JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 2005 N.3 "RIVISTA MILITARE" by Biblioteca Militare

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NumberThree2005 September - October November - December

Rivis ta Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the mi litcJrY way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publica\ion of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues_

2 The Italia n Army continues its opera t io ns a broad fo r peace a nd freedom . In Ira q, A[ghanis tn n Hnd the Balkans, o ur soldiers ,1rc a

sure reference and tin

t\ Univer!;a] Democracy .

(Gusepp e Romeo)

e.n11n -

p l e of p rof-'essiona lism an d

sel f-sacri /'ice.

FOUR -MONTHLY

A Joun1ey to B eirut. On the Routes of Itala ir. (1\Jdlo Rega) The War Against Terrorism. · (Gian..cai:l.0 Bo1·e) S011,alia in Ouest of a Balance.

(1Vicola Gallippi and Franco Carlini)

Supplemen 1 to numbt"rs 5 and 6 of

R iv isL.a Militan~ Italia n F.di1ion

E ditor in Chief: Giusepp e Maiia Giovanni

the Centre 0£ Africa on the Threshold r;1ID

11==

TRICARICO

ofHclJ. (,Vicodcmc N'.Kasbama N'Koy)

Management and E ditorial

Science, :rechnology and Training

Office 8, Via di S. Marco - 00186 Rome Phone 0039-06--17.>.'i81 .>9

Tl1e M my Dog Units. (Ugo Ga~La)

Printer IMAGOM EDTA

8101 0 Drngoni (CE) tel. 0039-0823-866 71 0 w, vw.iniagorn~dia.i l

..History 80

Great 1\llothcr Pntssia. (Da niele Cella111<1re)

The Dcstruct'ion of Jerusalem. (Allilio Claudio Bon-eta).

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R i,ista !Vlili1arc

J\SSOCIATEO '10 CSP! UNlONE SrAMl'A

TTJ\l .JANA ~ --PERIODICA The pnxluclion ol this n1agazine has bc--cn su pc1Yiscd bv Omero Rampa

108 The Tunisian Voltmteer BaLtali6ns.

( FilippQ Cappellano)

122 Somm.ario, Summary,Sommaire, Inhalt-Resumen-Sumario

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ORDEROFTHEDAYTOTHEARMY Officers, Nuncom111issio11ed Officers, V<>lu111ec1-s, Carabinieri lllld Civilian Personnel se1ving with the Anny, toda,·. af'ler 1wo vcars. I ,tm leavin!! the office or Arnw Chief or S taff ,1 nd, at the sa111c time, r retin: from active senicc. ,11 the encl o r ;,ppro., i,nately 46 \.cars of mili1my life. On this occasion, l wish first or all lo add ress niy ckfe remial 11.~garcb lo the President of the: Republic. who is 11,c sv11thcsis and ,wmbol of 1h,· Nations 11nilv and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces. · · I pay a dc,·ote~d ho111.igc to the \.Var H ag of the A.rmv. 10 lhe Bunner~ of the Branches. Co1vs. Rq:imen ts and training lnstitutes and I address a deep-felt thought to those \\'ho lost thei1· lifc in thc 1x.,rfo1111ancc of their duty, in the Coun1 1y's se1vk·e and for the good of 111<~ 11,1lio11:il and in1enrn1 io11al communitv. My grateful farewell goe~ to the Vder~11s' /\ssocialio11s. for 1hl'i1· acti, ity in ke•epi11g alive the besl militarv traditions a11d the hi!!hcs1 mililaiY 1·al11es; I nm ccnain that thc·,· w ill find new fonns or support l<)r thc rnilila1Y,pcrson11cl a;,d, in n1tn·e general 1crn1s, in the se,vin' or the national co1nmuni1v. Finni!_,·. I than k the, Coi;11cils of Militai'\' Rqm:sema1ion, fOI· their loval and conc1·c1e crn1lrih1 1tion, a 11d the Auxilia1y Corps of the A1111cd Forces for thdr prcdous suppon to Olli' Units in the man ifold "ctivities call'icd out b()th at home and ah.-oad. These two vcars have been 1·c1v intensc, a11d r li,·ed through un ique human a nd pro l'..:ssional experiences, \\-Orking side b~· side w ith cxccptionalh· skilled collaborato1~. ho lding the 1·t•spo11sibili1y ;111d honour of leading th,· org,111iza1 ion I low and to which l devole'd my physical and intcllectual ene·qzv: an exacti ng pe,iod, extre·melv interesting and full of the 111nnv salisl,1c1iom, , ·ou all ~ave me. T lic Annv's Oqrnnizatio~,-, ,111d L:ni1s hal'e llll't \\'ith the greatest pre<'.ision and efficienc_,, the ,·cry numemus and complex com111it mcn1s cmn1stcd 10 us lw our Country. Togcthcr we have proceeded \\·ith the prnee•ss of transl'orniali<)n and profcssionalizat iori of our Ser\'ice, receiving unanimrn1s altc,-,tation,-, of .ipprcci,llion i<ll' ajoh well done. The A1my professional activi1,· has lived tlnuugh nn e'~tremely conc1·ete page, aimed at reaching the short- and rnedium-tc;:rm objectives of primarv importance. in vie\\· of the trnnsfornia tion uncle,· way. I wish lo mcn1ion, among the various prnjccls. those rega rding the k11ow lt>t.lg~· of languagcs. the improYcmenl of the housing racilit.ics fo1· volunteers, the 1'C,-alua1ion of the "combnt'' func tion, the special forces, comma nd ,111d control, high-lcvel sports and Veterans' Associatio ns. Our Uni ts d is tinguished themselves, in Ila!~- a nd abroad, unde1· the dil ige nt a nd skilled kadersh ip of their Commanders at ,lll lcvel~. some of \\'horn ha\'e .tssumed \·en impon anl international iasks a nd 1·esponsibili1ies. ln the nex t few da~•s. the direction or three of 1h,· fo1w most i111JX)rlant missions a broad• KFOR in Koso\'O, A l ,TJlEA in Bosnia a nd ISAF in Afghan istan • "'ill bc taken by 1wrsonnel of 0111· Arnl\·: a further clemonstr::itio n or the hig h quali1,ttive level c.xprcsscd b,· the Service. These a rc rcsults appreciated b\' Iii<.' Italian people and by the international commlmity a nd make me p1·oucl. They hm·e bccn mack possible b~, o u1· 1nosl pn~cious 1\:sow-ce: man! Man. who has been n1pable of e,·olving, kc;:,•ping pace with technolog~·. accepting and kading the transforma tion and safeguarding the et hical \'alucs ol' his predccessori,. which arc esscnt i.il for thosc who, like 11s. ,·an be called to use forcc i11 the dercnce of the Coumrv and the ma intenance or Peace. · I s taikd my lifl' as an Office,· in the Army a t the beginning of the sixties, in n n cwgani,~11ion that was the prnduct of those times, created 10 meet 1hc ne,~ds of a pe,iocl not <.·asy bu t full of great ,·xpectations. ~o"· l lca,e a dynamic Ser-.-icc. with problems 10 sol,·c but a lso cndm,·.::d with e:xlrno,·dinary capabili ties, which will be 1he win ner in am· kind of challenge. 11 is therefore with feelings of gn:a l satisfaction and p,idc· that, in a day l'erv sig11ificant for mc, I now address vou, mc;:n and women of the Arnw. The s uccesses, the: apprecia tion, the growing consideration, the reputation lahoriouslv eumccl on the field, both in tilt: ,·arinus Operational Thcat1"<.'S and on the nationnl 1e1r itory, ,ll'C the li1.1its of your \\'Ork, of your de1errnina 1ion, of ., ·ou r passion. Together we hm ·e gone through happv moments and li\'c d times of grent pain and sorrow but. in thc· firs1 case, we never bo..'lsted nnd. in the second, \\·c reacted "·it h uni tv and vigour. It has been a unique pl'i,·ilcge 10 be you r Com1r1,mdcr and lo have .vou at rn_v side in the thousand dai ly lxn!les that \\'el\: indispensable in ord,:r lo make ou1· Am1y belier, mon: prt:pa red ,111d more efficient. I am deepl.v gra1c-ful 1.0 _rnu f,w all this ,111cl I sh.ill a l\\·a_,·s be'. My sinc<.· re 1h,rnks go 10 vo1 w fami lies, who follow us \\'ith 11·epidation and nffection, sh,1ring <)Ur \\'01Ties and Olli' expcctal ions. I address a 1hankrul thou~hl to the cities that host ow· Units, for their affect ion and collaboration. To nw successor, Licute1~,111l General Filiberto Cecchi, to whom 1 am bound bv sincere 11c:la tions of e:,1eem and [1iendsl{ip, I ll'ish the same joys and s,1 tisfac1ions cxpel'ic nced b_v me. Tam sure I h,;I tht: Anny, uncle,· his leaders hip. will continue to gro\\' and imp1-•\ ·c, pe1fonning as best ;is pos~iblc the tasks that 0\l r Crnmu>· w ill want lo c111111sl it. To all of vm1. men and wome11 of 1h,~ Arnw. I \\'ish the best of luck. Long live the A1rny and the Anncd Forces! U>Jlg liH' ltal,·! 0

Rome, Jui_,· 23. 2005

Lieulenant General G iulio Frat icelli ARMY CHIEF Of STAFF

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ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE ARMY Officer;,, :-.lonco111n1i-.siont•d Officer,.. Vol1111let•1,. Scudt·nls al Sl'iwol, and 1 raining lnstilulc:-.. Ca,ahinkri and Cil'i lian Pcr,-01111t·I !-t'IYilll! \\ilh the Anm! I ;1s~um,' lo da\' th._. ollic,· of ,\rnn Chiel ol Scali. I am prou d and honoured lor 1hi, pri,·ik·gc.• and fulh a\\an' o f' m,· nt'\\' res pon-.ibil i1 i,·,. Fina ,,t all. I wish 10 addr..:!->" 111y (k•f,·1·en1ial rcj!ards to lht• Pn·,-iclcni o l 1lw Republic, Crn111nandt•1·-in -C'hid ol the An11\· and hil!hcs1 wmhol or ilw '\at ion-.. unit,. I pa~ hmnag,· IO th,· War l'lag. ol 1hc Arn1_ , .. lo tlw 13anncrs of 1h,· Un ii... ln,-,lilutc,-, and Organiza1 ions. ;111d I turn a h,';11 1feh and g r;11dul thought 10 111<· Falk·n and \\'Ot111ckd in I hc pe1f on11;111ce or t hdr d 11 1~-. ad111i.-ahk examples o f honour. d,·\·otion and alkJ?iancc IO the Co11111n . To llw Veterans' ,\,-,ocia1io11,-, i1n·plac,·abk linl,. ht:l\\<'<'fl th,· Soldier,, ol ,c,1<·rda~· and 1oda,·, pn•dou,- cu,-,tocli:111,0111· hiµht·sl mililur~ 1r:1di1ion,, µoc,- m, si11n·1·c, app1·ecia1ion for wha1 the~ h,l\e h..·,·11 doinJ! and I am ,..I ll'<' - \\ill t·onti nu,· lo do 101· the good of1 li v i-\n m. Toth._. Co1111t'ils of \11ili1a1"\' Rqwc,-c•111:,1 ion . whil'11 can'\ 0111 a cldir:11,• and \Cl~ u,-dul ta,I... 10 lhl· Au,ilian C'oqh ol the Armed Foret',-. more and mrn,· int,·µratcd wit hin our Lrni ls in llah ,111d ;ibrnad. I \\hi,-h 1ha1 111,'\' \\ill be' ;1ble 10 nrn1i11u,· lo \\'01·k in the \\'al..c of a lo~:i l and h·ui trul L'Ooperalion. · .v ly lwartfd1 1hanb go to 1m pn·cll',·cssor. Lie111cna111 GL•nc·r.11 Giulio Fi·atic,·lli, fo r his ,·nthu~i;ism and prolc.,sionali!->111 i11 lcacli n):?: the An11y ,11 a mom<.' 111 o l g1..:a1 commi1111Pnts a11cl ck·q> 1ransfo1·ma1io11s. ;i p,·1·iod \\hich wi1ncs,-,·d. ;1mon~ 01hcr th ings. 1hc 1rn11,i1ion from con:,cription 10 ,olun1;11·is111. I e.,prc,-,~ him 111, frat,·rnal \\ish for a fu1 11rc· rull ol i-ucn·ss ;md salisla,:1io11. Finan,, 111\' grateful and aff,.... tionalc thought g<k'~ IO 1lw men and \\OIIWII o l th,· Ar111v who. a t home and abroad. bo1h in thl.'ir acti\ ilie,-, and in 1h,· cldicatc and ,i,.1,.,· opc,:a1io11s caffk-d oul for rhe 111ai111,•1r.111n• of peace and ~1T1B"it_, in Lh,· \\'odd, crn1i1·ihut,· lo Li1,· cslabli,-hmcnt of lht' , ·ah1t'S and principles 011 \d1ich 0111· S.:1Ticc and our C'ountn are fo11ncl ..·d. v1." appreda(ion and grn1i111d,s a lso go to till' ten~ of 1hrn1sa11d~ of ,,'1'\'iccmcn and ri\·ilian~ of lh.: Arn1\ \\ho. unct'a,-ingly, modcs th and l'ar l'rn111 llil' spotli!!ht,-,, o ffer 1hcir pn·l·ious \\Ork in Sl1ppor1 or 1lw operational 11ni1s. We arc li\·ing through an age.· marked I)\ grea1 coinpkxitv and eh nami,111. in front or w, \\C h,l\e a dilfinrl1 rn;1cl that \\ ill he arduous ,-om,·timcs and \\'i ll 1101 allo\\ us an_\· b1·.:al... \.e\\ a11d h,ml tasb arc aln:ad_, appea1·ing on the hori ✓.0n, \\hile d1<' rc·organization proc~•,..,, which will can:\· 1hc An11,· 10 higher lc1d,. ol dlicit'llt:~. 1·eadi11L'ss and national and i11ln11a1ional cr..:-dihilil~. is pn.1<:t·,·dinµ al lull ,p.:ecl. l\,•wnllL'less we rn11s1. and ('a 11, look ,ll 1hc fulurc I\ iLl1 t·o11fid,·11cl', O\\'ing to our 1-1-1 n·ars of hisw1 \ and 3-16 n·:1 r,- of !!lol'ious 1radi1ion,-, and, abo\·c ,ill, to the .,cn,.e of d111~·. pror;s,-ionalisrn .,;,d de1,·rminati~1n or llw ,;1,·11 a11d \\'omcn of o ur 1\ rm,·. I encourage- lhc Command('l'S of .tll rnn k,, and h:.-\·cls I<> \\1ll"k \\it h s,-1·c11itv and t·o111";1ge, a\\',ln.' that the~ a,,. can~ing out a function of 1111eq11.tlled imponancc. and ;,lso \\ith the mode.,1,- :111d st'nsi1i\·i1_1· that di,,1ing11i:-h thos,· c har!!c'd wi th the lea!k1·ship ,rncl cmplo~me111 o th,·1· 111,·11. )011. \\ith ,mn· b,·hal'iour. ar,• the credi1abk a11d u·ut· au thors of rlw , 11cn·s, of ou r i\rnl\. In m v \ '(HI will alwa\'" lind a ,-1a1111d1 a11d 1·c•., olu1c- supporter. It will hen grca1 pri, ileg,· and a great ho110111· for me to lead ~011 in r11t•,·1ing Llw challcngc" ol the h11111·t•. You nnd I w ill do it 1ogt>llwr, in the name ol co111i 1nri1:·, but a J,.,o in 1h,· sig11 ol opcnn,•,.,. 111odcr11i1,· a11d i11110, ·ation. Officers, :--Jo111:ommissioi1l'cl Officc rs, C'arnbinic-ri a nd Ci,·ili,111 f\•rsonncl S('l'\'i11g wi th till' 1\rm~. \\ ith these' st·111ime111:-. I wish \'Ou and your fomilics the bc,-,1 or lm·k and µ-real "a1isl;ic1io11s in ~-our work. Long lin: 1h,· Italian Ann~ and the i-\nn,·d Fo1·cc,-,! Long Ii": llah-1

Rome. J uly 23. 2005

Licu1enan1 (;t'n,· ral Filib,- no Cecchi AR.\1\' CI--IIF.F OF STAFF

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Tibice JPCO)Il.IID.1t coif cllITTrn.w<iill coif ~ clceceJP)-ifceil1t ~rm.<dl wn.<dlce$JP)Jrce~cl micececl

__ _. - , ..• •• ~~::.~!'!'~~--... -r.!!~~!f~-- ____t:aflr-.. :::.~~---~-=~-;"':!!~#! ~-':~-:-- =~~-~ :--~Z!"~~~..,,_, ......... -· -•· ·-· ·. . ·- ---· --- --- ---

Above. "Columbus Dav" in Nc11Âˇ York. Left. A Nc11 York slreet.

THE PICTURE

hat s ta nd s ou t tod ay

in Lhc scenarios of the Midd l e

Eas t

and

Central Asia, after the horrors o f' M ad r id and B es lan , is the absence of an exact perception in t h e ,v orl d o f Lhe sense of legality. A perception of legality t h a t c.innoL b e restric ted within a set of national laws hu t whic h , mving to the multilatera l charac te rÂˇ of worlc.l relations 6

ine lu ctab l e ,.v ay t o,vards d emocracy as u n iversal va lu e vis - ~1- vis a histori_ca l process t hat , i n the pro li feration of polit ical communities, compels every i n d i v idu a l an d every institutiona l entity lo deal w ith t he rest o f the wo rld. The "p eriphery1.alion" of the eco n orn i c and social p ol i c ies

redefines the h umanized space, th u s c reatin g systems of cul tura l p roximity that bind cultu res ,vhic h, owing t o shared reli g io u s, cul t u r a l o r ethn ic lingu is ti c va l ues , are similar in their diversity . For this reason, Lh e sen se o f legal ity b ecomes a necessary p erception of tbe limi ts of on e's liberty in order

and the stro ng international i1.a tion process of p ol i ti cal, soc ial and eco n omic r ela ti ons, becom es a u niversal val u e . In th is p lay of political a nd jurid ical balances every aspect of hu man li fe is no more imm une fro m t he destiny of others . In th e last years, in fac t, t he force o f righ t and the right or fo rce have presented t hemselves as coun terdeve lop m ents o r t he same dimension, where man, go i ng over t h e divers i ti es, tri es to affirm an o rder that overcorn es th e u ncertainty of the fu ture . Neve r theless , today i l becomes difficult lo imagine an

The United Nations Building.

e r c ornmun1t1es, Lo th e d e t r iment of a common will to reali ze a truly united sociely. For exa mpl e, Lh is is where the anlimodern ist ic reac lion o r Is lam plac es itself, interpos ing b e tween universali ty and indiv id uali s 111. 0 n th e other hand, in an inlerclepenclenl international sys tem closely l inked ny web inforrna lion, the significance o[ the politi ca l communi ties in ques t or t h eir o wn va lues , w h ic h shou ld h elp Lhern to hncl a p osi t io n with i n the i nternational reality, represents a way t o op pose th e e cono mi c h omolo g a ti on of g lo bal i7.a tion and an a ltempt to retrieve the cultural c red it that distinguishes them frnm the ot h ers . T hus, as we don't properly want to agree to Huntinglon's proposal Above. Danwscus Mosque.

Right. Folk-c:ostumcs in the Rc:cl Square.

to guarantee the liberty of the other, the defence of' a cu lture from the d omination o [ anothe r culture .

THE SENSE OF IDENTITY

•

Now, in a svstem where one observes a compress ion or Lhe nati on -S tat e a nd tr ies to reestablish a shared international ord e r throu g h supra n ational for111u l as, th e id ea that th e sense of nati onal identity has become \ve..ike1· is not only the outco m e of econorn ic global iza tio n. lt represe nts th e li mit o f an appa 1·en1 intern ational izat ion w hich s h i rts t h e terms o f the legality of r ig h t from th e individuality of the national reg11lalions lo the indi v idualilv o r the marke t. This rl'Oduccs a disorientation \Vithin the wea k-

. 'r . . t .

â€˘

about the "clash of civilizations", predictable per se and anLinornic i n ils theses, it is quite clear, in any case, lh at the tensions that stem from coexistence refer lo incomprehension for lack of communical.ion. A gro und of competitive con frontation, where the c ul tural p ec uli arities overlap an d becom e conflictive a t th e moment ,vhen a nat ional interest - or lhc interest of a com m unity - b ecomes dominant vis-a -vis cooperation. T h ere fo re th e p ro b lem is to be able to findÂˇ a new political formula that re-ori e nts consensus towards a universa lily of princip l es from wh i ch t o d ra \v insp i ration, avoiding homologation and emphasizing lhe divers ities in a whole of shared r ights and mode l s o f govern ance to be taken a s example. On the other h and, in an e ra tha t represents the result of the end of the dominant cullures, of co ll ectivist planned totalitarianism and deregulated liberalism , il becomes reductive and d angerous lo identify only lhe mark e t and its l aws as the ins trumenL for reconciling cultures. The logics of th e market, in fact, are indiviclu alislic logics, fo unded on competitiveness and not on so lidarity. For thi s reason, lo a ssign lhe task of ferrying the inte rnational com munity lowards a uni ve r sa l society only to lb e globalizalion process is not t he b est instrurnen t, u nless one decides l o homologale all cultures vis-a v is a prevailing one . An i n te grated society th a l doe s no l comprehend the diver sities and the differe ntiations, actually fa lls in to the trap of intere lhnic conflicts, "'vhich are obviously an e ffe ct and not a cause of globalization .

Left. London: I.he famous Big Ben. 9

Above.

Tmvc.:r []ridge. Left. London: ! he Citv .

I n s ho rt, \vh al. does not guaran tee a future Lo the process of globalization of Lhe markets, as an ideal instrument for reach ing political world ordcl' based_ on equil ib rium an d conse nsus, comes precise ly l'rom the e nd of the ideologies and organized judgements, which descr ibe, explain, in terpre t a n d justify the ich.:ntirv of a co mmunity. In the face of such relational dynami cs, nol eve n r eligion gels away wi t h iL, sin ce, fo r examp le, the attempts al reun ification o f the Christian models into a fundamental monotheist ic orthodoxy can not but be an effort to sp r eac..l the commo n values that can draw the con-

Paris: Place Vend6mc.

sensus through wh ic h a u niversalism of fa iLh can be affirmed.

THE CRISIS OF GLOBALIZATION Nevertheless, a l though g lobalizat ion tries to approach o bjectives of economic growth , thus supporting a balancing process of the inte r national corn m u nity, it is only through a conse nsus founded on the recognition of the diversities th at an international o rder will be reali zed . An order that sbou ld overcorne the presen t-day emergency: but this docs not seem to be amon g the resul ts o f Lhe internationalization of the rnarkets. Considering the possibility that the State coul d survive as the highest expression of an i nstitutionalised politica l cornmuni t_y, th e p rese n t-day emergency

resides in the democratic value's abi lity to become a func tion of tolerance and soli darity, respecting a certain and actu a lly exercised right, in a regime of consensus towards the norm and its sanct ions . On the other hand, considerin g t he \vill to join the wo r ld more and more together in a multi -confessional an d mu l ti -racial poli tica l system, any p rotect ionis t trend risks to c r eate as many fr ac tu res as homologat ion in globalisation, paradoxically ,-ernovin g even the srnal lcst perception of legality of a thus constituted world ord e r . v\iithout po l itical prÂˇoposa l s aimed at for rn i ng a consensu s based on social b ehav iours, with con verging interests and at titudes co mbined wi Lh the respec L of all ideas and of the various p rofessions of ra ilh , i t will be harcl1:y poss ible to remain within the

esse nLial limits n ecessary to affirm a p;Hticipation t h at could overcome th e in teret:hni c confl i ct s. A participation t hat sho uld fu rth er the re spect or t h e diversities and cultures, in a climate of juridical safeguard based on t he re c ip roci Ly of guaranlees that: should give a legal value to the protection of rights a nd th e app licability o( sancti ons.

CIVILIZATION AND CONSENSUS Proceeding from the foregoing cons ider ations, quoting H untin gton becomes a lmost a duty. B ut t he risk about quotin g H u n tington too often is that one cou ld beli eve him . Now, beyond the analyses carr ied out on the f ragility of t h e borders be tween civi li sations, history 11

teaches us that every confron tatio n is, a t th e bott om, an exp,-ession o[ an "encounter" o f c ivi li za Lions, some tim es vi ol e nL, or p e ac efu l if i n th e exc han ge a common rule is fixed a nd s ha,-ed. An "e ncounter" t h a t represe nts a manner through wh ic h , as no synthesis between differe nt valu es or inte rests is rea lized, on e c hoose s t he r oad of co nflict: civ i l, if internal, or war, i f between comm uni Lies institu tionali sed in to Slates. Nevertheless, what escapes Huntington is that the propens ity to realize a g lo balized sysLe m assum es the aspects of the ris k of ass imilation and it is on this poin l that the possibility of a c risis is realized. Tn fa c t, t he vulnerability of the Wes tern democracies res ides above all i n th e inab i l ity to manage cl iversi ry, a l lernat i ng m ome nts of tol era nce w i th attempts at social a n d econom ic ass imi l a tion oC the minori ties. I n oth er words, the probl e m is not to t ry to ho rnologale, but to o ffe,so cial an d poli Li cal mode l s b e s id es th e econo mi c o nes. Models wher e everv diversi tv ca n r ea l ize it s expec t at ions w i thout upsetting the juridical balanc e o r a communi ty . fn o ther words , by e xte nding lega li ty t hrough c onsensu s a nd r emov i n g any poss ibility of a cris is. Actu a lly, prec isely t h e latter as p ect r ep re sents t he moment of maximum crisis of Hunlin gt on's theory. If, for example, immig ra tion is today a p h enomenon which p r oves the tendencv to affirm a "transvcrsali ty" or t.he c ommun i t ies , ce rtainly e ith e r Lhe fau l t li nes s h i ft oÂˇr perh a p s we have missed some pa ssage. Rea lity, des pit e the p oss ihle c las h, is after a ll ve ry mu c h di rre rent. B esides the n ecess i ty to find

The Eiffel 'roll'er.

better opporLuniti es i n the Western \.vorld, certainly the r eduction of the frontiers to a mere cultural, more than a physical -po) i tical, acceptation, causes a progress ive shifl i ng of the communities , incl uding the Arab ones, to\.v ards a mu ltic ultural dime nsion. A het eroge neous dimension o f the social reJations, for ,vhich th e "fron tier" conce pt becomes ex t remely r e lative as it is expressed as line of contact, of greater in teraction b e t ween different V>'ays of inte rpreting re a li ty, man's experience, everyday li fe. Th e increase of t he flo ,v of immigrants actually shm.vs how much t he political weight o r the States, all of them, ,vas pro gressively reduced as th e outcome of a permeab il ity of th e economic and soci al systems with \Vhich the confrontation can dema teri alise in the same logic o f the interne t. On the other hancl, in t he face o f a society of immigrÂˇation, the sensitivity of a government is shown by the l e ve l of possib le in tegrability , especially as regards i ts capability of adaptation an d a c knowledgeme nt of someone el se's rules without pursuing the ir assimilation. Jn t his r ega rd the only possible quest ion is: is a democratic model compatible with a multiethnic soc iety ? Now, the answer can only be positive for t,vo reasons. First, b ecause t he democracy concept itself, in a d ec ision -making and mana ge ment sys t em of th e community, is ba sed on the e nhance ment of the diversities, respecting and c ons titut.ionali zing the e t hical-ju r idical aspec ts on ,v h ich human so c iet y is built. The second reason is- the effect induced by internationa liza tion, since the weakening o f the State is ravoured by a cultuntl lran sversalil.y that lirn its

The St.alue of Liberty 13

democratic hvpothesis and precisely t he most advan ced com munit ies would pay for it.

