Issuu

·JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

SEPTEMBER OCTOBER 1985 LIRE 3,000 $2 D.M, 6 £2

COLLECTIVE SECU.RITY AN D NATO

ETHICS AND MILITARINESS

TANKS ANTITANKS AND ... ENVIRONMENT

If you need to identify ... Italtel's IFF system capability: fixed and mobile surface interrogators, airborne interrogators, transponders, antennas and decoder groups developed and manufactured in the L'Aquila facility.

A OOÂŽOO@~ HU-STET GROUP

IF YOU NEED TO IDENTIFY.

Number five 1985 September-October

European Military Press Agency

RIVISTA

MILITARE BIMESTR ALE

The aim of the Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the technical and vocational training of Army Officers and NCOs. To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military thinking and as a forum of study and debate. The Rivista Militare is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and military maners through the pubblication of articles of current technical and scientific interest.

Collective Security and NATO. ( Umbert o

Cappuz zo)

Tanks Antitanks and ... Environment.

(***)

The Frontier of Freedom. With the "Legnano Combat G roup" in 1945.

Direttore responsabile: Pier Giorg io Franzo~i. Redatt ore Capo: Giovanni Cerbo Teletono 47353078. Graf ico: Rino Fusi. Direzione e Redazione: Via di S. Marco, 8 00186 Roma Tel. 47353372 - 47355192.

(Giorgio Dona ti)

Pubblicita: A c ura del la segreteria dell'Ufficio Rivista M ilitare Tel. 6794200. Stampa: Tipogra fi a Regionale - Rom a. lllustrazioni: A c ura di Rivista M ilitare.

Ethics and Militariness. (Giro D1 M ar tino)

The Roya l Italian Army 191 5-1918.

( Valerio G 1bellin1)

Spedizione: In abbon amento po stale Gruppo IV - 70% . Condizioni d i cessione per ii 1985: ·Un fascico lo: Lit. 3.000 - $ 2 -

D.M. 6 - £2. Un fasci co lo arretrato: Lit. 6.000 - $ 4 - D. M. 12

.£4.

The Realities of NATO Security. ( Bern ard W . Roger s)

Abbonamento: l}alia Lit. 16.000, estero Lit. 24.000. L'impo rto deve essere inviato median te assegno bancario (per i residen ti all'estero) o versamen to in c/ c postale n. 22521009 intes tato a SM E Uffi c io Rivista Milit3 re Sezione di Amministrazione Via XX Settemb re 123/ P. Rom a. Autorizzazi one d el Tribunale di Ro ma al n. 944 del Registro, con decreto

Evolution of the NA TO Strategy ... with a bit of Science Fiction. (Luigi S alatiello)

Technical Data.

Book Reviews.

7-6-1 949. Ouesto fascicolo e stato dato alla stampa ii 3 0 L uglio 1985.

1985

Proprieta letteraria. artisti ca e scientific a ri servata

M ember of USPI Un,one Stam pa Period ica ltaliana

Rules for contributors. Anyone can contribute. In the interest of the maximum objectivity of information, the Rivista Militare allows contributors considerable freedom, although it does not necessari ly subscribe to their opinions. The articles are published unedited and free of any editorial constraints and are therefore the sole responsibility of the Author and reflect his personal ideas exclusively. The topic must be treated in an original way and the articles themselves should not exceed 10 typewri tten pages in length. The Author, got his reward, makes over his exclusive article right to Rivista Militare. Rlvista Militare can make over Author's exclusive article right to other pubblications and to the periodicals of EMPA (European Military Press Association}. The articles should be accompanied by any necessary photographs , drawings and explanatory tables. Each author is requested to send a photograph of himself, together with his «curriculum vitae » and a 10-line summary of the article to be published. The Rivista Militare reserves the rig ht to alter the article's title and to choo se the typeface in which it is set.

INTRODUCTION When - as in the case at hand - one confronts problems wh ich , though they, may be general ones, ca n sti ll be traced back to princi ples and concepts already firm ly esta blished on the scientific plane or ana lyzed by experts from specific discipl ines, when faced with such dangers, a break with the accepted doctrine , or an attempt at giving certa in aspects of this doctrine a personal interpretation, is a hazardous undertaking . I will r un this risk in dealing with the topic in q uestion, not beca use I wish to seem original, but beca use it seems to me that a certain num ber of original pol itical considerations lend the problem scientifi c connotati ons. though these may not be scient ific at all . I am referring to the vast field of international law in which "collective security" has a precise place, being clearly defined as "a system of mutua l guardianshi p subscribed to by two or more states which allow s each of these to depend upon the solidarity of all the others in the eventuality of international aggression" (from the entry "secu rity" in the " Italian Encyclopedic Dictiona ry" . published by the Ita lian Encyclopedia Institute - Vol. XI - pg. 260) . The question soon arises as to how and where such a principle may be put into practi ce. The mind quickly pictures some type of international organ ization oriented t owa rds un iversality or, for the more geographically confi ned areas, associations of peoples whose governing structures share common denominators (a n appeal to the same set of values, si milar politica l regimes). Having mom entarily put aside the overall solution (the one tending towa rds universality) due t o a lack of examples, we should look at th e con cept of "collective security" within a set

Left.

The duel.

of more lim ited contexts. Here is where the idea currently fun ctions and shows a fair amount of promise. _ NATO and the Wa rsa w Pa ct nations are two cases in poi nt. The subject becomes more complicated when one considers, as has been done, a hypothetica l "collective security" backed sim ultaneously by both al liances. Without questioning the wisdom of pursuing security, an absolute prerequisite to growth and progress, I wish to examin e the li mits of "collective security" in its most widely accepted form and express my doubts concern ing the instruments meant to t ra nsform th is concept into concrete, practica l policy. Desp ite any reservations I might have, though, a look at the broader pictu re shows that "collective security" was once a relatively popular concept. In the not too distant past, schola rs of various persuasions were drawn to it as a means of expressing - - in the way of a "s logan " - - a possible di rection for the evol ution of international relations. An occupational hazard of soldiering is the tendency always to consider security in terms of a threat calling for defensive measures. The fact is that in a conflict involvi ng the entire planet - such as the one between the Eastern and Western wor lds - a conflict which is ph ilosophically cha racterized by a collectivism absorbing every member of the international community who counts for something politically or mil -Âˇ itarily, it is very diffi cult to determine just what sort of threat could possi bly endanger the association of nations whose security needs to be guaranteed. One finds oneself asking, "Against what outside force must the collective be defended ?" . If there is any truth to the notion t hat, in practical terms, collective security is, "a plan for keeping the pea ce with an organ ization of sovereign nations committed to defending each other in the eventua lity of an atta ck" (Rona ld Strom berg's definition in the " Encyclopedia

for America n Foreign Policy" ) then how ca n we even imagi ne the lau nching of an attack agai nst this or that cou ntry in a politica l system where the two su perpowers stand together side by side, as do their respective allies? And who w ould launch it? Th us we are brought back t o the more lim ited subject of an in dividual community: one wh ich in the pursu it of its political ends encounters. or cla ims to have encoun tered, opposition from a second com munity tied to princ iples, ideals and bonds which lead it to pursue other ends. NATO has such a connota tion an d its motivat ional ideals are valid because it holds to certain values - liberty an d democracy - and because it pursues goals such as the elimination of nationalistic selfishness. a ba lanced growth , and peace . In accordance w ith these principles, NATO has accepted some very precise li mitations and chosen to follow a code of conduct which rejects the use of force for the resol ution of international disputes. Within these limits, but with a different ideological orientati on and different motivational idea ls, the sa me line of reasoning hol ds for the opposing ca mp. In concl usion , there is no doubt that the "collective" wh ose security is being discussed must be li mited in size. Otherwise, the discuss ion loses all concrete significance. That hav ing been sa id , however, I do not wish to exclude any future attempts at creati ng a web of security relationships between nations from differen t blocs and even between the opposi ng blocs themselves: a true network of multilatera l re1ations capable of preventing a 3

possible conflict from degenerating into something more serious. Avoiding a war should beÂˇ the principle. goal of an era dominated by the nuclear threat. Indeed, Lawrence Kaplan sees th is goal as attainable through what he calls a "restructuring of the international system". A like effort at restructuring - one which preserves the principal associations so as to avoid a proliferation of protagonists, which would surely give rise to tensions and dangers - could lead us to abandon (though in the classic, pacifist sense, and not for reasons of demagogy) the Clausewitzian conception of war in which armed conflict is nothing more than a continuation of politics, though through other methods. , This step forward is more a matter of pragmatism than principle in as much as we all view the possibility of a nuclear conflict as something belonging to the realm of theÂˇ irrational. For the very reason of its irrationality, the removal of such a possibility leads to a whole series of manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres centered around the choice of a substitute. They result in the identification and acceptance of new forms of war: forms which represent quite a change - as they often have nothing to do with the direct use of arms or other means of physical and material destruction, though they are highly lethal all the same - and lead to a very interesting confusion of the traditional boundaries which once defined the unequivocal concept of peace (true peace) and the unequivocal concept of war (waged war). Within this framework, there exists a whole spectrum of indirect strategic techniques. 4

The course of recent events, from the Cold War to the Economic War, demonstrates "ad abundantiam" that we must come to terms with this reality. Indeed, during a formal peace, nations pursue the same political ends as always, the difference being that their instruments and techniques do not include the classic milita ry confrontation. We wou ld seem to have reached the end of an historic cycle characterized by the two extremes of "pax romana" and the "non-war" - a contemporaneous combination of a "semi-

peace" and a "semi-war" - during which, furthermore, tensions did not degenerate into confrontations, nor were agreements synonymous with harmony. The current situation is characterized by a mixture of tension and a desire for accord: all based on the logic of the "interrelationship between de~ tente and deterrence". One must ask, at this point, if the policies of th is or that alliance reflect the increasingly urgent desire for peace expressed by civil society, and if so, to what extent do they reflect it. Ultimately, we wish to discov-

er any type of solution contributing to the growth of collective security - provided that it falls within the limits already mentioned - which. leads us to a world order that is progressively more just and, why not, easier to understand and accept. ON THE SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY All of society is demanding security and peace because afl of society is afraid, and, naturally, fear creates the need for security.

I would like briefly to examine this last phenomenon, one which has a direct effect on security. _ Fear turns out to be the most popular sentiment of the 80's. This is evidenced by recent shifts in public opinion which has discovered fear's role as a moving force in history and a power~ ful evolutionary factor. In his day, the German philosopher Oswald Spengler defined fear as, "the most powerful of all the primordial sentiments". Living, as we do, under the constant threat of nuclear destruction, we - men of our times

- see fear as a faithful, diligent, ever-present companion. We must banish this fear. But how? A very simple, almost banal comparison comes to mind. Just as we banish our fear of the dark by lighting a light, which then carries our mind's fantasies back to reality, so too can our fear of others be overcome through communication, by getting to know these others, and by letting them get to know us. Fear, therefore, is overcome with the twin arms of dialogue. and information. And the moment we overcome fear, or even make an attempt, we are working towards the goal of security. Actually, all we need to do is work backward, attempting to control our level of insecurity. Despite its limitations, this method appears to be valid, and it certainly offers very interesting possibilities. Inverting the problem - that is to say, attempting to solve it by raising the, level of security poses a number of other problems. none of them simple. The first problem - which I've already alluded to - concerns the meaning of the term "collective security". Individual security is easily understood: an individual provides himself with assurances against another whose intentions or whims may differ from his own and thus lead to conflict. However, before entering into a discussion of collective security, and aside from the fundamental problem of a referenceframe - a problem I dealt with

The sea she/ls.

earlier on - we need to look at a basic misconception: does the concept of collective security mean maintaining the "status quo", or does it mean pursuing changes in the "status quo" through various methods which do not include either the use of force or the threat of force? Within the range of possible options, I would definitely reject a rapid transformation from the "status quo" to a world order that is supposedly "more just", both on account of the objective difficulty of putting such an utopistic model into practice, and because the evolutionary period needed to pass from one model to the other would be rushed and, as a result, extreme ly insecure. Given the current international picture, or rather, given the context of the "status quo". society's need for security is the only force moving towards the goal of universal security. In fact, NATO's security and the security of the Warsaw Pact nations can not possibly coincide: each has to maintain its security with respect to the other, and when one of the two manages to increase its security, then the insecurity of the other simply becomes that much greater. An instrument of collective security could crystallize the situation, but this hypothesis is an impractical one, both from the historical and political points of view. The fact is that classic political doctrine gives the state, or group of states, the right to evaluate independently their own vital interests and, thus, the goals. the.y set for themselves assum ing that no ethical limitations have been imposed by a higher, international body. lnevi6

tably, this doctrine leads to confrontations between opposing nations and sets the scene for progressively degenerating conflicts which send relations spiralling through a series of actions and reactions matched by a gradual increase in cr ises, tensions, conflict situations, and actual conflicts. Therefore, creating a system of collective security capable of reducing levels of insecurity involves finding a common meeting ground on the ethical plane, a task which has already proven quite difficult for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. If the pursuit of universal peace presents difficulties, then the dual idea of "growth through peace", though certainly a worthwhile goal, spontaneously provokes a question or two: whose growth and at whose expense? Growth is synonymous with progress, but it also entails contractua l obligations, areas of interest, and therefore friction, conflict, etc .. With that, let us move on to the level of "e,xtra-national security". The East-West confrontation is still the determining factor for global stability and peace. However, bipolarism in t he strict sense seems to be having functional difficulties, both in terms of the leadership exercised within the blocs and their ability to gather support in the outlying areas. There are many reasons for these difficulties: mistrust, suspicion of imperialism and neocolonialism, changes in the relationships of power. But above all - according to a number of scholars - the two socio-economic models proposed by t he super powers have slowly worn themselves out, and as a result their respective ideologies have suffered a gradual erosion. Further, the superpowers have lost cred ibi lity both at home and abroad for having compromised their identities by grabbing once too often for the immediate, seductive gains of pragmatism and "realpolitik". It should also be pointed out that deterrence, founded on the so-called balance of terror, has

definitely turned out to be a strategy of non-action. It has infected political thought with a type of sclerosis, leaving it incapable of coming up with new ideas or finding a way out of this very dilemma. There is no avoiding the paradoxical situation in which deterrence - based essentially 'on

nuclear arms - has so far kept the differences between the two superpowers from degenerating into a military conflict. In other words, it has kept tbe peace. We can logically confirm that until such a time asÂˇ different situations and conditions are creat ed, peace will be a political goal of great moral relevance in

which the military element continues to play a part. As proof of this. we see the need to ma intain certain balances: balances of power which - given the structure of international relations at the present moment - represent an element of security. Unfortunately, they exist in a continual stage of development. Circumstances force us to accept this situation, but the important thing is that the balances be maintained at the lowest possible. Here is the key to the fundamental negotiating policy used throughout the world; it is also the crucial element in the broadbased appeals demanding an end to the madness of the arms race. We should not be misled by an elementary consideration of the long period of peace brought about, paradoxically enough, by the nuclear ba lance. Nor should we be led to draw obvious conclusions from the fact that this peace has been rm1intained only in Lhe areas directly threatened by nuclear destruction. In the rest of the world - the so-called "marginal areas" - there have been roughly one hundred wars since 1945, and others are still being fought. Even if we can accept the claim that within a hypothetical framework ot international relations, one which the systems analysts would call a "perfect bipolarity", armed conflict would probably cease to ex ist, the way things stand right now - with an "imperfect bipolarity" and the potential for a "multipolarity" the dangers are very real, and cannot be, ignored. Apart from the fears connected with an eventual nuclear proliferation, in other words, the dangerous increase in the num-Âˇ ber of nations possessing nuclear weapons, the mere idea of nuclear use and the possibility of a catastrophic error, though still nothing more than a possibil-

The Arc on Mount Ararat.

ity, have shaken the conscience of a world population which vigorously rejects the thought of a disastrous war having neither losers nor winners. Moral considerations force us to abandon a path - that of the nuclear arms race - which seems unable, to offer the slightest reassurance for the future. Hopefully, these considerations will eventually have a decisive, practical influence on the choices of those who hold, and rightly so, that it is time we found a different set of answers to, the problems of security. It is high time we moved beyond the misguided logic of "Assured Mutua l Destruction". How? Here is the one truly great problem of our future. In this context, the resumption of talks between the superpowers is a cause for satisfact ion and hope. The above scenario is the basis for current international relations . Whether we like it or not, we have to accept it. It goes without saying that if humanity - and here I quote from the hope-filled words of Odette Thibault - "were able to rid itself of aggression, xenophobia, racism, exasperated nationalism, and the thirst for power, if it were able to replace the balance of affection", then collective and universal security would become a working reality. At present, the, conquest of peace appears to be an arduous task, packed with difficulties and fraught with all sorts of obstacles. Despite its many shadows, however, the picture also offers much light. To paraphrase Mark Twain's comment on the music of Wagner, one might say, "it isn't as bad as it sounds". 8

. involves us as Europeans and, Certainly it is too early to therefore, deserves a thorough make valid arguments for a collective security if we have yet examination. I think the occasion wil l to understand where the bases present itself in the near future. for its construction will come Finally, my third point: it is from, but we can nevertheless note that a ce,rtain progress- has encouraging to see the recognition being given to the vital role been made in the reduction of of negotiations. Its dimensiom1 insecurity. A mo,vement in this direction, preclude the possibility of a mere political manoeuvre by this in fact, can already be seen; signs of its existence are numer- or that faction. The opinion is widespread ous and highly reliable. The controversy surrounding - and it could hardly by otherwise considering the enormous the uncontrolled escalation of destructive power of the current the arms race has heated up for military arsenals - that, as Presa number of reasons. Among ident Reagan stated in his these, we should not underestiaddress before the United Namate the moral cons iderations tions, given on September 24th, thrust onto the scene by the 1984, "there is no reasonable pressure of public opinion. alternative to negotiations beIn the second place, a good tween the nations who possess deal of attention is being given the means to destroy civilization". to a revised strategic concept which would move the military confrontation from the offensive HOW THE SOVIETS area - where it increases the opponent's fear - to the realm of VIEW SECURITY defence: from "Mutual Assured Destruction" to "Mutual Assured I have always believed that Survival" (which is itself an inter- semantics offers a very interestmediate phase meant to proceed ing appro:::ir.h to understanding a progressive dismantling of the psychologies of different nuclear capabilities). peoples. The Russian equivalent President Reagan's "Straof the English term "security" is tegic Defence Initiative" in also "biez opasnost", which literally part of this picture. means - is the reader ready? In fact, its proponents argue "without danger", in other words, that the study of the "space absence of danger. shield" represents an attempt to One finds oneself asking move the conflict away from the "absence of danger from earth's surface by relocating it whom?". And still further, "danout in space with the creation of ger from what source?". a system guaranteeing an almost Without indulging in wild total impenetrability to the pro"extrapolations", one can, at the tected area. In this way, all po-Âˇ very least. note that the Russian tential enemy attacks are doomed linguistic construction contains to failure and any concept of a concrete reference to an nuclear superiority becomes external situation (the danger) dubious at best. which must be eliminated in Officia lly, its supporters view order to create the proper conthe "Strategic Defence Initiative" ditions for security. as an acceptable prelude to a The objective element is the gradual disarmament. danger, a concrete entity, and Obviously, the Soviets see not just the sensation of danger. On the other hand, the Latin the matter in a very different linguistic construction for securilight, considering Washington's move to be another attempt at ty - a word formed by the destabilizing strategic relations fusion of "sed", the equiva lent of "without", with "cura", the between the superpowers. equ ivalent of "care" - refers to The subject is vitally impora sensation (care, worry) which tant and cal ls for more than a is an internal phenomenon; the simple acknowledgement of opposing declarations. It directly removal of the sensation brings

on a state of security, something which takes place on the psychological plane before it is confirmed on the operational level. The objective element is the sensation of danger, wh ich Âˇcan be overcome, and not the danger itself, which must be met with action . I will merely underline what I have already said: danger is eliminated by precautions, measures, and actions; the sensation of danger is eliminated by logic, reason, and, on occasion, the act of repeating to oneself that the danger does not actually exist. The distinction is a subtle one, and may even seem a bit extravagant, but the fact remains that this difference in interpreta-

tion has led the West to emphasize its requests for "peaceful cohabitation" as a primary condition for the establishment of an improved strategic balance, which is itself a primary condition for forcing the opposing side to accept "peaceful cohabitation". Incidentally, it should be remembered that "peacefu l co-Âˇ habitation" is something different - very different - from "peaceful coexistence". The latter, in fact, refers to the crystallization of an existing situation and does nothing to reduce the dynamism of the other side as it pursues its political goa ls through means which are not always political (purely political - to be perfectly clear - of the classic type) with the result that the most elaborate

forms of indirect strategy are put to use. Beyond the theoretical anal ysis, there is present in the Russian tradition (and to a much greater degree than in the Soviet tradition) a painful memory of real-life experience which lends concrete substance to the concept of danger, li nking it, as has always been the case, to the idea of encirclement. Here is another element which should not be underestimated in our attempt to understand the reasons behind certain attitudes. To reiterate, the West's idea of "collective security" is not the same as the East's. At best, the emphasis on threats gives us two "security systems" in confrontation, such that the collective concept begins to vanish, limited as it is to a "bilateralism" which would be better put to use as the basis for a system of "reciprocal security" . If this is the effect, then it would seem more logical to go back and look for the cause. This is found in the "balance of power" concept - the balance between the two superpowers and the opposing formations that act as their vanguards - which has kept the peace for the last 40 years. Seeing that the analysts all agree on the crucial importance of maintaining an acceptable balance in terms of both western and eastern security, let us shift our attention from "security" to "balance". Despite the change in perspective, the fundamental misunderstandings remain. To beg in with, in fact, both sides need to agree upon the The tired tulip.

meaning of the word "balance". And things are certainly not helped along by the periodic moves towards integration which introduce the concepts of "symmetry" and "asymmetry" into the discussion of the gee-strategic areas where balance is being pursued. One forgets. or rather, one tends to forget, that balance has a value of its own, in as much as it weighs not only potentialities but also - and this is a very significant development - vulnerabilities, both of which must be seen as belonging to the same species and category. Finally, to complicate matters even further, there is the disagreement over the very nature of balance. Does balance represent the basis of a relationship at any given point in time, in other words, something im mune to change, or is it a dynamic process governed by various parameters and, thus, subject to change? Without wishing to stir up a controversy, one can not help but notice that the Soviets - followers of an ideology which still maintains a certain forward momentum - tend to think of balance as only a temporary step in a dynamic process. Given such a mind-set. it is no wonder that the dialogue occasionally stalls. No amount of good will can keep certa in prejudices and preconceptions from coming into play. The fact is that a line of reasoning must be sketched out for an opponent whose subtle dialectical game moves forward by theses and antitheses in an attempt to find. for example, a logica l justification for unilateral actions taken against other systems in a clearly offensive mode, or to demonstrate that his

systematically acquired positions of strength are not really positions of strength, or, final ly, to claim that what the West perceives as an imba lance is no such thing at all. The game goes on in this way until one is forced to conclude that the dialectical plane represents the greatest source of difficulties for EastWest relations. In other words, there is a difference - a fundamental difference - between the two reasoning processes, and this difference cannot be ignored. On the subject of different reasoning processes, it is worth looking at an episode reported in the "Times" of August 27th,

1984 which described a plan proposed by the Pentagon and then rejected by Bonn - to protect the eastern border of the German Federal Republic with a system of tubes containing a liquid explosive. The proposal was meant to create an extreme defence against a potential Wwsaw Pact invasion force. "Pravda" stated that the idea of using explosive tubes was linked to "the shadowy emergence of a nostalgic, West Ger-

Building the lunar butterfly.

man desire for revenge, and the recent speeches given by President Reagan and George Schultz in which they questioned the division of Europe agreed upon in 1945 at Yalta". I do not believe it is necessary to waste time providing subtle explanations of what must be obvious even to the nonexpert: that the construction of an explosive line along one's own borders as a defence against unwelcome incursions. even if they are hypothetical incursions, is an act meant to maintain the current division rather than abolish it. But this is the logic - or rather, the type of logic - with which we must come to terms. And in doing so, no initiative should be rejected if its ultimate objective is the establishment of relations conducive to peace. In this sense, despite the doubt and confusion heard from many quarters, the "Conference on European Security" was a very significant occasion. Its success has less to do with the results than the dialogue which was maintained on subjects vital to the future of humanity. We yearn for security, but as I have alreadv pointed out this goal still depends, and sadly so. on a balance of power. though there is no need - and here I will repeat myself so as to avoid any misunderstanding - to establish this balance on anything but the very lowest level. We must remember that the opposing side enjoys a superiority in every area of conventional weaponry. I say this not merely to emphasize the potential threat. but in order to clarify the point from which our thinking must proceed. The West would have great difficulty overcoming this disparity in conventional weaponry. Other courses of action remain, and yet they are full of obstacles which render the task all the more difficult, especially if the opposing side can shrewdly manage to mobilize public opinion with references to fundamentally attractive principles and accusations whose veracity is question-

able at best. These accusations are most damaging because they can leave the less informed sectors of the public uncertain, doubtful and perplexed. One of the many options is Western aggression, and yet we rightly hold this tactic to be undeserving of our world's political system, based as it is on authentically democratic principles. Given these principles. no one can dispute our willingness to defend our world against outside aggression, and thus an ideologica lly-based system that classifies conflicts a priori on the basis of moral judgements relative to their participants (the theories of the "just war" and the "unjust war") seems rather irresponsible. The key to determining such values has nothing to do with the opposing factions, but rests on a higher plane: with a condemnation of war itself as a means of solving international conflicts. This is the principle which our Constitution solemnly proclaims. The truth is that a broadbased discussion of international security calls for a mixture of ideological considerations and pragmatic calculations; these two elements interconnect and compliment each other, introducing factors which are not always easily understood. It is necessary, however, that every effort be made both to understand and interpret. In as much as they are in fluenced by factors of economics and security, the internationa l problems of our time would appear to be extremely complex. There are any number of dilemmas calling for resolution; but there is no reason for depair. Given such conditions, the subject of collective security becomes quite complex. and its conclusions run the risk of being misleading . Those who wish to continue living a free and independent life, who yearn for a peace they can live with, must, when all is sa id and done. put their trust in the forces of reason, lucidity, intellectual honesty and, unfortu-

nately, the unavoidable need for a constant vigilance backed not only by weapons of military defence. but also by the "un armed" measures which must be included in any strategy of penetration formulated for a world where the conquest of public opinion represents an essential element of success. To borrow an apt phrase from Glucksmann, I would say that a combination of comm unication and deterrence creates the ideal conditions for detente.

