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JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

NOVEMBER DECEMBER 1985 LIRE 3,000 . $ 2,00 D.M. 6 £2

BRITISH TANKS AT CAMBRAI

THE MILITARY LEADER: WHAT FUTURE?

GRID DEFENSE

European Military Press Association The European Military Press Association exists to make public opinion more aware of the relevance of military and defence issues

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RUSI Soldier

CONTENTS European Military Press Agency

~/:1 Number six 1985

p,~·:: :;~. ,~;}~;. November-December ~

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The aim of the Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the technical and vocational training of Army Officers and NCOs To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military thinking and as a forum of study and debate. The Rivista Militare is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and military matters lhrough the pubblication of articles of current technical and scientific interest.

RIVISTA

MILITARE BIMESTRALE

Direttore responsabile: Pier Giorgio Fra nzosi.

British Tanks at Cambrai. (Giro Di Martino)

Grid Defense.

Redatto re Capo: Giovanni Cerbo Teletono 47353078.

(Fabio Mini)

Airborne Electro-Optical Systems.

Public Information: Unknown Quantity?

(Basilio Di Martin o)

Grafico: Rino Fusi. Direzione e Redazione, Vi a d i S. Marco. 8 00186 Roma Tel. 47353372 - 47355192.

(Marcelfo Colaprisco)

Pubblicita: A cura della segreteria dell'Uffi c io Rivista Militare Tel. 6794200.

The Royal Italian Army 1919-1933.

Stampa: T ipogra fia Region ale

Roma.

lllustrazioni: A cura di Rivist a Militare. Spedizione: In abbonamen to postale Gruppo IV - 70 %. Condizioni di cessione per ii 1985: Un fascicolo : Li t. 3.000 - $ 2 D .M. 6 - £2. Un fascicolo arretrato: Lit. 6.000 - $ 4 - D.M. 12 -

£4. Abbonamento: Italia Lit. 16.000. estero Li t. 24.000. L'importo d eve essere invi ato medi ante assegno bancario (per i residenti all'estero) o versa mento in c/c postale n. 22527 009 in testato a SME Ufficio Ri vista M ilitare Sezio ne di Amministrazione Via XX Settembre 723/ A Roma. Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Roma al n. 944 del Registro. con decreto 7-6-1949. O uesto fascicolo e st ato dato alla stampa ii 30 settembre 1985. @ 1985 Proprieta letterari a. artistica e scientifica riserva ta Foto di copertlna:

Giancarlo De Zanet.

Membe r o f USPI Uni one Stam pa Peuodica ltaliana

The Military Leader: What Future? (Pierro Re)

Artillery.

(Luigi Ramponi)

(Valerio Gibellini)

Technical Data.

Book Reviews.

Rules for contributors. Anyon e can con tribute. In the interest of the maximum objectivity of information, the Rivista Militare allows contributors considerable freedom, although it does not necessarily subscribe to their opinions. The articles are published unedited and free of any editorial constraints and are therefore the sole responsibility of the Author and refl ect his person al ideas exclusively. The topic must be treated in an original way and the articles themselves should not exceed 10 typewritten pages in length. The Author, got his reward. makes over his exclusive article right to Rivista Militare. Rivista Militare can make over Author's exclusive article right to other pubblications and to the periodicals of EMPA (European Military Press Association). The articles should be accompanied by any necessary photographs, drawings and explanatory tables. Each author is requested to send a photograph of himself, together with his «curriculum vi tae,, and a 10-line summary or the article to be published. The Rivista Militare reserves the right to alter the article's title and to choose the typeface in which it is set.

BRITISH TANKS AT CAMBRAI A HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE TECHNICAL SURPRISE IN NOVEMBER 1917 After all the stud ies that have been ca r ried out, to go back now and review events and aspects of World War I could be considered as a fruitless search for something new. T his is made all the more apparent by the fact that the 70 years o r so separating us from that conflict have been charact erized by scientific and technological in novations and advances of un precedented proportions. 2

The overall impression is not so much of ordered and gradual progress but of a rather frig hten ing case of actual mutation. As a result, t he events of the 19141918 war have been proj ected much fu rther back than just 70 years. Nevertheless. not everything has been engu lfed by this mael strom of mutating phenomena of unheard of proportions. This confirms the lasting val ue of par-

ticu la r event s which, having survived obsolescence and oblivion either completely or in certain of their aspects. allow credence still to be given to history as a source of information that, although always linked to the past. affords us some in sight into the present and even allows us to make reliable projections regarding the future. One of these events is the battle of Cambrai, w hi ch w as fought between 20th Novem ber an d 6th December 1917. In his book "Tanks in the Great War", with understandable and w ell-grounded enthusiasm, Col. Fuller describes Cambrai as the first great tank battle in the history of war and, whatever the judgment of future historians might be, one of the most noteworthy battles ever fough t.

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THE SCENARIO The general situation in Autumn 1917 was characterized by the aftermath of t he partial failure of the offensives of 1915, 1916 and Spring-Summer 1917. All three offensives had been preceded by massive and prolonged artillery preparation which merely tore up the ground without, however, completely eliminating machine gun nests or barbed wire, the main obstacles to any attack. Attempts were thus being made to find something new which would allow the deadlock of trench warfare to be broken. According to the convincing assertions made by Liddell Hart ("La Guerre Mondiale, French tr. published by Payot in 1932) the main idea of the supporters of the early tanks was to launch them in massed surprise attacks. This idea. as set out in a memorandum of the British

John B Rid

the infantry, a further 9 failed to Supreme Headquarters in Feb-Âˇ keep up with the foot-soldiers, ruary 1916, was first applied although they proved useful in when some fifty tanks were mopping up operations, 9 had deployed in the Battle of the mechanical failures and 5 became Somme (15th September 1916) bogged down in shell craters. as a means to re-establish the Despite the persistence of initial aims of the attack, now in adverse factors (e.g. mechanical a state of complete disarray. problems, bulkiness, environIncomplete and overhasty ment, mode of deployment still preparation. the inevitable meslightly influenced by unconchan ical shortcomings of the early machines and their deploy- scious constraints or determined by the procedu res adopted in ment in twos and threes. i.e. nearly three years of fighting) disregarding the principle of the concentration of effort. cost the slightly better results were achieved by the French the folventure all possibility of a relowing Spring, north of Rheims, sounding success. Nevertheless, on 16th April 1917. the 15t h September 1916 saw The objective of this first the introduction of firepower, deployment of tanks by the movement and protection combined in a single weapon, which French (eight companies of . Schneider tanks) was to effect had hitherto been regarded as a rapid penetration of the Chemin exclusive to those fighting on des Dames area. Although the seas. better than the British perforOf the 49 available tanks, mance in the Battle of the Somonly thirty or so succeeded in me, the results were anything but reaching what would now be called the start line. Nine of the satisfactory and left in their wake doubts and prejudices, most latter advanced together with 3

Scottish War Chariot, 1456.

Stevin' s land ship, 1599.

Valturio' s War Chariot, 1472.

16th century Assault Chariot.

Holzschuher's Battle Chariot.

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of which persisted until the battle of Cambrai. These were the first and best known concrete attempts to solve the problemsâ€˘ involved in tank deployment. They -were passionately upheld by the supporters of the new weapon and viewed with considerable skepticism by those whose menta l inertia prevented them from accepting any innovation that was not the result of step by step evolution. Of course, these attempts were accompan ied both by raised hopes and confidence and also by disappointments. There was also a lot to be learned from them. The same lessons were even more obv ious after the battle of Cambrai. One of these will be discussed immediately as it was taken into account in plann ing and organizing the Cambrai operation, i.e. the need for t he tanks of the time, and to a certa in extent also modern t anks, to operate over terrain that has not been damaged too much by artillerv fire. An Axr:imin.:ition of how the Cambrai operation came about is of fundamenta l interest as regards both the planned action proced ures, although not al l were actually implemented, and the experience thereby acq uired. The prelude to Cambrai was the third battle of Ypres, which began on 31st July 1917 and ground to a halt in the mud of Passchendaele three months later. The main lesson to be learnt was, as we have seen, that the customary procedure of using prolonged massed artillery preparation made the terrain over which the attack was to take place practically impassable. Consequently, on the 3rd August of the same year, Col. Fuller made an alternative recommen.dation to Tank Corps HO, pre-Âˇ ceded by an introduction in which he stated that, from a tankman's point of view, t he th ird battle of Ypres could be considered as over. To insist on using t anks under those cor.ditions would not on ly lead to the loss of good veh icles and even better men but also to an inevitable decline

Top.

Above.

French "Schneider M.16" tank. This vehicle had several structural defects and was also vulnerable to light artillery fire. Four hundred were commissioned in 1916 and it was used for the first time at Chemin des Dames in 1917.

The British "Little Willie" tank. the first armoured fighting vehicle. It was nothing more than a large armourplated box mounted on tracks. Tried out in 1915, it was to be equipped with a 6-pounder mounted on a revolving turret. This solution was however abandoned, as the centre of gravity was too high.

in the mora le of the infantry units and ta nk crews. This convincing introduction was followed by an alternative recommendation that, in order also to ra ise British prestige, a tank attack should be carried out on St. Quentin before the onset of winter, as a strategic prelude to a subsequent (Spring 1918) thrust towards Valenciennes. After discussions lasting a whole day, durin g wh ich the difficulties involved in mounting a combined Franco-British operation became only too apparent, and it was seen that the latter wou ld not be compatible with the simplicity and rapidity of action considered necessary for the success of the new tactic, a second and less ambitious plan was proposed the day after, 4th Aug ust. This plan ca lled for a tank raid in strength to be carried out to the south of Cambrai. The emphasis was la id on the rapid and violent nature of the raid, the aim of which was to hit enemy personnel and weapons

in order to cause serious disorga nization and demoralization. The ra id was to be of 8-12 hours duration so as not to allow the enemy ti me to concentrate the forces required for an adequate counter-attack. Th is limit was subsequently extended to 24 hours, although the other operation parameters remained unchanged. In his book, Fuller summed up the latter clearly and concisely, as follows: "AdvanceHit-Retire". The zone chosen, i.e. t he Cambrai reg ion, where the Germans had carried out a deliberate withdraw al in March 1917, was held t o be suitable for the operation. The zone was delim ited on the left flan k by the Canal du Nord (now in the dry period) and on the right flank by the river Escaut and the canal branch ing off it. On the ground it consisted of a corridor 8-10 kilometres wide running SouthNorth and characterized by five topographic features in a WestEast direction:

• the Gouzea ucourt platea u, attack position ; • a large ridge sloping down to the Escaut at Marcoing; • the Flesquieres crest; • the hollow in which the villages of Anneux and Cantai ng. are situated; • the subsequent crestline of Bourlon, with the wood and village of the same name.

THE BATTLE PLAN The plan has already been seen to consist essentially in the massed deployment of tanks in a violent surprise attack to replace the heavy artillery bombardments that had been used up to that time.

French " Renault F. T.17" tank. Designed in 1916, this vehicle weighed 6.7 tons. mounted a 37 mm gun, tor which it carried 237 rounds, and had a 2-man crew. The Renauf: F.T.1 7 was also used in World War II.

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The overall plan of the British 3rd Army entailed : • brea ki ng th rough the Hinden bu rg defensive line th rough t he corridor between the Esca ut ca na l and the Canal du Nord; • occupation of Cambra i. the Bourl on wood and the crossing of the Sensee rive r; • c utting off the enemy forces in the area south of the Sensee and west of the Canal du Nord; • explo itation of the breakth rough in the di rection of Valencien nes. The t anks' role in the operation was to open up a path for the infa ntry. The subseq uent ex ploit ation of the success of the operation was to be carried ou t by the caval ry as far as the Sensee r iver. Surpr ise was to be pu rsued at all levels, ta king all the necessary precautions to achieve this end. The forces allocated t o t his ambitious plan consisted of the 3rd and 4th Army Corps, i.e. a total of 6 div isions, a cavalry corps com prising two divisions, 381 battl e tan ks of the Royal Ta nk Corps, reinforced by some hundred or so older t an ks in a s upporting and ancillary role, i.e. a t otal of 476 ta nks, plus about a thousand artillery pieces. The 381 battle tanks w ere of the Mark IV type, each w eighing 28 t ons and havi ng an average speed of 3 Km/ hour, a c rew composed of 1 offi cer and 7 other ra nks and the capa bility of crossi ng trenches up to 3 metres wide. As far as arma ments w ere concern ed, the ta nks were divided up int o "males", w ith two 58 mm gu ns and 4 machine g uns, and " females" equi pped w ith only 6 machine gun s. The German defences consisted of the network of positions known as the Hindenburg Li ne and incl uded an outpost zone an d three ma in lines of defensive trenches: the Hindenburg Li ne proper, the reserve Hindenburg Line and the BeaurevoirMasn ieres-Bourlon line. The latter was still incomplete. All t hat remained of the orig inal plan of attack were t he

essential pa ra meters of surprise t o be achieved by t he massed deployment of tanks, the tactic of using ta nks followed and protected by infantry, and the sector chosen for the operation. T he other essential fea tures of the orig ina l idea ha d been modified: the raid had become a large-sca le offensive w ith ob jectives lying deep in enemy ter ritory. Instead of striking into a pocket and then retiring rapidly, it had been decided to make a systematic advan ce along a narrow sector bounded by two watercourses. While provid ing protection for a brief raid, t he latter would become a dangerous li mitation in the case of a

large~scal e attack because the t an ks w ould be forced to deploy in a narrow area and t hus lose their outfla nkin g capability. However, the principal w ea kness of the overall plan was above all the lack of reserves, as the t wo cava lry divisions ava ilable could not be considered sufficient for the task. The effectiveness of orga nized defence. pa rt icularly thanks t o the machine gun , had in fa ct clearly shown that the caval ry could no longer play a decisive role in the batt le. THE ACTUAL BATTLE

The preparation for the battle was carried out very skil-

The Mark IV was the most important World War II tank. It derived directly (like the Mks. /-Ill] from the 1916 tank prototype. Work on its design began in October of the same year. The first model appeared in March,. 1917 and by April, the first vehicles were ready to go into action in France. where they were used for the first time on the Messines crest on 7th June. In October 1917, 700 of the 1,220 commissioned were delivered to the Royal Tank Corps, which used 378 of them at Cambrai. Weight: 28 tons; length: 7.93 m; height: 2.45 m; crew: 8 men (two drivers, two gunners for the 6-pounder and two for the machine-gun, two mechanics]; ammunition: 332 2.7 Kg HE shefls in two containers and 5,640 Lewis gun rounds; range: 56 Km (on road]; armour-plating: 6 to 12 mm cladding.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Plank for anti-tank ditch Entrance and exit manhole Tubular radiator Secondary gear levers OF Hotchkiss cannon Ammunition container 6-cylinder Daimler engine Rollers Drivers' seats (two) Brake levers for tracks Track adjustment device Transmission shaft brake Engine clutch Gear lever Foreward observation hatch 303" Lewis machine-gun Water tank Rail for anti-tank ditch plank Forward turret Silencer Starting crank Reduction unit Rear turret

fully and in great secret. To dece ive the enemy as to the scale of the operation anj the front involved, fire actions were carried out using smoke and gas, and diversions created using small numbers of dummy tanks to the north and south of the sector chosen for the real attack. At 0620 hours on 20th November the tanks and infantry began advancing over a front of about 9 kilometers, achieving total surprise and complete in itial success over the entire sector, except for the central zone of Flesquieres. This one and only "slip-up" occurred because the 51st Division had, on its own initiative, adopted a different battle tactic to that laid down by Tank Corps HO. The prescribed close cooperation between tanks and infantry was not achieved; this resulted in .the infantry being unable to exploit the protection of the tanks and becoming pinned down by machine-gun fire on reaching the barbed wire entanglements . On the other hand, the tanks, advancing on their own (thereby earniriy t11em selves the epithets of "knights errant" and "privateers") were subjected to close and concentrated fire from several German batteries, which had been allowed to go into action undisturbed owing to the failure of the Brit ish infantry to keep up with the tanks. In the overall economy of the battle, however, the setback suffered at Flesquieres, although much dramatized later, was actually nothing more than a simple pocket of resistance, which was bypassed and cut-off by the flanking units as they continued their advance as far as Marcoing. Indeed, in _the other parts of the sector to the north and south of Flesqu ieres, the 20th of November was characterized by the complete achievement of surprise and a successful penetrat ion of something like eight kilometers, i.e. as much as the advances previously achieved at the cost of months of heavy fighting and much heavier losses during the battle of the Somme 9

29· OIV.

Li ne of contact at Nov. 20th, Morn in,., It Lin e of contact at Nov . 20th , Night •

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and the t hird battle of Ypres. The British troops w ere in reach of a decisive victory: the main defensive works of the Hindenburg Li ne had been breached ; the next line of def ence had only been partially orga nized ; beyond t he latter lay undefended terra in. However, the infantry and tank crews engaged in the attack had prac-· ticall y run out of steam and the two cava lry divisions, except for a Ca nadian squadron, fa iled to exploit the situation. The following day, 21st November, the deployment of a few 10

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"local" reserves allowed some further adva nces to be made. The position of Flesqu ieres itsel f was abandoned by t he Germans at dawn , and the British 51st and 62nd Divisions advanced rapidly as fa r as Fontaine- Notre Dame, more than two kilometers beyond the point reached on 20th November. The 48 hour time limit set by the British Supreme Comma nder, General Haig , had now expired . However, numerous conside rations, incl ud ing the hope of el iminating the threat posed by the Bourlon hill, still held by the

enemy, and to force the enemy to withdraw - while somewhat less probable after the modest gains made on 21st November and by the arrival of German reinforcements - convinced Ha ig himself to continue the offensive. This he did despite the misgivings and risks men tioned earlier, incl uding the vital f act that all the ava ilable atta cking forces had been thrown into the battle by 20th November. Starting from the 22nd, the subsequent actions were anyth ing but successfu l, and only in creased the number of losses. On the 20th alone 179 tanks (about 50% ) had been lost, together with 118 officers and 500 other ranks. From then unt il the 29th, a series of undec isive loca l actions were ca rried out, especially aroun d : he positions of Bou rlon and Fontaine-Notre Dame. During th is time, the Germans, displaying great resil ience, spirit of initiative and t actical sense, were preparing a deadly counter-attack, the potential ser iousness of wh ich was not fu lly realized at the t ime. The part played by th e tanks in the long drawn-out operation s declined prog ressivel y in importa nce. For a few days more th ey were used in several sectors in small, comparatively ineffective g rou ps until they all had t o be withdrawn because of mechanical wear and tear. The violent and unexpected Germa n coun ter-attack was un leashed on 30th November agai nst the two flanks of the British salient. The surprise achieved by the British tan ks on 20th Novem ber was now mat ched by another surprise, of simi lar conception, if different in its execution . Instead of the usual prolonged preparation, a short heavy arti llery bom bard ment was used to open the w ay for the Ger ma n in fa ntry to advance using "infiltration " tactics. T his represented the prot otype of the attack to be used by the Germans on a large scale in the Spr ing of 1918, just as the preceding British attack had introduced the ta ctics that w ou ld be used by

---the Allies in the Summer and Autumn of 1918. The upshot was that. between the, 30th November and the 6th December, the British lost most of the ground previously gained and, after an even more serious setback had been avoided thanks only to the valour of a few units, practically the same balance of forces and positions as prior to the attack was restored. "A gloomy sunset after such a brilliant dawn" were the vivid words used by Liddell Hart in the book cited above. We shall return to the significance of these remarks of his in our conclusion. · CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNT

On 19th November 1917 (it is again Liddell Hart who describes the· events, and not without a note of humour) the German troops before Cambrai were contemplating, with serene con-· fidence, the calm hovering over the sector. In the well-appointed trenches of the Hindenburg Line they compared their peaceful situation with the much more difficult one of their comrades in the Ypres zone. On 20th November, 381 British tanks, followed by a comparatively small number of infantry units, carried out a dawn advance which took the Germans utterly by surprise·. The defenders were almost incredulous before the unpleasant novelty of an attack carried out using unusual weapons and tactics and, above all, executed without the customary artillery warning which almost always left the defenders a few days in which to prepare a suitable welcome for the attackers. On 21st November the church-bells of London were rung joyfully to announce a triumph, which appeared at the time as the prelude to imminent final victory. On his return to his HO, Field Marshal Ludendorff hastily drafted his orders for a general withdrawal. Both the London church-bells and Ludendorffs draft orders were reliable