THE F UTURE

Distribution of food in Jrnq.

the capabiliti es or a ction of the dom i nanl comm u n ily . On Lhe other hand, the d emocral ic fo ,-mu la, in a well-es tablished an d contemporary political system, a ttempts to render the very id ea o r n alionalism a rela ti ve concept. Th is h appens at lhe morn e n l wh e n th e pro cess or supranat ional institutional isation contributes to a m p li Cy the bas is of con s ensus a n d bri ng the diversities nearer, trying to avoid polari z ation s , n o t only w iLh in Lhe s ingle nat ional comm un ities, b ut a lso i ns i de the regiona l communities or in th e inrernarional community . ln a certai n sen se Lhe same p rocess o f prog ress ive u n ifi c a ti o n o r Europe answers a s i milar o pportunity/n ecess ity. Thus, today, in a cl imate or 11101-e and mo r e w id esp r ead re l a ti ons a mo n g indi v id ual s, the duty or a democratic sys tem is lo overco me the aspec ls of its own and oth er peoples' marginality, in order to achi eve a se n1 imenl or l eg a litv that in its 14

conc r ete b e h avi ou r sh ou ld express a participative consensus in the pol i ti cal action c arri ed ou t. Marg inality, as a sta tic clement, b ecomes a li mit to b e s urpa::;sed throug h the con quest of consensus among t hose layers of legal i::;ed i m migra ti o n i n o rd e r lo ove1--come a cla::;h of civilizations, try ing to fin d a s y nthesi s of the diver s ity b y safeguarding the di fferences of the minorities. Neve rtheless, the ac tual limit of the \t\Testern point of view is t ha t of be in g una b le t o g o bevond the p o litical horizon of development, with no proposals aime d al removing the areas o f underdevelopment, and con qu er the conse n sus o f t he p eriph e ri es or th e w orl d in order lo subtrac t human and m ate rial reso ui-ce s From the mu ltinational of tcrroL On the other hand, in t he face o[ multil evel a nd tra ns n a ti onal threats, a limited dimension of th e o p pos iti on, im p le m e nt e d t hro ugh a limitation or p ower s and r ights, would not achieve p e rceptibl e effec ts, but produce a decli ne in consensus with a reducti on of t he gu ara ntees o f lib e rty a nd Lh e d e [ea l of a n y

Th e y ea rs brid g ing the 2 0 Lh and 21 st centuries have been p a rticul a r ly i nterestin g fo r Lh c a na lysi::; of t he relations between democrncy and world order. All thi s h as und e 1Âˇgone an acceleration due to the terrorist escalatio n. The events of 2001 have re m odell ed t h e ways of thinking the internal and intern a ti on a l rel ati o n s , a nd th e t ransnational connections among the communitie::;, to lhe poin t o f ma ki n g t hi nner and thinner the boundary between war a nd ins ta b il i ty. They h ave s hirted it on a new dimension, where one cannot distinguish what ass u m es the characters of i nternationality ri-0111 \Vhal a p pears almost an i nt e n1al a spec t o f a vvo r ld community taken as a whole. T he consequ ence o f a ll lhi s is t hal an in ternational order ba::;ed on ]~, on force is no more a feasible proposition. Poree alone creates unbalances and sh ifts the relational Len ns on a con rrontatio n o f povver. A con[rontation which. dragging along cverv possible po li tical prospect or grow th and lire in common, without ensuri n g a future o[ stab ility, o bta ins the resul t of s u bver t ing an orde,- only lo establish in its place a nother provisiona l order. J\ world tha L tries to find in the rorce of this or 1hat power its rea so n o f balan ce e nds up h _v undermining the political growth of t he inter-national commun ity a nd that of t he in dividual national communities, which are becomin g culturally a nd economica lly c loser and closer. T h us t he real problem is again not so much the end o f the State but the reorganization of the d emocratic S tale as a mod el o r p rnximi ty, as ins tit ut ion s u b-

sidiary to a democratic model of cosmopolitan governance. \·Vith all this, it is not so much a matter of demonstrating that the State is functional lo tf1c process of globalizat ion, as to th ink that the diversity oC opportunities is the best way of interacting in a system founded on relations prevailingly cooperative and noncompeling. The truth is that, in order to include the other , one needs the consent of the one and of Lhe other. Owing lo th is, not even Huntington finds his absolution in the reductionism where he sets the future of the world in a hypothetical clash or civilizations, as if a confrontation o l d iversit ies were no t, p er sc, a confrontation between differen t ways of interpreting the economic and po l itical r eal i ty . Besides, \Vithoul going Loo far, there is not much regarding ideology and very much regarding traditio.n and religious sentiment t h at characterizes the \Vay of perceiving reali ty in the Islam ic communities Lo th e po int that, in the past, they have been hard ly permeable to both the socialist ideology and the capitalistic liberalism. The LnHh is that the guarantee of the cultural diversities must be aimed a t increasing the dialogue, avoiding poss ib le fractures in a system that \vould u l ti mately r isk h omologal ion . Au tonomy , interdependence, seH-determ i nation, respect or the universal values safeguarded a nd gu aranteed for all, are the elements that can str·ucture consensu s as a pol itical ca tego ry qualified by partic ipalion and by the safeguard of the mi n or·iLies . For this reason, un iversalism is n ot t h e resu l t of an utop ian approach reserved t o a few en li gh tened persons . It rnusl represenl the point or arrival o f a percept ion, diffused in the everyday li fe, or a historical necess ity founded on the respect and defence o r values s u ch as so li dari t y and coope r a Li on in observance o r Lhe la,-v . In

A lillle Afghan gid

defence oC va l ues such as democracy, liberty and p eace in their name and only in that sense - can the use o f force be legitima led . A universalism, therelore, which should no more he consid ei-ed a value belonging lo on l y a part ol th e ,,vor lcl and shou ld not be an expression of a u ni l ateral choice or world goven1ance.

CONCLUSION ln a universal repr·ese ntation of a shared democracy, the con sensus becomes th e keystone of the new order t h rough which the anxieties or th e p resent and the unce rta inties on the futu,-e of mankind can be overcome . A broadminded ouL l ook needs a counterpart, a con trast, and consensus can only stern

from another consensus , in a progressive overcorn i ng of oppos i ng positions through a process of po l itica l synthesis ground ed on a dialogue that only Lhe democra t ic method can guarantee. Th us, if democracy is i ncompa tible with soc ial inequality ,vh e n Lhis means d ifference of opportunity and exclusion or a p e r·son from the par tic ipation in the format ion of consensus and rrorn the possibilities or growth and access - it becomes physiologica l to universal ly consider scarcely enduring a ,vorld orde1· bu i It on asymmetric opportunities of political participaLion and access to the economic development of the communities . And this is the breaking point of any possible and long-lasLing equilibrium . D

''Expert in geostralegy 15

"You Italians are very important here in Lebanon. ITALAIR has a determinant role in our mission. Your servicemen are indispensable because they enable us to control the Blue Line from the sky and, furthermore, they are exceptional in the dialogue with the population'~ Major General Alain Pellegrini, French Commander of UNIFIL 16

eace, detente, diplomacy, high specialization. This is the synthesis of a meeting anticipated and hoped for . The journalist's curiosity and his wish to describe, once more, truth and concreteness. The joun1ey starts on a hot summer day. Everything is shipshape. The details of the operation and the indispensable notepad are in the suitcase. The airplane of the Middle East Airline is ready to take off for a

irHrigued looks . Visa, passport control. and Lhe Lebanese advenlure begins .

BEIRUT The landscape that ope ns before our eyes is a hlcnd of Medilerranean colours and Arab shades. The chaotic and frenetic traffic reminds me of that o f the \Nestern metropol is . All around , the "advancing n ewÂˇ" . Globalization-sly le b uildi ngs,

posters , blow-ups of the po liti c ians who, in the past decades , have made Lhe Lebanese hislory. The attention is a ll focused on the eleclion for the new Parliament. It is the firs t election held \vithout the presence of the Syrian Army. After a fC\,V kilometres, \Vri ggling among road hogs and metropolitan pedestrians, we reach the centre of the town. ResLOred

Beirut. A view of lhe city.

ride that I could define as hellish, to say the least. From the Roman skies we head nor th, destination Milan. We wait an hour here and then off we go, heading south. We fly over Rome again and then the aircraft steers towards the Mediterranean and Beirut. The impact is the same as that met many t imes before in other Countries of the area. A modern airport, advertisements all over the walls . Surprised and 17

The rncdal mvarded l o the personnel who served 1-viih lhc UNIFTL rn issiu n.

b u i ld i ngs a n d o ld bl ocks , sti ll sh mving t h e ho les m ade by the bL1llels of the civil \var, On the st reet-corncr·s, policen-1e n o n the a lerl. The tension is high but, a t least a p pa rently, life seerns no l Lo real i , e i L Suddenly we see t he m ain sym bol o f Leba no n. Tt tells o f the c ivil wa rs that have Lorn the Co u n t ry a p a 1- I d LI r i n g l 5 year·s, and rem i n d s of foreign invasions a nd a LLemp ls al coloni,a Lion. Al the centre of i'viartyrs' Squar e, a sta tue embod ies blood a nd vio lence. T he sh ell h oles a rc still visi b le. On t he corner, an expa nse o( flmvers on a field o f as phal t. i\ few m e lres mvay, the t o mb s o( t h e m artyrs of th e um pteen th a t tack against peace. Seven coffins for as m a ny victims of the massacre o f Va lenti ne Day. The ph o tographs portrav the men of t he esco rt o f fo n n er· 1xe rni er Ha rir i, killed by a b om b togeth er \Vith the poliLical leader \,v hen, on Febru ary 14, an enormo us explosion g ripped the hearl o[ Beirut. Al a lit tle d is t a n ce from the "cem e tery on th e a sp halt" , the 18

ci t_v spread s toward s t he port, \,v hich is still one of Lebanon 's economic o utlets. Mearnvh i.l e the streets are fill in g wit h people . Some s top Lo observe s liop -\,v ind mvs colo ured by \Nestern fash ion, o t hers "take s h e lte r·" i ns ide c o rners of American cuisine. ln t he a ir one ca n feel the Ara b presence . Intense perfumes an d m idd leEastern arnmas sur-prise us in the twilight of expec t ation. The expecta tion t hat. is in the heart of the Lebanese people, who h ope t hat it \Vill d issolve with the new· day. T he journey ins ide Lhe "after S:vria'' Lebanon has just stan ce!. After a crowded fl ight. and the im p act. with the capital, the sout l1\va r cl road is belore us . T h e r e a re less than a hundred ki lome t res, but the asphalt is unca r·e d ror and the \Vi n cli ng roads m u ltiply th e di s ta n ce. As we rnove awa_y from Beirut th e traffic drop s. My gu ide and travel companion , a Lieutenan t Colonel of the Italian i\rmy, suggests lo observe Lh e deta i ls . Al ong th e road th e election posters pro Ii[era te. \Ve cou nt almost t\vo h un dred of them in a li ttle more than t wenty ki lo rnetres . They a r c mostly those of Hari ri's son, port r aye d nex t to his father, to remind the voter t hat he wants to fol low in h is lootsteps . Mean while we nm in to the fir·st roadblock, than the second ... th e t hird. After almost hun dred kilometres t he nu n iber of the r oadblocks h as gon e up to te n. T he sold iers slop ou r car, look a t o ur faces a n d , \Vi th a typically Medi terranean gesture, let u s go. Some, instead, look fo r ev id ence in our p assp<xts.

THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY

The ro ad b ecom es n arrower and narrower, the holes increase. T he eyes of my gu ide speak, as if to say : this seems ano th e r

Lebanon . T hen, a post.er \vith tlw symbol of Hezb ollah and an Imam armed \Ni th a s u bm a chinc gun. 'vVe are entering t he cxtrcnie south of t he Country, strongh old o f t h e pro- S yrians and , u nt i l 2000, controlled by Israel. On the h o ri ,.on we can see Naqo u ra , \,vashed bv t he sea. ILis a littl e vi llage, \,vitl; less than 500 in h ab itants and abo u t 2000 "gu ests", the mern bers of the UNIFIL (U I\ Interim Force in Lebanon) rn issio n. " W·e have been here since 1978, with different jobs bul n sole pwpose: Lhe respect of pe:JCL' and international agrcemen Ls". The Lieutenant Colonel explains that "Italy is one of lhe Counlries with a vc,y old /radition of prese nce in Lebanon, a real national pride" . The UNIFIL base expands for more than 2 km, \vilh helicopter landing s trips , lod gings, offices, coordi nation a reas. The "blue village" is on th e seasho re and hosts a lso t h e cemetery of Naqou r a . J!ere Lhe graves follm.v one ano t her, decora ted \-Vi lh Clowers and p ho tographs and - unusual fac t seem to be watc hed over by th e Bl ue Berets. But it is only a coincidence . In fact, lhe inh;;1 bi tanls o r t he village can enter the cemct e ry ea S iJ y, CV e n i [ i I i S lJ LI i t e pecul iar that in ord er to pray on th e tomb of t heir loved ones th ev mus t have th e aut hori zation of the UNIFlL l-l q. Before hea din g fo r t h e Head q uortcrs or t he Italian base I sco u t. t he corn ers of Naqo u ra . Th e silence is broke n by th e noi.se o f the UNIFIL h elicop ters taki ng off and by Lhc few a l l-terrai n ve hi cles of the United Nations . Very few peop le o n t he streets. AL dawn, from Lhe mosq ue, the local I m am bre a ks t he sleep of the fa i t h ful, c alling th em fo r t h e rnorni ng praye r . Thus the Ch r ist ian c i tizens of Naqoura h ave the "l uc k" of n o t n eed ing Lh e trad ition al ba ttery -powered a larm -clocks to star t th e d ay . Look ing Lo the left, along t he sea, one can sec Israel. WiLh a go od

An AB-205 hel icopt er taking off frorn

ITALAIR.

binocular one ca n even make ou l the sol di e r s . Un l il 2000, the Israel i Lroops con trolled and garrisoned the wh ole a rea. T hey had a rrived m o re than t\ven tv vea rs before, in response Lo the· Sy rian m ilitary. T od ay, th ings a re back t o n orm a l , or a lm o s t. To th e sou th t here is Hezbollah , i.e. "the party of God" . For Lhe U.S. and Israel t hev arc te rrorists , for Lhe Lebanese ·s ci'ites th ey ar ~ heroes. Throu g ho u t the y ears, the have c ou nter ed Isra e l' s at tacks , a ltacked Israel , b uilt schools and hospita ls, he lped Lhe poor. NO\v they have go t a goo d n u m be1· o r seats in Parliam e nt. \ .

THE UNIFIL HQ M y g u id e ta kes me to t he UN I FIL Comm a n d e r, Maj -Ge n Alain Pell egrini, a Fr ench o ffice r proud to be born in Cors ica, ,vho s ta tes : "The UN resolution n o . 1559 on th e 1vilhdn.n1·a l of Syria From L e banon does no t c h c; nge

Lhe UN/FIL mandate. On the con lrDrY, I believe I.h a t. the p mgrcss achie ved up to /J OH' on the plane ofstnbjJity is going to increase". T h e Co mm an d er oC the UN m is s ion i n Leba no n is vcrv pl eased \Vi th t h e effo r ts m a d e along t he " Bl u e Line" tha t runs bet\Nccn Lebanon and Israe l. T he purpose o r his men is to g uarantee the coexistence o f" the two peoples that reside a lo ng the 12 1 kilometres of the b order establ ish ed after the \vit hclrm-va l of the lsraeli troops from souther n Lebanon . The Commande r docs not hide the d elicacy of t he \vork o l the Blue Ber e ts. " \!\ic n ever Forget to h ole/ a dialogu e 1.vith nil the su bj ec ts i n /.e res!ed in Lhe respect of 1hc Blue Line '. I ref-er fo particular to H ezbolla h and its importDn t role in the rn -en" Between a d iplomatic speech, a mi litary vision and comments on the con tend ers , he sto ps to La lk. Then, after a pause, he goes on: " You Italians are vc1 y importan / here in Le ban on . ITA LA IR has n det erminant role in our m issio n. Your servicem en are indispensable because the_v enable us to con/rol Lhe "Blue Lint'" from the skv and, Fur thermcn-e, lh(v arc

excep liona l in £he dialogue ll'ith th e populntion". H is eyes express p ride and gratitude. He adds: ''For this reason on the pas/ 5ili o( J\ifa,, ITALAIR 1-v as D\FDrded the /JN medal For its cornrni1mcn1 in supprnt of peace. It 1vus a much deserved aclrn01dcdgcment which crowns the choice macfc by Rome to stan d by Ilic Un i1cd Nntfons as protagonis t. Ita /_1· has hccn in UNIFI! . s ince the first mome nt and 1 hope ii 11,jJJ remain here also in the /i!t un:. Wi1h more commitrnc nl a nd responsib ilit_v, i f anything. Tha nks LO Italv and lo the flalian s". Wha l can one add to these words? What docs one fee P T he repo rt er, fu ll o f p r ide and happy to b e lo n g to a g1·e al Coun try, can only l1ead fo r Italian

land . ARRNAL AT ITALAIR

The Ital ian Tricolour flanked b v s ig n s s1. ancls o ut al. the entrance, to m a ke one "Feel less lan1 way from h ome" . "Roma 22.'i 0 km" a b la c k inscri p tion info nns. l\ evert he less, d csr itc t he distance, r k e l a t home: voic19

An AB-205 h elicopter getljng rcacly for wkc-off

es, sou nds, inflex ions, glances. I have entered a bit of I taly, \vhich soon I am going Lo cal l "\,\/hat a beautiful I taly". The encou nter with the most lradi li onal Italian citizen - coffee - is inevitable . This time the blend has a di fferent flavou r, better, more aromatic, more intense. There is ins ide it the ,vish to assert the pride of our roots, the hope of being help ful to peace, the certainty to be engaged in an important mission. 1 meet some Officers and, after a fe,v words, I [eel l am hack in Rome. And yet I am thousands of kilometres a Âˇway 1 1 meet the Commander of the helicopter squadron, who takes me on a tour of the b ase. A first-ra te workshop for the maintenance of the helicopters, Lhe q u a rt ers, t h e operations room , the mess - \Vhere at lunch and dinner one can find again an 20

Ita l ian corner - th e club. T h e reporter has now only th e task or u nderstanding the objectives, the risks, diffi cu lties a nd hopes or t his mission on th e Lebanese soil. My interlocutor is genero us vvith ans,vers. "In this mission there is a veiy high professionalism in our men. This aspect tells a lot

abou t I.he parlicularily o r o ur m ission which, although certainly not de manding as other missions in terms of psychophysical stress, ii. s1.nnds oui For its delicacv and the spin-off for our Armed Forces and for llaly as a 1vhole". There is pride in his ,vords and, du r ing o ur chat , my gui d e a nd the other components of t he Contingent. \vcar a prnud look . "We are an example of effective organ i zation on the Jogislic c hain . A lthough we are a ve1y small unit, we enjo_y the privilege oF a swift log istic support w)1ich an swers our needs as regards spare p arts, contact-sq uads For important second-level intetTentions. This has pe rrnitlecf, ancl

permits, an average operational eHec/Jveness ol 80-90% in t.erms of helicopter availabili(v'' . Al this poinl, the subject of 0111 chat turns out to be the helicopter, \vhich is the actua l protagonist. o r this mission: the flight average is 1000 hours per year. The promptness of the interventions is 15 rninu tes in case of rn edical needs in the whole area concerning t he "Blue Line". The chopper is th e AB-205, a machin e that the pilots dehne as '\vonder{u l" i n terms of sturdiness and reliability. \Nill this last also in the Cu ttffe? "We'll have to fi nd an alternative that can e nsure the same e fficiency" acid s the Commander. "In our Armed Forces the similar nwchines no1.v in service are the AB-212 and AB4 l 2 . Conside ring /h e tasks present1-yÂˇ assumed abroad by the AB-412 and ils c rews, one can assume that its substitute could be /h e AB-212. Selling a side names and numbers, in his eyes there arc interrogatives about another question. "The rotation ofpersonncl is

In the cnpitul, the damages caused by the civil 1vc1r a re st ill visible.

a. great problem. In these last years we have noticed tlwl \Ve must go back to a part ial but constant "feeding" o[ the unit". In tl1e office of the Commander lhcre arc a lo t or photos with the Lebanese population: the smile of c hild, a man's ha nd lifted in a thanking sign, the colours of happiness for the recovered autonomy. "We lwve ve1y good relations with the Lebanese. Our thirty-year ~,presence h;.1s cert.Mnly h elpe d ·"' detente and encournged the dialogue. We {/_v over the Lebanese territo1y but the airspace is controiled b_y the Israeli air- fo rce. hence the need lo have close relations and agreemenl.c; with IDF (Israel Defence Forces). Also with U1e Israeli 1vc have excellent relations, whene ver we g o sec the m they always welcu111c us with a fi:iend(y smile and esteem. With us lta/ians, in particular, th ey are much more open and inclined to dialogue, and not on~y for slricL(v operational reasons. We must continue to do this, and do it belier. A friend{y smile is worth much more than lot.s or words written in the international resolutions". The agenda of my p resence a t Naqoura at this poinl e nvisages th e "encounte r of all e ncounl.e l"s" . My guide accompanies me, with his u n(ailing smile, "number one" in the UN-Italv relatio ns. I m eel "hi m", un li t cigar ha nging rro m hi s lips, hel icopt er p ilot suil, relaxed face and eyes that enclose thousands o f m issio ns and d i ffic ul ti cs lo he fa ced. Colon e l Giacomo Lipa,-i is the represenlative o f the Commander o f t he UNJFIL mission in Beirul, as wel l as th e Command er of the Halia n co ntinge nl in Leba non. H e belongs to AVES and here he has a poli lical a nd military role that enables him to have a complete picture o r Lhe situation. After I.lie wi thdrawal of the Syrian troops

from Lhc Coun l.l"y, it is p e rhaps n ecessary Lo reconsider the UN mandalc. Of course we turn the qu estion l o th e Comm ande ,-: "Certainlv the new scenarios call fo r al le;sl one reileclion. Whal has changed since April, when the S_vrians left Lebanon? W e shouhl slart from £here tu rc dra,,v the presence and the mandate or the United Nations. I believe that in NelV York this is nearing a serio us and inlelligent disc uss ion". Will this o bservation suffice to rewrite a resolution of the S ecuri ty CounciP " I f only an interview ancJ s ome poli licosLraiegic cons idera tions cou ld suffice! These last weeks I have brought up at several levels this necessil_y. I lw ve found good liste ning ears and excellent interlocul ors. We s hall see. For the moment, I am Fe1y glad to live with o ur s uccess and I he ve1y good I talian rcla l.ions \,Vith the Forces in th e f'ic!d". How docs an lla lian Officer live in this conlesled a n d lacerated corner of t h e world? "When people m eet us or not ice our colours on the uniform, they lift their thumb as a sign or joy and friendship. These allitudes, especiully For a soldic1~ fill £he hear t. We Italians have perhaps more sensitiveness, 1.ve

always re member the sufferings of uur Counlty dur ing the Second World War and the efforts 10 become a great Nation. Moreo ve r', our ch,1 racter a lso help us, as 111e/l as our ahilit_v to al1Vays find a solulion. It is our spirit or adaptabiliLy. And this is 1101 easily lcnrned. Al Lhis poin L Lhe picture is clear. Also here the Italian accomplishmenLs arc excellent and so are the hopes for Lhc future. Enriched bv these umpteenlh exper ie nce, a t a distance of a lmost three thousand kilometres from I ta ly, also this Lebanese diary is a bnut Lo encl. I try LO fi x a ll t h e co r n er s or Lebanon , I he cha.-ac tcrs en countered, the stro ng and scduct ivc emotions. A fare-,vell Lo my guide . A doubt com es to my m ind : is it my luck Lha t always ma kes m e m~et helpful, prcpar~d and professio nal people, or is it that also the hurnan aspect. so detcrn1inan t, is very ,.v idcspread among the persons in unil"orm? The a nswer of course is not thal simple, hut my graliLucie us journalist and Ha l ian is in the ha ndsh ake I exchange with Giovanni. Thank you, also on Lhe south of Beirut! 0 '')ounwlist, RAI-Televideo 21

by Giancarlo Bove I

... Nothing is more necessary and useful to ,a General than knowing the intentions ani:l plans of the enemy. The more difficult is the acquisition of this knowledge, the greater is. "the merit of he who succeeds in making a correct forecast ... Niccolo Machiavelli

This article describes a defence and security model which takes into account the role of Intelligence as an instrument of previsional analysis and strategic management of information.

II I

o rÂˇ Intel.ligence,. the restricted areas of strategic im portance and the enlire civilian and mil itary infrastructure of contemporary civilization rep resent a high-priority objective, on which one should focus the altention in order to ensure security and defence against terrorist aclions. This objective can be achieved by exploiting all means and resources which can perm it Lo anticipate those actions with enough time lo organize and apply the necessary cou nlenneasures. For fnlelligence, to "anticipate" means to identify, beforehand and correctly, two physical variab.les: "time" i.e. "vhen terrorism is 24

going to slrike, and "space", 111eant as "internal environment", location of the potential target of the terrorist action . "Prevision" and "Environn1ent" are two interdependent concepts \Vith a fictitious link. This link, in its turn, is extended to the "I nternal Environment", which includes the land space controlled b y modern surveillance means and securitv svsLems, and to the "External Em;ironmen l" i. e . the air space and coastal area wh ich are hostile and difficull lo control, O\ving to their geographical extension and because certain situations cannot be changed. Nevertheless, to anticipate them can be useful because th is

A "Bcrsaglieri" patrol in haq.

reduces the uncertainty o f the fu ture decisions wh ich concern not only the planning of military operations aimed al contrasting and neutralizing the terrorist threats, but also the selection of the appropriate rneasures of d e fence and security for averting them. We should not forget, Funhermore, that after 9/1 l the very notion of security, defence and attack is changed . Suffice it to think, For example, of the NATO Countries and the U.S., which are now d efending their security by fighting and attacking the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

,....c:;::!!::::::::::::::============::::i Fig. 1 Conflicts among technologically advanced nations

Tribal and ethnic conflicts among equally advanced nations

Type of Conflict

Technologically advanced nations against technologically non-advanced nations

But that is not all, because the situalion of tension now prevailing after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. and Spain and lhe threat of attacks against other Nations, including Ita ly, has led to strengthen those measures, \vhich have become more a nd more frequen t. In this article we are going to describe a model of preventive defence and security, taking into account the role played by intelligence as an instrument for anticipatory analysis and strategic management of informaLion. Besides, we should remember that the strategic management of information, together with a programming, anticipatory and pre-

Terrorism and Guerrilla warfare against technologically advanced

venting capability, is the basis of any c ivilian or military initiative against terrorism.

