JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 1987 N.4 "RIVISTA MILITARE" by Biblioteca Militare

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JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

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CIRO D_ I MA.RTINO Subversive War. Retrospective Views

CARLO JEAN ·east-West. Economic Relations and Problems

ANTONIO LOMBARDO The Secret of the Prince. Geopolitics from Thucydides to Gorbachev

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European Military Press Agency

Number four 1987 July-August

The aim of Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the technical and vocational tra ining of Army Officers and NCOs. To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military th inking and as a forum of study and debate. Rivista Mi lita re is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and military matters through th e publication of articles of current technical and scientific interest.

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ffllLITARE BIMESTRALE

Politics, Economics and Strategy 2

Dlrettore responsabile Pier Giorgio Franzosi Dlrezlone e Redazlone Via di S. Marco, 8 00186 Roma Tel. 47357373

Subversive War. Retrospective Vie,ws. (Giro Di Martino)

East-West. Economic Relations and Problems in the Transfer of Critical Technologies. (Carlo Jean)

Segreteria Lia Nardella

Pubbllclta A cura del la segreteria dell'Ufficio Rivista Militare Tel. 6794200.

Stampa Tipogra fia Regionale - Roma. Spedizione in abbonamento posta le Gruppo IV - 70% . Condlzloni di cesslone per ii 1987 Un fascicolo: Lit. 4.000 $ 4 DM 7 £ 3 Un fascicolo arretrato: Lit. 8.000 $ 8 DM 14 £ 6 Abbonamento Italia: Lit. 22.000 estero lit. 30.000. l'.'im porto deve essere versato su c/ c postale n . 22521009 intestate a SME Ufficlo Rivista M ilitare Sezione di amministrazione Via XX Settembre 123/ A - Roma. I residenti all'estero possono versare l'i mporto tramite assegno bancarlo o vaglia internazionale.

Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Roma al n. 944 del Registro con decreto 7-6-1949.

End of the Energy Crisis? (Franco Reviglio}

The Secret of the Prince. Geopolitics from Thucydides to Gorbachev. (Antonio Lombardo)

Science, Technology and Training 48

The Tanks of the Nineties. What Propellers? (Giovanni Savonuzzi • Giuseppe Palmarini)

History 58

The Combat Pack-Mule Units in the War of Liberation. (Enrico Boscardi)

The Great Painters 72

Jacques Courtois, II Borgognone. Painter of Battles. (Lia Nar<.11:11/a)

1987

Proprieta letteraria artistica e scientifica riservata

Associato all'USPI Unione Stampa Periodica ltaliana

Technical Data.

Book Reviews.

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An approach to the concept of subversion in its essential aspects has already been made in a previous study (see no. 5/86 of "Rivista Militare"). In particular, the lexical definition of the phenomenon is recalled, according to which subversion (or overthrow) must be understood as the "up.turning of a traditional order, often associated with the idea of a degeneration and corruption of values". That particular form of armed conflict which is subversive or insurrectional war also clearly falls within the context of this definition. A type of war as old as time, as the numerous examples to be found in history demonstrate. A type of war which must be understood as an armed struggle within a territory against the authority constituted by one part of the inhabitants, whether supported or not from the outside, with the purpose of removing control of the land from the authority in charge or - at least - in order to gradually paralyze it. As such, subversive war was, and still is, generally considered as the only way to fight against foreign rule or to overthrow a dictatorial regime. Pr.esent and past - despite the good will of governments and politicians, evident in several solemn statements of principle, not unlike the one contained in art. 11 of our Constitution ("Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offence to the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the solution of international disputes") - show how the phenomenon has persisted and how it has influenced the history of peoples. To this end, it is sufficient to call to mind the following , amongst the many cases of political systems originating from subversive combat. developing into full conflict: • the independence of the Netherlands; • the insti tution of the parliamentary regime in Great Britain; 4

• the independence of the United States; • the independence of almost .all the states in South America; • the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The effectiveness of such a type of conflict. although it has often been repeated and is not inferior to the so-called classic conflicts, was not - unfortunately - deemed worthy of the interest and attention of historia ns and - above all - of military scholars. Clausewitz, in his treaty on war, dedicates an entire chapter to what he defines as "wars of the peoples", but he limits the study to action against foreign invasion. Nor did the matter have any greater luck with Clausewitz's successors in the field of military study. The main reasons for the essentially negative attitude towards an uncomfortable form of combat like subversive war, which is entirely unorthodox, are diverse. One can mention, on the one side, the diffidence and "uneasiness" which military men and other war scholars have always felt in the face of a type of conflict which does not respect the classical principles and customary procedures in the conception and conduction of operations. From another standpoint, one ought also to bear in mind that, especially in a Europe which was as stable, in its state system as that of the XIX century, any reflection upon a form of war which generally - above all in the early phases - comes into being through episodes of little importa nce, was viewed with a sense of intellectual "irritation" because it distracted minds and efforts from the study of the trnditionc1I "external" conflict. And, what's more, this type of combat entailed both communities and individuals,

Subversive war was, and still is, generally considered as the only way to fight against foreign rule, or to overthrow a dictatorial regime.

accustomed to order, having to concentrate their attention on the study of factors of conflict inspired by "disorder" and the overthrowing of customary actions and behaviours. However, the events of 1917 in Russia sparked off unexpected interest in revolu tionary war. Thorough studies were performed and new incentives resulted, favouring the appearance of the insurrectional war in Asia, since 1921. Western military circles . have dedicated greater attention to subversive war primarily as a result of the various forms of "resistance" movements which developed during the first and. mainly, second world war. It was therefore possible to trace back over the course of this phenomenon in history, in order to draw out the constant factors and to analyze their development in the various eras and in the different countries . Rome. the Middle Ages and the modern era, the XIX century - examined from the point of view of the conflict of a State's armed forces with armed internal opposition movements - are found to have several constants in their origins. preparation, outbreak and in the conduct of subversive wars and counterrevol utiona ry fights. Some examples will confirm the soundness of the thesis. The Roman era is rich in examples of subversion, deriving from opposition either between state authorities and the population, or between the wealthy classes and working classes. Among the former. one r.;m recall the revolts of xenophobic nature which broke out in countries subjected to Roman power. Lusitanians and Celtoiberians fought ruthlessly with the Roman leg ions from 154 to 133 B.C. in the Iberian peninsula. The risks for Roman rule were serious. especially beginning from 147 B.C. when the rebels found in Viriato a leader of

Delacroix: The Lion Hunt. Boston, Museum of Fine Arts. Variation of a theme which recurs numerous times in the work of the artist. In the savage violence of the wild beasts and of man expbsing himself to death in order to win, the artist sees the symbol of life: life as a struggle, as a contrast between primary impulses and rational will.

great skill and prestige, who louy t,t the invaders with a bold and fast guerrilla war. In Numidia from 112 to 105 B.C., Jugurtha - with the support of the local peoples - fought bitterly against the rule of Rome. in a war which in the "Bellum Jugurthinum" by Sallust has a political rather than a military account. In Greece too - where there were even many who were persuaded that the Greek nation

might find in Roman rule not its end but its rebirth - there were two typical cases of insurrectional conflict. The first was in 146 B.C. under the direction of the League of the Achaeans, a city federation establ ished between 280 and 270 B.C. which, after a long pro-Roman period, rebelled against Rome because the poorer class, at a time of

the legions of Ouintus Caecilius Metellus before and of Consul Mummius afterwards, Polybius reports that the Achaeans had all understood that if they had not lost immediately, they would never be saved. The second case came to being in 86 B.C., when - owing to the effect of the increasing subjection to the Romans - the Greeks of Asia rose up led by

economic crisis and social

Mithridates and Athens, encour-

contrast. accused Rome of favouring landowners for the various local governments. Pausanias and Polybius, the only sources of information on this conflict, discuss both it and the deeds of Critolaus, the recognized leader of the league, as an amazing display of bravery which, coupled with weakness, borders on madness. And, with reference to the rapid success of

aged by Aristion, took part in the fight which ended with the siege and reconquest of Rome under the leadership of Silla. The more or less latent xenophobia relights at times in the history of Rome, owing to the desire for equal dignity and other examples of subversion thus resulted. Among them the following can be cited. 5

2 . . R.

The "social" war which the Italic peoples conducted from 91 to 82 B.C. against Rome, which refused to recognise their rights, and primarily that of citizenship, despite their loyalty, for which they claimed the unity of the Roman-Italic peoples. Similar factors were at the basis of the Pannonian r.evolt (6-9 A.D.) and the parallel insurrectional turmoil of the Germans. amongst whom P. Ouintilius Varus, Augustus' ambassador, wan led to introduce the rules of law, changing the country's customs. And Arminius, a German prince who knew the Roman legions well and with whom he had spent long periods, with the ambush and massacre of Teutoburg, still today constitutes a typical example of subversive fighting, in its destructive forms of deception and violence (9 A.D.). The repressed desire for independence is at times accompanied by a religious feeling. This was the case of the insurrectional revolt of Judaea against Rome, between 66 and 70 A.D .. A bitter struggle, ended by Titus in 70 A.D. with the destruction of Jerusalem, which occurred after five months of relentless fighting, from April to September. A fight which, even after the fall of the fortress of Masada and the death of the last Zealots (April of 73 A.D.). did not succeed in diminishing the messianic hopes and the proposals of revolt. Some subversions of a social or religious nature fall into the second category, that of the antagonism between the wealthy classes and the poorer ones. The rising of Spartacus and the war of the slaves, during the years from 73 to 71 B.C. is a symbolic expression of this. The existence of an irreparable fracture within society, provoked in many cases by the magistrates injustice and abuse of power and furthermore by the greed of tax exactors, often pushed the rural masses and 6

the poorer ranks of the town populations into subversive conflict. Beginning from the Ill century A.D .. racial antagonism, the hate towards Rome and Latinism were the primary causes of the subversion against Rome in Africa, Asia, Italy and in other European regions. The hate against Roman occupation often cemented the union of all the classes, up to a point where internal hostility among peoples and cities was overcome. A hate which was sublimated, raising

itself to "ideal" values, capable of galvanizing the popular forces and Lurning thern into indomitable troops able to defend cities like Numantia (134-133 B.C.) or Jerusalem (70 B.C.) or of confronting the legions of Rome in the open field. Common to all the above mentioned subversive manifestations. is the fact that - once the racial antagonism, political Âˇ intolerance or religious fanaticism diminished - the subversions themselves ended up losing the

Delacroix: The Restless of Tangier, New York, J. Hill Collection. Like The Women of Algiers, this masterpiece also originated in the sketches and watercolours which the artist directly recorded on the theme or memorized on his journey through Morocco and on his return: the painting represents the frenzied religious excitement of the followers of Ben Yssa .

• existence of a racial, social, political or religious contrast; • development of that reason for conflict owing to the weakness of the established authority or to the abuses of its representatives; • exploitation of discontent by capable and skilled charismatic leaders; • secret and detailed preparation of the movement; • opening of the combat by surprise and conduction of the operations modelled on the features of the environment; • duration and violence of the struggle closely linked to the support of the population, because of which the movements of a xenophobic or national nature and those of a religious background were found to be the hardest to overcome; • Roman reaction based upon the combination of military effort and political action, with a single command.

support of the people and were rapidly repressed. The second character common to the subversions against Rome can be identified in the fact that their outbreak generally coincides with a period of weakness in the central power. A weakness that on the one hand also entailed abuse by the authorities and the ruling classes, who stimulated the discontent of those who lay victim of it. and on the other favoured a certain impunity for the emerging

leaders of the rebellions. The main insurrectional fights against republican Rome in fact coincided with the periods of fighting between the Senate and the popular forces. Similarly, the more serious subversions of the Imperial era almost all broke out in times of power voids. The examples recalled so tar and the observations made above allow one to note how the subversions present a rather repetitive pattern, which is found in the following factors:

The Middle Ages and modern times up until the French revolution manifested their own aspects in the field of subversion, even if - "nihil novi sub sole" not entirely original. The breaking down of the central power into a series of small loca l powers made national subversion increasingly rare and the frequency of lesser revolts of a political-social nature rose. For the most part, it was a case of social inequalities which periodically throughout Europe caused the revolt of the masses of peasants, torn by misery from their resignation, and pushed them to fight. For instance: • in France, the Jacqueries, antifeudal uprising of the peasants (given this name because the 7

nobility mocked the peasants with the name of Jacques Bonhomme) which broke out in the region of the Oise in 1358, reached such an extent that bands of 5000-6000 men were formed and found an able and energetic leader in a peasant named Guillaume Karle; • in England, the peasant revolt 1i11hich in 1381 took its name from the Lollards, wandering heretic missionaries who, by accentuating the anticlerical and communistic characteristics of John Wycliffe's teacl1ir1y, were considered - more or less correctly - the instigators of the conflict. Very different were the subversive revolts - during the same period - resulting from the aspirations of ethnic or economic groups to set limits on the arbitrariness of the "lords". The conflict of t he inhabitants of central Switzerland against the Hapsburgs (12911516). that of the Free Cities of Lombardy against the Hohenstaufens, wh ich saw in Leg nano the Lombard Valmy of the Middle Ages (1176). that of the English barons and Commons throughout the Middle Ages were all conducted by worthy leaders and by motivated and organized communities and often developed into ruthless and bloody fights. From the beginning of the XV century up to around the middle of the XVII, the insurrectional revolt had new starting points in the religious feeling that had blossomed at times in the past and then become a fac tor of stability in many countries, to then turn into a serious element of antagonism and fight. An early -example of this was Bohemia where - under the banner of the Hussite heresy (after Jan Hus, founder of a religious movement which ended by embracing the reformist doctrine of the heretic Wycliffe). associated to the blind particularism and under the impulse of leaders of great prestige like Jan Zizka - a long struggle against catholicism and legiti8

mate dynasty developed from 1419 to 1433. Following this, with the XVI century, the eruption of the reform caused a dangerous rupture in the religious unity of Europe. Subversion, religious in its essence became, in relation to the position and prestige of its leaders. a social and political phenomenon. The "war of the peasants" ( 1520-1525) and the ." re_volt of the Camisards" (beginning of the XVIII century) in Germany and in France respectively, are further classic examples of combat in which religious reasons and social motivations are interwoven. Thomas Munzer, German Reformation preacher. in both a religious and a social sense, and Jean Cavalier were its strong and fanatical leaders. The former (executed in 1525) played mainly on the right to work and on the rejection of any authority whatsoever: which was not elected (Memmmgen charter); the latter organized the Calvinists of the Cevennes in a fight against the armies. of Louis XIV, after the abrogation of the Edict of Nantes (18 October 1685) owing to which all the prerogatives granted to the Calvinists by Henry IV in 1598 were suppressed. And Marshall de Villars succeeded in defeating the guerrillas conducted by Cavalier by accompanying military action with the offer of impunity and personal advantages for Cavalier himself, who had fled to Switzerland. The so-called "wars of religion" of the same period (XV-XVII century) were also in reality subversive political fights, which were to find backing in the The "war of the peasants" (1520-1525)' and the. "r~volt of the Camisards" (begmnmg of the XVIII century) in Germany and in France. respectively, are further classic examples of combat in which religious reasons and social motivations are interwoven .

religious antagonisms. . In France, in Germany, m England and in_ the Netherlands, leagues and unions were set up: Calvinist Un ion in France, Protestant League in Germany, Parliamentary League in England and League of the Gueux in the Netherlands, where the political and religious parties joined together under this name and began the anti Spanish movement in 1566. Princes and noblemen, because of ambition more than true conviction , often lent Lheir support to these· communities, transforming them into true political and military organizations. This is the case· of William of Orange "the Silent One" (1533-1584), of Henry of Navarre (1503-1555). of the Palat!ne Elector (Ludwig V, Frederick 11, Otto Heinrich, follow one another in the rule of the Pa latinate from 1508 to 1559). All these "wars of religion" were not true people revolts because mercenary forces paid by the princes were operating_ in the opposing fields, alongside the town or peasant troops. They aimed primarily at possession of the cities (Paris, La Rochelle, Dresden) and ended up turning themselves into attrition struggle, whose duration depended mainly on exter~~I aid, motivated solely by pol1t1cal aims. It was in this way - for instan·c e - that the Duke of Anjou, a Catholic prince, backed the protestants of the Netherlan~s and Cardinal Richelieu negotiated the French aid to the German protestant princes against the catholic house in Austria. The English civil war was also far more political than religious. It arose from the . conflict between Charles I (King from 1625 to 1649). who wanted to re-establish absolute power for the sovereign, and the members of parliament who wanted to preserve their control over the monarchy. Anglicans, Catholics and the majority of the nobles marshalled up around the King; the mass

Delacroix: Liberty Guiding the People. Paris, Louvre Museum. This is almost a political propaganda poster, full of rhetoric, and yet it is so authentic and so passionately illustrative that it redeems itself and is convincing : the artist, who did not participate in the July days, portrayed him self in the figure of the rebel with the rifle.

of the wealthy classes, the small rural property owners, the puritans and the independents constituted the pa rliamentary army . The charismatic leaders of the opposition to the King were John Hampden. John Pym, a very skilled parliamentary tactician and - above all - Oliver Cromwel l, who drew unshakable energy from his ardent puritan faith . It was precisely due to the spirit of relig ious fana tic ism that Cromwell was able to instil into

the forces he commanded, that - after three years of ups and downs - the decis ive victory of Naseby (14 June 1645) determined the triumph of Cromwell, with the tragic sequel of the decap itation of Charles I (9 February 1649) . Forerunner on the military plane because he was able to model the rebel torces along the lines of the regular armies of the era. Cromwell was also a pol itica l pioneer. With the execution of the King , he wished in fact to demonstrate that powe r was not of divine origin, but rather a result of the people's will. Around a century later, the colonists of America and the revolutionaries of France, took up and applied his teaching .

The former began to rise up in 1766 to reject the new tax on trade which had been imposed by London, but was not approved by the local representative bodies. A period of crisis, agitation and trouble followed, lasting from 1766 to 1773, and developed - in Philadelphia in 1774 - into the constitution of a federal republic and an insurrectional war. The latter very soon took on the look of an external conflict because the inhabitants of the thirteen American colonies were only to fee l - the large majority of them - increasingly more American and less Eng lish. A long and fragmented struggle, led by the British army with troops who were too widespread and operated accord9

ing to the conventional and "stiff" procedures of the time against formations which were only able to conduct - by surprise - rapid operations of a small size, ending with the surrender of Yorktown (19 October 1781) and with the Peace of Paris (13 September 1783) which sanctioned the independence of the United States. So, from the Midd le Ages to the eve of the French revolution, the subversion wars conducted in the name of social equality, cf religion and of political freedom, were numerous. The first were largely failures, since as they were restricted to an undeveloped peasant and working class, they lacked organization and military strength . In the others - however the rebels were successful, at least with regard to their basic vindications, thanks to the backing of all the social classes , including the highest, the only rank able to guarantee an ideal, an organization, a military force and charismatic leaders to an insurrectional movement. Th.e ideas and values which were asserted in the American War of Independence were certainly influential in the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. But the latter was soon to assume a character of universality, perhaps favoured by the hostility of the European nations, in coalition against a movement which intended to crush the rights and traditions of sovereigns, nobility, and clergy. In the wake of the Armed For<.;es of the Republic and later of the Empire, the principles of the Revolution - freedom equality, brotherhood - spread throughout Europe and elsewhere, causing, like the Reform of a couple of centuries earlier, violent antagonism. The following subversive or insurrectional revolts were more or less direct results: • the colonies of South America against Spain from 1806 to 1825; 10

• Poland against Russia in 1830; • the early events of the Italian Risorgimento in 1821, 1830, 1848; • Hungary and Bohemia in 1848; • the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire during the entire XIX century. In all these XIX century conflicts, although they may ditter in causes and aims, several common factors can be found. Of these, which often recall those found in the previous centuries, and are repeated even during times nearer to us, the following can be considered predom inant: • firstly the "weakness of power" which has always favoured, and will always favour. the outbreak and development of subversion; • a second factor catalyzing subversive events is the existence or rising of a widespread hostility against the established authority; • a third "constant" is the difficulty encountered in uniting and setting up the ditterent elements of opposition to power. to the point where they are efficiently amalgamated, overcoming individualism and particularism; • a fourth common element may be identified in the tendency to build true armies and in the attempt, even if not always achieved, to conduct operations

The particular importance given to the subversive and insurrectional fights of the XIX century, even though it is a phenomenon true to the entire history of mankind, a phenomenon which unfortunately continues to project its dim light even in our own lifetime, leaving little space for optimistic forecasts for the future, is justified by the observation that - in one hundred years - the subversive, war has strongly influenced the political system of Europe and the rest of the world .

with the precise criteria and procedures of classic conflicts; • a fifth factor, almost indispensable , is constituted by the necessity and by the incidence of a consistent external assistance, be it military, moral or diplomatic, expressed in a direct or indirect manner; • a sixth characteristic, mostly inherent in the conflicts of the XIX century, is the almost exclusively mi litary form of repression . with the general exclusion of those political means which had even been shown to be rather fertile with results in the preceding centuries. The particular importance given to the subversive and insurrectional fights of the XIX century, even though it is a phenomenon true to the entire history of mankind, a phenomenon which unfortunately continues to project its dim light even in our own lifetime, leaving little space for optimistic forecasts for the future, is justified by the observation that - in one hundred years - the subversive war has strongly influenced the political system of Europe and the rest of the world. It has done even more because it has contributed, almost everywhere, to the evolution of a still semi-feudal and patriarchal society towards new forms of equality and individualism. It has therefore aided in the development of democracy, that is, in a new form of government which no longer places the origin of authority and power in a supernatural right but in the people. With the beginning ot our century - the XX - only the Tzar of all Russias continued to have no wish to acknowledge the now affirmed truth, and fatally went towards the drama of that October 1917 revolution, of which - according to the historian Jean Marabini - the "subversive melodrama'' of Rasputin's death was a kind of "ouverture". Ciro Di Martino

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EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSFER OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES

Security is not an exclusively military concern. It also involves a complex of pol itical, cultural, economic and technological relations between countries and, in particular, betweeÂĽ1 the West and the Soviet bloc. In this case, the economic and technological sectors involve very delicate issues. Increasing economic resources deriv ing from trade with the West mean that the Soviet Union can also step up its military effort, while the transfer of technologies can pave the way for qualitative improvements in the Soviet arms system. The fact is that the West is making a financial and technical contr ibution to the enhancement of the. Soviet threat through its trade with the Soviet Union. There is, however, another side to the coin: trading with the communist bloc represents an opportunity for the West to establish more regular, stable relations as well as obta ining material economic advantages that can eventually reinforce Western security. The problem is to ascertain the extent to which trade with the East can affect NATO security negatively, and this is a very deli cate question. Duri ng the last five years, econom ic and technolog ical relations between East and West have created more problems and tensions within the Atlantic Alliance than between it and the Soviet Union (1) . In certain periods, especially at the time of the Urengoy gas pipeline and the sanctions the United States adopted against its European allies, these tensions reached the level of a real crisis, coming to a climax at the 1982 Versailles summit and subsequently dropping after the 1983 Williamsburg and 1984 London summits. The tensions are still potentially there, for they are not merely contingent but also structural, involving certa in basic differences in views and interests between Europe and the United States. Prototype of the AMX close support aircraft, which in the second half of the '80s will renew th e Ita lian line of reconnaissance fighte r-bombers.

If the Alliance is to continue running smoothly we must recognize the differences between the various NATO countries, consta ntly comparing positions according to a prag-matic approach, seeking a "modus vivendi" and agreeing to disagree on some problems while at the same time seeking acceptable compromises on the most essentia l issues. The pragmatic approach requires sound knowledge of the facts, flexibility and respect for each other's interests and viewpoints, and can bring about all the adjustments necessary to maintain a reasonab ly united front in the sector. Moreover, this unity is the necessary precondition for the political and strategic cohesion of the Alliance. There is no such thing as an economic NATO, nor is there a un ited economic strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. Some people mainta in that not even the United States has a long-term policy on trading relations with the Soviet Union. The Kissinger approach, which viewed increasi ng trade exchange as a basis for normalizing re lations between the United States and the Soviet Union, has now been abandoned , and the United States has since resorted to such classical tools for a short-term, contingent policy as embargoes and restrictions (2). According to others, restrictions on the transfer of American technologies are not really inspired by a strategic aim, i.e. to arrest the advance of the Soviet threat, so much as by commercial aims. In other words, the real aim wou ld be to keep Europe out of the "Mecca" of United States technology which has already boosted the competitivity of European industries in the markets of the developing countries, and even in the American internal market, thus contribut ing to the huge deficit in the United States' balance of payments (3) . In fact, each member state of the Al liance decides on its own trading policy with the East. in te rms of the sovereignty and autonomy deriving from the

degree of ob jective national independence it enjoys. Any attempt at international regulation of trade is viewed with suspicion by Europe and considered undue interference in its affairs in the name of issues like collective security. These issues are seen to belong to different spheres of interest that can even clash with commercial interests. Deterrence is collective and bipolar whi le detente, for which commercial relations are an essential cata lyst, must remain multi-polar. Each state must handle the problem of detente independently, according to its own contingent interests, without undergoing the control of a major power like the United States over its economy; such control would transform United States leadership into hegemony. The problem is further complicated by the different views that Europe, the United States and Japan (which is now an integral part of the Western system) have on the nature of the Soviet threat. Excluding Japan, which is moreover something of an exceptional case, Europeans and America ns have different opinions on the very meaning of security and the relation between deterrence and detente. Moreover, the United States takes an overall view, while the European attit ude is basically regional. Again, while the United States tends to see trade as a political weapon and give prime consideration to the political and strategic rather than economic aspects, the European countries tend towards the opposite attitude, viewing the fields as qu ite independent. Finally, there are very different interests at stake . Trndc with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, and in particular between Western and Eastern Germany, is of far greater importance for Western Europe than for the United States, which limits itself to exporting agricultural produce to the Sov iet Union . On the other hand, the countries of Europe import raw materials and energy products from the

Soviet Union and export mainly industrial products. The four areas we have so far mentioned - the meaning of detente and trade with the Soviet Union; overall versus regional assessments; the political-strategic or essentially economic view of trade with the East; the importance and type of commercial interests - are dealt with below, with particular attention to the European and American viewpoints. We shall then go on to examine the ways in which the West has tackled these problems, achieving adjustments and compromises despite the efforts and difficulties involved. Although these compromises are only partial and leave either side somewhat dissatisfied, they have had the positive effect of limiting the consequences of tensions and commercial disputes on the political and strategic cohesion of the Alliance. DIFFERENCES IN THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TRADING RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND THE OTHER COMECON COUNTRIES

TRADING RELATIONS, DETENTE AND SECURITY The 1967 Harme l Report described the coupling of "deterrence-detente" as the basis for the Western security system. Thus it stated that increased relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries was the fundamental means to reduce antagonism, establish mutually advantageous relations and. in the long term, tone down poliliGc1l-strategic confrontation and reduce the risk of a Soviet attack in Europe . On this subject, the Harmel Report referred to some ideas already put forward in the doctrine of containment and subsequently elaborated in the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the conference. the issue of economic cooperation was 14

elevated to something like a holy creed (4). The following points received particular attention in the West: • an improvement in the standard of living in the Soviet Un ion is an indispensable factor for lasting detente ("better a fat Russian than a thin one"); • development of trade means economic interdependence between the two blocs. Apart from constructing relations and mutual understanding and reducing preconceptions, distrust and suspicion, it lays the basis for economic solidarity and relieves political-strategic tensions significantly; • the development of trade with the West and improved standard of living will favour the spread of liberal attitudes within the Soviet Union, leading not only to the vindication of civil rights but also to a positive "contagion" of freedom. The result would be progressive change in the power structures in the Soviet Union and a reduction in the degree of militarization of society and the economic system which lies at the basis of both the predominance of the Party an_d the possib ility of mobilizing the human and economic resources necessary for the enormous Soviet military machine (5). Only increased trade with the West could lead to radical changes in the Soviet economic system as it stands today - a war economy in peace-time, with 12-15% of the gross domestic product diverted to military expenditure (6). From this point of view military deterrence should remain a merely short-term aim, and the demands and prospects of detente, which remains the medium- to long-term objective, shou ld absolutely not be sacrificed to it. During the period of detente and important agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control, emphas is on the desirability of increasing trade with the Soviet Union took on ideological connotations in the United States where its value as a vehicle

for freedom and greater security was strongly advocated. The European countries, however, adopted a more pragmatic approach: to begin with, they did not believe in the possibility of a rea l change in the regime or in the Soviet threat; moreover, they were primarily interested in the prospects of economically advantageous exchanges; finally, in keeping with their long-standing traditions, they considered economics and politics separate spheres. The American "ideological" attitude did not survive the crisis in detente that developed in the mid-seventies and came to a climax with the American economic sanctions decided on after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the European attitude remained basically unchanged, the Americans performed a 180°-turnabout and became equally radical in t he opposite direction. Any improvement in economic conditions in the Soviet Union amounts to greater chances of stepping up their military power and the Soviet threat to the West. According to this attitude, which prevailed from the mid-seventies on and gained much ground with the Reagan Administration (7). increased exchange with the Western countries would represent a more or less direct but at any rate significant contribution to the Soviet military effort, and Western security would lose out. In particular, the Europeans would gain considerable economic advantages which would balance out the negative results for the United States; however, it is the United States that incurs considerable costs and risks to guarantee protection from a Soviet attack in Europe. Thus we return to the conditions of the "cold-war" period, but with a big difference. Then there were no fully consolidated interests, while trade between Europe and the East has made great strides forward during the period of detente and. as a result, clearly defined interests have arisen and the so-called "Soviet lobbies" exert pressure on the politicians.

The United States AH 64 "Apache" helicopter, photographed in stationary flight, is the most sophisticated among battle helicopters.

