JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 2006 N.3 "RIVISTA MILITARE"

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CONT ENT S

September-October November-December

Rivista Militare aims at broadening and_ updating the technical and vocational tra ining of Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the mil(tary way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista M ilitare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

The New Logistics, a Phenomenon of Interdisciplinary Polarizat;on p.2

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How the United States will Confront Iran

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Editor in Chief: Marco CENTRfITO Management and Editorial Office 8 , Vi,, di S. Marco - 00 I 86 Rome Phone 0039-0o-47357373

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From Europartnership to Proximity Policy p . 10

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Values and Technology p. 11 2

Security and Energy Development

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NATO in Tirana p . 72

Summary in Various Languages

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THE NEW LOGISTICTS A PHENOMENON OF INTERDISCIPLINARY POLARIZATION by Lieutenant General Emilio Marzo Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army

T he Multi-Purpose Centre of Experimentation of Montelibretti hosted on the 27th June a conference on 'The New Logistics, the Phenomenon of CrossDisc iplinary Polarization' , organised by the Army's Log istic Command and sponso red by AILOG (Italian Association of Logistics). During t he conference there was a simulation of 'Network Centric Logistics' (NCL) with the deployment of a Reg imental Module integrated with 'expeditionary' elements of th e industry, which put into practice some of the concepts being discussed. The initiative is part of an ampler debate promoted by the Heads of the logist ic organizations of the Service, together with AILOG, and is aimed at opening a reflection on the new logistics as a

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A moment of the meeting.

phenomenon of cross - discipl ine polarizati on. The activity is of particular interest to the Army, because it represents the academic world, the managers of national companies and expe rts in information and communication technology (ICT), promotin g the interc hange of ideas and experiences in the field of log istics between different organizations and institutions. This exchange of ideas is vital for the Army, which in the past ten years has started to go through great t ransformations, which had become necessary in order to go from an organization based on conscription to a professionalised

Rivista Militare Englisli Editio/J n. 3/2006

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Above. A medical team carried on the ambulance version of the "Oardo", engaged in an emergency-surgery simulation. Right. A truck - trailer unit carrying the turret of a "Dardo" on a special support.

Service ready to face continuous and deep changes in the geo-strategic picture .

In view of this, logistics has been able to respond with flexibility to t he requirements, go ing from a static and territorial model to a dynam ic and modular one, in a position to sustain w ith adherence and continuity the effort of the forces employed simultaneously in theatres very different as regards operational environment, distance from the strat egic base, geographic and environmental characteristics and resources available in t he host

nation. Today the Army must meet the challenge in the logistic field with a multidiscipli nary approach, in order to deal with the ever increasing complexity of the modern operational scenarios, heavily influenced by the new geometries of the battlefield . This latter has in fact lost its past linearity and is now marked by asymmetrical threats that literal ly place th e logistic units "on the front line" and require that they carry out additional tasks, which actually be long to the combat units. Once again the answer to th is challenge can on ly be based on the two factors that represent the added value of any military organization: men and technology. The human resource is surely t he main element that supports t he entire system . Th e Army has long understood t he strategic im portance of train ing Commanders in logi stics, i n order to make

each one of them 'the man of the day befo re and the man of the day after'. The answer of the Army to this press ing need is a training procedure that envisages a co ntinuous upd ati ng and a profitab le confrontation w ith th e academ ic and indu st ry worlds in the field of management of complex systems. Technology, t he second pillar of t his system, makes logistics an act ive container of several sc ientific discip lines; a large int egrated system , into w hich flow information t echnology, management engineering, operational research and statistics, wh ich permits to manage macro- activ it ies such as procurement and supp ly in the w idest acceptation of the terms, in o rde r to se nd to t he right th ing to the right place at th e right t ime. T he logistics of the It alian Army is thus really becoming a pheno me no n of mu ltidiscip lin ary polarizat ion t hat can prepare it self for the future challenges in the operational scenarios , integrating with t he defence ind ustry and coope rat in g with the academic world in o rder to m ake t he most of their potential s.

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HOW THE UNITED STATES WILL CONFRONT IRAN The thorny Lebanese situation and t he unstable balances in the Persian Gulf can be traced back to a single asymmetric confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. The contrast takes place both directly, on the plane of international diplomatic negotiations and through the media, as well as at a distance, through an indirect conflict, involving Countries and armed politico-religious factions close to the two opponents. In this article, Edward N. Luttwak, the well-known political scientist, discusses the situation w ith us .

T here is no pub lic or secret evidence that the Un ited States and its al lies . They fund, trai n and r ul ers of Iran instigated the deliberate attack of arm the Mahd i militia of Moqtada Sadr wh ich the ir fellow ext re mists of Hizballah aga in st Israel, periodically attacks US and British troops, which started the Lebano n war of 2006. But there specifically supplying - to others as we ll-th e is no need of any secret evide nce t o prove t hat Iran triggering devices for the bombs that are causfully supported the Hizballah, because they loudly ing most US casualties in Iraq. Unde r th e banner proclaim ed their approval. of Shi'i so lida r ity, it was the Iran ian regime that What the rulers of Iran are doing, without any established the Hizballah of Lebanon whic h it nuclear weapons to p rotect them , is already reckhas continued to train, arm and generously less ly aggressive and ve ry damaging to Ame rican f und - t o then g ive full support fo r the ruleinterests. Nor are t hey just defending themselves breaking attack on Israel that has provoked t he from outside threats--they are driven by the current war. Th is now directly serves t he interpurely i nternal dynamics of an intense competi ests of th e Iran ian reg im e by dive rting diplomatt io n bet ween riva l factions with in the reg ime. ic efforts from the build - up to UN Security That is why all the many attempts at conciliatory Council measures against it s urani um - enrich diplomacy, start ing with Mitterran d of France in ment act ivities.Moreover, even though bot h the 1990- 9 1 inevita bl y fail: as Salafist Al Qa ida and Hamas as soon as one fact ion agrees to an offshoot of the Mus li m t alk, another wi ll accuse it of ~, Iran's armed forces are Brotherhood ho ld t hat the giving in to the infide l -an d Twelver Shi'is of Iraq and Iran stage a provocation to abort QUtdated in structure, train are not true Mus li ms but aposth e initiative . It would be folly ¡ng and equipment ,, tates deserving of death, in a to let these rulers acquire the co nvergence of extrem ism t he shield of nuc lear deterre nce rulers of Iran are harbo r ing for t heir extremism . surviving Al Qaid a ele m ents, and also funding Some advance the notion of mutual deterrence Hamas to support its refusal of any peace. It is w ith a nucle ar Iran. The proof of its imprudence therefore unreasonabl e to expect that the r ul ers is the fa ilu re of non - nuclear det errence . US of Iran would sudden ly see the w isdom of modforces are present on both sides of Iran in both eration if th ey are able to assemble their own Iraq and Afg ha nistan, as we ll to their south i n nucl ear weapons. the Persian Gulf and In di an Ocean, Iran's own It fo llows that if all diplomat ic efforts to armed fo rces are outdated in st ructure, training obta in a verifia ble cessation of u ranium en r ich and equ ipment. Nevertheless, instead of bein g me nt fa il , the United States m ust be ready to det erred, t he rulers of Iran fee l free to attack US bomb t he buildings t hat are li ke ly to house critpo li cies worl d-wide in the most violent terms, to ica l processes an d equipment. It is argued t hat form alliances with any and all enem ie s of the Iran has many fac iliti es in many p laces . Th at i s United States from Chavez of Venezuela to North true, but an a ir stri ke would not have to ach ieve Korea, and to foment actual violence against the total destruction -i t is not a Las Vegas demoli-

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Rivista Militare English Edition n. 3/2006

Title pages. A partial view of Teheran. Right. Satellite view of Natanz, presumable site of uranium enrichment.

tion contract - nor even partial destruction. While the e nrich ment process requires several functional stages, it is only necessary to destroy the buildings and facilities needed for one of them to stop the entire process. In itse lf, that result is l ikely to be shortlived, so an air strike would also target other bu i ld ings or facilities that are both critical and more difficult to replace. It would take something of an air campaign to destroy every single structure in every instal lation associated with Iran ' s nuclear program - the total m ight come to 1,000 ai ming points, requiring some 500 sorties for t he strike aircraft alone , assum i ng both a num ber of re-strikes, and no use at all of Cruise miss i les, because of their smal ler warheads and lesser accuracy. But to destroy selectively only the crit ical or hard to replace structures less than l 00 aiming points would suffice, so that unless an exaggerated number of defense suppression and air super iority sorties were also flown (Iran's fighters are use less and its airdefense missiles obsolete) the combined total could still amount to a one-time air strike as opposed to more prolonged bombing. That difference is of the essence po litical ly. It is one thing to start a bomb i ng cam paign of unknown duration and scope, and quite another to announce that the previous n ight a number of buildings were destroyed. The negative political impact within Iran, within region and g loba ll y would be infinitely smal ler. It would be most unfortunate if narrowly bureaucratic conside rations or a rigid adherence to standard operating proce dures were allowed to prevail over pol itical pri orities, increas ing sortie numbers unnecessar-

ily to over-insure against feeb le Iranian air defenses, thus precluding a one-t ime str ike. It would be i mperfect of course , but then the purpose is not to solve the prob lem presented by Iran or even its nuclea r pr ogram , but o nly to delay the acquisition of nucl ear weapons as long as possible , in the hope t hat Iran wi 11 not want to provoke another attack by persisting in its efforts, or even that a better regime comes along something that w i ll sure ly happen one day. A ll of the above pres um es target intelligence of sufficient accuracy . That i s not an unreason able assumpt ion. Iran is not North Ko rea. It s borders are open to v isito rs and are eas i ly crossed i lle gally, both ways. There are a great many Iranians expatriates abroad -mo r e than a mi ll ion in the US alonewho travel back and forth and frequent ly communicate with frie nds and relat ives sti ll in Iran , and t here are active oppositio n group s both formal and infor ma l with i n Iran's educated clas ses,

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which reach deep i nto scientific establishment. In the absence of an unforgivable Intel ligence failure, enough should be known of Iran's n uclear activities on a current basis to allow really accurate targeting. But it is also an ag reed assumption that Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons in less t han three years by th e shortest estimates. The r e is therefore no compe ll ing reason t o use force before then, while t here are very good reasons to wait. One may still hope that diplomatic efforts to pers uade Iran to abandon uranium enrichment will succeed, however unlikely that now seems. A more solid reason to wait is that the United States is already over- committed, and one hopes that it wi ll regain some freedom of act ion once US troops are disengaged from active operations in Iraq. An even better reason to wait is that the next t hree years could be used very product ively to weaken Iran 's regime. Even if the UN Security Council fails in the end to impos e sanctions, so long as the United States can preserve it s present entente w it h the European Un ion

OIKOS - 8

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ove r Iran, punishing measures co u ld st ill be implemented to dissuade investments in Iran, to deny internationa l bank i ng services, and prohib it the travel of leaders broadly defined and their families to thei r favorite Europea n destin at ions - it would not be a global travel ban, but Pyongyang is not Par is. In the m ea ntime, the new Inte l ligence now avai lable shou ld be used to slow down Iran ' s nuclear program by final ly, at long last, stopping expo rts of electron-be am welders, ba lancing machines, vacuum pumps , flo w- fo rm in g machines and suc h, chiefly from German and Swiss manufactu rers . For th at was t he startl ing discovery made by the IAEA inspectors: although Iran's nucl ear program cr itic al ly depends on equ i pmen t imported

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wel l known fact i n itself t he Iran ians had not even bothe red to remove t he man ufacturers' labels , complete w ith names, ad dre sse s and telephone numbers. There is also somet hin g else that should be done mos t vigorous ly i n the meantime, if only to keep faith with Western ideals of po litical se lf expression , includ ing the expression of free ly chosen nation al identities. In the age of em pires , national identit ies were everywhere suppressed but no more. Twelve nati on - states and several more autonom ies have emerged from th e Soviet Union, four emerged from Yug oslavia with Kosovo yet to come, t wo from Czechos lovak ia, and now Montenegro has separated from Se rbi a, even though both share th e same language, the same religion and a long h istory of fraternity in arms. ¡ It is now t he turn of mu lti - nat iona l Iran to u ndergo the same transformatio n. Although Pers ians and those assimi lated to the m monopolize po litical power, although Persian culture and Pe rs ian- lang uage is imposed on all, ot her nationalities account fo r almost half the populati on. Of these, t he Kurds of t he north - west and t he Bal uch of th e south - east are already actively fighting for independence , from both 765848AI (C00<!60)

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Rivista Mililare English Edition n. 3/2006

Azerbaijan y"'B KU the cu ltural oppression of their JOO 200Mi1~ ~ let(ew,'btioa ls Pers ian rulers, and Shi ' ite dis Caspian crimi nat ion against their Sunn i Turkmenistan { Sea faith - there are Sunni mosques i n Rome, T el Aviv and Washington, but no()e is allowed in Teheran. The Kurds and t he Baluch, w ho accou nt for some ten percent of the popu lation deserve our sym pathy, and discreet help. Then there are t he Shi' ite Arabs of Afghanistan the south-west who valued Tehran's protection when Iraq I r aq next door was ruled by Sunn i oppressors, but are now revo lting aga i nst Pers ian oppression, and see them se lves as natu ral ly un iting with thei r fe llow Arabs of Iraq just across t he border. Arabia \ These are al l periphera l U $Ilia 8 Sunni minor it ies and the Pe r sian c:::J Persian c:::::J Turl<men Sh i' ite reg ime that rules Iran ,-,,---, Gilaki - • /Ho.. ~ Azeri L--..1 &- · ~ could probably continue to c:::J Kurd ~:~darani ( Persian Gulf '. _' . :~ ...: _ -., _ _ suppress them b r uta ll y, as in C=:JArab the past. But it can not sup- 1 C]Lur c:::] Other "'\'DOHA · . / / Qatar · ~ u/1 of Oman C::;J Baloch c:::::J Sparsely populated .. ; , • ~ , } t' Arabian press the Azer is of Iran. c:::J Qashqai They are Shi ' ites and histori -United Arab - * MUSCAT Sea _ un_da...:. ry_ _ _, _ _,__ _E ;;;.;.;m.;.;.; ir= a tes Oman _...___ - - - - ca lly they too wPrP glad to al ly " -- -=-.::-_P_rOVJ_·n_ce_ bo themselves with the Persians Ethnic and religious distribution on the Iranian territory. to protect the i r faith against the Sunni threat from the ne ighboring Ottoman empire of Turkey . But that threat is now i ndependent, un it ed long gone and forgotten, Azerbaij an (to include the while it is the Pers ian sup - ' ' The shape of things tc, seven m il l ion Azeris in the pression of their entire ly difcome was made clear by the Republic of Azerbaijan across ferent Turkic language and cu ltural identity that the gigantic demonstrations in the borde r). Un like the more Azer is bitterly resent: Azeri Tabriz on May 11 of this r ura l, less advanced and far less numerous Arabs, Baluch c hildren are condemned t o year, during which the poand Kurds , the Azeris are not grow up as il l iterates in t heir lice, the Pasdaran Revoluresorting to v io lence to assert own language . T hi s is no tionary Guards and the Basi~ their nat iona l rights-no r smal l minority than can be militia of the regime did not should they have to. bruta lized - there at least l 6 even try to resist, even Outn u mbering as they do the million Azeris in the North west. Iran (Iranians of Azeri though banners were carried population of l 83 UN mem origin in Te hran or elsewhere calling for an independent, ber states and territories (or l 93 with t he northern Azeris) , in the co u ntry are often united Azerbaijan,, they certainly deserve thei r entire ly assimilated) as a national independence, and corn pact popu lation needs our own fr iendly regard and support , if on ly to on ly cohesion to control the situation where facil itat e t heir peacefu l separation. That they live . The shape of things to come was shou ld be at the center of the three - year intermade clear by the gigantic demonstrat ions in im agenda for Iran . Tabriz on May l l of th is year, during which the police , Pasdaran Revolutionary Guard s and Basij Edward N. Luttwak mil itia of the regim e did not even try to resist, Political Scientist even though banners were carried cal l ing for an

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FROM EUROPARTNERSHIP TO PROXIMITY POLICY Within a political prospect of integration and cooperation towards the Mediterranean, the Barcelona Declaration of 1 995 is a strategic document for the European Union. But it is not sufficient for achieving concrete objectives, since these depend on political values that should be shared by systems and cultures very different from each other. The Union's proximity policy - started in 2003 - today is trying to re-modulate the pos sibilities of having a shared political space towards the South, counting on a progressive harmonization of the social and political values within the Euro- Mediterranean partnership.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

a region charact erized by a strong social dynamism particularly sensitive to the needs of th e The European Union, in its geopolitical position, minorities, and meeting po int of d iverse an d adis not a negligible element in the political and evanced cultu res . The Mediterranean and the cono mic analysis of the Middle East and Med iterMiddle East actually share very ancient cult ures ranean region. and interdependent economies, at least for the The continental aggregation remain s a political energy balance that the latter represents for the identity, which - besides its en largeme nt to the former. Nevert heless, the cultural similarity has East and the possibility of a discussed opening to d ifficulty in realizing a bond ch aracte r ized by Ankara - implements its project of a widened strong solidarity t ies. T he difficu lty is caused by community, envisaging an ampler Mediterranean, interests in the Middle East area that have never which involves Europe in the events of a "greater" been shared, and by the wrong perception that Middle East. A political community characterized th e European Union and the United States have by the joint interests present in the area. A comhad about the strategic value of the basin , from munity that is a synthesis of very strong social and the end of the Cold War onwards. economic proximities. A reg ion Nonetheless one can t hink t hat is Euro- Med iterra nean on that a pos it ion of politico-sone side and Middle-Eastern on ' ' ... the role of physical-po- trate gic centrality may have the other. It is a synthesis be been taken d uring these last tween two geopolitical regions litical hinge played by the decades, espec ially today, aft hat inte rface and take turns in Middle East represents a per- te r t he start of the Oslo d irecting and conditioning t he fect example of junction line process and the West's se nsi political act ion in the Med iterbetween different entities , , tiv ity towards the critical state ranean. of the Middle-Easte rn sociFrom the Balkan crisis oneties, which fear modernity wards, i n t oday's world of i nte rn ational relaand are a prey to terrorist violence. An old centions, the role of physical-political hinge played tral ity that entrusts to the Medite r ranean bas in by the Middle East represents a perfect example the role of an area where economic and exof junction line between different entities. A line chan ge opportunities conve rge. An area th at has along which the decline of the State as maxirenewed itself, owing to its abil ity to manage the mum system of political organizat ion of one or resources , and this time not o nly the energetic more communities confers a particular political ones. Exchanges that have as an objective the dignity to the minorities and the aggregate g rowth of the comm un ity, the stability of its incommunities. stitutions and the freedom from ne ed . ExIn this system, tod ay more than in the past, changes that are ind ispe nsab le for the co he sion politics and economy increas e t he imp ortance of of the commun it ies of the enlarged region, in

O IKOS -12 I

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order to take away space and human resources from destabilizing actors, whose log ic is the erosion of the regio n's pol itical capab ilities so as to avoid the establishment of future sce narios of energy domination as expression of power objectives at the heart of t_h e world, as Ch ina and Russia tend to do .

WHAT SOUTH FOR THE UNION?

There is one more question that pertains t o the preceding analysis. What are the elements that connect the Euro - Atlantic Countries with those of the southern shore of Europe and the Middle East? In a certain sense, the re is a Mediterranean tradi tion in the particularly anthropocentr ic customs and culture typ ical of the southern and Mediterranean regions. A human d imension, w hich, in a good or a bad way, characterizes the life style and relativizes the worship of organ ization , typical of the no rthern reg ions, promoted by ancient com munities, which had already within them their own cod es of conduct. Second ly, the presence of overcrowded metro politan areas, where there is no possibility of any investment. Neverthele ss the sout he rn region of th e Mediterranean shows also a diversity in t erm s of social stratificat ion. Name ly , a widespread marginality of minority classes , due to the prevalence of sca rcely tole rant dom in ant cultures, a low level of environmental protect ion and, therefore, a quality of life that lacks institution al su pport and spirit of private enterprise on the territory. A governance deficit whic h prevents its re-modulation, in te rms of opportuni ties of access t o the economic and growth resources. Th is insuffic ient capabi l ity of politi cal leadership causes th e lack of programmes and projects apt to progressive ly appease th e social te nsions in side the communities, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In al l this, an i mportant role is entrusted precisely to th e transfo rmation of the en larged Mediterranean in a space of support to the economies that are developing in the area. An organized space, where a common gove rnance can express itself, in order to avoid unidirectio nal t hrusts t hat could ripen within part isan strateg ic choices, be they concern ing the infrastructure programmes of the partn er Countries or the reconsideration of the security policy of the area. A su perficiali ty, whi ch, especially in the face of t he terrorist threat, would transform itself in a non - manifest proxy to reg ional ambitions, risking a drive t owards a controlled economy that wou ld not guarantee internal stabi lity and the conti nu ity of th e energy suppli es to the West.

Title pages. The Mediterranean represents a convergence area of economic possibilities and trade exchanges.

Above. Barcelona. A view of the EUROMED Summit (2 7- 28 No vember 2005).

Therefore, th e success of a Mediterranean se curity policy, as well as that of a common economic policy, depends also on the ca pabi li ty of the Western European partners of consid ering th e region as a humanized space, extrem ely important for the pol itical and economic stability of the conti nental States. More than yest erday, the Med iterranean becom es a real projection p lace of the West towards the South and the near East. A space, whose geograph ic importance is the result of histori cal circumstances, which along the times have give n it th e role of a hinge betwee n different worlds and cu ltures, but whose desti nie s have intertwined in the past and are opposed at the present time. But o n wh at econ om ic and social variab les one shall have to intervene, in order to create a positive homogeneity of economic- productive organization, of shared political objectives, which shoul d contrast and chang e the negative trend of marg inali zation of the Midd le East from th e typically Western model of development? Certainly, demographic pressure is not a negligible factor. The proces s of urban ization of the coast al areas and the abandonment of the hinterland have produced an unbearable concentration on lim ited spaces and the migration of the small rural co mmunities, with negative effects not on ly from the econ omic point of vi ew, by depriving the territory of a homogeneous and integrated growth,

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but also caused subcultural conflicts, w ith the en suing difficulty in governing by employing forms of diffusion of representative, popular and decentralized power. In view of this, and in a prospect of shared com mon security, possib le and decis ive, it would be wrong to propose for the Mediterranean a k in d of doctrine of advanced defence of the West, and nei ther a "forward strategy" could represent the most usef ul defensive concept, without exposing the Euro- Med iterranean community - in a unilateral effort of reorganization of the world force ratios to possib le moments of crisis . In this perception of a comp lex identity to be restructured , t he daily contradiction between West and East remains open. A contradiction t hat limits any poss ible effort towards a progress ive levell ing of the d iversit ies. For instance, the Islamic communit ies believe that their societies must remain immutable and, on the ot her hand, the Europeans think that Mus lims cannot be int egrated. A paradox due to the radicalization of the muc h- exploited cultura l confrontation and particu larly to race mixing. In this confrontation, the effects of the globa li zation of the international relations have produced a not negligib le result. That is , a process of growing "cult uralization ", wh ich , setting back the state as a lay po litica l category, has caused, in the uncertainty that derives from such political relativ ism, the "sectarisation" of the Mediterranean communities, which , instead of promoting an approach, r isks to preclude all prospects of a dialogue, because of un iversal values not universally acknowl edged as such. Thus, immigrat ion, human rights, women's r ights, religious confront ation and inter-confessional relations are social and po litical phenomena wh ich we have to deal w ith in the region . But they are also the most immed iate resu lts of the globalizat ion process of human relations, be t hey economic or political . Phenomena t hat create a dilu t ion of prospects, wh ich can on ly present values of synthes is. A synthesis that should overcome the cultural conflict through the re- positioning of the lay function of the State in gu iding the growth of the community and the enco unter of t he commu nit ies, especially those professing the Islamic fa ith . In view of this, against an immanent request for security and stability, the emerging truth is that the d il ut ion of identity, due to the permeability of the commun it ies and th e decompression of the ethnic front iers, will necessarily require a revival of the Euro- Med iterranean approach. A new Mediterranean perspective, wh ich can be useful, provided that one kept in due consideration anot her perspective, whic h is fundamental for looking between land and sea: the end of a symmet ry in the

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re lations between the European West and the Atlantic West. A good result is possible, and the success of any Euro- Med iterranean policy wi ll be decided on it. T hi s means that, in the face of a system oriented towards find ing in the future it s own balance in the alternat io n between uni lat eral models , the Mediterranean will sta nd as a region where any attempt at domination is diluted in a continuous, progress ive comparison between models having a particular cohesion and, for this reason , hard to dom inate.

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ECONOM IC SECURITY From the preced ing cons iderations one can infer that, today more than yesterday, pol itics and economy enhance a reg ion characterized by a strong social dynamism , particularly sens itive to the request s of the minorities and meeting point of d ifferent and deve loped cu ltures. Cultures where a bond charact erized by strong relations hips of solidarity deriving from shared interests in the area is not easily created . Thus the Middle East and the South of the European Union redefine t heir geographical pos ition , reciprocally exchanging their situation of being out skirts of the West and central places of the Med iterranean region. Two interesting positions, if one considers thP h;isin as an area where econom ic opportunities and exchanges converge. As we have seen, this is an area that can renew itse lf due to its capacity of managing its resources , and not on ly the energy ones. Resources that can d ifferentiat e the supply of goods, creating the bases for a competitive market in the progressive internat ionalization of t he life, not so much of the single States, but of the politicoeconomic communities. But what ro le can be attributed to security as a fundame ntal value for t he economic growth of a southern West, capable of releasing the forces for the implementation of a European project for the management of the Mediterranean policies oriented towards the conquest of new markets7 These are the chal lenges put out by t he system of area relations. Clearly the slow, but essential, process of political liberal ization of the market of Maghrebian Africa and t he Middle East, exceeding ly late if compared to the markets' tendency to g lobalization, with t he exception of the oil sector, lead to this consideration. A cons ideration that derives both from the particularity of the political systems t hat govern the Mediterranean commu nit ies and from the difficulty of realizing an integrated production system and logist ic layout linking the markets of t he reg ion . A system that impleme nts an organized econom ic space that makes up for the absence of a Euro- Medit erranean agg regation t hat cou ld guide the regional political choices, be they typically political or

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economic. For this reason the European political and economic periphery cannot be left on its own, since the South is the geographic element that brings together different, reciprocally-related economic realities. In view of this, the geopolitical role of the peripheries, their being constdered contact points with the rest of the world, changes the relation between the aggregation and the territories that comprise it, enhancing also the marginal realities. Those communities which, for their cultural proximity, permit the direct projection in the area of interest of the political and economic reasons of the respective national communities. In this sense, t he Mediterranean, and therefore, together with it, the broader Middle East, may represent the political region which fulfils the ambition of satisfying the many interests t hat often overlap in a narrow basin, characterized on its edges by a particularly advanced cultural and ethnicreligious heterogeneity. In short, the conflict among cultures, and not in the paradoxical "Hungtingtonian" obviousness, shows how sensible it is to maintain a balance between worlds t hat are different, but very near to each other. Also, it shows that the possibility of securing a quality of life of a certain level is very much dependent on the external relations that one is able to create and manage with diplomatic actions, neither limitP.d

to umbrellas of power nor reproposable within contingent neo- imperial logics. The transition to a regional order and to an equal characterization of the relationships changes the scenario, entrusti ng to each individual politically organized community its own destiny. Also in this case, the acknowledgement of a new role of the West in the Middle East, the strategic ability to plan a EuroMediterranean partnership open to the Arab world becomes the conclusion of a new geopolitical order to be ascribed to the contiguity of the grey zone between the Mediterranean and the Middle East. A grey zone that coincides with Palestine, where t he contradictions betwee n the West and the Arab world clash in controversial terms that have become unbearable. This is a danger not represented by a determined, or determinable, enemy. A risk of a crisis considered within a possible evolution of peripheral unrest, brought about by conflicts of a socio-religious oreconomic-political character in the definition of t he development levels, and of the terms of respons ibility in the control of the strategic resources for the communities of the States of the Is lamic area, as well as for the Countries of sub-Saharan Africa and of eastern Middle-Central Asia. The request for security is substantiated in all this. A security that express es t he need to be a necessary guarantee for the free and autonomous exercise of the government func-

tions, which should ensure the functioning of the market and the safeguarding of resources, attributing a capability of international action that should integrate with the economic credibi lity of a mature region. This is particularly t rue for the Midd le East. The utopia of a market characterized by exchanges based on comparative advantages being disproved, today a national economy reshapes itself on the pursuit of competitive advantages, finding econom ic security by virtue of the force of a State - or of a body of institutional entit ies , such as the European Union, for example - to make innovations in t he space of a globalized market, which involves , in the whirl of t he maximization of profit, social aspects and marginalities left to the political dynamics of confrontation. For these reasons, both the broader Medite rranean on the one side and the Middle East on the other, can be qualified as projection places of an interdependent and complex regional political reality in quest of minimum conditions of security. A reg ional system aimed at supporting the endeavour to create a synergic and competitive market. A regional system motivated to realize conditions of security suitable for avoiding extremely destructive crises, given t he delicate t errit orial balances, as the IsraeliPalestinian question and Iraq teach us. However, it is a matter of decidi ng, once and for all, and meeting the obligations undertaken within the regional aggregations to which one belongs, how to find a balance that could permit to reorganize the production and service system necessary for the development of the Middle-East communities, and how to involve t hem in the relational dynamics of the region and of the international community. T his in volvement is necessary for an integrated economic space in a Middle East with large productive and supply potentialities and with a heavy strategic weight in ensuring the security of the States that form the Eu ro-Med iterranean heterogeneous patchwork. A space where energy, water, marine and human resources become a source of development, but also an extreme danger of conflict for their control.

SECURITY AND DIALOGUE T he problem of security is not only a po litical problem but also a necessity for a decisive econom ic development, as decisive as the stability of the institu t ional structure is for giving credibility to the economy of a Country. Thus t he estab lishment of a global and EuroMediterranean partn ership aimed at transfo r ming the Mediterranean in a common space of peace ,

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of g lobally shared cooperation shou ld have favo ured th e multilateralism that, with due respect to the specificities of each partner, m akes it an added value. In view of a possible participation of the Union, the Euro- Mediterranean Partners hip (EMP), also known as the Barcelona process, did not mean to re p lace t he oth er ac tions or i ni ti atives undertaken in favo ur of peace, stability and development of the region ; on the contrary, it tried to be a po ss ible synthes is am o ng the three aspect s on whi ch the cooperative architecture of the region sho uld have been realized. T hat is, the security and political aspect, aimed at rea lizing a com mon space of peace and stab ility (Political and Security chapter), t he econom ic and financial aspect that wo uld permit the creation of a zone of shared prosperity (Econom ic and Financial chapter) , t he soc ial, cultural and human aspect, for d evelopin g the hu man resources, promoting the comprehen sion among A digitised satellite image of Europe and the Meditercultures and exchanges among the civil societies ranean basin. (Social, Cu ltural and Huma n chapte r). T he Barcelona decl aration, in short, w as a f un d am entally strategi c document, dec isive, and stab il ity and prosperity through the strengthenperhaps ambitious, for t he realization of a coming of the political and security d ialogu e, an ecoprehen sive picture of the poli cies t o be followed nomic and financi al partnership, as w ell as a soin order to pro mote a progress ive integ rat ion. cial, cultural and human assoc iatio n represe nt Thus, in addit ion to the fo rmu las of protection the goals of a future to be shared in time . The fiof the econom ic pos si b ilities and o f cooperative nal declaration of the Eu ro-Medi terranean Mi nis support - as well as t hose of rPorganization of terial Conference of Barce lona of 27 and 28 Not he cred it system of eac h ind ividual pa rtner, as vember 1995 is th erefore still topical. Indeed, it a measure ai med at creating the condition s for r egenerates in the formu lation of the proxi mity fosteri ng the development of the national epoli cy , in a series of int erventions meant not to conomies, guaran t eeing equ al acce ss to direct ex port but to prom ote economic capa bi lities and foreign investments and lay th e fou nd at ion s for jurid ical so lutions in order to start a process tha t th e harmonization of nation al legisl ation s in should lead to the con stitution terms of democratic value and of a mu ltilateral frame of diaprotection and guarantee of logue and cooperatio n among ' .to start a process tha1 hum an rights - the security o f the E.U . Countri es and the h d I th e region has assumed a deMediterranean third Countr ies. - O O ia ague an cisive centrality, since it has T he Euro- Med iterranean dee- COO etw en th been entrusted wi th the stalaration ado pted in 1995 inE.U and t Medi e ranear bility of an area as a preco nt ended to define a mu ltilateral third Countries ,, diti on for any further step forpict ure that would strictly as ward. In affirming the liberty soci ate the economic and se of the peoples, an d th ei r right curity aspects and com prise, moreover, the cul to se lf-d eterm ination, the Barce lo na declaration tural, huma n and social dim en sion of a vital also appeared as a sol emn commitment. Acomspace that cannot lower itself on political and em i tment aimed at building re lation s among t he conomic cho ices decided outside the area . The Co untries of the area, based on respect of the decl arati on aimed at resolving the di alogu e not t erritorial integr ity, of non-intervention in in terna l affa irs, o n peacefu l sett lem ent of co ntroo nly among State s but also in a transnational pe rspective, involving institution s and com mu niversie s, on the co mmo n wi l l and p led ge to fight terrorism, organ ized crim e and the scourge of ties, overcoming a bilateralism no more consis te nt with the international dynamics t hat have drugs in all its aspects . Thes e goals are to be ac hieved with in a fram ework of regional sec uricharacteri zed the Mediterran ean pol icies of th e single partners of the Un ion . The dec is io n to re ty, and doing one's best in favour of ch emi ca l, ali ze a regional system based on equal re lations biologic and n uclear non - proliferation thro ug h

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the participation in, and compliance with, the regimes of non proliferation, both national and regional, as well as the accords on disarmament and control of armaments, creating a Middle East area free from weapons of mass destruction. The picture sugge~ted by the Barcelona process could be considered almost complete if one pauses to think that the declaration ascribed, and ascribes even now, the success of any partnership policy to the concrete realization of a social partnership that draws the pop ulations together. A partnership that should be the re sult of the best possible comprom ise between the existence, acknowledgment and mu tual respect of the d ifferent traditions, cultures and civilizations on both shores of the Mediterranean and, moreover, laying emphas is on the common roots. A system of cooperation bui lt on the importance of the intercultural and inter-re lig ious dialogue on the role of the mass media, in order to achieve knowledge and mutual understanding among the cultures , on the development of human resources in the cultural sector, on cultural exchanges, on the knowledge of other languages, on the implementatio n of educational and cultural programmes respectful of cultural ide ntities, on the importance of the medical sector and social deve lopment and on the respect of fundamental social rights. Acomplex architecture of human and economic relations, based on the necess ity to involve civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean partnersh ip, and on the strengthening of the instruments of decentra lized cooperation in order to promote the exchanges between the various sectors of development and security, from the cooperation in the sector of illegal immigration to the f ight against terrorism, drug traffick ing, international crime and corruption . But, despite this, the Barcelona process has not been deemed sufficient. The process of progressive approach of societies, institutions and economies i n the Mediterranean faces a very widespread and significant picture of diversities. T he choice of a proxim ity policy, i.e . a neighbourhood policy, aims at correcting a hope which faded after September l l: to be able to realize, as soon as possib le , a real cooperative and integrated pa rt ners hip. The Mediterranean proximity po licy, wh ich re-invents the Euro-Medite rranean poli cy, intends to be a kind of complementary poli cy. Namely, as an effort to avo id the abandon ment of a process in itinere but to re-modulate, to re-orient it, towards a possible mode l of harmonization, without affecting the international structures of complex and non-equal institutions of the Mediterranean States , espec ially of the South.

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CONCLUSIVE REMARKS At the end of this analysis, set between Europe and the Mediterranean, we could conclude that the overa ll pol it ica l act ion will be decis ive not so much for the economic opportunities of growth and deve lopment of the communities them selves, but for a po litica l stability derivi ng from a sha red security, considered an added value of the democratisation process that wi ll have to be ensured on the South of Europe. In th i s perspective , the image of a possible conflict cou ld come to mind. A kind of continuity wit h the not much histo r ically credible theory based on t he clash of civilizations. Now, if we were to bel ieve Huntington also in the Mediterranea n, we cou ld certain ly say t hat no reg ion has suffered more from it. But clashes, war, force itself, in th e past centuries represented the act ion of the historical becoming, which puts diversities in cont act, where the sangu in ary reason of pol itical and m il itary violence has been rep laced by the syn thesis of culture , wh ich prevai ls and does not annul, does not standardize the phys ically defeated culture, but makes the mos t of it in a multi level system of dialogue. A lexander the Great, the Hellenistic culture , the Roman Empire and the Euro-Asiatic and Mid d le East event s, af ter all, mark the histo r ical evolution of a world made of d iversities, where d isag reements, if not clashes, between the single diffe rences are in evitable, because inev itable is the diversity of the human commun ity. There are no homologating formulas that can g ive stabi lity to a system that reorganizes itself by re- determin i ng the conditions of the re lations between the communities that constitute it . Not even the force rat ios, as well as the nuclea r thermoregu lation of i nternational relations during the Cold War, succeeded in homogen iz ing the regiona l subsystems that characterized both polarit ies . In view of th is , it easy to see the connections between Europe and the Mediterranean Countries as a system of necessary relations. A system of relations that expresses itse lf in a reg ion where there is no conflict between Ch r ist ian ity and lslam ism, but which is heir to ancient civi lizations, whose proximity promotes a compa rison in exchange, in dialogue, in the i nevitabil ity of an age-old contact due to a geographica l sharing of the same expanse of water . Giuseppe Romeo Expert in Ceostrategv -

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The article was written befo re the recent events I l'_n Lebanon. .

1

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THE ARMY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN Backbone of the Country since the attainment of independence, today the Pakistan Army is the internal cement of a frail national identity and an instrument of pressure for the Country's foreign policy.

Between bloody clashes and dramatic migrations of populations - about ten mil lion Hindus moved from Pakistan to India and seven million Muslims from India to Pakistan - the "Land of the Pure" declared its independence in the summer of 1947, after the British Empire d ivided In d ia into two Dominions: Pakistan (with an Islamic majority) and the Indian Union (with a Hindu majority), despite the strong tensions connected with the definition of the borders. In particular, there was the vexed question of the sovereignty on the Kashmir region, wh ich remains the subject of a dangerous military controversy between two Nations that are in possession of the atomic bomb.