THE ASYMMETRIC CONCEPTION OF THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

The war against terrorism is different from a traditional war and, in order to produce an adequate model of defence, security and intelligence, one should have a deep knowledge of an e nemy w hose offensive capability is carried out through various Corms of vi olence, including the politico/psychological one ( 1). A contribution to this kno\N-

ledge can be given by setting up a data bank for keeping a record of all terrorist events. The elements filed in the data bank are pr ocessed wil11 certain criteria, including mathematical ones, in order to fo retell, as much as possible and V>'ith suffici e nt precision, every probable situation and future scenario that could be used for providing an Li Lerrorism and counte r-terrorism responses (2). These responses must take into account the fact that the enemy does not fight, but attacks and strikes with recourse to tactics that belong to a conception of conflict - or war - that the experts d e fine as "asymmetric". 25

Water Air

Maritime

Transport Network

Infrastructure

Energy System

Railway

Electricity

Gas

Nerve Centres of Contemporary civilization

Road

lnfostructure

Computer Net

Telecommunications

Computers

Fig. 2 This notion, linked to Lhe technological, mililary and economic gap between the parties, includes also t\vo cl ifferent types of confl ict - symmetric and asymmetric - ,vhich can b e classified as showTJ at fig. 1. Asymmetric types of conflict high- Lech against low-tcch - \,Vere experienced during the first Gulf vVar, in 1991, ,vhich las t ed a short time, w ith rninimum losses for the contender ,vho was stronger and hc tLe r organized, both m ilitari ly and economically. Other examp les of this type of confl icL appeared in 1999 in Kosovo, in Afghanistan a fter S eptember 11, 2001 and in l rÂˇaq in 2003, in the second Gulf Vlar. Th ese conflicts \Vere fought with the partic ipation o f a Nati o n, or a coalition of technologically advanced Nations. Very d ifferent is the situation wh e re there is terrorism, where the asyrT11T1elric characteristic - lowtech against hi gh- tech - does 26

not follO\v the rules of military strategy but , on the co ntrary, employs any k ind of means to strik e with a modus ope randi typical of terrorist strategy. A ruthless, lucid and apparently irrational strategy, \vhere the select ion of the targets is rnade ,vith the intent ion of achieving the maxirnum destructive result on the psychological and physical plane. On the psychological plan e, because or the emotional impact on people caused hy the highest possible number of innocent victims, ,vhereas on the physical plane the e ffecl .is achieved throug h the destruction and para lysis of the i nfrastruclu 1-e and info-structure considered the nerve centres of con temporary civili za tion, as shO\vn at fig . 2. lt is worth lo specify that. in low-tech against hi gh- Lech conflicts typ ical 0 1Âˇ terrorism , te rms like "b a ttl efielclll, "e n e my" and ''\veapons" a.re m isleading compa-

red to the pasl, since they arc linked Lo a period \,1,rhcn Lhe armies were los ing or \,vinning battles sealed by armistices or peace treaties. lf up lo nO\,\' the armies' attention has always been directed towarÂˇcls their likes, i.e. the m ilitary instruments or other States and th e ir defences , no\v Lh e world must face t ransna tional threats posed by terroris t ind ividuals and networks \vhich, after Sep Lem ber 11, 2001 have asse rted themselves as Lhe new global enemy, d efyi ng States, economy and society. These terrorist nets, which have no borders and take a ll values out of the nat ional grammar of arrr1ies and war, have a non-territorial and decentralized structure and act at national and t.nmsnational level. In addition to th is, there is the threat represented by the individualization of the wars, \Vhich are no more fought onlv hv Sta-

tes against olher States. bul. also bv individuals against States. ri,ese individuals, \,ViLh Lheir actions, operate in almost unlimi ted times and manoeuvre spaces, following the example of the a lLacks the U.S. fed e ral buildings of Oklahoma City in 1995. As a matter or fact , a single individual can have, even i ( he is alone, lhe techn ical know-how to make weapons thal can be used for terroris t objectives. This is lhe type of enemy who, unlike the subvers ive groups, is very difficult to find w ilh the traditional i ntelligence instru ments. As \Ve said, in the face of these threats, besides the work clone by the Intelligence to foresee them, it is i mportant to adop t a new model of securÂˇity and defence capable of preventing Lhem .

01;

THE INTELLIGENCE

PREVISIONAL MODELS The importance ol preven ting, i.e. acLing in advance, is expressed by Ovid's Latin maxim: ... pr incipiis obsta sero medicina paratur ... (oppose it from tb e beginning , it lakes a long time to prepare a medicine ... ). This principle is a pplicable to all fields of human activitv, including defence and securil~: w here " ' prevent ion is a fundamental and essential requ iremen t. Prevention, in its turn, implies a pre-

vious evaluation : the future n1ust be seen in advance. This is the basic pcpblem 1.hal Tnl.e ll igence must solve . For example, to foresee a terrorist attack means to know in advance the intentions of the enemy. This requirement is vitally irnportant i n strategic term s and has been translated into a series of criteria and procedures whose aim is to p rovide essentia l e lements o f information, to produce other intelligence requ ir e ments and supply, in a complete and systematic form, the intell igence needed for special operations (3) aimed at countering and neutrali/.i ng the threat (military intelligence operations). Prussi an strategist Karl von Clausev,citz said that war is the kingdom of the unexpected, a nd this is also true in the war against terror \.vhere, in order not. lo be taken by surprise, it is i ndispensable Lo evaluate the unfolding o[ the situations, no matter hmv unpredictable they are. This evalualion is clone through previsional analyses based on a statistic pro cess ing of historical data concerning t:en:orisn,. Since ror lack of space it is practically impossible Lo describe all poss i ble methods, \Ve shall mention only some of them . One is the "Analytic Hierarchy Process (AH P), developed b.Y Thomas Saaty o( P illsburgh University. The method is expedienl. for solving confl ict situations like those prevailing with terrorisrn, for op-

timising complex decisions and for creat ing tentative scenarios \vhich, Âˇwith the appropriate variations, could be adapted also to the m ilitary conlexl. The Analylic Hierarchy Process was fo llowed by the "Analytic Nel\,v ork Process" (ANP), a more compl ex and sophisticated instrument, already used by the researchers or the lnsti tute for International Prevision and ResearÂˇch Stud ies (ISPRI) when requested by Government bodies. Ins txumental in the creation and prevision of scenarios are the "Even ts Data Banks". const.itui.ecl ,.vith heuristic goa ls, i.e. structured on theoretic bases and able lo significantly correlate a plurality or factors, such as strategic objectives, a ttack tactics, availab le resources and means, together with the events that could be al the bottom of lhe terrorist threat. Such events are very important, because th ey can be correlated \.vilh the so-called "unforeseen developments", i.e. the unexpected developments of the terrorist threat. Researchers abroad have singled out at least t\VO categories of unexpected events which are dif[i cu l l or impossible to foresee: the extrapolaLive ones and the rnutanl ones (fig. 3). According Lo Professor UmberLo Gori ( 4), the extra po lative unexpected evenls could actually be foreseen if there \vere apprnpria te simulation models and

Fig. 3

Extrapolative Unforeseen Events

Mutant Unforeseen Events

I â€˘

.,.,, â€˘

_,~,.:

S e1viccrnc:n from !he 9th ''Col Moschin '' 011 reconnaissance: in the Afghan desert.

more historical data to process. In this regard, the Ddense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other American defcnse agencies have acquired specific software capable of processing all events from a tactical, strnlegic and dccisionmak i ng viewpoint, gathering information on previous situations, from the most remote Lo th e most recenL ones. To obtain good results, one

should process the his torical data in o rder to establish a data base, or a know ledge base, aimed at bui ld ing an abstract model of reality. Later, after the creation or propositions and niles wh ich cons titute the b<1sis of the programme, one can move to the "inference" phase, i.e. a concatenation of rult:s looking for differen l solutio ns of th e s<1111e problem, with all

possible variations. The unexpected mutant events, on the contrary, because of their nature c<1nnot be considc1Âˇed in advance. T hey ca n be e ither sponta neous or coincident. The former arc events such as murders and the so-called "acts of Goc.l" in the name of the holy war and I s lamic fundamenta li sm, w hile a mong Lhe latter there arc events which derive their impor-

tance from o the r even ts, nol linked to them by a common cause, -which occur in the same period. An example of th e latter is the attack of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, three days before the poli lical elections, a nd on July 7, 2005 in London, during the GS S u m mit. These eve nts a rc apparently unlinked, but could actually reflect p recise and even disquieting strategies (5). All terror ist actions, if carefully evaluated in their modus operandi a nd execution times, permi t to gather useful pieces of in formation, enr iching t h e data base mentioned above_ Other analytic instruments th a t seem to work well a nd \VC do not desciibe for lack of space, are the crossed-impact analys is for b uilding scenarios and the VolterraLotka 's determini st ic equations used by the researchers of lhe Tnternationa l I nsti tute for Applied Analysis of System s (IAASA) (6). Neural ne ts, arLi fi c ial intelligence and the games theory are a lso effective: the latter is s uitable for studying the s trategi c i nteractions between terrorists a nd a government designated as target. Th ese stra tegic interactions between rational actors who arc

tryin g LO act according to th e ir conscience, and so will a ct and ,路eact, arc t he basis of.the sim ulations reproducing the possible s ituations between terrorists, th eir demands and the ir goals. One o f the rules of antiterrorism is lo refuse to negot iate \Nith terrorists holding hostages. The non-negoti a tion pol icy has been taken as a model by m any Countries and is based on the fact that if a s ubject (the o bjective of the action) decides a priori not to give in to the kidnappers' requests, those who have the intention of takin g hostages, knO\ving that they cannot negotiate, can be ind uced to desist Ev idently there is so m e thing that does not \,vork in this policy, s i nee the terrorists continue to take hostages, as s h own by the recent events in Iraq. F urthermore, a terrorist action can encl in different ways: an attack can cause a rai lu rc of the special units for logistic reasons, another could end with th e acceptance of the requests advanced by the terrorists; yet another could be successful and produce no concessions. These simulaLions have s hown that th e responses to terrorism end up vvith security a nd defence

measures to prevent i t a t horne. In prevent ion, every target invents prolecl.ive stralegies to diver t the attack, and the Nations that s pend less o n defence and security are th e most exposed to terrorist actions, Still t here is not a single analysis o f the ternwis t d eeds capabl e o f giving an answer to a specific situation, It a ll d epends on the in formation on the various terror organi1.ations and thei r modus operand i . Having a ready-Lo-use solution can o nly be useful, a t most, for studying the ten路orist organi1.ations, their assets and for deciding whether they can be influenced by the failure o r success ol p revious operaLions. By applying a ready and d iffe rential structure, t he analyst can bet ter understan d the dynam ics o l' lhe terrori sts ' strategic choices as \.veil as those o f politics and governme nts. On these subject, the Counter TerTCffiSL Cent re (CTC), in cooperation wi th the Los Angeles l nsti1.u te for C1路eative Technologies, specialized in vir路tual simulations conducted together with the Un iversity of S o uthern Cali fornia , has devised a project aimed at training the analysts to think outside the traditional patterns .

Fig. 4 Costs

Total Cost

Estimate of Cost

Imprecision Cost

Precision of Prevision

Fig. .

Prevision is a necessary prerequisite for knowledge

Knowing present events in real time and knowing future events ensures remarkable advantage over the enemy

A contribution to knowledge comes from the analysis of information

The fact that the enemy is aware that our defence and .security instrument knows what is taking place is a valid deterrent and adds value to knowledge

Defence and Security are the result of two variables: Information and Knowledge

The efficiency of counter-terrorism operations can be significantly improved through a rapid supply of a greater quantity of more precise information

Defence, Security =Information x Knowledge

This p roj ect is nothing ne\,v, if consider that sorne time ago the Pentagon submitted a plan, which was late,- ca nce lled , fo r realizing an applicative soft\varÂˇe capable of foresee ing a terrorist attack in the Middle East. The failure of the project led to the resignation of Admiral .John Poindexter, chief of the counterterrorism data r esearch programn1e ca lled "Total In [o rmation A\vareness (TIA)" (7). \Ne

The newÂˇ project, proposed as a substitute for the cancelled one, consists in an innovative approach to the 'lvar against terrorism. Ivlark Mansfield, spokesman for the US Intelligence, says that the strategic objective of the project, which assembles academicians, experts and research institutes, is to train analysts to look at the world and conceive it. through the eyes and rninds of the terrorists.

In t h e past, t h e 1.ra111111g of analysts was made easier by the study of the results o[ processing the infornrntion gathered through th e "Human Intelligence (HUMINT) techniques. These techniqu e s c onsist in gathering information wo rking di rec tl y within th e Lerrorist network, thanks to the in fil tra tion of trained a ge nLs from the so-call e d count er-terrori sm teams, similar to those created in

Fig. 6

Difence I

Global ProtectioÂˇn

-External Environment

Security

I--___.___

--------

...... ...... .......

.1--/ "I Internal Environment ' ~

___,_,__

)

Local Protection

____ .....

Infrastructure

(

Italy by Ge nera.I Carlo Alb erto Dalla Chiesa. Today, to galhcr informalion by infiltrating agents in Lo the terrorist nets is ver-y d ifficult; because the international terrorism of Islamic rnould imposes language barrie rs w hich are di fficu l t to surmount. Suffice it to think of the difficulties encou ntered by \,vestcrn agents \.vhen trying to learn the various Arabic dialects. I lcnce the need to col lec t in formation u sing more sophisticated means which exclude a ll forms of lingu istic commu nication and permit, as we said, to look and think with the terrorists' eyes and m inds. The means e rnp loyed by the analysts arc provided by the "Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a d ep artment \vhich, together \vi l h the Pentagon, deals \vith the most advanced projects concern ing technological and sc ien ti fic r esearch.

The assets are cornputers and special nets, which reduce the limes necessary [or the analyses bv using sophisticated softw;;;,-e an~I "text mixing" (categorization o f in l'o nnation contained in the documents) (8). Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for the Office of Homeland Secur ity, confirmed the appropriation of a fund o r 1."iO b illion dollars for t he financial support or those means. These economic resources ,.vere supposed t.o go to the "Counleri n tell igence 21" projecl, \v hosc system for dala sharing was fou nd to unsuitable for meet ing the ne,,v requ.i rements connected \vit.h t he war agains terrorism . It must be remembered that the lack of an appropriate p revisional analysis by the intelligence cannot be toleraled, since it is inclispensablc for the security and defence of the post-bipolar world afler I.he rising of the threat of international. Lerrorism .

As regard forecasts, it also import.ant to fix the lim it of precision, which depends on the horizon o r th e p revis ion itself. For long-term forecasts Lh e lim it is obviou sly low; in this case it is a dvi sab le Lo l'o ll ow the more complex casual methods, based on s ta tistical techniques, while for the short term o ne should have recourse to self-proj ect ing methods, exploiting historical series of data in order to be easily imp lemen ted by computerÂˇs, in order to limit I.he relevant costs also \vhen large quantities of data arc processed . When the choice is difficult, it is possible to rnake a confrontation between different. methods; th is reduces the risk of big .m istakes due to havi ng chosen a non-suitable method and, al the same time, increases the level of precision . An indisputable fact is that the p recision o r t.hc forecast. a ffects t.he cost of previs ional analysis

Fig. 7 Threat

The possible cause of a terrorist event

Terrorist Action

It is the materialization of the threat. By intuition, one can distinguish between threat and action, considering that it is possible to "feel" abstractly threatened, while in the concrete case, one is really attacked

Vulnerability

The weak points existing in the defence and security model. They are e)(ploited during the planning of the terrorist action. Each terrorist action, in order to succeed exploits a vulnerability

Value of the Threat

Probability or frequency of materiali.zation of the threat and thus of the terrorist action

robot in action during a mine-clear-

ing opera/Jon in lrnq.

but, considering the risk represented by terrorism, it would be unwise Lo cul the funds destined lo this delicate and precious intelligence activity (fig. 4 and 5). Once the possible (or, to be more precise, probable) event is foreseen, together v,,,ith the type of threat w ith \vhich il is go ing to materialise, the task of preventing it is up to the defence and security organization, within ,.vhich the terms of "securi ty" and "defence" take on different conceptual and structural meanings. From lhe conceptual vie'vvpoint, while security includes both the

military and civil dimension, defence, on the contrary, gives priority to the military aspect. From the struclt.11Âˇal viewpoint, defence means global protection of the "External Env ironment." from \vhich the terrorist threat arrives, an environment. defined by the air, coast or sea space. Defence ends up by turning into security if, on the contrary, refc rs to the "Internal Environment", defined by the land space which is the home of civilian and military infras tructure or, more generally, of the nerve centres of contemporary c ivilization. T he defence of the "i nternal Environment" is a synonym of local protection applied w ithin the perimeter of lhe infrastructure.

T his protection, in its t u rn, is guaranteed by specific security 1neasures that we are going to examine later (fig. 6). H is worth mentioning that, as regards de fence and securi.ty, Countries like the United States have availed themselves of particular models capable of giving an effective response lo the terrorist threat. These models are called "Homeland Security" and "Homeland Defense". The latter includes the mi li tary protection of territory and population, and the d efence o[ critical infrastructure against external threats and aggressions, as well as activities aimed at deterring the aggressors and preparing the Army for Lhe action fol-

Fig. 8

Technological Space Cyberspace

Conventional Space Battlefield

Range

lowing the failure of deterrence. The "Homeland Security" model, instead, includes the means suitable for preventing tcrrorisL attacks and for reducing the vulnerability lo terrorism, minimizing the damages and helping the recovery after an attack. For the coordination of these activities , al the beginning of 2003 the Pentagon has established the posl of "Assistant Secretary of Defence (or Homeland Defence", ass igned to Paul IVlc Hale, who carries out the lia ison with the \ 1\/hite House, the National Secu rity Council and the Department of Homeland Security, created in 2001. In the ambit of defence and security, the concept should be specified as shmvn in at fig. 7. Defence and security are therefore the basic concep.ts on \Vhich the sludv of two distinct rnodels is developed, as illustrated in lhe following sections.

THE PREVENTIVE-DEFENCE MODEL The terrorist actions, just like military operations, are characterized by ,{ (undamental clement: rapidity w hich, combined \Vith surprise, prevents defe nce from realizing what is taking place. In this situation, the possibility of successfully applying a defen-

Simulation of Training Missions

sive strategy becomes precarious, owing to the lack of tin1ely infor mation . In fac t the prob lem is not only that of evaluating the effectiveness or th e system t hat counters the possible threat, bul also lo discover the outset of the threat itself ,.vith a warn ing sufficient to enable the defence to operate correctly. In this regard the "De(ence Science Board ", an a d visory group of the Pentagon, has proposed a model of defence based on so-called "proactive" m ili tary actions, aimed al caus i ng t h e reaction of the terrorist nel. Such a reaction would co m pel tbe enemy to expose h imself, thus permitting to assess h is organization, tactical doctrine and armament and also to find out which States provide international terrorism with logistic and financial support. A special unit, the Proactive, Preve ntive O perations Group (P2OG), operates within this model and can infiltrate the various terrorist groups in order to collect reliable information coming directly from the source concerned. It should b e stressed that the particular operational specifici Ly of the P2 O G requires special equip ment and infi ltration techniques ,vhich are carried out through a complex n el of intelligence agents and intermed iaries, as

Cyberspace Virtual Reality

\vell as \Vith a special training in information-gathering. The rapidity in collecting these data, and their precis ion, is of fundamental importance for three reasons: the first concerns the conduct of operations of surgical war against Countries which suppor t terrorism and mvn weapons of mass d estruction. The second is connected with the success of the operations of the surgical war in a non-military context, where a mistake could cause serious political damage. The lhi rd reason is the ro le played by intelligence which, according to a methodolog ical viewpoint, besides being an integral parl of the actions against terrorism, operates also for situation-simulation for training purposes. The simu lation of the m issions required for the nc\v scenarios is very demanding, because of the enormous variety of sit uat ions an d behaviours thal have to be modelled . This requ ires specially equipped areas to be used as firing ranges. In Italy, these areas are decidedly smaller than Lhe most important foreign ranges. Even without considering the 2600 sq km of the US National Training Centre, in the middle o[ the Californian cleser l, and looking only at the European ranges we see that the Hohefcls 33

range, used by the US Army in Germany, covers an area of 200 sq km, \Vhile Capo Teulada has surface of 72 sq km which, moreover, cannot be entirely used, considering the orography of the region, and Monteromano covers only 46 sq krn. It is very difficull to \viden the available areas in order to adapt them to the new training scenarios by b u ilding real-size and detailed reproductions of the infrastruct ure to be defended. In this regard, the Italian Defence Administration is beginning to acid some areas adjacent to Capo Teulada, but in any case it will be impossible Lo reach the size of the training areas used by the foreign Countries mentioned above (9). The expansion concerns the plain of Medau Becciu, in a rela-

tively impervious area of the Capo Teulada range. The plan is Lo put up a v illage with more than seventy buildings and typical infras tru ctu re, such as schools, churches, bus station, etc. in or路der to simulate situations of antiterrorism combat in an urban environment. On planning the training mission, the simulations require that the following condit ions should be verified: definition of the characteristics of the battlefield inside the range; ensure the defence of the "External Environment" from Vv路here the terrorist threat comes; guarantee the security of t he "Internal Environment" and therefore o[ its infrastructure. T he first condition, which concerns the d efinition of the characteristics of the battlefield, is

particularly im portant from t he strategic vie\vpoi n t since, according to the asymmetric concep tion of the fight against terrorism, war has changed. In fac t , in a traditional \va r路 and, more generally, in symmetric conflicts, the balllefield is defined by geographic areas of various size, which are the object of the conquest. With the war against terrorism, i nslead, the balllefield is defined in a new dimension that includes two separate spaces - conventional and technological - withi n 路w hich the enemy operates (fig. 8).

"Conventional Space" cornprises the "Internal Environment" and therefore the land spac e \vhere terrorism's potential ta rgets are located, and the "Exler-

Above.

An A-.129 "Manguslc1" helicopter aimed with "Slinger'' missiles. Left.

An AB-412 helicopter in Irnq.

nal Environment", physically represented by the air and coast space from which the threat comes. "Technological Space" includes the infrastructure, i.e. computer nets and, more generally, cyberspace (10). Furthermore, "Conventional Space" and "Technological Space" are not separate entities, but can intersect and superimpose on each other, thus becoming complementary as each one develops in its own direction according to the means and \.veapons that terrorism employs for its strikes. The arms and mea ns em ployed, owing to the asymmetric

characte r istics of the conflict, could belong indifferenLly lo military or civilian technology. A laptop can turn into a weapon, an airliner can become a missile and a boat can turn out to be a highpolenlia l bomb; not only that, but the progressive crnmbling of the dislinclion between military and civilian technology and professional and non-professional soldier contributes to make im possible lo dis Li ngu ish the border between these spaces. All the enemy needs, therefore, is the capability of striking Âˇwithin a certain space which can be found in any environment and which engages 1n tell igence and military experts to the highest degree. Once the battlefield is defined, one should verify the second condition, which concerns the "External Environment" from where the terrorist threat is coming. We should remember that the

defence of the "External Environment" concerns mainly the components of the air and coast space. DEFENCE OF THE AIRSPACE Strengthening the airspace defence is a constant aim of the Armed Forces . Suffice it to th ink, for examp le, of the defence organization set up on the occasion of the G-8 Surnn1 it held in Genoa in July 2001 . During the mee ling, although the attacks on the United States had not yet occurred, the need was felt to create an air shield against possible threats corning Frorn lhe air. After 9/11 the threat of terrorist. act.ions carried out wfr,-1- a ircraft became a conslant nightmare for the whole Western world. The example oC France is signihcant: rnany years in advance Lhe Country had c reated a defence instrument called "lVlesure Active de S(iret.e Aericnne (MASA) - Ac3.')

An observation posl al An Nasiryuh.

tivc Measure of Air Security _ very effective against terrorist actions of different: natur e and scope. The origin of the studies that led the experts in terrorism to de36

fine MASA goes back to the eighties. During that period a myster ious cha r acter, n icknarned "Black Baron" by the media, enlivened the Paris nights in an origi-

nal \,v ay by fl ying over the capita l at low allitude vvith a small touring plane. The Black Baron 's exploits prompted smiles and quips among the citizens of the capital,

but his feats were no t perceived in the same \vay by the author·i ties of the "Prefeclure de Police", worried that undertakings or this type could one day turn •into threats. And precisely Lo counter a hypothetical, h u t not imposs i ble, terrorist attack of th is kind, the Defence l\llinistrv decided to develop a deterrence-and-intervention instrument, with the support of a helicopter component. NATO has adopted specific measures called "Renegade", which in Italy are under the aegis of the Air Force Staff and are applied in case of incursions inside the national airspace. These measures can he strengthened in case ,:,f specific sign ifican t events, as '1appened for the funeral o f Pope John Paul II, especially to face a p ossible threat represen Led hy the so-called "s lo \,v movers", i.e. aircraft (essentially, u ltra-l ig h t and light passenger a ircraft) which, owing to their low speed and low altitude of overflight, may be clifficull to detect and , if necessary, to intercept. In this respect, the most suitable means for guaranteeing air security is the helicopter. In vic\v of this, also th e Army, through its air component (AVES), can g ive an important contribution, thanks to t he machines in its possession. The latter, all of them a national product, ,u-e su itable for anti-terrorism airmobile operations, owing to their rapidi ty of intervention, agility, manoeuvrability and , above all, the possibility of redeployment in the immediate vicinity of the area that needs protection. In particular, with the adoption of the Agusta A-129, the Army Aviation in the past years has had at its disposal a combat machine o f entirely Italian design and qualitatively advanced , \vhich is obtaining wide acknmvledgemcnts a t international level. The reduced dimensions of this cra[t, its diversified fire capacity (also air-toair), its ability to o perate also in a stancloff position (\vhich explo its

the cover offcreel by the environment in which it works: trees, irregularities of the ground, buildings, etc.) mak.e iL a highly insidious defensive instrument i n operations that i mply a c lose contact with the enemy, be it represented by land forces or light a irplancs (including drones and remote-control a ircraft). V./e should not forget that a seminar on the new· terrorist threa Ls, held at "Le Bourget" in France, the offic ials responsible fo,- the particular sector s expressed their serious concern about th e arrival on the market of unmanned aircraft capable of carrying an offensive load consisting of bombs, h igh-potential exp losives, nerve gas, etc., al a r-elatively low cost. W ith just a few thousand E uros, a terroris t can buy an aircr aft of this type, equipped v.i i th GPS and autonomous navigation system, wh ich can carry a load of some kilos over a d istance of 15 or 20 k m and hit the obj ective from above. A last, b u t certainly not Jess im portant aspeCL which, on the contrary, has a very high priority, concerns the command-and-contro l system of the aircraft em p loyed in the possib le MASA-type

cou nter-terrorism actions. The Italian Army Staff, aware of the importance of effective and integrated assets for command and-conlrol, has already adopted in the mid-eighties the Tactical S ighting Command and Control Subsystem (SOATCC) . The system is fully automated and permi ts to control the Army Aviation Aircrah and a lso to survey the lower airspace, identify the targets, evaluate the air threat, process the tracks corning from the various sensors, diffuse the information of the ind ividual users and, finally, to video-acoustically a lert the self-defence weapon systems.

DEFENCE OF THE COASTAL SPACE The defence of the coastal space extends beyond the coastline through \vhich terrorists threaten drilling platforms, oil te rm inals and other infrastructure. To approach the coastal space is easy, \Vith simple craft like kayaks, motor rubber dingh ies , fishing boats [il lcd \Vith explosives or clcctrically- propcll ecl pocket-submarines, like those already employed for tourist use.

The roles of the Army in asymmetric conflicts

• Defence, Security and Control of Conventional Space and Technological Space • Surgical War and Psychological Operations • Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) • Counter-terrorism and Counter-guerrillawarfare • Strategic and Tactical Information • Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA)

Fig. 9 37

An {t;.1/hrn palm ! on surveillance duty.

