Issuu

JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

JULY

AUGUST · 1985

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TRAINING AND CHARACTER EVOLUTION AND TRADITION

NOTES ON T~E STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION

THE PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE YEAR 2000

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CONTENTS European Military Press Association

RIVISTA MILITARE

The aim of the Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the technical and vocational training of Army Officers and NCOs. To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military thinking and as a forum of study and debate. The Rivista Militare is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and military matters through the pubblication of articles of current technical and scientific interest.

Training and Character Evolution and Tradition. (Umberto Cappuzzo)

The Problems of Defence on the Threshold of the Year 2000. (Giorgio Donati}

Editor: Col. Pier Giorgio Franzosi. Deputy Editor: Maj. Giovanni Cerbo. Telephone 47353078. Graph ic: Lt. Rino Fusi. Editori al Office: Via di S. Marco, 8 00186 Rome - Tel. 6794200 47353372 - 47355192. Ad vertisements: by Secretary of Rivista Militare Telephone 6794200.

Notes on the Study of Public Opinion. (Giro Di Martino)

Printed by: Tipografia Regionale - Rome.

Collective Security and National Defence. (Antonio Pelliccia)

Illustration s by: Rivista Militare. Registe red for transm ission by post. Subscriptions for 1985. Subscriptions run from January 1st (Back issues will be supplied until exhausted). Single issues: L. 3.000 - S 2 D.M. 6 - £ 2. Back Number. if available: L. 6.000 - $ 4: D.M. 12 - £4 Year"s subscription: Italy L. 16.000. Other countries L. 24.000. Payments may be made by cheque (residents ab road) or through Post Office Current Account n. 2252 1009 payable to SME Utticio Rivista Militare Sezione di Amministrazione - Via XX Settembre 123/A - Rome.

Registered at th e Rome Law Courts Decree n. 944 of 7-6- 1949 This issue went to press on M ay 20th, 1985.

Member o f USP J Unione Stampa Period ica Ita lia na

The Citizen and Defence. (Umberto Cappuzzo)

Are Citizens Informed about Defence Problems? (Luca di Schiena)

Is Public Opinion Interested in Defence Problems? (Giancarlo Mingoli}

18 The Royal Italian Army. (Valerio Gibellini)

26 27

Technical Data.

Book Reviews.

Rules for contributors. An yone can contribute. In the interest of the maximum objectivity of information, the Rivista Militare allows contributors considerable freedom, although it does not necessarily subscribe to their opinions. The articles are published unedited and free of any editorial constraints and are therefore the sole responsibility of the Author and reflect his personal ideas exclusively. The topic must be treated in an original way and the articles themselves should not exceed 10 typewritten pages in length. The Author, got his reward, makes over his exclusive article right to Rivista Militare. Rivista Militare can make over Author's exclusive article right to other pubblications and to the periodicals of EMPA (European Military Press Association). The articles should be accompanied by any necessary photographs, drawings and explanatory tables. Each auth or is requested to send a photograph of himself, together with his «curriculum vitae» and a 10-line summary of the article to be published. The Rivista Militare reserves the right to alter the article's title and to choose the typeface in which it is set.

which does not throw over her traditions but knows how to be modern, without asking what has to be done, and sets about bui ldi ng up a better future, w ithout asking for anyth ing in return . The Carabineri Corps is an extremely va luable benchmark, together with the othe r Institutions that are fighting the same battle, and it is fully justified in taking delight in the results obtained, and the prestige it enjoys in the great national community. But this is not the point of today's ceremony. "SENSITIVITY TO INNOVATION" AND INNOVATORY PROCESSES

Speaking t o you ng Officers who will shortly be expressing their full professional maturity in posts of responsibility on the threshold of the year 2000, this rallying call to take pride in past achievements has a sign ificance that we would do well to examine closely, so that we can draw 4

from it the needs and prospe,cts of the immediate present and the most dista nt future. In the age in which science and technology, information and commun ication, awareness and participation are reign ing supreme, the relationship between the men belonging to the Institutions and the, general public is qu ite different from what it used to be in the past. At a time of fast-moving development, the professionalism that I had occasion to address more thari once when I was the General Commanding, is not only the synthes is of a t raining process in which theory and practice, notions and procedures, cultura l heritage and acquired technical skills are perfectly harmonized. Certa inly it is all of these, but with Âˇ something more. That "something more" is not knowledge, nor experience, but sensitivity - sensitivity to innovation, to the innovatory processes through which we are living. These are innovatory processes that enhance the dignity

of man c:HH.I Lt1e good of society, freedom and consensus on the one hand, and the inexhaustible possibilities of electronics on the other. All of this reflects on the approach to be taken to personnel use and the command action in the broadest sense of the term. At the same time, they are innovatory processes which as far as we are directly concerned also give rise to modern criminal techniques that areÂˇ becoming increasingly menacing. All this determi nes the need for personne l specialization, to give our men the professional ski lls they need to beat the most aberrant forms of crime. such as those inspired by terrorism or the mafia, and wh ich are having such a har mful effect on the security of society through their domestic and internationa l ram ifications. The course that you have been attending will enable you to become aware of the duties that await you, in what I would call a historic perspective in the sense t hat it is linked to the

disciplinary or interdisciplinary approach to the education you are receiving. As such, it will be of relevance to you insofar as it enables you to transfer it to those duties you will be .given as you advance in your career. in a broader perspective, in wh ich society - present and future - will itself become the primary subject of a discipline that comprises, and conditions. al l the others. TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

"Sensitivity to innovation" also means the ability to take in the un ique contributions of technological and scientific progress, which does not merely mean designing appropriate methods but embarking on a real revolution in the way we approach problems. in the methods of analysis, in the procedures used to take decisions. It is the type of scientific and technologica l progress which has an educationa l impact on the man who makes use of it, affecting the way he reasons and his benchmark val ues. and it therefore takes on phi losophica l relevance in the ful l sense of the term . Data processing, which is now a fact of life wherever we look, is not just a technology as some have simplistically been led to believe; it is not merely a question of having equipment with a large storage capacity to be used by, and for the benefit of, man . It is much more than that: it is the affirmation of a new rationality which deeply affects t he pedagogical approach to training specialized personnel and the methods to be used to solve operational and forceuse and command problems. Faced with so many difficu lt ies. we often hear the selfstyled experts (who are anything but) laying down the law and sayi ng that the panacea to th is or that operaticnal problem is a "data bank". This is pretty naive as it stands. and shows how much further we sti ll have to go before we create a real 5

"EDP culture" that places the right emphasis on ,the "creative" software design stage, and the hardware-use stage. Certainly this is important, but it requires a preliminary programming process, specially targeted at the goals intended. Having an EDP culture means knowing how to think along EDP lines. Thinking along EDP lines means having the right degree of training and knowledge to be able to use the logic that we have managed to put into the computer. It therefore means knowing how to give the computer the logic that we feel is the most appropriate to meet our insti tutional objects. TRAINING AND CHARACTER

The military Institution is fully aware of the magnitude of the problems that have to be faced and solved, and it attributes primary importance to Officer Training Institutions, and particularly to this School, where longterm Carabin ieri Officers 6

are given a sound training under the watchful eye of highly qua Iified military and civilian instructors. It is an undergraduate education in terms of the number. the breadth and the difficulty of the disciplines you study. But it also another kind of training - and I would like to stress this aspect - whrch differentiates this University (if I may be allowed to call it that. even though it has not yet received the legal recognition that has been proposed in a great many Bills laid before parliament) from t he other Italian Universities. As you can guess. I am referring to the moral profile that the undergraduates from this Institution must have and perfect, in order to become Commanders: they must be men who are able to set an example in am things, to lead and guide other men not only in their daily routine duties. but above all in. the dramatic moments of emergency and crisis, in the most dangerous moments when certain supreme values are at

stake, such as honour, dignity and human life. Hence the ethical sense of your education which involves your hearts and your minds at one and the same time. as wel l as the specific sphere of the subjects you are studying and the general sphere of the principles that are proposed as the pillars and standards by which to live your lives. The professionalism of the security officers who apply their skills within society itself is enriched in the case of Carabinieri Officers by training in the command function,, since they have to be able t o establish themselves as Leaders - men who have the exciting duty of using other men, and coordinating their actions, in the various spheres in which they are called upon to serve. They must be able to do this, as I have already said, by setting a good example: an example in everything - technical and moral. their military style and form, their constancy and tenacity, the ir organizational

abil ity and personal mora lity, fairness and sense of justice, no less than their r igorous respect for the ru les and the orders received. In this light, we are looking to you, the young Officers attending this Course, with confidence, trust and hope. The future is in your hands. The Corps will be what you make it with your dedication, hard work and self-Âˇsacrifice. EVOLUTION AND TRADITION

It is important to perceive the symptoms of change in a given situation to identify the f uture trends, which have to be mon itored as time passes, and then study the changes needed to adapt the structures and the regulations, and to decide what steps are necessary to perform the duties required'. But it is equa lly important to know how

to interpret the benchmark ideals and values in contemporary terms. Evolution and tradition, correctly understood, can be the locomotive force of the vitality of an Institution, which is increasingly winning over the support of the community, helped by the fact that it covers the whole territory. I am sure that the Carabinieri will remain the official symbol of our Italy for a long time to come, quite apart from their function and the particular duties they perform at any given moment. This call for professionalism in a contemporary context, and the emphasis I have placed in the ethos of command, offer me an opportunity to repeat to you something else that is very important to me: your work will bear fruit to the extent that you manage to achieve a high level of efficiency in the structures in

wh ich you wi ll be required to perform your duties. Efficiency means organization, planning, method and the ability to rationally use men and materials at the right time and the right place to attain an end, and perform a duty. Italy is craving for efficiency, but demand ing it does not in itself bring it into being. It takes a long time to achieve; it demands will-power. unstinting effort, constancy, control and sacrifice. Compared with the world that surrounds us, we soldiers have no cause to criticize ourselves, but this is not a good reason for sitting back content with what we have managed to achieve. We can and must do more to make an adeguate response to the many challenges that society is throwing down to us. We must therefore work to adapt the distribution of effort

and procedures, courses of study and faci lies, operational methods and the principles of force-use to meet the needs of the times. In this endeavour to modernize an Institution wh ich proud ly boasts 170 distinguished years of history, the Carabinieri Officers' School has a unique role today, which may become increasingly more vital in the future. This role will develop if - as we all hope - this School, together with other similar establishments in the Armed Forces, manage to become Research Centres in their sphere of competence; in other words, if they devote themselves above all to the systematic study of particular technical aspects of every kind of internal violence, from subversion to terrorism, from 8

petty delinquency to largesca le crime. This study is not an end in itself, as an abstract academic requirement, but the prerequisite and the outlet for an ideal itinerary through which the legal and purely technical disciplines merge into a perfect whole in view of the tasks to which the graduates will be assigned. It is not without significance that a great step forward has been made with the use of EDP, even though it is only a first approach that has to be fleshed out with new substance as time passes, and it confirms our proud boast that we are the sons of our age! We have set up a "data bank" in the ambit of what we call the study of conflict, which is a totally original interdiscipl inary system that has long since been elevated to the

rank of a specia lism, and which has replaced the classical "polemology" approach to war studies, and has given our War Col leges a positions of unrivalled prestige. The ability to relate the data available in the Armed Forces' War Colleges on external violence (wars, revolutions, emergencies, international crises) with the data on internal violence stored in the Carabinieri Officers School will enable us to dea l with all kinds of problems relating to security, using a rigorous method , referring to many parameters that are suitable for indicating the distinctive features, and the constants and variables of particu lar situations, and then suggest the most appropriate course of action to be taken. This confirms the val idity of an approach which postulates

the development of an e,xtremely interesting age in the military art, of which I have been a careful observer and witness. It has been so overwhelming in terms of the repercussions it has had on cherished doctrinal ideas, that it is a "fully-fledged revolution" that has few precedents in past generations. This is an elementary observation, but it prompts me to remind you that you should never consider any of the certainties of which you are now the custodians to be definitive. You must also be careful observers and witnesses, in order to learn, to understand and to act. In other words, to acquit yourselves intelligently and competently of the sensitive tasks that will be entrusted to you. You must also be bold in taking on responsibilities, and in putting forward your ideas and views with intellectual honesty. Remaining aloof from any kind of conformism, which is even more mortifying to those who tolerate it than to those who profess it, you will only manage to establish yourselves as leaders worthy of total respect if your intellectual honesty is such that you play an active part in the life of your Corps, giving what is required of you and doing everything in your power to ensure that it does not remain a static Institution, but one which moves ahead with the times. I still remember the words written to me when I was a Lt. Colonel on the General Staff by a great Leader, Gen. Oreste CONCLUSIONS Viligiardi, whom I remember with As I reach the peak of my great reverence. In his letter, military career, ,rnd when I think which I have jealously preserved, he wished me well in my of the 42 years that have gone new post on the General Staff, by since I was standing where you are now, at a similar inau- and said that the hope of a better future for the Armed gural ceremony, when - as I say Forces lay in their capacity to - I think back over those 42 years, to my mind springs a "innovate, modify and revolutionize". succession of facts and events, I take these words as an mingling history and current .affairs, in a rapid panorama. admonition . And through these events I see Yes, "revolution izing", sinnot so much a career which glemindedly and fearlessly, givhas been a source of great ing this term the constructive satisfaction to me, but rather sense of "change for the better"

a clear strategy as being the only way of planning and executing any action. Do not think that the high road that I am indic,3ting here is out of all proportion with the initial responsibilities that you will have to take on. Any sound educational process must aim at training the students to do their immediate duties well. but it cannot neglect the general framework within which they have to operate in the future. Only in this way will you be able to take on increasing responsibilities and be firmly in control of them, as you proceed in your careers. These are goals that cannot fai l to be a source of pride to those who still believe that the Armed Forces' Educational Establishments have a cultural function, ranging beyond merely supplying technical knowhow for the short term, and becoming a primary source of stimulus to that necessary process of renewal in everything we do, with the firm intention to enhance the operational efficiency of the whole system. Taking a rather romantic view, linked to so many past memories, it is quite reassuring to hear your General Commanding say that this operational efficiency will remain one of the kingpins in the Carabinieri Stations, as a tangible sign of the presence of the State in every corner of the national territory.

without reneging on the past as such, but changing it when it no longer meets newly arisen needs and situations, without fearing to take on board the ferment and the demands of the present, not so much in se, but insofar as they are pointers to improvements in performing the mission that has been entrusted to us. This is the path of renewal in continuity, and of modernization in tradition. With this wish, which is also intended to be a message of hope, and with the permission of the Minister of Defence, I have the honour of officially opening the 1984-1985 Academic Year of the Carabinieri Officers' School.

Address by the Army Chief of Staff, General Umberto Cappuzzo, at the inauguration of the 1984-85 Academic Year, in Rome on 29 November 1984, at the Carabinieri OfficersÂˇ School.

SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

its more authentic institutional forms, such as voting in elections and political parties, fail Publ ic opinion has always to give full expression to it. been widely acknowledged as an However it is defined, publ ic important basis for authority: opinion remains an element of present in the life of the Greek fact. not theory, a concrete prob"polis", considered by the lem and not an abstract conRomans as "rumor" or "vox cept. populi", referred to by the generA movement of opinion al term of "consensus" in the either exists, or it does not: Middle Ages, it was considered modern survey and experimental also by Machiavelli, who pointobservation methods make it ed out the importance of the possible to state this without people's support, and thus of fear of contradiction. public opinion as a powerful Like the population itself, force in government. public opinion is not homoHowever, the role and ingeneous; it is divided into diffluence of public opinion have ferent groups according to sex, developed and grown stronger age, geographic position and with the rise of contemporary working environment. To varymass society and with the gradual ing degrees these different process of the democratization aspects and influences deterof nations. mine the different individual From Rousseau's "general attitudes. will", which has led several Eva luations concerning the scholars to set the emergence formation and development of of modern public opinion at the public opinion are dependent on time of the Frend1 Revolution, the peculiar "distribution" among the "opinion" factor gradually the homogeneous groups of grew in a country's democratic "values" corresponding to historstructure as a force capable of ical, psychological and social exerting an appreciable effect factors, the most important of on State affairs, although out- which is "tradition". The prinside the constitutional organs . ciples handed down from the The Armed Forces in gepast are generally accepted as neral, and the Army in particular, absolute, i.e. not subject to as the largest and most repreverification, as they have become sentative component of the mil- consolidated in time and are itary apparatus, have always now respected as axiomatic. implicitly acknowledged this . Having become part of everyday importance, equating the "molife, these pillars of "common rale" of its personnel with its sense" provide a basis for other own form of "public opinion". "values" that are considered unstable because they are linked to fashion, passing fads and the current state of affairs. PUBLIC OPINION The lowest common denominator of both lies in their interest in the community, What actually is public opinion, in essence and in all its whereby the majority tends to subscribe psychologically to multi-faceted aspects? . certain utilitarian models which In its definition as the gencorrespond to widespread logiera l opinion, and not just the cal patterns of thinking. opinion of active minorities, In this framework, Italy comparatively little is still known today manifests set patterns or about this important "phenomenon" acting on the social and "formulae" and is characterized by the predominance of certain political life of the people. Even

THE IMPORTANCE OF OPINION

stereotypes, i.e. of those socially shared beliefs organized into sets of characteristics attributed to such a category of persons as represent the essence of Lippmann's theories. This phenomenon is encouraged by the spread of consumerism in the broader sense of the term, which involves the general acceptance of patterns of behaviour often unaccompanied by any rational justification. There is no denying that the Italian people is currently the unwitting prisoner of so-called "factors of conformity " ranging from isolated phenomena to the incessant bombardment of commercial advertising and other forms of pressure that ultimately lead to an actual "polarization of opinion". The "cl iche" is now so much part of our daily lives that its antidote, consisting of forms of rational realism, is often interpreted as a sign of originality and nun-c.;onrorrnism. Th is provides a fertile soil for the growth of the "pluralistic illusion", since individuals are convinced that the generalized adoption of certain models means that an identical conviction is held by the majority of citizens. However,Âˇ it would be a mistake to think that Italian psycho-social reality is made up of various homogeneous groups linked by a basic consensus of opinion. The apparent uniformity of behaviour merely conceals a whole kaleidoscope of different ethical values, customs, class prejudice, atavistic preconceived ideas which cannot be changed by the various fashions and conventional atti-

Left. Picturesque image of the square in front of Orvieto Cathedral during the oath-taking parade of recruits of the 3rd btn. Granatieri "Guardie". In the foreground: the Colour Troop.

SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

no tudes. This gives rise to methodological problems when the time comes to carry out evaluative surveys of characterological aspects, typical temperaments, the incidence of the religious factor and environmental conditioning. An opinion scale system, i.e. a "qualitative" evaluation of opinion based on an established theory like that of Thurstone,

would be suitable for the Italian context. However, this method is very slow and would call for laborious techniques. The tendency is thus to use the faster "sampling" method, which is also characterized by higher acceptability levels. This system is now being used both by private and public structures, all of which acknowledge its "scientific" nature in view of its

proven adherence to the social reality of the results obtained. This expla ins the great success enjoyed by public opinion surveys used to measure the extent of the phenomenon. They cover a wide range of applica-Âˇ tions and allow extremely reliable predict ions to be made. A good example of this are the "projections" made at election time, which almost always give a fairly accurate picture of the results of the final count. However, the question to be asked is: what are the basic motivations and characteristics of Italian public opinion that must be taken into account in any research that is to have a guaranteed significant content? It is therefore r.ecessary to give a brief outline of the lines of development that have characterized Ital ian society in this century. Historically speaking, in Italy the various aspects of public opinion take on a peculiar physiognomy as a result ot the lack of any real tradition of democratic independence. The stirring events of the Risorgimento leading to Italy's unification and independence did not find any immed iately fertile soil which could foster the development of a true form of training and growth of common trends or coherent schools of thought on which the modern concept of public opinion could be based. The ideals underlying the great political movements of the nineteenth century, although almost unan imous ly supported, did not find the right objective conditions to allow them to be translated into factors of perceptible transformation of the .psychological structure of society.

CH-47C helicopter on a fire-fighting mission. Attached !o the aircraft is a "Smokey" container with a capacity ot 5,000 litres of Wqter or retarding liquid.

SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

Also, after the unification of Italy, the obstacles iinked to the previous conditions Âˇ continuedÂˇ to have a retard ing effect on the "explosion" of public opinion. The governments of different politica l colours that followed one another during the post-Risorgimento period did, however, take popu lar demands into account, These demands were either expressed openly or else could be guessed at behind the screen of an apparently uneventful life and a social "peace" that was more apparent than real.

An army unit guarding a railway line. As part of its civil protection and guard duties. the army also provides personnel for polling-booth guard duty ai election time.

The mingling and coexistence of middle class, patriotic, materialistic, spiritualistic, utilitarian and epical ideals that characterized the early twentieth century was unlike ly to allow a dominant factor to emerge from among this kaleidoscope, of social trends. However, it was actually this intense dialectical exchange of ideas that, during and after the first world war, was t6 increase the importance of the role of public opinion vis-a-vis political decisions and customs. These historical facts seem to explain the delay with which the "science" of evaluating social trends developed in Italy. The advent of a dictatorship in the 'twenties was not favourable, among other things, to the free development of the various survey techniques, except for those suitable for obtaining certain well-defined results.