Western trade (the OECD countries. including Japan) with the Warsaw Pact countries has risen to about 75 billion dollars a year, representing 30% of all the Soviet bloc's international trade (though only 3-4 % of the OECD countries') . The main Soviet imports are food (about a quarter of the total). above all from the United States where t here is the most powerful "Soviet lobby"; it was this lobby which forced Reagan to stop the grain embargo introduced by Carter after the Afghanistan invasion . Soviet exports to the OECD countries consist mainly of energy products. which exceed 70% of the total. Trade with the East (3-5% of exports from Western European countries) does not render Western Europe particularly vulnerable. According to a research carried out in Western Germany, only 222.000 jobs

depend on exports to the East. and 90,000 on imports from the East. amounting to about 1.3% of the German labour force (8). Not so very much. after all. A halt in trade relations would have more negative repercussions for the Soviet Union than for Europe. It must be remembered that it was certainly not "ideology" that boosted trade with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe during the period of detente. What really got it going were the credit conditions granted by the West, often over the long term and entail ing Aflf)E'!tizing fi nancial advantages. Factors hamperi ng the steady, lasting development of trade relations were: the oil crisis , which represented a real blow to Europe's credit capacity; the artificial nature of trade relations based on the systematic credit concessions offered by the exporting countries; the qualitative gap between the European and Sov iet economies. the latter offering only raw materials and semi-manufactu red

goods produced with great expense of manpower; nonconvertibility of the roub le and lack of flexibility due to the centralization of the Soviet econ omy. Since the late eighties there has been a halt in the expansion of trade , followed by a distinct drop (25-30% in four years). Th is was not the result of politica l positions. but reflected hard economic realities. Intensive trading can only be conducted in conditions of equi libriu m deriving from homogeneous , complementary economic systems. It was also with the aim of aiding European industrial exports. as well as diversifying sources of energy supply, avoiding excessive depend ence on the OPEC countries. that Europe decided to accept payment for imports from the West with the export of Siberian gas at the end of the seventies. It was precise ly on th is point that contrasting attitudes and tensions began to build up between Europe and the United States. The US put pressure on Europe to reduce exchange of goods

at the very moment when a natural reduction had began to occur as a consequence of the effects produced by the different economic structures in the two blocs. OVERALL VERSUS REGIONAL VIEWS OF TRADE WITH THE EAST The United StatAs has an overall view of security, and so also of detente. The Europeans have an essentially regional view, limited to Europe. Thus they hold detente to be a separate phenomenon which can survive increased tension and Soviet military in itiatives in other parts of the world. Moreover, the Western European countries assume that trade can have a certain impact on the solidity of the Soviet empire in Europe. In fact. as a result of both traditional exchange patterns and the increasingly complementary nature of the economies, the expansion of trade and concession of easy-term credit to t he Eastern European countries can lead to differentiation within COMECON, thus at least preventing the total integration of the economies of the Eastern European countries with the Soviet economy. Last but not least. the European conception of the Soviet threat is very different from the view prevailing in the United States. The European view is more pragmatic, less influenced by ideological issues. The vision of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" is alien to the European mentality. This is not to say that the Europeans are unaware of the risk that the West may be making a financial contribution to the Soviet military effort. However, thanks to their experience stretching back over history, they are well aware that. except in conditions of extreme crisis, mercantile states have never succeeded in subordinating economic interests to politicostrategic considerations and are even sceptical about the real strategic importance of trade with the East so long, of 16

course, as it does not involve technology directly geared to military aims. THE MEANING OF TRADE WITH THE EAST The United States claims that Western exports, including those of no direct military utility, strengthen Soviet military power and undermine Western security, or at least compel the West to bear a greater financial burden for its defence. In fact, exports mean an increase in the resources ava ilable to the Soviet Union, and this in turn means that the military apparatus will have less effect on consumer goods production. Since military expenses represent a huge burden, and can only increase at the risk of an internal crisis for the Soviet regime, it would be both possible and advantageous for the West to use trade as a means to compel the Soviet Union to cut down on military expenditure. According to the United States, however, the negative effect of exports to the Soviet Union is above all qualitative. Using Western technology, the Soviet Union would save between 8 and 13 billion dollars on research and development and could thus reduce by 5-8 years the time it would take with its own advances alone to level off the technological gap between the Soviet and Western arm systems (9). The countries of Western Europe, on the other hand, tend to believe that only exports of direct military utility increase the Soviet threat. A drop in trade relations with the West cannot, in their opinion, bring about a reduction in the Soviet military effort. Lately, however, their attitude has come rather closer to that of the Un ited States, and they have shown greater awareness of the risks that trade relations can entail for their security, given the particular structures of the Soviet economic system. In the Soviet system, military expenditure is among the main econom ic priorities. The demands

of consumption are met with only when all demands for military expenditure have been satisfied. Priority is given to investments in heavy industry and defence. The Soviet industria l military complex, unlike that of the United States, does not represent a partial, artificial superstructure, but is an essential part of the system itself. The Soviet Armed Forces have absolute priority in the allocation of resources and figure in every facet of economic life. Moreover, unlike the Western system, Soviet industry can very rapidly be adapted to military production. In 1971 Brezhnev stated that 42% of the production of Soviet military industry was in the field of consumer products. The Ministry for general mechanical construction-work manufactures both missiles and refrigerators, and this, by the way, represents a real hazard for the West. There is something quite humorous about proposals for the reconversion of the Western arms industry, occasional ly advanced by wellintentioned people in Italy as well, when one considers that the situation in the Soviet Union is of convertibility in the opposite sense. Western Europe has been gradually waking up to this fact, too. Above all, European countries have shown a greater awareness of the risks inherent in transferring industrial capacity and technologies which can directly enhance Soviet military power. It is, of course, true that they have not fully accepted the United States' concept of security, which they consider too exclusively military, even when economic issues are at stake. They assume that economic cooperation can survive crises in detente, and are inclined to make a clear distinction between trade that can only indirectly enhance Soviet military power and trade benefiting it directly. However, they are . showing an increasing readiness to consider the whole range of security problems involved in East-West trade: not only

limitation of energy dependence on the Soviet Union and control of transfer of militarily significant technologies, but also limitation of easy-term credit for exports. The credit question actually seems to be more a matter of reckoning economic risks than a question of political and strategic risks; there is, for example, the risk that credit cannot be refunded, as well as a general reduction of credit capacity in the West due to the economic crisis. There is, however, a certain concern among Western European countries that the United States may tend to lay down restrictions on the system of Western economic relations to strengthen their supremacy in the Alliance. This would obviously be unacceptable for the Europeans. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMERCIAL INTERESTS

As we have already pointed out. there is great disparity between the European and

American interest in developing trade with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe . This disparity is not only qualitative - actually, the United States only exports agricultural produce and the Soviet lobby is powerful because of the concentration of interests, but at the same time localized - but also quantitative. The overall European percentage of trade with the Soviet Union, in terms of exports, is more than double that of the United States, even though it does not on the whole reach very high f ig ures. While about 1.5% of America's total exports are to COMECON countries, the l:::uropean f ig ure is around 3.5% (at times touching on 5%) (10). Apart from agricultural produce, moreover, the bulk of this trade involves technology-intensive products, especialiy industrial plants (11). However, between 1970 and 1981 the high-tech products represented a steadily decreasing proportion of exports to the Soviet Union (from 16.2% to 8.3%), while rema ining at more

Belgian Army tank waiting in ambush during an exercise.

or less the same level for the other COMECON countries (from 11.8% to 10.7%) (12). This appears to be due not so much to improved technological performance in the Soviet Union as to the fact that the social and economic context does not invite much in the way of hightech. The exception is, in fact. the military sector, where demand is able to condition supply just as it does for all products in free market societies where competition and the decisive infl uence of demand represent a powerful stimulus for improvements in supply services. WESTERN INITIATIVES SUBSEQUENT TO TENSIONS OVER THE GAS PIPELINE CONTROVERSY

The gas pipeline dispute, coming hot on tensions deriving from the US embargo on Poland after the decision to apply martial

law in that country, caused considerable friction between the United States and Western Europe and shook the Alliance's political cohesion. These events showed Western governments how important it was to make a joint examination of the problems of trade with the communist bloc. This led to a series of studies in the various sectors concerned. Apart from their practical effects, i.e. better coordinated t rading policies among the Western countries, they also greatly helped to clarify the various positions arid reduce clashes of interests and tensions, thus eliminating the risk of a thoroughgoing trade war between the United States and its European allies. As there is no single institute working on economic strategy vis-a-vis the East, the approach has been piecemeal, involving various decisional organs each working in its own field . In the NATO field two studies were carried out: one on the general military implications of East-West trade; the second on the technological capacity of the Soviet Union in the military sphere. Although they did not directly lead to any operative decisions be ing taken. both studies did much to improve the quality of information available to the countries belonging to the Alliance. The second study was of particular he lp in laying the basis for combined analyses offering guidelines for the policies of individual countries. It also made governments far more aware of the strategic importance of technologica l transfer and gave the European countries a more serious approach to the strategic im plications of trade with the Warsaw Pact countries and led them to take steps to safeguard technology when it is critical for defence. The International Energy Agency (/EA) carried out the study which had the most farreaching practical consequences. It aimed at evaluating the vulnerability that could accrue to the West as a result of depending on energy products

imported from the Soviet Union, above all natural gas. The problem appeared more manageable in the light of the fact that Western Europe depends on the Soviet Union for only 5-6% of its energy requirements (but the percentage rises to 30%in the case of natural gas) and that. if the Soviet Union were to halt the flow of natural gas it would lose its main sources of convertible currencies (the second source is arms exports to the developing countries which are, however. critically short of liquid assets). Moreover, the recent plunge of oil prices in the world markets has further strengthened the standing of the West and weakened . that of the Soviet Union. In fact. 1985 saw a 14% drop in Soviet exports of energy products to the West which cost Russia 5-7 billion. dollars in convertible currencies (13) . The study represented a compromise between the American and European positions. Pointing out the risks run by Western Europe in depending excessively on energy from the Soviet Union, which could use supply as a strategic weapon by abruptly halting it and menacing Europe with economic crisis. the IEA report led Western governments to postpone the planned doubling of the Urengoy gas pipeline and to draw on it to the extent of only 26 billion cubic metres per year instead of the planned 40 billion. Moreover, the IEA study offered a coordinated context for the definition of alternative solutions that could be adopted from 1990 onwards, when reduced gas production in Europe will create greater interest in increasinQ imports from the Soviet Union. The OECD (Organization tor Economic Cooperation and Development) examined the problem of easy-term credit granted to the COMECON countries to import Western products. It was the study that had the least practical consequences as credit policy is one of the basic factors in the commercial policies of the individual countries. However, the interest

rates required of the Soviet Union have in general risen from 8% to 12.15% for credit of up to 5 years, and 12.4% for longerterm credit. This has caused considerable difficulty for the Ea stern countries, given the drop in their exports to the West. Their foreign debt increased considerably in 1985. rising from 85 to 96 billion dollars (29 billion borne by Poland alone). The basic factor in the influence of East-West trade on Western security is the transfer of technology that could lend itself to military applications. This is not only the most important point. but also the one most closely involving Western security in the short term. The problem has been studied in depth not only in the United States and by NATO, but also by the COCOM (Coordinating Committee), an organization for informal agreement working in Paris. Its member states (the NATO countries plus Japan) work out unanimous agreements on the transfer of strategically critical material to the Warsaw Pact countries. The problem of control over technology transfer is not only extremely topical and vital, but it is also the cause of much debate between the United States and Europe. One reason for this is that. unlike credit and energy, it is a field where the United States has the means to enforce its line.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER As was pointed out in the Perie report to Congress (14) and in a subsequent pamphlet published by the United States Defence Department to awaken public opinion in the West. the export of Western technology represents a considerable contribution to Soviet military strength. The security of the West rests on its superior technology. Giving the Soviet Union access to strategically critical technology "reflects a

United States "Ohio" submarine. which represents the peak of US

technology.

limited, short-term view bordering on criminality" (15). Western technological superiority has been eroded over the last 20 years. In the fundamental field of microelectron ics. for example. the 10-12 year lead the West had in 1965 has dropped to 3-5 years (16). This problem is aggravated by the fact that in the West, for a number of reasons (the ma in ones seem to be the multirole capacity attributed to arms systems and the application of innovatory technology wh ich is often just taking off) there is a greater lag between technological innovation and its application to the current arms $ystems. It has. in fact. been calculated that out of 20 areas of strategically critica l techn ology the West is superior to the Soviet Union in 15, equal in 5 and inferi or in none. On the other ha nd, out of the 31 main categories of weapon systems and specialized compo-

nents (submarine detection, for example) NATO is superior in 17, eq ual in 10 and inferior in 4 (17). This is a truly serious state of affairs. since technological superiority is decisive. With small investments, as for example in the field of "stealth" where radar signals are reduced or suppressed, a technological advantage can neutralize the entire enemy defen ce or attack systems. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that protection of Western technologies with military application s is crucial. Obviou sly, this protection can never be absolute or permanent. The aim should be to slow down the Soviet Uniun's acquisiti on of strategically critical technology and maintaining the gap in favour of the West. or at least compelling the Sovi et Ministry of Defence to empl oy a larger portion of funds on research and development, t hus diverting them from the supply of new arms . Even if the West could only succeed in compel ling the Soviet Union to resort to illega l ways of_acqu iring new technol-

ogy, it would still be convenient to do so. It has been calculated that illegal acquisitions cost about 10 times more than lega l ones . The difference in cost can be yet further increased by consol idating control systems and bringing heavier sanctions against those who break the regulations on critical technology transfer. The need for the West to control its technology exports to the Soviet Union for the sake of security has always been recognized by the Atlantic Alliance. 1949 saw the founding in Paris of COCOM, an organization for promoting informal policy agreements among all the countries that were then receiv ing aid under the Marshall plan. This aid also included the transfer of advanced technology project and production capacity. 1951 saw approval in the United States of the "Battle Act". which laid down the guidelines for American leg islation in the sector and, in particular. introduced extraterritorial sanctions for states and/or companies breaking US reg ulations (suspension 19

of aid, bar on all technology transfer. exclusion from American markets. etc.). It was no great problem for European countries to accept these restrictions during the cold war period , not on ly because they fully shared the politicostrateg ic aims of the sanctions. given thei r sense of the incumbent threat of Soviet mi litary might, but also because of American su premacy and the fact that Europe depended on American aid for its reconstruct ion. Fina lly, there was practica lly no trade between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. and therefore no consolidated interests. With the advent of detent e, controls were considerably relaxed and trade between Western Europe and COM ECON was stepped up. This situation began to cha nge after the mid -seventies, when it appeared quite clear that detente did not mea n any slackening in the Soviet mil itary effort or any less intervention in the developing countries. The 1975 Callaghan report established the principles for increasing coll abo ra ti on across th e Atlantic in the field of armaments and defence equipment and provided the basis for the Memorandum of Understanding between the various European countries and the United States to achieve the so-called Two Way Street to restore balance to mi litary exchange between Europe and the United States. At almost the same time a study was ca rried out that rem ains fundamental; it is ca lled the " Bucy Report" after the name of the leader of the work-group t hat drew it up (18). It pointed out tl,al LIie Suviet Uni on is not interested in importing fin ished products or acqu iring basic or general scientific and technological knew-how so much as designs. detail ed technologi cal know-how and project and production capac ity, especial ly in the fields of high precision, machine tools and industrial autom ation. Western con ce rn should therefore focus more on advanced technology and in-

dustrial plants than on fin ished products . It is, moreover, becoming increasingly difficult to trace back the know-how tha t made it possible from the finished product (reverse engineering). The Bucy Report also pointed out the need to assess the impact of Western technology on the military capacity of the Warsaw Pact, with particu lar attention not so mu ch to "the technolog ical performance levels achieved in the West as the level reached in t he East and like ly future devel opments there. It is obviously pointless to set an embargo on even the most advanced technology if the Soviet Union has already mastered it. wh ile there is a point in the case of technology the West has ava iled itself of for years and that many even be outdated if the Soviet Union has not yet succeed ed in acquiring it. The so-called Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) was drawn up on the basis of the findings publis hed in the Bucy Report and is continually updated as technology evolves . It is kept secret. among other reasons to prevent the Soviet Union from acq ui ring useful informa tion on wha t the West considers to be critical technologies. However. exa minati on of the reg ulations on techn olog ica l control within individual Western countries shows which areas are protected . Along with th e MCTL, a Watch List was also drawn up on emerging technolog ies of mil itary interest. It does not amou nt to an actual emba rgo list. bu t it simply lists areas where control must be exercised t o allow for prompt protective measures should the stage of development become indicative of direct strategic significance. The 1979 Export Administration Act was drawn up on the basis of the Bucy Report. It expi red in 1983, and renewa l is being obstructed by a clash between the Senate. the Presi den t and the Defence Department. on the one hand - in favour of increasing restrictions - and the State, Treasury and Trade Departments on the other, where a less restrictive attitude prevails.

Difficulties in organizing effective controls on technology transfer constitute another aspect of the problem. The customs must. in fact. be qual ified to single out protected technolog y products. The Urtited States, followed at least in part by the countries of Western Europe and Japan , has been making great efforts in this direction. "Opera tion Exodus" has been laun ched in the United States. and the result is a distinct improvement in the technologi cal leve l of the customs system. Obvi ously, withou t con trol ca pacity, any embargo w ould be merely theoretical. At any rate, with the Reagan Administration the problem received top priority, as the President himself pointed out on several occasions during the 1981 summit in Ottawa . It has come to represent a critical point in relations between the United States and Europe since controversy broke out on the gas pipel in e and the credit policy adopted by Western Europe on exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The prob lem of control of militarily significant techn ologies is exceedingly thorny. Defin ition of a st rategically importan t product is fairly easy and clearcut. but this is not so when we are deali ng with technology. In fac t. technologica l developments have led to the merging of civ ilian and military t echnol ogies. The bulk of technologies concerned are of a dual na ture (Dual Use). application in the civilian field usually precedi ng mi litary appli cation. Moreover, restriction of techno logy tra nsfer to the East has repercussions on the exchange of technologies across the Atlantic. Some have argued from this that the strategic question was on ly one of the targets the United States was aiming at. wh ile the more gen eral picture wou ld appear to show a larg e-sca le restoration of American economic leadership in the free world. The eventual aim of restricti ons , partly recommen ded and in pa rt actu ally imposed would . according to this theory, be not so much strategic

New version of the British "Rapier" antiaircraft missile system, called "Darkfire". The system has 6 missiles, electro-optical tracking system and surveillance radar.

in purpose as to relaunch the competitivity of American industry in the world markets. This is considered necessary to make up the United States balance of payments deficit and restore its economic leadership in the free world. This leadership is also seen as a prerequisite for a healthy balance of payments. Security requirements would thus be a cover to hide from some Europeans a policy amounting to technological protectionism on the part of the United States, the aim being more economic than strategic (the American share of the international technology trade had dropped from 27% in 1970 to 23.5% by 1980, while the 1984 trade balance shows a 30 billion dollars deficit with Japan. and one of 15 billion dollars with Western Europe) (19). This theory sees American technological protection as an

aspect of the United States' neonationalism and isolationism, which also receives encouragement from European behaviour. considered excessively passive in its relations with Eastern Europe in regard to issues involving the Middle East and international terrorism. The controls have inevitably affected the freedom of exchange of scientific information and technologies. This exchange plays an extremely important role in the advance of science and accumulation of know-how , and considerable tension has arisen between the United States Administration and the Western scientific community. In fact, the problem of technology control has very delicate implications in an area where politics, economics and military affairs all meet. an area rife with potential tensions for the entire Atlantic community. Obviously, controls cannot be effective if they are not multinational and do not involve sanctions for those breaking the rules of Western solidarity. The temptations here

are great. as countries breaking the embargo could receive very considerable economic benefit. However. sanctions can only be applied by the United States. and not by the Europeans. This entails a somewhat subordinate position which could be euphemistically described as "unpleasant". but which cannot be overcome unless Europe makes a good recovery in the field of technological innovation and in the capacity to achieve rapid industrial applications. Finally, mention must be made of the huge organization run by the Soviet Union to gather scientific and technological information from the West. It involves many Soviet institutions including: the VPK. the Premier's Committee. concerned with military industry; the GKNT. the State Committee for Science and Technology, running a complex international system; the KGB. or Committee for State Security, whose T Department employs thousands of technicians working abroad under diplomatic 21

protection; the GRU (Department for the Military Information Service); the Soviet Science Academy, which appears to have a staff of 20,000 systematically ana lyzing Western scientific and · technical publications; and, finally, the Ministry for Foreign Trade, which is mainly concerned with legal operations (20). According to CIA estimates, a good 70% of militarily significant technology transfer takes place illegally on the basis of a precise plan for research and data collection covering thousands of technologies considered important (21). Only 30% of the imports are legally conducted. Moreover, 3-5% of these imports involve goods under embargo, sale having been authorized by the COCOM (22). It has been demonstrated that ·all the Soviet Union's major armaments have drawn on technologies imported from the West, including: the guidance systems of the SS 18s and SS 20s; the SAM 7 derived from the "Redeye"; the new fighter-bombers. etc. It is patently absurd for the West to make such a great contribution to the Soviet military effort. entailing for itself the need to step up its own defence expenditure to counterbalance the more dangerous threat. Despite the initial worries and misunderstandings, the United States' all ies have become increasingly aware of this fact and technology control has become less of a thorn in the flesh. Progress has been made from radical, ideological confrontation to a more reasonable. calm and pragmatic assessment of the facts. COCOM, COORDINATION COMMITTEE FOR THE CONTROL OF WESPERN HIGH-TECH EXPORTS

COCOM is an informal organization based in United States' Embassy premises outside the centre of Paris. It draws up lists of products and critical technologies and may unanimously grant exemption

from embargo when requested by individual states . Its aim is, therefore, to establish a collective policy. It is constituted by the NATO countries and Japan, and represents the lowest common denominator among the policies of Western states in this sector. Its decisions are also respected by such neutral Western states as Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, basical ly to avoid United States' extraterritorial sanctions. These sanctions would have a great effect. much sooner than is commonly supposed. on the technological level and market outlets of their industries. The bas ic features of COCOM are: • the absence of legal formalities; • a work ing system based on the common consent of member states; • specialization in the field of technology control; • independence from any other decisional organization in the West; • the strict reserve under which its activities are conoucted. The lack of legal formalities means that COCOM is not an institutional Forum, but simply a place for governments to meet and coordinate their policies. i.e. it is not an international organization whose decisions are binding. This is largely due to the second feature, i.e. the fact that it is based on the common consent of all member countries. It is they alone that are empowered to apply COCOM recommendations to their national export regulations and bring sanctions against industries or economic operators breaking regulations in individual states. The unanimity of all members required for COCOM decisions represents a safeguard to prevent selective applications of embargoes to the advantage of any particular country's industries. Its specialization and independence from any other organization like NATO or the OECD derives from the particular nature of the Committee; basically, it is due to European opposition to the constitution of

a single organization dealing with every aspect of economic relations between East and West, on the understandable grounds of wishing to prevent an increase in the United States· political and economic influence in Europe. The secrecy in which the organization conducts debates and formulates decisions is an indispensable corollary for the proper functioning of the system. On the one hand. it allows for selective, flexible application of embargoes, and en the other hand helps restrain tensions among the Western countries wh ich publicity and the involvement of public opinion would only aggravate. It also favours compromise and med iation between the various member states. On the whole, COCOM has worked and still works effectively and satisfactorily, above all because the confrontation of radical positions between the United States and the other members has given way to more pragmatic approaches. One important factor here is that Western governments have clearly realized how irrational excessive liberalization of technological transfer would be. It would, in fact. amount to surreptitious Western financing of the Soviet mi litary machine. especially now that the arms race takes place in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. Otherwise, the West would be behaving as Italy did in the late thirties, selling Greece great batches of arms, including 81 mm mortars, that were then used against Italian units in the second World War. The procedures now followed for flexibility in the application ot embargoes as specific exceptions can be granted (23). The overall flexibility the system thus acquires means, among other things, that differentiation is possible between the Western countries' policy towards the Sov iet Union and towards the other countries of Eastern Europe. These differentiations, especially where export of production capacity is involved, can in fact

offer a certain degree of leverage in the development, consolidation and differentiation of the economies of the countries concerned, preventing them from becomi ng mere satellites of t he Soviet Union. With the advent of the Reagan Admini stration the United States has proposed improvements in work procedu res and in the information base avai lable to the Committee to speed up operations and give them greater effect. It has, even more significantly, proposed concrete Gur1 Lrol measu res (national Âˇregulations, techni cal specialization for cu stoms, etc.). However, significa nt results can only be obta ined with tig hter controls applied by individual stat es in Europe and a more determined effort to restra in the illegal transfer of technologies, scientific discoveries and project and production capacity, or, at lea st. to make it more haza rdous and costly. CONCLUSIONS

Economic cooperation with t he East is one of the areas where the United States and Europe confront one another, risking tensions and crises in t he Atlantic Alliance which cou ld. in fact, have far more serious negative effects than the actual economic (for Europe) and strategic (for Western secu rity) impact of the problem. It involves. after all, 2-5% of the OECD countries' trade. It is clearly irresponsi ble to contribute to strengthening Soviet military power for immediate economic advantages in limited sectors, in cu rring further defe nce expenditure that not only . counterbalances the economic advantages but places a considerable burden on the Western tax-paye r. Policy in thi s sector must be form ulated regardless of ideologica l attit udes and principles or the pressu res that va rious economic lobbies exert to varying degrees on Western governments. A more pragmatic attitude is therefore ca lled for, devoid of ind ulgence. rhetoric and

illusions , ca pable of enforcing controls but limiting them t o the min imum strateg ically necessary. Western governments must obviously ensure that trade with the East does not increase the Sov iet mi litary threat to the West. and the impact trade can have on this threat is therefore the fi rst point to be clarified. The attempt made by the United States to assess this impact quantitatively and qualitatively represents an extremely useful bas is to begin an exami na tion of the problem (24). The truly critica l point is t ech nology t ransfer, and all efforts must therefore focus on this. pinpointing the targets to aim at by means of thoroug h " Net Technological Assessments". This is th e only way t o have a clear idea of where em bargoes are to be placed, not only to avoid the dispersion of energy and resources but also t o elimin at e the two incidental effects that could hit back at European security. Firstly, largescale, intensive interference would have the fin al result of confrontation and tensions, not only between the United States and the countries of Europe, but also within each of the Western countries. Secondly, it is necessary to avoid excessively severe controls. which could amount to a limitation of the

Anti-aircraft "Aspide" missile launched by the "Albatros" naval system.

circulation of ideas and sc ientific and technological information in the West . as well as involving a US block on licences gra nted by American companies and research centres to European industries. This t oo would place very serious problems in the way of western solidarity and eventually arouse a lot of very strong feeling. But the basi c point remains that of st epping up technological development and above all ach ieving prompter industrial utilization of inn ovation s. This will entai l a rea l change in ment ality and the criteria according to which the nations' wealth is handled. In Western Europe th is wea lth is all too often squandered on mere relief operati ons aiming not so much at obtaining the electors' assent as t heir acq uiescence or even complicity. . Am erican pressure in.this sector is perfectly legitimate, especially when trade with the East involves technologies coming more or less directly from the United States. The cha nces of achieving greater capacity to resist these pressures are in d irect proportion to the developments Europe, or rather

the countries of Europe, succeed in ma king in their own technological capacity with their own efforts, without expecting to avoid effort through US aid. The crude facts of political life have to be faced. In international relations, despite all the various legal and diplomatic issues, what Thucyd ides blu ntly poin ted out in his commentaries on the Peloponnesian war still holds today: "right is a question of the will of the strongest: in fact, the powerful do as they wish. while the weak get their deserts,

since if they are weak they have in one way or another contributed to being so". It is futile to rely on others to make up for one's own shortcomings, if only because sooner or lat er their help must be paid for at a surprisingly high cost. Carlo Jean NOTES

(1) A. Stent: "Technology Transfer in East-West Trade The Western Alliance Studies", AIE, Foreign Policy and Detense Review, 2nd January 7985. pp. 44-52. (2) S. Berts h: "Eas t West Trade, COCOM and the Atlant ic Alliance", Atl antic Papers no. 49, Atlan tic Institute fo r International A tfairs, 1983. (3) See the "Rieger Report " to the European Parliament. 1-37 /84/B of Apri l ,27 th 1984 and G. Guilder: "Security Manias only Back fi re", Wall Street Journal, 2nd October 7985. (4) In particular, see the "Declarations of principles regulating relations be tween the Un ited Sta tes and the Soviet Union". si qned by Ni xon and

Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972, quoted by P. Aud igier: "Les implications strategiques du commerce Est-Quest", Defense Nationale, February 1984, p. 10. (5) V. Zaslavs ki: "II complesso militare industriale sovietico", Forum Humanum Pro ject, Working Papers no. 2, Rome. December 1985. (6) K. Ritter: "The Critical Issues of the Transfer of Technologies", NATO Sixteen Nations, March 1985. pp. 39-45. Also see P. Wiles: "Is an Anti-Soviet Embargo Desirable or Possible", in IISS, Adelphi Papers no. 190 "The Conduct of East-Wes t Relation s in the 1980s", London, 1984, pp. 37-50. (7) R. Perie: "The Strategic Impli cations of East-West Technology Transfer". and D. TahtinEm: "Fcnnnmic Rela tions betwee n East and West", Adelphi Papers 190, c it., pp. 21-27 and pp. 51-56. (8) D. Buchan: "Western Security and Economic Stra tegy toward the East", IISS, Adelphi Papers no. 192, London, 1984. (9) Perie Report to the United States Congress, "Assessing the Effect of Technology Transfer o n US/Western Security", Department of Defence, February 1985. (10) D. Buchan: "Western Security and Economic Strategy toward s the East", cit., p. 8. (11) These represent 49% of Western exports to COMECON, against 12% of COMECON exports to the West (O ECD study 1980). (12) J . Martens: "Qualification of Western Exports of High-te ch no logy Products to Communist Coun tries", US Depart ment of Commerce, Washington DC, March 1983. quoted in D. Buchan. Cit., p . 6 {13) 1985 Report of the economic Committee o f the United Nations for Eu rope. q uoted in F. Cro uigneau: "Les echanges Est-Qu est en questi on". Le Monde, 3rd Ap ril 1986, p. 24. (14) See note (9). (15) Statement made in the course of a lecture given by Defence Secre tary Weinberger to the Foreign Policy Assoc iation of New York o n 21st M?.y

1982, quoted by B. Warusfel: "Le controle des exportations strategiques" , Defense Nationale, February 1985, p. 62. (16} Weinberger Report to Congress "The Technological Transfer Control Program", Washington DC, March 1983. (17) USGPO: "Fiscal Year 1985 DOD Program for Research, Development and Acquisit ion", Washington DC, 1984. (18) Office of Director of De fe nce Researc h and Engineering, De fence Science Board Task Force o n Export of US Technology: "An Ana lysis of Export Control o f US Techno logy - a DOD Perspective'', Washington DC, February 1976. (19) K. Ritter: "Th e Critical Issues of the Transfer of Technology", cit., n 44. (20) H. Regnard : " L' URSS et le re nÂˇ seignement scientifique et technique". Defense Nationale, December 1983, pp. 107-121. See also A. Alexa nder: "Decision-making in Soviet Weapons Procurement" in J . Alford (ed}: "The Soviet Union . Security Policies and Constraints", IISS, Adelphi Library 15, Gower, London. 1985, pp. 25-88. (21) CIA: "Soviet Acqu isitions of Wes tern Technology", Washing ton DC, 1982, and above all the report of the "Roth Committee" Âˇ Report of the Committee of Governmental Affairs - US Sena te - made by Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations "Transfer of US High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations", US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, November 1982 (22) D. Buchan: "Western Security and Economic Strategy toward the Eas t", cit., p. 24. (23) According to D. Buchan. op. c it., p. 25, there were 1,087 req uests for excep tions to embargoes in 1977. almost all being approved (only 31 rejected). (24) See R. Perie: "The Strategic Imp lications of East-West Trade", in Ade lphi Papers no. 190 "The Conduct of the East-West Relations in 1980 Part II", 1188, London, 1984, pp. 20-27, and the Perie Report to the USA Conq rpss quoted ;n note /9)

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND PROBLEMS IN THE TRANSFER OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES 24

price of crude oil - a fall which followed t he price explosion of the seventies - represents one of those changes in the terms of t rade whose sheer magnitude actually manages to infl uence the course of history. The wide range of crude oil prices (and of prices of raw materials in general) is on e of the many . variables wh ich determine the

"wealth of nations", exerting a significant influence not only on the collective development and weHbeing of the different geographic areas, but also on t he political balances which govern relationships between the different groups of countries. The two oil "shocks" of 1973 and 1979 represent the fundame ntal structural elements - thoug h by no means the on ly

factors - responsible f or the crisis in the growth of income and employment experienced during the seventies . It is not yet clear whether t he "countershock" wh ich we are currently w itnessing will prove durable and stable enough to spark a return to the income and . employment levels of the 1960's. T here can be no doubt, however, that the growth and monetary

Graph 1

OIL AS % OF WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND THE PRICE OF OIL

Oil as % of world energy consumption ($/barrel)

Averag e price of crude oil (contemporary $/barrel)

100%

50 11, 1~1 ,fl

,~111,

_1,,,

~ '

., II

I ,, I

80%

40 r. [t

ltl li IHI ,: [i<; ,: 11- 11

' f I ',

... ...

I•

60%

,~1~1·;~ 1·~ 1111

, r If

40 % ·- 1,..

,_ ....

I~' :

1, ••

't l,·1

,1·,

.... _ --- --

-- -_... --

,...,-.

-- ...

,--.-

0% 1938 '40 '43

- ,_ r-,-

-- --

,_ ....

........ ._i-

20 %

I:' l!.ii

... ,..

... .......

20 I'•

,... 0

'46 '4~

'52

'55

'58

'61

'64

'67 '70

'73

'76 '79 '82

'85

Source: ENI calculations using data from BP statistical review, U.N. World Energy Supply.

stability of the industrialized own inability t o explain the nations (as well as other areas of events in question. The oil market is far removed the world) are critical ly affected from the cases dealt with in not only by th is phenomenon. mi croeconom ics textbooks. but also by our ability to appreIndeed, it is closer to recent ciate it and to meet it through developments in the study of t he formulation of adequate ol igopoly. The oil ma r ket is an economi c policies. imperfec t market in which various With this in mind. I will do economic agents are busy my best to offer an overall promoting a wide array of picture of the current situation · interests. The various ag ents · on the oil markets, together interact with each other and , with a review of the related when the time comes to make short. med ium and long-term decisions, they are al so ineconomic consequences , fluenced by the outside world. identifying just what it is we In this field, analytica l instru· are able to understand and ments su ch as game theory describi ng exactly the analyti ca l prove extremely helpful (in instruments we must use. particular. hierarch ical games Besides its relevance in involving threats as well as both t erms of the real world. the issue cooperative and non-cooperative of crude oil prices also represolutions). Clear ly, however. sents a formidable theoretical they are not able to investigate challenge for anyone seeking certain aspects of the phenom· t o explain the real-life situation enon. In any case, the task analytically. In addition it provides ahead of us will certa in ly put economists with a theoretical our skill s of comp rehens ion and empirical mea sure of their to the test.