HOW NATO VIEWS SECURITY

NATO's security is a function of the H1reat pm,ed by the enemy

camp, with all the consequences such a philosophy entails. The Alliance was born to compensate for a lack of secur ity and the continuing need for that security has kept it alive through all these years. As for the current relevance of its role, one need simply look at the preamble to the pact written in 1949: "to unite their efforts for collective defence and for preservation of peace and security". TheÂˇ institutional aims of the Alliance require that the present fragmentation of Europe be replaced by an ever increasing level of political-military integration amongst the member nations. This is such an elementary concept that it should not require further explanation . Just as there should be no need to examine the economic, political and social problems which NATO has faced ever since its inception. Political accord, a unanimous, integrated military strategy, and the support of public 11

opinion are all elements essential to security. Therefore, they must also be among the goals of a strategy for peace which projects all potential conflict as taking place at the lowest possible level of cost and danger. Another concern o-f the Alliance is the, internal dialogue between the United States and Europe. In this area , both sides must quickly agree on a way of lessening the gap between their respective public opinions: in the United States the emphasis is on potential military might and, more generally, deterrence; European public opinion favours negotiations and rejects the spectre of nuclear destruction. The "peace goal" may be attainable, but it wil l require a unified commitment and a global strategy wh ich, though its final goa l is disarmament, cannot afford pointless, indeed, dangerous demonstrations of a naive defeatism - such as conscientious ob jection or unilateral disarmament - but must follow a harmonious progression of partial strategies. In substance, present day strategic thought, as well as that of the future, concen.trates on finding ways of avoiding conflicts. It also tends to establish the conditions for an acceptable stabi lity, and it emphasizes vulnerability over potentiality. This historic change in perspective could be - or so it wou ld seem - a first step towards peace, though it is not an easy concept to understand nor, from the moral point of view, to accept. All this could be nothing more than a by-product of the nuclear arms whose advent has shaken the historic conception that envisioned humanity's development as a process punctuated

by a steady stream of wars. Should the devastating power of these nuclear weapons ever be put to use, the very word "development" would lose all meaning. It is time to champion wholeheartedly the human and civilizing force of Western thought, rejecting as so much mystification and hypocrisy the influence of any ideology fore ign to our culture. Furthermore, it is time to create a solid and lasting framework for the role reversal which to me seems a part of today's reality. The ideologica l threat has effective ly lost a part of its kinetic energy while, on the other hand, the ideals of liberty and democracy endorsed by the Western countries appear to have gained in strength and obtained a certain heroic vigour reaching beyond the strictly Western area of influence. The examples lie right before our eyes and should inspire al l of us to make the courageous choices and continue on in our commitment to a solidarity based on exemplary participation and not just inconsistent whimsy. Th is direction seems well adopted to the state of watchfulness which must be maintained lest the current balances of military strength be disrupted. Though military confrontations sometimes carry the risk of potentially uncontrollable "spiralizations", the other method for guaranteeing peace - based simply on "detente" - has proven neither practical nor reliable enough to make it a reassuring choice. But the future of East-West relations, and therefore of world peace, is still in large part tied to the resumption of a dialogue which - though it may prove difficult given the objective complexity of the problems being discussed and the confrontation between two diametrically opposed mentalities - nevertheless includes a strong point of common interest: the assured survival of the two populations along with their current ideologicalpolitical structwes. This goal will be pursued even at the

cost of making reciprocal concessions which can not easily be quantified. Such reflections could be a cause for well-founded hope, assuming that all the actors in the international arena - and here I am referring to the European countries in particu lar -;

resolutely accept their respective responsibilities and act with one accord. In t his way, should the negotiations between the two super powers y~eld the desired, positive results, tt,e Europeans will be active participants and not just passive recipients of a situation determined without

their contribution or, worse yet, against their interests. But there is another element of hope which we would do 'to'ell to keep in mind: a great many institutions and a great many private citizens are attempting to resolve - both prior to and beyond the official contacts - the most urgent of the complex and dramatic di lemmas of our time. As a result, dialogue and communication have already been established at a truly exceptiona l level and degree, overcoming barriers and boundary lines wh ich once seemed impregnable. On both sides people are convinced that man cannot live on the edge of a precipice, and the force of public opinion - both in the West, where the public is well informed and fu lly involved, and in the East, where it appears to be undergoing a gradual reawakening - is destined to push ru lers and political leaders towards the goal of peaceful coexistence.

CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF PEACE

The conclusions to be drawn are read ily apparent in the points I have discussed. "Deterrence" is a concrete element. It exists and is currently a factor in international relations. Until an acceptable substitute comes along, it is better not to question its effectiveness: this, no matter how bizarre one finds the logic - as I have already mentioned - of "Mutual Assured Destruction". Ideally, a revision of that logic would lead directly to "Mutual Assured Survival". "Detente" has a great many possibilities, but as of late it has failed to provide consistent, convincing proof of its validity. For this situation to change, the doctrine must base Âˇ itself

Spring desire.

more on facts and less on declarations of principle. Even considered in materialistic terms, as a matter of mutual advantage, "detente" has a number of applications and could make a sizeable contribution to the establishment of a new approach for solving the great political problems of t he moment. These problems center around the East -West relationship - it is true - but the influence of the North-South confrontation is on the rise. Today, all nations of world importance, no matter how great or small, must measure themselves in terms of this confrontation, and in the future it will count for even more. In the absence of valid alternatives, detente and deterrence will guarantee a "state of nonwar", at leastÂˇ in the Northern Hemisphere. This is not the ideal situation, but it is already a big step forward. Once peace is understood as the absence of waged war, then it becomes a feasib le, practical alternative. This has been amply demonstrated in the 40 years since the end of World War II and is possible thanks to a subtle game in which, unfortunately, the instruments of war still play a part. This is a game played at the very lim its of the balance of world power. We must once again emphasize that in an era dominated by the threat of nuclear holocaust. war can no longer be considered an acceptable means of solving political problems. Given the lessons of recent history, plus the immeasurable destructive power of current nuclear arsenals, war - which authoritative sources have justly defined as "mankind's curse" -

would represent an utter triumph of the irrational. In protecting our interests and guaranteeing our security, NATO still represents the keystone of a system which appears to have· no substitute. A change in the ,data describing the current balance of military force would give rise to a number of unsettling possibilities. Despite the rigid, seemingly paralyzed nature of this conflict, we can take comfort in noting that - beyond the quantitative or qualitative aspects of the two opponents' potential strengths the ideological factor is slowly losing its energy and drive, and there is a good chance that bipolarity may soon begin to show its limits, too. Despite all appearances, entering into the game might not be an impossible task. Perhaps if we proceed in a relaxed way, we can be persuaded to characterize the present moment as a "period of transition" - from an old to a new system of international relations - a period during which the rise of new protagonists (or rather, of a group of new protagonists) ready to join the principals and play a more active role in the pursuit and maintenance of peace should not be that difficult. To make it a reality, a global objective· should be determined which is valid for all nations; the need for such an objective exists, as is evidenced by the extremely fluid atmosphere of world public opinion, along with the current cultural ferment and the confused, pulsating mass of social aspirations. I have said that this is a period of transition, and as such it is full of risk, both on account of the unexpected directions which the world of ideas may take and because of the eve~ present possib ili ty that events will escape our control and current situations will explode. We must be able to manage this phase. That statement. quite

Icarus.

an easy thing to say, definitely has a certain glamorous appeal, but I am well aware of the unending series of obstacles which must be overcome if we are to transform it into reality. On more than one occasion, I have pointed out that it is high time we developed a body of global strategic thought - something which is missing today, especially in the Western countries - designed to give an answer, or a series of answers; to the major problems of the moment: • East-West relations; • North-South relations ; • policies for the use of energy and prime resources; • economic disorder. We must confront these problems, and we will continue to confront them in the near future. Bringing them closer to a solution means working for peace and the progress of mankind. Their complexity and their tangled sets of interrelations should not dishearten us. Europe's duty is clear. She must dedicate herself to solving these problems, even if this requires a long-term commitment. She must work on an equal footing with the superpowers. participating in a conceptual context to which she contributes by reassessing both the Atlantic ideals and the priceless body of values and culture inherited from the old continent, which could once again fill its classic role, acting as a bearer of ideas and a guide of universal thought. Umberto Cappuzzo

The illustrations are reproductions of paintings by Sergio Amadio.

Ethical perception is a fundamental characteristic of man, It manifests itself in his capacity to participate in the events of life and is bound up with the very essence of the individual. Without the capacity to distinguish between good and evil, between right and wrong, man could not five in freedom. Ethical perception is an innate faculty linked to the coexistence, in one and the same individual, of a real world, which forces him to come to terms with reality, and an ideal world; it raises him above material concerns, at the same time, however, subiecting him to the authority of his own conscience. Man thus exists as a complex and mysterious being, a perfect microcosm that, although of enormous proportions at its own level, appears quite tiny when compared to the Universe as a whole. The history of man is characterized by his constant endeavour to reach unattainable perfection. To this end, he has gradually extended the boundaries of his knowledge and his capacity to implement his ideas, striving to pass on to the following generations the transcendental values of society and of the individuals of which it is composed. He has tamed nature and, with the help of science, has made great efforts to understand the complex phenomena affecting his life. One of these phenomena is violence , considered as a means, a tool, a form of social behaviour. Violence is one of the factors permanently influencing human evolution. Nevertheless, we are now at a point in our history in which violence has reached such an absurdly high level as to threaten our civilization and even fife on this planet. Another of these phenomena is the gregarious aspect of human nature, which is in permanent contrast with man's violent nature. Man's instinct for preservation leads him to seek the company ofÂˇ others, so as to form a tightly-knit social group and ensure that social values can be developed. The incompatibility often found between these values, whether taken separately or in their interaction with rules and established practice, is what produces the violence which occurs in human relations and iustifies the creation of a social group specialized in the use of force . "Mi/itariness" is thus felt to be a necessary part of all forms of organized human society.

Right.

"The surrender of Breda" by Velasquez. The city was conquered in 1625 during the uprising of the Netherlands. The painting illustrates the embrace between the victor, the Genoese general Ambrogio Spinola and the defeated governor of Breda, Giustino di Nassau, depicted as about to kneel before the victorious general. In a gesture of great humanity, the latter prevents him from completing this humiliating act.

~ND-Mill

THE MILITARY PROFESSION The soldier is trained by and for his country to be a specialist in the use of force on behalf of his particular Service. His training consists in increasing his effec路路 tiveness in using the available weapons and equipment in order to inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy. Both from the personal and the Service points of view, the serviceman can consider his task as accomplished if he can achieve th is aim. However, this aim entails the unavoidable use of organized force, considered by many as the essence of the military profession. The control of violence is a vital function of any society and the soldier, i.e. the professional of the armed forces, thus forms a social group that is necessary to the national society. This truth is of use to those bearing arms for their country in that it helps them to overcome an apparent contradiction which may otherwise lead them to have doubts about their chosen career. This is because, in actual fact, man rejects violence. It is, furthermore, condemned by ethics in all its forms and also our own conscience tends to consider it in a negative light. If this is true, as it appears to be, why has the military profession always withstood the above attacks? Why have there only been 200 years of real peace over the last three thousand years? One major reason has been the use man has made of violence as a factor of change and historical development. The various schools of philosophy that have attempted to provide man with a moral code of behaviour have vainly sought to explain the reasons underlying violence. However, in spite of the different methods followed and the praiseworthy efforts made, these philosophical efforts have not obtained the desired effect. It has been vainly attempted to justify violence and to lim it its scope by the application of morality, politics and law. 18

Ethics has attempted to come to terms with violence by the use of different religious and ideological structures to water it down and somehow make it more acceptable. Politics tends to rationalize the way violence manifests itself by introducing the logic of the balance of forces and of mutual effort to achieve a situation characterized by good will and tolerance. Lastly, in order to admit the use of violence, the law requires the underlying causes to be essentially just and refers to cases of defence against aggression, although the difficulties involved in defining aggression and the variety of possible forms of conflict have considerably reduced the effectiveness of this rule. THE ESSENCE OF WAR As a manifestation of organized violence, war has been one of the main means used by man in his relations with other men. Ever since the beginning of human events, this form of social pathology has been handed down through the centuries, to quote Hegel's apt phrase, like a "judge of history". It is precisely its importance over the centuries that has led to the consideration that it does not depend either on the collective will of the masses, nor on that of the dominant minority. As an extreme hypothesis, war can be considered as a violent conflict between organized groups arising out of a clash between opposing interests. However, the contingent cause must always be sought in man's independent will. In fact, the "law o-f cause and effect" found in natural phenomena does not seem to be operative in this case. War is impervious to the humanistic ideals used to路 try and steer human behaviour within the narrow confines set by "duty" and "being", and continually reappears as an inescapable recurrent historical reality. To refuse to acknowledge the de-

structive effects of war would amount to subscribing to one of those totalitarian follies in which it is considered to be a moral condition peculiar to human society. However, to refuse to accept war in any form would be equally idle and would merely shift tl;le emphasis on to an abstract, ideal world based on Utopias incompatible with man's very nature. And so the concept (or the appeal?) of the "just war" again raises its head. The origins of this concept are as old as Christianity itself, as symbolized by St Augustine's exhortation to Count Boniface to use the sword received from his Emperor against all those disturbing law and order in Africa. When on the horns of the dilemma of whether to engage in a just or an unjust war, it would be absurd to expect to be able to retrace the entire troubled path trodden by Christian thought. Ideally then, wecan conveniently link the exhortation of the Bishop of lppona, in "De Civitate Dei", who refers to war as a necessary evil, something inevitable, to certain statements by Pius XII in some of his messages and speeches. In this 1948 Christmas message the Pope said that certain people hope to find salvation and the solution to all their problems in the formula of peace at any price. Unwitting ly, they actually end up by jeopardizing the cause of peace, because they encourage the arrogant certitude of would-be aggressors. He goes on to say "true Christian desire for peace is strength and not weakness or passive resignation". Jean-Paul II himself, in his unceasing oecumenical efforts

Right.

"Officer of the Chasseurs on horse路 back during the last charge" by Theodore Gericault. Like a modern snapshot, this romantic painting captures the release of vital energy from the horseman and his mount.

to abolish the very idea of "just war", pecu liar to mediaeval thought and revived in the modern age, and to induce an increasing number of peoples and nations to adopt a Âˇ~peace culture". stated in an address to the UN in 1982 that "under the present conditions, deterrence based on equilibrium - which is certainly not to be considered as an end in itself, but as one stag~ in the process of gradual disarmament - can still be considered as morally acceptable". But how long is this stage to last? It is not possible to suggest any reliable figure: years, decades, or perhaps even centuries? The very definition of "war" as an immanent reality, however deplorable, has given rise to extensive and persistent controversies. Such renowned experts as Basil Liddell Hart and Raymond Aron have defined it as the art of using the Armed Forces to achieve set political objectives. The French general Beaufre goes even further, considering war to be the art of combining force with political ends. Such approaches to the problem. characterized by a valid conception of war as the collective manifestation of the use of force, can all be related back to the military thought of Karl von Clausewitz, whose work has steadily been growing in importance and acceptance for a long time now. Untainted by dogmatism, von Clausewitz' principles were doubtlesslâ€˘1 a clear expression of his age. His arguments concerning the moral implications of war and his conceptions of total and limited war have been, in many respects, highly illuminating for

left. "St Martin shares his cloak with a beggar" by El Greco. Jn this symbolic image, the figure of the horseman represents che synthesis of the moral principles informing the soldier's life. As wg// as valour and obedience. he must also cultivate civic qualities to the high'-!St degree.

tive value of war and the opporany statesman faced with the problem of choosing the best tunity that the defeated countries strategic course in a hectic world have of making up for their torn between different ideological defeat still exist today? The apocalyptic, although only hypopoles. Nevertheless, also the ideas that Clausewitz produced thetical, vision of the possible and disseminated with such Teu- Âˇ consequences of nuclear war tonic methodicalness had a num- raises a number of doubts in this connection. ber of precedents. The second consideration, Without embarking upon a also perceived by Clausewitz and long and possibly unrewarding survey of past history, let us confirmed by military events and simply examine the case of Flavio studies in every historical period and part of the world, refers to Renato Vegezio (late 14th centthe often decisive role sometimes early 15th cent). A statement in the early part of volume I of his played by chance in the uncertain "De re militari" (" ... the Romans world of war. Indeed, more than in any other human activity, a conquered the whole world history of battles would clearly exclusively ... because of their disciplined organization, their use indicate that war is linked to chance. Together with luck, of the Army"} reaffirms the link which is only one aspect of the between the policy of Rome and its military activity. Nor did the same thing, chance often plays a preponderant role in human role played by the Army (i.e. the present-day Armed Forces) vicissitudes and, despite all the careful planning, leads the phein the general framework of the nomenon of war into the field system of government weaken of uncertainty. The chance factor the unitary spirit on which the Roman state was founded. In this exerts its effect throughout the state every aspect of the institu- duration of any conflict. The risk tional context was a cogent force thus arises of an uncontrolled use of violence, so that war, of the "lex", the rigorous and functional civilian ideals and the which is a phenomenon that can elude all control in its abstract basic philosophy of military art. form, can find sufficient rationalimbued as it was with the conity and possible ethical justificacepts of order, training and tion only in the expression of discipline. political means and ob jectives. Two further considerations must be made in this brief descriptive note on the phenomenon LIMITS TO THE VIOLENCE of war, both of which can also be found in Clausewitz' thought, OF WAR although the nuclear situation has now made absolute and Violence may find rational total war practically unfeasible as an instrument for solving inter- limits in the reasons that ought to, or actually do, justify its use national disputes. and the extent to which it is used. The first consideration is The first of these reasons that of war as an historical event. consists essentially of legitimate No conflict to date has produced self-defence. However, the conabsolute results. The defeated cept of self-defence covers a nations have often suffered only wide range of different situations a temporary setback, and have and necessitates a clear definifound a satisfactory solution tion of what constitutes aggresat the political level. This assertion is worth dwelling on. If it is sion. The most readily perceivable conception is the one in true, as numerous actual historwhich the aggressor is identified ical cases seem to indicate, as the one first using force: This another piece can be said to is the definition given in Interhave been added to the jigsaw national Law. puzzle comprising the several However, some thought must elements condemning war as a be given to the possible ways decisive factor in international disputes. But do the non-defini- aggression can manifest itself. 21

In modern times, these manifestations often do not involve actual physical aggression, but are expressed in subtle forms of psychological, economic and cultural pressure. Although much less conspicuous and destructive

than actual armed conflict, these forms of aggression can have equally devastating effects in their specific fields. The other limit mentioned above, i.e. the use of violence on a reduced scale, tailored to the objective to be attained, is related to the perpetual endeavour to "humanize" war, so often unsuccessful in the history of armed conflict and today clashing harshly with the almost unlimited power of modern offensive weapons. The attempt to identify these limits leads to the convic-

tion that the reasons sought to contain and perhaps ''.humanize" war have a kind of intrins'ic ambiguity. No definite elements can be found, either juridical or moral, to sanction violence, despite the moral and juridical rules intro-

duced over the centuries in order, on the one hand, to reduce the number of those who have to suffer the consequences of the violence and, on the other, to reduce the suffering of those taking part in the war operations. One significant example, chosen from among the many available, of the rules "humanizing" war is the " Instructions for the conduct of United States armies in the field" issued by President Lincoln in 1863. These instructions state that "military necessity cannot justify cruelty,

the subjection of the enemy to suffering for pleasure or vengeance, mutilation or the causing of wounds outside actual fighting, o, to torture in order to obtain confessions. The use of poisons is prohibited, as well as any

Above.

"The Oath of the Horatii" by Jacques Louis David. This work, an example of noble and austere celebratory art, shows the Horatiis' moral strength, expressed by their powerful posture.

Right.

"Charles V at the battle of Muhlberg" by Tiziano. Against the background of the battlefield and a livid sky, the victorious Emperor seems to have sacrificed all sense of humanity to the myth of royal power.

arbitrary act of devastation. The deception allowed in the conduct of operations must not degenerate into acts of perfidiousness. As a general rule, the state of military necessity does not justify any act of cruelty that would also needlessly make the return to peace more difficult". These noble principles were su ited to the period and to a war in which, despite its peculiarities, it was possible to respect them up to a certain point. With all the best intentions in the world, could they be applied to a hypothetical conflict of the '80s? The answer can only be no, which confirms the flimsiness of all theories humanizing war and defending everything that can be used to increase the credibility of the ÂˇArmed Forces as an instrument of deterrence, dissuasion and detente, a champion of peace, designed to preserve and foster the essential values of civilization. MILITARY ETHICS It was mentioned earlier in this article that the soldier lives and operates inside society as a specialist in the use of force. The military profession cannot bypass the constraint obliging it to prepare itself to use force: the very nature of armed conflict makes this impossible. In this sense the use of force in the interests of peace and not for the purposes of aggression, is legitimate and justified by the need to safeguard the common interest. Even the Vatican Council II (Gaudium et spes 79) acknowlJ edged that "all those dedicated to serving their Country in theÂˇ ranks of the Army can be considered as ministers of the security and freedom oÂˇf their peoples and, when they carry out such duties correctly, truly contribute to the stability of peace". The result is a kind of "exclusiveness" of the soldier in return for which he must show himself to be worthy, and cultivate also the civilian virtues to the highest degree.

The thoughts and actions of the soldier must be characterized by respect of the law, honesty in his social dealings, austerity and patriotism. He is thus considered as someone special, not only because he is capable of bearing arms in his Country's defence, but above all because his conduct is based in the highest moral principles. The first in this scale of values is valour itself, which consists of a synthesis of qualities that are indispensable for anyone who has to face responsibility, risks, danger and sacrifice. However, valour must not be confused with rashness or cruelty. Valour is accompanied by obedience, an essential quality for a soldier. This obedience is not passive, but must be conscious and participatory. Its raison d'etre lies in the conviction of the need to implement the overall aims of the nation. In practice, it nourishes and expresses that sublimation of freedom which is discipline, the fulcrum of the hierarchical principle and the strength of any well ordered community desirous of progress. Discipline thus appears as a corollary linking up the various qualities of the soldier because it tones down courage, preventing it from degenerating into rashness and cruelty; it also rationalizes obedience so that the latter becomes part of the soldier's consciousness. Unfortunately these qualities are sometimes misunderstood and despised by modern individualistic and hedonistic society. By replacing confidence, solidarity and being with scepticism, selfishness and the idea of gain, modern society has been the cause of widespread psychic conflict and frustrating discouragement among the military. But these are the values that make the soldier a man with confidence in himself and worthy of respect. Backed up by his character, raised to the level of a coherent life system and, according to Stoetzel, representing the true objective aspect of the personality, these qualities

give comma nders the moral strength they need to take the right decisions at the right time, and to accept responsibility for making them. This moral strength can be present only when it is based on deep-rooted ethical convictions justified and supported by knowledge. This is the form of military ethics that can survive in troubled and alarming times, in which the structural and cultural factors, over which the atom bomb has cast its shadow, only increase the feeling of uncertainty over the validity of a life style chosen and deepen the sense of isolation from civilized society which sometimes seem to hover this professional category. Although by no means a closed caste, they still preserve and cultivate interests and qualities of their own which characterize their fundamental ethics, but never-. theless remain open to the new technological, organizational and cultural influences. Protection must be afforded to this military thics from the insidious threats of beguiling destabilizing forces by affirming that the present-day Armed Forces must not only serve in the Country's defence but also be a means of education and of strengthening the national identity, as well as having new tasks to carry out, such as technological training, emergency services to protect the free institutions and in defence of the community in the case of national calamities and the execution of special high-risk missions {inspection and clearing action, bomb disposal, etc.). This is the ethics tout court to which William I of Orange was referring when, extolling the principles and actions peculiar to military service in his times, he stated that "there is no need to hope in order to begin, nor to succeed in order to persevere".

Ciro DI Martino

The all-weather fire control system for the artillery

to direct rocket and gun fire

THE REALITIES

Of NATO SECURITY

The North Atlantic Alliance recently celebrated its 36th anniversary. Since its foundation in 1949, NA TO has success fully preserved peace while guarding the freedoms of the peoples of Western Europe. As a result of the unity displayed by the Alliance and the collective efforts of its member nations we can be thankful that a generation of West European youth has been raised which has never experienced the devastation and the tragedies of war. 26

Left. Italian " Afpini" and "Alpenjaeger" of the German Federal Army during bilateral activities.

Below.

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

A moment of the ceremony for the award of the Italian Paratroops Badge to U.S. soldiers.