Tn o rder Lo cope Âˇwith this type of t hreats a Country like llaly, which is enormously d cpendenL on sea commun ications , s ho uld prnvicle itself wi th a single operational command, with an air-naval i ntegrated system or Commun ication, Comma nd, Co ntrol and Information (C3I), equ ipped with senso r-s and in strum ents [or 38

gathering data on la nd, airborne and on ship, capable o f keeping under co ntrol th e waters s u rroun di n g the pen insu la and the most important points of access a nd transit: t he Cha nn el of Ot.ranto, the Stra it of M essina and the Channel oC Sicily. A com plete picture o f the si tuation would enable the Comma nd

to em ploy fo rces a dequate, in type and s ize, to the level of th e threat. Th e resp onsibility o f t.his Com m and vmuld he Lha t of manag in g the forces available for the operations envisaged for th e prcsenceand-su rvei llance function in peacetime, exploiting in the best possible way the various systems on

amphibious or land units lo defend the coast. Of course, for all this to be accom plished, the Army, Navy and Air Force, besides lhe Harbour Offices and the "Guardia di Finanza" with its air and nava l units, should be enabled to operate t ogether in real situations, overcoming ministerial jurisdictions, bureaucratic obstacles and possible rivalries. These are not lrifles and require a great effort from the political and military leaders, also because the rationalization of the chains of command would imply a reduction in personnel, b ut it is necessary to take resolute ly the road of utmost joint collaboration in order t.o implement a really effective defence instrument, adequate to the meet needs of the Country and the foreseeable threat. In addition the type of threat and the means to counter it, the

the basis of their characteristics. Therefore, it is a matter of realizing a complex structure, which could be defined as "in layers", where each layer contains certain types of systems, going [rom the simplest ones, e.g. patrol motorboats, to the most advanced such as high-sea patrol boats, corvettes and aircraft. These layers should be complementary and not made of waterlight compartments, since the most capable systems could also v,/Ork as local Command-and-Control Centres and intervene, if necessary, where the lower-level ones usually operate. In crisis situations, the structure would participate in a function of integrated-defence of the nation al spaces, contributing to close the accesses to any form of threat coming from the sea. The Command could also coordinate the actions carried out by

configuration of a defensive instrument depends also on the hydrographical characteristics of the b asin concerned and the morphology of t he coasts. An examp le: a Country like Nonvay, with 1500 km of jagged coastline, densely populated and with import.ant industrial infrastructure, entrusts its defence to a m ixed deployment of artillery pieces and t017Jedo-tubes protected by fjords . An attempt at modernization was the planned adaptation of the "Penguin" antiship missile to the requi1-ements of coastal defence. But the instruments mentioned above are ins ufficient for opposing terrorist actions carried out with small submarines, e ith er electric or \.vith closed-cycle heat engines, or wirh any type o[ undenvater vehicles. Against these actions one can use nets of underwater acoustic

Information Vulnerability Assessment

IVA

Material Counter Measures MCM Information Counter Measures ICM

Training

âœ“

Operative Counter Measures OCM

l L

Least Risk

Post Attack Measures

Fig. 10 39

The turret of a "Centauroâ€˘ heavy annourecl car.

and magnetic sensors, placed on the seabed al a certain d is tance from Lhe coas t a nd connected with an operations stat ion on land . The efficien cy of an instrument of this kind would b e furth er enhanced if Lhe chain o f sensors co ul d be i ntegrated w ith un derwater telecameras for surveillance a nd r econ naissance when the threa t cannot be identified with the necessary certainty. In case of alarm, as the threat is icle nlified, the countering acti on co uld be assigned LO amphibious units of the Army or to formations like the Navy's Underwater Raiders (COMSUBIN). Anot her important contribution Lo Lhis defensive deployment

is given by radar an d naval/air patrols. In the latter case, an aircraft like the helicopter, equip ped with a survei llance radar a nd flying at a n altitude of 5 m etres above sealevel can control an a rea of a ppmximately 1140 sq km. T he mo ni tored area increases to 3700 sq km i[ the aircraft flies at an al ti Lude of 150 metres a l a speed of 190 knots. The a irpla ne is obviously preferable, since helicopters have very high operational costs and need a great number of maintenance hours for eac h hour of Oight. To veri fy the third condition, concernin g the security of the "In ternal Envi ronment" and there fore of the in frastructure located within it, we shall have to have recourse lo the construction of a preventive-security model.

THE PREVENTIVE-SECURITY MODEL For construc li ng this model we should refer Lo a statement made by Daniel N. Nelson, a p rofessor at the University of New Haven, who ha s long been interested in milita ry strategy. Security, according to Ne lson , consists o[ a delicate and d ynamic balance between resources and t hreats and, in order to ensure this balance, a Nation must. develop two differe nt models. The first is conceived on the reduction of dangers, thanks to diplomacy and international al liances; the second , instead, is based on the exploitation of the Country's resources. As regards the first model , we can say that the need to resort to inte rnational a lliances had a l-

ready been ant.icipated by US General Douglas Mac Arthur, a man that knew many secrets and who used to repeat thal t.he next world war would be a global cunflicl of ]and forces, joined logether to fight evil forces. Probably the same evil forces which characterize those that U.S . President Bill Clinton once defined as the invisible threat of international Lerrorism. We are going to work on Lhe second model, keeping in mind that the concept of resource contained therein is very far-rea ching and includes organizations such as the Armed Forces which, accord ing to Nelson, must be modernized in order to present them as an instrument of remote control of con fliers and of active prevention of crises ,v iL hin the defence and security frame\.vork. The initia tives for ac hieving this modernization include, firsl of all, the training aclivilies necessary for lhe acquisition of counter-terrorism operational capabilities in an urban environment. The selection of this training ground is not accidenlal since terrorism exploils to its own advantage any urban infrast.ructure in order to cause destructive effects on the civilian population and consequences at e conomic and politico-military level. The Army carries out its tasks of high professional level in lhis direclion, as s hown by Exercise "Fight in Built Urban Areas"(FlBUA), with technical experimentations of patrolling Lechniques againsl guerrillas and terrorists, search of suspect areas, capture and inlerrogalion of prisoners and gathering of inforrnalion. These Lechniques are applied within operations defined as "Three-Block War" ,.v hich, in general, include monitoring activi ties, control of the in frastructure and military actions against lerrorist cells or groups of guerrillas (fig. 9) ( 11). ln order 1.0 carrv out these ta-

sks, the Armed Forces, and the Army in part icul ar, most have operational units ,vith..an high level of mobil ity and flexibility. Thus it is important for lhe Government. lo ensure the possibility of acquiring modern equipmenl and materials for the constitution of these units. The international cooperation must be closer and closer, at both uniL level and information level. In the first case, sen 1icemen from foreign units should spend longer training periods wilh the Italian unils and vice versa. A mut u al operational knowledge cannot bul give positive results, as \vas proved b y the joinl Halo-Maltese exercise "Terraferma 2003" (12). In the second case, international cooperation at informalive level is fundarnen Lal because informal ion, even if confirmed by many sources, is in itself sterile and therefore requires the anaJysis and comparison by different intelligence services. Therefore a real cooperation and the exchange of information and data is essent ial. Ra\v inforrnalion coming from a unil can be analysed, developed and managed more efficiently on the field. Bes ides, one should take into account that. al informative level th e.re must b e no doubt or perplexity, not even licit ones, and to folly understand that the "terrorist enemy" is Lhe same for everybody and without a resolute common military policy il is impossible Lo achieve a definitive victory. Another important resource to be employed for security purposes is the modern technology for surveil lance, which provides concrete inveslrnenl occasions for our industry, for training civilian and military personnel and for employment (13). vVe should cons ider that after 9/1 J there has been a proliferation of reactions concerning sec u ri ly and surveillance. The hi g hl y technologica l industries, srnelli ng the possibility of laun-

ching their products, sensed in th e attack on the World Trade Center the occasion they needed for making security appliances, exactly as has been clone in lhe last thirty years, after terrorism induced the airlines to make technical c h anges in aircraft and airport structures. F rom the tec hnological viewpoint the security measures w ill be applied to the infrastructure, to the personnel working therein and lhe info-str ucture that includes the compuler nets.

SECURITY OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE

vVaterworks and electric syslems are particularly vu! nerable to the terrorist threat. They are highly technological net\,v orks, ramified a ll over the territory and very difficult to control thorou ghly. Jn this situation, the prevention of terrorisl act ions must be entrusted to a network of sensors that can immediately signal any situation of risk. As regards waterworks, for example, one can employ special chen,o-resistors, i.e. eleclrochemical sensors whose electric resisLance varies according lo the degree of a!Leration in the \Vater composition . In case of chemical or bacleriological attack, the lype of toxic agent can be identified by imrned iatcly interrupting the water supply to the urban network. As concerns instead the electric system, if on the one hand lhe situation is not worrying at pollution level, on the other it can have chaotic consequences in case of a black-out caused by a terrorist attack. In these emergencies it is necessary to experiment eleclronic devices ,vhich can make automatic the redistribution of lhe flow of elecLric energy, Lhus offsetting the power losses caused by accidental failures or sabotage. The p robl em is similar lo that 41

of the internet, where the management of the data stream must be operational even if portions of the net are destroyed . For the security of mil itary or civilia n land installations of a certain strategic i mponance, such as NATO bases, electric and nuclear p lants and sc ien tific research centres, one can employ devices for controlling and surveying the perimeter of th e area of the installation. T h ese devices are the so-called "Unattended Grou nd S en sors " (UGS) wh ich provide in forrnation on the movements around restricted areas. The other possible applications, besides those for reconnaissance , intelligence a nd mon itoring of perimeters, inclu d e t he m easurement of the level of radiations and th e d iscovery of contaminations caused by chemical or bacteriological agents . The integration \,Vith a secure and protec ted communication system permits to connect the U GS into a net, enab ling the control centre to better observe the movements around the ins ta llation. S till as rega rd s security, a spec ial chapter should be devoted to "Person nel Security", i.e. the security m easures adopted for control and identification of th e qualified personnel who operate inside civd ian and military ins tall a tions. To this e ncl, one .resorts to b io metric identification techn iques, based on the comparison of th e imprints of voice , iris, hands and face . These techniques p ermi t to enter restricted areas and services, such a s: • Military Security Areas of strategic and milita ry interest, i.e. Defe n ce Research Centres; • Network and Computer Security Areas: data bases and critica l a pplica tions; • Air port Security Areas: reserved areas for the airlines. 42

Infastructure security In order to face the threat of cyber-terrorism against civilian and military infastructure, appropriate countermeasures systems can be developed, known as Informa tio n Counter Measures (ICM), cJivided into several areas (fig.10). Information Vulnerability Assessment (IVA)

Materia l Counter Measures (MCM) I t is fundamental to update the equipment of the net, paying a ttention to what is offered by m odern t ec hnolo gy in terms of hardware and software, in ord er to be sur e to detect and eliminate all possib le viruses, electrom a gnetic emissions and codi ng o l data.

Training In th is area one can define the various levels of danger and class if-y the damages caused by an attack against the net, singling out t he most vulnerable work stations or connected s ites, im plementing at the same time the necessary security measures for the in formation system recoded in computer files. 1£ we establish a certain order of priority for the security of the net, the Information Vulnerability Assessment should al the first level , a s a security measure that. can identify and classify the type of attack, its level of dangerou sness and consequently the type of countermea sure to be adopted ,,v hich could be found in the su ccessive intervention area, known as Operative Cou nter Measures (OC M).

Operative Counter Measures (OCM) The Operative Counter Measures include: Least Risk. With this countermeasure one lries to reduce the extent of the risk connected with a possible attack on the net, through the use of removable Hard Disks, the transfer of im portan l Gies to other restricted users, in the shape of b a ck-ups, and the replacement or update of the passwords w ith di fferent access codes. Post Attack Measures: they include the measures for recovering lost or damaged in formation, reconst ructi on of data bases and restoration of disrupted connections.

The training programme of technical personnel must be adequate to the spec ific needs of security and protection of the net and com puter system. The p rogramme envisages the s tudy of s ubj ec ts concerning methods for detecting and describing the security goals. Then, as didactic logic in the train ing context, the p rogramme w ill cover the analysis and assessment: o f the risks deriving from cyber-terrorism and the estimation of the co nsequences on the nets an d computer systems as a result of one or more threats. Furthermore, it ,-v ii[ be necessary lo study the decision-making procedures a nd techniques for the countermeasures to be adopted, not only to avoid damages to the systen.1s but also to reduce the risks to an acceptable level, thus finding a reasonable comp romise between the cost of the countermeasures and that of the electronic equipment needed for· the ir implementation. Th erefore, the training areas \Nil l include the "Knowledge Management, Intelligence Collection and Distr ibution", the "Joint Surveillance" and the "Information Technology Security".

CONCLUSIONS The realization of an adequate de fence and security model requires assets and fin a ncial resources proportionate to the pro-

bability of occmrence of terrorisl events, and covers overlapping areas, levels and funclions. The areas are respectively represenled by the "Exlernal Environment" from which the lerrorist threals come, and lhe "Internal Environment", where the Lhreats materialize becoming offensive and destructive actions against the civilian and mililary infrastructure and info-structure. The levels, instead, concern intelligence, modern technologies for surve il lance and security, and military training. These levels, in their turn, arc divided according to the follo\ving separate functions: "Intelligence, configured for the identificalion of terrorist evenls and recognition of the type of th-

reat and action, through ad hoe analytic previsional models and investigative instnunenl. "Technology: il refers to the "Internal Environment" which houses lhe infrast ruclure v\rl10se security musl be defended. Theimporlance of this function was already well known in the past epochs. Suffice to think that in lhe Renaissance there was lhe widespread idea thal peace and prosperity should be organized precisely thanks Lo lechnology and science, an idea that was further strengthened byÂˇ lhc European Enlightenrnent. Since t hen the attempts at planning secur ity have been an essential priori Ly in a world of fears generated by terrorism. "Military Training, which must

Rangers of 1he 9th "Cul l'vToschin" Regiment. in the afghan desert.

be adapted to the scenario imposed by terrorism, which requires the capability of fighting on a battlefield represented by any environment which includes, besides the conventional one, also Lhc social, ethnic, political and economic space. From this po int o f v iewÂˇ, one should progressively modernize the traditional training conducted at mili tary inslitutes and acaden,ies. Unfortunately Lhere is a great gap between the conventional military and the modern ones. Today's soldier musl be trained lo fight, think and reason like a "mi43

An A -129 "!'vlangusl:J" helicop lcr

d uring n low-nltilude flight in Traq.

lita ry Machiavelli" a n d, at t he same tim e, adj us t hi rnself \vith ext reme fl exibilitv to the requ irements impose~! by the d i verse operatio nal situation s of the war against terrorism .

•

Expert in Geoslrategy

NOTES ( l) Gian carlo Bove, "Terro r is m in

M.e d ict Format ", Ri v ista M il itare, E ng. Ed., no 3/2 004. (2) ~Anti terrorism includes the passive fo rms o f defence, while counterterrorism cond ucts offensive actions ai m ed a t neu tral izing the terro ris t th reat. (3) Special Opernt ions: actions cond u c ted by m ilita ry or param il itary forces s p eci fically organ ized , trained and equipp ed for ach ieving rnili Lary, poli tica l, economic, psych olog ical and count errorism goals by em ploying non-conven tiona l m eans in hos tile, prohibited or particularly sensi tive areas. l n pea cetim e and in conflict s itua tions, they a re carried out in dependently or in coordin a tion \-Vith conve n tional forces. Politico-m ilitary consid enitions are often a t t he root of Special O pera tion s , i m p osing clandes tin e . covering or low-visibility tech n iq ues, as \veil as controls a t natio na l level. Spec ia l Operation differ from Con ventio na l Operations a s regard s risk, o perational tec hniqu es, m o d a lities of· em p loym ent, independence from a n y support and dependence on detailed operati o nal in forma tion and lo cal resources. (4) Pres iden t o f the Un iversity Centre of Strategic and In te rna ti onal S tudies, and ISPRT Sc ie ntifi c Coordi nator. (5) The terrorist a ttacks and the dcf eat of Premier J ose Maria Azn ar are terTorism's greatest victories s ince Se ptember 11 and perhaps of' the last vears, as stated by Am e rica n cons~rvat ive political scientist R obert Kagan . (6) At L';;.xemburg Cas tle, near Vienna, form er residence o f Maria Theresa, Queen of Austria, there is a research centre (IAASA) which h as the sole o bjective o f tra nsform ing a pre-

d ict io n of the fu ture into a n exac t science. The Cen u·c was founded in the late sixt ies tha nks Lo a R ussianAmerican agree m e nt a nd employs as researc hers scientists fr-c>rn every part of the world. (7) In January 2003 th e U.S. Senate, after a vote following a proposal by Se n ato r Ron \-Vyde n from O regon , rejected the possibility of fi n a nc ing a pr·ocrram mc for figh ting terrorism ca ll ~cl "T otal lnfo/;nation Avvare-

ness" (TlA) . The draft o f th e pla n had been co mm issioned to ret ired Adm iral J oh n P oindexter by the Defe n ce Ad vanced Researc h P r oj ects Agency (DARI'!\). A forme1· Nation..il Securitv Adviser in the Reaga n ad min is tr.ation, the Admiral has been appointed by P resi de nt Ge orge IN. B ush as Ch ief' of the Tn form,ll.io n Aware ness O ffi ce (IAO) . a cle pai"l ment dealin <> w ith new intell igence systems, Tl.'\ amo n g them. TIA can

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rely on a number of capabilities of electronic reconnaissance of information called "d ata m ining", wh ich wo uld faci li tate: the wo rk of the analysts. (8) Text l'Vlixing permits to deal with docum e n t s bv u s i ng automaticanalysis insl r~1m e n t;. These tools s ummarize and categorit.e the infor mation con La ined in the d ocuments, identify the ir· language, extrnct names and sente nces, report the: (re-

di'

,,,,, J.;, ""

quency of words anJ phrases and c lassifv documen ts accordi ng LO their i; 1portance wiLh in a spe;i[ic subjcct. The analysis and information coming frorn many sources a nd releva nt to the: same subjecL can disclose structures and connec Lions pe r m itting to go back to the planning of a cenain policy and even to foresee fulur·e decisions. (9) On the basis of w h al has already b een done h y several Eu ropean Ar-

mies, the Italian Army h as also decided to acquire an innovat ive tra inin g system for simulation . A docume~t ·issued bv the Army Staff in Apri l 1999 oti°.t lincd th e r equ irements in thi s sector and \Vas fol lo\ved by a Project Group for Si m u latio n . This small group of Officers ,vas given the task o( rna k i ng a through analysis o f the stale o f the art in the simulatio n sector in order to create a svstem capable of n1ceLing all train ing r·equiremc.nts. (10) "Cvb erspace" is a parnllel universe, ·c r eated anJ nou r ished by communication nets and c:ornpu tci-s . A world produce d by traffi c and by the digiw l accumulation of da ta, information, knowledge, eval ua ti on s, compariso ns a nd indicators. ( 11 ) In th is rega r d , th e "Ni bbio l" Task Force, based on th e 9th "Alpini Re gim cn l"of the "Tau rine nse" Brigade: r e inforc:eJ by personn el of other Branches .rnd Corps, has appl ied Lhese techniques in its ac Lions o f terrorism co nt ras t and p reven tion. The "Ni bbi o" contingc nL operated in the KbosL area, in the eastern part of Afghan istan, on the Pakist,1ni border, the so-called Sanctuary Denial 1\rea, in ord er Lo n eutralize the tcrrorist fon11ations a nd th e ir possible logistic bases. (12) Exercise "Terraferrna 2003" 1vas conducted a t the Cesano Infantry School The activitv carried o ut bv IV!altes~ a nd Ttalian·· servi.cemen helped to improve the cooperation, integration a nd relations between the Armed forces of the 1.wo Countries in a well defin ed o peratio n al context. The exercise included the activation o f checkpoints and observation posts, armed escorts, control of riots a nd crowus, s u rveillance of sens itive areas, m ine-clearing, opera tion in urba n environments . (13) As for p erso nne l train ing , in 2004 a project called "Sccu ri ty Cons ulting United Didactic Organ iza ti o n (SCUDO) was p ro rn o tecl with the cooperation of the "Ente N azionale ACLl Tstruzionc Pofessionale (ENAIP) a nd the Israeli m ultina tional or ganization "Loaan's Ltu". "Lo0aan's Ltd" \Vas found~d in 1988 hv .J a group of securi ty a d visors, fo rmer mem b ers of the Israeli Arm ed Forces, with an extensive know·-how in antiterrorism. SCUDO is a n initiative reali zed in order to teach how LO manage terror-related s ituations which enJ anger the people's ph ysical safety, ac tiviti es and property. For mo re de tails visi t: www.logansltd.corn and WW\v.enaip.

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THE RECENT HISTORY

From independence to the "end of the State" n July 1, 1960 the territories formerly governed by Italy and Britain become independent and are unified into the parliamentary Republic of Somalia. The coup d'etat carried out by Siad Barre on October 21, 1969,

Iii

changes the form of the State into a "Socialist Republic", governed at first by a Supreme Revolutionary Council and then, from July 1, 1976 by the Revolutionary Social Party. Anyway, the power remains in the tight hold of dictator Siad Barre, who leads a bloody war against Ethiopia, coming out a loser. On January 27, 1991 the regime falls, pulled down by underground political forces; the first

among them is the Liberation Army of Somalia, which assembles several minor groups. Thus a phase of power struggles begins, led by various· warlords. The figures of Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, allied in the United Somalian Congress, stand out among them. This phase degenerates into violence against the ci- · vilians, with thousands of dead · and injured. The fight for power

becomes an actual war of bands, blindly led, unable to take control of the situation and restore political and social order. On April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council approves the employment of Observers for the implementation of the ceasefire subscribed by the warlords, but does not provide for adequate control procedures. The following September 19, Farah Aideed enters Mogadishu and imposes the withdrawal of the UN Observers. On December 9, 1992, following a resolution of the United Nations Security Council, the American Marines land near Mogadishu before the television cameras. Operation "Restore Hope" begins under American command and with the participation of an Italian Contingent, "Italfor Ibis", which has already been present in the Theatre since December 13 with its reconnaissance teams. The Command appoints Ali Mahdi "ad-interim" President of Somalia. The United Somalian Congress splits up forming two main political groups: the Somali National Alliance, headed by Aideed, and the Somali Political Union led by Ali Mahdi. In the meantime, on May 4, 1993, the multinational operation becomes a UN mission, "Continue Hope", with the participation of 28 Countries. The Italian Contingent becomes "Italfor Ibis II". Despite the repeated ceasefire agreements, and because of the presence of Muslim terrorists infiltrated by bin Laden, who has moved to nearby Sudan, violence does not end and culminates in the shooting down of an American helicopter and Âˇthe murder of

Today the Country is fragmented by infinite divisions. Since 1991, in the areas that had been under British rule during the colonial period, there has been Somaliland, a State that has never been recognized by the international Organizations. In 1998 the north-eastern Regions declared their independence taking the name of Puntland. The southern regions are prey to a number of "warlords", forever fighting each other. 0

eighteen rangers. As everyone knows, the Italian Contingent counts three dead and twentytwo wounded during the clashes in Mogadishu on July 2, 1993. The perpetuation of violence brings to an end the peacemaking effort carried out by the United Nations. On March 21, 1994, the last Italian Units return home, at the end of an evacuation that lasts about seventy days, within a scheduled reduction of the multinational force sanctioned by the UN. On February 28, 1995, the entire multinational force completes the evacuation, leaving Somalia to its destiny of violence. During the following five years there is an increase in the terrorist presence, on which Aideed leans, and the continuation of the impotent Presidency of Ali Mahdi. Aideed is killed on August 1,

U.S. Marines on a Somalian beach.

1996. In 1991 Somaliland (formerly British Somalia) declares its independence. Attempts at pacification A National Reconciliation Conference, convened at Arta by the President of Djibuti, begins on May 2, 2000. The Conference appoints a Provisional National Assembly, which elects Abdikassim Salad Hassan ad-interim President for a three-year term. He takes office in Mogadishu with the Assembly, but does not manage to exert his authority outside the capital, even though he is supported by the Muslim Fundamentalists and the econo-

whom Lhe Presidenl of the African Union and the previo u s temporary Presiden l, Abdi kassi m, elected at Arta. Yusu l's election is seen wilh favour bv the Vatican for his attitud ; againsl lerrorism. The UN a lso expresses its appreciation. • beginning of Novernber: President Yusuf appoints as Prim e Minister Al i Mohamed Gecli, from the Hawiye ethnic group and lhe Abgal clan.

A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY

The complicate formation of the Government A VCC-1 at a checkpoint on the linp crial route.

mic powers. The Somalian territory is still conlro.Ued by the warlords. It should be noted that at the Arta Conference, counting no less than 2000 delegates, many warlords were noL presen l. Among them: Yusuf of Punt.land, Osman Assan Ali Alo of Central Somalia and Musa Sudi Yalahow of Southern Mogadishu, all o f them important names \vho \ Vill later on come back lo lhe limelight. Abclikassim, therefore, is appointed President without being backed by the holders of the military strength. Between 2000 and 2002 the situation of diffuse violence keeps dragging on Lill lhe National Reconciliation Conference arrives at a declaration o( cessation of hostilities (October 27, 2002), after \vhich the disorders d e crease. At about the same Lime of the declaration of cessation of hostilities, the "Technical Commillee" holds a summit of the three bordering Coun tries in Kharlou m. On this occasion, an agreement is reached for a new reconcilialion conference, to be convened on ethnical bases. The Technical Committee becomes a "Facilitation Commiltee" for-

med by the delegates of the "Inter Governmental Authority on Development" (!GAD) (1). The ,,v ork goes on smoothly, also because th e Abdikassim pres i dency de facto continues his term of office. Thus the partici pants in the Reconciliation Conference establish the Temporary Parliamentary Assembly, ,vith 275 members appointed on an ethnical basis, which ,vrite a draft of the Conslilulion . On September 13, 2003, the Assembly approves lhe draft of a temporary federal Constitution. The decrease of lhe fights among the armed factions, vvhich had started the previous year, is rnore and rnore evident. The year 2004 is fu ll of hope. The most important stages are: • January 19: amendment lo the Constitution draft, fixing in five years the transition period; • Oclobe r 10: the Parliamentary Assembly elects Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, f-rom the Darocl ethnic group and the Migiurtinian clan, as provisional President ofthe Somalian Federal Republic, with temporary scat in Nairobi; he is elected by an overwhelming rnajorily (189 votes out of 273) and the election is extended to all clans; • October 14: President Yusuf s,vears in lbe presence of important personalities, among

Obviously th e even ls of 2004 arc par ticularly important in order to understand Lhe current Somali situation, together with the behind -the-scene acl ivily th a t makes them part of the Somali reality, which is mostly delerrn inecl by the strong powers existing in the capital. Mogadishu is th L· seal of thr·ec pmvers: • a religious pO\ver, held by th e Islamic courts, with their own militiamen; in at least a [ew or lhem, one can surmise some radically oriented Islarnicisl j nspi ration. The courts are religious t ribunals that can assure some order to the ci ty, but most of all they can assemble and nuinoeuvre a large number o f people; • a military pO\.ver, typical of the warlords, who are rather "lav" and essentially interesled i ;1 tl;e game of clan or family alliances, according lo the convenience of the moment; • an economic power, he ld by traders, who can buy political. religious or military alliances, in order to develop their own intetests in the best possible way. T he main holders of these povvers seem to be: • as for religious pO\ver, Sheikh Shariff Ahmed, President of the Islamic Religious Organization;

RELIGION The Muslim -S unn i is the prevaili ng relig ion . There are small° Christian Copts m inorities. Islam h as been present s.ince th e VU cen tu ry A.D., as shown by the fact that the Somalis trace back the origin of th eir internal ethn ic groups to Mohamm ed's conLemporaries. Traditionally, th ough, the Islamic religious r igour did n ot permeate the Som alian tribal web deeply. Th e Somalis are still firmly anchored to clan and tribe ties, which through these "civilian" and military hierarchies lighten the power of the religious ones. Therefore the episodes connected with fundamen talis m and religious terrorism have occurred only recently, mostly because of al-Qaeda's infiltratio ns, which found a fertile soil in t he disorder and violen ce w hich fo llowed Siad Barre's fall.

• as regar ds m ilitary po wer, some figures of th e Ha\viye-Haba r Gidir , the '\varrior" clan, whose arm ed m ilitias are a mong the s tro n ge s t in M ogad is hu . At their sid e there is powerful Musa Sudi Yalah o w, o[ the sa me Hawiye ethn ic grou p, but from the Abgal cla n, who is hos tile to the West and to Italy, a nd boasts an im portant arrned p resence in t he so u thern area o f the Capital; • as for economic power, Osman Assan Ali Ato, f-.rorn the Haw iye ethnical group and Haben Gid ir clan, a po we rful b u sin e ssman from Mog adishu. Bot h Musa Su di and Osman Ato, in the beg innin g a t le ast , have supported Aideed (Haw iye-1 labar Gi cl ir) again st Ali Mahdi (Haw iye-Abga l ) and a s t ron g fe ll ows h ip has heen existing be twe en them for years , eve n though they belong to different clans .

eh coul d h e useful to have th e economic pO\ver on his side, an d for the neu trali zation of Musa Sadi, w h ic h wou ld elimin a te a heavy obstacle to his pro-W est p olicy. lt is also impo r tant t o und erline th a t the e lec tion o[ Presiden t Yusuf ·wa s not expected, since th e \vide ly favoured can d idate was Abd i Abdullahi

Abdou , a very charismatic figure wi th an imp o rtant poli tica l and diplomatic backgroun d , genera lly looked up to , b ecause h e h as always h een abo ve the fact ions . Fina ll y , i t se ems tha t Yusufs election had rather obscu re im p lications and thal he \vas s tron gly backed by E thiopia (Somalia 's histor ical e nemy ) a ls o on the advice o[ th e Uni ted States, \,v h ich s u ppo s edly c on s id ered him an ally in the an ti- te rroris t s trategy for the region . The rnos t unsat is fi ed is the very s trong Hawiye-Habar Gidir cla n (Lo \vhicb Abdi Abdullah Abd ou b elongs). T h e Habar Gidir, h a vin g tak en n o te o f the resul t o f t he presid ential elect ion. \Vould h ave li ked a t least th e a p poin tm ent o f o ne of th eir candidates as Prim e Min ister. But things d o not go th is \Vay, as Presiden t Yusuf chooses the almost unknown Ali lVIohammed G ee.Ii, who be longs Lo the I la wiye ethnic group, b ut is from the Ab gal clan , and is

.. SCUOLA ElfM£NTAR£. GUGLIELMO • ,.MARCOtt-

President Yusuf - an o u ts id e r in the Cap i ta l, sin c e h e comes from periph eral Puntland - soo n after h is e lec tio n th inks he can get around the Mogadishu situation a nd fo llo\,v h is o w n policy: i.e. he neglect s to look b oth for an alliance with Osman Ato, whi-

I talian soldie rs g uarding a s cho ol reopen ed 1,vith th e help of the "Ibis" Con tingent.