THE CRUDE OIL MARKET To understand the oi l markets, it is best to begin with a brief historical analysis. Oi l ha s not always enjoyed widespread use as an energy source. At the end of the Second World War , it accounted for little more than 25 % of total world energy use (graph 1). The beginning of its growth dates from this period. Oil's share of energy consumption contin ued to grow up through 1973. at which point it reached 50% of the total. With the onset of the energy crisis. however, this percentage began to decline. Comparing the price trend to the percentage share, we see that the replacement of oil with other energy sources begi ns in 1973. ·immediately · following the first shock, and becomes decided ly more pro nounced in the wake of the second , 1979 shock. Between 1973 and 1985. the decline in energy and oil

A production and drilling platform in the Gulf of Suez.

Graph 2

OECD: ENERGY AND OIL INTENSITY 1973

60L...._L..____J_ 1973 '74 '75

= 100

___J,_

'76

___J,_---l._---1.._.....1.._-L_...J...._...1...._...1....-----1

'77

'78

'79

'80

'81

'82

'83

Source: ENI calculations using data from OECD, UN and BP statistical review.

'84

'85

use in the industrialized nations of the OECD (graph 2) reduced the consumption of crude oil by 20%, from approximately 50 million to roughly 40 million barrels a day. As I mentioned earlier, the drop was relatively greater after the second oil shock; what is more, it was absorbed in its entirety by the OPEC countries, which lowered their production from 30 million to 17 million barrels a day between 1973 and 1985, reducing their percentage of the total from 65% to 40% (tables 1 and 2). Within this overa ll picture, the principal "buffer" was Saudi Arabia, which has more t han halved its production in terms of 1981 levels and now operates at around 40% of its production capacity, as compared to levels of 60% and 80% in the other countries. At the same time, we have witnessed a strong growth rate (in absolute as well as relative terms) for North Sea oil - a source which did not even exist in 1973 - and other non-OPEC producers. As far as the United States in concerned, it has raised its percentage of total production by simply keeping its levels unchanged . For that matter, the United States is a case apart, being both the world's largest producer of oi l (10 million b/d) and the largest importer (5 million bid). At the end of January of last year, the price of crude oi l registered a significant fluctuation, bringing the price in rea l dollars to levels slightly below those which prevai le<J immediately following the shock of 1973 (graph 3). Indeed, in real terms the current prices are actually lower than the average quotation for 1973. The drop in price has been caused by surplus demand. the resu lt of a sharp increase in Saudi Arabia's level of production. which has gone from an average of 3 million b/d in 1985 to 4 million b/d duri ng the

first quarter of last year. The current production figure was not arrived at by chance. It represents the ceiling assigned to Saudi Arabia by OPEC some time ago. To assure- that it can sell the desired quantity of oil, Saudi Arabia has introduced the net-back contract. a new type of arrangement which sets the price of crude oil according to the ultimate value of the refined products generated from that oil so as to guarantee that the buyer makes back the cosl of processing the oil (graph 4). This form of contract has slowly replaced fixed-pri ce spot purchases, which have fa ll en from 40-50% of the market to 4-5% and are limited, tor the most part. to North Sea oil and a few shipments of American crude. According to the experts, two principa l ob jectives lie behind Saudi Arabia's decision to fol low this pricing policy: â€˘ force a limited number of marginal producers out of the market while checking the tendency to replace oi l with other energy sources, a phenomenon which became extremely wide-

WORLD OIL PRODUCTION (1) (2) (Millions of barrels for day) OPEC

NON OPEC

(3)

TOTAL USA

North Sea

Others

Saudi Arabia

Others

11,3

5,2

;,,6

20,0,

40,1

1, 7

1973

10,9

6,3

7,3

2J,7

48,2

5,0

1979

10,1

2,0

7,8

9)6

21,9

51,4

24,0

1981

10,.2

.2,3

8,7

10,0

13,4

44,6

34,2

1985

10,5

3,5

11,4

3,2

lJ,9

42,5

26,5

(1) Countries with planned economies not included. .(2) NGL's included. (3) Average prices of OPEC crude

Source: ENI calculations using BP Statistical and Platt's Oilgram.

OPEC

10,5 (23,8%)

PRICES ($/ barrel)

1970

WORLD PRODUCTION OF OIL IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF 1986 (1) (2) (Millions of b/day and percentage shares)

January

Table 1

North Sea

Others

3,8 (8,6%)

11,4 (25,8%)

Saudi Arabia

(3)

PRICES ($/barrel)

Others

14,2 (32,1 %)

4,3 (9,7%)

Table 2

44,2 (100,0%)

22,5

February

10,5 (23,9%)

3,8 (8,6%)

10,9 (24,8%)

4,6 (10,4%)

14,2 (32,3%)

44,0 (100,0%)

(1) Countries with planned economies not included. (2) NGL's included. (3) Average prices of OPEC crude on the market.

Source: ENI calculations using Petroleum

Units of the Saipem company docked at the Shariah base prepare for the voyage to Saudi Arabia, where they will lay a number of sea lines.

spread after the second oil shock (it should be remembered that, at the time, Saudi Arabia was opposed to the price increases); • persuade both the OPEC and the non-OPEC countries to cooperate in a unified policy of production control. At the present moment, despite the low price of crude oil, estimates put the available surplus on the world-wide oil market at approximately 5-5.5 million barrels a day, amounting to roughly 10% of the total demand (includ ing that generated by countries with planned economies), which is estimated to be around 55 million barrels a day. In reality, the potential surplus of supply over demand is much higher (up to 10-12 million barrels a day for OPEC} if one takes into account the theoretical top levels of production, that is to say the levels which would be reached by the Gulf States, and Saudi Arabia in particular, if they could produce "at will". Today,

however, this scenario is rejected out of hand. The surplus of supply over demand caused by Saud i Arabian production levels is thus the root cause of the fall in prices . And this fall has yet to bottom out. given that the current prices (around $ 12-13) still produce a surplus. As a result of the Saudis' decision to maintain current production levels, the prices are destined to drop even further, until the market once again reaches a point of stability, a function of two complementary factors: • a slackening of supply resulting from the fai lure of certain marginal, cost-intensive producers; • increased demand caused by the rise in consumption which results from accelerated economic growth, decreased energy savings and, above all. the increased replacement of coal with hydrocarbons, a trend which takes on massive dimensions just below the present price levels.

Obviously, all producers lose income with prices at the current levels (and even more so at lower levels). a fact that should add to the incentives for once again forming some type of global agreement: the course advocated by Saudi Arabia. · The question of whether or not such an agreement can be reached is no small matter, given that its outcome will determine the temporary or structural nature - for a number of years - of the decline in oil prices. Further uncertainty is generated by the fact that not only economic phenomena, but also political decisions and relationships on a world-wide level. can have · a decisive effect on the issue. The eventual response. no matter how much factual support it may enjoy. will still present a rather high element of risk. The situation which has prevailed around the oil markets since the beginning of last year can be described in theory as a " hierarchical game for x number of people". The adoption of this theoretical framework makes it possible to consider whatever information has been gathered through the more traditional criteria of balance and imbalance. all the while allowing for the possibility that cooperative or non-cooperative forms of behavior on the part of the principal economic agents may lead to at least a locally stable price. as opposed to the market clearing level, or the price at which the various levels of supply and demand desired by all the agents have balanced out. The principal "players" in the chosen framework are: • the rich OPEC countries with considerable unused production capacity (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates); • the "poor" OPEC and nonOPEC countries wh ich have little unused production capacity

,,. AVERAGE OPEC MARKET PRICE - Current $/bi - Constant $/bi (1973)

OPEC SPOT PRICES - Current $/ bi - Constant $/ bi (1973)

40 IJ

:;,

.--

,--

;

':#{..ij

20 q ~,,..::-.

i ,,

u === J 0

Graph 3

CHANGES IN "'THE PRICE OF MARKETED OPEC * CRUDE IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS

••

-----

L-

'---

... ... It .

·"'·

,...

- L- - ......

r--,.......

. ,,.r. !=:l ~

...., ''

7-.r--t_

··1,:

~~1

.. . .. ,. .-,: ·; I;

LJ-

r--,_ t-...r"

1-oiiii

1970

1980

1975

1985

Jan '86

Feb '86

Source: EN I c alculations on OECD data and PLATT' s Oilgram. • Calculated average between OSP and spot pri ces.

I ..., ,.•

Graph 4

WEEKLY CHANGES IN NET-BACKS (cycle T+R + C at full cost)

/ ($/barre l)

l ~-

18+---=.:.=...:.:.,,.:::........,-=,..-,--+- --W~ ;.........:~ - ----"-- -----:aa-- ---=:------''-------=..::_..!!,_= ~--l 16+-~ ~':-"---,~:.,__- + - - -- -"'.-----=-~ -----,,---____3,,~ - -"""'-c-- - -- - ----4

10 +----1----4---l----+-

D1 D2 D3 D4

1985

-4---1--+---l----+--+--l-----+--4-~I---+--~ -+--+-~ J2

FJ F4 Ml M2 M3 M4 Al A2 AJ A4 1986

Source: ENI calculations using data from Plait's Oilgram.

(other OPEC countries and Mexico); • industrialized non-OPEC producers (Great Britain , Norway); • the oil compan ies (divided into large and small concerns) . Each of these parties has a different set of interests, and thus a different operational goal. The oi l companies naturally maximize profi ts. The OPEC countries and the non-OPEC "poor" nations seek to maximize their gross revenues in order to finance their development. The rich Arab countries are interested in staying as close as possible to price and production targets. levels which have been chosen with an eye to maintain ing an optimum flow of resources extracted while limiting, or even reversing, the replacement of crude oil with other fuels (it shou ld be remembered that Saudi Arabia was opposed to the second shock). It is good to keep in mind that up until the end of last year. the "game" had an implicitly cooperative solution. as long, that is, as Saudi Arabia agreed to make up for the "defections" of the other producers. The rich OPEC countries. and especially Saudi Arabia. have acted as swing producers, adjusting the overall quantities of oil produced in order to keep the price at the leve l decided upon by OPEC. Under such a system. however, the fact that the non-OPEC producers (both countries and companies) have taken on the role of free riders - refusing, in other words. to limit their production. and, indeed, gradua lly increasing it at the expense of the swing producers and, in more general terms. OPEC reduces OPEC revenues considerably. Between 1980 and today, these revenues have fallen by more than 50% in face value. descending to 1973 levels in terms of real dollars (graph 5). The balanced situation of the past, in which Saudi Arabia compensated for the behavior of the other producers. has been broken. and we find ourselves in a fluid phase. in part because the non-OPEC producers, and

especially those in America econometrics model developed and the North Sea, refuse to in cooperation with the OAPEC negotiate new production levels (the Interdependence model), point to two years as the amount with OPEC. As is rather widely known. of time needed to clear the the f irst result of a like theoret- market of its current surplus. ical framework is the existence The number of years becomes of multiple balances. Some can 4 if the price settles at a level turn out to be cooperative (the of about $ 16-18. result of explicit and implic it A drop to current price agreements between the players). levels does not exclude any others non-cooperative. primary producer from the Naturally, the existence of market (especially in the short multiple balances per se does run). but it does have a dramatic not mean that "anything goes". effect on the revenues of all Indeed, the sum total of possible the producers. including those solutions is limited. and the in America and the North Sea . range of potential results can In any case. an eventual be assigned a likelihood accord- production rise caused by the ing to the consequences of a replacement of other energy given solution for the different sources. chief among them coa l. players. wou ld never reach the dimen The absolute limits, which. sions needed to compensate in a certain sense, also represent for the price fall and maintain objective boundaries. are gross revenues unchanged. For (graph 6): reasons of production capacity. • upper, the price at which the chief beneficiaries of such crude oil is replaced on a a r ise would be the "rich" OPEC massive scale by other sources countries, who have suffered of energy (leading analysts . the largest production drops hypothes ize a level slightly · on account of their role as above 25 dollars a barrel); swing producers . • lower, the limit represented For the majority of the by the marginal cost of extracting , producing countries. th en. a the oil; for quantit ies of more resurgence of revenues is imthan 50 million barrels a day, possible in the absence of the experts place this level at controls which limit the overall roughly 5 dollars. or even less. supply to a level where the For al l intents and purposes. price of crude oil begins to rise . But according to the countries the marginal cost is the physical who triggered the fall in prices, f loor. representing the bottom any production controls must be limit for any non-cooperative accompanied by a complete solution. But there are other renegotiation of the various thresholds in the higher price range which have a good chance quotas: the famous fair share requested by OPEC. of checking the price drop. When one considers the Analysts place the most losses that would befall all important boundary at around producers during a price war. $ 11-13 a barrel. With crude oil together with the not entirely at this price. a large number unreasonable accumulation of small producers are excluded from the market. and a significant resulting from the redistribution of the quotas requested by amount of coal is eliminated, allowing for a healthy increase OPEC (and Saudi Arabia). then it seems obvious that the game in both demand and production within a time period which is must once again become a cooperat ive event. and quickly, reasonable, though not brief . given that all the producers There is disagreement over stand to gain from a decrease the exact dimensions of this in product ion levels which rais·es increase. but the most widely prices. respected opinions. as well as the calculations we ourselves At present; however, implehave made with the oil-market mentation of this solution seems

OPEC INCOME IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT Graph DOLLARS (1973)Âˇ

(billions of dollar s)

300 250 200 i;o

100 50

highly improbable, due in part to the wide variety of interests underlying the actions of the different producers, countries and corporations. Though the producers should theoretically be in favor of an accord, they nonetheless have considerable incentive to play the tree rider role by defecting from the cooperative balance at the first possible occasion. In abstract terms, one has a classic case of the so-called prisoner's dilemma in which the first defector benefits at the expense

0 '-----L------'---'---- - ' - - --L..-------'- - ' -- - ' - - - - ' - - - - '

1970

1973

1977

1975

1979

1981

1983

1985

Source: ENI cal culations using OECD data and PLATT's Oilgram.

Graph 6

SUBSTITUTIONS AMONG DIFFERENT ENERGY SOURCES ( cost in $/bi or $/bi equivalent)

Electricity from coa l

Indigenous coal Western Europe

LNG Ja pan Europe

DD -

I mported natura l gas ( European Cl F cou ntnes 1985)

------

BARRIER FOR NON-OIL FUELS

BARRI ER FOR NORTH SEA OI L

Cost

r,,fâ€˘ .r

....

.,.

Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates; OECD; Shell; PIW.

of those who cooperate by selling hjs oil at a price kept high by the others. But apart from theoretical considerations, we should perhaps listen to what the large American companies have to say, g iven that they may possess a better "feel" for the situation than our fellow economists. At one end of the spectrum, we have Mr. Garvin, President and Chief Executive Officer of EXXON, who forecasts prices of no more than $ 12 during the next couple of years. And Mr. Garvin is not joking: on the strength of that prediction he has halted all plans for exploration and laid off 40,000 employees out of a total of 140,000. The major European compan ies, including Shell , have taken positions at the other extreme, holding that despite a further, short-term drop in crude oil prices (a function of the disappointing OPEC meeting, the end of the strike in Norway and Soviet exportations, which, as expected, have o nce again begun to flow out of the USSR), the levels wil l begin to rise by summertime, reaching $ 18/b by the end of the year, at which point they will remain essentially stable. At present, this is the reigning hypothesis , being backed by a projected rise in demand and a fall in the nonOPEC supply of crude. Neither prediction takes for granted a new agreement signed by the producing countries , an eventuality which could obviously stabilize prices in a much shorter period of time and at a level determined by the supply.

A striking view of the "Saipem Due"

as it performs a drilling operation.

Two years of price s tability at a level of roughly 12 dollars per barrel would have a very negative e ffec t on t he cash-flow of the oil compan ies and. as a natural consequence. on the level of fu nds invested in the researc h and developm ent of petroleum deposits. According to a number of analysts. these investments cou ld fall by more t han 50% from thei r estimated 1985 level of 100 bi ll ion dollars . A like development would have grave repercussions on the energy vulnerability of the industrialized cou nt ries. Thei r dependence on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Nations would grow to a t remendous deg ree. producing a complementary rise in the risk represented by the rev ival o f a sellers' market. What is more. the elimina tion of the oil-related service ind ustries would destroy a crucial, t echnological lyadvanced field of endeavor. one whose reconstruction would

prove very difficult and costly. In my opinion, the industrialized c ou ntries. and chief among t hem . the United States. will not easily accept this prospect. Indeed, the scenario will eventually lead to chang es in the current laissez-faire oi l policy, spawning policies aimed at making the gam e of the oilproducing nations a more cooperative affair in the interes ts ot stabilizing the price at a level - as mentioned earlier. 16-18 dollars - which allows for both economic revival and a dec line in the inflation rate , but w ithout compromising the dearlywon autonomy and relative energy independence. THE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE PRINC IPAL GROUPS OF COUNTRIES

Compared to the conditions which prevailed at the beginning o f t his years, the prospect of lo w c rude oi l prices w ill have a significant effec t on the various groups of nations which make

up the world economy , in part as a result of the dollar's gradual deva luation. All other conditions being eq ual, the oil-producing nat ions as a whole lose 10 billion do llars (sligh t ly less t han 5 million in t he OPEC countries alone) for every one-dollar decrease in the price of crude oi l, a mechanism which has a serious effec t on t he abi lity o f these countries to import goods and services. A drop of $ 11 per barrel in t he price of crude oil (from an average of $ 27 in 1985 to $ 16 la st yea r ) represents a $ 110 billion decrease in the flow of wealth from the firs tworld countries to the oilproduc ing nations, with the principal benefits going to the industrialized nations (82 % of the petroleum sold is bought w it hin the OECD area ). Among the oil-prod ucing nations, the hardest hit in absolute te rms are Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, Algeria and Indonesia. The most sign ificant percentage reductions in GNP. however. have been registered in certain small countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, and, in genera l, in th e moderate Mediterranean cou ntries whose industrial structures are just beginning to develop. The c onsequences for the Sovi et Union are very serious. given that petroleum and gas exports to Western nations represe nt roughly 60% of her hard-currency ea rn ings and 84 % of her exports. In the short run. however. the Soviets' huge gold rese rves will compensate for the missi ng currency. In the case o f the United Kingdom - despite the reassuring words o f the British authorit ies the situation 1s equa lly gloomy. Crude o il production represents 4 % of the GNP and accounts for 9% of all tax revenues . Oil ex ports make up 7% o f all exports, and thus a fall in the price o f oi l natural ly res ults in a net deterioration of the principal macro-economic vari ables. The only oil-p roducing countries able to withstand a decrease in the price of oil for

an extended period of time are the rich OPEC nations . · Saudi Arabia, in particula r. has sharply increased its production levels (from 3 million barrels per day to tl.5 million), thus managing to limit the overall drop in income, despite the effect of fluctuating prices. This further explains how the Saudis succeed in playing what appears to be a leading role in the maintenance of the current situation. As far as the US is ·concerned. there is no denyi ng the sizeable amount of damage inflicted on the domestic oil industry . On the whole, however, the macro-economic benefits exceed the costs. For t hat matter. the Reagan administration, despite problems of competitiveness. does not seem ready to impose protective tariffs (as has been done on other occasions). In the industrial ized countries which do not produce oil, the prospect of low petro leum prices is viewed with great satisfaction. In the absence of a rigid price floor for consumption, the principal forecasts all point to an increase in gross national product and employment levels as well as the likelihood of a drop in interests rates and inflation compared to the reference scenario (which was based on oil prices of $ 26-27). Trade figures are also showing signs of improvement. Only two ind ustrial countries have seen their balance of payments take a turn for the worse (the United Kingdom and Norway) . Naturally, the effect varies from country to country. Italy in porticu lar - where the economy is twice as oil-intensive c1s u·,e EEC average - seems to benefit in comparison to her European partners. In the absence of any further political or economic manoeuvring, and assuming that the dollar stays at its current level of exchange, the available estimates show tha t an oil price of $ 15 a barrel would result in a 2.6-2.8% growth in the GNP, and this despite the decline in exports to the OPEC countries.

"by country", without taking into account the repercussions for foreign trade relations between the different geographical areas. Furthermore, the models ignore factors which, in my opinion, will play a fundamental role in the macro-economic evolution of the months to come. On the one hand. these include instances of financial fragility and effects on liquidity; on the other. they involve repercussions of a political nature. Within this last area. one st1ould not lose sight of the scenario in which Saudi Arabia is "politically" persuaded to return to its role a residual producer. Given the magnitude of the drop in net income suffered by the oil-producing countries, it is not unreasonable to predict a period of heightened political instability in the Mediterranean area (indeed. we have already received indications of a like development). The fact is that no country will prove eager to return to its pre-1973 standards of living, not after having enjoyed much higher levels of well being. Before the oil counter-shock, the rich oil-producing countries found various ways to maintain the standard of living of the poorer, no n-oi l-producing nations. However unstable it might have been. the resulting balance was laboriously preserved by subsidies and transfers of wealth from the "rich relatives". This aid became a fundamental element of consensus, amounting to a sort of welfare state among states. The drop in oil income now makes it necessary to CONCLUSION reduce the transfer of funds between rich countries and poor Estimates for the decidedly ones, a trend which will prove positive effect of energy unsettling for the political savings on the economies of · stability not only of the moderate. the ind ustrialized nations are friend ly countries, but of the produced, for the most part, radical, potentially hostile nations by simulating models based on as well. econometrics. As a resu lt, the In both history and econoexercises involved, though highly mics, the presence of theoretical sophisticated, are mechanical in models does not erase the need nature, being chiefly concerned to take the unexpected into with the wide range of variations account: in other words, chain on the exogenous variables. reactions which might modify What is more. the majority of the framework for our forecasts . these models are formulated

According to the same forecasts. inflation should fal l below 6%, while trade figures will improve by a tota l of roughly 3 billion dollars Naturally, the macro-economic effects will be determined by the political and economic policies of the individ ual countries as well as the coordination of these different policies. A manoeuvre which has one meaning in Ita ly could produce a very different effect - due to a renewed growth in the supply - following chnnges in the policies of the country's European partners or the United States. Similar considerations hold true for every industrialized country . The effect on non-OPEC developing countries is equally pronounced . Generally in debt. these countries would seem to benefit in a particu larly marked way from the expected drop in interest rates. a development which should relieve some of the pressure on their bala nce of payments. Looking at the fo recasts available for these nations as a group, we see a growth in the GNP (a·n average of 1 % ) as well as a significant increase in reserves, but the most important element. from our point of view, is the substantial rise in the ability of t hese nations to import goods, a figure as high as 20% for the major Latin American and Asia countries. In relative terms, Brazil second only to Mexico in the size of her debt - should benefit most from these developments.

A series of precise parabolic amplifiers, each with a peak power capacitv of 500 kWe

A chain of events - which by fts very nat ure, proves difficult to anticipate - cou ld produce oil-industry scenarios that differ from those we have identified in the present effort. In t hese scenarios, the revival of the pre-1986 sellersÂˇ market will take place long before the date predicted by economists. I offer one fina l observation . The events witnessed at the beginning of 1986 seem to represent the "revenge of the marketplace". The dissolution of the agreement between the oilproducing countries has led to a drop in the price of crude oil, a development whose effect on income and employment levels has been decidedly positive. This, however, is only the first half of the story. Oil is a scarce resource whose distribution among the various countries of the world is extremely uneven (suffice it to say t hat Saudi Arabia alone holds 65% of t he world's known reserves, and the cost of extraction in the area is much lower t han elsewhere) . The depressed prices now in effect will b ri ng petroleum's share of the world's total energy sources back to 45-50 % . and within a few years, most of that oil will once again Âˇ be coming from the Gulf States. If a "free"

market is allowed to operate. without any corrective measures on the part of the consuming countries, then the situation wi ll once again return to a nearmonopoly, making it a simple matter for the producers to launch another price shock . Faced with t his shock, neither the European producers nor the US will be capable of instantly . or even rapid ly, entering the market to calm t he waters. given that the sums spent on research and exploration outside of t he Gulf have been steadily declining: indeed. should t he price stay at its current level o f 12 dollars, these sums will undergo a veritable collapse. A market free of energypolicy interventions on the part of the consuming countries would lead to extremely wide osci llations in the market fo rces and prices. More than the given price level. it is t h is variation in the price which generates chaos in the systems of production. I would like to conclude with a general observation. When politicians or the press discuss this subject. their words are often saturated with an acritical, nearly blind faith in the benefits of a free market. In all likel ihood, this is a fitting reactio n to the excessive faith p laced in in tervention ist economic policies in years past. But in a less t han perfect world - a world which contains

non-competitive markets and suffers from uncertainty over the future - the free market system can give birth to "monsters". Policies meant to maximize profits in oligopolistic markets whose producers ma intain interdependent relationships ca n lead to price fluctuations which will produce dest ructive sideeffects in certain industries whi le disrupting entire economic areas. In many cases , the higher the profit, the further the distance from an ideal situation and the greater the damage to consumers. My point is drawn from firmly established. self-evident doctrines of economic theory, and yet it is often overlooked in current discuss ions of t he subject. The economic and politica l advan tages of the present laisse z-faire policy sta nd in direct contrast to the future economic and political costs of increased vulnerability. With the price of crude oil at less than 15 dollars a barrel, dependence on OPEC is just around the corner . Franco Reviglio

Professor Franco Rev,g lio graduated from the Univ ersity o f Turu, in 1959 w ith ~ law degree He was named a tul f professor of Economi c Science and FinanGia f Law ,n 1974. goin,; on from for Economic Science at the Facu lty of Econom y and Trade of the Un ,vers,tv o f Tur in. Having previously served as ao econom ist ,n the lnternal io na l M onetary Fund ' s Public Fi nance Department, he wo rked betwee n 1971-1973 for 1he Institute or Studies on Ec:o no mic Planning (ISPE). carrying out studies on tax reform and its implementation . From August 1979 to June 1981, he se rved as Mi nister o f Finance. I n 1983, he was named to the presidency o f the EN I c orpor;,1,on . I" Jhe sa me year he became a direc tor on the ASSOÂˇ N IME boad. ~nd in 1984 he tlecame a m ember ot the ASPEN INSTITUTE fTALIA.

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GEOPOLITICS-~~---~,-FROM THUCYDIDES TO GORBACHEV '

"La politique d'un Etat est dans sa geographie", Napoleon used to say. After the ideological intoxication of the Cultural Revolution and of Western leftism, the hard facts and reality oi Soviet imperialism have brought China and the West back to realism. Some major problems have forcefully been brought to the attention of statesmen and experts in recent years: the relationship between the internal structure of individual states and international politics; the recruitment, modus operandi and political influence of the secret services; and the issue of geopolitics, i.e., the age-old correlatively, the possibility of a timely forecast of the probable locations of future conflicts.

Two works recently published in Italy and France offer essential contributions to these subjects. The work published in Italy is a new edition of a classic, the first and most important Western classic of political history: Guerra del Peloponneso ("The Peloponnesian War") of Thucydides, edited for Laterza by the communist historian Luciano Canfora . The French work is a bookinterview by Christine Ockrent, who conducted a 340 page interview with the Cuunt of Marenches, formed head of SDECE, the French information and counterespionage service, between 1970 and 1981, and who is stll, as is revea led, one of the most sought after counselors of world leaders, beginning with President Reagan. Let us begin with H1ucydides. In the seven volumes of Guerra del Peloponneso, he recounted the 27 years of war that involved, in two rounds, two blocks of po/is, led on one side by an authoritarian , militarized, and economically autarchical state with stronger land forces (Sparta) and, on the other. by a democratic, economically and commercially vigorous state with the stronger naval forces (Athens). The lesser allies in the two camps had internal political regimes similar to that of the hegemonic power. Of the two recent Italian editions of the work, published by Rizzoli -BUR and Laterza, the first has an introduction by Mcises Finley, the second, by Luciano Canfora, who captures the contemporariness of Thucydides. Political history can teach something about the recurring quality of human affairs, given the essential sameness of human nature. Thucydides, according to Canfora, is at the origin of a line of thinking that leads to Machiavelli, Ranke, Cla usewitz (and, we would add, . to Hobbes, Toynbee and, by a different route, Carl Schmitt}. The key concepts of . "realistic" political science are constants: "the impossibility of coexistence 40

between great powers, the necessary connection between repression and empire, the relationship between war and and politics and the estrangement of ethics from politics. The end product of this complex reflection is the concept of necessity". An empire is a necessity to one who has achieved a certain level of force, and it is against human nature to renounce it (1.76.1). Repression of the ruled by the rulers is a necessity. War is a necessity when, in a geopolitical area traditionally dominated by a great power, there is the ascension of another great power (1.23.6; 1.88). Therefore, resumption of war (V.25.3} is a necessity, following peace with neither victor nor vanquished. At the heart of this thinking is the idea that the development of material and moral resources of a nation and the necessity of war are strictly connected . "Development itself is the driving force behind hegemony: the maritime development of Athens, for example, produced the alliance, that is, the emergence, in a world until then dominated by Sparta, of. an antagonist that 'forced' (anagkasai) Sparta into war" (1.23.6). The impulse of tl1e great powers towards hegemony is thus, in a certain sense, the driving force in the dynamics of history. The ways in which hegemony is exercised are, therefore, the focus of Thucydides' thinking. He admires that apparently painless form of "ideological occupation" with which Sparta bound its allies to itself (1.19) and seeks to understand why Athens, the great democratic power, was led to the practice of violent repression . And he arrives at the pessimistic conclusion that the democratic city is incapable of administering an empire (111.37.1), precisely because its citizens, accustomed to the interpersonal relations typical of democracy, do not fully understand the inherently tyrannical nature of every empire. Analyzing with dispassion the disturbing events of which

he was a protagonist (Thucydides had been a general in Thrace). the first great Western political scientist concluded that Athens had lost, not because of its defeat in the expedition against Syracuse or because of the alliance between Sparta and Persia, but because it had twice "beheaded the empire". Twentyfour centuries later, the great naval power and democratic hegemonic leader of its time, by "beheading its empire" with Watergate, witnessed within six years roughly ten states become authoritarian regimes and satellites of the opposing alliance. Mario Tronti correctly observed in Rinascita (26 July '86) : "From Thucydides through Machiavelli and Hobbes, Clausewitz and Ranke, throughout the long period of modern politics, these Athenian discourses are handed down to us". In 1972, Raymond Aron had published his book "Republique imperiale, les Etats Unis dans le monde, 1945-1972". David Watt reviewed the English edition in the Observer and Thucydides' name emerged. In his "Memoires", Aron replied: "Watt is quite right to place me in the shadow of Thucydides, but he is mistaken when he sees a difference between the Greek writer's tone in narrating the Sicilian expedition and the one I used in describing the American expedition in Vietnam". In the nuclear age, the Tnucydidean "law". according to which expansion by great powers in the same geopolitical area leads necessarily to total war, needs to be redefined and updated, to the effect that the process leads inevitably to global conflict that will be exr,rnssP.rl in global strife: ideological, cultural and economic. Military conflict will take shape along three lines: "vertically" in the qualitative arms race; territorially, in conflicts conducted directly or through the use of third parties in peripheral areas of tl'le empires; and. finally, througr the use of terrorism. (It is noteworthy that, at the recent summit of the seven major Western powers held in Tokyo,

the political definition of terrorist state was set out for the first t ime in modern history). From Thucyd id es to Count Marenches the leap may seem too great, the connecton too strained. But this is not t he case. In the first p lace, one must reflect upon the fact that all the great "real istic" thinkers in history had concrete experience in political leadership; and that. conversely, a few men of action in each age produced writings that were relevant fro m the point of view of political t heory. ThucydirlP.s w;:is ;:i general in Thrace. Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander the Great; and, in addition to the Politica, he wrote a large volume on comparative politics in which he analyzed 138 political regimes of his time. The volume was almost totally lost in the fire that destroyed the library of Alexandria: al l that remains of it is one part concerning one government. "The Constitution of Athens". Machiavelli was an

ambassador and advisor of Pier Soderini, Perpetual Gonfalonier of Florence, which is to say the pres ident .for life of a presidential republic, and his theories were based upon concrete experience. What can one say of Armand Du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu, the greatest Catholic statesman of modern Europe? What can one say of Napoleon who, in letters writte n from the battlef ront, set out in a few pages the essential ideas of geopolitics and modern constitutions as well? To give but a single example. all of the constitutional, ju ridica l, political and administraThe key concepts of "realistic" political science set out by Thucydides are: the impossibility of coexistence between great powers, the necessary connection between repression and empire , the relationship between war and politics and the separation of ethics an(f politics.

tive theory of the Fifth Republic is contained in a letter to Talleyrand written on 18 September 1797 while Napoleon was in Northern Ita ly contending with organizational problems in the Cisalpine Repub lic (1 ). The question of the relationship between the political and institutional internal structure of ind ividua l states and their foreig n policy was crucial to Thucydides. Global unification of politics ushers t he development of geopolitics. Marenches reminds us that the annexation of Afghanistan and Baluchistan. as well as the construction of a large military port with access to the warm and open seas was prescribed back in 1725. in the testament of Peter the Great: a second Petersburg on the Arabian Sea, not strangled like the Baltic Sea by the bottleneck of Skagerrak (nor like Odessa by the Bos phorus, or Murmansk by ice, or Vladivostok by the Japanese Islands). 41

In his celebrated work. "A World Restored", Henry Kissinger, an intellectual who rose to high political offices, analyzes the conta inment policy of the democratic, maritime power of the age, Great Britain, with respect to that period's continental power, France, wh ich. in the Napoleonic War, had demonstrated what revolutionary wars were ab.out. That is, conflicts in wh ich the stakes were not partial or li mited (occupation and annexation of a city or region). but total (annihilation of the enemy). Marenches' book, published last September for the Stock editions. "Dans le secret des Princes". provides fertile material for thought on al l these questions for the past 20 years and for the future. Marenches beg ins wth a brief account of his life: these· chapt ers of the book-interview offer an instructive insight into the way the West selects its leaders. Marenches comes from a family with a thousand-year history: originally from the Piedmont region, its feudal title was confirmed by Frederick Barbarossa in 1186. His father. who served in the same regiment as De Gaulle in the first world war. became aide-de-camp to General Pershing, then commander of the American expeditionary force in France. and in that headquarters struck enduring friendsh ips with men like Marshall and Patton who, 20 years later, would be leaders in the armed forces and in American foreign policy formulation. After 1940, the young Marenches escaped from occupied France, fought in the resistance and served on the staff of General Juin during the Italian campaign. The whole interview is rich with recollections of personal friendships and family t ies between the French aristocracy and the American ruling class. Marenches says clearly that he considers himself a French patriot and, at the same t ime, a citizen of the West. intended as the land of liberty. In answer to a specific question

by Ockrent as to which position he would take in the event of a confl ict between France and the United States. he admits that the choice would be very difficult. This shows how the experience of two world wars has created in the ranks of the rul ing classes of the three great In the nuclear age, Thucyd ides' "law", according to which expansion by great powers in the. same geopolitical area leads necessarily to total war, needs to be redefined and updated, to the effect that the process leads inevitably to global conflict th~t will be expressed in ideological cultural, economic and military strife.

al lies (Un ited States. France and Great Britain) a moral and practical symbiosis which would be difficult to deny. In 1970, Marenches was asked to become DirectorGenera l of the SDECE {Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Cantre- Espionage) by President Pompidou; he accepted and held that post until 1981. Mitterrand invited him to remain in that post. Marenches· response was: "I cou ld do it only if you will not have communist ministers" . That was not to be and Marenches resigned. Subsequently, the French secret services were variously reorga·nized, not always to best effect. Marenches describes internationa l political life as seen

from "inside " the most efficient Western secret service. in the last 16 years. As soon as he arrived in the Rue de Tourelles. he found 10 tons of Gestapo files on the period of the Nazi occupation of Fran ce . He discovered at once that many so-cal led partisans (who had based a career on this claim) had been, in fact, on the Gestapo payroll. These revelations togeth er with other observations regardi ng French internal politics created a furor at the time and some echoes were heard even in Italy. But this is not the most interesting part. Moreover. it takes up few of the 340 pages of text. The question of th e Gestapo files is important for

another reason: because Marenches revea ls that. while each of the three Western powers has only one part of the files, the Soviets have them all and are therefore able to blackmail and influence many people (there is a cautions reference to Kurt Waldheim 's favoring the East

the section dedicated to the geopolitica l analyses offered by Marenches to the heads of state of various countries: Pompidou. Giscard, Nixon, Reagan, Hassan II, the Shah of Iran, and Juan Carlos of Spain, observations wh ich he shares with us and to which he adds a personal

during his tenure as presiden t

appraisal o f the f uture.

of the U.N.). Of grea ter importance is

Marenches. a connoisseur of men and of the history of nations, is a disciple of the great lin e of classic politica l thought. At his time Thucydides had already clearly seen that an increase in geograph ic dimens ions, of demographic and economic power and, most important. of the maritime power of a country, inexorably led it to establish an empire.