As one of its founding mem bers, Italy has always made an important contri bution to t he Allia nce. Its geographic location has made Italy a cornerstone in the defence of the Southern Reg ion of Allied Command Europe (ACE). Successfu l deterrence and defence in Europe depend on the ability to maintain ACE's land link with the Southern Region by defending Italian terr itory while controlling the vital sea areas and .sir space of the central Mediter-

ranean. Italy provides well tra ined, ready forces vital t o the accomplishment of these tasks. Current modernization efforts in all three Italian services are strong evidence of Italy's resolve t o con tinue to ful fil! these im-Âˇ portant missions in the future. Yet it is not iust in her contributions to defence of the Southern Region that Italy has proven her commitment to the All iance. Italy's decision to deploy cruise missiles on her soil was a key factor in the success

of l'.',IATO's intermediate range force (lNF) modernization progra m. This modern ization addresses a long standing gap in the spectru m of Alliance capabilities. Italy also makes major con tributions of men and equipment to the NATO Airborne Early Warn ing Force and the ACE Mobile Force - two multinational Al liance programs which con tribute to the security of all NATO nations. The Al liance has bu ilt its successful record t hroug h the

r.n .,

efforts of all member nations. However. despite its success, confusion exists in the minds of many of our citizens regarding certain important aspects of NATO's security concept s, policies, plans and aims. If we are to ensure the prevention of war in the future. we will need to seek the continued support of our peoples while eliminating wherever possible the confusion that jeopardizes th is support. Clearing up this confusion requires an understanding of the realities of NATO security. To prevent aggression in Europe, NATO has a deterrent strategy of Flexible Response supported by a triad of military forces: strategic nuclear, nonstrategic nuclear and conventional forces. As a defensive Alliance, we do not need to match the Warsaw Pact one for

one in any area of force comparison . However, in order to sustain the necessary balance of forces for each leg of the triad. Now that the United States and the United Kingdom have embarked on programs to modernize their strategic nuclear forces, the deterrent value of those forces will remain high, if the modernization programs are fully implemented. The NATO decision of December 1979 to modernize NATO's non-strategic nuclear forces addressed a major shortcoming in that important leg of our triad. Continued deployment of the intermediate range nuclear forces, despite Soviet attempts to prevent us. is proof of Alliance resistance to intimidation. Additionally, deployment provides a major incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously and

The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Gen. Rogers, with the Commander of the "Susa" Battalion.

therefore aids in our efforts to achieve a satisfactory arms control agreement. For some years we at SHAPE have been pointing out that NATO's major weakness is in its conventional leg of the triad. Currently we lack adequate conventional forces to deter a purely conventionally, NATO pol itical authorities would face fairly quickly the decision to authorize the release of theater nuclear weapons. By declining to pay the bill for adequate conventional torces, our nations

plague the Warsaw Pact. It is have mortgaged NAfO's deironic that this myth is nurtured fence to the nuclear response. by complacency stemming from That is the message we in uniform have been transmitting , NATO's very success - thirtysix years of peace. but the message is •not promptThe facts are that the Soviet ing action to provide adequate Union and the Warsaw Pact conventional forces. continue an unrelenting military The obvious question is, buildup both quantitatively and "what is working against our qualitatively. The quantitative efforts?". I believe it results from our failure to convince· our military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is against peoples that there is a threat us by at least 2:1, and higher to their freedom in the future. Our failure has been fueled by a in most areas, and that imbalance grows annually. Qualitativeseries of misperceptions - let's call them myths - about NATO's ly, just since 1970 the Soviet. · Union has developed and fielded defence policies and the nature more than 15 new types of airof the threat we face. In an alliance of democratic craft. 9 new ballistic missiles and 25 other types of missiles, nations such as NATO. defence over 50 new or modified classes policy must be debated in the public sector to gain the willing of submarines and naval comsupport of the people who must batants, and at least 50 new ground force weapons. These sustain it. The current debate developments reflect steady, lacks clarity because of the number of myths which have evolutionary progress that has resulted in sign ificant improvegained credence among too ments in the range, speed. accumany persons in our nations. racy and payload of major new These myths are dangerous Soviet weapons. Many of the because they have distorted new Soviet systems equal, and reality, diverted attention from in some cases exceed, the capathe real issues and can lead to unwise policy advice. In some bilities of Western weapons. The day has gone when we cases they have enabled the could take comfort in the belief Soviets to perceive snags and .tears in the fabric of Alliance that Soviet superiority in numcohesion which they exploit bers could be compensated by constantly in order to attempt to the quality of our systems. unravel the transatlantic relaThe flywheel on the Soviet tionship and thus move them military growth machine revolves closer to accomplishing one of unabated, resulting in a widentheir primary goals: the separa- ing gap between NATO's force tion of the United States from capabilities and those of the the European members of NATO. Wasraw Pact. During the latter My purpose is to try to half of this decade we will see dispel some of the confusion by the deployment of an entire new generation of weapons designed providing my views on some of in part to replace the systems the myths and realities as they fielded in such large quantities relate to NATO - its strategy, military policies and the nature during the early 1970's. Some of these weapons will reflect of the threats we face today. In doing so I hope that I can Soviet technological breakthroughs and new approaches contribute to the current debate to warfighting. about NATO security and to our attempts to design our future But it is not just the growth and sophistication of military course for Alliance security in a realistic manner. hardware which is disturbing. We also see the Warsaw Pact The myth which we hear continuing to refine its offensive most frequently is that there is no threat to peace and security operational doctrine and exercising its forces in a purely in Western Europe or that NATO exaggerates Soviet and Warsaw offensive manner. It is clear that the Soviet leaders - should they Pact military power and ignores choose to attack - seek the the many weaknesses which

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE) MOBILE FORCE ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTHERN

NORTHERN EUROPE

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE NATO AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING FORCE I

-~~ I

ALLIED FORCES BALTIC APPROACHES

AMF(L) personne' during an exercise. Left to right: two Italian officers, a Norwegian infantryman, a British soldier.

capability to overrun rapidly NATO defensive positions and bring a war in Europe to a quick conclusion before NATO has time to organize an effective defence. I acknowledge that just using figures of military comparison does not reflect the complete balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We in the West have also been modernizing our forces, though not nearly at the rate of the Warsaw Pact. We enjoy comparatively healthier economies, democratic

political systems and freedoms and a more open and equal alliance of sovereign nations. Our values are worth protecting. The Warsaw Pact is plagued by repeated agricultural failures, weak economies heavily dependent on Western credit, questionable loyalty of some East European nations to Moscow's dictates, a constant concern over China, and severe social and human problems which impact upon the military. But. these weaknesses do not translate into reductions in available

Warsaw Pact military strength. As the trend of the widening gap between force capabilities continues, we must be concerned about the Soviets' exploitation of that gap. Those who reject relative force capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and NATO and base their judgment only on intentions, should recall that the Soviets have frequently demonstrated a willingness to use military force for political purposes, even in the nuclear age. For example, the invasion and continued subj_ugation of Afghanistan is a stark warning to those who wonder if Soviet weaknesses translate Âˇi nto restraint in military adventurism. However, in spite of the very real overt threat, the most likely menace to freedom in Western Europe comes not from a possible outright attack, but as Colin Gray has said with such clarity, " the name of the game in Eurasia is political intimidation in the shadow of military power" (1 ). This menace, the Soviet objective in Western Europe, would manifest itself in demands for political and economic concessions and a veto _power over the form of our security measures. The potential reality our people must face is: if the gap in force capabil ities continues to widen, making the military situation (even for a defensive alliance) beyond restoration, there is the very real danger peace may continue in Western Europe but our freedom could gradually erode as critica l Western decisions are made in the shadow cast by the Warsaw Pact's massive military might. We should acknowledge that the Soviets do not want a war. They simply want to reach a balance of forces by which they can achieve their objective without having to fire a shot or even call their troops out of their barracks.

There is a rather insidious corollary to the myth that Soviet military power is exaggerated. That corollary contends that current American security policy is an equa l threat to pe9 ce. Those who accept and perpetuate this myth sometimes ascribe a moral equivalency of purpose between the Soviet and the American objectives in Europe. This myth is especia lly dangerous because it has a degrading effect on cohesion within the North Atlantic Alliance. United States policy in Europe today has been formulated against a backdrop of the menace our nations face collectively and is directed towards protecting common vital interests in conjunction with US allies. All the All ies must now pay increased defence bills because of Soviet disregard for detente in the 1970's, because of continued Soviet global adventurism and because of the continuing Warsaw Pact military growth. We should remember that it was not the United States that disrupted the military balance in Europe by a massive military buildup, highlighted by the deployment of SS-20's, 21 's, 22's and 23's; nor the United States that has sent over 100,000 soldiers into Afghanistan; nor the United States that pressured the Polish military to destroy the aspirations of the Polish people for human rights. The view that United States policy, because it is more assertive in the defense of Western interests, is somehow responsible for globa l unrest resu lts from an unwillingness on the part of those who hold this view to face up to the realities of the world today. Soviet objectives vis-a-vis the West are counter to our interest, despite the Soviet's rhetoric for peace. All of us want peace, but we in the West want peace with our freedom intact. To achieve that goal, NATO was formed as a defensive Alliance. The United States, as the senior partner of NATO, fully subscribes to NATO's primary mission: the deterrence of war. NATO nations do not seek one

This is not so 1 Flexible Response inch of Warsaw Pact territory. is the only strategy which, when Further, NATO will not be the first to employ mi litary force in supported by adequate forces, takes full account of the imperEurope. The historical record atives of deterrence in the bears these statemen'ts out. European environment. Its goal Since the founding of NATO, is to deter by posing costs to a the only nation to use military potential aggressor which would force against a Warsaw Pact country to achieve political ends outweigh any possible gains he might seek. has been the .Soviet Union itself. The strength of our strategy Anyone who is tempted to see a symmetry of moral purpose is the range of responses available to meet aggression. Should between the Soviet Union and deterrence fail, we will seek the United States, should compare the quality of life today in first to defeat the aggressor at the level at which he has chosen West Germany with that in East to fight. By this direct defence, Germany. Moscow uses its we hope to place on the aggres~ power at home and abroad to sor's shoulders the burden of stamp out the freedoms which are a threat to its system. Amer- deciding whether to cease his attack or to escalate the conica and its allies use their power flict. This is our preferred Âˇreto protect our many democratic freedoms and to liberate creative sponse. If our direct defence is unsuccessful. NATO is prepartalents - a major difference. ed to escalate the scope and There are some who argue that the Alliance nuclear capa- intensity of the conflict, thus directly challenging the enemy's bility is sufficient to deter any will to continue his attack. The Soviet threats to Europe. This is frequently offered as justifica- third level, the general nuclear response, is the ultimate guartion for not doing more to imantor of deterrence prescribed prove conventional capabilities. by our strategy and poses the This, too, is a myth because it ignores some basic facts to the threat of massive intercontinental nuclear strikes on the contrary. Over-reliance on enemy's homeland, the one thing nuclear weapons could actually the Soviets fear most. This encourage the threat of a constrategy of Flexible Response, ventional attack since the Sobacked by an adeguate specviets might find incredible NATO's threat to commit mutual trum of military capability, is designed to create uncertainty suicide as a response to all in the mind of any potential acts of aggression. Additionally, aggressor about the manner in such a posture would frighten our publics and give added sup- which NATO might respond and to make it impossible for him port to those who advocate unilateral disarmament or neutral- to calculate the losses he might sustain. The greater the aggresism as an alternative . sor's uncertainty and incalculaFinally, reliance solely on nuclear weapons will not enable bility about the ultimate risks he takes in initiating hostilities, us to resist intimidation and the stronger our deterrence will cÂˇoercion - the more likely men-Âˇ be. Therefore, I disagree with ace to our freedom - because those who suggest NATO needs the physical protection of our a new strategy. Flex ible Reterritory and our interests can only be provided by convention- sponse is militarily sound and politically agreed among the al forces. Another myth is that NATO's Alliance members. The main challenge is to convince the strategy of Flexible Response people of our NATO nations to is no longer appropriate for provide the improved conventoday and tomorrow. Some tional capability necessary to argue that changing conditions support the strategy. in the military balance and the There are also myths relattechnology of the modern battleed to the manner by which we field have rendered our strategy in Allied Command Europe are of Flexible Response outmoded. 31

trying to improve our conventiona l forces. Since 1980 our priority tasks for such improvements have been: • First, to do better with the forces already committed to ACE by bringing them up to ACE standards for manning, equipping, training, sustaining and reinforcing. These are the forces which will man our General Defensive Position and must hold against the lead echelon of attacking forces. • Second, to continue to modernize our weapons systems, and as we do, to seek the means to improve our ability to reduce to manageable proportions the number of Warsaw Pact forces arriving at our General Defensive Position. • Third, to add to our force structure, especially with mobilizable. trained reserves. To accomplish our second priority - seeking means to reduce to manageable proportions the number of Warsaw Pact forces we must engage at the General Defensive Position - we developed at SHAPE a subconcept of operations called Follow-on Force.s Attack (FOFA). There are many myths surrounding FOFA. FOFA is an operational concept designed to complement our conventional defence efforts at the General Defensive Position. It achieves this by attacking with conventional weapons systems those enemy forces which stretch from just behind the troops in contact to as far into the enemy's rear as our target acquisition and weapons systems will permit us to locate and attack his forces. At pre-· sent we have the ability to attack enemy follow-on forces with some short-range, indirect fire weapons and manned aircraft. Having outlined what FOFA is, I want to refute some of the myths that surround it. • It is not a new strategy: it simply provides the means to implement our current strategy more effectively. • FOFA is applicable to current Warsaw Pact doctrine: it takes account of the latest changes

which include the Operational Maneuver Group and .the circumstances in which the enemy's lead echelon may be thickened by second echelon troops. • A FOFA capability will not be acquired at the expense of our forces defending at the General Defensive Position: defending at the GDP and attacking followon forces are complementary and mutually reinforcing mission components. • FOFA is not an offensive strategy: as always in the past, we must let the Warsaw Pact know that if they initiate an attack, their forces will not enjoy the benefit of sanctuary in their own territory. • FOFA is not U.S. Army Airland Battle by another name. Our planning for this sub-concept cannot accept pre-emptive attacks (NATO will not fire the first shot); nor does FOFA envision ground counter-offensives across our nations' borders heading deep into the enemy's rear area; or the integrated use of conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons. • FOFA is not reliant upon the

weak reed of emerging technology: our thinking is to improve on current proven technology, while not missing the opportunity to exploit for our purposes the new advanced technology if it proves mission effective and cost effective. Some people, especially in Western Europe, also argue that by improving our conventional capacity we will make war in Europe more likely. This is another myth. The additional conventional capability which we seek is limited to that required to offer a reasonable prospect of frustrating a conventional attack. Such a level of conventional improvement will not permit the renunciation of either the possible first-use of nonstrategic nuclear forces to prevent being overrun, nor the role of US strategic systems as the ultimate deterrent. Improved conventional posture will strengthen our deterrence of war, not weaken it. NATO's perceived ability to protect its territory

- and not just threaten to bring on a holocaL:.st - will strengthen the only worthwhile firebreak: the one between peace and any kind of war. Other myths also arise which impede our ability to get our message across when our people . contemplate the cost of the conventional force improvements we seek. Some argue that such improvements cost too much. Others claim that because budget resources are tight - and when have they not been - increasing defence spending can only be accomplished at the expense of necessary public and social programs. ,· .. ,

General Rogers together with the "Alpini" of the "Susa" at chowtime.

force readiness and determination are protective. These latter are also the qualities which can provide incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for arms reduction accords. And I happen to be one who believes that, if the future we all want is one of peace with freedom, greater internationa l stability and reduced and balanced levels of arms of all categories, that future lies at the negotiating table in the form of arms reduction accords. Thus, it behooves us in the West to provide positive incentives for serious Soviet negotiating. CONCLUSION

In reality the conventional force improvements that we seek can be affordable. But it is also true that they become more expensive every year we delay them. If we commit ourselves as an Alliance to making steady, consistent and gradual increases in defence spending, I be lieve we can acquire the increased capability we need without economic dislocations or sacrificing necessary socia l programs. The key point is that security and freedom comprise the most basic, necessary social service which a nation must provide its people. It is the primary moral jmperative of government.

Our mutual hopes for the future rest on our willingness to do what is necessary to strengthen Alliance deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict. Some additional sacrifice by our people wi ll be required, but the results will be worthy of our efforts. In this regard, the next few years will be a critical time for our Alliance. We will either see NATO take those actions required to strengthen deterrence or we will see the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO capabilities widen to the point that the balance - even Some have argued - erroneously in my judgement - that for a defensive alliance - cannot be restored. We do not have improving military ?trength to accept the latter situation as threatens our ability to achieve what we all desire - a world at inevitable. The threats that we as an peace. I disagree. History has Alliance face today are less shown that wars come to navisible - but just as real - as on tions when they are weak milthat day in 1949 when twelve ita rily. If we have learned anynations signed the North Atlanthing from history, it is that tic Treaty which gave birth to strength and the readiness of our great Alliance. Now, 36 years the forces threatened by an later, we have grown to 16 adversary's excess accumulanations, still strongly united by tion of military power are not the desire to see peace last provocative. Rather, they are essential to the preservation of with our freedoms intact. NATO has indeed been the most sucpeace with security. Weakness, cessful peace movement the unpreparedness and equivocaworld has known. tion are provocative. Strength,

Irving Berlin, a famous American composer, once said , "The toughest thing about success is that you've got to keep on being a success". Never has it been so important to so many people for an organization, NATO, to keep on being a success.

Bernard W. Rogers

(1) Colin Gray, "International Order and American Power" , Air University Review. Sept.-Oct. 1984, p. 49.

GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS

General Bernard W. Rogers was born in Fairview, Kansas, and entered the United States MIiitary Academy, West Point, New York, in 1940, was First Captain of the Corps of Cadets, and graduated in June 1943 as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry. From 1947 to 1950, he attended Oxford University, England, as a Rhodes Scholar, receiving a Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. In June 1952, he joined the 2nd Division in Korea and commanded the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment. He then joined the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations and Far East Commands in Tokyo, Japan. Following attendance at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he again joined the 2nd Infantry Division as Command er of the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington. In June 1956, he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, in Washington, DC, serving with the Coordination Group and as Executive and Senior Aide to the Chief of Staff. After graduating from the US Army War College in 1960, he was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division in' Augsburg, Germany, where he commanded the 1st Battle Group, 19th Infantry, and later served as Chief of Staff of the Division.

He was then assigned to the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and served as a Military Assistant to the Chairman, then as Executive Officer to the Chairman from May 1963 until October 1966. In November 1966, he became Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Infantry Division in the Republic of Vietnam. In September 1967, he was assigned Commandant of Cadets at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. From September 1969 until December 1970, he was Commanding General of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado. He served as Chief of Legislative Liaison in the Office of the Secretary of the Army from January 1971 until October 1972. He became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, on 1 November 1972. On 18 November 1974, he assumed command of the US Army Forces Command. He was the US Kermit Roosevelt Lecturer in 1976. On 1 October 1976, he became Chief of Staff, United States Army, serving in that position until assuming duties as Commander-in-Chief, US European Command on 27 June 1979. General

Rogers became Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, effective 29 June 1979. General Rogers has been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, Defence Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, Legion of Merit with three oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters, Bronze Star with "V" device and oak leaf cluster Âˇlor merit, Air Medal with "V" device, Army Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster, Vietnamese National Order, 5th Class, Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with palm {two awards), and vari9us other foreign decorations. He has been awarded Honorary Doctorates of Law from Boston University and Akron University and an Honorary Doctorate of Civil Laws by his Alma Mater, Oxford University, England. General Rogers is also an Honorary Fellow of University College, Oxford University, England, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. General Rogers married Ann Ellen Jones in December 1944. General and Mrs. Rogers have three children, Michael W. Rogers (C aptain, US Army), Mrs. Diane E. Opperman and Susan A. Rogers.

OTOC 13 ARMOURED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES Weight: Road Speed: Range: Versions: • ·JFVs:

• • (

• APC: . _.Cargo:

15,000-;-19,000 kg 70 km/h ,...., 500 km IFVs, APC, Ambu lance, Cargo Carrier (payload 6.5 tm) Armament: 20, 25, 90 mm gun+ 7.62 MG + 6 grenade launchers + firing ports. 4 x 25 mm AA System. 60 mm gµn + 7.62 MG + 8 grenade launcher + fi ring ports. ' TUA .+7.62 MG. 12.7 MG+ ·a grenade launchers+ 6 firing ports. Crew 12. 12.7 MG.

EVOLUTION OF THE NATO STRATEGY

WITH A BIT OF SCIENCE FICTION •••

INTRODUCTION It is generally believed that the success of a military operation depends mainly on two fac:ors: the validity of the available instrument and th e way it is employed. In the term "1alidity" there is a confluence of various elements, of differen t weight but. revertheless, all necessary: the size of the forces required to attain the goals: the quality of the available arms and means, which must match the adversary's and if possible outdo them; the organizational structures of the battle forces. such as to permit - thanks to a marked flexibility - manoeuvering down to the lowest levels; the degree of the units' training, the cadres' spirit of enterprise; the capability of enduring a prolonged war effort and, final ly, the consciousness of fighting for a just cause. As for th e "method of employment" a distinction must be made between doctrine and planning. The first defines the principles that must inspire th e Commanders in conceiving. organizing and leading the operations, without a definite connection. neither with the political situation nor with the geographical picture. The doctrine becomes less bind ing as the authority level becomes higher and as - consequently - the responsibility of the receivers grows. Being comparatively independent of contingent factors and also due to the time required for its elaboration by one side. and its assimilation by the other. the doctrine changes rather slowly and almost never in a revolutionary way. unless the• scientific progress induces a sudden break from the past, as was the case with the appearance of the nuclear explosive. The planning decides. in the light of the doctrine, how to employ the forces in a determined theatre of operations, taking into account the enemy forces and the features of the natural environment. The, relation between doctrine and planning is much closer and evident in the forces belonging to an individual Army or in those of a coalition dominated by a leader state such as, for instance. the Warsaw Pact. I') the coalitions such as NATO. in whi::h the participating nations have, at least nominally, an equal standing - and which despite their efforts. have· obtaired, as regards standardization. rather modest results. so that they have replaced it with the less

ambitious and more indefinite objective of interoperability - the connection between doctrine and planning is not only less evident, but appears more or less shaded in the various operative areas in which the Alliance is divided. Visible and remarkable in the areas where the forces of a single country operate, for instance the Italian Northeastern theatre. it is less so in the areas where there are forces of several countries, for example in Central Europe. Here, while at low level the national doctrines of employment are widely applied, at the level of complex Major Unit, from Army Group to Corps. they are replaced in practice, in order to achieve the indispensable homogeneity of beh~viour, by the directives of the Supreme Commander, which configure the strategic conception of the Alliance and. although deriving from a compro mise, inevitably reflect the official - and unofficial - thought of the country of a-rig.in ot the abovesa1d persona lity. Later in this discussion we shall see the practical consequences of this phenomenon; for the moment we shall limit ourselves to observing that this does not have only negative aspects. because, often, the absence of excessive constraints stimulates the initiative of the subordinate Commanders and can lead. if coupled with operational imagination, to positive resu lts. beyond all expectations and sometimes totally unforeseen. For some time - and more· precisely. from the moment when four distinguished American personalities (1). preceded by the more modest writer of this article· (2). questioned the idea of the first use of nuclear weapons, which is the cornerstone of NATO's present strategic conception, called flexible response - there has been a lively debate over the most convenient way of confronting a possible aggression by the Warsaw Pact. The military experts, and the increasing number of civilian students who have been participating in the debate by writing on newspapers and magazines, as well as participating in seminars, panels and open discussions. though differing in specifi c knowledge and experience, are drawn toge ther by the common intent of divulging the military themes and contribu ting to the solution of a problem on which the destiny of our continent and the very survival of mankind may depend. In the following pages, after pointing out the reasons that have shaken the confidence in flexible response, I have

the intention of summarizing the various theories, advanced recently, aiming at modifying and eventually renewing the NATO strategy; to see whether these theories are- consistent with the fun damental principles of warfare and. more partciularly, if they are applicable in t he operational context that would arise in case of general conflict in Europe, and. final ly, to call the readers' attention to some proposals on this subject, which have been suggested to me by the long years, in Italy and abroad, devoted to the study and elaboration of the military thought. As it is my wish that this work be read and easily understood by the younger officers and by the public at large. who have been reading the Ri vista Militare with increasing interest, thanks to the guidelines of the Army Chief of Staff which have been intelligently implemented by the Editor. I shall try to express my thought in a simple- way, avoiuiriy c1µµroxirnations as well as abstruse concepts and compl icated terms. such as "triads. heptads. asymmetries, subconventional units, territoria l war or people's war {very fashionable at present), remembering the teaching of a professor of history at the War College. the unforgettable General Moscardelli, who used to tell us - at the beginnnig of the Fifties - that if someone's thought cannot be manifested in a comprehensible way it means that th e thought itself is not clear in the mind that has conceived it (a valuable norm for me, too!).