Line of contact at Nov. 30th, Morning • ii' ii' Line of contact at Nov. 30th, Night ---

prophets, only that they were some nine months ahead of the real events. On balance, the outcome of the Cambrai operation left the British with comparatively little of the ground they had seized (ironically, that little included the position of Flesquieres, the site of the main setback of the 20th November). At the end of three weeks' fighting, British and German losses, excluding the British tanks (about 200), were also indicative of a disappointing relative equilibrium. The British

had lost 44,000 men, 145 artillery pieces, 456 machine-guns, and the German 41,000 men, 145 artillery pieces and 500 machineguns. Both sides ~earned numerous lessons from the battle of Cambrai which, from the standpoint of military history, can be considered as the successful rediscovery of the fundamental principle of surprise. However, the beneficial effects of this rediscovery were cancelled out by repeated violations of the equally essential principle of the economy of forces, which was

neg lected both as regards fi tting t he means to the ob jectives to be ach ieved , and in the appreciation of t he capacities and limits of the hu ma n factor . Some of these lessons were learnt immed iately, wh ile others were assim ilated only after more serene and detailed post-w ar studies. Briefly, the former are as follows : On the German side: an overhasty re jection of the operational va lue of the tank, per haps due t o the Germans' desi re t o bolster the image of t heir own defens ive system. This re jection w as shortlived and of dubious validity, as subseq uent experience and studies were to show. On the British side·, the lessons learnt were obviously greater in nu mber and more va ried. From the techn ica l point a view it was realized that some important in novations and enhancements were necessary, e.g.: • the need to increase the tank's speed for fas ter action and to increase the chances of avoiding the enemy's counter-· attack ; • increased fuel ta nk capacity in order to enhance the tank's range of operation; • an improved power-weight ratio, which in later years w as to be the sub ject of many investigations and studies, as a result of wh ich more and more ad vanced solut ions are still bei ng sought; • opti mal gu n placement, suggested by the fact that, because of the low position of its main gun, on a rise, the Mark IV beca me a target for enem y fire before it cou ld bring its own gun to bear. From the opera tional standpoint, the Ca mbrai operation showed the Briti sh that: • surprise had actually been ach ieved; • the German line of defence had been broken; 12

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• the success could not be exploited owi ng to lack of availa ble reserves; • the action had had no true centre of gravity; • it had been seen how decisive tank-infantry cooperation could be and how hard it was to implement prom ptly and effectively. Of course, after the end of what has someti mes been ca lled the last "Romanti c war" , there was a plethora of comments and studies on both sides. The first ma in supporters of the ta nk were Ful ler and Guderian, whose ideas basically converged on several essential points, i.e.: • on the need to use armou r with the support of the other arms {infantry, artillery, aircraft); • on the massed used of tanks,

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with su fficient echeloning in depth; • on the con ception of the armoured division as a tool to be used in conjunction with air power to achi eve the above two conditions. In con clusion , the battle of Cambra i seems to have been increasingly influenced by a gradually developing error of conception , perhaps due to a form of unconscious hysteresis, during the operationa l stage . . The brillia nt initial idea of carrying out a ra id without actually occ upying any grou nd was t urned into an offensive action typical of the time, except for the fact that tanks were used instead of the conventional preliminary artil lery bom bardment. The means available were insufficient for such an opera-

I tion, particularly .because tanks were still in their infancy and their performance inadequate. The above transformation, which took the form of an almost unconscious return to a routine established by three years of fighting, shows that neither the high commands nor the units themselves were yet ready to return to a war of movement, although the writing was on the wal l. However, the considerations and lessons discussed herein would be of much less significance were it not for two other repercussions they have had on military history. The first of these is once again suggested by Fu ller (op . cit.) when he claims that, although only a partially successful surprise attack, Cambra i represented a new Valmy. Just as the latter in 1792 paved the way to the use of massed artillery, so the British ta nks at Cambrai paved the way to the use of armour. The second reflection is related to Italy. In the collected "Depeches de Sir Douglas Haig", the 1920 French edition of which was enhanced by a significant introduction by Field Marshal Foch, we read that the Cambrai operation was of direct and substantial assistance to the allied forces operating in Italy. It is the authoritative opinion of the British Supreme Commander on the French front, supported by several other sources, that several German divisions posted to the ltslian theatre were rerouted to the Cambrai front to ward off the unexpected British attack. The concentration of the forces of the Central Powers in Italy was thus reduced at a very critical time, i.e. when the Italians and their allies were engaged in setting up the defensive network on the Piave. The reliability of the source and the probable accuracy of the information justify this citation of the battle of Cambrai in an Italian review 68 years after the actual event.

Below.

Bottom.

French St. Chamond tank. This vehicle . The German "Sturmpanzer Wagen A/V". had a 9-man crew, 5 of whom serving This tank had an 18-man crew and the 75 mm gun and the 4 machinemounted a 57 mm gun and 6 or 7 guns . This tank was used Âˇtor the first machine-guns. Twenty tanks of this time in May 1917. It weighed 23 tons type were built, each powered by a and could attain a speed of 8 Km/hr. 100 HP motor. It could attain a speed Some 400 St. Chamond tanks were of 9 Km/hr and was equipped with built, one of which was ceded to the 30 mm thick armour-plate. Italian Army to be used for experimental purposes.

BRITISH TANKS AT CAMBRAI

Ciro Di Martino

What future?

One of the consequences of the growing interest in management training today is the debate· that has opened up in military circles on the cultu r-al qualities and professiona l skills that an officer needs in today's Armed Forces. It has been the subject of articles published in specialist magazines and journals and in the national press, and the CASD (Centre for Advanced Defence Stud ies) devoted a whole session to it. The debate hinges around the question of what is the most appropriate profile for today's officers, whose· fun·ctions are akin to those of management if one views the Armed Forces as an industry that "produces" security. This definition is the result of an over-eagerness to draw comparisons between our Institution and other governmental or private non-military organizat ions. trying to pick out from them a number of unchallenged innovations in the management process. Many schools of thought exist on this subject, and often the "managerial" function seems to override that of the "Com-· mander". In this connection, our Chief of Staff has made some enl ightening comments in recent years, on the subject of the· rapidly changing social and technological environment in wh ich we are living. In his inaugural address to the Italian War College for the· 1982-83 Academic year, the Defence Chief of Staff put his finger on the crux of the· leader vs. manager issue, when he said that. "It is true that there are similarities between military and civilian structures, but it is equally true that the essence of the officer's profession is totally d ifferent". He went on, "The military Leader's duty is not solely to attain economic and productive ends : his operational ambit is far broader than that. It comprises resource planning and use, the operational selection of facilities, ad hoe organization and command, which involves responsibilities for training, for moral preparation, sound govern-

ment, working in harmony with the men being led. This is not on ly true in peacetime. but also in preparation for possible tension and conflict. The military Leader is both a manager and a Commander. a planner and an implementer, a weapons expert and a decision-maker. with a

But who is the Chief? The word comes from the Latin for "head": the man who knows, who wishes, who does, who knows how to demand the maximum commitment from his men, and gets it. coordinating their efforts. He is the man who takes on the responsibilities of the others. He is the man who serves his own ideals, his own men, and his own mission. This definition reveals two distinctive features of the Chief: • sense of service; • ability to command.

variety of possible tasks awaiting him". The Chief of Staff has frequently summarized this is in the following terms: "The Commander is, at one and the same time, a manager and an organizer, in whom psychological and social sens itivity merge harmoniously with his mastery of the latest techniques and methods which are needed to manage the structure for which he is responsible·". Of these two terms, it is the Commander, the Chief. which best describes the modern officer. But who is the Chief? Where does he come from? It is universa lly agreed today that human communities, at every stage in their evolution, have always had a chief or leader. It is a fundamental and vital necessarity, almost as a means of self-defence, which leads the members of any organized group to give· up some of their freedom and to hand over group responsibilities to a particu lar indivicual, elected or imposed on them to guide the group, on account of his acknowledged qualities.

Commanding is the sk ill at leading subordinates, coordinating the-ir work to attain the institution's purpose. This being so, it is natura l to consider that the concept of "command" automatically implies the concept of "authority". But we have to draw a distinction between authority and authoritarianism. The former is a principle underlying ordered socia l cohesion wh ich does not clash with the· concept of freedom, when it is directed to attaining the common good. The latter is a manner of exercising authority which clashes with the principles of individual freedom and dignity. A further distinction exists between authority in se, which is a state, and the exercise of authority, which is an act. Lastly there is the authority of law, which gives the. right to command and require obedience, and the de facto authority, which is the ability to impose oneself on others by virtue of one's own merits. To complete the picture, we have to refer to the three basic activities that qualify the command function in whatever socia l environment it is performed, all of which are intimately

Left. Personality. discipline, training, experience and intuition are the bases of the professionalism of an officer. But to prevent this from becoming an end in itself, it has to be underpinned by moral courage. The emblematic figure of the Bersaglieri officer leading his men into battle epitomizes all these values .

linked and inseparable: forecasting, decision-making and controlling . Forecasting comprises all the conceptual and organizational work carried out before orders are issued. The more complex the operation, the more necessary forecasting is. Napoleon used to say on this subject " ... I usually plan what I have to do well ahead of t ime, and I always calculate expecting the worst. In war, you achieve everything by calculating. The reason I take so many precautions is that I never leave anything to chance. It I seem to be ready to respond to anything, it is because I have thought at length about things, and predicted everything that is likely to happen before I actually do anything. There's nothing magical about it, and no sudden revelation about what I should say or do in a situation that noone else expected. Simply reflection and meditation". Forecasting, then, whatever type of problem one is dealing with, involves analyzing the situation, deciding what action to take, and then organizing. The order is the expression of the Chief's wil l: it must be clear, complete·, and precise; but ii must also exclude any attempt to lay down all the ways it is to be executed, because that would stultify the initiative and powers of subordinates. Lastly, control: this consists of ascertaining the gap that exists between the planned, ordered action and the objectives it is designed to attain, and of intervening to redress things if necessary. Control does not stultify the initiative of subordinates, and is not a curb on their freedom of action within the limits of their powers, if: • the control methods are laid down in order; • the controls are suffic iently spaced out; • the control relates to the whole organization, and not to the component parts in the lower echelons of t he organization.

What has been said so far is an attempt to focus on the basic features of the Leader, starting with a simple defin ition, and to spell out the functions typical of the command action. The command action is always directed at men, and its efficacy is based on the relationship that exists between the leader and his followers. But to identify the features of the modern Chief, we need to examine the main features of contemporary society

and the peculiarities of modern warfare, and then draw conclusions on the conditions under which command has to be exercised today, and even more so tomorrow. Our society, being one of the world's leading industrial societies, has progressed at an unprecedented rate over the past few decades, giving rise to innovations that have been particularly noticeable in the social and technological fields. This has

• modern technology is centralizing information at a time when people are demanding decentralization; • there seems to be a faltering emergence of those moral values that the unbridled consumer society s.eems to have relegated to a secondary plane ; • people are demand ing more efficient State structures. rejecting authority, and are apparently unwilling to accept laxism and demagoguery any more.

created new psychological developments, particularly among young people, and given rise to new and often contradictory demands. requiring difficult sol utions that could not be deferred any longer. Now that we are going through a period of social "decanting", in which things are settling down in the wake of the stormy Seventies, we can describe the domina nt features of present-day society in the follow-

ing terms: • men are aware of the new possibilities they have to know and act. and are aspiring to greater autonomy; • citizens are increasingly demanding more assistance from the social structures and the State; • in an attempt to provide all things, society is reducing the power and participation of individuals;

Moving now to the specific area of the modern battlefield, one of the first th ings to be noted is that technological progress has introduced such powerful, mobile and sophisticated weapons and vehicles that the role of the modern combatant has taken on hitherto unknown dimensions. Furthermore, the fragmented nature of the tactical acts, and the possibi lity of rapid force withdrawal and concentration have enhanced the- operational capacities of sma ll groups which which have to act with initiative, albeit in a unitary manoeuvre plan, exploiting to the full the capacities and possibilities of individuals and groups. Initiative and professional skill on the part of ind ividuals, mutual acquaintance between everyone concerned, and group cohesion seem to be the features of the military operational environment today. Now that we have defined the general framework in which to fit our man, we wi ll now try and see which are the logical places in which the command action has to be. exercised if it is not to be a failure . Montesquieu said that "If you want to do great things, you must be among men, not above them" .

The spirit of enterprise, mutual acquaintance, group cohesion: these are the particular features that characterize the Commander. The photograph symbolizes the operational environment in which the cadets at the Modena Academy train together to perfect their technical/ tactical skills.

This seems to fit in perfectly with what has been said above, because today it is necessary to work in such a way that subor-· dinates lend their support and respond to discipline through communication and decentralization, without ever losing sight of the human dimension. Today, more than ever before, it is essential to exchange· information because it is only if all the "pawns" belonging to an organization are aware of the objectives to be attained that all their energies can be coordinated and the common endeavour can be carried through more easily. Hence the need for dialogue between the Chiefs and the followers at all levels. This does not mean demagoguery or, worse still, abdicating authority, but it is the best way of obtaining discipline wil li ngly. Willing discipline depends on participation: contemporary man is becoming increasingly loth to be a simple· cog in a complex machine, he wants to participate directly or indirectly in the choices that have to do with him, within the constraints of his rank. In this manner, he feels that his desire to safeguard his own dignity is being satisfied. But if this participation is to be productive, the relationship between Chief and followers must be based on the utmost loyalty and mutual esteem: only in this way subordinates can honestly express their own ideas, free of all servile conformism and preconceived protest, and actively share in the operational construction of the organization in which they belong. The natural corollary of participation is decentralization which must be accepted whenever possible, to make the best use of the skills and potential of subordinates, to enhance initiative, enterprise and motivation. In other words, it is necessary to resist excessive prudence leading to the concentration of all the information - and hence all the decisions, including marginal ones - in the hands of the Chief. Communication, decentralization, participation: these are the three

pillars of the modern action of command. But they would merely be functional schemata unless humanized: and humanizing them does not mean cheap demagoguery, but love alone . In the command action, no error is more serious than creating a

breach between the Chief and his followers; the men must be drawn closer to the Chief, and they must be respected and treated with dignity, and be offered total trust and encouragement, with understanding and - above all - fairness and justice. This is the only way to have the firmness which is indispensable to be able to inflict more severe punishment on them, when this is necessary. We began this paper with a sketch of the Chief, mainly in terms of the semantic meaning of the word. The time has now come to examine· the particular qualities that the Chief must possess in the light of the demands of contemporary society. Being a Chief, as we saw at the beginning, basically means having to take decisions, laying down what has to be done; but it also means having the determination to do what has been decided, mobilizing everybody to get them to work for the same end and stimulating the initiative and enterprise of one's own subordinates. sustaining their action.

But three basic qualities, shared by Chiefs throughout the ages. are needed to be able to do this. professionalism, strength of character, and motivation. "The most immoral thing of all", said Napoleon, "is being in a job that one cannot do". And today, in a society , characterized by incredible technological wealth, it is no longer acceptable for a Chief to operate solely on the strength of his personal magnetism and moral qualities: he also needs professiona lism. This is rooted in his education, the soundness of his training, and maturity of his personal experience. While· education and training provide the Chief with the vital knowledge and interior balance he needs to face his problems. it is the experience that has matured over years of work that enlightens his insights and is often the real key to taking the right decisions in abnormal situations. He therefore needs skills that are not just required as a matter of prestige, but because they are guarantees that he will perform his duty in a professional manner. But professionalism would merely be an end in itself if it were not supported by the· Chief's determination and tenacity to attain his objective : namely. by his strength of character, which may be considered to be a balanced synthesis of courage and willpower. It is courafe. in the moral sense above all, that the Chief must depend on when he has to make a choice between the various possibilities open to him and when beset by doubts. It is courage that leads Chiefs to be daring. And it is willpower that serves as the spring which urges them on to attain the objectives, despite the difficulties. The· Chief's determination is all the more appreciated by his men to the extent that it is not selfseeking. Wher this is the case, the common good prevails over personal interests, and this is the concept whicJ- underpins both the authority of the Ch ief and the obedience of his followers.

An ethos of this kind inevitably spells doom to the quest for power and the lack of intellectual honesty. These are things which can never exist in a real Chief.

But what does the future hold in store? Will scientific and technological progress take place at such a frenetic pace that it will slip out of man's control? Will the human dimen-

sion still be valid in the robot age? Without claiming to tell t he distant future, one can extrapolate from the current trends to see what is likely to happen in the Nineties, and assume that we are likely to be faced with young men whose ethical/cultural features will not differ very much from those that exist today. We shall be dealing with young men who are better integrated into society, but increasingly less willing to accept personal risks and sacrifices, and who are used to comfort and affluence, more demanding and more practical, more culturally developed, more willing to accept the institutions provided they are efficient. Young people, in other words, who will be harder to handle because they will demand more concrete proof of credibility, but who will still have more or less the same needs as young men have today. Consequently, the Chief of tomorrow will not be, very dif-· ferent from today's Chief. He will have to be: • a man in whom young people. his followers. can and must place their trust because he is thorough ly trained to carry out his task; • a professional who is capable of handling increasingly complex men and equipment; • a man of his age. But looking back over what I have said above, and thinking of the great leaders of history, the following question comes to mind: do things ever really change? To conclude, one might say with a fair amount of confidence that the art of the Leader is based on a number of immutable principles and a number of variables.

The uplifting of the spirit of enterprise is the precondition for the willing acceptance of discipline and selfsufficient professional training. One of the educational targets of the Academy is to train the future Commanders to operate under critical circumstances.

While the great ethical princip les of command dating back to the dawn of history remain as valid as ever for the relationsh i p that e,xists between the Ch~ef and his followers, no-one can deny that the style of command has to keep pace with the times. It is unthinkable that a real Chief could possibly fail to sense the needs and tensions and problems of the world that surrounds him. So he must be a man who fully respects traditions and yet is constantly reaching out to the advancing world. He, must set aside both intransigent authoritarian ism and hypocritical paternalism which creÂˇate barriers of diffidence and rancour, and weaken the flame of the spirit. The world that is now opening up before us is the world of understanding, open-mindedness, and facts, example, and the indefeasible nature of funda mental moral values. But one thing is certain: the real Chief is going to have a hard task ahead of him, which wil l demand a great sense of balance and extreme sensitivity.

And if experience is the guarantee of balance, sensitivity is the synthesis of the sense of the human dimension, which enlivens relations and helps people to understand, and of the cultural dimension, in the sense of being trained and the wealth of the spirit. Balance, culture and the sense of the human dimension, therefore, are the values of an inner sensitivity that the Chief must continually draw upon in moments of loneliness, and when he has to experience the anguish of his doubts, and take upon himself, si nglehanded and without sharing it with anyone-, the full burden and privilege of taking decisions.

Pietro Re

At the Modena Military Academy, the Officer Cadets learn the principles of the ethics of command, which will enable them to take on the burden and the privilege of decision-making once they are Commanders.

Majo r General Pietro Egidio Re gradua ted from the M ilitary Academy, and attended the War College, the Inter -Service Genera l Staffs lnstiture and the XXXI I Session o f the Centr e fo r Ad Âˇ vanced Defence Studies. In ter a lia , he has served as Operations Chi e f at the Command of the 6th Army, Comnwnder of the 2nd Battalio n of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment, and d eputy lectu rer in tact ics, Cour,e Ch ief at t he War College; Deputy Commander of the " Trieste" Mechanized Brigade, Chief of St3ff of the War College and Schools Inspectorate. He was the Co mmanding Officer of the Modena Military Academy for over 3 years. Maj. Gen . Re has published several articles in previo us issues of Rivista M ilitare. In November 1984, he was appointed Com mander of the " Fo lgore" Mechanized Divisio n,

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Also in the field of artillery, as for the other components of th8P tac tical operative instrument, the technological progress is making its presence strongly felt; those who have the responsibility for the planning of the battle are therefore confronted with new possibilities. different options and diverse threats. The argument is not totally new; on the contrary, it has been recurring lately and often - being based on theories that ca n be called workshop theories - it has been developend in a most fanciful way, assJming as certain some accomplishments that in practice have often not come up to expectations, resulting in the annu lment of several new programmes regarding new systems, due to the cost or other difficulties. On the basis of the actual employment in the field of new systems, it seems that the time has come for considering a new rea lity wh ich. to be managed, must foresee a radical change in the procedures of employment and in the utilization of the support fire delivery systems in the battlefield.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS

As regards the gun as system for launch ing a shell, remarkable progress has undoubtedly been made which has entailed increased ra nges, more automatisms, much improved systems for munition supply, better capability of movement. both for towed and self-propelled artillery. As a whole, these innovations have nevertheless remained within the traditional schemes and still t oday they are not so determinant as to cause a reconsideration of the concepts and procedures of employment of artillery. As a matter of fact there is a great novelty in this field. t he realization of which will certainly bring about a real revolution in this sector. This is namely the possibility of adopting a liquid instead of a solid propellent in the charge, with advantages that can be easily understood, such as: elimination of the cartridge, abolition of the extraction phase. great increment of the firing rate, great reduction in w eight, etc. Nevertheless, despite the recent encouraging successes obtained by research and experimentation in this field, t he results are still being evaluated; therefore the subject is a prospect

for the future and must not be taken into consideration today in view of an immediate revision of the procedures and standards of employment. INTRODUCTION OF THE SATURATION WEAPON

The concept of saturati ng with f!re certain areas of the battlefield has been progressively gaining ground after the wide employmen t and the good results obtained during the second world conflict, especially by the Soviet Army. The possi bilities offered by the system of simu ltaneously conveying with remarkable timeliness massive volleys of rockets conveniently distributed over wide areas, has prompted the adoption of the term "saturation" and its basic concept has deservedly become part of the number of elements which concur in the development of a battle. With time, the concept has equally undergone improvements and the rocket with a big expl osive charge has been joined by the mine-carryi ng rocket for t he creation of minefields of interdiction within the adversary lines, with the consequent limitation of the enemy's mobility - as well as rockets carrying antitank su bmun itions with self-

Left.