~-~:~ . ,t,.,,..,,,,,,,,. . \ ·t•~.... 49

considered by the Habar Gidir a powerless Prime Minister. Among Yusuf's ele ction intrigues, one should also consider the possible Islamic repercussions, as the fundamental ists were in favour o f the confirmation o f Abdikass im, v-,1hom they supported during his 2000 - 2004 term. Moreover, il seems that they have not complete ly cul their relations with al-Qaeda. The formal acts of const.ilut.ion of the Go vernment continue with the appoinln1ent. of ministers in a number consider ed sufficient lo m eet the ethnic and clan balances, according t o a partic ular Soma li an "handbook". The Government takes of[i c e in Lh e temporary seal of N airobi on December 1. But al th is point the dissatisfaction of the Habar Gidir comes to the fore , and exactly on December 2, in Gelinsor, near the Ethiopian bord er, th e re arc clashes with many victims between subgroups of the same Habar Giclir clan, the Saad and the Suleiman. The reasons, \vhich were revealed only aftenvarcls, would lie in the fact that the Saad accuse the Suleiman of backing the policy of Yusuf and Ge di; besides, be ing Gelinsor so close to the Et hiopia.n border, it almost sounds as a warning to both Yusuf and Ethiopia. Moreover, on December 11, the Parliamentary Assembly passed a vote of no-confidence against the Prime Minister and his gove rnment, for protocol reasons, and on the 17 th of the same month fi ghting breaks out again at Gelinsor and merchant ships of the United Arab Emirates are bombed o ff the coast o[ Mogadishu by a minor warlord who controls the port. ln the meantime, though, already on December 12, the day after the no-confidence vote, the diplomacy of the clans start to work again and political meetings among the government Authorities and all their counter-

TERRITORY Somalia, the "horn" of the Horn of Africa, is a vas t tableland sloping down from Ethiopia, and higher in the northern regions. The land is arid, ,vith the exception of the southern reg.ions crossed by the Juba, Uebi and Shebellc rivers. The climate is characterized by scarce rainfall. Bes.ides Mogadishu (the Capital, with more than 1 mill.ion inhabitants). o ther important cities are Hargeysa, in the internal northern territory, Berbera, an im portant comme rci al port o n the Gulf o f Ade n, Hobyo a nd Kismayu, port towns respectively north-east and south-west of Mogadish u; Baidoa, which is 250 kilorneters n orth-west of the Capital, almost halfway between Mogadishu and Ethiopia; Jowhar, a small town located 90 kilometr es from the Capital. The economy relies mainly on sheep, goat and camel breeding. Agricultu re is quite developed as regards cereals, sweet potaloes, peanuts and bananas. Minerary r esources are modest (rock salt, iron and gypsum), although there are n on -exploited depos its of carbon, copper, ch romium, gold, manganese, uranium and zinc. There are few industries: petrochemical, cement, textile, leather tanning, food (sugar and cooking oil). The nor thern regions. fro m the bor der \,vith Djibuti to Sanag and Sol, fo rm Somaliland (practically the form er British Somalia, with Hargeysa as its capital) which in 1991 declared its independen ce and con firmed it with a r eferendum in 2002. Somaliland, though, is not internationally recognized. Also Pun tland, whic h more or less corres pon ds to the vertex o f the"horn", has given itself a marked authonomy. T h e bord ering Countries a re Djibuti (for mer F re n c h Somal ia) , Ethiopia and Ken ya. Ethiopia, 61 %Christian, mainly orthodox, a fflicted by Lhe lack of an outlet to the Indian Ocean, is Somalia's historical r ival : between them there is also an old border dispute , regulated by an admin istr at.ive line which cuts in to t\,VO parts vas t territories mainly inhabited by Somali ethnic groups. Som alia, mos tly for religious a ffi n ities, strongly feels th e presence of Yemen and Saudi Arabia on the opposite shore of the Gulf of Aden.

parts follow one another at fasl pace, ,.vith the result of a possible strong agreement betw een th e Saad of Habar Gidir (Hawiye) and Lhe Migiurtinians (Darocl). The Agreement would lead to the appointment of G e neral Add e Mussa (old rival of Yusuf, his predecessor) as new Pres ident of Puntland. The m eetings d e fine also a new government , in a position to obtain a vole of confide nce, which includes the po\verful men of Mogadishu , who would otherw.isc prevent the Government from entering the Cap i Lal an cl [ rom carrying out its institutional activity. Th e n evv ministerial slruclurc asks Parliament for a vote of confidence on December 23.

Thus 2004 ends with an apparent albeit difficult success of the reconciliation policy v,mntcd b y Europe, in all likelihood in accordance will1 the United States, and directly promoted by the IGAD Countries. Among them the.r e is also the historical enemy of Somalia, Ethiop ia, whose presence casts a shadO\v on the result. The n ew Sornalian leade rship leaks out reassur ing reports to\vards the international community, expressing the intention of neutralizing Isla.r nic [undarn entalism in order to achieve a normalization of the Country as soon as possible. This political attitude pays, if i t is true, as some say, that China immediately offers considerable help.

Licular, seems Lo 1·econstitute the old fellowship of Osman Alo and Musa Sud i, deployed o n the same The really Somalian, elhnic groups form 98.3% of lhe popui'ation . The fron t, so much so that the [ormcr financed the constitution of the Arabs are 1.2% and the remaining 0.5% is made up of other small minorities. militias of Lhe latler. There are five Somalian ethnic groups: Also important is t.he aforesaid • Hawiye (35%) whose main clans are: Abgal, Habar Gidir, Hawadie, appointment as President of PunMu rosade; 1.land , as a substitu te fo r Yusuf, • Darod (25%) of which Migiurtinia, Ogaden and Marrahan are the most imof General Adde J\llussa, a Darodportant clans; M ig iu rti nian li ke Yusuf, regarded • Dir (19%) with Issak, Yunis, Wallo and some other less important clans; as an important figure and consi• Rahanweyn (1 5%); d ered by many "no-friend" of his • Digil (6%). p redecessor. H we also ta ke into account Lhat the suggested a lli a nThe Somalian ethnic groups have a genealogical foundation of a religious ce between Saads and Migiurtinature, since all of them have a founder descended f·rom Aquil Ibn Taalib, Aln ians would b e , as \V e have al i's brother, Mohammed's cousin and designed heir. ready mention ed, an agreement: The Hawiye, the Darod and the Dir are the most important and the rich est between Osman Ato and Adele ethnic groups. The other are consider ed inferior and are contemptuously Mussa meant to isolate Yusuf, its called "sab". resu lt. could be the political need As there are conflicts among the ethn ic groups, so there can be conflicts for Yusuf lo look for a feasibl e among clans and even sub-clans (as is currently happening between the Saad agreement to r einforce I.he Goand Solcyrnan sub-clans of the Habar Gidir clan). vernmenl. The ahscnce from the The same situation pr·evails also as regards the alliances. Government of the Sornali persoFamilies a re large, of an open lype, and very important. They can b e transnality vv·ho seemed to be so preversal to the clans and even to the ethnic groups. The familiar bonds often sti g·ious and exert so much inprevail over those of th e ethnic group, the clan and sub-clan, generating new fluence , i.e. Abdi Abdullah Abdou and mutable tribal alliances, promoted by sp ecific interests (1-!a,viye-Habar Gidir), is q uite surpr is ing since he \Nou ld have been a sure reference, So m uc h on the internaGolfo d i Ad e n who could inspire feel ings tional plane. •Bosas.o of conhdence al home and As far as the intern al si1\-9; ll PUNTLAND abroad. tuation is co ncerned, •8erbern °-9..t,'f4,; 1 S O M A L I t. A N D 00~~:::::,1 One thing is certai n : among the newly-appoinI Diro Oawa 2004 ends with new violent H ~rgeisa •Burao S O M A' L I A ted Ministers lhere is the J ijiga 0%.1❖. (f$ 5 A K} (OUt.SAHANTCJ og fights, th is time in Mogadisignificant presence of 0 1 Ft DAROD (MAJERTt;) N) DAROO shu itsel f and in Hobyo, on Osman As san Ali Ato, a the coast of Ce ntral Somavery strong figure i n the E T I 0 P I A lia. Capital, mentioned as the (OGAOEN) holder of the Somalian OAROO (MARRA 0 ) OA A Government in "exile" eco nomic pow·er, wit.h in(HA8 AF=I Gl-l!OIA) HAWIYE terests as far as the United The year 2005 opens w ith Sta te; of Musa Sud i Ya the presentalion of the Golahow, one o f the main ver n m cn t, ,vhic h \vas warlords conlrol I ing sworn by Pres ident Yusuf southern Mogadishu and on January 7 and received central Scebeli; of Hussein •Hogad i sc.io the vote o f co nfid ence by Aideed, son o f the dead Ai<> i OGA E N ) •Merce '> OA OD Parliament on Jan u a ry 13. deed, Ali Mah di's ant.ago(BIMAL) DIA During the same d ays nist. These three a r e rethere is a rumour lhat the spect.ively, Minister o r Inmost import.ant represe nfrastructure and Recon•Krsmayo tative of the Habar Gidin, struction, Minis te r of ENYA From the Geopolitic Abdi Abdullah Abdou, Commerce and Minis ter Atlas by A. Desiderio ...1 would voluntarily leave the of Information. The contiEditori Riuniti,. 20031 political contest . The news, guity of th e responsibililnflttraziont e-tiopi edition. . if true, can be interpreted ties of the First l\.~O, in parPOPULATION

. . . __ _, . - .I'

in two ways: one wh ich is reassuring for Lhe L,vo leaders, Yusuf and Gedi, \vho do not have to fear anyrnore the cumbersome presence, in terms or legitimation, o( a charismatic and challenging figure, who \NOulcl have been a menace; and an opposite one, since Abdullah Abclou's withdnt\.\Âˇal (final or temporary?) could also derive from his negative appraisal or the Somalian si tuation, considered Loo intricate to be safely managed. The fact remains that, from the very lirsl days, there is a series of i nciclents, one-sided stances and violence that hamper Lhe government policy and the possibility of installing the new Ins tilulions. The incidenls concern essentiaily the profanation of the llalian cemetery in Mogadishu; the stances refer lo the probable e ntrance into Somalia of a multinational peace force and to the possibility of temporarily moving the capilal from Mogadishu Lo ano ther tovvn; the violence is aimed at many d ifferent targets. The Italian cemetery of Mogadisliu is profaned by Islamic militiamen on J an uary 19 and the Government, despite Lhc official apologies, the symbolic reparat:ory initiatives taken by President Yusuf and some attempts at: mediation, docs not succeed in solving the question. A rudimental

mosque is built in the cemetery area and guarded by militianien; during the praye rs of the fo llowing Friday, leaflets againsl Lhe Italians are dislribulcd. On February 2, in order to unlock lhe situation, the Government decides to send a parliamentary delegation, accepting to pay a high polilical scot. Despite the I La l ian official pro tesl, Lhc incident of the cemetery is not solved but fades a\vay against the background of olher events. The governrnen t's approval of an international peace force, cons isting of 7000 men, is voted on February 5, in the presence or President Yusuf, by 36 Ministers; 9 l\tlinis Lcrs vote against, some 'vVarlonls are among them This causes new disturbances: the rollowing day (Februar)' 6) the arrival or a parliamentary delegation, sent to l\tlogaclishu for the question of the cemetery, does nol calm the troubled \Vaters, actually the contrary is true. On Lhe same day Min ister Osman Ato , speaking on a local rad io, says that the inhabitants of Mogadishu will never accepl Lhe presence of foreign troops. The opposition against the deployment of a peace force does not decrease, although President Yusuf says lhat the 7000 troops will be provided eq u a l ly by the Afr ican Union and the Arab League (Fe-

bruary 9). Also Minister Musa Sucli says thal "the Preside n t should come to Mogad is}i u without foreign lroops", wh ile Osman Alo reappears, crilici,.ing Yusuf's pro-Ethiopian policy a nd inciting the people of Mogadishu to fight against the probab le Ethiop ian peace forces and a l l lhc enemies of Somalia, even if they are Somalis (February 9 ). The Islamic courts, on their turn , keep on saying, albeit with slightly different: nuances, that thc_v are against other Countries' peace forces, even African ones, u n less they arc Muslim. Sheik Shariff Ahmed, Pres ident of the Islamic Re ligious Organization , d u ring a manifestation goes as fa r as threatening a HolyÂˇ \Nar (February 10). In Lhe night between February 26 and 27 many parl iamentarians and m inisters sign a docu.m en l against the presence or bordering Countries in the peace forces. This document has di fferent repercussions. On the one side E Lhiopia steps back, sayin g that it does nol want to impos,: its presence (March 2); the American State Depanmcnt basically agrees 'INith those in the Govern ment w ho do noL want Ethiopia11 troops on the national Lerrilor\" (March 7). On the other sid e IGAD starts to show its intent ion of intervening i n Somalia with troops from all its member cou ntries (March 14 and 15); the Somalian Government pres~nts a motion in favour of the intervention, vio lently opposed b y t h e par! iamentarians, also \Vith physical fights, and then defini Leh Âˇ rejected (March 17) . The fo l10\ving day !GAD, seen the u n bearable political situation, fol lows the Hal ian suggestion an d decides to send a p eace force formed by ils m ember Count r ies , wi Lh the exclusion of those bor-

A CH-47 transporting material uncl personnel o( NGOs working in So rnalia.

dering Somalia (Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibuti). Therefore the question o[ a possible Ethiopian in Lerfcrence is solved with a great defeat. o r President Yusuf and Pr ime Minister Gedi. Also the Presiden t's intention of bringing home the Institutions, in a town temporarily designated as capital ( Baidoa or Jowhar), while waiting for the normali,.ation of the situation i n Mogadishu., meets with many obstacles: the Italians do not like i L (declaration by the Speaker of Lh e Chamber of Deputies, the Hon Pier Ferclinando Casini, to his Somalian counterpart Hassan SheikJ1 Aden on February 14, during the latter's visit Lo Rome), and iL is also the s ubject of an opposing document signed by many Somalian ministers and parl iamentarians, during the aforesaid night between February 26 and 27. Minister Musa Sudi, in his t urn, in accordance with other warlords, d eclares his w illingness to '\-Vi thdrmv his m ilitias from the Capital, in order to facil itate the entry of the Government (March 13). Despite all these signals the Government, duri ng a meeting held on March 21 , decides to move the Capital all the same. But the meeting is abandoned by about ten Minis ters, among whom important Mogadishu personalities who, in a document or their own, d eclare to consider illegitimate any decision . The split is evident. The Government takes notice of a seco nd defeat, rnadc even worse by the clash es that break out in Baido a on March 26 among militiamen of pro-government Minister Hassan Mohammed Shatigudud and Mohammed Ibrahim Habsadai, a parliamentarian hostile to the possibility of mabng Baidoa a temporary Capital. A third s ign of res en tment toward s the Govern rnent is the resu mption of violence. Besides the murder of L'vvO Generals in

GENEALOGY OF THE SOMALIAN PEOPLES AQL!IL lBN TAALTU (A li's brothe r, Mohammed's cousin)

MOIIA..l\1ED ABDURAMAN

. I

MOHAMED YOW

Hl,,L I

SAB I

MOHAMED

ALI I DIGHU ,

lRRIA

RAHANWEYN I

.DIR

PREHA1\<'IYA I

HAWIYA

I DAROU

SAl'<IARON I

GADDABURSI I

DONBIRRA

th e tense climate created by the profanation of the Italian cemetery, we must also record the res um p ti on o f sk irmi shes al Hobyo, with the prob able presence of troops corning from Mogadishu (February 3), the demonstrative shooting against a parliamentary delegation arrive d to Mogadishu two days before from Nairobi lo attend a meeting wi th local notables (Febru ary 8), the murder of BBC journalist Kate Peyton (February 9), the terroris t. attack with an "explosive" motorcycle against a delegation or the African Union, in Mogadishu for Lalks with representatives of the Arab League and IGA D ( February 17), the c lashes bet\veen the Islamic courts and the inha bitants of Mogad ish u 's Huriwa districts, and the fights at Hobyo between Saad and Suleyman (Niarch 23). This sequence or attacks against the Goven1ment, carried out in different ways, and the warnings to the international community, show that some persons do not want to renounce the p ositions gained during ri(tec n years of anarchy an d prevent the President and his Government from se ttling in the Country. A quick visit to Somalia (February 24 and 25) by President Yusuf and Prime

[SSA

Minister Gcdi does not bring any appreciable resu lts, but actually stirs up old d isputes. Yu suf's position is not easy, as is shown by a very cri lical letter, divulged on a Somalian site by a certain doctor Abdishakur Jower. T he let ter invi tes Prime M inister Gedi Lo di stance himself from President Yusuf, condemn ing his stra tegy , develop e d with th e Et h iopian backing in order to isolate and weaken the strong 1-Iawiye clans (Habar Gid ir, Abgal, el.c) . ln this strategy is also included the idea of moving the Capital from Mogadishu - where the Habar Gid ir are a majori ty to Baidoa. ln order to oppose Yus u f, the Virit:er of the letter urges the Prime Minister Lo take as a reference Gen e ral Adele Musse, nev,., Chie f of Puntland and old rival of Yusu f. Doctor Jowar also advises the Prime M inis ter to oppose Islamic terrorism rÂˇesol utely, since in t his way he \Vill gel t he support of the moderates and even that of the warlords.

SOME EVALUATIONS

The \veil-founded doubt is that some leading represe ntat ives of t he ne\v Somalia n course should be taking advantage of this situa-

A squad of US .M arines.

tion in order to rediscuss lhe balance reached on December 2004 . In fact it seems that three poliLical areas come out from these events, even though it is not easy Lo uÂˇace their boundaries or superimpositions. It is also difficult to say someLh ing about t heir internal unity and consistency: one area, pro-WesL and pro-Ethiopia, is led by President Yusuf; another is mainly lay, traditional and nationalist, more or less of a Nasser ian type, agai nst Ethiopia and animated, within the Hmviye ethn ic group, by t h e Haba1~ Gi cl ir clan, where there are many important personalities, making it still very difficult to say ,vho is the leader; the third is inspired by religion and consider s the Pres ident of the Muslim Religious Organization, Sheikh Shariff Ahmed, ils leader. Amidst all this, the Muslim terrorist threat remains looming and could have an important role in an unscrupulous game or short-lived alliances, creeping among the different factions in order to acquire positions of power and, in the final analys is, Lo orientate t he new course of Somalia. Th e letter \vri llcn b y doctor Abdishakur Jower can help in t h e eva lu aLions. I ts meaning seems to consist in the indication or Adele Mussa as a r eference figure: if one considers that 54

h e is a Darocl-Migiurtinian, exactly like Yusuf, lhis could suggest the ,vish to replace the latter with the former , as this wou ld not change the balances at the summit reached at the Reconc il iat ion Conference: the Darnel l\tligiurtinians would keep the P resi dency ; the Hawiyc of the Abgal clan would keep the Prerniership and for the 1-lawiye of the Habar Gidir clan the games \VOu ld reopen, with the possibility of obtaining a larger presence in the Government and fostering the victory of a lay-nationalistic line, w ithout the proEthiopia obstacle represented by Yu suf . Fundamentalism would stay in the background, like a drifting mine. This is the situation at the end of March. During the following months of April and Ivlay, it has been dramatically confirmed by the t\,vo main ensuing events: at the beginning of May, a fai led attempt on Premier Gadi's life in the Mogadishu stadium, during his visit to the city (May 3), mad e to convince the people Lo accept the President's decision to rnovc t he Capi ta l; at the encl of May the town of Baidoa is take n over by the faction opposing President Yusuf. thus making imposs ib le th e transfer of the governmental institutions there.

The slackening or th e dispute about the peace force , due to the moderate li ne fo llowecl by lGAD, triggers the quarrel on the Cap ital, ti II a pmbably conclusive d av of reckoning. In s u ch a complex game is it possible to foretell the protagonists' fu t ure actions? Let us give it a try. The 1-labar Gidir seem to be in the strongest position : they arc w ide ly backed b y the Country (the Hawiye ethnic group, o f wÂˇhich they arc the main clan, is the most numerous and is loca ted in the heart of Somalia) and they hold a firm povver in Moga dishu, where President Yusu f cannot take office withou I beco111 i ng a "hostage" (and he has also serious problems about i.n stalli ng h imself in a tcmporarv Capital). Furthermore they represent the econo111ic power and have a rather good control ol the interna ti onal relations th rough high personalities of t h e clans, and have shown t heir skill in the development of military capabil ities by occu pying Bai doa. Finally, they are furth e r re in forced by the alliance \Vith the Migiurtinians, through th e sub-clan of the Saacls. The lay nationalistic "party", therefore, at present seems to have the best cards and be able to achieve ils goals . Also the religious "party" which is less strong if compared to ten years ago and does not show any govcrn111cnt ambi tion - can feel protected enough fr om ex te rnal interferences of non-Muslim Countries. In fact, il is backed by two leading Ministers (Osman Ato and Musa Sucli) and, precisely in the Capital, has shown that it can mobi 1i ze the crowds and exert a remarkable pressure. At present i t shou Id JlOL have t he ncccssi tv to look fm: the support of extrel;1isl fringes.

A BRIEF UPDATING C,

The events of the months of June and July brought important changes in the situation. On the international plane there has been the sudden transfer of the Governmental and Parliamentary institutions from Nairobi, Kenya, to Jowha.r, Somalia (about 90 kilometers north o f Mogadishu), while the dissident ministers and parliament arians, gathered in the historical Capital, took a rigid position against the transfer of the political and administrative structures (June 14-30). Furthermore, President Yusu f started t:he constitution of a "Presidential militia", made up of loyal men from Puntland, to be employed as a police force and for the government's security (information confirmed by Prime Minister Gedi on July 8). These initiatives taken by Yusuf widened the gap between the Lwo government factions, starting an exchange of accusations, which brought the dispute to an almost breaking point. Also important, in the month of July, was the reemergence of Islamic fundamentalism, with th e awkv-1ard shadow of Al Qaeda. In this respect, Brussel's International Crisis Group (I.C.G.) raised its authoritative voice, and in a report published at the beginning of July, as well as in a study of the end of the same month, reconstrucls the activities of the al Qaeda groups in Mogadishu b etween 2003 and 2004 and informs of the recent constitution in that city of a terrorist formation, the "New Jihad". The I.C.G. maintains that it is time to give Somal ia the same attention given to the Middle East, and that the Country risks to go back to the situation of 1995: in its territory, in fact, there could be leading figures tied to al-Qaeda (some of them made known also by the Italian Press), working in coll usion with an emergent Somalian terrorist and linked to the l\fogadishu militias. At the same time, the press agencies record exchanges of accusations between the "dissident" Minister of Security, Qanyare, and the aforesaid emergent terrorist, about two assassinations that have occurred .in the city, w hich have had a high impact from the social and relig ious viewpoint. In short, the internal picture looks simpler no,v than al the encl of May: there are only two parties, one pro-"\/est and faraway from terrorism, and a nationalist one, controlled by the Mogadishu clans, historically not a lien to alliances with terrorism, whereas the.: non-extremist religious party seems lo have lost its voice. But the picture is politically more complex, as both parties are in the Government. The nationalist party counts the Hawiye ethnic group and the strongest clans (Habar Gidir and Abgal) Lhal dominate over Mogadishu without rivals and, should they make a new alliance with the fundamentalists, they could reopen a violent phase, as was Lhe case at the beginning of lhe nineties. As for the pro-West party, it can rely on the Darod ethnic group and on the minor groL1ps present on the Somalian territory, on the alliance wilh Ethiopia and on the Puntland hinterland (which can be regarded as secure, considering that the recruitment of the first unit of the presidential troops was carried out there) and on the leadership of Yusuf, the only one who managed Lo drive fundamentalism out o[ the territory under his control. For diplomacy, work is becoming more and more difficult, and could require radical choices.

The Government is in the worst position, and especially President Yusuf himself, because h e is regarded as an expression of the hostile Ethiopian diplomacy and appears less powerful after the

events of Niay. Besides, Yusuf has probably lost the ethnic and territorial "hinterland" constituted by PunLland. The presidency of the region has in fact gone to General Adele Mussa, considered his

opponenl by some, even if they both belong to the same e thnic group and clan : this wou ld be an aggravating circumstance for Yusuf. His game, which is mainly played on the strength of the axis with Addis Ababa, at the moment lacks any prospect, as the axis has neither been able to contrast the alliance bel\veen lh e Haban Giclir-Saad and the .IVIigiurti nians, Lhe latter being loyal to the new President of Puntland, nor to permil Lhe transfer of the Capital. In such a situation, Yusuf seems Lo be cornered and could hazard politically lacera Ling rnoves. Being aware of the uncertain character of these scenarios which have been assumed accorÂˇding to \vestern keys of interpretation, although we have always tried to identify w ith the Somalian cultural reality - our wish to Somalia is that it will not waste the opportunity of a rebirth, bu il t with so many d ifficulties, and will look with determination fo r a feasible balance, considering the diplomatic proposals rnade in order to b ridge the serious rifts opened between the Pres idency (and part of the Government) on the one side, and the d issident Ministers (with the Mogadishu lobby and all those \vho contrast the new course)on the other. Jn this phase, it \vill not do any harm to also express the wish that Italy could develop an a uthoritative role and its diplomats be "l istened to" by the co mpeting Somalian leaders. D

'Lieutenant General (rel) ,-,, Experl in geopolitics

NOTA

( 1) 1GAD is formed b y Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibuti, Eritrea, Uganda and Sudan. lt is supported by the IGAD Par tners Forum , cons tituted by the European Countries under the co-presidency of Italv and Norwav. J J

Massacres, migrations, famine and destruction. An endless tragedy that occurs before an inattentive and confused world B di, Rwanda, Uganda and the Congo are the theatre of dreadful tribal wars, in an intricate scenario of greed for the richest subsoil of the Continent. The United Nations and the European Union especially Italy, with its diplomacy and influence - can give a precious contribution to end this distressing situation.

ars with an ethnic and social background go on in some Countries of Black Africa, sowing seeds of death, destruction and looting, with ensuing mass-migrations and famine. The populations of Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Congo, and particularly those of the Region of the Great Lakes, will never be able to forget the repeated massacres. On the international stage for a conflict that has been going on for about half a century, the region of the Great Lakes is the theatre of a new and intricate war which involves the nations on its borders and feeds economic interests.

....