Facing page. Italian soldiers disembarking from an ACP FIAT Oto Melara 6614 (4X4). This vehicle, protected by welded steel plates, can reach a speed of 100 km/h; maximum gradient 60%. It carries a fully equipped rifle squad, that can fire its individual weapons through ten firing ports fitted with bulletproof vision ports.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE CAUSES OF ITS LOSS OF CREDIBILITY The present NATO strategy is based on two concepts, about which there is a remarkable confusion, and the un justified tendency to link them together: advanced defence and flexible response. Both concepts involve operational choices suggested by precise political motivations. Let us try to clarify this statement. It is well known to experts that he who does not want to take the initiative of military operations, and is therefore liable, in the state of tension that marks the present international relations, to suffer an aggression, can choose between two solutions: to resist on a position closeÂˇ to the threatened frontier or to manoeuvre in a retreat. in order to gain time by giving space: interposing a distance between the attacking forces and their logistic bases, at the same time weakening them with fire, obstacles and local counterattacks, while waiting for reinforcements, with the help of which the . defence can be established in a rear position. The fi rst solution, less bitter than the second because it does not entail territorial losses, assumes that the proportion of forces, as a rule in favour of the attacker. should not be excessively negative, because, if it were so, a field battle would beÂˇ hopeless and could have very serious consequences on the conflict's outcome.

This is the solution which the Czarist armies, taking adva11lc1y~ of the immensity of their territories, chose when confronted by Napoleon's attack; the same solution was intended by the newly founded NATO, faced by th e Soviet Union's overwhelming superiority. It is evident that after the Federal Republic of Germany's joining of th e Atlantic Alliance, made official in May 1955, the German territory could not be considered a space to be exchanged for time, all the more that the contribution given by the Federal forces made the outcome, of a frontier battle less uncertain. The strategy of flexible response adopted in 1967 has the purpose to put into action, in a logical and operational concatenation, means proportionate to the size of the offensive, in order to avoid closing the door to a dialogue, which would become impossible if one yielded suddenly or, by overreaction would induce the aggressor to make abrupt and massive accelerations. To begin with, being unlikely that the Soviet Union will initiate the operations employing the nuclear weapon, the response would be exclusively conventional, growing in intensity according to the increasing seriousness of the situation. Secondly, the nuclear factor would step in, at first with a warning purpose (low-blast explosions, as "clean" as possible, against uninhabi ted zones and military objectives). then in the tactical field, in order to increase the land fo rces' ability to resist (explosions over artillery deployments, at theatre level, in order to exhaust the adversary

Royal Air Force "Jaguar" aircraft. The "Jaguar" is a single-seat tighter for tactical support. with air combat capability (A and S versions} and is used, in the two-seater version, tor advanced training. It can reach a speed of 1,320 km/h al sea level, is armed with two 30 mm guns in fixed belly position, and is fitted with 5 attach points, to which a war load of 4,536 kg can be hooked. The "Jaguar's" wing tips are provided with mountings to carry air-to-air missiles.

advanced instrument (explosions on 2nd echelon Major Units, missiles bases, airports and runwa-ys of the support air force, territorial logistic depots, road junctions) and mainly to let the aggressor realize that the limit of tolerability (i.e. the intercontinental nuclear exchange) is about to be reached. The third and last stage has no territorial bounds and wears the terrifying face of general nuclear war, which would bring mankind - or, rather, its survivors - back to the Stone Age. First of all, 2nd more than a strategic directive, the theory of flexible response wants to be a warning to the enemy that we are firmly determined to employ all means, including the extreme ones, in order to stop an aggression. And not only that: the gradualness of :he response should cause some "reconsideration" in the

party who has started the hostilities, allowing him to stop them before, escalation by escalation, the irreparable is reached. The fi rst criticism that can be made on the, purely military. plane to the doctrine of flexible response is that it sketches a rath er artificiaI • outline of react ions. in which the actions to which such reactio ns are intended to respond seem to· be wishful thinking rather than conform to a general programme of manoeuvre - t hat of the aggressor which, at the beginning at least, should be considered as prevailing, because the attacker is largely in a position to choose the time, the places and, above all, the wavs of his offensive. One forgets. in substance, tha t every armed conf rontation is, from the human poin t of view, nothing but a confronta tion of wills, each striving to prevail over the other. a')d the greater the superiority of available means is. the . better are the chances to succeed (this remark should be kept in mind also when assessing the new ideas proposed today for the, defen ce of Europe). More particularly my disagreement vis-a-vis the fl exible response concerns both the conventional component and the subsequen t nu:::lear component. On the conventional plane, because the field battle - a fu ndamental act in the strategic manoeuvre, owing to· its conseq1,1ences which, if not decisive, give nevertheless the prevailing side remarkable advantages in vie.w of the subsequent operations, and a highly

all means at his disposal in order to stop the attack within a certain depth, cut down the penetration as it starts and rega in the lost ground as soon as possible. This out line, which gives good chances to a skillfu l defender, is valid on condition that an excessive disparity of forces does not induce, under penalty of a rapid and irrepa ra ble yielding. an accelerated increase in the intensity of the response, shortly resu lting in having to rely on the employmen t of nuclear weapons as the only way out. On the nuclear plane, it is unlikely and rather unrealistic that the, Soviet Union wi ll endure, without reacting,, that small. number of nuclear strikes, however limited and demonstrative, which. in NATO's intentions, should prove its firm reso lution to res ist the aggression at all costs. The Soviet Union could have done so in the years of its nuclear inferiori ty, but why should it .do that now, that the terms of comparison are reversed? And if, as it seems logical, it did not want to tolerate it. a chain reaction would start, whose ru inous ou tcome would be a general nuclear war.

On the other hand, let us not forget that the, keys of nuclear power are·, for the greatest part, in the hands of the United Sta tes and one does not see why t he U.S. shou ld use· them if, by defending Europe, it would be, risking its very survival.

SYNTHESIS OF THE MAIN PROPOSALS FOR THE EVOLUTION OR THE OVERCOMING OF THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE The by now widespread convict ion that t he concept of flex ible response has become outdated - mainly because it is most unlikely that NATO should deliberately want to be the fi rst to start a nuclear war - has promoted the devising of complementary proposa ls and alterna tive hypotheses, which are all characterized, albeit in a variety of solutions, by a revalua tion of conventional operations, in the declared inten t to ra ise the, nuclear threshold and, implicity, to avoid overstepping it.

dramotic oct f or the loss of lives and

equ ipmen t that it entails - follows a logic and complies with a scheme that cannot be disregarded, save the except ions that prove the rule. The logic is t:,at of every test of strength, in which each of the two opponen ts tries to overpower the other, and to accomplish that he does not wait until the enemy has put him in bad shape. The outline can be summed up as fo llows: • he who takes the initiative of operations, and has the necessary resources if not the mora l justifi cations, strikes at once to attain his goal, in order to take advantage of the surprise effects, sweep away the act·, anced defences and, as soon as possible, move the fight to the open field, where his superiority can prevail; • in his turn, he who defends himself, having opposite ai'Tls, avails himself of

Rescue tank of the German Democratic Republic on T54-55 hull. Up to the '50s and '60s the T54-55 medium tanks were in service with the motorized infantry, armoured and amphibious Divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries and, from 1963, have been replaced by the T62. The hulls of the T54-55s weight 35t, range 400 km, maximum speed 50 km/h - have been used for a number or special duty tanks: Minec/earing; Engineer; Bridgelayer; Dozer.

Royal Air Force "Lightning" aircraft. The "Lightnings" which entered service in 1968, have been gradually replaced from 1977 by "Phantoms"; the last two units equipped with the elderly airplanes have been only recently assigned the air defence version of the MRCA "Tornado". The "Lightning", armed with two 30 mm. Aden guns. two De Havil/and Firestreak missiles and 48 canistered rockets,, can reach a speed of Mach 2.3 at an altitude of 11,000 m.

Among these proposals and hypotheses we shall examine the "Airland Battle", outlined in the U.S. publicat ion FM (Field Manual) 100-5 "Operations", ed. 1982, and th e Rogers Doctrine. so called after the name of its author, the Allied Supreme Commander in Europe. The two proposals seem to be the most significant, apart from the authority of th e sources. th e f irst for the originality of the theses it advances, which justifies, with a little emphasis, the title of this survey; the second, for its precise reference to the defence of our continent. We shall also mention fleetingly some nonofficial schools of thought which, all inspired by the convi ction that nuclear war must be averted, are quite different from the U.S. doctrine as well as from the Rog ers concept, th ough they include, some traits of both, and contribute, with their orig-inality, to enliven a debate which cannot but help finding a strategy for NATO. less dangerous than the one now in force. THE AIRLAND BATTLE

The " FM 100-5 Operations" (3). whi ch con tains the Airland Battle doctrine. was published on August 20, 1982, but some anticipations had already been given in March 1981, in the document 525-5 of TRADOC (U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine Command) and in an article by Gen. Donn A. Starry, Chief of TRADOC at the time. appeared on the "Military Review", no. LXI: all had the main purpose to provoke rea ctions. helpful for improving the text being prepared. Before the publication of the FM 100-5, TRADOC had also published a study projected beyond the Eighties (to which the FM 100-5 was limited) which had been termed " Airland Battle 2000", thu s creating a considerable confusion between what was deemed possible in the short term and what the not yet perfected emerging technologies would have permitted at a later date. The FM 100-5 is centred on Corps, Division and Brigade level, where - it states - battles are won. but not wars, and excludes military strategy, seen as a way of using the Armed Forces of a nation to attain th e ob ject ives set by politics. Conceived mainly as a regulation for offensive operations. it is valid, with the due adjustments, also for th e defens ive ones, and thi s ambivalence, or better this wide possibility of application. is one of its outstanding features. It evinces a marked offensive attitude. which is expressed with the insistence on the principles of manoeuvre, fi re power, movement. rapid ity of execu tion. fl exibil ity of action. initiative. cooperation among the various branches of the Army and between the land and air forces, and the coordin ation with the Allies.

And still not many years had gone by since the 1976 edition of the same handbook. which written shortly after the Vietnam war and having mainly the European situation in mind, envisaged - despite its titl e. "Active Defence" - a war of predisposed positions. exceedingly static, based on fire rather than movement, and on the wear of the enemy forces rather than on their disintegration. Influenced by the more political than operational decision to conduct an advanced defence against an adversary who, with a global superiority of 3 to 1, is in a position to remark ably raise locally, the rati os to his advantage, th e FM 100-5 of 1976. in con clusion, suggested a covering deployment of almost all the means. in the hope of stopping the first wave of the attack but with no possibilily to withstand th e fol lowing waves, thus making inevitable an early recourse to nuclear weapons, without explaining how these would be integrated with the conventional weapons and in what manner :hese means. reduced to the rank of support by th e intensified nucleariza tion of the battlefield, could combine with the "nuclear" which would be given the role of protagonist. The acknowledged intrinsic weakness of the defence envisaged in the 1976 edition of the FM 100-5 opens the way to a new concept, th e "extension of the battlefield", which is added and in determined future circumstances tend s to exclude it (4) - to the concept of "integration of the battlefield", intended as a combination of conventional and nuclear factcrs. A concept which. though attenuated vis-a-vis the initial formulation proposed in the already mentioned TRADOC document 525-5, is largely reflected by th e Airland Battle. Thus we read in the new FM 100-5 that the aim of any operation is the destruction of the enemy forces and that this aim can be attained by breaking the cohesion of the enemy instrument with powerful initial strikes com ing from unexcepted direct ions, and by exploiting theiÂˇ effects. in order to prevent the enemy from reorganizing h imself. The best results are obtained, better th an by attack in~ the forward formati ons, by delivering these initial strikes on the units that protect the areas of vital importance, the loss of which could seriously endanger vast sectors of th e opposing ceployment.

"Aist" class amphib:ous ship, in operation with MIL Mi-24 helicopters during an exercise of the Warsaw Pact forces. The "Aist" class units are large air-cushion ships, capab.le of carrying three BTR 60 vehicles and an 80 t load at a speed of 58 knots. The ships, armed wit.'1 four 30 mm guns, are approximately 48 m long.

The enemy must be attacked in depth, with unexpected. swift, and violent actions, relying on fire and movement, maintaining the flexibility necessary to move forces and fire where the adversary is weaker. and, by a speeded up tempo, precluding him all possibilities of effective reactions. Proceeding from principle to practice we observe. together with the previously mentioned Lt. Col. Coccia, that: • the attack against the second echelons ,of the Warsaw Pact, which - according to our official terminology - should be distinguished as echelons and Major Units of second a ignment (5), must occur as soon as the two- confronting formations come into contact and, therefore, mostly when they are still on their own territory, and this tor two main reasons, which, as someone contends. have nothing to do with the insufficient space tor manoeuvre on NATO's side: in order to avoid transforming the FRG's territory into a conventional - and possibly nuclear - ba:tlefield and, more important, for the awareness that, once the advanced defences are broken, the Soviets and their allies could easily spread in the open field. outflanking, surrounding and overwhelming the rather scarce allied reserves; • the possibility to move forward the combat at the right time is linked to the availability of: systems for the survey of the battlefield and for the acquisition of objectives, performing much better than the present ones; means that the western technology could afford but at considerable cost and not within a very short time; launchers of adequate range and strike power to which the above remarks apply too. and lastly a command and control network capable of receiving, evaluating and distributing, almost in real time, a great bulk of information and orders, in order to manage a battle characterized by ample spaces, swift pace, contemporaneity of defensive and counteroffensive actions, the coordination of which is of crucial importance if one does not want to run the risk of seeing the almost assured destruction of the pawns left on the chessboard without the support of the surround ing pieces; • extending the theatre. of the action entails greater responsibilities for the Commanders at the various levels, fo r each one of them has the primary duty to stop and defeat the opposing unit and the complemen:ary one to keep an

On the contrary, Col. Trevor N. eye on the· other forces that show up Dupuy appears sceptical. He writes on in the area assigned to him, foreseeing the August 1982 issue of the "Armed as much as possible their intentions. Forces Journal International": " ... if the Before ending this paragraph I deem Warsaw Pact is capable of destroying it appropriate, in order to justify the our defensive potential with the sole evaluation that will be made further on, to cite some interpretations of th e new . forces of its first echelon, it is of very little importance whether we can inflict doctrine, not always concordant, publosses to the second echelon or delay lished on specialized U.S. reviews. its advance. If, on the contrary, we Thus, Lt. Col. John S. Doerfel afare so strong as to resist the first firms on the "Military Review" of May echelon it would not be convenient to 1982 that, helped by the difficulties weaken ourselves launching a p·art of that the Soviets find in dissimulating our troops to the attack of the second the modalities of deployment in depth echelon". of their forces and the rigidity of their Finally, an acute interpreter of the system of command, the first echelon Airland Battle. Lt. Col. R. Hart Sinnreich, American Corps, during an operation has observed (6) that every attempt well inside the enemy defences, will aim made by the United States to convince at destroying the adversary format ions NATO to adopt a classic strategic ofrather than gaining land, avoiding neverfensive would increase the doubts, widetheless to engage in a decisive battle spread in Europe, about America's straas well as in wearing actions. To this tegic prudence and would end by · end, they should rapidly move beyond weakening considerably the cohesion the line of contact, penetrate deeply of the Alliance. adding that an offensive in th e enemy territory, neutralizing durconception could lead to a result coning the movement all the objectives trary to that pursued, as it would make encountered, and get ready to prosecute the Soviets' recourse to nuclear weapthe attack behind the first echelon ons very probable. just when all want Divisions. NATO to give less importance to the In his turn Lt. Col. L D. H·o lder nuclear factor. does not deny, in the same issue of the "Military Review", that employing forces of manoeuvre within the attackTHE ROGERS CONCEPTION ing instrument is somewhat risky, but he contends that the chances of success Gen. Rogers, a capable strategist for this type of operations are so high and keen observer of the manifold and that they justify running the risk of a complex problems on which the defence possible negative outcome.

of Europe depends, perceived long ago that the increasing conventional inferiority of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact dangerously lowers the nuclear threshold and poses a dramatic alternative: either to accept a rapid collapse of the western resistance when confronted by an aggression, or to take the road of nuclear war within a very short t ime. Being stated th at it is impossible to renounce the threat of employing路 the nuclear weapon, which presupposes the re-establishment of a balance, both in order to deprive the Soviet Union of the trump card of political intimidation and to prevent the路 forces of the eastern bloc - freed from this threat - from closing the net of th e attack instru ment, concentrating in the areas chosen for the breakthrough, thus speeding up the pace of the action, the Allied Supreme Commander has repeatedly pointed out in various forums, including our !STRID (lstituto Studi e Ricerche Difesa), NATO's possibilities to dissuade the Soviet Union from a military initiative and, failing deterrence, its possibilities to increase its ability to resist an aggression. In order to understand Gen. Rogers' thought, his articles published on "Foreign Affairs" of Summer 1982 (7), on the official NATO monthly "NATO Review" of February 1983 (8). on "NATO's Fifteen Nations", February-March 1983 (9) and on "Strategic Review" of May 30 of the

same year (10) are of fundamental importance. In substance and in short, stated that the Warsaw Pact would base its offensive路 on the principle of mass, (to achieve a rapid breakthrough) and succeeding waves, (to exploit success). General Rogers deems that. granted the importance of the advanced defence's resistance, one must cut and possibly paralyze the supplies to the initial effort, by attacking the enemy second echelons, fo rcin g the Soviet Union either to desist or to take responsibility for the first nuclear strike: this means raising the threshold, apart from the political and moral aspects of the supposed Soviet decision. Three路 measures should be taken in order to reach this result: overcome the present NATO shortcomings, update the Allied forces, take advantage of western technology in order to improve the means for the location and destruction of the enemy reserve formations. The third measure, in its turn, includes various provisions: availability of devices for the surveillance of the battlefield, which should permit to locate and acquire in rea l time the most vulnerable objectives; existence of a well sheltered system of command, capable of transmitting information and decisions; availability of classical weapon systems. allowing us to hit with great precision and effectiveness the

objectives located beyond the contact line. In this regard, the new munitions being studied now open interesting p.rospects. They are equipped with a large number o f shells and can neutralize numerous units not yet engaged, or prevent such units from approaching the critical areas of the battle under way. According tc Gen. Rogers, the cost of these improvements, whose value would considerably increase the c~pability of NATO's conventional defence, averting th e recourse to nuclear weapons and inducin-;i, the Soviet Union to resume and carry on the dialogue on the balanced reduction of all war arsenals, would be approximately 9-10 billion dollars, comparable to that required for strengthening the theatre nuclear forces; a cost that the Nations of the Alliance could afford by raising from 3% to 4% the increase of the military budgets. As can be noticed, there is no lack of points of contact between the Allied Supreme Commader's thought and the

British combat vehicle MCV 80. Equipped with an aluminum armour, this vehicle can reach a speed of 75 km/h, is armed with a 30 mm gun and a 7.62 coaxial machine gun, and can carry 10 men, including commander, driver and gunner.

Airland Battle doctrine, bu t there are also differences, the most fund amental of whi ch is t hat the attack to t he enemy's follow-on ecl"elons is c arri ed on exclusively with fi re. In ord er to clea r up all misunderstandi1gs, J or those who mix the card s. either In good fa ith, for lack of specific knowledge, o'r in bad fa ith, in orde r to attribute· to NATO th e insane Intention to in-,ade t he territories of the eastern bloc at the first sign of hostility, Gen. Rogers has solemnly stated In the ment-ioned arti cle on the " Stra tegic Review" (11} th at t he concept of a fi re attack against the conventi onal fo rces of the- Warsaw Pact has no identity with the Ai rland Battle and, even less. with the futu ristic Airland Battle 2000. Th e first is a m1.Jltinati onal produc t particularly related to the European problem. while the second is an official document meant fo r the Americ an Army - concei ved bearing in mind the world responsibilities o f the U.S. - which entails provis ions that cannot be applied for th e deterrence and defence aims entrusted to tte Allied Command in Europe.

SIGNIFICANT UNOFFICIAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT (12)

• Senator Nunn. in a report addressed to the U.S. Senate Arm ed Forces Committee on May 13, 1982, summarized In the " Wash ington Quarterly" and on "Survival", accepting the thP.!=:i!=: that it is necessary to dimin ish the importance given to nuclear weapons and. fo r deterrence purposes. tc strengthen NATO's conventional fo rces. contends that this goal can be reache:J through new initiatives. Among th ese he mentions the use of advanced te:hnologies, the updating of the opera:ional doctrine and, what seems more ori ginal. a better employment o f the forces for territorial d efe nce and the considerable European re serves of trained personnel. These resources, increased and properly organized and equipped, could prevent the Soviets - but he does not sa y how from keeping th e territories initially conquered. • Gen. (ret.) Steven L. Canb y, shows his scepticism aboL t atta cking the second echelon units with special munitions, because every attempt to acquire a techni cal superiority is subjected due- to the inevitable advanc ements. within shorter or longer terms. of the other party - to the law of decrea sing performance and then leads to a spiralling quest for mo~e and more sophisticated means. the cost of which must be offset by reducing the size of th e forces. He · affirms th at th e military inferiority of the West Is not so much due to th e insufficient fin ancial resources as to th e scarce fighting forces and to the adoption of operational concepts founded on linear defence supported by fire, bu t lacking substa ntial reserves. For him th e crucia l problem is not t hat of attacking the second echelon units and preventing a break through

th e advanced lines. but rath er tha t o f neutralizing any penetration through these lines. Joining the thesis of Sen. Nunn. Gen. Canby therefore- maintains th at by emp loying the forces that each country has at its disposal for its territoria l defence. by creating new types of lightly struct ured standing units for the d efence of the advanced position s, by improving the ratio between the men who actually fig ht and their logistic support. it would be possible to increa se the size of the operational reserves. without altering the present fin ancial alloca tion s. Going well beyond Sen. Nunn, he concludes that the conventional parity would allow NATO to overcome the Warsaw Pact in military power, profiting by th e historica l. geographical, political and human advantages th at it en joys. • Prof. Samuel P. Hungtington of Harward University, in a conference held in the summer of 1983 at the U.S. Army War College, maintained that the role of deterrence and - fa iling that - of direct action, today ent rusted to the binomial "conventional forces - nuclear weapons" , can very well be given to the former only, on condit ion that these be increas ed - but not necessarily to reach parity - and employ a different stra tegy which should include - and this is the thesis' central and charac terizing point - also retaliation, in the form - in case of a Soviet attack - of a ra pid cou nteroffensive in Eastern Europe. According to the Am eric an scholar. this would not

Launch er for SA-4 "GANEF" antiaircraft missile system. This Soviet-made weapon s ystem, in service with the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, consists of 3 tracked vehicles on which the launching ramps, a search / acquisition radar, and a guidance radar, are respectively located.

be in contrast with NATO's defensive nature, becau se if the legitimacy of the nuclear firs t use or retali ation is admitted, one does not see why a cl assic retali ation should not be accep ted.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE AIRLAND BATTLE, THE ROGERS CONCEPTION AND THE UNOFFICIAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Keeping in mind that the vari ous doctrines, conceptions and schools of thought summa rized in th e preceding paragraph, though each has its own individuality, show various analogies, we shall make a survey p ro ceeding by con cepts rath er than by au thor, hoping to avoid repetition s and to develop a more easily understandable discussion.

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND RETALIATION

The conventional forces have always been regarded as means of deterrence and. fail ing th is, of direct action. After the appearance of the· nuclear explosive, that has taken a preponderant ro le in deterrence with the expectation. lately become less credible, that later it would participa te in the, direct action. It is ra ther unlikely that the traditional instrument wi ll be again the only facto r o f deterrence. especially vis-a-vis a possible enemy which, like the Soviet Union, has adopted a military doct rine that considers as normal the employment of nuclear tactical weapons. At present. and until a bilatera l and ver·ifiable ban of all nuclear energy meant for war purposes is achieved, there cannot be deterrence without the simultaneous availability of nuclear energy in all its forms, togeth er with conventional weapons. Of th e former · firs t of all, because a. denuclearized Wes t, or a West in a state of evident inferiority, or not able to clearly show its willingness to respond to a nuclear attack, would be an easy prey to blackmail and would give up its freedom wit hout having even defended it. In its turn, the conventional retaliat ion, besides appearing an opera ti onal nonsense, does not seem consistent with the Alliance's character. with our constitution as well as with that of other European countries, and with the present social environment. Tile North Atlantic Treaty was born with exclusively defens ive aims; its "morality" and force reside in th is. While in art. 11 the contrac ting parti es undertake, in con formity with art. 51 of the U.N. Charter, to settle by peaceful means any international controversy in which they might be involved, art. 5 - which establishes the obligation of mutual assistance - says that this will become operative in case of an armed attack against one or more of the signatories. in Europe or in North America, while art. 6 stresses that such an attack must be directed against t he terri tory of one or more member coun tries. or against the forces, sh ips or aircraft of these nations. located in the abovesaid territories, in the Mediterranean or in the Atlantic, to the north of the Tropic of Cancer. Our Cons ti tution, at art. 11, is even more explicit in repud iating war as an offensive tool against the freedom o f other peoples and as a means to solve international con trovers ies (13). Given these premises, one does not see how the NATO authorities and the individual national governments could endorse a coun teroffensive carried ou t on East German territory - th is is the actual point - at the first concrete signs of attack by the Warsaw Pact considering that, before a situation of deep involvemen t between the opposing forces is created - i.e. a si tuation of noreturn - there rema in ways open for a diplomat ic settlement; and NATO's political and military authorities had indeed these possibilities in mind while

conceiving and adopting the strategy of flexible response: even the author of this article does not question the con ceptual validity of this strategy, but rather its limits of applicability. On the other hand, the pacifis t movements of the most varied descriptions. which in good or bad fa ith cond emn not only the nuclear weapons but war per se, even defensive war, would have every good reason to cry shame if the first signs of aggression were reta liated with massive counteroffensive; and they would also have the tools for undermining the unanimity of consent, which is the prerequisite of a serious military engagement. Let us dwell a little longer on the operational aspects of retaliation, which are the most pertaining to a specialized rev iew such as ours, also for the influence that this subject will have on the discuss-ion on the Airland Battle. Since the purpose of war is to force the enemy to change his intentions, be they aggressive or defensive against an aggression, it follows that, if the politi cal means fail, and in order to deprive the enemy of his fighting, possibiliti es, the only choice left is to dest roy - or at least seriously undermine - his material power. According to the experience in almost all wars, the best way to do this is to go to t he enemy's p-lace and occupy his territory for a while - or at least cont rol it strictly - in order to make· sure that he complies with the terms that have been dictated to him. Orii:: \;ar1 therefore affirm that war, in order to reach its aims, must be fun damentally offensive and that the defensive attitude, apart all considerat ions of political, constitutional and moral nature, is suggested by the awareness of being weaker, and by the hope of gaining strength by gaining time·. In substance it is a delaying manoeuvre, which tends to achieve the cond itions necessary to· start a counteroffensive. In order to assume an offensive attitude, in itial as well as successive, one must be certain that he is stronger than the enemy, so· strong, as to neutralize the factors (knowledge of the terrain, fire planning, battlefi eld fo rtification and, within certain limits, the depth in which to move} that tradi ti onally operate in favour of the defen der, and to make up, for the wear suffered by an opera tional instrument that advances while fight ing. NATO neither has this superiority, nor wishes to have it, because its member nations pursue different and nobler aims other t han threatening the freedom of other peoples and if, for an absurd hypothesis, NATO were to decide to reach it, it would be useless to dream of immediate offensive or counteroffensive designs, because the mere possession of this superiority - supposing that the opposing side did not react, wi th the consequent spiralization of the conventi onal armaments also - wou ld be an element of deterrence aga inst t he enemy's aggressive intentions, with the same value of nuclear super·iority or nuclear parity.