The crew of a " Lance" missile ramp perform the last operations before tiring. The ÂˇLance" is 6.15 m long, its diameter is 56 cm and weighs 1.6 t. The ÂˇLance"'s range is 75 km with a conventional warhead and 125 km with a nuclear warhead. Right. The artillery Multi Launched Rocket System (MLRSJ is being acquired by th e Italian Army through the participation in a co-production agreement with other NATO countries. With a salvo of its 12 rockets, the MLRS can spread 7,728 disruptive-effect submunitions over an area of 250x 100 m, 168 antitank submunitions or 336 mi.,es over an area of 1000X400 m. The MLRS can be connected to the most advanced systems of fire control.

In the sector of search and acquisition of targets, one of the main means is the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPVJ, which can follow pre-memorized or groundguided traiectories, giving a televised view of th e enemy deployments in the overflown area. The best Known RPV is the "Scout" which can trasmit to the ground, from an altitude of 3000 feet, the image of an area of approximately 50 sq km.

guiding heads, sti ll being tested, and rockets as carriers of "iammers", and others. Thus we have at our disposal a syst em characterized by a great capabiUty of instant del ivery and very hig h concentration of fire. One need on ly to think that a volley of the complete load - 12 rockets - of a MLRS (Multi Launched Rocket System) which is being acq uired by the Army through Italy's participation in a coproduction agreement with other NATO countries can spray 7728 submunitions, each with a power equal to t hat of a defensive hand-grenade, over an area 250 m wide and 100 m deep., obtain ing , for example, the neutralization of a whole battery, deployed in the traditional way. Moreover each rocket can carry antitank submunitions in such a numb.e r (14) that they can knock out a whole tank company (I wa nt to stress that th is is still at the research stage, particu larly as regards the reliability of the self-guid ing warheads). We have already mentioned mines and " jammers". These cha racteristics of pow er, together with the outstanding capabilities of movement and the ascertained possibility of lin kage with .the most advanced fire control systems.

make the rocket la uncher besides its being a precious aid for laying minefields of interdiction on the enemy ground or wide systems of electronic distu rbances - a reliable substitute for the gun in most of the actions of mass fire. This does not mean that we must consider fin ished or obsolete the function of the gun. We shall see further on, how this weapon system still retains ample space for action but with a different perspective of employment from that adopted till now. INNOVATIONS IN FIRE-CONTROL AND OBJECTIVE-ACQUISITION SYSTEMS

With the employment in the field of the systems - fully achieved today - the forward observer can convey to the fire direction system, at battery, battalion or other level, through a rad iocomputer transmitter. a standard fire-request message of 1-3 sec du ration . At battalion level the automated system of fire direction (control) processes the message and according to: the availability of laun ching systems. the priorities of the request. the prememorized standards of em ployment, the characteristic of the

arms, as well as thei r condition and location, the availability of am mun ition, the weather cond itions and other possible elements, it selects the type of in tervention and the weapons concerned, and transmits then the ordAr of intervention and the firing data . The battery's computerized syst em, wh ich can manage up to 12 weapons, receives and transmits directly to the guns the intervent ion data. It must also be observed that the battery's computerized system ca n also communicate directly with the forwa rd observer and. consequently, operate autonomously. Let us mention here the system for the direction and control at Div ision level. It can ma nage up to 100 fire un its (i ndividual sources or groups), including naval arti llery and aircraft. and can record data regarding more than 1300 ob jectives. Linked to these automated systems of fire-control, there are position finders and weather condition recorders, all based on computerized systems. Another remarkable progress must be recorded in the sector of the search and acquisition of obiectives. Here. the most important means at our cisposal are RPVs (no-pilot recce aircraft), systems for control of the battlefield,

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laser for lighting theÂˇ objective and fire-source finders. It is worth to deal briefly with these elements because their capabilities draw a really new picture in the sector, imposing deep changes in the field of fire employment, in its procedures and deployments. The RPVs, which can fly for 30-60 minutes within the adversary lines along pre-memorized trajectories or be guided from the ground during the flight, give the unit a photohraphic or televised view of the entire adversary deployment in the surveyed area. The systems controlling the battlefield work by means of three types of sensors: magnetic, acoustic-seismic and infrared. Spread on the ground and linked by radio with a centralized reception and processing system thev can ensure the control of

up to 100 km within the enemy lines. The laser outlining the objective is employed by the forward observer, on the ground or on an aircraft-carried platform. With it, the trajectory of laser-guided projectiles such as the "Copperhead", "Hellfire" etc. can be controlled during its final phase, by lighting the objective with a coded laser-beam in tuning with the guiding system of the incoming projectile. These field systems have at present already a 10 km range; an observer-designer, well positioned within the friendly lines, can therefore " lighten" a target well inside the adversary lines, guiding the incoming projectile in the final phase of its trajectory. The fire-sourceÂˇ finding systems (artillery, mortars) have reached today a technica l perfection of the highest degree.

With a range from 10 (for mortars) to 30 km (for artillery) these systems can be conveniently deployed inside the friendly lines and ensure the indepth cover of all possible enemy deployments. The times are outstanding: it has been experimentally demostrated on the field that - simultaneously with the departure of the enemy weapon - these systems, linked with the above mentioned chain of con-

Carrier for anti-aircraft "Hawk" missiles. This missile is 5.12 m long. 350 mm wide, weighs 850 kg, and can engage targets up to a distance of 40 km at an altitude of 19,000 m.

Due to the technological progress achieved in recent years, it has been possible to realize computerized fire direction and control systems, capable of processing firing data in real time and in c lose connection with the type of target, the availabiUty of the launching systems, the priority of the requests, the characteristics and location of the weapons, the availability of munitions and the weather conditions. The photo shows a "Fieldguard" fire centre for rockets and field artillery.

trol and fire-direction, can ensure the location of the source, its definition, the fire request, the indication of the weapon to be employed for countering it, the firi ng data for intervention; all this, before the arrival of the enemy blow. TYPES, HARDNESS AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES Having given an overall view of the possibilitiAs of Action offered today by the arti llery, if is now convenient to ta ke a look at the fea tures of the possible ob jectives and therefore the possible needs of intervention, considering the average configuration of the, modern armies. In short we can point out two basic operational situations: the fluid one and the static one. In fluid operational situations, the ob jectives offered to both the attacker and the defender will be marked by deployments certain ly widespread but, above all, very volatile and hard. as they will be protected from the spl inters effect. In fact the armoured or mechanized combat un its will adopt procedures whose ma in features will be mobility, operating as much as possible from aboard, persuing success th rough movement and long range fire more than through methodic action. The logistic supports wil l be conseq uently involved in such types of procedures and. in their turn, will have to be characterized by great mobility.

This battlefield configuration envisages, for t he artillery, possibilities of intervention marked by the necess ity of great timeliness, very scarce need of mass fire, great request for "capillary" and very accurate fire actions (hit pinpointed on t he adversary weapon system) . Static operational situations can still be cons idered possible today, despite the very high mobility of the modern arm ies. Of course we must consider an operational situation of comparative immobility, which includes, alternatively, st atic and dynamic actions and proceedings, in wh ich the idea of immobility is connected ma in ly with the concept of a man oeuvre planned by the defender, who aims at exploiting, as best as he can, partic ular conditions offered by not very extensive areas, with good tactical features, or by t errains very di fficult for movement Âˇ but with very good defen-

sive possibilities, severely lim iting the manoeuvre of the attacker, preven:i ng him from ach ieving swift and easy concentrations of power in areas where he can apply his breaki ng efforts. In such an operational condition and con trary to what we have surmised for the flu id situations, also the modern armies ca n have the opportunity to ma ke an intervention with fire on less tra nsient and less spread-out ob jectives and, sometimes. less hard and sheltered along the line of contact. The defender of strong vital firmly anchored and well organized positions , can have the opportun ity to beat the attacker's concentration of forces, essential for achieving the mass needed to break the pos itions. that the defender has set up in order to bar the directi cns of attack. And wh ile, in depth, these concentrations can maintain

their hardness and sheHering character against the disruptive effects of the trad itional fire. at a shorter distance, when the attacker is compelled to assault with a systematic and typica l infantry action the positions of the defender. the latter will be offered enticing occasions for carrying out very effective interventions of mass fire. The problem for the attacker is slightly different. The defender's anchorage to strong positions will certainly offer non transient and remarkably thick ob jectives, especially along the line of contact, while, in depth, the static objectives will be comparatively less numerous. The objectivesÂˇ hardness, except for the logistic bases. will continue to be very high (armoured or built protections) and the large concentrations of fire will obtain almost exclusively shock effects or force the defender inside his positions. preventing him from

reacting efficiently with fire. In short, from what we have just said, it emerges that we need. as regards the artillery action, mass interventions with disruptive saturation effects as well as "single" fire actions having a "ca pillary" character. great timeliness and outstandi ng precision . Fort the first action, that of mass interventions - which are not a novelty from the requirement point of view - the best solution, as far as economy and effectiveness are concerned, is provided by the rocket launchers which, as we said, allow a great concentration of disruptive power and ample possibilities to saturate vast areas. This entai ls the adoption of launch ing units and relevant fire control systems. The second requirement, that of single fire actions of "capillary" character, is best met by the em ployment of the tradi-

The recent innovations in the fire control and target acquisition systems let us to anticipate that, in the near future, there will be new outfines for the empfoyment of artillery - with the use of rocket launchers for mass saturation with disruptive effects: as well as for mines and jammers spreading - and of howitzers for interventions of extreme precision, with the employment of laserguided shells. The photo shows two FH-70, 155 mm howitzers of the British Army in action.

tiona l gun's fire. In order to satisfactorily meet this requirement, great precision and timeliness are in fact needed. because it regards individual, point-size objectives, very mobile and very hard; conseq uently, fire must be pinpointed on the target. We have thus outl ined the two main components of the support and interdiction fire not

- and th is must be stressed - of the distant future, but of a very near future, beca use all fire delivery an d control systems can already be em ployed in the field. ARTILLERY'S N EW OUTLINES OF EMPLOYMENT

Having th us summarily examined the rea l situation of the field employment of the weapon systems, of the fire control and fire-sources determi nation systems, as well as the systems t o determine the type of the ob jectives, and consequently the type of intervention , we can now outline the new operation al fra mework of the artillery. The essen tial weapon syste ms for ensu ring an adequate fire support must include the rocket la uncher and the, artillery components. T he em ployment must envisage the use of rocket la unchers for saturati on or mass interventions with disruptive effects and spl inters aga inst mobile objectives, besides special actions. such as min elaying , jamming, etc., and the use of the artillery (the traditiona l g un) for pinpoint interventions by mean s of laser-guided shells. Of course, in pa rticu lar insta nces, the artillery can always ca rry out fire actions with mass in terventions with traditional shells. The concept of deployments will have to be radica lly cha nged. The ease with which the origin of the tra jectories can be determined, the rapidity of processing the data for reta liation fire and the possibi lity f or the systems to se lf-determine the positions, require a new vis ion, wh ich foresees and permits deployments of shapes as vario us and as irregula r as poss ible, in whi ch each weapon system, or the whole deployed unit, must be able to change its position very freq uent ly in order to avoid the certa in determ ination of its position by the enemy and t he consequent swift arrival of the adversary reta liation fire. Moreover, it is essential t o consider that while the selfpropelled artillery and the rocket 28

•

lau ncher systems are efficien tly protected aga inst splinters and disruption effects and have therefore a good chan ce to su rvive an out-of -ta rget blow, for the t owed arti llery t hings are more serious. They are today highl y vul nerable t o an enemy fire reaction and, on the other hand, one cannot thin k of displacing them after every int ervention. It is therefore perem ptory to envisage and plan their progressive and rapid replacement with selfpropelled armoured systems. CONDUCT OF FIRE, TACTICAL ORGANIZATION, COOPERATION

In the field of artil lery proper, three elements play a most importan t role : • the remarkable contribution they can give to laser-guided

CH-47C helicopter fitting, with its barycentric hook, a 155 mm. howitzer and relevant ammunition, The howitzer weighs 5.8 t and has a maxim um range of 15 km.

fire actions on an individua l target; • the traditional capa bil ity to fi re from rear positions which , though susceptible of being easily and rapid ly detected, as we have said, can change their positions with much greater ease, compa red to what the occu pier of advanced or contact positions can do; • the great ca,:::iability and fa cility that the present systems of fire conduct and control have in data processing ; this permits the si multaneous ma nagement of a large number of weapon systems.

These elements lead to foresee - as normal tactical organization - the "orientation in favour ", which sha ll have to be understood in terms â€˘more extreme than the traditional ones, such as to give the Commander of the combat units a more or less steady availability of the "in -favou r-oriented" support for timely laser guided fire actions and to make him responsible also for the deploymen t within his own sector. For the rocket launch er systems, on the contrary, the concentration will normally be at Maj or Unit level as regards interdiction and area saturation actions, with mass interventions with disruption and shock effects. The anti-battery and antimortar action s will be of course conducted and coordinated at Major Unit ComTtand level, where all the data of the detection systems are assembled and where the type and size of the systems to be employed will be decided according to the actua l situation. In cooperation. the automation of the various systems progressively introduced in the chai n (detection, determination and des ignation of the targets request of intervention, selection of the type of intervention and source, transmission of data) enhances the function and trai ning of the forward observer, especially in case of direct support. The forward observer must possess not so much hig h techn ical capa bilities - where he is amply supported by the automated digita l systems - but "tactica l" gifts, such as, for instance, the ability to "see" the enemy, to locate and distinguish the objectives, to be t;mely in requesting and properly guiding the incoming hits.

CONCLUSION

The transfer to the field, today ful ly achieved, of new weapon syst ems. of computerized syst ems for fire direction and control, and location and determination of objectives. as

well as the realization of munitions and subm un itions and of laser-gu ided systems, all existing in an operational environment tha t shows an impressive "hardness" and great mobility and fleetness of the targets, impose a new vision in tackling the problem of the support fire. The fire-delivery means wil l have to include. in well balanced quantity, both rocket launcher systems and traditional artillery, but al l will have to be self-prope lled and well protected from the splinters effect. The employment shall have to envisage mass interventions for the rocket laun cher systems and mostly "capi llary" interventions - with great timeliness and target precision - for the tradi tiona l artillery. Consequently, the tactical organization will have to envisage, as a rule, a concentration of the rocket lau ncher systems whileÂˇ for the traditiona l artillery the choice wil l be high decentralizat ion or, better still, an orientation in favour of a new type, in which the high Comman d could eas ily obta in temporary control; this is easi ly achieved with the new fire direction systems. The deployments will have to give up the old schemes and repla ce t hem with maxim um variety and pliabi lity, having as first priority the search for suitab le positions for concealment and exploitation of additiona l Âˇ shelters. Frequent movements particularly short ones - will have to be env isaged in a well organ ized plan, which will coordinate the reaching and the occupation of subsidiary positions. The whole operation of the intervention praxis, especially the support, anti-battery and anti-mortar actions shal l have to be sped-up - under penalty of los ing all timely effectiveness tak ing advantage of the new automatic computerized systems, foreseeing new procedures and consequently new goals and new tra ining programmes. Finally, as regards the cooperation with the combat units - which remains the really qualifying element for the artillery on the battlefield the close con nection of the Com-

manders of the traditional artillery units (battery and battal ion) with the Commanders of the Combat Units (minor combat grou ps and tactical groups) will have to proceed in a continuous and complete way, in order to ensure the complete integration of the support fire, within the framework of the resources available to the Commander of the combat units. In this picture, the already essential role of the forward observers becomes even more important. owing to the necessary absolute timeliness of the interventions, for their capillarity and for the need of guiding the fire on the target. The number of the observers will have to be increased and thei r training adapted to the new requirements, in order to enable the Command er of the combat un its to avail himself of that effective, intelligent and econom ic resource whi ch, more than ever, artillery represents on the battlefield. Luigi Ramponi

Major Genera l Lu igi Ramponi has attended the Mi li tary Academy, the Service Branch School and the War College. A Paratrooper, a Pilot and an Army Observer-PIiot. he has been Commander of the 11th Bersaglier i Battalion, o f the 1st Bersa glleri Reg imen t and o f the 8th "Gar iba ldi" Bri gade: he has carried o ut his Genera l Staff activities ot the 5th Army Corps, at the War College and LANDSOUTH HeadQuarters, and has held the office of Military Attache at the Italian Embassv in Washington. Al present, Major General Ramponi is the Commander of the Military Regio n of Sardinia .

WHY A "GRID DEFENSE"

There is no doubt that a modern defense should be based on mechanized and armored units which are the only ones capable to carry out effective barrier actions, to concentrate power where required and to solve different operative situations. These forces, however, have serious employment restrictions when environment conditions do not allow to exploit the possibility of movement of the vehicles and the fire power of their weapon systems. Contrary to what could be thought. these restrictions are not only present in particular zones or in small areas; moreover in NATO theatre they are not only coming from terrain morphology but mainly from human settlements in the territory. The 1976 edition of the US Army "Field Manual" (FM) 100-5 "Operations" described in a short section the environment characteristics of Central Europe (Germany) where responsability of de,fense sectors is given to the US forces. Inter alia, it was written: "the German landscape is changing continuously with the increasing of population and industrialisation. Rural and industrial buildings cover more and more the countryside. There are hundreds of urban centers exceeding 50,000 inhabitants and little villages are more and more connected by built-up areas. Cities and towns form continuous urban areas, covering hundreds of square kilometers, as e.g.: Mun ich: sq km 310; 30

Nuremberg-Furt: sq km 247; Stuttgart: sq km 297; Frankfurt Mainz-Hanau: sq km 560; Heidelberg-Mannheim: sq km 302; Ruhr area: sq km 1155; CologneBon n: sq km 393. The urbanization in Germany has a major impa ct on military operations. The German buildings are made out of

bricks, stones and cement. They can give protecti on and cover to the troops. The villages represent "natu ral strongpoints". The urban areas reduce visibility and ·field of fire, making more difficult the acquisition of targets. Fighting in Germany will

automatically entail repeated, almost continuous battles through cities, towns, villages and urbanized areas (fig . 1). In add ition to the urbanization aspect, the "Field Manual" also considered the consequences of natural environment on the intervention possibil iti es of antitank guided missiles '

DEVELOPMENT OF URBANIZATION IN WEST GERMANY FIGURE

• BERLIN /

EAST GERMANY

Legend:

NEARLY ABSENT AND SPARSE SETTLEMENTS

~ BIGGER DENSITY OF

~ SPARSE SETTLEMENTS

CTI] HIGH DENSITY

till]

OF SETTLEMENTS

D II

VERY HIGH DENSITY OF SETTLEMENTS HIGHLY URBANIZED AEREAS

AUSTRIA

(ATGM's): "it is not easy to find long extended fields of fire for tanks and ATGM's". In fact, due to terrain morphology, vegetation and buildings, the real line of fire is often broken. In zones of major military interest of Germany (Fulda gap and Northern plain) the medium

percentage of loss of visibility between weapon and target, because of natural and artificial obstacles, is shown in figure 2. Figure 3 gives the length in meters of the tract for which a target has to remain exposed so as to be hit (not necessarily destroyed or neutralized) (exposure segment = S).

Above.

Theatre of possible confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is Central Europe and in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, where the terrain is characterized by numerous natural and artificial obstacles. Thus it is n::it easy to find extended fields of tire tor tanks and antitank guided missiles.

Let's consider, for instance, an ATGM engaging a tank moving at a speed of 7 miles per hour (13 km/h) at a distance of 2000 meters. The missile flightpath time is 10 seconds. If the layer acquires and shoots in 10 seconds, the tank will have to remain uncovered

LACK OF RECIPROCAL VISIBILITY (MEAN PERCENTAGE) AND RELATED CAUSES

FIGURE 2

TERRAIN MORPHOLOGY

VEGETATION

CONSTRUCTIONS

Fulda Gap

58%

25%

17%

Northern Plain

21 %

78%

AREAS

for 72 meters so as to be hit. On the basis of terrain characteristics previously described, figure 4 shows the probabi lity of the exposure segmen t (S) in the mentioned areas of in terest in Germany. Continuing the previous example, had the layer operated in Fulda area , he would have had 73% of proba bi lity of having a tank visible for 72 meters; in the Northern Plain, on ly about 48 %. These considerations on terra in, the assessement of the purely armored and mechanized threat, the acknowledge ment of objective limitations in time and available defence mea ns, have made the 5th US Army Corps in Germany examine the opportun ity of studying t he "Grid Detense" (GD) . The experi ments are still under way and even if the study is con-

ducted by mecha nized and armored forces, the hypothesis is to employ against motorized and armored formations nonmechanized infantry using ambush technique for defensive actions, exploiting the cover possibilities of numerous vi llages that are spread in agricoltural European plains. Those villages are usually from 1 to 3 km away from ea ch other; therefore two or more of them can be organized in a system of co-operation. Areas with a width and depth of 12-20 sq km , with a zone of co-operating villa ges, are considered ideal for grid defense (fig , 5). That concept was originally used by the Germa n defence during 2nd World Wa r, .to contrast Engl ish attacks during the "Goodwood" operation (see article by the same author "The, use of nonmechanized infantry", Riv ista

FIGURE

Militare no. 1/ '83). From that operation experience, English experts have developed a technique ca lled "Framework Defence") . Grid detense consists in adapting such a techn ique to the operative possibi lities and armament of the US infan try units. SOME DIFFERENT APPROACHES

Beside the Army's interest for sole mi litary purposes, the use of foot infa ntry is well liked by everybody tryi ng to see real ized, in Europe, a purely and unequivocal defensive system. The spectre of nuclear holocaust provoked by mistake or by a wrong threat preception or by mere provocation, has g iven impulse to studies and proposals on the possibility of

MINIMAL LENGTHS OF THE EXPOSURE SEGMENT (S) SO THAT A TARGET CAN BE HIT WITH SUCCESS

FIGURE 4

PROBABILITY THAT A RECIPROCAL VISIBILITY SEGMENT HAS A LENGTH AT LEAST EQUAL TO "S"

DISTANCE (METERS)

APPROX TANK TRAJECTORY SPEED DURATION (MILES/ HOUR) {SECONDS)

11100

1.0

SPOTTING AND ACQUISITION TIME (SECONDS)

611

117

126

162

..........