League in the City of Calcutta, there were over 4000 dead and 10,000 wounded. And it was precisely on Ali Jinnah's pressure that the British Empire issued the "Indian Independence Act", destining to the Muslim League the region of East Pakistan (a region that in 1971 became Bangladesh and was inhabited by a Bengali majority) and the region of West Pakistan. The two regions were separated by as many as l 700 km of Indian territory. During the massive exodus of the Indian Muslims to Pakistan (Mohajir) there were very serious disorders and bloody fights between the two communities, including real massacres on both sides, wh ich caused over 300,000 dead, reaching the frightful number of one million victims in less than three years. At the shout of "Pakistan Zindabad" (Long live Pakistan), the first war THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE between India and Pakistan had practically begun. Within the intricate programme of division of the two After the birth of the Indian National Congress in Countries, the British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten and 1885, the large Muslim minority living in India his Commander in Chief Auch inleck defined the proclaimed right away the possibility of acceding to the portion of military personnel and equipment: 64% new political institutions, with a different political was allocated to India and 36% to Pakistan. It was a weight in the social life of the Country. The claim was rather speedy operation, considering that it was met with the firm resistance of the Hindu majority. completed in less than a month, from 3 to 30 June This led to the foundation, on 1947. Pak istan w as allowed December 30, 1 906, of the Pantherefore a lesser share vis-a-vis Indian Muslim League, under the ~, ... about ten million Hindu~ the Indian one, and the Pakistani leadership of Mohammed Ali Armed Forced were formed, on moved from Pakistan to Jinnah. The aim was to safeguard paper, 6 mechanized India and seven million Divisions, by8 Infantry the interests of the Indian Regiments from India tc and as many Arti llery Regiments, Muslims in the Country. Instead, Muslims the result was a worsening of the Pakistan ... ,, in comparison with the 40 rivalry between the two religious Divisions, 40 Infantry Regiments communities, which, in the twenand 20 Artille ry Regiments ties and thirties, saw an escalation of clashes, which , assigned to the Indian Union. As regards Officers, the as regards violence and brutality, reached its peak in share due to Pakistan (about 4000) was seriously the last year of British colonial ru le - together with the invalidated by the losses and the targeted attacks definitive breakdown in the re lations between suffered during the violent disorders between the Congress and League - when in the "Day of Direct two relig ious communities, which reduced the actual Action" (16 August 1946) promoted by the Muslim number to only 2300 Officers. Owing to this dramat-

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ic situation, as many as 5000 British Officers - al l volTitle pages. Soldiers of the 67th Medical Battalion. unteers - en listed in the ranks of the new Musl im State, joined by some Hungarian Officers, to fill the Above. vacancies in the Medical Corps. For the troops the Storage of humanitarian aid on board a "Chinook" CH47 helicopter. situation was even more dramatic: l 50.000 men, scattered in the various military bases in India, were transferred to Pakistan by train, but many convoys ders - already since 1947 the "Land of the Pure" had were furiously attacked by Hindu and Sikh militants, adopted Urdu as its official language; a mixture of who, according to the reports of some witnesses , Hindi, Persian and Arabic, widespread in the British succeeded in massacring almost a fourth of the men, Indies and, above all , in the Muslim communities of including t he families that were travelling with them. the area. The territory contested with India was However, it is still unknown the number of the surKashmir, in West Pakistan. During the British occupavivors that managed to reach the 'T he Country of the tion th is region was a kind of autonomous Pure" and constituted the first effective core of the Princedom, ruled by a Hindu Army of Pakistan. In October dynasty, but with a large majority 1947, at the beginning of the first war with India, the young " ... the new Army could coun1 of Muslim population. Since the State could count on 4 effective from the very beginning on "Partition" did not envisage the of the Princedoms, Divisions, deployed on the west 1umero s adhesions of independence but only their possibility to join and on the east, l O Infantry one of the two Dominions on the Brigades and one Armoured Muslims coming from South ast Asia, the Middle East ana basis of religion and geog raphic Brigade with l 3 tanks. Even if this contigu ity, t he irresolute unit - battalions included - could ven from North Africa .. , , Maharajah Hari Singh d id not be considered a minimum force, decide immed iately on the issue the new Army could count from perhaps in the hope of obtaining the autonomy of his the very beginning on numerous adhesions of rich and fertile region - and in the delays of this Muslims com ing from South- East Asia, the Middle stalemate, the pro-Pakistani tribes of t he north west East and even from North Africa, who were carried by zone (North West Frontier, NWFP, o ne of today's the emotional wave of the constitution of an entirely provinces of Pakistan) entered into the Srinagar valMuslim Army. For this reason - the new Pakistan had ley, with the support of the local Mus lim militia. This to be born under the wing of a mil itary structure paramilitary force - called AZK ,"Azad Kas hmir", in which could ensure the defence of the uncertain bor-

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Urdu "Free Kashmir" - in a very short time overpowered the scant "reg ular" forces of the region, already deployed along the frontier only in order to resist dangerous terrorist raids in the te rritory but not an actual armed invasion whose goal was the conquest of the capital, Srinagar, like the one that was attempted between 22 and 26 October 1947. Even if the attack did not achieve the intended depth (regular Indian troops were immediately lifted to the region and successfully deployed in defence of the city) the he lp of the regular Pakistani forces - for the first time engaged in a direct military confrontation with the support of the British Officers - permitted to control important areas of communication in the Himalayan zone, while the continuous small-scale clashes in the valley brought no strategic advantage to neither contender. But for a better comprehension of th e d ispute still open on Kashmir, we must keep in mind that the intervention of the regular Indian troops was officially requested by the Maharajah at the moment of the invas ion by the AZK (a request that was very welcome to Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who happened to be born in Kashmir) thus t riggering a chain of problems on the sovereignty on t he region, that are still unresolved to th is day. In fact, according to New Delhi, Kashm ir had always been part of India, not only owing to the "Partition" procedures, but essentially for the spontaneous adhesion of the ruling Prince (but we should also add that the d ispatch of lndi;in troor~ to the rescue of Srinagar was probably an essential condition for the annexation to India) and for the unjustified invasion of t he territory by the Pakistani troops. For the Islamabad government, instead, the parties signed the "Act of Accession" only after the entrance of the regular Indian troops and , therefore, the annexation was to be considered "forced" by an equally unjustified Indian mi litary invasion. The ceasefire proclaimed on December 31 , 1948 sanctioned, together with the end of the hostilities, also t he wane of the aspirations of the independe nce movements of Kashmir and, in practice, the formal division of the region 2/5 under control of Pakistan and 3 / 5 under Indian control. After the death of about 1 500 men, for each dep loyed force, the resolution of the United Nations (UNCIP 13.08.1948) envisaged the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces (regular and paramilitary) from the zone initially occupied and allowed Ind ia to leave a minimal force in order to ensure and maintain order in the contested zone. Only in 1957 the entire reg ion of the Jammu-Kashmir was officially transformed in a (federal) State of the great Ind ian Union. The ceasefire line of 1947, approved by both parties, became the "Control Line", i.e. the de- facto frontier between the two Countries, which remained unchanged unti l t he war of 1977, which led to the independence of Bangladesh. Oddly enough, it was t he only war not foug ht by Pakistan and Ind ia for the

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control of Kashmir in the ambit of three wars broke n out in the short space of fifty years. Like for other Countries emerged from a hard colo nial experience, also for Pakistan the Armed Forces constituted from the very beginning the backbone of the young independence achieved, especially if one considers t he serious problems connected with the borders of t he State and the future discredit widespread over all the political and state instit utions, while the Army has somehow managed to remain unscathed.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE YOUNG STATE AND THE AMBIGUOUS ALLIANCES OF THE BIG POWERS In 1954, a first th reat by an independence movement of the "Eastern Province" was put down by the regular Pakistani troops with the proclamation of the state of emergency and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. In 1956 an Army General was appointed Governor-General (lskander Mirza) for the first time. He promulgated the new Constitution, transformi ng Pakistan into an Islamic Republic - still associated with the Commonwealth, even if it was no more a "Dominion" - whi le India decided to cancel defacto the frail administrative autonomy of Kashmir, reinforcing its control with the dispatch of more troops. General Mi rza, probably frightened by t his sequence of difficulties, decided to proclaim "Martial Law" and ended up by fostering the first military coup d'etat (1958) that brought to power General Ayyub Khan, former Commander of the Armed Forces, who restored the political normality through the so- called "g uided democracy", promoting a policy of considerable opening to the United States. At this point, it is necessary to understand what role the U.S. actually played in the game started with the division of India and Pakistan in 1947, until the moment when t he power passed into military hands . The father of young Pakistan, Ali Jinnah, sensed from the beg inn ing that his Country would meet g reat difficu lties (both financial and international) and did his utmost to obtain help from the United States, taking advantage of the temporary attraction that linked India to the Soviet Union. The strategic position of Pakistan - privileged observatory on the entire area - convinced t he American Government to sign an agreement of mutual military assistance, officially an "Al liance Treaty". Soon after (1 952), also India stipulated a four-year agreement with the U.S. in order to obtain funds dest ined t o promote the industrializat ion of the Country, which was moving towards a certain pol itical stabi lity. But the subsequent and unexpected t reaty signed with China (New Delhi, October 14) suddenly broke the relations with the United States, together with the blatant refusal of its protection, flaunted by Nehru in the name of a new foreign policy, inspired to "neutralism". Howeve r, Washington's military interests

Rivista Mililare Englis/1 Edition n. 3/2006

remained decidedly oriented in favour of Pakistan: besides large military supplies, the U.S. granted a credit line of more than a billion dollar, all for military purposes (1954-1965), besides providing the military training of Senior Officers at the American and English Military Academies, and a concrete contribution to the entire organization of the Armed Forces, in exchange for the installation of several military bases along the border areas, in order to spy on the dangerous and cumbersome Soviet Union. The "frontier problem" has always been a constant in the Islamic Republic's life. The "Durand Line", traced out by the British in 1893 to divide the internal provinces of Afghanistan, with time has become t he frontier between the two Countries, without considering the tear that would be created within the local Pashtun tribe, strongly motivated to remain united, and even with the ambitious project of forming a new State, Pashtunistan. The first incidents on the frontier line had already started in 1947 with the incursions of the Pashtun tribes and, in 1955 - in the face of continuous crossings of the frontiers - the Islamabad Government was forced to engage the regular troops in the Bajaur region. The peak of the tension - frontier clashes of a certain size, with many dead - was reached in 1 961 when the respective Embassies were withdrawn. In the meantime, the United States - already involved in supporting Pakistan against Afghanistan, which was backed by the Soviet Union - was forced to provide simi lar arm supplies also to India, after the defeat with China, in order to check the Communist threat in the Indian sub-continent. Paradoxically, the United States found itself supplying arms simultaneous ly to the two Countries, which were continuously at war against each other. But the Indian Government - whose foreign policy was undefined in its essential lines decided to send Prime Minister Shastri to Moscow (May 1965) to ask, and obtain, military and economic aid . The situation between Pakistan and India was degenerating again towards another military confrontation: to the New Delhi complaint of Muslim irregular troops trespassing into Indian territory (August 1965), India replied by sending regular troops on the Pakistani soil. This sparked furious fights in the Lahore area and only on September 22 of the same year the United Nations managed to enforce a truce between the two opponents, with the simultaneous "embargo" on U.S. arms supplies. Pakistan - having verified its objective military difficulties against the Indian Army - decided to turn its d iplomatic attention towards India's chief enemy, China, and managed t o obtain a loan of 60 mi llion dollars. The Pakistan i succeeded in getting from China more than 900 tanks, some Mig- l 9s and the complete equipment for the 3rd Infantry Division, but obtained also an unspecified number of "M irages'' and submarines from France and as many as l 00 T-55 Tanks and some Mi-8 helicopters from the Soviet Union (funny ways of internation-

Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf.

al diplomacy), before India's protests stopped the military supplies. Meanwhile a popular movement arose in Pakistan against Ayyub Khan's dictators hip. Its intensity was such that the strike proclai med on M;irch 2S , l 9fi9 induced the leader to resign. Anot her General, only a little more tolerant, Muhammad Yahya Khan, replaced him. But he was incapable of coordinating the relief, entrusted to the Army, for the populations of the eastern region hit by a cyclone of exceptional violence that caused the death of hundreds of thousands people, t hus nourishing the separatist incl ination, already prevalent in that area. In any case, even if militarily well supplied, Pakistan could not obtain important successes, not even during the war of 1971, where it suffered a bitter defeat. A widespread and pervasive campaign of civi l disobedience started in the tormented reg ion of East Pakistan, where it caused serious clashes in the city of Dacca, between the Territorial Militia and t he separatist demonstrators. Sheik Rahman, relaying on the popular favour, formed a provisional Government and, on March 26, 1970, proclaimed the independence of the Country, which took the name of Republic of Bangladesh. Although there were a few defections in the Pakistani Army (the independence of the region was considered leg itimate, like t he separation from India) the troops loyal to Yahya Khan entered the territory of the new State and, after bloody fights, managed to regain a temporary control of the region. But Ind ia did not certainly stand idle (the Congress Party of Ind ira Gandhi had reconquered the absolute majority and hastened to sign a new accord of mil itary cooperation with the Soviet Union) and sent its troops

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in support of separatist Sheik Rahman, succeeding in occupying the entire region within a few days. The Pakistani troops acknowledged the shocking figure of 93,000 prisoners and, on December 22, 1971, retreated from Dacca giving the green light to the Government of t he new People ' s Republ ic of Bangladesh, while in Islamabad President Khan res igned and entrusted the power to the leader of the People's Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But his arrival on the political stage unfortunately marked the beginning of a long period of violence and corruption, continued also during the following reg imes, characterized by police brutality and continuous social abuse, whereas apparently only the Army took no part in this misgovernment, embodying for the Pakistani public opi nion the nationalistic ideals that had inspired the birth of the State. With the coup d'etat of General Zia ul-Haq Uuly 1977), the Assembly was permanently dissolved and the political parties banned, not without having sentenced Al i Bhutto to be hanged, despite the many popular protest demonstrations. After a short period of a slight political improvement, in 1986 Pres ident Zia ul-Haq reassumed full power and personally gave the police the order to shoot at the population demonstrating against the dictatorial regime, causing tens of dead and hu ndreds of wounded. Two years later, President Zia dissolved the Government in office and imposed the Is lamic law as Su preme Law of Pakistan, wh ich was maintained also after his death, due to an in-fl ight explosion of his aircraft, presumably because of an attack against him. After his death, Benazi r Bhutto, the first woman at the head of the government of an Islamic nation, tried to start a process of democratisation in the Country. In the fol lowi ng decade, Pakistan went through a tormented period which ended with the electoral victory of Nawaz Sharif, the last democratically elected Prime Minister (1997), and with a fourth short war with India, for Kashm ir as always , even if never officially declared, known as the Kargil War. Moreover, the disastrous situation of the economy was worsened by the international sanctions that followed the atomic t ests carried out by Pakistan in response to the Indian nuclear experiments: in May 1998 India conduct ed five nuclear tests in the desert of Raj astan - although the first Indian atom ic bomb had been exploded in 1974 - and Pakistan answered with six nuclear t ests in Baluchistan, followed by the foreseeable disapproval of the international community and the suspension of American econom ic aid to both Countries. And it was this environment that paved the way for a General - former Chief of the Army - who, with a blood less coup on October 7, 1999, committed himse lf to promote the gradual

O IKOS - 24

return to democracy and restrain the process of rel igious radicalizat ion in progress in the Country: Pervez Musharraf. Once in power, he arrest ed Nawaz Sharif, decreed the state of emergency, suspended the Constitution and dissolved Parliament and local Governments. In 2000 the coup was declared leg itimate by the Pakistani Supreme Court and , in 2002, Pervez Musharraf saw his military regime and his personal power confirmed by a popular referendum called on April 30, where more than 72 million voters gave him an overwhelming majority.

THE MULTIFACETED AND CONTRADICTORY PERSONALITY OF GENERAL MUSHARRAF General Musharraf is really an Indian (he was born in New Delhi in l 943 and emig rated to Pakistan with his family in that tragic 1947) and started his mil itary career in 1964, with courses of professional qualification in Great Britain. He held t he position of General Director of Mi litary Operations durin g Benazir Bhutto's Government and , in 1 988, became chief of the Pakistani Armed Forces. But what kind of Country did t he new President f ind? Actually the "Land of the Pure" is in a state of total pol itical and social decay. On the verge of financial bankruptcy, corruption has reached extreme leve ls and the econom ic situation is coming to a head after the end of the international financial aid - mostly coming from the United States - equal to four billion dollars on a yearly basis. Moreover, what kind of Army did he find? To better understand the intricate events connected with the Pakistan Army at the dawning of the third millennium, one shou ld go back to t he humi liating defeat suffered during t he war of Bangladesh in 1971, a hard blow for the Country's entire machinery of war. After a military class formed by "cosmopolitan'' Officers, coming from the prestigious British Military College of Sandhurst (during the period of President Ayyub Khan, 1958-1971 (by many historians regarded as the father of t he modern Pakistan Army), there was a turnaround in t he alternation of the ruling classes. The new generations of Officers, coming from the midd le and rural classes of the Country, historically with more limited capabilities, proved themselves more sensitive to t he call of Islamic extremism, wh ich was encouraged by President Zia ul- Haq (1977- 1988), who favoured its growth unti l he made a "privi leged" class of Officers animated by the common ideology of (anti-I nd ian) nationalism and by the sharing of the new Islamic cal l, and with their dangerous concentration in the Pakistani Secret Services. Althoug h characterized by a

Rivisla Mililare English Edition n. 3/2006

military regime, actually the Government does not really ru le the entire Country, because local tribes that often fight each other control some areas. In particular, the frontier zones (li ke Peshawar, on the frontier with Afghanistan) are considered factual 'Tribal Areas", led by guerri lla leaders much nearer to the Taliban demands than to thP. state system of the Capital. In view of this difficult internal context, some observers blamed on Washington the responsibility of having let Islamabad decide which groups to support for the res istance during the war in Afghanistan, favouring the extremist groups that catalysed the other paramilitary Islamic associations under the flag of the Jihad, the ''Holy War" to be fought in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, the ISI Generals (Inter Service Intelligence) channelled the aid towards the more intransigent militant groups, li ke th e "Hizbul , Mujaheddin", instead of the more moderate elements of the Pashtun tribes, being afraid that the latter, once the war was concl uded, would claim again their rights in the Pakistani province of the "Northwest Frontier", where there is a large Pashtun majority. T he thesis upheld to persuade the American Administration to accept this choice was a rather elementary one: "the more mil itant the Jiahdist are, the more fanatically they will fight the Russians and their Allies". This situation inevitably formed the humus suitable for the preparatio n of international terrorists of Islamic mould. Therefore it should surprise no one if Musharraf's coming into power was seen with suspicion by the western Community (president Clinton

October 2005: The crew of a Pakistani Mi- 8 helicopter dispensing the first humanitarian aid immediately after the earthquake.

condemned the coup, albeit with moderate words) until the definitive break - August 2001 - between the United States and that kind of "Tal iban Emirate", because of the continuous American accusations of supporting the terrorist activities of Osama bin Laden. This was the right occasion for the new President: he offered to the United States the help of his Secret Services - with the precious competence acqu ired in neigh bouring Afghanistan - and use of the valuable national airspace to wipe out the Taliban evil, believed responsibl e for the September l l attacks, in exchange for t he revocation (President George W. Bush) of the sanctions imposed in 1998 (President Bill Clinton) after the oca provocative nuclear tests, including a pledge of substantial help against international terrorism. With his backing to the United States, General Musharraf, even if fortified by the support of the two main political parties - the People's Party and the Muslim League - did not take into due account the growing anti- American sentiment that was spreading among all strata of the population, he pref erred instead to obtain a strong alliance with the West, after the bloody attack of Islamic origin on the Indian Parliament (October l, 2001) which caused the breakdown of the negotiations on Kashmir, the recall of the respective Ambassadors and the dangerous

25 - OIKOS

concentration of troops and missile batteries along the frontier line. But the most careful military analysts point out that, in reality, the real problem of the new President is another General , hi s former right- hand man as Chief of Staff and today Commander of the strategic regions of Lahore, the influent ial General Mohammed Aziz. He is indeed the "eminence grise" of the coup d'etat of 1999 and commands a good many nationalist and intransigent generals that are at the origin of the militant Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, exploitable objectives for t he more ambitious military project of conquering India. In Islamabad the real power is in his hands. Before and after the Afghanistan war he controlled the activities of the Pakistan Secret Service and in that area he organized training camps on the frontier line, Lashe-Taiba (Pakistani militia and Afghan members of the Taliban political police) and Harakat- ul- Ansar, infamous for hijacking to l<andahar, in January 2000, a civil airplane of the national Indian ai rlines. In any case, ISI has a great responsi bility for distributi ng to extremist Islamic groups large amounts of arms and aid received from the Un ited Stat es. Although General Musharraf's coup was met with large popu lar consent, both for the fall of the corrupt Sharif government and for hopes that the military would return to power, the new President - who has always counted on the relig ious neutrality of his Army - was soon compelled to reckon with the fundamentalist pressure, which was by then widespread among the high ranks of the military structure, despite his policy of religious moderation, implemented through the programme known with the name of ''The Seven Pi llars of National Renaissance". In August 2003, twenty Pakistani Officers were charged with having maintained relations wit h terrorist groups in Afghanistan (and seven of them, including a Colonel, for connections with al-Qaeda) and in such a delicate moment concern about internal stabi lity and, at the same time, need to keep the American financing for relieving the deep economic crisis of the Country - an audio message by Ayman al-Zawahi ri broadcast by Al- Jazeera (September 2003) urged the population of the "Land of the Pure" to remove their Pres ident, believed guilty of having betrayed Islam. In the month of December of the same year there were two attacks aimed at General Musharraf - some other sources maintain that there were eight attacks - in Karachi and in the protected citadel of Rawalpindi. The intelligence Agencies have advanced various theses (apparently the attackers did not really intend t o kill Musharraf) but we cannot exclude the possibil ity that the Leader of a Muslim nation, in possession of the atomic bomb, may have been put under heavy pressure to let the most fanatical extremist groups have the coveted nuclear t echnology capable of making the so- called "dirty bomb", although the Pakistan nuclear bomb cannot really be considered an "Islamic bomb", but

OIKOS - 26

rather a strong deterrent against the feared India. Nevertheless, exactly in that period the new "Ghauri" missile was presented in an official ceremony held near Islamabad, before General Musharraf. The missile, already tested in 1998, can carry a nuclear head up to a distance of l 500km (med ium range, but able t o penetrate into Indian territory) and bears the provocative name of a Muslim warrior who, in the XII Century, defeated Indian leader Prithyi Chauhan. Bes ides its "nickname", its official denomination is Hatf- V, with a payload of 700kg. Recently, on August 11 , 2005, Pakistan perfected also the new ground-air cruise missile Haft- VII, which, despite its more limited range of 500km, with its ability to transport both conventional and nuclear warheads is equipped with a technology that can avoid radar tracking. This new technology has been studied not so much to surpass the "Brahmos" Indian cruise missile (290km range) as to offset the Indian acq uisition of the American "Patriot" missiles, which have an advanced t echnology. Once the long sequence of problems connect ed with international contingencies was somehow overcome, Pervez Musharraf - probably on pressures from Washington - had to t urn his attention to the thorny problem constituted by nearby India. The real hopes of peace opened during the talks between the respective Def ence Ministers Uune 1 9, 2004), who, by mutual consent, decided t o institute a "direct line" of communication, to prevent doubts and misunderstandinqs in case of hypotheses of mi litary att;ick , besides the possibi lity of averting the risks of nuclear involvement. But t hat was not the end of the problems for the General. In t he night of December 21, 2005 a war broke out in Baluchistan, the tormented western region of Pakistan, rich in natural resources (natural gas and precious minerals) but inhabited by a Baluchi population, who has always been intolerant of the dominion of the Punjabi. In response to the launching of eig ht missiles against the Kohlu barracks during the President' s visit to the city, the Pakistani Armed Forces launched a massive military retaliation (thousands of sold iers, heavy artillery, fighterbombers and com bat helicopters against the villages of the area, caus ing, according to the Pakistani authorities, the death of tens of thousands of people, mostly civilians. The Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) believes that Islamabad's plan (the dam of Kalabagh on the Ind us river) is to the advantage of the Pu njab region, historically the "reservoir" of the elite of the Pakistani military regime, and claims the right to use the wealth of the region for the development of the local population, whil e no Pakistan i Government - civilian or mil itary - ever considered seriously the possibility of entering into negotiations on these subjects, preferri ng in any case a harsh military repression. While the relations with Ind ia were again deteriorati ng (the diplomatic relations between the two Countries had been contrasting since the U.S.

Rivista Militare f;ngiish Edition n. 3/LOUti

announcement, in March 2005, that it intended to sell as many as twenty- four F- l 6s to Pakistan. A fact that irritated India and China remarkably. The violent earthquake that hit the areas on the border with Afghanistan and India in the month of October forced General Musharraf to call upon international solidarity in order to try to relieve the dramatic situation, with an official count of 38,000 dead, 62,000 wounded and 1 million homeless. The Italian military contingent in Kabul (General Claud io Graziano, Commander of the Kabul Multinational Brigade) prepared immediately 3000 combat rations of food, 14,000 litres of bottled water and l 00 blankets for a first aid, t ransported by C- 130 aircraft supplied by the German Armed Forces, besides a more substantial aid provided by 2 50 soldiers of our Army with operation "Ind us" (within the Atlantic Alliance) and, more in detai l, with the assistance and reconstruction in the area of the city of Bag h (l 00,000 inhabitants, Northeast of Islamabad, completely razed to the ground), with the "Elefante" Tas k Force, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Giulio Biot of the Eng ineer Co rps .

THE PAKISTAN ARMY: LOYALTY, RESPECT AN D HOLY WAR IN THE NAME OF ALLAH According to the western military analysts it is a strong Army, d isciplined and well organized, consisting of one million men, in high favour with the civilian society. Shaped on the examp le of the Briti sh Army, the active force is formed by t he: Army (620,000 men), Air Force (65,000}, Navy (27,000) and "Parami litary Forces" (288 ,000), besides a Reserve - in service up to 45 years of age - formed by 52 8,000 men, 513,000 of whom belong to the Army, l 0,000 to the Air Force and 5000 to the Navy.

A Pakistani soldier directing traffic at a military airfield.

Therefore a "platform" of over 1,500,000 men that can be expanded, if necessary, to well over 2 million men, as there have bee n 1,969,0 55 mal es fit for military service (aged 16) recorded in 2005, without reckoning the availability offered by the group of those aged 16- 49, still recorded in 2005, that counts 39,028,0l 4 men. The ''specialization" of the Army - cal led to defend the frontiers and t he inte rests of the Country also within the framework of the recent international obligations - consists of the "offensive- defensive" military doctrine, i.e. in the preventive lau nch of an attack in enemy territory, in order to upset its strategic positions, and a simultaneous advance of the troops over the border, with the aim of moving t he battlefield always on enemy territory (the first large-scale exercise was "Zab-eMomi m" in 1989, fol lowed by su bsequent improvements) and the development of reconnaissancecombat capabilities in desert and semi-desert areas, as far as earn ing the dispatch of specialists (Advisors) to the Armed Forces of African, Arab and South- East Asian Countries. The recruitment of the soldiers - at l 6 years of age, even if they cannot be employed in combat unti l they are 1 8, and for a period of fifteen years - must take into account the rural extraction and the low level of literacy of the young recruits (com pulsory instruction for the five to nine- years- old as been introduced on ly recently). Therefore the young recru it s must start with a preparatory course of elementary ed ucation and teaching of the Urdu language, before starting a real mil itary training. Th is pe riod of 36 weeks has been defined as "paternal istic" by the duly accredited American military observers. Actually it has the task

27 - OIKOS

of developing the "sense of belonging" to the State An Islamic fundam entalist demonstration in Pakistan. that should replace the strong ties to the tribe or the vi llage of orig in. It is interesting, on the contrary, to note the level of qualification of the Office rs Corps. the eighties, about 200 young Officers were sent To a procedure of highly competitive selection one every year to foreign schools (over two t hirds to the m ust add a complete "education course" that lasts United States), but the end of t he American subsidies almost ten years, w here the time at the Officer's disof 1990 coindrled w ith the conclusion of the IMET posal is eq ually divided between military training programme in the Unit ed States - the Officers were and academic studi es, until obtaining a university detoured to Sc hoo ls of the Commo nweal th degree or a doctorate, including fluent English, both Countries. IMET was resumed only after the attacks spoken and written. The Pak istan Military Academies of September 11, 2001, together with the restored are cons idered among the best of the Asian world. "al liance" between America and the "Land of the They include - besides the traditional t raining Pu re". T he Officers, according t o their rank, reach schools - the University of Naval t he retiring age when they are Engineering, University of Flight between 52 and 69 years old , Training, Military University of ' .. a strong Army, d1sc1 - usually not before having Engineeri ng, Army Medical I ned and wel I organ zed boug ht a small plot t o build their University, besides the Un iversity on i t' g o one mill'or own home (the military own the of Military Personnel, where a best land, both for exposure and in hig avo r with h farmi course of ten months t eaches the ng), employing the loans "governan ce of personnel", i.e. ...ivilian society . ,, granted by the Army, with the management, the attributions extremely co mpetitive instaland the assessment of the operaments and interests compared tional unit s. But the spearhead is constituted by the to the market's . Moreover, almost all the retired University of National Defence, estab li shed in Officers are placed in key posit ions of the civil ian Rawalpindi in 1978 for teaching high military strat i nstitutio ns (Pos tal Service, Railways, Sport egy, obviously destined to senior Officers, but also Federations), not to mention univers ity teaching and , ope n to civilians for specialization cou rses on the in cases of higher profess ional importance, they are most im portant functions of national security. also appointed Ambassadors. The female presence Already since the early fifties , the best students of in t he Armed Forces is q uite import ant. Init ially the Military Academy were sent to Great Britain or to placed in the sectors of Teaching, Health and the United States for their specialization cou rses Re ligious Assistance (in this case ¡~ob Welfare", a and, in 196 1, this specific kind of training has been kind of psychological support), today women are included into the wider international military proenlisted also in the Antiterrorist Forces , and it is gramme of "Education and Training" (IMCT). Around interesting to note that Pakistan is the only Islamic

e ,

O IKOS - 28

Rivista Militare English Edition o. 3/2006

The Pakistan Flag.

Country in the world that counts also a woman, Shahida Mal ik, among its Generals. But surely the most interesting aspect is the role that the Army plays within the civil society. Some mi litary enterprises, although born to provide food autonomously - like the dairy factories - have become real commercial undertakings that supply products that go from sugar to fertilizers. Furthermore, the "National Logistic Cell" ensures the transport of goods (food and non - food) within the whole Country, and the "Frontier Works Organization" has built the Karakoram motorway (as far as the Chinese borde r) ; the "Special Communication Organization" can ensure communications (Networks) to the most remote and impervious areas of Pakistan. Albeit helped by a favourable government policy, the development of the military and civilian production allowed the Army, born as the internal cement of a frail national identity, to play a determinant role in the progress of the Country, with a strong and acknowledged presence within the institutions and in society as a whole . Before examin ing in detail the structure of t he Armed Forces, we should make a short summary of the composition of the various units, according to the "Pakistan Military Glossary": Corps, generally consist of two or more Divisions; Divisions include three Brigades, with different com positions (infantry, artillery, enginee rs, signal and logistics); Regiments , in general, consist of 600 sol diers divided into several Companies. In 2005 Pakistan could deploy 9 Corps, 19 Infantry Divisions, 1 Artillery Division , 17 Air Force Wings, 2 Special Forces Brigades (with 5 Battal ions), 3 armoured Reg iments, 6 Mechanized - Infantry Brigades, 7 independent armoured Brigades , 9 Artillery Brigades, l Air Defence Command with 3 Groups and 8 Brigades, 7 Engin eer Brigades and 2 Armoured Divis ions. Of the 9 Corps, we find it suitable to analyse more in detai l (Com mander and location) five units that represent the Country's strat eg ic defence. Although the sources available do not always ag ree on the number of units, we can confirm

a "basic formation", generally shared by the Western intelligence Agencies. The II Corps (1 st Armoured Division, 2nd Artillery Division and the 7 4th Infantry Division) is statio ned at Mu ltan, Punjab, under the command of General Mohammed Yusaf. The IV Corps (l oth, l l th and 40th Infant ry Divisions) is located in Lahore, also in Punjab, and commanded by General Mohammed Aziz Khan, the "Is lamic soldier". The V Corps (16 th and 1 3th Infantry Divisions) is quartered in Karachi, Sindh, and commanded by General Muzaffar Hussein Husman. The X Corps (12th , l 9th and 23rd Infantry Division) is stationed in Rawalpindi , Punjab, under the command of General Jamashaid Guizar, and the XI Corps (9 th Infantry Division) is deployed in Pes hawar, in the North West Front ier Province, under the command of General Ehsanul Hag. To the other units (I Corps at Mang la, XII at Quetta, XXX at Sialkot and XXXI at Bhawalpur) we must add the "Order of the Northern Zone" (FCNA), stationed at Gilgit and comparabl e to a Corps al ready since 1999, although t he information on its present configuration is still discordant (there are recent report s on transfers from and to Peshawar). Actual ly it could be more akin to an infantry Division pl us four independent Brigades. Against a considerable number of Main Batt le Tanks (assessed at 2315 in 2005), a particu lar mention deserves t he new "Al Khalid" - formally MBT 2000 pride and boast of the Pakistani land forces. Produced by the "Heavy Industries Taxila" (COLPO) with a pilot project started in November 2000, t his modern tank is actually the Pakistan i versio n of the more experimented NORINCO MBT l 00 tanks produced in China. In addition t o the present availability of over 100 tanks, 300 more have been ordered by the Armed Forces, with delivery foreseen for 2006-2007. According to the Army Chief of Staff, this new system represents the "ideal integration of firepower, mob il ity and protection", even greater than the Russian "T- 90s" and the German "Leopard", whi le the data available mention only the automat ic system for target purs uit, thermal nig ht vision with double magnification of the image and a ballistic calcu lation time of less than one second. What seems to be more interest ing is the work done for reducing fuel consumption (the auxili ary functions can be carried out without exploiting the main feeding system of the eng ine) and for a better manoeu verability of the vehicle (wit h a maximum we ight of only 46 tons , it has an acceleration from O to 30km /h in less than l O seconds, reachi ng a maximum speed of 70km / h. In any case - sti ll accord ing to the General Staff - the "Al - Khalid" is much better than India' s "Arj un" and therefore it makes Pakistan "invincible in a land war" . Another important project is now underway. It is the new "AI-Zarar" (about l 00 of these tanks are available now - delivered on February 26, 2004 - and another 350 will be arriv-

29 - OIKOS

Armed Forces asked the "Heavy Industries Taxila" to design and manufacture (on ly experimentally, at the moment) the new "AI-Talha", the updated version of the well-known M- 113 (850 veh icles), which is more used in comparison with the BTR 70 (169 carriers), the UR 416M (45 vehicles) and with t he smaller "Scorpion" (35 carriers only). We mentioned the Hatf V (Ghauri) and Hatf VII bal listic m issi les and their recent tests (2003 and 2005). We should add that the whole production of t he missi le arsenal is "officially" of a local nature (with the exception of the Ml 1, which uses liquid propellant and has a range of 300km and payload of 800/1 200kg - imported directly from China) as regards the entire Hatf class (I , II "Abdali" and Ill "Ghaznavi") and the more interesting Shaheen class , all solid- prope llant missiles, with the basic model S/ 1 (range 700km and payload 750 kg) and the new version S/11(range2500km and payload l 000kg), not counting the project - still secret, but very interesting - of t he S/ 111 evolution, Pakistani peasants. which should have a range of more than 3600km and a payload of over one ton. But as regards the real "paternity" of the necessary technology and the ing in 2006- 2007). The producer is again "Heavy relevant production , many analysts believe that the Industries Taxi/a" but this time with the cooperation contribution of China and North Korea has been f un- actually, a real official joint venture - with China's damental. In particular, Selig S. Harrison - Director of NOR/NCO and Ukraine's KMDB. "Al Zarar" will grad t he ''Asian Centre of International Politics" - has ually replace the Soviet T-59s (there are no less than given an interview to the "News Max" magazine Uune 1200 of them) and the American M47 /48s (present2003) maintaining that General Musharraf bartered ly 450 tanks in the AS version). To the 320 betterthe HATF iNODONG missiles with North Korea known T - 80UDs acquired in 2000 - Ukrainian veragainst the specific technology for enriching uranision of the Russian T- 80, particularly su itable for um, and that for transporting the miss iles he used operations in desert areas and also the American C- l 30, given equipped with sophisticated to Pak istan as military aid . armament systems - we must . ..the development o Harrison added that the CIA add 225 T-851 lAPs (made in m"litary produ ion al owf' holds indisputable evidence on Pakistan under Russian licence), he Army t p etermi- the connections between the 2 50 T-69/IAPs (Ch ina' s updated Khan Research Laborat ories and dnt ro version of the T- 59), 50 T-55s the North Korean Changwong .he Cou try (with the updated version of the Corporation. As regards the Air 3.nd acknow 100mm gun) and 100 amphibiForce, the presence of French ous T- 63s of the "60" series. As ithin t e technology is very important, regards guided antitank weapon oc1ety ,, with the powerf ul "M irages" systems, the "Khan Research (Model Ill and Model V, both Laboratories" (KRL) start ed the Mach 2.2, besides the Model production of the new "Bakter-Sh ikan - Green 11/OD for traini ng and Ill RP for air reconnaissance, Arrow", with a weight of 24.5 kg and a range of 3000 with the "At/antiq ue" for naval surveys, the SA- 319 metres, under Chinese licence of the HJ- 8 "Red for search and rescue missions, and the AM- 39 Arrow" missile. The artillery has also t he T- 54 (400 Exocet missile. Even if t he real strategic role pieces, 122 mm), T-60 (200 pieces, same calibre), nuclear capability - is exclusively entrusted to the M- 101 (300 pieces, 105 mm), T-56 (200 pieces, 85 three squadrons of American F- l 6s (together with mm), M- 198 (100 pieces, 155 mm) and M- 115 (26 the C- l 30s and Boeing 707 /737s for transport, t he pieces, 203 mm) for a total of more than 2000 guns. T- 37s for training and the P- 3 Orions for naval On the other hand, the classificat ion of mortars is recognition), a decisive contribution comes from rather simple: 81 mm (500 pieces), AM 50 / 60 (225 China. For "combat" the Pakistani employ the Q-5 pieces, 120mm) and the recent Chinese made 63-1 (Fantan) and the A-5 (derived from the MIG 19) fo r (60mm), whose import number is "Restricted". Also "defence", together with the effective J- 6 and J- 7, as regards t he "Armoured Personnel Carriers", the derived from the more let hal MIG 2 1 MF. Also in this

the

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/.//VIS/a M1/1tare l::ng/1$/l /::(/lt/0/l 11. .JI LUUO

case, Pakistan has an important project underway: the JF- 17 "Tuono". It is a single- seater, "day-night" polyvalent fig hter, a produ ct of the cooperation with "China Aero Technology Import and Ex port Corporation (CATIC)" within the larger "Super 7" programme, wh ich, besides exclusive co- production rights, envisages also t he possib ility of making substantial deliveries to the foreig n market. The project, approved by the Government in October 1994, envisaged a cost of research and development of about 500 million U.S. dollars, financed by Pakistan to a maximum of 59%, besides 20 million dollars and another 20 millions at the beginning of the production. The prototype was completed on May 31 , 2003 with the cooperation of China's "Chengdu Aircraft Industry Cor poration (CAC)" and the Russian "Tu rbofan" RD-93 engine (already used for the MIG 29 and the Chinese FCl ). Its fi rst test flig ht (8 mi nutes) was made in September 3 2003 from the Chinese airfield of Wenjiang. Two Pakistani pilots conducted their first test flight (30 minutes) on April 9, 2004. Pakistan and Ch ina envisage to have at their disposal no less than sixteen JF-1 7 fighters, with mass prod uction begin ning in January 200 7. Their foremost objective is the immediate construction of 1 50 aircraft for Pakistan and 200 for China. T he sit uation is rather unhappy as regards the Navy, considered the weak link of Pakistan's "defe nce chai n". In October 2005 , it listed 6 "Tariq Class" Frigates (i.e. Amazon Type 21, U.S. and U.K.), plus 10 diese lelectri c propul sion "K hal ed" (1 ), "Has mat" (2) , "Hangar" (4) and SS- 1 (3, still being delivered and of undeclared nationality) almost all purchased from

"Long live Pakistan!". A propaganda poster.