The general acceptance of certain rigid principles forms the .basis of widespread homogeneous behaviour patterns that are accepted acritically and without being tested against a set of opposing circumstances. The resulting psychological constraint is concealed by means of skilful propaganda often cloaked in authentic but naive enthusiasm. This "science" of forming public opinion weighed heavily on an artificially gu ided society and had inevitable repercussions also at the mil itary level. Youthful enthusiasms, carefully and subtly directed, can, on the one hand, be useful for disciplinary and behavioural purposes, al though they can also lead one to lose sight of objective reality. It may not always be possible to predict which direction the resu lting disappointment and react ions will take. World War 11,

SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

which had a disastrous outcome for Italy, is a perfect example of this. However, this war laid the foundations of the historical and social dialectics forming the basis of the present Italian democratic situation, in which public opinion has been raised to the level of clear political will as expressed in the organs of the State. It is no coincidence that article 21 or the Constitut ion sanctions the safeguarding of the free expression of thought in the wide and diversified forms sanctioned by the law. It is true that the constitutional enactments also favour the freedom of propaganda, which often acts as an instrument of persuasion, but it is also true that the autonomy of general opinions and the cultural growth that has occurred since the last war allow both single individuals and communities a choice of thought

and opinion sufficient to render even the most "sophisticated" expedients virtually harmless. Consequently, also under the influence of the systems of sociali analysis in use overseas and in northern Europe, new techniques and "scientific" criteria for evaluating public opinion are now being introduced at a rate that wou ld have seemed impossible several decades ago. These methods make an extensive use of statistics, a branch of learning that is now developing in leaps and bounds. This extraordinary evolution of statistics, which. as a science was created about in 1660 for the purpose of describing states in the wake of Conring's courses at the University of Helmstedt and which became firmly established in about 1850 when it merged with Ouete let's proba-

bility calculus. is now accompanied by that of the computer. The tremendous impact of this machine, which has now been introduced even in the home. is gradually changing our way of life and has actually come to represent a threat to independent thought. However, when viewed in perspective. these devices are seen to have made a substantial contribution to the free formation of public opinion. One example of this is the computer's

Lagoon troops on the Tiber during a boat race. An annual event in the "Tevere Expo" show held in Rome is the rowing race between lagoon tropp units. On the same occasion, engineer units traditionally give a practical demonstration of throwing a bridge acress the Tiber.

SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

capacity for making projections, which although still only statistical predictions, nevertheless provide a reasonably accurate indication of future trends. For some years now, extensive use has been made in the military field of results and indications obtained through the use of computers, which have proved to be particularly useful in recruiting and in establishing objective situations to be taken into account when drafting specific regulations. However, the technical instrument consists ma inly of a system of recording the main trends of a society of which the Armed Forces are an integral part. In a dynamic and dia lectical democracy, other components have been given the specific tasks of acting as the vehicles of formative ideas. These are the mass media. i.e. in the first instance, television, which for

better or for worse has literally become the modern equivalent of the old fireside. Increasing use has been made also by military organiza-Âˇ tion of television's capacity for transmitting messages down to the lowest levels, in order to give a more realistic image of the Armed Forces. and in particular of their social function. At the same time there has been a considerable increase in the amount of space devoted by the national press to defence matters. and a growing awareness of them by the public at large. The general attitude to military matters has thus become much more favourable and a hitherto unsuspected social sensitivity to related topics has emerged. Except in cases of vested interests and propaganda. it may be assumed that no public " promilitary" or "anti-military" opinion exists, only a concrete

Bersaglieri fanfare on parade. The music units of the Army often perform on public occasions, captivating the people present and earning a lot of applause. The most pestigious musical unit is the Amy Band composed of 102 NCOs who are conservatory graduates.

appraisal of what the Armed Forces produce for the benefit of society. This is closely related to the image they project through their loyal and generous efforts. The reason for this is that the principles and convictions generally accepted in Italy today are not the result of abstract concepts but derive directly from facts and events in

SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

which the entire population is involved through the media . This is shown by the unanimous consensus and manifestations of gratitude received by our soldiers for their services in times of national calamity and their significant action on behalf of peace. It would be interesting to conduct an extensive survey ot the people's attitude to the military as a whole, and not just of a specific

branch, as the results could be highly indicative of the more general relations that exist between the citizen and the institutions. A survey of this kind could provide interesting indica tions for a country like Italy that has yet to probe deeply into its own psychosocial identity. This probing has already been done in certain countries, in which for decades a wide use has been

Military and civil;ans during a public exhibition. One of the Army's many tasks is lo seek continuously to make direct contact with the civilian population, and particuiarly with young people. This is done by means of stands set up at the various local and national exhibitions, congresses, shows and festivals .

SOCIETY AND ARMED FORCES

no made of statistics and other survey tools for the purpose of sounding out their own pÂˇublic opinion. The present historical period is marked by the increasing use being made of these tools at the international level despite t heir obvious limitations. These lim itations are implicit in the very field in which they are used , namely human nature, which is essentially heterogeneous, unpredictable and changeable. To some extent Disraeli's caustic comment that there are three kinds of untruths - the outright lie, perjury and statistics - st ill holds true .

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS Although a tool for observation and not for action, a public opinion poll is nevertheless capable of illuminating and guiding the behaviour and the study of the human environ ment. Public opinion pclls must be set up and carried out usi ng the correct scientific procedures. If this can be done they will render a very precious twofold service: at the theoretical level. increasing our overall knowledge; at the practical level, improving the organization of social relationshi ps within the fra mework of democratic institutions. With specific reference to the military field, a scientific understand ing of opinion or "morale" adds a further decision making tools to the array already available to the command fun ction in order to back-up the decisions to be taken . Furthermore, the interest taken and the efforts made in studying a hu man envi ronment and investigating publi c opinion can have extremely valuable spin -offs. The results of these studies allow the manager or commander to make use of environmental evaluations and public opinion

surveys by going from a knowl edge of the opinions held in a given human environment to making certain pretliclions based on its behaviour. Leaders can utilize the results of the human factor survey as a powerful means of acting on "groups" . This will provide them with a psychological "keyboard" from which they can choose the d ifferent "keys" they wish to press. Of course certain doubts will come to the surface from time to time, more as the result of erroneous or distorted applications of survey methods than of any lack of validity in the actua l statistics. In the words of the French sociologist Jean Stoetzel "the legitimacy of any quantitative sc ience cannot expect to go unchallenged. However, philosophica l obj ections of the transcendental type have merely delayed the progress of science without making it possible to establish a qualitative science that will both satisfy the mind and be effective in its applications. The value of the use of the concept of 'quantity' is a matter of f act".

Trooping the colours during a parade. Veterans and Servicemen's Association rallies provide the occasion tor young servicemen, veterans and the general public to meet.

And for us in particular, in the face of the growing importance of statistical and sociological studies, the foll owing statement by the French Marshal Louis Lyautey, who is also the author of a book on the social function of offi cers, shou ld serve as both a warning and a spur t o making a greater and "more open" effort: "the sold ier who is nothing but a soldier is a bad soldier". Ciro Di Martino

THE CITIZEN . . AND DEFENCE

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General Umberto Cappuzzo, Army Chief of Staff, has reviewed two articles by Luca di Schiena and Giancarlo Mingoli.

A few days ago, an article in a national daily had this to say: "Here is yet another sign of the times. One of many. Only ten, fifteen years ago, the word 'success' had fallen from fa vour. Seeking or obtaining success was not meritoriousÂˇ, but a weakness. An act of culpable 'individualism' (often qualified by the adjective 'bourgeois' to get the point home) ... Today, three books on success are being published ... ". Until very recently, it was considered even more serious to tal k about the "m ilitary life" other than in contemptuous or belittling terms. And th ings were hardly helped by the halfhearted sporadic attempts to praise it. Today the situation has changed somewhat. and is still chang ing. A great deal is being said and written about it. Not all the hesitations have been overcome, but people do wa nt to understand and learn more about it. and to do away with a misunderstanding that has lasted far too long. There is renewed interest in the military Institution, wh ich plays a primary role in the field of the country's security, and hence its development. Yet th is U-turn, and all the time and energy devoted to it have not yet managed to topple the hasty judgements and the uncalled for obfuscation that w as prevalent throughout the Sixties, often in the form of slogans, to attack the Army, depicted as a compendi um of negative forces, with its back turned against society, intellec-

tually backward, conservative and hankering for the past. We are still on ly halfway home, and two articles in this issue of "Rivista Mil itare" by the distinguished editor of TG3, Luca di Schiena , and one of the lead ing newscasters of GR2, Giancarlo Mingoli, have very clearly summed up the problems of this tra nsitional phase, which I persona lly consider to be very stim ulating and valuable. Both these writers deal very penetratingly with the problem of the two-way flow of information between the Army and the Country, examini ng the level of integration between them, and the " popu larity rating " of the Armed Forces in the public mind. The first article is deliberately provocative and more stinging in its comments; the second more understanding and opti mistic. Two different journal istic styles, but above all, two different sensitivities to the current status of the military world, and indeed the questions Âˇput by one writer are substantially answered by the proposals advanced by the other. Both agree that there shou ld be more detailed information available. In Luca di Schiena's article, there is a sense of bitterness that what might have been done has not. Perhaps, deep down, there is the need for a benchmark behavioural model that is becoming increasingly necessary today. One can sense this, reading between the lines, and from the fact that the author spells out his question so clearly that it almost hurts a "man of arms", who appreciates utter si ncerity. And for this I am gratefu l to him. I am equa lly gratefu l to Gia ncarlo Mingoli for his wel lpondered considerations about the "cha nged relationship" be-

tween the mi litary and civilian worlds. "When they are not in Leba non, or when there are no disasters to deal with, or when their intervention is not in demand , what do soldiers do? How do they train? What use are they?". Th is is the clear, concise. telling question that Luca di Schiena asks. And it strikes home, because if th is is rea lly what "people " are asking, one would have good cause to question the very stuff of wh ich our well-founded participatory democracy is made, and be very concerned about the efficacy of the mass media whose choices and activities - incidentally have certainl y noth ing to do with the military sphere. One is tempted to answer the question with another one: "What do athletes do when they are not competing? What do firemen do when they are not putting out fires? What do teachers do when they are not actually teaching?" . And so on. We cou ld ask hundreds of such questions. Well, the military do something very sim ilar (they train, they practise, they study for a particular job or activity that they may be required to perform). Except that in their case, these "jobs" or activities are events that they hope they will never be called upon to engage in (like a blaze to a fireman). with all the psychological implications that stem from this. It is hard to "fulfi l oneself" (if I may use this ugly neologism!) by getting in

Left. The Army Chief of Staff speaking to young students at th e first national campus of Veterinar y Undergraduates, held in Grosseto.

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a state of readiness for a duty that one hopes one will never be called upon to perform. I am obviously referring to putting out a fire or to putting one's combat readiness to the test in a real-life situation (on the battlefield). To complicate matters still further, there is the fact of military service with the idea of coercion and compulsion, in a country which does not exactly shine for its public spiritedness (plus the fact that the work is poorly paid, and that the remuneration is not proportional to the sacrifice involved). As I was saying, the military are not dissimilar to the firemen. They are endeavouring to prepare a military instrument that is "credible" and, as such, able to make an effective contribution to shoring up the equilibrium that has given us forty years of peace.

"Credibility" is something that belongs to the category of value judgements and it is therefore not easy to evidence, and even harder to measure. If people really want peace, in freedom and independence, they cannot ignore the importance of the "security function": it is a function of great social relevance. And so it is the people that have to be informed, urged to participate, and made to understand why we exist, who and what we are, and what useful purpose we serve. Security, international military equilibria (that have to be kept at the lowest possible level - which also, if not above all. depends on the other side), deterrence, and the composition of the military instruments - all these are issues that relate to the broader amb.it of "military policy".

It is the outside world, then, that has to become more inquisitive, to learn something about , the fundamental technical issues from the "experts" themselves, so that they can approach the problems correctly for themselves, leavi ng the authorities with their constitutional duty to make all the due political assessments. Then there are many other areas, such as the way we live, what we do, how we train, what

Alpini at a snow measurement station belonging to METEOMONT (avalanche surveying and information service). The 4th Alpine Corps is responsible tor the METEOMONT service in favour of those who live or travel in the mountains. Its information is sent to all the agencies requesting the data thev gather and process. During winter, it ,c,ur,plies the information which is thien

broadcast by RA/.

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constraints we work under, what career prospects are open to us, and how we achieve them : all this has to do with the broader ambit of "the military status". It is up to us, inside the Institution, to speak to the outside world about these, to create a public awareness of our personal and professional problems. to correct the widespread dis information that exists, to shoot down the silly slogans, and to earn the public's appreciation of what we are and what we are worth . Basically, there are no mysteries. We do what we are supposed to do: work to give "credibility" to an "instrument" that is at the service of the country, for the loftiest ends and for essential duties. As I said before, this work involves training, practice. study: all geared to the use of the instrument. At various levels, with increasing responsibil ities, we have to study, plan and programme in order to be able to better manage the ever-widening spheres in this organization which is one of the largest, well-articulated and complex organizations in the country. And we have to do this in the face of difficulties of all Kinds, and often without the unflagging support of a section of publ ic opinion . This demands a high level of professional ism of a very special kind. I would even go so

A cadet from the Modena Military Academy. The Army Officer Cadets attend an undergraduate /eve! course for two years, before being promoted to the rank of Second Lieutenant.

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far as to say an "all-round" professionalism. And this also deserves recognition , which it often does not have. Not a professionalism that brings with it caste privileges, but the satisfaction of contributing to the security and the welfare of the whole community, based on the spirit of service, which is the driving force of any advanced democracy that wants to keep moving ahead . Perhaps there is another question one might ask: "What do reporters do when they are not reporting?" . They should be busy collecting interesting, well-documented news and information: the very news and information that we military men would be more than happy to give them whenever they care to ask for it. We would be insulting the intelligence ,rnrl the common sense of the Italians if we - the men who live enthusiastically in the Institution striving to uphold high standards - did not long for the "quantum leap" that we have been advocating for so long: namely, the direct involvement of public opinion in the prob lems that are of relevance to us (military policy and security, the military status. effi-ciency and credibility). Personally speaking, I would prefer not to have to answer any more questions from people who seem to have suddenly "discovered" the existence of a respected profession that has existed for millennia, a national organization that affects hundreds of thousands of people, each one with their own personal and social aspirations. I would prefer not to have to answer any more questions that place in doubt the very existence of the "military world", and which are designed solely to restrict the exchange of news to superficial generalities, with a zero information content in

.. .._____ , . - l' __

,:;. .

practice. And this has now become fairly standard practice. and even where it is not intended. the effect is still the same. Let us start admitting that the military Institution. despite its shortcomings that we have no wish to plaster over, is working with dignity - with great dignity; that it is a machine, more complex than any other, driven on by an engine - a powerful engine that works and which, above all, never leaves the driver stranded . To improve its efficiency is our duty, not Âˇto say the essential source of satisfaction and professional pride. But it does not depend on us alone; the others also have to give us a hand. This means that the debate needs many speakers on all sides. A debate of this kind could, in my opinion, do a great dea l

Transmissions Specialists checking a radio relay statio.'l. These facilities are connected to .the civifian system so that when a naturaf disaster occurs, aff the civilian and mifitary intervention forces can be coordinated to undertake relief operations.

to make us better known and understood. But even here, there is something I shou ld like to say quite plainly : in a democratic country like ours, in which the basic economic law of supply and demand is the order of the day, if people want to know something all they have to do is ask. If there had always been such keenness to find out about this component part of the country as there is today, it would have been satisfied long

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Engineers erecting a bridge to make the road system viable.

ago, largely thanks to the mass media which are always so anxious to cater for what public opinion wants. But apart from that, anyone who wants to find out what soldiers do, how they train, and what useful purpose they serve, only needs to read our own publications, some of which are more specialized than others, in which we make no bones about what our realities are, and the problems we haâ€˘1e, without mincing our words and without ulterior motives. Then there is the more direct approach, by questioning the present and past members

of the Armed Forces, even those working at the lowest level. But these direct approaches should not be conditioned - as they often are - by an a priori sense of rejection on the part of representatives of a fully-fledged subculture that does so much to penalize us, since its origins are to be found in an atavistic incapacity to rise above selfish personal interests and to show a genuine spirit of solidarity towards the other members of society who have superior interests to protect and defend. But even here, we must not hastily over-generalize, and lose our objectivity by taking individual cases to be representative of the whole. The first question to be asked should be designed to find out how, and to what degree, these present or former members of the Armed Forces, or bodies or units belonging to the

Armed Forces have helped, or are helping, to enhance the overall viability of an Institution that is an essential part of the very fabric of the nation. And the question should be asked with a "social sense". If this information were collected and examined patiently and painstakingly, the real picture that would emerge would Âˇ be quite different from what some people - deliberately - try to make it out to be. And this would not requ ire the investigator to indulge in ha lf-understood sociological acrobatics. It is evident. though, that there is a greater demand .for information now that the military Institution and Society are coming closer together. A demand that requires exhaustive responses, and above all, clear answers to clear questions. And this is where the press is hamstrung, unless it is asso-

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ciated with radio and television broadcasting facilities, and even the high honour of the cinema screen and fiction. The increased curiosity about the military world makes it necessary, not only for those of us that belong to it. but for the whole of the mass media, to help increase the quantity and improve the quality of the information available. For the Institution, the only problem is how, not what. Ethical reasons and questions to do with our image prevent us from "selling the Army" like a consumer commodity (with advertising spots and similar schemes that have been used in the United States, for example).

The Army is, and remains, the custodian of traditional and moral values. It has its own style, which must be respected. Apart from this, there is the maximum openness to any form of dialogue not only with the press and representatives of the mass media, but directly with the public through current affairs programmes and the radio and televis ion. It is to be hoped that the demand will be such that we can provide ever more balanced and substantial information. We are playing our part, and will continue to do so, willingly and courageously, placing ourselves there for all to judge, with all our authenticity, as we are, for we have the institution-

al duty to perform a function which requires us to work in society, with society and for society - to put it in a slogan ' that I love repeating. But apart from these con siderations that have to do with technical/functional aspects of our commitment. which have to be known before there can be any real relationship between the Army and the country, there is something else that has to

Whenever a disaster strikes, the Militarv Medical Corps is alwavs in the forefront, bringing relief to the civilian population and setting up field hospitals.

,.,n

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brought out, appraised for what it is worth: namely, the "fallout" of the military service experience, in terms of its educational va lue to the citizen of a modern democracy. In a period that is certa inly not subject to s:.ispicion - I am referring to August 1969 - a collaborator of mine, Infantryman Giancarlo Bergamini, in an address to his comrades in arms who were about to be demobilized (of which he sent me a copy as his former Regimental Commander a few months earlier) sa id this: "We have learned, through our difficult daily experience of the aspirations, the opinions, the criticisms and the ideals of the young conscripts, enabling us to form a more ob jective, cool and adequate iudgement of the way . we see things, to enhance the qualities of character, and moral personality. "But this maturity process is nol magical, and cannot take place without creating a crisis in ingrained menta l habits, and the petit bourgeois parasitic featherbedding that is so dear to some. It demands direct. responsible sharing in the most humble tasks, and making flexible and intell igent use of the human intellect and human sensitivities. "It means becoming a new man, experienci1g continual self-fulfilment, which everyday life in the barracks very often helps to deepen and render more precious". And recalling the contribution made to this end by enlightened Commanders, he added: "But if the work of these men is to be truly effective and have

lasting results, we must show our active solidarity, and the whole country has to show its understanding and lend its disinterested support. "But above all else, the country's civic conscience and political awareness must mature and advance more decisively. "These are the ideas with which we are inviting you Infantrymen of the II 1968 Contingent - to become the ambassadors of the real needs of the organization and operation of the Armed Forces to the public at large and the political parties, and to bear clearly in mind the close bond that exists between solving military problems and the general renewal of the Community. This is the reason why

everything we do in civilian life will also foster the democratization of the Army and adiusting it to meet the needs of a society - like Ita lian society - which is moving ahead along the path of far-reaching and profound economic, technical and spiritual changes. "Today's service moves ahead in this way, and receives new promptings from the future ...". Well. even without Lebanon, even without the Army's . intervention at times of disaster, and apart from the daily training and the commitment to acquire "credibility", this is something else that the Army does. And it is of no small account.

One of the competitions in " The ArmySport for Youth" event.

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Are citizens informed about defence problems ? Luca di Schiena answering

Information is scarce. often distorted. still cond itioned by remains of a pseudo culture that. stemming from schematic concepts for which militarism means fascism, the Armed Forces· aim is aggression and war means defeat, has pictured, by his stubborn prejudices, Institution and military organization as a kind of demon. Moreover, values of hierarchy, uniform. salute, have been deval uated; there is nearly a sense of shame in passing dressed in uniform along the city streets. Those ideas have dominated and conditioned public opinion. augmenting endemic rejection for military service tolerated as a suffering, a punishment, an infection and, in the best of cases, as an harmful waste of time. The military Institution, on its part. has not been able to set the equation "Army social duty constitutional obligation" against the slogan "Disarmament = Peace". It has also failed to stress the fact that arms can affirm values of progress, culture and peace. Instrumental lack of information has thus not been fought by effic ient counter-information. Peace expeditions in the Middle East or help in occasion of natural calam ities are not enough. . The real, inexfensive information is based on involving military people in the reality of the Country, out of the barracks enclosures. The real problem is isolation: the Army, once a privileged

and envied caste. has nowadays become a no-prospect profes- • sion. In fact, people ask: when they do not go to Lebanon. when disasters do not occur, when their intervention is not requested. what do the soldiers do, how do they get trained, what are they there for? What does military information answer to these questions? How does the military Institution react?

