu re international equilibriums and for the success of the arms con trol and disarmament negotia tions.

Carlo Bess

BOOK

"Life 1946-1955, Ten Years in Photographs", edited by New York Graphic Society, 200 pages. The 200 bl ack and w hite photographs presented in the book were taken by 74 photographers during the 1946-1955 decade for the magazines Time, Life and Fortune to illustrate the most important historical even ts and famous people of that period. Two years of work went into study ing 156,000 images to select the ones published. The result is a co llection of photos that consti tu te an excellent means of commun icating at a g lance the most important events that took place around the world. It is a well thought-out selection of the most surprising, irresistible and enchanting images of that period. Th e images attest to the fact that they were happy years throughou t most of the world And even if one cannot define as joyous a decade that saw the co ld war, the Korean war and the beginning of rac ial wars, th ey are still years that one remem bers with fondness. One learns a good deal from examining these photos: the pleasure of looking " inside", the feelings and stimuli transmitted by the images wh ich elic it opposite react ions from di fferent people and the integration of the image by each observer who brings to it his own experiences and sensibilities. Doris C. O'Neil, director of photography for Time, presents them by saying: "Some pho tographs in th is co llection are charged with individual emotion, others are of a universal character, some are of great beau ty, others are terrifying. But they all share ce rt ain qualities and there is

,,,,

REVIEWS

a certain harmony between them. I am asked at times how I choose a photograph. It is difficult to answer that question because many va lues are per sonal and subjective in photography. I have often tried to analyze myself as I rummage throug h a drawerful of pictures to understand how I come to set aside four or five - and only those. There is no hesitation in my reaction to a photo: my response is as immediate as tha t of the float on a fisherman's line when the bait is taken". The photographers are transformed into narra to rs through these images in Life; th ey are the true precursors of tel evision repo rters. w ith much of the editorial freedom enjoyed by writers. During th e period in question we see th e homecoming of American solc'iers in 1946 with visible and invisible wounds fro m the war in Europe, the Berlin airli ft. the beginning of the war between Arabs and Jews when the British withdrew from Palestine in Apri l 7948, the signing of the Atlan tic Treaty in 1949, the Korean war and th e situation created by hydrogen bomb testing and atomic bomb shelters. This is a book with unforgettable images that show how much a magazine can mean in everyday life, in reporting on a period, in the history of an era. ALFONSO BARTOLINI

PER LA PATRIA ELA LIBERTAI

I soldati italiani nella Resistenza all'estero dopo 1'8 settembre MURSIA

Alfonso Bartolini, "Per la Patria e la liberta! I soldati italiani nella Resistenza all'estero dopo 1'8 settembre" ("For Country and Liberty! Italian Soldiers in the Resistance Abroad after 8 September"), edited by U. Mursia, Milan 1986, 372 pages, L. 20,000. Captain in ba tant on the