France. The only ones worth mentioning are the "Khaled" and the two "Hasmat", both derived from t he better known '"Agosta 90- B", des igned by France's "DCN" with a licence recently granted to Pakistan. The se three su bmari nes - de livered respectively in 1994, 2002 and 2003 - are eq uipped with an "int egrated co mbat system" (SUBTICS) which includes the "Exocet SM 39" missile t hat can reach the target at Mach 0.9 with an effective range of 50km. The Navy Aviation is at a similar level: only the Lockheed Martin "P-3c Orion (a t otal of 10 , but 8 delivered o nly in October 200 5), the Fokker "F-27" (5, Model 200/ 400) and the Alouette (6, Model SA316b) are worth mentioning. But the fi rst t o parade in Islamabad on September 6 - Pakistan Armed Forces Day - are the men of t he Special Forces ("Special Service Groups"- SSG) with their dark- red berets, camouflage j ackets and lightcolou red trousers. It is a special elite force (an independent "Com mando" directly subord inate t o the Army Chief of Staff, comparable t o the famous American "Green Berets"; their total number is classified, an assessment made in 2004 mentions 2100 men divided into 3 battalions, althoug h the most recent information refe rs to a formation of 4 Brigades, consisting of 3 battalions each. Born in 1957 as an "irreg ular" milit ary unit, t oday th is special force has its main bases in the towns of Cherat and Attack, besides a unit (perhaps l 000 men) stationed in Karachi and included in the Naval Forces (acronym:

31 - O IKOS

A "Chauri" missile.

SSGN) with functions of "non-conventional war" on board submarines. Its members wear a dark-blue beret with a qualification badge (a submarine) on the left breast- pocket, while on the right one they wear the symbol of a parachute. All members of these special forces must be qualified HALO/HAHO, besides the various traditional specializations (almost all achieved through special courses attended in the United States). Moreover, they are all experts in "Desert and Mountain Warfare". Thus the SSG seems to be destined to carry out those tasks deemed unsuitable for the regular Army, special missions incl uded, (officially, the rescue of hostages) and undercover missions managed by ISI. At any rate, on the basis of our information, the first two Brigades are assigned exclusively military tasks (including the security of nuclear plants), the third Brigade is an anti-terrorism force, and the fourth seems to be permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia, for protection of the Royal Family. The Special Forces have been employed for the first time in 1964 Uammu and Kashmir) in reconnaissance and sabotage operations against the Indian positions, but in the war of 1965 a Commando of 1 80 men - parachuted to sabotage three Indian bases - was intercepted and exterminated : only 20 soldiers were able to return home.

INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEM The secrets of Pakistan 's national and international policy are kept behind a high boundary wall, in the centre of Islamabad, along t he Khayban-eSuharwady Boulevard: it is the home of ISI. Although it was founded in 1948 by a British Officer - General Cawthorne - in order to organize the Pakistani presence in Kashmir and in the eastern region, it seems that in practice the Agency has grown following the models of SAVAK (the Iranian Intelligence, trained by

OIKOS - 32

CIA) and SDECE, the French Secret Service for "Foreign Affairs". According to the (scarce) information given by other Western intell igence organizations, ISI can count on a pe rmanent strength of 10,000 men (between Officers, non-commissioned personnel and civilians), organized in seven Sections: "JIX" (the most important office - intelligence evaluations and countermeasures - which employs about 60% ofthe personnel available), followed by "FIOCCO" (political appraisal, with a special subsection about India), 'J(IB" (surveillance of Pakistani diplomats abroad, with subsections for the Middle East, Southern Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Muslim Republics of the former Soviet Union), ''.JIN" Uammu and Kashmir), ''.JIM" ("traditional" espionage in foreign Countries), ''.JSIB" (India) and ''.JUT' (the Technical Section, with particular reference to explosives and chemical warfare). They are all subordinate to the Prime Minister, but in practice they are controlled by the Chief of Staff (COAS). In any case, what happened to the "Nuclear Strategic Order"? Pakistan's nuclear strategic system has always been strictly controlled by the military. Some analysts even believe, and they are probably right , that the system has freed itself of ISI control. The American as ked some questions about the security of the plants, and President Musharraf declared to have established a special "Nuclear Strategic Order". His spokesman, General Rashi Qureshi, added that the nuclear weapons "are not kept in a deployed form", meaning that the sites that house the bombs are separate from the arming-systems depots. Besides, these weapons are controlled by "selected and welldisciplined soldiers, whose origins can be traced back to the times of British colonial rule". Nevertheless, although in Pakistan all agree with the security system adopted ("we have never had a loss and there was never a theft"), Michael Krepon - a nuclear expert and President of Washington's "Henry L. Stimson Center" - continues to be doubtful about the efficiency of the surve illance, adding that "the general security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons cannot be separated from the (critical) situation of the Country". Shireen Magari, Director General of the Government Institute of "St rategic Studies" in Islamabad, is quick to answer: "Pakistan is the first nation in the world to have the atomic bomb, despite the United States' attempts to prevent it". With in Pakistan this is a reason for real national pride. Glorified on the schoolbooks and exalted by the local press, it is even immortalized in the most important cities of the Country with monuments representing the "Chagai Mountain", the historical place where the explosion of the first atom bomb took place. The date of the event - May 28, 1998 - is still a national holiday, and Admud Khan, the Pakistani expert who produced the first centrifuge for the enrichment of uranium, is a "national hero". Besides, it should not

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 312006

Pakistani and American soldiers during a cooperation activity.

be forgotten that nuclear power allowed the Country to achieve a strategic balance with India. In order to better understand the "d isparity" always felt by Pakistan vis- a- vis its powerful enemy, suffice it to remember that India's Armed Forces are among the most numerous in the world (one million and two hundred thousand men, immed iately after China and the United States, not to mention an unlim ited reserve of conscripts) and is the best equipped Nation among the so- called "deve loping" Countries , even superior, as regards conventional armaments, to China itself. Pakistan can also deploy ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2 500 km, very advanced fighter aircraft, two aircraft carriers and more than 5000 last- generation tanks, without mentioning l 00/250 nuclear weapons. They are all warheads and, therefore, can be launched by airplanes. Pakistan's nuclear programme started in the mid fifties - actually helped by t he U.S. ' and Europe - and the first reactor was installed by Canada in the city of Karachi . From the seventies onwards China's help has been decisive. From three to six bombs are produced every year in the Kahuta laboratories, and apparently the technology acquired of late permits to miniaturize the bombs, so as to fit in the "Ghauri" and "Shaheen" missiles, which we have already examined in detail. Furthermore , Pakistan has a plutonium reactor in the town of Khusab. The plant has been ready since 1998 and therefore , presumably, today can produce plutonium weapons. Therefore the concern recently expressed by Tony Blair is quite understandable: " These Countries are neophytes of the nuclear instrument, that lack therefore the principle of deterrence of the Cold War. Pakistan could have recourse to atomic weapons if it were to be defeated by India during a conventional attack" . Without going too deep into the operations conducted by ISI in the var-

ious wars against India and Bangladesh, we bel ieve it would be more important t o underline Pakistan's complex relations maintai ned with t he American intelligence. As a matter of fact, these relations con tributed to feed the criticism and t he contrasting interpretations of the joint wo rk of the two Agencies. Today Pakistan's f uture depends mostly on the development of the situation in Afghanistan, j ust as the strategic decision made by General Musharraf to formally support t he U.S. must still be accepted by t he people of 'The Land of the Pu re", an explosive mixture of poverty and social alienation, of ethnic instability and nuclear arsenals. T he Pres ident has recently g iven an interview t o "Time" (lnt. Ed. October 3, 2005) stating that his Country has started a diplomatic approach to Is rael - Pakistan' s Foreig n Minister Muhammad Kursheed Kasuri and his Israeli counterpart Silvan Shalom met for the first time at official level on September l, 2005, in Istanbul, in the presence of Turkish Prime Minister Erdo?an - sparking off foreseeable polem ics from many political circles about the advisability of the approach. Beyond the strong religious component, the event represents a hand held out t o a Country t hat up to now has been a strong ally of India, Pakistan's hist orical rival. But Musharraf cannot but take into account the new balances ("Arms and Business") developing in the Indian subcontine nt: "Lockheed Martin" sold F-16 and P-3C aircraft to Pakistan and at the same time obtained an order from India for the fliqht software of the new "Light Combat Aircraft", j ust as "Motorola" delivered some components for the P- 3C for detecting submarines and, at the same time, signed several important contracts on telecommunications with India. The thaw between Pakistan and India could favour the construction of a network of gas and oil pipelines between t he two Countries, with an envisaged expenditure of 5 bill ion dollars and a length of 2600km with important branches in Pakistan territory. This , besides the energetic advantages, would bring 70 million dollars c1 year into the coffers of the State for transit dues. If General Musharraf succeeds in keeping the political control and moral cohesion of his Army - a crucial factor for the stabil ity of the whole region - the forecasts made by Benazir Bhutto in 1995 could indeed come true: "Pakistan is a moderate, democratic and Islamic Country, strat egically located at the junction of Southern Asia, Central As ia, the Persian Gu lf and the Arabian Sea a reg ion of political instability, but also of great econom ic possibilities. Daniele Cellamare Lectu re r of History of In ternational Relat ions at the Urbino University

33 - OIKOS

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SECURITY AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT A connection networ k that can rapidly manage continental communications and energy supplies is the flywheel for the development of 25 - member Europe and represents a project that is actually the most advanced attempt at governing the globalization of the economy, so that SOO million European citizens can l ive together.

The creation of a politica l and economic area which is common to the countries that have been enemies for centu ries represents a really innovat ive institutional project. After the Second World War, the European States started to establish with difficulty some institutions in order that t hey could favour the convergence of different po litical and economic systems and stimulate the process of integrat ion. Creating an economic and monetary union has turned out to be ext remely important . However, a lot remains to be done so that this union can be used for the common good rather than for individual profit. In this regard, in 2000 Lisbo n hosted a meeting in wh ich Heads of State and Government part iec ipated in order to lay the fo undations for an ambitious European policy aimed at making the continental economy t he strongest and t he most competitive and advanced in the world from a social point of view. In add i-

OIKOS - 36

Title pages. Europe's energy networks. Above. Detail of a Swiss gas pipeline.

tion, it is interesting to note that there is also close cooperation in terms of security, which has resulted in vis ible improvements up to now, taking account of the variety of laws concerning judicial affairs and internal security. Finally, t he Rapid Reactio n Force has become ope rative and has played a lead ing role in different inte rnatio nal contexts. Ultim ately, Europe is mak ing great strides towards its goals. Th at being stated, it is advisable to draw our attention to a key iss ue re lating to the f uture of t he Eu ropean Unio n: development and modernization in a sig nifica nt social dimens ion.

Rivista Mifitare English Edition n. 3/2006

THE STAKES In thi s context, any difficu lt ies arising from negotiations on agriculture, transit ional periods and emigration must not overshadow the enormous pote ntial of the E.uropean Union . In fact , this is the g reatest chall enge to face because the last enlargement cannot be considered in the same way of t he previous ones . We do not have to discuss the question in terms of popu lat ion and l ivi ng standa rds. We have to consider it in terms of civilizat ion and values. Actually, the project to make 500 mil lion people l ive together is an attempt t o handle t he process of g lobalizat io n which the whole wo rld hopes for. If this proj ect is successfu l, historians will say that Europe has managed to create a perf ect synt hesis of market ing strategies (compet ition and free compet ition) and rules for the preservation of identity and talent. We need to try new approaches to the problem. In fact, Europe cannot pursue only the objectives that have been defined by the Maastricht Treaty. It also has to estab li sh attainable and realistic goals concerning the European Union as a who le: there is no difference between economic and social success because both of t hem are part of the same project. Hence the need for European ideals, a complementary role of the East and the West and the recognition of the cultural plmali sm. Some peop le see th is Un ion as a ÂŤconti nentÂť with its own personality and diversity. T he new member states' contribution depends on the ir history. Many of them were victims of totalitarian ism and were subject to the great powers for more than one century. Moreover we should take into account the pecu liar mentality of people living in t he small est nations of Europe . In th is regard, Jean Monnet said : this abundance, this coexistence of big and small countries has great human value and even spiritual significance. Their contribution is much more qual itative than quantitat ive and t his factor must be con sidered when d iscussing the European future . Admittedly it wil l not be easy. As we ll as economic and legal d ifficu lt ies, these countries have to overcome other obstacles . After t he Second World War they had to struggle to pre serve their nat iona l identity because t hey could not benefit from effective administrat io n within pluralist democracy and a free market economy. Anot her problem l ies in t he absence of the m id dle classes and the secu larization whose effects were clearly visible in the new Lander of East

Jean Monnet, one of t he founding fathers of the Euro pean Economic Community.

Germany. Their past has not been erased. It can be recaptured and assume a different shape w ith nostalgia, remorse and difficulty. In other words, it is necessary to red iscover one's own tradi tions and personal ity. When Greece , Spa i n and Portuga l became members of the EU, they brought a further quarter of territory to the Union, whereas the last ten new members have brought just one third . The three Mediterranean countries produced an increase of 22% of the EU's popu lation, the t en new members caused an increase of 30%. As far as the gross domest ic product is concerned , the former brought about an increase of 1 0%, the latter only 5%. In addit ion , in Greece, Spain and Portuga l the st andard of living is two thirds of the average of the EU co untries. It is on ly one third in the other countries (38%). The d ifference is significant. Lots of progress has been made, but considerable d ifficu lt ies l ie in the emigration of labour and the modernization of

37 - O IKOS

This is a re levant question. Unfortunately, each cou nt ry tends to estab lish direct economic and financial relat ions w ith the Unio n. It is a real horn et's nest. For instance, the Mediterranea n count r ies that were not a party to the treatie s need a leader. This makes the dream of a great Europe extremely difficult to real ize. However, we should consider t he objective of i ntern al security carefully since crimina l ity and ter roris m touch al l the countries. Of course, it is impossib le to regulate everything ; it is not only up to the Armed Forc es to def end t he frontiers, but it is necessary to handle the relat ionships with the States ne ig hbour ing on t he Europea n Union. The second goal is to promote fair and sustainable development. The European market is Buiiding an o ffshore installation. becoming huge with its 500 million people and the aim is to get each member country to adhere to a single set of rules. The Single Act of 19 85, various sectors of agriculture, energy, trans port which had a key role in creating a common marand enviro nment. With regard to these four secket , was composed of three points which were tors the adoption of regu lations would require accepted by t he «Fifteen» r eluctantly: competi huge inves tments (about 6% of GDP). tion spurs people into action, cooperation strengthens r elat ions between cou ntr ies, soli darity establishes close ties between states. If PRIMARY OBJECTIVES national egoism or financial reasons led European count r ies to disregard these golden The European Union pursues three major rules, the EU would be nothing less than an area objectives. It aims to become a reference po int of free trade, and so it would not stand the for pe ace and security, to promote fair and suswearing effect of time. Competition is based on taina'.Jle development and to al low the cultural the big market; cooperation and structural polidivers ity of the population fu l l and free exprescies are based on the partnership between sion . In fact, the essential featu res that d ist i ncountries wh ich have drawn up programmes, guish one culture from another must be worked together and received European funds. retain ed. Only in t h is way can we «reach t he In t he past, the project succeeded pretty well. universal» without los i ng our unique id entity. Now, it must be carried out in othe r secto rs. To The first objective involves guaranteeing the give an example, there i s no effective cooperainteg rity of the frontiers. This t ion in th e scientific research is an histo r ic revolution. To because none of t he cou ntr ies 'The European Union pur- are up to promoting it. The give ,rn example, there are still a lot of problems con- sues essentially three major same is t rue for heal t h an d cernin g Hungarian minorities objectives: to become a policy rel at i ng pharmaceuti cal and , he Sudetes. This re quires space of peace and security products. Cooperation is a re markable effort to solve essential for all countries and to promote a fair and sus th e situations in the Balkans . must to be d evelo ped. There is no doubt that tainable development and T he last objective concerns Bu lga r ia and Roman ia are .1llow an enriched expres solidarity. T he Sing le Market b e hi nd the other countries sion of diversities .. . ,, would never have been creath orn the point of view of eco ed if t he European Community nomic development, but it is had not inc reased its budget also t rue that it is not easy to transform ex from 5 billion Euros (1984) t o 40 (today). \' ugoslavia, which originated from a treaty, into Howeve r , it was not simp ly a matter of money: J. system of independe nt nations. Nevertheless, Europe did exist. People running re gional and we should wonder whethe r urgi ng those cou nloca l affai rs realized that and did not confine tries to mutual cooperation , which requires their attention to funds . Th ey came up w it h considerable effort like t hat made for the ECSC , innovations and exchanged experiences w ith is really much more difficu lt now than before . each other.

OIKOS - 38

Only in this way will they be able to build a common «laboratory» to handle the process of globalization. This will prove that the EU is able to accept competition and free trade provided that all countries observe basic and fundamental rules.

THE HISTORICAL REFERENCE FRAMEWORK The downfall of the Soviet Union marked the end of an era which had last ed about fifty years, during which the gathering clouds of the Cold War had mastered the relationships between the powers. T his situation resu lted in a two- party system which defined all political and economic relat ionships clearly. The events that occurred during the period 1989- 1991 led to profound consequences: al l countries had to bring all up to discussion in order to assume a new role within the framework of geo-economical stability. In th is context, the Euro- As ian area with its beckoning riches was beginn ing to look like a «Big

The Spanish nuclear power station at Cofrentes.

Chessboard» (exactly as Brzez inski described it). Subsequently, th is has been defined as a «Big Game», because the great powers employed the ir strategy in the game. Th is policy has also con cerned the Balkan area because it enab les the regions of the Black Sea to be linked with Europe and, consequently, with the West. Italy is particularly interested in the free trade with the whole area of central eastern Europe: after Germany and Russia, it represents the third commercial partner. This complementarity is supported by the extension of the offshoring . Many Italian companies, especially i n the North- East, have shifted the ir business affairs to those latitudes. T he constant growth rate po ints to the tendency towards rapid continental integration, w ith regard to the penetrative capacity of Itali an entrepreneurs. Obvious ly , future depends on the dec isions that will be made in the European transport infrastructure and network.

39 - OIKOS

An oil refinery.

THE CORRIDORS CONNECTING EUROPE Transport po l icy rep res ents one of th e most complex issue. In order that all EU cou ntries can be nef it fro m th e enlargem ent it is esse ntia l to build up an extensive network conn ec ti ng Europe to other continents throug h the complet ion of the so -called «corrido rs». Th e sig nificant g rowth of transport market with th e ex pansion of t ransport infrastructure and the consolidation of the i nternal market makes it necessary. T he Treaty of Rome had provid ed for a common transport policy but fo r a long t ime the Comm uni ty did not carry it out. Only in l 985 when the Court of Jus tice offic ia ll y admitted to the i nadequacies of th e coun cil of ministers, did t he member states all ow the Court to t ake all ne cessary leg isl at ive meas u res to overcome them . In Maastricht, the sh ift from unanimi ty t o q ual ified maj ority an d the «p roposition al» role of the Parl iam ent made t he institu tional , political and econo mic foundation s of t ransport pol icy pretty strong. In addition, t he concept of «trans European» network allowed th e EU co untr ies to set a bas ic fram ework of trans port infrastructure at a European level. On the occas ion of the pan-European con ferences of the mi n isters for

OIKOS - 40

infrastr ucture and transport, the Committee, together with t he member states and confere nce part icipants, ex plored the topi cs relatin g t o this po licy and formu lated the concept of «corridor». The second conf er ence about transport, which was held in Crete in 1 994, focused on the t opic conce rnin g t he qua litative develop men t of com munications w ithin the Un io n. On t hat occas ion, t he conference members d elineated nine principal «corridors». At the third conference, whi ch took p lace in Helsin k i, in Jun e 1997, th ey drew u p a furth er detail ed sc he me involving a te nth «corridor» t o link the cou ntries of ex-Yugoslavia with the EU. In the final d eclaration, the partic ipants underlined that the «corridor s» represent the key factor to achieve th e objecti ves of a corn mo n trans port policy whic h see ms essential after the EU enlargement. T he esta blishm en t of a «tran s- Europ ean » netwo r k, w hich is fundamental to th is infrastructure, involves 70 000 k ilomet res of roads and rai lways, 20 000 kilometres of river systems and 300 airports wi t h an investm ent of over 400 billi on Euro s until 201 0. In this context, g r eat importance is g iven to the fourteen p rojects concerning the railway sect or to which the EU will al locate 1 00 billion Euros. They aim to build hi g h - spe ed train lin es (t he Paris-B r ussels Co l ogne- Amsterd am - London lin e and the Paris-Berlin li ne via Strasbourg), a tun nel and a

Rivista Militare Englisfi Edition n. 312006

bridge between Germany and Denmark , a link between Lyons-Turin and motorways in Greece. With regard to the ten pan- Europea n «corridors», three of them are of great interest to Italy. The fifth «corridor»,, which runs from east to west, l inks our northeas.t to the Ukraine and, in prospect, to Russia through Slovenia and Hungary. From Hungary three secondary lines branch off into Slovakia in the north and into the northern area of Croat ia and BosniaHerzegovina in the south. The main l ine of the fifth corr idor (Venice -T rieste - LjubljanaBudapest-Kiev) and line B (Rijeka-Fiume Zagreb-Budapest) would lead, in the south of the Alps, to centra l-eas tern Europe and the Community of Independent States. From a strategic point of view, the construction of the eighth corridor (Durazzo-Tirana- SkopjeSofia-Plovdiv- lstanbul-Burgas-Varna) will be very relevant because it will extend from west to east, from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, through Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria. Among all the scheduled routes, with in the EU, thi s is the most southern and poorest i n lines of communication. The tenth corridor (Salzburg - Ljubljana-ZagrebBe I g rad e -N i s-Sofia-1 stan b u I- Thes salon i ki) extends along a li ne which cuts central and south - eastern Europe diagonally, across Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and FYROM as far as Thessaloniki. T he improvement of the communi cation lines and the completion of the ten corri dors are today even more urgent than in the past, because in a Europe enlarged to twenty-five members t hey represent an essential strategic factor. As the «Van Miert report» , which gets its name from the Dutch minister who drew it up in June 2003, anticipated, lots of projects concerning this topic have been conceived. T hey aim to make the t ransport policy of the European Union prot agonist of the new «European initiative for development» geared to stimulate investment in some f undamental sectors in order to promote, through an integrated approach, the socio- economic development of the whole EU and the jo b creation. In detail, in the list of the European projects that have been approved, four of them concern Italy: the fifth corridor (Lisbon-Kiev) inclu ding the railway line Lyons-Turin-Trieste; the sea motorways of south - western Europe which cover Spain, Italy and Malta; the first corr idor (Berlin - Pale rmo) and the railway li ne Genoa- Antwerp (with the l ine Genoa- Milan - Swiss border). In any case , not considering the eighth corridor among our priorities, that is the Adriatic ridge, it seems to be essential for the coope ratio n with the whole Ba lkan area to shift the nerve centre of the European infrastructure networks in order to strengthen the integration between d if-

Detail of an off-shore installation.

ferent areas preserving the demographic and geo-political stability of the Union.

A NEW PROSPECT The eastern Itali an frontier has to cope with unrelenting pressure from organized crime w hich gives cover to ji hadist terrorism in some Balkan areas. Therefore, extending our sphere of economic and geo-political influence towards east must be given t he highest priority, considering t he central importance of this region, as the report of the International Committee on the Balkans, which was presented on 12 th April 2005, has pointed out. It stresses the necess ity for European integration which is seen as the only so lu t ion to guarantee stability and complete the process of continental unification. At the same time, the Report of feasibility has been approved in order to negotiate an agreement of associ at ion also· with Serb ia and Monteneg ro. Howeve r, the most relevant event has been the establ ishment of an ene rgy Community

41 - OIKOS

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SYRIA consisting of t he EU members and eleven states of t hi s area (among which there is T urkey), whose princip les were discussed on 14 December 2004 in Brussels. As far as the Mediterranean area is concerned , there are differe nt levels of cohesion in t he eastern and weste rn zone. T he eastern area is characteri zed by the inadequacy of sea trans port; t he western area is much more cohe sive and is livened up by national inte rests and by those of some coastal regio ns, whi ch have pro mot ed economic cooperation and territorial partners hi p agreeme nts betwe en them and No rth Africa. In thi s context , it is also impo rtant t o point o ut that new en ergy hubs are taking shape such as Ceyhan in Turkey (which gives importance to the nearnes s of Georg ia and Azerbaijan) and Nile delta (which has relevance to possible po litical cooperation concern ing not on ly Egypt but also Libyan reg ion of Benghazi in the west and Israel in t he east). These hubs will increase the ene rgy sea traffi c via the Mediterranean towards the A tlantic and th e United States and boost the co mmercial t rade wi th the hyd rocarbon - producing reg ions and wi th zones that are cons idered a t ransit point in the hydrocarbon trade. Our geographical positio n pus hes us t o areas o utside the EU, such as beyond the Atlantic and t he south ern part of the Mediterran ean coast, where Italy is an impo rtant li nk into Europe . T he Balkans are a region whose identity is deeply European and wh ose historical event s, in the nineties, ended up impairing the process of th eir becoming closer to the EU. We have committed to bridge the gap separating the Balkan s from Brussels.

OIKOS - 42

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Above. Layout of the Baku- T'bilisi- Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline.

Right. The French nuclear p ower station of Civaux.

THE ENERGY ASPECT Among t he t hree main sectorc; of the development of netwo rks (transport, te lecom mun icati o ns , ene rgy) ene rgy is the d r ivi ng force behind the d istrib ution of investmen t. The i ncreasi ng use of natu ral gas i n the the rmoelectri c sector pose s the proble m of provi sion from th e outside. The recen t «w ar of g as» between Russia and the Ukrai ne end ed wit h an ag reem ent . Th i s event has had important con sequen ces for Eu rope and , in particul ar, for It aly hig hl ig hting t he strateg ic releva nce of t he «web of energy»: gas and o il pipeline network s which supply ou r ho uses w ith me than e and pet rol stat io ns with o i l byprod ucts. Th e Siberi an gas and oi l pipe lin e network dat es back to the Fifties. Enrico Mattei, who fo und ed ENI , i s cred it ed w ith bui l d in g o i l p ipelines li nking the Soviet Un ion and western Euro pe , wh en the «Iron Curtain» ob st ructed comme rcia l trade. In t he middl e of th e Fifties, d es p ite the host ility felt by wes t ern o i l co m panies, he fl ew t o Moscow to reach an agree me nt : th e Soviet Un ion wou ld p rovid e hydrocarbon in exchange fo r oi l pipelines produced by ltalsider of Taranto . Today , Russ ia sup p lies oi l and nat ural gas t o 23 Euro pean states among w h ich Italy

Rivista Militarc £11glish Edition

is seco nd after Germany. As far as gas is con cerned, t he Ukraine is th ird. In 2004, Italy imported from Russia, through gas pipelines, 21 billion cubic metres each year, equal to 30% of its requirements. The Ukraine imported 18 billion. Thi s gas comes from the oilfields of Pechora, Benezovo , Urengoi, which are situ ated 6 000 kilometres away from the Italian border of Tarvisio. Other oil supp liers are Holl and (9 bil lion cub ic metres), Norway (7 billion) an d A lgeri a (23 bi llion). The link wit h Algeria is gu aranteed by th e p ipel ine «Transmed» con sisting of two big sections: the first, 740 kilometres long, runs fro m the Saharan fields of Hass i R'Mel to Cape Bon, wh ereas the second runs from Tun isia to Sicily (Mazara de l Vallo) through submarine pipelines (20- 26 inches in diameter) whi ch cro ss th e Mediterran ea n 600 m et res below the surface. The pipeline was constructed by Sai pem t hat has been in use since 1982. The fift h supplier is Libya. Since 2004 it has pumped gas from Mellitah to Sicily through a 32-inch

11.

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pipel ine, which is call ed «Greenstreem» (540 kilometres long), at a record depth of 1160 metres. In f uture, the len gth of the p ipelines, which are laid in different areas of the w orld, will multiply. Links from Kazakhstan, Uzbek istan an d T urk men istan to Europe and Ch ina, from Ru ss ia to Chin a, from Brazi l to Ch i le, from Nigeria to the Mediterranean, from Iran to Rus sia, from Pak is t an to India are expected to be built resulting in a web coverin g any border. Even the corridor Baku -Ceyan will be ab le to increase its consistency through the British-Russian company Tnk- Bp, th e third most important company in the world, allowin g other countries t o use the gas flowi ng in the opposite direction from the Russian- Azerbaijani pipeline, which is cal led Novoros sijsk- Ba ku . Moscow would jo in th em to play «the match of th e Caspian» accepting t he fait accompli and trying t o change the traditional anti-Russian spi r it. In this way, there is a tendency to give the energy outlet a European se nse rather t han an

43 - OIKOS

Italy's main external energy sources.

American o ne. The energy g iant ÂŤGazpromÂť wi ll increase the capacity of the pipelines of Byeloruss ia and so th e Russian ene rgy su ppl ie s to Europe wi l l depend less on Kiev. As well as t he increase of the capacity of the pi pe lin es, a pri ma ry goal is to build an emerg en cy system of o il reserves (about one b illion cub ic metres of gas) in Minsk. Curre ntly, 18% of oil exports to Eu rope passes through Byelorussia as agai nst 80% of pipe lines ru n nin g through the Ukraine.

THE SECURITY PROBLEM The Midd le East crisi s, the growi ng energy demand from the rapidly develo pi ng countries (India, China), the strategic position of Russia as a bri dge between Europe an d Asia, t he increasing ho st il ity the big Lati n American producers (Venezuela, Bolivia) show ag ai nst the United St ates paint an optimistic scenario for the energy policy

OIKOS - 44

of the Kremlin . Gazprom is one of the giants not on ly of the gas ind ustry (it controls almost all the Russian producti on) but also of the oi l prod uction. The private compani es Yukos and Sibn ef, in fact, merged under the control of Transneft : it is a public company whic h holds a monopoly on carrying gas and oil to t he Ru ssian Federation. It is an economic empire which is able to redre ss a new balan ce th at the unilateralist po licy of the United States cannot control. Ru ssia has established relationships wit h Iran, Byeloru ssia and China creating three trade li nks with t he Pers ian Gulf (t hrou gh which 40% of oil requ ireme nts passes), Europe (th rou gh the oil pipelines of the Baltic Sea which offer an alternative to those of the Ukrain e) and As ia. Europe appears to be vulnerable fro m the point of view of energy and it will have to adopt all necessary measures to ensu re a reg ular supply of energy. What has happened recently serves as a warning to all European cou ntries to devel op a coherent an d targeted policy. Therefore, it is not only about gas and oil pipelin es. For example, in Italy it will be necessary to build a network of gas installations which are able to transform the methane coming from the sea from a liquid stat e to a gaseous state. Currently, th ere is just one. It is si tuated in Panigaglia (La Spezia) and was built by ENI forty years ago. Our territory is rich in maritime ports which are safe from an environmental point of view. In the next few years the market of li quef ied natural gas wil l be relevant. From 201 0, it will be possible to use t he Russ ian deposit of Shtokmanskoye 600 kilom etre s away from t he coast of t he Barents Sea. Its current capacity is 22 billion cubic metres each year, but it will reach 70 bi llion when it operates at f ull capac ity and th e gas wi ll be liquefied in loco. Ot her alternatives are coal and installations which are able to t ransform all waste mate ri al into clean energy, as it happen ed in Brescia. In t his context, people who are in charge of Eu ro pean energy policy have to face im po rta nt key questions : an inc reasing dependence on gas and oil imports, political relation sh ips with energy- exporting countries, d efinition of a more sustainable mix of energy, preservat io n of ene rgy reso urces , th e use of alternative sources of ene rgy. In view of a constant increase of dependence on fu el o il im ports, the data t hat has been collected by the EU hides lots of differences between one country and another. The natu ral gas, for example, represents almost 40% of the t otal energy consumption of Great Britain, and only 15% of France and Spain . Th e oi l covers 50% of t he total consumption of Italy and Spain. This consum ption is much hi g her than t hat of the other prin cipal continental economies.

Rivisla Milllare l::ng11s11 1=01l10n rl. Jl:!UUI:>

The extent to which the consumption of natural gas will increas e depends on a range of facto rs. To give an example, France is likely to complete a programme that ai ms to rep lace nuclear power stations with new installations and the potential development of t he t rans port sect or with the creation of reciprocating eng.ine and consequently to reduce country's dependence on hydrocarbon s. In fact, there is another factor to consider carefully: the relatio n between energy ch oices and environmental sustainabilit y. The question about the cli matic changes relating to carbon dioxide emis sions from the burning of fossil fuels is less con troversial than in the past. Even though the prevalent opinion is that an «id eal» alternative energy sou rce, which can replace o il, does not exist, at least in the short and med ium period, the problem concerning the discovery of a variety of alternative sources remai ns press ing and controversial. Wit h regard to Europe, th is pro blem together w ith geopolitical uncertainty relating to the Middle East has reopened th e tal ks on nuclear energy.

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R K f:. Y CONCLUSIONS Th e structu ral reforms that have been p ro posed represent an important ste p towards the cont inental unification, especially in the most peripheral r eg ions. In this process of integ ratio n it is necess ary t o po int ou t t hat we cannot make defin it e choices regardles s of th e Balkan s and, above all, the pol icy of enlarg ement since the process of stabil ization of the Balkan area is based on the i r well- known ambition to enter the European Union. A cha nge of strateg y would lead to negative con seq uence s for security in the short period in the whole area of south easte rn Europe. Econ omi c deve lop ment, soci al and environmental secu r ity are often interre lated factors. The fail ure of this process in the eastern regio n would r esult in a risky sit uation of vul nerabi lity con side ring the fund amen- &' tal geopoliti cal and geo- economic prospect of the Con ti nent, th at is «t he En larg ed Medi terran ean ». Consequently, it i s necessary to speed up t he process o f normal ization. In an are a where our so ldi ers have served a crucial fun ct io n of sec urity for a long time it is essential to achieve a new ba lance as a synthesis of a st ro nge r sense of responsi bility of l ocal political forces and Europeanization of the inter nation al presence. This is ext reme ly i m portant within a wide spread geopolitical agreement which can redefine the

The strategic energy area of th e 2 75t Century.

regional and European frontiers and open a «seaso n» of coo peration betwe en t hose cou ntries . Therefore, in f uture it will be neces sary to fol low two fu ndamental lines c lose ly re lated to each other in regard to funct ionality and effects : t he mi litary in strumen t for ensuring and streng thening se curity and th e economi c strategy aimed at enhancin g the developme nt of the EU and settli ng, in part, the unresolved confl ict. Both of them are neces sary i n ord er that t he Old World can ta ke up th e challe nges that are pre sent with in the i nterna tional Community at the dawn of the th ird millennium. Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi

Expert in Strategic Sciences

45 - OIKOS

BEYOND THE ADRIATIC: KOSOVO After seven years of international administration the time has come to put into place the transfer of respon sibility. The future status of the region cannot be separated from certain other essential factors: democracy, human and child rights, pluralism and guardianship of the heritage of art and culture.

Kosovo is a sm all reg io n wi th a population of about two and a half mi llion, half th e peop le are Albanian and the rest are a mix from other eth nic origin s, Serbia n, Ashkali , Croat ia n, Romanian, Montenegrin, Tu rk i sh, Egypt ian amongst others. A pile of cultures, rel igion s, traditio ns, the tense mixture of diffi cult sharing. Kosovans don' t ex ist. Only Kosovan - Alban ian, Kosovan - Se rbian an d many other small comm unities spread out across the region. The minori ties represe nt 5% of the population but even th ey have a right to live in d ignity in a country in which who owns what is one of the great unknowns of the h istory of this region. The other side of the Ad riati c is clo se but very di fferent: completely within the Bal kan zo ne and here and there a handful of houses. T he pace of life is slow, and much of the la nd is poor and to now ignored. Tens of Auto Larje fill the road, t he local self car washes: a fai nt line of ru bbe r on the road, a man w i thout age en d lessly waiting. A lot of mud, eart h and du st , and one as ks onese lf why this interest in a cl ean car. And the people are not in poverty, they stop and join t he queue. One ca nnot 'i nvent' w ork for one self, a leftover from the days of comm uni sm. And som et hing from those days that st ill hurts. T he misery of today is more than befo re, because today there is the un certai nty of the fu ture. It's a region impervious, with a history going back to the battle of Kosovo Polje (1389), where the Serbian community was defeated and t hus under the control of the Turkish invaders, and a modern history; less than ten years ago t he Serbian repression, rapes and attacks on the ethnic Albanians. There were months of conflict

OIKOS - 48

before NATO stepped in to repel the Serbian troops Uune 1999). And the number of victims increased; victims of the pove rty, of wretchedness, of the uncertainty of the future. Seven years after t hat conflict and seven years of inte rnation al presence in ord er to recon struct the institut ions an d social structures, to bring about t he changes and prepare the land for a solution of this status. The ne gotiations for such a definiti on were on ly formalized at the end of Novembe r 200 5 wi th the invi tation by the United Nation s to Ahtisaari and his adviso r Roh ;in. The disappearance of th e pres ident Ibrahim Rugova , head of the country unti l aft er the war, d elayed e the timetable and also the the neg otiation platform s of the two sides had not bee n well defined. Mitrovica is t he sym bol of t hi s region, a city split in two, and the object of the st ruggle. What w ill become of this city when the reg ion takes its new pol itical , or even geograp hical, structure? What will become of this 'Kosovan' society7 There are no 'Kosavans' but Serbs and Albanians fighting over their diffe rences and t heir common wis h for liberation. It almost seems an error, a reality that is still hard to find and receive a degree of acceptance and leg itimacy. Kosovo ex ists as an area, a region, t he remainder is Serbia, but there are few Serbs here.