Luca di Sch iena has a jegree in law , he teaches journalism and writes 3bou t history and lite rature . He is part ol th e RAI staff since 1944 and has been responsible for the 1960 Olimpi ads radio T .V. b roadcasts; president of the Cannes direct linkup transm issions interna tiona l competition, adviser of the pontifical commission for social commu nications; responsable for programs abou t Vatican II Counci l and Pope's trips un ti l 1967; European producer and reporte r for satellite programs: head of the press service. director of training for radio and T.V . reporters. director of radio-T .V. b·oadcasts from the italian Parliament. He has been awarded several Prizes among wh ich the Cannes Prize (1965) and the St Vincent Prize (1967). He has been superi ntendent o f Ro me' s Opera House. He is now moderator in the transmission "Tribuna Po litica". president of U.C.S.I. a,d directo r of a nationa l T.V. broadcast (TG 3).

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Is public op1n1on interested in defence problems? Giancarlo Mingoli answering

On Sunday, November 4. 1984. several thousand people were present in Rome's Ouirinale Square, at the changing of the guard "on open air" between the Modena Military Academy Cadets from the 165th course "Fierezza" and the Granadiers from the "Cengio" battalion. The ceremony, reminding that of London's Buckingham Palace. is preceded by a parade along the via XX Settembre of the unit which is to mount guard, and takes place every second Sunday of the month. In November has

Giancarlo Mingoli was born in Rome on 6-4-1948. He has a degree in law and has been a professional journalist for nine years. He reports news concerning justice, defence and school for a nationa l radio network (GR 2) . Four years ago he made a serial enq uiry called "Serving in the Army today". He interv ewed military personnel t,y visiting barracks, train ing, schools, air bases and sh ips. It cam e out an image of army life interesting ma inly for its reflections on civilian society. In April last year. he held a conference at the Military Academy of Modena on press and Army relations. He is now one of the GR 2 conductors. He often takes part in debates and conferences about ustice. He was awarded the "Prem io Noto" (Siracusa) for judicial journalism, for h is reports on the "Moro" and "7 aprile" trials and on organized crime.

been anticipated because of Army Day. One hour before the changing of the guard, Ouirinale Square was already so crowded that policemen had to close the traffic in the area. The centre of the town has been jammed with traffic until late evening. Beyond the call of an event like that, the presence of so many people has not been surprising. In several occasions. starting from the re-established parade on Republic Day, we have had, in the recent past. evidences of a strengthened tie between citizens and Army. The wide participation in the Ouirinale ceremony has stimulated comments in the people present: "Times have really changed said a lady -. At the beginning of the 70s, during the youth protest mov.ements period, all these people would never have come. We have re-discovered ancient values we had long forgotten. if not repudiated". This remark illustrates very well the different situation of

today's relationship between society and Army, compared with that of fifteen-twenty years ago. The consents gained by Italy for the Lebanon operation have contributed to a better approach between the Country and its Army after periods of divisions and incomprehensions only. And newspapers, with their increasing interest in military subjects are a valid way of making public opinion understand the actual changings in the military world. Moreover. it is undeniable that it does exist a special military culture which includes. ogether with strategic thought, economy, law, sociology, history, technology. A culture bound to progress if the dialogue between the two worlds will consolidate by overcoming those obstacles, also of ideological natureÂˇ, which still exist and certainly do not facilitate a mutua l understanding. CIVILIAN SOCIETY AND ARMY BETWEEN 1950 AND THE BEGINNING OF 1970

Twenty or thirty years ago, the ties between the two worlds were not as strong as they are today. The social context was different. Those generations did not have the chances of the present ones. more and more compelled by progress to enlarge the frontiers of knowledge, industry, home and foreign trade. It was just after the war and people had to put up with several restrictions. If I remember well, newspapers used to talk about Armed Forces on the occasion of the 2nd of June parade, military celebrations, swearing-in-ceremonies and some exercises. If we compare those years with nowadays. we can say that at that time the exterior aspects were pri-

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HH THE CHANGE

vileged. I honestly do not think of having read as a student many reports on military condition, on our army's role, on its cadres' formation and expectations. Which causes have determined in the past the scarce interest towards the military Institution? Firstly there are historical causes. In the post-war period, the desire to forget soon the defeat grows. To many people, uniforms evoke moments, situations they want to cancel from their mind. In spite of our soldiers' heroical behaviour during the liberation war, the trust in the Army is not very high. Anti-militarism builds up and it goes on expanding between the '60s and the beginning of the '70s, when the youth protest movements are born and traditional values (family, religion, country) undergo a profound crisis. Protest movements do not even spare barracks. Those are the years when violence is being theor ized. Protest movements proliferate; terrorism is born. Innocent blood is shed through slaughters, murders. woundings. In spite of several magistrature and police successes. the defeat of subversion is not yet at hand and there have been and still are signs that keep us alert. But we also have

another major aim: the fight against organized crime. Important results have been obtained also in this field; but there is much to be done. To make the phenomenon "withdraw" we must go on fighting with the same strength and mobilization that permitted us to defeat terrorism. I had mentioned anti-militarism as one of the causes oÂˇf poor dialogue between civilian society and Army. Moreover the hostile attitude is bred by deviations of military hig h officers. The Army's democratic spirit is doubted. and as usual only a few are able to separate good from bad and avoid to reap the tare with the wheat. On the military side, contribution to make things clear is lacking. The attitude towards the outside world is one of closing or timid opening; that leads to the definition of the military institution as a caste. Some military refuse any kind of contact with the civilian society and. perhaps because of thei r education. are not inclined to understand the outside world. Some others. although showing an open mind towards the outside, react to the depreciation of the military institution by deciding not to open to the civilian society.

The situation starts changing in the middle of the '70s. People look at the Army with new atten tion. It is an inverted tendency corresponding to what the Army Chief of Staff. General Umberto Cappuzzo has defined the Army's inversion of image. General Cappuzzo outlines the new soldier's characteristics: "open to the outside world, dinamic part of reality, attentive interpreter of terms and ways by which he can contribute to realize the Country's security and defence within a frame of real partecipation". Which are the factors helping changes in the Army and civilian society relationship? First of all. the rediscovery of traditional values (family. religion. State) which had also brought a revaluation of military ideals. Citizens are more in contact whith institutions through a serious ideo[ogica l and political debate which has contributed to a greater sense of democracy. Another cause for the change has been the new kind of men in charge of the Army, men open to the outside world, sensitive to social transformations. ready to acknowledge their significance and weight; men engaged to give modern features to the Institution. an image up to the time. First. the Army assistance during public calamities, then the Lebanon mission have pushed forward the process of change. ARMY DUTIES TO IMPROVE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE CIVILIAN SOCIETY

For the reasons we have just said, that are at the basis of the military institution's restored consent. it is necessary to c larify the Army's duties and functions. When we talk about defence and security, people often think that our Army still wants to

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make war. There could be nothing wronger. because our engagement is for peace. "Fighting for peace means doing best our to avoid that others try to attempt at our freedom. that is at our peace". So general Cappuzzo wrote in this magazine two years ago, explaining the concept of Army at the service of peace. Consequently we need to have an instrument able to discourage possible aggressions. I like also to remember Jean Paul ll's words on the Army Jubilee Day: " Your force is necessary for the welfare of your fellow citizens. for your Country's security, for the common good of home and foreign peace". In that occasion. the Pope said that chasing military life is the effect of vocation. Other professions. as journalism and medicine. if they are practised metic ulously and with devotion, need the support of vocation and involve great sacrifices . But sacrifices (for instance continuous transfers) and responsibilities of the regular soldiers are different frome those of any other kind of citizen. for the special duties that the Constitution commits to the Army: the Country's defence and security. Such duties are not easily accomplished: they need special psycho-physical aptitudes. a bent for command, and full confidence in Army idea ls. In that consists the atypical characteristic of military institutio n. This atypical characteristic does not involve separation, but only specific duties compared with those of other social structures. People called to accomplish these duties come from the same society that has formed. and is still forming, traders. engineers, clerks. mechanics. and so on. This atypical characteristic is part of society and is not in contrast with the attitude to dialogue and opening to the outside world.

THE USE OF THE WORD "MILITARISM"

Unfortunately, for many people, today as in the past. backing military Institution was. and still is a. synonym for militarism. Well. if a word has been misured that is the word "militarism". Militarism means degeneration of the military state or predominance of the military organization in the life of a Country. The democratic ideals rooted in our Army are not to be discussed. They are at the Republican Institutions ' service. Their task is not to prepare a privileged class. and to place themselves over the Country's law. but to serve all citizens without any difference . And when. during these years, there have been doubts and perplexities. we have at once made a clean sweep not to leave

shadows of doubt and to reaffirm the stength of the democratic ideals. HOW TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP

To overcome the still existing incomprehensions and prejudices against the military, our engagement as journalists is neeeded. As I said at the beginning, newspapers. radio and television talk a lot about the Army. It is important to improve the information by a more careful attention to Army problems and needs. People do not remember soldiers only on the occasion of parades and other military ceremonies. They are not satisfied with appearances and they try to understand how the Army works, the way it adapts itself to home and foreign society changes, what its condition is the way it places itself in front of growing strategic needs. also within the context of the East-West relations .

It is evident that to give an answer to these and other questions. journa lists must be informed in their turn. We must say that a lot has been done by the General Staff to open to tlie press by a continuous contact with newspapers and massmedia. We must now improve the quality of the dialogue. organizing periodica l seminaries, conferences, debates tor journalists specialized in defence problems. These initiatives can contribute to build a "culture of security" in public opinion. to give citizens an answer about the basic themes of national defence. Those meetings could also be useful for overcoming the military's ancient mistrust towards the press. A frequent exchange of ideas and views might help to clarify things and remove any kind of obstacles. The role itself of the Press Officer must be emphasized. Not all the Officers agree on that, because they fear a "reduction" of the military function. But. with the assumption that an Officer is a man of his time, he cannot remain detached from society and must hold the contacts with the press in the right consideration because they represent the direct way to communicate with the outside world. I suggest. in fact. that Officers be prepared to have contacts with the press from the beginning of their careers. to avoid later difficulties if eventually they have to assume a duty in the service of military public information or in the General Staff departments for promotional activities and documentation. To conclude, in the light of recent years' improvements. we can say that Army-PressSociety relations are bound to settle on more secure basis; but it is important to apply those correctives necessary to achieve a change of quality.

OUTLINE OF THE POLITICO-STRATEGIC EVOLUTION

The possibility to cause instantly enormous destructions with nuclear weapons - even if employed in a limited and selective way - as well as the losses deriving from a possible employment of the modern biological and chemical weapons, and the possibility that large areas could be contaminated, have had a determinant influence on the evolution of the doctrines of employment of the two superpowers' armed forces and, consequently, of their allies, influencing the whole world policy, from 1945 onwards. Since the distant April 1949, date of birth of the Atlantic Alliance , NATO's defensive strategy - though evolving and continuously adapting to the defensive instruments as they were introduced - has been based on the principle of deterrence; a principle that can be considered valid since, for 35 years, it has been able to keep peace inÂˇ Europe. At the beginning, in order to reach this goal, the strategy adopted by the Alliance was based mainly on the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States, to which corresponded a clear inferiority of NATO's conventional forces compared with the Warsaw Pact's. In this context, the only way out seemed to be that of discouraging the hypothetical enemy from undertaking aggressive initiatives, threatening an immediate response with the employment of the whole US nuclear potential. This is how the strategic doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation (or total nuclear response} was born. A first change in this strategy took place around the Sixties, as a consequence of the technologic progress made in the West as well as in the countries of the Soviâ‚Źt bloc; a progress that had upset the

foundations of the strategy of massive nuclear response. The USSR, by then, had at its disposal new means of nuclear intervention, such as the intercontinental missiles installed on nuclear submarines or on sheltered launching ramps, which allowed the weapons to survive a surprise nuclear attack and respond immediately. After the first strike the two superpowers were therefore in a position to retaliate, i.e. to deliver a second strike. The theory of "nuclear parity" with the Soviet Union, which got some footing after that. was formulated by the American Secretary of Defence of the time, Mac Namara. According to this theory, if the two superpowers were to maintain a quantitative and qualitative balance in the respective nuclear armament, they would have neither interest nor advantage to assail each other, for the result would be "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD). This situation questioned again the credibility of the strategy of massive retaliation and also the hypothesis according to which the most probable 32

form of conflict would be a general nuclear war. Consequently a new and more flexible strategic doctrine was introduced: the present doctrine of flexible response and advanced defence, i.e. a strategy of "appropriate" reactions, gauged, in time and space, to the type of aggression. As is known, also this doctrine is based on the concept of dissuading the hypothetical aggressor and, in case, to con-Âˇ trast his attack on any member of the Alliance using a well ba lanced complex of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces (Triad). capable of giving a wide range of responses in the framework of a "spiralling" controlled from the politico-military point of view. At the beginning of the Seventies (1972-1973), the theory of "nuclear parity" led to the stipulation of the SALT-1 (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and to the following negotiations. But these agreements Âˇand the "balance of terror" - which postulates its effectiveness have, little by little, lost their validity and, as a consequence, reproposed the problem of

The B-52G long range heavy bomber is still in service with the USAF, in spite of its 12,000 flight hours. Its maximum SflP.P.d iR 1,n11 km /h, its range 16,300 km. Instead of conventional bombs, it can carry 8 free-fall nuclear bombs or 20 ALCMs ( Air Launched Cruise Missiles) with nuclear warheads.

security in different terms when. as it happened from 1979 onwards, one of the two contracting superpowers - the Soviet Union - has increased, not only in number but also in quality, its nuclear potential (nuclear overtaking) with the entry into service of the "SS-20" missiles and "Budget" and "Backfire" long range bombers (and today there are talks about the "SS25", with a range of over 10,000 km) and has devoted greater and greater resources to the con ventional forces buildup. The difference between these and the similar NATO forces has increased in the last few years by about 50%. Although the experts say that the balancing of forces should not follow the "one for one" philosophy (tank for tank, aircraft for aircraft). from the

evaluation of the situation it has been inferred from many sides that t he All iance's military potential desti ned to face the threa t is declining , aod equally decreasing is the credibility of deterrence based on the strategy of flexible response. Hence the need to re-assess the concepts of defence, thinking ahead to the year 2000. Within this framework the US Army has formulated its new doctrine: the "Airland Battle" and its long term projection (Ai rland Battle 2000). t he so-called "Rogers proposals" worked out in the ambit of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters All ied Powers Europe}. aimed at "Europeizing", that is, at extending the Airland Battle's principles t o the European cou ntries of the Alli~nce and , final ly, the "Strateg ic Defence Initiative" (SDI) known as "Star Wars" to t he public at large. These initiatives have given rise to heated debates - still very intense - both at public opin ion level and among the experts of military pol icy on both s ides of the Atlantic. This should not be a surprise, for whenever there have been "requests" for a "substitute strategy" , there have a Iways been more or less heated de-

bates and discussions - at all levels - regarding the basic motivations for the change of strategies. This happened at the time of the transition from the strategy of mass retaliation to the present strategy of flexible response. And it happens today vis-a-vis the new in itiaâ€˘ t ives, al beit the Atlantic Allies' attitude has been di fferent in both instances. In fact, the change from the previous strategic doctri ne to the present one of flexible response and advanced defence had been accepted and agreed upon by all member countries of the Alliance (except France) because all had rejected the strat egy of mass retaliation. On the contrary, t oday it seems that the European members of the Allia nce do not recognize the need for a substantial cha nge of strategy, because they are convinced that there are, no valid alternatives to the present strategy of flexible response, which as previously mentioned, continues to effectively play its role as a credible deterrent. We could say, anticipati ng a few concepts which w e shall develop later, that the European members of the Alliance, while on the whole they seem scarce-

ly ready for a substantial change of the present strategy - as said before - are, on the contrary, more inclined to review or, better, to adapt the present operationa l doctrine in order to keep step with the new t echnologies and with those wh ich wi ll foreseeably be introduced in the next years, both w ithi n NATO and in the Soviet bloc. NEW DOCTRINES AIRLAND BATTLE The 35th Session of the CASD (Center for High Defence Stud ies} has made an in-depth and detailed survey of the Airland Battle doctrine. Therefore I shall just recall a few fundamental elements of

The nuclear-propelfed " Constellation" aircraft carrier and the "Leahy" missile cruiser, about to refuel at sea from the fast supply ship "Niagara Falfs". The "Constellation's" displacement, at full load, is 80,000 t, and its speed 33.6 knots; it carries 80 afrplanes and 8 helicopters. It is armed with three octupfe launchers for "Sea Sparrows" surface-to-air missiles, and three 20 mm "Phalanx" systems.

this doctrine and of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" in order to express some new considerations - without having the pretension to be saying anything - or anything much - new regarding the implications of these strategies on the defence problem in Europe in general, and in our country in particular. The Airland Battle: • it is a new operational doctrine, worked out, as we said, in the United States, already adopted by the US Army and to be fully applied by 1986; • it _is a doctrine which concerns all operat ional theaters (continental and maritime) in which the US forces could be employed; • it is part of the long term planning of the US Army, which embodies some of the so-called "Maritime Strategy", as opposed to the "Continental Strategy" followed up to now. As is known, the latter envisages the deployment of a substantial part of the US Armed Forces in the

areas directly threatened by the Soviet bloc; the former considers instead the stationing of the bulk of the US forces in the American territory and their rapid transport, by air and by sea, to the threatened place. In order to reduce the transportation costs and to speed up the units' flow, they would find the necessary materials and supplies already in the area; • it has the purpose of putting the airland instrument in a position to qu ickly take and keep the initiative by means of offensive and/or defensive actions aimed at concl ud ing the military operations from positions of force, in view of the subsequent political settlement of the conflict. This is based on the assumption that without military results it is impossible to start profitable political talks; • it postulates the indispensable cooperation with the air forces, in all the traditional tasks of direct and indirect participation in the actions of the land forces;

British Army "Scimitar" combat and tactical recce vet.icles, during an exercise in Norwa·r. The "Scimitar" has a 3-man crew an(! weighs 8,7 t. Its Jaguar engine gives it a maximum speed, on road, of 80 km/h and a range of 644 km. The turret, for two men, is armed wit.'1 a 30 mm "Rarden" gun and a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun.

• it finds its concrete expression in the so-called emerging technologies (equipment for the survey of the battlefield and for the acquisition of objectives, arms for area saturation, guided precision weapons, command system, control and processing of data capable of reducing to a minimum the time of discovery and offence of the located objectives systems for electronic warfare and countermeasures, etc .... ); • it revives a more reactive strategy, with more initiative compared to the past, and at the same time more credible, owing to the clear willingness to strengthen the instrument necessary to guarantee our security;

• it is hinged on the western world's elements of force such as the technological superiority and the greater flexibility and resilience of our "for.ma mentis"; • it aims at overcoming ·the socalled "crisis" of the strategy of flexible response; • it has been shown and proposed to NATO, like the Airland Battle 2000, as a possible guide for modetnizing the Allied forces and for the conduct of operations in the 21st century; • it outlines a type of defence mainly oriented towards confronting an attack after the Soviet model, characterized by an overwhelming superiority of mechanized and armoured forces, which permits to keep out of contact a substantial number of forces with which the defences engaged at the front can be supported and/or outflanked . As a consequence the new doctrine provides that, together with a close action (close-·in

battle) meant to stem the forces in contact. an action in depth be developed (deep battle), with fire and also with "ad hoe" forces, against the rear enemy formations (2nd and 3rd echelon) not only in order to delay and prevent their manoeuvres, but also and mainly to seize the initiative and proceed to their destruction; • it stems from the fact that the Western military power is declining, as we said, in all three components of the "Triad " (nuclear-strategic, nucleartactical and conventional forces) but especially in the conventional armaments, thus raising doubts about the credibility of deterrence. In this context, a possible conventional aggression would force NATO to resort to an untimely employment of nuclear weapons, with the mu ltifarious consequences deriving from this initiative. From this, the need for the West to modernize its conventional inventory using the

most advanced technologies at its disposal. REFLECTIONS OF AIRLAND BATTLE 2000 ON NATO. THE ROGERS DOCTRINE (FOFA OR FOFI?)