0.8

0.6

ISO 210

270

' I'\ \

234

108

144

390 ;;; a::: w Iw 126 1!

"'z

I-

2000

Ill

12IJ

lllO

240

180

300

252 ~ (!) w 420

"'u. 0

::c

I-

135

(!)

100

12(,

162

198

a:::

200

150

210

270

330

400

0 t"'-,....

........

r---....

JOO

;;;

a::: w w

I-

200

270

451)

w w

300

G~RM~N NPRT f!ER~ Plf'IN 13

;;; I-

...J

3000

t--....

FULDA IJ

0.2

0.4

300

400

â€˘

-··

______..--

A POSSIBLE "GRID DEFENCE" ORGANIZATION - -.--

staging defensive systems different from the present ones and not involving nuclear weapons. It is the same concept long expressed in Germany by Dr. Horst Afheldt: "All today's European Armies are sons of Hitl er's armoured units conceived to attack and to carry out "britzkrieg " . The Historical events of 2nd World War compelled Red Army and Allied Forces to get ready for the attack which was to lead to the liberation of Europe. Th e Army structure is not changed since then. The w ea pon systems have been modernized, new tanks have replaced the old ones, but the structural framework and the concept in using conventional forces have not changed. T he problem is that this structure, with forces ready t o attack from both sides, is highly de-stabilizing. It would be even more de-stabilizing if NATO had the capability of deeply striking the Warsaw Pact territory; and, finally, it would be a disaster if NATO had conventional forces eq ual to those of the Warsaw Pact: in this case the Soviet Union could use nuclea r weapons first".

-- __

FIGURE

__ .. -~-- - -

Without discussing Dr. Afheldt's considerations, it would be logical at this point to ded uct that the· only defense for Europe would consist in adopt ing the Trappist warning: "re member that you have to die". The German research instead points out two main req uirements: • avoiding that the Western def ensive structure could offer paying targets to Soviet nuclear weapons (putting into effect a no target structure); • changing Western Europe conventional structure (developed for attack 40 years ago) into a defensive specialized structure. In accordance to these principles, the "Study Group of Alternative Security Policies" of the Max Planck lnstitut of Stern berg, has developed a defence model based on three essential elements: • a purely defensive net of light infantry; • a net of high precision field arti llery (rockets or missiles and granades with terminal selfguide;

A kind of "grid" defence hypothesizes the employment of infantry units in ambush defensive actions against motorised and armored enemy forma tions, using the cover possibilities offered by many villages present on european territory. Such villages, normally distant each other from 1 to 3 km, can be organized in a cooperative system. The figure shows a possible defensive organization.

• an information net for spotting and acquiring targets. A ccording to Dr. Afheldt and his collaborators, the net of high precision artillery, even if equipped wi th rockets with no more than 20% of Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP) and 40/ 50 km ra nge, could permit to eliminate a very high number of enemy armored and mechanized vehicles already during the first Kms of penetration . For insta nce, assum ing to have 5 rocket-launchers per sq km. in case of attack coming from 10,000 armoured vehicles

FIGURE

INFLUENCE OF ACCURACY Casualties suffered by the attacker In%

BASIC DATA Enemy attack on: 50 km front Number of crafts: 10,000 armoured and mechanized vehicles

HIO

Effective range of rocket systems: 40 km

\'i ,:: l\,2

80 70

"" =o,os

30 20 W 10

= 0,01

N - 5

Ill

100

ll0

Depth of enemy penetration In km N: Number of defensive systems/ sq.km W: Hitting probablllty

distributed on a 50 km front, after 10 km the enemy would have lost 50% of its veh icles (fig. 6) . If the artillery had a 10% SSKP, in the same attac k condition theÂˇ enemy would lose 50 % of its tanks after a 65 km pe netration. Of the same interest are the data regard ing t he infantry net th at the M ax Planck lnstitut has considered for European defense. Western Germany national territory ought to be garrisoned by sm all infantry units (in the average 3-4 men per sq km) with an area of employment coinciding with t he o ne of ga rrison. T hise un its ought to be equipped with antipersonnel weapons (individual and at unit level), mines and mine launchers and, above all, with highly sofisticated anti-ta nk weapons. Th is defensive net should g ive protection to the men, and permit the use of weapons with remote control. Practically, always with respect to th e no target principle, weapons and operators should be at about 200-300 meters from each other.

Under an operative technique profile. another interesting point of view is exposed by Jochen Loser, former Genera l in the German Army, in his book " Neutrality f or Centra l Europe the end of the Blocs". The defensive net considered in Germany by General Loser starts from the Eastern frontier and ends to the Wese r-Lech rivers line. In this area t he defence sistem develops through successive bel ts where light defensive forces (Jagdkampfgruppe). with a covering task and the aim of canalizing the enemy forces towards prearranged zones of obstacles (sperren). and mobile forces at Brigade level with counterattack tasks, alternatively operate. Such a procedure is based on principles of territorial defense, self-protection. civil defense, non-use of nuclear weapons. As for the technical aspect, it tends to prefer skirmishes and ambush actions to battles. exploitation of obstacles and firepower to movement, use of small units with large autonomy

to classic forces at Brigade and Division level. Dr. Afheldt 's and General Loser's structures do not take into account t he defensive possibi lities offered by urban and rural centers (although not excluding them) and, in the way those have been illustrated, they stil l appear . to be at a con ceptual phase in which the real availability of means and resources, and some essential technical procedures are not always fully taken into account. Moreover. those structures seem to have more political purposes (achievement of a non-provocative defense) than mili ta ry purposes. A concept of grid defense that ta kes into account the real possibilities of actual instruments, the natura l environment evaluation. the li mitations in tra ining and employing Western Armies appears to be of a different nature. Beside that, it would be compatible with other classical defensive actions or with the techn iques and aims of "Deep Strike" or Airland Battle". Considering that in our country phenomena of urbanization. build ng development, special ized cultivations-which have made US experts study alternatives forms of defensive ba ttles in Germany - have had exceptional intensity and rhythms. we think that it can be useful to mention the technical operative outlines of grid detense as they can be, empirically detected without pretence of completeness. DEFINITION

Grid detense is a co-operative defensive procedure based on fire positions mainly orga nized by "foot" infantry located in villages and smal l rural centers. Mobility is ensured by combined or isolated use of helicopters, mechanized and armo red carriers, and "on foot" movements . Grid defense aims at disorganizing, delaying, destructing enemy mechanized and armored troops. Th is tactic is devised to punish the enemy and

. .does not consider, as a main task to hold positions for an undeterm ined time.

ORGANIZATION Avenues of approach : the various avenues of approach leading to t he areas with high density of villages, have to be analyzed and evalu ated in order to locate: • avenues of approach for motorized and armored units; • avenues of approach for units on foot; • dead areas.

Small villages are essential elements on which a "grid" defence organization is based. Th e figure shows the defensive organization of a village with the forward edge facing the most dangerous avenue of approach, on which the main defensive position is built. The secondary edges of the village are facing the minor avenues of approach (81 and 82) and the herein located positions can also engage fire ori the near avenues of approach leading to nearby villages. The rear eclge of the village in th ~ area from which the unit is supposed to evacuate (CJ.

The various defense weapons have to be placed so as to block the avenues of approach accordi ng to types and capacities of the avenues themselves. During periods of limited visi bility the avenues of approach and-always~the dead areas are to be covered with se nsors, radars and patrols. Obstacles and fire support have to be planned in order to prevent the enemy from entering particular areas or to canalize him in those avenues of approach where the defense intervention is more likely to be effective. Although not absol utely necessary, it is preferable that every avenue of approach for motorized and armored units could be included in the intervention sector of one of the cooperative village defense system. The most dangerous avenue of approach will norma lly be the one reserved to motorized and armored units. Organization of a village (fig. 7):

• the forward edge of the vil lage is where the most dan-

gerous avenue of approach leads. On this edge the main defense position is organized (A); • the other edges of the village face minor avenues of approach and their positions can also intervene against one main aven ue of approach leading to another village (B1 and B2); • the rear edge of the village is the area from where the units will evacuate. Sometimes the rear edge can be organi zed for defence in order to engage those enemy forces that have managed to outflank the position (C); • the main antitank weapons have to be placed on the forward edge. For each weapon at least two alternate positions have to be organ ized; • the riflemen organize positions capable to protect antitank pits and guarantee the close defence of the village during periods of scarce vi sibility. Sentries have to use building roofs or other high positions in order to spot at t he right moment the enemy units; • rifl emen pound at avenues of approach suitable to un its on

FIGURE

ORGANIZATION OF A VILLAGE .. _.. .... _____..

·: ··:··~·...

.. ...... ,

........ ... .

....

foot and organize observation and/ or listening posts to avoid a surpr ise action and intervene qui ckly on dead areas. They have t o be equ ipped with enough short range antita nk weapons so as t o g ive close protection in case of fla nk attack from motor-Âˇ ized units; â€˘ supplementary and/ or alternative posit ions for antita nk wea pons and riflemen have to be prepared on the secondary edg e so that it is possible to int ervene o n the main avenue of approach lead ing to another village; â€˘ every defensive element has to have entry itineraries t o an area, c lose to the rear edge, to be used as a gathering po int, to embark men on land and air mea ns of transportation, or from where it would be possible to activate other positions.

EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES Surprise is the key element. In order to achieve maximu m surprise, th~ defender must develop a det ailed plan, arrange an accu rate camouflage and discipline movements and fire control. Every ant i-ta nk unit must have a specific intervention sector to deceive the enemy an d get the maxim um of surprise, the first antitan k action of fire must be done simultaneously by all wea pons. Subseq uent ly, fi re control must be su ch as to avoid that a target be pounded by more than one weapon . Indirect fire is plan ned so tha t the enemy is and wi ll remain engaged and that the enemy formations could be destroyed and/ or cut off from reinforcement s. It is essential t o plan and prearrange d irect and indirect fire on minor avenues of approach. The artillery must be used to d isorgan ize enemy troops and to con tribute to battlefield ill umination. Obst acles must be pos itioned in such a w ay as to stop and/ or cana lize the enemy troops into areas most fa vorable t o

antita nk intervention. Protective positions or areas out of range obstacles will be positioned in of enemy direct fire. minor avenues of approach. Withdrawal on foot is norBooby traps and explosive dema lly carried out when the t ime, v ices constitute ways of alert factor is not bind ing and when for possible comings from dead concealed outgoing iti neraries areas. are avalia ble (e.g . crossi ng of On a dayti me attack, riflewoods). men must favour dissociation of Withdrawal on foot must ,be infantry from armou red mea ns. considered the only one posAt nig httime, riflemen offer sible when units are cut off from close protection t o antitank the rest of the, system. It is sistems and ca rry out patroll ing, normally done by night and observation and listening. Duris in any case protect ed by ing movemen ts from one edge prearranged artillery fire and by of the vil lage t o another, rifleaircraft. men move advanci ng by bounds, When a unit has carried out ind ividually or in small g roups. its task and gets ready for the When the unit or part of it has withdrawa l, combat responsibi lreached the rear edge of the ity must be handed over to vi llage and is w aiting for trans- another unit located in a vil lage portation means for w ithd rawbelong ing to the same system . ing, riflemen put into action a It is very important that condefensive perimeter around the ventional comma nd signals and main weapon systems. T hey modalities of checking credenalso constitute counterattack tials are predete rm ined and well groups to help d isen gagement known in order to ease the pasof the forces under particu lar sage of command and unit pressure. exfiltration s from one posit ion to Withdrawal from t he village the other. can be done by helicopters, Every opportunity for countermechan ized and armoured atta ck must be exploited to win veh icles, or on foot. the enemy on ce and for al l. In Concealed approa ching itin- that case, t he possibility of conera ries are particularly necessa ry t inuing the defen ce from t he for he licopters . The embarkasa me village will have to be caretion zone must be easily refully eval uated. The enemy, in cognizable and allow veh icles fact, w ou ld know the position and and troops to move in q uickly. the surprise effect w ould not be exploited anymore. In particular Withdrawa l by helicopters must be tried by day and night- cases, the strenght of the positime w henever possible. Durtion w ill prevail over other considerations. ing withdrawal a careful evaluation of t ime is essential to red uce aircraft exposure at min imum level. Under no circu mstances, SPECIAL ASPECTS however, an aircraft can rema in on the ground for more then three minutes. Antiaircraft defence is planWithdrawa l on mechanized ned in detai ls. Ma n-portable and armoured means must be ground air defense weapon sysplanned in detail and defi lated tems are located on posit ions itineraries are to be used to th e covering the most probable air hig hest extent. One or moreways for both fixed and rotary assembly areas must be chosen wing aircra ft. Areas particular ly as meeting poi nts for carr iers and su itable t o be used by enemy troops. It might be necessary for attack heli copters must be demechan ized and armoured tected. troops t o protect the riflemen On such areas. prearranged withdra wing towards the assem~ art illery fire is to be orga nized. bly area s by fire of their w eapon It is improbable that the systems . While w ithdrawi ng, casualties could be evacuated in vehicles w ill move by bounds t ill daytime. Personnel must be t hey have reached protected then prepa red to the poss ibility

Right.

M75 Armored Perso:inel Carriers of the Belgian Army crossing a river on a pontoon bridge built by "MOFAB" amphibious vehicles.

Below.

Belgian infantryman equipped with a TR-PP-11 transceiver and an F. N. light authomatic rifle cat. 7.62 NATO .

of having to delay rescue and medica l evacuation. The un it must have additional medical eq uipment. Supplies during combat will be difficult; before combat they must be avoided so as not to com promise the position. The units then must dispose of enough equipment and supplies for the presumed entireÂˇ period, from the moment of the occupat ion to that when the position is abandoned. The control of civilians is a particularly important element. The ideal would be to evacuate the village completely. If that is not poss ible, the population will have to be warned, through local autorities, that fighthing is going to occur in the area. Civ ilians not intending to leave the village, must gather in that pa rt of village believed to be most safe and will be constant ly controlled to avoid the failure of the defense plan. For thise purposes, local authorities are to be used. Military personnel will have to be selected and trained to carry out liaison tasks and improve civilmilitary cooperation. REMARKS

As we have said before, grid defense is not a new concept. not even for theÂˇ US doctrine that. until some years ago, had used techn iques similar to t hose described for "areal defense" . But new is the concept of employing non-mechanized infantry in the European Theatre, normally considered a field for mechan ized anc armoured un its.

This concept results from the following considerations: • the high intri nsi c and running cost of mecha nized and armored units does not consen t at present to deploy in Europe forces big enoug h to gua rantee an effective defense. For example, an Army Corps respon s ible of an area of approx 70 km has 1 mechan ized Div ision. 1 armored Di vision and 1 cavalry reg iment in order to contrast an estimated threat of 6 Divisions in first array (0-72 hours). of 4-6 Divisions in second array (72-84 hou rs); • intervention of external mechan ized and armored reinforcements is bound to the ava ilability of means and ma terials located in advance, to the capability of local forces to defend and protect the places where those materials are located, to the capability of the· forces to contrast the enemy for enough· time to allow the intervention of reinforcements . At present such an intervention requi res a minimu m of three days for the bulk of manoeuvre forces, and up to six days for reinforcements. In this kind of situation, employment of non-mechanized

infantry can be by fa r regarded as the most economi cal and timely. But we must add that it is an easy solution to a complex problem and that must be critically analysed so that economical factors would not exceedingly w eig h on the operative considerations. Another consideration is about grid detense's staging place and moment. The US and the UK tend to see its employment, in Europe, in the rear area of the defensive position, so as to form a last "emba nkment" aga inst the enemy advance, and give reinforcements time to counterma noeuvre or establish a new defens ive array. But. ta king into account that grid detense can ac hieve a high rate of friction against mechanized and armored enemy troops. it would be maybe more convenient to adopt such a proced ure in the most ad vanced areas of the defence system (where it is possible to give in space) and during the ea rly days of the figh t (when the enemy forces' concentration is higher). In any case, the elements conditioning such a choi ce would always be the entity and type of enemy forces and the natura l envi ronment.

Thas is because if little harm would ensue from the grid detense tec hnique appl ied against the wrong kind of enemy forces, it would be suicidal to try such a defense under unsuitable env ironmenta l conditior:s. As we have said before. those cond itions not only can be found in Italy, but they are present in almost t he totality .:>f the nat ional territory, and in any case reach the highest intens ity in the very areas of greatest military importance. Evidence can be given by examining statistic data referring to phenomena indicators most directly corinected to grid detense aspects, e.g . urba nization and development of built-u p areas, ag riculture, comm unication lines. Statistics from the 1982 Italian Statistics Yearboo k give the following outstandin g data: • the Fri uli region is formed by 57.4% of hills and plai ns. 42% of mountains ; • Friul i has a commu ne every 36 sq km; • 90% of North Eastern Italy has a population from 500 to 20,000; • Gonsidering the house-room ratio, we find that Friuli's houses built in 1979 have an average of 9 rooms each; • North Eastern regions have a population index of about 0,7. That means, for instance, that there are four rooms every th ree people; • 41 % of Friuli is cu ltivated, 22 % is covered with woods; • 60% of Friuli is cultivated by direct growers (average of 5 hectares x grower). 38 % in cultivated by farms (average 170 hectares x farm) ; • in all North Eastern Italy there is intensive and almost sole corn and vineya rds growing; • in relation to its surface, Friuli has on e of lowest roadway ratios.

A "M arder" armored combat personnel carrier at full speed.

GRID DEFENSE

A MBB 80-105 helicopter equipped with 6 #MILAN" ar.titank wire-guided

missiles.

These data clearly indicate that, due to urban concentration, territory utilization, bu ilding and communication development, Northern Italy is a natural defensive theatre, quite ideal for grid defense. Friuli in particular is worth of special remarks in regard to: • building development; • com municatio ns. As far as the first point is concerned, we have already seen that Friuli has a very high room~house ratio and a very low population ratio. These are typical indicators connected with groups of residential buildings formed by one or two family units with independent services . In regard to our subject, t he evolution of that phen omenon has as a result t he extension of urbanized areas with consequent increasi ng of obstacles to observation and shooting, and limitations to offroad vehicles.

As for the second point (communications). Friuli has a very low road-surface ratio. Basically there is an objective (relative) lack of roads. From that point ca n result an interesting consideration for a defense relying on small built-up areas and finali zed to stop mechanized and armoured troops compelled to move along the roads by natural or artificial obstacles: number and possibilities of routes to the defensive area are smaller than those of the rear territory and villages (lined up just along the roads) forming a close, contin uous and con stantly expand ing net of fixed passages. Adding to that the barrier ca pabilities of a permanent fortification system, we ca n conclude that grid defense can be part icularly well applied on the advanced area of the North Eastern zone. Grid defense, if integrated by the tradi tional systems adopted by mecha nized and armored f orces, can constitute the basis to a new defensive system. A system able to rebalance the defense and to take into consid eration other necessities of our national territory. Fabio Mini

Lt. Col. Fabio Mi ni was com m i ss ioned in Infantry (bersaglieri) from the Military Academy and was graduated from the Italian Army war College. He was platoon leade r an d com p any commander In the 2nd Bersagllerl btn. · Governo10·; se,ved as Operation Officer with the 4th Armoured Regiment "Legnano· and was G4 in the Brigade (mech,) .. G rana t ieri di Sa rdegna... operations officer, Deputy and Chief of the Exercise and Evaluation Division (EED) ,n the 4th US Infantry Division (mech .) - A . Carson, Colorado. Assig ned to the Ital ian Army General Staff. has served as Sta ff Officer within the DCS for Personne l Office and as Chief of the Studies Coordi nation Div ision with t he O ffice of the Army Chief of Staff. He ha s commanded the 1st Bersaglieri Battall ion " La Marmora· and his present posting is w ith the Army Genera l Staff Public Affa ir Office. He is US Army Commendation Medal recipient.