MITROVICA A long grey road takes you from Pristina to Mitrovica. Even the sky is grey and the ai r heavy: t hese are t he fumes of the city of Obelic, the head quarters of electricity and carbon . Along the road

Rivista Mililare Eng/is/1 Edition n. 312006

we come across international cars, some carts, or old style cars - all fi led with poverty and wretchedness. Small towns with small populations and only the minimum for survival. The signs of the war on the orthodox churc h, signs of the vio lence in March 2004. The small 'huts' of humanitarian aid and of the international organizations that are now abandoned, but they sti l l bring back the memories of seven years ago. All next to each other, one after the other, UNDP, Humanitarian Relief and others . There are also signs of a border that passes through the heart of the city, signs of aid for Serbians as much as for Albanians. Now it's no-mans land, a border just li ke seven years ago. The Kosovan Serbs have retreated north, the Kosovan Albanians have almost complet ely the southern part of the city. Thirty or forty metres from here is the river, and over there is 'Serb land', where the life is d iffe rent, different pace, lang uage and for some a different history to retel l. A mi ni ng carriage is the symbol of the city but the mine is now not in use, 20,000 jobs inexorab ly lost for the southern part of the co untry. In the plains below the city there is furrow, the River lbar, that hugs the north and separates it from the south. Mitrovica is an emblem of the Serbian community in another reality, a different reality, with the river as the pe rimeter fence. And it's not the mem ories of 2004 or of the war of 1999 that confirms these boundaries , it is a deep rooted division that leaves little space for change or modern times or new ideas of cohabitation. In the centre of the Serbian part of the city it's better not to have a number plate, or at least one just in case it is demanded. Because t here is always the risk in the other part of the city of being ambushed, so it' s dangerous. The Main Bridge, the bridge over The lbar, is the story of this city. It's the bridge that d ivides, that defines, the bridge that shows the difference, the bridge that is claimed by all. There seems to be a calm, but there is still the barbed wire and soldiers that check every other car t hey come across. T he international so ldiers have taken the ro le of 'Bridge Watchers' who defend the bridge and their portion of the city and are ready at any sign of problems to call for reinforcements. Ol d men sit in their poor cloth ing on the benches along the banks of the r iver. Even the old women in these times of uncertainty are ready to keep watch and call out for help if something happe ns. Now it's the KPS (Kosovo Police Service) who control the area, the two banks, and maybe when they are approaching that certain bridge they have a vigil and worried eye watching it.

Title pages. Pee: the old monastery. Above. Mitrovica. the mine, symbol of the city.

The situation is stable, there are on ly small incidents, and minor dai ly crimes, but the memory of March 2004 lingers on. Mitrovica was t he centre of the mess. Some tens of dead but many houses were burnt, fam ilies forced to flee and the fear of the Serbians returned t o haunt t hese o ld houses. The course of t he negotiation s is to initiate two separate municipalities for the city, one on each side, and that these are run independently, but t hat there is also a international body that oversees both sides for some years to come. And t hen there is another thorny issue. That of who owns what.

OWNERSHIP Owne r ship is a difficult prob lem and is at t he heart of resolving the issues of this area. No

49 - OIKOS

ownership is necessary and helpf ul for findin g the peace, and cohabitation. They don't know who owns the land, if the land be longs to thos e that occupy it, and also how the land can be managed by the local communities. For now the land is no one ' s, and up sprouts commercial centres, gyms, hote ls and petrol stations. And all around reigns misery and unemployment. All signs of a black market that must in some way invest its illicit proceeds. The geography of t he area makes, like the u ncertain political situation, the administration, the future , difficult to control.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international presence in Kosovo is now in its seventh year. The work of the international community is still to create the four pillars that a society can be built on law and order, civi l administration, reorganization of the in st itutes and reconstruc tion and development of the economy. The reorganization of law and order is concerned with setting up the relevant institutions and guaranteeing the fair treatment of a ll minorit ies, and to facilitate th e policing and intervention of eventual discrimination. This process will also inc lude the. solving of the problem of the missing peop le. Along t he fence of the parliament t here is a series of photos and a l ist of names of men of various ages and professions Mitrovica.¡ the bridge on the !bar river. who all have one thi ng in common; they disappeared into thin air. They have long since lost trace of the d isappearance but the family have o nes wants to invest in th e land if they cannot not stopped waiting or hoping. be sure who owns it. They are justifiab ly worOne of the principal tasks of the new civil ried that i n an instant the land administration will be to initicou Id be expropriated and ate a census of the population taken from them and so lose and add resses, but tru ly to H ... t he Ian d .1s no one ' s, all they have done to the land, work th is out, any statistics all the fruits of their labour. and up sprout commercial here, is a task nearly imposs iThe Serbians, when leaving centres, gyms, hotels an ble. In t he area of economic the region, took or burnt the petrol stations .. .al I arou n development, there is the land registry book s. Now the reigns misery and unem- issue of looking after the retrieval of lan d is difficult and artist ic and cultural heritage loyment ,, the process of proof is infiof t he area, the reconstrucnite. tion of monasteries and the Both sides claim ownership protection of relevant te rritoof this or that, but how can ownership be ries claimed by orthodox and Albanian alike. In proved 1 0 years after the Serb attacks on the the confines of civi l administration there is also Albanians and their reprisals against the t he issue of hu man itaria n aid, the right of freeSerbian occupants? Times have changed, not dom of movement and the respect of rights . the i nstrume nts nor th e resu lts; devastation The reo rgan ization of social institutions is in and occupation. The issue now is con fusing and the hands of the European Organizat ion fo r even more confusing after the war. They say Security and Cooperation , which concerns itself that it is essential to resolve the question of with the democratisation of the country, at

OIKOS - 50

Rivista Mililare English Eclition n. 312006

the public, who continue to only see, and suffer, ~ development, the p rot ection of human rights th e lack of and inefficiency of state services. and the organizing of the po l ice force. No matt er how much th e European Uni o n is conce rned with economic deve lopment in th is area th e MOVING TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF THE resource s are always meagre. It's only recent ly STATUS that they've me t the . requirements of the International Monetary Fund to receive aid, and In addition to the comp lex ity of the state th e Kosovo Trust Agency fol lows a path of priadministration, pol itics , in st it uti ons is added the vate investme nt . problem of how to find and define a future st aOn the seventh anniversary of the presence of b ility. the international community it is still there . T he international community will eventually have NATO guarantees the stability of the area . T he to leave t he reg ion and the Albani ans see no ot her region has the Kosovo Police Servi ce and t he solution than independence. civil protection fo rce (KPC) but doesn't have at What can be done7 What is the solution? its di sposal an army (and won't have while it is The Serbian Aut horit ies want to extend t heir not an i nd epen dent country, t ec hn ically now it contro l to cover the Kosovo region and have has the armed forces of Serb ia and Montenegro sweeping bureaucratic powers ove r the whole Foun dat ion). The NATO forces in Kosovo are in corridor, cutting the reg io n. The Albanians don't fact spl it into four areas with four separate approve . Nor do th ey accept revisions of the brigades, but is i n the process of being unified border or divisions as t he north want that wou ld into one task force. join it to Serbia. The borders are no n-negoThe Un ited Nations is gradually transf erring t iable . power to th e local authorities. T he Provisional And in this way sticks the problem of the ortho Institutes of Se lf Governing (PISG) have already dox monasteries, th e churches, of the small taken on board a lot of the local responsibilities Serbian comm unities. The fu tures of these peo(the more sensitive areas are st ill out of their ple are in the hands of the negotiato rs, between control). OSCE is taki ng care of human and tho se moderates and tho se of more extreme mi nori ty rights, t he repat riation of refugees beliefs who could set off a new and secu ri ng the r ights of conflict. You can as k which side freedom of m ovem ent. Th e will w in in t he negotiations, but European Union is almost 'OSCE is taking care of hu maybe it 's better to say how ready to take over the reins man and minority rights could everyone win. One soluof the reconstruction mis he repatriation of refugees tion that only one side and d ission that p robably the Unite d Nations wi ll pass up. securing the rights of free- pleases the other is just not acceptable, it will surely only The re are a hundred or so dom of movement , 7 resu lt in a future bomb or attack non-governmental organi that w ill set off anoth er conflict zat ion s that are involved in that is ready and will ing. va rio us initiatives re lated to And so what is t he be st way? To not create win t he protection of rights such as freedom of ners or lose rs but to make everyone a litt le lose r, moveme nt, minorit ies, mu lti - ethnicity and is t hat t he best way7 What are t he possible repatriation . options? Th e European Agency for Reco nstruction has The Albanian government working group are redesigned it s funding for t he Bal kans and for campaigning for a solution that protects the ri g hts Kosovo. From abou t 2,000 ,000 euro for the and f ull re spect of t he minorities, that allows t he period 1997-2003 (abo ut 280 ,000 eu ro a year) region to stay unified and under ind ependent the budget has been reduced to abou t 2 50,000 Albanian authority. To f ind Albanian consent on a year. A fifth for Kosovo but the majority this issue is difficult. Rugova was able to manage going to Serb ia. The recons tru ctio n an d reo rthe negotiations but his already ailing health ganization of t he infrast ructure of Kosovo has meant there were serious doubts about the f uture always been focused on building ho use s, water government of t he country. His disappearance has supplies, bridge rebu ilding, m unicipa l buildraised many new q uestio ns. in gs , care of the enviro nm en t (water, waste It shou ld be tried to create alliances that would ecc) an d energy issues. They also fund the satisfy all groups in t he discu ss ion. And to make reo rganizat io n of institutions, econom ic devel such improbab le alliances were made for these op ment and the protect ion of rights for the discussions. And to make sure that th ese negotiaminorities. tors reflect the population. The biggest problem has remained t he eyes of

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51 - OIKOS

Number of Serbians returned each year, according to UNMIK data: 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

totale

906

1.453

2.756

3.801

2.302

12.218

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITY At this stage in the negotiations it is essential t hat the local government takes control of the responsibi lity for the protect ion of minority right s, j ust as they are t o be responsible for economic developme nt, reconstru ction work and the making of local instit utions. If the local powers can take responsibility for t he f uture of the area, in all aspects, then it will be possib le for the internat ional community to hand over the rei ns of control to the local au t horit ies. The problem now is indeed the hand over of power from the international community, who manage t he projects now, to the local authorities The problem being that on the one hand this is delaying the time 'One of when they wi ll have "assumption :>roblems ¡n of responsibility" and can control their own political, economic and ot secur"ty social development but on the ather how th other hand they are not fit to run -eiv the country autonomously.The organization most competent for this type of work at the moment is the municipality, but t hey are reticent to assume control of the projects , when the projects are handed over by the international commun ity they falter, for two reasons one for lack of managerial capability the second for lack of financial resources. There doesn't exist a holistic vision. The m anagement of the projects is more ad hoe t han that there is a cent ral system that plans and controls everything from one master plan, which would then maximise resources. One area lacking in the activities of the international community has been to fix a political objective that can be followed; to guarantee the end of the inter- ethnic conflict. One cannot think about 'after', how t he living together can be managed and the community can be re- integ rated. On cannot think of a long t erm plan without solving the complet e pro blem, to think to about the empowering of the politicians and the populace.

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THE 'PERCEPTION' OF SECURITY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES

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One of t he persistent problems in t his region, and on e which will signify a large step forward

O IKOS - 52

a

when it is ac h ieved, i s the secur ity of the coun try, but not so much phys ically but how safe the people feel themselves to be. This percept ion in fact, and above al l t he perception of not feel i ng secure in a situatio n , br ings numero us prob lems when one considers the return i ng o f refugees , how t he minorities a re t o be rep resented, the participation of them in the community, or more simp ly how they can live together. The problem regarding the Serbian population is t hat t hey could be forced to leave thei r place of or igin o r to l ive in enclaves, where A l banians who then would l ive, pa rticularly in the no rth, in constant fear and i nsecurity. The numerous non -governmenta l organizations, local and internat ional, t he Un ited Nat ions, the PISG (the e Prov i siona l Institutions of Self-Government) who ;:i rp involved i n t he protection of the rights of th e minorities have all underlined the importanc e of i nvolvi ng all the people in the find i ng of t he po ssible solutions, incl uding even fami lies who have left the region. T hey have proposed numerous projects such as awareness, information and prevention of infringement campaigns, rega rd i ng the rights of othe rs and to ease the return of refugees, but the problem is that the resul t s have been limited. When the Bishop Artemije, head of the Serborthodox comm unity, visi t ed the towns of Vidanje, Bicu and Gradac, in the area of Klina, he deplored the level of poverty, the lack of freedom of travel, the lack of respect for prope rty, and the faith and hope for Serbia to help t he ir plig ht. According to United Nations estimates only 5.5% of Serbian and non-Albanian peop le who had abandoned thei r houses in 1999 have returned to Kosovo (see table). Certain ly it seems that more refugees wo uld return o nce their was a system of just ice and local security in place, but not all the pu blic services can ever be fu lly guaranteed. Access to justice and the protection of the rights and he ritage of t he m inorities are not fully functioning. T he popula-

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t ion are still outside the system, because it 's impossible to appoint a Minister of Justice and to refer t o a system of justice in a country that is still being built. The lack of coordination between t he ce ntral and th e local governm~nts ensures that the re patriatio n (for IDP and refugees) programm es are insufficiently controlled. Yet a greater coordination wou ld b uild a legal connection to the people and g reater info rmation would render more conc rete the effects of these 'go ing and see visits' (the monitoring of local activities). Instead, however, the monitoring is u ncoordinated and i mpratical and lacks the initiative at central governm ent level. There doesn't exist a central plan for repatriation. There doesn 't exist a p lan that wou ld guarantee the security of people once they have return ed, for th em to integrate and readapt to the area, no r systems that guarantee the essen tials, such as health, freedom of movem ent, education, acce ss to public services amongst others. There are no plans th at can guarantee the placing and utilizing for t hese people. The work prospects in thi s area are limited as al l resources are left to flounder. When the fear of unemploym ent is added to the fear of marginalization the n there becom es l itt le reason fo r pe op le to return. Such measures would require the collaboration at g overnment level of a number of min istries, for example, the ministry respon sible for repatriation, for defendin g the rig hts of the mino r ities, economy, finance, labou r and so on in order to maximise the social impact. These questions however are only the oreti cal, because t he changes are stu ck in practice.

THE PROTECTION OF THE MINORITIES

The protection of the minorities in thi s zone , according to the standard definitions of the international commu nity an d the local authorities include; t he guaranteeing of freedom of movement and security, acce ss to public services (water, electricity, medicine, education) and respect o f peoples' cu ltures, languages and reli gions. It is often the access to public services which actually causes the most probl ems. The hospitals are badly organized and lack ing. Within t he popul ation th ere is a silent code, one that states the hos pital in Mitrovi ca is for the Serbians and th e hospital i n Pristina is for the Albanians . An underlying mistrus t and a split

society. Probably given the deficiencies and inadequaci es of th e system , people th ink that not only that one cure for one et hnic race won 't su it anoth er, be it Serbian, Romanian, but also the fear, the perception of the difference between the people that further splits them today. It's the same regarding education. Th e international community is attempting to initiate multiethnic schooling. One of the criteria for a project, apart from its feasibility, is th at it mu st be multiethnic. Th ere are schoo ls where both orthodox and Islamic children go, and it is this mode that the community will gel, not by religion, but time wil l bring down the divis ions. Good access to public serv ices is a mirage. Th e electricity system hiccups along, and the in Pristina, like t hose in every Kosovan city, are used to power cuts for ho urs on end, without warning it just goe s off. And they have al ready built two new power stations. The second has five gene rators but only one wo r ks, and the co untry i n ge neral requ ires a third station and a centra l plant. The European Agency for Reconstruction, who is the mai n do nor in the energy sector, is not prepared to invest money in the new electrical plants. In the same way, water, gas and central heating, to supply t he peop le is diffi cu lt because of the obsolete system and anyhow the cost of these services is too much for the poc ket of most of the peopl e. Looking afte r the rights of the mino rity includes guaranteeing them access to the law, but not just rights of arrest and detention , that happen in lan guage they don't speak. Also, in the years of Milosevich the Albanian lawyers and judges were kept far away from the legal system. Now everything m ust start from scratch, all the relevant people required by a leg al system must be educated to internationa l stand ards and the compl ex st ru ctures of a legal system m ust be put into action.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The pol itical institutions have developed over the past few years under t he g uidance of the internat ion al com mu nity and t he United Natio ns, but their ab ility to gove rn autonomous ly is still untested. T hree vital sectors, secur ity, justice and defence, are still in the hands of the international commu nity . Th e future independen t and autonomous governmen t will need to be monitored by the inter-

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Mitrovica. a partial view of the city.

natio nal community, otherwise it will simp ly col laps e. At the local level there has been the welcome presence of the international co mmunity for nearly a decad e, but t he people also know th at i n t he final solution there will need to be this much needed status that will bring about the pol it ical, economic and ownershi p solut io ns th at t hey need. T he securi ty sector is still relatively untested and needs more t raining and a lon ge r period to consol idate. It's at more of an emb ryonic stage at the moment, and it ' s ability to protect the rights of the minorities is more on paper than in reality, but however it is stil l the only system that is understood in this zone and is the f irst step towards t he end result of democracy and respect for the law. Perhaps it will take the "h andover of power" and the "tak ing of responsibility" themse lves that will bring t he f i nal pie ces of the jigsaw together and ma ke a complete final system . Until now howeve r the sectors most se nsitive are in t he hands of t he international comm unity. It's probably a neces sary st ate, so that they can search for a fo rm of government, and push them

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towards self-rule and autonomy, that t hey could reach in an undefined number of years, but a sove reig nty that they will reach. The local politicians are all of the same opinion t hat t he security of the reg ion is a fundamenta l step towards the final solution, for this area to leave the security in doubt would be a very risky policy.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT The economy is find ing it difficult t o get going. The vast majority of internat ional aid has come as donations and not as investment, fair enough at the beginning , but this has the possible lo ng- term implicati ons of asphyxiating and paralys ing the economy. The unemployme nt rate remains high (fluctuating between 40 and 65%, depe nding on t he source), and what can be done to renovate a economy from the rece nt difficult years . The biggest project so far in the sector of t he economy has bee n the privatisation of compan ies, which will bring more jobs, bu t only in the long term, and has brought more immediate problems such as the legality of competitive tenders. T he results in te rm s of new work have been poor, and

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it would need the restructu ring and large scale len t reg ional pol itica l structu re that is perfectly intervention to become productive. In the second in line with the needs of t he area and th e evo l uplace there are all the secto rs that remain obso lete tion of th e loca l situ ation. It concerns two objec (the mine for example) and whi ch present them t ives; t he creat ion of inst itu tions and self-govern ing , in the knowledge t hat the country still selves as good investment opportunities. The process of privatisation of t he large com paneeds the control and su pport of th e internationa l o rganization s. nies started in 2004 ,but was o nly given a big pu sh The European Union wi ll p robab ly be asked to in 2005 and subsequently compl eted in 2006 . The process was broken down in to var ious p hases; step and take control of the reins of the situaidentification , analysis, partition and sale . By tio n , b ut it wil l have t o do it in re spect to what has already been set in place by the UN, who December of last year Kosovo was in the tenth stage of privatisation, t hat would then finish in have already set up ref erence and interlocutor structu res , b ut there will be a lot more work in January 2006 with the auctioning and assigning of regarding the development and applicatio n of a lot s. system of law . Th e results at an institu tional Some of the effects of the Kosovo T rust Ag ency leve l can already be seen , but not yet at t he level have been negative, t he privatisat ion and the parof law enforcement (appl ication of the law) . If the celling out weren' t always in the interests of the govern i ng of the area changes to the EU the i r local population , and were not completely free of ro le will be rather pecu liar, not le ast becau se dubious activities. The Kosovo Tru st age ncy carthey will arrive at the t im e whe n t he need to r ied monitoring on the process and those people decide on the new status, for 'autonomy' or who gained in the process (on individuals, on their activity, as well as any poss ible illegal activity). But 'inde pe ndence'. more went to foreig n investors and multinational s. T he only local - born investors were tho se NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF KOSOVO Kosovans who had recently left to live abroad. It was the minin g and energy sectors who had T he political situatio n is constant ly chang ing. attracted t he most attention. Financial legitimacy was controll ed by t he banks who ch ecked all fund s The Albanian delegatio n is looking to fin d a platfor any transparency and illicit monies. However form to support independ ence, expel ling any dissident internal voices or splits. T he choice to make t here are some doubts over the activities of t he these so-called Working Group::, agency and th e banks. An exam ple is Ferronicke l, a multi represents so me of the political opinio ns in discussion, t hat national that deals in the 'The European Union wil they come to t he agreement of extraction and transformation probably be asked to take independence w ith out con di of nickel. Work was stopped for four mo nths i n t his firm t ions, refus in g any type of id ea :ontrol of the situation ,, such as cantons, municipalities because of doubts over the o r condit io nal independence. legitimacy of con tracts. The achieving of status could have numerous T he political authori ties refuse suggestions of decentrali sed admin ist ration or partition, in fact good effects for the economy, it would mean t he they want the borders as of the 1974 constitution. country could d ivert its economic ene rgies towards neighbouring countries, like Italy and On the eve of the negot iations Daci, as president of the As sembly, was ask ing all and Kosum i, t he FYROM . The stability wou ld attract fore ign investthen Prime Minister, to support measures t ogeth ment. So me countries, European and non er and not to put th ing s to the vote . T he natural European, have made some moves already, especonvergence point of the Albanians is to where the cially in the sectors of banking, telecommunicaEU stands. Lufti Haziri, Minister for local self govtions and ene rgy, but is still listed as a "risky area. " ernment stee rs t he Pristina negotiat ion s. The di sappearance of Pres ide nt Rugova, the di scharge of Premier Kosumi (AAK party) and the THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE mistrust for th e Pres ident of t he Assembly Daci (LDK) , in early March there were a serious of T he slow but grad ual develo pment of the coun try comes undoubtedly because of t he permanent attacks on the state of progress for th e negotiapresence of t he international community, based tions . aro und t he presence of th e UN army, that guaran Fatmir Sejdiu, a lawyer and universit y prof essor, was elected President on the l oth Fe bruary. T he tees the legal fu nctioning of in stitutions, especialPremier Kosu mi has never experienced th e full ly the new ones. The European Un ion has developed an exce lsupport of the main party AAK, that had elected

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him head of government after the accusations of refuses any changes to the Balkan boundaries but the Hague Tribunal at ex- Premier Ramush offers instead wider powers of autonomy for th e Haradinaj. The discharges were inevitable after the Albanian people. poor results achieved in terms of material gains At the UNMIK summit first Pete rsen, and then and reforms . From the dismissal of Bajram Ahtisaari called for the possibility of mediation , Kosumi, the candidate names for taking this post since the unilateral declarations of one or th e inc lude the Comandante of the Kosovo Protection other group could not do anything but aid the Force (KPC) Agim Ceku, a member of the Alliance conflict. The re are ce rtain request that are, Party for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and close to regardless of the even t ual Kosovo status that Haradinaj. cannot be ignored; the value of democracy, And in fact on the 2nd March President Sejdou respect of human rights, pl ural ism, respect of nominated Ceku the new Prime Minister with the minorities, care of the cultura l and artistic legaresponsibility of forming a new government based cy. The diplomats in the Contact Group, th e on the support of the coalition of the majority (LOK United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, and AAK). Kole Berisha (LOK) was appointed the Italy and Russia, have f ixed the guidelines for new President of the Assembly and so replaced his the future the pursuit of international stan predecessor Daci. dards, the deve lopment of one legal state, t he The United Nations and the High Office reprerespect of the rights of the minorities, the equi sentative Javier Solana had said that the librium of the region and non -viol abi lity of the appointment of Ceku was an 'internal issue' for borders of neighbouring countries are all essen Kosovan politics. While politicians in Belgrade tial objectives. are puzzled and critical at the The 20th February in Vienna appointment of a member of saw the first meeti ng between the Kosovo Libe ration Army to the two sides. It reached no 'The dip omats of the set be at t he negotiation table. conclusions but the o Group, the Unitec atmosphere was definitively There are fears that it will sti fle negot iations between States, G eat Britain, Ger "constructive". The topics for Belgrade and Pristina. The y, F Italy discussion on the second Serbian President Boris Tadic round (1 7th March) were si has in fact declared "Serbia devolution, the financial forin o the f t re , cannot choose the Premier of mulas for the municipa lities, Kosovo but it is not a good the connect ions sideways and sign that an ex-soldier has up -down and to Be lgrade of become t he new leader of the regime. " the municipalities. Serbia has promoted the On the 1oth March a new twist followed when the financing of the municipalities and in regard to Hague Tribunal Court of Appeal stated that Ramas the connection between the municipalities and Haradi naj could return to political life. Another ext he capital has suggested: a wide margin of soldier has returned to Kosovan politics. On the autonomy and decentralisation, that would part of the Serbs it has caused some puzzlement, include t he monasteries and Serbian monu but also some hope that this popular figure will ments. The ties between the munic ipalities and bring a small sense of security and stability to the the capital would have to be guaranteed howevregion. er in certain sectors, health and education for The next day t he Hague Tribunale dec lared the example. However on the other hand Sejdiu has death of the ex-Serbian leader Slobodan reasserted t he importance of finding a way that Milosevich. It rem ains a matter of rancour for would guarantee the ful l respect of Kosovan Albanians and Serbians alike who were awaiting law. Sejdiu, promoter of dialogue and harmony, a sentence in order to put a full stop to that has underlined the importance of inter- ethnic past. tolerance as an essential value in every municiOn the part of the Serbs it was debated for quite pality. One of the essential aspects of the status some time as to who should be at t he negotiation talks is in fact th e restructuring of local admintable and after weeks of indecision between t he istrat ion, in line with the internat iona l ly wanted President Boris Tadic and the Prime Minister aims of 'integration between citizens' and Vojislav Kostunica the government appointed a ' integrity of t erritory' . T he second round didn't team of thirteen, led by Kostunica and Tadic, that produce anythi ng concrete but was a good also inc luded two Serb Kosovans. From Belgrade attempt to face those particular problems that there even came a suggestion of their line to folface self-governance, t here was even a fear t hat low 'more than autonomy, less than independ Pristina wou ld not have even accepted the order ence'. The current resolution offered by Kostunica of business.

Hae

m

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ance, an have fixed the

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Cracanica: the Monastery.

At the end of March there was a sixth round of negotiations, dedicated to the economic issues and as said by Stefan Lene, from the European Union, 'the most difficult to date', which real ly struck home the differences and the lack of comprom is e especially regarding the issue of privatisation, but with some exceptions regard ing foreign debt and care of cultural and artistic patrimony. Independent of the defining of status the economic divisions appears a toug h issue. In June even the UN Security Council added a sess ion on Kosovo. Ahtisaari proposed that in the following round, the seventh, t hat both sides were to be headed by their respective heads of state, Kostunica and Ceku. The top ics to be discus sed were the respect of the patrimony of art and cu lture, property ownership, rights of t he minority and the economic question. In t he case t hat the don 't reach a decision by autumn it was mooted that the Contact Group would decide on the status, and that then would be approved by the UN Security Council. However this has not been officially announced. The attention on these status talks takes the attention away, and one could say worry away , regarding the future stability of the area. One

fear of the situation is that the new Kosovo wi ll spark a new resentment in the region, and in particular in the Presevo Valley, and also there is the fear that the whole balance of the area will be upset. Kosovo will have its independence, econom ically and politically, but its borders cannot be up for discussion once the status is dec ided. Although there seems to be no drive towards a reunification with Albania, there is an internationa l fear of th is eventual poss ibility. And if differences ex ist between one and the other, between Kosovan A l ban ians and Albanians in other countries, in nearby Albania, t hey haven't received the expected fraternity that has been expected. It has been the fo reig n policies of the A lbanians to concentrate on regional stability than A lbanian fratern ity in the last ten years, that in fact saw the m place the country in a difficult human itarian eme rgency that t he government was unable to deal w ith. T he permanence of the international st ructures, both civil and military, will continue to have t he function of supplying the stability to the region, the protection of the minorities and the following of standards. It is probably the only point in common that the two sides have that of the relative permanence of the international presence, and more so for the military presence than civil.

THE ROLE OF THE NATO MULTINATIONAL CONTINGENT

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) today has the role of peace keeper. In the course of the recent years of this miss ion it has been noted that what is missing is not security but the perception of security by the local population, and like a vicious circle if secu rity is pe rce ived not to be present it brings mistrust and fear of the f uture and a lack of willingness to invest, it stops the development and growth of the economy, things which could all turn the situation around and simplify the work of the multinational force. The current objective of KFOR is as a guaranteed presence, supervision, deterrent and supporter of the peop le and t he local authorities and controlling the borders and se izing of arms. The object ive is also prevention, as well as arrests, of criminal activity from both locals and cross-border. Much of the arms and munitions seized by KFOR, like those arrested, have been sent to the International Court of Justice (the Hague T ribunal) for the ex-Yugoslavia. As well as the t rad itional work¡ of the peace keeper KFOR has followed other work plans in relation to the essential reconstruction of the

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Prizren : dome and minaret of th e mosque.

country's infrastructure. It 's an essential element for various agencies of the United Nations and th e provisi onal government, to the non- governmental org anization s and the European Age ncy for Reconstruction - but often these agencies have to re ly on t he support and security of the NATO forces to achieve t heir project objectives. And in other times, situations of extreme danger have required the immed iate intervention of the multi national contin gent. The control of reconstruct ion is above all the duty of the J9 coordination , in KFOR command, of civil and military activities. The cell evaluates the

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feasibility and sustainability of various proj ects based on the resources that are at t he ir disposition. The projects must respect the crite ria of 'mu lti-ethnicity ' and conform to t he poli tics and objectives of KFOR as a whol e. The reali zation occurs at b rigade level , that is to say a nat ional level. The reorganisation and recons truction of the structu res of t he cou ntry r eq uires part icula r promi ne nce and sensitiveness , in order to create a legal re lationship wi t h the local population is ofte n th rough the actual carrying out of proj ects . Th e J9 cell op erates as an outpo st w ithin the armed fo rces in respect to the population and its needs. As a consequence the projects

Rivista Mililare English Edition n. 3/2006

are often coord i nated by another part of the mission, for example PIO (Pub li c Information Operations) and PSYOPS (Psychological Operations), who focus on opt i mising the impact of various in it iatives on the people and publishing the benefits . . The current big project is the w interisation of the area, namely preparing the people and t he structures for the winter ahead. Another curre nt project initiated by the European Council is the reconstruction of about l l orthodox churches and the care of the environs of the monasteries. Amongst the projects for cooperation in civil and mi litary matters are also small private projects aimed at kickstarting small and medium sized enterprises. The 'Small Enterprises Project' is one of these proj ects (initially financed by the Finnish government). Another project concerns a dairy factory. The financing is usually used for buildings and for training of staff. The projects carried out at a regional and local level are coordinated by the Brigade (who directly follow the project), and then also by the cen tral cell in Pristina. The other internationa l groups and non-g overnment organizations are also involved in the projects and the development of the area. NATO has also some place to the NAI, NATO Named Area of Interest. Which concerns places of historic valuP - both cu ltural ly (for examp le churches and monasteries) but particularly sens it iveness. Usually the gua rantee of protection to these areas is by assigned Task Force. In th e case of the Monastery of Decani there is a constant su rObelic: a coal mine. veillance from the Italian army. The process of reorgan isation the region, as such the comand reconstruction of the area mon ag reement between by the NATO forces is also con~, The presence of the Kosovan Serbs and Kosovancerned, as said, by the protection of the people, of the rights multinational forces remains Albanians: t he presence of the of the minority, of projects of a an essential element for thf armed forces builds a t r ust and hope that day by day civil nature, however there is future of the region,, there is a gradual movement limited funds available for work towards a peaceful co - exis in this area. The NATO Quartier tence of the var iou s ethn ic General leve l ma intains a compeoples. The t ime is not yet r igh t to leave these bined vision of the operations of liaison, with peoples to their own dest iny, but probab ly the particular attention to the recent pol itics and definition of the status wi ll be a move in that strategy of topics re lated to minority rights and direction, and within a few years an area that can IDP (Internally Displaced Persons). offer 'autonomous su rvival ' and project itself Even the local authorities, the provisional govinto a new fu ture and new boundaries w ithin the ernment, the United Nations, the OSCE and the European Union . non-governmental organizations are all involved in the process of looking after the rights of the Laura Romanazzi minorities and of refugees. To now though t he Researcher for the SME-/MONT cooperation results, especially to do with repatriation have project" been very slow. at the Force Organization Office, Th e presence of the multinational forces Army General Staff remains an essent ial element for the future of

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NATO AND THE MEDITERRANEAN In order to contribute to the security and stability of the Mediterranean area, NATO has worked out a Master Plan, which entails a wide range of initiatives. This will require the active involvement of the Mediterranean and Middle East Countries and will include some important sectors: information and the press, civil emergency planning, science and environment, crisis management, defence policy and strategy, as well as a programme of military cooperation.

The Atlantic Alliance lau nched, at the end of 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue with t he aim of increasing the security and stabili ty of the Mediterranean area. At the Prague summit of 2002, the NATO member countries, obviou sly inc lu ding Mediterranean Italy, signalled th eir intention to intensify, and as a com plement to European Union's Barcelona Agreement, the cooperati on of the seven Dialog ue members (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisi a), as an extremely im portant consideration for the security of Europe.

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After Septe mber 11, in an d outside the Med iterran ea n area, the Medite rranean Dialogu e became the object of much internal and external attention. It brought up certain questions regard ing its futu re development, in particular, the proj ect that sees NATO and it's Mediterra nean Partners act more closely in collaborat ion in order to initiate a t rue partnership against common threats, such as te rrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Such a proj ect was better outlined by the Istanbul Summit of 2004, going beyond an agreement of stability in orde r to

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impose anything, but rather, to take into account their dive rsity and t heir specific role in t he developmen t of the cooperation prog ramme. Such a li ne Left. was also take n in the rece nt info r mal NATO meetA meeting of the NA TO Members ing (note 1) of Defence Ministers he ld on February 10 last in Taormina. And such a meet ing repregive a wider and more ambitious structure of a net sented a clear political signal in the int erest for the of cooperation between these countries, the NATO Alliance in a practical cooperation, wider and leaders started the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative deeper than before, with the partners in th e (ICI), a separate programme than the Dialogue. It's worth noting that in Taormina, for Mediterranean Dialogue but which complements it the first time, the seven in the purpose of promoting the Defence Ministe rs of the coun practical cooperation with the invo lved in the wider zone of the Middle East, ' ' It is the start of a long- tries and starting with the six mem- term cooperation process Mediterranean Dialogue were ber countries of the Golf whose success will require sat aro und the same table with 26 Defence Ministers fro m Counci l of Cooperation (CCC); the active involvement of the the all ied countries, signalling Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the Un ited the Mediterranean and Mid - the continuation of t he com dle East Countries , , mitment of coo peration Arab Emirates. between NATO countries and Undoubtedly it is only the the Istanbul Summit. start of a process of cooperaThe all ied leaders, in Istanbu l, hoped for the tion with a far off end in whose success will rely on transformation of t he Mediterranean Dialogue into the active cooperation of the Mediterranean and an effect ive partnership that would strengthen the Middle Eastern countries in a spirit of partnership. annual programme of activity t hat was already in It remains understood that the countries involved place , including a wide range of activit ies that covwill be free to choose to coope rate with NATO and ered various sectors , such as; information and the determi ne its own rhythm and level of cooperapress, planning for civil emerge ncies, science and tion . The Al l iance for its own part doesn't want to Turkish soldiers disembarking from a Black Hawf< helicopter during an inter-allied exercise.

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the environment, cris is response, defence politics and strategy, light and small gauge arms, humanitarian action against mines, and a programme of military cooperation . This last aspect concerns one of the most priorities of the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces of NATO (SHAPE) that aims for the interoperab ility of the NATO forces with those of the countries involved in the Dialogue in a manner of military operations that NATO would choose and guide.

Utilizing the Master Plan coul d seem vague but every possible building block has to be detailed , specific and suited to the needs of the miss ion for wh ich the Plan has been set in place. Some sect o rs could obse rve t he threat of terrorism, the pro life ration of weapons of mass destruction, .. dne clearing operations and the combined multi m edi a libraries. To give a precise idea of the recent developments wi t hin NATO, w hich figu re 2 serves as a way of furt her exemplification, the typology of m issio ns already included in the recently approved Master Plan of t he Nort h Atlantic Commissi on INTEROPERABILITY AS THE BASIS FOR THE (NAC) (note 3) include; Disas t er reli ef, MILITARY COOPERATION PROGRAMME Humanitarian relief, Search and Rescue, Peace Support Operations. From strict ly a military point of view t he Such a Master Plan is undoubtedly very generic improvement of the Med iterranean Dialogue is but represe nts the starting point for f utu re negocentred on various activi t ies (Mediterranean tiations with the countries in the Med iterran ean Dialogue Work Programme, MDWP) w ithin which Dialogue. In fac t , afte r the prelim inary contacts the interested countries are able and formal meetings bet w een to choose that which best suits NATO and t he countries in the their needs. In order to construct ' ' From a strictly military Dialogue, the generic Mast er a common framework of selection point of view the improvePlan was able to be adapted t o processes of the activities offered t ment of the Mediterranean he needs and capacities of the Sup reme Command of every sing le partne r, with a Operations (ACO) developed a dialogue is centred on var- view to establish ing an methodology that sets itself the ious activities among which Individual Wor k Plan. aim of build ing an Individual Wo rk the interested Countries The various Individual Wo rk Programme (IWP) tailored to the can select those which best Plans (rntPnti;:illy as many as needs of individual partner coun the numbe r of different ind isuit their interests ,, tries but still following the com v idual countrie s in th e mon objective of interoperability Mediterranean Dialogue) will (note 2) of thei r own armed forces w ith those of be revised annually via bi lat eral negotiat ions takNATO. The concrete idea is t hat of developing a ing into account the evaluat ion of the approved generic plan, called Bi-Strategic Command developments of the partner (i n accordance w it h Training and Exercise Master Plan, that the inte rthe guid eli nes of the Framework of the Operational ested partner cou ntry has to fol low if it wants t o Capabilities Concept) (Not e 4). contribute with NATO and make it inter-operable. In other words for the Al lied Forces , and where possible their Partners, the t raining, exercising PROCESS OF DEVELOPING INDIVIDUAL WORK and operati ng , effectively and necessari ly, shou ld PLANS (IWP) be done as one for an improved execution of tasks and their assigned missions. In particular the SHAPE elaborated the gen eral gu idelines in order Master Plan specifies a series of building blocks to facilitate t he achieving of the interoperability on relevant t o certain essential aspects of the intert he part of the countries in t he Mediterranean operability of the Forces: instruction, training, Dialogue w ithin their selected participat ion in m ilexercises, evaluation and operation. itary co-operations. The objective is t he ideal Figure l shows the division of the responsibil ity development of every IWP in order to implement it between the two NATO Strategic Commands: in t he already exist ing MD Work Programme. Such Allied Command Transformation (ACT), based in Guidelines flesh o ut the BI- SC Interim Proposals Norfo lk (USA), and Allied Command Operations for the Implementation of the Mediterranean (ACO), based near Mons (Belgium). Dialogue Work Programme document - Military One can see that ACT is respons i ble for Cooperation Activi t ies. Education, Individual Training and a part of the The existence of the MD Work Programme, is not Collective Training, wh ile ACO is actually respon at odds with the Individual Work Plans wh ere t he sible for most of Collective Training, Exercises and main difference between t he f irst and the new the Evaluation of Operations. approach is seen in the fact t hat while the MDWP

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Rivista Mili/are Englis/1 Edition n . 312006

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CONSTITUENT COMPONENTS

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Fig. 4 is a simp le list of cooperation activit ies , the proFor every miss ion, the Force Modules have to be posed object ive of achieving interoperability, that able to satisfy a range of operat ional requirements we are illu strating, through a objective driven (note 5), for examp le: (tab led) in succession, NATO approach, as ment ioned before, wi ll be used in the Strat egic Command and t he partner countries harmonic development of every identify the requisite objectives IWP. Such a process is very that these countries have lackdet ailed and based on t he defi- ''Every Strategic Command ing and put in order of priority n1t1ons in Force Modules, manages a number of acfor attainment. In this way they Missions, Standards, Supporting tivities already placed for put together a list of requ isite Activities. contributing to achieving objectives to follow that repreBased on the Plan and on the the specific objective of in sent the po int of reference for negotiations w ith individ ual MO creating the Individual Work teroperability , , partners it is possible to identify Plan for the country in question. their leve ls of ambitio n (Leve l of Closely re lated to the operaAmbition, LoA) and the ir operational requirements are the t ion requirements (st r uctu res) of obtaining and interoperabi lity object ives of the NATO forces. possess ing in order t o be cons idered inter-operaT hey define t he criteria for measurin g if the operble. In such a way it's possible to design an IWP ativeness is attained in a specific area (figure 5) . suited to the needs, interests and capabilities of Every St rat egic Command manages a numbe r of each country in t he Dialogue (figure 3) . activities already p laced for contributing to The startin g point is the definition of the Forces ac hi eving t he specific objective of interoperability. that can be inclu ded in the Master Plan, t he poten For instance in the sl ide that fol lows it is possi tial list could be increased where needed in the ble to see a list of ex isti ng act ivit ies that support future where necessary, and also, it's worth the above said Interoperability objectives. These, remembering t hat the point of v iew of the partner as already borne in mind, have to be mod if ied for countries that it is not ob ligatory that they will have to cooperate in the futu re. By way of examRight . ple of the main point see Force Modu les (figure 4). A lesson on C/MIC procedures in Agadir, Morocco.