the Bersaglieri co m Greek - Albani an front

and in the Greek resistance, decorated with th e Silver Medal tor M ilitary Valor, journalist editor of the bimonthly Pa tria lndipendente: th is is a brief biographical sketch of Alfonso Bartolini, the author of th is book which describes th e tragedy of hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers surprised by the ar mistice of 8 September 1943 in France, Jugoslavia, A lbania, Greece, in the Ae gean islands and in Corsica. Bartolini states that "young students who are tota lly detached from those even ts and who have not lived them as protagonists or contemporaries will be able to look at that period with greater dispassion and equanimity. We who lived in that era have a duty on ly to record all the information we can: testimo ny, impressions, ref lections". And the book is rich in testimony, impressio ns and reflec tions, a gold mine o f facts and judgements to reconstruct the truth about the conduct of Italian sold iers abroad and about the res istance against the Germans by Italian Army units dislocated outside the country. We gather from the abundant facts and testimony reported tha t the resistance against the demands of the exal ly was spontaneous and immediate, even if fragm en tary and episodic, and was c haracterized by count less acts of va lor and sacrifice tha t met with mis fo rtune. And it is s igni fi cant that following the armistice the immediate reaction against the Germa ns took p lace especially outside the country. In some cases the struggle began on 9 September when Italian units joined with partisan detachments in thei r respect ive areas and we re able to give substantial help and support in personnel and material. Bartolini w ri tes: "The history of our Armed Forces, particularly abroad, is fiilled w ith exceptional deeds and great sacrifice fo r th e student who wants and knows how to interpret them in light of a judgement that should be preserved and transmitted as part of the historicay memory and moral and patriotic heritage of Ita ly". And the author adds: "the long so journ of the Italian soldier in th is or that village in contact w ith people whom he did not consider different generated a sense of human solidarity toward t he su ffering of others. Since racia l superiority co mplexes were alien to h im, no order could prohibit h im fro m fraternizing w ith those from whom he should have kept his distance. He did not comm it acts of savagery: he co uld be harsh at times, but never c ruel, and tried to com municate with a smile or a modest gi ft that he was not an enemy but on ly a soldier who found h imself at war through no wish of his own and that war had its inexorable laws". The study of the conduct of Italia n detachments begins with the vicissitudes of the "Acqui" Division at Cefalonia, w ith particular references to the know-

77

BOOK

ing choice of the sold iers and of fi cers. to the sad end of the desperate battle and to th e massacre of the prisoners. Th e author examines the cou rageous res istance of the Italian garri sons in the Aegean· islands, the heroic co nduct of the naval batteri es and of the "Reg ina" infantrymen, the defense of Lero. the d isputes between the Allies and the collapse of the entire defense system. He also examines the "many lost opportunities" in Greece, the col lapse of the 11th Army. the strugg le o f the "Pinerolo " Divisio n at Thessaly, the sad Neraida Camp and the welcome ex tended by the Greek population to thousands of clandestine guest. With rega rd to th e military collapse in Alban ia we are reminded of th e condu c t of the Command of t he Eastern Army Group and of th e 9th Army, the Italian Command of the Mountain Troops, the first agreements betV:,een Italians and Al ban ias, the " Firenze" Division tha t redeemed the surrender of the High Com mands. the fig hting at Kruja. the Osvaldo Conti naval ba ttery and the Pi/o torpedo -boat. Th e reevocation continues with the trag ic fate of the "Perugia" Division, the march toward the sea am id desperate fig hting punctuated by episodes of heroism, the shooting of 120 offi cers at Cape Luminione, the massacre at Kucj, the conduct of an extraord inary group o f officers in the Ita lian Army's last feats of resis tance. the "Mosconi", "Zig nani" and "Nuova Italia" battalions. th e g reat number of Italian soldiers who joined the partisan formations, the deeds of the "Cotta" and "Menegazzi" batteries and t he Ital ian contribution to the A lbanian stru ggle for liberation. We are also rem inded of the 170 men of the "Gr amsci" battalion who we re able to resist the Germans for five hours, the long journey of tha t unit fro m ba tt alion to Division th roug h increas ing commitments and th e precious contribution o f t he Italian A ir Force. The author th en examines the situation tha t developed in Jugoslavia with the tot al paralys is of the Italian Major Units c hecked by the perfectly organ ized German forces. the first heroic resistance actions, the conduct of the "Bergamo", "Marche" and " Emilia" Di visions. the massacres at the Furnaces of Sigma and Tril j, the sold iers shot at Ombla and the fai led attempl to defend Cattaro We are rem inded of the Ita lian partisan "Garibaldi" Division with inte resting considerations o n the transformation of the partisan units into regular units, the massacre of the Guardie di Finanza the rol e of the Ita lian artillery and the birth of the " Itali a" Brigade from t he "Garibaldi " and "Matteotti" batta lions. Barto lini w ri tes beautiful passages on the Ita lian p resence in Jugos lavia in the Risorgimento trad ition. remembering th e "Matteotti ", "Mameli" and "Fratelli Bandiera" bat tal ions. th e