The Airland Battle doctrine has raised perplexities and criticism. above all in European NATO, and in particu lar in the Federal Republ ic of Germany, the most concerned - for obvious reasons - about the strategic-operational changes that the new doctrine would

A ground crew reloads the ammunition magazine of the General Electric GAU·BI A "Avenger" 30 mm gun of an A-10 "Thunderbolt II" close support aircraft. This powerful gun has seven rotating barrels, and can fire 2,100 or 4,200 rounds per minute; its rounds have a spent-uranium core capable' of piercing the armour of all tanks in service at the present time.

involve if it were employed within NATO. The doctrine must be credited with undeniably positive aspects, such as easing the limitations (or restraints) of the advanced defence which, as everybody knows, cannot exploit the space at the rear as a factor increasing the defensive power, due to the territory's scarce depth and the high concentration of population and industries - especially in Central Europe - very close to the frontier line. On the other hand, the in depth manoeuvre (in enemy territory) envisaged by the new doctrine is not devoid of a variety of implications, for this aspect would certainly be instrumentally exploited in order to make the NATO defensive strategy appear aggressi•,e and provocative (including the charge of wanting to disguise a real preventive attack against the Warsaw Pact). These polemics could shake the propensity, widespread among the European political leaders, to maintain a climate of dialogue and detente vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact countries. On the operational plane, moreover, there is a risk that the NATO forces' deep actions (i.e. also on Soviet territory) could induce the Soviet Union to have "justified" recourse to the employment of nuclear (and chemical) weapons, thus starting a nuclear war in Europe: exactly what the Airland Battle doctrine intends to avoid. It is known that the European NATO countries attach great value to the deterrent contents, as compared to the defensive - or, better, operationa l - con-· tents of the present NATO strategy of flexible response, whose effectiveness for maintaining peace is based essentially on the close connection between the US strategic deterrent and the European defences. This is based also on the conviction that a war limited to the European territory alone cannot be conceived: if there should be war, it could only be a general one and, as such, it

wou ld inevitably involve also the two superpowers' territories. Vis-a-vis the official positions there are also doubts and perplexities about: • evolution of the Warsaw Pact doctrine: no more operational

"echelons" deployed in depth, but strong pressure on the line of contact, in order to produce breakings in the weaker sectors. where more agile and highly manoeuvering formations could be thrown, in order to exploit success immediately (these are the "operational manoeuvre groups" formed by special units) (the Soviet Union is preparing and strengthening precisely its advanced forces); • effectiveness of the much extolled highly sophisticated weapon systems. They could turn out to be, high costs apart, commercial bluffs, whose effectiveness could be easily nullified by a cunning adversary. In the worst of cases. the "ET" (Emerging Technologies) could become a mass of expensive potential capabilities looking for employment. . Moreover one should consider the limitations that an excessive sophistication of the systems can bring about on the operational plane, for, beyond certain li mits, any increase in sophistication - far from produc-

ing an increased operativeness - establishes an increased vulnerability; • skepticism, both about the possibility of an effective and timely in-depth intervention on mobile tc:1rgets and about the convenience of the immediate employment of "dual role" systems in their conventional form, due to the ambiguity of the signal and the possible nuclear retaliations; • actual possibility to bear the enormous costs deriving from the concrete application of the new doctrine. Actually, it entails the adoption of very advanced technologies which, if on the one hand lead to a global reduction of personnel and an increase in destructive power, on the other involve an amount of industrial and financial resources that the European partners of the Alliance could hardly sustain, and our country least of all. considering that the financial resources allotted for the next decade will allow us to attain only. 80% of the objectives defined with the 1975 restructuring. Assumably, in the next five years, no European country will be able to substantially increase its defence budget: on the contrary, the resources destined to the strengthening of

Left. U.S. self-propelled M247 "Sgt York". The system will be issued to the divisional anti-aircraft battalions, and is armed with two 40 mm guns derived from the Swedish "Bof<Ks L70" gun, already in service, in the to.wed version, in several NATO Armies. Right.

A Martin Marietta XM-712 "Copperhead" 155 mm guided proiecti/e, about to hit an M47 target tank. The XM -712 can be fired by almost all the 155 mm howitzers now in service, and is guided on the target by a laser designator, which can be installed on the ground, on a helicopter, or on a remote-control aircraft. Below.

A model of XM-712 "Copperhead", with empennage and wings unfolded. Its HEAT nose cone can pierce the armour of any tan~:.

ing for granted the strategy of flexible response and advanced defence, although with a policy of "no early first use" of the nuclear potential (which maintains a primary deterrent function), is oriented towards arresting the first echelons on the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) and wearing out the second operational echelons, by means of the new weapon systems and the acquisition of the objectives in the real time permitted by the "emerging technologies". FOFA will be the subject of discussions and it seems certain that it will shortly be approved by the Atlantic Council political summit. Also the last obstacle regard ing only the ter-

forces will decrease, due to a sensible increase in the costs of technica l personnel; • convenience to employ a part of the air and land forces for the in -depth action (into the enemy territory), considering that the forces of European NATO are qu::intit::itively insufficient or, at most, just adequate for conducting the manoeuvre of arrest in the border zone. The American Airland Battle 2000, transferred to NATO, in the period 1983-1984 has be·· come the so-called "Rogers doctrine" or F0FA (Follow-On Forces Attack). To synthetize the composite dialectic process within NATO, this doctrine, tak-

minology (but of conceptual importance) and meant to replace "Attack" with "Interdiction" (FOFI instead of F0FA), has been overcome. FOFA will stay, even though - unlike the Airland Battle which envisages the employment in depth of counterattack forces up to 150 km beyond the FEBA - the in-depth action (about 400 km beyond the FEBA) will be carried out only by fire. The Rogers doctrine, already operating, as far as applicable, in the ambit of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), will have medium and long term reflections on the force goals and, consequently, on the technologica l evolution of the armed

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forces of the Allied countries, which will be responsible for the defence of Europe in pro-Âˇ portion to the resources that each nation is able to invest for its security. Thus the gap in the operationa l capabil ity will widen, in direct proportion to the amount of resources devoted to the strengthening of the military instruments (1) (2).

"STAR WARS" STRATEGY

Next to the Airland Battle, the US are starting research and development programmes on an anti-missile strategic defence system based in space; a programme labelled "star wars" by the American press. Its purpose is to avoid the "snares" of a future security entrusted solely to nuclear reta liation. This programme, whose exact techn ica l denomination is "Anti-missile Defence by Energy Oriented in Space", is stil l in the phase of research and study in the United States, where ample technical and financial resources/ have been assigned to it (it has been sa id that, just for 1985, there has been an allocation, for this purpose, of 2 billion dollars, wh ich must be added to the allotments of the last years) . This article does not have the purpose of expla ining the techn ical features of these systems. We want to stress instead the fundamental concepts underlying the mil itary employment of this technology, also known as "Bal listic Missile Defence" (BMD) . BMD includes a wide range of interventions, such as those against cruise missiles, Submarine Launched Bal listic Missiles (SLBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) but the best defence (BMD) seems to be - as adm itted by the American experts them selves - the interception of the intercontinenta l ballistic missiles (ICBM) (see diagram}. Having said this, one asks himself: if it were dec ided, in the next years, to actual ly pro-

duce these anti-missile systems capable of neutralizing or destroying the enemy nuclear missiles, what would be the consequences? The nuclear strategy wou ld certai nly undergo a radical transformation, with deep changes in the world strateg ic balances. This systems could - in theory - guarantee the security not by threatening a "mutual assured destruction" but by promising a "mutual assured survival" assuming that the United States and the Soviet Union have the same capabil ity to produce antimissile laser systems. And almost certain ly the Soviet Union - covertly and without clamour and internal and international echos {unlike the United States) - has also been carrying out programmes in the sector of laser beam weapons that are apparent ly the equivalent of the US ones. We could therefore be witnessing a race between the two su perpowers wh ich want to equip themselves with systems of global defence - a kind of "Maginot Line" in space, as Gen. Cors ini has called it - with the hypothetical risk that the party reachi ng this goal first cou ld, in theory, be tempted to use its presumed invulnerability to destroy the other. Luckily for mankind, or unluckily (depending from what viewpoint the problem is seen). it seems certain that a system making a society invulnerable to nuclear attack cannot be accomplished and would inevitably be doomed to failure. The scientist and technicians presently engaged in studying the feasibility of the "Star Wars" programme are convinced that an absolute defence does not exist. for any kind of defence would always have a certain degree of vu lnerability. And we have seen it, while speaking about the various operations of engagemen t. On the contrary, on ly safe antimissile defences limited to protecting the strategic forces or limited zones are deemed feasible. (There are already talks about stationing experimental systems

Facing page. The diagram shows the hypothetical flight of a Soviet ICBM from the Russian territory to lhe US, covering a distance - in missile terms - of 10,000 km. The atmosphere's limit is at about 100 km above the Earth's surface. As a matter of reference, we mention that the spaceship "Shuttle" normally orbits at a height of 250 km. The red line shows the initial phase, when the missile leaves the atmosphere and is propelled into space. At the beginning of the green line, the booster rocket drops away and the missile is now formed by the main rocket, or "BUS", which includes the re-entry vehicles or nose cones. During this phase, apart from small adjustments made by the governing propellers, lhe "BUS" travels in a Âˇ free fall towards the United States. At a predetermined point the re-entry vehicles and the decoy targets {offensive independent warheads) are disconnected from 1he "BUS" and travel towards their respective objectives. The defence against ballist ic

mis-

siles {BMD) has a multiple capability to hit an enemy missile along its t rajectory: immediately after the launching, when the missile travels at low speed; in the phase shown by the red line (coinciding with the launching's longest time-span, which is also the fastest); in the phase shown by the green line, re -entry in the atmosphere and separation of the independent warheads. The most advantageous solution seems to be that of attacking the missile during the "red line" phase, because possible attempts to deceive a defensive system in this phase would require the orbiting of a comp lex system of "decoy" missiles that would be enormously expensive. After the s ighting, a method to engage the missile could be that of activating lasers on mountaintops. The laser beams would be reflected by retransm ission mirrors to other interceptor mirrors sited on the attack route to the targets. The accuracy of the intervention would be ensured by spacelocated laser radars. Another system of defence is t hat of orbiting interceptor missiles which destroy the enemy nose cones with nuclear-produced "X" rays. These actions of engagement at high altitudes, above the Earth's atmosphere, would probably occur in the "green line" phase. On the other hand, in this phase the enemy would find the deceit more costly, but easier. After the separation of the nose cones from the "BUS", the defence would become quite d ifficult.

in Europe for the direct protection of the "Pershings" and "Cruises"). As will be noticed, it is aga in a matter, albeit in "space" terms, of the ancient dilemma of the sword and the shield, the gun and the armour! In such a context, apparent ly the survival of our Society will have to be ensured throug h

an effective deterrence based on suitably protected offensive strategic systems. And it is of scarce importance, in a framework of ampleÂˇ globalÂˇ availabi lity of nuclear devices of "megatonic" power. that one of the two superpowers had more of them , provided that the other ca n command suffi cient and

credible forces of retaliation which can guarantee the stability. And then a spontaneous question arises: why assign so many resources for the implementation of program mes that don't provide absol ute security? Is it in the interest of mankind that armaments be installed

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into space, capable of hitting not only the enemy missiles but also the satellites (considering that, besides, the latter have been for years effective tools of surveillance and early warning against a surprise attack, positively contributing to mutual security)? Certainly not. also because the development of these systems could have serious destabi lizing repercussions on the present strategic balance. And almost certainly the space weapons and the employment of space for military purpose will be the subject of talks and, hopefully, of agreements complex as they may be - between the Soviet Union and the United States. Also about "Star Wars" there has been no lack of criticism and perplexities in the European countries of the Alliance, if only for their consciouness that they cannot offer viable alternatives, neither in the field of technological research nor in that of financial contributions, especially when the cost of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" is reckoned in tens and tens of billion dollars: science fiction. real ly, from all points of view! We cannot let our fantasy carry us away, our feet must stand firm ly on solid ground; we must continue to believe. first of all, that the force and cohesion of NATO are fundamental elements for the security and the preservation of a stable peace and try to find. within the Alliance, the model of defence and the ensuing operational tool apt to deter and, if forced, to repel, a possible aggression. COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF DEFENCE

A comprehensive model of defence must stem, first of all, from the scenario of the threat which. in practice, can be considered unchanged at the eastern frontier, with an essentially air-land character and with the only variants connected with the more and more deep-rooted intention of the two

bordering neutral countries to defend their territorial integrity, with the ensuing manifold positive reflections for us. There is, on the other hand, an increase only in the air and naval threat from the south to the lines of communication, deriving from the possibility, more than the probability, that the hypothetical aggressor could take firm root in the Mediterranean countries, where, at present, it keeps friendly relations. In this connection it must be pointed out that the political situation of these countries is marked by a permanent unbalance. which derives both from conflictual internal reasons, typical of the

individual countries, and from external influences aimed at destabilizing the whole area. In this context Italy, although bound to NATO with a precise role of its own, tries to act as an intermediary between the parties. in order to mantain or improve the pol itical stability. of the zone. Of course this entails possible involvements, also of a military nature, with a weight

A U.S. ballistic missile submarine shows its launchers. Some are empty, but the ones closed with white foamed plastic already shelter the SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles).

or tone proportionate to the activism, incisiveness and determination of our foreign policy. Lastly there is the possibility - but the probability is scarce - of sudden attacks against the smaller islands, for demonstration or within the framework of disputes connected with the exploitation of the continental shelf. In other words the scenario of the threat can be assessed as: • quantitatively unchanged on the north-eastern border, though constantly on the increase from the qualitative· point of view (and we have daily confirmations of this);

• on the increase from the south, in the air~naval sector. For what we have said, the military policy should be aimed towards an instrument as much "integrated" as possible, capable of fulfilling the "five joint operational missions" pointed out by the Minister of Defence in his "White Paper". Namely, they are: • Defence of the· north-east (1st mission), by advanced defence - the validity of which is fully confirmed - in correspondence with the north-eastern border, as we said, aimed at obtained a frontal arrest, repeated, in depth, if that be the case, on successive positions,

mainly through an effective antitank and antiaircraft defence, together with the wearing out and the interdiction of the enemy Major Units in 2nd and 3rd echelon before they come into contact, using aircraft fire and

Mc Donnel Douglas F-15 "Eagle" fighter-interceptor, equipped with a transport pod tor an antisatellite Vought ASAT missile. This missile can destroy satellites up to an orbital altitude of 1,000 km, and is guided on the target by an infrared system and eight small telescopes. The ASAT reaches the speed of 49,375 km/h and does not have an explosive warhead: the target is destroyed by the energy developed at the moment of the satellite-missile impact.

long range weapon systems, keeping in mind, among other things, that the mentioned Major Units will have to be channelled - due to the typical morphology of the terrain - first in the Jugoslavian, and possibly the Austrian, valleys and, after, in those of the Alps and Pre-Alps. • Defence to the south and defence of the sea lines of communication (2nd mission). ensuring, in cooperation with the allied forces, the surveillance and control of the Mediterranean with adequate air-·naval forces to face a possible offensive from the sea and to protect the sea ways of communication. • Air defence (3rd mission), by ensuring, in cooperation with the allied forces, protection from the air and support to the naval and land forces through an adequate availability of multirole aircraft. • Operational defence of the tenitory not included in the

north-eastern area (4th mission) by intervening - in the threatened zones - with the power and cadence of development that appear to be compatible with the territorial organization which must be restructured within a joint framework - and with the institution of mobilization, which ought to be revived with measures aimed at extending the system of "linkage", on a regional basis, to the units of territorial defence, permitting the periodic recall of the reservists for the constitution of the units. ·• Actions of peace, security and civil defence (5th mission) ensured by establishing a "mobile force of rapid intervention" capable not only of intervening quickly in any area of the national territory (excluding the Combat Zone) possibly exposed to external attacks, integrating the local defences, but also of carrying out tasks of inter-

Close air support and tactical reconnaissance AM-X aircraft. This airplane, still at the prototype stage, in the second half of the '80s will renew the fighter-bomber-recce light aircraft line, consisting of G-91R and G-91Y, and the F/104S - in fighter bomber role - not replaced by "Tornados".

national security, intervening upon request of the UN or friendly countries - to carry out actions of peace and humanitarian deeds as well as actions of protection and removal of Italian citizens abroad, in case of serious and direct threat against them. As regards the interventions for civil defence in case of national disasters, an "ad hoe" force of rapid intervention must be created, because the requirements to meet are of a completely different nature.

ADEQUATE INSTRUMENT In order to meet the operational needs described above, the operational instru ment must necessarily be adjusted Âˇin its three components (land, air and nava l). Here I shall just deal - very briefly - with the aspects concerning the Army, for two series of reasons: first, because I am an Army general. second because the Army, within the joint framework, will have to play the leading role, like the Infantry and its branches within the Army: the infantry is known as the Queen of Battles, because all other branches and forces operate together w ith it and to support its action, which remains irreplaceable (Falklands docent). We have seen that the present operationa l instrument (and I mean the field army) can be considered barely sufficient, in quantitative terms, for confronting the supposed threat, but it is absolutely inadequate from the qualitative viewpoint, due to the serious deficiencies existing In the armament and equipment in general and, particularly, in the sector of di rect anti-aircraft defence of Head-

quarters and operational units (low altitude defence), anti-tank defence under 500 metres, armoured and tracked vehicles, systems for the surveillance of the battlefield and acquisition of targets, systems of command, control and processing of data, electronic warfare, etc .. Therefore, first of all, the already defined programmes of modernization must be completed and, second , the need remains that more real resources be allotted for the problem of defence; resource to be employ-Âˇ ed as economically and as profitably as possible, with joint outlook and participation, which would allow the actual qualitative strengthening of the instrument, avoiding the well known "restructuring" makeshifts that always result in a reduction of forces. Unfortunately, as regards the resources for the defence budget. the Hon. Savio has said in so many words that "Italy appropriates 2.5% of its GNP for defence, setting itself at the 11th place among the NATO countries, after the United States, of course, but also bet1inu Greece, Great Brita in, Turkey, France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal. The Netherlands and

Norway". Clearly this is not encouraging, and cannot be accepted without foreseeing a decline of operativeness (which could become irreversible) and a loss of credibil ity within the Alliance. Indeed, our feet must stand on the ground, but not underground! Corrective measures must be taken, both of a financial (additional appropriations) and of a politico-diplomatic nature, as well as on the military plane. These measures should not only be aimed at tak ing the best advantage of the aspirations of the two northeastern bordering nations (Austria and Jugoslavia - which, as we said, have more and more transparently shown their firm determination to defend their territorial integrity - but also at improving our relations with Albania, Malta, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt. Somalia and Ethiopia.

Launching of an "Aspide" missile from a "Skyguard" antiaircraft field system. Designed as a defence against air allaul<.::; al very low altitude, the "Skyguard" system is equipped with a miniature tire control centre, based on digital techniques and high-level technologies.

As regards our territorial army, it must be said that it ought to be reorganized, envisaging the establishment of units, at battalion level, charged with all responsibilities of territorial management and security (i.e. guard to depots, also with the participation of auxiliary Carabinieri) and keeping as "cadres" units of rapid constitution, using "linked" personnel, on the same line of what has been foreseen for the completion of the operational units. Finally, as regards the "Mobile Force of Rapid Intervention" to be established in view of a timely deployment in the areas where a situation of crisis has arisen - or better, is about to arise - it is commonly believed that it should not exceed the Brigade level and should have a joint frame. To this instrument, the following are indispensable corollaries:

• presence of a reliable air force, capable of giving immediate and close support; • a modular structure permitting, at the moment of the emergen-· cy, the gathering of an instrument qualitatively and quantitatively adequate to the needs; • a light and powerful antitank and antiaircraft armament. so as to allow an acceptable operational autonomy; • a high training standard, real-. ized in an adequate framework of training areas and aids (simulators). and frequently tested during exercises. CONCLUSIONS

It results from the above that a model of defence totally different from the present one seems unacceptable, because the threat in its main outline is unchanged, and unchanged are

OTO C-13 combat armoured vehicle . Produced by OTO Melara, it reaches a maximum speed of 70 km/ h, with a range of 480 km. Its high weight/power ratio (25 HP/t) gives this vehicle a good cross-country capability on any type of terrain. It carriers 9 fully equipped men, who can fire through 5 loopholes and from a trapdoor in the high part of the hull. The vehicle is armed with a .50 caliber Browning machine gun.

the socio-organizational structure of the instrument (conscription) and the amount of· economic resources. The most appropriate path to be followed seems to be the adjustment of the present instrument. also in order to better concentrate and assign the available resources. The establishment of a mobile force appears to be a viab le objective, provided that one does not indulge in overambitious dreams which, besides the hindrances from our foreign

policy, would meet insuperable obstacles in the resources available, especially if assessed in relation to the air-naval instrument entailed by am1 long range development. Before concluding, I shou ld like to dwell briefly upon two subjects: the first concerning the Alliance and the second more specifically our country. As regards the Alliance, we have seen that three are numerous differences between the European countries and the United States, and some of them are rather weighty, but one cannot ignore the many aspects on which there has always been, and there is today, full identity of opinions. In all there is the common will to pursue the great principles of freedom and democracy, as well as social justice and peace; concepts tfiat have also been firmly underlined at the conclusion of the extraordinary meeting of the Western European Union (WEU). recently held in Rome. All want to avert a conflict, at any level, and in all there is

the wish to strengthen the defensive instrument and to raise the nuclear threshold. Till now, and luckily tor mankind, a third world conflict, which could have had apocalyp-Âˇ tic consequences, has been avoided. All the same, the risk is always impending , also because the hypothesis seems scarcely credible that a country (or Alliance) that owns nuclear weapons will be ready to accept a severe "conventional" defeat without using its nuclear power. The nuclear threat exists, and will continue to exist (even if we put our missiles away). Just as the chemical threat, discarded during World War 11, has reemerged, multiplied in its lethal effects by the technologi cal evolution. In this context, therefore, we must not only do our best, at all levels and by all means, to prevent all types of war by supporting and encouraging all initiatives apt to prevent us from overstepping, by mistake or imprudence, the threshold of the existing powerful armaments (if this happens, it would be a tragedy for all