AIRBORNE ELECTRO -

OPTICAL SYSTEMS FOR BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM OF NIGHT VISION

In the extremely fluid situation characterizing a hypothetical battlefield of the future, the defence's chances of success would depend on its capacity to supply the command and control centres with prompt, possibly real-time, information. In the past, battlefield surveillance was carried out by aircraft equipped with conventional photographic systems, and so darkness and atmospheric factors often proved to be insurmountable obstacles. Rapid progress has s ince been made in overcoming these limitations by means of new types of sensors and a special effort has been devoted to developing electro-optical systems. The latter may be divided into two categories: television (TV) systems and infrared (IR) systems of the type known as thermal imagers. The former are capable of operating at very low levels of environmental illumination, while the latter are independent of this parameter and so their performance is not affected by factors such as smoke, haze or dust. Both systems can operate without the need for active elements (conventional reflectors or infrared projectors) to illuminate the scene. As these systems are completely passive they are particularly suitable for operating in a hostile electronic environment. Even if electro-optical systems can be mounted on a wide range of vectors, aircraft are preferable owing to their intrinsic mobility, which ensures flexibility of use and the possibility of exp loring even very vast areas. The present article sets out to examine technological developments in the field of low level television (LL TV) and thermal imagers. The article is concluded with the recommendation of a possible system for use in battlefield surveillance and w ith the identification of the most suitable type of aircraft for this kind of mission.

Natural light levels range from 105 lux in full sunlight to 10- 4 lux on a cloudy moonless night. Table A shows the illumination values corresponding to the d ifferent conditions of natural light. The human eye operates at its maximum efficiency at the higher levels, at which its resolving power, i.e. the capacity to see two objects placed close together as separate items, allows an angle of 1' to be appreciated. This is the equivalent of a separation of 1 m at a d istance of 1 Km. As the level of illumination descends below 1 lux, resolution grows smaller. The eye manages to partially accommodate to darkness by integrating the signals generated by the nerve endings of the retina, thus increasing the overall signal level. However, at 10- 1 tux it is very difficult to distinguish colours, and between this level and 10- 3 lux (corresponding to a clear starlit night), the type of vision used changes from photopic to scotopic, in which nerve endings other than the primary ones are used.

Gates Learjet M.35 A, ECM and target designation aircraft.

Tab.A LEVELS OF ILLUMINATION (1) LUX

106 101 103 102 10 1 10- 1 10- 2 10- 3 10- 4

NATURAL CONDITIONS Sunlit snow Bright sunlight Cloudy sky Dim daylight Early dus~ Late dusk Full moon Crescent moon Clear moonless night Cloudy moonless night

(1) For the sake of comparison, 30 lux are, necessary toÂˇ b~ able to read.

At the end of the accommodation process, which can take up to 30 minutes, the eye can be said to have adapted to darkness; this means that it has greater sensitivity but lower resolution. Therefore, although the eye can operate down to the lowest level of natural illumination (10- 4 lux), all perception of colour is lost and only large objects contrasting with their background can be perceived.

LLTV SYSTEMS

Fig. l

Diagram of EBSICON camera tube The core of a conventional telecamera consists of a device known as the camera tube, the function of which is to transform images into electric signals. A camera tube works by analysing the reproduction of the observed scene on a photosensitive surface. This image is created by the light energy reflected from the scene itself. The performance of a television system is, however, highly sensitive to the level of environmental illumination and special camera tubes have had to be dev.e loped for operation under low illumination conditions. The main devices of this kind are the Ebsicon (Electron Bombardment Silicon Induced Conductivity Vidicon) and. the Image lsocon. Both systems interface with the external world by means of a photoemissive input surface known as a photocathode, which emits a number of electrons that is proportionate to the luminance of the image elements. In the Ebsicon tube these electrons are accelerated by a voltage of 10 KV and collide with a screen (the target) consisting of a set of silicon diodes. The diodes are kept in a state of inverse polarization by means of a scanning electron beam sweeping continuously over the target. In the absence of illumination this state of polarization, which corresponds to a very low discharge current and a comparatively high capacity value, remains between one scan by the beam and the next. In the presence of a minimum illumination value the high energy electrons emitted by the photocathode are absorbed by the N regions of the diode, producing electron-hole pairs, i.e. pairs of charge carriers of opposite sign.

Target

Scanning beam

Photocathode

....

I'.._

IS Out-put

These carriers discharge the condensers formed by the diodes to an extent which varies according to their number. The pre-existing situation is restored by the electrons deposited by the scanning beam as it passes. The signal current determined in the output circuit is proportional to the electric charge lost by the diodes during t he interval between one beam pass and the next. This is proportional to the number of electrons emitted by the photocathode and therefore the current becomes the equivalent of the image in terms of electric signal. The Ebsicon tube (fig. 1} has a diameter of 16 mm and performs well down to the minimum values of 10- 1 lux. In the camera tubes of the Image lsocon type (fig. 2) a voltage of about

500 V is used to accelerate the electrons emitted by the photocathode. The electrons strike a target consisting of a semi-conductor membrane. After the collision, secondary electrons are emitted which are collected by a grid on which a positive potential is maintained. In this way, a positive charge distribution is set up which is proportional to the incident radiation. The original conditions are then restored by a scanning electron beam. The latter has a lateral velocity component consisting of a magnetic focussing system which forces it to follow a spiral path. The instant it reaches the target It gives off a number of electrons which is dependent on the distribution of the existing charge. These electrons have no lateral velocity component and return along the

Fig. 2

lsocon Image camera tube

Separating plates

Photocathode

Amplifying section

l I

. . - - - - - ' - - I

T I~ \

Output

Scanning coil Focussing coil

-axis of the tube. They are comparative ly :unaffected by electronic noise and are subjected to an amplification process. The signal thus fo rmed is then sent to the output circuit. The electron beam, which does possess a lar~ e noise component, returns with a spiral motion with an ampli tude such as ·to allow special separating p lates to be used to block it. Using th is procedure it is possible to construct a comparatively "clean" video signal, i.e. one that is not disturbed by noise generated inside the cam era device. Tubes of the Image lsocon type come with diameters rang ing from 36 to 60 mm and are capable of good performance· up to 10- 2 lux. Both the Image lsocon and t he Ebsicon are often used as the second stage of a system, the first stage of which is an image intensifier. The latter is an electronic device which reproduces on a fluorescent screen the light rad iation impinging on its photoemissive surface. In this way a k ind of preamplification occurs which allows both the camera tubes to work up to 10- 4 lux. Experimental results have shown that the Image lsocon offers a slightly better performance in terms of resolution. Furthermore, the latter device is less likely to be damaged by the sudden appearance of a very bright light source. In the silicon target of the Ebsicon tube a sudden overload causes a spread of charge into the surrounding substrate, making the signal unutilizable over a large area. An othP.r factor to be taken into account is performance in the case of moving objects. This performance is dependent on the response time, defined as the interval of time required to follow the transition of a point on the screen from white to black. Ebsicon has a response time that is determined by the target's capaci ty. The Image lsocon has a response time due to the difficulty of having the electron beam "land" on the points of the target surface where the potential range is small. The smaller the environmental illumination the more difficult this problem becomes. The Ebsicon tube thus represents the better solution when a good resolut ion of molfing images is required. With its smaller d iameter, the Ebsicon is to be preferred also from the standpoint of size.

SOLID STATE TELECAMERAS The development of CCD (Charge Coupled Device) technology has led to the construction of telecameras without a camera tube, i.e. built out of solid state components only. _The basic structure of a CCD matrix (a matrix is an array of elements ordered into rows and columns) cons ists of three layers: a set of conductor electrodes, a silicon substrate and a separating layer of silicon d ioxide. The CCDs have the capacity to store and transfer information in the form of electric charge packets. The latter are stored in zones known as potential wells; the presence or absence

of .charge in one of these zones is used to represent information. The charge packets can be shifted from one well to another by applying suitable voltages to the electrodes. The use of CCDs instead of a cam era tube is made ossible by the· fact that the mechanisms that allow the introduction of charge packets include also that of exposure to light. In fact, in a CCD array the absorption of rad iation by the silicon substrate g ives off a number of electrons which is proportional to the amount of incident radiation. By collecting and accumulating the electric charges thus created, a video signal can be produced. The first CCD te lecameras used 100 x 100 arrays, but larger ones have since been introduced (table B). Having a larger array means that the image is formed by a greater number of elements, which enhances resolution. However, a array of hundreds of thousands of cells produces data at such a high speed that they become very hard to handle. The images produced by a 400X400 array developed by Tex as Instruments for the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory consist of 160,000 elements. Since a television type display requires the images to be reproduced with a fre quency (frame rate) of 25 Hz, this means that the signals generated by single elements must be sent to the output 0

production. CCD telecameras have performed satisfactorily down to a minimum Of 1 • 10- I IUX; at IOWer levels Of illumination the effectiveness of these syst ems is limited by the amount of noise generated in the amplification cir cuits. Further limitations consist of the di fficulties in coping w ith sudden overloading and loss along t he charge packet t ransfer channels. In the larger arrays, the latter d ifficulty can mean corruption of the signal and thus of the image produced. Technology is still seeking a solution t o these pr oblems. INFRARED SYSTEMS lnfrared rays consist of electromagnetic radiation produced by the movement of atoms in any body whose temperature exceeds absolute zero (- 273°C). These rays occupy a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum in the vicinity of visible light and have a wavelength ranging from 0.75 microns (1 micron 10- 6 m) and 1000 microns. lnfr ared rays are attenuated by absorption by the molecules of gases in the atmosphere and by diffusion through suspended particles. The phenomenon of absorption is linked to the wavelength and is significant f or ce rtain va lues of this parameter and negligible for others. The mechanism of diffusion can be considered independent of wave-

Tab. B

-· MANUFACTURER

FA IRCHI L RCA G.E. T.I.

"--~

EXAMPLES OF CCD ARRAYS SPACING

No. OF ELEMENTS (Vert. X Horiz.)

488 51 2 244 490

X X X X

380 320 248 327

circuit at a frame rate of 4 MHz (4 million bits of information per second). In the case of a 1024X1024 array, which represents the ultimate goal of the research, the output f rame rate wou ld be as high as 26.2 MHz, i.e. even higher than the maximum rate at wh ich data can be extracted from a CCD array, namely 20 MHz. Despite these drawbacks, an everincreasing number of applications are being found for the solid state telecamera. Its main advantage is that it eliminates the need for an internal electronic scanning system. This allows a considerable reduction in weight and size to be achieved. A typica l CCD telecamera may w eigh as little as 340 grams and have an overall size of 50 x 65 X 95 mm. Furthermore, eliminating electron ic scanning removes a source of noise and takes with it many of the disadvantages linked to a slow response time. Other advantages of solid state devices are: robustness, low operating voltage and possibility of low-cost mass

Horiz. (mm)

Vert. (mm) 0.0178 0 0305 00350 00229

0.0305 0.0305 0.0450 0.0229

length, except for small particle sizes. The transm ission characteristics of the atmosphere at sea level as a function of wavelength are shown in f igure 3. Windows that can be used for the propagation of infrared rays exist in the 3-5 micron and 8-13 micron bands. Thermal imagers exploit the fact that the greatest emission of infrared rays by objects at ambient temperature (20°C) occurs in the 8-13 micron band. At shorter wavelengths the amount of heat rad iation emitted by sources at ambient temperature declines rapid ly. Nevertheless, a small variation in temperature corresponds to a comparatively large variation in heat radiation. In the 3-5 micron band a heat-emitting object is thus highly contrasted w ith the envir onment and this transm ission window is exploited by the sensors used in infrared missile guidance systems. Even when they had spatial and temperature resolutions suitable for military purposes, the infrared sensors that preceded the modern thermal imagers

Fig.3

Atmospheric transmissivity at sea level (percent)

3-5µm

8-13 µ,m

WAVE-LENGTH (MICRONS)

could not operate in rea l time. In particular, this was true of the infrared line scanner systems (IRLS), wh ich have found large-scale applications in aerial reconnaissance. Even though it is possible to have a real-time display of the images collected by an IRLS, this type of device will not be cons idered here. An IRLS is capable of scanning a scene only in one dimension and the movement of the aircraft is used to build up an image line by line. Furthermore, although capable of producing high quality images, this system cannot display changes of scene or the relative movements of objects. These characteristics make the IRLS systems unsuitable for ca rrying out surveillance missions during which an area must be maintained under constant observation. Missions of this kind can instead be carried out by thermal imager devices known as forward looking infrared syst ems (FLIR). The first FLIR consisted of a system based on three infrared-sensitive elements and was built by Texas Instruments in the early sixties. The device was tested under operational conditions on board a US airforce Gunship. It was followed by an improved model which used an array of 150 elements w ith a parallel type of expansion. This was the first of a series of devices used in Indochina on B-57G, AC-47 and AC-130 aircraft. A schematic representation of a typical FLIR system is shown in f igure 4. The heart of the system consists of a scanning device which, in the systems operational today, is of the mechanical type. This device has the function of sequentially sampling the radiation conveyed from the optical section, after which the latter is sent to excite a small array of infrared-sensitive detectors. In other words the scanning system has

-20()<>C. The output signals from the various individual elements are amplified, processed and displayed to the operator. The method normally used consists of exciting an array of LEDs (light emitting d iodes). The same scanning system is used to project the light radiations onto a suitable lens system, thus reconstructing the image, bit by bit. Another system consists in sending the

the task of subdividing the scene in equal portions, to collect the infrared rays emitted by the latter and to send them to the detectors, where they are transformed into electrical signals. In order to reduce the noise caused by the thermal excitation of the electrons, and thus to increase the sensitivity of the device, the array of infrared-sensitive elements is cooled down to about

Fig. 4

Diagram of a FLIR system

Direct display optical system

~ ] : : : .:::tp. Observer

•+

u.: :1 I

Opr.:ti=ca=l=in=p=u=t=s=y=s::,tem

.,.._

;:-.::-.....

.,.. -1..=---=====:!J

-rr:::

-+- ---~•r- - - - - - +- - - - ., -

l.::::J

LED

.. - -- - - - -

·n

T cJ Scanning

\:::=::/ \ I

system

Ampl ifier

Detector elements

\ I

Preamplifier Cooling system

Video output

signals to a cathode ray tube (CRT) where, after being converted, they are displayed in standard TV format. It Is therefore clear that a FLIR system must possess:

•

-----

Scanning direction

• an array of infrared • detector elements cooled down to a sufficiently low temperature; • a lens with as large an aperture as possible;

Fig. 5

Principle of DISCOID technique

Detector elements

a sufficiently fast scanning device;

• an internal pathway for the infrared rays such as to guarantee the least possible energy dispersion. Weight and size must be kept down during the design phase. These requirements can be satisfied by using different scanning techniques, some of which are already known while others are in the course of development. A different approach involves the use · of an array of sensors set up on the focal plane of the system. SCANNING TECHNIQUES FOR FLIR SYSTEMS One of the first techniques used has been called Vertical Raster Scanning with Multiplexing. The scanning system basically works in the same way as described above except that the output from the infrared-sensitive elements, instead of being fed into the LED circuits, is combined into a single video channel using the multiplexing process. That is, the signals are drawn off sequentially as the scene scrolls horizontally with an angle of less than the width of the elements. This operation is repeated until the scene has been scanned completely and the Image is displayed to the operator on the CRT. The complex optical system required to transfer the image reconstructed by the LEDs to a visualizing system is thus eliminated. The use of a CRT, which may be located at some distance from the sensor, makes for considerable installation flexibility and allows any symbols desired to be generated electronically. The elimination of the LEDs means a saving in weight and size and avoids the possible drawback of the loss of a portion of the image as a result of failures in one or more channels. The DISCOID system (Direct Scan Operating with Integrating Delays) uses

Pre-amplifiers

Delay line Video output

IIIII 7

a small array of detector elements oriented according to the direction of scansion. In this way, all the elements observe the same point in the scene at successive moments. Their output signals are amplified and then sent along a delay line by means of which they are integrated in the correct time sequence. The signal constructed in this way is amplified and sent to a cathode ray tube. This technique can be used to provide a standard television format without any need for multiplexing. Furthermore, since the signal s from all the detectors are combined into a single channel, the .only degradation that would occur in the case of one of them failing would be a general r eduction in the signal-noise ratio, while the onscreen image would remain uniform. A schematic representation of the DISCOID system is given in figure 5. A third scanning technique is the one known as Signal Processing in the Element (SPRITE). As this term indicates, the signal is proce ssed inside the detector element itself. This technique uses a special element consisting of a thin strip of intrared-sensitive material. When radiation impinges on a portion of the latter, overload current carriers are developed. After a forcing current is applied, the latter are displaced towards the output terminal. The displacement velocity depends on the material and on the size of the applied current; by varying these parameters it is possible to modify this velocity by linking it to the imagescrolling speed. The charge carriers thus all reach the output terminal together. There is thus no need to insert time-delay or OR gate circuits, since

these operations are already being carried out. inside the detector element. A sch;e.matic representation of the SPRITE system is shown in figure 6. NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR FLIR SYSTEMS Considerable efforts are currently being made to· develop thermal imaging systems in which an array of infrared elements installed on the focal plane of the system replaces the conventional scanner. The introduction of effective techniques tor transferring electric charges is fundamental to the development of these devices. Because of the large number of elements of which an array is composed, the information collected may be input only by means of a multiplexi ng process, i.e. by using shared terminal connections to which the data are sent sequentially. The solution has been identified in the use of CCD arrays which, combined with arrays of infrared elements, aUow the information contents to be re.ad off and then sent to an image display system. The use of CCD technology lays the basis for the construction of arrays which not only allow the radi ation to be detected and converted into electric signals, but also the data thus collected to be processed so as to facilitate the operator's task. Three main types of focal plane arrays have been developed by the research laboratories: • intrinsic hybrid array: an Intrinsic detector material such as mercury cadmium telluride (Hg Cd Te) is both mechanically and electrically combined with a CCD structure;

• extrinsic monolithic array: extrinsic silicon is used as the infrared-sensitive material together with intrinsic silicon for the CCDs, all mounted on the same chip;

SPRITE element

Scanning direction

• intrinsic monolithic array: 'the same type of material (usually Hg Cd Te) is used for both the infrared elements and the CCD complexes. The extrinsic monolithic type of array has the advantage of exploiting a well-known technology, although its use is restricted to very low temperature operation. The technology on which the intrinsic monolithic type of array is based is still being developed_ Furthermore, there are a number of drawbacks involved in using only one type of material. Not always does a good sensitivity to infrared rays go hand in hand with a satisfactory behaviour when the material is used in circuit components. The most suitable material for making circuit components is silicon, and this explains the interest shown in hybrid arrays. This type of array exploits stateof-the-art silicon-based circuitry and thus allows the infrared-sensitive part and signal treatment to be optimized separately. The greatest difficulty is now represented by t he need to mechanically and electronically connect two dissimilar materials. This · problem i s aggravated by the high impedance of the CCDs. It is significant that all three solutions examined involve the use of CCDs. In the case of large arrays the problem thus

arises

of the frequency

at which the signals are input. In view of these considerations infrared sensors are unlikely to become fully operational before the end of the present decade. Numerous problems remain to be solved and the well-tried electro-mechanical scanning systems will therefore dominate the scene for the next few years. Nevertheless, once full maturity has been reached, the focal plane array type of sensors will be capable of satisfying the most stringent requirements and offer the following advantages: • weight and size reduction owing to the elimination of the electro-mechanical scanning system; • enhanced resolution thanks to the use of smaller-sized elements; • enhanced sensitivity owing to the high number of detector elements and signal integration; • elimination of background and target emphasis, which can be achieved by distinguishing between fixed and moving objects; • "on-chip" signal treatment to extract significant informat ion and to reduce operator workload. PROPOSAL FOR A SYSTEM In order to carry out battlefield surveillance missions, an electro-optical system must have sufficient resolution to guarantee recognit ion at a sufficient

Fig. 6

Outpu t circuit link

Forcing cu rre nt in put

Forc ing curren t o utput

Ampli fier

distance also of small sized objects that blend in with the surrounding environ ment. Furthermore, the optical section should have a fairly large field of view in order to allow a wide area to be exp,lored and to facilitate the initial spotting of the target. The objective to be attained is a 60° x 40° field of view which, in the case of airborne systems, also guarantees excellent attitude and groundspeed indications, thus avoiding any likelihood of loss of orientation due to too narrow fields of view. On the other hand, a fairly narrow field of view is necessary to allow the target to be examined in detail. The system should thus be equipped with a zoom device, or at least with a second set of lenses that can be brought into play at the right time to give a field of view of only a few degrees. For the sake of example, it is possible to have fields of view no larger than 2.2° x 1.5°. Once these general concepts have been defined, it is necessary to decide on the type of sensor to use, choosing between conventional and infrared sensors. An LL TV system is certainly not the best choice. Even under excellent weather conditions the scene is likely to be at least partly obscured by smoke and dust, and the interesting targets will probably be camouflaged in some way. An LL TV system cannot see through smoke, nor can it detect well-camouflaged targets. Furthermore, the overload due to strong light sources (tracers, gun flashes, etc.) can damage the camera tube. Atmospheric factors have less effect on infrared systems since the wavelengths involved are about 10 times greater than those used in TV systems. A FLIR can thus guarantee round-theclock surveillance even under poor

weather conditions. It can also see through smoke screens and sparse foliage, and can easily detect targets camouflaged by means of nets and branches. Lastly, tracers, gun flashes and other bright luminous sources have absolutely no effect. Thermal imagers are thus preferable, although this does not mean that TV systems no longer have useful applications. Indeed, their relative cheapness makes them suitable for all comparatively low-performance applications. Another possible application area is represented by multi-band systems using a combination of TV and IR sensors_ This type of system represents an optimal solution, since it improves upon the performance of bot:h systems when used separately. The TV and IR images could be combined electronically to exploit the characteristics of the target in the two frequency bands and to make the task of interpretation easier. It would thus be possible to exploit the various different effects of the weather conditions. Studies carried out in Germany have shown that, under the weather conditions typical of that country, the probabili ty of detection is greater using TV systems during the spring and summer months, while infrared systems are more effective in winter.. So far cost and weight have been obstacles to the development of multiband systems. The values of these two parameters have been increased by the need to have separate optical and stabilization sections. In order to be cost-effective, therefore, a multiband system would have to have common optical elements and a single stabilization system. The construction of common optical elements entails the use of materials with good transmissivity.