78

REVIEWS

Ital ian partic ipation in th e liberation of Belgr ade and in the Zagreb offensive. pointing out the message o f peace of the Itali an partisans. In particular the author examines the strong Italian pres ence in the Jugoslav res istance with the proli feration of small units, the pa rt isan formations nea r the border, the influx o f volunteers from the ports' of Puglia and the partisan flotillas in the Adriatic Sea. The author examines the resistance of Italian soldiers on French terri tory, wh ich was d ifferent in cha racter from the re sistance in the Balkans. with the painful d isbandment of the 4th Army and the admirable show of courage o f th e detachment left in Corsi ca. The Italian par tisans operated in numerous fo rmations th ro ughout Europe; two Ital ian companies operated in the Red Army. Finally, we are rem inded in moving detai l of the Italian soldiers who by the h undreds of thousands ended up being deported with brutality and contempt to German concentration cam ps d istribu ted throughout half of Europe Their g rea t show of d ignity and courage in res is ting threats by the Germans and the allure of the fascis t emissaries of Salo are remembered in particular, together w ith the moral action conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Pietro Testa, the o ld commandant of the "Zara·· Bersaglieri ba tta lion. This book deserves care fu l con s ideration. It communicates two f undamental messages to t he professional military man: the importance of thorough training to allow the rational transformation of a regu lar unit into a partisan unit on account of enemy s uperiority in occupied territory, and the need to coord inate the planning efforts to dep loy forces spread over vast territories. A stinging memory lingers of the episodic resistance of our units, without guidance or coo rdination from a cen tra l com mand , overwhe lmed one by one by the Germans fo r lack of an efficient. un i fied direction of the operations. For these reasons this book should be required read ing for members of the A rmed Forces. especially the younger ones, so as not to lose the spiritual herita ge of the conduct of our soldiers in such tragic circumsta ntes. The preface to the vo lume by General Andrea Viglione is apropos in that it synthesizes the work w ith an authori ta tive judgement: "a true odyssey that Ba rtolini retraces with painful reca ll and the rigo r of intense persona l experience: an in-depth critica l st udy of the events; a patient and detailed research of unknown o r forgotten episodes".

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Filippo Stefani, "La storia della dottrina e degli ordinamenti dell'Esercito italiano" ("The History of the Doctrine and Organization of the Italian Army"), Vol. II, Book 2, Historical Office of the Army General Staff, Rome 1986, 998 pages, 86 cartographic sketches, L. 25,000. This second book of vo lume JI is somewha t d ifferent than th e p receding ones. In fact, the author interrupts the analysis o f th e doctrinal and organiza tional evolution of the Italian Army after the first chap ter and devotes the rem aining nine hundred pa ges o f text to a description of the operatio ns conduc ted by the Army from June 1940 to September 1943 in the general contex t of the war. The au thor 's motive fo r the long digression is th at "only by examining th e various campaigns conducted by the Italian Army, au tonomously or in co operation with the German forces, is it possible to discover where, how and why official tactical doctrine proved inadequate before the rea lity of war an d to mention the remedial measures adopted duri ng the con flict by highrank ing commanders to adapt doctrine an d organizat:on to c hanging conditions". Following this scheme, General Stefani has divided the book into three substantive parts: the operations con ducted by the Ita lian forces autonomously (the campaign in the western Alps, the operation in Libya from June 1940 to February 1941 . the Greek-Albanian cam paign and the operations in East A frica); th ose conducted together w ith the German troops (the second phase of operations in North Africa , the par ticipation in ttie Russian campa ig n and the defense of Sic ily and Calabria): and. finally, the struggle against the Germans immediately fo llowing the 8