THE MANEUVERED ATTACK AGAINST THE SECOND ECHELONS AND SECOND ALIGNMENTS OF T HE WARSAW PACT

We regre t to have to observe that the maneuvered attack against the rear forces of th e Warsaw Pact wh ich we in Italy call more properly "counterat tack ", goes against th e fundamental canons of tactics, as much as the conventional retaliation is, to say the least, a strategic nonsense. It is even more regret table in tt- at the FM 100-5, Ed. 1982, wh ich embodies the Airland Battle, wants to be a return to the origins and to the traditiona l principles of war. It is true that the publication is meant for use by the American Army, bu t noth ing prevents us f rom thinking that, lacking a se t of norms of employment common to all NA TO Armies, the Commanders of the U.S. Major Units. fro m Brigade to Corps, using the autonomy they are granted at their level (especially at the second level} may be tempted to apply it, endangering the manoeuvre of tt-e higher Ma jor Units, Army and Army Group, wh ich could hardly reconcile two substantially different actions, such as arresting th e aggressor and c:1rrying1 out a dynamic reaction beyond the line of contact. But there is more than th at. The coun terattack. be it led by a combat group at Battalion level or by an elementary Ma jor Unit (Brigade) presupposes the not fortuitous but planned occurrence of various conditions, fi rst among them the creation of a favou rable proportion of forces at th e place and time chosen, the temporary stopping of the units to :ie counterattacked, in order to avoid finding a situation different from the expected one, and the encirclement by fi re of the terrain of the action, in order to prevent the inflow of other enemy forces. It is evident that such condit ions can be rather easily achieved inside a defensive position, but are almost unrealizable beyond the contact line, in the mesh of the enemy organization. How can the second echelons and the second alignments be stopped? · Long-range fire (land or air) alone could not be enough. How can the flanks of the units which, while coun terattacking, "dive" into- the middle of the opposing, deployment be protected? In-depth format ions and fi re may not be sufficient. And how can th e attacker be prevented f rom moving the not yet engaged units to the threatened point, in order to cu t short our penetration and neutra lize it? And why should we suppose that the Soviet forces, mainstay of the Warsaw Pact, have a manoeu vering. capability inferior to the West's? The current opinion is that in the· lower ra nks of the Soviet cha in of command there is lack of spirit of initiative. but no one doubts that the higher Commanders are well acquainted with the art of warfare and are able to employ to the best advantage t he powerful military mach inery at their disposal. A study on the battle fo rmations of WWII shows that the Red Army

applied the principle of echelons in a variable and most flexible way, according to the enemy defence's characteristics. As a consequence (14) the indepth counterattack force could run the ri sk of remaining on its positions, waiting for the information organs to find out the possible location of a hypothetical second alignment. while the enemy, having eyes to see and brains to make evaluation, wou ld have the

Above.

Soviet MIG-23 "Flogger" multi-role fighter while landing. Equipped with variable sweep wings, this aircraft can reach a speed of Mach 2.3 at an altitude of 12,000 m, and has a 1000 km range. The MIG -23 is armed with a 23 mm gun and can carry - on its belly and wing mountings - a rem arkable war load.

Left. 105 mm. Italian howitzer. The gun weighs 1,290 kg in travel configuration, is employed by many NATO countries and has a maximum range of 10,500 m. It c an be air-dropped, and disassembled to be transported by pack-mules. It is currently in service with the Italian Army, in the paratroop artillery and mountain artillery units.

possibility to ward off the threat. assembling his rear units in th e appropriate way and conveying them behind the advanced echelons, or among, them, on the defender's weaker points. Such tactics, embodied in th e creation on the spot of operational groups of manoeuvre, were successfully employed by the Soviets, both during the revolution and the second world conflict. And is it worthwhile, in a condition of general inferiority, to risk more or less substantial portions of a "battle corps" in actions of uncertain outcome, if not doomed to certain fai lure? These questions and considerations entitle us to believe that the app-lication of this action in the NATO theatres of operation is problematic, for the moment at least, and Gen. Rogers did well in dissociating himself from it. Besides, as I said before, the action has been conceived having in mind hypothetical employments by the U.S. Army, within a global vision of its tasks, and, above all, with the aim of giving a jolt to a mentality which had become · too conservative, due to the Vietnam syndrome. We Italians, who in the Sixties had included in our operational regulation, publication no. 700 on the "Employment of Complex Major Units" , an action somehow similar to the one discussed above, but with more limited purposes and easier to carry out (a preventive counterattack, to be launched in the enemy territory, once the imminence of an attack was ascertained, with the purpose of disorganizing and weakening the instrument of th e enemy, forcing him to repair the damages it had suffered and to start again his preparations). But. in the successive doctrinal guidelines, we have given it up, both because the game was not worth the candle and because it could be instrumentally action of command and control of the exploited politically. enemy", while air interdiction is "an operation of tactical air support to land operations, with the purpose of extendLONG-RANGE FIRE ACTION ing, deep into the territory under enemy control, the effects of the battle. It intends to destroy, isolate and neutralize The long-range fire action supported enemy forces and means, and to delay by Gen. Rogers - which is intended to their employment, by p-reven tin g, or at inflict losses to the second echelons least hindering, his movements, his of the Major Units in the first alignsupplies and his action of command". ment and to the Major Units in the Our employment regulations have second alignment, and to slow down always given an important role to intheir movement, in order to hinder the terdiction. supplies that the attack needs to keep Already in publication no. 600 of a quick pace - is nothing new, and the 1958, which sets us among, the first Allied Supreme Commander knows it Armies that have taken a posit·ion as well, despite the noise that is being regards the incidence of the nuclear made about it. factor on land operations, it is written The action was made possible by that "the artillery constitutes the most the invention of the exploding shells flexible, inexpensive and timely means fired from the first artilleries, and its available to the Commanders of Major importance has been increasing togeth er Units for conducting a battle", and that with the range, the single-shot power "long range interdiction tends - together and the fi ring cadence. At present. bewith the tactica l air forces· action - to sides the tradi tional guns, also missiles, prevent or hinder th e supplying of the saturation weapons and air forces take battle". part in it. Publication no. 700, which in 1963 Distinguishing the action as close replaced no. 600, deals with this subject and distant, according to the depth of in several paragraphs, among which we the objectives, we call it interdiction, mention: which is defined by our "Nomenclator" as a " fire action meant to prevent or • 13, which affirms that the defensive at least hinder fire, movement and tacoperations must be based, among other tical/logistic supply, as well as the things, on the interdiction of the enemy

lines of communication and on the disorganization of his logistic potential; • 25, which stresses how the firepower of today permits to obtain rapid ly major results, bu t adds that - nevertheless success cannot be pursued with fire alone; • 277, which, referring to the tactical air forces, specifies that interdiction permits to isolate the battlefield and paralyze - or at least hinder - the inf low of the· enemy, and th e operation of Commands; • and finally paragraphs 328 and 330 which, deal ing, with the activities of the Army Commande· and Corps Commanders during the conduct of th e battle, state that the former conducts on his own the actions of interdiction in depth, carried out with aircraft and/or missiles, aimed at destroying or neutralizing the enemy to the furthermos t distance, dea position to interfere, with the battle's development. while the latter employ the fire at their disposal to wear the enemy to the furthermost distance, dep,leting its logist.c and tactical supply, and to strike with maximum timel-iness the adversary concentrations, especially the armoured and mechanized ones, whenever they materialize. Publications no. 800, which in 1971 replaced no. 700 and no. 900, which

Italian Army paratroopers in simulated combat in a built-up area. They use a 106 mm recoilless gun, mounted on a AR 59 recce vehicle. This gun is now being replaced by more modern weapons.

replaced no. 800 in 1977 (and is still in force). move along the same lines. General Rogers. the, representative of a nation which after th e last war has given its imprint to the most significant scientific advances and th eir employment fo r war purposes. has the great merit of having understood the contribution that a long range fire action could receive from longer range ground launchers, from the study of a new type of ammunitior and from applied electronics. One of interdiction's weak poi nts was in fact the time that elapsed between the location of an objective and the fi ring of the shells: a time, that penalized its performance against moving targets and enhanced it against fixed targets. The progress in electronics will nullify this harmful difference and will permit the acquisition in rea l time of the ·Objectives. while the modern fire control ·centres, also being perfected now, to gether with the automatic loading sys-

terns, will speed up both the starting of fire and the firing cadence. But, as every medal has its reverse, also the long range fi re action has a cost that cannot be overlooked, due both to the sophisticated devices needed for increasing its effectiveness and to the huge· amounts of ammunition it requires. And, moreover,. Jiet us not delude ourselves thinking we have found a panacea against the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. First of all because the Soviet Union and its satellites have the fire sources necessary for striking our reserves and the technical capability to make the same progress we make. thus reestablishing the "status quo ante". Secondly, because fire alone has never solved anything. It is valid and multiplies its effectiveness if it is included in a contest that perm its and enlivens the manoeuvre. In 1917, after the Caporetto rout and our retreat on the Piave river. the Austro-German forces, emboldened by success. decided to give· us the coup de grace. That was the first battle of the Brenta and Piave rivers (15). better known as th e battle of arrest. which was fought fiercely from November 10 to December 25, from the Stelvio pass to the lake of Garcia. from Garcia to the Brenta river and on the Asiago plateaux, from the Brenta to the Piave, over Monte Grappa, which has since then become a legend, and along the Piave down to the sea. Thirtythree Italian Divisions, 19 of which were sorely tried by the retreat, with 3000, guns, faced 55 Austrian and German Divisions with 4500 guns, under the direct command of the Emperor. Behind, we had almost no reserves and the French and British units, that were sent to Italy to support us, joined the battre - and only partially - when the outcome of the battles was already in our favour. The manoeuvred fire did indeed have its effects but it was mostly the infantry, with its weapons, its counterattacks, its obstinacy, that shattered the Hapsburg dream of spreading over the Po Valley. Marshal Gaviglia, one of the protagonists of the First World War, in his chronichle of that battle, wrote "our infantry, alone against the Austrian and German infantries, placed itself with honour among the best in the world". Some months before, in April, th e offensive of the Aisne had failed, with heavy losses and the complete collapse of the French Army - which had been unable to take other initiatives for the rest of the year. The offensive had had the purpose of moving the battle again in the open field and was launched with great abundance of men (4,500,000 against 2,700,000) and means (8,000 guns. with a density of 1 gun every 8 metres). Gen. Nivelle, who at the end of 1916 had rep,laced Gen. Joffre, paid with his dismissal his excessive trust in the artillery fire. thanks to which breaches had been indeed opened in the advanced trenches, but this had not prevented th e Germans from closing the breach by occupying the rear positions. And yet there had been intuitions - and

this is confirmed by the employment of the first rudimentary tanks - that the problem was to reach a speed of progression higher than the enemy's speed of recovery. The Germans understood it well and drew the proper conclusions. which led them to· mould that formidable war instrument. based on power and pace, which 20 years later imposed its law during the fi rst part of the second world conflict. THE INCREASE OF RESERVES

The availability of tactical and strategic reserves, in adequate quantity and well deployed - the former, oriented to reestablish, by counterattacking, the integrity of the posi tion, the latter to cut and destroy any penetration from the rear of the position itself - has always been considered an indispensable factor for th e success of a defensive manoeuvre. NATO should increase its reserves: there is no question about it. The problem is, with what modalities. It does not seem realistic to use fo r th1s purpose a fraction of the forces destined to the defence of the territory. This could have been done, perhaps, by France in Central Europe, had it not left the Alliance's military organization. and we do not know whether such a measure is foreseen in the operational p-lanning of that country in the event that - in case of emergency - the French forces were reintegrated in the allied organization, automatically improving its conditions of inferiority, which would allow the transition in reserve of the other partners' units that are now advanced. We are not in a position to do the same and, moreover; we do not need it so much, because the present situation around the Mediterranean advises against reducing the protection of peninsular and insular Italy in favour of the Veneto-Friuli area. We also deem fanciful the idea, which has also found followers here, of improving the proportion of forces by setting up a certain number of so-called light formations, either already in peacetime or through the mobilization of instructed reserves. The term "light" makes one think that in the mind of the supporters of this thesis there should be other units having a heavy structure. Such distinction has no foundation at the present stage of the battle techniques. Let us take, for example, infantry, which is still one of the protagonists of the battle: both when it operates in particular geographical environments, such as the "Alpini" or the "Lagunari", and when mounted on armoured vehicles (tracked and, in the future, also wheeled) it operates in close connection with tanks - and this is the mechanized version - as well as when, transported on vehicles, it can rapidly cover great distances - and this is the motorized version (the poor relative, for economy reasons. of the preceding• one) - in order to effectively carry out its tasks must be able to avail itself of complete armaments and equipment. of the best possible quality. The paratrooper units

themselves. owing to the progress made by the launch ing devices, are not different from the other branches of infantry. And all of them need the support of artillery, engineers, communications and logistics. Regarding the possible establishment for mobilization of these supposedly light formations, it would anyway be necessary to supply them with the required equipment, keep them in good shape with expensive controls and maintenance, periodically renew them to keep up with the times, call up the reservists frequently (with more ex penses) for refresh er courses, without taking into account the time required for assembling the men recalled as well as for their moral and train ing amalgamation. A time that could be incompatible with the urgency of the need. At this point, it would be better to strengthen the already existing forces, maintaining their organizational levels, filling the shortages that afflict them and replacing the obsolete materials at the appropriate times. It would be a good step forward on the long and difficult way we have to go in order to reduce the conventional "gap" that separates us from the Warsaw Pact.

GUERRILLA WARFARE It is an idea regarded with favour in some political circles, which are probably influenced by the myth created in Italy about the Resistance in the years 1943-1945, and which are certainly little informed about the c haracteristics of this form of warfare and the conditions required for its organization and development. I am well aware that I am going ag•ainst the present trend when I say that although the Resistance did have a very high moral significance. being the expression of the Italians' will to resurge, its contribution to the liberation of our country was not determinant. Italy has recovered its sovereignty thanks to the Anglo-American troops and with the generous and largely voluntary contribution of that part of our Army (the First Motorized Regiment, the Italian Corps of Liberation, the Italian Combat Groups) which, overcom ing mistrusts and difficulties of all kinds. was capable to abide by its oath, showing once more thar·rne Italian soldier is second to rfone when he fights for a just and heartfelt cause. Gen. Li Gobbi, a hero of the Resistance, and therefore "above suspicion", has complained (at the end of 1984, in a speech celebrating the battle of Montelungo, in which - before the astonished eyes of the Allies - so many fine Italian youths sacrificed th eir lives) that the merits acquired by the Italian Armed Forces in our country's moral and material resurgence have not been adequately acknowledged. I cannot but agree with him. As for the features of guerrilla warfare, I have dealt with them in a study published on no. 1/1968 of the War College Review "Alere Flammam", to

which I refer the readers willing to probe into the subject (16). As I wrote on these pages in 1980 (17), it is my wish to stress that: , guerrilla warfare has always been, with some particular exceptions, a follow-on procedure: i.e. it presupposes a previous invasion of the territory by foreign forces: • also the people's war, no less than the traditional one, poses - if one wants to predispose it - serious organization. training, logist ic and execution problems; , the guerrilla warfare not organized in advance and, in the long run, also the predisposed guerrilla, needs, in order to survive and operate. recognition and help from the outside, for - without these - it would be forced to leave the areas economically and demographically more significant, on which the army of occupation could better make the weight of its power felt, and take shelter

in isolated and impervious zones. having scarce influence on the general goals to be reached; • the ideological differences, typica l of some democratic States. would rapidly undermine the moral unity which is the foundation of a ty pe of struggle that, not being able to lever on material factors, has the absolute need to have. within itself, unity of intents and spirit of solidarity and, from the outside, the widest support of the local population; but a support that must come from consensus and not from intimidation; • in case of geJgraphical areas of outstanding strategic value, the party opposing the occupants will try, sooner or later. to ensure their possession, starting military operations, the brunt of which would be take n by the civilian population. Do we really want that Italy, renouncing th e possibility of a direct

Left.

U.S. infantryman wearing the new combat uniform. The U.S. Army is issuing this outfit, consisting of camouflaged uniform, helmet made of com;Josife material, and bulletproof vest. The infantry. squads will shortfy adopt also a 5.56 mm automatic weapon, the "Improved M-16A2". Right.

Paratrooper armed v,ith a dual-purpose 7.62 mm MG 42-59 NATO machine gun, in simulated combat. The NA TO armies will shortly replace the 7.62 NATO individual arms with more modern 5.56 mm weapons.

of a gradual and flexible response, does not increase the defence capabilities of NATO; on the contrary, it weakens them, because it gives us the illusion of a capability of resistence th.at we do not have and prevents us from facing with realism the actual problem, which is the strengthening of the, conventional component and the revision of the operational doctrine. This does not mean that the use of nuclear weapons should be totally excluded. It is necessary, instead, to foresee and plan it, both to answer a possible, although unlikely, enemy initiative and to demonstrate· with a single "warning" explosion, as "clean" as possible, on an unhabited territorial objective, our firm determination not to yield to arrogance, as well as - finally - to induce the Warsaw Pact, for fear of

We must not believe, however, that a lasting advantage can be derived from it. The Soviet Union has the capability to do the same, sooner or later; but this race towa rd s the "more and more sophisticated" which would furtherly lower the already low living standard of its people could lead it to desperate extreme solutions. The U.S. decision to carry on with the so-called "Star Wars" project exposes us to the same danger. And, probably, in the impossibility on the Soviet Unions' part to accept the scientific challenge a serious - and not enough felt - danger for the peace of the world is hidden. , As passive defence has always ended in failure, the NATO operational doctrine ought to evolve, in the observance of laws and principles that give meaning and logic to the art of warfare, towards

other nuclear strikes, to keep the mesh of its attack instrument loose, forgoing, within certain limits, the concentrations of power that are the prerequisites for a massive and swift offensive. , The improvement of NATO's conventional power - awaiting that a balanced reduction is reached also in this field, either within the global negotiations on armaments or separately, as it seems more logical, which presupposes an increase of the national appropriations consistent with the other goals pursued by the Western countries - will strengthen both its deterrence and its capability to resist an aggression. The increment of the long-range lire, whose concept is not new, if one excludes the technologies that can already be foreseen, will contribute to this improvement, on condition tha t this does not go to the detriment of other power factors (mobility in its various fo rms, antitank and antiaircraft defence, logistic support).

a more and more maneuvered employment of forces, excluding the untimely advances at the heart of the· enemy instrument of attack - which would lead to a doomed battle of encounter - in favour of a stubborn resistance, but not only a stationary one - in the forward part of th e defensive position, combined with long range fire, in order to allow the Major Units' Commanders enough time to locate the Warsaw Pact's effort axes and to convey adequate sectorial reserves - supported by the strategic reserve according to necessity - towards penetrations to a depth that must be assessed without patriotic prejudices. It is at this stage of the battle that beyond-the-border counteroffensive answers could be envisaged, both for reestablishing and possibly improving the former situation and for obtaining useful te.rri torial pawns, as well as - finally for creating, a climate of insecurity in the Soviet Union, concerning its sate!-

defence, enhanced by the nobility of the goal it pursues, should become once more a battlefield for foreign troops and experience again the horrors of factions, hatreds and civil war?

CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND PROPOSALS • The present debate on th e NATO military strategy mJst be considered an extremely positive fact. It is from the intelligent and constructive comparison of ideas - not empoisoned by factiousness - that the best is born. Also worthy of respect are the trends that do not seem to take into sufficient account the hard reality of war or that seem projected towards a not well defined future. History demonstrates that in all fields of political, artistic and scientific thought even the most extremist trends, which have caused - and cause - disapproval. have borne - and will bear - their fruit, because, having freed themselves, along, the road, of th e most heated accents, they have contributed, accelerating it, to the incessant ascension of mankind. • The nuclear weapons which, among fiery protests, have nevertheless given the world at least 40 years of non-general war, - if not of peace - remain a powerful tool of deterrence, provided that neither of the two opposing parties attains such a superiority over the other as to induce th e more exposed countries ,to assume a yielding behaviour, ending up in a subordinate condition. Once the theatre capabilities are balanced again - as is being done - it will be necessary to resume the talks for a balanced and surely veri fiable reduction of the nuclear a rsenal, as a premise for its elimination, with the two fo ld aim of freeing mankind from the anguish of a possible disaster and to convey the resources thus spared to the fight against hunger and to the -civil promotion of all peoples. • The intention of being the first to use the nuclear weapona in the framework

The crew of a torpedo-boat of the East German Navy preparing for a launch.

lites' reliability, so that it will have to remove forces from the front in order to ward o ff any possible internal disturbance. In a type of defence which emphasizes and enhances manoeuvre at all levels, we can write down among our assets the cadres' higher spirit of in itiative and the moral impulse that always multiples the energies of those who are conscious of fighting for a just cause. It would be most timely for the Allied Supreme Commander to promote the study of standards of employment, or at least of employment directives at Corps, Division and Brigade level, valid for all the forces under his authority. In this way the interoperability of the units of different countries would be enhanced and a possible incompatibility between the SACEUR conception (18) and the national doctrines would be avoided. It goes without saying that every army would be free to retain its own doctrine and to follow it in the engagements outside the Treaty area. NATO has indeed already felt the usefulness of reaching standardization agreements, but while very good results have been obtained in the field of procedures with the STANAGs (19) and in that of th e organizational structures. I am not aware - unless recent progress has been made outside my knowledge of advances as rega rds procedures of employment (even though in the Sixties there have been discussions, on this subject. within regional groups such as FINAB EL) (20) and materials, where the national economic interests have prevailed, permitting, bi-or multinational

studies and rea lizations only for a few weapon systems. I do not deceive myself thinking that the criticism I have made and the suggestions I have advanced will meet the approval of all my readers. but I should consider myself content if, by inciting reflection, I shall have contributed to widen a debate of fundamental importance for the security of the West and the peace of the whole world.

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Luigi Salatiello

NOTES. (1) Mc George Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. Mac Nama ra and Gerard Smith in "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance", Foreign Attairs, Spring 1982, pages 753-768. (2) "EuromiSS iles, Neutron Bomb_, NATO Strategy and the Situation of the Ita lian Army", Rivista Militare. no. 2/ 1982 [Italian ed ition) . (3) Readers wishing to probe into the subject are referred to the excellent article " The Airland Battle" by Lt Col. Maurizio Coccia, published in the issue 1/1983 of "Rivista Militare" (Italian edition) and to the even more outstanding article by Robert A. Gessert " L'Airland Battle et le nouveau debat doctr inal dans l'OTAN", pub lished in the Ju ly 1984 issue of "Defense Nationale", The latter has been a precious help for me. when writing the paragraph devoted to Airland Battle in th is essay. (4) I refer, as also R. A. Gessert ma inta ins, to the possibility of obtaining effects almost equivalent to those of small nuclea r weapons, thanks to the combination of the launcher's precision and the ettectiveness of the ind ividua l munit ions, presuming that our threat of reta liation dissuades the Soviets from resorting first to the nuclear factor.