Marenches foresees three major problems in the next century: uncontrolled population growth, desertification of certain areas of the planet and global expansionism - military, political and ideological in a locked matrix - of theÂˇ Soviet empire .

ACCESS TO THE WARM SEAS

CHINA

••

LIBYA

INDIA

NO~H

SOUTH1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3~ YEMEN M._a nd ab Gulf of Adenc:-.- -- - - - -- -4 t raits

t---- -- - - - - - - - -----1

! ~::::::::::::::::::::::::::..:! Thucydides observed the contraposition of an authoritarian, militarized, economically stagnant state with powerful land forces (Sparta) and a domestical ly democratic, economically and commercially vigorous state with preponderant naval power (Athens), both at the head of a "camp" of allies with analogous political regimes. A conflict of this type is resolved in favour of the authoritarian continental power in two cases: when t he continental power also develops a strong navy (it was to prevent th is possibility that Great Britain took part in the

In those years, the Soviets conquered. either directly (Afgha nistan) or indirectly, roughly ten countries. Marenches provides an analysis of geopol itics and reveals that with statesmen he always discussed geopolitics. It is conceivable that the extremely interesting "Atlas strateg ique" by G. Chaliand and J . P. Rageau. the first available atlas on the powe r relationships of world geopolitics. publ ished by Fayard in 1983, was suggested by Marenches. It is impossible to review here all of Marenches' analyses,

war c:1yc:1irisl the Germcmy of

which

Wilhelm), or when the democratic power collapses as a result of internal politics. as was the case with ·Athens. which lost because it had twice "beheaded the empire" in a, so to speak, Watergate ante litteram. Watergate decapitated American foreign policy (as well as the secret services: and not just the CIA. Marenches observes , but the FBI as well).

For the past 25 years Marenches has predicted two major events. The first is that the Soviets would invade Afghanistan, then Baluchistan Pakistan, and build a major military seaport on the Arabian sea opposite the Strait of Hormuz which closes off the Persian Gulf.

are

interwoveri

with

Oil-zone

Risk-zone

accounts of events in which he participated. He underscores t he power and political importance of the resistance by UNITA of Savimbi, in Angola. He recounts how the SDECE deposed Bokassa in Central Africa, the operation in Shaba (southern Zaire) , their difficulties and the conditions which brought about their success. He tells of how he warned the Shah of Iran of plots against him, and of his plan to neutralize Khomeini, vetoed by Giscard . And of how he warned the Vatican in January of 1980 of an imm inent assassination attempt on the Pope (and one rnig~1t ask whelt1er he w;;:1r11eu the Italian authorities and . if not. why not) . Here we shall limit ourselves to an analysis of his two major predictions and his final advice for the future. Marenches explains that for the past 25 years he has consistently predicted two major events. The first is that the Soviets would invade Afghanistan. t hen Pakistan's Baluchistan. and build

HYPOTHESIS OF AN ATTACK TO THE UNITED STATES UNITED STATES

ATLANTIC OCEAN

PACIFIC OCEAN ATLANTIC OCEAN

llllllallili.. Probable attack at the heart .......,,. of t he United States a maj or military sea port on the Arabian sea oppos ite the Strait o f Hormuz wh ich closes oH the Persian Gulf. Such course of action had been advocated in the testament o f Pete r the Great in 1725. The Soviet have four fleets, in M urmansk, Leningrad. Odessa and Vl ad ivostok. all four o f w hich are located in seas that are either closed, frozen or vulnerable to blockade. They need a large warm-water port in an open sea te rritorially connected to t heir Eurasian empire. After the invasion of A fghanistan there will be the destab iliza tion or invasion o f Bal uch ist an. The o ther major event he predicted is a direct attack on the United States through Central America and Mex ico, bot h o f whi ch are overpopu lat ed. Cuba is the springboard, Nica ragua the detonator and Mexico the potent ial explos ive. Mexico will have a pop ulation o f 120 mill ion in 1999, wh ile mi ll ions o f clandestine immigrants are

al ready pouri ng into t he United Sta tes where neith er national identification documents nor knowledge or the English language is req uired and w here the Hispanic commun ity, Amer ica's largest ethnic comm un ity, often insists on preserving its original language. We would not wa nt to pass judg ment on the val idity of these predict ions . On t he other hand. we are certain that. given the facts presented in these chapters, Pres idert Reagan has been strong ly influenced by MarenchesÂˇ analysis with regard to at least two poin ts: Nicaragua and South Afri ca . We have already addressed t he subjec t of Ni caragu a. With regard to South The second major event he predicted is a direct attack on the United States through Central America and M exico, both of wh ich are overpopulated. Cu ba is the springboard, Nicarag ua the detonator and Mexico the powder keg .

Africa. Maren ches recoun ts how. after illust rating its geopolit ica l importance, he told Reagan: "the territory of the United States contains four of the eight strateg ical ly esse ntia l raw mat erials; Russia has all eight. But South Africa also has all eight". He showed Reagan South Africa's min ing charts. Reagan took them and as ked whether he might keep them since , according to him. the CIA was at that point incapab le of more than sa tellite reconnaissa nce and propagan da abroad . Marenches foresees three major problems in the next cen tury: uncontrol led population growt h (N igeria wi ll have 325 mi llion inhabitants in the year 2020). desertification of certain areas of the planet (the Sahel being t he ma jor one ). and global expansionism (mi lita ry, polit ica l and ideolog ical in a locked matrix) of the Soviet empire. In the face of this menace. he proposes, w ith regard to Europe, a program of political, economic and military collabora -

tion between Western Europe and the Maghreb in t he broad sense (that is, including al l the "coastal states" of tha t internal sea which is the Sa hara) . We intuit that the "political" leader of this Euro-African quasi-nation, of this European Risorgimento, shou ld be France. as Piedmont was for Italy. But this should occur in symb iosis with the United States and not as an alternative to it, as De Ga ulle had wanted . It should be structured like NATO, but without the "N" , that is. extendi ng Lo

the entire north African geopolitical area ; an inter-al lied. multidisciplined mi litary and civil supreme military command; a European army wit h the same standardized eq uipment as the American military, with four branches: nuclear forces, battl e forces destined to the European theater. a rapid deployment force and an army in the reargua rd. on the Swiss model add itional to , and not a subst itute for other forces). In t imes of "weakness of thought ", Maren ches advocates, with th e even ts he recounts and the quest ion s he addresses. " strength of pol itica l thought". Antonio Lombardo

NOTE (1) Recen tly the text of that fa mous letter was publish ed in no. 2/ 84 of Rivista ltaliana di Scienza Polit ica . dedicated to institutional re form s. The question of the relationsh ip between pa rl iament, government and execu tive administra ti on is analyzed careful ly by Gianfra nco Miglio and Anton io Lombardo in that iss ue The en tire text of Napo leo n' s letter follows.

Au Ministre des relations exterieures Quartier genernl. Passariano. 3< jour t ornplemcntaire an V ( I 9 seprembrt 1797). j'ai re\u , C irnye n Miniscre, vo tre leme confidemic lle d u 22 fruc tidor , re bnivcrne nt a la mission quc vous des ire z dormer ii Sieves en Jrnli<.:. Je crois cffruivernenr, com me vous. que sa presence serait Hussi neces;a ire a Milan qu' el!e ,1unii1 pt.1 l'etre en J-lolla nde e t qu' el le I' est ,t Paris. Malgre notrc orgueil, no, mi lle et une brod ,ures , nos harangues it pene de vue et tfrs-bavar·de,. nous sommes tres-ignornnts d ans la science politique morale. Nou, n'avons pas encore ddi ni ce que !'on entend par pouvoir executii, !egislat if et judit iaire . Montesqu ieu nous a do nne de- fousses definit ions, non pas que cet: homme celehrc n'eut e,c vfrirnblemenr a meme de le foi re. ma is son ouvrngc, comme ii le d it lui-memc, n'est gu\,nc-cspi:·cc d 'analvse de ce 011i a ex istc- ou e, istait; c·est

un rCsumc: des note~ fai tes dans ses

\ 'O~ragcs OU

dans scs lectures. I I a fixe les yeu x su r k gouvemement d' Ang!eterre: ii a defin i. en i!<-ncrnl, k pouvoir exfrurif. lcg isl;ttif et jud i~iair~ . Pourquoi . effect ivem<·nt. rcga rderait-011 com mc une attri butio n du pouvoi r l.:gislati f le droit de- gu<· rrc et de pa ix. le droit de fixe r la 911:tn1 it<: c·t la nature des impos itions? Li const itution a con fie nvt, ra ison une de- ccs ,Ht ribu tions ;, la cham lwc des comm unes, et d k ,1 tres-bicn fa it , parce gue b const itution anglnisc· n'est 911\rne ckrt, dc pri vileges: c·est un plafond wui e n noir, n1,1is borck: en or. Comme la chambre des communes es1 fa seule qui. ta nt bi en que mal, rcprcsente la narion, St'U· k: d k a dL1avoir le dro it de f imposer: c'esc !'unique d igue que l'on a pu trouvcr· pour modifier k despotisme er l' inso lence des courtisans.

lvla is> dans un gouv~rnemcn l oll touccs fes au-

Ao 1onio LomM rdo is ;, Professor o r Po lil ica I Science at the Higl1 er School of Public Ad ministration . He also teaches Ad min is trativ e Sc ience at toe LU ISS Univers i1y in Rom e. He h;1s cont rit)uted to numero us Ita lian and fo reign news~a pers and n1t1gt~z!nes and has ed11ed 1~n volu mes. among wI1ich " I I s is tema pol i tico de ! Giappone" (Ange li. 1975) " La c ris1 de lle demo c raz ie ind ustriali" fVa llecch i. 1977), "La gn, nde rjforrn a. Governo , 1s, i tu2ioni , Partiti" (Sugarco, 19841: " Co me saremo g overnJ ti . Sc ienza dell' am , min1strazione e potitiche pubbliche in Ita lia" (Angel i, 1987) . He is a m ember o r the _N at1ona I Executive Council or the ttali an At lantic Committee .

writes <:manenr de Li nation, OLI k sou,·er,i in ,·st le pcupk, pourguo i classer d,ins ks attr ihmiom d u pouvoir l<:gislati f des choses qu i lui sont emrn geres. Depuis cinqu.itlle ans, je ne vois qu · une chose gue nous avons bien dc:fin ie, c 'est la souverninett' d u peuple: mais nous n'avons pas ere plus heu reux d ans !a fi xat ion de c<· qui , st consti rut ionnd q ue da ns I' attribHtion des d iffcrt'nts pouvoirs. L'or?anisation du pe'.'!Jlc fra,;<;ais n'est don( enco re ven table ment qu eh,1,,chec'·. Le pouvo ir du gove rnemcnt, dans toute la hn irude quc: je Jui donne, devrait em, C'Onsidere comme le vra i reprcsenwnt de la nation, lequcl devrai t gou\'erner en consequence de la charte <'Onstitutionnelle et des lois organiques: ii se rlivisc, ii me semble. naturellement en dc:ux magistratures bien d isti nctt's, dont u ne qui survcilk et n'agit pas, i1 laq ud le ce q ue nous appellons 1\Uj<,urd' hu i pouvoir t'xecutif serait ohl ige de soumett re les grn ndes mt·sures. si je pu i pa rler ainsi, la leg ishui on d<:

]'execution: cette g1·ande nrngis tnl! Lll't' sera ii: vcritablcrnc:n t k grand consei l de la na i:ion; ii aurnit route h1 parric de !'administ ration ou de !'execu tion qui est par notre constitut io n confiee au pouvoir legisl,1tiL Par ce moyen, le pouvoir du gouvernement <'Onsisterair dans deux magistratures, nommees par le peuple, dom une trcs-nornbreuse, ou ne pourrnienc etre admi s que des bornmcs qui auraient deja rc·m pli guelques-unes des fonctions qui don nenr ,iu, hom mes de la 111an11· ite su r Jes objt"ts du gouvcrnemcnt. 1.e pouvoir legislatif ferait d 'abord tol!les les lois o rganiq ucs, ks changerai t, ma is pas en dcux on rro is jours, comme !'on fa ir: car, une fois qu 'une lo i organi que scrait en execution, je ne crois pas qu'o n pu t Ja changc:r av ant gua tre ou ci nq mois de discussion. Ce pouvoir lcgislatif, sans rang dans la Rcpublique, impnssibk, sans ycu x e t sans ore i.lles pour ce gui l'entoure, n'aurait pas d 'ambition et ne nous inonderai t pl us de mille Jo is de circonstance qu i s'annukt tollles seules pm· leur absurdi te, e t qui nous cons ti tuent une nati on sans lo is avec trnis cenrs in-folio dt" loi s. Vo ila, je n ois, un code com ple1: de politiq ue, q ue les circonsrnntes dans lesq uelles nous sorn mes trouves rendcnt pa rdonnable. C'est un si grand ma.lheur pour une nat ion de trente millions d' hahirnnrs, ~t au dix-huitieme siec le, d '~tr<· ogligee d'avo ir· recours aux baionne ttes pour sauvcr la patrie1 Les remedes viole,u s at rnsent le legisl,iteur: car une co nstinttion qui es t. donnee aux hommes doi t etre calculee pour des hornrnes. Si vous voyez Sieyes, comn1uniquez -lui, je vou, pric. cette lettre; je !'engage ~ m'ecrireque j'ai tort; et crovcz que vous me ferez un sensible plai si r. si vous pouvt'z comribuer a fa ire '-'Cnir en Judie un homme dont j'esti nte les rn!enrs et pou r qui j',ii U t1C ami ti<: Wllt a foi t par ticuliere. _fc Jt seconderai de- tous mes movens, et je des ire que. rtunissanr nos efforts. nous puissions donner al'I ta lie une co ns tit ut. ion plus analogue aux moeurs de· ses !1abi ta nts, aux l'irconstan~~s loca les et peu1<:tre me me aux vrn is pri1Kipes, que celle que nou, lui avons donnee. Pour ne pas faire une no11veautc au milieu du tracas de hi guc:t'r<: t·t des pass ions. ii ~ ete difficile de i,1ire autrcmcn t. Je me resume: Non-seu lement je ,•ous rcponds confide ntiellerncm que je desire 911e Sieyes viennc t'n !talie. mais je pensc: m1:mt', et cela tres-o fiiciellemem , quc, si nous ne donnons pas 11 Genes et a b Republiqut' cisalpi ne Ullt' cons tit.u tion gui lem conviennc. la France 11'en t.irc:ra auc'un avamage: leurs ,'.Orps I{-. gislatifs, achet.es par l'or de l' c: tra nger, seront tNli t'ntiers a la di sposition de la Ma ison d'1\ rnri d,c et de Rome. II en scra, c·n dc rn ii:re analyse, coinme de la I lo!lande. Corn me la presente len:rc n'est pas 1111 obj,,r de t.K tique, ni un pla n de campngnc, je vous p rie de la gardcr pour vous t't pour Sieyes, er de nc· la itT usage, si vous le jugc-z ii propos. que de ce quc j<: vien!; d e

VOllS

d ire

Su r

r i n<.-onv<.•rrn ncc tk5

C011S l'i·

tutions q tJe nous ,ivons donncc-s 11 l'I rn lie. Vous verrez, Citoyen M. inistrc, d ans ce tte let· Ire-, la co nfiance enriere quc j'.ii e n vous. e t une rcponse i, vo tre dernier·e.

vous salue. Bonaparte

Co!!c:ctio1; Napoleon. Co1respomlcliiCC' de NapoMo,; .fer. puhtih• Jitzr ora're de l'L,npercur :\'apvMo;; Ill. Paris 1959, HI , pp. l U- 315

GEOPOLITICS

THE TANKS OF THE NINETIES WHAT PROPELLERS?

The modern battle tank is a vehicle characterized by high specialization, owing to the manifold performances and requirements it must meet - absolutely different from those of any other vehicle - and lo the standards of quality to which it must conforrri,. It is not only a vehicle suitable for covering distances transporting men or suppl ies - typical use of a common vehicle - but also and especially for · performing other tasks of primary importance on rough terrain, often impracticable to other vehicles. The first basic difference, for example, is that, in order to solve the problem of mobility concerning the common vehicle, interventions have been made outside and complementary to it, i.e. construction of roads, bridges. tunnels, the improvements of which are an integrant part of the progress achieved by those vehicles. In order to solve the same problem for the combat tank. one must instead work on the tank itself, equipping it with all the systems that enable it to move easily off th e road and overcome not only the natural obstacles but also the man-made ones that could stand in its way. The tank must be envisaged in an operational environment, in which only 40% of its movement is on road; fo r the rest it will have to operate off road in order to meet the fundamental needs of the war actions: during these actions. the superiority levels will be put to test and will entail the survival of the tank itself and of its crew, as well as the positive outcome of th e battle. The consequence is that each component shall be the result of painstaking studies aimed at adapting to the operational requirements all that the most advanced technologies place at our disposal. In this article we are dealing with one of the essential organs of the tank: the engine. Starting from the strict requirements it must meet - summed up on table 1 - we shall present a comprehensive picture and make a critical analysis of the current power units and those still on th e drawing. board. in view of presenting the predictable development trends of the engines that will equip the tanks of the coming generations. Today the possibility to employ new materials; fibres , ceramics. plastics and elastomers, compounds of elements with different but complementary characteristics, and the remarkable progress in electronics as well as in mechanicalhydraulic and electromagnetic systems, let us foresee solutions which were unthinkable in the past. Thanks to these solutions it will be possible to increment horsepower density (so as to be able to contain th e bulk of the engine in no more than 0.80-1 m3) and fuel consumption (20-30% less than at present).

The new battle tank must be characterized by very high specialization.

THE STATE OF THE ART OF ENGINES FOR MILITARY USE TRADITIONAL ENGINES

With very few e,xceptions. and only in the field of low-power engines. practically the totality of the engines for military and industrial use are of the four - or two - stroke diesel type. The diesel engine is a well-known machine. with over 80 years of development, which at the present has the highest thermal efficiency. This is obviously a quality of primary importance, owing to the necessi ty of maximizing the logistic performance, i.e. to permit, first of all, the maximum autonomy or

low consumption per km, considering the high cost of fuel and also bearing in mind that its availability is not only, confined to certain privileged zones but is also assuredly going to diminish progressively, even if not immediately. It is precisely for this reason that the diffusion of th e diesel engine- goes beyond the field of industri al and commercial transport - where the cost per km of a, transported ton is essential into the area of personal transportation. i.e. the automobile. The difference in power and specific gravity, considerably unfavourable compared to the Otto-cycle engines, is partly offset by the addition of turbocompressors, although this solution sometimes also increases the already

REQUISITES OF TANK ENGINES

Table 1

Requisites

1. High absolute power.

High power/weight ratio; high mobility.

2. High volume and mass

Better exploitation of the volumes to- the advantage of: tire power: mobility (less volume to armour); protection (more armour for equal weight); range (larger fuel tanks).

3. Limited height.

Lower "silhouette" protection).

4. Parceled auxiliary components.

Better exploitation of available volume (see 2).

5. Limited fuel consumption.

Longer range or, at equal range, greater mobility and / or protection.

6. Multifuel capability.

Better logistic qualities the propeller unit.

7. Reduction of elimination of cooling systems.

See 2; increased rel iability.

(passive

10. Capability of operating completely immersed in fresh water or seawater.

Greater

11. Capability of operating in extreme conditions of gradient (60%) and side slope (36%).

See 10.

12. Starting and operating capability in extreme climatic conditions (from + 50 °C to -30 °C).

See 10.

13. Good operation at altitudes up to 4000 m; keeping the homologated power up to 1700 m. Very good operation in dusty desert areas.

Flexibility

14. High power and complete shielding of the electrical equipment.

Passive protection and better electronic connections.

15. Availability of many power takeoffs.

Flexibility of employment

16. Must to fail if stored at extreme temperatures (from + 70 oc to - 60 °C).

Ruggedness.

17. Highest reliability.

Limited times of inactivity.

18. Easy replacement of the- whole unit.

See 17.

19. Reduced maintenance.

See 17.

rather high cost, due to construction reasons. The continuous advance of the turbo, enhanced by its increased di ffusion and by the acqu ired greater effic iency in its coupling with the engine, p romotes the increment of its speci fic power and the rma l efficiency, and despite the opinion held by some, that the d iesel engine has alread y reached the top of its possibilities, this seems still rather far. We maintain this even thoug h the machine has some- characteristics which canno t be easily accep ted, such as certa in inevitable mechan ica l complica ti ons: its bul k and we ight, the diffi culty of starting it at low tempera tures. its noise. the produc tion o f pollutants, such as nitrogen oxides, aldehydes and smoke. On a qualitycost base. these d ata still keep th e diesel engine at a phase of necessary improvements. As regards efficiency, th e declared va lues are often rea listic fo r the big engines, bu t they are much less so fo r the small ones. Especially in relation to indirect injection engines of limited cub ic cap ac ity generally used for automo biles, if the advantage vis-a-vis the Ottocycle engine can be cons idered positive at partial load . at full load is rathe r less positive and som etimes nil. The reduct ion of consumption deriving from eq uipping t he same vehic le w ith this or that eng ine is not only produced by the increase o r its g lobal performance. bu t also by a notable reduct ion of the available power. reduc. t ion wh ich c an sometimes reac h va lues o f 30 to 40% . By injec ting gasoline into the Ottocycle engines, and by adop ting the re levant elec tron ic con trol system s. wh ich are also steadily sp read ing, this difference tends to decrease. But i f one cons iders turbocharged engines s tart ing from a few hund red kW - design standards being equal th ese considerations fall comp letely. In relat ion to tank propellers. and considering the g row ing power needs. on table 2 are listed the main c haracteristics of the eng ines with power ove r 600 kW. It can be not iced that th e maximum power per unit of capacity, weight and vo lume o r the- eng ines are on the average approx. 40 kW/ I, 0.52 kW/ kg and 460 kW/m 3 ; w ith peaks for fo urstroke engines o f 66.8 kW / I for the Poyaud V8X 1500 " Hyperbar" and 0.81 kW/kg and 1138 kW/m 3 for the MTU "MT 883', at development stage. To the above one may add the two-stroke Detroit Diesel Allison " 12V71-TA" with 481 kW/ I and 416 kW/ m 3 . Consump tions average around 230-240 g/kW/ h at the lowest level. But we are still far from the values cons idered adequate to the mili tary requirements. Nevert heless, even co nceived as they are now. these engines can achieve further substantial improvements of t reir cha racte ristics th rough th e review of their general design. togeth er with a be tter understanding of the combustion process and fur ther developments o f the feeding sys tem (turbocompressors,

,~.

Tabl e 2

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN TANK ENGINES

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4 12 V 142 130 20,64 80&

4 4 4 8 V 12 V 12 V 142 13:5 146 130 152 146 16,47 26,U 29,34 Power (kW) 1100 895 677 Revolutions (rpm ) 2500 2500 2300 2400 Weight (k) 2300 1888 Volume (m3) 2,29 1,82 2,19 3,28 kW/I 39,l 66,8 34,3 23, 1 kW/k 0,48 0,47 kW/m3 350 605 408 2l0 MEP-Nmax (bar} 18,8 32 17,9 11 ,.5 MEP-max (bar) 19,8 12,7 Compression rati o 15 7,8 12 14,5 Cycle strokes

Cylinders Bore (mm) Stroke (mm} Capacity (1}

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4 4 2 12 V 12 V 12 \7 146 146 108 146 146 127 29,34 29,34 13,96 895 1100 671 2400 2400 2500 23 13 2029 3,61 2,41 1,611 30,5 37,5 48, 1 0,39 0,54 250 456 416 15,3 18,7 11 ,5 · 12,3 15,7 22+ 10 22 .. 10 17

4 12 V 170 17.5 47,6 1104 2600 2590 3,68 23,2 0,43 300 10,7 12,4 18

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12 V 8 V 140 l33,4 1.36 120,7 25,l 14,8 1104 735 3000 3200 1)60 1500 0,97 1,22 44J2 49,7 0>81 0,49 1138 602 17, 7 18,6 16

var.

• In development.

injectors and pumps ). To the same end. one must not overlook th e availabi lity of mo re modern technologies concerning tribol og ica l cond itions and th e improved fo undry and manufacturing processes, wh ich are deve loping very fast. NEW-CONCEPTION

ENGINES

The constant spur to p ro gress, th e competition factor, the incessant demands fo r more and more numerous and stric t specification s, have led to p roposals and stud ies on engines of di fferent concep tion, such as the rotary engine. the gas t urbine and, without leaving the trad itional field of the recipro cating engines. the "H yperbar" and the adiabatic " Turbocompound" . The technical co ncepts of these solut ion s are of cou rse more than sound. Nevertheless, to attain our goal, we must have at our d ispos al an adequate ideational and productive capabi lity as we ll as the capability to cond uct a well planned work of researc h for the verification and dimensioning of the parameters concerned and the corresponding avail able funds.

The rotary engine. The rotary engine belongs to the category of the interna l combustion, ro tary -expansion engines, rep roposed by Felix Wankel in 1957.

Among the holde rs of the re levan t patents. we wish to mention in part icu lar th e "Curtis Wright" firm, wh ich has been s tudying and experimen ting for sever al yea rs th is type of engi ne for milit ary use . It is currently develop ing various experimental specimens. They are machines, of vario us powers. ach ie,v ed through the co upling together of 2. 3 or 4 rotors. . The power of eac h elemen t. having a capacity of 5.8 I w ith 280 kW, c an be reckoned to increase up to 600 kW, owing to wh ich, with this datu m as a base, it cou ld be theoretically possible to go up, to 1200 kW for two roto rs, w ith an exceptionally high perfo rmance: 140 kW per litre of capa c ity. At present, only two units have been produced : a two -ro to r unit w ith 560 kw and a fou r-rotor unit w ith 1120 kW. The specific power of t hese two units. 48 kW/I, is certain ly rema rkab le but even more astonishing are their cha ra cteristics of compac tness (127 0 kW/m 3 ) and lightness (1.30 kW/ kg) The s tated pos itive prospects are: • ca pability to operate co rrect ly w ith very weak mi xtures, thanks to the adoption of a strati fied -charge system, with low specific cons umption, eq uivalent to the bes t reciprocating d iesels; • wide multifuel possibilities: reduced polluting emissions; • reduced vibrat ions; simplified coo ling systems;

1100 kW "AGT 1500" Lycoming Turbine

very limited we ight and volume: • reduced cost On th e other hand th is type of design p resents various p ractical an d constructive d ifficulties in order to attain the required degree of reliability. Namely, the fo llowing can be mentioned: • rotor materials: • resistance and durabi lity of the rotor rings, especially at the indicated specific power levels: • considerable tem pera ture unevenness in the unit: • excessively flat stator, that can prevent the fuel jet and the air charge from reach ing an optimal interaction: • very low torque at low engine speeds. This type o f engine has been experimented by many manufacturers. lately by Rolls- Royce in a 2-stage tworotor diesel , bu t never successfully. The only manufacturer currently on the market is the Japanese "Mazda", which has been able to profit by the Japanese substan tial progress in t~ field of ceramics. This has revived the atten tion on the ro tary eng ine. As a matter of fact. tests made with p rot otype s, stu dies and

comparisons made by and for NASA on light-ai rcraft eng ines have led to the conclusion trat the rotary engines, once they att ai nthe necessary improvements, can offer well -grounded promises for the next decade. In the compa rison with the currenttype rec iprocating diesel, the supporters of the rotary engine boast about the cost, the low noisiness, the mutifuel capabilities - scarce in the diesel, unless a variable ratio of compress ion is adopted - the faci lity of installation, besides the fuel economy. operating cost, volume and weight. Th e cu rre nt of the orthodox d iesel supporters maintains, on the other hand. tha t the fu ture belongs to the high feed-pressure d iesel with high-efficiency turbocompressors and electronic-con trol, high-pressure injection systems.

Gas turbines. After four decades of research and development. today the gas turbine for land propulsion comes fo rward in the field of high power as a -really competitive unit for military use. Suffice it to mention th e American Main Battle Tank MTI, equipped wi th the Avco Lycoming AGT 1500" tu rb ine, of 1100 kW, which compared with the most advanced diesel of the same power has positively proved itself more conforming to the desirable requi rements.