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Rivista Mililare Englisll Edition n. 3/2006

'

FORCE STANDARDS- MTI

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Utrlize mops, I diagrams and symbols approve d by NATO

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The lnteroperobility is often reliant on the cohesion of the Tea m Its members must spea k English and know NATO terminology. They a lso have to be able to interpret the intentions. plans and orders of Supreme Command

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The procedure connects loca l/other maps to NATO maps. All the Command and the Unit must be able to exchange geogra phical information quickly a nd accurately using standard documents

G.1 .8

Presentati on reporting and return

The military forces are subject lo a structure that foresees the realiza tion of formal reporting for communicating information along the chain of command. The Superior Com mand a nd the Unit have lo familiarise themselves w ith reports in order to achieve this.

In peace-support operations (PSO) the joint commission is essential for the exchange of information amongst all those involved in order to achieve agreed implementation. Every unit give n an area of responsibility (AOR) from the level of battalion and up, hos to pre- -- - - ' - -a_r_ r a_n--'g'---e_ w_ilh the j oint commission of operations.

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SERIAL No 7 MISSION: GENERIC FORCE MODULE: BTG. OPERATION REQUIREMENTS: Presentation reporting and return. INTEROPERABILITY OBJECTIVES: The military forces are subject to a structure that foresees the realization of formal reporting for communicating information along the chain of command. The Superior Command and the Unit have to familiarise themselves with reports in order to achieve this. ACTIVITY (in sequence) Order

-

Activity

Nominative

Duration

Cost

NEW4

Work meeting and staff procedures for the Partnership for Peace (PIP)

7

6600

MB-45

Official course for Operational staff in the dialogue between NATO and Mediterranean countries

19

14800

- -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - ' - -- - _ _ 2__N _E _W _ 12_ _ _ P_la_n_n_ing of ground operations 4 3 4 5 6

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Fig. 6 diverse requirements and capacIt1es for each of the various Mediterranean Dialogue Countries. Furthermore the participation in certain activities contributes to the attainment of other objectives that are l isted under additionally supported Mi litary Tasks for Interoperabi lity (MTls) (figure 6). Taking as reference t he highlighted activity, from point ACO - 05-0416, Crisis Response Operations, it could be described in more detai l, such as indicating the type, scope, location, duration, estimated number of people involved in similar events, as shown in the following diagram (figure 7): whose careful examination allows an elaboration of the generic Master Plan. Taking account of the characteristics of a good part of the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries (note 7), of their military capacity and their objectives, we can reasonably imagin e the partner countries Master Plan ambitions they hope to develop in regards to what level they want to be represented in the Battalion Manoeuvres for PSOs. The Master Plan lists therefore in sequential order the re levant activities , which NATO offers to the partner coun tries to help determine t hei r Level of Ambition (LoA). In the example in figure 8, the partner that would want to supply a battalion for Manoeuvres in future operations of NATO, has t he possibility to join both Officially and Unofficially certain courses

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given at t he NATO School in Oberammergau in Germany, in order to learn how better to train up their participating personne l in specific seminars, in learni ng to plan an exercise, and requests that NATO sends "home" a team of CRO experts an d , in the end, participates in a NATO exercise t hat is open to Mediterranean Dialogue Countries. These are t he essential elements, together with estimates of cost (note 8), that is all included in the Master Plan (figure 8).

CONCLUSIONS In the new methodology NATO considers the most important eleme nt in relation to the Mediterranean Dialogue Nations to be a clear and precise definition of the level of ambition of each country in the alliance in relation to cooperation, taki ng into account the type of mission where possible deve lopments could occur, according to each's opinion, w ith the Allied Force's interoperability. Of the successes gleaned from the Mediterranean Dialogue, one of the most remarkable is surely the participation of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in the NATO operations in the Balkans, where Morocco was represented by the second highest contingent of non-NATO forces (figure 9).

Rivisfa Militare English Edition n. 3/2006

SUPPORT ACTIVITY '---'-=- c:::!111 c:::111 CII C3II CII OIi Cll Cl 1'.11

Seminar on Peace Support Operations (PSO) - Identification code: ACO-05-04 1; - Typology and Purpose: the seminar is open to participation from MD (Mediterranean Dialogue) and PfP (Partnership for Peace) Partners - (ACO.3143.1). The scope of the seminar is the presentation and discussion of relevant scenarios both to the Support Operations for Peace and those for Crisis Response; - NATO authorized responsibility: CC-Land Madrid; - Headquartes: Madrid, Spagna; - Date and duration: 4 days in the last week o f May 2005; - Required linguistic capacity: all the activities will be conducted in English, translations or interpretation wil l not be possible; - Number of participants: 1 or 2 per country, preferably suited to those in operational p lanning and/or Ministry of Defe nce, or Command level up, training; - NATO point of contact: omitted; - Note: the seminar w ill include information briefing and collective debates regarding all functional areas relevant for Peace Support Operations and Crisis Response.

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NATO course in orientation for s1·aff Officers NATO course in o rie nta tion fo r Senior NCO's NATO/Pf P seminar for Trainer Ironing Advanced Seminar on NATO/PfP C ourse in orientation for multinational forces Training course in the planning for Mullinational Task Forces and inter-forces Mobile team training for operations in support of crisis situations Masters in Logistics and Medicine «Better combined effort»

22 TOTAL

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«Associa1·e cooperatorn

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International Cooperation Initiative (26+4) BAHRAIN

QATAR KUWAIT

UAE SAUDIA ARABIA OMAN

Fig. 9

Euroatlantic Partnership · Council (26+20) ;

EGYPT ISRAEL JORDAN MAURITANIA MOROCCO TUNISIA ALGERIA

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: BELGIUM CANADA : CZECH. REP. . DENMARK : FRANCE : GERMANY . GREECE : HUNGARY : ICELAND ITALY · LUXEMBURG • HOLLAND . SPAIN

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ALBANIA ARMEN IA AUSTRIA AZERBAIJAN BELARUS CROATIA FINLAND FYROM GEORGIA EIRE KAZAKHSTAN REP. KYRGYZA MOLDAVIA SWEDEN SWITZERLAND TAJIKISTAN TURKMEN ISTAN UZBEKISTAN

UKRAINE NATO COMMISSION-UKRAINE (26+1)

Also there are the operations being carried out in The project described that is based on the the eastern Mediterranean, Operation Active Master Plan could re presen t a clear signal in the Endeavour, which rep resents the concrete contrichanging nature of t he Mediterranean Dialogue, bution of NATO against the world th reat of internawith its measure of trust towards a more operat ional terrorism, and where Israe l, Algeria and tional and centralised partnership, from a mili Morocco have shown their willingness to contribute t ary point of view, regarding interoperabil ity. The with their own means to the project is ambitious if one only same operat ion. Beyond the thin k s of the amount of mi lita ry political significance of such a ' ' Succeeding in this un- interaction req uired for the gesture the integration of miliNATO commanded operation tary forces of these countries dertaking would represent peace-keeping that covers success of immense thousands and thousa nds of with the Allied forces has allowed a prestige for NATO , , great strides to take place in kilometres in distance. The mutual confidence in view of an implications in the f ield of eventual complete cooperation command, doctrine, communiacross the Med iterranean, while at the moment it is cations, logistics, international law, health and so still in an embryonic phase while the problem of on are innumerable, comp licated and cannot be diversity has negatively influenced the programme, set aside from the procedural process nor the firstly because of the reluctance of Arab countries modus operandi of NATO to which the new to participate in the same exercises as Israel. And methodo logy high lighted approaches. Managing obviou sly the process of cooperation requires a this task rep resents for NATO a success of long time in which its success is, however, clearly imm ense prestige, more than the extrao rdinary staged in intermediate steps such as t he Taormina prospects in the rapport with the Arab world fo rMeeting (note 9) where, for the first t ime, the six getting the fact of the economic interests and Arab states and Israel participated. security of energy resources - which is at the

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ce ntre of NATO in the Mediterranean po li t ics, the zone wh ere about 6 5% of pet ro leum and natura l gas th at Weste rn Europe co nsu m es pas ses through.

Alfredo Mesolella Major, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

NOTES ( 1) T he informal meet ings of NATO Defence Ministers

are t rad itionally held twice a year in addition to the formal meeti ngs . T he informal consult ations don't have a fi xed agenda and are not aimed towards having deci sions reached, but the Defence Min isters have t he opportu nity to freely discuss the key issues of t he Alliance. (2) In NATO terminology Interoperability mean s; "The ability of A ll iance forces and, when appropriate, forces of partner and other nations to train, exercise and o perate effe ctively t ogether in the execution of assigned m issions and tasks." (3) Cou nci l's Memorandum (C- M (2004)056) (4) The Ope rational Capabilities Concept (OCC) is designed to establish new means and mechani sm to r einforce PfP's operational capabilities t hr ough enhanced and closer m ilitary cooperat ion. The OCC has two specific aim s: to improve the ability of partner forces to contribute to NATO- led PfP operat io ns; t o g ive incr eased flexibility, predictability about potential cont ributions, and capability in putting together tailored

SHAPE Headquartes in Belgium.

force packages to mount and sustain fu ture NATO- led PfP o perations. (5) The differe nt non- article 5 possible m issions are typically those of p eace- support operations, humanitarian relief, disaster relief, search and rescue. The word General in the slide indicates a com mon m ission of the typical type PSO. (6) The activity termed ACO- 05-04 1 corresponds to the 41 a activity cited in the Med iterranean Dialogue Work Programme 2005, managed by ACO and approved by NAC. (7) Apart from Israel, th e othe r part ners have a very low level of ex penditure on Defence in compari son with the national economy. (8) Current ly NATO g ives f inancial support t o the Med iterranean Cou ntries t hat correspond s to approxi mately 80% of the costs incurred when training at MDWP, in terms of cour ses , sem inars, conferences, observati on of exercises, workshops, meetings and such like. (9) In this view the Taormina Meeting of the 9th and 1oth February 2006 repre sented an im portant preamble to the next NATO Summit t hat w ill be held at Riga (Latvia) o n t he 23t h and 29th November 2006 for t he levels of Head of States and Heads of Government s, as con firmed by the Alliance spokesman James Appathurai when talking about t he Sicilian meeting 'Th is meeting is an important build ing block in the preparat ions for t he Riga Summ it, w hich wi ll focus sign ifi cantly on NATO's modernisation."

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NATO IN TIRANA The "open doors" policy of the Alliance Albania wishes to become a full-fledged NATO member. A reciprocal advantage that will entail a remarkable financial effort and concrete cooperation.

Since January l, 2006, t he NATO Headquarters A SHORT HISTORICAL SYNTHESIS Tirana (NHQT) has been working with a new structure and a new role, in order to be more effective In March 1999, as a resu lt of the conflict in and more in keeping with the reform necessities of Kosovo and with in the "Allied Harbour" operation the Albanian Armed Forces. NHQT has become a aimed at giving so lidarity and assistance to the focal point for both NATO and the Albanian Kosovan refugees, the Atlantic Council endorsed authorities, increasing its visibility and the coopthe employment of a multinational force called eration with t he diplomatic community and with "Albanian Force" (AFOR) , to which Italy gave the the organizations present on the territory. largest contribution with 2300 men, mainly from The change has occurred at the most approprithe ''Taurinense" Alpine Brigade, along with about ate moment. As a matter of fact, in a little less than 300 men of the "San Marco" Regiment and 160 two years (within 2008) Albania expects to receive "Carabinieri". Operation "Joint Guardian" started on the invitation to become a fu ll- fledged NATO August 3 1st of the same year, when the refugees member. An objective that the Albanian citizens returned to Kosovo . A "Command of the and the Albanian authorities consider extremely Communication Zone West" (COMMZ WEST) was important (l ). Fo r achieving, it constituted on the basis of the they are called to produce a sig"Tau ri nense" Brigade and nificant effort, also financial, ' ' The change has come at included in t he structure of the which should be consistent with the most appropriate mo - KFOR forces. The COMMZ's their expectations. At the same operational task was to control time, NATO and the internation- ment. Within 2008 Albania t he main lines of communicaal community will have to direct expects to receive the invi- tion (LOC) from Albania to their efforts in such a way as to tation to become a full Kosovo, the important Puke correctly assist them. In fact, fledged NATO member,, Pass among them, and to Albania's NATO membership is maintain the ability to ensure a mutual benefit. For Albania it the flow of supplies and reinmeans to be through, once and fo r all, with a past forcements by making use of the Tiran-Rin as marked by isolat ion and open a new door on a Airport (Airport of Debarkation - APOD) and the future based on principles and goals shared with Port of Durres (Sea Port of Debarkation - SPOD). the entire international community. For NATO it From the humanitarian viewpoint, COMMZ WEST represents a resolute step forward towards the HAD instead the task of keeping, through its CIMIC stability of the Balkan area and the Mediterranean (C ivil Mi litary Cooperation) t eam, the necessary basin, and also an advanced platform in the fight contacts with the local Authorities and with the against terrorism. non-governmental and international organizaNHQT is the on- the- ground expression of the tions. NATO po licy, and therefore its transformation is in On June 1 7, 2002, fol lowing t he normalization line with the new course, which takes the Albanian of the political situation in the who le Balkan area, necessities in greater consideration. NATO started a process of reconfiguration of its presence in the region, which led to the creation of three NATO Headquarters: in Bosnia, FYROM and Albania (Sarajevo, Skopije and Tirana). COMMZ Title pages. Tirana, Skanderbeg Square. WEST was transformed into NATO Headquarte rs

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T irana (NHQT), with t he task of continuing t o carry Italian presence has doubtlessly contribut ed to the out the me ntio ned o perational tasks and assist stability and to the process of democratisatio n of and support t he Albanian authorities in t he ir path t he Country. In t hese years, t here have been toward s t heir NATO membership. co untless episodes where our soldiers have helped The parties to NHQT were Greece, Italy, Hungary the population with material, infrastructural and and T urkey. The Comman.d was as signed, in turn, logist ic aid, as well as with humanitarian ass ist o an Italian and a Gree k Gene ral, as rep resentatance, that often saved hu man live s. tives of the main contributing Cou ntries. At t he Albania today is a Country that has implemented beg inning the NHQT was located at the Plepa a ser ies of impo rtant institutional and adm inistraCom pound in Durres and afterwards was trans tive reforms, whos e democratic vocat io n has been ferred to the "Ure Compo und" (1 0 km fro m T irana) co nfirm ed by th e peacef ul alte rn ation of its proj ecting to Tirana those components that were Governments and which is, above all, a Country to start giving advice to the Albanian MOD. Thus that is about to j o in NATO and the European t he NAT (NATO Adviso r Team) offices were locatCommunity. ed ins ide t he Ministry of Defence, w hi le t he Public Information Offi ce (PIO) and the Pol itical Advisor (POLAD) were based at the "Rogne r" Hotel. T HE NEW NHQT STRUCTURE Italy (ITALFOR) suppl ied the operational component, heir t o the tasks of COMMZ West , and the T he first consequ ence of the new miss ion, consecurity company of the Ure base. sid ering the reduction of personne l and in order to With the utilization of the new, shorter and faster have closer relations with the Alban ian Authorities, line of communication, which goes from Greece was the clos ing of the Ure Com pound and the sub(Thessalo niki) t o Kosovo (Prist ina), the Pu ke Pass seq uent tran sf er of t he Offices of the NATO lit tle by little lost its importance and, as a conseCom mand t o a new build ing at the centre of quence, also the "operational" role of NHQT in Tirana. The NHQT personnel were to be housed at su pport of the KFOR forces was reduced to the the "Regner" Hotel, and everything was due to take point of becomi ng irrelevant. NATO started a new place by t he end of Novem ber 2005 , so that, start reo rgani zation process, in ing from December l, 2005, terms of reduction of personnel NHQT could begin to o perate in ;:ind reconsideratio n of NHQT ' ' NHQT has become an the new Offices, thus expresstasks, whi ch in the sum mer of Advice and Planning Com ing its Initial Operati ona l 200 5 was implemented withi n Capability (IOC) and achi eving mand for the Albanian its Final Operational Capability the periodic revision of the Forces, for the (FOC) by December 3 1, 2005 . miss ion s of the NATO Armed Head q uarte rs. NHQT was process of their democrati The Ant iaircraft Arti lle ry tasked with giving advice to the sation and for the Reforms Brigade HQ, w ith t he additio n of local Authorities o n the military of the Security System ,, some components U ENG and J aspects concerning the Security 8 cell), which in Aug ust 2005 Secto r Refo rm (SSR) an d the rep laced the Fie ld Art ille ry entry into NATO, in orde r to increment t he Euro Brigade HQ at the head of NHQT, implemented the Atlantic integration. Th e Sen io r Military reorganization project, harmo nizing the simultaRepresentative (SM R - NHQT Commander) and all neous closing of t he two Compounds (Tropikal personnel of t he new NAT, in o rder to car ry out and Ure), the t ransfer t o th e new venues and t he their tasks as best as poss ible, had to be embed start of the new organization structu re. ded within the MOD, i.e. their Offices had to be These operations are easily described but they ins ide the MOD. are actually extremely comp licate, owing to the The cerem ony of Lowering the Flag, carried out quantity and int ricacy of the actions th at must be on Novem ber 1 1, 200 5 by t he "Trieste" 21 st Field coo rdin ated in o rder to abandon t he occupi ed Artillery Regiment, marked the end of both the areas, restoring th em to their orig inal state and ITALFOR Italian m ission - therefore the return handing them over to their leg iti mate owners, home of the Manoeuvre Regiment - and th e operwithout controversies and / or admin istrative o r atio nal ro le of NHQT, with the transfer to KFO R of lega l outstand in g matters. On the w hole, t his has the LOC responsibi lities. required a detailed inventory of the materials T he Italian Contingent deserves a separate con present in the two Com pound s, the definition of sideration . Its return, after eight years, represents the state of t heir f inal employment (return home, t he su ccess of the missio n and the ac hi eveme nt of hand back to KFOR, do nation t o t he Albanian all goals. Thanks to the commitment, capability Armed Forces and unserviceable), th e ensuing and sense of responsibility of our soldiers , the hand ling of the materials, occurred without prob-

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NHQT NEW STRUCTURE X

SMR

SMR Office

PIO

POLAD

LEGAD

NATO ADVISOR TEAM NAT OR7 J/LCH Staff Assistant

OF3 J Projects/Coard

NATO Advisor

OF4 Navy NATO Advisor Intel. Security

OF4 Air NATO Advisor Logistic

lems, the closing of all trade activities and relevant administrative acts. The works for the adaptation of the new office building and the mentioned closings were carr ied out at the same time. In order to give an example of the number of admin istrative acts, for the functionality and implementation of all the security measures of the new building, about 40 tenders were called and the related contracts assigned. Moreover, in order to allow all the Italian mil itary to be back home by November 30, 2005 , simultaneously with the handing over of the new offices and the transfer of the NHQT personnel to the "Rogner" Hotel, the security of the Ure Compound, after the departure of the Greek Support Group, was entrusted to the Albanian soldiers until the materials were com pletely dismantled and the keys given back to the owner. Once retrenched, the new NHQT has abandoned the structure based on branch heads U- Heads) and chosen an ampler NATO Advisor Team. It consists of three modules (fig. l ): the Senior Military Representative (SMR) with his office, to which are attached the Political Advisor (POLAD) and t he Legal Advisor (LEGAD); NAT, with one component concerning the operational aspects and another the Security Sector Reform of the Albanian Armed

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OF4 Navy NATO Advisor Engineering

OF4 Navy NATO Advisor Training

Fig. 1

Forces; the Support Element, that provides the maintenance and security of the Headquarters. SMR and NAT, having to work in close contact with the Alban ian Defence Minist ry, have also offices ins ide the MOD, so that they can estab lish the approp riate connection with the staff and increase the links with all those involved in the modernization process of the Albanian Armed Forces. Thus NHQT has become and advice and plan ning comma nd that works on a wide range of activities concerning the Albanian Armed Forces, the process of t hei r democratisation (Defence Institution Bui lding) and the Reforms of the Security System (SSR) (fig.2). The activities carried out and the progress achieved are listed in the documents: "Membership Action Plan" (MAP), "PfP Planning and Review Process" (PARP) and "Individual Partnership Plan" (IPP), w hich are compiled w ith the contribution of NHQT and presented to NATO by the Albanian Authorities. As is known, MAP is a process, a kind of "road map" introduced du r ing the Was hington Summ it (23 - 25 April 1999), aimed at strengthening the commitment of the en largement of NATO as practical man ifestation of the Open Door Policy. It includes the development of a programme of

Rivista Mililare English Edition n. 312006

MISSION of Albanian MOD E F

F E

C T

All PGs Fully Implemented

Defence Institution Buildings in progress

SSR in progress

Budget for Modernization

s 1. Range of capabilities 2. Degree of Interoperability 3. Training & Slmalation tecb 4. Mannine ofstructures 5. Commo & Info Sys Sec, (Personnel, Physical, INFOSEC)

6.NBC& EOD 7. RN capabilities 8,lnfrastructures

1. Democratic & Civilian control ofAAF 2. Reforms & Restructuring (Long-Term Tnnsformatlon Plan) 3, Effective & transparent: - penonnel structures; - training & education; - career development; - civil right & freedom of members of AF; - budaet allocation; - manapment of defence spending 4. Procurement procedures

1. Rule of Law & Human Rights 2. Border Security (equip., training commo sys) 3. Fighting org. crime & terrorism 4. Regional Cooperation 5. Excessive Ammo & Equipment

Disposal

1. Present & planned Outlays Defence Resources to meet Defence priorities (financial planning & resources allocation) 2. Budget accordlag with the plan (2% by2010)

Fig. 2

activit ies i ntended to assist t he aspiring nati ons in the i r pre paration for the ir future entry i nto NATO as fu l l members. Th e first important step is th eir co mplete as sent to the PfP ope ration s, because this increas es th e political and military bo nds of the aspi ring nations, help ing them in their p reparation in every sector o f the new missions. MAP is a yearly programm e that includes the objectives for the preparation and also the specific information on the activities carried out, the respons ible authorities and, when approp riate, a list of the work on the particular aspects of t he preparation.

NHQT AND THE ALBANIAN FORCES NAT and the professionalism of its personnel, wh ich is the guarantee th at t hey will fu lf i l the role of advi sor, as san ct ioned by the mi ssion, will be the d r iving force of the new NHQT. In the last months, NHQT has already o pened a new chapte r, carrying out an active and effective role, which has somehow anticipated th e reorgani zatio n and has been met w ith enthusias m by t he Albanian MOD.

There are now t he conditi ons for a more open coope ration with the Staff and es pecially with t he Min ister of Defence, who is firmly determined to carry out t he refo rms of his Mini stry. The wo rk done by NAT before it s re shuffle was ce rtainly positive, especially in su pplying indications and suggestions for drawing up the MAP, PARP and IPP documents. Nevertheless, such work has been limited to a few as pects deemed more important by t he Albani an Government, without its including the entire aspect of the potent ials. Besid es, the efforts that t he donor natio ns have offe red on a bilate ral basis have not been synchronized, coord i nated and harmon ized w ithin a framework of a wider vision . NHQT can play an im portant ro le also in this latter field. There are at present all the conditions for developing th is plan for the conve rgence of both the donor Countries and the Albanian Government towards t he co mmon objective of receiving, within 2008, the invitation to become a member of NATO. T raining is carried ou t accord ing to the NATO doctrine and standard . Some units, especially those of the Commando Regim ent and t he Rapid Reaction Brigade, are part of t he Pf P forces, equipped with modern system s and materials, and take part in the missions in Iraq, Afg hanistan and

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Fig. 3

Virtuous Circle Experienced personnel

NATO Policy Implemented Through NHQ

I

Increasing NATO Credibility& Coherence

Cost/Effectheness Countries Coosiste!IC)'

Advisory Coone

People • Well Oriented • Aware • Motivated Proactive behavior HN great Benefit

Prepared and promptly available personnel

Bosnia with excellent results. These units, working alongs ide the colleagues of the NATO Countries, have acquired a significant experience. Moreover, the level of the exercises carried out with the Countries of the Adriatic Chart er (2) and the com ing emp loyment in Afghanistan of SEEBRIG (3) rep resent a further indication of the progress made in t he integration and cooperation with the other Armed Forces. At the moment, it is necessary to concentrate the efforts to extend to the other units of the Army the level of the NATO standards, the improvement of the living conditions and quality of life of the sold iers (infrastructure and quarters), regulation of the military cond itions (recruitment, status and promotion), rationalization of the reserves and of the structure of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force). NHQT, included in the MOD throu gh its daily presence and contact with the main operators in the various fields, will make the difference. In fact, a daily life in close contact increases mutual trust and transparency, leading to the development of a familiar language and a common vision. To carry out the task of "advisor" one ought to "know". To know the NAT personnel it is necessary to be able to move freely and have free access to information. For th is, the MOD must give its con tribution. "Knowledge" generates "comparison" and hence "/suggestion/advice" (fig.3). Moreover, thanks to its role of coordinator of the donor countries' aid, NHQT wi ll have the possibility to direct such aid towards the areas that need it most, avoiding overlapping and duplications, improving the standardization, homogeneity and maintainability of the materials . The concept of "coordination" has been fully accepted by both the MOD, which intends to create a specific Office for the Coordination that will operate within the General Staff, and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs , which, having acknowledged the importance of its role in the entire process of entry into NATO, will create a special NATO Office.

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In short, there are the conditions for the wish to come true. What is important is to continue t o forge ahead. In order for NHQT to carry out its new task as best as it can, it should be provided with the nec essary quantitative and qualitative human resources. For what concerns quality, a special attention should be given in ass ig ning personnel expert in the specific sector, in order that they affectively contribute to the NAT work, and throug h this latter, carry out the requested role of advi sor. The duration of the mandate of at least one year (preferably two) is a guarantee of conti nu ity. Besides, considering that a part of the Partnership Goal (PG) within the PfP cooperatio n concerns the Navy and the Air Force, NAT shou ld necessari ly include also t hese profes sional figures. That the personnel selected fo r NATO Headquart ers Tirana (the Senior Mi litary Representative and all NAT personnel) should necessari ly be "expert " in their branch, has been conceptually accepted at al l leve ls, for it is a conditio sine qua non for playing an effective role of advi sor. This importance stems from at least two considerations: each branch can count on a single person, who, therefo re, must trust his own knowledge, without help from a staff. His work has a high political value for NATO, and his behaviour and professionalism have direct repercussions on the NATO credibil ity. As a consequence all Nat ions shou ld select their personnel according to the "job description", veri fying the personnel's profess ional preparat ion before assigning t hem. The possib le actions o r activitie s at NATO level concerning the cand idates could be: interview them in order to ascertain their basic knowledge Tirana: entrance of the URE Compound, former home of NHQT.

Rivista Militare English /:;d1hon n. :.Vi!UUt,

of the present NATO standard s and of the pro cedures of the specific branch in wh ich they are going to work (log istics, t raining , operatio ns, finance); su pply an upd ate of the NATO situation and pol icy in the Balkan s an d in the specific area (Alba nia, FYROM, Bosn ia) 1 so as to fol low the same line of action and show the coherence of t he Alliance. Thu s NHQT wo uld become a true and effective tool of th e Atlant ic policy in the area; once assig ned, peri odi cally (poss ibly every six months) organize workshops focused o n the progres s made by the respect ive Cou ntri es and the li ke ly way ahead , besides a possible upd ate of the NATO policy.

As regards t he number of personnel, keeping in mind the new ro le an d the increased cooperation with t he Alban ian MOD, the structure of NHQT could be reconsidered so as to meet its real needs and be up t o t he new tas ks, once its efficacy an d effectiveness have been proved o n the fie ld. In any case, consideri ng that for every NAT sector there is only one Officer, NHQT, if necessary, should have the possibility of calling ad hoe teams of experts, especially for assessing the progress made in the various secto rs.

classified means of communication (CRONOS , VTC), which, if not deemed indispensable, would allow NHQT to operate from t he Offices su pp lied by MOD. In this way one could do without the entire pe rson nel of the Support Element, saving equipment and human and fin ancial resources. The "End State", and conseque ntly t he definitive closing of NHQT, will be achieved wh en Albania becom es a member of NATO, or when it does no more req uest the su pport of any NATO Headq uarters, because its reforms in the Defence and National Se curity se ctors w il l be at an advanced st age, in li ne with a realistic development and with the fu ll support of other international sources.

CONCLUSIONS

The advi sor, in terms of military profess ionalism , is a figure introduced recently, and envisages not on ly a deep knowledge of t he specific matter, but above all an analysis and synth es is capability and an ability to find the right corrective measures or the suitable advice. A complete professionalism, with the addition of di plo matic qualities , for it is an action t hat must be carried out with col leag ues THE FUTURE OF NHQT of different nationalities. NAT O, li ke every dynami c T he p res ence of NATO i n and vital structure, und ergoes Albania, as well as in the other continuous evol ution , ''Now it is necessary to in - atogether Countries that wish to join, is a with t he local strucmutual ben efit . The work t hat crease the efforts and en tures co mmi tted to t he specif NHQT has been do ing up to gage all energies, because ic need. NHQT is t he exp resnow, to which Italy has con- the goal is at hand,, sion on the ground of the tributed a great deal, can be Atlantic policy. Its transformacons idered a great value. Now it tion is an exp ression, and at is necessary to increase the efforts and engage all the same time a guarantee, of t he attention given energi es , be cau se the goal is at hand . The to the development of the problems vis- a-vis the Albanian auth orities must make every effort to whole Balkan Theatre. Thanks to its dynami sm , continue on the road already taken. For its part, today NHQT is in a position to play its role thorNHQT must focus its com mitment on its new funcoug hly, due to the relations created with the tion, pe rform ing it in an active and propositi onal Albanian Authorities and w ith the inte rnational way. When Albania receives th e invit ation to enter community working on the t erritory. into NATO, it will be possible for NHQT to undergo a further reduction in term s of personnel as Vito Di Ventura regards the Military Liaison Office (MLO), which Brigadier General, could be put under the command of a Colonel. The NA TO Senior Military Represen tative MLO will have to continue to assist and advise the Albanian Auth orities and to interface with NATO. NOTES Act ually, t he prese nt NHQT structure is already com parable to a Liaison Office, exce pt for the (l ) A recent survey shows that about 95% of the popucommand level (Brig ad ier General), considering lation is in favour of Albania joining NATO. that the tasks t hat derive from its mission are per(2) Croatia, FYROM and Albania participate in the formed by the SM R and by NAT personnel only (the "Adriatic-3 Charter". latter co ns isting of ju st 8 service me n and 3 civil (3) Al ban ia, Greece, Bulgaria, FYROM, Turkey, Italy and ians). Its location in a bui ld ing se parate from the Rumania participate in t he "South Eastern Europe Brigade" (SEEBRIG). Albanian MOD is main ly du e t o the employment of

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OPERATION <<INDUS>> In Pakistan, the "Elefante" Task Force o perated to assist t he local popu latio n hit by a disastrous earthquake. T he work of our Engineers , also t hanks to the quality of their equipment, was appreciated by all local Authorit ies and international Organizatio ns.

Ours is one of the few states to have inte rTH E EARTHQUAKE vened to help t he v ictims of last October's terrib le earthquake in Pakistan that had destroyed an It was one of the most devastatin g earthquakes entire cit y. In particular it was the contingent of t he last fifteen years. It destroyed entire vil ca lled 'T ask Force El efante', based around an lage s, causing tens of t housands of vict ims and eng ineer's unit, that intervened to face the brin g ing an entire country to its needs. It hapemergency. pe ned in Pakistan, t he eighth of October last year, " Here we d on't throw anything away ... It fi rmly remaining in the min ds of many. The earthseemed l ike a scene from the fi lm ' In the Name q uake, with a mag nitude of 7.6 on the Richter of t he Rose', when from an open in g in t he Scale , annihilated cities and affected numerous monastery the leftove r s from the kitche n were reg ions in central As ia; apart from Pakistan, it also jet tisoned out onto al l the poor peop le that affected certain zones of India and Afghanist an . were stationed under t he high wa ll of the T he tremors were felt above all in Islamabad , in abbey, inst igating amongst all the people a the Rawalpindi area, and Lahore, Peshwar and mini - war to get the best pieces . Sim ilarly the Quetta, ne.a r the Afgh;in border. The zone hardest populat ion of Bagh , above al l hit was that of Kas hm ir and t he the ch i ldre n , were standing mountains of the Hin du Kush. be low the ramp, wa it i ng for '' Villages buried under landVill ages were bu ried under the discarded rubble , more slides, bridges collapsed, lands lides, bridges collapsed, than 25 metres be low, in the houses, schools, public buildhouses, schools , public bu il dhope of salvag i ng something ings reduced to rubble, hun- ings red uced to rubble, hun t hat cou ld prove usefu l. " This dreds of dead or inj ured: th is is the strongest memory of dreds of dead or injured: this was the co untrys ide of Pak istan Corporal Raffaele Ci priano , was Pakistan's landscape a few a few days after th e earth spe ci a li st e ngineer mach i ne days after the earthquake , , quake. Once again the country operato r, participant in mis was sinking under t he conse sion 'lndus' in the devastated q uences of a t ruly devastating earthquake reg ion . earthquake and again it needs the effort to pick "Pieces of wood, iron rods from re info rced conitself up again. T he cou ntry, and the internat ional crete , utensi ls or whatever oth er objects that comm unity, mobil ized immediately. The President might have any economic value become precious Pervez Musharraf and the Prime Minist er Shaukat booty for the masses of desperate peop le," continAziz mobilized all possib le equipment and all ues the Co rporal. avail able armed and civil forces for t he pu rposes "In spite of the efforts of the local police to of the aid operation. 'A national tragedy, the worst keep the crowd away, every time they raised the catastrophe in the history of Pak istan,' was the skips of the dumper trucks to un load the rub u nan imous comment from t he country's authorib le" he remembers , "it t ri ggered a rush for t ies. whatever was available . A ll this at great risk for 'What will remain in my m in d is not the images the safety of t he unfortunate peop le, because of destruction, represented by the thousands of the rubb le comes down at high speed t owards cubic metres of rubble, b ut the fatali sm and resig the ground ." It ' s a t ouching sto ry from the nation of t he people . Surrounded by the moun Corporal "because t hese are experiences that tains of rubb le,' continues Corporal Paolo touch the heart." Pal umbo, operato r of special ist engi neering

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eq uipme nt, "the pop ul atio n ju st continued to live out the ir daily lives . Th e women hagg li ng over the shopping w it h the shopkeepers, the bakers making t he chapattis in t heir stone ovens , the butc hers killing t he animals o n the ir blocks surrounded by blood and dust, but no one works on the removal of the g hostly rubble. Th e fata li sm with wh ich t hey acted was for me something inco nceivable, espec ially if I remember the images of the earthquake in Umb ria-Marche or the Sardinian landslide. In those d isastrous situatio ns of our national history the local pop ulation, even though desperate, uni ted to find ways t o help the ret urn of normal life and return faster t o normality. ' T hey started appeali ng for international he lp immed iate ly: We need it urgently , affirmed t he Pakistan President. The f irst to arrive on the sce ne was the European Union, three mill ion euros was the f irst contribution . And immed iate ly help t eams were se nt from Great Britain, France , Japan, China and Russia. The United States needed no encouragement to he lp. Pres ident Bush, talki ng of the horrible tragedy for an allied country, se nt aid equ ipment, and Washington offered $50 mi lli on

Title pages and above. Engineer personnel and equipment during the removal of rubble.

and 31 he licopters. Other important hel p came from Turkey ($150 m ill ion) and Saudi Arab ia ($ 113 million). Help also came from UN ICEF, who sent covers, clothes, tents, medic ines , food, above all aimed at ch il dren, t he most vulnerab le to the cold and hu nger and sickness . The re was also a health emerge ncy. T housands and tho usands of i njured , in particular in the mou ntainous regions , remained for days waiting for suitab le he lp. A situation defined by one UN co- ordinator, Jan Ege land, as "worse t han t he t sunami of December 2004 ." A factor worsen ing t he situation was the t orren t ial rain that hit the north of Pakistan and the Kas hmir area in particu lar. Fact ors that slowed the aid operation and sapped the hope of find i ng f urther survivors in the stricken areas. The f inal balance was awfu l. Mo re t ha n 80 thou sand verified as victims, 75 thousand injured , and nearly 4 m ill io n home less.