BOOK

September 1943 armistice. The analyses of operations in individ ual . campa igns are precise and rigorous and are conc luded in each case with a persuasive paragraph setting out final considerations, rich in pertinent critica l notes d ictated by independent judgement and intellectual honesty. Numerous cartog raphic sketches of admirable clarity are of cons iderable aid in grasping the operative p lans and maneuvers. Th e author' s motivation is, of course, controversial; at a d istance of forty years from the events we can assume tha t the progress of the operations is we ll know n: we must recognize, however, that the collection in one vo lume of the essential contents of .the many individual monogra phs regard ing t he various campaigns has been an undertaking of g reat utility and scope. In fact. the author briefly analyzes - but not in summary fash ion - even the operative cam paigns in wh ich the Ital ian Army was not invo lved : the recount ing of the military opera tions, therefore, is adequately placed in a wo rl d politico military contexts. Of course, a recon struction of events which is so concerned with the overal strategic p icture merci lessly exposes the serious defic iencies of our country's leadersh ip. The author states in this regard: "O f the t hree powers of the Tripartite (Al liance) Ita ly was the least p re pared when it went to war, not on ly at th e level of numerical and qualitative deficienc ies, but even at the conceptua l level of tactics and strategy and in the organiza ti on of the forces and command. The lack of an updo-date vis ion of modern warfare, the absence of adequate operative planning to guarantee the security o f maritime and aerial commun ications w ith the " fourth shore", the lack of understanding of th e interdependence between ground, sea and air as it each had a separate existence, the superficial manner in wh ich the problem of Malta was dealt w ith, the absence of a Supreme Command during the initial phase of the war - all these negative factors weighed on the firs t phase of th e war more th an the quantitative and qualitative in fer iority in means and materials". We are therefore quite tar from the comfortable defensive explanations often adopted by the military protagonists of the era w ho tend to blame only the politica l leadership for the lack of preparedness for war. General Stefani also underlines the Chiefs of Staff's failure during the war to update w ith all possible speed t he doctrine of employment and the organization, as was cal led for by the setbacks on the battlefield Especially in North Africa the in itiative of the various commanders, spurred by hard lessons inflicted by the enemy and by the unhappy comparison with the ally, led to an autonomous ree labora tion of defensive

REVIEWS

doctrine. substituting the c_oncept of position defense to that of continuous line defense, which constituted a qualitative leap in the evolution of Italian military strategy. Even the new attack p rocedures adopted. which were rapidly assimilated by the units, imp roved operative efficiency, bu t, as the author notes, new materials wou ld have been neede d to modi fy substan ti ally such a hopeless situa tion. It is, in sum, a vo lume of great interest. rich in facts and judgements; it is a success ful attempt to offer even the inexpert reader a global, undistorted view of the 1940-1943 conflict analyzed w ith deep yet fair critica l rigor. Oreste Bovio

Mario Montanari, "Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale Tobruk: marzo 1941 - gennaio 1942" ("Operations in North Africa - Tobruk: March 1941 January 1942"), Volume 11, Historical Office of the Army General Staff, Rome 1985, 992 pages, 81 sketches in the text and 8 separate maps, L. 40,000. This is the second of fo ur vo lumes that th e Historical Office of the Army General has decided to ded icate to a structural analysis of the operations in North Africa during the second wor ld war. This monograph - based on Italian documentation stored in the archives of the Historical Office, on English, New Zealander, South African. Indian, Aust ralian an d German documents - has "the chrism of detached objectivity", as the Chief of the Office states in the presen tation "because of a settling over time. of knowledge, and cross-check ing of facts. of qualtiy of the resea rch methods, and of the te chn ica l-operative developments by both contenders".