- as shown in the fi lm "The day after" - including those who use them first) but we must also operate in order to reduce, within certain limits, the devastating effects of the NBC weapons, if, regrettably, a conflict breaks out. Unfortunately it must be admitted that nothing - or very little - has been done in our country about it, while in neighbouring Switzerland anti-NBC shelters are ready for more than five million citizens, i.e. 76% of the population. The defence of our country, today more than yesterday, is not just the task of t he armed forces, but affects all of the nation's resou rces. The national security is given - always within the wider framework of

"Folgore" recoilless gun, used by an Italian Army infantryman. The "Folgore" has been designed by Breda in such a way that a single man, if necessary, can carry the weapon, aim and fire. Its hollow-charge, semi-selfpropef/ed round has a speed of approximately 500 m/s and can {)iP.rr.P. A 4?5 mm armour.

the same time, we must prethe Atlantic Alliance - by the dispose an efficient defensive summation of military defence organization that would not only and civil defence. Therefore the necessity ex- discourage a potential aggressor, but also reduce the casualists that the organization and ties and damages in case of mobilization (military and civilian) of the country for its defence conflict. The Italian Armed Forces be pre-arranged already in stand in front of the entire nation peacetime, using adequate rea guarantee for security at the sources and operative legislative tools, which regrettably we frontiers and inside the country, against disorders created by do not have. This matter is still man or nature. They present governed mainly by laws and themselves, especially, as a relevant applicative regulations dating back to the distant 1940; valid component of the force of deterrence constituted by the they cannot be considered fully valid, due to the deep modifica-· Atlantic Alliance, which for nearly 40 years has been ensuring tions occurred in the constitutional and administrative systems peace in Europe. In order to carry out their of the country. tasks, the Armed Forces request Unfortunately, the existi ng the necessary resources for serious legislative deficiencies, achieving an adequate operaalso in the limited military •tional efficiency (3) but they field, cause the impossibi lity to work out a concrete planning or also request the consensus and moral support of the national to . give validity to t he planning community, of which they feel in vital sectors of the country's defence. We are stil l proceeding to be a lively, vital and democratic expression. with "drawer" decrees, because there is no political willingness Giorgio Donati to tackle and solve - at least from the legislative point of view - the important problem of defending our Fatherland: apparently we are afraid to be taken for "warmongers". We must not be disheartened by this; on the contrary, we must consider it our precise duty to continue the necessary NOTES actions in the appropriate fo(1) Besides FO FA, the fol lowing are i nd irums so that the civilian and cated as an alternative to redress the unbalance of forces: military authorities will have at of the French forces and the their disposal sufficient resources •Geparticipation rman territo ria l Army; • 4 additiona l Divisions; and the suited legislative • 4 re inforcing D ivisions in the first 8 days. instruments for organizing the (2) The " emerg ing technologies" will be on : defence in all its various aspects, directed • first echelons; • counter-air 90 (ba listic missi les} : within the framework and in • second echelons; conformity with the Eurorean • C3 and in formation systems. (3) The operationa l efficiency of the Armed and Atlantic treaties. Forces is the integra l complex (not be summa tion} of 5 strictly interdependent factors: And, in this sector, the • man and his spiritual and psycholog ical moCenter for High Defence Studies t ivation (sustained by the consensus o f the national community); has already done much, and • ind ividua l and collective training at the various jo int levels: inter-branch, inter-service, inte rwill be able to do more in the allied (with ava ilability of firing ranges. traini ng future. areas, simulation devices. ammunitio n): • avai labi lity o f modern and re liable arma ment, Summing it up, we ought equipment and amm unition; • capability of adegua te support to the defen· to continue insisting with pasive effort (well trained and rapi dly mob ilized tience and obstinacy (equal at reserves, well located and sufficient logistic and operational stocks); least to that of our Russian • redundant and flexible command and contro l systems. interlocutors), and with objecTo disregard ju st o ne of these factors retive "optimism", in the dialogue sults in a serio us hazard for (and perhaps the annu lment of) the deter ren t va lue and the and negotiations about a "verificredibility of a defensive force. Th is is what we arc suggesting today as a sub ject for medable reduction of armaments", itati on to those responsible for defence, and in order to prevent war, but, at to pu blic opinion.

General Giorgio Donati has attended the Military School of Rome and the Academy of Artillery and Engineers in Turin. After his commission, he participated in the Liberation War as O.C. patrol leader. comnander of a mortar platoon of the "Piemonte" Alpini battalion in the Italian Corps of Liberation and, later, in the "Legnano" Combat Group. In 1944, he was wounded in battle and received a Solemn Citation for the action in Val Canneto (Parco Nazionale degli Abruzzi). After the war, and until 1955, he served as 1st Lieutenan t and Captain with the "Bergamo" and "Vicenza" mountain artillery battalions in Alto Adige. He attended the War College and the Joint General Staff Institute, besides several courses in Italy and within NATO. As a General Staff Officer he held many important posi tions, among which: Chief, Training and Manoeuvre Section, Hq. LANDSOUTH (1961-1965); Chief of Staff of the "Tridentina" Alpine Brigade (19651969); Chief of the Training Office, Hq. LANDSOUTH (1971-1973); Chief of Staff of the 5th Territorial Military Command (1975-1976); Chief of Staff, Hq. LANDSOUTH (1976-1980). Commander of the "Susa" mountain artillery battalion of the "Taurinense" Alpine Brigade, he then commanded the 3rd Mountain Artillery regiment "Julia" and the "Cadore" Alpine Brigade. Promoted Lieutenant General. he commanded the 4th Alpine Corps and, later, the N.E. Military Region. On April 30, 1983 he was appointed Commander of the Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOUTH). Gen. Donati has been awarded the· Gold Medal for Long Command, two War Crosses fo r Merit, the Mauriziana Medal and the Portuguese 1st Class Medal for Merit; in 1978 he has been made Grand Officer of the· Orcer of Merit of the Republic of Italy. This article is excerpt ed from th e lecture delive.red at the Centre for High Defence Studies on December 7, 1984.

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE The publication of the U.S. Army's new doctrine (FM. 100-5 of August 20, 1982) has animated the debate regarding NATO'sÂˇ strategy. The names' confusion that has grown with it has, been denounced by us for years and termed "jungle of definitions" by General Umberto Cappuzzo at a meeting organized by the "Centro M. Brosio-" (1). As always the discussions are, one can say, "hypnotically" limited' to the. land battlefield, leaving out the air and naval ones or, at the most, premising that, while the land battle is fought, the struggle for the conquest of skies and seas is also under way. This shows that only verbally all agree, on the need to study the war as a whole, so that all the elements that take part in this complex social phenomenon are harmonized and exploited as best as possible, in order to achieve success. This inconsistency between theoretical aims and actual behaviour is evidenced by the attempt to raise the American doctrine known as "Airland' Battle" to the rank of NATO strategy. The debate, complicated by an hermetic language. and some doctrinal involutions is creating further intellectual discomfort as regards the study of the problem of common and national defence.

With this work, we shall try to overcome this uneasiness; we shall also try to orient ourselves in this complex subject, dividing, when possibj e, the political from the exclusively military questions, the Atlantic Alliance's interests from the national ones, the needs of each Service from the global exigencies of war, in the aim of reaching the core of the problem. Although in the abovementioned manual it is clearly stated that "the formulation of a strategy is beyond its aims", and that it is only concerned with the doctrine of land forces' employment at Corps level, the "Airland Battle" has been nevertheless defined as strategy. Someone has called it "opera tiona l strategy" or "major tactics" because the manual has inserted it between strategy and tactics. Something like it was done by the Soviets almost twenty years ago and is still in force today. In fact they call "art of operations" (Operativnoye lskusstvo) the section of the rnililary art devoted to the theory and practice of the preparation and management of joint or independent operations of the major units of each Service.

ÂŤr,,zs

Starting from the strategical prerequisites, the new art establishes the methods for preparing and conducting the operations, in order to achieve the strategic objectives, giving the initial data to tactics. The latter, on its turn, prepares and carries out the combat, according to those objectives and to operations (2). Also the Soviets, like the Americans, do not explain the theoretic need of this new "art". Studying their texts it seems that this art derives from the greater operational auton-Âˇ omy of the major land un its, which is due to the advances in the armaments field, especially the nuclear one. The nuclear weapons have emphas ized the importance of the time and surprise factors and of the manoeuvre of the forces and means, together with the minor units Commanders' ability to autonomously organize their operations in order to fulfill their task. The nuclear arms' destructive power requires in fact the dispersal of the combat formations, at distances which make it very difficult for the higher Command to coordinate the action, especially in the offensive. Among the mentioned ex-

amples there are: the case of motorized units, which make a rapid offensive along a preferential line, following nuclear, missile, air or artillery attacks, in order to achieve the complete defeat of the surviving enemies; that of an attack along converging axes in order to surround and destroy an enemy's defensive stronghold, and others . Interdiction by nuclear, aircraft, missile fire is envisaged in order to prevent the reserves from joining the battle and, subsequently (if the remaining reserves are within reach) the artillery will be employed. In general, it is foreseen that "the offensive start with nuclear air attacks and missiles, in order to eliminate the means of mass destruction and defeat the main enemy formation along the main axis of the attacking troops" (3). of course taking advantage of the surprise factor.

Sikorsky RH -530 helicopters on the deck of the carrier "Nimitz". The RI J-5:JD is a modified version of the HH-53 and is used in minesweeping operations. Different versions of the HH-53 are employed in salvage, air rescue, combat assistance and troop transport operations.

The organization in "Fronts" and . "Strategic Formations" (Operational Manoeuvre Groups) should permit to achieve the goals. The "Front" is the highest level of a strategic formation made up by units of the three Services. This joint organization and the definition of strategy confirm our assumption regarding the reasons for the creation of an intermediate branch be -Âˇ tween strategy and tactics. In short, it seems that only the organizational and the conceptual part rega rdi ng the Armed Forces has been left to strategy, transferring the employment of the Armed Forces in war to the art of operations. In fact, according to the Soviets, military strategy investigates and elaborates (4) the problems of the training of the Armed Forces, both as a whole and as ind ividual Services, their employment in war, the forms and methods of conducting and directing a war and also the problems regarding the strategic support of the Armed ForcesÂˇ combat operations (5). An important fact that should be stressed is that the

Soviets, sometimes, wrongly classify the objectives according to their distance and not according to their strategic value. It follows that they define as strategic a war means (or a unit) because it can operate at a great distance in order to destroy (or conquer) an objective, without considering whether this could or could not be determinant in the achievement of t he strategy's goal which, being a concrete result, is the only fac tor that qualifies the operation of the action. For the Soviets it is therefore "the art of operations". and not strategy, that which defines the objectives of tactics, which remains "the art of study ing the objective laws of fighting and of developing the methods for confronting and conducting with success the la nd, naval and air battles" (6). For the Americans, "strategy makes use of a nation's Armed Forces in order to achieve the objectives fixed by the na tional policy, employing force or the threat of it. The military strategy defines. the fundamental conditions for the conduct of opera-

tions" (7). This means that, on the one hand, strategy is given a function that belongs to politics (recourse to war and use of the Armed Forces) and, on the other, the highest expression of the military art is reduced to the mere and simple definition of the fundamental conditions for the conduct of ' operations (this be ing a limitation very similar to the one made by the Soviets). The "doctrine of operations". temporarily called " Airland Battle". points out the methods for fighting and winning battles. In the manual it is stated that the doctrine is founded on the idea that one must take the in itiative and make use of it in an aggressive way, in order to defeat the enemy. This concept derives from a previous publication of the U.S. Army, "Training and Doctrine Command" (TRADOC 525-5). in which it can be

BMP-1 combat armoured vehicles for mechanized infan trv, of the German Democratic Republic's Army.

The BMP-1 can carry 8 men, and is the trestle of the Warsaw Pact Units.

noticed an attempt to express its views in a clear and nonconformist language especially where it maintains: "The operational concept empt,asizes the too-often overlooked or ill-under-Âˇ stood lesson of history for, once the political authorities employ the Armed Forces to attain their political goals, they must win something, otherwise there would not be bases on which the political authorities can negotiate to win politically . Consequently the aim of military operations cannot be simply that of avoiding defeat. but rather of winning" (8). In the "Airland Battle", classic terms and concepts are also used, such as : in-depth attack on the enemy's weak points with fire and movement; "rapid, unforeseeable, violent" operations; precise but flexible plans of operation. These show that the Americans have in part got r id of the current fashion, which we mentioned before, and have discovered again, together with the principles of war, von Clausewitz's simplicity (9). We have said "in part" because in the new doctrine there are still a few euphemisms, residual tribute to politics. In fact the battlefield is called "integrated", meaning that traditional and nuclear weapons are employed together, and at the same time it has been "extended" (extended battlefield) to justify the counteroffensive deep into the enemy's territory. It is actually a semantic trick which permits the strategic interdiction and avoids to call it by name, defining it "Follow-On Forces Attack - (FOFA)" performed by the air force, or (Airland 2000) by the sophisticated weapons of the future, the famous E.T . (Emerging Technologies) which should also allow us to give up nuclear armaments. The justifications for this new doctrine is that a possible war on a front (i.e. that of Central Europe) where the advanced defence requires a linear dep loyment of the defensive forces, the recourse to theatre nuclear weapons is inevitable in

order to stop the enemy invasion and the risk of using the strategic weapons is greater. On the contrary, if one prevents the supply of the attacking forces, by destroying the second echelon and even the third one, it is then possible to stop the offensive and, without recourse to strategic weapons, to induce the enemy to negotiate. In the discussions following the publication of the "Airland Battle" it has finally been conceded, without periphrases, that advanced defence is a political condition put by the Ge rman government, which cannot accept the development of a defensive nuclear battle inside its territory. Eight years ago, with reference to our solitary work intended to explain the true nature of the theory of flexible response, we wrote that at the foundation of NATO's conception (MC . 14-3) there is the assumption that the primary function of the land forces on the defensive is that of containing and checking the enemy attack as much ahead as possible, in order to prevent any possible territorial conquest which could be politically exploited. We added: " ... the advanced defence concept must not therefore be understood as the capability to stop the enemy attack and to counterattack and penetrate deep into the adversary's territory, but rather the ability to block the enemy

AT-3 " Sagger" long-range anti-tank guided missile. It is the best known ATGM employed by the Warsaw Pact forces. Its range goes from 300 to 3000 m.; it can pierce an armour thicker than 410 mm.

penetration and to counterattack in order to regain the initially lost territory". In other words, we concluded " ... the advanced defence is a defensive procedure deriving not so much from tactical and strategic considerations as from political, military necessities, the objective of which is to protect the territory and to anchor the allied forces sta tioned there" (10). With this, the Soviets were told: " ... if you attack us in Europe, at the worst you would be driven back inside your own borders; on the contrary, your success could cause global war". Since the two main factors which have always helped to avoid wars are the degree of risk, i.e. the price that has to be paid, and the improbability of success, the NATO doctrine reduces the first to a minimum and leaves the second in a state of uncertainty. Furthermore, it is surmised tha the Soviet, ignoring both Lenin's and history' s teachings (Czar Nicholas' eagerness to seize the Dardanelles led to the Crimean war and its well -known consequences) would attack in Europe, with the intent of conquering their sup51

Yako/ev Yak-36MP "Forger-A" VTOL light fighter-bombers on the Soviet aircraft-carrier "Kiev".

posed objectives in the central region, being uncertain about their success and risking to hasten a final and decisive clash with the United States. And not only that; there is the convinction that they will attack with conventional arms even if they know that, in theory at least, they would still provoke that clash, after renouncing the advantages of nuclear initiative and surprise (11). In the present situation of strategic parity between the two superpowers, this hypothesis appears even more improbable and therefore the American political problem to reconcile the willingness to avoid the risk of a nuclear holocaust and the pledge to guarantee Western Europe's security becomes again dramatically urgent. As regards the military aspect of this problem, there is, undoubted ly, the need to raise the price the Soviets should have t o pay for a possible geographically lim ited aggression made with conventional arms, so that they would be deterred from attempting to take advantage of their superiority. From this, the importance of a correct evaluation of the plans and objectives which could be the subject of this temptation and, moreover, the ways and means with which the Soviets could try to seize them. The technologica l scientific development regarding armaments and, above all, that of the traditional and space aviation,

has given new vigour to the principle of resisting on la nd in the intent of forming a mass in the air (soon it will be more appropriate to say " in space") and new importance to air (space) conquest and control. Both of these have always been challenged by the U.S. Army, first because the war suitability of the aircraft was undervalued, and therefore the validity of the principle and the possibility to dominate the air were questioned; secondly, because they led to a limitation of functions and a decrease of the importance of land forces (12). Confronted by the evidence, which shows that one cannot operate successfully on land without having at least loca l ai superiority, everyone wants his own air force. The U.S. Army, finding objectively impossible to re-establish its own, has probably contrived the means for integrating, into the land forces, the air forces, so that they are now side-by-side. In this way t he land forces regain the possibility to operate offensively. General Rogers, aware of the European political reactions to these new conceptions, revolutionary for those used to speak only in terms of defence, has immediately distanced himself from his American colleagues. He has hastened to defend the originality of his doctrinal conception, mantaining that, though they had ideas in common with FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack), "Airland Battle"

and "Airland 2000" have been conceived for world employment and have some aspects which. do not apply to the tasks of deterrence and defence, established for the Allied Command in Europe" (13). With FOFA he aims at making "flexible response more flexible" (14), attacking the second echelon of the Warsaw Pact forces with conventional air. In practice - to put it in a nutshell - Gen. Rogers has re jected the American concept of an "integrated" battlefield, because he hopes to fight exclusively with conventional weapons (but also for obvious political needs) and has borrowed from the "Airland Battle" the concept of an "extended" battlefield, because it permits to define as "tactic" all the land and air operations which take place within the geographical limits in which the second echelon enemy forces operate. In this way the ACE (Allied Command Europe) forces can overstep the NA TO borders, d'e fensively attacking enemv troops, airports, aircraft, in their territory, thus performing strategic interdiction and counter-air. To do this, Gen. Rogers relies on the improvement of the systems of command, control and communications, on the use of satellites and, in particular, of the "NA.VSTAR Global Position ing Systems" which, besides giving a determinant support to navigation, will also be used to provide the coordinates of the location of the enemy forces to be attacked. For interd iction and counter-air he expects greater operational capabilities from the arrival of the "Tornado" aircraft which will joi n - under his command - the USAF "F111s" and the RAF "Buccaneers". With the new tvpes of conventional ammunition, all these airplanes should increase their capability to destroy the air bases of the Warsaw Pact, apply-

Right.

Catapult launching of a Grumman E2C "Hawkeye" early warning and control aircraft. The "Hawkeye's" highly automatic systems give its crew the capability to follow mor.e than 250 targets up to a disiance of 480 km, and to guide the friendly aircraft on them. Below.

A-78 Corsairs, A-6E Intruders, F-14A Tomcats, and SH-3D Sea Kings on the "John F. Kennedy" aircraft-carrier.

ing the methods envisaged by another American publication, "US Counter Air 90". In the second article cited, Gen. Rogers speaks also about an attack against the enemy air defence system, besides that against air bases. That is, he lists all the most important missions of counter-air for achieving air supremacy. But he never mentions this real strategic aim of the air force::;. The reason is probably the same as that suggested for the U.S. Army. This is also proved by the NATO document "ATP--33", in which counter-air is downgraded to a tactic operation. In short, Gen. Rogers gives the impression of wanting to

rÂˇ'

get ready to fight (or to avoid), single-handedly, a war, conventiona l - if possible - and limited to the European theatre (15). That is, he anticipates with ACE what could be the aim of the defensive organization of a United Europe, closely connected with that of the U.S .. In order to attain his aim, Gen. Rogers, not having at his disposal strategic air forces, which, as such, have the task of attacking the Warsaw Pact's air power, has created a strategic dimension for the air force under his command. The latter, in fact, operating jointly with the land forces is seen, from the American standpoint, as tactical (Allied Tactical Air Force

AT AF) (16) despite the fact that its aircraft have the capability to perform counter-air strategic operations. It can be seen that Gen. Rogers has gone further than his U.S. Army colleagues, since he has produced a real doctrinal revolution which, surprisingly, has not given rise to any reaÂˇction from the NATO airmen . With it, in fact, the air strategy is deprived of its fundamental objective and therefore of its "raison d'etre"; consequently, an independent air force has no justification anymore. But the main point - as serious and important as this may be - is not this umpteenth attempt to cause a doctrinal

and organizational involution. implying the division of the sky in slices and the distribution of the air power between the army and the navy. The problem is that the study of war is once more carried out by sectors, in a land - and geographically limited - dimension, with a deceiving language to the detriâ€˘ ment of the military art. Moreover, this one-dimensional vision of war presupposes the Soviet's agreement to fight a- conventional war in Central Europe: namely, it assumes an irrational behaviour of the Soviets, which their doctrine leads us to exclude. And, if we refer to it. particularly to the part we have synthesized before - which, in our opinion is we ll framed by the irenic-centred conception described by Gen. Cappuzzo in the above-mentioned statement (17) this conception reca lls the Horatii and Curiatii and Ariosto's Orlando who, brandishing his powerful sword inveighs against the use of the (nuclear) "abominable device" and challenges the adversary to fight chivalrously with traditional arms. Underneath this challenge there is obviously the belief that the United States wants to avoid the risk of global war to defend Europe. Above all, the

war is still considered from the land point of view and lim ited to Central Europe, owing to anachronistic military conceptions and to the Soviet expansion ist thrust occurred in the forties. We, though sharing the same convlnctlon. are looking into space and believe that the thrust is exhausted. In our opinon it was occasional, and also caused by the fact that the Allies did not pay attention to the warnings given by Walter Lippmann to the heads of government in his famous book: "U.S. Fore ign Policy: Shield of the Republic". published during the war in 1943. He wrote that the thrust would be provoked by the victors' non-observance of some particular conditions while determining the new Âˇ political order of the world. These conditions concerned main ly the pacific settlement of the territoria l border between the Soviet Union and the Atlantic nations: a border that started. according to Lippmann, to the north of Finland and , through Poland, the Danubian and Balkan nations. reached Turkey. All these "border" nations, including Sweden, Germany and Italy, should have followed a policy of strict neutrality between the only two great powers which, according to the American jour-

British Aerospace "Sea Eagle" antiship missiles, fitted under the wings of an Hawker-Siddeley S.MK2 "Buccaneer''. The "Sea Eagle" reaches the speed of Mach 0,9 and tile range of 100 km.

nalist, would emerge from the second world war: the United States and Russia. Lippman was right (in fact he was a good prophet) because that "border" has a long history: it had been traced by Czar Ivan the Great and pursued more or less successfully by all his successors. Stalin too, like Catherine the Great, was about to fulfil! the great czarist dream. After ww11: having "reconquered" the Baltic countries and the Polish region - always thought to be determinant for the defence against western invasions - he tried to move southwards, but was stopped by President Truman with his declaration of assistance to Greece and Turkey, on Apri l 23, 1947. It was the first serious politica l setback that the Soviets had to suffer - for the U.S. had then the atomic monopoly - and which determined the USSR's race towards strategic parity. After procuring the nuclear weapon, and having preceded the Americans in the construe-

tion of intercontinental missiles, the Soviet Union took its revenge in 1956, forcing the English and the French to withdraw from Suez. In 1962. during the Cuban crisis, i( suffered again a political defeat. because the U.S. had bridged the famous missile gap (18). Since then. being satisfied with the borders established in Northern and Central Europe - together with the enormous progress made in the military field. which has re-established the strategic paÂˇity with its adversary - the Soviet Union leads an effective ideological offensive in the West and cautiously tries to penetrate in the Mediterranean area (of which it feels to be part. and which has acquired new importance due to the Soutl1's industrialization and the ensuing need to reach the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal) with the help of its dynamic foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East. Its preliminary objective is that of reducing the West's, and particularly the U.S.'s, influence in the Mediterranean.