Tab.C

,,,,

PROBABILITY OF REMAINING ON TARGET '

PROBABILITY LEVEL

HEIGHT (m)

460 300 60

100% 100% 1Q0%

properties in both the visible and infrared bands. The number of materials that could satisfy these requirements is extremely small. Moreover, nearly all of them would be unsatisfactory in terms of robustness and resistance to environ mental agents. Special protective paints can, however, be used to improve this situation, although this does lead to a reduction in transm issiv ity, particularly in the visible part of the s pectrum. After the optical section has been passed, the visib le waveleng ths could be separated from the IR wavelengths by using a spectral separator to direct each of the two types of radiation towards the appropriate sensor. This type of operation should not be too difficult to carry out since some spectral separators tested (based on germanium, zinc and selenium) have displayed a capability of allowing more than 90% of radiation in the 8-13 Âľm band to pass through, and of reflecting more than 95% of visible light. The problem of sensor stabilization, i.e. of the ir isolation from the movements of the vehicle, can be solved using two different techniques. In '!he first of these the optical sensors are mounted on a gyrostable p latform. The second uses fixed sensors and a gyrostable mirror that enables the system to be aimed. The fi rst technique allows greater accuracy, but has the d rawback of being heavier and bulkier. The use of a gyrostable mirror thus seems to be the most preferable solution to adopt in the case of multispectral systems.

PROPOSAL FOR AN AIRCRAFT In a real-life scenario, surveillance act ivity carried out by helicopters operati ng in the "pop-up" mode would, in all likelihood, be limited to observation from positions on their own s ide of the FEBA, if possible beyond missile and AA gun range. Their detection capability may be adeguate even with these limitations, although the ir identification capacity wou ld be much reduced . Existing FLIR can detect a target the size of a tank up to a range of 5-8 Km, although they will not allow the recogni t ion (i.e. the identi fication) of any type of vehicle at a distance of more than 2-3 Km. The availability of zoom systems or the use of focal plane arrays would allow the operator to identify the target at greater ranges. In this case, however,

JOO% 98% 45%

5 KM

2 KM

.,VERTICAL

" -

99% 85% 22%

it would be necessary to take into account the likelihood of natural or artificial objects b locking the line of sight, thus reducing the system's capability. The probability of having an uninterrupted line of sight in flat country in Europe is shown in table C. It must also be borne in mind that "pop-up" manoeuvres can reduce ground concealment effects only at the cost of a significant increase in altitude and thus of the aircraft's vulnerability. The use of piloted high-performance aircraft on battlefield surveillance missions would be extremely risky owing to the ef fectiveness of modern anti-aircraft systems. Low-level, high-speed operation wou ld reduce vulnerability but inevitab ly also restrict the f ield of observation. Furthermore, the high speed would also leave the operator very little t ime tor real-time image analysis. Furthermore, under these condit ions, the image would be d istorted by the movement, and the operator would quickly become exhausted trying to extract the information. These drawbacks do not apply t o film exposed during flight and analysed on the ground. However, wh ile completely valid, the information obtained in this way would lack the immediacy of real-time systems. Piloted aircraft would thus not appear to be suitable for battlefield surveillance using elect.r o optical sensors. This si tuation could be changed by introducing sensors capable of allowing an aircraft to operate deep on its own side of the FEBA. For the time being, however, the only system wh ich would allow this to be done seems to be synthetic-aperture radar. The studies and experiments carried out on remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) have shown that this type of aircraft have excellent survivability in the battle area by virtue of their small size and their small equivalent radar section, to which a typical value of 0.1 m 2 is assigned. Moreover, it is much easier to accept the loss of such an aircraft than of a piloted one. These characteristics allow RPVs to operate at fairly high altitudes so as to reduce ground concealment effects and to extend the observable area. Another factor to be considered is their great fuel capacity, which gives them an operating time of even more than 3 hours at a time. The main limitation of RPVs is their necessarily small payload. The introduction of miniaturized sold-state sensors could thus further

enhance the already noteworthy capabilities of the equipment described above. CONCLUSIONS Over the next decade, electro-optical systems are bound to play an increas ingly important role in battlefield surveillance. Present-day micro-wave sensors do not have a high enough resolution to allow the majority of tactical targets to be identified and are also vulnerable to electronic counter-measures. The need for round-the-clock operation has led to the development of infra red LL TV systems. Despite the increasing use being made of CCD telecameras, TV systems will probably be rep laced by thermal imagers. The latter are capable of oper~ting in total darkness and can see through smoke, haze and camouflage systems. The introduct ion of sensors constructed using arrays of infrared-sensitive elements mounted on the system's focal plane is likely to further enhance their performance. Even if surveillance missions can be accomplished in an optimal fashion using infrared devices operating in the 8-13 Âľm band, systems using combined TV and IR sensors have also proved to be valid. Since all targets have welldefined characteristics in both the visible and the IR portion of the spectrum which can be used for detecting them, an integrated system is more effective than a TV or IR system on its own. The use of a stabilization system and common optical elements would allow such a system to be reduced to a weight and size suitable for installation in an aircraft. In view of the performance required, RPVs would seem to be the best type of aircraft on which to mount electro-optical systems for the purposes of battlefield surveillance. Basilio Di Martino

AIRBORNE ELECTRO - OPTICAL SYSTEMS 49

In spite of the favorable comments expressed by foreign representatives, according to whom the ltal.an languag e has a rich and melodious vocabulary, we do quite often encounter difficulties when called upon to translate English terms for which there is no similarly effective word in Italian. • Certain English words and expressions. the real meaning of which we do perceive, have no satisfactory counterpart in our language, and thus. we must often use long and complicated sentences to translate terms which in English are quite simple and clear in meaning. How to tra nslate, in the same terse manner, terms such as teen-ager, sponsor, earlytimes or fast-food? The difficulty is evident to the point that. in the cases mentioned, people have resorted to using the En glish terms, which are by now un iversally accepted. In our specific professional field. this problem is particularly apparent whenever we are called upon to find the Italian equivalents of intelligence and information . We know very well, because the concept is quite clear to each of us. that the "Intelligence Division" and the "Information Division" of a NATO Headquarters are two totally different Agencies because their respec-

PUBLIC INFORMATION

•

Unknown quantity? tive areas of interest are totally different. But the inflexability of our language demands that we use one term for both concepts, albeit with a subtle distinction. i.e. using the singular in one case and the plural in the other one. We thus call "Ufficio lnformazioni" the Intelligence Division, and "Ufficio lnformazione" t he Information Division. A subtle distinction, which however does not convey the true and deep difference between the two terms. 50

Leaving aside any cons ideration of etymology or . semantics, which mig ht suggest interesting subjects for meditation, there is a basic distinction in that those who operate in the field of "Intelligence" conduct a menta l activity (from Lat.: "lntelligentia") designed to construct an overall situation out of items of information that have been collected in a deta iled and "i ntelligent" manner and may or may not be coordina ted but can be compared to the pieces of a mosa ic or, in more modern term:::;, ci pu a le . Those who work with "lnfor-· mation", however (Lat. "lnformatio") are chiefly interested in disseminating items of information to the larg e public. In fact, the latter activity has introduced the term "Public:. and is more completely and properly called "Public Information". It is this very Branch that we propose to address in the following article. in which we sha ll try to highlight NATO policies as opposed to Nationa l ones, and em phasize those points which identify implementing procedures, means and above all fun ctions. Even though NATO's official languages are Engl ish and French, it is from English that military terminology has been mostly derived ever since the establishment of the Alliance . An example is the great number of short titles of clearly Eng lish, or even US, origi n, that are comm only used in written and verbal communications among the representatives of the 16 All ied Countries. Indeed, terms

taken from the US military vocabulary have become common usage. Public Information, however, is somehow an exception. The Defence In formation School of Fort Harrison, Indiana, defines its quite imposing sub ject matter as " Public Affairs", and the officers dealing with it at the various levels as PAOs (Public Affairs Officers) . Within NATO, however, the commonly used term is Public Information, and the people who dea l with it at the various levels are called Public Information Officers, or PIOs. At the National level, the term "Ufficio lnformazione Pu bblica" is generally replaced by the more general term of "Ufficio Stampa", or Press Bureau, which certainly does not properly highlight the many activities conducted therein. To rema in within NATO, and more specifically within Allied Command in Europe (ACE). this matter has been addressed in various Directives of the 95 Series, AD 95-1 providing a clear defin ition of the term: "Pub lic Information is the command function of communicating information about NATO in general. and about AC E in particular, to the public. The function includes, but is not limited to, peacetime and wartime policy planning, research and evaluation, media relations, briefing of visitors groups, and the preparation of information material. The term specifically excludes activity in the domain of psychological operations". A self-explanatory comprehensive statement in which two points stand out: • Public Information is a com mand function, and • the term specifically excludes activity in the domain of psychological operations. ACE Directive 95-1 also defines exactly the role of the Chief, Public Information (CPI) . He is "responsible for planning and implementing a PI progra mme for his Commander. Th e CPI is the spokesman for his Commander and is his command's officia l outlet for PI".

PUBLIC INFORMATION IN PEACETIME

When addressing the sub ject of Public Information within NATO, lt is necessary to establish a command level as a reference point, and to review in detai l those activities that are cond ucted at that level in peacetime. Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH) is an excellent example in this respect, because : • LANDSOUTH is a NATO Command where the nat ional component is quite dominant (approx. 95%) and inclu des the highest ranking command positions, i.e. a four star Commander and a two star Ch ief of Staff. • because most of the field army (the three Corps, the NE Military Region and the Army ADA Command) is under COMLANDSOUTH's operational con trol, the handling of Public Information matters necessarily involves contacts with the parallel national organizations, i.e. the Italian "Uffici Stampa ". • as a "Land" Headquarters, LANDSOUTH is a natural link between the NATO Military organ ization in the Southern European Region and the National Authorities. and especia lly with the Public Information Agencies at t he Defense General Staff and the Army Gen eral Staff. The general responsibilities of a PI organization (whether Division or Branch) within NATO can be summarized into two essential points as follows (AD 95-1): • to keep t he public informed about ACE and issues/developments relevant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEU R's) mission. • to keep commanders aware of media and public opin ions trends on defence issues. To meet the above requirements, the following concepts must be constantly kept in mind, and .in fact con stitute a definite policy: • the public must be kept informed to the greatest possible ex51

PUBLI( AFFAIRS -... .

'HANDBOOK

DIRECTORY FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS

ANNUAIRE POUR LES OFFICIERS D'INFORMATION

Public Affairs Handbook. In the U.S., public information is a quite imposing matter which is studied at the Defence Information School of Fort Harrison, Indiana.

t ent, except for the restri ctions demanded by security requirements. • Public Information is an essential element of deterrence as well as a command function. • the Pio, as a specialist, must be granted direct and immediate access to the Commander, to whom he is to provide advice on public information matters. • strict coordination is essential between Publ ic Information and the other operationa l Agencies of the HO. Any PI activity undertaken within ACE must be in line with NATO's political attitudes and the prerogatives of NATO's member Countries.

The Officers dealing with the function of Public Information at the various command levels of ACE (Allied Command Europe) are called "Public Information Officers".

The range of activities performed on a routine basis within the LANDSOUTH PI Branch includes: • Reviewing some ten dailies and 6-7 period icals. • Maintai ni ng biographies and offic ial photos of NATO Authorities. • Pictoria l services for special events and those associated w ith the preparation of personnel identifica tion document s. • Reviewing milit ary magazines, and ma intaining a retrieva l system. • Prepa ring and dissem inating NATO information material. • Organizing press meetings, interviews and press services.

• Issuing press communiques on special events such as visits, celebrations, changes of comJ mand and anniversaries . • Preparing a bimonthly press review . • Maint aining operational PI records (OPORDERS and other planning documents) . Additionally, the LANDSOUTH PI Branch promotes collateral activities such as : • Editing a local bimonthly periodica l, NATO a Verona. • Producing and issuing commemorative postcards . • Printung and issu ing promotion al literature, calendars and miscellaneous publicat ions.

• Occasionally, organizing Art Exhibitions. In the face of the above tasks, the current strenght of the Branch is quite moelest indeed, as it consists only of: • one· Officer, the PI Officer; • one NCO photographer. Thus. administrative, tasks such a record-keeping, filing and typing, must necessarily be performed by the clerical personnel of the PI Branch's parent Division, i.e. the office of the Secretary for Staff. However, the existence· of a peacetime establishment, albeit limited, involves undeniable advantages, such as: • The exact organizational connotation of the Branch staff, and thus a c lear definition of responsibilities (which, inter alia, allows the proper maintenance of personnel records). • The irrenounceable availability in peacetime of an, albeit skeleton, organization on which to build the· larger organization (Division) scheduled for an emergency. Unfortunately, the above configuration does not apply at assigned~headquarters level (i.e. at Corps level). where the establishment does not envisage any Press Office an::J where. consequently, neither manning nor equipment and supply levels are established in real terms, nor are the associated tasks set forth officially. This, as we shall see further on, is no minor problem whenever the subject of "Public Information in an emergency" is to be addressed, a theme that is often discussed and is highly considered within NATO. The datailed tasks and activities to be performed during recurring NATO Exercises such as WINTEX, ABLE ARCHER, DENSE CROP, DISPLAY DETERMINATION etc., will be addressed separately, since these Exercises involve special situations that do not apply in peacetime. but are more similar to those anticipated for wartime.

PUBLIC INFORMATION IN AN EMERGENCY

This matter is dea lt with in depth by ACE Directive 95-3, wh ich considers not only hostilities, but also periods of crisis and of tension, i.e. the more or less extended period between peacetime and wartime. While AD 95-3 addresses this matter in great detail, for reasons of convenience we shall limit our review to aspects of primary interest. In an emergency, PI tasks and functions remain essentially unchanged except that a greater emphasis must be placed on security, and procedures must be standardized. In wartime, greater and more detailed efforts will be required to gain public op inion support, a decisive factor for deterrence. A well informed public whose attitudes are favorable to NATO will facilitate the conduct of military operations. Obviously, the capabilities of PI Agencies will be increased in terms of both numbers and quality and scope. Appropriate intera llied organizations known as "Allied Press and Information Centers" (APICs) wil l be established in the Combat Zone as focal po ints for media representatives detached there as war correspondents. The function and standard composition of an APIC are described in detail by AD 95-3, which also includes at which level of command those APICs should be established. APICs are field organizations, equipped with transportation, communications and logistics equipment. which are capable of providing support, advice and information to mediareps, including foreign representatives, to assist them in the performance of their mission. APICs are, in any case, multinational organization which should include Host Nation PI representative as well as those from NATO. It is clearly stated that NATO and National Officers are to alternate in the role of APIC Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs.

Once all augmentees envisaged by the TO wartime establishment have arrived, sufficient personnel will be available to set up all planned APICs in the Combat Zone. This, however, is not true for LANDSOUTH'S Host Nation Subordinates. i.e. the Corps. Bacause of the lack of an established peacetime and wartime PI programs. planners must insert a number of "question marks" regarding the standard structure of the APICs. This highlights the urgent requirement for the peacetime organization of Corps-level Press Bureaus to be defined even if on a skeleton basis - to serve as basis for developing the emergency PI organization requirements to include personnel, equipment and vehicles. Th is evident deficiency currently causes appreciable problems in terms of operational planning, since Annex "P", Public Information, to LANDSOUTH OPLAN is not matched (nor could it be matched, given the existing "organization void") by a correspondent document at Corps level. As an example of the appreciable difficu lties being encountered when addressing these problems, consider the dilemma involved in the appointment of the APIC Chief. Who should be appointed to this position? A "reserve" Officer who will report to Hq. LANDSOUTH when the time comes - probably with little or no experience, or the Press Officer of the Corps, who is physically there, and is well trained in peacetime, but cannot be officially considered since his position does not exist in the official organization. This is not a new problem, but it requires prompt solution since inclusion of the Press Officer in the official establish ment would not only constitute a deserved recognition for the people concerned (who currently perform PI activities almost ... on the sly). but would also provide the basis for the required emergency build-up. The above action would also fil l a gap between the NATO and the National organizations, 53

a gap wh ich, for the previously stated reasons, is most acutely felt at LANDSOUTH .

PUBLIC INFORMATION DURING EXERCISES

From a PI point of view, recurri ng NATO Exercises are of two types, as follows: • Passive policy Exercises; • Active policy Exercises. To the passive policy category belong all those exercises that are conducted essentially on a CP basis, with min imal or no live participation. Th ese Exercises, which are identified by generally recurring nicknames, are conducted in accordance with an established cycle and are designed to test and improve operational plans. There are no press releases, and only general information may be released to the mediareps on the conduct of the Exercise in accordance with SACEUR's guidance. In the above Exercises Public Information plays a totally simulated role,, i.e. hypotetical incidents arising from the attitude of the media, and thus of the public, are developed by successive steps in accordance with the progress of military operations and with the basic political scenario within whi ch operations take place. Imagi nation plays a major role in th is process, albeit not to the extent of ignoring the real status ')f the operations involved . The· exchange of information with in the higher NATO Headqua rters (SHAPE and AFSOUTH) follows standard procedures and is played by means of periodical messages P(ISITREPs) designed to artificially create successive situations . In th is Exercises, HO. LANDSOUTH operates in conjunction with FIVEATAF, and the PI Cell is set up at the LANDSOUTH/ FIVEATAF Operational Hq. The PI Cells of assigned HOs, however, are not exercised, and message flow stops at Theater Command level: a pity indeed, because these Exercises would provide· an excellent opportun ity for testing the opera-

tion of APICs, even though not on a live basis. Exercises of this type are valuable tools for testing the effectiveness of the· PI chain of command and for exercising the essential coordination between the PI Branch and the other operational Cells of the HO, incl uding the Distaff. During active policy Exercises, however, the· presence of mediareps is not only accepted, but is invited. During Exercises of this type, the Units deployed in the field play a major role and their train ing activities are shown to the mediareps for the latter to write reports about. It's during activities of th is type that internationa l cooperation among the NATO member Countries is highlighted . The presence of Allied forces (external reinforcements) operating in the nationa l territory provides a demonstration of the solidarity and unity of purpose of the NATO Nations. DISPLAY DETE RMINATION is the best known of these Exercises. It is conducted in North-

ern Italy with pa rtici pation of US and PO forces along side Italian Nationa l Units. The very name "Display Determination" indicates that the activities involved must be widely publicized and indeed participation by highly qua lified media representatives has always been large. Simi lar policies are applicable in the case of Exercises involving the participation of AMF(L), again in view of the· intern ational character of this training. The wartime PI organization is tested during the above Exercises by establishing one APIC in the vicin ity of the areas where sig nificant demonstrations are conducted. The APIC is obviously set up with peaceti me personnel and facilities, augmented as required. The Press Officers of NE Military Region, the three Corps, Fiveataf, and those of incoming

Some of the officials interviewed during the Display Determination's press conference.

Allied Units participate in the APIC, thus provid ing an opportunity for testing the effective-· ness and capacity of the PI organization to ensure support, advice and hospitality to the numerous mediareps accredited to attend significant phases of the Exercise. The media representatives "accrediting system" is also tested in accordance with the provis ions of ACE Directive 95-2. Accreditation is "the recognition which makes a Mediarep eligible· for available· ACE facilities and assistance". In periods of tension and hostil ities, this prerogative is reserved to SACEUR ·and the Ma jor Subordinate Commanders (i.e. : CINCSOUTH). but AD 95-2 states that during Exercises involving the establishment of an APIC, the latter will promote a system for accrediting mediareps. Th is policy was implemented during DISPLAY DETERMINATION by prepari ng appropriate "cards" which will remain va lid also during normal peacetime activities. CONCLUSIONS Defining Public Information as "unknown" in the heading of this article was probably excessively pessimistic. A pessimism that may be somewhat attenuated by the presence of a question mark. In fact, when I look at the entire matter with the eyes of a NATO Officer, I real ize that to define it as "unknown" is going too far, since one cannot honestly say that Public Information is a totally unknown activity. Far from this. PI is held in a very high consideration at all NATO Commands, whi.ch is evidenced by the wealth of personnel and equipment it commands, especially at SHAPE and at AFSOUTH . A visit to the large PI Offices of those HOs wi ll g ive an exact idea of what this activity represents wherever it s held in high appreciation . The· adjective used in the heading may acquire a more real

meaning if the· matter is considered with the eyes of an Italian Army Officer, because the latter will certainly realize the gap that exists between the NATO PI organization and its Italian national counterpa rt. This shou ld not surprise anyone, because there are other activ it ies that are conducted according to different standards at NATO and at National level, albeit without engendering too many difficulties. Where PI is concerned, however, the deficiencies are perhaps more evident, and sometimes evident to the point that reducing, if not filling, the gaps becomes a necessity. By this paper which, far from being exhaustive, is simply intended to highlight the main points of NATO policies, I have wanted, above all , to cal l the attention of those· professiona ls who, at the nationa l level, are interested in, or even have merely the curiosity of learning how things are done with in the Alliance.