~--~

by Nicodeme N'Kashama N'Koy *

At present, with the attention of the world focused on the Iraqi and Afghan vicissitudes, the war in progress in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo risks to be forgotten, while the number of the victims, 4 million up to now, is going to grow. The economic interests of this conflict have been denounced several times by the United Nations and by the Congolese Government. The Kinshasa government has quantified the damages suffered in the years between 1998 and 2001: they are upsetting and concern mineral, agro-pastoral, environmental, financial and material resources. The entire world has not yet been able to forget the apocalyptic pictures of the Hutus (farmers) and Tutsis (herders) victims in Burundi and Rwanda. The consequences of these bloody, still unresolved conflicts, culminated in the genocide committed in Rwanda in 1994, have gone beyond the national frontiers of the two Countries and reached the Democratic Republic of the Congo because of the presence,

ences among these SLaLes, as regards area, population, cultu re and customs. The lerrilorial exlenLs arc also different: Burund i covers an area of 28,000 sq km, Rwanda 26,340, Uganda 237,000 and the Congo as rnany as 2.3 million sq km. The latter, \Vith its 54 million inhab itants, is the mos t populated Country, follvwed hv Uganda Âˇwilh 19 million, Rwanda with 8 million and Burundi with 7 million. In the lasl two Countries, the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups, well-kno'vvn antagonists, were originally the maj ority, bu t \Ve should remember that b efo re 1994 they had never fought each other so much . Despite their language, culture and religion in common, and although being accustomed to sharing the local resources and the sa m e v ill ages , between these arnong the refugees, of many infiltrated Rwandan soldiers carrying weapons and munitions. Taking advantage of the oppositions within the Mobutu Government, at the time President o[ the De mocratic Republic of the Congo, the leaders of Rwan da, Burundi and Uganda sen t their troops to the norlh-easl of Lhe Country in support of AFDL (Alliance of the Democratic Forc es [or the Liberation of Congo -Zaire) led by Laurent Desire Kabil a w ho, w ith this help, managed to seize po\.v er in May l 997 and proclaim himself President. After having d istanced himself from his a llies, Kabila had Lo reckon w i th th es e same forces vvho, together with some groups of rebels, tried lo overthrow him in August 1998. In this circums tance he came through thanks to the intervention of the Armed Forces of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe but in January 2001 was assassinated, leaving the Democratic Republic of the Congo with serious problems of internal politics and social and economic stability.

THE REGION

OF THE GREAT LAKES This region, located at the centre o f Sub-Saharan Africa, i n cludes Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the DemocraLic Republi c o[ th e Congo, the nations that are the subject of our attent ion, as we.ll as Keny a and Tanzania, which have hosted the r e fuge es frÂˇom Burundi , Rwanda and Congo. There are e norn1ous differ -

groups there has never been a real and lasting peace. Moreover, the ethn ic conflicts have been joined by the differences determined by political interests for the conquest of po\,v er. Accor ding lo writer Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, in order to conquer and maintain power on e is w il l ing to do any thi n g . \!\Then ethnic belonging does not guarantee th e permanence in power, coalitions between m em b e rs or the antagonist ethnic

econorny to a hard tes L. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is th e nation wh ich has more mineral and agricultura l resources in the regio n. The in stitutional crisis, consequence of the last period ot Mobutu 's government, the following com ing Lo pmver of Kabila in 1997 and, finally, the war that. has bloodied the east of the Country, have had a negative impact on the economy and have d estabilized political and social life.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE ETHNIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS

In order lo have a clear pictu1~e of the present situation , we should exarn in e each Country separately, \Vithout omitting the possible fu ture developments. groups are automatically made and unmade, also at the cost of perpetuating or permitting massacres inside one's own group .

THE GEO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Burundi has an economy based essentially on agriculture, in particular on t h e cultivation of maize, legumes, coffee and fru it. Besid es t h e lack of suffici en t funds for the development of this import.ant sect.or, Lhe overpopulation problem is determinant: 7 m illion inhabit.ants occupy a territory of 28,000 sq km. The insta bility of t he ins titutions, due to the ethnic and political crises, h as slowed down the agricultural production. Th e econo m y of Rwanda is based on the production of coffee and tea. Despite the reorganization of the institutions and the renewal of the eco n omic s tructures, the genocide of 1994 and the m islrusl that marks the relations be tween Hutus and Tut.sis are obstacles that. s till have to be overcome. The hatred and resent.-

men ts acc umulated a lo ng the time do not encourage the creation of the c l ima te of mutual trust that would be necessary for a peacefu l coexistence. Uganda, a Country of hills and savannas, has an economy founded on breeding and on the growing of cotton, coffee and tea. Despite the stability of the politicogovern mental organization, t he repeated raids of the r ebels of the "Lord's Resistance Army" and the numer ous movements that. oppose the government put its

Burundi Formerly calJed Urundi (its dynasty is believed to go back Lo the XVII Centu ry) , has been a German colony until the first \vo rld con flict. Militarily occupied by Belgium ( I 916), it became a Belgian protectorate (1 923) together with Rwanda, under mandate by the League of Nat.ions. Economically linked to Belgian Congo until the independence,

Cyprien Ntaryamira was elected in his place bul he soon died, togel.her \vilh Rwandan Presid en t Habyarimana in the al lack to lheir airplane, on April 6, 1994 . In a climate of violence, Sylvestre Nlibanlunganya, \Vho had take n Ntaryamira's ph1ce, was ove rthrown in 1996 by a coup d'etat led by Pierre Boyoya. Since lhen Burundi has been living in a situation or civil war, where lhe Army, consisting mai nly of Tutsi, fights against th e: Hul.u militias. This has caused about 200,000 d ead and 1,500,000 refugees. This has been going on until the intervention of th e internationa l community , culminated with Nelson Maudela's rnediation, which unfortu nately has not yet produced the fruits hoped for.

obtained on July 1, 1962, Rwanda and Burundi have always been characteri7.ed by ethnic conflicts. The efforts of King (Mwami) Mwambulsa IV to guarantee the defence of the national uni ly were to no avail. The conflicts bel ween the T utsi ethnic group, considered Nilotic, and the Hutu, o f Bantu origin, thwarted any fom1 of political accord. In 1966 King Ntare V was removed by M icom bero, a Tutsi, ,vho abol ished the monarchy and made Burundi a separate republic. ln 1972 the Hutu revolt against the Tuts is ended with the massacres 60

of the latter at Bujumbura and, in the south, with t he outcome of 300,000 dead. Four years later Jean Baptiste Bagaza seized power with a military coup d'etat, only to be ousted in 1987 by Tutsi Major Pierre Boyoya. The Hut.us, who constitute, as in the past, the 90% of the population, rebelled against the monopoly of power exercised by the Tut.sis, t hus causing the mas sacres of 1988 . Melchior Ndayaye, a Hutu, elected President of the Republic in June 1993, was assassinated in Oclober by the Tu I.Si. In January 1994

Rwanda Afl.er the tutelage exercised by Belgium on a League of Nations' manda te, Rwanda was annexed to the Belgian Congo. Since 1950 the Hutus, \vho were a majorit:v in the Country , have been trying lo impose their laws on the Tut-

sis. The monarchy ,vas abolished in .1 961 and the following year Rwanda acquired its independence with Gregoire Kaybanda , who becarne the first President of the Republic. Before assuming power, in 1959, he had d eclared that Rwanda belonged Lo the Hutus (Bantu) and that the Tutsis would he invited to go back lo Abyssinia. In 1973, General Habyarimana, a Hutu, seized po\ver with a coup d'etat. S ince then, the Country has had a one-party Government, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) . A civil war exploded in 1990. It was originated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), formed by Tutsis immigrants in Uganda, who ,vere asking for democracy. After a new Consti l u tion and the Arusha

Uganda

(Tanzania) accords, signed in August l 993, there \Vas a period of peace. Unfortunatelv, President Habyarimana's death: in the mentioned attack of April 6,1994, threw Rwanda again in the hell o f an intereth nic war between Hutus and Tuts is, which ended \,vith the genocide of 800,000 people.

Occupied by the British until 1962, the year o( i ls i n d epen clence, Uganda could in itially count on the capabilities or i ls Prime Minister Milton Ohote. The government vvas based on a federal sys tem which gro u ped four traditional Kingdoms ( Bu gan d a, Buny oro, Toro and Ankole). With the new Constitu tion of 1967, this organization was abolished and an authoritarian regime took its place. On January 25, 197 1, General ldi Amin Dada set up a dictatorship that a b olisl1ed al l rundamental liberties. In 1979 he was overthrown by the Tanzanian Army. From then on, Uganda lived in permanent insecuri ty, caused by pol itical instability and by the p roliferation of movemen ts of rebe llion, until a coup d'e tat against. Obote , in

1985, took to power General Tito, who \,v as deposed the following :y ear by President Yoweri Museven i, who is no\v in power. Since then, Uganda has been facing a continuous and persistent armed opposition in the north and east, su pported fro m outside its borders.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo It is a Country of ancient kingdoms and empires, essentially consisting of a population of Bantu orig i n . Th e Berlin Conference (1884-1 885) took it away from the sovereignl)' of Leopold IJ (April 30, 1885) and gave it to Belgium in 1889. After becoming Belgian Congo, it \von its independence on .June 30, 1960, with Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba, respectively President of the Rep uhlic and Prime Minister. From 61

1960 to 1965 there were wars of secession, and tribal movements of rebellion proliferated. Jn November 1965, with a coup d'etat, General Mobutu seized power and set up a presidential Republic, \Vith a sole party, the People's Movement or the Revolution (MPR), making life difficult for all his opposers. In 1990, the people's demands for democracy forced the dictator to organize the Sovereign National Conference (CNS), which elected Prime Minister the leader of the opposition, Etie1me Tshisekedi.But the rebellion led by Laurent Desire Kabila was successh.il and Ivlobutu was forced to go into exile in Morocco, \vhere he died . JVIobutu's place \Vas taken by Joseph Kabila. During the past ten years the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been constantly at war, 62

and 4 million victims arc its tragic result.

THE REASONS, THE PRETEXTS, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN THE CONGO

The Congo, after its occupation, in 1996, by insurgents supported by forces fTom outside the Country, has become a ground of conflicts, not much considered b.',' the mass media and world public opinion, but. which risk to inflame the whole Black Continent. T he will to take possession of the Congolese enormous mineral resources is at the core of the interests of some Cou ntries which are trying to seize control of them . The Congolese, there-

fore, besides being powerless w i tnesses to a war that hits the civilian population with all types o f violence, must also surfer the d ismemberment of their Coun l.r v because of its natural wealth. Thi s treacherous occupation, vvhich concerns the eastern h a lf of the Congo, according to journalist Hugues Delctraz is due to economic and political reasons. The exploitation of the mineral resources or Lhis territory (cobalt , copper, manganese, gold, ,.i n c and diamonds), but also of th e rare metals (niobium and tantal ium) existing in the Kivu region. finances the war efforts and provides not-negligible resources to the forces of occupation. Sometime ago a lso the local Bishops condemned the systemat ic p lu ndering carried out to the detri ment of the people. Th is \Va s reaffirmed by Monsignor Munzihiwa before being ki lled: the interference of the industrial States in the district of the Great Lakes, w ith the intention of exploiting the economic resources of the Kiwu and Shaba regions, is one o f the main concomitant causes o f the Congolese tragedy. Despite the various agreements s igned by the warring parties to allO\.v the withdrawal of the [ore ign troops, the war has never stopped completely . These arc the reasons why the occupation continues and the conflict stagnates. In 2001 , the Kinshasa Government brought a furlbe.r accusation before the United Nati.ons with the document "Synthesis of Lhe Government concerning the systematic sacking a nd illega.l exploitation of the natural resources of the Democrati c Republic of the Congo". The consequences of this si tuation are very heavy: economic recession, paralysis of the banking: systems, widespread growing impoverishment , proliferation o f diseases, hunger, loss of purchasing power, a forced migration which in fact assumes the characteristics of deportation, block

of agriculture and s tock ra1s1ng, shutdown of schools and hospitals in the occupied provinces, inability to pay the wages to Lhe civil servants. The population lives in rear and insecurity, also for the instability of the Governmenl i nsti Lutions. Politically, the democratization process decided by the Sovereign National Conference (CNS) is at a standstill, whi.le Lhe period of transition envisaged by the South-African agreemenls is almost over. In such desolating context, one inslinclively asks when it will he possible, at long last, to achieve peace. The European Union and the United Nations are at present among the institutions which can mediate \.v ith the Governments involved in the conflict. Italy, in particular, ,,vilh its diplomacy and infl uence can give, within the European Union, a significant contribution. A joint intervention of the EU, UN and African Union is therefore essential for putting an encl to the agony of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and permit the recognition of its rights. But this action must be carried out Âˇwith utrnosl rapidity. Up to now the African Union's attempts at deploying a force or interposition between the fighting parties have failed for diplomatic reasons. Also at the fourth meeting that took place on the 30 and 31 Ja nuary 2005 at Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, the African Union has proposed to p ut an end to the conflict before the elections, which should be held ,vi thin this year, but it is unlikely to succeed by itself. The intention is to proceed Lo the disarmament of the rebels who operate in the east or the Country. Artur Zahidi N'Goma, one of the four Vice-Presidents of the Congo, has asserted: The times o[ the reciprocal accusations is finished, hecause many people have died, vmmen have been raped and our resources have been pillaged. The rÂˇesolu-

lion adopted at Abuja will have a concrete effect only if the disarn1arnen t becomes effective and the Country recovers its territorial sovereignty. Considering that the African Union, with tbe aforemenLioned document, has ascertained the responsibilities or the uncerLain Ly prevailing in the region of the Great Lak es , tbe Euro p ean Union, through the ,vorcls of its special Rep resentative, Aldo Ajello, has stated its resolve to economically support lhe implementation of the resolution . Therefore, the United Nations, in ils turn, \Viii have to make sure that th e rights or Lhe citizens of the concerned Countries and their Ler.ri torial integri ty is duly respected. The results of the process of pac ificat ion of the

area \Vi 11 depend on the success of this action. Certainly, no regional settlement will last long if, at the same time, there is no reconcilia tion between the t,vo ethnic groups that have been fighting each other [or centuries. Tutsi and Hutu will have to learn to live togelher respecting each other. Only the recognition of equal rights ror a ll those who inhabit the region, an actual process of democratization of the Countries concerned and the rÂˇespect of their terri lo rial integrity and sovereignty \.vill guarantee peace and prosperity. D ''-Professor of French

at the Army School of Foreign Languages and the "S. Pio \I"

University of Rome

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THE DOG GROUP Establish ed on July I , 2002, in Grosseto, with in Lhe preexisting Mil itary Veterinary Centre, the Dog Group is a unit at battalion level, whose organizaLional structure is based on four main branches: Command; Logistic, Trainin g and Operational Support, w hich enable the Group to carry out a number of fi.mction s related to the following activities: • Promotion, selection and training of military personnel in the specific sector; • Breeding of clogs, Lo meet the requirements o f the Service: • Specialization of binomials; • Control and periodic validation of the dog teams; • Development of the operational procedures of employment and testing of the equipment and technical canine materials; • Prepara tion for the employment of dog teams; • Logistic provision of technical canine materials in s upport of dog units, both in Italy and in the operational Theatres. The Group consists mainly of military personnel, all of them volun teers, who have passed a rigid selection. There are also civil ian employees of the l'vlinistry of Defence, who deal mostly w ith the breeding and training of puppies. Moreover, the Group ava.ils itself of the precious collaboration of a num ber of professionals from the "Completion Forces". The 600 hectares of the vasL estate of the Military Veterinary Centre of Grosseto offer the bcsl condition s for carrying out Lhe daily dog-trai ni ng activities. Modern support. structures have been realized in a short time: a new kennel, classrooms, training grounds, headquarters and lodgings for the Group's personnel and for those attending the courses.

Airdrop o( a handler and his clog.

lhe dog-teams capabilities represent an important objective for the regular Army . . Th ey gjvf:' more mobility and flexibility to the manoeuvre Forces, and in some operational theatres represent a power multiplier... Th e binomial man-clog can function in particular operational and geographical concliUons where th e use of a machine wou ld be impracticable or self~deFeating ... " (Lieutenant G eneral Roberto Speciale, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, "Rivista M ili tare"It. Ed.,no. 4/2002). Three years la ter, this statement looks quite well-founded. The commitment of a.11 those who worked hard and did thei r utrnost on the conceptual, organizational and \Vorking p lane, in order to develop the canine capabilities within the Army, has been amply repaid . A new uni t of the Service, the Dog Group ,

"Queen" on patrol duty in Kosovo.

today is operational and the results in the field are very signi[icant. Dog-teams of the Italian Army take turns in the various operational Theatres, making a great contribution both to the development of the Contingents' Force Protection and the mobility of some combat [ormations. The experts of the US Army Engineer School of Fort LeonarÂˇd Wood (Missouri) expressed their appreciation of the capacities achieved so far, after a recent joint training activity oC Italian and American Dog Trainers and Handlers which took p lace in Grosseto, home of the Dog Group. The clear apprec iation for both the innovative training method, developed ex novo by the Italian Anny, and for the operational results attained, is well expressed hy their words: We thought that our method to pull out injured people from mi-

nehelcls was fas/, bul /he llalians showed us that the same operaLions could he done more rapidly and as safely. We are 1,v orking to introduce this technique in our operational procedures. We would also like to underline the following statement: lVc 1.vere really impressed by their operational wicl training me/hods: the ltalians can be proud of them. The American experts also expressed their wish that the dogteam prograrnme or th e U.S. Army could benefit from future exchanges. The proved practical and operational experience of the Italian Dog Group can .improve the operational capabilities of the U.S. Army in lhe field or "M ine Detection Dogs", as they explicitly state. ln such a context, this ne\v operational capacity is more and more evidently shmving a potential to become in a short lime "a niche of international excellence" of our Service.

In 2001, the Army Staff started a programme aimed al providing the Service with nevv operational capabi li ti es based on clog units highly specialized in carrying out tasks extreme ly interesting for the military contingents deployed in missions outside the national territory. This Project has been updated several times, in relation to the improved exp erience ga i ned in the sectors of training, development of I1e\V doctrines and procedures, special logis tic support and, most of all, during the employment in the Operational Theatres. Todav, in its final vers ion, the project- provides for the training of dogteam s in the rollowing specializations: â€˘ Explosive Detection Dog (E DD) Team, con si s ting or a Do g Handl er from th e Engineer Corps", a Voluntee r in Pennanent Service (VSP) trained as a Sapper and an EDD trained dog, capable of searching for

Dcmining a cart road in Kosovo.

and signalling the presence of explosive substances, irnprovised explosive devices, booby traps, ammunition and weapons inside and outside infras tructure and transport carriers. • Mine Detec t ion Dog (MDD) Team, made of a "Dog Handler· from the Engin eer Corps", a VSP (Sapper), and a MDD-trainecl dog, capable oC searching for and signalling the presence of buried mines, booby traps and other explosive devices. • Scout Dog Team, forrned by a "Paratroop Dog-Handler from th e Engineer Corps", a VSP (Sapper) and a trained Seoul dog qualified, together with his trainer, for parachute jumping. 68

When on patrol, this dog is capable of signalling the presence of hosti le elements on the ground and, when necessary, can see k and signal mines, booby traps and other hidden explosive devices. • Patrol Dog Team, consisting of an " Infan try Dog-Handler", a VSP Rifleman, and a trained Patrol Dog, capable of perform ing multiple operational activities in support of any type of militai·y patrol, such as following a track and finding a hostile person or· a friendly one (as for· example a hostage or the pilot of a shotdown airplane). IL can alert the members of the patrol before an ambush, or signal possible clues along the route, traces, booby traps, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Unexploded Ordnance (UXOs). Finally, the Patrol Dog is trained to keep

crowds under control, either in small teams or in larger uni ts organized for that particul a r purpose.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Engineer Corps Canine platoons sections o r the Engineer Corps are included in the 3'" and 1O'" Sapper Regiments of Udine and Cremon a , within the "Support Lo M.obilitv" companies. Some teams are also p resent in t he Grosselo D o g Group, where they not only contribute to the turnover of th e clog I.earns in the Theatres, b u L also carry out a precious dut.y as ins tru ctors during the specia lization courses. In Lhe current scenario of terrnris t emergency, th e EDD Learns

assume an essential importance, thanks to their possibilities or deployment, wilh particular reference to lhe prevention or: • IEDs: they are mainly directed againsl the convoys or lhe Coalition Forces; hidden along the edges of the roads arnong apparently harmless objects, such as piles of stones, heaps of rubbish, cardboard boxes, packing remains, discarded gas cylinders, old ty res and other objects; • VBIEDs (Vehicle Borne IEDs) and RCIEDs (Radio Controlled IEDs). Apart from the important findings of UXOs and other explosive dev ices and materials made by the canine un ils, one must Lake into consideration the effective deterrenl action coming from the daily use of the binomials for checking all vehicles al lhe entry points of the military compounds. The MDD learns are trained to operate in scenarios where "intensity" goes from "medium to high"; they move with medium and long-range patrols, and lead the march in the stretches that are more al risk for the presence

DOGS EMPLOYED AND BREEDS SELECTED At present, the most: numerous dogs are German Shepherds and Belgian Malinois Shepherds. There are also Labrador Retrievers and Rottweilers. The clogs start their spcciali/.a Lion train ing \,v hen they are a bouL one year old. Before that, they are entrusted to the Military and Civilian personnel of the Reproduction and Breeding platoon, to attend a preparatory training programme adapted to the various growing phases of t.he puppy·. A particular attention is paid Lo Lr\e "socialization" phase, where the puppies learn to interact outside kennels and military areas. In Lhis delicate phase, the v.rorlcl is their training ground: they are taken everywhere, from markets to beaches, from stations to airports. Afterwards, they will have to pass the selection of a Technical Commiss ion, \,\rhich includes a Veterinary Officer·: the suitable puppies are sociable, brave and have a very good aptitude for p laying games. The dogs that do not pass the select.ion are declared unf'it and can be given gratis-to proven dog-lovers.

of TEDs and mines. They have combat requ1s1tes and, therefore, their operational procedures di IJer from those us ed For "humanitarian dernining" activities in "low-intensity" Theatres. The operational procedures of the Engineer canine units maximize the possibilities o[ using clogs in var.i ous situations or operational backgrounds, \vhi le e nhancing a dog's great flexibility of employ-

ment. So, iLis possible to employ a clog in "systematic search", with a shorl lead, For example to ope n a safety lane in a rn inecl area, or wilh a long lead, to inspect a suspicious route, unli l we come to Lhe so-called "free search", wilhoul lead, to make quick checks on "hot spols" (suspect IEDs) sending lhc clog towards the target to be checked, with the possibiLi Ly of guiding it frorn a distance, up to 25-30 metres. In the P roj ect of the General Staff of the Army for the consti tution of the "Dog Capabilities of the Army" the EDD/MDD canine unit is oriented lo combat support, w.ilh particular reference to ,nobility duties, with procedures and sel ups extremely different from those of EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal), as they refer to other operational contexts. The EDD/MDD activity is based on the acceptance of "operational risk", as i l is directed Lo an Operational Thea tre of "medium/high" intens ity" . All the same, in a "lovv intensily" Operational Theatre there might be an integration or some sel-ups of the Engineer Corps, as it happens, for example, \vhen

A ha11lller and his dog inspecting a lrnck in A fghanistan.

"Bruno" in h eliln.rnspurt training.

searching for a car bomb or during a search in d\Ncl lings \vhere weapons or mu ni tion s may b e hidden. Paratroops The Seoul canine Leams have

the same polentials or the E ng ineer Dog teams ( EDD/MDD capacities) in the field or explosive search, but they work according to th e set-u p s of the "Fo lgo re" Brigade. Therefore, their training includes the implementation of specific modu les such as Lhat orie nted to Lhe parachute jump of the binomial.

On the ground they lead the paratroop patrols with the task o l alerting in advance the member:-. of the patrol about Lhe possible presence of hoslile elements (ambush prevention). Jn the presence of particula r clues they can be employed in MOD or EDD modality in search of m ines , traps and explosives and . in some oper atio nal con-

texts, for choosing a secure route. The l.raining is so complex and meticulous that only a fe\v unils are formed each year. Organizationally they are included in Lhe 8'" "Folgore" Sapper Regiment of Legnago. In relation to the Seoul Dog capability, it is importan t to li.nk the un ils lo a restricted number of patrols or, even better, only lo

one of them, in order to foster the inlegrnlion of the dog ,vilhi n the group. The long training proced ure and the acquired advanced capacities make these Scout teams a specialized but very "costly" resource. Being trained to overcome various natu ral and artificial obstades, moving on aU lypes of whee-

led and tracked vehicles of the Armed Forces, ,vith the possibility of a irclrop and hel icopter landing, also by using ropes or ,vinches, they d o not lim it the choice of the route of the patrol. When on fool, a Scou l Dog team moves in a leading position and, when poss ib le, against the \Vind: The clog moves forward, generally free, 10/20 steps i n 71

Patrolling aclivily.

fronl of the handler, \Nho constantly observes i Ls behaviour, ready Lo "read" any possible \varning signal. A slop in the position of "auention" will lead the handler to signal the possible imminent danger to the palrol and he will call back lhe animal using the specia l ultrasound dog-\NbisLle. S hou Id any clues lead to su spect the presence of mines in lhe ground, the unit will control the route in obedience of Lhe procedures provided for the use of the M DD capab ility regarding the tasks of r-cconnaissance and conlrol of potentially dangerous areas and rou Les (Route an d Area Reconnaissance). In proximity of cr i Lical 72

points, the Learn may be requesled Lo check them through the procedures provided for the use of the EDD capability in Lasks of search of explosive substan ces in activities of reconna issance and control (road and railway \vorks, buildings and vehicles). During stops and camps the Scout team can integrate the security and the surveillance or the patrol. Infantry

The lalcsl capability \Vas activated in G rosseto w i l h i n the Dog Gro up in a single operational company, called "Security, S u rveillance and Cro\vd-Con trol Company". Employment "basin" fo r th e entire S ervice, this Unit is structured i n four

canine platoons that can i ndefi nitely operate on more tha n one Theatre simul taneousl y . This capability is not very well known yet, but it ,vill soon become a further precious opera tional instrument at the Commanders ' d isposal , thanks t o the exceptional qualily level . o r the binom ials (result of an accurate select i on and a har d training) . The canine units of the Infantry" have Lo reach a high level of preparation in order to be ab le Lo ,,v ork wi Lh a combat. set up in every operational scenario an d con lexl. Therefore, the basic prerequisites slarl frorn an exceptional leve l and the selec tions are mad e among a high number of applicants. Man y can d idates com e from e li te units of our Army, and

Inspection ofa car in Afghanistan.

the t ra i ning ,-vill have lo lead them to reach levels adequate to the expected operational larget, i.e. carry out several activities of high operational interesl \vhich correspond to the entire range of military operations that the Army has to perform. Th ey can be employed in operational scenarios o[: â€˘ "Low/medium intensity", with priority as "se nsors", during the surveillance of sensitive po ints and areas and as means of security and d eterrence in crowd control, in searÂˇch i ng for vveapons and munitions, to reinforce the struct u re of the T CPs (Tactical Check Poinls) search es. In short, lhey integrate a patrol in all i ts duties, and at

the same time, raise its security level; â€˘ "H igh intensity" where they represent an increasing factor of success of the mobility of combat activilies : search, pursuit and possible immobilization of hostile elements, ambush prevention; search and signalli ng of explosive devices and boohy traps. Thus, the Patrol Dog capability is destined to integrate th e units in charge of leading special operations. A Patrol Dog, thanks to its exceptional olfaction, is able lo sense human srnell at a great distance a nd, thanks to it s keen hearing, is able to h e ar an enemy trying to infiltrate, through the detection of sounds inaudible by lhe human ear. In certain operational conte xts

these teams represent for a patrol p recious sensors for preventing ambushes an d avoiding lo be caught in traps or incur in accidents caused by explosive d evices. Moreover, they can increase th e security level of the redeployed Headquar ters of a Great Unit garrison ing, as static or mobile surveillance-and-secu rity elements, its se nsitive areas and points. \.\Then requi red , a Patro l Dog can follmv a track a nd signal all the evidence left on the ground; can check beforehand areas and objectives of interest a nd, if necessary, it is trained, on its handler's ord er, LO a ttack and immobilize a hostile element w ith remarkable speed of action. The specialization of Jhe binomials is obtained a l the end of a course that lasts aboul a year ,

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and presupposes the execution of specific activities aimed at giving them the so-called ''combat capability" connected \Vith getting through tra.ining modules such as: tac tical transport on military vehicles, fording a watercourse, techniques of movement and c.:ornbat in urban contexts, techniques of crowd control, procedures of Immediate Automatic Reaction. It is plain that the infantry canine units do not limit the mob ilit)-' of the patrol; on the contrary, they make the opera tion easier by raising the securi ty level. For

example, when crossing a body of water, the clog team is the firs t element of the patrol that reaches the opposite bank and carries out an accurate contro l of the area before the patrol is reunited.