The quality leap made with the "AGT 1500" can be summed up by the following data: 0.91 kW/m 3 : these data, in order to be co mpared with the correspondent data of th e diesel. should be doubled, considering the absence of the cooling system. "A trump in the Army's hand" as it has been called by Caspar Weinberger, the American Secretary of Defence. The most outstanding characteristics of the gas turb ine are the fol lowing : • comparative mechanic simplicity, due to the fact that it consists of rotating components and that the loss due to function is low, wh ich means high mechanical efficiency and limited wear, i e. longer life; • absence of vibrat ions at all speeds; • practically unlimited power values wi thin very limited weights and volumes; • capability of generating a high torque, with the maximum values at the lowest speeds of the power shaft; • possibility to employ transmissio ns with a smaller number of gears and consequent diminished stress for the clutch: • due to the possibility to utilize a s impl ified power tra in: th e power delivered being equal, the turbine transmits to the tracks a percentage of power which is sometimes 20% higher than that of the diesel; • high braking power, as it is possible to use, besides the normal brakes, the

compressor as a braking element. by coupling it to the power shaft; , absence o f bulky, heavy and vulnerable cooling systems - fundamental on all other types of thermi c engi nes - which reach from 50 to 100% of the weight and volume of the engines; • noise limited to abou t 10-1 5% as compared with that of the diesel; • low level of polluting and smoky exhaust; low exhaust temperature (200+ 300 °C); • ready start at any temper ature; • immediate availability of the normal operational temperature for the crew and for all services . connected wi th engine and veh icle; , rela tively limited consump tion of lub ricating oil, equal to 1/50 of th econsumption of a corresponding diesel: • much longer intervals between comple te overhauls and generally reduced maintenance needs, i.e. longe r life; • opera tion w ith various types of fuel without appreciable influence on the power delibered: • total air consumption - considering the amount of air necessary for combustion and for cooling - eq uivalent to about half of that requ ired by diesel engines. As a conseq uence of th e lates t improvements, th e "AGT 1500 A" will benefit from a reduction in the fuel consumption of 10-15%, a more accurate control system and an upgraded airintake un it, thanks to the adop tion of a less-encumbe ring, self-cleaning filter, which will require less maintenance. Moreove r. by fitting the gearbox parallel to the drive axle and by mounting the power plant crosswise. a reduction of d imension of approximately 30% has been achieved, with all the ensuing adv antages. In addition to the "AGT 1500 A" we should also mention the Garret Corporation's "GT 601". experimented in the US but also tested by the French and German Military Technical Corps. This turbine, which supplies 470 kW extensible to 740, has roused interest because, unl ike other turbines, is not o f ae ronauti c derivation, but has been designed for exclusive employment in the mo tor-vehicle field , laying special stress on the necessity to solve, at least in part, some of the fol lowing problems, typical of the turbines: , high specific fuel consumption, owing to the necessary limitation of the cycle' s maximum temperature due to the currently available materials. In fac t, in order to effectively compete with the d iesel, the turbine should function with gas temperatu re of at least 1250+1350 °C at the entrance o f the rotor fi rs t staging, temperatures that can be ob tained only with the emp loyment of ceram ic components, which today are available only as labor atory specimens. Actually it can be mentioned that the last experimen ted turbines, manufactured by Garret and by Allison General Motors, currently being developed, wi th ro tors and fixed components made o f ceramic and fi rst staging entrance tempern tures of 1300 -a- 1370 °C, are cap able of obtain-

ing, according to what has been stated, a speci fi c consumption of 180 g/kW/r, constant from 20% to 100% of the delivered power. , rapid ity of acceleration, impossible to compare with the reciprocating engines save by keeping the gas generator at its maximum speed when the vehicle is not in motion, thus introducing, even if temporarily, an extra source of consumption: • presence o f large filters which make it difficult for the turbine to function immersed in water, with negative influences on the· vehicle's capability to ford deep waters. , manufacturing costs still too high because of the materials and technolog ies required, and because new produc tion lines must be organized, generally completely d ifferent from those set up for conven tional engines; • last, but not last. the problem concerning the stal'f at all levels, who must be expert. both in management and in prod uction / services. The turboengines' positive characterist ics, which greatly su rpass the negative ones, should lead to unwavering decisions in favour of gas turbines fo r the military requirements in th e field of high power engines. But, on the o ther hand, the diesel still has a remarkable potential for development, if one conside rs the opportunities offered by the cu rrent rapid technolog ical evolution in the supercharging, injec tion and elec tron ic control systems, in hightemperature materials, as weel as in d esigning and manufactu ring techniques; with further possibilities of development, thanks also to th e new techniques of thermal insulation for the combustion chamber which will probably make it profitable to use a turbine for tra nsforming in actual horsepower the energy "surplus" available in the exhaust gases (tu rbocompound ing).

Hyperbar. The supercharg ing sys tem called "Hyperbar" is the first that introduces us in the fami ly of compound engines: it has been rea lized in o rder to make th e eng ine always work under conditions of maximum - feed pressure in order to obtain high specific powers and a ready answer in t ransient conditio ns, while maintaining the mechanical and thermal loads within th e limits of conventional engines. The s ys tem, recentyl app lied in France on engines for military use, in Italy had already been patented in 1946. Today the French Government owns the application patents. As can be seen in the scheme on the facing page, the system consists in the adoption o f a direct conn ecting duct between the supercharger and the turbine - by-pass (1), with con,rol valve - of a supplemen tary burner upstream the turbine (2) and a valve tha t cuts out th e intercooler at the starting phase (5). Energy is supp lied to the turbin e by the exhaust gases of the engine and, in controllable proportions from practically O to 100%, by the

turner in which a small pilot light is kept constantly burning so as to ensure immediate ignition and, consequently, readiness of response. In this way the operation o f the turbocompressor is completely indepen dent of th e diesel's working conditions, since it can be controlled by ac ting on th e flow of fuel to the burner. In particular, one c an arrange for the compressor to work only in the maximum performance areas and have moreover high rates of supercharge in the engine's entire field of opera tion. High supercharging rates, also at the lowest speeds and loads, permit drastic reduction of the engine's volumetric compression ra tios (from 15 + 17 up to 8+10, withou t comp romi sing the starting capability and the regul arity of operation even at low tempera tures): hence the possibility to increase the fuel supply considerably, without reach ing the cycle's maximum p ressures, detriment al to the engine's structura l integrity. The "Hyperbar" system, compared with the normal turbo, achieves the following advantages: • increase of the specific horsepower; • widen ing of the engine's stable field of operation: • promp t response in transient conditions (one second from minimum to maximum speed at full load ): • possibility to influence the torque curve at low speeds. All this, of course, p resupposes. besides high-efficiency componen ts, a system for the adjustment of the by-pass and intercooler valves - and, above all, of the flow of the fuel to the burners c apable of implementing, swiftly and p re cisely, the most appropria te strate. g ies of control. What are the negative e ffects? • the most evident is th e increased fuel consumption over the entire field of opera tion, also when the b urner is not working (apa rt from the pilo t light). essen tially due to the consider able reduction of the compression ratio: • next comes the cost of the turbine and o f the con trol elements, which raise the engine's cost notably, although this should be cons idered, delivered powe r being equal, taking into account the reduction o f the cylinder capacity and therefore of th e overall dimensions of the unit. The "Hyperbar" has been adopted and is being developed on the Poyaud "VBX 1500". It has increased the P.nQinP.'!': P.ffi~iP.n~y tn 67 kW [)P.r litrP., ie a power of 1100 kW on a capacity of only 16.47 I. There fore, ii has been possible to rea lize a unit with high HP values per unit of weight or volume (0.48 kW/kg and 610 kW/m3 ) . The " Hyperbar" sys tem can be seen as another approach in view of enhancing, without noticeable design interventions, the basic Diesel engine's capabi lilies.

The turbocompound engine. As we have seen. at the presen t stage of development each type of

lntercooler

\I I

Compressor

Turbine

Functional scheme of a "Hyperbar" engine.

engine has. bes ides characteristic deficienc ies that can be o ffset in part with appropriate interventions. global performances not yet satis factory and such that researchers are led to concentra te their efforts on the high percentage of power wasted during the thermodynamic process - about 65% of the total, 35% of which in the exhaust and 30% in t he cooling system. The observation of the work ing cyc les of the various engines, Otto, Diesel, Brayton. Rankine, Stirling, etc.. evidences that each engine excels the others in at least one characteristic. but all face the same problem: none of them is capable of exploiting - or CAn do so only in a limited way - the energy source that is suppl ied to th em for producing mechanical power. We are then led to ask if it could not be possible to obtain the matching of cycles having apposite bu t complementary characteristics For example, the Diesel and the Brayton cycles are complementary. The first for its high working temperature and pressures, the second for the possibility of extreme expansion. Among the engines cur rently in use. the diesel is the one tha t has the highest - albeit relative - effi c iency. As regards the turbine - in the instance of a land-drive machine, of compara -

tively limited power - due especially to the containment of the cycle's temperature obtainable at presen t, the thermal efficiency cannot be compared to that of the best highly turbocharged diesels. In order to be able to reach , in these terms. values of efficiency as high as possible. one is logically induced to try to couple the two machines. in order the first part of the cycle to be developed in the cylinders (high temperature) and the second in the turbine (wide expansion), so that they be used in the best prac tical condi tions. Thus the less than excellent actual ef fi ciency of the turbine becomes more acceptable by recovering, as we said, exhaust energy that otherwise would go irremediably wasted . In short, we seem to have a higherefficiency operating cycle due to the prolonged expansion. wh ich is bigger than that o f the conventional engines. This is how the concept expressed by the "turbocompound" denomination has been born. In fact the turbocom pressor is not only a boosting element of the engine, but can also pour on the driving shaft the portion of power, delivered by the exhaust gas exceeding that required by the compressor. This entails coupling the turbocompresso r with the engine. One can thus roughly envisage that the reciprocating engine performs the function of a combustor which, thanks to th e pistons and the crank gear, transforms the highest part of the cycle's enthalpy, which occurs at a temperature un-

acceptable to the turbine, and commits to the turbine the transformation of the lower part, thus accomplishing the compound cycle. The mechanical coupling between the engine and the turbo can be of the infinite-gear type (see d iagrams at right) ; the latter solution, more complicated, has the merit of maintaining the comp ressor precisely at the desired speed. independently of th e engine's rotations and the power supplied by th e low-spe ed exhaust gases. Thus the efficiency, power and torque of the unit are considerably increased with a resu lting prompt acceleration phase. The unit that best demonstrates thi s concept is the Napier Nomad 2-stroke Diesel engine (p. 54). having a maximum specific power of 72 kW/I and specific consumption of 200 g/kW/h. i.e. a therma l efficiency of 42% with a mass of 0.5 kg per kW. Despite its absolutely exceptinn;:il characteristics, this engine had no commercial development because, having been conceived for aviation, it was surpassed, as regards general characteristics. by the turbine. which is more congen ial to the aircraft. In the case of land propulsion employment, the main qualities of these solutions are very attractive and, moreover, the turbocompressor can act not only as generator of active energy but also of passive power. because the amount of braking power of the volumetric engine, due to the compressor's mechanical dragging, is increased by a notable percentage.

In short, it is a matter of using a second engine, in series to the first, also driven by the energy contained in the exhaust gases of the reciprocat ing engine. For a better utilization of this energy, one can also envisage to couple the engine with a two-shaft turbine, instead of a single shaft one, connecting, in this instance, the rotor of the first stage, with the compressor. and the rotor or the second stag e with the drive shaft. The result is a more flexible unit. always exerting, in whatever condition a positive action. or a negative action (brak ing) if one equips the free turbine stator with reversing vanes or with a controlled connection o f the compressor w ith the drive shaft. The scheme (facing page, top), shows the setup of the latter possibility. It consists of: â€˘ compressor; â€˘ 1st stage turbine; free tu rbine mechanically connected with the sha ft of the vo lumetric engine. The addition of a burner could moreover transform the two -shaft turbo into a second engine in series to the fi rst. The se tup of the various comple te elemen ts appears as follows (facing page, bottom) : 1) compressor; 2) 1st stage turbine: 3) 2nd stage free turbine: 4) valves switching the gas f low to the engine, to the engine plus turbines. to the turbines: 5) combustor; 6) coupling clutch of the 2nd stage ro tor with the drive shaft; 7) intercooler. The movement of the valve (4) permits to convey, totally or in part. the air generated by th e comp ressor to the manifold feeding the cylinders or to the combus tor. This setup permits to obtain the following positions. Starting position.

The turbocharger functions independently; the air of the compressor is conveyed to the combustor. to the lst-stage turbine and to the 2nd-stage turbine. In this wa y one can obtain powe r and torque sufficient to set the recip rocating engine in motion. By partially or comp letely bypassing the intercooler, the engine can be fed with hot air also in extremely low environmental temperatures. Normal working position at minimal specific consumption.

Wh en th e combustor is switched off. the exhaust gases teed the lststage turbine and hence the 2nd-stage one The power generated by the energy contained in the exhaust gases, minus what is used by the compressor, will be conveyed drectily to the drive shaft. Position of maximum power.

The energy supplied by the volumetric engine work ing at fu ll speed

is incremented by that suppli ed by the combustor. The, power on th e drive shaft is the resultant of the delivery o f the two engines - volumetric and turbine - mechanically coupled so as to make them work in parallel. This scheme, with possible secondary variants. is all that can be imagined to increment the delivered power and maximize the engine's efficiency, optimizing the coupling between the volumetric machine (diesel engine) and the flu id dynamic machines (compressor and turbine). This, in fact.

From top. Functional scheme of a lurbocompound engine (engine-turbine coupling of the fixed type). Functional scheme of a turbocompound engine (engine-turbine coupling of the infinite-gear type). Napier Nomad turbocompound aircraft engine.

adds to the advantages of the compound turbine (in terms of exploitation of the energy contained in the exhaust gases. therefore of specific consumption) those of drastic power increases with simultaneous reduction of the engine's response, times, typical pf the "Hyperbar" system. Nevertheless it also combines the mechanical architectural and control complexities of both systems with counterbalances in reliability, dimensions adn costs. At the present level of technology, if the "Hyperbar" system can be a short cut towards the attainment of extremely high power densities (as in the Poyaud engine) th e turbocompound ing technique does not seem, as yet. a close- at hand solution for military employment, owing to the fact that the complexity/benefits ratio is still unfavourable. As a matter of tact, the best results obtained so far consist in power increases of 10-12%. with equal consumption, in a limited area around maximum-power conditions, which decline anyway at lower speeds and loads. If on the one hand the "turbocompound" solution is not yet reliable enough when it is a matter of obtaining determinant increases of the engine's power, on the other it will perhaps become interesting when the engine will reach such degrees of "adiabatization" as to make available sizable increments in the energy contained in the exhaust gases.

Turbocompressor

Free turbine

coupling damping)

The adiabatic engine. In order to better understand the considerations that follow, it seems appropriate to start with a brief terminological introduction. In thermodynamics, the term "adiabatic" de.fi nes an engine where the walls in contact with the gases that go th roug h the cycle can neither absorb nor yield heat; i.e.. they should be able to assume moment by moment and point by point the gas temperatures (i.e. be devoid of thermal capacity and perfectly insulated from the exterior). The "adiabatic" engine, in the thermo-dynamic sense, would permit a remarkable increase of the engine's internal efficiency with sizeable advantages as regards consumption. The practical realization of such an engine is nevertheless impossible to conceive. What is commonly understood with the term "adiabatic engine" is something close to tt1e <,;u11ceÂľl of "completely insulated engine", where there is no rejection of heat towards the exterior, but the walls in contact with the gases. because of their thermal capacity, assume the cycle's mean temperature, absorbing heat in the "hot" phases and yielding it in the "cold" ones. Th e advent of new materials, which combine good insulating qualities and high resistance to thermic loads, and the promising developmen ts under way, which aim at making the mechanical qualities compatible with engine applications let us fo resee the rea lizatio n of a "completely insulated engine".

0 In this case the advantages as regards the internal efficiency are scarce and very inferior to what is expected of the ideal "adiabatic engine"; moreover there are d isadvan tages in the engine's volumetric efficiency. Vis-a-vis the traditional engine, the advantages remain nevertheless important. The thermic energy contained in the exhaust gases increases considerably and, up to a certain degree of insulation, can be profitably employed in the turbineÂˇ of the compressor, in order to obtain higher boosting p ressu -

From top, Functional scheme of a two-shaft turbine turbocompound engine. Functional scheme of a two-shaft turbine, independent-combustor turbocompound engine.

res with lower exhaust back -pressures, with th e ensuing advantages espec ially as regards consump ti on ; at higher degrees of insulation, with the appl ication of a compound turbine down s tream th e comp ressor turbine it is possible to obtain sensible increases in power. A fu rther advan tage is the comp lete elimination (or reduct ion) of th e costly, heavy. cumbersome an dvulnerable systems currently adopted for cool ing, i.e. radiators, fans, water pumps and related transm issions, pipes and jo in ts. From a structural point o f view. the possibility to technical ly insulate, even if only partially, the wa lls com ing into contaca w ith the hot gases, can produce substantial benefits. for it can reduce the strain in the underlying structures, caused by high and uneven thermal fluxes. The basis idea of th e adiaba tic engine (in the sense of " completely insulated"), as we have alre ady said. can today become a real ity especially thanks to the technological advances made in the field o f ce ramics, partic ularly as concerns tenacity and expansion coeffi c ien t (approaching that of metals). besides the already we ll kn own resistance to hig h tem peratures The work of technological research. wh ich s tarted more th an a decad e ago especial ly in th e United States. Japan, Great Britai n and Germany, with hefty government con tribu tio ns, proceeds with results that are encouraging, albeit not yet comp letely resolu tive. An example of this activity c an be seen in the diagram above, wh ich shows the work under way at Cummins, in a governm en t-financed programme for the "adiabatiza tion" of a 4-stroke d iesel engine.

PROSPECTIVE EVOLUTION OF TANK ENGINES The fu ndamental c harac teris ti cs of th e engines for the future battle tanks (late '90s). such as they have been outlined w ithin NATO. can be s ummed up as follows: power: 1100 kW; • engine vo lume: 1 m 3 ; • power-pack volume: 4.5 m:; {engine + tra nsmission + air fil ters + cooling system). They will have to show: high efficiency; limited operati onal expenses; moderate technical development risk (1). Th e turbine engine and the diesel e ngine stand out'. with different p roblems, as the main competitors fo r th si employmen t. For the turbine engine, wh ich potentially presen ts the bes t characteristic {lig htness, compactness, very hig h specific power, etc ). to become the engine of the future there wi ll have to be industrial-scale developments in the manufacturing technologies of th e ceramic co mponents w hich, hitherto o nly at laborato ry level, have made possible for the cy cl e to reach maximum

"ADIABATIZATION" PROGRAMME. CUMMINS TACOM ENGINE

1 · Cylinder Liner with Ceram ic Lining 2 · Inta ke Port with Ceramic Lining 3 - Intake Manifold w ith Ceramic Lin ing 4 . Va lve Guide Ceramic 5 - Exh,n,st Manifold with CeFamic Lining

temp eratures o f 1300 ''C. nece.s sary to attain consumption standards simil ar lo the diesel's. The p robl em's d ifficulties, mostly connected w ith the indispensabl e strict requ irements of reliability, indicate th at its d iffusi on can be deemed possible only in the long term. For the diesel en gi ne the problem is essentially that o f subs tan tially increasing the specific power (up to rates sensibly higher than 55 k\11/ / 1) without affecting its reli ability and limited consump tion. We have seen how levels of speci fi c power verg ing on the 50 kW/ I have almost been re ached by the most recent h igh-power, superc harged d iesels, wh ile wi th the adoptio n of non-conventi o nal supercharge systems (see " Hyperbar") the limit of 55 kW / I has already been amply surpassed. As far as the dimension requ isites are concerned, most of th e presen t eno ines ,ire i:: ti ll rn thAr f;:ir Imm thA goal of over 1100 kW/m'1• wh ich nevertheless is already with in reach o f the engines at development s tage. As for the 2-stroke or 4-s troke type engines, it can be noticed that, at p resent, they have equiva lent dimens ions and weight q ualities. The various man ufac turing fi rms are carrying on th eir progr ammes of development on eng ines typical of the ir traditiona l production, i.e. 4-stroke engines fo r all of them excep t General Motors. Prospectively, the rapid techno logical evolution in the field of the hig hly-supercharged diesel engine, spurred on moreover by fierce competi-

6 7 8 9

· · ·

Exhaust Port with Ceramic Lining Head Plate Ceram ic Va lve w ith Ceramic Face Piston with Ceramic Cap

l ion in the civi lian field. confirms th at the re is good ground fo r tru stin g the diesel's possibilities to rem ain the power unit of battle tanks also in the medium term , and to keep, in th e longer term, a competitive position vi s-a-vis the turbine engine. In particu lar. the recent develop ments in th e area of the technologies involving the highly superch arged 4-s troke d iesel: • highly effi cie nt supercharge sy stems in the tield of high-ratio comp ressions. supercharge control systems (variabl e geome try , sequential t urbocharg ing, "Hyperbar" ); • electronic -contro l, high-pressure injection system s; • materials and manu facturing technolog ies capable of ensuring high therm alstructura l resistance (monolithic cera mics and/or coating, surface treatment. fo undry technolog ies ... ) and the associa ted CAE techniques of design and experimentation; • therm al-stru ctural design assisted by tridimensional-calcula tion models; • more sopristica ted experim entation techniq ues fo r researc h on com bus tion and the local analysis of the engine's

(1 J The concept of "technical de velopment risk" has been explicitly introduced in order to ensure the availability of demonstrative prototypes by 1995 and definitive prototypes by the year 2000 for the future battle tank (Main Baille Tank 2000).

thermal-structural performance; indicate as possible, in the medium term, a ra pi d escalation, in terms o f power density, much beyond the level of 55 kW/ I Further increments will possibly be obtained with the al(ea dy tes ted " Hyperb ar" syste m and, when significa nt degrees of therma l insulation are reached through the adoption of t he tu rbocompounding techn ique, there wi ll also be simultaneous advantages in term s of consu mp tion. Finally, a substantial reduction in the amount of heat eliminated throug h the coo li ng system and an ensuing reduction of the tota l vo lume o f th e

power-pack (values of as much as 4.5 m 3} is tec hnica lly feas ible through the employmen t of: • more sophisticated techn iques fo r re moving heat from the s tructure's c riti ca l points; • technologies for thermal insulation of the com bustion chamber, based o n the employment of advanced mate rials and ceramic coatings. The research activi ty in the p ri ncipal cou ntries and ma jor industrial groups in the fie ld o f the engines for the battle tanks of the near f uture is actu ally developin g in the abovemen tioned directi ons.

In Italy, the FIAT Research Cent re, · thanks to the considerable experience acquired in the development of diesel engines for automobiles and t rucks, is folowing those lines within the pro gramme fo r the rea lizat ion of an Italian power unit for the ba ttle ta nk of th e near future (Main Battl e Tank 2000) . The Ministry of Defence effectively participates in this programme through appropriate agreements with the lvecoFiat-Oto Melara consortium, wh ich is charged wi th the developmen t of the 2nd generation tank. Giovanni Savonuzzi Giuseppe Palmarini

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Toyoki Ishii, Ken ji Fu jim ura and others: "Experimental Work o f High Speed and Highly Supercharged TwoCycle Diesel Engine fo r Combat Ve hicle" . • H. Dean Wilsted: "Preliminary Survey of Possible Use of the Compo und Ad iabatic Diesel Engine fo r Heli copters " . • J , V. Edwards: "Ceram ics and the Swing Beam 2 Stroke Diesel for the Au tomo tive Engine", • L. D. Fox, J. W. Black and others : "Upra te of Cummins V-903 Diesel Engine to 1000 bhp for Military App lication". •Berton Schechter: "An Investiga tion of Enhanced Thermal Barrier Coa ting Sys tems for Diesel Engine Components". • R. Kamo, W. Bryzik: "Cummins/TACOM Advanced Ad iaba tic Engine". • Ray Sekar, Roy Ka mo: "Advanced Automot ive Diesel Assessment Program" . • Franco Pinolini, Giovanni Biaggini: "The Development of a High Performance Diesel Engine Family for Special App lica ti ons". • Rob Wilson: " TACOM 's Aips: Pro pulsion for the Year 2000" , Diesel Progress Nor th Ame rican. Oct. 1984 • G. Bolognesi Note on the Symposium: "Vehicle Propuls ion Systems of the Future", American Defence Preparedness Association, 20-21 -22 March '1984. Indianapo lis • F. J. Wallace and others: " Thermally Insulated Diesel Engines", Proceeding IME, vol 198A, no. 5. • "Advances in Ad iabatic Engines". • Toshio Yoshimitsu and others: "Capabili ties of Heat Insulated Diesel Engines"

Dr G iovanni St1v<)m1ZL, sraneo ri :s a.-.:.t 1v11;, in 1940 with FIAT's Department o f /lirc ra f1 Eng,nc Experimentation He has been technical manager o f various compan ies. des1gne( o f the wo rld · reco rd Lesco marine engine: Chief Engi neer J\v tcmotive Research and Gas Turbit1e R & 0 . w i th the Chris ler Corp . in the Uniled Sw tes (from 1957 to 1969): man;,ger o f technotog,cal researc h w i th FIAT and full pro fessor of " Engines" at the speciali za tio n co urse on motor iza tion or Turin' s Polyt ech nic (from 196fi to 1976). Al present Or . Savonuzz i is c on sul tun t w i th companies of the FIAT g ro up and m ember ol FIAT Scienti fic Resea rch Comm1Uee .

Co Io ne 1 Giuseppe Palm arin 1. 1 cchn1ca I Corps. tio lds a Univ ers i ty degree in Physics He has attended the M1li1ary Acad emy. the Application School and u, e M otoriza1Ion Advanced Technica l Course Col. Pa lmarini has carried out his activity as o ft:cer of the Techn ica l Corps most ty at the Motor iza l ion Techn ical Centre. whe re he has been c I11ef of the Eng ine Test and Experimentation Sec tio n. and t eacher of Engine Theory at the Mot orization Adva nced Techn ic al Courses. Membe r of v;,rious nationa l and internat io na l work groups on fuels, lubricants and mo tors. Col. Pa lmarini is in the lis t o f experts and resea rchers of the Ministry of Defence and is curren tly Direc tor of the Motori2a1ion Techn ica l Ce ntre

THE TANKS ~f. IHE NINETIES WHAT PftOfELLERS f 57

It happens sometimes that a little group, small if compared to the whole system, succeeds in influencing the work of a large organization. It occurred in England in the '.50s, when the strike of the newspaper electricians paralyzed by itself the entire sector and interrupted the publication of the dailies tor forty days. In other circumstances and with entirely different ends, something mented on them. Having said this, there should be no doubt of the kind happened in 1944that the remembrance of these 1945 at the hand of the Italian units on "Rivista Militare" must pack-mule units during the last not be considered a colour year of the Italian Campaign. piece but rather a way of making No doubt the Allies would have readers understand why these won the war in any case; one units, called simply "Salmerie" may ask, nevertheless, how (Pack-Mule Units) until the::.end much heavier, in terms of time of September 1943, at the end and human lives, the cost of victory would have been for the of 1944, following a decision of United States and Great Britain if the XV Army Group had lacked the contribution of the Italian pack-mule units. Because it was the men of those units, with their mules and their stubborn determination, who, in that month of May 1944, helped to make the operations for the battle of Rome more swift, and in the following autumn helped to overcome, on the Tuscan-Emilian Apennines, the difficulties caused by the rough ground, the lack of practicable mountain roads and the protracted, exceptionafly bad weather conditions, thus creating the preconditions for the successful outcome of the Âˇ final battle in the following spring. For this reason it seems not only appropriate but also dutiful, to point out what the Allies' needs were at that time and with what tenacity the pack-mule units operated to meet them, how the Allied Commands at all levels evaluated their work and how the press of the time com-

the War Ministry and with the concurrence of the XV Army Group Hq. were named "Salmerie da Combattimento" (Pack -Mule Combat Units). We want to establish, moreover, once and tor all, that the tasks carried out by these units cannot, and must not, un;ustfy and unappropriately be defined "second-rate functions" (1) .

Right.

The edelweiss, symbol of the Mule- Train Units. Top. Heading of the "Pack-Mule Page" of the 210th Division magazine.

PACK-MULE UNITS: WHY?

Italian f ront in 1915-1918 was nothing compared with that on If, on the one hand, the the Apennines, during the Italian existence of the Italian pack-mule campaign 1943-1 945. These are units is still ignored by many at the reasons which, already in the present time, on the other, 1943, compelled the XV Army even among those who know Group to solve the serious proabout them , one happens to blem of sending supplies to the hear the question: "Why all these frontline - a problem determined mu les in the Ita lian Campaign, by the difficulty of movement in a period when mechanization by organizing special kinds of and motorization were already mountain transport which could be done only by mules. at a very advanced stage, especially in the Allied armies?". The The Allies actually had their answer in simple: there has own mule trains, but they were always been. ,rnrl there is today, insufficient and inadeq uately an inclination to understimate trained for the hardships of the the Ita lian Apennine reg ion, its Apennine environment. On the ruggedness and the scarce prac- other hand, already at the ouset ticability of its roads by wheeled of t he operations on the Gariand tracked vehicles. According gliano it became clear that in the to an American book (2): "By operations planned for reaching soldiers of great experience it the Po Valley many units of this has been said that the difficulties type would be necessary: faced by George Washington's thousands of men, thousands of army at Valley Forge cannot be mules. Units which the XV Army compared to those met by the Group could not easily improvise, Allied Divisions on the mountains on its own and in the amount of Italy"; and further on : "if it required, also considering the was difficult to carry the supplies large number of men that would up there, it was also difficu lt to be necessary at that precise bring back the wounded". More- and delicate moment when the over, not only the Italian but Allies intended - and had the also the Allied officers who had interest - to spare as much already gone through WWI, in personnel as possible in view of more than one occasion said that the operations in Normandy. The the mud in France and on the ensuing solution, which the

Anglo-Americans were compelled to choose between the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, was that of entrusting the constitution of these units to the Ita lian Army which, instead of participating in the Campaig n of Liberation prevailingly with operational Major Units, as Marshal Badoglio desired and had repeatedly requested and proposed, would have to supply mostly logistic Major Un its (3). in some of which (4) the presence of pack-mules would be, according to the Allies' demands, particularly substantial. And so it was. For the Anglo-Americans this solution was in line with the Quebec Memorandum (5), while for Italy, in a moment when her future seemed so uncertain, it represented a hope of obtaining from the "victors". at the end of the conflict. better armistice conditions through a mitigation of the harsh and heavy clauses of the peace treaty.

Medal of the 20th Mule-Train Group, designed by Sergio Vatteroni, a sculptor serving with the 210th Infantry Division as artillery captain.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITS

The Allied Commands. already in Oct ober 1943, ask the Italian Central Auth@rlties for an ever increasing number o f pack-mu le units: the f irst req uest is made by the British 8th Army on October 5, 1943 (6): the establi shment of the unit is ca rri ed out by the LI Corps within the "Legnano" Division. on October 18 (7). The next request follows within a few days: the co nstitution of the 2nd pack-mu le unit, also ordered by the LI Corps, occurs on October 25th. withi n the "Piceno" Division (8) . And then othe rs follow: by the end of December 1943, by order to the General Staff of the Regio Esercito. another five units are set up which, un like the first two, are establis h-

ed in Sardinia. On November 27, 1943, t he LI Corps, owing to the increasing num ber o f packmule units and the need to train the personnel assigne_ d to them , orders th e const ituti on o f a "T raining tea m" on mu le employment for the 5th Army" (1 Officer, 12 Alpini , 12 mules) (9) . At the beginn ing of 1944 the units attached to the 8th Army are assembled in t he 1st M ule-Train Group, th ose attached to the 5th Army form the 2nd Group (10). and Col. Euge nio Berni Cana ni, a Cavalry o ffice r, is appoin ted lspector of the M ul e-Trai n Units. and charged w ith supervising all the Italian Pack-Mu le units attach ed to the 5th and 8th Army (11). At the end of the Italian Campaign (April 1945) the "salmerie" units reached the number of 31, with a total of

14,500 men and 11 ,500 mules (12). They w ere div ided between the 20th Com bat Pack- Mule Group (13) organ ized within the 210th Division and tasked to cooperate with t he US Divisions of the 5th Army, t he 21 s t Combat PackMule un it (14) organized w ith in the 231st Division, which had to cooperate with the British units o f the 5th Army, and two more combat Pack -M ule un its . the 252th and 253th (15) , which, alternatively subordinate for different periods to the 209th anrl 228th Auxi liary Div isions, had the task to cooperate with the British 8th Army. The 20th Co mbat Mule-Tra in Group (Table 1) at the end of t he campaign represen ted almost one th ird of the forces of the 210th Division and consisted of about 6500 men and more than 4500 mu les. The group was

20TH "RAGGRUPPAMENTO" COMBAT MULE-TRAIN UNITS (Early April 1945) LOCATION

"Raggruppamento" Hq

COMMANDERS

ATTACHED TO (1)

Serra di Casale (Casti g lione dei Pepo li)

Table 1

Cav Col. Eugenio Berni Canani Ca v Lt. Col. Alberto Moro Arty Capt. (res.) Corrad o Galli Cav. Capt Pierluigi Cavalli lnl. Capt. (res.) Pfero G1llard1

Hq 1st Bn. 5th Unit "Montecassino" 10th Unit "Va)dic.n" 17th Unit " Monte Belvedere''

Pracch1a !Pistoia) Cappellelle Pi-nv1sa Poggetta

10th Mountain Div. IV Corps '10th Mountain Div

Hq 2nd Bn 2nd Unit "Piemonte" 13nd Unit "Montecuccoli" 21st Unit

Creda ( Bologna) Pian di Monterio Pian d1 Serio S.B.V. di Sambro

1st Armd . Div. 1st Armd Div. 5th Army

Cav. Mai. Renato Bruttini Cav. Capt. Amedeo Chi arazzo lnt. Cap. Raffaele Forasassi Cav. Cap. (res-l Achille Pannocchieschi D'Elci

Hq 3rd Bn. 1st Unit "Gennargentu" 9th Unil "Lancieri di .Novara" 16th Unit " Sassoleone"

Piamaggi o (Bologn a) Le Pozze Piamaggio Castel d',Alpi

II Corps II Corps II Corps

Arty Capt. Nicola Simone

Hq 4th Bn.