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trench to reach a sma ll built up area that had become isolated following a lan dslide. The ne xt morning we had loaded it no problem, an old Caterpillar out of condition, large in compariso n for our tow truck. However we managed to overcome the problems of hooking it up and w e began to take it along the narrow and curvy small mountain road. After 30km we were forced t o unload the machine in order to remove a mud slide on the road, after the work we reloaded th e bulldozer to continue the ascent, along a road with about 20cm of snow and that in certain stretches two vehicles couldn't pass. It took us about four hours to do the trip and arrive at Birpani and there de liver the machine to the local department of civil engineers, who then starte d immediately the work to reach the isolated bui lt up area." The primary objective of the mission was t o construct an air supply bridge to reach th e st rick en areas as fast as possible, tak i ng account of the approaching winter. The coordination of the offers from NATO countries and partners was formalised in t he Euro At lantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) (note l ), the only inte r locuto r - both for NATO and for the Europe Union - with the Pakistan authorities and its representatives in the United Nations (UN-Office for the The reconstruction and strengthening of a road hit by a landslide. Coorrlination of Humanita rian Affairs). Tht> responsibility for the execution of movements was given to the Allied Movements Coordination NATO INTERVENTION Centre (AMCC) of SHAPE, managing also the air equipment of the NATO Response Force (NRF) NATO inte rvened immediately. On th e l oth both for the air-tact ic- positioning t ransport , October, a few hours after the terrible earthquake from inside of Europe, for aid, and also for and subsequent minor tremors , the Pakistan sending goods from th e United Nations from authorit ies had formally Turkey directly to Pakistan. Fo l lowing the fu rther requested assistance. The request on the part of same day the Council contacted ' ' The first NATO men their military structures and reached the village of Bagh Pakistan, on the 1 7 th October then on the 11 th October the on the 29th October, one of the Council made available the sending into the emerallies had constructed an the most important urban gency Operation Plan relevant to supzone a contingent of porting the humanitarian relief centres of the homonymous NATO, taking advantage of region, symbol of a country NRF equipment available , lim operation. But how did our military that is no longer there ,, ited to a 90-day use. And so organised the ir mission? the Joint HQ involvement was "It had snowed the day before set off from Lisbon which, on t he 24th October, and so when Commander Brigata's cell in charge of CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperat ion) , giving the lightening the load in Is la mabad - g iving life t o evening report he had asked us to organize, a Deployable Joint Task Force HQ - and initiatalong with our complex loads the transportation ing the necessary contacts with the Pak istan governmental authorities, at the start of operaof a Pakistani bulldozer to a vil lage in Birmani, t ions . The first NATO men reached the village of about 40km from Arja, at an altitude of 2,100 metres ." Says Corporal Antonio Di Giulio, Bagh on the 2 9 th October, one of the most Commander of Mobility T eam. ''The activity was important urban centres in the homonymy of necessary in that it needed a communication the reg io n, a symbol of a country that was no

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longer there. After the earthquake of sth October it became a spectral city. It was here that the majority of the international aid forces we re to be con cent rated. "The rubble were not only a symbol of the damage caused by nature on the civilisation," says Corporal Gianpietro Caleschi , pathfinder, "but also the source of earning, w ith hard work, something could be done to im prove the wretched conditions of a people's l ife that does not know the meaning of the word surp lus. On top of the cracked buildings were tens of people, people of all ages, with hammers, picks, bars and other rud imentary tools, h itting the building in order to extract the iron from the concrete slabs. Back - breaking and frenetic activity, interr upted only by the occasional cheer of success as a small piece of iron was wrought from the building, which at the end of the day would be weighed and sold." The NATO contingent is characterized by extreme lightness and flexibility, in order to be ab le to deployed all over the area by ai r . Everything obvious that could be done to he lp quickly has been started, but they are heavily limited in the necessary work that require heavier

Unloading vehicles from a train .

machinery, specifically such as bulldozers and tow trucks . From the o rganizational point of view, the Joint Commander of Operations - Air Commodore Andrew Walton, British - and his relevant staff, were deployed in Islamabad, whi le the Land Component Commander, Spanish, were based near Arja, near Bag h. The land component of the NATO T ask Force planned, a Mu ltinational Battalion, based in Bag h, composed of three engineering companies, supplied respect ively by Great Britain, Poland and Spain which would be with a Lithuanian platoon dedicated to water pur ificat io n and an Exp losive Ordance Disposal from Spain. This was how NATO had foreseen the mandate and on February l st the mission at Bagh was finished. The operations included, 168 fl ights from Europe transporting around 3,500 tonnes of necessary materials, such as tents, cove rs and such like, supplying ove r 7,500 peop le. The NATO medical unit had helped over 8,000 patients.

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EFFECTIVE AID At a fast pace - but always with a ready smile - the Italian engineers have brought to a successful conclusion the following projects: Boys College: A scholastic institute within a wide leafy zone, composed of two buildings of two floors destined t o become classrooms, one to become a library, one two storey building to be for management, two single storey buildings to be for classrooms and a one storey building to be a theatre. Completely built in mixed structure of prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete which the earthquake had razed t o the ground, except the administration bui ld ing which was badly damaged. The eng ineering equipment used for this project includes an excavator, two loaders , 4 med ium sized dumpers. In 5 days work they had managed to remove 5,000 cubic metres of rubble. Other work to the removal of the rubble includes the demolition of the dangerous building and the levelling of t he whole area. Boys School: A scholastic institute built on three terraces on top of which 5 single storey bu ildings destined to be classrooms and one building for meetings. The school complex was built of mixed materials, prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete. All t he buildings were seriously damaged except two which were razed to the ground. The engineering equipment used for this project includes an excavator, one loader, a bulldozer and 6 dumpers, 4 medium and 2 small. In 8 days work they had managed to remove 4,500 cubic metres of rubble . Also in this project as well as the re moval of the rubble was the demolition of the dangerous building and the levelling into two terraces the original three terraces. Electrical Power Station: comprised of the administrat ion building of the company that manages the distribution of electricity in the city of Bagh, composed of a four storey building, made in reinforced concrete with brick filling. The bui lding was completely razed to the ground. The engineering equ ipment used for this project includes two excavators, one loader and 6 dumpers, 4 medium and 2 small. In 8 days work they had managed to remove 5,000 cubic metres of rubble as well as levelling the whole area. Military Hospital: complex composed of four buildings in two floors, used for one hospital wing and the other a doctor's surgery. The structure was made of prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete. The buildings were seriously damaged and partially collapsed . / The engineering eq'uipment used for this project includes an excavator, two loaders, a bulldozer and 8 dumpers, 4 medium and 4 small. In 10 days work t hey had managed to remove 5, 500 cubic metres of rubble and level the entire area. Market Square: the piazza was in the centre of the city of Bagh and was surrounded by buildings of various heights, with an average of two floors, in which the ground floor was used for commercial purposes and the other floors for resident ial purposes. The buildings were built of a mixture of prefabricated walls and reinforced concrete. Virtually all the buildings were either raz ed to the ground or seriously damaged. The engineering equipment used for this project includes an excavator, one loader, a bulldozer and 6 dumpers, 4 medium and 4 large. In l O days work they had managed to remove 5,000 cubic metres of rubble. And also in this project they levelled the ground afterwards. In this proj ect there arose certain problems with the rubble. Part of the area was owned by the state who wanted the area cleared and then left flat and vacant for building works to begin when the better weather arrived, while the other buildings were privately owned and the owners were keen to have their property, in rubble, available for them to salvage and start rebuilding immediately. It meant the extra task of keep ing the rubble demarcated amongst ownership. Sewage system: After the earthquake part of the city sewage system for Bagh had collapsed or was blocked up. The plan was to get it unblocked and working again, at least to a small degree. In 5 days it was achieved and the syst em was flowing again, albeit as an open system. Such work took two small capacity plastic terns, and the related removal of about 60 cubic metres of rubble. Arja-Bagh Road: A key strategic transport route on t he route between Kashmir and India. However following the earthquake some containing walls had collapsed and as such some of the road was covered. The Italian contingent were assigned two sections of t he road, where respectively a 12 and 30 metre wall had fallen onto the road. The project was carried out with a reinforce d concrete foundation, on top of which a new containing wall was placed , using dry stone wall techniques, but with the external walls reinforced. The work had also the additional issue of allowing for water run off. The complete task was finished in 20 days, thanks in addition to two working teams of pioneers.

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"Thanks to the government and the Pakistan i population for the open reception offered to NATO personnel and I offer my congratulations to the Alliance staff for their humanitarian mission which was carried out with professionalism and pass ion ." These were the words of.the Secretary General of the Atlantic Organization at the end of t he rescue miss ion .

THE ITALIAN PARTICIPATION

One of the key ro les, inside the NATO contin gent, was by the Italian Armed Forces . In particular it was the Engineer Brigade that had the task Above and Left. In the middle of the rubble, the population has been trying to go back to normal life.

ed into a Task Force Command at batta li on level of about 250 units. It was more than evident that such components , r ig ht from the start, would have to be free of any planned obligat io ns. From the init ial act ivation, felt at the lowest leve l from 14th October, the nat ion al equipment was added t o NATO on the 1 9 t h . If one ca n imagine the strict log istics that are invo lved in such an operation in such a time period one can imagine how they must have worked to achieve this feat . There fo llowed a per iod of an apparent lu ll in individual duties within the necessary vectors of organiz ing rapidly a gro up of men and equipwh il e the contingent we re sent to Pak istan , while ment to he lp as qu ick ly as possible in t he strickt he chain of command were organizing t he ir desen zone. And in order to guarantee t he rapid ignated personne l, deciding on suitable acq ui sideployment of aid NATO ut il ised a specific tions for us ing overseas and the comp leting of recourse - t he NATO Respo nse Force - com necessary preventative med icinal measures, once posed of Command and Troops known . in 'Tours of Duty" in rotat ion The port of Civ itavecchia from the Alliance co u ntr ies, ' ' A key role was played by was to be t he point of justly organised to respond the Engineer Brigade, embarkation (SPOE) - the on ly d ispatch - of the mate immed iately and, consequent ly, which was tasked with carrials and equ i pment on deploy men and equ ipment in a rying out timely interven - board a ship direct to matter of days. In a nationa l tions in the areas hit be the Karachi a nd not ing the date environment it has to start from of departure ava i lable to zero, putting together al I the earthquake ,, NATO was to be the 7th requ ired parts for such aid (the eng inee ring requirements), and Nove m ber, all the troops the troops w it h al l the total elements necessary related to the operations had received the to guarantee t he complete logistic autonomy, orders to get equ i pment, mate ri al and person commun ications included, 6 ,000 km from t he ir ne l to t he 5th Pioneer Engineers Regiment in homeland. Rome, the unit set asi de an Assembly Area for The original Engineering Company was alongthe reception of the needed practical equ ipside a Support Group - at company level - and a ment , the recondit ion ing of loads , the transfer Communications platoon, all organ ica lly integratand loading at the SPOE dock, as well as the

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Notwithstanding the damage, the schools return to teaching activities.

co l lection po in t for the Contingent where they could go through al l the last minute preparat ions pri or to d eparture. Simi lar support was give n t o the re giment. Th e Italian personnel were transported to Pa ki stan by air i n t wo legs, apa rt from a smal l g roup who were on board t he tra nsport sh ip . T he first group, abo ut 40 units, were to disem ba r k in Karac h i, w it h the task of carrying out the un load ing, and then transfer back to the col umn in lsl amabad / Rawa lpindi , some by road ot hers by r ail. T he rema ini ng personn el , the Main Bo dy, reached Islamabad on the 2 nd Dece m ber to jo in w ith coll eagues and head to the di saster zone. Together un t il Bagh, the Cont i ngent camped at Arja - a place nearby g ivin g control of the Engineer's Company over to NATO Command. Here is the log book of 8 th December 2005 the day that saw the d isembark ing of our engineers in Pakista n. Lieut enant Maurizio Spaccini, Mobility Platoon Commander rete ll s the day; "12 .00 8 /1 2 / 05 ultimate reco nnaissance in he l-

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icopter to decide on deployment area for It ali an Contingent. "17 .30 8/12 / 05 after 180km journey in and 10 hours in convey, along t he rocky mountain road that connects Is lamabad to Bagh, the first tranch e of essential equipment and personne l reach Camp Green Elefante. "20 .00 8/12/05: the core of the camp is built, tents have electric ity and the latri nes are functioning ; one can finally eat (obvious ly combat rat ions) and the n sleep in order to continue tomorrow morning the necessary work for the setting up of t he Italian Base ." In the next ten days w ith tranches of 30 vehicle s a time the deployment of Task Force Elefante was completed. The base was officially opened on the 15 / 12 / 05 but in rea lity there was group work ing on the Boys College in Bagh from the 1 1 /12/05 . Camp Green Elefante, in its final vers ion, comprised a Battalion Command, an operations room , two company commands, a hospital, an office, a refectory for l 00 persons and 30 camp sites , all under tent cover, while the kitchen , the bread oven, the washroom , the fue l and lubricant depository, the latrines, the showers and central communications are placed under Shelter. For water

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engineers, logistic troops and a transmissions plarequirements the camp was based near a river and toon. The personnel that were called up apart from near a purification plant. the Engineering Brigade, who comprised 55% of Electricity was taken from the large capacity the total group and almost all of the office rs - w ith COELMO 300Kw, which supplied the kitchen, the the exclusion of the Commander of the communioven, the wash-room all the services and the cations platoon, the administration officers and transmission centre. veterinary officers of l 7 groups from all over The remaining electrical needs, perimeter lightItaly (from Merano to Palermo). Despite the initial ing for example , were taken from a COELMO SKw concerns the military group gelled although they from the illum inatio n tower SIRIO. were diverse it proved to be quite simple, probaIn order to surpass the problem of the cold, typbly thanks to the choice of individual commanders ical at that altitude all the tents were isolated and and the commander of the whole Task Force, equipped with their own extremely efficient genLieutenant Co lonel Giu lio Biot. erators (CARMAR). 32 light vehic les, 90 trucks, 60 of which were The camp was built on terraced land, some heavy, 4 tanker t rucks, l 3 specialist engineering already existing others purposely made or extendvehicles, 4 compressors, a water-purifie r, 2 very ed - using rubble from earthquake remains. large generators and 1 0 smaller ones, shelters of The base of the camp was bui lt with drainage various types for cooking, communicating, planunderneath so allowing the camp to live suitably ning, washing, showering and toilet facilities. even in snow or rain. There were these equipments , and materials and l 5 days were stil l required for the ship with its tools put at the disposal of the Italian Contingent. load and support troops to reach Karachi , then 8 In total 1,200 metres of loaded sh ip, weighing days to reach Islamabad and 9 days to reach Bagh, 2,200 tonnes. the city flattened by the earthquake. In line w ith the Allies our ' ' At the beginning of the Contingent initiated the f irst Operation, the population THE AID ACHIEVED phase before February 1 st . The looked with suspicion at In almost a mont h a village only difference being that half of those soldiers, who were was complete ly reconstructed. the Islamabad - Karachi journey wearing camouflage faOperation 'lndus' could be said was by train. The last ltc1li;rn tigues with a green, white to have reached it's goal. personnel to arrive home were The orange flashing lights on the 24th of February and the and red shield ... ,, illum inating the human shapes whole operation was officially in the Kashmir night lean ing closed on the 9 th March by the against the damaged bui ldings, staring in wonder Head of the General Staff the Army, in conjunction th at the file of arriving Ital ian transport vehicles. with the unloading of the ship by the 6 Pioneer "These trucks," affirmed Lieutenant Spacini, "had Engineers Regiment. crossed 'koala bridge' , the limit of administration "It has been a difficu lt mission," said the Head for the Kashmir region, in order to follow the nearof the General Staff of the Army, Armed Forces impassable mountain track to reach Camp Green General Filiberto Cecchi , "to which our men gave Elefant, in Arja, from which the next day they a exemplary performance, manag in g with selfwould leave to go to Bagh to start their assigned assurance and natural capacity to resolve the work in Task Force Elefant. problems they faced. Notwithstanding the dis 'The express ions of wonder, that the Italian soltance from our own country, the disrupting cond iers had read in the eyes of the Pakistani peop le s, dit ions, the difficulties of protection faced and all in seeing these large vehicles plough along their with extremely heavy machinery, and so today I broken roads in that so unfortunate zone of the can say that the faith in the Italian Army, the world, from the moment of their arrival, they had Armed Forces, has been repaid valiantly. You accompanied t he m until t he end of their work. have the recognition of the civil and military What the Italian soldie rs had seen change," continauthorities, here in Italy and internationally, but ues the Lieutenant," in fifty days of work in favour above all of the population that you have helped. of t he earthquake struck people was the attitude You have brought inspiration to humanity." of the people! "Day after day the suspicion transformed first into curiosity and finally into admiration and gratTASK FORCE "ELEFANTE" itude. At the start of t he Operation the Bagh ¡population watched with suspicion these soldiers What is Task Force "Elefante"? It's the name given d ressed in strange clothing and camouflage to the Italian Mission in Pakistan , to the group of

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the perimeter wall, like the Boys Co ll ege o r t he Boys School. With every project the Italian Contingent moved closer and closer to the heart of t he city, ever closer the market square. "The population continued to carry out thei r daily life even though many of the buildings had been destroyed in the earthquake. Amongst t he mountains of rubble there was a barber, with a client sitting on the unmistakable chair having hi s hair cut and his beard trimmed. A short distance away two firemen were washing their red fireengine in what remained of their fire station. "In this context, somewhat surreal , excavation s, loadings, earth shifting and a continual stream of vehicles with ' Italian Army' written on the side, th e uninterrupted work continued. "By t his point the Italian Contingent had become an integral part of the urban life. In those fifty days the Italian army had had the fortune to see also t he change in behaviour of the local women. At first the faces of the women, at the moment they we re near Italians, became covered with their traditio nal veil and they looked away. "While t hey began as strong , untiring and mod est, the warm nature of the engineers was ab le to pu ll down the barr iers between the cultures and also the veils of the woman and the suspicions of the fema le populace. "Significant examples include two road workStrengthening a road after a landslide. sites that were reconstructinq a collapsed wa ll along the road Arja-Bagh. Near the work the re was a female school. Ini tially the girls , whe n colours with a three coloured shield , green, white, passing infront they covered their faces w ith red, on their left arm . blue veils. As the work progressed so did t he 'The symbol of a nation , geographical ly and culesteem and trust in the Italian Army, and so in turally far away, had come slowly slowly to symthis brief time the engineers had the fortune to bolize fraternity that the popu lation of Bagh eventual ly see faces cha racterised by startl i ng proudly displayed back to our looks, alive and f ull of life as soldiers, busy with their any young girl of that age. machines removing the rubble, '' By then the Italian Con"Some girls were 'courahittin g dangerous buildings and geous' and offered a greeting tingent had become an inteflatten ing the ground for subsein English to the soldiers, w it h quent rebuilding, all accompa- gral part of that particular a smile and a timid gesture of nied by the phrase 'ltal ian my urban context ,, the hand . Once again the friends ' street li ghts started to work, "The eyes of the population now all the night could be lit. were no longer small cracks but had become large, "And in the orange light one sees the population light and laughing. The population had wanted to of Bagh and the friend of the policeman, who every talk to the Italian engineers to understand what day regulates the traffic on the access bridge into places they had come from, if they were married or the city, greeting Task Force Elefante that had disif they had any children. In short they wanted to charged its mandate and is returning to Italy. know al l about their new friends t hat, with smiles on their lips, covered in dust, they worked al l day to the point where only the stee l parts of the tools CONCLUSIONS were visible. "In itial ly the tasks assigned to the Italian Starting a month ' later' than the other counCon tingent were in the periphery of the city of tries, the work of the Ital ia n Contingent - conBagh, like the electrical power station, or around structed for this particular mission - was

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extreme ly appreciated, above al l tak ing into account the capacity of how the enginee rs could express themselves with the tools they had at the ir disposa l. In fact the sa me spo ke sm en of NATO, James Appat hurai, in reference to the impressions made by the Deputy Supreme Allied Com mander Europe (DSACEUR) - Generale Sir John Reit h, Briti sh, - on occasio n of his visit to the effected area s in Jan u ary 200 6 had exp ressed his compliments from all of the Alliance to Italy for its important role in bringing aid to the Paki stan peopl e, above all thanking the heavy machin ery. In parti cular, Gene ral Reith was very favourably struck by how much the Italians had done in such a small amou nt of ti me, removing an inc red ible amount of rubble, showing t he unq ue stionable value of its eq uipment. From the national point of view, to be able to send in good time a high quality specialist Contingent t hat's capacity, work load, stamina at a distance far from home is valued, surely means another objective has been reached for our armed forces in the continual process of transforming what we have al ready started. Fin ally a simpl e co nsid eration connected to the occurrence of natural calam ities eve r more unpred ictable and with effects ever more disas trous. Remembering that the Italian te rritory is stretch ed over a tecton ic p late, whose movements can cau se ea rthqu akes, we are certainly conscious of our own country being at high risk.

A view of the destruction caused by the earthquake.

We can not understate t he possib i l ity of intervention, for emergenc ies, in ou r te r r itory and , consequently, the emp loying of a minimum amount of resou rces for i nvestment o r at least keepi ng the level of equ ipmen t for our engi neers, and so guarantee th ei r capac ity in thi s spe cific sector. Antonello Carpino Colonel, Commander, 6th Engineer Regiment

Serena Sartini , Journalist

NOTE

(l) In April 1997, during a NATO meeting for the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPEC), the Russ ian Federation proposed the increased cooperation within international aid in case of disasters. Recognizi ng the importance of such an initiative, on the l 7th December 1997 in a ministers session, the Euro- Atlantic Partne rs hip Council (EAPC) formalized the proposal to create such a capacity. The Euro- Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre was inaugurated on the 3 rd June 1998.

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THE <<PzH 2000>> SELF-PROPELLED GUN Its technical characteristics make it flexible and suitable for employment in any operational theatre. In the envisaged procurement programme, the Italian Army requested all the guarantees that can ensure an ade quate logistic support for the future.

In 1994, while the programme of transformaassisted projectiles an d 40km with assisted protion of the self- propel led Ml09G into the M109L ject iles of the "base bleed" type. wit h a 155/39 barrel (concluded in 1996) was The barrels and the propelling ch arg es have under way, the Army General Staff was monitorbeen developed according to the common military in g with particu lar interest the development of requirements defined by t he Joi nt Wo rki ng Grou p new weapon systems, with a view of equ ipping on Ballistics which includes France, Ge rmany, Italy, the artille ry units with a new self-propelled gun the United Kingdom and the United States. which, following NATO ' s t rends It has an automatic shellconcern ing the modernization , , loading system, which permits of th e artillery systems, could ... the Army General Staff a substant ial reduction in the permit to achieve ranges of singled out the PzH 2000 tim es of inte rve ntio n, w hi le 40km, and improve the rate and howitzer as the system that, en suring a high firing rate , so accuracy of fire while ensuring , as regards performance and t hat a sing le howi tzer can at the same t:me , a redu_ct1on of characteristics could totally develop an amount of f ire the systems vulnerability, in h ' ¡ f equal to that of three Ml 09L order to give to the crews amp le meet t .e req U I re me nts 0 self-propelled gu ns. In pracpossibilities of surviva l. the Service ' ' tice, a battal io n with three sixAccording to the results of an piece batteries develops a volinternational technical-eco ume of f ire almost t hree times nomic survey cond uct ed by the General that of t he present M l 09L and can simultaneousDirectorate of Land Armaments on the self-proly intervene on a target with 3- 5 ro unds fired by pelled guns already developed or in an advanced a single howitzer (Multipl e Round Simultaneous stage of development, the Army General Staff Impact). si ngled out the PzH 2000 howitzer as the system The PzH 2000, which is planned as a f ire unit that, as regards performance and characteristics, that can automatically and autonomous ly manage could totally meet the requirements of the all firing operat ions, can posi t ion itself, make fi re Service. preparations (releasing the anchorage of the g un, sighting, load ing the firs t shell), car ry out a mis sion with 10-shot volleys and resume moveme nt GENERAL FEATURES in less than 2 minutes , ensuring a remarkable level of su rvivability in case of counter-battery fire. The PzH 2000 was conceptually born in Germany at the end of the eighties, afte r the conclus ion of the SP 70 programme in which , beside Germany, TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES Italy and Great Britain partic ipated . Krauss-Maffei Wegman (KMW) deve loped and Before analys ing in detail the main techn ical and produced 185 systems for the German Army, and operational characteristics of the weapon system they entered into service in Germany in 1998 we wish to high light th e technical adm in istrative (actually the deve lopment was done by Wegman activities that have permitted t o reali ze the proalone, since Krauss-Maffei was incorporated later). gramme. Armed with a 155/52 gu n, it employs modular On the basis of th e Army Ge neral Staff' s decisio n propelling charges with a range of 30km with nonto acqu ire the syste m, in July 1995 the German

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count erpart pressed for the timely start of the ini t iatives necessary for sign ing a Memorandum of Understand ing (MoU). On the industrial plane, the German company Wegman and the Ital ian Oto Melara, still in 199S, signed a preliminary agreement of industrial and commercial cooperation for the production of the self-propelled gun. Later the Army General Staff confirmed its interest in t he German programme, proposing the signature of a "Letter of Intents" aimed at laying the foundations of a successive legal-adm inistrative agreement between the two Governments, in order to safeguard the rights of the administrations and of the manufacturers. This letter, signed in October 1996 by the Min ister of Defence, in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff Committee , envisaged the acquisition of 94 weapon systems . Later on, owing to the Service's reorganization process, aimed at achieving a new structure corresponding to the foreseeable tasks and the financial resources , the order was reduced to 70 systems. In October 1998 the Minister of Defence , considering the favourab le opinion of the Parliament's Def ence Committees, decreed the approval of a "long-term programme" for the acquisition of seventy PzH 2000 howitzers, with a

11.

3/2006

Title pages and above. A PzH 2000.

1S5 /S 2 barrel. On October 2, 2000, at th e end of a long series of meetings, Italy and Germany signed a b ilateral MoU, which included the Industrial Agreement signed in March of the same year by t he lveco-Fiat-Oto Melara (CIO) consortium, fo r Italy, and by Krauss-Maffei - Wegm ann (KMW) for Germany. The main aspects of the MoU concerned : the development of a national contract with the lveco-Oto Melara Consortium for the supply of 70 self-propelled guns, 2 of which were to be taken from the German production line, in order to "ltalianize" the system; the supply of a "Block Garantie" logistic support by the industry; the possibility of starting a Common ltalo-Ge r man Integrated Logistic Support (with the prospect of involving other poss i ble PzH-e q uipped Countries). T his could be realized by wo rk ing out a specific MoU for the jo int acquisition of spare parts, test equipment and special implements; the institution of an Ital ian liaison Officer at the German Federal Agency for Technology and Procurement (BWB), with the task to coordinate

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Fig. 1

L52 Barrel

Ballistic protection

L 52- Barrel

the activities connected with the operational reduce the wear a nd tear problems of the gu id aspects of configuration , production, training ing band of the shel ls, due to the longer barrel; and logistic support. internal chromium plating of about 2500m m , On December 13, 2002, the start i ng from the breech, to Defence Administration and the reduce the wear and tear; t he lveco - Oto Melara Consort ium "full" part of the grooves are (C/O) signed a co ntract which ' ' ... the Defence Administrahardened through a laser provides for the delivery of 70 tion and the lveco- Oto Melara process i n the final part howitzers between 2006 and Consortium (CIO) signed a towards the muzzle ; techn ical 2009, and ensures the log istic contract providing for the de- life equal to 2500 rounds at support of a "Block Garantie" maximum charge (6 modtype that covers the period from livery of seventy PzH 2000s ules); length 8 metres and the delivery of the first howitzer between 2006 and 2009 ,, volume of the powder cham to the Service until the year fol ber 23 l itres against the 18.8 lowing the supply of the last litres of the 39 - calibre. system (2010). Furthermore, the self- prope lled gun can use DM 72 modu lar propelling charges, divided into "bottom charge" (2 modules for ranges of 3 to l l km) TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS and "top charge" (6 modules for ranges of 7 to 30/40 km). The l 5 5mm gun of the PzH, with its three comThe DM72 Prope ll ing Charge System can also ponents: breech -block, L52 barrel and muzzle be employed with all 39 - cal ibre weapon sys brake was developed and produced by tems employed by NATO and, compared w ith Rheinmetall. (fig. l ). the "bag type" conventional ones, it offers the In part icular, the L52 barre l is characterized following advantages: easy use and handlin g by a 60 - groove rifling (an improvement, com (less human erro rs); i ncreased firi ng speed; pared to the 48 grooves of the 39 calibre howsimp le logis tics (on ly t wo types of module); itzers now in service with NATO). In order to longer life cycle; use of non-employed modul es;

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sign ifi cant redu ction of res idual combustion produ cts. T he modular propelling ch arge system s can be: 1) cou pled - the vario us mod ules form ing the charge are assembled through ap propriate clutches o r: 2) uncoupled - the . modules that constitute the charge are placed one on top of t he other, w itho ut cl utches. This new syste m of propel ling charges, studied by t he Joint Working Group on Bal listics, has been widely tested and used in many NATO Countries, and can be cons idered t he futu re "standard" system that in the future will replace the one now in use (fig .2).

~.----=---,

I TOP

MOBILITY

Owing to its high d egree of mobility, the PzH 2000 can compete w ith tan ks. The powe r / weight (55 to ns) ratio is sim ilar to that of th e Leopard 1. T his degree of mobility, rather remarkable for an art illery system equipped w ith protection, a 52 cal ibre g un and a considerable availabi lity of munitions, is the result of the high performance of t he MTU MT881 Ka- 500 engi ne (736 kw) mounted on the fro nt of the hull. It is an 8-cylind er directinjectio n, supercharged d iesel engi ne wh ich per m its a maximum speed of 60km / h. Three fuel tanks provide a 420km cruis ing range.

UNCOUPLED

CHARCES

AUTOMATIC SHELL- LOADING SYST EM

T he automatic shell - load ing systems are now almost normal in modern self-pro pelled g uns . They systems permit t o achieve high rates of fire (6- 8 rounds pe r mi nute in t he first 2- 3 min ut es are now the norm) and reduce the physical efforts of the crew in the loadin g proces s. The automat ic shell loadi ng system of the PzH 2 000 can man age up to 6 0 shell s. Th ey are loade d from the back of th e veh icle an d autom atically stored i n th e magazine located in the back, at the ce ntre of t he chass i s. T he automatic loading system i ncludes , tog ether with t he "flick ramme r", a digital co ntrol system for the manageme nt of the she ll supply an d an induction graduation syst em of t he fuses , perm its a rate of fire of 3 rounds in le ss than l O seco nds an d the load i ng of 60 shells by t wo gunners with i n l 2 mi nutes . T he shel l loading system has been realized for moving she lls t o the turret with no li mitation and pe rmi ts a rate of fi re of 3 ro un ds in less than 10 seconds, 8-9 ro unds in a minute and 20 rounds in 3 m inutes. If necessary, t he 60 ro unds stowed can be f ired with continuity, w ithout interruption .

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Trajectory Duration .L8A1 6.L8A1

89 seconds 70 seconds

6.L8A1

60 seconds

7.L8A1

49 seconds

Round no 5 8.L10A1

With an improved automatic loading system, the rate of fire of the PzH 2000 has been f ixed, in a series of tests made in October 1997, at 12 rounds in 59 seconds and 20 rounds in l minute and 47 seconds.

37 seconds

MULTIPLE ROUND SIMULTANEOUS IMPACT (MRSI)

ity of real izing the techn ique called "Mu ltip le Round Simultaneous Impact", which enable s the system to hit a target with more than 2 round s (from three to five) at the same t ime, firing them with a single gun. This is done by app lying procedures, which, through ballistic calculation, enable to find out several trajectories characterized by th e time gaps that the crew needs in

One of the peculiarities that boost the operational capabilities of the howitzer is the possib il-

Basic performance of the PzH 2000

UNDER ARMOUR

< 2 MIN

MOVE

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< 30 SEC

< 1 MIN

COMING INTO ACTION

l 0-ROUND FIRE MISSION

< 30 SEC

COMING OUT OF ACTION

MOVE

Rivista Militare English Eclition 11. 312006

Fig. 4

3.30 m

Ill

GUNNER

COMMANDER

order to conduct t he operations for t he next ar mour that shelte rs the hul l and t he turret it self. interventio ns. The weig ht of th e vehi cle, abou t 60 t ons, partial T he employment of the PzH 2000 in th is new ly reflect s the weight of the armour. On t he ot her role is particularly significant, hand, the limitations caused by since a single piece can be cont he heavy weight are offset by a sidered a fire u nit in every ' ' The limitations due to the hull capable of sup po rting t he aspect, suitabl e for the determi- heavy weight are offset by a armour's weight and by an nation of the fi ri ng data and the hull capable of supporting eng ine that increases its mobilneutral ization of spot targ ets the armour's weight and by ity. (diamete r 50m or less) ; the vol ula r , the protect ion an engine that enhances its ofIn partic um e of fire strikes the target in t he we apon system mobility,, less t han 3 minutes, a time sufin clud es: b asic protect ion ficient t o neutralize it and perfrom 14.5mm rounds and mit to leave the gun's pos ition artill e ry shrapnel ; add it io na l w ithout ri ski ng po ssibl e enemy reactions (countarmou r ag ainst small bom bs (optional); col le cer-battery fire) (fig. 3). tive system of anti - NBC protection and ventilat ion; alar m and f ire - exting u is hin g automatic system in the engine compa rtment; su bd ivis ion PROTECTION of t he cha rges in t he tu rret into com partments; pe r manent emergency ex it (bac k doo r) . Today, when speaking about protectio n of a self - prope lled gun , th e ref erence standard is given the PzH 2000. The Germans equipped it with a LOGISTICS significant level of act ive and pass ive protect ion. Even if t he roof of t he turret is rather thick, the T he PzH 20 00 is equ ipped wit h a so phisti cat ed system ' s protection can be increased w ith reactive system of se lf-diagnosis (BITE) that, in case of

99 - TECHNE

BLOCK GARANTIE WITH.-- - - - - ----'---------

Fig. 5

T

..... ..

ENSURES

D /

During that pe riod, the industry's techn ician s, along with our Se rvice's specialists, will give t he necessary assistance, ensuring the operabil ity of the system, making use of the equipment provid ed by the industry. In detai l, and provided t hat the employment of the systems and the preventive and corrective ma intenance ' ' During that period, the pertain ing to the crew wi ll have be car ried out directly by our industry's technicians, to mi litary personne l, the industry "BLOCK GARANTIE" a I on g with o u r Se rv ic e ' s will make its techn icians avail The high techno logical level of specialists, will give the ab le on the maintenance places, with the tas k of: carrythe weapon system, together necessary assistance, en w ith the evident complexity of suring the operability of ing out the practical part of the cou rses fo r service engineers the relevant logistic support , the system ,, of the Adhe rence Area; making, convinced the Army Staff to together wit h the personnel of adopt an innovative solution t he Service, the preventive and corrective mainteconsisting in t he request to the in dustry to guarnance be longing to the Adherence Area; organizantee the effic iency of the system in the period ing the transfer of the broken systems from the between the delivery of the first gun until the year maintenance yards to the industry (CIO); testing fo llowing the cons ig nment of the last piece, by t he practical emp loyment of the special tools and carrying out preventive and corrective maintetechnical handbooks and provide the necessary nance.

failure of the electron ic unit, can detect the damaged device and , i n most cases, po int out the element of the system that has to be replaced. The special position of t he devices inside t he vehicle permits the easy replacement of the broken elements, thus reducing the times of technical stops (fig.4).

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Rivista Militare English Edifion n. 3/2006

information about any poss ible modification; keep ing up to date, in cooperation with the personnel of the Italian Army, t he configuration of the weapon system. CIO will also provide, at its own centres, the personnel necessary for: gathering and analysing the data made available by the sites, and those pertaining to t he repairs carried out at the industries (Support Area); the transfer of the devices to be fixed to the industries in charge of the repairs, and vice-versa. In short, the activities of maintenance and repai r are executed at the sites by the industry personnel, with the involvement of military technicians controlled by a service centre of the industry. To this end, the "Block Garantie" envisages a range of services that should ensure the efficiency of t he systems , including research and adoption of corrective measures in case of difficulties, as well as study of the logistic support. At the end of the "Block Garantie" phase, the Service will have at its disposal a data bank, wit h the number and types of the shortcomings found, repairs made and type and number of spare parts employed . All these data will be used in order to define the log istic support of the weapon system, with significant savings. The data concerning the activities carried out at the sites are transmitted to the data bank of the industry, where they are scrutinized in order to detect the critical areas , start corrective actions and establish the Logistic Data Bank. The information t hus collected, and subsequently exchanged betwee n the industry and the Army, concern the data of technical-logistic management (configurations, logbook), maintenance activity (consumption , progress of repairs) , supplying activity (spare parts used, whole, partial) and technical publications. Through the analysis of these data and the scrut iny of those connected with t he "Block Garantie" on the 185 German Pz H 2000s, the Service can decide the type of logistic support needed to assure the operational life of the 70 weapon systems. This is the first time that the Italian Army puts a weapon system into service ensuring at the same time, with the said guarantee, the initial support of the industry and the possibi lity of defining, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the logisti c requirements for the future l ife-cycle (fig.5).

A PzH 2000 with its gun at the highe st elevation.

The PzH 2000, with its very advanced characteristics as regards fi ring rate, precis ion, range, protection and rapidity of deployment, is the most technically advanced system to be found on the market; in our Army is destined to rep lace the Ml 09L self-propelled gun at three Land - Arti llery Regiments (8th "Pasub io", 2 1 st "Trieste" and 132nd "Ariete"). The Ml 09L has been in service since the seventies and has now reached the end of its operational life (25 years). In view of the distribution to the un its, the Army Staff programmed to start, at the Bracciano Artillery School, train ing courses aimed at qualifying the instructors that subseque ntly will train the crews. Meanwhile, CIO has begun the production of the first systems, whose introduction into service is envisaged for the first months of 2007 with the assignation of six PzH 2000s to the Artillery School. Within the first quarter of 2008, the distribution to the "Pasubio" Regime nt w ill be completed and the delivery to the 132nd Regiment wil l beg in. The last PzH w il l be de livered to t he 21 st "T riest e" Regiment in 2009.

CONCLUSIONS Outside Germany t his weapon system is already in service in Greece (24 pieces) and KMW has started the production of 57 guns for Holland.

Pierluigi Genta Colonel, Logistic Division, Army General Staff

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EXERCISE WATC 2005 In Guinea, Ghana and Senegal, the 1 st "Lagunari" Regiment carried out amphibious training activities under the Marines' European Command. Once more our «Fanti da Mar» (Infantrymen of the Sea) have shown that they have acquired the skill and experience that enable them to operate as landing forces from amphibious assault ships.

A un it of the Regiment «Serenissima» participated in the training activity of that the US Marine Corps carries out every two years, off the western coast of Africa, which is cal led West African Training Cruise 2005 (WATC). The aim of the training was to do tra ini ng amphibious activit ies with the Armed Forces of three coast countries: Guinea, Ghana, Senegal. Designed and produced by the European Command of the Marines, who are based in Stuttgart, the activity consisted of three international preliminary meetings which were held in Dresda, Cape Town and Naples, in which some representatives of General Staff and of the <<Lagunari » took part. The Regiment of the «Lagunari» participated in the WATC with a landing platoon that had been

that they have been issued wit h and t hat improves their amphibious capabilities.