(5) In our term inology, the Brigade (which is the smallest of the Major Units, also called gJementary Major Unit) divides itoclf up for combat into echelons of the combat group order at Battalion level, that are progress ive ly numbered from the front to the rea r {1st-2n d and possib ly 3rd). The alignment instead is made up by the Major Units which are deployed for combat on the same line. para llel to the front. Also the alignments are numbered progressively from the front to the rear (1st-2nd and 3rd). (6) I have read this article in the translation published on "Defence Nationa le", Ju ly 1984. (7) "The Atlantic Alliance: prescriptions for a difficult decade'. (8) "Enhancing Deterrence - Raising the N uclear Threshold", (9) "Sword and Shield: ACE Attack of Warsaw Pact Fo llow-on Forces". (10) "Greater Flexibi lity for NATO's Flexible Response". (11) See (7) . (12) Also for the introduction of this schools of tho ught I refer to the mentioned study by R. A. Gessert. (13) The Constitution of the Federa l Republic of Germany is more peremptory. At art. 27 if condemns not onl~ any action intended to disturb the pacific cohexistence among nations, but also the very preparatiÂˇJn of aggressive wars. to the point of subordinating to the Gove rnment's permission the prod~ction of weapons destined to military o per.11ions. delegating the enforcing of this princple to a specia l law (promulgated as " Law for the control of war armaments"). (14) See "La Batai lle Aeroterrestre: une Doctrine plus qu'un d ogme", by Col. Wi lliam G. Hanne, published in French in the 8/83 issue of "Revue lnternat iona le de Defense". (15) Th e second, fought between June 15 and June 23. 1S18 opened the way to the victorious counteroffensive of Vittorio Veneto. (1 6) "Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare; and the Army", "A lere Flammam", no. 1/1969. (17) "Advanced Defence", Rivista M ilitare, no. 5/1980. (18) Supreme Allied Commander Europe. (19) STANAG Standardization Agreement. (20) A regional Organization formed by France, Ita ly, The Netherlands, Germany, Be lgium and Luxembourg (the name is made up with the co untriesÂˇ Initia ls in French) tasked w ith the study o f the mi litary characteristics of arms and weapon systems, in view of a joint production and, within certain limits. with the definition of the operational framework in which tllese weapons would be employed.

AND..

TANKS ANTITANKS NVIRONMENT

• terrain, enormously changed by a growing urbanization, manmade structures and intensive cultivations; • hypothetic enemy, oriented to a mobility, firepower and protection development process which since long time has led to entirely armored units. For these two phenomena the validity of armored units and infantry employment was frequality of anti tank weapons capable of guaranteeing the halt quality of antitank we·apons capable of guaranteeing the halt and harassement of the enemy advance. In this context some innovating hints have been given, in order to prime an experimental process that will challenge Cadres and troops in this matter.

The sketch shows the characteristics of a terrain partition hampering the firing and moving capabilities of mechanized and armoured forces.

THE REFERENCE TERRAIN

of various positions for every unit and weapon . It is enough to thin k that to obtain the ideal conditions for deploying one ground emplaced antitank missile launcher it would be necessary the whole working day of a machine capable of knocking down and rem oving the vegetation in the weapon firing secto~ Our statement is confirmed by the abovementioned map showing the ma in obstacles in a section of the reference terrain, e.g .: channels in red, builtup areas in blue and intensive cultures in green. Such a natural environment is to be considered normal in most of the operational assumptions. In su ch an environment, the mai n significance of tanks and antitank weapons in their

Most of the operational terrain - especially as far as the action of armored and mecha nized forces is concerned - consists in an alluvial and wholly flat land, characterized by a limited depth of fields of view due to cultivations and vegetation - by a consequent emphasized partition, by a large number of minor bu ilt-up areas and by small but numerous water courses. Needless to say, in an emergency these characteristics cannot be altered in a short time by means of important works aiming to improve the observation, fire and movement capabilities. The real intervention limits come from the required techni cal time and from the combat dynamism which allows the use MAP OF A "REFERENCE TERRAIN"

Legenda:

-·••••

-·--

built up area

wooded area

1 square

river

= 1 Km

road

particular tactical role, as regards the· traditional combat against infantry units, should also be considered normal. The following considerations on the most suitable action choices are to be made: • The reduced extent of fields of view dictates the employment of longer range antitank weapons from higher positions to better utilize the effective range; in any case, it limits the tanks fire power capability. • The terrain partition very often affects not only the realization of the typical defence scheme which is based on the seizure of dominant positions (strongpoints) spaced out by stretches of terrain controlled by fire, but reduces also the possibility to use linear uninterrupted arrays (antitank formations).

It follows that "geometrical structures" solutions (circleline) which we are used to know, show significant limitations. We should look for fire integration of different range weapon systems by fitting them to the terrain in a coordinated whole of defensive elements or groups. having variable size and structure, basically as regards the depth of field of view and the range. Furthermore, the terrain partition will often impose to achieve a higher force density compared to the generally accepted one, to assure the control of the defensive front. On the other hand, in many cases, an effective antitank defense might not require the contemporary employment of all.. the available weapon systems. In some situations, for example, the use of longer range weapons might be absolutely

"TOW" antitank guided weapon system. In service since 1970, the "TOW" - tanks to its excellent performance on the battlefield - has become the most common ATGM (Anti-Tank Guided Missile) in the West. It can be fired from the ground as well as from vehicular installations and helicopters. It has a maximum range of 3,750 m and can pierce an armour thicker than 600 mm.

insignificant, with all the consequences in terms of aggregation of forces, deriving by this awareness. • The limitations imposed to fire and movement make very difficult the unitary employment of large armored formations. The action will tend to split up into a series of events. Their results will be conditioned more by the decisional and operational autonomy of the minor units commanders than by the manoeuver layout at higher level.

On this subject we can see that the presence of more open and practicable areas is not to be considered as the most probable attacker's avenue of approach. He will be greatly interested in "pressing down" under cover, by concentrating close to the objective and avoiding to be under the enemy long range antitank fire for too long. • The built-up areas, of limited extension but present everywhere in great numbers, contribute to divide the attacker's formations, which will be compelled to outflank them, by penetrating the relatively narrow spaces between the various built up areas. Moreover it is to be remembered that. should dominant positions be lacking, the built-up areas would offer the mere possibility to find those higher weapon emplacements, even if not very high, that allow the missile system to get rid of the view lim itations deriving from the flat land and the vegetation . Moreover, buildings ;:irn a natural obstacle to the movement and a partially sheltered environment. Therefore they save· time and work in the detense organization and weapon emplacement preparation. Small built-up areas as a whole are very important and represent a natural chessboard of "strongpoints" where it is very convenient to pivot the defense. • The natural obstacles (small water courses, embankments, protrusions) very often are considered as connection "braces" between built-up areas. The defense can exploit them in two ways: through the "over the obstacles" deployment when it is possible to take advantage of the cover offered by vegetation and embankments; or through "behind the, obstacles" deployment when the defense halting capacity permits to hit the enemy during the critical crossing phase of passage, where he will be forced to form into columns his vehicles.

It is also possible to adopt both procedures in successive times, in relation with the same obstacle .

HE WEAPON SYSTEMS To better utilize this peculiar environment, so· usual in our landscape but not well known in analytical terms, it can be useful to compare, it with the main characteristcs of the weapon systems that we have today or will acquire in the· near future: • The tank can still be considered as the most effective vehicle to face an enemy attack. In fact: • it is barely vulnerable to indi-· rect fire effects, while the protection increase of the last generation models guarantees a renewed survival capacity even against the hollow charge shells; • can rapidly change position

The ameliorations made in the protection of modern tanks require adequate improvements in the performance of weapon systems. In particular the light antitank weapons, as the "Panzerfaust 3" - shown in the photo, employed by a German soldier - play a crucial role in the self-defence tactics, especially in built-up areas. The "Panzerfaust 3" can also be fired from a closed location, and can neutraiize any modern tank.

to intervene or to avoid fire when located; • con "withdraw while fighting" and can break off contact also without the intervention of the cooperating units; • has a high rate of fire. The peculiar polyvalence (antitank and anti-infantry) and the possibility to accomplish very quick offensive (counter attacks) and defensive (antitank deployments) tasks, confirm the decisive importance of its com bat role with the restrictive terrain conditions under consideration.

,.. But also tanks present some limitations which come from their high cost and their expensive maintenance, from their weight and technicai characteristics (mobility on bridges, icy or muddy surfaces, crossing of trenches and water courses), from the poor possibi lity of observation and intervention at short distances (dead zones); in addition, its size exposes it to air observati on and offence. â€˘ M edium and long range, missile systems, cannot be used, for the well known technical reasons, at short distances, while they are more effective in a situation of deeper fields of fire. Due their vulnerability to indirect fire, some work as dug-in or protected weapons empl ace-Âˇ ments is required. This means a prevalent static defense or, optionally, a manoeuver based on ly on short ambush actions and, consequently, large handovers of the avai liable space. Other characteristics are

the low rate of fire (long dura. exatly on that terrain to which tion of the trajectory) ad the pos- we should pay our greatest sibility to be effective only against attention. objectives which stay exposed The antitank close combat for the time necessary for hitting will be considered therefore an essential need in many situathem . tions, if we don't want to give up all defense. â€˘ The small antitank weapons We have already emphasized for close combat, rather neglectthat the short distances are ed for a long time for their poor those limiting the tank's operaperformance, have recently tional capabilities, and, t heregained new interest. fore, the infantryma n, if equipThe prejudice of their poor ped with a light handy weapon, reliability resulting from the unfavourable psycological con- and well trained, can gain, in this case, some advantages over ditions of the rifleman in a close-in combat situation, must the tank. This kind of antitank weapbe discredited. ons could be more important If, on the one hand these conditions cannot be undervalued, on the other it must be noted that this type of weapon "MILAN" (Missile d'lnfantrie Leger cannot be considered only the Anti-tank) guided antitank mediumextreme means of self-defense. range missile system, employed by an The need to fight the enemy Italian " Alpino". tanks or tracked vehicles in all The " MILAN" s range spans from 25 to 2,000 m; the missile can pierce up to close combat situations, with 352 mm of armour. short field of view and range, Together with th e "TOW", it is one of must be considered not only an the weapon systems most commonly exception but a normal event. emplo yed by the Western armies.

/'/' I

only if we show trust in their OSSIBLE OUTLINES OF possibilities. MPLOYMENT Anyway, these low cost weapons can be used only once from the same position. Before any decision is taken Therefore there is the need we have to individuat e: - considering also their future • weapon emplacements with configuration ("disposable wide field of view (for long and lau ncher" type) - t o have a medium range missile systems) , large quantity of these weapif available; ons in order to reach a good • we;:ipon emplacements where power ratio. c lose combat will be unavoidable · More precisely, the classic ratio I to 3 - which is consider- (for shorter range antitank weapons) ; ed good enough to resist a defensive combat at the longest • spaced up areas between built up areas, where the tank ranges - will be, in this particular situation, i to 1 because polyvalence will guarantee either defensive deployment of quick it is very difficu lt that a single movements ; weapon can face more than one attacking t ank. • natural obstacles able to slow In such a context, it seems down the enemy advance and necessary to deliver them to manoeuvre. the rifle squads in a larger From that we can desume quantity than the one presently the ideal balance of forces to foreseen for the bazooka . accompl ish the task. As the missile system, also The peculiar terrain here the short range weapons are cons idered seems in any case to vulnerable to indirect fire and confirm the opportunity to moreover they have no defense assemble mixed teams (as largeagainst the fire of the automatic ly accepted by all military weapons of the enemy tanks . doctrines) in which the examThis is the reason why they ined three components (missi le are to be used from dug-in or systems, tanks and c lose comprotected emp lacements . bat weapons) are harmonically There will be, therefore, adrapresented. ditional work to carry out, in conThe analytica l definition, nection with their high quantity. based on the terrain, of the most Once again the wise exsatisfactory balance between ploitation of built ·up areas is the above mentioned compovery important. because they . nents could involve repeated allow a better protection in the forces redispositions when we defense, than the open terrain . forecast to reiterate the . defence

in successive alignments. Generally speaking, therefore, in static situations it will be necessary to set up teams where the number of each weapon system is adequate to face the conditions set by the terrain we need to garrison. In more dynamic situations i! could be more convenient to define an average basic composition, by accepting a partial or limited utilization of one of the components in certain combat stages, on condition that repeated adjustments and changes are avoided, since they would affect the combat team cohesion. Moreover we must define the more appropriate· level for achieving the integration of the· various elements. Normally this will be operated at task-force level but often also at team level. But different solutions are possible (which range from the homogeneous task-force structure to the tank section rifle squad integration). Once1 more· the terrain characteristics will impose the decision and will involve an integration at the, lowest le,vel in relation to the largest compartmentalization. The antitank combat will be based on the harmonization of the three components , as follows: • missile systems, particularly at medium ranges (without ex-

An infantry squad of the French Army, carrying a "MILAN" anti-tank weapon system, disembarking from an Aerospatiale-Westland "Puma" helicopter. The infantry-helicopters cooperation is essential when the terrain is deeply partitioned.

engaged units, and for counteroffensive operation. Forces coordination is essential in this defensive scheme and the grea-ter is the terrain compartimentalization, the more complicated is its achievement, due to the fragmentariness of the action. Theoretical and general formulations on criteria to be followed cannot be given. In fact. such criteria can come out only from the examination of real cases, and most of all from the research of the simplest and most stan dardized command and control procedures.

eluding long range systems). located in minor built-up areas HE COMBINED ARMS on top of buildings to intervene OOPERATION at their maximum ranges, with the aim of achieving the over~ lapping of fire with deployed Besides the integration weapons on conterminal posiproblem among the well known tions (prominences, embankantitank combat components, ment and terraces may be used the conditions of cooperation in a simi lar way); with Army Aviation, Artillery and Engineers deserve some • small antitank weapons, for specific notice too. built-up areas direct defence and, in any case, for countering the enemy progression any- • The employment of antitank helicopters on a large scale where the field of view limitations make unnecessary the use related to the vehicles performance should allow to overcome of longer range weapons; most of the difficulties empha• tanks, to be integrated only sized by the described environif necessary by mechanized infantry in order to operate· "be- ment, specially the limited depth of the field of view and tween interspaces" on defensive fire. deployments, to move everyIn this context we should t ime the situation dictates their consider: .action also at lower level to reinforce and supply particularly • the aircraft high cost that

limits the increase of their number and availability; • their vulnerability to air offence and to new anti-helicopter weapon systems; • the impossibility to use them in extended actions or in those requiring continuos control and real seizure of positions. In this context helicopters seem to find their best employment · with mass and. gravitation criteria, especially as a reserve to achieve the greatest concentration of antitanks fire on the point and a the desidered moment in critical situations, to intervene on unforeseen penetrations or to protect exposed flanks. • The artillery and mortars adhesion fire· must be directed to obtain: • interventions concerning specific situations (crossing obstacles, bound passages) rather than less detailed action phases, by considering the transitory, hard and remotely uncontrollable targets;

French infantryman with an "APILAS" short-range antitank rocket launcher. This system has been developed in order to provide the infantry with an antitank weapon able to hit the enemy tanks up to a distance of 300 m. The "APILAS" can pierce up to 330 mm of spaced armour at a 65° incidence.

• smoke screens, when the terrain doesn't offer an adequate cover to the break of contact by the friendly units; • barrages, in order to hit at the right moment the dismounted enemy units close to the objective. The recurring tendency to foresee important operations against enemy armored formations for cutting down their advance speed and limiting their freedom of action must be careful ly considered case by case. The generalized adoption of th is practice could be, in fact, not remunerative in terms of cost-efficency if we consider on the one hand the poor resu lt we can get (which is restricted to "nuisance" only) and on the other the risk that the deployments are detected by acquisition systems and neutralized before having produced worthy results. Synthetically : the particular terrain and the nature of the objectives foster numerous and timely interventions, with high rate of fire, even if in contrast with the most generally accepted principle of mass employment of fire. Special importance have: • the observation, related to the considerable limits imposed by

reduced fields of sight; • the tactical organization aimed to give the minor level units the maximum autonomy in favour of the intervention times. • Concerning the employment of Engineer units, the environment under examination suggests to emphasize, besides minefield emplacement, rather difficult to be laid on a large scale in a short time and in successive alignements, the fol lowing steps: • mines, explosive booby traps, and barrages to be emplaced in set paths, in buildings or in groups of buildings properly selected; • strenghtening of natural obstacles; • improvement of the protection given by built-up areas; • support for the realization of weapon emplacements when the terrain doesn't assure a sufficent cover and concealment; • works and activities aiming at facilitating the friendly units' moves (preparing passages over the obstacles, removing ruins, using bridge-laying tanks). To satisfy the above mentioned requirements the engineer units have to conform their action criteria to those of the combat units.

AGL 300 "Jupiter" French antitank rocket launcher. This weapon can be fired also from a closed location, provided that any obstacle behind :he shooter is at a distance of at feast 80 cm. The "Jupiter" can pierce a compactsteel armour of 800 mm.

The training activity, which is on the theme "Tanks, antitanks and ... environment" has already started with realistic criteria, concreteness and maximum adhesion to the inconstant reality of the natural environment and relevant modifications caused by man. The· experimental test will certainly give· rise· to a general investigation of this matter which in turn will translate into a thorough formulation of the relevant doctrine. In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing the peculiar element of these hints, for in the past we have more or less discussed the "tanks and antitanks" matter,. but never the environment factor. All the above is solicited by the issue as well as by a request to the Cadres to examine closely the· sub;ect so that the players of the modern conventional combat between infantries can be considered a single sub;ect: "tanks, antitanks and ... environment".

•••

WAR OF

LIBERATION'

The Frontier of Freedom WITH THE "LEGNANO COMBAT GROUP,, IN 1945 THE ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS ON THE TRAIL OF THE 1st MOTORIZED GROUP (*) OF 1943 AND THE ITALIAN CORPS OF LIBERATION OF 1944

The "Legnano" Combat Group entering Bologna.

In 1944, after tenacious pressures by the Italian General Staff and long discussions w ith Allied Powers, aimed at increasing Italian contribution to the liberation of Italy from the Germans, our military authorities were finally able to form six Combat Groups, real Maior Units at division level. agile and well articulated, equipped by the Allies with the same kind of weapons , means and materials of the British Divisions. Two of these Groups, the "Mantova" and the " Piceno" did not arrive in time to take an active part in the fightings. The "Cremona", the "Friuli", the "Folgore", the " Legnano" Groups, after a short but heavy training period, were deployed, in January-March 1944, along with All ied units: the former three with the 8th British Army, between the Senio river line and the last degrading layers of the Appennin i mounta ins, between Se1Â·1 Translator's note: Unit at Brigade level.

nio and Santerno; the forth one with the 5th American Army, in the valley of the !dice river. During the following April, as soon as the Allies started a new offensive against the German Army in Italy, our Combat Groups fought decisively and with determination against an enemy worn-out and inferior in forces and means, but determined to resist. The "Cremona" Group, having shattered the enemy defences on Senio and Salento, overcoming the obstacles posed by the enemy and the terrain, reached Mestre and Venice. The. " Friuli", the "Folgore" and the "Legnano" Groups, competing in determination and heroic conduct, moved to Bologna and liberated it. Then they spread north of the Po river to liberate all Northern Italy, in connection with the Resistance, until the end of the military operation in Italy. In these short lines, all appears simple and smooth; yet, behind the constitution of the six Combat Groups there was an incredible labour, with discussions, hope, bitterness, disillusions, in an atmosphere of objective and psycological difficulties. Not Divisions (as the Allied ones) but Combat Groups. Those Groups were assigned to the Allied Army Corps and not to one or two

Italian Army Corps. No armoured units were assigned to the Groups. - We would have wanted more and better. But never mind! We could boast of being on the fighting li ne, at the "Allied " side, reasserting the Italian presence in the liberation war; presence already initiated by the glorious 1st Motorized Group and by the audacious "Italian Liberation Corps". After a long and hard war:, lost but honourably fought. we wanted to express the will of the Italian Army for ricovery and active engagement, until the complete liberation of the national territory and as a base for its future reconstruction. All the Combat Groups operated with enthusiasm and spirit of sacrifice, earning wide recognitions from the Allies. Particularly, in this article, I will report my experiences in the "Legnano" Combat Group, that originated, through an organic transformation. from the Italian Corps for Liberation. FROM THE ITALIAN LIBERATION CORPS TO THE "LEGNANO" COMBAT GROUP

On 24 September 1944, the Italian Liberation Corps, after having climbed up the Italian Peninsula, with generous enthusiasm and steady determination,

side by side with General Anders Polish unit, was dissolved and with its units two Combat Groups were formed: the "Folgore" and the "Legnano". The Italian Liberation Corps (CIL) had honourably fought. and had accomplished all its operative tasks, al-Âˇ though through painful losses, winning appreciation and consents by the Allied High Com-Âˇ manders, who at the beginning were not very well disposed towards their former enemies. The CIL men had re-asserted their will to fight for the liberation of the Italian territory. Yet, during eight months of continous operations, this Large Unit, without reserves, without equipment, with few motor vehicles, was worn out: at the end of the offensive action against the Gothic line, men were literally torn to pieces. The order that brought us back to the rear area for the reconstruction of units proved to be providential: new weapons, new equipmen t, English outfits, with those odd helmets that, for years, propaganda had shown as "frying pans" crooked over the "tommies" ' oblong and twisted faces. The change was certainly stimulating and engaging: especially the idea that we could use good weapons and, above all, ammunition "without restrictions".

Two moments of the liberation of Bologna by the "Legnano". On 21 April 1945 at 09,30 the Bersag/ieri of the " Gaito" and the IX Arditi assault unit enter the town, enthusiastically welcomed.

WAR OF LIBERATION In the rear area, to reconstruct units (from a second lieutenant's diary)

The Frontier of Freedom kinds of small and crew-served weapons: 16th September. Corridonia zone. men are excited and high-spirited. I am We have just taken the mules out when satisfied' with my platoon: w ith "ten gunwe are told that tomorrow we are to shots fired rapidly" wecan obtain a move to the South. - We are not very terrific concentration. The Chief says happy about it. - The few days in that I can be satisfied in having inCorridonia have given us courage. creased the ca liber by a millimiter People have been marvellous and (from 75 to ...76). generous. - It seems to stay at home. We work to get ready until late even15th-16th November. We are in Rome ing. - We say good-bye to friends to leave materials at Forte Bravetta: (and girl friends) with nostalgia until good-bye dear old 75/13, I am forced late night. - Some people cry. to leave you; I have become a mortarman, good'-bye. Plonging into Roman 17th September. We remove in life with Carlo T.; Watching dance-girls motorconvoy from Corridonia to Piedimonte d'Alife, at the Matese slopes at Sistina Musichall; dinner at the it pours with rain - we pitch the "Osteria dell'Orso". In Rome, very few people talk about war, nobody knows tents in the mud, regretting Corridonia that Italian units are fighting on the comforts. front line, it seems to be something far 19th September. The gunners of away in space and time. Back to Piedi"Piemonte" battery are given the choice monte with bitter spirit. to join either the 11th field artillery 17th-18th November. Trip to Naples: regiment, or the "Alpini" supporting same impressions as in Rome, doubfire company of the " Piemonte". After a led in intensity. But a distraction, every short plenary meeting the decision was now and then, does not harm. Chaotic to join the "Piemonte" company, heading to the Piemonte region. but fascinating city. 20th September-20th October. 19th November-6th December. InWeather conditions exceptionally bad cred ible: within two months, we have rain and snow are falling and a cold changed from being a packed battery wind comes from Matese; hard training with 140 mules and four 75/ 13 obices with new weapons; very tiring; we get to a company with Âˇone tracked platoon wet all the time. In spite of everything, with 4 76 mm mortars, one anti-tank gun moral is high. Our mules start off: on Âˇ(6 pounds) platoon, one command the Marrone mountain and on the Caplatoon and one services platoon comstelnuovo they have done marvels, pletely motorized. The best drivers of during the advance on the Adriatic front tracked vehicles are the " mule-drivers" we have never run out of ammunition Dialley e Daine, from Aosta Valley, who and food and we have often given food had never seen an engine! Allied officers to hungry motorized troops waiting tor come to watch our combat training and supplies. Good-bye friends, and thank go back saying: " Alpini, very good you! Alvise and Eraldo, reserve officers, soldiers". A warning order to move on request, are on leave. Only us, pertowards Manziana-Bracciano, North manent officers, are left to go on of Rome. No regret for leaving th is marching to the North! Eraldo leaves marsh! Off we are again, marching me a letter for his relatives who are in towards the North, with english weapa difficult situation in the North. A sound ons but with the Italian and the "Aland pleasant fellow from the Abruzzo pini" spirit. region called "Fab" comes for reinforcement: he will be the leader of the 7th December. Off to Bracciano, close supporting weapons platoon. quartermasters section leader, let's hope not to jump out of the frying pan I will be the leader of 76 mm mortar platoon. I have resulted first in into the fire. Very precarious accomodaa short but intensive mortar course tion, but a poor quartering is better organized by the English: they make us than a good camping. It is snowing sweat blood, through a simple, essential, all the time. It' s always cold and diabolically repetitive, but very effective windy. We are going on w ith hard training. Rustic weapon, powerful amtraining in co-operation with the munition, mortar easy to handle. It "Alpini" companies. Between "panse is all right for me. We are astonished longhe" (gunners) and "cunici" (alpini), by the number of motor vehicles our there is always a perfect understanding. company has been equipped with: Some short visit to Rome, but we come motorbikes, jeeps, light and medium back at evening tired and discouraged. lorries, tracked vehicles, great quantity It is the second sad Christmas far f rom of fuel; we all become skilled drivers. the family: people are working serously We are beginning to touch by hand the (but th1s war never ends!). We spend meaning of "no saving war", conducted Christmas all together in Bracciano, by the Allies with plenty of logistic with nostalgic songs. The Battery is a large family where every body has support and organization. been living for more than one year 20th October-14th November. The suffering, fighting and rejoic ing together. very intensive but stimulating training is Shared risks and hardships are incregoing on - we are shooting with all

d ibily effective means of cohesion. 1945 New Year's Day and Epiphany Day at B. house, attending a ball at the Italian Alpine Club (CAI). Pleasant distractions. 8th January. I am leaving for the Chianti area (charming name) as Quartermaster (the Chief says I have become a specialist). To- the " Piemonte" is given the responsibility of the Radda, Vagliag li and Castellina area. The Battery, (to me is always the battery in spite of what the new Bn. Commander Maj. Rossetti, who has replaced "old" great Chief Penna Bianca Bri atore, says), settles down in Scopeto, a beautiful Tuscan villa with a large cottage around. Good accomodation. Hard tactical training. Shooting training with English instructors; camouflage exercises; the English training method is hard and systematic. The instructor, even if he is a non- commiss ioned officer, is a "little father'' and he is very strictly obeyed. The Chianti zone is marvelleous: we visit villas and castles; Ricasoli Barons have given us a touch ing hospitality; people from Chianti are genuine and open: we are received in farms as sons and b rothers. In the evening, patriarchal families use to gather around the fireplace and the head of the family is used to tell, with right words, brilliant and salacious stories: it seems to hear Boccaccio or Sacchetti; the words "bischero" and "passera" (*) can be ofte"n heard, and everybody (adults and children ) is laughing aloud. To us, from Piemonte region, it is a different and warm world, that soothes our worries due t o lack of news from the North, where things are going rather badly, with bombings and mopping-up operations. We have the news that the Italian troops (Alpini?), fighting with the Germans, have attacked in the region of High Garfagnana, making the Brasilian unit that oc,cupied the sector run away. I don't mind the episode (what a chauvin ist!) but I also think that we could fi nd them in front of us, who knows where, when we are in the front line. Italians against Italians, what a tragedy! The owners of the villa of Scopeto are very hospitable and generous: we sing and dance serenely. Chianti life is spoiling us. Short visit to Siena: _a beauty! But there is an atmosphere of moving: we are going to get back into the front line. We are in good shape, enough trained, moral is high: yet, compared to a year ago, men have "felt" and "seen", during these six months, that from Florence downward nobody thinks about the war anrl the Italian Combat Groups, that are getting ready to combat. We would really like to feel behind us a more solid " national consent". (*) Note of translator: Salaci ous words (s lang) .