To achieve this, .the Soviets exploit all crises of this turbulent area, in which rise, develop and intertwine the most varied problems that harass the populations living in its shores or depending economically from it. To support this policy, the Soviet Union keeps a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean with the aim of imposing and legitimizing its status as a Mediterranean power, and of opposing the U.S. politico-military position in this sea. All anti-American, pacifist and neutralist currents and movements existing in this region are exploited to this end and, above all, to obtain ports and safe berths for the Soviet fleet. These are of vital importance, for the Soviet fleet has

The Soviet aircraft-carrier "Novorossiysk" navigating the Mediterranean at reduced speed. The flight group of the "Novorossiysk" consists of twelve Yak-36 aircraft and twenty-two helicopters of different types.

to operate far from its national bases, in a hostile sea, whose main accesses are under the control of other countries. A sea strewn with islands ' which make the East-West lines of communication rather narrow, Âˇ following fixed routes, unsafe in case of conflict. From Cyprus and the Aegean islands, to Crete, Malta, Sicily and Pantelleria, there is a large number of areas that can be blocked with mines. or suitable for ambushes with submarines or fast attack craft armed with anti-ship mis-

siles. Non to mention the air offensive from the aircraft based on Turkish, Greek and Italian territory, which the SOVMEDRON would have to withstand without interruption during its slow and long navigation, always under the watchful eye of reconnaissance spacecraft (satellites). AWACS aircraft and submarines. In this field, during the last years, the Soviets have transformed their air power in the European theatre from a defensive force (with the task of attaining and maintaining local

air superiority and covering the zone behind the front) into a wide-range offensive force, with a remarkable ability to operate effectively in an evironment of electronic war. Moreover, the aircraft have greatly increased their payload in relation with their range and have been im -Âˇ proved as regards armament, avionics and air logistics. According to the paper "Soviet Military Power" of April 1984, published by the U.S. Department of Defence, the Soviets have tested the new cruise missiles with nuclear warhead and 1600 km. range; they have redeployed in the satellite countries the new "SU . 24" (Fencer) fighter-bombers, with nuclear armament and a high penetration capability at low altitude. The "Frog 7" tactical ballistic miss iles (TBM) have been replaced in the same countries by the mobile "SS.21" with a 120 km . range, the "SCUDs" have been replaced by the "SS.23" and the " Scaleboard" by the "SS.22". Final ly the Soviets foresee, for the near future, the commissionÂˇ of two 60,000 ton aircraft carriers, each equipped with modern attack and defence aircraft. With them the Soviet fleet will probably be structured after the American model and

will achieve the capability, that it does not have today, to confront the 6th Fleet in a decisive air battle in the Mediterranean, in order to gain the air supremacy in the reg ion . The command organization and the battle array of the Soviet air forces clearly show the aim of their air strategy. Marshal P.S. Kutakov (19). following a priority order, so lists the air operations: those to destroy the enemy air forces in order to attain air superiority; those to destroy the operational reserves and to cut the lines of communication; finally, the operations for destroying the military and industria l installations. To the mighty deployment of the Warsaw Pact forces, NATO opposes, apart from the numerical inferiority on land, a formidable and very much superior naval and air-naval strength. Nevertheless it must be said that lately there have been many debates in the United States on the expediency of keeping the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the convenience of its transfer to the North Sea has been ventilated; there, according to some experts, it could better perform its function to support the land

battle in Central Europe, at the same time enhancing its security. Concerned about a decision along this line, the Italian navy seems inclined to establish two tactical groups centred on two all-deck ships (wh ile waiting for the construction of the second ship, its function could be performed by one of the ' three cruisers of the "Vittorio Veneto" class) and to create a land-based naval a1r force. It is a very suggestive but utopian surrogate hypothesis, which could lead to the same mistake made in the thirties, when the air force, and the bases that should have been the stationary aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, were not sufficiently strengthened . This shou ld be avoided, owing to the perception that today, unl ike WWII, the threat is clearly an air and land one and is acquiring increasingly worrisome dimensions, complicating the defensive

The all-deck cruiser "Garibaldi". The unit has a load displacement of 13,000 tons, and is armed with two anti-aircraft "Albatros" missile systems, three "Dardo" systems, eight anti-ship "Teseo" missiles, three 40 mm. guns, two MK32 torpedolaunchers and two 105 mm. Breda rocket launchers.

problem of the nations gravitating towards this geographic area, and especially Italy's. Owing to their geo-strategic position and the de.riving problems, all three Mediterranean nations (but mainly Turkey and Greece) have their own military needs, which do not always coincide with those of the Alliance. Moreover it must be pointed out that, unlike the air forces of Central Europe, directly subordinate to AAFCE (Allied Air Force Central Europe). a Command which has real ized the centra lized control of all air operations on the central front. the air forces of Southern Europe operate, one could say, on a regional basis, due to the Turkish-Greek relations. The organizational and operational problems solved in the Centre persist in the South, worsened by the incidence of weighty political problems. One should add to the above some doctrinal differences between the European air forces and the USAF, which risk to produce not too small a confusion in the doctrinal field rey,:nding the employment of the air forces. To solve all these problems, the NATO Air Defence Com mittee (NADC) was created about two years ago. It should study and coordinate a general and realistic planning of air defence with all the Allies. But being only an organization of studies, as such it will not be able to solve the air forces' three main problems: control and coordination of all air operations at the highest level; the rapid transfer to NATO command of the national air forces and, finally, the close coordination between the Command of the air forces and those of the other forces . Probably, General Rogers is confident to solve these problems with his new doctrine, even though he does not even touch on them in his articles. To conclude, the U.S. Army's new doctrines are no doubt a progress in the manifestation of military thought. As regards the studies of the war phenomenon and strategy, the new

conceptions follow the old onedimensional schemes and have neglected to study the character and form of a future conflict. determined by the peoples' political and social evolution and by technical and scientific progress . They are also influenced by the old American inclination to undervalue the geo-political factor in the study of defence (20). As a consequence, the Soviet Union's primary political aim has been overlooked and attention has been given to the secondary aim, which involves a reduced and limited dimension of war. Moreover, from the military standpoint, the two main factors that characterize the conduct of war are not taken into consideration: the nuclear power the conquest of space and the transfer

BU 206 "Hagglund" total mobility vehicle. At present this vehicle - capable of transporting 17 fully equipped men or a load of 2000 kg is employed by the units of the 4th Alpine Corps. Its maximum speed on road is approximately 60 km / h; its range is 330 km.

there of the air operational technique. In short, disregarding the main elements (progress and political evolution) which impress the "mark of the epoch's character" (21), there have been wrong, or least anachronistic, assumptions at the base of the doctrinal studies. In addition to these, there are the national interests, and those of each service, which, in the log ica l results deriving from

those assumptions, come to be fully . rea lized. The truth is that the Soviet political aims and the military doctrine show that in the modern world there are two con trasting political and social systems and two opposing phi losophical conceptions of life. The war between them (inevitable according to the MarxistLeninist theory) will be a global and planetary one, and will explode when the Soviet Union is ready and certain of winning; or, in times of crisis, when one of the two superpowers, for fear of losing its retaliation means as a consequence of a first strike (22), is tempted to be the first to attack. Up to that moment, the Soviet Union will do its best to consolidate its czarist frontiers, aiming at the same time to obtain the Balkans' denuclearization, the neutrality of Turkey, Greece and Italy and the renewing of the "Treaty of Montreux", relying on the class ical effect, known since the times of the Peloponnesian War, of the disengagement of the allies from the lead ing power, , which has lost its defensive credibility, and their search for forms of accord with the bordering and opposing leading power (23).

To achieve these goals within medium terms, the Soviet Union will exploit the principle of pacific coexistence which "creates the favourable conditions for the construction of socialism and communism, and for the further development of the national movements of liberation " (24) . The war means already available and these being read ied, the military doctrine, the strategy, the people's preparation to the idea of nuclear war, the civil defence plans, the progress of the communist ideology in the world, are all to this purpose. The problem of the Western world 's collective security, to which that of each individual country is closely linked, is therefore a political and socia l problem rather than a mi litary one, and does not permit independent solutions for the United States and for the European nations. This is the lesson that can be learned from historical experience, and which the Americans, according to Henry Kissinger, seem to have learned, overcoming the traditional inclination "to waver between isolation and occasional bursts of involvement. both conceived in idealistic terms" (25).

It is indeed right to say that we are all on the same boat and we must row together, in synchronism and possibly with the same energy, The political union of Europe could greatly contribute to this common effort, but at the moment it seems far away. The unification of the European Armed Forces within ' the WEU, taking advantage of the Allied Command in Europe (ACE) would probably help to hasten it. Of course the contradictions and the anomalies of structure, which have been pointed out, should be corrected beforehand, defining the strategy in a way appropriate and adequate to the main factors of a modern war and to the real Soviet politica l goals, better adapting national and Service interests to the general interests and to the needs of the war. The time margins for creating a modern European military body, capable to fulfil! its deterrent and defensive role are becoming increasingly narrow.

U.S. soldiers ;ump from an M2 "Bradley" infantry '.Jombat vehicle; they carry the M16A1 assault rifle and wear the new helmet made of Keilar resin and nylon, instead of steel.

The British soldier on the right holds a 5.56 mm XL70E3 assault rifle, while the one with the transmitter-receiver carries the support version (with a heavier barrel and a bipod) of the same weapon, named LSW XL73E2. Both rifles have the release mechanism in front of the magazine, and are therefore short and compact.

NOTES (1) According to Prof. Ettore Paratore, it is a phenorienon very common throughout literature in general, due to the influence of the p resent fashionable hermetism (II Tempo, 10/84). (2) Various Authors: "Dictionary of Basic Military Terms", Moscow 1972, translated from Russian, by initiative of USAF. U.S. Printi ng Office. Washington D.C. (3) Marshal A.A. Grechko: "The Armed Forces of the Soviet State", Moscow 1975, translated by initiative of USAF. (4) Author's note. (5) "Dictionary of Basic Military Terms", already me1 tioned. The Soviets maintain that strategy has an o ffensive character and that "offensive is the military operations' fundamental type. and its objective is th e total destruction of the enemy". (6) Ibidem. (7) HDOS. Department of th e Army, FM . 100-5 "Operations", Washington D.C., August 20, 1982. (8) "TRADOC" 525-5 - March 25.

1981. (9) A typical example of this fashion can be found in "Survival" no. 5 - 1982,

in which Sen. Sam Nunn writes: .. take th e initiative counterattacking defensively (sic) the Pact's forces". (10) A. Pelliccia: "Anchored Defence, Mobile Defence and ... ". Rivista Aeronautica, no. 5-6, 1976. See A. Pelliccia: "That uncertain trumpet sound - End of a s trategy ?". Rivista Aeronautica, no. 4, 1973. See A. Buchan: "Europe and America from alliance to coalition". The Atlantic Papers, Saxon House. England. no. 4, 1973. (11) H. Kissinger: ''The White House Years". The author maintains that the Soviet Union would never attack West ern Europ·e without expecting a nuclear response.

(12) M. Taylor: "The Uncertain Trumpet", Harper & Row, N.Y.. 1959. (13) B.W. Rogers: "Greater Flexibility for NATO Flexible Response", Strategic Review. no. 5 - 1983. See B.W. Rogers: "Sword and Shield: ACE Attack ... ", NATO's Sixteen Nations, no. 2-3. 1983. (14) Ibidem. (15) Our conjecture is supported by the foci th at the "/\irland Battle" ic

clearly not applicable neither to the Italian nor to the Greek-Turkish front. (16) This is also a consequence of calling "strategic" all that is very far from the battle field or, in the air warfare, the bombing of cities; the latter is a gross doctrinal aberration. (17) That is, condition o f non-war, in which one tries to attain the political objectives by all means. excluding war. Besides, it is common knowledge that Marx and Engels mantained that power must be attained lawfully by exploiting the mistakes and contradictions of the bourgeoisie. See A. Pelliccia: "Clausewitz and the Soviet Politico-Military Stra tegy", NATO's Fifteen Nations, no.

The technological and scientific progress made by the two superpowers in the field of armaments and in that of the military use of space is growing to such an extent that the Europeans will not be able to reach them, with the foreseeable logical consequences. In this unhappy event, the solution of the problem of national defence will have to take into account the old and always valid principle that one must be at least as strong as the strongest neighbour, within the necessary .and opportunely restructured and revived alliance with the other Western nations. In any case, it will be imperative for politics to avoid influencing this solution (be the problem collective or national), acting as a dispotic dictator; on the contrary, it will have to adapt to the laws of war (26). The military intellectuals can give a significant contribution to th is adaptation. avoiding th·e use -of euphemisms and semantic mystifications, which have never helped, neither to win a war nor to safeguard one's own identity. Antonio

Pelliccia

6 - 1975. (18) In this occasion Kuznetsov told

MacCloy: "You Americans w ill never do some thing like that to us again". H. Kissinger, "The White House Years". (19) "The Conduct of Air Operations", Selected Soviet Military Writings, Moscow, 1972; translated by initiative of USAF. (20) H. Kissinger: "The White House Years". (21) C. Clausewitz: "About War". (22) H. Kissinger: "The White House Years " . (23) Ibidem. (24) Various Authors: "The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War", Moscow, 1972. (25) H. Kissi nger: "The White House Years". (26) C. Clausewitz: "About War".

Ma jor General (ret.l Antonio Pelliccia, IAF, attended the regular courses at the A ir Force Academy. and was a fighter p ilot. A member of the SHAPE Air Tra ining Adv isory Group and of t he NATO I nternational Aircraft Eva luation Team, Gen. Pel liccia has served on the Air Force Staff and Defence General Staff, and attended the 1st Course for Instructors of Instrumental Flight on Jets. the Air War College. the USAF Air University, the Center for High Defence Studies. and the NATO Defence College, where he has been Deputy Commandant. He has written "The Control of Space" and " Nobody is a Prophet in h is own Country" , Gen. Pelliccia writes on Ita lian and foreign rev iews, and is a member of the Mi litary Hi storians· Association and of the Center for De.f ence Studies of the University of Genoa.

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THE ROYAL ITALIAN ARMY 1908-1911

Events both external and internal influence to a large degree the life o f the Italian Armed Forces in th e years immediately preceding t he First World War and this to su:::h an extent as to lim it th e very strength of the national war apparatus. In fact, in the international f ield considerable chan ges take place in a brief period of time, resulting in uncertainties and changes of attitude on the part o f Italy which are not always understood abroad. TheÂˇ position of Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance wi th the central Empires. seems to give no doubts as to the identifica tion of France as a possible enemy to be fough t, also considering the hosti le attitude on the part of the French on th e occasion of t he occupation of the north African territories of Algeria and Tunisia. However, the authorities cannot overlook the fa ct th at also Austria - particularly after th e year 7908 - demonstrates far from friendly attitudes towards Italy especially after the mili,ary occupation of Bosnia and Herzego;i na. This unfriendly attitud e is clearly evidenced by the Austrian military manoeuvres which are carried out in the Tren tino area in 7908 and which are an obvious sign of the p rog ress ive change of mood o f the Hapsburg Empire towards Italy. When t he deterioration of rel ations with the Turkish Empire culminating in a break in diplomatic contac ts and the subsequent beginning of hostilities in the Mediterranean and on t he Libyan shores is 3dded to the p roblema tic situation with Italy's neighbours on the other side of the Alps, it is not difficult to estimate the situation for the Italian Government and fo r the General Staff as bei ng complex,

to say the least. The internal situation is tha t the problems raised by the various international even ts are not adequately understood, part icularly in th e political world which is itself unstable owing to the continuous and extreme antagonism between th e con servative and the progressist forces. The governments which succeeded each other in these difficu lt years do not maintain th e close contacts which would have been essential with t he leaders o f the military apparatus, up

ITALIAN

MILITARY

UNIFORMS

to the point where t he military au thorities are informed only after a considerable delay and when action has been taken, of changes in foreign policy as a resu lt of the new international balance of power and of the declaration o f war on Turkey. The insis tent and repea ted requests for increases in the budget allocated to the Ministry of War are met by Parliam ent, fo r its part, by increases which are always insufficient and, worse still, late. The heated discussions by the Left Wing regarding "superfluous and unjustified" expend iture reach almost drama t ic levels in these years. Nevertheless, the Min ister of War in conjunction wi th the Chief of General Staff manage in most cases to meet the, situation. due to tireless and enthusiastic efforts to con vince the Government and Parliamen t and to a continuous control of the appropriateness of expenditure. In this way the Minister of War and the Chief o f General Staff are able to increase the force under arms, to modernize the arms and weapons in use, particularly artillery and the adoption of auto matic weapons, to establish a fleet of veh icles, and to initiate the fo rming of an air force. A proposal i s subm it t ed and approved at government level for the establishmen t of a Joint Defence Council and of an Armv Council. Th ese two bodies in add ition to overcoming the lack of contacts be tween the government au thorities and the Armed Forces. ensure a more rational utiliza tion of the fina ncial resources. In particular. the Ch ief of General Staff - who is designated Commander of the Armed Forces in the event of a war - is entrusted with extremely complex duties which are decisive for

the very survival of the nation. The first of these duties is to ensure th e sa fety of the country's northern fron tiers firstly in th e case of a conflict with France and then, reversing the front, in the event of a final break with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The vulnerabi lity of the eastern sector gives particular cause for concern. In fact, there is nothing or almost nothing to defend the Veneto plains from a hypo-

thetical overrunning by the AustroHungarian Empire. There is a serious lack of essential fortified points along th e salient territory of Trentino and in Friuli and insufficient lines of communications to meet the needs of the whole Army in movement towards that sec tor. Another aspect which is not reassuring is represented by the scarcity and age of the artillery guns and the almost total absence of a supply

1908 - Lieutenant of the 20th Infantry Regiment "Brigata Brescia", in service dress. The rank insignia are placed horizontally on the cuffs on a trial basis. The boots are also experimental.

1908 - Corporal of the 18th Infantry Regiment "Brigata Acqui", in garrison dress. The corporal is wearing the semi-st:ft cap, with pom-pom and metal badge, which has replaced the traditional kepi. 1909 - Soldier of the Alpine Corps, in garrison dress. The grey-green Alpine felt hat, definitely more practical and comfortable, is adopted later.

of machine-guns which it is easy to foresee would play a leading role in the next war. The General Staff faces the situation excellently succeeding in constructing a series of forts and trenches along the frontiers, and adopting the French field artillery piece 75 Deport and the home-produced mountain artillery 65 gun, with the result that there are available 92 batteries in addition to 602 machine gun sections, each of two weapons. These positive results which are, however, insufficient to meet the entire needs of the Army, are destined to remain incomplete on account of the almost sudden outbreak of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire which necessitates the use of weapons and materiel for a large expeditionary force requiring ample logistic resources since it has to operate mainly in the desert . The consequences of the overall situat ion - and immediately prior to the First World War - can be summarized as follows: in addition to a reduction in the plans for modernization particularly regarding fortress artillery and

heavy fi eld artillery. transport and aviation. a reduction of the strength of t he various units depleted by sending troops to be incorporated in the expeditio: nary fo rce, and a reduction in reserve stores diminished owing to the despatch of supplies. If to all this is added the fact which occurs repeatedly that both the national and foreign firms do not always deliver the equipment at the expected time, it is not difficult to understand the extent of the limitations to the Italian military potential at the outbreak of the First World War, in particular considering that the central Empires take farreaching and timely action. As regards the structural situation of the Army as from 1908, there are recorded alternately pushesand slowdowns in the defin ition of the number and strength of units and in the training activities of the troops caused not only by the particularly disturbing and unstabling international events but also by the limited availability of funds.