Porre tt a Terme (Bo logna in movimento Gaggiomontano Vid iclallCO

12th Unit "Mon te Ba ttaglia" 18th Unit 20th Unit Hq 5th Bn.

11 th Un it "lancieri di Firen ze "

15th Un 1t "Monterumici" 19th Uni\

Mu11yl1icloro (Borogna) Le Fratle Aua lla Lognola

Mule Infirmaries 11 0 th 730th 211th 212th

La Selva Cafaggio lo Zon a Abetina Pontepetn

1st M ule-Tratn Tn g, Battalion (2)

Cfgnaho

Ca v. Maj. (res.) Giuseppe Turrin i lnl. Cap!

(res.) Augusto Sanson

Cav. Capt. David Miscia telli 92nd lnf. Div 1st Brazilian Div 1st Brazilian Div.

lnf. (Bersaglieri) Ma jor M arcogallo Guerrini Art y Capt. Corrado Me rcu ri al i lnf Capt. (res) Fedele i3alestrieri /\rly Capt. (ras.) Gina C.:ipnr::ili

34th lnf. Div. 34th lnf Div 34th In{ D1v.

lnf. (Alpini) M aj. (res.) lginio De Cao Cav. Capt. (res.) Umberto Palagi Cav. Lt. (res. ) Filippo Avenali Cav. Lt. Marcello Borselli M aj. (vet.) Antonio De Lucia Capt. (vet.) Alberto Maurich i Capt. (vet.} Antonio Vecchione Capt. (vet.) Geraldo Palma

(7) All are U.S. Ma jor Units, with the exception o f lhe Braz il ian Division. (2) Former "Centro Addestramento Salmerie " (C.A.S,); ii was a unit of th e 525th lnf. Regt. "Addestram ento".

21ST COMBAT MULE-TRAIN GROUP

Table 2

DATE Year

ITALIAN SU BORD INATION

Month

1944

March

1944

Ap r il

1944 1944 1944

July

ALLIED SUBORDINATION

210th lnf. Div. (aux.)

4th Indian Div.

3rd - 4th - 7th - 14th

210th lnf. Div. (aux.)

78th British Div. . 8th Army

May

3rd - 4t h - 7th - 14th

I. FA HO (4)

5th and 8th Army ·

June

3rd - 4th • 7th - 14th

Italian Liberation Corps (C.I.L)

5th an d 8th Army

3rd - 4th - 7th - 14th

Italian Liber ation Corps (C.1. L.)

8th Army

8rrl - 4th - 7th . 14th

Italian Liberation Corps (C.I.L.)

8th Army

1944

August

1944

September 3rd - 4th - 7th - 14th

1944

October

3rd - 4th - 7th - 14th

1944

November

Italian libera tion Corps (C.I. L.)

8th Aqn y

21 0th lnf.

XIII Br itish Corps

3rd - 4th - 7th . 14th - 250th - 786th (2)

210th lnf.

XIII British Corps XIII Br itish Cor ps

250th (2) (3)

1944

December

3rd - 4th - 7th . 14th - 250th - 786th (2)

231st Div.

1945

January

3rd - 4th - 7th . 14th . 250th - 786th

231st Div.

XIII British Corps

1945

February

3rd - 4th - 7th . 14th - 250th - 786th

231st D iv. (aux. )

XIII Br itis h Corps

1945

March

3rd - 4th · 7th . 14th . 250th - 786th

231 s t Div. (aux.)

Br itish Inc rement 5th Army (5)

1945

Apri l

3rd - 4th - 7th . 14th . 250th - 786th

231st D iv. (aux.)

British Increme nt 5th Army {5)

1945

May

3rd - 4th - 7th . 14th . 250th

231st Div. (aux.J

Br i tis h Incremen t 5th A rmy (5)

(1) The 14th Unit. th e only one with a name. was the "Cavalleggeri Guide" Battalion. (2) In this month the Group included also the 1 st F Troop. (3) In this mon th the Gro up included also the 479th Mountain Ar ti llery Battery (4) Italian Forces Admin istra tive Headquarters. later (September 1, 1944) Headquarters 228th D ivision (Aux). (5) British nuc leus in the Headquarters of the U.S. 5th Army, w hich con tro ll ed all t he British units in the 5th A rmy .

commanded by Col. Eugenio Berni Canani, a Cavalry officer. Cavalry off icers were also the Deputy Commander, Maj. Enrico Cadeddu and 70% of the Commanders of 5 battalions and 15 units, some of which bore the name of old regiments, such as "Lancieri di Firenze" and "Lancieri di Novara". Their constitution went through three distinct phases. In the first phase, corresponding to the winter 19431944, the first six units were establist1eu (16), albeit with some difficulties. By participating in May in the operations on the "Gustav" line, these units gave their imprint and formed the · tradition of the unit that was to becom:; the Mule-Train Group. The fact that they had been immediately given a name certainly contributed to the creation of the unit's spirit. The 1st. 2nd and 3rd were called respectively "Gennargentu" , 62

" Piemonte", "Valdieri"; the names were derived from the places and regions of origin of most of the men of the initial groups The 4th was called "Montecassino", first area of its front-line employment. The name of the 5th and 6th was "Lancieri di Firenze" and "Lancieri di. Novara", which were their previous units. Four more units (17) were created, again with some difficulties, during t he second phase, which coincides with t he summer of 1944. They were given the name of a locality where a military action had taken place. The 13th was called "Montecuccoli", after the site of the f irst battles on the "Gothic" line; the 15th "Monterumici" , the name of one of the northernmost points, less than 20 km from Bologna, in the 5th Army's advance; the 16th "Sassoleone", after a place where the Santerno river flows into the plain, as a

memento of an epic day for this unit; the 12th was named "Monte Battaglia" after a height on the eastern border of the Army sector, on the watershed between the Santerno and the Senio. At that point, the 20th Mule-Train Group, which then assembled as many as ten units, was transformed (Dec. 1944) into a "Raggruppamento", in acknowledgement of its large size, and, at the same time, was given the titl e of "combat" unit. In the third phase five more units were set up , at the beginning of 1945, in order to lighten the task of the ten existing units, which had been enduring a lot of hardships. The constitution of these units took place in conditions much more favourable than it was the case for the preceding ones, just in time to take part in the final battle. They were distinguished only by a number (17th, 18th, 19th,

20th. 21th). apart from the 17th which took the name of "Monte Belvedere" , after a place north of Lizzano (Perretta) c onquered by the US 10th Mountain Division, to which the unit was attached. At the same time. in order to ease the task of the Group Headquarters which, with 15 units, had become excessively heavy, it was decided to prepare and constitute five Mule-Train Âˇ Battalion Headq ua rters, assigning three units to each one. We must mention moreover the four mule infirmaries (110th, 130th, 211th, 21 2th) set up gradually since the beginning of 1944 as a consequence of the progressive increase of the pack-mule un its. as well as the 11th "Pack-Mule" Tra ining Battalion" (18). The 21st Combat Mule-Train Group (Table 2) in April 1945 had a total strength of about 2,900 men and 2,000 mules. The

Group's Commander was Major Ugo Barbato, another Cavalry officer. The first units established were the 3rd , the 7th and the 14th, which in March 1944 formed the initial core of the group. The following April the group was joined by the 4th unit, in October by the 250th and in November by the 786th. These un its, unlike those of the 20th "Ragg ruppamento", as far as we know were distinguished only by a number. apart from the 14th. which Kept its original name of "Gruppo Cavalleggeri Guide", with Cavalry Capt. Mario lmperiali d'Afflitto as Commander. In the period October-December 1944 the 21st Group included also the "F" troop (19) and in October the 479th mountain battery (20). The 252nd and 253rd Combat Mule-Train Group, constituted respectively at Fossombrone on January 2, 1945 and at Orvieto

Cavalry Colonel Eugenio Berni Canani (hands on hips), Commander of the 20th "Raggruppamento" Mule-Train Units: on his right {wearing boots) Col. Giovanni Riario Sforza, Commander of Nis Ma;es1y's Carabinieri Guards, and Col. Antonio Scaramuzza De Marco, It alian Liaison Officer with the 5th Army Hq. On Col. Berni Canani's left is Col. Balzani, Commander of the 525th Infantry Regiment.

on February 17, 1945 with in the 209th Auxiliary Division , included five units each. Afterwards. on March 12. the 252nd Group was moved to Faenza, as part of the 228th Auxiliary Division. still within the orbit of the British 8th Army. SUBORDINATION

For the pack-mule un its the subordination aspect assumed 63

a noticeable importa nce. An importance which. contrary to what one may think, must not be ascribed to the more or less frequent changes of dependence (none for the units of the 20th Group, which remained always with the 210th Group and the US 5th Army: of scarce importance for the 252th and 253rd Group. which made alternate transitions between the 209th and 228th Division and remained always attached to the British 8th Army; very frequent for the 21st Group) but rather to the type of dependence. As regards the reflections on the administration of men. equipment and mules. on the action of command and on the respons ibility of the Commanders. on the management of the staff and on the operational employment, it was of decisive importance for the un its to belong to the US ITI category, or the BR ITI category (22). In the units of t he first category, life was undoubtedly easier. The Americans. in fact, allowed a lot of freedom to the Commanders at all levels even after the constitution of the Technical

Supervision Regiment (23). while the British, through the British Liaison Units (which were called British Cadre when they concerned the pack-mule units). constantly inte rfered with the command action. especially at the minor levels. depriving the lower Cadres of their authority, so as to provoke. at a certain point. the spirited reaction of Maj. Barbato, commander of the 21st Group (24). The level. form and contents of the citations awarded by the British to the "Salmerie" units, compared with those awarded by the Americans can. alone. evidence the difference of system. method and attitude in the two Armies. This confirms that the remark repeatedly expressed by Maj. Nini, Chief of Staff of the 210th Division, "The assignment of the 210th (Division) to the 5th Army has been our salvation", must not be considered a wisecrack, but rather a just and pondered consideration based on the mentioned difference between the behaviour towards the Italian units shown by the Americans and the British.

EMPLOYMENT Already since the end of 1943 the Italians had been doing their best so that the Allies could get from the pack -mule units the type of contribution they considered necessary and had insistently requested . The General Staff of the Regio Esercito had realized, already during their first employment, that the importance of these units was much greater than it could be inferred from the "auxil iary" denominotion given to the services entrusted to them. In fact the Allies soon fully realized that the pack-mule unit's operativeness, their optimum performance and fu ll reliability was gradually becoming a determinant factor in producing

Gen. Truscott. Commander of the 5th Army, awarding the Bronze Star to Infantry Capt. (res.) Augusto Sanson, Commander of the 9th Pack -Mule Unit "Lancieri di Novara" (left} and Cavalry Mai, (res.J Giuseppe Turrini, Commander of the 3rd Mule-Train Battalion (below).

I I

that change of attitude which the Americans and English showed. albeit in different ways, day after day, with a progressive increase in understanding, confidence and esteem. The first news about the employment of the Italian pack mule units was sent to the General Staff of the "Regio Esercito", by the Hqs. of the 8th Army , already on December 1, 1943. It concerned, of course, the first two units, constituted in October, requested by the 8th Army and destined to the British divisions. One. organized within the 209th Auxiliary Division and attached to the British 8th Army, which had requested it for the New Zealand 2nd Division: sent for three days to the front on the Sangro river, it had three dead and eight wounded . In midDecember, still with the same division, it took care of the transport to the front of arms, ammunition and victuals in the zone of Castelfrentano, to the satisfaction of the British authorities, who proposed a citation for Lt. Di Pinto, the unit commander.

The "salmerie" units worked The other unit - also realways in the advanced areas quested by the 8th Army and and were essentially used for employed by the British but subordinate to the 210th Division trasporting food supplies, ammunition and reinforcement within the 5th Army, ,since the material to the front. The trasport British X Corps, to wh ich it were carried out almost excluwas destined, was on organic part of it - in November suffered . Âˇsively at night. some times along passages struck by enemy two dead and eight wounded. artillery, mortar and machineOn December 31 , it was attached gun fire. Besides accomplishing to the British 56th Division. their fundamental supplying task, Another unit among the first employed by the Allies as pack - the units often found themselves involved in combats, sometimes mule units was the 14th "Guide" capturing several prisoners . The Squadron which, within the transfers were nerly always Oritish X Corps took part in the crossing of the Garigliano, giving made on foot. In this connection , suffice it to consider that the a substantial contribution to movement of almost all the the positive outcome of the pack-mule units from the Rome operation (25). area to Tusca ny was made by After that, as the other "ord inary way" , i.e. on foot: the "salmerie" units were constituted, they were gradually employed within the two Allied Armies in the operations that led to Rome and, later on, to the "Gothic" line and the final battle. It was a remarkable undertaking. The fulfillment of the task required, day after day, resistance, perse- Gen. Truscott, Commander of the 5th Army, awarding the Bronze Star verance, spirit of sacrifice, often to Cavalry Capt. Pierluigi C aval/i, reaching the extreme limits of Commander of the 101h Pack-Mule human endurance. Unil.

DEL r

,·P J\RT .IT 0

e::, e

111 LI

s Ta

Anno XL VIII - Nu ova ·serie

Giovedl 7 dicembr11 1944

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Cc ii frtddo, q:,i, sc!c!cti di qut$!o rt;a;(o ancnr. ;,cr-;::!i,1c: t moc(ilic, ii ;,ro;,io r/iscorso: :ir.,r . i/a!iar.a. · · · · · ii fcoga, ,;orsli conlinlli colpi. di jcni eM~ ad al/itt'<>, ai:ni la, od!ai • anziche /iid~,·!i, con parol~ pi,i . . :C,'sono molli ao:iani.' Ce 11110, u11 can•ont, ~ i f.trl,sdi, chc a 11<>clli SC-Joi~ di cquilazi~r.t, ii loro copi-.11mi!i t ;,rolondt Ji r:~,r~:la. sar,fo. cht e sotlo Ii arn11 ea circa ichilomclri di qwi s/razi"11n_ f noslri ita•o, dice a/Ire cose, co.,e C<Hl<;rtlt,j C?t !a P;o,:1.7,J_,n!a ;oncr~a Jl!OI- olt<> ,an?i ir,inlmottom_cntc. I: ,no~,iral tl/L , • . 1uma~e:, stn.:o nr.:s~~c:ta r(:r,,r:co. Pi:r::l~ oi qurst, r1 (IJ ( 1a!1 _all (St; :.:1/Q !:U· mt lo dJce L:ar.e:itondos:, r~:; a:..:i :1- : fr.rlc~,!o p_r~--sa ii lvn;to; c ~110~ lla ad/a pos!a, aclle l1ccr.zc, .dtJ ?[1ar:C1: t fltal11 :oro salrtl. . · · dc.,do, comt se ~ar!asse 01 u~a b1?· co 11sc,omo dC.:filccc:i:C,nameruo e . ,conar.di per i pi:i nr.,iani. Par!a n! I so'<l:iti . . · · : ··. :ar.i,1: q,alcnt· coso ' Clime la ~a;-J,ccsa la stra. !;'.1 ;,lotant di sc_lrnc-; 1 ' ba~n. t·occ, ..!o~;-::ncsscmtnft, qr:~i; . : • _._ • • .t(jli!ta ilb,;!r.sta cht . anira a des!i- n'sti, s:sl!o SFi:J;;o, 1ul fa1tgo~ s1a. 1:,,nirlamedt, qull.•i 1n.1/cr:ic:ncsfo. I!. !occaf:, .c~mt me, t' y,u d, mc,!,o:ivr.t do~o sei o ulft ltU/ri. Jc,i c:uiccnrio i to"/i. f:' "'' pl(I/Mt ciMl !sol:f,:fi In• 9uor1,rn~ .'i.ssi, c· .<i ,·11pi-;ccilc ;,::11e _,le/ col~nnello,. furo~&,n1,codc :ie;,;,urc, cht ne' , ha ba .liln ;crec,·~ia <lrcdn ,fo . /nrc, JI'-"! !.see c.'!~ :m fi?o cosl C: q::cllo .:he ci:~·:::-f_o c11cJ:e , :~of:icf:. Perch,. f.:i,fo i~fo 11, rJi !:itl,1 qu~tla -ci!a, e r.,\tl,1199jv1t!7ttz It t,i;ic:te chr cln~e ! l't:U.r ., .~ loto. j'l c1scof"jo, onl:,,l'llo ,wcc-:-a }'"R ro/.llt·or;ebbe yos.sihilm.e-:tle fom~..-e a ce,..,/ur.,:Tt. c r,arfr primn clt nU -,}fr,. j , E:' l'il::fi-u j/ cJJ!or.r.d:O, di mc-;t:1 ~·lltlr:.ti, t.,-u~::df1 ~·r.nnc ll~nlmc-n- sa.- coi\ il $'"JO r t gfJi'ate con9edo aj A;rcltt ;1Gi dt.•l1J,fr;.--r..,, p:1rfi1t •. Uni 1t!ia sfohlr::.. q:.1a.1i cc:11:0. Ra ur.a;:c tl ~ rc l!1?t:tc le right:.:., n17:cscr0Jr.ui }..n, ormci, ogr.i din'Ho. E9li non ,tJprcna ,c!iam, ii.:llit jP.Cf)t ,,; accor· lsr.iorpa inturno cl cello, cni'IOdclo)~~ quclc,'lc _, ... la:ile .'"'.' " r.? 1mruo- ,i9nc-ra r:hc. ci snno i11 gl"!o, in Hadg:a:no clu; lu1 un:i.uomma a k:7"~ Jeon int:olonlcrio rl,r9na.a. Par!a cr.,·b:/,, ~omt .''"~"~a:zct, . cfo, ;,ropn!1io, mo1:issimi piu :;,iova,i' di lui, che jConducir.mo /a Jeep c~>lo 1nr.tn ml 'le mcni infrecciolt darar.!i al pct.'confus, scnt::-ncnf:; e uno che ~tcva 1~on .1ono s·ouo .le arrni. £~ii nOA IU n un , ro~lo M11trir.a110_. da,:c due '1·ro.: sc.mbr(l u:, 1'.~~tl! anzi un pa-1in prirno ,~](J~ :1:10 dai co;:tl:i rcs."' _e)igr.or., chc, ie t-o{esst, JIOfrcbbt bc-io,;ti:di prcccrfon1> s.,bito ttl. rnmJinl dr c sptrmur!t:.-£,l' r.::·cfit la ~un 7,0. !un §:on :u:HiM.t' altrat:erso la :accia friissimo tonu:rc a c4.,a· t' mag.:-ri fc;-ldt(lo r;sol!J. :~~,f.ciu 1',t;1ralmc::.te riULiafa, e 1aJ&:.;:~a:c7; ffrO fo':ri ~clfo fosca .. 'u: fq tlr:Uri:ti col ~tree:~ "ero, .!Ja pre-1 _I~. ~utl m?rnt1.S_~· ,rno srt1;p,;<,!j $UC t·occ sla:rc<1 c so::imC$M, .'w:i- pdft; r,.,> ~, qucS1 pc. scrol/ore l rm. fer.~cc 'fr.rt ,l suo d0tttrt. Scr.1n·~:1c:::1ss::r.o, Cs t=Cli:mmo: ll rolpo , ; { 1,in 1 qr,alcota c,~~ t·a diT-:t/a at C!rorr. 1bcra::o l.11 ;i t dci C0';;1?C9ni, lo ac·,-::,,; farJi t 3cn:a la·me:tlo~~i. Svlh1n.l c!7ii:alo u cclllo ·metri ,la noi, ~llR~ 1 iJ/.1 riO ch-c ·.;,iJ°i...-tr.tc3 e; _nc_ll'do9i!,1to$~O n!lc L:.~~r,2 c "! t:asfe ur.c;:,,, t·o;.cbbe:, sr fos-1! postib.ilc. elcomr1.1 rhc e fJdtlr,.,~<> nllc cnsc: .lien~: c.~ ·t~{j iirt-l!jc ci sioci scfou:,~ fo mi- -,~~;::d~ <,.·:1lc·f>J /a... i>1J;•oc!1che_, n::scosci ...,fr:hi 1.i ha d:r::tn il tC'1':1td;J. Eb-·irc cn(c,:-a g:cn...,Jl11wo, ae artu.·11 ,rn! n•ilil prronw._ipu_:fone ~he f"/Htsto r·~"~'.oi:a:;:c~tc :1 plffrro in. ta_sr~n, (' 1lbt::r, q,:t,'(fo /.rc:1~.~,:;~ ~·r;vr.-<1ajt.1!rO. 1p1r.~fn 1·0/t:r :m .Pk )'ili 1jC:no.; [09io nc,n .~1 r:l!i:!fa. coni?r;!quc, ~-u ~;im 11011 10 ',:ode suortcre . .Ho M ,.o nfo modrs!:a, l:Oi ln nnteroniamo a!!n 1 ,. Sr.:: no (1,r, Q!lCt(,t '! l cro cl,~ r.11di ,;,, sits.so.:. ~1cn di1.·c:!H, nt;;u:-:: j~ut~i trr.:to sc'J;,;,:'aii a n't.ft·:-t, : JvlfocQndi~ di .r,;;!i _hcUi~csi c;-oi. L_a:ri_ci,i1rmo i ,.?.trii •, cC;,rn1c:,l11 Jl _t.."tl· ~tr ::n ~r.1? ,~fnu!c.., c. ?r.r :::?u. ;rns-•d ,; en; scg:rnh d, roinp•!le l,: n9n c.l pc!;l!l c 1 rma r.r,!: ("Tc-,: urn ,\11 }11. lr!ano .1: c C'"fr;11•n :,:t.:·n;1r~ d, p,11:~C'i.Qr:a rrdcrri dd diucr!O an cu.!1 rn:tlr, ,;Cr.;so ek e t:_t drde in. :i:! ,;r,r;r.o .,1ot;illut/o di (I!/.1di11i chc!:,vr qnr.ki,,: f:·rQ .. . · · tot in?iiJ. ' 1:-0 tnol!i ~1i:u·ct; il,l/;arit r-csfiN :i:l, lta(eir.1'.'n i! troprio o·or;r:rr. Pcr!i:Jr:'11>1 J1;/(,r,to. :,;j ;, /i;lfo ii t11t.1t1,, ::u,nt • Vi $Ono pc:-Hc-olc:-men:c of/c;;o. ! qun.l; 0~!1 ,r!ictJ:i, dis!:n9ut.rli da i~o; ,ol C'U(lifr.no: ~ .si,,p11l mn • info{. ,rr huf111'(). Jin i !1-0!,f,:J; ,f..>l pt~; 1 1 r.afo ~rrr.\t ;t 1.·,:,;t;-0· (api!a:io ~ s!G- ~:rtsli. ~ c·,t,"'o_... !icur?? _Ho.~01 crit , chtf fi. cir e rn:::i11 u0 :;(1:-rio' ~;,· ~ ~tmp ... c!(.-::?1.·, url 1,r{ 1,a·::r, ,1,,1:,, f;,ia:zo,: r,·::r,-!•'> r,;r.ic_c..!/J ,':..~$u:t~ uc!l_li occh 1• i r_d.-_rtc \ lo- Ji,.'.os!rr.tn 1 _,. . rnnE;_rvn in 09~i oc-ilurnto ci,;1!iii1Jr.io il loro ltu·oro,...co-1 1 /o mio allic t·o ::. F:, ~ crc.:n:io dd. colo::r:ello 1!d .'':cpr~(o ~rrlu, $r.lil,1 111/"~- 111«:!11. r.t.L ~.:t·;c::.~1,ri.c· a d1mostrars:, r,~ ~nUfo!o non mr. x~ r.1dl;1 f,,~.,c; P.. F. mc~tr,.. a.~''!'"I ;p".'nr.::n. Comt s~ con lc:1,,iJU ,,os, 1?(':$1. =;.i~~r.a. ..s,w:'· ~!J <Jrr,.1 ... ~:~scl:Urdo l,rot·o, r.ut nrld1, 1llvra t:n(n- rmic, b:~tr r. ( rrmn lr· rw.tJlr,r. ~nf~ 0 , jrm:·t·,:-u:ir,naii t r;u~~i r.1nr:.-!c~1i, ·rnnjlml[~r e cJ;. ;;ro::I~ 1~/el,1qn:a. GlrJroso. la ;1t'fncia ,J,:j m:,ii., 11/:,s;!o. In s9utJr:v11·{').,srrr::11'.1:1c cnii .?rd!,,:r.c:,lt di~{/'·~! de~.! crn!:--:_tnn, :. _r:i ~_r:ic~e.1L:-.:icc...,nton:1tllCoto . . -do r.c.--s., d; r.t,i: t ri'tfflntJ cnn ali 5 .: i,1(11fo:!,1 · d!o. ;.,frc!o-!c.:9:, n~r,!t'U '1; c:-.,, ?"P~l, ,. ~,:, 5io-1 r,l. · ·,1,,~n "ilc,i •ic,•i ttlfdlut,si l u:siit'a .r.i11 ,lei ~(-·:,;j,..; ,v:l.a(i (:~:r ['Olc:n t',· rc,1i, :-:d,:,!10 5,:1," ".ptl'. ,.r :wllcrl':;fr. r;.~i,'jn:no lo $lci1::.'.lctc lcrrt:\t 0ic ... ,. ,, . ' ..... : • to'I ., .. .... ·· · . , · ·· , . ., .r l , • . • .,. _, _, · d ,,., ..,,0 ,cs-::•'!J!J:.-:·o s111r.rrw1i'u . 1 ,.H<,,::,~. :z;.,pu1:fo, (Sl i tino p:tdcrr, 1r;o..-~r,q mc::,c.!' "?i.1. ., nt::.:r;:? ..... :ji:cccim.: ! 1~ 1,c c.,,1f?C'l't,;, ~· a01'l' JOnGj 1 . ~. 1 ... . }{. • . • s .. I;~r. ,tmprt /a rretpri11. ,,.·r~:r;,na do!una llo,..-1~,tll. Gu GCC~j dt.!]:J ilr.-,acn,n/or.(ttJ C ! {Jlmui~f,. rc:r lcrre, . 1 1q,inllitio f>ac:o~!Po Ci q:nsti r.icr.tti per

c-is~alo!~

•

ri-l

...

march was long, tiring and hard: it was summer, and the muleteers had only their winter uniforms. In the winter and fa ll 1944-45, on the mountains of the "Goth ic" line, in mud and snow, they had to overcome the most difficult phases of their employment. Between Septembe r and November, two units of the 210th Division, the 9th and the 11th, did more than seventy days of 66

continuous service, whi le one, the 10th, never had a day of rest. Its Commander, who had 350 men working for the Divisions of the IV Corps deployed on the Apennines, did not have a single motor vehicle to keep in touch with his un its. which were fractioned down to squad level on a front of 60 km, and was compelled to move on horseback. The historical journal of the 20th

Above and right. Some clippings from newspapers of that period, emblematic witness of the silent but remarkable work done by the Combat Mule-Train Units in the War of Liberation.

FROM THE JOURNALS OF THE UNIT COMMANDERS

Per le strade de/la gucrra- d' Italia

onue nuEra msilenzfonruanuuarma mun eserciio cne r1m1sce

,_,7

,11,,:,Nltl._......,.,........,.......,..__.,.,....,...._,fi1411-on,,,..,...

i Roma. Vcuerdi 10 Nov emJlre 1944

j ~

• • • • • • • • • L. i.30

• • • • .d.lJW0;,1u~1lto .SlllSlcnUttre •

AD~Xd.)1.ENTJ

J P.t.r uaa a.nno • • Yri: un l'ieDtf~Cre •

• •

• ,,... • • • •

• •

spc.-d!:!Cte Jn a bbco.ameut o postal~

•

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' """"'..."""··· ........ m... ....... .:11um1•1u,..N1..111wi.1w,1111011wmmu,w,--.11111e~,-",~·

(DAL NOSTRO IN V J.4.1'0 SPECIALE) • • • • • ••

· .. Lotta co.muue,·t d umca meta

lnfotli, a·;,che ~ 1wslri 11old.aH so. no caduU • cadouo in (lttesta {JUN· ra che stri$cia malia11a inforuo alld loro case. N~lle cillti orm,ii ton· taue " dim.l!nfic-1~ mol/ i lo iow>rn. 110, al.,L<Scin<.lli clai 1wmi strattied·

di chj ra1n1hrngc c conduce la vit• toria. emmrc ,tn.:a qrwi m.orti non ci turcbb,·ro :data quest,? vittorie. Soiro ·i reJ>(lrli dci srr J.!i;:i ,.uu.i.• lic!ri i quali Stil /route d-ellc Armu,e alleat~ J,amto combattuto una baltaalia. umile e inorala. che non conoscc l'cbbrezza dcWassallo 111a il clriro ltlvoro dd salmieri"ta· e dcl 1>orta-muni;ioni, a ctii tton d dato cader~ /uhnin.ato su uuci H· oea 1ua stroucato su una mrtlatt.ie~ ra, camminando. d rinu:wcrs U sun~ vroda, --mentre lien forte pet il YtWTIO la aua bestia clu, porta da mangiard' o da $pa rare. Questi morti $Ctmtano con il ril.endo cJr,a U a ·v1.~olgo '8 run1<>rose 6 $1)t$10 inglor-lo~t mortf 'lt"l o··m~ Pt ·~asi~u.•; 1 noslr'i soLdati, cRn uno · &lil..ncidio conthiuo se tl8 1tan· no cosl, 1enta rumore, 1enza me· dagiie B letua titOli .tUi glornali.. Yolevano andars. /accia a /accia..'

cOntro il tedesco, ma era 1ma pioia lroppo grandc; bisognat.•a scoutare. •olfrir,, tacc»do, incompresi dai proprl /ratelli. da(lli amicl, m.iscouosciuti. ' E ll clove le aoiU. oamionett-6 potei.,ano arrivare. essL souo arri• 11.ati: <lot>4 la macchita<J loaisHca: di un esercilo che h4 bisoono di --xtrade c1 vive di strade s£ /er,nava. CJ:ii non $i sono /errna fi. ·1sono andoti. ava>£tt semprit '"' 'J)O' &calz c e sdl'uciti., 1nalamlaU , SJJ,euo febbricjtantl.· ,.ten:a avere mat il cambio·~ conoscono tutti , sentieri della ·o·uerrii, ·.sanno tuUd l.e golu e le cime d.eUe.' rnoutap111 tra la bad avmuate e I caposaldi. arrit~ano sino ai pezz& ~c1"6 si l<'trdo,·,o contto il 1&.er,tico, portan.o, t•ir1ore assiduo a quest'oroatiismo articuloto • nascoslo tra te monta..· 911e, come un f>OPOlo misterioso dS coboLdi. : Oon i tan to qualcuno cads ,ui ,passuou; obl,ligali d ceds la 111d ~nula u.,conipngno che $CQUe, e Ja colonn~. umilc e sileu:iiosa 11011 s·arresttJ: con le svc. bcdid c1'i!i• • ali uomini fatti pn, tristi dev• ar. ri1:ore. perd,d la .9uerra non abbla ~osta, perc/r4 lei batlcolia no• ri· ma>lga priva del 1uo clbo,

Mule-Tra in Group records that, until mid-November, every day there were nine or even ten un its in serv ice, which means all of them. Their losses are witness of the contribution given in those months: 428 casualties. against 519 for the entire 210th Division. Very intensive was also the work of the mule infirmaries. In eleven months, the 110th attended to 762 mules. 200 between September and November, 50% of them were injured. Larger figures are recorded for the 130th, which took care altogether of as many as 989 mu les. 250 in the above-mentioned period; half of them were injured . Dur ing the spring offensive (1945) the pack -mule units, with a great spirit of sacrifice - and also in emulati on of the Allies contributed to the positive outcome of the battle on the Apennines; there is no doubt that their contribution was determinant, considering that in just a few days the Ma jor Units engaged in the battle succeeded in moving from the mountain

"°"

,,,o..