These are weighty words, but reading the vo lume amply vindicates th em. Even in th is work General Mario Monta¡ nari, in fact, confirms his reputation as a carefu l and scrupulous historian who is very knowledgeable about the subject under examination and who is, the refore. a wise and evenhanded critic. The operative cyc le analyzed marks the end of the "parallel war" inasmuch as it begins with the influx of German units in Libya to bolster our units. which were inadequately mechanized to withstand the pressure of the British Commonwealth, and with the almost co ntemporaneous. vigorous resumption of t he initiative of the now ltalo-German troops. Th e narration continues w ith the caref ul and balanced description o f the British o ffensive maneuvers, ca lled "Brevity", "Battleaxe" and "Crusader". and the ltalo-German counter-maneuvers. As is we ll known, it was possible to pursue an adequate containment action with regard to th e fi rst two offensives, while the third at last succeeded against the battle-ready Axis troops, forcing us, in the month of December. after a year of un interrupted successes. to abandon again the Cyrenaic reg ion and fall back to the starting position of March, though a lesser price was paid in men and materials than the one paid in the previous retreat - a sign of the g reater solidity of the operative sector and of the higher level of train ing among troops and cadres. The vo lume is not limited to describing the forces , the operative plans or th e actual unfolding of the oeerations by both protagonis ts in the fight ing; it also takes into caref ul account t he strategic situation, the functioning of the High Commands. the problem of s upplies an d ltalo-German re lations, and for each o f these ponderous arguments the author is generous with pertinent judgements. It is, .in fa ct. a text of military history properly set out in which the narra tion is always accompanied and brough t to life by critica l judgement. and wh ich also has the virtue of giving due credit for the many sacrifices endured by ou r units. wh ich we re always asked to deliver a bit more than they could. We note. finally, tha t the text is complemented by the following : 20 photographs: an appendix of 32 histo rica l documents; 81 to pograph ic sketches in black and white and in color included in t he te xt and 8 large maps attached: accurate indexes of names of persons and places and of the Commands and units mentioned in the text; a handy glossary of the most common topog raph ic terms in th e Cyre naic reg ion; and an accu rate bibliography with notations on sources and publications consu lted. Oreste Bovio

79

BOOK

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John Laffin, "Brassey's Battles. 3500 Years of Conflict, 11 Campaigns and Wars from A-2 , Brassey Defence Publishers Ltd., London 1986. To prepare a compendium of the principal battles which were fough t

REVIEWS

th roughout the history o f the wor ld migh t seem a relatively easy task. The old criteria adopted by the histoirebataille for the compilation of its chronologies could easily be transposed to a work of th is k ind. But the author has preferred a methodological, co mplex and problematic approach attempting to define battle by means of a theory of conflict. A battle itself may have different importance in the eyes of the various contenders. The ba tt le of Lepanto. for ins tance. was considered a historica l victory by Christianity w hile the Sublime Porte perceived it as indeed a serious setback, but without serious consequences. Moreover a battle may not be the central event that decades of ultra -Clausewitzian thought have led us to believe. Various skirmishes and maneuver campaigns (Turenne, Marshal of Saxony) ach ieved important political objectives through a series of minor clashes, at times w ithout combat. The resu lt of this careful methodological approach co mbined w ith a succinct exposition and careful documentation is fel ic itous. The refe re nce value o f the work is enhanced by the lists of battles considered and their sometimes double names (Ed irne -

Ad rianople), the p rincipal airlandings, the code names o f the most importa nt operations of the second world war and by a vast selection of maps. It is inevitable th at in a book that required twenty years of work and a dispassionate selection among military actions there would be mino r - but easily corrected - lapses. We mention with regard to doubl e names the missing designation of " maneuver of Tolmino" for the battle of Caporetto currently used in non-Italian literature. We also thinT< that the battle of Tanga should have been mentioned in the von LettowVorbeck campaign (Eas t Africa 1914 1918). And final ly we note that "Ri:isselsprung" is the German code name both for the attack on the convoys on the Murmansk-Arkhangelsk route as wel l as the "blitz" against Ti to's command headquarters. The value and utility of the book, however, are undispu ted, because it is an excellen t referen ce source for the military historian (and everyone else) inasmuch as it leads him to cons ider more carefully the historical events that took place outside Europe. Alessandro Politi

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