Some reporters being informed by the Public Information Officer of LANDSOUTH before the last exercises of Display Determination 84.

Should then, a comparison with what is being done at the National level, highlight the existence of discrepancies, so much the better, since th is could stir up some· activity and make people conscious of the vast problems involved . NATO Di rectives are clear and exhaustive because they provide accurate and unequivocal indications. It is hoped that this summary of their main points may promote an interesting dialogue wh ich could produce undoubted advantages t owards t he best performance of a task which req uires professional efficiency, dedication, enthusiasm and faith . Marcello Colaprisco

55 \,

tangram integrated logistic system In the modern military field the logistic functions must be really mobile, not only movable ones. These functions must be operative immediately after arriving in site by the use of their own means only. The changing of position must be equally easy and quick The towing vehicle must assure all the auxiliary functions: from the armoured personnel transportation to the wounded people gathering, from the supplying of water, fueL compressed air to power and drive. TILOS provides an answer to these needs of mobility, autonomy and operative flexibility. 'I'ILOS is formed by two vehicles: the towed unit, housing the main logistic function, and the towing vehicle, containing the auxiliary functions, b esides the main towing service.

TILOS may be thus employed for instance, but not only, as: D communications/ comman,d/control post 0 logistics for electronics and missile -systems D surveillance D field hospital D NBC center D mobile air b ase D mobile hydrofoils base D mobile system for police control 0 mobile workshop.

'I'ILOS is the real answer to the needs of logistics in tactical area.

Via Corsica, 19 - 16129 Genoa/Italy

Phone: 10/ 53 1101 (10 lines) - Telex: 57 1250

THE ROYAL ITALIAN ARMY 1919 - 1933

The victorious conclusion of the First World War !Eaves t he Army to face new important problems of diffi cult solution. Above all, there is t he need to demobilize the enormous war apparatus and facilitate, where possible without traumatic results, the reentry of millions of men into civil life and the conversion of the prosperous war industries into peacetime activities. The complexi ty of the political events in the first postwar years (suffice it to recall that in the first three years alone there were five different governments without the achievement of a balanced basis fo r ruling the country) certainly does not faci litate the work of the mi litary world which Âˇs. in addition, not always in agreement on the solutions to be adopted. Almost four million men under arms are, however, too heavy a burden for the national fi nances requiring drastic reductions in numbers and slowdowns sometimes almost to a standstill, also in the supplies and modernization of arms. Thus, demobilization is carried out despite the rea lization that definite areas of discontent are forming in the country. In particular, it appears difficult to solve the problem represented by the regu lar officers who are too numerous for the needs of a peacetime Army. The steps taken are not always entirely suitable and provoke spreading dissatisfaction and gradually increasing outspoken react ions. If to the main problems of demobilization are added the uneasiness resulting from the demonstrations - sometimes even violent - of patriotic fe rvour, especially the patriotism in Fiume, which

found the military divided over the issue, the diffi~11lt <iflfinition of a future policy for the Armed Forces and the aggravating situation of the political ideologies which were contrasting, it is possible to have some idea of the delicate moment in which the military institution found itself.

ITALIAN

MILITARY

UNIFORMS

The change in political regime which took place in 1924 finally forces the need for a different psychological order for the military world. Wholehearted loyalty to the Crown now has to be reconci led with the new political situation and once the republican tendencies are abandoned, an agreement is achieved with the monarchy. The new deal is based on openly nationalistic and expansionistic principles and to a certain degree gives prominence to the Armed Forces which are considered an indispensable means to reach the goals set. However, theÂˇ traditional inadequacy of financial allocations is once again the case with the result that there is an almost total halt to the process of modernizing equipment and means. In fact, the innovations in the field of arms are limited to individual light weapons (despite this. the 1891 model rifle is still confirmed and in use) and to the inclusion in theÂˇ artillery armament of items captured from the enemy. It is true that the first tank units are formed but these, too, are p rovided with tanks which had seen service during the war. Train ing is also restricted in quality on account of lack of funds, for the troops called to conscription were often reduced in number and not all those available were called up. Nevertheless, the Army undertakes gradual changes, not all of them positive, and new systems which slowly develop during the '30s. It can be stated, however, that little or nothing is effected to modernize the apparatus of 1918 and it is found preferable to proceed with merely formal alterations.

In November 1919 the organization of the .A rmy includes 5 commands nominated Armies, 15 Army Corps. 30 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions. 1 grenadier brigade. 53 infantry brigades. 6 "bersaglieri" brigades. 4 "alpini" brigades, 6 cavalry brigades. 15 artillery and 7 carabinie.ri brigades, with an total force of 210,000 men. Military service

is for 12 months. A lready in April 1920 in order to effect savings the averall force is reduced to 175,000 men with a conscription period of only eight months. However, in March 1926 there is a change in tendency in that while there is a large reduction in commands and units, there is an increase in the overall force to 250,000 men.

1921 - Major-General, in off duty uniform. The blue velvet collar with the gilt stars. the shoulder-straps with silver piping and the stripes on the trousers are distinguishing marks of the general officers. This particular uniform which is worn oft duty is kept only tor a brief period.

1921 - Captain of the "Lancieri di Montebello" Regiment, in service uniform with overcoat. The overcoat in very bright blue and the cloak of the same colour are worn by officers of mounted units only.

Various organizational measures are taken and, funds permitting, efforts made to increase the d egree of mechanization and the number of vehicles. The wartime uniform cohtinues to rem ain in use in th e first postwar years. Thus. apart from some ch anges limited

1923 - Grenadiers' Captain, in full uniform. The trouser stripes have been adopted recently: each stripe of grey-green silk ribbon is divided by a central stripe of the characteristic colour of the corps or service.

1923 - Sergeant of the 151st "SassariÂť Infantry Regiment, in full uniform. The new pockets begin to be seen on the tunics o f NCOs and soldiers. while the buttons are stil! h idden from view.

1924 - Warrant Officer of the Engineers, in full uniform. The epaulettes worn by the three ranks of Warrant Officers in full uniform are typical: in black cloth, with piping of the characteristic colour, they bear the embroidered badge of the corps or service and rank insignia.

1925 - Bugler of the "Piemonte Reale" Regiment, in full uniform. After the World War the first four regiments, the Dragoons, resume wearing the characteristic helmet of Risorgimento pattern.

to details, officers, I\COs and soldiers are dressed in the uniforms worn in t he trenches, rather simply cut and in rough cloth. All ornaments are totally ignored even in fu ll uniform. However, despite th e" unfavourable attitude of some political part ies, a winning army cannot exist only with a p lain fie ld uniform in view of the pressing need to bring military clothing on to the same level as that of civilians better and smarter. Thus, in 1923 all uniforms are modified and in particulcr for officers the quality of the material is improved and the piping and the ornaments increased especially for ceremonial and for offduty dresses. In this way we see the return of coloured collars, shoulderstraps wit h piping in the colour of the regiment. corps or special unit; capes and overcoats are much smarter and footwear better-looking and more com fortab le.

1926 - Lieutenant, Medical Corps, in full uniform. Epaulettes with a fringe are in use, replacing the shoulder-straps of plaited braid worn in preceding years. The trouser stripes are in black cloth with central piping of the characteristic colour. It should be noted that officers of non-Combatant corps do not wear the cross-belt recently adopted.

1924 - Alpine soldier, in service uniform. The Alpines' boots which are fitted with special nails, are left in hide colour, since they are only greased and not blackened.

Badges are no longer embroidered in grey-green and black thread but once again glitter in silver and gold. In particular, the fol lowing points deserve special mention: • generals reinstate the traait ional silver "greca" (silver zigza g pattern •embroidery) and are distinguished now by a blue velvet collar with gilt stars: • special grey-green epaulettes are worn with the full uniform. These epaulettes, with piping in the characteristic colour, bear a design of Savov kno ts worked in silver or gold metal thread, accordin g to the unit;

• all ranks have on the tunic four outside pockets with a rectangular flap. Th e pockets have a double vertical pleat in th e centre In addition to th e f lap; • further, all ranks when on duty, in full uniform or in duty dress are to wear a helmet bearing a distincti ve metal badge in either yellow or white metal. The only exceptions to this regulation are the special units since these wear their characteristic headgear which is confirmed or reallowed {"bersaglieri" hat. artillery kepi, alpine hat, etc.); • officers are once again to carry the traditional sword and there are no changes in its pattern nor of the swordk not. The year 1926 sees the end or the system of badges which was introduced in 1915 and the reinstatement of the prewar badges worn on th e shoulderstraps. In ful l uniform, officers now wear the traditional type of metal epaulettes with a fringe, in gold or in silver accord ing to th e regiment or corps to which th ey belong, in place of the epaulettes with the Savoy knots; combatan t regiments or corps wear a cross-belt with a richly ornate cartridge-box. Troops are also to wear. in full uniform, a metal ornament on th e shoulder strap. In 1927. in addition to various measures dealing with details, a regu lation is set out for the uniform of the Royal Carabiniers. Only in July of 1931 a detailed regulation on the uniforms for officers

1932 - Supply Corps soldier, in fatig ue dress. The wearing of grey-green forag e-cap and gre y coarse cfoth overafls is a recent institution and represents an improvement, much more practicaf, particufarly in the summer.

1931 - Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry, in service uniform with "Spencer". The spencer, an elegant black jacket edged with astrakhan fur which dates back to the Risorgin:ento, is reinstated tor officers, but is not compufsory.

of oil

the Arm y

is published

and this is without doubt one of th e most exhaus tive publications ever issued by the General Staff. In fact, while all the previous still valid orders issued as notes or circulars are finally collated and assem bled. numerous completely new changes are introduced. It should be noted that the tunic worn by all ranks maintains the buttonhole hidden from view by a fly, while shoulder-straps are fixed by metal buttons, the buttons often being burnished. The trousers worn by officers in this period have double black cloth stripes. divided by piping in the characteri s tic colour. which replace the dark grey silk braid with central piping in the colour of the regiment or corps. The gradual evolution of the uniforms is slow but continuous: towards th e end of the period under consideration it is decided to show th e buttons of the tunic, maintaining the gold and silver metal. Five large buttons are set on the front and a tot al of 6 small buttons on th e shoulder-straps and th e pockets. The overall appearance is now much smarter than that of eight years before and this improvement is further enhanced by the decision. in June 1924, 10 adopt a lightweight twill cloth of lighter shade for officers and NCOs in place of the heavy cloth for the troops.

Valerio Gibellini

848B

92F

Cal. 9 mm short

Cal. 9 mm Parabellum

TECHNICAL

DATA

"TILOS" INTEGRAiED LOGISTIC SYSTEM Geneva's TANGRAM, which has been operating in logistics for 60 years, has presented an interesting systems, TILOS (Tangram Integrated Logistic System), designed and developed to provide a new solution to the logistic problems of the battle area. TILOS is a mobile armour-plated modular system, consisting of an "intelligent" towing vehicle (VTL) and a towed unit (TU) - equipped with independent power generato's - which can contain, for example, a C3 centre, a hospital, a fi e·ld kitchen, or personnel. Th e VTL and TU are an "integrated" system which permits to have mobile and independent logistic components, with cross-country capabilities and a good on-road speed, easily connectible with other similar units, which can be operational within a few minutes after their arrival in the employment area. The VTL has the capacity of a standard shelter, and car transpo rt up to 16 persons or contain any type of electronic equipment. The TU can be completely equipped to meet any requirement. and delivered in the size required by the purchaser. The most significant specifications of the system are the following :

VTL TOWING VEHICLE

TU TOWED UNIT

•

Body structure in aluminum alloy.

•

Body in aluminum alloy.

4 wheel drive.

•

Length, width and height as required.

•

Adequate power.

•

Spacious one-room interior.

• Hydraulic suspensions, individually adjustable; leveling system.

• -

Size: length: 6.14 m; width: 2.45 m; height: 2.41 m.

•

Independent power generator.

•

Large back port.

COLT'S NEW ASSAULT RIFLES The Colt Firearms Division has introduced - in the series of its infantry assault rifles - new models derived by the well es tabl ished M 16 A 2. They are the 723 M 16 A 2 Carbine and 733 M 16 A 2 Commando, with a barrel length of 370 mm and 290 mm respectively. The ney line is ccmpleted by a M 16 A 2 HBAR. with a so-called "heavy" barrel, which will be employed as a submachine gun, with a bipod; total weight: 4.58 kg.

TECHNICAL

THE EMS SYSTEM The AM General Division of the LTV Aerospace and Defence Company has produced the EMS System (Enhanced Mobility System) which could be applied on the 5 t trucks, series M 939, in sP.rvice with the U.S, Army. The EMS is a centralized device for tyre pressure control.' which can operate with the vehicle in movement. The system permits to increase or decrease the tyre pressure - thus facil itating movement over sand, mud or snow - through a dashboard-located

DATA

control. The driver can select four different types of pressure: 1.4 aim fo r mud, sand or snow: 2.1 atm for cross-country; 5.2 aim for fast driving on road; 0.7 atm for emergency conditions. ThA rAs11 lt is a rnpid adjustment to the conditions of the terrain, the capability of towing artillery pieces, a longer life for the vehicle, low operating and maintenance costs, higher con tort for personnel, greater safety in the transport of sensitive material. Other elements offered within the EMS system are high-flotation radial tyres, special

wheels and self-b locking differential gear. The M 939 series has a 5-year automatic transmission and a large cab for 3 persons. All models are standard as regards cab, engine, fram e, brakes and electric components. The M 939 line includes the following options: cargo, troop carrier, recovery, dumper, ar:illery tractor, expansible structure type. In 1984, AM General has been awarded a 262 million dollars contract, for the production of 4,186 M 939s in all their various versions.

It can be used as antipersonnel grenade-thrower up to a dis tance of 400 m and can also ti re antitank bombs.

The FAMAS has been initially distributed to infa1try, paratroops and special units.

THE NEW "FAMAS" ASSAULT RIFLE CAL. 5.56 The French Army has recently adopted a new assault ri fle, which employs NATO ammunition cal. 5.56, The new weapon is currently being distributed to the units. The FAMAS rifle has been designed by GIAT to meet the French Chiefs of Staff Committee's request for a new generation ind ividual weapon that could replace the automatic rifles and submachine guns now in service, relatively light-weight, with an effective range of up to 300 m, which could also be used as grenade-thrower. The 5.56 calibre, amply available and standardized within NATO, was considered the most appropriate for this type of weapon. Th e FAMAS is fed by a 25-round magazine, has a very limited size, is easy to handle and wel l balanced.

TECHNICAL

DATA

FIAT 6640 G AMPHIBIOUS TRUCK_ The FIAT 6640 G is an amphibious truck designed for rescue operations in flood or earthquake-damaged areas, but it can be employed in operations in swamps and mashes. Its on-road speed is approximately 700 km/h. Its excellent cross -coutry performance is ensured by the independent suspensions, the high power engine, and the low specific pressure on the ground. Afloat. the vehicle can be· pushed in all directions (360°) by a jet system, and can reach the speed of 11 km/h. Thanks to the absence of propellers in the propulsion system, it is possible to carry out rescue operations without safety risks. The flat-bottomed hull makes navigation possible also on low depths, with weeds or plants. The cab sits three persons, while the rea r tray can carry a crew of 14 men and ½ t of materiel. The bridge that runs around the hull facil itates the recovery and loading operations. Electric bilge-pumps ensure the evacua tion of the water accidentally penetrated inside. On the hull there are attachments and rings for towing other craft. On the rea r, a small 0.7 t/m crane and a 4.5 winch can be installed. SPECIFICATIONS • • •

Crew: 17 men. Payload: 2,000 kg. Weight, loaded: 8.450 kg.

___

------·--- _..__ I

- --·-·--

• Max speed, on-road: 100 km/h. • Max speed, on water: 11 km/h. • Max gradient: 60%. • Max transverse inclination: 30%. • Turning circle: 7.5 m. • Range (at ¾ max speed): 600 km. • Engine: Fiat 8062, supercharged with aftercooling, six-cilinder, 5.499 litre diesel, water-cooled. • Gearbox: automatic TX 100, with 3 forward and 1 reverse gears.

• Front and rear axles: simple reduction, with epicyclic reducer at the hubs. Front and rear d ifferential gears can be blocked. • Propulsion on water: centrifugal pump-jet, which can be oriented over 360° from the driver's seat, through an hydrostatic control. • Fuel tank: 1801. • Additional equipment (on request): 0.7 t/m loading crane, 4,500 kg double purchase Capstan type winch.

If reliability becomes dimension , if even the smallest risk has to be controlled as to conduct tasks safely, then the new 40-10 WM of lveco shows what it's made of. Innovative engineering, progressive production technology and relentless test procedures - more than 2 million test-kilometers under tough conditions - are the basis for peak performance and reliability of the new 40-10 WM of lveco. Its powerful 100 PS Turbo diesel engine with direct injection, high comfort even cross country and its robust chassis permit the 40-10 WM to pass through all types of terrain, to reach his destination anywhere. As a carriervehicle for weapons, for command and communications, or as an ambulance vehicle, it is simply indispensable in its broad range of employment. These are characteristics you can rely on.

IVECO .F/I/A/T••1jf·Ml;1•FJWutN/J /ca lveco Defence Vehicle Division. Bolzano (Italy) - Ulm (W. Germany).

NEW 40-IOWM. RELIABILITY AT ANY TIME.

TECHNICAL

DATA

"GUARDIAN" LAND ROVER ASA At the 3rd International Exhibition on Security at Essen (FRG), Italy's ASA (Armoured Security Vehicles) has presented a new armoured vehicle, based on the chassis of the Land Rover One Ten. The "Guardian" can be employed by the Armed Forces or Police in many tasks, as reconnaissance, patrols, surveillance of sensitive areas, escorts. It can carry - besides the driver - 7 fully equipped men who can fire their individual weapons through 6 loopholes. The "Asaloy" armoured plates and bulletproof glass ensure protection against bullets of a caliber up to NATO 7.62 mm as well as from artillery or mortar splinters. The vehicle provides the same onroad and cross-country perfo rmance as the Land Rover One Ten 4X4, keeping its characteristics of reliability and easy maintenance. The seating of the crew has been studied to provide a modern solution to the problem of the long stay of personnel inside the vehicle. The ''Guardian" gives also a good protection from incendiary devices. The radiator is armoured and the fuel tank is self-sealing.

SPECIFICATIONS • Crew: 8. • Weight, loaded: 3,600 kg. • Towing capability: 4,000 kg on-road, 1,000 kg cross-country, • Max speed: 138 km/h. • Max gradient: 100%. • Max transverse inclination: 40%. • Turning circle: 6.42 m.

• Range: 375 km. • Engine: Land Rover BV, 3.856 litre petrol, developing 114 hp (83 kW) at 4000 rpm. • Max torque: 251 Nm at 2500 rpm. • Fuel tank capacity: 68 litres. • Optionals: air-conditioner, siren, loudspeaker, protective grating, armoured roof, radio equipment, self-sealing fueltanks.

and Marine Corps testing grounds. The final model is a good combination of adaptability to all types of terrain, reduced weight, low profile and excellent front visibility. The "Hummer" is constructed at the renewed AM General Division plant

of Mishawaka, Ind. The contract awarded by the U.S. Army to the AM General Division of LTV Aerospace Company for t he . total amount of 1.2 billion dollars, envisages the construction of 54,973 vehicles in five years.