1909 - Warrant Officer of the Bersaglieri, in full dress. This NCO is carrying a sword of the special model worn only by this Corps.

1909 - Soldier of the 40th Infantry Regiment "Brigata Bologna", in garrison dress. Some units are supplied with the new accoutrements for the 1891 model rifle before receiving all the new greygreen uniform. The habit of carrying the bayonet on the right hip instead of on the left is characteristic.

It can be noted that only a few new units are formed and at the same tim e steps are taken to avoid the lacks in the train ing programme for the troops. This is effected through a better utilization of the resources available as well as through the joint efforts on the part of t he Minister of War and the Chief of General Staff, as has been mentioned, to obtain a more amp le government appropriation. The most noteworthy measures initiated are· the designation in 7908 of the Chief o f General Staff of the Army to the post of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in the event of a war, leaving the King with only the nominal role of Supreme Commandant. and the reduct ion, in 7910, of the period of conscrip tion to two years for the whole contingent estimated at some 120,000 men. The reorgan ization of the force thus results in the following overall picture:

1911 · Soldier of the 24th Infantry Regiment "Brigata Como", in field dress. Although wearing all the new grey. green uniform, the infantryman is still carrying the· accoutrements for the obsolete Vetterli rifle previously in use.

1910 · Soldier of the 13th Regiment "Cavalleggeri di Monferrato" (Light cavalry), in garrison dress. It is interesting to note the experimental wearing of puttees by cavalry troops: the initiative is quickly dropped.

4 Commands at Army Corps level, 4 Inspectorates (infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers), 12 Army Cprps, 25 military territorial divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 1 brigade of grenadiers, 47 infantry brigades, 3 Alpine brigades, 8 cavalry brigades and 12 " Legions" (regiments) of can,biniers which are equivalen t to a to tal of 2 grenadiers· regiments, 94 infantry regiments. 12 bersaglieri regiments (including the ' special companies equipped with bicycles), 8 Alpine regiments. 29 cavalry regiments. 36 field artillery regiments. 1 horse· artillery regiment, 2 mountain artillery regi ments. 2 heavy fi eld arti llery regiments, 1O fortress artillery regiments. 2 sappers regiments, 1 signals regiment, 1 miners reg iment. 1 bridge engineers regiment. 1 rai lway reg iment. 1 special engineers brigade and 88 military districts. Therefore, it is expected that th e stand ing Army can mobilize up to 750,000 men to which, at least in t heory, can be added the trained reserves and the mobile and territorial militia forces, bringing the overall total figure to 1,393,000 men. After 1910, with the assistance of t he increases in the budget. it is possible to improve the strength of the military apparatus through the training of specialized personnel in the activities which the new scientific-indus trial advances make available to t he Armed Forces and which reqa ire qualified staff (telegraph operators, drivers, air balloon staff, airmen. etc.) while the force under arms could be augmented to 225,000 men. At the beginni ng of the 20th cen t ury t he rap id evo'ution in automa tic weapons and in artillery and the greater precision in ordinary bolt-operated weapons force the General Staffs of the major armies to study new uniforms which are less visible and which are certain to be more practical, sacrificing smartn ess in favour o f better camouflaging. It is obvious from the heavy losses regis tered during the colonial cam paigns fought in the fi rs t years of th e century th at this problem has to be solved without f urther delay. The British forces are the first to adopt khaki, the colour o f th e earth, the favourite of the t roo ps in India. Shortly af terwards the Germans, the French and the Austrians follow suit. preferring grey colours, howe-.ter. as being more suitable to the European surroundings. In Italy after the experimental grey uniform fo r the Alpine t roops, due unbelievably - to a private initiative. little or nothing is done of account of the extremely hea'ly fi nancial expenditure that such a rad ical undertaking would requ ire. Hov,ever, the Army is not lacking technically qualified sta ff which understands the need and in the end they are able to convince the governm en t also o' the new pressing requiremen t to mocernize the uniforms worn by th e troops. Thus, even with

. 1910 - Sergeant and 路 soldier of the 10th Regiment "Lancieri di Firenze", in field dress. The helmet covered 路 in grey-green material and reinforced with strips of blac路k leather is experimental and is quickly eliminated. 路

,,r.

Rank insignia for gray- green uniform

Lieutenant-General Major-General Brigadier

0 Colonel Lieutenant-Colonel Major

First Captain Captain Lieutenant Second Lieutenant

Commissioned Warrant Officer 1st class Warrant Officer 2nd class Warrant Officer 3rd class Warrant Officer

Sergeant Major

Sergeant

Lance Corporal

Corporal

effort the first concrete results are obtained in the first decade of the cent ury. Among the other camouflaging colours, a mixed grey-green shade is chosen as being the rrrost appropriate to the Italian environment. At the end of 1908 regulations are set out in a special decree which envisages the int roduct ion of the new orders as from the fol lowing year 1909. The greygreen uniform, called field uniform, not only tends to ensure a sufficient degree of camouflage but also is the same for all ranks since it would be useless to keep rank insignia clearly distinguishable by the enemy. The only variations envisaged are slight differences in details for foot troops, cavalry units and bersaglieri units.

Various models are studied and prepared before the fi nal pattern is adopted and the new uniform is widely employed during the ltalo-Turkish War. The uniform for foot troops com prises a non-stiff capÂˇ (officers and warrant officers wear a sti ff cap) of stove pipe shape, with a peak and chinstrap: cap badges and rank badges worn on the cap are still those o f previous regulations. The tunic worn by privates has a fitted upright collar and the front buttons are hidden from view by a fly. The total absence of pockets contributes to give the tunic a neat and clean cut. simple but with a certain soldier-like dignity. On the shoulders there are two rolled shoulder straps called "a salamino" (little sausage) to fix the belts.

The trousers worn by privates are long and fitted into half-boots. Officers and NCOs wear a similar tunic but, however, with four pockets: the upper two pockets are placed rathe r low near the waistline giving an easily recogn izable aspect. Shoulder straps with the rank insignia on the shoulders. Breeches are worn with either boots or leggings. Cavalry troops generallyÂˇ fo ll ow the same order except for the fact t hat t he back of the jacket is ornamented at the waist by a half-be lt with two buttons. The bersaglieri, especially those in the cycle units, wear a similar tunic to that worn by other foot troops but with a turn-down collar instead of a standing collar.

1910 Âˇ Soldier of the 12th Regiment "Cavalleggeri di Saluzzo" (Light cavalry), in fatigue dress.

The leather accoutrements (cartridge box and cross belt) are also in grey-green according to theÂˇ series foreseen for the various units which are now armed with rifle and musket of the 1891 model. The table in the appendix provides a summary of the system for rank insignia. After various tentatives to simplify rank insignia the same system is kept as was previously used with the dark turquoise uniforms, maintaining for the embroidered badges and metal badges and braid the t raditional

gold and silver colours according to Corps, Regiments, Special Units or Services. The red backing for badges and embroidery for general officers is also maintained. To complete the picture it should be noted that when after 1907 greygreen trousers are distributed on an experimental basis to some units, almost automatically a new dress is formed and this is in use in many detachments until the period before the First World War. This dress which is entirely unofficial is called garrison

uniform and comprises a not always p leasant mixture of dark turquoise and grey-green and represents an interesting transition period in the uniforms of the Italian Army. More variations are due to the fact that this dress is worn with accoutrements and equipment of either the old or the new models. Similar innovations and variations can be recorded as regards the mobile and territorial militias which tend to adofi)t the dress worn by troops on active service although with a certain delay on account of limited supplies.

Gen. Valerio Gibellini

1911 - Soldier of the Horse Artillery Regiment, in garrison dress. Leggings with str:1ps of the new pattern are worn together with greygreen trousers.

I I

I i

8488 Cal. 9 mm short

92F Cal. 9 mm Parabellum

TECHNICAL

THE HELICOPTER AMBULANCE A 109 MK II The hel icopter ambulance Agusta "A 109", on duty with the Land Administration of Salzburg, Austria, has performed 307 missions during the first seven months of its activity, thus clearly demonstrating the validity of this new concept. In Italy, the medicare version of the A 109 helicopter has been employed for the first time during the earthquake in lrpinia. Its versatility, speed and manoeuvrability, combined with the medical equipment on board, have made it an essential means of rapid and effective first aid. Besides such important Italian and European experiences, the "A 109 Helicopter ambulance" has been a success also within the difficult U.S. market. Six machines, with

DATA

lengthwise stretchers, are presently employed by qualified hospitals among which the Emergency Medicine Center of the California University of Los Angeles. As shown by statistics, the first 25 minutes after a major accident are decisive for the safety of wounded individuals. The helicopter, not only grants the rapid trans port of the injured persons to the nearest Medical Center, but assures to the patient a first decisive treatment, even anticipating the thera py through the broadcast. during the flight, of the patient's vital parameters to the Medical Center. The A 109 MK II in its ambulance version is equipped for emergency operations. It bears therefore a universal stretcher, easily and rapidly mounted, a pulmonary volumetric fan, rapid oxygen intakes, a "mini" electrocardiograph. The medical kit

on board permits to start a diagnosis keeping in touch with the hospital structures during the flight. Anyhow, the medical version of this helicopter is onlv one of many other useful employments. For its capability to land and take-off on rough terrain it can easily reach the most unaccessible areas, therefore being highly qualified for modern Civil Defense and for training activities as well.

TECHNICAL FEATURES Loads: • Max. take-off load: 2600 kg (5730 lbs.) • Operational load (including standard and medical equipment): 1647 kg (3630 lbs.) • Fuel capacity: 560 It. (148 US gals.)

Engines: • Two • Type: Allison 250-C 20 B • Power: 2 x SH'P 420 Twin engine power: • At take-off: SHP 740 • Max. continuous: SHP 740 • Max. t rans itory (6 seconds): SHP 856

Single engine power: • At take-off: SHP 420 • Max. continuous: SHP 420 • Max. transitory (10 seconds): SHP 450

Performances · (ISA conditions at sea level): • Take-off load: 2250-2600 kg • Ceiling (twin engine: 100 ft/min): 4570-4450 m; 15000-14600 ft. • Ceiling (single engine: 100 ft/min): 3292-1616 m; 10800-5500 ft. • Ceiling in hovering: - with soil effect: 3749-2408 m: 12300-7900 ft . - out of soil 6ffect: 2732-1440 m; 9300-4900 ft. • Climbing spee,j (twin engine): 2110-1650 ft/min • Climbing speed (single e ngine) : 500-255 ft/ min.

,.,.,.,

TECHNICAL

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, .1

THE FRENCH-GERMAN ANTITANK HELICOPTER The Defense Ministries of France and West Germany have signed a memorandum of understanding for the development of a common program concerning a new antitank helicopter. The interested firms are the german MBB and the trench Aerospatiale. They shall start a joint venture, called "Eurocopter", based in Paris and charged with the coordination of the whole program. The basic machine shall be developed in three versions depending from the different needs of each Force and produced up to a total of 427 aircraft. The first French version shall be the HAP (Helicoptere d'Appui et de Protection), an escort and logistic support aircraft, equipped with a 30 mm gun and 4 air-to-air Matra AAM missiles. The hel icopter shall be delivered in 199'2. By 1996 has been foreseen the introduction within the Armee de Terre (French Army) of the version HAC 3 (Helicoptere Anti-Chars de la 3me Generation Antitank Helicopter of the 3rd Generation), equipped with ATGW 3 missiles (Anti-tank Weapons of Third Generation) and with an infrared camera, mounted on top of the rotor and orientable from the cockpit. The West German Army shall adopt it starting from

1993. It is a 2nd generation antitank helicopter called PAH (Panzer Abwehr Hubschrauber der 2en Generation), equipped with an infrared front camera for the pilot and the gunner, 8 antitank HOT 2 missiles and 4 air-to-air AAM missiles. Later the helicopter shall be probably equipped with a third generation weapon system of the "fire and forget" type.

All the aircraft of the Eurocopter program shall mount two MTM 385 R 900 Kw engines, produced by MTU and Turbomeca. The maximum take-off load shall be 5 tons; the cruising speed, respectively, of 250 km/h for the German PAH 2 and of 280 km/h for the French HAP and HAC G3; the maximum duration: around 2Â˝ hours, plus 20 min. reserve.

EMERGENCY DWELLING SYSTEM

the necessity to abandon, for timely, economical and psychological reasons and for the convenience to avoid any dispersion of human and economic resources. the old assistance formula based upon the fixed course of tent-caravan-container-prefabricated housing. The SAPI System (Sistema Abitativo di Pronto lntervento

The IRl-ltalstat Group has sponsored a study and testing campaign to reach a modern housing solution for emergency cases. Several experiences have convinced the researchers of

TECHNICAL

DATA

Emergency dwelling system) meets such requirements and permits to face a wide range of situations. The project philosophy is based upon the idea of constructing a dwelling unit !..._ formed by completely re-usable elements - with all its pertaining commodities and such as to grant the provisional resettling of those who have been caught by a disaster or the installation of emergency operational groups even for relatively long periods of time. Some basic standards have been then singled out such as, for example, the use of totally equipped modules capable of increasing their surface up to three times as much and of an extremely careful selection of materials. The system is formed by:

• Multi-use Modules (Moduli Pluriuso - MPL) having various dimensions, for housing uses or for secondary urbanizi:ltion (medicare, schools, etc.). • Connection Modules (Moduli di Connettivo - MCO) to be used for a more complex urbanization and to connect MPL's between them. • Seit-propelled Service Modules (Mod uli di Servizio Semoventi MSS) to ensure a self-sufficient housing for the first period (water supply, electrical power, etc.).

01 72

The area standards pro inhabitant of the MAPI 750 and 912 were indicated , by Civil Defense authorities on the base of the experiences gathered, with light pre-fabricated structures. within the zones of the recent earthquakes. The projected dwelling solutions, although foreseeing some fittings, have left, on purpose. ample possibilities to the use of property furniture. All the fitt ings, included . the sanitary and kitchen blocks, are transported into the central part of the module.

• Industrialized and re-usable components for infrastructures, i.e. for foot and vehicle traffic, sewer network, etc. The SAPI System performances might be divided into the following four categories: • psychological and environmental requirements to keep the image of a true dwelling: planimetry of a regular form, floor rigidity, wide windows, covered area in front of the entrance; • functional and use requirements: dwelling area standard of 11 or 14 square meters pro resident, high safety levels, con-

T TECHNICAL

DATA

mw -- .

--~··,-·

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siderable dwelling comfort. thermic and acoustic isolation; • general technological requirements: tra nsport capability on road within standard limits. all terrain laying capability, rapid installation without specialized labour, complete re-usability; • primary and secondary urbani zation requirements: possibility to adapt the modules for schools, offices. churches. social centers; self-sufficiency for water and power supply, for sanitation and roads during the first phase of an emergency. The multi-use MPL module, constructed in three different

sanitary and kitchen groups are blockwise composed and the lighting system is formed by complex components. Each MPL module selfcontaines the interna l partitions, some folding furniture elements and the food and first aid kits. Floor Once laid down on the Lateral wall ground with its supporting arms (a self-contained winch permits Roof rotation and upsetting operations). the module is rendered Front wall practicable within 20 minutes. Centtranl · area The MCO module grants con a1 ing, . for transport. inner the connection among several partitions and fittings MPL modules through orthogonal junctions. thus favouring more complex urbanizations or: dwelling models of, respectively, simply forming entrance halls or corridors. · 44, 54.60 and 66.40 square The self-propelled service meters. is transportable by a hinged truck and does not module MSS is composed by require any police escort on two containers - transportable by a hinged truck trailer - caparoad. The smallest module (3500 kg) can be transported by ble to meet, autonomously and for four days, water, power and a helicopter as well. The external containers of sewage requirements. Beyond this time limit the module can each module have a bearing structure made out of extruded be resupplied by an external source or on its own: the tractor aluminum and are connected by may be separated from its bearing hinges. trailer whilst inflatable water Noteworthy is the use of rolled or sandwich-wise plastic tanks and power batteries can be provided . All the connections materials and of anti-condensare ensured by rapid joining ing panels. Climatization is ensured by a heat pump; the clutches.

TECHNICAL

THE LAND OTOMAT The surface-to-surface all weather OTOMAT system, already adopted by several Navies, has been modified by OTO Melara also for land use, as a mobile coastal defense complex. In this version, OTOMAT can be installed on tracked and wheeled vehicles, one used as a control and command center and the others capable of carrying two missiles. each. The link between the com mand section and the launching units is maintained by radio, 1thus covering a large area with only a few means.

DATA

In its land version the system shows the same features of the naval one and requires only one operator at the monitor, whatever wide the inter ested area. Depending from the operation al context within which the weapon system operates, the S/S OTOMAT can reach theÂˇ target either guided or through the "launch and forget" technique. When guided, possibi lity is given to follow the missile trajectory and to obtain a good target discrimination. With the "launch and forget" system, the trajectory is inertial, but radar-assisted, so

as to eliminate or to reduce the enemy's countermeasures. The . destruction capabilities are very high: minor ships are annihilated, the medium ones get out of use and those of major t onnage suffer severe damages. The OTOMAT missile flies at transonic speed, reaches a range beyond the horizon and bears a head loaded with high explosive capable to pierce reinforced steel armours even with a hitting angle of 90"; it is provided with a percussion fuse and is propelled by a turbojet engine and by two acceleration busters.

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INFLATABLE DECOYS A decoy system, already and successfully experimented during World War 2, has been proposed again in a modern and inexpensive form by the German Ballonfabrik of Augsburg. A .simulated antia ircraft missile battery of ni!l1e launching units can be mounted by six men in less than one hour. The decoy missiles and their supports, made partially inflatable and partially rigid, produce a visual effect very

similar to a real battery. The inflating system is electric and grants an optimized and, above all, constant pressure, automatically compensating any pressure diminution. The whole complex is fixed to the ground by anchors. The deflation is rapid and is obtained through the simp le release of a central switch which automatically opens several valves located on the surface of each decoy, thus making them ready for a quick repacking in their containers.

,,,,

TECHNICAL

DATA

I -,

LASER TARGET LOCATION AND AIMING TECHNOLOGY Litton has recently introduced among their production two new laser systems: a target locator and an aiming device,

both offered for the first time at the Farnborough show. The target locator (fig. 1), of the type LTWM, weighs 5,5 kg and can be used with or without its tripod. Principally employed to indicate from a land position, targets to the supporting aircraft and artilleries, the system

is composed by a transmitter, by some lithium batteries and by the tactical container to transport it. The aiming device MK V (fig. 2) weighs only 1 kg. Conceived for the artillery, but also for special troops, it has a target location rangP- of 10 km.

ta rget and fires. The blast is simulated the headset and so are the options of target hit or missed which appear on the screens, both for the instructor and the student.

The system, which employs a visual computerized technology, has been offered at Aldershot during the yearly British Army's equipment exhibition.

NEW LAUNCHING SIMULATOR FOR THE ANTITANK MILAN SYSTEM

The Ferranti Ltd. of Manchester has improved its new launch ing simulator for the antitank Milan system. The device reproduces perfectly a Milan complex, overcoming the previous concept - which used an adaptation of the simulator to an operative model - and thus reducing the risk of damages to the real equipment. Within this new concept, the instructor avails himself of a command station by which he may change targets and scenarios into the student's screen and add other targets beyond the optimized ones, like helicopters, or tanks. The studert receives orders trough his headset, selects the

TECHNICAL

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General:

ANTI-NBC PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

- colour: IR NATO, olive green or different on request; - available in three sizes; - wrapping: in vaccum PVC ' envelopes; - tra nsport: by a light waterproof bag.

The Pirelli Group. already ~ctive within NBC defense before World War 2, and particularly the Sekur Company, have recently deepened and diversified their contribution by an extension of their activity bot'h to the individual as well as to the col lective protection equipment.

Components : - coat with cap and trousers made out of a four layers protective fabric; - butil e rubber boots. nylon reinforced; - butile rubber five-finger gloves.