A HISTORY WITH VERY ANCIENT ROOTS

The modern «Lagunari>> were founded on 1 5th January 195 1 when an inte rs ervice unit consist i ng of army and navy personnel was establishe d and was cal led «Lagunari Forces Sector». After it had lost eve ry member of the navy and afte r subsequent changes , on 24th May 1967 t he Regiment «Lagunari» was founded . The the n Chief of Staff of the army gave it the name of «Serenissi ma», rega rding t he «Lagu nari» as descendants of «Fanti da Mar», the embarked troops of the «Serenissima» Republic of Ven ice strengthened as prin cipal comrionpnt of multiwhich were founded back in l 202 by the doge national amphibious force. They spent 5 7 days Enrico Dandolo. Today, th e on board two American ves«Lag un ari» wear o n their un isels: the floating dock landing forms symbols and colours , ship USS «Gunston Hall» and a the training like fac ing s, which rem ind us swift troopsh ip USS «Swift». ' ' During of those noble Venet ian Dur in g the training cruise , the cruise , the amphibious as amphibious assets of the sets of the «Lagunari» «landing forces»; even the «Lagunari» were used by all turned out to be the back- war-c ry «San Marco», wh ich th ey proudly sing out d uri ng part icipants and turned out to bone of all activities con every military ceremony, can be the backbone of all activi ducted on both the ocean be traced back to the «Fant i d a ties that were conducted in the Mar». Consequently, their ocean and on the African and the African rivers , , sense of ident ity is sharpened rivers. by the overseas deeds in The «Lagunari» had already which the embarked m il itias of the done several training embarkations on American «Seren iss ima» d ist ing uished themse lves for six troopships but they had always operated in t he cent uries: from t he capture of Zara and Mediterranean. T he WATC was t he first multinaByzantium to the sieges of Candia, Famagosta tional training to have some un its of the Regiment and the famous victory of Lepanto. The landing on the African coast and operating in the Regiment seems like a recently established un it. Atlantic Ocean. Actually, its essence, traditio ns and symbol s Before des cribing in detail the activities that have distant origi ns and bring to mind an illuswere done during the WATC to fu lly un derstand trious past. Being «Lagunare» means perpetuathow the «Lagu nari» have acquired ability and ing this heritage of glory and bravery and lookexperience to operate on board amphibious ing beyond t he sea like their Ve netiam ancesassau lt ships like a landing force, it is useful to tors . In addition, th e Regiment is stationed in cover the history of this Reg iment in orde r to th ree different places in the surrou nd ings of understand the cu ltural framework of the Venice. One of these headquarters is situated o n «Lagunari» by refe rring to the special equipment

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mortar company, an antitank company and an amphib ious tactical support company which cise. in cludes amph ibious as sau lt force~ dr1 cl the spe Above. cial amp hibio us platoo n. With regard to vehicles, An AAV- 7 RAM RS amphibious assault craft. the Reg im ent is issu ed with the dou bl e mechani zed (VCC2) and amph ib ious line, with a rang e of specific mate rials: an amphibious assault an island of the lagoon , w hich is u sed as an vehicle AAV- 7 RAM RS (desi g ned in the United am phi biou s base , ma kin g its li nk with the lagoon States) with diffe ren t mod els (amphibious city even more direct. assault and recovery) with which even the Marines are i ssue d (at the moment, the «Lagu narb}- iss ue mode l is the most advanced) ; EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS an assault boat that is able to carry a well eq uipp ed team and is fitted The «Lagunari» Reg iment i s with a 1 l 5 horsepower outo ne of a ki nd in the Italian board engine; an inflatable army with r egard to orga niza- ' ' The "Lagunari" identity is boat Zod iac FC 470 with a 40 the great overseas horse power en gin e, autotional stru ct ure, trai ning and kindled equipment. It has been profes- deeds in which the embarked i nflatable and air droppable sionalized fo r m ore th an five militias of the «Serenissima» mat erial th at is known for i ts years and has taken part i n all distinguished themselves for rusticity and ve rs at ili ty; MTP, the prin cipal overseas missions land ing crafts that are able to centuries .. . , , that the armed force has percarry a maxim um of 3 0 fo rmed in th e last yea rs . The eq uip ped men ; crafts of diforg anizat ional structure conferent d imensions and tonsis t s of the Comm a nd and Company nag e for all the tra inin g and log istica l activit ies Headquarters Logistical Support and the l st of the Regiment; special underwater material Ba tta lio n «Lag un ari» , which is the operationa l that is used by the special amphibious platoon, pawn of the Regim ent. In th e Battal ion th ere are which is a reconn aissan ce pawn of th e batta lio n three amphibi ous fusil ier companie s, a heavyconsisting of rigorously sele cted and well trained Title pages.

«Lagunari» on board a rubber dinghy during an exer-

by

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ship, was aimed at establishing a mu lt inatio nal landing force consisting of a platoon of t he Marines, an infantry platoon of Spanish navy and the un it «Lagunari» that would embark on tw o American shi ps . Thi s activity invo lved employing 46 «Lagun ari» : an Official of t he Staff of CLF; an Official Commande r; an amphibious fus ilier platoon; a unit of ten amphibious scouts (five of whom worked underwater); t hree teams AAV-P7; a t eam AAV-P7; a t eam of craft pilots. In t he f inal phase of th e t ra ini ng, as the Chi ef of Staff dec ided , a team of l O men on foot of t he Reg iment «San Marco» of t he navy join ed th e unit «Lagunar i». Afte r conducti ng a brief traini ng of «ama lgam» in Venice, where the Regimen t is stationed, du ri ng th e WATC the team of the navy was placed under the Command of the Captai n of the «Lagunari», Commander of Ital ian unit , making use of the means that the «Lagunari» had put at t heir disposal. The «Lagunari» and th e «Maro» of the «San Marco» shared an impo rtan t experience. This al lowed t he small un it of t he Marines t o i nteg rate i nto the amphibious un it of the army quickly. As mentioned above, the Regiment «Laguna r i» provided t he multinational unit WATC with a si gnificant number of la nding crafts (in all, seve nteen crafts): three amphibious assault perso nne l vehicles AAVP7; an amphibious assault recovery vehicle (AAVR7), th ree assault boats; six assaul t in flatable boats Zodiac FC4 70; three VM T 90 fitted with a boat trolley used fo r carrying small assau lt boats; a van «Ducato» in support of scuba diving operato rs . The American contri b uAlso the special amphibious platoon took part in the tion consisted of landing ships with two LCU (big exercise. crafts for transport), logi stica l support and some wheeled vehicles, whereas the Spanish co nt r ibution was re stricted to t w o people. Its organ izationa l i nflatable boats with out board structure, the equ ipment and engine . Though t he numbe r of th e con s iderab le experience ' ' ... one can see that the parti cipants was li mited , th e that sp rings from a f ifty- year- "Lagunari" Regiment is Regiment «Lagu na r i» lo ng amphibious t raining show perfectly capable of being employed «reconnoitrers » of th at t he Regiment is perfectly embarked on any amphibi - the la nd in g beac h, land i ng ab le to be embarked on any ous unit of the NATO/EU means and person ne l wit h d ifamph ibio us u nits of marine Navies to perform the ferent vehicles (boats , sma ll NATO /E U to serve its own functions of landing force assau lt boats, amph i bious functions of landing force assa ult vehicles) , lo gist ica l without requ i ring any external without requiring any real means (recovery vehicle) and support ,, cooperation. the Comma nd and Co ntro l (St aff of Commander Landing Fo rce) . EXERCISE WATC In add ition, during t he last phase of the training that took place in Senegal, the m ult in ational un it As mentioned above, a unit of the Regiment WATC integrated into an amp hib ious operation «Serenissima» took part in the amphibious t raining under the English leaders hi p, participating in the «West African Training Cruise» in the western train ing Gree n Osprey that had been organi zed Africa. The training, unde r the American leade rand conducted by an amphibio us task force of the

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Rivista M1/Jtare l::ng/1s11 1=.a,110 11 rl. Jl«Uuo

showed. In fact , a special military ceremony took place in the Ministry of Defence in the p resence of the accred ited ambassad ors and mil itary attach es. Ghana After the re-e mbarkati on form Gui nea, the amphibious force headed for Ghana. During the navigation, they did other tech nical training in the daytime and at night to improve the «amalgam» of the unit. Once they had arrived off the coast of Ghana, a team of am phibious scouts was entrusted with the task of carryi ng out special patrols in the selected landing beach , in th e area of Secondi, using subm arine eq uipme nt they were issued with. After having taken a company of fu siliers of the Above and right. Two pictures of the floating dock on the landing ship USS «Gunston Hall» that facili tates the operations of floating and re -embarking craft.

British Royal Marin es, as well as by Norwegian, Dutch, French, Danish and local amphi biou s troops .

EXERCISE WATC: ACTIVITIES In Napl es the unit of the «Lag unari » em barked o n the ship USS «Gunston Hall» which headed for the Spanish base of Rota to take the remaining Spanish and American personnel on board. Duri ng the oceani c navig at io n , the cohes ion of the unit WATC in creased gradually on board the landing ship, taki ng numerous and mutual les sons on materials, r adio systems, usual pr ocedures, doing target practice at sea and focu sing on pre paratory activ ities for the following land ing phases .

Guinea The first nat ion to be v is it ed was Guin ea, where the unit WATC operated in t he exercise area of Benti. Th ey arrived there by sea. Th e ex erci se area is situated on the estu ary of a large river, wh ere they d id inte nsive trainin g to carry out «riverine» operations by using i nflatable boats and facing the dangers of the great African waterways. Once they had landed , th ey undertook lots of activit ies to try techniques for ambushes and movements i n the th ick jungle of Africa. Th e Armed Forces of Gui nea appeared to be ful ly satisfied with the qua lity of the joint exercis e as the promotiona l activities that the Italian u nit did at the end of the operations

Ghanaian navy on board the ship «Gunston Hall», they did an interesting amphibious assault training when the sea was very rough. Then , the landing units head ed for th e Jung le Warfa re School of the Ghanaian Armed Forces, 80 kilometres away from the landing beach to d o four- day training activities that were aimed at planning and leading a surprise at tack in the jung le. In add iti on , t hey us ed a small arms range with un moving and movi ng targets in the dense local vegetation. The amphibious scouts focused on t he trai ning and perfected the techniques for carrying out patrols and identifying targets in the jung le. Afte r their return to the ship, which had been docked at the port of Takoradi, official ceremon ies took place in the presence of local authorit ies and the accredited ambassadors.

Senegal After sailing back , the amphi bious force headed for Senegal. During the navigation th ey carried on doing all preparatory and o rganizational activities

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Above. Rubber dinghies set sail off the Senegalese coast.

Below. «Lagunari», Marines and Ghanaian infantrymen on board a US LCU getting ready for landing.

for the future training that they had to face, as well as the maintenance work and the tidying up of materials that had been employed. They also did target practice at sea. When the ships reached port in Dakar, t he bulk of the multinational un it WATC moved to the Infantry School of Senegalese Army

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that is situated in Thies , whereas t he amph ibious scouts of the <<Lagunari» headed for the base camp of the battalion «Recon» of the British Royal Marines in Kaolack, 200 kilometres away fro m Dakar. During the ir stay in Senegal, the ent ire multinational unit WAT C integrated into t he Command and Control of the British amph ibi ous force t aking part in t he different planned t rai ning activities. In detail, we shou ld mention the most important activities that took place du ring m ore than two weeks of intense joint exercise with out interruption. After the initial contacts w it h t he Britis h Officials to plan t he activities of the patrol amphibious unit, the amph ibious sco ut s «Lagunari» did their first thirty-six-hour ope rational exercise in the Senegalese savannah , a co nt inual tra ining exercise in target id entification, cover fire and barrage, and assault on target; th e fusi liers and the other personnel performed many different exercises. They had theoretic less ons on amphibious raids and NEO (Non - Combata nt Evacuation Ope ration) for the final exercise Royal Chamo is. The unit WATC took part with t he Royal Marines in joint exercises using diffe rent kinds of

mines and doing practical demonstrations (for example, hand ling explosives for demolition work, setting booby traps usin g C4 and building exp losive circuits). The instructors came from the Britis h Royal Marines and the American Marines. During t he day and at night target practice was done with

RMsta Mili/ore English Edition n. 3/2006

A «Lagunari» team regroups after landing.

t hat were provided by the «Lag unari» w ere profitably employed: assault inflatable boats Zodiac, small assau lt boats and amphibious as sau lt veh idifferent weapons. Soldie rs w ere dril led in com bat cle AAV- 7 w hich sailed for the coast and navigatin the built- up areas an d with the ins tructors of ed the w id e local r ivers to do the plan ned activithe Royal Marines they practiced hand - to- hand ties. It should be noted that one of t he distinfighting. They also did t he theguished featu res of all training o retic and practical t raining to activit ies was a high degree of make inspections of su spicious reali sm. Th e Non -Combatant ' ' The amphibious scouts Evacuatio n Operations, which ships . The train ing activity reached component focused on were in oppositio n to hostile the most i mportan t m o ment the specific training and forces, set a perfect exam ple. with a majo r exerci se in the area perfected the techniques They were real prisons fo r civilof Tobacouda. The first Non- of reconnaissance and ian hostages w ith the «cooperCombatant Evacuation of an ent ire village , target acquisition in the ation» which w as invo lved in the train Operation un der the Brit is h leadership took place w ith a fol- jungle ,, i ng as theatre of rescue operalowi ng exh i b ition on tion. T he closi ng ceremony of «Lagunari»- i ssue means of the training Green Osprey took transport and materials that was attended by releplace i n Fat ick (230 kilometres away from Dakar) vant auth orities. After the re- embarkation t hey in the presence of the Senega lese Prime Mini ster started to prepare t he fi nal phase of the trai ning and Min ister of Defence, lots of ambassadors, thoroughly which incl uded such activities as infilamong whom the Italian ambassador , as well as tration of scouts fo r target id entification, am phibim ilitary attaches and a large aud ience. After these ous raid s and another bigger NEO. During these activities , during the navigation they com me nted act ivities, which we re very compl ex in terms of on what t hey did: lessons and pract ical o perations (mainte nance of vehicles and materials). rhe Command and Control, all the amphibious assets

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A landing craft leaving USS «Cunston Hall».

and the unusual environment in which lots of operations were conducted (they experienced great difficulties in navigating the African r ivers American ships headed for the base of Rota, where near th e estuaries w ith the t ide of t he Atlantic and the Americans and the Spanish landed. Then , only th e dark nights in the jungle) increased the coh ethe troopship USS «SWIFT» headed for the port of sion of the international personnel, the spirit of Venice where the unit «Lagu nari» set foot in its sacrifice and the comradeship. native soil again and completed an unforgettable Without any doubt, the t rainin g has had lots of and invaluable training activity. consequences for the «Lagunari». Firstly, they were allowed the possibility of operating and launch in g the amph ib io us assets on board landing ASSESSING THE EXERCISE ships off the Atlantic coast: it was the crowning achievement of the amphibious training that was During the WATC, the unit «Lagunari» was ab le being conducted by the Regiment «Lagunari». to conduct different activities such as: amph ibious Secondly, they were able to confront t he li fe on assaults ; amphibious rai ds; «riverine» operations; board a land ing ship and this has improved thei r reconnaissance activity of landing zones; training professional skills. Thirdly, operating in unusual in target identification; training latitudes and in hostile natural in combat in the jungle; target environments has broadened practice with small arms; traint heir experience. In additio n, ing in setting afloat amphibious ' ' ... the participation in during the WATC they had the vehicles in the sea and in recov- WATC caused a great im opportunity to test amphibious ering and taking them on board age spin - off for the Italian vehicles, crafts and diffe rent landing ships; Non-Combatant Army and the Nation as a materials in particular waters Evacuation Operation; refining and in unfamiliar environments. whole ,, combat strategies in built- up Lastly, as far as the t rain ing in areas. the African countries is conDuri ng the trai ning activities, cerned, it is important to stress the comparison between techniques and procethe quality of Jung le Warfare School of Ghana dures used by the principal world amphibious where they took part in fruitful exercises with forces enabled the participants to develop highly highly qualified instructors . To conclude, it is in professional skills. The cohab itatio n in small ships their own interests to increase this «mutual

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ex change». T heir aim is to shar pen their military skills. T he t raining activity WAT C can d o t his very costly-effect ively.

CONCLUSIONS The West African Trai ning Cru ise 200 5 turned out to be a golden o pportunity to improve the amphibious t rai ning of t he embarked units al lowing the «Lagu nari» to operate on board the alli ed land in g ship s to increase t he knowledge of t he procedu res for launching into the sea the am phibious assets that t he Regi ment was issued with . T aking part in the WATC has revived t he imag e of the Italian ar my and the entire nation , becau se the training cruise has been a rel evant activity for the host African countries and has brought the participants comin g from sea into th e spot light . In fact , at t he end of these activities, highly in st itu tional military ceremo nies and convivial receptions took place in th e presence of govern ment repre-

Above. Reorganizing after landing.

Below. A team of «Lagunari» embarking on their craft in the floating dock of USS «Guns ton Hall».

-~-

sentatives and the accredi ted ambassadors. The local med ia coverage has been cons iderabl e exact ly li ke t he spont aneou s popular partici pat ion of t he pop ulation in all th ese eve nts. Tak ing part in the training enables the nation to report to other countries with highly professio nal mil itary sk ulls . To con cl ude, the partici pat ion of t he «Lagunari » in the WATC, which has invo lved operations in unfamiliar environ ment s (e.g. the savan-

nah of Senegal , the jungle of Ghana and Guinea), has bee n a good train ing opportunity and has proved t hat the Reg iment «Sereni ssima» is capable of operating easily on board landing shi ps of any NATO and EU country. Giovanni Parmiggiani Lieutenan t Colonel, Commander of a "Lagunart' Battalion

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VALUES AND TECHNOLOGY The real essence of a modern Army The road that leads to the growth and development of the individual and the organization goes necessarily through study, research, tradition and innovation. Although technology is the most concrete and visible element, ethical values remain the foundations for a well-balanced and effective action.

Whoever theorizes without knowing data tends to change facts to adapt them to theories, not to revise theories to adapt them to facts. Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930)

In the last few years, science has changed our way of working, acting and communicating rad ically. Modern technologies have paved the way for extraordinary innovations in lots of fields , creating

new opportunities and setting great value on everyone's life. Consequently, in order to be competitive both individuals and organizations must show wi lli ngness to follow new trends, cooperate with thei r own kind and pay attention to the feedback of the ir actions. Scientific progress springs from a gradual process of global innovation concerning the cultural, social and ethical aspects of the western civilization. With regard to t hi s, we can focus our attention on some events of tra nsition which have made t he evolution of our civil ization patchy and studded with turning points . Going into detai l , the technolog ical development has always produced changes not only in the ways of organization and in the use of military force. It has also changed its significance and t he way it can be used to achieve political objectives affectin g the schemes aimed at conducting military operations. The spread of the computer science has transformed both t he economy and t he strategy. T he

Title pages. A Bv 206 tracked vehicle of the alpine troops. Right. The equipment of the ÂŤFuture SoldierÂť.

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Rivista Militare English Edition n. 3/2006

Fig. 1 transm ission and sharing of knowledge in real ca l progress has produ ced pos itive effects in d if t ime have become a f undame ntal factor to maxiferent sectors and, above all , changes in t he m ize the potent ial of human and materia l attitude to l if e and in the mora ls, sett ing new resources . prior it ies and dist orting the rea l mean i ng of T he use of knowledge does not consume it. It essential va lue s. gene rates ot her knowledge . Th is is a decis ive eleThese changes of society (va lues of reference ment in a context of wid espread uncert ainty and and instrument s of action) are «interna l». unpred ictab ility in wh ich t he new tasks must be However, t here has been also a radical «external» f ulfilled , sin ce the operat ions are mu lt inational change which has been caused by t he parti cular and interservice and require t he emp loyment of situation where the m ilitary inst rument has to units that enabl e us to use force only if necessary. operat e. We have to carefully cons ider the change s affectTh e w o r ld and t he strategic con t ext have ing not only the po lit ical-stratec hanged radica lly: concepts g ic context but also sociology l ik e security, def ence , twoand ethics of the contemporary party system, threaten, mi litary systems i n o rder t o ''· ..the technological progress natio nal i nte re sts are consi d evaluate the enormous impact has produced positive effects ered in a di fferent way from of tec hno logical development of in different sectors and, above how they were regar ded te n arms and organ izational struc- all, changes in the attitude to years ago . ture. What is the fit rouge that can life ... , , All human actions are perlead the organ izat ion and the formed i n a moral order t hat individua l to act in a cons isorig in ates from a social d iscit ent and effect ive way7 What is pli ne based on ethi cal principles and respect of t he element that could rep resent a guidel i ne? nat ural and f undamental human r ig hts. However, How does innovation comb ine wit h trad ition it is not easy to spot ethical values in a ch anging with i n our m il itary wor ld? societ y. Th ese que st ions have aro used our personal and Even t houg h th e m ilitary world tries to adhere profess io nal curios ity. We hope they also draw the t o bas ic eth ical princi ples, inevit ab ly it acqu ires reader's attention , in search of poss ible and not the q ualities and fau lts of the contemporary pure ly doct r inal answers . society, beca use of its role w ith i n the communi T he fol lowing paragraph wi ll outline the hi stori ty. Th erefo re, it is nece ssary to underli ne the cal evo lution of tactics and techniques , referring to content of milit ary and profess iona l eth ics, so me battles or campaigns of great importance fo r • alt hough t hese pr inciples are shared by all sol the part icular arms and system s that were used to di ers; only their «comb inat ion» has changed as fi g ht t hem . After that , we will do an analysis of t he time has gone by. «set of values» t hat has always rep resented a refIn the post- industrial soc iety, the tec hno log ierence point of action , as a heritage of all fighters,

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in accordance with the contemporary technologi cal progress.

HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY

T he topic of war has always been related to the history of civilization, touching all its aspects: culture, economy, politics, t ec hnology as well as the essentia l components of intelligence, courage, astuteness, intu ition and even the luck of a combatant, Commander or soldier. The primitive warrior is fighting spirit. At times, it is pure instinct. The hero is considered a lonely being, inevitably doomed to fighting. That kind of mystic insanity t hat d rives him to t he fighting is t he mirror of the celestial favour. The clash between two armies represents a «judicial» duel in which the Gods choose which part has the right to win the battle. With the dawning of the po/is, war lost its individual dimension which was replaced by a collective action. The Homeric «prince» was no longer in charge of this kind of combat. The property owners, as a class of people of equal dignity even at political level, had responsibility for that. Therefore, the hoplites were in charge of war. They formed a compact group and were heavily armed to be able to resist the col lis ion with another army when t hey closed ranks. T he birt h of the phalanx

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was due to a slow and gradual process: it dates back to this period but it became in common

usage only from the middle of the seventh century B.C. This first important tactical revolutio n was caused not by the adoption of the big Argive shield, the hop/on (figure l ), after which th e hoplite was named, but by its hilt with a double support consisting of a sling and a grip. As we l l as arms, even the conduct of sold iers and the concept of war underwe nt a lot of changes . Easier to handle and more effective , the hop/on could cover not only the pe rson who carried it but also the fellow man on the left. Whereas the Homeric hero could get rid of his shield easily , the hoplite, who was in t he ranks, could not abandon his weapon or else he would compromise the compactness of the formation and betray his f el low men (figure 2). In this sense , the battle that was fought by the Thebans against the Spartans in Leuttra i n 371 B.C. is significant. In the spring-summer of that year a Spartan army under the Command of King Cleombroto invaded Boeotia and pitched camp in the plain of Leuttra, next to the walls of Thebes. The Spartan army consisting of 14 000 men was deployed in front of the enemy as usual; on t he right side, in a pos ition that was t radit ional ly considered the most honourable, th ere was the elite of 2000 Spa rta n hoplites with

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flex i ble organizational schemes, which re lied on t he combative skills of each soldier. Hence the «classical» form of the legion: the so - called velites, who acted as scouts and vanguard, led t·he legion w hi ch was divided, in depth, in three successive lines: hastati, principes and triarii. They were the backbone of the Roman heavy i nfantry a nd we re deployed on the ground so that the maniples of soldiers formed an ideal chessboard. Even this second strategy did not solve the prob lems that the guerrilla warfare had posed after the conquest of the Iberian te rritories .T hey came up with a solution by adopting an organizational u nity that is midway between the maniple and the leg ion, the coho rt . It usuall y consisted of t hree man ip les of hasta ti, principes and triarii which carr ied the same the King . About 9000 Thebans adopted an innovative tactical disposition which was still unknown in the battles of hoplites. In fact, considering that the phalanxes , because of their armament, tended to divert to the right side to protect themselves with the shield of their fellow men on the left side , in order to upset the enemy army Epaminondas decided not to offer the right flank of his army (figure 3) - i n contrast to what they used to do in that period and adopted a more oblique disposition wh ich was much deeper on the left (50 ranks instead of the usua l l 2) by which he would try to break t hrough the enemy lines conclusively on the Spartan right side , exactly where the King Commander was. The tactical option, tog ether with the Theban strict discipline, all owed the Thebans to defeat the strongest army of that period. numbe r of order : the men who were on the first Of course, the phalanx had a gradual developli ne were equipped with long arms and each ment (for example, the Macedon ian phalanx laid soldier could rely on the protection an d help of the foundations for the enveloptheir fel low men again (figure ment), but this basic operational 4) . strategy would not change in the The key facto r to achieve foll owing centuries and it would ''The topic of war has aland maintain the domi nation be adopt ed by other populaces. ways been related to the of Rome was neit her the arms Even the Roman legion originathistory of civilization, nor the t actics: it was the ed from the hoplite phalanx but touching all its aspects· organizational, mat erial and it moved in the opposite direc- culture, economy, politics, cu ltural superiority of a civi tion. lization. technology .. . ,, Originally, the pri ncipal arm T he batt le of Alesia ( 52 of Legio nnaires was still the B.C.) , where op erational and spear the f irst class consisted mi l itary efficiency enabled of actu al hoplites and this tactical model lasted Cesar to suppress the Gallic rebellio n, gives us • until the Punic wars, as the manoeuvre of the tria good examp le of this . The populaces of arii shows. cisalpine Gaul revo lted aga inst Rome, but un til The Samnite wars forced the Romans to make 53 B.C. These facts were occasio nal events. transformations and adaptations , streamlining However, the following y ear, the tribes of cen th e heavy c I ose formation, wh i eh was not tra l Gaul managed to re ach an agree m ent, taktrained to comb at on the uneven mountain ing advantage of the absence of Cesar. Th e ground of the Samnium, and planning more chieftain of the Arverni , Vercingetorix , took

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Fig. 5 over t he leaders hip. He represented, together with his supporters, a po in t of reference for anyone who wanted to t ake part to the conspiracy. After different acts of provocatio n which were performed by the Gal lic leader, the re were m i nor conflicts and battles in Cenabum (Orleans), Narbo (Narbonne), Corgobina, Avaricum, Noviodunum (Nevers), Verc ingetorix was ab le t o gather l 5 000 knights and 80 000 infantrymen , consta nt ly trying t o avoid an open f ield battle and focusing h is efforts on guerrilla warfare as wel l as preventing Cesa r' s army from being provided w ith any k ind of supp lies. After a first battle that was fough t nearby Dijon, the rebe ls we re able to take refuge in Alesia i n 52 B.C. , i n Burgundy. The town rose o n a h ill that was 41 8 met res h igh and was situated between the r ivers Ose and Osera in; Vercingetorix dep loyed h is troops at the foot of the walls, o n the eastern part of t he hil l del i m it ing the g round on the externa l side with a r udimentary wa ll that was 2 metres h igh . Before th is great wall there was a moat . Cesar orde red to b ui ld a doub le boundary wa ll. T he external fortificat ion, about 21 k ilo metres long, was designed to repe l the att acks from the plai n and the surro u nd ing hi lls. The

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internal one was about l 7 kilometres . Bot h of them were interspe rsed w it h eight pri nci pal blockhouses and twenty - three second ary b lockhouses . l 00 metres away Cesar ordered t o erect two large moats that were fou r metre s deep and wide (the previous one was six metre s deep and w ide). Th e most i nternal one was filled with t he water of one of t he two rive rs whose course had been diverted . Behind this moat, th reemetre hig h fence s with breastwork were erected . On the rest of the terrep lei n, which sup ported the fences , there were some logs wit h sharp branches t hat w e re aimed towards th e enemy. In add ition, every 25 m et res towe r s were constructed. War machines (p robab ly, t hey were l ight catap ul ts) were placed on the top of the towers . Then, between t he first mo at and the others he o rdered to set a series of man traps: the f i rst one consisted of f if teen l ines of moats where t here were logs wit h interlaced and sharp branches (a sort of barbe d w i re) t hat were embedded in the ground and were ca lled stones. Before t hese, there were eigh t l i nes of sharp posts, whic h were cove red with bushes and were called lilies. Fi nally, there was a set of sta kes wh ich were eq ui pped w ith

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 3/ 2006

iron hooks and were called stimuli. It took the Romans one month to bui ld this wall. During this period, Vercingetor ix sent messengers throughout Gaul and gather a mighty army. To resist the attack of this huge army, Cesar ordered to build the s.ame fortification even aimed towards the outside providing h is seven camps (three camps of infantry and four camps of cavalry) with supplies for more than one month and lots of water coming from the diverted river (figure 5). On the one hand, all these fortifications, together with remarkable ability to exert control and command, enabled the Romans to prevent the Gauls, who had barricaded themselves in Ales ia, from attempting a11y sortie from inside the town. On the other hand, they were able to repel any breakthrough attempt from the outside by the reserve Gallic army. The Gau ls launched the last decisive attack: the soldiers of Vercingetorix and the warriors of Comnius, who had command of reserve army, would attack the fortifications from the ins ide. They were about to succeed in their attempt, but once again the discipline and strength of t he Francis I of Valois, king of Fra11ce, came to Italy Legionnaires prevailed. in l 524 with an army consisting of tens of thou Their organizational skills and, above all, the use sands of men and powerful siege artillery. Since of obstac les as defensive and offens ive weapons they were fewer in number, the im peria l troops this was a real innovation - allowed the legions, retreated behind the line of Adda to wait for which we.re. f e.we.r in numher, to get the better of backup troops. T hey left other units in some fo rthe Gallic forces. T he revolt was crushed - this was t ified towns , among which Pavia whose garrison a warning to all subdued populaces - and t he pax consisted of about 6 000 men (Spanish, was re-established . Germans, Ital ians) and was a thorn in the From t he thirteenth to the French's side. Boosted by their sixteenth century, a profound superiority, Franc is I decided change occurred in the comto launch an assault on the position of European troops, ' ' ... once again the disci- town, mounting a series of which were of medieval origi 11 pline of the legionnaires attacks on the walls which and in which there was the and the steadfastness of the were all repulsed. After three tact ica l and moral predomi- infantrymen prevailed .. . ,, weeks of skirmishes, on the nance of the cavalry. The batnig ht of the 24th Februa ry tle of Pavia was fought by the 1 525, the im per ial militias French and the imperial penetrated in to the woods troops on 24th February l 52 5 in order to gain taking advantag e of the element of surprise after the control of Italy . T his battle marked a turnbreaching the eas t ern wall of the viscount park ing point in the us e of technology i n the art of in the north-east of the town. Believing that it warfare. In fact, the dukedom of Milan reprewas a diversionary manoeuvre, Francis I waited sented a real strategic junction to li nk Italy to for lon g before entrusting 6 000 Italians of the the rest of Europe . «black bands» with the task of guarding the town All three components of the two troops had and before start ing t o deploy hi s troops in dribs undergone a lot of changes in the Middle Ages. and drabs. The cavalry had developed more and more sophis At the peep of day, the imperials were already ticated tactics and the infantry of the Swish pikeready and the deployment of troops was the fol men had had to face a new threat posed by the lowing: on the right side there were three forma- • artillery and change the battle order by making t ions of the imperia l cavalry, in the middle of the rapid movements. This contrast ed with t he stratefield the Spanish harquebusiers under the gy which had been adopted to fight against the Command of the marquis of Pescara; on t he left heavy cavalry. sid e two squares of lansque nets. Only the

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art il lery dropped back and it was the last force to enter the park (figure 6). The French dep loyed the i r mighty heavy caval ry before the imperia l cavalry in accordance with the chivalrous scheme of King Fra ncis I. T he King knight sought the clash w ith h is kind by trad it ion and b lood. Immediately, the Fre nch lansquenets were dep loyed i n front of the harquebusiers leav ing the majority of the Swiss pikemen beh ind. T he art il lery was on ly pa rt of the French army to be deployed in advance and it started to hammer the nearest enemy: the imperia l lansquenets. In the meantime, the French li ght cavalry attacked the imper ial arti llery, wh ich had not been dep loyed yet, dispers ing t heir troops and captu ri ng some so ldiers (figure 7) . The French art illery was decid i ng the bat tle's fa t e and, after having neutralized the enemy art il lery, Franc is I did not want to give th e cannons the cred it for the v ictory and la u nched an attack against the imperial cavalry. At this point , the astuteness of the marquis of Pesca ra came on stage he moved l 550 of h is harque busiers t o t he sma ll wood which was situated next to t he spot where t he French «spears» were. After t he f irst three harquebus shots, the most powerfu l cavalry in Eu rope, for the most part, fe ll under the p recise fi re of l 500 boorish Span ish. The Span i sh c a v a I ry , which had been strengthened by the i nfan try , mounted an attack against what remained of the French

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format ion . In a desperate attempt to prot ect t heir king , many knight s formed up in a defe nsive square . Desp ite t heir zeal, many of t hem , who were o n foo t and loaded down w ith t he ir weapo ns, f el l u nd er enemy fire. T he Span is h infan t ryme n had t he opport un ity t o stab th em i n the c hi nks of their ar mou r; even t he weapons of t he harquebusiers we nt r ig ht through the defences of t he enemy and t hen they opened fire. Francis I was on foot bu t any way he carr ied on fighting fierce ly . His fa te wou ld have been sealed but fo r the inte rven tion of the v iceroy of Nap les. The latter spared him the cr uelty of the ha rquebusiers who had just captured him. T he batt le continued . T his time, the infa ntry came on stage (figure 8) . The French lan squenets clashed with the impe r ial lansquen ets in an evocat ive «head - on co ll ision». After hav ing overcome the fi rst enemy lines and put t he French art il lerymen to fl ig ht , t he German im pe rials had t o face t he fearful square wh ich had been fo r med up by the Sw iss p ikemen who had j ust been deployed and hence fresh phys ical ly. Lucki ly for the lansquenet s, the bes ieged of

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Pavia succeeded in def eati ng the Italians wh o made up the blac k bands in front of the walls of the town launc hing an att ack aga inst t he sam e Swiss fo r mation which hence was caught in th e middle . This was the end for the pikemen an d the French . On 24th February 1525 , at the beginning of t he day, the batt le ended . The French left 6 000 men

Rivisla Militare English E dition n. 312006

lroql rorcn on the field. Francis I was captured and deported Fig. 9 ~ ':'.: to Spain as pr isone r. He realized that the era of fi • --~ heavy cavalry as dominator in the battlefield had 8 • ...... !gJ ended. Since then technology has made great strides i • - 18J and has decisively influenced the fol l owi ng con flicts: from the art illery of Auster litz (l 805) to the r ifled m u sket of Vicksburg (l 863), to the SYRl.l AIA~~•~~ducti tanks of Bl itz kr ieg (l 940) to the armour- p iercd.'rl\Cll'I. b 10.000, t4"l, ~ ing systems of the war of Yorn Kippur (l 973), to ...Sfflll!l\lW'WbDOt~tt the strategic transport of the Fa l klands war ( l 982). A further crucial turning po int was marked by the last conventional war which was fought in Iraq in the first months of 2003. After the Gulf war of 199 1, Iraq was not able to take the past m ilitary power also because of the embargo that had been imposed by the UN. Even though the embargo was relative ly ineffect ive and Iraq managed to find a way of dea li ng wit h it, without any doubt, it prevented Iraq from acquiring new weapon systems. The Iraqi army was much more modest than that of 1991. This time t he United States did not overest imate it, but it ran high risks because it "' emp loyed a limited number of un its (three divisions and j ust one brigade) counting on its tech and the irregu l ar formations attacked t he l ines nologica l superiority and the l ight strategy which of supp li es and communicat ion . The Iraqi was supported by the Secretary of Defence. In Commands made the m istake of order ing the add ition, the US cou ld not «orf' n» a second front Republ ican Guard to move in order t o face the since Turkey did not allow it to dep loy anothe r enemy exposing themselves to the ai r attacks mechanized division and a reg iment of armoured of the coal ition, which decimated their troops, cavalry in the north as well as the use of ai r and to attack them in an bases. uncoord i nated way . In add iTaking advantage of the so tion, it worried them that the cal led No Fly Zone wh ich was estab l ished by the UN , from '' ... technology has made enemy cou ld open a second front in the no rth and so they the beg i nning of 2003 the Air great strides and has deci kept some units st i ll. On the Forces made sorties that sively influenced the follow co ntrary, the Americans sent breac hed the air Iraqi ing conflicts ... ,, a parachute brigade by air to defences and hi t the system of the north, which wou ld sup Command and Contro l (figure port t he special forces and 9). The war broke on 20th the Kurd ish m i litias . A posit ive change i n the March 2003 , with an «att ack of decapitation» weather , between the 2sth and 29tn March, led by miss ile and air forces against Bag hdad i n enabled the coal i tion to inte n sify t he air order to destroy the Iraqi antiaircraft arti llery attacks . The land forces , despite the bitter on the basis of reports g iven by the clashes , were ab le to reach the su rround i ngs of Intelligence . In the meantime the land forces the capita l city by crossing t he T i g r is and to sprang into action , attacking the city of Bassora occupy the international a irport of Baghdad on and the oil insta ll ations in the south of the 4th and 5th April (figure 1 l ). Aft er having sur- • country. Consequently, the Amer ican forces rounded the t own , the coa lit ion forces started headed for Baghdad. The goal was to reach the to .advance re ly i ng on the support of t he air cap ital as soon as possib le count ing also on forces wh ich ruled the skies . T hey went along the popular revolt of the Sh iites in the south the clearways towards the c ity centre and con and bel ieving that the regular army wou ld not quered vast port ions of the bu il t-up area . The f ight (figure 10). However, a lthough the batt le ended betwe en l O and 11 Apri l , when American «columns» advanced rapid ly, the the organized res istance ended w ithou t the Iraqi army fought, the Shiites rema ined neutral

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urban battle happenin g. T he Iraq i forces in th e north and at t he border cru m bled and o n ly a few pocke ts of mode st resistance remained. The military op eration s on a large sc ale ended on April 14th ; in the last decade the fightin g decreased g rad ually and on May l st the military ph ase of th e o pe rat ion end ed. Technology has undoubtedly influenced the mil itary operati ons in the course of hist ory. Who is t he fighter? What are the moral resources that made the material resources necessary?