THE "LEGNANO" GROUP BACK TO THE FRONT LINE

Between September 1944 and February 1945, under the energetic command of General Umberto Utili, the "Legnano" Group became an operative and combat-ready unit, and moved from the Piemonte d'Alife zone to the Manziana-Bracciano-Triolo zone, then to the Radda-Castellina in Chianti zone under the logistic and employment control of the 8th British Army. On 13 February, the "Legnano" Group passes under the operative control of the 5th U.S. Army, with a warning to be employed by the 15th of March in a mountainous and hilly area with defensive tasks. Firings, tactical and motor-convoy exercises, at day and night time, give the flnal touch to the training. Three Italian Combat Groups are already on the "Gothic Line": the "Cremona" (since January), the "Friuli" (since February) and the "Folgore", employed from the beginning of March. The "Legnano" is organized in the following way: - Headquarters (with 2 "Cara bin ieri" mixed sections); - the 68th regiment with two battalions and one assaultbattalion (Col Moschin), one 67 mortar company and one antitank gun company (6 pounds); - Special Infantry Regiment with two "Alpini " battalions ("Piemonte" and "L'Aquila") and one "Bersag lieri" battalion (Gaito), one 76 mortar company, one 6 pounds cannons company; - the 11th artillery regiment with four 25 pounds battalions, one 17 pounds anti-tanks battalions, one 40 mm light antiaircraft weapon battalion; - the 51st mixed engineers battalion; - Services (Medical Section and 2 Field Hospitals), transport and supply company, repair and recovery unit, mechanical workshops. On 15 March the "Legnano" Group moves from Chianti zone to the "assembly area", 62

north of the Appennini watershed ridge (Piancaldoli, La Martina, Tre Poggioli). On 17 March, the "Legnano" passes under control of the 2nd American Corps and reaches the front line at ld ice sector between the 10th Indian Div ision of the 8th British Army on the right, and the 91 st U.S. Division on the left. The "Legnano" then operates exactly in the delicate overlap point between the 5th U.S. Army and the 8th British Army. The insertion is done with "surprising regularity and order" (the Germans do not notice it until some days later) and ends on 23 March. The "Legnano" deployment, about 10 Km wide, was constituted by the line that the Allies had reached during the offensive operations of the previous year. The advanced positions, in the whole, were quite unhappy, either because overlooked by the German observation points and strongholds, or because they were open or very close to the enemy positions. They did not have much value for a valid defence nor as a line of departure for a new offensive. The defence was organized "by strongholds" with large minefields covered by the fire. The Italian and German Infantries were at tight contact expecially at Pizzano, Casa Collina, Poggio: the all advanced area was under German machinegun fire, intervening, on purpose, at weapons maximum balistic distances (with strong and also psychological effects). Opposite to "Legnano" there was the 305th German Infantry Division, that had a main defence line based on strongholds running from 500 m to 1 Km behind the outposts line. Some ad- Âˇ vanced German strongholds were intentional ly very close to our advanced positions to make, for obvious security reasons, very difficult a heavy concentration of the artillery fire. As we discovered during the final advance, the German observation organisation and the field fortifications (several concret.e works) were very good indeed. Mine-fields and sparce booby-traps were numerous.

Mortar positions were very good. Reverse slope firing positions were frequent. In short, a noneasy terrain and a well-organized defence. Enemy vulnerability: low moral, reduced personnel, scarce munitions avalaibility, air and land inferiority. (What a difference from the dynamism and the fighting spirit on the' "Gustav" line and during the delaying manoeuvre between the "Gustav" and the "Gothic" lines!) Patrols of "Legnano" start. Since the first night, an intense patrolling activity leading to the first clashes in front of the Parrocchia di Vignale and the Ca' di Rezzone positions: we could feel in the air the approaching of the spring offensive. The "Alpini", on the front line from the beginning, are toughly engaged by the enemy who, although in a defensive strategic attitude, operates in the field tactic in accordance to highly dynamical concepts. The German offensive patrolling is tenaciously opposed by the Alpini, and, as the days go on, it looses effectiveness, leaving to the "Alpini" the tull initiative in a no man's land. Major Augusto de Cobelli, the "Aquila" battalion commander, falls during one of these "reconnaissances". For this reason he is posthumously awarded a Golden Medal for Military Valour. The Commander of "Legnano", General Utili, IA{ill write: "I thank him for having sealed, with his own blood, the traditional place of honour of the Italian Officer". THE SPRING OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE "GOTHIC" LINE AND THE CONQUEST OF BOLOGNA

On 25 March, the action of the artillery battalions joined together began and the number of the enemy positions under attack increased. These drum-fire actions with large use of ammunition lasted until 7 April. Since then, every night, always at different hours, an actual artillery preparation fire began together with simulated thrusts of reinfor-

"LEGNANO,, COMBAT GROUP OFFENSIVE ACTION FROM 18 TO 21 APRIL 1945

LEGEND

.......>-

--+20

RGT.

.I.Anna

• •. L.Jrenron,

WAR OF LIBERATION

The Frontier of Freedom "LEGNANO,, COMBAT GROUP DEPLOYMENT ON 23 MARCH 1945 ,,,.,.., -~ • ( .ft/1t, "D'"lt

C Modo,•i,7x, )

,,, Cc

(

=1·::~

{

..J,CQ..f1+k? • . • .,,., C i:r1g10 ••

Cautla -:• /

/ '

!t,h.irn delUO~/)o .~ .... -

• '>. ,o,r.:;,_

,..

I .-

·-;c raKace ~ ~

•\

~ /r11rn.Hvl1nella

'-+ ~:::::~~

·•"'~""l !r--J~~3

.Jt,g?YfnrrinaI~

C(,,,prara ,

+ }

.C.l'a11111~

/'aJ,Ta/t>mpi ·' = -

•

.~(1/mMtZ

• Co/111/ungo

e++--

ced companies, that tended "to deceive the enemy about the D day and the H hour". The D day. the 2nd U.S. Corps was supposed. to attack with 4 infantry divisions a.nd also the "Legnano" Group, in first array towards Bologna, along the n. 65 State Road, thus manouvering from the west to the east. In such operative scheme the "Legnano" Group was init ially supposed to contribute with its supporting fire to the action of the 34th U.S.A. Division (wich had replaced the 82nd one) deployed on the left side, to protect the 2nd Corps right flank and to provide connection between 5th U.S. Army and 8th British Army. Later the "Legnano" Group was supposed to conquer the 363 spot height and to simultaneously advance and protect the right wing of the 2nd Corps, by -adjusting continously the front of contact. In this context. on the 10th of April , the 68th infantry regiment carried out successfully two divers ionary attacks with the two "ard iti" companies of "Col Moschin" battalion on Parrocchla di Vignale and hill 459 accompanied by heavy artillery, mortars and tanks fire supporting action. Such an action deserved the appreciation of General Keyers, Commander of the 2nd U.S. Corps. On April the 16th at 3 o' c lock, the 34th U.S. Division attacked Poggio dei Mori and M. Amigo; with the fire support of the "Legnano" Group it conquered them on the 18th, while at the same time the "L'Aquila" battalion carried out thrusts on Ca' Merla and on hill 160, and the 68th infantry regiment on hil l 459. Meanwhile news was heard of the 8th British Army advancing . towards Romagna plain and of the successes scored by the "Cremona", "Friuli" and "Folgore" Combat Groups, that were operating in that sector. Also the 5th U.S. Army, that was gradual ly manoeuvring offensively from the west to the east with the 91 st, 88th, and 34th Divisions managed to break through and to achieve satisfying progresses.

It was then the turn of the "Legnano", and general Utili gave the order to start the operations on April 19th. The "Alpini" of "Piemonte" started the action with an epic assault against hill 363; and conquered it with vehemence using hand grenades and bayonets, whi le the enemy stronghold w,rn 8lill covered by the smoke of the artillery last heavy concentration fire, and many Germans were still in their shelters. "L'Aquila" battalion went into action against C. del Fiume and San Chierico; also the 68th infantry regiment moved towards Roccioni di Pizzano and hill 459, strenuously defended by a german stronghold. All Groups receive the order to go on pressing the enemy as hard as possible, without loosing contact. «Forward, "Bersaglieri" of the "Goito" batta lion»; «forward, "Arditi" of the 8th assault batta lion! Towards Bologna». Pogg io Scanno e Casola Canina fel l into "Bersaglieri'"s hands, Monte Gradizzo was conquered by "Arditi", while "L'Aquila" battalion moved towards Mercatale and the 68th battalion towards hill 377. On the evening of 20 April our advanced patrols took position on the hills facing Bologna, evacuated during the night by the german troops. Forward, men of "Legnano" special regiment! At 0930 on the

April 21, 1945. The "Leg nano" entering Bologna, welcomed by the population.

21th of April the "Goito", "Bersaglieri" and the IXth assault unit "Arditi" entered in Bologna. This town, after an anxious night of waiting for liberation, welcomed with enthusiasm our soldiers snd the Al lied Forces. The "Alpini" of "Piemonte" were overtaken on the hill 363 by other units; after a terrific "motorride" towards the final objective, they reached Bologna just a little lat er. In the afternoon, after an exhausting march, "L'Aquila" battalion arrived by foot. Al l the other units of the "Legnano" moved to Bologna, while the defeated Germans were retreating through the Po river, pursued and attacked by the elements of the "Resistence" movement that. since the 23nd, the date of the general insurrection. had all together gone into action to hastern Northern Italy liberation . On the 23nd of April, the "Legnano" Group (that was already ready to move towards North behind the 91st and 88th U.S. Divisions) was detached from the 2nd Corps and assigned to the U.S. Army with the temporary task to keep public order in Bologna. This task lasted very shortly. 65

because on the 27 of April the "Legnano" Group began the movement towards Brescia, under the operative control of the IVth U.S. Corps. On April the 29th, Brescia was occupied by a regimental combat team (Goito Bn., 68th Bn., 9th assault Bn., one U.S. tank company) supported by two artillery battalions. On April the 30th, the "Goito" Bn. and "L'Aquila" Bn. occupied Bergamo, while one company of the IX Bn., helped by partisans and U.S.A. troops, el iminated at Ponti sul Mincio, a barricaded german company. On the first of May the 143th company of "L'Aquila" headed to Pavia with the 91st U.S.A. cavalry squadroon, in order to eliminate an enemy concentration; then it proceded towards Alessandria and Asti, reaching Turin in the af ternoon of the second of May. It was preceded a few hours earlier by the 4th Company of "Piemonte", that was converging from Milan, Novara and Vercelli. Offensive thrusts and mopping-up were carried out in Co-· mo, Edolo, Passo del Tonale, Sarnico, Val Sabbia (last fighting - the 2nd of May) by companylevel units. During this short operative period of 40 days, the "Legnano", although not engaged in decisive fights, (it did not have anyway the shocking power necessary for main break-through actions). had operated with professionalism and determination, gaining consent and praises from Allied Commanders. General Clark, the Armies Group Commander, at the closure of an acknowledgement letter sent to general Utili, wrote: "It has been a privi lege having had you with us in the XV Armies Group. Thanks deeply". In these 40 days the "Legnano" received the inheritance of the first motorized "Group" and the Italian Liberation Corps. This inheritance is made of sacrifices. bravery, pa inful losses, and has brought the flag of liberation to Homeland borders. "By sword and spear against Frederick Barbarossa". 66

On the front line of Bologna and further (from . a second li~utenant diary) · 13th of March 1945. The usual . quc1rtermaster. Good bye: good bye, · sweet Chianti hills, generous, witty and hospitable people. We are going back to the· fight. From Florence to Appennines. - Futa and Radicona passes2 .everywhere lots of ammunition, ma_terials fuel, tracked motor vehicles. Ai Piancaldoli, in Selene Valley . (assembly zone). We are· in the Po river basin: fn everybody there is a bit of emotion: we can hear the artillery. rumbling a\ a distance. 15th-16th of March. Night _time reconnaince in 'ldice Valley - we .will replace some USA units- agreements and understandings (what a· difficulty: in comprehending each other!). 17th of March. In line with mortars platoon at Casa Croce. Today is my twenty-first birthday- my soldiers have toasted me, they were very moving. Germans are firing some shells: during six months spent in the rear area we had lost the habit of them. 20th March. All organized - we are all well "dug in" and "defilated". Well protected, efficient observation post. At the orizon we can see the S. Luca sanctuary overlooking Bologna -. We toasted the town rapid seizure, · the end of war, the coming back home: in the air we can feel the spring coming. In front of us, in the Zena Valley, there are no infantry men: mortar men are in front line. I will send night patrols. 24th March. Col Scarpa, Special Regiment . Commander, visits the unit. While he was going up to Casa Croce, Germans shot at him with .machinegun. He talks to men in a moving way. He is a good Commander indeed! 25th of March. Starting from today, "rapid fire", to deceive Germans about offensive beginning: all artilleries shoot simultaneously for 10' at maximum rate of fire: the effect is dramatic but fascinating: the sky is lighted by hundreds of blazes as a terrible thunderstorm; I would'nt like to be on the other side. It will go on like that every night, until general offensive. On the last days, airplanes, mortars and tanks will also operate. 10th of April. A patrol has found in · an old farm of Zena Valley, in no . man's land, a small USA tinned goods and cigarettes depot. We establish a permanent advanced garrison. In twenty days we have shot nearly 7,000 mortars shots. Gun crews are going great. ·

11th of April. From this night on we also start being part of the "big night concert": the· offensive is approacing. 12 April. On the edge behind the front line, five USA tanks have shown up to take part in the "big night concert". After the fire they move away and we had to receive two- rounds as german answer: very well served! A small ammodepot took fire, but gun crew intervened at once with great care. 1.Sth of April. Some- german 75 granades are. shot spreading propaganda leaflets in english language exhalting nazist victory. They must be really at · the end. We heard rumoi's about V2 launching pads in the Padana plain: we talk about them but we are not anymore afraid of them. · 16th of April, 3 o'clock. The 34th USA division on our left has open a hell of a fire. I have followed from n. 1 observation point the attack on · Cemetery of Gorgognano: it was done in a perfect way. Firstly artillery and mortars, then tanks with flat-trajectory and short distance fire, until the last minute. Finally, a bound of assaulting troops. Very good action, I believe with small losses. 18th April. Federico Gasca, replacement of Tandoj as cannon platoon leader is wounded at the head by a splinter at Casa Marchetti. - Hoping it is nothing serious. In the american sector, f ights are- still very hard. We also intervene during day and night time. 19th of Ap ril. Alpini have gone decisively against the well fortified with 363 and they have conquered it. Fantastic soldiers, as usual. Also the mortar men have done well. We are off to Bologna. We are not eating or sleeping; "Anxiety for the big event" takes every thought, every energy. 21st of April, 12 o' clock. We are entering a happy but still incredulous Bologna. The feelings, the scenes, the episodes, the faces, the tears, the hugs, the cries, the kisses, the confusion: there are no words able to descrjbe the arrival of Allies and of us Italians in Bologna! And the same during the following days spent in the town. 27th April-2nd of May. After a short duty visit to Chianti zone, off to Brescia with "Piemonte" Bn .. Then we continue towards Bergamo - on the second of May the 4th supporting arms company is detached in Turin - we arrive in Piazza Castello at 17.30 - I had left Turin at the end of August 1943. I meet my parents in Turin, after twentyone months of separation: I cant' tell what I feel. In Italy war is ended. Now we must start working for reconstruct ion.

CONCLUSION At the end of the war in Italy, we looked back to the road we had own from the 8th September 1943, when, being at the Staging Area Command in Bari,

Right. April 10, 1945. An "Arditi" platoon of the 123rd company, attacks Hill 459. By this surprise action , carried out in connection with our artillery's continuous fire, and lasted !ess than 1 hour, th e "Arditi" eliminated four enery positions.

I .

,Â·

we had the news of the armistice: within a few days we had witnessed a material and spiritual collapse of Italy and its Armed Forces, so dramatic to seem total and defin itive. . But our people's capacity of resistence and recovery has risen aga in, f irstly in an incoherent and d ivided w ay, then with more aggregating force. And wh ile some propagand a was call ing madness the very thought of italian units fighting at the side of Al lied. Forces. men of the first Motorized Group fell on December 1943 on Monte Lu ngo for the liberation of the Homelan d. The contri bution increased month by month with the Italian Liberation Corps in 1944. Then four Combat Groups on Apri lMay 1945 broke into th e Po Valley with the Allied Divisions. bring ing back aga in the National Flag on Alpine passes. In the meantime Italian Navy ships were crossing aga in the Mediterranean and Italian aircraft were ta king control again of nation al air space. Twenty months may seem little t o human memory; yet we "found very long·· {using a way of saying from the Piemonte reg ion} ; they seemed to us to last for an eternity, maybe main ly because of the compelled separation from our families. without the possibility of excha nging news. A psycolog ist cou ld easily tecnically describe this phen omen on: we only knew that ind ividual and collective spirits were always very low. We acted in order not to think. How many things we have learned duri ng :hese twenty months! The first is that an individual or a commu nity should never throw in the sponge: every situation, however dra matic it may be, is always reversible , provided w e don't give in. "Let's

Left. 19 April, 1945. Alpini from " L' Aquila" batt alion figh ting tc liberate the village of S. Chierico. Almost at th e same time, anoth er "Alpini" · unit. the "Piemonte" battalicn, conquered Hill 363, holding it in sp it e of the heavy reaction of th e enemy artillery.

roll up our sleeves. sons" so my artillery men used to say during the most difficult momen ts. The second thi ng we have learned is that the heroical and romantic war was someth ing of the past: we understood at once that war is a matter of pla nning, abundance and not shortage, industrial organization and effort, method and sta nda rd ization, cooperation in all forms and at all levels, common wi ll of reach ing the aim. We verified at once that modern weapons, munitions and equ ipments are a strong mu ltiplier of determination and drive. We rea lized immediately that operative effi ciency is the mutua l interaction of five basic factors: first: man , with well trained body and soul, rich with the consent given by the Com mu nity he is bou nd to defend; second: individual and col lective training, carried ou t always in cooperation and in the most realistic environment; third: armament and eq uipment. that must be functional, simple, strong and modern ; fourth: lrciined reserves and logisti c stocks, in order to give contin uity to the combat effort; fifth: strong and reliable comma nd and control capability. We also understood that to neg lect even only one of these five factors would mea n to compromise, if not to reduce to zero. t he whole operative efficiency. T he third thing we have learned is that war evolves tow ards more and more divided and episodical forms, where only platoon. company, battalion Comma nders can have a good chance of success, if they are able not only to organize but also to interpret the received instructions and to operate with task tecniq ue, with initiative and autonomy, in an operative environment more and more fluid, rapid and complex. Withi n this context, to conclude, let's. go back to the attack of hill 363. " We are approaching the 1945 spring offensive and , within the overall scheme of the action, the "special reg iment" receives the task of conqu ering the ill-· famed hill 363, a hill overlooking

the !d ice and Zena Va lleys, orga nized by the Germans as a fearful fort ification, at the overlapping point between the 14th and the 10th Army. "Gaito" Bersagl ieri batta lion is tasked t o conquer hill 363, but on April 19-, unforeseen events that always occur during battle developments. give th is ha rd task to the "Piemonte" Alpini battalion , that had faced for one month the "363" dom inating position and had to put up with automatic weapons heavy bursts. The 2nd company of "Piemonte" starts off, attacks, adva nces. stops in a fire storm. All men are in suspence: what is happening? Sud den ly· the " Dragon" (this is the nickna me of the Alpi ni Commander} asks for an other 10 minutes of continuous fire, then, im mediately after, asks for an "add" . 10 minutes later. a period of time that seemed years to us. we receive th is laconical messag e: "Stronghold has been conquered". The action on "363" has been an example for t imeliness. synch ron ism , ability, initiative, and decision. While splinters of the last shots were still to fall, the Alpini troops broke in to position with hand grenades, su rprising most of the defenders in thei r shelters. There were short but hard figh t s, so· vehement that they forced to surrender an enemy ready to resist: a rapid penetration into the en&my position . that stifled at birth a counter-attack attempt. 70- prison ers (a mong which the stronghold Commander}. The road to the plain was open ". Than k you. Wa r of Liberation me n. Your sacrifices give su pport and reason to our mission of today, give us strength to look with optimism at our Homeland's future. This is what we have learned, and what we wou ld like to have taught to our successors, with the idea tha t the frontier of freedom is today still open and it is t o be defended with the sa me engagement of yesterday, to give to ou r sons and to the sons. of our sons a long-lasting, free and secure peace. Gen. Giorgio Donati

848B

92F

Cal. 9 mm short

Cal. 9 mm Parabelfum

THE ROYAL ITALIAN ARMY 1915-1918

The lack of close and continuous contact between the General Staff and the Government, particularly between 1914 and 1915, results in serious problems and delays in the preparation of th e Italian Armed F:>rces for their early entry into the World War. In fact, the situation appears inevitable even if the reasons for the change of front due to complex political-diplomatic events do not always seem to be sufficiently known in the responsible military spheres. The fact is that the Chief of General Staff is faced at the last minute by the sudden need to intervene, against Austria and in view of the· state of unprepa redness of the nationc:I war apparatus, he tries to gain time. However, he succeeds in obtaining a delay of only a few months and this not beyond the date of May 1915 in view of the agreement fo rmally undertaken with the Enten te by the King and the Government. Planning is, therefore·, hasty and its carrying out so11ewhat problematic. While envisag ing an immediate offensive, the onerous and complex problems of mobilization and the assembling o-f troops are not satisfactoril·t solved. At the outbreak of hostilities while the, assembling is under way, an unrepeatable and favourable occasion is, thu s. lost to proceed with the hoped for occupation of the Innsbruck and Lubl jana basins as a first step,. Minor adjustments to the front iers are the only advantages achieved and these limited to the first days of figh ting. Then the lines of defence previously organized in suitable chosen locations and the continuing transfer of more troops from the Russian front allows the Austrians to bar the way to the attackers, forcing them to adopt terrible trench warfare. In order to avoid deleterious immobility and to meet the continu ed requests from the Allies, the Italian Army is obliged to attempt an opening in the enemy's positions and to advance, certainly not under such favourable con-

ditions as would have been the case at th e beginning of hostilities, towards the interior of the Hapsburg Empire. In this way, the decision is taken for the sanguineous battles - the hammer blows on the lsonzo river line, the battles that for three long years depleted the cream of the troops without, however, obtaining results sufficient to justify the enormous sacrifice in men and materials. In addition, the fighting is rendered still fiercer for the Italian soldier by the aggressive initiatives of the enemy who reacts with the maximum determination. In particular on two occasions: the "Strafe-expedition" of 1916 and the widescale offensive undertaken jointly by the Austrians and Germans from the

ITALIAN

MILITARY

UNIFORMS

Caporetto and Tolmino areas in 1917. In a highly dramatic and dangerous situation the Italian Army is, thus, obliged to defend itself vigorously and to pay a high price due to the strategic deployment oriented towards attacking. However, although in these cases t he exhausted state• of units at the front and the weakened resistance on the part of th e population rep resen t the negative aspects which are most evident, on· the other hand as the war proceeds and progressively becomes a total war, the increase in professionality of military personnel at all levels and the fact that the population is convinced th at fighting is the only alternative for the survival of thei r country are the positive elements which in the end reward all the sacrifices, dangers and disappointments. There is no doubt that the· Army of 1918 has very little or nothing at all in common with that of four years before: with the moral support of the population and the commendable productive capacity on the home front. our soldier has become a well-trained fighter and, more important still. he is highly motivated. It can, therefore, be stated that the troops of the last year of the war are the finest in every way that Italy has ever had: proud and strong and unusually we-II equipped with modern means. The resistance on the Piave River and the great ba ttle at the Vittorio Veneto are the tangible proof, as are the laudatory judgements of the Allies and the opposing armies. It is not an exaggeration to define as immense the Italian war effort during the Firs t World War. Apart f ro m the remarkable productive capacity in the agricultural and industrial fi elds despite the absence of the cream of the male population which is employed at the front, the sheer force of the number under arms is surprising and deserves admiration. ·