"HUMMER" HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE The "Hummer" has been conceived to meet the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps' req uirement for a new fam ily of versatile, technologically advanced vehicles, able to serve in both combat and tac tical/logistic support. Its chassis is designed as a platform for the TOW antitank missile system, for 50 cal. and 7.62 mm machine guns and for the 40 mm MK 19 grenade launcher. It can also be equipped with a remarkable range of electronic and communication systems. Its good mobility, reliability and speed, make th e "Hummer" suitable for a wide variety of missions. The vehicle will be produced in 15 different configurations: 4 cargo versions. 3 ambulances and 8 combat vehi cles. The "Hummer" prototype of AM General Division has gone through several months of hard trials at the Army

TECHNICAL

DATA

.r/// TORNADO AIRCRAFT WIN TWO IMPORTANT TROPHIES "Tornados" of the RAF have taken part, for the first time, in the "Giant Voice" competition, organized in South Dakota by th e U.S Air Force. and devo.ted to bombing missions. In two of the three contests in which they have taken part. the British "Tornados" have beaten the B-52s and F-111s of the USAF Strategic Air Command and the F-111 s of the Royal Australian Air Force. The "Tornados" of RAF 617th Squadron won first and second place in the "Le May Trophy" - awarded to the crew with th e best score in three missions from high and low altitude - as well as f irst and third place in the "J.C. Meyer Trophy", awarded to the crew (non B-52) achieving the highest damaging effec t in six low-altitude missions. It is the first time that non-U.S. crews win the "Le May" and "J. C. Meyer" T roph ies. The success of the ÂˇÂˇTornado" in these competitions - which include missions fro m 15,000-20,000 feet as well as f ro m 500 feet is a demonstration of the aircra ft' s capabilities. As is known, the "Tornado" is a

MACH 2, varying-geometry combat aircraft realized by Panavia, a European consortium which includes Italy, Great Britain and Germany; the aircraft is now equipping many units of the air forces of the three countries. Within the consortium, Aeritalia is responsib le for the construction of the wings of all the " Tornados " envisaged

by the project, as well as for the cons truction and tests of the aircraft to be assigned to the Italian Air Force. The photo shows a pilot of the RAF 9th "Tornado" Squadron, holding the cassette with the mission programme which, inserted in the aircraft computer, will automatically guide the "Tornado" on the objective.

GALIL RIFLE FOR SHARPSHOOTERS A semi-automatic gas-operated rifle with rotating bolt, the 7.62 Galil has been conceived to meet a specific request of the Israeli army. The rifle , which employs the standard NATO ammunition 7.62 x 51 mm. is equipped with a "Nimrod 6X" telescopic sight - already in service with the Israeli Army - mounted latera lly, in order to allow the use of the normal sights. The rifle has a folding stock with an adjustable recoil-absorbing pillow. a bipod permitting remarkable movements in elevation and direction, a muzzle brake, and can be equipped with an image - intensification night sight. Th e Galil for sharpshooters weighs 6.4 kg. and is 111.5 cm long; barrel: RH. 1 turn in 305 mm. With this weapon, a sharpshooter can hit a human '.arget in the head at 300 m, in the bust at 600 m, and score a hit. in any case up to a distance of 800-900 m.

TECHNICAL

NEW LYNX 3 HELICOPTER The new "Lynx 3" helicopter, latest realization of Britain's Westland Helicopters. has two Rolls-Royce Gem 60 turboshaft engines and is equipped with composite construction blades for the main rotor. The aircraft can be armed with airto-air or air-to-ground 'missile systems, cannons, rocket launchers and machine guns; therefore, it has the capability to operate as antitank system, in close support actions, for the transport of personnel, in logistic support and medical evacuations. The naval version can carry a greater payload than that of the p resen t "Navy Lynx", and will be equipped fo r antisubmarine operations and surface attacks. The "Linx 3" Âˇ has many components in common with other helicopters of the "Lynx" series and is equipped with new sensors and new electronic control systems.

"APILAS" ANTITANK ROCKET LAUNCHER France's Manuthin has realized a "ready-to-use" lightweight antitank rocket launcher, which can be employed by one man; the name of the weapon is APILAS (Armour Piercing Infantry Light Arm System) . The weapon is 1.27 m long, consists of preassembled launcher and rocket, can work at temperatures between - 31 and +51 centigrades, is completely waterproof and weighs 9 kg. TheÂˇ "Apilas", when fired from the shoulder in standing position. can hit a target up to 300 m; with an additional sight it can re ach an effective range of 600 m. The rocket - calibre 108 mm. initial velocity 295 m/s - is fin-stabilized and has a 1,5 kg hollow charge, capa ble of penetrating 760 mm of steel plate (at 80 degrees obliquity). The telescopic sight can be adapted for right - or lefthanded operators, and is equipped by a set of stadia, which provide the capability of firing without having to assess the range. The weapon can be fired from the shoulder, in lying, kneeling or standing positions; during the evaluation tests it' achieved a number of hits equal to 98% against fixed targets and 73% against moving targets.

DATA

• Light with no deck per1:: '!ration • Anti aircraft and anti rface high capability • Dual amm-u

TWIN 40 L 70 COMPACT NAVAL MOUNTING

TWIN 30 COMPACT NAVAL MOUNTING

105 mm NAVAL ROCKET LAUNCHER MK II

81 mm NAVAL ROCKET LAUNCHER

LIGHT CHAFF NAVAL LAUNCHING SYSTEM

BREDA MECCANICA BRESCIANA s.p.A. EFIM illt:ANZIARIA e'.'sReoA 2 Via lunga 25128 BRESCIA (Italy) Tel. 030/ 31911 Telex 300056 BREDAR I 1

BOOK

F; Dyson: "Arms and Hope". Boringhieri, Torino, 1984, pp. 345, L. 25,000. The author, a well known physicist, has worked for a number of years as a scien tific consultant to the United States government. He is, therefore, uniquely qualified when it comes to evaluating the ties which bind technology and strategy. ,Jn analysing the problems crea ted by the dawn o f th e nuclear age, his book concentrates on finding ways in wh ich the two super powers might move beyond the current balance o f terror, extracting themselves from the MAD syndrome and its con stant threat of re taliatory strikes leading to mutual destruction. . Arms capable of mass destruction represent a reality which will not disappear. The "non- judicial" nature . of international relations is also a real ity. Differences between individ ual nations, and especially between the two s_uperpowers, can not be eliminated by simply negotiating treaties. or even _ reaching a total disarm ament. Force still plays a fundamental role, and this will continue t::i be the case. Nuclear strategic thinking, however, does inclu~e . one _fu ndamental intrinsic con trad1ct1on: in the event 'of a direct conflict. it would destroy wha t it was meant to defend. No flex ible or limited strategy can solve t his problem. The fact is th at any nuclear conflict would be extremely difficult to- control. And so the two super powers have a mutual interest in avoiding such a disas trous course. But to do so, they must fi nd a way around the stalemate wh ich currently precludes an y effort at negotiating an arms control agreement. Th e author's intent is to come up wi th a technical proposal which both th e United States and th e Soviet Un ion

,,,,

REVIEWS

can consider a reasonable solution, at least in principle. Such a proposal must overcome the current dissimilarities separating United States and Soviet strategic thought: in other words, it must move the two parti es beyond their irreconcilable strategic differences to a point where they can open up . a con structive dialogue. free o f ng1d preconcep tions and prejudices. . Dyson maintains that the United States must abandon its theory of l1m1ted nuclear war. the basis fo r the current policy of extended deterrence. He_ would also eliminate the NATO doctrine of flexib le response. The Soviets will not accept these concepts. Indeed, th ey have s ta ted th at their response to a limited, selec tive use of nuclear arms would be a global counter-attack. The stalemate brought about by curren t nuclear arms pol icy not only exposes t he two superpowers to the danger o f a reciprocal holocaust. it also threatens them on the practical level. One can easily imagine the current deadlock producing a wave of auto-d eterrence within the two opposing blocs. The resul ting disintegration of the two alliances would certainly b ring about new international tensions. The superpowers cou ld resolve the curren t impasse by shifting their emphasis fro m offe nsive to defensive nuclear weapons. This move would allow them to adopt a more rational strategy, one whose implementation would not bring about the destruction of humanity. Such a development could serve . as the concre te basis for a ~reg ressive reduction of offensive arms. The author is well aware of the risks attached to this course of action. The end of the interrelationship be tween conventional defences and n uclear arms along with a lessening o f the threat posed by retaliatory strikes could_ upset current strategic balances, especially 1n Europe. Should this happen, the probability of a conflict would increase, and Europe would find itself without t~ e one element which has guaranteed its military stability. Dyson's proposal is essentially a wager. and not an inexpensive one at that. Among other things, it calls for a massive conven tional rearma ment. But it is a wager that should be accepted. The tru th is that the new strategic order would involve much less risk than the current situation. In a certain sense, Dyson's conclusions are much the same as the ones underlying the United States Strategic Defence Initiative, though he has reached them by using a very different approach. The chief merit of th e defence initiative was the 1ncent1ve _it gave the Soviets to begin new . talks 1n Geneva. The technical scenarios proposed by Dyson could serve as the basis for concrete agreements between the two superpowers. Carlo Bess

Massimo Mori La ragione delle armi

LA CULTURA 22

~?t'·T"·* ·,,.,· ll SAGGl~ ORE

Massimo Mori: "La Ragione delle Armi" ("The Logic of Arms"). II Saggiatore, 1984, pp. 307, L. 30,000. War has always represented a fun damental socio-political phenomenon. And yet its role, indeed its very validity, hove been subject to drastic rev isions from one period of history to- the next. The work Lnder rev iew exam ines German political and philosophical thought in the years be tween 1770 and 1830, analysing the way in which people's perceptions and understanding of conflict and war were transformed during this crucial period, one in which the generally accep ted pre-nuclear theory of w ar was first established. During the eighteenth century, the thinkers of the European enlightenmen t took a clear s tand against war, defining it as a completel·t irrational concep t, a relic from the. past. something generated by the madness of a dynastic era. The military profession was looked down upon. Its practitioners were seen as mere machines. Brutal ly disciplined, with absolutely no idea as to why they were fighting, sol:Hers had become the unwitting instruments of a des_pot1c power system which had no real interest in their welfare. Out of th is situation grew a strategic ph ilosophy in which major ba ttles were to be avoided. To a sovereign ruler. the army was an essential element in the maintenance of domesti c order. It was also irrep lacable, and, there fore, p recious. Of necessity, operations centered around manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres. Sieges were p referred to . battles. _a nd most actions lee to static s1tuat1ons rather than decisive outcomes. The most logical war was a "non-war". . The political. social and strategi c fram ework of conflict was profound ly

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BOOK

changed by both the American and French revolutions, The philosoph ical currents of the time reflect an awareness of the historic impact of these two events. Th e fresh outlook they produced was a complete reversal of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Social and political individualism was replaced by an organic vision of th e state and society: one in which the interests of the individual were subordinated to those of the community. Wars became national and ideological causes. No longer subjects, but citizens, soldiers became increasingly aware of the close relation ship between th eir own self-in terest and th e objectives they were fighting for. The mil itary profession gained in dignity and importance. Politically, conflicts were now seen as serving a two- fold function: not only did they support and secure the interests of the community, they also helped to define and strengthen the law. Furthermore, war was thought to be politically inevitable. Given a system of international relations which lacked a judicial apparatus. war represented an effective means of resolving conflicts. In purely physical terms. war was considered to be a necessary phenomenon. In light of the strong antagonistic element in natural law, it actually seemed to contribute to the development of mankind. From ::in P.thical point of view, it was accepted as a useful tool. War, it w_as thought, would strengthen the unity of the state while educating its people to the virtues of sacrifice. The rise of the nation-state gave political and military leaders the ability to mobilize vast demographic resources. Beginning with Napoleon, strategic think ing stressed decisive battles. One's army might be destroyed, but this did not necessarily lead to the downfall of the internal power structure. The unity of any given state no longer depended on the will of a sovereign leader, but on the consensus of the people. The soldier became a thinking, responsible individual. As documented by Clausewitz, the massive transformation of the Prussian army, introduced by Stein, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau following the defeat at Jena, reformed not just the army, but the entire society. Clausewitz's most important contribution to military philosophy was not his th eory on the political nature of war, but his thoughts on its social character. He recognized that moral forces and spiritual elements were essential to the success of an army and the power of a state. War was once again a rat ional, positive undertaking. The stage had been set for a radical transformation of all armed conflicts. This new ethos would reach its height during the two world wars, only to be challenged by th e massive· destructive power o f today's nuclear arsenals. Carlo Bess

REVIEWS

R. Kupperman and W. Taylor jr. (editors)': "Strategic Requirements for the· Army in the Year 2000". Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1984, 539 pages, $ 18,00.

•

This book presents the summary of a very wide -ranging in-dep th study carried out at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in co-operation with the Pentagon, the State Department, and American academic and research centres active in th e fields of strategy, politics and technology. The study forecasts the challenges which the US Army will be faced with in the year 2000. It also supplies a list of the strategic and operational concepts which must be adopted to meet these challenges, along with a structural picture of how the armed forces will appear after the changes have been made. The research is meant to provide political and military leaders with a broad overview against which they can evaluate their long-term p lanning. It also analyses the most likely scenarios for future operations of the United States ground forces. As is always the case with studies forecasting distant events, th e authors don't look for precise, definitive solutions. Instead, they have projected both the future evolution of the world political-strategic equation and the different role that the US Army must play if it is to go on adequately defending the United States interests. The global review covers everything from the advances in weaponry

to the internal evolution of both American society and the various single areas of strategic impo·tance. The vital interests of each political-strategic zone are identified, as are the major concerns of the United States. At the same time. the study examines the factors threatening these interests, along with the counter-measures designed to nullify the threats. The entire analysis is based on th e assumpticn that the USA must continue to act as a great power, ful ly accep ting the responsibility of its role as leader of the free world. The most striking aspect of the report - an effort wh ich involved some of America's foremost strategic experts, including such former high-level government figures as Schlesinger and Bzrezinski - is its relative lack of interest in the issue of European security. The whole subject takes up just one ten th of the document. In part. this reflects the commonly held opinion that a Soviet attack on Western Europe is highly unlikely, given the fact th at such a move would lead to a general nuclear conflict. Furthermore, a long-term. conventional defence of Europe would seem to require a more active part icipation on th e part of the Europeans themselves. Finally, the deterrence mechanism, based as it is on the tie between the European defence forces and the central. American deterrent. is thought to c1P.pend less on the structure of the American ground forces than on the political unity of the Alliance. The most likely scenarios facing the United States Army involve operations outside th e NATO reg ion. South West Asia should become an area of particular concern. The need for special, " low-intensity" operations in different parts of Asia, Africa and La tin America may also arise. It is essential that timely preparations be made to meet all these eventualities. Absolute priority should be given to th e development of light forces. These units should be extremely mobile, able to make use of "preposi tioned" heavy weapons and suppl ies. An equal emphasis should be placed on special forces units assigned to nonconventional operctions. Th e present study clearly underlines th e current trend in long-term US Army planning. n,e stress is on light, strategically mobile units trained for rapid intervention. Obviously, the reality of this situation has a direct effect on the European theatre and its defence system. A diminished American presence thrusts more of the military burden into Europe herself, forcing it to build up its conventional arsenals. Increasingly, this conventional rearmament represents an indispensable prerequ isite to maintaining the close interatlantic strategic rel ationsh ip which is, and will continue to be, the basis for our security. Carlo Jean

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BOOK

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r/H Various Authors: "Pace, Disarmo e Chiesa" ("Peace, Disarmament and the Church"). The Gregorian University, (Rome), 1984, pp. 205, L. 14,000. As it is emphasized in the introduction written by Father Urbano Navarette. Dean of the Gregorian Univers ity, this book presents a study of the religious. ethi cal and moral aspects of violence. At the same time, it also develops the ethical conditions necessary to the establishment of a dignified coexistence on the international. social and family levels. This line of thought represents a logical response to post-war Papal teachings. Whereas efforts towa rds peace were once considered to be nothing more than an eschatological counterweight to the pragmatic conception o f the "just war", they are now seen as a very necessary and attainable goal. With this change in attitude, laymen have become more involved in the process of creating and formalizing the different "stra tegies" for peace·. As a result, the international discussion now includes each and every one of the interested parties, whatever their field may be: from philosophy to scientific

avoiding any radical ex tremes or trau-

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arms industry and the armed forces . Only in this way can a lasting peace be established, given the reciprocally dependent, interconnecting relationships which characterize the main political, social and economic topics of our time: the ideological challenge, the struggle to control both natural resou rces and the means of production, the basis for a possible redistribution of wealth, the goal of technological progress, the possession of new technologies, the global arsenal, the balance of power, and the international bodies that are charged with overseeing world relati ons. The· book under review clearly con tributes to this search for a synthesis, approaching the task with an indispensable knowledge of the mechanisms which control both the domestic and foreign relations of different nations. Furthermore. it never loses sight of the fact that today's world already has the means, in terms of wealth and organiza. tion, to guarantee to all its peoples a life of dignity, a life in which both the physical and the spiritual side of Man are respected. The book's various contributions ex tremely well developed in terms of the nature and presentation of th eir topics - all share a reassuring, concrete relevance which clearly emerges in the course of their continual efforts to reconcile ethical principles with real-l ife problems. The end goal is to bring the solutions of th e latter increasingly closer to the realm of the former, all the wh ile

Though the highly prophetic thinking of the more doctrinal contributors tends to reconfirm the inevitability of certain existential choices for Christians (non-violence, for example), even these pieces emphasize that one's life must be lived in a fu ll awareness of presentday rea lity. Th e themes dealt with in the book are noteworthy both for their number and their complexity, but the number of contributing authors is equally large. As a group, they bring to their task a wide variety of life experiences and intellectual backgrounds. The starting point is a look at applied scientific research in mili tary related fields and the ro le which such activities allegedly play in the escalation of the arms race. The author concludes tha t the policies which presently govern scentific research and the use of science and technology must be revised in the spirit of the trinity "science-technology. conscience". The, next article examines war as a moral problem, arriving at a definition for the "extreme limit" case of a truly just war. This would be a war in which: "a people sincerely committed to a doctrine and a policy of peace. having been outraged and menaced, courageously attempts every possible means of negotiations, and then appeals unsuccessfu lly to international organizations when such a people, though fully aware of the grave physical and moral ills which are war's product. nonetheless

finds itself forced to take up arms in the defense of its very existence against an irrational, brutal, overbearing enemy, then that is a just war" (Paolo Valori). Viewed in terms of a reasonable compromise between pragmatism and idealism. the same moral problems c'an give rise to a different, unexpected set of imp lications. Indeed, morality comes into play not only when arms are present in excess, bu t also when the resources set aside for defence prove to be insufficient (Luigi Salatiello). The various peace movements, founded by private citizens as a response to the arms race and the willingness of their participants to demand an accounting from governments and other institutions, are seen as an important factor in the overall effort to eliminate nuclear arms, revi •te disarmament negotiations and - as an immediate resul t of the decline in nuclear weaponry abandon the "first use" theory: all th is despite the very real risk of an increase in conventional weaponry (Fabrizio Battistelli). Naturally, th e problems of war. peace and disarmament are of great concern to the Church Its teachings, fu lly consistent with both today's chang ing times and the lates t intellectual advances. offer a precious guide in the midst of change. an historical- reference of prov1:m validit·1. ,:md a significan t opportunity to unite numerous, seemingly divergent causes and movements in the pursuit of a common goal. On the issue of nuclear arms, the call has gone out 'or a general disarmament in which all sides would reduce th eir weaponry by successive, simultaneous steps. This process includes no outright demand for unilateral disarma· ment. but it is ratter the intended result of a transforma tion in which the systematic. freely accepted violence of today's "society of confrontation" would be re placed by a "society of affirmation" in which full expression is given to Mankind's positive values {Rodolfo Bozzi). A fu rther concern of the Church is the on-going development of a philosophy of non-violence (of which pacifism is often nothing more th an a limited. partial version). This doctrine should be used as a tool in the effort to fin d and express, "the truth, peace's streng th " (Onorato Bucci). The theme of peace can also be traced th rough the Old and New Te staments. Indeed, it find s its in itial synthesis in the Hebrew word "shalom" (whose definition of "well-being" applies to health, worldy possessions. fam ily and society) and its ultimate expression in "koinonia", th e doctrine dealing with the red istribu tion ::if super fluo us wealth (Prosper Grech). But naturally, the teachings of the Church also offer guidance in areas more closely related to the real ity of everyday life. Having rejected the idea

BOOK

of war as a "fated", anti thus more or less inevitable, phenomenon, .a commitment has been made to avoid and reverse all of war's possible causes in a search for true peace. Within this context, one can also find a legitimiza tion for the system of obligatory military service. In today's world, such a policy represents both a righ t and a duty tied to the defence of a nation's liberty and the interests of the com munity in the face of an unjust aggression. The Church also condemns the arm race in no uncertain terms ("it has become a spiralling process which grows accordi ng to its own rules. bearing no relationship to any genuine- sentiments of aggression. The attempts of various nations to c ontrol it have all failed. It is truly a demented machine"). The

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morally acceptable alternative is a detente "based on a balance of power. which does not represent an end unto itself, but a step along the road to disarmamen t" (Pope John Paul II in a message given in June 1982). On the subject of conscience, the pure of soul, whose relig ious beliefs lead them to reject all violence, are credited with having made a dignified choice, while an equal respect is shown for those w ho dedicate themselves to serving their brothers by "giving order to Man's earthly dwelling place" (Joseph Joblin). This lasting dichotomy between a "more prophetic" and a " more ra tional " commi tment is th e subject of the book's fi nal piece, written by Giovanni Magnani. The issue is an important one. Given th e right interpretation, it can

functio n as the basis fo r a sustained effort towards a common goal. The process would be enacted step by step, with all the parties sharing the same ends. if not the same means. Contributions would come from sources which, despite their differences, are all equally indispensable: the th eologian would be charged with proclaiming the " prophecy of peace" while pointing to the instruments which man has been given in order to attain true peace; the simple believer. the man of good faith, would struggle to overcome the contradictions offered by h istory and the re ality of the present day by using these same instruments to construct a posi tive solution from the possibilities offered by the very forces of histo ry and presen t-day reality. Sandro Fantina

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