THE MISSIONS Today, in the canine sector, the Service can a vail itself of a remarkable kno\v-how at interna tional level and of an important experience develop ed in operations. As a matter of fact, can ine units

"ivfarvin", "Niki" and "Britt" in Iraq.

of the Italian Army have been , a nd still are, s uccessfull y em ployed in the Balkans, Afgh anistan and Iraq. Du r in g operation "Endurin g Freedom" they worked in the difficu lt Afghan area of Khowst, together with the "Nibbiol " a n d "Ni bbio2" Contingents, for preventing possible attacks and mine accidents, quite possible in a n area which is among the mos t mined in the world.

'?vlegane" in signalling po~jtiun.

Moreover, in Kosovo, in operation "Decisive Endeavour", they were employed in support of Sapper formations in activi ties of reconnaissance and co ntrol of potentially dan gerous areas and routes, looking for explosive material during the control of road and railway works, buildings and vehicles of all types. Curre n t lv, \v i thin the Italian Engineer Task F o rces, canine units have been engaged in Ope-

rations "Antica Babilonia" in Iraq (since December 2003) and "ISAF" i n Afghanistan (since last year), particularly to confront the terroris t threal. Their employment takes place after an accurate activity of "preparation in the Motherland". In this regard, the Canine Group of Grosseto, being a specialized unit of the Army, has up to now carrie d out the "mount in g fun c tions" for all the dog units em ployed outside the natio nal territory They start b y studying th e information regarding the Thea-

t1Âˇe of employment, with particu lar a ttention to the climatic and anthr opological factors, the ground characteristics and the cartograp hy of the area wh er e they are going to operate. The preparalion activities proceed w ith a check o f the necessary technological equipment for the clogs, and, at the same Lime, they include a specific training oriented to\,v ards the foreseea ble future deployment. The phase o( the adaptation of the clogs to the ne\,V working scenario starts with the introduction in the Theatre. The length of this

phase is variable and involves a training in progress, getting near as much as possible to the real condi tions or employment. Up to the pr esent, all the canine elements deployed have b een at squad or p latoon level; the numb er a nd the speciali zations of the binomials are naturally strictly connected ,vith the opera tional needs and are placed directly under q ualified NCOs, ,vho assure their correct deployment, respecting their potentiality a nd the envisaged procedures . These Non-commissioned Officers are spec ialized as "Com manden; of canine squad/platoon" fol lowing a specific annual cou rse, which q ualifies them to: • Manag e a can ine uni t a t squad/platoon level, al home or abroad, rrom a logistic and ad-

ministrative point of view; • Schedu le, organize and conduct the training or canine gro u ps at squ ad a nd platoo n level a l home or abroad; • Employ in operational aclivities a milita ry dog in order to carry ou t the task of supporting military contingents in operations o utside the national territory; • Employ a dog unit a t pla toon level acco rding to the envisaged o perational procedures; • G ive ad e quate advice to the operational Con,ma ndcrs a bout the d eployment possibili ties of a dog unit. ln t h e Theatr-e, the preparation activily begins as soon as a task is received: t h e Commander of the rormat.ion takes part in the pre-mission b r iefing (in

"Black" on patrol.

w h ich he gives s pecifi c advice about the depl oy ment procedures of the dog teams) and lhen he inslruc ts his men about the miss ion a nd the tasks to be carried out. Then the dog handlers concerne d check the individual eq uipm e nt, and prepare all that w ill be need ed for- t he emplovme n t or t h eir canine "colleague" . T he EDD cornronent has permilled to intensify Lhe m easures of "Force Prolecl ion", workin g daily in search of exp losives inside the vehicles entering Lhc compounds. Durin g a 4 -mon th shift, tht> E DD teams check an average o f 1200 vehicles.

The level of de tetT<:!ncc proved high, cons ider ing t ha t exp los ive material has never b<:!en introduced in to the I talian mili tary bases. The M OD and Scout Dog componen ts an: mostly <:!mp loyed lo control suspect areas and routes, in search or buried devices, including IEDs . The E DD an d MD D co m p onents have also been employed on th e occasion of search activities carried o u t be fo re m eetings and visits o f nationa l o r fore ign au thorities to th e local I n sti tutions. T he consta nt flow of inform ati on resu lting from Lhe d e pl oyment of t he dog teams in the aforesaid Theatres has Iaugh t userul lessons w hich integrated a nd improved t b e .i r tra inin g, so a s Lo meet m o ,路c a dequately t he r eal operationa l needs. So m e as p ects or the employrn<:! n t proce d ures h a ve been r eviewed in this sense, such as t h e dispatch of the dog o n a "free search " on the objective Lo be co nt ro lled . B <:!s icles , th e re h as b een a n in creased t rain ing of the dog tea ms .i n u r ban environments and a revision of the te chni ca l a nd ope ra tiona l require rn ents of some s p ecia l m aterials a n d pieces of eq uipment. Moreover, there is n ow the well-esta b l is hed p rocedure of cm ploy i n g dog team s u ndcr an expert NCO, in order to explo it al l the possibilities o f employmen t o f lhe c a n ine capabi li ty, wh ich is still li ttl e known b y most R egime nt p erso nnel a n d B rigade s ta ffs .

THE TRAINING METHOD A m ili tary dog is desti necJ Lo work in d ifferent a nd un expected situ a tio n s, w h ic h are t h ere fore d ifficul t to sch ema tize. Reliab ilit~' is a n essential prereq ui site [o r secu r ity, since i t r<:!d uce s th e r is k ot' accidents . A dog's mistake could have serious

co nsequ e nces! T h ese s i mpl e c ons id e rat ions are based on the intuitio n that it is necessary to adopt -a method that can provide the dog w ith the hig hest. motivation fo r its work. The "Train ing Meth od fo r the Dog Teams of the Italian Arn, y", elaborated ex novo by the mililar路y instructors o [ Lhc Dog Group o f G rosseto , d ocs not e n v isag<:! coercive measures, b u t favou rs, inslead, all the activi ties which lend to slrcng th<:!n Lhe bonds o f affec tion a n d feelin gs of mutual confidence , u nders tan ding a nd harmony. T he creation oF th is kind o r relation is evaluated a t th e e ncl o f the first phase of th e course (i.e. after four months of basic trai ning, com m on to all co u rses), and is a precondition for the continua ti o n of the cou rse and th e access Lo the following phase o( sp ecialization. Th e me thod is based on Lechniq u es o f worki ng, condi tio n in g and moulding: t he goal is to stimula te the clog's initiative and ke<:! p its mo Li vaLion a t the high es t levels. Dogs a l wa ys try to solve t h e problems a b out w h ich they are m o tivated : thi s is th e spirit o r military training. In a n ew e nvironmen t, an an imal lends to behave at random. If o ne o f its be haviours causes a n advan tage, then: is a chance t hat, unc.ler the same con d it ions for a second time, the an imal w ill rep eat it. All t he o t her random behaviours which did n o t bring any be nefit w ill gradually disappear. Therefore this conditi o n ing is b a sed o n th e ma n 's a b i li Ly to award a time ly "reinforce m ent" in coincidence with t he desired behaviour to a clog that is perform ing a s po ntan <:!ous and ra ndom b eh avio ur. Every exercise represen ts a sma ll p roblem to be solved, i.e. the r ight behavio ur t ha t the clog will have to d iscover and ad op t. Bu t w hen a desired beh av io u r

does not belong to its behavioural ran ge , and t herefore we cannot expect the dog lo perform il at random and in a spontan eous way, it is necessary Lo proceed by "successive appn:ixima tions". T h roug h mould i ng, t he b e h aviours wh ich come closer lo the final desired one arc reinforced. Al'ter路warcls, the behavio ur closest lo th e c.l <:!s irccl on e w ill be rewarded, w it hout reinforcing an ymorc the p1路ev io u s approx imation whic h, t herdore, w ill be forgotte n . In th is way, through su ccessive ap proximations, we can obtain th e new behaviour. At work, the clog US<:!s the same se ns es i t n a tur a ll y uses wh e n hu nting, search ing a nd defending the pack or the territory. The ha ndler spurs t he animal in to reproducing its capabili ti es by p lay i ng, w h i c h is a centra l compon ent of the clog's training. lL is p recisely th rough games that t he dog learns to d e tect and signal all tvpes o f explos ives. l t ta kes abou t t hree weeks lo me morize (learn to recognize) t h e sme ll of t h e firs t e xpl osive s ubstanc<:!. As t h e tra ining goes on, th e memoriza tion ti me of a new s u bstance decreases, til l it takes o ne W<:!ek for the last subs tances in cluded in the m e morization p rogramm e. So far, no technology m ore re1ia b le th a n a dog's nose has be<:!n l'o uncl. In an a du l t "Germ an shepherd's" nasal cavity t here are about 220 million o lfacto ry cells, for a s urfa ce of ab out 172 squ a re centim e tres, agai ns t only 5 squ are centimetres in an adult man. T he p rogramme of me morization of explosive su bs ta nces is giving very good resu lts, arous ing also t he in terest o f other Armies.

THE COURSES Th e development o f the project has enta iled the crea tio n of new pro(e s s io na l fi gures and , a s a con sequence, the establis hmen t 77

Patrol training.

of specialization courses for Noncommissioned Officers and Volunteers. All courses are carried out in Grosseto by the Military Veteri nary Centre and its subordinate Dog Group. They envisage a careful selection both of the candidates, to check whether they possess the requ isites listed in the .lob Descriptions, and of the dogs to be set out on the complex and long training route. The activities related to promotion, selection, recruitment, and qualification of the new professionals involved a great organizational effort, but today the Centre can give the following courses each year: • Canine-Platoon Commander: nine-month du ration, for Warrant Officers just graduated f-rom the Viterbo NCO School. Also Infantry, Cavalry and Engineer Corps Stuclent-\:\IOs attending the last year of course can app ly. • Can ine-Squad Corn mander: ten-rnonth duration, for Engineer and Infantry Sergeants aft er a professional refresher course given at the 80th RAV (Volunteer Training Regiment) in Cassino. • First- and Second-Level Dog Instructor: for VSPs already qualified as Dog Operators/Handlers, and Canine-Squad Com manders who h ave been holding that job for at least two years .. After a four-month course, they receive the certificate of first-level dog-i ostructor, and two mont hs later reach the second level. • Engineer Dog Operator (EDD/MDD): ten-rnonth course r eserved for Sapper Engineer VSPs in possession of the MINEX module issued by the Engineer School. • Eng i neer Dog Para trooper (Scout):ten-month course reser-

ved for Sapper Engineer VSPs, holding MINEX and militaryparatrooper certificate. • Rifleman Dog Operator (PaLrol): the selection/training is reserved for "Riflemen" Infantry VSPs from any Unit/Headquarters of the Operational Land Forces . It is an eight month cou rse and includes a specific EOR-operator module (Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance); those who qualify may be reemployed in Grosseto, \Nithin the "Security, Sur veillance and Cr owd Control" security company of the Dog Group. • Dog Handler: open to all VSPs \Vho, regardless or lbeir specialization, \,\.•oulcl like to try their hand at tending, training and looking after the clogs bred by the Centre facility for the requ irements of the Service; it is a four-month course (s ix \Veeks for VFP 1 s), envisaging the recmployment of- the Handlers at tJ,e Grosseto Dog Group,

with in the Breeding and Raising Platoon.. • Assistant Dog-Handler: t \VOmonth course for lhe qualification of VFBs from units w i th canine capabilities. Unlike the previous qualifications, Lhi s course does not e nvisage the assignment of a clog. It qualifies the personnel only (or takin g care and looking after the operational dogs (already specialized and assigned) when th e VSP handlers are absent frqm the Unit. Those who pass th e course test and wish to undertake the career of clog-handlers when they become VSPs, are admitted without selection. • Nurse for Quadrupeds : after a selection, al l VSPs holding a d ip loma, with any job, and c oming from any unit, can apply. Th e course lasts two months , and the assignment of a dog is not envisaged . The nurse fo r quadrupeds is a sort of Medical Assistant for the Army's dogs and horses. The qualified pe r-

sonnel works at infirmaries and medical posls for quadrupeds, in close contact v.,rith Veterinary Officers. All courses envisaging the assignmen l of a dog i nclude a firsl four -month phase where the "correcl man -dog relation" is sought. In th is respect, the phase of formation of the binomials is very delicate, as the character and behaviour of both handler and dog are evaluated. First of all, the handler learns the dog's different manners of communication and its learning process: he learns hov.,· to play on motivational factors and how to be recogn i zed as a reference point to follow and trust. At th e same t ime, he must be able to motivate the dog on all the envisaged activities. Theoretical subjects include: ethology, veterinary first-aid, cynology, hygiene and prophylaxis, operational employment procedures, dog-team logistics. Practical s ubjects are divided into s pecific training modules, such as: leadership and "centripetalization", play and mental-activation exercises, obedience, motivation control, substance memorization, helicopter transport and landing, mobility exercises, fording, combat qualification, track finding, security and surveillance of sensi tive points/areas, cro\,v d control. Great importance is given to the athletic training of the binomial. The weekly training programme includes numerous periods of "physical training", in order to make the binomial capable of ,vorking in all types of environments, including the most difficult ones . Th us all binomials have to undergo physical "time" tests, such as a 5000111 run and a 15km "b allasted" march, \Vith operational activations after or during the march, in order to test the operational capabilities of lhe binomial under stress.

As mentioned above, at the end of each course a period of "on the-job training" is en~•·isagcd. Tl is a son of really operalional apprenticeship, usually carried out in Kosovo, an area thaL represents a very good training ground. Its purpose is to improve and consolidate what \Vas learned during the course, through an action in the field . This one-month period takes place at Pee, Kosovo, in a special logi sLic-tra ining area, realized at the "Villaggio Italia" Base. Here, at the encl of each course, the clog teams, accompanied by their instn1ctors, show the operational capabilities learned during their training, working in support of Enginee r or I nfantry formations of the Italian Task Forces. T hese activities "on -the-field " permit to make a real qualitative leap in a short time, also on the psychological plane, leading the clog handlers to feel more secure in their operations \Vith the dog and raising the level of reliability of the binomial. ll is all done in expectation of the subsequent deployme.nls in areas \vhich require a consolidated skill, such as the Afghan and Iraqi Theatres. At the end of the specialization period, when the course is over and the binomials are assigned to the operational Units (Udine , Cremona, Legnago, Grosscto), the target of the binomials' daily training is to "keep and impmvc the acquired operational capab ilities". As a matter of fact the canine units, in order to maintain their full operational capability, must carry out a constant technical and tactical training activity, both at team level and at all other levels (squad, platoon, company, battalion). The clog keeps its capability of maintaining the behaviours learned during the course only through constant and cyclic exercises . The lack of stimulating exercises will inevitably lead to the ex-

tinction of all the behaviours acquired and, therefore, lo the nonoperativeness of the dog team.

CONCLUSIONS

General Roberto Speciale concl udcd his arlicle with these words: Undoubtedly it is a gamble ... Our sincere 1,vis hes to the p ersonnel that, at the present time, are 1vorking for the creation o( I.he first dog units. Nm,v \Ve can say that what t hree years ago \Vas just a gamble is nmv a reality! The Army canine units can give a tangible response to the operational needs of our Continge nts employed in the various operational Theatres. Trained according to an "Italian-Army MeLhod", unique in the world, and employed respecting the procedures developed by Lhe Service, the dog units express operational capabili ties that arc precious for the soldiers in the field, r·eclucing the r isk of acci dents and, therefore, the loss of human lives. But these important. results must not represent a final goal. As a matter of fac t, they only represent the achievement of the short- term goals set by lhe project, and therefore show our Army's capa b ility of achieving them with in the fixed timcframe, monitoring and correcting the d ev iations in real Lime, and its ability to build and maintain hrst-class capabilities also at individual-soldier's level. The bet, lher·eforc, is renewed today, \Vith the awareness Lhat we are on Lhe right track. In this sense, the results achieved represent a further spu r to go on and persist in the same d irect ion, lead ing to the full acquisition of the complete operational capabilities or all canine components by the end of 2008. D ;e

Lieutenant Colonel,

Comnwncler of the Dog Group

uring the second half of the 19'" century, thal nati onal feel i ng which rlO\Nadays is known by everyone as patriotism, w as so powerful, politically and socia ll y, to be ab le to d isrup t the trad i tional values of that period in order to create a new idea of Nation, i.e . a common fee li ng about h islo1·ical origin, langu age and religion which managed to unite the European people under lhe same id eological flag . S u ch new p erceplion of the polit ical Ji fe mostly meanl the e ffacement of lhe s ingle individual and b e cam e every bod y's gene ral patrimony , to b e used during big social compe tition, i ncluding the participation in the delicale and complex organ iza tions of the military structure and in their impact on civi l society. N otably, German nalionalisrn - a reallv unif vi n g force o f lhe S tate - i~ the ; pace of less than twenty years rnanaged to produce on the European political scene the firs l impressive u nifical ion of the G e rman State, based nol only on th e right of self-determinal.ion of the Teu tonic culture, but mainly on its except ional military leadership, exerted witl1 force on t h e rest of the Continent.

FROM THE CONGRESS

OF VIENNA TO 1858 The mil itary and political cl irection of t he unification was carried out by the n.1li ng class of the Kingdom of Prussia and by its dete rmina tion to create a strong military po\-v er able Lo fight the Austro-Hungarian and French Armies, c ons idered, up to thal lime, the strongest in the world.

Of-Ficcr's mitre of £he "Empcro,·

Alexa nder's 18 1 Grenadier Guards" R egi ment, I 894.

Adolf Northen: "v\la1e rloo, 18 June 1815. The Prussians conquer Plancenoit".

A[ler the Congress of Vienna in 18 15, there \vas not the instiluLion of a properly unified Ger man State, there \,Vas instead a German Confederation, \,v hich consisted o[ 39 Slates repr esented by a Diet, located in Frankfurt and headed by the Emperor of Austria, to the clisappoi ntment of the new Prussian political class. In 1834, Prussia took the first political step towards a form of German unification through the constitution of the Dcul sche Zollvcrein, which exempted the States from custom duties, and made trade and exchanges easier within the Confederation, laying the foundations for a new way of thinking, more openminded and common to the other Kingdoms, Grand Duch ies

and Principalities belonging to the same culture. But the pol itical process of the Restoration did not take the development of l h e emerging nalionalist ideals into the right consideration - they rather opted only for the recognition of the principle o f dynastic sovereign Ly, in the reformulation o[ the European map - and, as a resu.11., lhe claims of the representative and conslilulional political systems did not take a long time to rnake themselves felt. In 1847-1848 a heavy economic crisis incited the insurrectionary activiti es of Lhe liberal middle lower classes , and the revolutionary explosion devastated Europe, ,vith extraordi nary simultaneily in Countries verv different fron, each olher, to the exclus ion of industrial ized Great Britain and backward tsarist Russia: in short, the highest and the lowest points of

the European economic deve lopment. Therefore, the Liberal Nation alist revolt quickly hil also th e hear l of Prussia, and riots hro ke out in Berlin in 1848: Lhe Libe, a ls called for democratic political reforms and Lhe nationalis ts s tarte d lo clamour for a u nited Germany, possibly without Austro -Hungarian leadership. The revol t did nol achieve the d esired effects as Fried rich Wilhelm IV of Hohenzollern, \,Vh o al Cirst had promised a constitutional Monarchy, refused the Crown offered by the National Assembly for the leadership o r a German State - \vhich, as w e said above, had lo exclude Austria and the territories under its control - and, by doing so, decreed the failure of the revolution and the political downfall o[ the Assembly. Bismarck, then a youn g deputy in the Diet of the German States, open ly Look lh e

King's side, advocating the idea that the sovereignty descended from "divine right" and, surely, should not be condilioned by social or political factors. It was he who convinced Wilhelm TV lo renounce the Crown, and in this way he managed lo (ind favo ur with the King, who re\.van.led him with ever nwre prestigious positions. At any rate, Wilh e lm .IV was not indifferent to the attractive project of a united Germany, which he quickly seized, adapting it to his personal dynastic perspective, and sacrificed the idea of Nation as exp ress ion of the people's \.Vill, on the altar of Prussian military expans ionism.

WILHELMI AND THE MILITARY REFORMS

In 1858, follo\ving the serious mental illness of his brother Friedrich W ilhe lm IV, Wilhelm I assumed the Regency of th e Kingdom of Prussia (he will ascend the throne only after h is brolherÂˇ's death in 1861) with the intention of realizing a pure Const.it.ut.ional Monarchy, in order to receive the nevv advantages of the representative system, but without a reduction of the trad i t ional and important royal prerogatives. The defeat suffered against the Austrians in 1850, was sti LI a burning issue to the ne\v Re gent, and the process he had started, regarding the reorganisation of the army, \Vas so im portant that it could he considered a real "refoundation", w ith all the political and social implications it involved in Lhe Prussian society, as we shall see later. Also Friedrich "Wilhelm IV had already started to make some changes in the Army, but his innovalions consisted only in new uniforms and the inlrocluclion of the .Pickelauhc, the famous helmet with the "spike", which \-vou ld laler become the symbol

of Prussian militarism. The Hohenzollern tended to favour the Armed Forces and worked For the cons titution of a strong and powerful Army that could, at the same time, back an aggressive fore ign policy, but th ey also produced an efficient tax system capable of supporting the ir reforms. In particular, it is worth men Lion i ng here that the founda tions for consolidating the Prussian State were laid by Friedrich \.VilheJm (1640- 1688), a lso knO\vn as "The Great Elector", who expanded the territory of the Kingdom through new annexations, after the acguisi-

Prussian Hussars (1815- 1830).

tion of the Duchy of BranclenburÂˇg in 1415 . Besides, he received twenty lhousand Huguenots escaped from France after the Edict of Nantes, and e mployed them to relaunch the Prussian econorny.(Before him, (or two centuries, Prussia had been ruled by lhe Te u ton ic Kn ights. ln 1525 the Grand Master of the Order, Albert 1-lohe nzollcrn, succeeded in transforming it into a hered itary Duchy for h is o,,vn family). Fri e drich Wilhel m I ( 17 13 1 740), too, strengthened the 83

Troop busby of the i s; Regim en t Hussars of the Guard, I 900.

State, developing absolutist: tendenc ies and founding a well trained Army, which was quile numerous for the lime, thanks to a conscriplion system thaL caused him to be cal l ed the "Sergeant Ki11g" . In Prussia, therefore, the conscription had a lways been lhe real founda tion of lhe Army, formed , moslly, by soldiers on a short term of service. W hen in 1814 conscription was set up for all rnen between 17 and 50 years of age - a princ iple sanctioned by Lhe Constitution - people did not p u t up any resistance, as they vvere somehow accustomed to conscription and because they assoc iated this provision, though hard, wilh the liberation from Lhe recent Napo le on ic tyranny. In France, on the contrary, the abolition of conscription which had been the worst calami ty for the people during the Napoleonic regime, so m u ch so that it became one of the most i1T1portant causes of t he Country's crumbli ng - was considered one of the best reatures of the new· Constitution, as people experienced it as a ne\.v ac84

quired freedon1 which could not be renounced . In the other States of the European Continent the conscription systern continued to exist only nominally, and th ere were so many poss i b il i ties to dodge it , or to be replaced, tha t in most cases the recruit s b ecame mere reserves without i mportance, compared to a standing Army made up of regular vol un teers . \,Vi l hel m I received h is bap tism of fire w·hen he \Vas only 17 years old, in 1814, as he took part in Lhe French campaign against Napoleon Bonaparte, and all his Li [e was firmly convinced that the minimurn duration of the enlistment should be three years . For this reason, as a result of the fears of a poss i b le vvar against France, in 1859 he proposed immediate and i mpres s ive military reforms: conscription [or three years, creat ion or new Battalions to absorb the ever gro\ving numb er or con scripts, allocalion of funds for Cmiel Schools - in order lo prov ide the Army with a greater number of qualified Officers -

and, [inally, a significanl reduct ion of t he autonomy of th e Landwehr, the Militia \vhi ch had not b een very efficie nt when, during the mobi lizat io n of 1859, was d ep loyed side b:,.1 side \v ith the regular troops. On ly the Ge rman "Old Libe rals" vvere willing to su pport l he King and his proposals , bein g convinced that a new Prussi a , still in the perspect ive of leading a possi ble German unificat ion , could provid e an u npara lleled mili Lary force for the progress and the expansion of the Coun try. But the "Young Liberals" \Vere against su ch a wide diffusion of "militarism" - a synonym of antisocial mentality - and, in particular, they saw in the proposed allocations for the Cadet Schools, a further form o[ h idden funding in favour of the already rich Pruss·i an aristocracy. The di spute over mililary policy was made worse by th e strong opposition of Nlinister o f \t\lar von Bonin, a liberal, \vl10 open ly disapproved the s izeable increase of mili t ary expense s and their repercussions on the national budge t. W il helm I d id not hes itate to replace von B onin \Vith von Roon , a conservative, hostile to the liberal ideas because they were nol consistent \vith h is absol u tist conception of the Prussian monarchy and, at lhe d a\~,n of a harsh inslilutional conflict, Wilhel m l and von Roon decided t o take act ion and established lhe new Regimenls, even before ob taining the necessary hmds. Ln 1861 the K ing, a lways eager to assert his political s uper iority, with royal boldnes s "showed" to the Parliam.e nt in plenary session the ne\v troops and the newl y adopl e d uniforms.

Troop Czapska of the 13tf, Regi mL'rll K ing's Uhlnns, 1900.

THE ADVENT OF BISMARCK ON THE POLITICAL SCENE

The new "Party of Prng,-ess", by then in power, decided not LO collaborate with Lhe Crmvn, nppeal in g 10 Lhe p e0p le's s0ve r e ignty: the aim was Lo vote against the new allocations and to allow o nly a Lwo-year co nscrip tion , in excha nge for Lh e co mple te a nnulment of Lhe reforms made by the King and h is new Minister of Wa r. The situation got even worse when Lhe Army s ided with conservative von Manteuffel, H ead of the Military Cabine t and rcrso nally in c harge o f choosin g the Prussian Offi cers. He \,v ns ready to have the will of Wilhelm J respected, a lso by using force if necessary, s ince he was a firm suppone,- of the need to leave the Army under the exclusive and totul control of the Sovereign. But in 1862 the Parliament rej ected all Lhe prnposed appropriations and called for disbanding the new Regiments. In order lo end th e crisis, ,,vhich had by then become acute and dangerous, von Roon advised Wilhelm I to entru s t the solut ion of the problem to the clever and determi ned politician Ollo van Bi smarck, who overcame the deadlock by us ing almos l unconstitutional rn enns. After w inning th e favour of the Liberals (he arranged Lo exLend the duration of the conscription lo t\vo years, granting at the same time Lhe possibility lo obtain an exempt ion upon payment o f a s um of mon ey, wh ic h wns to be used to increase th e number of regular trnops) Bismarc k proposed to keep the Army units to a constant ratio of 1.2% of Lhe wh ole po pulation, and to make eve ry ci ti zen finance Lhe Army with a

determined amount of money. Contending that, since th e Constitution did not have precise provisions for cases where a bu d get \vas not put to th e vole (and, o n these o ccas ions, the Crown had to keep on guaranteeing the State a dminis tration), he co nvinced Wilhelm I to dissolve Pa rli amenl, with the legitimate authoriza tion to continue tax col lection. Therefore, after \Vinni ng such a for-r eaching victory, he remained in office. But the new model of militai-y organization, p lann ed by the King and his Minister of War, qui ckly proved to be th e cause of deep d ivisions and it was necessary to assure the Army the natio n 's unreserved s urport in orde r to dispe l s uspicions and resentments.

Bismarck sensed tha t. Lhe o nly way to " legi tim a te" the Army was to put i t a t the centre of the Prussian po litica l and military rise on the Europea n sce ne, but a lso at the head of the proj ect of unification of the who le Germa ny, and this was his trump cn rd.