At the outbreak of hostilities the Army comprises 14 Armed Corps, con sisting of 35 infantry divisions, 1 "Bersaglieri" division, 4 "Alpini" divisions and 4 cavalry divisions, making a total of about 31,000 officers and some 1,058,000 NCOs and privates, without counting the approx imately 50,000 men still fig hting in Libya. In particular, the Army has available 438 infantry battalions each of 4 companies with mobilised carabiniers units, 58 battalions of "Bersaglieri" of which 12 were equipped with cycles, 52 "Alpini" battal ions, 171 cavalry squadrons, 363 field artillery batteries each of 4 guns, 8 horsedrawn batteries, about 70 with mules and mountain batteries, 28 heavy field artillery batteries, 277 fortress artillery com panies, 1 complex of 132 heavy guns, 114 engineers companies of the various branches, 10 balloon sections, 15 air squadrons with 58 planes, and 5 airships, 18 mobilised battalions of the Royal "Guardia di Finanza" (Finance Guard), 113 garrison companies, medical

services and ordnance groups and 5 fleets of vehicles, in addition to the Territorial Militias consisting of 198 infantry battalions and 9 engineers battalions. The availability of weapons is approximately 760,000 ri fles, 170,000 muskets. 21,000 cavalry swords, 168 machineguns, 88 heavy field pieces, 1,453 field guns, 32 horsedrawn guns, 108 mule-drawn guns, 200 moup tain guns, 5 an tiaircra ft guns, 132 he·avy artillery. There are evident signs of shortages in the availability of machineguns (only six per reg iment). of art illery guns, of motorized vehicles, and of munitions for the artillery. However, towards the middle of 191{, reinforcements of all types are avail 2ble in reasonable quantities and are forwarded to the fron t, proving e'ffective and useful soon after the first months of the following year. In accordance with the first strategic plan which had the double objective of the Lubljana basin to the east and the cutting off of the Trentino salient in the nort h. the available· forces are deployed in order th at 214 battalions and 141 batteries cover the Stelvio-Monte Canin line and 201 battalions, 30 squadrons and 180 batteries the Monte CaninAdriatic Sea line. General reserves, totalling 134 battalions, 50 squadrons and 108 batteries are all oriented towards the lsonzo area. Six new Army Corps with 13 infantry divisions are· formed in 1916. At the end of that year the Army comprises 5 Armi es. In addition, in vi ew o f their special importance mention should be made of the increase in the air force (370 aircraft in 1916), and the fleet o f vehicles (950 cars, 10,800 trucks, 570 tractors and 4,000 motorbikes, again in ' that same year) . In 1917 there are also remarkable increases in the number of troops so that the total of divisions is now 69 and there are more than 7,000 artillery pieces of various calibres. The machineguns also now number 8.700 and the vehicles more than 24,000. The heavy losses in men and equip1916 - Major of the Engineers, in warment due to the defeat usually called time uniform. "the Capore tto collapse " seriously reduces the· numbers available in the new Often the officers replaced the legItalian line of defence from . the moungings with puttees or knee-high socks . tains to the Piave River, but the fighting The belt with a metal buckle decorated spirit remains high. In fact, together with the Savoy eagle in relief, was with the decision o f t he troops to resist gradually substituted towards the end at all costs there is the admirable reac- ffl of the war by a brown feather belt of t ion on the part of the population. The a type similar to the British Sam Browne civilians now united and no longer habelt. rassed by political diatribes and defeatism succeed in supplying incredible quantities of materials and reinforcements as well as the younger generations to effectiv,lly fil l the gaps. In this 1915 - Soldier, "Carabinieri Reali" · way, all the units which had disappear(Royal Carabiniers), on foot, in wartime ed are reformed and even augmented dress. and all the equipment which was desThe cocked hat with its grey cloth troyed or damaged is rep laced and recover and the black cloth collar on newed, thus contributing to the fi nal which the silver patches stand out, are victory. typical of the Carabinieri. Personnel At the end of the conflict the Italian Army comprises, among, others, 9 belonging to the mounted units wear the uniform and equipment of the Armies consistirg o f 24 Army Corps, 57 mounted troops, maintaining the above divisions and 194 infantry brigades, as well as an assaul t Army Corps and sevmentioned details.

eral hundreds of artillery batteries and machine gun companies. There are now more· than 700 aircraft and in th e last few months of the fighting even more than 1,000 planes. The .same increases can be noted in the number of vehicles. Jn fact, there are thousands of all types of transport available. The remarkable total number of citizens under arms is amazing: it has been carefully calc•Jlated after the war at about 6,000,000 men (and this considering that the total population is

approximately 36,000,000) and the high percentage of losses reached about 15% of this total. The· entire mobilized army is now dressed in grey-green. Although deficiencies in the depots are signi ficant on account of the Libyan War and th e enormous number of men now under arms, it is, however, possible to meet the demands most satisfactorily, due to the high production rate in the factories during the months immediately preceding the war. In 1915 the soldiers are wearing the uniforms in use since 1909, as set out in the Ministry circular No, 24727 of 8 December. However, some variations can be noted which are adopted during the conflict and which are destined to change slowly but surely the appearance of the fighting soldier: after the first year of the war the long breeches tucked into boots give way to

1916 - Sergeant of the 10th Infantry Regiment "Brigata Regina" (the Queen's Bri'gade) in wartime uniform. After March 1917 rank insignia consist of a ribbon and only two black stripes, always ending with the characteristic ornamental knot. The gas mask is often worn across the· chest.

1916 - Lieutenant General, in winter wartime uniform. General officers wear the overcoat of the model for mounted troops. On the shoulder straps are sewn small silver rectangles with two golden stars on red cloth backing which indicate the rank.

1917 - Artillery Lieutenant-airman, in wartime uniform. The officers and NCOs of the various Corps and Services who ioin the aviation units maintain their original uniform but using freely the most comfortable clothing or the dress they prefer. However, all wear the special fibre helmet and the fur-lined leather iacket.

1918 - Bersaglierl cyclist, In wartime uniform. In addition to the traditional plumes fixed on the helmet, the cyclist units are distinguished by the special turned down collar of the jacket.

the Zouave-type breeches. These are tied under the kn ees and completed by puttees, also in grey-green cloth, or alternatively by knee-high woollen socks. Despite being hardly practical puttees are generally preferred by all t he troops obliged to live in the trenches. In 1916 distribution of a metal helmet is com menced. This is of the French "Adrian" pattern and at the beginning is light blue in colour as the helmets came directly from the depots of th e French Army. As the war proceeds the soldiers get rid, as they always do, of everything that is superfluous and prefer to keep the most useful items regardless of their. aspect. In this way, the narrow shoulder wings tend to disappear and where possible are substituted by a ! plain strip of material fixed by a button. The outside tunic pockets are more and more often used and the heavy items of equipment left aside in favour of lightweight essential items. In 1918 the helmet is protected by a grey cloth cover to avoid reverberation. Officers tend to wear the uniforms and equipment of troops more and more often, distinguishing themselves only by their rank insignia. Reduced in size and specially designed, rank insignia is in greygreen cloth as the traditional gold and silver insignia has been abolished. Th e table shows not only the ranks of o ffi cers but also those of NCO's and corporals. In this connection, it should be noted that the table must be considered together with the following remarks: at the beginning of the conflict officersÂˇ and warrant officers' triangular rank insignia on the cap is soon changed to the more traditional horizontal stripes; the rank insignia for generals always sewn on a silver rectang le is gradually integrated and in 1918 is as fo llows: Army General, Chief of General Staff o f the Army (two stars, one crown and two gilt bars). Commander of an Army (two stars, one crown and one gilt bar). Commander of an Army Corps (two stars and one crown), Lieutenant Genera l, Major General, Division Com-

1917 - Soldier, 19th Regiment "Cavalleggeri Guide" (Light Cavalry), dismounted, in wartime dress. Cavalry units w!1ich are dismounted and redeployed as infantry keep the original uniform but do not wear leggings or spurs. They do, however, wear the accoutrements and gaiters of a special model. Left. 1918 - Soldier, 243rd Infantry Regiment "Brigata Cosenza" (Cosenza Brigade), in wartime uniform. This is the simplest and most practical dress worn by infantrymen in the last months of the war. It should be noted that heavy and bulky equipment has been elimin:ited, a helmet cover has been adopt.9d which is often completed by a badge, painted in black, depicting the regimental number below a royal crown.

-1917 Âˇâ€˘ Dragoon of the "Genova Cavalleria" Regiment (Heavy Cavalry), in wartime uniform. The special distinctions which identify the soldiers of this regiment are the .black Savoy cross painted on the helmet, the entirely yellow collar and the piping, also yellow, on the shoulderstraps .

.. E.>

;. -:::::-_ ~

;;.--..,,: ...

... ,~... ..

. .,~

........

Rank insignia during the First World War

General of the Army Major General Brigadier General

. '

~ ~

~ .

Lieutenant Colonel Major

lieutenant 2nd Lieutenant Aspirante

â€˘

Battle Adjutant Warrant Officer 1st Warrant Officer 2nd Warrant Officer 3rd

Sergeant Major

Sergeant

Corporal Major

Corporal

mander (one star and one gilt bar), Major General and Brigadier General (silver background only); after 1916 "aiutanti di battaglia" (literally battle adjutant), a rank created during the war, and the three ranks Qf Warrant Officers are distinguished respectively by three rows of black zigzag piping sewn in an upside down V with a single knot, three rows of black zigzag piping sewn in an upside down V, two rows of black zigzag piping sewn in an upside· down V, and one row of black zig -

zag piping sewn in an upside down V; after 1917 sergeant majors and sergeants, keeping the traditional single knot. are distinguished - by two th in stripes and one thin stripe respectively, in addition, of course, to the wide stripe. The· format ion of new specialized services requires the promulgation of a numerous series of orders regard ing the characteristic signs and badges: in this way, for example, bombardiers, flame-throwing personnel, telegraph operators, etc., are identified by badges

normally worn on the forearm and embroidered in black. New collar badges are added to those of the peacetime army. Among others, the red, green or blue ribbon with three white· vertical bars worn by machinegunners or the black flameshaped collar badges worn by the assault units who set up a new tradition for uniforms by being the first to wear an open-collar jacket. Gen. Valerio Gibellini

1918 - Corporal, 27th Regiment "Cavalleggeri Aquila" (Light Cavalry), in wartime uniform. The bugle with the number 27 painted in black on the helmet distinguishes the regiment, which is among the first to liberate the town of Udine and the Friu/i.

'•

1918 - Guardia di Finanza (Finance Guard), in wartime uniform, This man belongs to the Battalion Assault Unit, as can be noted from the special jacket with open lapels and the yellow collar badges, distinguishing the particular unit. In the s~me way all the troops of the 1arious Corps and Services keep their own typical collar badges while the newly formed independent units wear the black doublepointed collar badges.

~~e -,,-

TECHNICAL

COMMAND AND CONTROL GROUND STATION "ALAMAK"

The "Alamak" system, together with "Mirak 20" and "Mirak 100-2", is a subsystem of the command and control center "Andromeda". The "Alamak" system is designed to guide the RPVs constructed by Meteor and can be converted into a control station for ground or naval unmanned vehicles. The system is capable of gathering and memorizing the data supplied by the "Drones" during their operative missions, of visualizing them on video, and, moreover, of performing telemetric and on-map plotting operations.

-·· 78

DATA

With an additional kit, the system can be gyrostabilized when used aboard ships and aircraft. Nearly all kind of generators can be used to supply power to "Alamak" station. which is also equipped with batteries capable of guaranteeing, in case of generator fault. a 30 min functioning of the system . The "Alamak" station is available in two basic configurations: the "standard" sheltered version where the personnel can operate under the most severe environing conditions over extended periods of time; and the "Rid" version with the same per-· formance characteristics of the "Standard" version. but wich the possibility of being splitted into components. so that it can be located on terrains not reachable by vehicles.

The "Alamak" can operate under any climatic conditions, at temperatures from - 20° to + 50° centigrade, with wind up to 90 km/h (50 km/h in desert areas) and with an umidity not higher than 95%.

TECHNICAL

DATA

.I'/// TACTICAL VEHIGLE FIAT IVECO 40-10-WM (4X4) The tactical vehicle 40~10WM, designed and developed to meet a very mide range of operational requirements, is a versatile means of transportation that keeps unchanged the characteristics of the reconnaissance vehicles such as, e.g ., good on-road speed, limited weight and size and cross-country capability. The vehicle can be aircarried by C-130 "Hercules" or

"Fiat G-222", air-dro'pped, or used as artillery tractor capable of towing 1,5 t guns. The personnel! carrier version can accomodate in the back 10 fully armed and equipped men or, alternatively, 1,5 t of materials, or the S 250 standardized shelter. The 40-10 WM can also be produced in other specialized versions such as, for example, command post, communication center, ambulance (transport capability of 4 injured men) or weapon stand for any kind of armament (antitank, missile, and antiaircraft systems,

single and multiple machine guns, recoilles guns, multiple rocket launchers, mortars). The vehicle, equipped with a diesel engine, has a maximum on-road speed of over 100 km/h; maximum gradient 60%, range 800 km.

The most extensive range of

FUZES • point detonating • mechanical time • proximity to meet the most demanding requirements of performances, reliabi lity and qual ity standards needed for advanced ammunition.

M739

r:;;,aORLETTI

1.1.:J DIVISIO#I DIIISA

Via Washington , 70 - 20146 MILANO D1--1 ,1'l QO

_ TI

'l'l'J

7 R

Rf\ 11

- IT IV

M577

FB368

FB375

B O OK

RE VI EW S

.I'/// Regional Security in the Middle East ADEi.Pi ll LIBRARY ~

~:~';;~JRNATIONAL(NST.TOTÂŁfORSTRATEGIC STUDIES by

Gower

C . Tripp (ed.): "Regional Security in the Middle East". International Institute for Strategic Studies. London, 1984, pp. 182. ÂŁ 4.20.

Middle F:::istern sP.r.11rity r rohlP.ms are not the si mple resu lt of d ifferences between the various nations. T hese differences contribute to, but t o an even greater extent secu rity problems are a consequence of, the domestic insta bility afflicting the coun tries of t he Arab war d. In deed, it sh ould be remembered that there is no fu nda menta l consensus on e it her the existence of certain Arab states nor the legiti macy of their g overn rrents. The Arab world is deeply divided by the "seculari zing" tenden cies represented by the "Ba 'ath" parties. and by the recurring waves of "confessional" fervour. The Islam ic Republic of Iran is the most striking exa mple of tbe latter. The outcome of the conflict between Iran and Ira q will have a decisive impact on t he area's ent ire strategic picture . Resu lting tensions could lead to t he risk of a direct confrontation between the two su perpowers, with obvious repercussions for the strategic balance of the en tire world. The danger of nuc lear

prol iferation is another menace hangi ng over the area. It is very di fficu lt to ma ke predictions for this part of the world. T here is the on-going conflict between Israel and the . Arab states, fueled in pa rt by the difficulty of establishing definitive relations with Egypt. These relations are made al l the more problematic by the intractability of the Palestinian problem and t he objective d ifficulty of solving it through the crea tion of a Pa lestin ia n state, not to mention the potential repercussions of su ch an act on the strategic stability of the entire area. The confusion surroundi ng these questions, whic h exists not only in Israel, but among the Ara b st ates as well, became evident du ring the negotiations which even tual ly secured asylum for the Palestinian gueri llas in Leban on. The Leban ese question remai ns an open one, w hile a direct involvement on the part of t he two Sll[)P. r[)OWP.rs looms on t he horizon as a more and more menacing possi bil it y. The articles in th is vol ume reflect the uncertai nty and the di fficulty of predict ing the future for this area. One fact. however, is f oun d in all the possible scena rios. Outside intervention, pressu re. or mediation alone wil l not bring strategic sta bility to t he Middle East. This goal ca n on ly be reached following the establishment of new internal equi librium s which depend less on factors of milita ry strength than on t he creation of a g reater dom estic pol itical cohesion with in the va rious countries of the region . Given th is over-a ll picture, the West must search for reasonable comprom ises which lead to a status qua that the region can accept. Pure milita ry pressu re and outside int erference can at best solve . secondary problems. They can not, however, establish a sta ble equilibriu m in an area that is vita l to the West. given the econom ic importance of it s oil reserves. Carlo Bess

A. Woodcock - M. Davis: "La teoria delle catastrofi" (The Catastrophe Theory), Garzanti Ed., 1982, pp. 187, L. 12.000. The appl ication of the vulnerability theory and the catastrophe theory in the field of decisionmaking is a matter of great interest whic h throws new light on the so-called logic of action or praxeology. The potential uses of the two theories are tied to the fact t hat they permit the penetration and acquisition of synthes ized , convin cing explanations f or the qualit ative changes w hich affect the var ious factors influencing different problems. Normal logic, the basi s for the problem-solvi ng method codi fied by the Defence Chiefs of Sta ff, is Ca rtesian. It is founded on the prin ciple of the excluded thi rd and assu mes that a compl ex problem can be divided into many elementary ones which ca n then be exami ned one by one with the result that the ir separate analytical deductions ca n be synthesized into scena rios which gradually become mo re and more compl ete and thoroug h. This log ical approach has been criticized by ma ny for not ta king in to account the constant c hange

BOOK

which affects the various factors of each problem. A cybernetic-type approach, that is to say, a "retroactive" approach rather than a "cascading" one, seems to correspond best to the logical foundations of a method designed to produce decisions in conflict situations. The two theories alluded to earlier contain reference structures which can serve as the basis for a progressive - and often cyclical - investigation into the terms of the problem. Thus they provide frameworks for reference which can help the decisionmaker to act in the most rational way possible, fully aware of the realities he is confronting. The catastrophe theory - which this very interesting book is attempting to popularize - provides models that illustrate what happens when physical structures, or even social systems, are subjected to forces involving a qualitative change which results in the destruction of the previous structures and the creation of new ones. Using seven elementary model-catastrophes, the theory is meant to lay out the mechanisms which allow for the transformation of the quantitative into the qualitative, and which permit the actions and reactions needed to accelerate (in the case of an attack against an enemy, for example) or slow down (in the case of a defence) the structural collapse of the organism subject to stress. The theory's applications are potentially widespread, not only in the field of physics, but also in the "soft" sciences, such as sociology, psychology, strategy, economics, etc.. The book presents interesting, concrete examples in a plain, convincing way without resorting to complicated logorythms. The examples give a lively, concrete idea of the theory's intrinsic possibilities. There is, however, a major danger to be avoided . Many are incli ned to reject new theories either because they don't feel like making the effort to study

REVIEWS

them or because they hold that the pragmatism gained through common sense and experience is more than sufficient for the concrete problems that need to be faced. But without implicit or explicit models to refer to, no problem can be examined, and the course of action to be taken is eventually determined by nothing more than casual improvisation and dilet-· tantism. The catastrophe theory does not provide a series of equations with which to solve problems, but rather a set of models to interpret them, while evaluating the ways in which structures are modified by variations in the different internal and external factors governing them . It can thus be a very useful theory for those involved in a changing reality or a conflict situation. Carlo Jean

SPECIAL REPORT

The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense -»CQOll'r,n KCV.:.vis Rco()r,t,, i:--4 11:0--0« ,J:.

o-1r«ronon

~.tehoel J. Qoo.10 .IOIVI MCollr:.

J. Davis and others: "The· Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile, Defense", Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., Harvard (Mass.)·, 1983, pp. 71, $ 6.50. United States strategic thought gives absolute priority to deterrence, distinguishing it from

defence as understood in the traditiona l sense of the word. Classic strategic thought considered deterrence to be the collateral effect of a true operational capability. According to the American conception of deterrence, despite all the different theories, such as flexibility of use, limited strategic options, NUT (Nuclear Utilization Theory) and NUTS (Nuclear Utilization Targeting System), deterrence depends on the threat of an escalation that will lead to mutual destruction, in other words, MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). In th is context, priority has been given to strategic offensive arms. in part because the defensive option could not guarantee similar results. Furthermore, the development of deterrence policies independent of policies for a plausible and acceptable defence has gradually led to there being two distinct conceptions of use and structure: one for the forces assigned to deterrence and one for those assigned to defence. The change in the balance of military strength between the two superpowers, a change not favourable to the USA. has progressively eroded MAD's credibility and essentially limited its validity to within the borders of the United States. On the other hand, the USSR has always followed a different doctrine. Soviet strategic scholars and experts have always concentrated on defining the ways in which a nuclear war could be fought and won, or at least survived. This is not to say that the USSR intends to launch a deliberate strategic nuclear attack. It only means that the Soviets are acquiring the capability to do so successfully, preparing themselves not only to strike the United States nuclear forces, but, at the same time, to limit their potential losses from a United States' retaliatory strike. This could bring about a change in the perception of the United States' strategic power and its

BOOK

ability t o achieve its desig nated security objectives. The only way for the United States to overcome this obstacle is to make a major effort in the area of strategic defence while formulating an accepta ble operational doctri ne that abolishes the artificia l disti nction between deterren ce and defence. The study under review is part

,.,.,.,

REVIEWS

of the extremely dynilmic renewal which characterizes current United States strategic thought. This renew al began with Schlesinger in the mid-70's and has gone on to include the "Countervailing Strategy", the concepts contained in the FM 100-5 Operations of the U.S. Army, 1982 Edition , the longer-t erm concepts of the Airland Battle 2000. and President

Reagan's Star Wars programme. The renewal took definite shape following the adoption of MAS (Mutual Assured Survivability) as the goal of Un ited States defence pla nni ng, and it could bring about a profound cha nge in the world strateg ic equation whi le creating new cond itions for Europea n security. Carlo Jean

M ISAR

spa

via b rescia ,39Âˇ41 castenedolo (bs )Âˇ i ta Iia tel. 030/2732411 telex 302081 misa r i 83

BOOK

REVIEWS

works. Naturally, the author includes purely political factors, which must be addressed even if the subject at hand is defence policy. The title of the chapter on mili-Âˇ tary considerations is significant: "Europe, Strategic Wager" . Nothing more than a wager - according to the author - in a highstakes game (to which Europe is not invited) run by the two superpowers. These two giants might come to an agreement, but if they do, it will be without, and Reflexion:; sur !'Europe perhaps even against, Europe. ,wee le centre deludes This situation must therefore du Mouvemenl des democrates be changed through the creation of a common, autonomous defence system, because, "our con tinent will not become an area of peace until her peoples assume the burden of its defence". Though many of the final goals Michel Jobert: "Vive !'Europe proposed by Jobert may be libre. Reflexions sur !'Europe objectively acceptable, and have avec le Centre, d'etudes du mou- for some time now certa inly vement des democrates", Ramsay been a very real cause for conEd., Paris, 1984, PPÂˇÂˇ 208, FF. 69. frontation in different political and strategic centres, the doubts To make Europe truly free. to (and the difficulties) concern the make it the subject and not the "how" and the "when", beginning object of high-level politics with the choice of the French (beginning, naturally, with the nuclear force as the exclusive problems of military defence): core of the new European defence this is the unequivocal objective system, " ...today, (this is) the which Michel Jobert wishes to only element of independence bring to our attention in his available to Europe. Great Britrather short book whose style ain's forces are tied too closely is at times telegraphic, and per- to the American military system haps a bit overbearing, but whose to be truly independent". content is formidable indeed. Without look ing at the complexity The author's line of thought does of current technological requirenot stray far from a theme which ments, a factor which certainly has been a part of French postraises doubts concerning the war politics for some time now. "force de frappe'"s true operationIts essence is a sometimes al independence from the USA, irrational search for a maximum one might wonder if this soludegree of autonomy made contion does not indeed create a cretely possible by a shrewd Europe independent of the two exploitation of the political possi- superpowers, but, nonetheless, bilities created by a "force de "dependent" on France, whose frappe" . interests might not always coin Though the mi litary theme is cide with the other, non-nuclear the "clou". it is not analysed European nations? In fact, on the "in vacuo", being firmly planted fundamental question of operain a rich global context whose tional control, Jobert's project reference points run from joint leaves no room for doubt: " ... until agricultural and industrial policy the dream of a united European to the underlying cultural framepeople becomes a reali.ty, it is

MICHEL

]OBERT

~ VIVE

L'EUROPE

LIBRE!

better that control of this force be left with a single country. France cannot help but be the only nation to command it". Given his solutions, Jobert's analysis does not do justic'e to the potential role of England and _the future relations of that country with a continental Europe whose political and military makeup can not leave her indifferent. As for the United States, that nation must abandon the Mediterranean (along with the Soviets), accept the fact that the Atlantic Alliance is evolving into a strictly European organization, and help Europe develop a defence industry of its own (including artificial satellites, without which the use of nuclear arms would still depend on information prov ided by the United States). If nothing else, these objectives are certainly simple and clear, and yet they do not seem to allow for the fact that international politics is, and always has been, a clash of interests. The birth of Jobert's Europe would run contrary not only to the interests of the USSR, but also to those of the United States, and even Great Britain: furthermore, as a third force, it would infringe on the prerogatives of both superpowers. Up to what point is th is either possible or desirable? These and other concrete questions are not fully answered by the book. Nonetheless, it is still a valid contribution to the debate over a new Europe, and thus to the debate over a military Europe: " ... all true partisans of an independent Europe must consider the swift creation of a defence policy to be an indispensable condition to its existence". Here, Jobert is right; and all one can do is hope that the number of these "true partisans" continues to grow.

Ferruccio Botti