Individual equipment

Substantial ly, the ind ividual protective equipment is formed by proper clothing, boots, g loves, gas masks, glasses, filters against polluted air and selfprotection devices. All this in cludes the normal equipment · for the combat forces, as well as the protective means for degassing units or for those charged with specific f unctions (for example: operators of technical-scientific instruments, ammunition arid missile loaders, stevedores of dangerous substances). The produ cts offered by the Sekur Company include: • Basic equipment: - NBC perspiring overalls complete with overshoes, gloves and bag; - gas masks (M 59); - NBC filters (M 58) . • Special equipment: - optica l gas masks (M 73); - tight pneumatic overa lls complete with gas mask, overshoes and gloves; - neoprene or butile rubber boots; - neoprene or acrilic rubber gl oves; - open cycle, pressurized selfprotection devices (NPC 300); - firemen equipment (VVFF 81); - gas/dust filters for special protection, included CO;

Main features:

- oxygen masks and respirators with gas and dust filters; - anti-gas glasses; - NBC smal l filter masks. • Auxiliary equipment: - gas masks (C.607); - combined gas/dust fi lters (DIRIN 500 NBC); - anti-fallout overalls complete with masks (C.607), incorporated cap, neoprene gloves and boots. NBC Perspiring Cloth

Use: by Armed Forces operational units for protection aga inst all NBC agents and nuclear flash. Wear: over the uniform or combat dress, together with masks M 59 or M 73 and filter M 58.

clothing: four layers protective fabric; external layer: resistent to tearing, oil and wat er repellent, mimetic colour; intermediate layer: g lass-fiber, reflective and fire repellent; innor layor: poliuretane foam soaked in active coal; fining: knitted f abric; - overshoes: butile rubber vamp, nylon reinforced; butile r ubber anti-slipping soles. Easy and rapid to wear over any type of boots; anti-mud, -dust or NBC-agent drops; - gloves: butile rubber, five fingers, ensuring an effective grip and permitting the use of weapons or instruments. Total weight: 3 kg. Collective protection equipment

In several situations the individual protective eq uipment is not compatible with operational functions or cannot be generally supplied; to face such cases, several collective protection systems have been produced. Substantially, a complete NBC collective protection system is formed by: - a tight structure or covering: - a ventilation system with NBC filters;

TECHNICAL . QATA

air in- and outlets with antiblast valves, adjusted to maintain overpressurized theÂˇ inner room; - control systems for personnel access to prevent any contamination of the protected area. The Sekur Company produces filter and NBC protection units to be used within: - fixed installations (fortifications, operational commands, communication centers, accommodations, vehicle and aircraft shelters, workshops, hospitals, storages, etc.). In short: military installations used by land forces air and naval bases, protection of major centers; - installat ions on board war-, support- or transport ships. NBC filter complex SP 85 Description:

NBC filter complex SP 35

The 85 cubic m/h NBC filter complex is a device conceived to fi lter and/or pressurize a closed and limited room. The system filters the air which passes through it using a series oÂˇf suitable elements capable to block both rough and

TECHNICAL FEATURES Weights and dimensions:

Complex: total weight 29 kg NBC filter case: weight 8,2 kg Muffler and electro fan case: weight 6,3 kg

very thin powders, including biological spores or radioactive elements, nnd to neutm lizc

chemical agents employed under the forms of aerosol or gas. Features of the complex: - capability: 85 cubic m/h; - total weight: 40 kg; - dimensions: 420 mm x 690 mm; - 6.p tot.: 70 mm H20.

Protection capability:

- Pre-filter: Effectiveness: 98 % Surface: 0,010 sq.m - Anti-aerosol filter: Effectiveness: 99,997%

Air-flow capacity:

Nominal: 35 cubic m/h Real: continuously adi us table to 60 cubic m/h

from

Electric power:

Resistance,: 400 W Electrofan: 400 W

TECHNICAL

NBC filter complex SP 1200

The 1200 cubic m/h NBC filter comp lex is a device con structed to ventilate and/or pressurize a medium-size c losed area through the input of fresh air, free from chemical, biological or radioactive contamination. In particular, the complex filters the air which passes through it with the action of a series of proper element s capable to block the passage of rough but also very thin powders, includi ng biological spores or radioactive elements, and to neutralize chemical agents employed under the form of aerosol or gas. The complex has a capability of 1200 cubic m/h and a total weight of 350 kg.

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I'/// THE 35 mm OEBLIKONOTO MELARA TWIN GUN

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For its versatility and the broad possibilities of employment, the 35 mm ?erlikon -OTO Melara twin gun 1s one of the best known weapons within the navies. T~e gun has ~e~n mainly conceived for ant1-a1r and anti-missile employment, but can be used against sh ips or for land fire as well. Particular features of the complex - which mounts the 35 mm 6erlikon KDA 35/90 gun, capable of a stockage of 800 rounds - are its low weight and reduced general dimensions. Noteworthy is the rapidity with which the gun reacts to commands and the high fire celerity (550 rounds/min for each tube), The manoeuverabi lity of the weapon is guaranteed, also when mounted on a poorly stabilized base, by the automatic exclusion of inaccurate manua l operations.

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The twin loaders feeding system permits to select. also through remote control, the various ammunition types; the fiberglass shield is tight against bad weather conditions and gives easy access for maintenance, made even simpler by the modularity of the spare parts. The operating principle is the classic one of gas recuper-

ation; leading is ensured by 400 round loaders with servofeeded guides which exclude any manual operation up to the ammunition exhaustion. Fire can be remotely controlled and executed. The elevation servo-mechanisms are electric-powered, whilst those for feeding, loading and fire operations are hydrau lic. Each barrel bears, at its muzzle, an instrument to measure the shot ve locity (initial velocity gauge) which sends this information to the firing computer. The 35 mm 6E/OTO uses four ammunition types: - HE and incendiary rounds with self destructive fuse for anti-missi le and anti -aircraft employment; - piercing and incendiary rounds with percuss ion fuse for light armoured targets; - piercing rounds for heavy armoured targets; - tracers.

BOOK

E. Pifferi: "Quirinale dietro le quintet' (Backstage Quirinale), ed. E.P.I., Como, price not available. Valuable publication for its typographical appearance and its photographic content, "Ouirinale dietro le quinte" has also the little magic charm of a discovery; it opens for us the doors of a Palace which has had so great a meaning in the history of Rome and Italy and which represents today not only the residence of our President s, but also the home of a man who has gained himself, as never before, respect. liking and sincere affection from all the Italians. Hence a particular curiosity which does not content itself only by admiring the art treasures and the precious architectural aspects of the palace, but wants to go beyond and to participate. from within, in the active life of President Pertini, in his milieu and among those who in many ways cooperate with him at every level. And the book has wonderful responses for such expectations. The swift text by Michelangelo Jacobucci introduces us imme-

n,,

REVIEW$

diately in the busy atmosphere pervading those rooms and forms a pleasant guide to the images showing the routine activities and, therefore, the engagement by which tradition and future proceed together in clear harmony. Evidence of it are. among other things, the imposing figure of the liveried doorman in his gala uniform. the craftsmen active in maintenance and restoration works. the warm candlelight which enhances the magnificence of the golden stuccoes, but also the monitor of a computer in an electronic file. a teletype keyboard. the view of a modern printing office. Another continuous and at the same time discreet presence deserves to be mentioned: that of the Armed Forces, here represented by the Carabinieri Guards of the President - the so-called Corazzieri, whose image is tied to that of the Chief of the State and by our young conscripts having the task considered a honour - to stand guard to the palace. The Grenadiers of Sardinia in their ample red-lined capes and the Cavalrymen with their long lances - jealous vestiges of a glorious past as well as positive signs of theÂˇ present reality - are shown during the guard's relieve. This was, time ago, a daily cerimony held at Monte Caval lo Square, reached by the units marching after their bands; it has been recently re-established in the same form. although only once a month. in obedience to the frantic traffic demand of our days. And this is another sign of a strong tradition which nurishes the ideal humus giving life and incentive to the entire palace. The men in uniform are a symbol of all the Army's branches, of the Navy, of the Air Force and of all the young generations - a promise for the future .- citizens

of an Italy believing in itself and in its institutes and finding a sure reference in our President, real fulcrum around which rotates and gets full meaning every activity and image of the Ouirinale. Sandro Fantina

F. Mazzonis (by the care of): "Garibaldi Condottiero. Storia, teoria e prassi" (Garibaldi a Condottiere. History, theory and praxis), ed. Franco AngeÂˇli, Milan 1984, pages 594, Lire 30,000. The volume includes the minutes of a meeting organized by the lstituto Studi e Ricerche Difesa (!STRID - Institute f or Studies and Researches on Defense) on the occasion of the centennial of Garibaldi. The book appears particularly interesting because of the original approach selected, which is twofold. It puts. ori one side, the condottiere Garibaldi and his military concepts with in the frame of the evolution undergone by the military thought of our Risorgimento, strictly tied with

BOOK

the political ideas not only stemming from the democratic movement, but also from the moderate party. On the other hand, it considers how much influence have had the figure, the ideas and the activity of Garibaldi on the elaboration of the Italian political and military thoughts after the Risorgimento period, up to the Resistenza, and how the Garibaldi myth, still alive and active, has been exploited by various political movements to support their own choices. The selected approach is an extremely stimulating one just because miiltary history, be it on the doctrine or praxis level, becomes actual only when examined within a social and political context, and under an economic and ideological one as well. Military and social institutions are always strictly tied together. Some determining factors of the military f orces depend directly on the links between army and society: organization. disciplinary regulation and praxis, politicalmilitary relations. The various essays of this volume, and in particular those by Della Peruta ("Military theories of our democracy during the Risorgimento"). Rochat (" The milita ry genius of Garibaldi"). Mazzonis ("The Italian Army at Garibaldi's time"). Del Negro ("Garibaldi between the royal army and the armed nation: the recruitment problem") and Franzosi ("Garibaldi between myth and history in Italy at the time of King Humbert and Giolitti") are a clear example of how some extremely topical prob1ems of our Army have their origin just where Italy and its military institutes have had their beginning. lt is, in summary, a stimulating work not only because of the variety of its themes and of the ideological approaches selected to study them, but also because it remains above the contingency of historical events, trying to

REVIEWS

establish a bridge between past and present time. Only this is the way to acquire a deep and not only superficial undestanding of some fundamental aspects of our national military history and of the reasons why our military institutions. their place within the social context and the military profession in Italy are what they are today. Carlo Bess

SILVANO SIGNORI

DECIDERE PERLA PACE ELA SICUREZZA LE IDEE DI UN SOCIALISTA ALLADIFESA

Pretazione di Salvo Ando

OUADERNI 01 "NUOVO RIFORM ISMO" GER . EDIZION I PARLAMENTO

S. Signori: "Decidere per la pace e la sicurezza" (Decisions for peace and security), ed. Parlamento, pages 118, Lire 10,000. In this work, short but rich in contents, the Author initially considers the problems tied to the international balance, to the Atlantic Alliance and to Europe and the steps already taken and still to take along the difficult way of peace within security and democracy. He examines then the institu tional context of defense and of our Armed Forces, their role and

effectiveness, emphasizing the personnel problems. Finally his attention is driven to the relations between defense and industry, to international cooperation and to the connected economical links. Starting from the premise that a status of persistir;ig unsafety, imposed by the military superiority of the Warsaw Pact, is unacceptable and that a submissive attitude of the West can only legitimate the Soviet pretentions, the Author hopes for a strengthening of NATO. This may happen provided Europe finds anew a strong unitarian incentive. also to fill the technological and armament gaps which make it dependent from the United States for its own defense and security. Only when having its proper voice within the international context, Europe shall be able to decide autonomously its own destiny. Hence the need of an ample political initiative, of a qualitative leap which can be accomplished by the European nations through the European Parliament, freely elected. The Author does not limit his study to the comparison between the military capabilities of the two maior systems of our time and to the consideration of the political and strategic theories which direct the present confrontation crisis between them; he proposes also someÂˇ choices and positive initiatives to maintain the international stability. In this context he reaffirms the necessity of not interrupting the dialogue between the two blocs and to ameliorate mutual information so as to avoid that the most intolerant circles may resort to irrational motives to justify a military action. As far as Italy is concerned, the on. Signori outlines the need of a more strict coordination between foreign and defense policies and considers, in par-

BOOK

ticular. the problems concerning our Armed Forces and the initiatives taken in this field by the government. He examines the perspectives of technological modernization and of a new organization of the forces in comparison to the budgetary possibilities and, for the defense personnel, the reforms of housing and careers. He thus reviews all the ma jor problems, without omitting the relations of our country and of Europe with the Th ird World and giving some indications on what must still be accomplished and on the policies to follow. Giorgio Anedda

PACE E SICUREZZA PROBLEM! E ALTERNATIVE

F. Accamc/H. A!heldt/P. Barrera M.L. lloccia/P. Buffotot/L. CaJ.igaris L. Castellina/F. Cerutti/D. Collingridgc A Guerra/ I'. Joseph/M. Pia nta/G. t>roc.icci ll. Schoch/L. Spccht/S. Tiedtke/F. Toncllo

Various Authors: "Pace e Sicurezza. Problemi e alternative" {Peace and Security. Problems and alternatives), ed. F. Angeli, Milan 1984, pages 235, Lire 16,000. The volume assembles about twenty essays by authors of very different political positions,

REVIEWS

from Falco Accame to Luigi Caligaris. Its key point is the crisis entered, at the beginnings of the '80. by the two principal factors of the strategic-political balance during the years after World War 2. On one side, the bipolar system and the various deterrence theories connected with it. The two superpowers have great difficulty to control the respective "engagements" and, above all , the unrests showing up at the periphery of the industrialized world. The present technological revolution raises not only the dispute on power relations among states. but involves the socia l and political institutions as well. The nuclear deterrence system. based on a capability of mutual ensured destruction. is nowadays discussed and in rapid evolution towards more complex and articulated forms based - on the last instance - over the possibility to "win" through a war. Clear evidence of it is given. on one side. by the efforts to associate, with the offensive strategic capabilities, the defensive ones so as to "conventionalize" the European defense and to integrate more and more, in acceptable doctrines, the mini- and special nuclear weapons. The technological progress is being speeded up and becomes today a destabilizing factor. A second aspect marks the present situation, i.e. the crisis of the world integration hopes, based upon the hypothesis of a substancial convergency of interests to keep stability . What suffers a crisis is, in other words, the Un ited Nations concept of international relations which assumed, in the past, the capability, by super-national and international bodies, to ensure peace within a frame of identical security for all the nations. International policy, in conclusion. becomes more militarized. Within this context, the bipolar

USA-URSS system remains strongly competitive. All the hypotheses of peaceful settlement of the quarrel exist'ing between the territorial and the market empires (a prerequisite for a controll ed disarmament) have been misled by different concepts of detente. The Soviet Union has taken profit of it to augment its military power and to conduct. on a world-wide scale, a more dynamic po licy. Of what nature shall be the last outcome of the present evolving trends appears difficult to find out. The same can be said about concrete measures to avoid that the present status of confusion and detente may lead into imcontrollable crises originating a direct confrontation between the blocs. surely full of tragic consequences for the whole humanity. The various contributions to this book are not aimed at supporting a specific and preconceived thesis, nor to propose solutions. They only consider the problem from different points of view examining it deeply and critically as a premise for new researches. One remains a constant motive: the request of a major role for Europe, not only to ensure its own security and to disengage it from the present oveÂˇr-dependence from the two superpowers, but also to contribute to the establishment of new balances, essential to avoid a conflict. It is evident that any further weakness of the bipolar system deriving from it shall show not indifferent risks and dangers. Such challenges cannot be ignored, nor avoided . The developing trends of the present worldwide political-strategic system are, in fact, not acceptable in so far they cause an unavoidable escalation of crises and contrasts. Carlo Bess

BOOK

"La sicurezza dell'Europa: retorica e realta" (The security of Europe: rhetoric and facts), ed. II Mulino, Lire 10,000. This work by AREL (Agency for Research and Legis lation , formed by parlamentarians, scholars, managers, entrepreneurs and trade-unionists). edited by Luigi Caligaris, assembles the contributions on defense policy of the major Italian and foreign experts gathered at Florence during the 4th Seminary on Foreign Policy. The study of the more topical questions and of the problems related to the process of European defensive integration is conducted in an interesting and complete way. The work opens with an introduction by Nino Andreatta, who outlines the doubts, the uncertainties and the perspectives which may arise from a defensively more united Europe considering, moreover, the possible international consequences of such a choice. Luigi Caligaris, in an ample geopolitical European overview, outlines how the politica l partitions - which see the Old Continent

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wards the EEC, is understood as split into one Europe of NATO, a dichotomic factor, and not as one of the Warsaw Pact and one of the non-aligned nations - play an integrative one, of a better defended Europe. A more strict a fundamental role. A better cooperation among the European defended Europe or a Europe nations would only deteriorate which, to real ly reach such the relations with the United objectives, is compelled to conStates and surely produce a duct a more cohesive policy? tension between the two more Caligaris does not forget that in this so various and sometimes significant Atlantic partners. The proposals for a more ample and selfish context Italy is the counambitious approach to the develtry more inclined to give up, at opment of the European Commuleast, a part of its own sovereignty in favour of the common nity in the field of defense policy and in that, much broader, interests. The analysis of the problem cannot be conducted of the mi litary procurements without separating from the poli- could assure, Roper believes, an tical considerations a strategic economic benefit also for Great discuss ion permitting to indicate Britain. common trends for the future. Walter Stuetzle considers the Robert Komer considers the U.S. problems stemm ing from the relaposition towards Europe in the tions between the two blocs light of the present difficult and evaluates the changes which worldwide strategic balance and could be produced, both in and of the c.oncepts of nuclear and out of them, by a defense policy conventional deterrence, stresfor the European Community. sing some assumptions on possi- The impossibility of a dialogue ble future developments of new outside the North Atlantic conthematics. text is a not negligible handicap Through an analysis of the little for the Old Continent, practical ly and great fa ilures of the past excluded from the international political-strategic context, polarand the contradictions of the ized by the two globa l powers present time, Pierre Lelouche tries to define, in his study of and weakened by the atypical atlantism, a series of "guiding and particular position of France. The last part of the volume asideas" for a real and durable European cooperation concerning sembles a series of excerpts from the resolutions taken by the defense, without forgetting the European Parliament and many severe economical problems data concerning the economic that every nation has to face. problems of European defense. The difficult relations with the Soviet Union are studied by It seems worth to finally underline that, considering all the inteRobert Nurik from the point of gration processes and political view of a possible gee-political developments imposed by these variation - with a more autonochoices, AREL has not wanted mous Europe and the U.S. practo answer all the questions tically more restrained - which concerning real future perspecmight subvert the present contives of European defense, the cept of bipolarism, not so much because of the Soviet reactions, links and relations between Eubut rather because of the change ropean defense, Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact from an explanof the present geo-strategical atory and authoritative position. terms of reference. The British position, which John but has rather wanted to propose a clear overview of the themes Roper considers marked by a developed. "pragmatic minimalism", well Claudio Magris shown through the attitude to-

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POLITIQUE MILITAIRE SOVIETIQUE CLAUDE DELMAS

UNIVERSITAIRES OE FRANCE

C. Delmas: "La Politique Militaire, Sovietique," (Soviet military policy). Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1983, pages 127, Fr.f. 30. Every praxis presupposes a theory. The latter is always conditioned by an ideological system - in terms of certain state conceptions of international relations, of the role and the benefit of the military function - as well as by geographical, economic and technological facts. Decisive are the geographical factors, subject only to marginal modifications. They exert a deep influence upon history and, therefore, upon the traditions and the mentality of every nation. The work of C. Delmas shows clearly the connections between all these aspects and stresses the fact that, in spite of the innovating force of the marxistleninist ideology and its particular concept of the state, of the

internationa l system and of the role of military power, the Soviet military policy has been and still is conditioned by the traditional achievements of imperial Russia and by its historical experience. The volume does not study the evolution of the Soviet military thought from the revolution to our days, nor the military strategy adopted each time. Using the term "m ilitary policy", the Author refers to a field which stays, in a certain sense, at the converging point between military thought and military strategy; between theory and praxis. The Soviet military policy has constantly made reference, and still does, to the ideology. But the latter, in its practical achievement, is frequently only an alibi to support choices decided by gee-political considerations. What is essential is to understand the two strictly connected aspects of the ideology which have, from time to time, determined its nature: the defensive aspect and the offensive one. From a defensive point of view, the Soviet Union is the socialist rampart constantly threatened according to Lenin 's dogma - by the imperialist forces of counterrevolution but, more concretely, this is due to its nature of continental empire surrounded by a maritime empire . Under the offensive aspect, the military policy is conditioned both by the gee-political national interests of the Soviet Union, as well as by the fact that it represents an instrument in favour of the "revolution", i.e. of the expansion of socialism. According to the ideological dogma, all this goes in the "sense of history". Hence the distinction between right and wrong wars: right wars are those which favour the predominance of socialism over imperialism. In spite of the ideological changes produced by the appearance of the nuclear weap-

ons, such a distinction forms a constant assumption of the Soviet strategy and military thought. Lenin has affirmed that the military problem forms, within history, the key point of every political problem. But the mil-Âˇ itary aspect is marked by its own features and conditions : gee-strateg ical , economic, social and technological. The ideology can modify these facts, although only on the surface. The consequence Ts a tension between the imperatives dictated by ideology, which form the legitimate bases of the political power, the real situation and the military requirements. Depending from circumstances, the Soviet military policy has balanced within these two poles, with inevitableÂˇ tensions, both internal to the Armed Forces ,:is well as between these and the

political power. In particular, the Soviet Union is a continental power. Up to the point when it has acquired the capability to project its military force beyond the ocean, it has been compelled to balance the requirements of a defensive military strategy with those of an offensive diplomacy. Later, even the strategy has turned clearly offensive and the ideology was reinforced, even if not becoming acceptable, at least in its real possibilities to express itself. This is a fact to be taken into account: the requirement to conduct an offensive strategy is becoming a very important component of a more legitimate power of the present Soviet ruling class. Dialectics between ideology and strategy, which hampered in t"le past the Soviet expansion, have disappeared or have been, at least , strongly toned down. And this is a risk for the West. Carlo Jean