L'attesa dei nuovi reparlj itafiaoi · Tra breve su guesti monti arr..: vcra11no ner contot:r~re amrttorzo i!rprc»10 di libera.:tone i 1,tannlllti gnrppl tlt combattimento ~e. 1UT· letti di sni,·tto·~ a, t1wui. cuttfftc(O-no c,rmai cou an.sia di inlrare iM li:::12. , J /anti di qu,:&te divisioni awf.. liari.e aspeltcm() con aioia (ci ,a-rauno <1uche ( loro compaoni in li11 eaj ma anch e con un po• di M4• liw~duia. .N"'i:ssuno li ricorda adeno ch.e 10no quasi soli a rappre,enta·re Ja i•olont,i di ,;p,esa militure delr[. lalia, •tan/Ide( loro amici phi ,..1 Jlezzogiorno vivono la. loro Ora dl , tancliezza post-bc1liclb • tanto del-· le -.. loro case 1ono crollato co,a ~ i. memorie viU Jolci e re,nok. 11e11M• no dunque adesso ri occupa · di essi. e domani, quando saranno·.....,e. nutl qli altrl,. non avranno piu 11-6Uuna 1peran1a di' ricordo o dt qratitudiM. . , , • . E aw:sto tonnm1to al UDP• ~I loro sauardo , nues"la trist,.,zza di ·n->n essero a uwdo cooios.;luU .dal poporo per cul combattonn ii "8ll, Vh,•en<lo in m.e:z~. t1 Iara. ·

areas right into the heart of the Po Valley. CONCLUSION

The 210th Division, during the entire campaign, suffered 260 dead, 640 wounded and 132 missing: between 90 and 95% of them belonged to the 20th MuleTrain Group. The 21st Group had a total of 57 dead, 177 wounded and 25 missing. The decorations awarded to officers, NCOs and muleteers represent a tangible acknowledgement by Ita ly and by the Allies. The 20th Raggruppamento was awarded 'JO Silver Medals. 3·1 Bronze Medals, 50 Crosses for Military Valour, 35 Solemn Cita tions and. among the America n decorations, 1 Legion of Merit and 25 Bronze Stars. The 21st Group received 7 Silve r Meda ls, 18 Bronze Medals. 21 Crosses for Military Valour. 13 Solemn Citations and 1 Legion of Merit. Moreover. all members of the "salmeri e" units were awarded the Cross for War Merit. The

Before mentioning the official journals of the Commanders of the pack-mule units, here is a quotation from a private diary. It refers to the 2nd Mule Train Unit "Piemonte", consisting of men (400) and mules (300) who disembarked at Neaples, coming from Sardinia, on December 1, 1943 (less than three months after the September 8 armistice). On December 9, the unit is attached to the US 5th Army. On December 12, the baptism of fire: an officer is wounded. Mules: 15 dead and 15 injured. From December 12 to January 15, 1944, uninterrupted service with the US II Corps. The diary reports: " ... our service continues from the 12th of December until mid-January. First Italian 'Salmerie' unit that cooperates with the Americans for the War of Liberation. By order of the II Corps: half unit, 150 men with mules, to C.E.F. (Acquafondata). Unit at rest. After three days the II Corps requests again its employment. The men, worn out with fatigue, are dismayed. The Americans realize the facts and allow the unit to rest. The men must be replaced and reorganized. The unit receives a commendation from the American Command for the effective and difficult work done in very bad weather and with scarce and unsuitable equipment" (January 22, 1944). The Commander of the "Gennargentu" recalls the conclusion of the manoeuvres carried out with the American divisions in the Certaldo area, in order to bring the units together. "The unit has participated in a military parade of the US 351st Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Castagno, bearing the national Flag. The enthusiasm of the men was great, because for the first time, after a long period, they saw their Flag saluted by American battalions in arms, by generals and senior officers and by the civilian population watching the parade". Most surprising is the transformation, in two weeks, of the hurriedly assembled "Montecuccoli". Clothing is insufficient, and so is the equipment. There is considerable lack of tent sheets (many men must sleep in the open) and blankets. Weapons are defective, the unit has small arms of various kinds, 130 of which are without cartridge pouches. At least 200 men lack helmets and masks. There is total lack of medicines for men and mules and we are also without horseshoes, nails and

coal for shoeing. In these conditions the unit received, on September 2, the order to leave the following morning. The weather, fair until the 2nd, changes for the worse. It pours. It continues to rain also during the following days. The men must use all their energy to overcome the moral distress produced by the lack of experience and training, by the bad weather and insufficient clothing. The Section Commanders prove themselves efficient and equal to the task ... The five difficult marches have been useful to the men, who are not lacking in good wi(l and initiative and have reacquired a sufficient military

posture. At Galluzzo, despite all difficulties the unit arrives in order and with a very high morale, in comparison with that at the departure. The 13th is already a fine unit. The officers feel gratified by the work done, the men are happy with the awareness of belonging to an orderly and discipilned outfit. Between Commanders and subordinates there is already a firm bond, made of mutual consideration and confidence". "September 7 (unit attached to the 34th Division). As the Division requests ready employment, the Commander arranges that civilian farriers from the area be hired to take care of the shoeing. This measure was indispensable... The materials will follow, in successive deliveries. On the afternoon of September 8, the unit is efficient and ready to go. On September 10, the first section, on its way back from the front-line, due to a mistake of the American guides, enters a minefield, There are five casualties: 2 dead, 2 wounded, 1 missing. The section leader is knocked to the ground by the explosions. Immediate reorganization of the

MINISTRY

section ... human remains are seen on the ground; a few days later two unidentifiable corpses are recovered. Further controls have been impossible owing to the mines and the enemy' s careful observation (Val di Bonella). On September 16, at Montecuccoli, a soldier of the 2nd section, on his way back from the front-line, captures 7 Germans. The unit Hqs. and the Section have all the time been encamped in an area exposed to the enemy artillery fire and strewn with mines. Many times the Sections have been employed two, three and even four times in the same day. Several men have carried out the ir tasks in precarious health conditions, even when running a temperature. There have also been cases of wounded and ill men who have refused to go to hospital. The 5th "Montecassino" was attached to the 85th Division, which was to act as a wedge inside the enemy deployment, and which, with the occupation of Passo del Giogo, was the first American unit to indent the "Gothic" line. The service required of the unit was therefore particularly

WAR

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER N. 10684011 136.1 .116

PM . 151 - November 20, 1944

ORDER OF THE DAY SUBJECT: Mule-Train Units . The Mule -Train Units, operating in fraternal cooperation with the Allied troops, have given , during a period of more than one year. a very high contribution to the operations on the Italian front . In the most impervious and difficult areas, this contribution has often been determinant for success. fsolated units at the beginning, the Mule-Train Units are now a p halanx which with their diuturnal sacrifices o f blood writes pages of pure he roism. Enemy fire, minefields. difficult terrain . rigorous weather. nothing

c;:in

.c.ln{)

them. Silent and tireless, they always reach their destination; they have the spirit of our mountain troops. Their c ontribution to victory equals th at of the fighting units, and they must be considered as s uc h, togeth er with all the oth er aux iliary units wh,ch cooperate wilh the Allies on the advanced lines . I express mv warmest praise to officers and o lher ranks. THE

MINIS T ER

CASATI

exacting because, besides the transpor t of supplies, it had to help with the transfer of light arms, radio stations and telephone lines along the front. "The supply lines - writes the Commander - suffer continuous losses of men and mules, especially due to mortar and automatic fire, and are so near the vanguard points that sometime s even take prisoners. It starts raining, the men must fight against a new enemy, mud, and some of them, overcome by fatigue, just give in and must be taken to hospital, thinning further the number of muleteers, so that sometimes the Commander must employ one man as driver of two mules". The Commander of the "Montecassino" is the first to point out the deficiency in number and quality of the reserves. "The scarce reserves received show an absolute lack of any military posture and technical knowledge and therefore cannot be employed right away. Moreover, as the advance of the infantry proceeds at good speed, the columns work very hard and often rest only a few hours each day, without blankets, also because the advance does not permit to recover the personal belongings left behind. October 17: a day of mournin~ and glory for the unit. All three columns are hit by enemy fire in a locality beyond Monterenzio and, despite the fact that the echelons marched wide apart from each other, all the columns suffer heavy losses..." . Despite this " ... also an officer has turned muleteer, the loads have reached the companies. Column B: the Commander's action has been precious and exemplary and it is due to his serenity and contempt of danger if the column has had limited losses of mules and none of men, under about forty minutes of mortar lire. The season, the Commander of the "Montecassino" continues, "has been so inclement that everywhere the mud is deep from a minimum of 10 centimetres to a maximum of 2 metres. Often earth banks cave in, carrying with them men and mules". Thus, in three days, ten mules are lost. "The men themselves, swept away, are rescued with great d ifficulty and one American guide dies: the end of October sees the columns very short of men and engaged in intense service... the men are tired and only their excellent morale enables them to continue their service. At the beginning of November, all men with special duties, with few exceptions, serve as mule drivers". The weather and ground conditions are the subjects recurring most often in the journals of all units.

This situation which lasts, getting worse, throughout November, does not cause a decrease in efficiency, thanks to the example constantly given by officers and NCOs and to the will of the bulk of the troops. The Commander of the "Lancieri di Novara" writes in October "the temperature has gone down, rain and mud seriously hinder our work, severely trying the physique and morale of the men, who have worked for twenty days without a moment's rest. .. The circumstances have tested the men, who, apart from rare exceptions, have behaved very well, also because they

have been encouraged and commanded by officers and NCOs who always, with their exemplary behaviour, have been able to obtain the highest performance from their subordinates". "Despite the serious deficiencies in personnel (the Sections have an average of 55 men insteatl of 84) another shortcoming is the lack of clothing ... The torrential and persistent rains compel the men to wear wet and muddy clothes, with scarce possibilities to get them dry, because the area presents considerable destructions of the few existing houses, and therefore scarce possibilities to find shelter". At the beginning of October there is mention of a column hit by artillery fire during the night. There are three dead and four wounded, plus 119 mules dead and injured. Conclusion: "Nevertheless 'the supplies to the line arrive regularly, also that night". Some notes of the Commander of the "Piemonte": "In September we are employed in supplying the line and in the recovery of corpses. The work has been particularly hard due to the inclement weather, the pace of the operations and the impracticability of the mountains... In all of the actions of our sol diers the spark of compassion and kindness has still been shinilJg ... From November 1 to November 8, the last days on the San Clemente front, destiny seems to be obstinately against our unit: fire, water and mud give no respite . Within a very short time an officer is hurried to the hospital for illness and exhaustion; another officer, severely wounded, dies two days later (Cavalry Lt. Della Rocca), eight soldiers are wounded, eleven mules dead or injured. The men have reached 55 days on the front, they bear or their faces and bodies the marks of stoically endured hardships". The not es of the "Valdieri" in the period considered let us realize the difficulties that the unit had to confront, owing to its very particular conditions of employment. "Not always the effort to which the men were subjected, owing to 'lhe bad weather conditions, has been rewarded by some units of the South African Division by satisfying their more urgent needs, especially as regards food; despite interventions of the officers of the unit, it has not been sufficiently improved. All the same, the men's performance has been constantly excellent, even in the most difficult conditions". In November the tasks carried out by the unit are stated more precisely: "uninterrupted service, despite the fact that a pause in the advance and the defensive deployment of the Allied units have allowed ten of the twelve sections attached to the 61st South African Division to enjoy a turn of 7 days of well deserved rest ... the squads attached to the 1st Brazilian Division and to the 92nd Division and two squads of the 6th Division have been allowed no rest in their continuous service, which has been lasting, uninterrupted, for 80 days". The Commander of the "Lancieri di Firenze", the last of the units constituted before the May offensive and sent to the front before the corn-

pletion of its formatio ,1, writes: " ...May 24, 3 a.m.; air attack, 40 minutes: 1 dead and 3 wounded. On the whole, the behaviour of the unit has been in substance satisfactory, despite the initial faults due to lack of training, high percentage of new recruits and hasty employment... From the formal point of view some work remains to be done... To take the unit in hand and do away with some deficiencies of organization, in order to bring the unit back to the line with greater solidity. The employment requested by the Americans was not always rational, perhaps as a consequence of the war actions with continuous shiftings of the front... The requests of mule trains have not taken into account the structure of the unit and compelled us to split a squad into smaller groups, creating dlfflcultles of command and control for the officers, who had always been with their men ... ". On July 8, near Castellina Marittima. the unit which operated with a regiment of the 34th Division was hit by a violent bombing which caused 2 deal:! and 6 wounded. Here is how the death of two muleteers, artillerymen Annibale Bellotti and 1110 Marzolla, is described: "firm under the fire of the enemy artillery, they did not leave their mules and their precious load and kept on inciting their teammates to do their duty, until a volley hit them to death, together with their mules, whose bridles they still clutched in their hands... " . "The service continues - the report goes on - and succeeds in taking all the mules uninjured to their destination". Three days later, during the night between the 11th and 12th, clash between a squad and a German patrol: "our soldiers have reacted effectively despite the inferiority of their weapons, and the German patrol retreats leaving one dead behind; it has been impossible to ascertain the number of the wounded ... ". It is interesting how the dead soldier was successively identified. A member of the squad had disappeared; five days later he was found dead behind a bush. still holding his rifle; two rounds were missing and one was still in the barrel. Next to him was another dead man, and this was German. The muleteer was awarded a Bronze Medal "in memoriam". In the month of October the figures regarding the services carried out by the "Lancieri di Firenze" are the following: "average number of mules employed daily: 190; during the whole month: 5,980. Loads transported: 450 t. During the return journeys: transport of corpses". The unit's commander also remarks a fact which induces some bitter considerations. "Thanks to two lorries supplied by the Hqs. of the 91st Division the unit command can provide a hot meal each day ...". "Several times the Hqs. of the 337th and the Battalion Hqs. show their gratitude with tangible signs, by distributing to the Sections on the front clothes, extra rations and cigarettes". In November the journal reports a very deep-felt consideration. After mentioning the losses of the 7th-8th and 9th November (2 dead, 16 wounded among the men and 27 mules lost) the Commander continues: "when one thinks that within the unit there are many men from

senior contingents (1914 and 1915) returning from long years of service in coastal zones dominated by malaria, and from other fronts, with their health generally undermined, who with a spirit of pride (perhaps not even realized by them , but so evident in their work and in their simple but frank words) have managed to overcome both the physical fatigue and the moral tiredness deriving from the fact that they come from still occupied territories and therefore for over a year have been ignori ng the fate of the ir fam ilies, we must say that as far as valour and sacrifice are concerned the muleteers, 'salmeristi', have given brilliant and lasting proof. Unfortunately it is impossible to recount everything... ".

WHAT THE ALLIES SAID THE AMER ICANS "I desire to commend you, your officers, and enlisted men for the splendid manner in which they have performed their duties in recent operations of II Corps. Since 9 December 1943 your unit has been actively engaged in the movements of essential supplies to front line fighting troops of this command. Through inclement weather, over difficult, mountainous terrain, the officers and men of your organization have exerted themselves to the utmost to deliver these supplies with efficiency and dispatch. Your cooperation has been a vital contributing factor in the steady advance of our troops toward their objectives, and is specially gratifying as an example of the unity of purpose and determination that animate the officers and men of your forces. It is my wish that the contents of this message be brought to the attention of all personnel of your command".

( From Gen. Geoffrey Keys. Commander of the U.S. II Corps, lo Cavalry Captain Amedeo Chiarazzo, Commander of the 2nd Pack -Mule unit " Piemonte"J January 22, 1944 ''During our last period of operations in the Terracina sector, our advance would have impossible or greatly impeded had not food, water, and ammunition been gotten to our 3rd battalion.. then operating in the hills. The rugged terrain made it impossible for motor vehicles to carry these supplies, nor could we spare manpower to do the job. It was then that the mule train came to our assistance and enabled us to complete our mission and force the enemy to retreat to the north. I wish to commend your Group and especially the platoon commanded by 2nd Lt. Forziati... Hope that you may be working with us again in the near future'.'.

(From Mai. H.C. Tries/er ;r., U.S. 337th Infantry Regiment, to Artillery Captain Corrado Galli. Commander of the 5th Pack -Mule unit "Montecassino"J. June 6, 1944

"On 15 September 1944, the First Italian Mule-Pack Company, under your command, was attached to this regiment, to assist in supplying our troops through the difficult and mountainous terrain. This regiment began its drive through the Gothic Line, from Mt. A ltuzzo, in the vicinity of Scarperia, Italy, and continued on through Firenzuola, Sambuco, Quinzano, and Mt. Formiche. You and the officers and men of the First Pack-Mule Company have demonstrated unquestionable devotion to duty and have worked untiringly in overcoming unsurmontable obstacles in supplying this regiment during th is long and difficult march. For extended periods of time most of the supply trai ls in th is regiment's sector were inaccessible to vehicles due to the extreme mountainous nature of the terrain and also because of heavy rains which made roads impassable. It was then that your ser vices proved invaluable in supplying, by mule-trains , ammunition, rations and water to our front line troops. The victories we have realized during this operation were w ithout question greatly aided by the tireless efforts of· you and your men. In operations which are yet to come, before final victory i s achi eved, I sincerely hope that the First Mul e-Pack Company under your command be assigned to support this regiment".

(From Col. W.H, Mik kelsen , Commander of the U.S. 338th In fantr y Regiment. to Artillery Captain Nicola Simon e, Commander of the 1st PackMule unit " Gennargentu" /, November 8, 7944 "Since you r unit has been attached to the Division I have received e){cellent reports from the Regiment commanders and my Staff on your effectual coopera tion and on the manner in which your unit has accomplished its duties, I would like to have the opportunity to meet all you r men soon and to commend them personally".

(From Gen. W.C. Livesay, Commander of the U.S. 97 st Infantry Division 10 Cavalr y Captain Umberto Palagi, Commander of the 11th Pac kMule unit " Lancieri di Firenze"). November 12, 1944 "During the whole period from September 15 to November 22, 1944 this Di vision has profited greatly by the service of your Pack-Mule unit. The terrain wh ich had to be crossed in the well-known weather conditions has magnified the problem of supplies. To carry out our task, it was necessary to cross mountainous terra in and the bulk of the supplies had to be carried by pack-mules, due to the lack of roads of any kind. Furthermore, due to the heavy rains which worsened the conditions of the mountain mule-tracks, it was necessary to spend hours of exhausting and dangerous work to supply our advanced troops. Your men have contributed to our success and enabled us to continue the offensive: it is therefore a great pleasure for me to commend you and your men for their spontaneous col-

laboration. May your participation be recognized as a determinant element for the liberation of your land".

(From Gen. Coulter, Commander of the U.S. 85th Infantry Division, to Artillery Cap tain Corrado Gall( Commander of the Paci<'-Mule uni/ " M on tecassino"). November 28, 7944 " I want to commend you and your unit for the outstanding collaboration extended to this Division during the just concluded period of operations. The sacrifices of your unit have contrib uted greatly to the success of th e. operations".

(From Gen. Coult er , Commander of the U. 8 . 85th In f antry D i vision , t o

Artillery Cap eain Corrado Galli, Commander o f the Pack-Mule unit "Montecassino"J. "Gentlemen, I wa nt to express to you my appreciation for the magnificent work done by your officers and muleteers last month, when your unit has been attached to my Regiment. They have performed their duty very well, although their task was very heavy and had to be carried out in very bad condit ions of weather and te rrain. It has been a real pleasure to ha11 e you with us" .

(From Lt. Col. M P . Comp rie, Commander of the 1st Ro yal Carabineers Regiment of the South Afric an Division, to Cavalry Captain Enzo Antonelli lncalzi, Commander of th e 10th Pack Mufe unit " Valdiern No vember 28, 1944 "The performance of your duty, your courtesy, your military discipline and the spirit of your unit have always been excellent. The behaviour of your unit is worthy of the good traditions of all the Allied armies, an example of service, courage and conduct. On behalf of the 10th Mountain Division, I thank you for a job well done".

(From Gen. GP . Hays . Commander of the 10th Mo un tain Infantry Division. to Artillery Capta in Corrado Galli. Com mander of the 5th Pack -Mule un it " Montecassino" ). April 30, 1945 " In the final attack to break through the Apenn ines your help, through the enemy minefi elds, has enabled our 87th Infantry Reqiment to keep the enemy constantly under pressure in his sector, until his resistance was overcome and we all succeeded in entering the Po Valley. On behalf of the 10th Mountain Infantry Division, I want to t hank you, your officers and your soldiers for the excellent manner in which they have accomplished the duties assigned to them, helping us to defeat our common enemy".

(From Gen. GP . Hays, Commander of the 10th Mountain Infantr y Division to Infantry Captain Pie(ro Giltardi, Commander of tile 77th Pack-Mule unit "Monte Belvedere").

"The long activity of the 20th MuleTrain Group, successful despite all the present difficulties, deserves our constant admiration and appreciation". ( By order of Gen, L. Truscott, Commander of the 5cn Army, to the Headquarters of the 210th Infantry Di vision IT). December 24, 1944 "I want to express my appreciation for the e){cellent services rendered by the Mule-Train units which, under your command, have been attached to my Division. The high skill of the officers, the evident sense of duty of the men, the effectual work done, have been a great help to this Division. I should be grateful if you would extend my appreciation to Capt. Simoni, Capt. Sanson, Capt. Forasassi and Capt. Misciatelli" .

(From the Commander of the U.S. 34th Division to Cavalry Colon el Eugenio Berni Canani, Commaoder ol the 20t/J "Raggruppamento" Combat Mule-Train Units). March 15, 1945 -~,K::-1

THE BRITISH

.• -Jt~.,:l ·r ·l-

"On this last day of your precious and indispensable work with our unit - the 1st Guard Brigade - the Commanding Brigadier has asked me to ex press his feelings to you. It is therefore w ith great pleasure and pride, since I am Italian too, that I convey to y ou all his satisfaction, his praise and his most heartfelt appreciation for the spirit of sacrifice, the promptness and the skill shown in the performance of your duty in these days of collabo r ation, taking into account, in particular, the not very easy conditions in which you have had to work. I can assure you that these words are not purely co nventional ex pressions: they sincerely reflect the deep admiration you have excited in the Brigadier, who, albeit not directly, has been following you very closely in this particular period, when your continuous work, carried out in order to provide us timely with supplies, was made exceptionally hard by the unceasing bad weather. The Brigadier wants also to remember your Commander, who unfortunately fell last night, and wishes to express to you his since-re regret and deep sorrow. The inevitable sacrifice of these humble and brave ltallans, made for the common cause which has finally brought us t ogether again, will serve to strengthen the friendship and the consideration of the British people, from whom , unfor tunately and not due to our fault, we had been separated in these last years. With all my frien,dship and best wishes".

(From Lt. Giorgiotti Utermann , Italian Liaison Officer, on behalf of the Commander of the 1st Goard Brigade, Brig. H. Monta9ue Douglas Scott, to Mai- Ugo Barbato, Commander of th e 1st Combat Mule -Train Group). Oc tober 12, 7944

uni ts were defined as "com bat" units; t he troops wore a badge representing an edelweiss encircled by a horseshoe. More evidence to help us understand the pacl<-mule un its - what they did. in what conditions they operated. especially at the begi nn ing, the extent and weight of their contribu tion can be found in the historical journa ls of the Commanders o f t he un its. in t he citations and acknowledgements received from the Allied Commanders. and in the space devoted to them in the press of the time. To conclude these comments, nothing is more appropriate than the Di spa tch of

November 20, 1944 addressed to the Armed Forces by the Minister cf War of the time, which well defines the pack-mule un its and sums up appropriate ly t heir determinant contri bution during the entire campaign. In the words of Alessandro Ca sati, Minis ter of War: "The "sa lmerie" units. operati ng in fraternal cooperation with the Allied troops, have given. duri ng a period of more tha n one yea r . a very high contribution to the operations on the Italian front. ..... Isolated uriil:s c:1t the begin ning, the Mule-Train Units are now a phalanx which. with its diuturnal sacrifices of blood. writes pages of pure heroi sm .....

Their contribution to victory eq uals that of the fighting troops". Experts of the War of Liberation sa id t he n, and st ill say at present, that withi n the fra mework of the operations in Europe , the Italian pack-mule units. tog ether with t he other aux iliary un its (200,000 men), shortened the duration of the war by at least six months. Here one is instin c tively led to ask : what wou ld be Europe today if t he advance from the East had

NOTES

two uni ts per division were sometim es necessary. Besides th e Commander. the o ther officers were: the deputy Comm ander. the section or platoon leaders . a quartermaster offi ee. a doctor, a veterinary and a chaplain. (13) Formerly 20th Mule-Train Group (5 batta lions . fo r a toli)I of 15 un1\s). (1 4) Wi th six uni ~s. (1 5) Each with five units. (16 ) DespiLe the laborious start of th e 2nd unit and the diso rd erly birth of the 9th and 11 th, the com m ~nd actio n or six Jirst-rate o fficers, three of whom from th e reserve - Maj. Turrini. fo rm er Commander of the "Lanc1en di Novara·•, Artil lerv Cap tains Simone and Galli, Cava lry Capt ains Chi arazzo and Palagi and Lieutenan t (later Captain) Sanson, an Infantry officer - was a de teminant factor for the good conduct of the men, (17) On the con s titution of these units and at the beginning of the ir employment, Maj. Turrini who. although he had not ye t been appointed battalion Commander, superintended all the PackMule units stationed in the Santerno Valley, gave a remar_kable contri bution, with his action and his personal prestige. to overcom e that period of cri sis, wJ,i ch concer ned part ic ularly the 12th and the 16th. which later o n received repeated and well deserved p(aise from (he Allied commanders . in recog nition of th ei r good performan ce. (18) The Ba ttalion had the \ask to train th e newly arrlv!:ltl µ1:: rsonnel destined to the pack- M ule units att ached to the 5th Army, and was part of the 525 th Infantry Re giment "Addestramento" (Tra ining). In the first months o f 794!;i. it had replaced and taken over the tasks of the Mule-Train Tng. Center constituted 1n 1944 (Locations: Gecina. Bagni d i Casciaoa, Cignano) start ing fro m the sm all uni t co ns tituted o n Novem ber 27, 1943 (1 9) Paratroop Group of the 185tb "Nembo" Regl ment, stationed in southern Italy. which o n the day o f the armi stice o f Septembe r 1943 gathered aro und Cavalry Capt. Carlo Francesco Gay, of the same regimen t. and started to fight

against th~ Germans. Attached to U1e Canadian 1st Division in October 1943, the unit was tra nsferred to the Bri tish XIII Corps. Initially (Dece mber 1943) the Gro up took the name of " I Reparto Speciale Autonomo" and later (Marc h 1944) th at o f " F Reco nnaissa oce T roop " . From Puglia to Emili a it c ar ried o ut ilY)port ant exploration. informa\ion and combat tasks. (20} The 479th (vlounta1n Battery was the Italian unite; o f the 7th British Mountain Art illery Regi men t. Th e battery arrived in the operation zone ii'\ June 1944, was o (gani zed wjthi n the British Ul)il and took part \n all its activities. performing tasks s1mllar to those of a Pc1ck -Mul e unit It suffered considerable losses in dead, wounded and m issing. (21 ) On thi s date. at Fos ombron e. the " Centro Addestramento Salmerie" (CASJ was constituted, simil ar to the one of th e 5th Arm y. The Centre was c harged with the training of all personnel of the Mule-Train units of the Brj!·sh 8th Army~ (22) Arti c le ''Th e Auxilia ry Units in the W ar of Liberati on" by Enrico Boscardi. " Rivista Mllitare", no. 5/ 86. p. 62, (able B. note (1 ),_ (23) The U.S. Techn,cal Supervision Regiment (TSR) and the British l.,iai son Units (BLU) were Al lied units working w ith the Italian units, o fli.ci ally es tablished at the beginning of 1944 by order o f the XV A rmy Group Headquarters (Gen. Al ex ande r) Th eir tasks consisted In cooperation. survc lllonce :3r1d control (tr-a ining, lia ison~ technic al assi stance). (24) See 1111 Tempo'', J anuaty 3, 1985, Artic le by Enrico Boscardi "Difficult Relations with the Al lies. Th e Campai gn of Liberalion wi th the Americans an d the Bri ti sh", {25) The " Guide" Battalion on Sep tember 8 was part of the 114lh Coast Reg iment. It was supposed to con tr ibu te to the con sti tution of the rap id reconnaissance ba ttalion of the 51 st Corps. but the order w as c ancelled. In January the " Guide'' becam e part or the 514th In fantry RegTment and in M arch con stituted the initial nucleus o( the 21st Mule-Train Group.

(1 ) Article- " L' Eserc ito Italian o nella Guerr1;1 di Libe razione" by Luciano Lollio. from the volume La Guerra d1 Liberazione. Scntti nel Trentennale" . Uffic10 Stori co SME. 1979, p. 145. (2 ) From th e volu me "The Fi ghting 36th. A Picto r ial History o f the Texas Division in Combat". published by "The 36th D1vis1on Associatfon. Aus tin. Te xas", 1945, p. 32 -33. (3) Arti c le "The Auxiliary Uni ts in th e War of Libera ti on", by Enrico Boscardi", Rivlsta Mili\are. no. 5186. p 61-62. (4) Of the ex isting eight Au xili ary Divisions (205th , 209th, 210th. 227th, 228th, 230th. 231 th and It. Hq. 212th ) only four had Pack-Mule t.Jn1ts: the 209th. 210th. 228th and 231th. (5) The Memorandum (Augu st 15. 1943) stated that tl:le armisti ce cond!lions could be c hanged in llaly's favour in proportion w ith the contribution given by the Italian governm en t and people to th e All ies. a9 ainst Germany, during the remaining period of war. (6) These were 250 mules. with harness and relevan t personnel (officers. NCOs and m uleteers) des tined to the Allies (British) in the Foggia area. (7) 5 office rs. 11 NCOs, 318 privates and 2?3 mules. [8) The unit. co nsisting of 7 officers . 309 NCOs and p rivates and 233 m ules, left on November 13th for San Severo d i Pugli a and then proceeded to the front line. (9) Later on ft will be ca lled "Cen tro Add es tramento Salmerie'' (M ule:rrain Tn g. Center) (10) The 1st and 2nd Mule-Train Groups will become respectively the 21st and 20th M ule-Train Group. (11) He held this office until th e en d of 7944, wh en was appointed Comman der of the 20th Mule-Tra in Co mba t Group. (1 2) Each unit cons1sted of about 450 rn en, 12 saddle horses. 370 mules and. as a r ule, co uld sa tfsfy t/1e needs o f a stationary division: on an 0Hens1ve.

con t inu ed for another six

mcnths?" .

Brig. Gen. Enrico Boscardi

JAC UES COURTOIS II Borgognone Painter of battles

"II Borgognone" was a lively interpreter of the battles fought during his lifetime as well as of the great biblical battles. He has left even in his self-portrait the mark of his passionate devotion to this artistic subiect.

Jacques Courtois (SaintHippolyte. France, 1621- Rome. 1676), called "// Borgognone", had painting in his blood : his father was a painter of icons. He was thel'l initiated into the pai nti ng of sacred subjects but his destiny soon brought him away from his father's school as he moved to Italy and set himself under the protection of a ma n-at-arms. From then. t he barely adolescent Jacques discovered his real in terest. and the subject of his art. a subj ect from whi ch he drew. with amazing accu racy and constancy, the fuel tor his future inspiration: ba ttles. Courtois would actually rei nterpret - th roug h his whole career - that theme in a thousand variants. with t he passionate enthusiasm which always remai ns the real characteristic of his personali ty. II Borgognone was a man of action. of strong feelings. of " full-blooded temper", as his biographers usually describe him. Indeed. the impression of such an ardent nature is imprinted in every choice. every act. moment or feeli ng of his life: from the passion ate love for his wife, Maria Vaiani , to the absolu te devotion to ascetic life in the Society of Jesus - which he joined after being left a widower - an d to his fa ithfulness to the subject of his pa inting. It is just in art. of course, that privileg ed place where the very essen ce of the ba ttle painter's personality emergers and asserts itself with more vigour. In the con fl ict. in the cla sh of arm ies. Courtois has actually detected a phenomenon where great energy and mig ht is displayed and where - in the complete involvement of the

Left.