ETHICAL STRUCTURE The ancient Greeks saw war as a vio lent «teacher» who co uld compromi se the welfare of al l peo ple. According to them, war was an open loyal fig ht involving, howeve r, stratagem s and tricks to prevail ove r the most powe rfu l ene mies. Neverth eless, they had q ualm s about this condu ct. Whenever they engaged in such im moral

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co nduct, they used to do it reluctantly. Th is attitude was express ion of clever pru de nce wh ich was one of their main featu res. As a famou s author has hig hli g hted , they took Achill es as their model, but they often be haved l ike Ulysse s. Ori g inally, the Greek f ighter had a doub le nature and on e of these two souls, th at is the «intell igent» d im ens ion of war, is embod ied in the figure of Ulysses. The shi eld of the ph alanx was the symbol of indefectible es prit de co rps, its element of cohesion . T he hoplites decid ed o n a common tactic and had to obey general ru les fro m which the co ncept of discipline origi nated. Taking up o ne's position betwee n the lines and keepin g it, moving t ogeth er w ith the enemy, perform i ng every man oeuvre as if it were a sin g le man were actions that coul d be condensed in one not ion taxis, that is to say «ord er», which means «men ta l attitude»; it was no coinci de nce that the word eutaxia too k on a new mean ing , that is to say «discip l ine».

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 312006

Ethi cal values such as d iscipl ine, order, esprit de Fig. 11 corps were re lated to the t ech n ical pri nci ple involving the keeping of pos ition as necessary cond ition for collective acti on. With regard to in dividual be haviour, t he change was rad ical: prima ry virtue was consid ered th~ ful l command of one ' s faculties wh ich replaced , ins ide the hop lite, the th r il l of fight that had dist ingu ished the archaic warr ior. Although the Romans w ere hig hly invent ive w ith regard to tact ics, as mentioned above i n the cond uct of war t hey proved to be lin ked t o a deeprooted and ancestral co ncept of ethos. Apparently, the mos t an ci ent Roman code of war rule d out i ntellige nt warfar e and astutene ss because it was at o dds with t he Roman virtue par excel lence, that is the fides. For the Romans t hi s co ncept, whi ch orig in ally defi ned t he co rrect and loyal be haviour, was th e essenti al theo retical cond ition fo r any kind of public and personal re lat io nship. There has alw ays been a link betw een this cond uct and the «r ig ht hand» th at re mi nds u s of the famous gestu re of Muzio Scevo la. Orig inally, th e concept of relatio nship betw een popu laces w as based on the fides; consequently, war, wh ich was seen as a transitio n phase, that is T hey had bee n crushed by violent actions w hi ch to say an abnormal mome nt of this rel at ionsh ip, w ere, however, aimed at bring ing about peace. must obey the same r ules. Th erefore, eth ics When th e Roman im per ia li sm r each ed it s im posed face to face fighting without reso rting to peak , peace was see n as t he on ly outcome of t raps, ambushes , betrayal , deception and so on. At war. After t he fall of th e Roman Emp ire, in t he the same ti me, t he theory of bellum iustum, wh ic h Mid dle Age s, in the te rr itories whe re the use of had bee n foug ht accordi ng t o precise ru les, t he Fran kish fe ud w as spread , evo lved and it would incur few an elite class was formed. It and rare exce ptions. The Pun ic wars traumat ized ' ' Ethical values such as consisted of you ng chi ldren t he Roma n soc iety. Mad pa nic discipline, order, esprit de w ho be lon ged t o fa mi lies with i n the ri gid hi era rchy of abou t military agg r ession corps are also associated fe u da l society . Th ey we r e swe pt th rough the populatio n. T he Ro mans kept watch on the with the technical princi- tra ined to combat and w ere Greek powers ' move men ts ple envisaging the keeping armed on horse back , but d iffear ing host il e in it iat ive s. Si vi of a position as a neces- ferently from the ir f irst - born pacem para bellum : for t he sary condition for collec- brothe rs they d id not have ad equate resources to Roma ns the m i litary dis sua- tive action , , respond to th e need s of their sio n beca me a fundamental ori gina l stat us and they t heo retical principle of fo re ign ai me d to shape a secu re future t hrou gh t he art po l icy. Fo r t he f i rst time, it w as appl ied w hen of w ar. the defeated Cart hag i nians w ere d isarmed by The tran sformation of the se warriors i nto pa lScip io. ad i ns of fai th (th e na m e «paladi ns» stems from The same co ncept of peace came under t he printhe privileg e whic h was g r anted by the Roman s cipl e of preventive war, wh ich meant that it to some people to l ive in t he Pafatiu m) was due depended on a preponderant military force that to the action of the Ch u rch whic h played o n was ab le to d iss uade any agg ressor. Con seq uent ly , t hese people ' s re l igi on feeli ngs and was ab le to the concept of pax took o n an active meaning in su bm it the fo rce of ar ms to the Ch r istian prejustification of th at process t hat is co mmon ly cepts . T he Ch r istian m ora ls laid the fo un dacalled im per ialism . Those who accepted the cond it io ns fo r ch iv al rous eth ics a nd, conseq uen tly, tions that had been imposed by the Republic had the ma in activ ity of t he members of t his class been appeased like the Gauls of Vercingetorix.

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r Fig. 12 that is the war - was conducted in accordance to ru les that were imposed by the Church, which would become the rules of th e cavalry . The ancient saghe, the oral traditions and th e warrior Christianity of the early Middle Ages, whose models were t he «bel licose» books of the Old Testame nt and the holy warriors su ch as Michele, Demetria, Martino and Giorgio, gave this ethical world a symbolic and rel ig ious support, a moral justification. The knight, the miles, was the priest of war and, at the same time, a martyr of Christ. He was aware of being superior t o the others because of hi s training and t he access to the warrior world. He rose above t he subdu ed r ustic people, the battl efield offe red an alternative to the fields to work, th e blood an alternative to the sweat. The cavalry - the class of miles - was created. It was an ideal societ y of men who had to prot ect religion and faith, to side with the underdog and to defend t he principle of justice . Th e appel lat ive noun «k ni ght)) lost its orig inal

ANTHROPOS - 124

meaning (someone who rides on a hors e) and it took o n another one : k nigh t is someone who has extraord ina ry qualities exactly as t hose people w ho have always live d up to high ideals. T his was the ach ieveme nt of an ethical a nd ideological purpose. The ai m was to wi n o r, at least, contain violence by making v iolent people convert to a new moral code which was based not only o n courage and faith, bu t als o on t he defence of the Christian ity and t he weakest. The chivalro us war was seen as anti - war, like figh t agai nst the ev il - t he m iles be came pacificus, that is to say bearer and resto rer of peace - and soon it would beco me courtly. T he ru les of courtesy were applied even in combat against the enemy in the extent to which he took part in the chi va lrous world. This set of values would continue to exert a profound influence on the m ilitary mentality in t he fol lowing centur ies. Still now its influen ce is sig nif ica nt.

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 312006

be came figh t ing between popu laces , with a c lear - cut d ifference between social cla ss es and t heir emp loyment in battl es (workers and farmers fought i n t he t r en ch es, t he noblemen w ere i n com mand of un it s) . What r emai ned of t he «chiva lrous war» could be found in aerial battle which was sti ll fought «o ne-agai nst - one» l ike the anci ent kn ights. T he val ues of reference, at times , cou ld be even antithetic to eac h other: depersona lisation of i nfantrymen that was opposed to the virtus of aviators. In mo de rn soc iety, tech no logy has developed fas t in all secto rs military art i ncluded. Eve n t hou gh operationa l options have i ncreased, as time has go ne by they have been i nfl uenced by the platforms: the weap o n systems and the eq ui pme nt that are avai lable define and, i n so m e cases, r estrict the freedom of choice of t he Commanders , du ri ng the operation and du r ing the strateg ic phase. Amon g othe r th ings, t he tech nological developme nt has in creased the decision - mak in g sk ill s of t he Com man de r s and the amount of operational t i me and it has made it poss ible to perform manoeuvre s with fewer u nits and much m ore effective A ra nger on patrol. ne ss. In fact, th is is the obj ective of th e current «network centric warfare», whic h i s a co nceptual system le ading to the integration The mi litary ethics of the modern soldier dates of different pl atform s in orde r to max imize t he back to the Middle Ages. In fact, in th is period, effects of m i lita ry operation s. T he k now- how is after th e feudal ism, eve n the Ital ian city- states r eal ly usefu l only for those contributed to the birth of the w ho are able to use it. modern mi litary ethi cs . Co nseq uent ly, since the end ' ... a composite universe of In t he Re naissance and i n the of the Cold War, with a great er following centuries , wit h the values continued to act for effi cie ncy of mil itary instru deve lo pme nt of the Art of War, c e n tu r i e s on t h e m i I it a ry m en ts, public opi nion has there were further changes. mentality, and its effects r evealed the t endency to tol Tech nology (e.g. th e gradual nave not completely van erate conflict s in which th ere spread of guns) has made less are very few vi ctims , not only ·shed today ,, «chival rous» and more i mp eramong civi lians an d th e ene- • sonal t he cont ribution that the mi es, bu t also am ong the single fighter made to the con Armed Forces. duct o f mil itary ope r at ions. The «life of trench» At th e same t ime , the theme of defence of of t he First World War, wh ich lasted u ntil the hu man rights in t he armed confl icts dates back t o brea kth rou g h of the western front, sets a good ancient times. Durin g the 20th century it entered example. It is no coincide nce that at that time a the collective consciousness after t he atrocities of new battle system w as introduced (tan k) an d it the two World War an d t he totalitarian reg imes. chang ed sign ificantly tacti cs in battles. War

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125 - ANTHROPOS

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CONCLUSIONS Today, the Commander makes decisions consid ering carefully lots of factors concerning «what» to do and «how» to act. As far as «what to do» is concerned, technology and leade rship are essential. The former is seen as a set of weapon systems and

ANTHROPOS - 126

instruments of Command and Control t hat are available . Therefore, technology estab lishes the parameters for the decisions that must be taken. With t he com ing of the computer age and new sophisticated techno log ies, the quality of weapon systems, which is seen as a factor that can in fluence the military capability, constitutes a decisive element. Links between military and civil technologies have undergone a lot of changes in the course of time. It is no coincidence that currently commercial components and subsystems constitute a reasonable alternative to the development of spec ific mil itary items. Scie ntific research and technolog ical innovation are primary strategic objectives for the efficiency of Armed Forces and, in this context, international cooperation is a valu able instrument to achieve positive outcomes. The latter performs a more complex and im portant function and it is a key factor in the decision - making process. It causes the change that allows complex organizations to survive and adapt to chang-

Rivista Militare Englisll Edition n. 312006

for a f irm and effe ctive act ion . In fact, both m ateria l-technolog ical forces and moral-psyc h ologica l force s are extremely i mportant. Moral in g contexts in which the re are a resource s g ive co hesion and high deg ree of un certainty and ~, The path to growth and bas is for ope rational capaci intense co mpetition. ty. Cohesion is a di stinguish ing development of the individ Th e aim of a modern army feature of m ilitary lead ers hi p ual and of the organization and it constit utes t he result of goes necessarily through should be the cont inu ing education of army per son nel. In d ifferent o rganizational factors study and research, tradi sho rt , th e deve lopment of (per so nality and ab il iti es of tion and innovation ,, h u man r esource s and an leader, needs and expectations increase in the technological of su bord inates). Internal vallevel of arm s are ext remely ues play an im po rtant role in im portant to reach the principal objective: «the the organizat ion and lead people to fi nd «how fu t ure so ldier». to do» to attai n specifi c obj ect ives . Will i ngness, honour, sacrifice, loyalty, d etermination , tradi t ion are co ncepts of m ilitary eth ics that co nst iRoberto De Masi ~ t ute r eference po ints of th e army. In add ition, Colonel, • we should cons ider th e va lue s of c ivil soc iety General Office t hat enrich and complet e th e «inte rn al » v alues. of the Secretary General of Defence T he path of g rowth and development of the indivi d ual an d th e organ i zation goe s th ro ugh Paolo Caviggiola • stu dy a nd r esearch , tradition and i nnovation . Lieutenant Colonel, ~ Even tho ugh techno lo gy is the m os t concrete General Office and evid ent ele me nt , ethical values and a g ood of the Secretary General of Defence and effectiv e leadersh i p provi de t he foundati ons

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127 - ANTH ROPOS

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GENERAL GIUSEPPE COVONE A forgotten protagonist of our "Risorgimento", General Covone took part in the Three Wars of Independence and was an excellent Minister of War in the Lanza Government. He was a modern Officer ahead of his ti me but was culpably given a desolating marginal place by the historians.

He was born in Isola d'Ast i on November l 9 t h Subsequently1_ he was assigned to the General 1825. He came from a Piedmontese fami ly where Staff of the 6tn Divis ion under the Command of honour, morals, loyalty to the Country and the General Alfonso La Marmora. King were fundamental and universal values. At the end of March 1849, the 6 th Division was From his adolescence, he was destined for a milmarching from Tuscany to the nort h, but it was itary career. Three of his brothers served in the dive rted towards Genoa whe re there we re lots of army. In his youth , he attended the Military political exiles coming from other parts of Italy. Academy of Turin and immediately showed a With rumours concerning the capitulation of t he strong incl ination for study, as well as reliabi l ity, kingdom of Sardinia, news came in of agreemen t s sensitivity, kind nature and cons iderable intelli on the handove r of Genoa to Austria, but it would gence. In 7 845 he was nominated as Lieutenant p rove groundless. An oppos ition movemen t, of General Staff. During the war l 848-49, he whose leaders were «Mazziniani» , developed. The took part in the operations as Official of General government ordered the 6 th Division to sup press Staff and earned a silve r medal. In that period, the revolt. It tried to restore orde r with the least he threw himself into carrying out patrols heart damage possib le since a rather tragic event had and soul. He used to consider situations and happened involving key figures and deep-seated suggestions carefully, showing an uncommon motives. On the morning of 5th April t he cleverness, a deep mi litary Piedmontese attacked the town knowledge and a strong sense with the support of t he of duty. At the outbreak of war, ' ' He came from a tradi artillery. These clashes claimed Covone was assigned to the tional Piedmontese famil~ many v ictims. Subsequentl y, General Staff of the Brigade where honour, high morals, the rebe ls took a mo re realistic «Piedmont» under the view about the situation and loyalty to Country and King the Command of Major-General re were the first defection s. Michele Bes. He was g iven the were absolute and funda Finally, the government grant ed an amnesty to the broad task of going to the stronghold mental values , , mass of t he insurgents and of Peschiera to negotiate with allowed the leaders to go away the enemy for surrender. Then, although it sentenced them in absentia. he was assigned to the General Staff of the 2nd After t hese events, Covone was awarded a secArmy Corps, under the Command of General ond silve r Medal. Ettore de Sonnaz, and took part in important operations. There were many other brave In the same year, he was sent on m ission to Officials besides him: Federici, Calder i na, the camp of the French expeditionary force Avogadro, Saint- Andre. which would besiege Rome during the Rom an During the retreat of Cerlongo, General Ardingo Republic. It was a delicate task , considering in T rotti told him: .. . / would wish you were my broththat period th e kingdom of Sardi nia was idea lly er or my son .. . With these words, he wanted to linked to Italian patriots and, at the same t i me , emphas ize the outstanding bravery Covone had it had to improve the diplomatic relations wi t h France. demonst rated on t hat occasion. In the meantime, he reached the rank of Captain. Despite t he negative en d of the war of 7 848-49 , the strength and prestige of the army remained Unfortunately, wa r went bad ly for the unaltered. Howeve r, the need to reorgani ze and Piedmontese and ended with an arm istice that was strengthen it arose. signed by General Salasco.

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Rivis/8 Militare English Edition n. 3/2006

Alfonso La Marmora, who was

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M i nister o f War for the third time, formPrl ~

group of va lued col laborators who started to work un de r him (e.g. the Duke of Genoa, Covone h imself and other good collaborators suc h as Coll eg no , Valfre di Bonzo, Daborm ida, Genoa Thaon of Reve l, Petitti of Roret o and ot hers . Pie ro Pieri would descr ibe th is group as the

most intelligent and lively element of the army Th ey could not be compared with Stein, Scharnhost, Clausewitz, the people who rebuilt up the German army during the period I 8071813, but they were honourable and brave men and were inclined to undertake the most important tasks that the standard procedure of that period could give them. In this context, in 1856 «Rivista Mi lita re» was fo unded. In 1854, on the occasion of the conflict that had broken between th e Russ ian and the T urki sh empire , together w it h second li eutenant Giuseppe Landriani of Piedmonte Royal Cavalry, he was sent to the Turk ish army as su lta n's adviser and Sardinian - Piedmontese government represe ntative to the Al lies. The m iss ion of the two Officials was part of a w ide - rangi ng programme of Cavour that was designed to give much more polit ica l stature and prestige to t he Ki ngdom of Sard inia in the context of the great European powe rs, also to facil itat e the process of Ital ian u nification.

Title pages. Third War of Independence. The 16th Division i n battle.

Above. Second War of Independence. the battle of Magenta.

At first the Tu rk ish army was concentrated in the Danubian region, between t he present Roman ia and Bu lgaria, in def ence of the border of the Tu r kish emp ire. Its o rgani zation and train in g were not up to those of European armies. So, Covone made a valuab le contribution identifying some faults in the defensive organi zation and in t he military plann ing. The theat re of operations shifted to Cri mea. There, an allied expeditionary force , wh ich was formed by the English and the French, landed. It supported the Turks in t he siege of Sebastopol which was firmly he ld by the Russians . As we ll as maintaining good relat ionsh ips w ith the Alli es, he broadened his knowledge and experiences to frame new operat iona l and organizational con- • cepts. On 2 5th October l 854 , the Br it ish Division of Cavalry was situated somewhere around • Ba laclava, close to Sebastopol. It was made up of the heavy Brigade, und er the Command of Brigadier Lord Scar lett , and of th e l ight Brigade , un der the Command of Brigadier Lord

131 - ANTHROPOS

General Giuseppe Covone.

Cardigan. The British, French and Turks on t he one side and the Russians on the other were engaged in battles that took place at dawn of the same day. After that, the English Commander-in-chief Lord Raglan gave the Commander of Cavalry Division the order to mount an attack on t he hi lls close to ' ' At Balaclava, Balaclava. T hi ngs went badly charge he was for different reasons: a lac k of jured and his clear orders, a l imited k nowledge of reality, personal mis- also hit,, understandings which were d ue to deep disagreements among the Commanders. The heavy Brigade moved along the central part of North Valley which is situated between two hills and ended i n a bottlenec k in the east. On the top of the two hi lls the Russ ian infantry and artillery were deployed sideways. On that day, Govone and Landriani were at the Light Cava lry Brigade. When the two Officials received the order to attack, they did not hes itate to join the English regiments to take part in the charge. It was an extraordinary fact which proved valour and bravery of the two Officials. With regard to this, it is im portant to point out that when the battle occurred , the Kingdom of Sardinia did not go to

ANTHROPOS - 132

war yet. The attack took place u nder heavy artil lery and rifle fire coming from the hills sit uated on the two sides and from the front lines . Cavalrymen suffered lots of losses. During th e attack, Govone was slightly injured and his horse was hit. Landrian i was severely inj u red and was captured by the Russians. The Sultan conferred honours on him for bravery: t he Medal of Silist r ia and the order of Medgidie. In addition, he offered him t o become Gene ral of his army. Govone asked t he Minister La Marmora for authorization a nd leave. The latter refused to grant it but, at t he same time, promoted h im to the rank of Maj o r and ordered him to go back to Piedmonte t o plan the Sardinian expedition to Crimea . A s military attache of General Staff of th e Sardinian expeditionary force, Govone too k part in lots of operations and patrols, such as the battle of Cernaia, because he had a lot of frequent contacts with the Allies. The pe rfe ct command of foreign languages and his gre at personal qualit i es were helpful to him. In Crimea he received the following honours: t he Military Order of Savoia, the French Leg ion of Honour and other English hon ours . After t he Campaign of Crimea, he came back to Italy w it h the exped ition ary force and operated an effi cient and modern information service with an f>Xtf>nsivf> nPtwork of offici>rs. On l st May l 85 9 , after hav i ng attained the rank of Lieutenan t Colonel, he reached the headquarters of t he k i ng to take part in the military operations as attache of General Staff. In that period he wa s promoted Colonel for outstanding bravery. During the campaign a serie s of manoe uvres was carrie d during the out, also with the use of ra ila nd b itter clashes bro ke slightly in - way, out such as the battle of horse was Montebello, Palestro , Magenta, San Martino an d Solfer i no. The French an d Sardinian-Piedmontes e troops managed to inflict heavy losses on th e enemy. Th e Austrian Commander, Field Marsh al Giulay, and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Kuh n encountered lots of difficu lt ies. The i nterven tion of the Emperor Francis Joseph and of th e Chief of Staff of the Imperial Suprem e Command, General Hesse, cou ld not give this desperate situation a new twist. During the famous bat tle of Montebello one of Govone's brothers, Giovann i Luigi, Second Lieutenant of the Light Cavalrymen Regiment , d ied. After the war, he was promoted Brigadie r General and when he was in Command of the

Rivista Mililare English Edition n. 312006

Brigade Forll he took part in the mi litary operaCrim ean War: th e Light Brigade rea ches the Bulganek r iver on September / 9 th , 1854. tions to conquer Central Italy and repress t he brigandage. On 30 th June 1861, after t he declaratio n of Italian u nification, he was elected deputy in Cittaducale. would he lp Italy to take Veneto back. In t his Subseq uent ly , he rose to the ran k of Majorcase, the aim of the alliance w ould not be a war th General and as Commander of t he 9 Div is io n agai ns t Austria. Bismark wou ld u se it as a he conducted the ope rations to combat the weapon to face a possible war and obtain pos ibrigandage in Sicil y. There, he analysed the crittive results easily i n case of di plomatic success ical and u nstab le social, econom ic and political w hich wou ld allow hi m to t ake possess ion of t he situation and drew up an interestin g report for d uked oms of the no rth, reac h ing an accord w ith the government. In th is con Austria. In the last cas e, Italy text, he came unde r fi erce would no longer obtain criticism from polit ical rep re- ' ' ... promoted to Brigadier Veneto , despite the considersentatives for tak ing a fi rm able suppo rt give n to Pru ssia. General, he directed the Obviously, l ine w it h the brigandage. t he Italian delegaoperations against brig- tion did not accept this agree In 1866 Italy fou nd the gold en opportunity to go to wa r andage in Sicily ,, me nt and , throu gh negot iaagainst Austria on Pru ssia's tion, managed to impose m ore side i n order t o free Veneto. favourab le conditions to It aly. Prepar in g the all iance treaty was not easy , given As we ll as a dipl omatic function, Covone perthe wel l-know n astuten ess of the German fo rmed an in- depth analysis of military issues. In Chancel lo r Von Bi smark. The It al ian government particu lar, he had lots of tal ks w ith his friend , the decided to send Covone to Berl in to collabo rate Pruss ian Ch ief of Staff, General Helmuth von with the Ambassador de Barra! in cult ivating the Mo ltke. The latter belonged to th e Prussian school diplomat ic re lation s between the two countries . of wh ich Generals l ike August vo n Gne is enau , During the negotiat ions, Bis mark decided to Gerard von Scharnhost and Karl von Clausewitz â&#x20AC;˘ ally with Italy, not only to secure m il itary support had been exponents. b ut also to persuade Wi l liam I Hohenzollern to In Ber li n Moltke and Covone faced lots of difgo to war facil itating an agree me nt with f icu lties in p lanning the m ilitary st rategies to â&#x20AC;˘ Napoleon Ill, who played at being the protecto r adopt du r i ng the war. In fact, before the outof Italy. Therefo re, Bismark inv ited t he It alian b reak of war, he p rese nted i n vain a good plan g overn men t to com mit itse lf to support Prus sia of operat ion. It d id not involve t he d ivis io n of from the very beg inn ing. In case of war Prussia the army i nto two armies, o ne al on g t he Mi ncio,

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THE COURAGE OF ONE'S CONVICTIONS On 25th January 1872 Giuseppe Govone died of a serious disease in his native home in Isola d'Asti. He was 47 and suffered from a psychological disorder that people sti ll described as «the loss of one's wits» before Freu d had defined it «neurosis, insanity» identifying its features and obscure roots. The news appeared in the «Ti mes» ; the pres s of his country that he himself had created fighting in the front l ine p re fe rred to stay sile nt . It was a deafeni ng silence i n a country that was distracted by the r ecen t conques t of Rome, fi ll ed with fears of a Bourbon - clerical conspiracy and fraught with enormous economic and social problems. And yet Govone was promoted General when he was on ly 40, he was considered an enfant- prodigy in an army where the re were predominan tly «mossbacks» and «methodical careerists»; he was also Minister of War. He fought agains t 1 the Russians, the Austrians, the bandits and he had almost always won. He played a lead ing role not only on the battlefield but also in establishing d i plomat ic relations : he dealt with Bismark the «iron» Chancellor personal ly and was ab le to be a match for hi m. However that silence was not a way to pay t ri bute to -his l ife, but the final act of reveng e which carried the signature of his fe llowmen: the Generals. Govone was sentenced to death by the «camari l la», which at that time was cal led «ch iesuola» because the term «mafia» was not still used by the Piedmo ntese. The Generals coming from the Sardinian army had contro l of t he army , its power and rules. Th e first rule said that nobody coul d violate group and professional solidarity disclosing fau lts and in abil ities of the «sacred» Institution. Govone had infri nged the code of silence. He was isolated and had to fac e public and pr ivate accusations which were u njust and bitter. He had a nervous breakdown and found relief in the insanity. He was Minister of War and at that time politics «destroyed» even the strongest and best men frayi ng their nerves and maki ng t hem physically exhausted . These events were Lhe caus e of his disease, the h id den detail of th e Risorg i mento wnich was much more «fe rocio us» than historians have written. Places and, above all, men define the identity of a nation and its popular feelings. It comes as no surprise to us t hat the figure of Govone has sunk into oblivion making the history of our country less glorious. The Risorgimento without heroes has not spared anyone: Cavour who has been described as a cynical and clever manoeuvrer, Mazzini as a mystic revolut ionary, Vittorio Emanuele as a «sergeant king». Garibaldi has been described as a «Che Guevara ante litteram» to live down his reputation as slaughterer of the Third State in Bronte. Radetzky and Cecco Beppe have had their revenge : those who defeated them in San Martino and on the Piave have been forgotten. We try to rem ember the Impe rial Royal government with romantic honourable men and meticulous administrators while a large part of Europe considered it an intolerable prison of popu laces. Govone rose above the Sardinian army: he was a modern General among old ideas . In t hat context, the art of war, despite Napoleon an d the spectre of t he Industrial Revolution loom ing over Europe, could be summarized as follows: shiny buttons, discipline and marching in front of the enemy. Then soldiers will use bayonets. There is no need to do anything else! Covone got rid of all this mediocrity, he travelled a lot and knew foreign languages. At that time it was som eth i ng revolutionary. In fact, the army used only Fr ench to write diaries and letters and spoke in the Piedmontese d ialect to give orders. He travelled whe n the Ticino had already become a frontier: Vienna, Paris, Istanbul and Berlin. He was always careful and curio us about the development of his «work»; he knew t hat planning, which is the doctrine of General Staff and the mind- set of war, would be funda mental in the future. In addition, he considered what today is called «i ntel ligence» to be extremely import ant. At that time it was still espion age: anticipating the moves of one's enemy and stopping them was much more d ecis ive than a caval ry charge . For th is reason he acted as

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Rivista Militare Englis/1 Edition n. 312006

detective: he penetrated in Austrian territories under a false name and created a network of inform ers among the enemies . They helped the Piedmontese army in 1 859 to repulse an Austrian attack that could have been fatal. As Cavou r was preparing his diplomatic plan, the king on hor-seback was going looking for a battle and the Generals was writing proclamations, Govone formulated concrete plans trying to establish an essential link with the French. Govone considered preparation and intendancy extremely important whereas the Italian Generals saw it as a waste of time. As well as battles there were other events that showed his great qual ities. Together w ith another Italian official, Landriani of the «Real Piedmonte» he took part in the «insane» charge of «Balaclava». As observer, during that war , he he lped the weakest, that is to say the Tu rks for whom he drew maps and plans of fortifications, developing plans and put- 1 t i ng his l ife at risk during the siege of Silistria. When he saw t he l ig ht caval rymen of Raglan moving towards the Russian guns in the valley of death, spurred his hor se and j oined the battle. Nothing forced him to do it, it was not his war, it was not his battle. However, he decided to make his co ntribution because he firmly be lieved that people who were entrusted with the task of kil ling other human beings in t he name of society had to prove that they did not to fear death and sacrifice. He wrote lots of letters when he took the responsibi lity of the «d irty» war against the brigandage on the border of the Papal States and was sent to Sicily where there were people who failed to report for military service and lots of resistance to the central government. Instead of relying on firing squads he had the courage to write phrases like t he following: these events support the view that the brigandage is a social revenge which is sometimes able to do justice. At Palace Carign ano everyone t urned pale. In Custoza (the event was a masterpiece of military ignorance) he was t he only one to make the rig ht moves and managed to wi n. He only needed the support of some units of Infantry. In fact, even a feeble attempt to advance from Villafranca would lead the Austrians, who had been repu lsed from Mount Torre, to retreat. He asked his Commander, General Della Rocca, for th is. He was a courtier and an incompetent general. He was in a tavern drinking a toast and talking to his Officials. La Marmora had ordered him to keep still and his only answer was to neglect the military operations. When the messenger, who had been sent by Govone, asked for reinforcements explaining to him that they had vict ory within their grasp, he answ ered in dialect: tell your General to sort it out himself!. Many people wou ld kept silent, but Govo ne accused and asked them for explanations. The Officer class cou ld lose battles but they we re not allowed to viol ate the cod e of silence. When he became Mi ni ster and undertook the task of cutting the m ilitary spend ing to balance the b udget of a country that was on the verge of bankruptcy they took reven ge on him. Before accepting this task he gave the City Hall of Alba a considerable sum of money in order to build a school: 2 5 t housand li ras. He had earned this money from the shares he had i n the National Bank. In this way he tried to quash false rum ours that he could have used the information he had to become richer. This was our country that would be called «ltalietta». It was the government of Quintino Sella and Lanza, the last one who would demand a balanced budget. T oday, in Alba, a high school is still dedicated to Covone but now they want to dedicate it to Beppe Fenoglio. People say that a General clas he s wi th modern times. Th is gives a perfect example of how a nation is able to keep the great heroes' memory alive.

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Domenico Quirico

Journalist 135 - A NTHROPOS

3rd Army Corps which was commanded by General En r ico Morozzo Della Rocca. Unfortunately, Italy committed grave errors in the organization of the Commands and in the formulation of military strategies. The Italian army was divided into two armies plus a vo lunteer division commanded by Garibaldi. This units acted in different theatres of operations and ind ependently from each other. Among other things, after the separation of forces there was no longer an efficie nt unit of command which was able to supervi se t he operations adequately. In the early hours of 24th June clashes broke out. Govone heard that the 3rd Division of General Brignone had been defeated at Custoza. Of his own accord, with the «Alps» Brigade and th e «bersaglieri» battalion, he headed for Custoza, recaptured it and he ld his line. During the battle, he often asked for re inforcements but General Del la Rocca obstinately refused his request and even decided not to employ the 7 t h Division of General Bixio and the 16th of Prince Umberto of Savoy which had not carried out his orders. Oreste Bovio wrote ... just on that day Covone proved to be a great general not only because of his experience and bravery but also because he was able to tell everything at a glance and had an innate tactical sense that lots of officials are not able to acquire even after having studied hard at the military academy. .. In thP north Garibaldi was in command of a volunteer division and managed to defeat t he Austrians in Bezzecca. On the evening, after some divisions of the l st Army Corps had disbanded and Some British uniforms of the Crimean war. From left to nd right, on horseback.·4,h Light Dragoons; 2 Dragoons; the others of the 3rd Army Corps of General Del la l st Royal Dragoons; l / rh Hussars. Standing: Grenadier Rocca had kept still , Govone, with his soldiers who Guards, Royal Artillery; 26th Infantry. were exhausted and without reinforcements , covered t he retreat taking part in t he clash with t he Aust r ian reserve army. Even though his troops the other along the Po. It called for a powerful were exhausted, munitions had run out, lots of army along the Mincio and the creation of a officials had been hit, and he him self had been contigent, i n Ancona, consisting of two or three injured, Govone was able to withdraw in good Divisions, under Garibaldi's order, covering also t he command, who would have to «Cugia» Division and consoli dock his ship in Trieste and go ' ' ... on his own initiative, dating his bridgehead on t he to Hu ng ary. There, he would with the "Alpi" Brigade and Mincio. Subsequently, after support the Hungarian patriots opposing the order of retreat in the "Bersaglieri" Battalion, vain, against the Austrian Empire . he carried out lots of headed for Cu stoza, patrols and was placed under This plan was in line with the he ecaptured it and kept the the command of the 2 nd Army principle of the build-up of troops , even if with convergent position , , Corps of General Cucchiari. manoeuvres , under lying von After the unsuccessful battl e Klausewitz' s doctr ine. T he of Custoza and the victoriou s adoption of his strategy would take the enemy campaigns of the Prussian army, it is possible t o by surprise (and this represented a key factor paint a picture of t he situation: for von Klausewitz) and the disbanding of Pruss ia had won impress ive victories over t he troops. Austrians and their allies; After the negotiations, Govone went back to Italy The defeat of Custoza was due to the ineffic ienand assumed command of the 9 th Division of t he cy and errors of the Italian Comman ds.

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Nevertheless, the Italian army w as not completely dest royed and t he bulk of the army was in good conditions . In add iti on , the army corps of Ciald ini was head ing towards north; It was i n Italy' s interest t hat war conti nued in order to allow the army corps of Cialdini to gain ground and obtain possession of Veneto. Govone was sent on a di plo mat ic m issi on t o Ni col sburg, wh ere the Pru ss ian head qu arters is situated. There, Govone learned that Pru ssia and the Austrian Empi r e had already agreed to the arm is t ice. Conce rn ing thi s, Napoleon Ill had p ut t h em u nd er i ntense pressure. In additio n, Covone heard of the defeat of Lissa wh ich had took place on 20th Jul y . Conseque ntly, hi s m ission co u ld n ot have any positive resu lts but, according to the agreement, Italy w oul d obtai n Veneto in any case. In regard to the battle of Cu stoza, Piero Pieri wrot e: _ even if the Italia n army had not been led

First War of Independence. Piedmontese Infantry during the battle of Novara.

effectively, it would have won, actually, the unworthy defeat of the young army was not in itself very heavy; it was seen as a disaster only because i t wa s a presage of what wou ld happen later because of the Commanders .. . Oreste Bovio wrote: ... La Marmora and his two Com manders of the Army corps, Della Rocca and Durando, did not show strong military leadership on that occasion, but th is cannot obscure the great â&#x20AC;˘ bravery that Comanders of Division such as Cerale, Sirtori, Pianell, Brignone, Cugia and, above all, Covone displayed ... The Aust rian Comma nd er him se lf, Archduke Albert, wrote in his report: ... we must admit that the enemy fought bitterly and bravely against us. Their first attacks were vigorous and the Officials

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set a good example throwing themselves forward. .. Above. Cflmean War: the port of Balaclava. For hi~ behaviour the King conferred the Cross ot Great Official of the Military Order of Savoy on him. Right. Subsequently, in consideration of his skills and A piece of Piedmontese artillery at the battle of Montebello. broad expe rience, as well as the need t o increase and reorganize t he General Staff, he was nomi nated Commande r of the Gene ral Staff. The army approved his choice. In that period, the government year 1870. Vittorio Emanuele II and some political saw the necessity to take strong economic measrepresentatives wanted to go to war in support of ures and so even the gove rnment had to subject France and again st Prussia. The Council of Ministers itself to a rigorous financial discussed thi s question. Sel la regime. When the king entrusted and Covone were firmly Giovanni Lanza with the task of ' In his capacity of Minis opposed to it. The former hand formi ng a new government, he l'.er of War, he devoted ed in his resignation. T he disasked Covone insistently to perhimself to the activity o cussion about t his was not min form the office of Minister of :>rganizing and directing uted and was postponed . War. He accepted this job relucDu ring thes e events, he was ,... efficient Expeditionary subjected to lots of vigorou s tantly considering that his duties an ... orps ,, personal attacks. During a disto Italy involved also taking on such res ponsibilities. After havcuss ion in t he Senate, which was in ÂŤSalone dei DuecentoÂť ing recog nized the necessity to pursue a strict financial policy, he wel comed the of the Old Palace in Florence that, at the time, was the capital of Italy, he was fiercely attacked by proposal of the Minister of Finance, Quintino Sell a, Cialdini b ut was defended by a broad coalition of to reduce mil itary spending further. In hi s opinion , authoritat ive members of Parliament. The bitter first of al l it was necessary to plan public works, attacks of Cialdini, who was very close to the king , balance the state budget and improve the living had been p rovoked by Govo ne ' s opposition to the conditions of population. After th e project to cut the entry into the war. As a great strateg ist, he sensed mi litary spending had been approved, the war that France would not be able to compete with between France and Prussia broke out. It was the

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Prussia. Since the Rom an question was unresolved, France might have chang ed its attitu de wit h regard to the defence of the Papal States. Consequently, it was necessary to put aside all economic plan s and pre pare un its and materials. Covone , as Mi nister of War, engag ed in th e activity of o rganizati on and direction mob iliz ing a well- organized and trained expeditionary force. As eve rybody knows, t he fo llowing events would lead to the downfall of France, t he creation of the German empi re and the conquest of Ro me. Unfortunately, physical and m ental exhaustio n, bitter d isappointments followi ng his appo intment as Min ister of War, ig nominious persona l attacks we re contribut ory factors to t he deteri oration of his state of health because of a d isease from whi ch he had bee n suffering for a long time . At the beg inning of September, during a stormy session in the senate , he was sha rply attacked by Cialdini agai n. His poo r health worsened . He sub mitted his resignations and retired to private life. On 25 1h Jan uary 18 72 Giuseppe Covone died in Alba. To co nclud e, in order to emphasize his nob leness of the soul, it is proper to quote some passages from the speech he gave o n 24th June 1870 when the charne l hou se t o the sold iers fallen duri ng t he war of 1859 was inaugurated. He addressed the Italian, French and Austrian fallen

u nited in t he ir grim fate: my dear fellowmen, who are covered by just a little earth, the same earth on which you walked eleven years ago, to the sound of the bugles, with angry voices on your lips, with a deep love for Italy, may you rest in peace! You did not spill your blood fo r Italy in va in, and our hopeful country i s grateful to you for what you did and bless you. The Army admires you. The King salutes you! Ma y you rest in peace, generous allies, you held out your fra ternal hands to us. Our memory of your actions wi ll never fade because we will always show o ur grati tude to you and even the future generations will do it. This memory will mark the dawning of a new era of freedom for all the nations of the world. Enemie s for one da y. Brave enemies! Your sacrifice was glorious for your country. You did not win, the hand of Cod and the spirit of the new times were against you. Have no r egrets about losing the battle, because racia l hatred drained from the heart. You should be happy because today you r fellowmen will shake hands with us, united by the same ideals of humanity and justice .. . Michele Petrolo Historian

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