In the self-portrait. one of his last works, the Borg ognone reaches artistic maturit y. Here he reaches almost an impress1onist,c effect rhrough the emphatic contrasts between h is own austere image and the vain and violent activit y of the world (symbolized by the min iature ballle) which he has by now left behind him. Gallena deg/, Utfizi - Florence.

basic strength of man - the utmost intensity and tragedy is reached . This tendency to tu rn contrasts into open figh t - a tendency which involves and betrays a need for energetica lly figu rative artistic representations. using weapons and blood contri butes to the inclusion of Borgognone in the characteristic spirit of the Baroque. Courtois's ma rked predi lection for battle themes ca n in fact be r\ghtly understood as his own way of seei ng and interpreting the most fel t demands of the spirit of the XVI I Century . Int ernal conf lict would be given a radical expression and be resolved - without dangerous and disq uieting residua ls - in absol ute action s. in crucial outlets: therefore more on the dramatic and emotional planes than on the theoretical c:HHJ ideological ones . The rise of such a tenden cy was due to the feeling bred by the Counter-Reformation. which was permeati ng all the XV II Centu ry art. It was a might ily aHermative and authoritative sentiment which - by avoiding the deep crux in which ma nnerist uneasiness an d difficulties origi nated and leaving it f unda mentally unsolved on the rational

One of !he first works of the Borgognone, which represents a moment of preparation for the action of war. Vatican Ga llery. no. 807.

level - privi leged the evidence of t he sensory, of visua l repre sentation, and choreographi c suggestion. But Jacques didn't certainly come suddenly, without an earn est and int imate search . to absorbing all the potentialities of the ba roque spirit and to incorporat ing them into his persona l style. The process whi ch led him to stick to seventeenth Century tastes was a slow and gradual one. His love for Rome - the undisputed centre of irradiation of baroque art - is the first evidence. It is not difficult to reconstruct the f undamenta l stages of this artistic journ ey; it can suffice to observe some of his first attempts at war sub jects. They are th ree oil-paintings kept in the Vatican Gallery. The first one in chronological order is undoubtedly no. 807. It is not actually a battle. but rather a representati on of immediately precedi ng moments. Signs of agitation are in the

anima ls: the th ree dogs in t he foregrou nd and t he horses q uivering and prancing. As for the rest, t he scene is somewhat stati c, and t his impression is emphasized by the motionless figu re of t he horsema n summon ing t he troops w ith his bugle. The second one is no. 810. The tendency to impart more and more energy to the scene becomes here more ev ident, but the f igures' movements still retain a certa in stereotyping and, above all , one does not get t he immed iate impression of the mass in motion, which wi ll be a constant feature o f Jacques' future art. The th ird one is no. 442. In it, Courtois takes a decis ive step towards t he conquest of his own pictorial lang uage, of his pecu liar expression of volume and movement. The scene is agitated, the space grows w ith figures, t he motions of drapings, of horse manes, of t he fighters themselves ga in natura lness and velocity. Cou rtois has by now mastered the style demonstrated in his best works. For the real ization of these pictures, Jacques certain ly

availed himse lf of his triennial experience as a so ldier of the Spanish army, wh ich took place in the environs of M ila n. This was in fact his first post since his arrival in Italy, where, in 1636, he was obl iged to em igrate together w ith two cf his younger brothers. He had to face such a dangerous journey because o f the raging of the Thirty Years' War, which - w ith the death of his father made it impossible for Jacques to go on liv ing in France . After his three-years' soldiering, Courtois devoted himself exc lusively to his painting wh ich, in fact, he had never neglected - and gained considerable success. In that age, a new taste for col lecting pictures was arising, necess itating t hat the pai nters, as a consequence, concentrated t hei r artistic creation on sma ller ca nvases. According to such a trend, Borgognone preferred to pa int ease l- pictures rather t han large pictures or frescoes, because the fo rmer were easily carried and sold and several patrons wished to hang Âˇthem in their houses and mansions.

In a short time Jacq ues Courtois, ca lled by now Giacomo Cortese, was known all ove r Ita ly, and particularly in Rome, (where afte r long ing to be there. he fina lly arrived in 1640) as Borgognone of the Battles. Sometime after, however, another painter became known in Rome as Borgognone: it was his younger brot her Gug lie lmo, who was a painter of sacred subjects and left frescoes and altar-pieces in Rome and in many cathedra ls of the Castell i (Castel Ga ndolfo. Ariccia, Monteporzio) . He rarely painted military subjects. Besides the paintings in the Congrega tion o f the Col legio Romano (wh ich he made t o comp lete the work begun by his brott1er Jacques) he left a very interesting fresco entit led the Battaglia di Giosue, which he real ized for t he Ouirinal Gal lery by appointment of Pope Alexander VII. It is in teresting to observe how, when they are treating the same artistic sub ject, the two brotl,ers show two deep ly differing sty les, so expressing a different sensitiveness to the various demands of the t ime.

A powerful perception of the whole - typical of the Baroq ue rules and organizes Giacomo's battles, where the whirling mass of the fighters gravitates round an ind iv idual or a group standing out in the foreground. This perception is lacking in Guglielmo's fresco of the Ouirinal Gallery, where the definition of t he details results in their being given greater weight than the total effect of the composition. The warriors fight man to man. Theirs is an individual

Left top. The representation

of th e defeated

enemies crushed by the fury of horses is a constant, and deeply humane, element in Courtois. Vatican Gallery, no. 810.

Above.

The Battaglia di Giosue by Guglielmo Cortese, brother of Borgognone. The painter fills up space with soldiers who struggle man-to-man, while Giosue - in the act ot invoking divine intervention - is driven into the background. Ouirinal Gallery â€˘ Rome.

battle. Their movements are almost theatrical, their sequence unwinds in a long foreground causing the flattening of perspective so that Joshua - in the act of appealing to the. divine intervention which would stop the sun - is pushed in the background, above the fray, like a shadow without prominence. In such choices, Guglielmo is a long way from baroque taste. which preferred to centre al l the meaning and emotional power in the total effect. thus sacrificing the concentration on particulars. After all, this fresco is one of t he first artistic works of Guglielmo. On the contrary, many baroque demands are met in the Battaglia di Giosue. The action of tt1e piclure takes up all the available space by the overlapping of his figures and leaves very little room for empty spaces. All this fits perfectly into the baroque need to close, through its strong concreteness, every space against the corrosion of doubt. The fear of doubt, of that eternal uncertainty which had troubled mannerist conscious-

ness during the years of the Council of Trent (we see, in literature, Ham let's drama) turns, in painting, into fear of empty space, of that "suspension" which bears with it the risk of reviving the painfu l perplexity (consider, now, the opposite of Hamlet Othello, who, never being touched by dou'bt, resolves his despair in a bloody and absolute action). Therefore, filling up and crowding space becomes an urgent need of baroque art, a need which Guglielmo Courtois himself cannot escape. In Giacomo, on t he contrary, this trend is lighter and more controlled. Also his backgrou nds are often filled with vc1rious objects such as towers, towns. castles and his skies with thick masses of clouds or with the smoke of the artilleries. They are, however. generally toned and distant and are never dominating on account of the ir heaviness and materiality, as in many contemporaries of his. In the second, and more significant, phase of his artistic production, however, this trend to crowd the canvas with images

and figures in motion becomes evident also in Giacomo Cortese. Gradually and deliberately, in fact - as we have already said - he came to consent to all the most prominent and typical trends of the Baroque. dominating in XVII Century Rome. From th is point of view. a crucial moment was Giacomo's entry into the Society of Jesus. which caused his further approach to the world of the Counter-Reformation. Although in the first moment Cortese felt in himself a need .to completely renounce any former activity - giving up, obviously, also the pleasure of painting - he after .some time yielded a wide artistic production. at the invitation of the Jesuits themselves and of private individua ls (in this instance. he obviously devolved his earnings to the . community). But the new religious inspiration. while urging him to people his skies with divine figures - in order to be able to tangibly demonstrate the providential guidance of human destiny and history - didn't distract his attention from the

military world. Actually, he had a predilection for those episodes of re lig ious and particularly biblical history where the power of divine intervention. side by side with the just. is clearly displayed in the crucial moment of the armed clash (the just winning against the adverse forces of evil). It is just in this most interesting artistic work that the influence of the spirit of CounterReformation becomes deeper and more marked. This influence revealed itself in Cortese and in his contemporaries as an impulse towards the creation of an art which would celebrate the Catholic Church, which. after the tempest of the Anglican Schism, was reaffirming on sounder bases its earthly and spiritual powers. But the recuperation of those lost certainties was carried out through the imposition of the Dogmas of Faith constructed and professed by the Council of Trent, which was by that time refusing any dialogue with the other part of Christianity and

causing the Inqu isition to become more repressive. Therefore the methods themselves wherewith the Restoration and the triumph of the Catholic Church were carried out - methods which substantially escaped any proper critical revision rekindled that need for a persuasive clarity which we have already referred to. The art which wished to mirror such a triumph was obliged to transfer the dimensions of matter and flesh to the world of faith and spirit. The baroque art of sacred insp iration - especially in altarpieces - often presents a peculiar horizontal division of the pictorial space into these two worlds, the earthly one and the heavenly one, ascribing to both the same Âˇ corporeal consistence. The Angels. the Saints. the Madonnas, though they are hovering and triumphing in heaven. still retain an "instrumental" concreteness, that is, a concreteness whose purpose is to reaffirm to the perception of the senses the tangibility of the spiritual world. With Giacomo Cortese these themes find complete and earnest realization. but they are never characterized by the typical heaviness of a larg e part of baroque art. Proof of this can be found in the frescoes of the second phase of his artistic production which, besides being battle scenes. have a religious character. They are the frescoes of the Chapel of the Oratory of the Congregation Prima Primaria at the Co llegio Romano. which was established in 1658. By that time, it was scarcely a year since Courtois had become a member of the Jesuit Community and soon the Vicar-General of the Order. Padre Gian Paolo Oliva, - a great connoisseur of fine arts - asked him to fresco the six lunettes and the six rectangular spaces below them in the Chapel of the Oratory. Of these frescoes. those Âˇ which Giacomo Cortese actually painted (some of them were executed by his brother Gu-

Facing page. The Vittoria di San Luigi Re di Francia. The divine intervention in the action of war is symbolized here, in accordance with the dictates of baroque art, by two little angels bearing the crown of victory and the Fleurs.-de-lis. Chapel of the Oratory at the Collegio Romano.

Above. The Vittoria di

Narsete su Toti l a. The Borgognone invests here all his knowledge of perspective. The figures, animated by a great energy, crowd the p ictori al space g iving compactness to the composition. As always the artist, while celebrating a triumph, doesn't forgo its tragedy. Chapel of the Oratory at the Collegio Romano.

Right. The Vittoria di Re Ferdinando di Castiglia. A direct and sublime commun ication takes place here between the divine and the human. In comparison with the King and the Madonna, the battle , being a vain moment of earthly history, is transcended and acquires a deeper meaning by the providential intervention. The minuteness of the battle contrasting with the much bigger figures in the foreg round will remain a characteristic trait of the Borgognone's last works. Collegio Romano.

g lielmo and others are of doubtfu l attribution) constitute his most valuable work. The Battaglia di San Luigi Re di Francia bears the mark of the most vital and effective Borgognone. The figures of the

painting are endowed with great corporeal - almost sculptural consistence and a powerful agitation generates life in them . Furthermore, a deep imploring human suffering is on the dismayed countenances of the

defeated, as in the case of the scldier who has fallen on his back among the hoofs of the Saint King's white horse. The battle, of course, is sponsored by the divine powers, here symbolized by two little angels - the one almost a specular image of the other bearing the crown of victory and the Fleurs-de-lis of France. The fresco of the Vittoria di Narsete su Toti/a appears st ill more compact and energetic. The space is crowded to the utmost, the force of movement skilfully expressed and the two knights in the foreground seem really to jump out of the pictorial space in their overwhelming charge which defeats King Totila and his men. Here Cortese demonstrates a knowledgeable technique of colour and chiaroscuro which confers a volumetrical impression to the images . The calm figure of the Virgin, however, does not participate in the general structure of the painting and looks almost as if it was added afterwards . Âˇ In the Vittoria di Re Fer. dinando di Castiglia, on the

contrary, the Madonna takes on a prominent dynamic role in the pictorial composition in that her figure is perfectly balanced on the opposite side by the figure of the King, who is completely detached from the fray and is kneeling in contemplation of her. Here the divine intervention. which resolves the fight in favour of the Christian King. is more manifest than ever. The violent movement of the war scene in the centre of the composition clearly contrasts with the hieratic immobility of the Virgin and the King. King Ferdinand can look at the battle from the outside while he is in communication with the heavenly powers and can perceive their action which rules and guides to a good end that feverish swarming of unaware mortals. As for the battle itself. which represents the Moors, fleeing like a winding river, and Ferdinand's soldiers, runn ing after them, it is of such minute proportions as to form an extremely complex and homogeneous whole.

Above and right. The two lunettes represent the roles of two biblical heroines, Maria, sister o f Moses, and Deborah. Their r elationship to the Virgin , to whom the Chapel of the Oratory is c onsecrated, is explained in the cartouch w ritlen in latin .

The same characteristic minuteness of the battle composition can be found in the Lunettes. In these. as in the Vittoria di Re Ferdinando di Castiglia, the battles do not constitute the dominant theme anymore. but are introduced as a background to the biblical themes . by which the six paintings are inspired . Their protagonists are as many heroines of the Old Testament. whose relation with the Virgin - to whom the Chapel of the Oratory is consecrated - is shown with the help of epigraphs in latin. Analogously, in the self. portrait - a wonderful example of Borgognone's maturest art an extremely minute battle serves as a distant background for hisÂˇ figure, which therefore stands like a giant. dressed in the black robe of the Jesuits.

This self-portra it was painted in 1675, a year before t he death of Borgognone, by appoi ntme nt of Cosimo Il l de' Med ici for t he Galle ria deg li Uffizi of Florence. On the serene and melancholy face of the artist we can read the overcoming of any involvement with the rea l world. The distanci ng from the agitation ofÂˇ the battl e, w hich his fig ure dominates, is a symbol of th is state of sou l. The battle f ills up all the space beh ind his figure, reaching as far as t he hor izon. It is therefore a clear rep resen tation of t he world (which he has by now left beh ind him} and a sign of his love for this particular artisti c subject, to which he owes his fame as a painter. The composition is full of contrasts produced by a deft use of chiaroscuro and by the busy and hori zonta l act ion in the backg roun d aga inst the motionless and vertica l portrait in the foreground . Some disquieting factor emerges from the vis ion of the picture because of t he excessive portion of space devoted to t he

big black area of t he robe which f ills up more than ha lf of it - and of t hose b lack clouds just on the edge of t he canvas. This is one of t he last works of Giacomo Cortese. It can therefore be considered to be one o f his last conquests in the field of art, in that here he succeeds in reach ing an almost impressionistic efiect. This last irnage that "// Borgognone" wis hed to express of himself was a conscious synthesis of his l1u ma n, artistic and relig ious real iti es and constitutes h is extreme mes sage w hic h is total detachment from the world. Lia Nardella

Notes. (1) All the biographical re ferences and the dates are drawn from : " I pillori Borgognoni Cortese (C ourtois) e la loro casa in Pi azza di Spagna " by Frnncesco Alberto Salvagn ini. Fra tell i Palombi Ed itori, r~oma. 1936. (2) Wy lie Sypher "Rinascimento, Manierisrno, Barocco " , Marsilio Editori , Padova, 1968 ("Four Stages of Renaissance Sty le", 1955).

Lia Nardelli' was born in Rom e on 31.10 1957. She h.;Js a clegrec in Modern Lvnguages frorn

Rome Un iversi ty and contnt)utes to s pccia lized reviews. Since 1983 she has lleen on the sta ff of the editorial office of ÂˇÂˇ R1vis1a M 1l1 tare".

TECHNICAL

.r.1.1.1 TRANSPIRING NBC SUIT The Italian industry, in collaboration with the Armed Forces, has produced a combat garment with long-wear characteristics comparable to those of a normal uniform. At the same time. the suit's protective qualities meet NATO's most recent requ irements. Th e garment permits the body to transpire normally and, among other things: • gives full protection from chemical and biological agents and - if used tog ether with a gasmask - greatly reduces the effects of rad ioactive fa llout; • reduces to a minimum the risks of skin scalds caused by th e flash of nuclear explosions; • assures perfect camouflage, both in visible light and in infra red environmen ts. The suit is impermeable to rain and oils, is not damaged by lubrican ts and fuel and is washable by hand or machine. This lightweight garmen t can be donned in a few seconds and fits a wide r ange of body sizes (3 sizes are sufficient to equip all individuals) . Strict protective e ffectiveness tests against war agents, including nerve gas, have been carried out in cooperation with specialized institutions of scientific research and have confirmed the validity of the transpiring NBC suit, which enables the Armed Forces to face the chemical and nuclear risks with an extremely reliable personal equip men t.

"MFS" ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE A consortium of industries has begun the feasibility study fo r the development of a medium-range antiaircraft missile system, the " MFS" (Mittleres Flarak System) specifically conceived for the interception of missiles. airplanes and hel icopters flying at low altitude. The pho tograph shows the probable general architecture of the system, whose installation on cross-country wheeled vehicles is proof of an effort to achieve the highest mobility.

DATA

TECHNICAL

DATA

IMPROVEMENTS. ON THE "ABRAMS" M1 TANK The "Abrams" M1 Al (former M1 El) continues to enter service equipped with the new (larger) turret armed with the Rheinmetall 120 mm cannon, produced under licence in the US. Its weight has gone up to 60 t but. besides the replacement of the turret, the tank has undergone other improvements. It is now pressurized. with a filter in the oir intake, for collective NBC protection; the ballist ic computer rangefinder has been replaced by an even better one, and the armour has been further improved. But the Arms Combat System Test Act ivity (CS TA) has more improvements under study. some of which should concern the whole Ml series: • new longer-duration tracks, which get less hot for lower thermic detection: at present. the T156 tracks have a life span of 960-1.760 km depending on terrain and modes of employment. New tracks. known at the XT158, are now being tested. Compared with the West German D570N-DI -EHL, similar to those employed by the "Leopard 2", these tracks are cheaper and tast longer; • modified transmission and gears, to

PROJECT OF A LASER ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPON

red uce the maximum speed. which in practice is never used, from 72 to 65.5 km/h, while improving accelera tion, which in certain situations is very useful for escaping fire rapidly and negotiating particular obstacles; , reinforced M 1 A1 shock absorbers. which offset the increase in weight resulted from the modifications (from 55 to 60 t) while keeping the same

ground-to-hull clearance (48 cm); • better stowage capability, with a removable cage behind the turret for the less necessary materials. Furthermore, accurate studies are under way to make maintenance and repairs easier and faster, with the aim of achieving the capability to perform most operations - up to a certain level in a combat environment.

•

The German industry, sponsored by the Ministry of Defence, has started studies for an antiaircraft weapon system based on laser. The preliminary studies have let to the production of a scale model of what should be a system installed on the chassis of a "Leopard 2" tank. Reportedly, the construction of. a prototype/demonstrator is now about to begin; with this, the feasibility study proper will start. In general, when we hear of a laser weapon, we instinctively think of the U.S. Strategic Oetcn:.c Initiative; on the

contrary, this type of weapon will probably be deployed on earth sooner than in space. The efficacy of the laser weapons at low altitudes and short distances could compel the attacking aircraft to penetrate at higher altitudes, with positive results for the air defence as a whole.

BOOK

REVIEWS

Umberto Cappuzzo: "WHAT KIND OF ARMY?,, Dino Publications, Rotne, 1986, 208 pages, 20,000 Lire With an introduction by Senator GIOVANNI SPADOLINI

What type of defense? What kind o f army? What is the point of the d ra ft? Is a system of vo lu ntary military service a viable alternative for our co untry? Th ese and other questions. all raised in the course of a strenuous debate over mi litary life in general, barracks living in particular and questions of consent and participation, have been given an unusual amount of attention in the mass media during the summer of 1986, leaving the general public both curious and perplexed concerning a number of points for which fitting explanations could not be found. At issue are a set of weighty problems whose politica l, economic, technical and social ramifications have helped create a situation of balance - in terms of the choice to be made which is ill-sui ted to faci le analys is. The nature of this balanced framework is such that eventual modifications. be they motivated by functional considerations or by the exigencies of the moment, must necessarily be the fr uit o f realis tic investigations together with concrete programmatic projections. The unusual fervo r currently in evidence was set ott during the last few months by a number of painful incidents which have unexpectedly thrust the military organization - in all its many-facetted complexity - onto the national stage. An essen tia l lack of interest in situations and problems which had been mistakenly, th ough very willingly, seen as th e exclusive domain of "professional" military personnel has been rep laced by an almost morbid interest in the subject, an interes t which all too of ten proves superficial. given the fickle nature of the judgements involved and the related desire to implement change merely fo r the sake of c hange. Restrained by the incompatibi lity of their intellectual orientations, certain publications have had very little experience in . cove ring, or following the progress of military issues. Not wanting to be left out in the cold, however, they have resorted to the standard anti-military, post -1968 "fare", working on the principle that it is batter to lash out than to understand. or to try to make others understand. A separate group of publications. working along more serene. more serious lines, has presented the under-

lying causes and p roblems, the areas of light as well as those of darkness. p ropos ing a process ot claritication wh ich wou ld undoubtedly benefit both the insti tution and the private citizen . Whatever the case, the attention cureently being paid to things military is definitely to be welcomed - despite the sad string of events which produced it - the result is a constructive dialogue geared towards solving a number of fundamental problems (with a particular emphasis on the condition of military life) . problems which the armed forces have been tryi ng for years, but only with varying degrees of success, to shift from what is essentially an internal con text open only to those in the field to a dimension which truly involves the entire nation. Given this scenario, the publication of Umberto Cappuzzo's book "What Kind of Army?" definitely represents a fitting, tremendously important event Imbued with a disti nctive personality, the book otters both reflections and in-depth analyses. all the while providing a healthy undercurrent of its own p roposals . At its core is a very luc id examination of both the distant and the more recent factors underl ying t he controversial relationship between the military and society, between the individual citizen and the institution of military service. One of the root causes of th is state of things is a "culturally-derived lack o f understanding" traceable to a shortage of information and a low level of interest; indeed, a good many Italians. if not the ma jority, would be hardp ressed even to give an adequate answer to the question: "Why do the armed forces exist?". "It seems like a joke", emphasizes the author, "bu t no one has ever conducted an in formation campa ign designed to give a complete and, most importan t, convincing answer to this fundamental question. As a result, we have been burdened for far too long 'Jy this mysterious weight, this negative heritage, th is tax whose purpose and function are only known to us in the sketchiest of terms". This explains the need for spreading an improved understanding of the military d imension "as a social phenomenon of tre mendous importance, given that it touches each and every male citizen at a crucial juncture in his life, the period between his schooling and

his entry into the working world ''. It also underscores the vital importance ot making a unified effort - one involving every sector of society - aimed at guaranteeing that th is period represen t a useful. formative time for al l involved - as is only right - both within a moral and c ivic framework and within the context of a consolida tion of our indispensable democratic va lues. be they individual or collective. a task designed to further our cou ntry's progress. These are the assumptions underlying an investigation which combines the historical, sociological and poli tic al prospectives as it sorts through a series o f questions, c larifications and subtle points of fine -tuning on the way to its ultimate goal: a picture whose color and charm is matched only by its ability to express and explain a rea lity which appears unmistakably alive and rich with potential for the futu re. The book is structured as an interview. Emilio Cavaterra puts the questions to Cappuzzo, whose answers lend form and substance to the convictions and intellectual positions he has developed over the co urse bf a long, intensely lived ca reer, a caree r which has taken him to the very heights of the military establishment. Written in this concise, ind irect format. "What Kind of Army?" amounts to an X-ray of the Service as it stands today: the contradictions are all there, but so are the causes fo r hope and the signs of vitality. The book is not meant, however, as a mere "guide" fo r those new to the field or a s imp le review of the many military problems currently up for discussion. Thanks to its undercurrent of substantive proposals. it reaches beyond the scope of an exclusively descriptive or critical work, becoming a highly intelligent cata lyst to furthe r undestand ing and action. This is the sense of the "strategy for structural renewal" which Cappuzzo lays out as an " updated understanding of a modern military institution's ra ison d'etre" within a society which must, for its own part. continue on in the development of its civ il consciousness. In keeping with th is line of thought. a third alternative arises in the dilemma over whether to maintain an army of conscripts or an army of professionals: a militia-army manned by citizen.

BOOK

soldiers who "view national security as an essential function of life in a community". . Here, the term "security" is Âˇused in its broadest possible sense, referring both to military and civil service: in short, to a system of "service to one's country" in which all citizens, without exception, must offer their contribution in order that "the citizen might see himself as a 'civis' participating in the Res Publica". Anything but utopian, this scenario rests on an intuitive perception of a new society which has already taken shape among us. In the last few years, the country has become more thoroughly homogeneous than ever before. overcoming centuries-old contrasts and artificial divisions. It is up to the nation's political and cultural leaders to further this process, renewing what are by now worn -out sociological and economic categories and smoothing the road towards the greater social and national maturity which already represent a part of our present. Viewed in this light, one can safely hypothesize a new. more authentic relationship between the Army and society. Sandro Fantina

REVIEWS

G. Tumiati: "Prigionieri nel Texas" ("Prisoners in Texas"),Âˇ Mursia, Milan, 1985, 204 pages, 14,000 Lire. Up to now. one voice has always been missing from the tragic chorus of Ital ian soldiers who fo ught in World War Two: the voice of the very few men who experienced the singular fate of undergoing years of imprisonment in the United States and then choosing not to rejoin the fight on

the side of the allies. This gap has now been filled by the journalist and writer Gaetano Tumiati. who tells of his own experience as a young cavalry lieutena.nt captured after two years of combat in May of 1943 on the occasion -Of the fall of Tunisia and then sent off to an isolated prison camp in the Texas desert. where he remained until the end of January 1946. In reality, the camp was a very comfortable, clean place where Tumiati and his fellow officers were treated in a surprisingly lackadaisical, generous way, though. if the truth be told, not without an undercurrent of disdain; in any event. conditions were decidedly better - at least during the initial part of their confinement - than those suffered by the prisoners languishing in the camps of Africa and India, or even those experienced by a large part of Italy's civilian population. In what amounted to a limbo, almost totally cut off from the rest of the world. the young officers waited. discovering previously unknown artistic bents (one of the more interesting cases is that of Giuseppe Berto. who actually found his vocation as a writer in the p ri son camp, where he penned some of his most beautiful works) and organ izing an eager hodgepodge of intellectual activities, seminars and impromptu conferences. all of which

BOOK came to a stop with the incredible news of Septem,ber 8th. Not possessing any information or direction from above, left entirely to their own devices and subjected to incessant pressure by the Americans, whoÂˇ wanted them to join the Allied cause as soon as possible (which meant an immediate return home), the prisoners tore themselves apart in cruel, painful debates, until, by the end, only a very few .had refused the American offer. For those men, labelled as die-hard fascists by the Americans (though in reality, as Tum iati explains, the motives of those who stayed in the camp were numerous and complex; there were some who refused to change sides out of respect for their fallen com rades, while others turned out to be dogmatic Marxists}. the period that fol lowed was one of increasing .abuse and ever more stringent oppression, culminating in a regime of hunger a_nd suffering which stretched almost Âˇ to the moment of their delayed liberation. Tumiati remained steadfast in his decision to suffer the consequences of his initial beliefs right down to the bitter end, and this resolve was only strengthened by the devestating news that his younger brother - to whom the most moving pages of the book are dedicated - also a tank officer and a volunteer in the African campaign, had become a commander in the res istance following the events of September 8, and was captured by the fascists. Refusing the clemency offered him by his captors, he was shot, equally steadfast in his loyalty to the other side (today, the 19th armored battalion of the Friuli Brigade is named after Francesco Tumiati, holder of Italy's highest military decoration, the Gold Medal) . And here the narrative ends. The strength of the work lies in its vivid moral portrait of a generation betrayed, a generation which proved itself able to suffer and fight with dignity in a pointless war. The true protagonists of the book - even more so than the telling description of the prison camp microcosm, a tableau created with unusual sincerity and not a little affectionate irony - are the consciences of Tumiati and his companions, the anguished conflict between a pa ined search for dignity (a quality which h1id tn hP. rP.RffirmP.d before the eyes of the enemy as well) and the first doubts concerning the possibly false nature of the values they had grown up with, values which they were nevertheless loath to abandon, convinced that it was too late to change sides. At a remove of forty years, when history's judgement on the nature of those wounds is calm and definitive, one can not help but cast a kind eye at young men like Tumiati, men who, having been betrayed in the generosity of their youth by the fascist regime, believed that they could ransom the digni-ty of their country,

REVIEWS

their army and their selves by choosing the path of sacrifice. Daniele Ravenna

Gambino Vivere con la Bomba

Sagittar'i Laterza

A. Gambino: "Vivere con la Bomba" ("Living with the Bomb"), Laterza, Bari, 1986, 333 pages, 26,000 Lire. The dawn of nuclear weapons has changed the role o f war as an instrument of politics. This transformation, however, has not been met by a corresponding change in culture- and politico-strategic procedures. As is always the case, emotional reactions, feelings of uncertainty and crises have come to the surface. Nuclear arms are nqt. however, possessed of their own regulating mechanisms. Political and strategic choices are not determined in relation to the available technology alone. They are the result of related perceptions and interests. These, in turn, are not identical in Europe and the United States. The evolution of technology, as well as the shift in the balance of power and the changing nature of United States domestic politics. have put some of the certainties of the past up for discussion, especially in the area of the United States' nuclear guarantee to Europe. The period of "nuclear innocence" lasted as long as America enjoyed absolute superiority. Nuclear arms could still be considered instruments of war and a nuclear victory was a viable option. Bertrand Russell, whose conversion to pacifism was to come at a later date, could blithely advise President Truman on the wisdom of attacking the USSR with nuclear weapons before the Soviets themselves became a nuclear power. Following the end of the United States' absolute superiority, and the

beginning of its current vulnerability, the situation became much more complicated. The idea of a massive, au tomatic deployment of nuclear arms was replaced by a model for selective use as formulated in the strategy of flexible response. In practical terms, a potential theater of war - a European theater in which direct, conventional defences would be supported by tactical nuclear weapons - was set off from an impossible, unthinkable type of war: a direct exchange of strategic nuclear attacks between the two superpowers. Obviously, this formulation did not sit well with the Europeans. Those nations which were able to free themselves from the system, such as De Gaulle's France, did so by establishing their own national nuclear deterrents. Those who, for one reason or another, did not have this option - such as Germany and Italy - made the best of a bad situation by pretending to be convinced that the doctrine of flexible response was primarily a strategy of deterrence which posed no danger in terms of an eventual test by fire. Today, both the overall situation and the perception of specific European national interests within the collective framework of the Alliance's interests are changing. Certain choices must be made, no matter how weighty and difficult they prove to be. Before this is done, however, it is important that the ramifications of nuclear arms, as well as the changes they have set in motion, be understood. This is what Garribino's book sets out to do. The author does not contemplate solutions. The various issues are approached in a manner which proves more problematic and indirect than programmatic and declarative. An effort is made to win the reader over through a very subtle line of thought, one which, at times, may actually be too indirect and veiled. The conclusions, however, are clear enough. It is not possible for a mid-sized power to entrust its own security to other states; any doctrine of nuclear victory is to be rejected; nuclear arms must continue to be instruments of "non-war": in other words, weapons employed for the sole purpose of deterrence-; the deterrence itself cannot be broad-based. but must remain min imal. meaning that it can not exceed the lim its of a national framework; the idea of unilaterally eliminating the bomb, a proposal backed by certain pacifist groups, is not only fool ish, but downright dangerous; the bomb exists, and it can not be "uninvented". The only responsib le course is to become familiar with it, gaining an understanding of its implications in the process, and formulate our actions accordingly. These are reasonable , suggestions which have our full support. Carlo Bess

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