THE WAR OF THE DUCHIES The W ar of th e Duch ies gave Bismarck the chance be had been wait ing for: T he new Danis h Constitt~ion ol' 1863, which was going to be used by the government or King Christian IX to deprive the Schleswig region of its traditional autonomy rig hts nn ope n vio lation of a pac.:l previously agreed upon w ith Prus-

sia - represented for the German Chancellor a very good opportun ity to mobilize his troops and show to the Prussian public opinion Lhe Government resolution and the efficiency of the new mi Ii Lary instrument. In January 1864 Prussia and Austria issued an ultimatum, \vhich requested the annulment of the 11e\N Constitution within forty-e ight hours, and since it ,vas refused the Army of the two Po\vers, under Prussian fvlarshal Wrangel's command, opened the hostilities against lhe Danes. Th e War of the Duchies, an Austro-Prussian arrned conflict against Denmark in January 1864, was so call ed because at sta ke were the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburh . After a strong atLack by the Austrians, in February th e Danes moved out of the fortified positions of the Danerwerk, in order to reach the Duppel wall in Northern Schleswig, v1.rhile \Vrangel proceeded lo the occupation of the Jutland peninsula. In April the Duppel fortifica tion Cell into Wrangel's hands, and after a Danish fierce resistance which went on for ten weeks, in J\ilay an Armistice was concluded, but after the failure 86

of the London international Conference, there was a renewal of hostilities. After losing the island of Alsen in June, the Danes were forced to surrender, the peace was s igned i n Vienna in October, and the Duchies \,vere transferred under Austro-Prussian control. Il LOok the Austro -Prussian joint Forces only a fe"'v months Lo defeat the small and disorganized Danish Arrny, but the subsequent division of the conquere d t erritor ies was set b y Bismarck in such a w a y as lo disappoint the Austrians and lay Lh e [oundations of a near at end conflict with the current allies. The victory over Denmark \Vas hardly a real testing ground Cor the Prussian Army, in any case it highlighted the efficiency of the General I leadqu arters, ,vhich since 1857 had been entrusted to the most b rilliant strategic intelligence of the 19 th century: Helmut von Moltke.

GENERAL HELMUT VONMOLTKE Respecting the spirit of the reforms \vanted by Wilhelm l and

Franz Adam: "Orleans, 1870".

von Roon - i.e. a strong and aggressive military effic.iancy and certainly not the social securi Ly of the borders o[ the Country von Moltke in peacetime organized the Prussian Army into Corps, Divisions and Regiments (the same as in war Lime) which were stationed in the same Districts where the reserve troops would converge in case of a gen eral mobilization. The Prussian war machine started to work ,vilh bureaucratic precision. Von Moltke was also responsible Cor the transformation of the Prussian General Staff from a restricted corps of eigh teen Officers, with exc lusively Lechnical assignmen ts, to a real Army Command, scparaL i ng it from the Ministry of War and making it an inclepenclenl advisory body , a lbeit st ill formally depending on the Mini stry and, although such provision temporarily diminished its influ ence, al the same time permitted to enormously increase its autonomy. Thus the Prussian G eneral Staff became the co llecti ve brain of the Army and had to

General's uniform, I 900.

formulat e Lactical doctrÂˇincs, prepare \vorking plans, both i11 peace and war time, and provide skilled advisers to field com manders at all levels. Act ually von Mo ltke created a completely new General Staff compared to the pasl (the "Aides -de-Camp" of the Com manders \vere usu ally given messenger tasks or had to deal with administration matters) and contributed to the collective nature of the direction of \Nar operations, which Âˇwere no more entrusted simply to the personal skill of the Cornmander-inChicf. These ne\v and well-trained Officers, besides reliev i ng the commanders of the burden to elaborate delailed p lans , a lso shared \Vith them the actual responsibilities of the fighting units. Moreover, the military victory had to be considered an end in itself, and po Ii ti cal objectives and considerations had to be subordinated to it, at least up to the moment \Vhen the enemy could be considered defeated for good. Unfortunatelv, later on, this growing powe; of the General Staff of the Prussian Army greatly contributed to favour the tendency to subordinate the entire poli tical doctrine to military considerations, a trend which, as \.ve knmv, two generations later was going to have dramatic and fatal consequences. With reference to our politic.al and military analysis, the rnost significant technical progress achieved in the second half of the 19 th Century was doubtlessly the railway, and Prussia was actually the first to appreciate, besides its social advantages, its greatly innovative mil itary importance. The thesis for realizing a railway network was immediately

convincing: il favoured the poJi tic a l uni fie.a tion of Germany and assured its military defense , also enabli ng the Nation to profit from its centra l pos1t1o n, which, up to then, had been

quite risky because of the neighbouring Countries. Von Moltke foresaw at once its strategic chances (he understood he could quickly move troops from one part of the ter-

Jacket of a one-year vo.lunlcc:r NCO, 2 1)(/ R egimen£ Emperor Fra n / Grenadier Guards, 1900.

t1· ibuted considerably to th e g en eral growth of the enti re: Country : in 1846 as many a s 178 ,000 workers were em ploy ed, and in 187 S the y reached a record figure o f 541,000. A well-organized system of river transporl was also developed along the Rhine and the Elbe , a llmving, t hanks t o a close net of canals, to carry out low-cost transport up to lhe great northern ports. T he R u h ,- districl, \vhich a lready in 1870 produced 1 1. 6 mill ion tons o[ coal, in 1900 reached a production of more than 60 mill ion tons and, in or der to meet the needs of th e Krupp s teel p lan ts, the Ruh r district \Vas able to offer 8 million tons or cast iron. Between 1849 and 187 1, th e employrn.ent of the Prussian population reached a lmost 45%. In 1850 there \vere 16 million workers subdivided as follows: 55% in th e agricullural, forest and fishing sectors, 24% in indust,-y a nd cra[Lv,1or k and 21 % in the service sector (transport, t rade, banks, insurances, public works). In 1844, von Mol tke, \;.,ho always saw the high d egree of indus t rial ization o f the Counlry only as a strong st ructure in the service of the Pruss ian Anny, wrote to one of his b rothers: ritory to the other), and al though such idea was inspired by defence criteria at the beginn ing, il was quickly realized by the General Staff \,Vith the aim of providing Prussia with a railway network suiled to avoid Lhe dange r of a war on two fronts, and therefore capable of solving the problem of the precarious position of the Counl1·y. Based on these considerations, 88

von Mollke even obtained the General Staff's approva l o[ the p lans [or Lhe construction of civil railway net\vorks and the acceptance, as an ob vious consequence, of those slrategically important. Immediately and forcefully the development of the railway network became one of the most irnporlanl factors in the German industria l ization and i t con-

"While the French Parliamenl is still busy discussing the problem , we have already bui/1 n [ive-hundrecl-kilumetre n.1il,.vay and are about to compfelc another lwo hundred kilometres". This is how in 1846 the Prussian Army, for the first time in history , moved troops by ra il way, on a large scale, during the cond uct of exercises. In 1859, during the Italian Second vVar of I ncl ipendence

Officer's full dress of the y 路ci Regiment Queen Elizabeth Grenadier Gunrcls, 1900.

(Austria attacked Piedmont , which \Vas helped by the powerful French Army led by Napoleon 111) Prussia refrained from intervening, but for von Moltke this was the r ight occasion to test the use of the railway for war p urposes : in record time, troops ,vere transported and massed along the French and Austrians borders, just as if they had to be ready to attack. The advantages of these experiments, together with the successive organizational improvements, ,vill be perceive d in a substantial and crucial ,vay during the Prussian invasion of Austria in 1866, and of France in 1870. In 1866, during the Auslro Prussia n ,var, it took the von Moltke's Army hal f the lime needed by the Austrians to mobilize and dep loy 254,000 sol diers, even though the population of the Kingdom of Prussia was on ly half that o[ the Hapsburg Empire. In particular, Pruss ians started the mobili1.ation later than the Austrians, because thev cou ld count on five railway line~5 to mass the troops corning from the various regions of the Country, whereas the Austrians had only one line departing from Vienna, which had never been used for vvar purposes As a result, von Moltke managed to deploy the Prussian armies along the Bohemian and Saxon fro ntiers - making them cross the mountain passes - before the Austrian could muster their troops in Moravia and start their advance in Bohemia.

THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR T he Prussian rapid and re sounding victories in these Lwo

vv路ars made a strong impression on the European military circles, so much so that they started to see the key point to the victor)路 in the rapid mus tering and deployment of forces at the beginning of the operations. This radically changed all the notions and the evaluation criteria, which until Lhen had been the constituent factors of strategy: number of forces in the field

and available space for the operations against the enemy路. For many centuries the evalu ation of the streng t h of the Armies was excl usively based on the number of I.he forces em ployed , simply distinguishing them between infantry and cava lry, and this criterion, despite the d eep c hanges which took place in the second half of the 19 th century, ,vo1ild be adopted

Anion van Werner: "Molt.kc and his General Staff in front of Paris".

by the high ranks of the General Staffs of the European Armies until the outbreak of the First World War. The war against Austria (1866) is today imputable directly to Bismarck's \,Vell-established diplomatic skil l (which found its immed iate reali za tion in the [ailed agreement of reconciliation with Austria after the division of the Danish Duchies) but, as a matter of fact, it had its deepest origins in the dynastic antagonism on German hegemony between the House of Hapsburg and that of Hohenzollern. Tn the meantime in Germany two po] itiea] factions had developed: the "Big Germans", which thought necessary to establish the presence of Austria in the Holy Roman Empire, and the "Small Germans" \,vhich vv·antecl to create the new Germany under exclusive Prussian sovereignty, leav i ng out Austria and its many non-Gerrnan appendixes. Also on this occasion, Bismarck managed to create the conclitions needed to make the conflict unavoidable. At the beginning of 1866 he sent a Circular to all the States of the Confecle,-ation suggesting to exclude Auslri a from the Confederation, with the clear intention of sparking off a process of irreme90

cliable political rivalry. Austria, through the Frankfurt Diet, answered according to Bismarck's expectations, and declared Prussia out of the Federal La\v. Before opening hostilities against the Austrian Empire, Bismarck secured a military alliance with the Kingdom of Italy, in order to engage Fran?. Joseph's troops on two fronts, and obtained F rance's neutrality with vague territorial promises to Napoleon III. Without a formal declaration of war, Prussia deployed its troops and started the war operations : the Prussians could deploy three hundred thousand men and the Austrians only two hundred and fifty lhousand, as they had to send a part o[ their forces to defend Veneto. The dispatch se nt by the Austrian Generalissimo von Benedeck to his Emperor gave Lhe right idea of how the military operations were going, even before a direct clash: / heartily pray Your I\llajcsty to make peace al. all cost. CMastrophe far £he Army is unavoidable. Austria, whose troops were numerically reduced and subject to a long period of s ervice, could certainly not compete \.v ith the perfect military organization of Prussia, \vhich cou ld

have at its disposal a large Army made up of conscripts enlisted for short periods. This war 'vvas th e firs t grea t occasion to compare two types of military organizations, which had developed in different \vays after Napoleon's era. In 1867 , after the resounding Prussian victory, t he ne w "Northern Germany Confedera tion" was constituted and obviously the new military organization \Vas shaped after the model of the new Prussian Army: every member of Northern Germany had Lo serve in the military, \.vith no chance of being exempted or r·eplaced, for a duration o f three years in active service , four years with Lhe reserve and five years in the Landwehr. Therefore it is plain that these provisions had their foundation in the thesis thal the Army had to be considered a war training school for the en Li re German nation . In lhe rest of Europe the mi litary ideas r emained anchored to the old principle according to which the size of the Army \Vas inversely proportional to its efficiency and the consideration of the reg ular soldiers was still proudly positive, when com pared to the new forces made of conscripts, who were thought nol lo be suited to perfonn a fighter's role. THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR After the victory over Austria, it was quite clear to the French that the Armies of the new German Confederation could be a serious menace. Napoleon III, counselled by Ivlarshal Randon, his Minister of 'vVar, made p1ans to re-organize the enti re French military structure, but , as ,.ve have seen, the

princ iple of con scriplion soo n met w ith s lrong opposition: the uppe r classes were disappointed by the loss o f the privilege of being completely cxemple d from con scription, and t he working class and lhe rarmers because they lost th e cliance or m ai nt aini ng their freedom , a l leas l by luck. Mo reover, the opposilion to conscription was form ed by legitim is ts, repub licans and Bonapartisls, therefore c rossing a ll the traditiona l polilical li neups. Napoleon III, anyway, aimed at dep loying in baltle a n Army made of one million men a nd decided to reach this number by establishing a regular service of s ix years, plus a nother threeyear term to b e spent w ith the reserves. B esides, he intended to e nlist one h undred thousand new recruits eac h year, obliging also th e lucky o nes, who ha d no t been drav.rn for service, to join the Garde Mobile, whe re th ey did not receive any type of training. l n the Emperor's good inten t ions there was a lso the end of any chance to be exe mpted. T he Commission, wh ic h had b een set up fo r this p urpose, worked out a comp rom ise between the new Prussian military model and the French tra diti onal one: the contingenl destined Lo j oin the Army was divided into two seclions: lhe firsl had to do regular service for five yea rs, and the seco nd would 1Âˇeceive a five-monlh training before passing Lo the reserves till Lhe completion of the nine-year period. The concession of exemp tio ns continued , a nd abo the right lo replacement was granted again. In political terms, Napoleon IT I received more damages than advantages from this mild a llempl at refor ming the Army: In 1868 djsorde rs broke in Toulouse and Bordeaux before the Enlistme nt Commissi on, and the fo llowing year lhe republi cans o btaine d qui te s ignifica nt parlia menta ry

victories (they considered mi li ta ry provisions detrimenra l to finance and agriculture), and also the loyal supp orters of the Empire soon reali,.ed that Loui s Napoleon had neither su cceeded in a ssu 1-i ng effi cie nt Armed Forces nor in satisfying French pu blic o pinion. l t m ust b e s aid here , tliat in addition to the lack of a General Staff or, to put it even be tter, or any Command able lo elaborate s trat e g ic pl an s, th e re was the o bservance of the soldi ers' "soc ial status" a nd th e exigu ity o[ the wages, which were in creased fo r the first lime in 1868, after thi rly-one years.

Pic k clhaubc of' a Guard Tn fanlry Soldier, 1871.

To make things worse, in the Fre nch Officer Corps more importance was g iven to a llegiance rathe r than to intelligence and, fu rt herm ore , promotions were granted on l_v in consideration or the rank reached by !he father of the candida te, or by h is b elonging lo a noble fami ly, a symbol of s teadfast loyalty Lo the Emperor. Reaching the highesl ranks in the Army a lso i rnpliecl the need to have large sums of money at one's disposal, a nd many high91

Ludwig Karl Behringer: "Ently of the troops into liilunich".

ranking Officers asked to be exempted from their assignment, since they could not eco nomi cally support the prestigious social status they had reached . A last necessary note regards the French military authorities' indifference lmvards the possibility of establishing a War College simi l ar to the Prussian Kriegsakadernie, to train the young Officers destined to the General Staff; unlike us Itali ans, who, realizing the importance of these military structures, found ed the Advanced War College in Turin in 1867. Continuing to think that high extraction and wealth were I.he q ua li fy ing elen1ents of a good Officer, the French Armed Forces were therefore go ing to become, just before the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, the less specialized ones in the European ConlinenL.

Also in Great Britain, afler I.he Crimean \i\lar, a Royal Commission highlighted the "market" of military ranks and, at the same time, Trevelyan advocated the need that also the m iddle classes should give their support to the Army. As a consequence, the admission to the prestigious Woolwich Royal Military Academy could only be obtained through a public compet ition and the exams were about general subjects, instead of the usual specifically m ilitary ones. As a consequence, t he much feared Army of Napoleon III \Vas defeated by the organized Prussian troops in exactly one month. After the well-knO\vn vicissitudes connected \vith the nomi na l ion of a Hohenzollern (Leopold, a cous i n of Wilhelm I's) to the Spanish throne, and the events related l.o the famo us Dispatch of Ems, in the Sum mer o f 1870, Fr·ance declared war· t o Pntssia and deployed

four Corps along I.he German borders. Von Moltke rapidly· massed three Corps and was the first to cross the border, compelling the French lo re treat. In a short time the troops o f Napoleon III were defeated a t Sedan and the Emperor handed himself over as a prisoner lo the Prussian General Staff, thus d ecreeing the end of th e S econd Empire of France. An immediate consequence of the F rench Army's catastrophe was the proclamation i n Pari s (Sep Lembcr 1870) of the Third Republic, entrusting Leon Garnbetta \Vith the Government or National Defence, bul the Prussian troops managed to put Paris under siege al. once. The feeble resistance of the volunteers recruited by GarnbetLa in the provinces (with the help given by Garibaldi i n the batt le of Dijon) could not change the destiny or the \Var. In 187 1 the Prussian Arm y marched on Par is - afte r the sig-

nature of the Armistice - and on January 18, i n the Hall of Mirrors, at Versail les , \l\lilhelm I was crowned Emperor of Germany. Bismarck chose that dale because, 170 years before, Friedrich I Hohenzollern had been crowned King of Prussia for the first time, and chose that Hall because Lo uis XIV had laid down the law in Europe from there. The German Empire, the Second Reich, bound its name forever to the memory of the humiliation inflicLed on great France. In this way, Great Mother Prussia, fulfi lled and consecrated with its a rms the poli tical and popular dream of German unity.

THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

By then the Prussian war machine seemed lo be invinc ible, and the impression it made on the European military circles, a mixture of admiration and awe, was so great that, after the ini t ial alteration of the u niforms (the Europ ean Armies stopped drm.ving inspirat ion from the Fre nch uni[orms and almost all of them chose the Pickelhaube), the approach Lo t h e Prussian military structu re became more and more substantial. But from that time onwards the armies became less manoeuvrable and, inevitably, \Vars lasted longer. The wars themselves, from the outbreak of the hostilities u ntil their end, from that moment were go ing be beyond p olitical control and conscription, generically recognized as th e essential feature of the new Armies, ,vere going to develop a tendency to make things come Lo a h ead because of the greater popular participation in the d ecisions aboul whether to intervene in a war or not. As a co nsequence, during the inlernational most tense ti m es , the enLire nation will fall victim

of deep alarm and a n x iety , vvh ich will often jeopardize the diploma t ic effor ts a i111ed at avoiding the ,-var, and that is exactly what happened in the case of the First World 'War. As a matter o f fact , lo find in lhe remole past the cau ses of WW J ,ve must go bac k to 1871 - i.e. to that unbridgeable ditch between Germany and France wh ich, sa n ct ioning w i t h th e T realy of Frnn.kfun the loss of Alsace a nd Lo rraine, decreed the birth of a first -class military power in the heart of our continent, the G erman Em pir e . France never forgot the de feat o f S edan and th e mutilation of its r ich border regi o ns, an d Paris and Berlin beca111c the opposite poles of the entire European pol itical syste1T1, forcing Ge rm any Lo keep continu ously on the alert, in order lo prevent France from finding a n a lly strong enough to seek a w ar of revenge [or the lost sup remacy over Europe. Between 1871 and 19 14 all European Countries an d also Japan, a new ,vorld pow e r, adopte d the conscr ipL ion sys le111: the lasL g reat \Var o[ Lhe n inetee n t h century taught that mass Armies, made up mostly o f "citize n in un iform" could overcome Armies formed b y "regulars " with a long ex peri ence, and this lesson was going to he

Anion Hoffown n: "Bavarian cavalry on pa I rol", 1885.

val id for many years to come, up to the complex developments or lhc m ilitary reorganizalion after the Second World War. But this wide and direct p a rticipation of the masses in the slralegic choices of a Coun try, made the negotiat io n of diplomatic agreements much har d er than in the past, when those decisions were taken only by the men in pmver and by the r egular soldiers a t their service. Th e fight among m en is based on two diffe rent elements: hostile feeling and host ile intenlion I ... ] T he war, being a viole nt act, is necessarily connected w iLh fee ling; if it is 1101 origim11ecl by it, it lvi11 all th e same lead to ii more o r less not according to the degree of civilizMion but on the extent and duration of th e interests of the conflict (Karl von Clause,vitz: "On \l\1ar"). Thus lhe effects of \var be came more serious and evil for the nations involved , and lhe armed conflicts were deslined lo b ecome more and nwre g lobal ,,v a rs , as h a pfiened i n the first half of the 20 11 Century. D

' .Lecturer in IntenwLiona1 HislOry at Urbino University 93

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by Attilio Claudio Bo""=·:g1._* ' ,~ -:;:,' .'.;

There was no space for pity; readling the chronicle of those tragic and terrible events~ we cannot but experience deep feelings of horror for such cruel deeds. Why did the Romans~ who we:re know for their generosity~ put down the uprising of the Jewish. l lople so violently? _ ~-:ttf ~; : t ,~ " 'r...

he si e ge and the consequent destruction of Jerusalem, and of its Temple above all, in history have had a grea te r r e sonance than the purely historical va l ue of the event. Surely the episode had a notable political value: the possibility for the Jews to obtain their independence faded forever and, fu rth ermore , this fact made it clear to the whole East that it 94

woud he impossible for any one to escape the immense power of the Roman Empire . The Roman victory, and the repression of th e J e wish uprising, was nev er in doubt, and its resonance has surpassed the histor.ica l moment and has reached us through the millennia. Since ils d estruction, Jernsalem has turned into an indestructible syrn bo I for Chr istians, Jews and Muslims.

In fact, the destr uct ion of the Holy City represents an extremely impor tant mo.m ent in the history or the J e,vish people as well as a n unre lieve d regret and a ceaseless pain . The Wailing Wall (the only thing left) is still th e most sacred place for the Jc,.vs. T he land of Israe l was given to them by God and is pan or an alliance between Goel and the Chosen People. The desire Lo go back

And .is he was going out ofthe Temple, one ofhis disciples said to him: "Master, look, what wonderful stones and what buildings!" And Jesus answered and said to him, "Dost thou see all these great buildings? There will not be left one stone upon another that will not be thrown down" (Mark XIII 1-4)

JUDAEA

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to the promised land las Led for two mille nnia of Diaspora, after Titus had destroyed the Temple: every year the Jewish people wish each other a happy Easler, b y saying: "Next year in Jen1salem". It is fundamenta l to remember the psa lm that warns th e Jews that the right ha nd of those who forget th is city ,vill he struck dead . Afte r th e destru c tion of J e rusale m, these people s tarted

their never-ending roaming throughou t foreign la nds, d iscriminated more and more, a nd unde1· the latent and impending threat of cruel persecu tions. The strong desire to return was essent ial in ord er Lo prese rve the ir identity tlu·ough centuries of dispersion, and gave the Jewish people its permanent d istinctiveness that obst ructed its ass imilation into those foreign lands and, consequen tly, prevented its destrn ction a nd disappearance. Instead, for Christ ians Jerusalem is the place of the Crucifixion and represents the "Civitas Dei" (City of God); the earthly Jerusalem is the image of the Celesti a l Jerusalem . ll has infini te mystical meanings: the Crusades and Lhe liberat ion of t he Hol_v Sep ulch re have been the mylh, and a bloody one, of many centuries. The city assumes a myst ical and symbolic s ignificance even for Mu sl ims, a.lbe it less , compared lo Jews and Christia ns,

Above. Aerial 1·ic1v o{ the city of Jerusalem. Below. Titus Flavius \lespasianus.

s ince Proph et Moh ammed as cend ed into !leaven from the area of the Temple.

THE UPRISING The spring of 66 A.O. bloomed in J udea while the unrest and c!iscon lentmenl of the Jewish people against Procurator Gessius Flor i us, appointed by Rome and guilty of misgovernm e nt, we re becom ing more and more serious

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and ins isle nt. Viole nt, cruel and dishonest, the man sent to control an irnporlant corner of the Roman Empire stained himself ,vilh nurn.erous kinds of crimes, day after day. According to his orders, nol only Lhe most beautiful temples of Judea, but also lots of c ili es, were sacked because he \,Vas never satiated with ·wealth, luxur)' and power. F o r a period, gangs of men, armed wi lh daggers, had started to wander about the whole Kingdom in order to protest against the numerous outrages. T hey were Jevvs longing for freedom, w ho tried to free their land from so much immoral behavio ur and decided to s tart attacking their fellow citizens who were helping the dish ones t leaders. Hiding among the crowd, the assassins would make the ir· attack on the target swihly and precisely and, protected by Lhe friendly cro\.vd,

From /eh to right: Recons truction of a ran1 to,ver, a n1usculus, a porl.ico and a plute us.

were always able to flee, escaping Roman justice. As Florio affronted the Jewish people once again, demanding 17 talents v,.rhich \Vere part of the Sa cred T reasure of the Temple of Jerusalem, the people rejected all advice Lo keep calm an d openly revolted against him. Th e revolu tion spread throughout the

Jud ean Kingdom l i ke wildfire: th e small Roman garrisons wer·e ovenvhel med and the rebel ci Lies appointed their ovvn r ulers. Jerusalem itself, in September of 66 A.D., fell into the hands of th e insurgents, and its cit i1.e ns, in a state of enthusiasm and defiance toward s Rome , ordered th a r there wou ld no longer be the daily sacrifice for the Emperor. T he small Kingdom of J u dea, with a bi g d ream of freedom , threw· down its gauntlet against po\verful Rome. Florio was not able to control the si tuation anymore . He left the capital and took refuge in a border town, .invoking rnililary help . Cestius Gallus was t h e fir s t who r u shed Lo h elp him w i th numerous troops, but did not o bta in anylhing concre te. Day after clay the situation was becoming more and more serious, and it became necessary to a sk directly for Lhe intervenlion of Rom e . lVleanwhile, the fi rsl disagreements, a lm ost a lways very dangerous and blo ody, broke out among the Jewish insurgents . The wise old men o f

Above. The walls of the Old Cily. Below and right. Ruins of the 1.valls.

the Kingdom tried lo curb lh e vehemence of the young and urged lhern to think over their decisions carefully. Hmveve r, as it often happens, lhe young did not \Vant to accept any advice or restrainl. Consequently, lhe mo u nting te nsion initiated a fratricida l war, in which ern in e nt people, be longing to opposite factions, died. Finally, after rnonths of u nrest, the internal situa tion started lo improve. The Jews were sure that lhe Roman counten.lltack-aLLack wou ld not be delayed any more and began thinking about the defence of their K i ngdom. Josephus, a

Roman legionaries.

priest of just thirty, energetic, brilliant, endowed with genius and remarkable political insight (he will be one of the greatest historians of his Lime), was elected as supreme commander o[ Palestine's Jewish troops. Under his leadership, cities were fort ified, soldiers \vere trained, and civilians were instructed so that they could face any kind of enemy manoeuvre calmly. As for Rome, the leadership of the expedition against Judea was given lo one of the most expert and brilliant leaders Titus Flavi us Vespasianus, vvho left Italy with h is son, T itus, leading a very powerful army. I n just a fevv months, he reached Galilee arriving from the North : soon 98

his magnificent legions defeated those heroic but poor defenders, and the small villages of fishermen, where Christ had passed a few decades before, preaching his teachings of love and fraternity, were powerless witnesses to the first horrible slaughters . In vain Josephus, who had l ocked h i mself up with his troops into the fortress of Jolopata, tried to oppose the advance of the Roman legions. After having resisted the hard siege personally led by Vespasian, the young Jewish commander realized that any resistance would be pointless and cause other mournings and destruction . So, he summoned the soldiers who had survived and invited them to

surrender, but with an impressive heroism they rebelle d against their commander and forced him Lo remain in the citv under siege . Taken refuge in ~ cell ar with (orthy other su rvivors, Josephus played a crafty game: since they preferred death to surrender, he persuaded the m into killing each other in accordance with an order established by fate. \hlhen only Joseph a n d one of his followe r s had su rvived, he convinced his last companion to desist from the insane intention and, after leaving his last refuge, handed h imself over to the Romans . Vespasia n sho,ved the desire lo meet hi s brave opponent. ln the presence of the great commander, an d showing inspiration, Josephu s prophesied that h e wo uld b e come Emperor ,vithin a fe v, months . Getting upset by these words , Vespasian did nol dare send the prisoner lo Rome, bu t held him in his residence as a n al ly rather than a de feated enemy and adopted him. This is the reason wh:y Josephus, \vh o would la t er become Flavi u s Josephus, had Lhe opportunity o l' attending the other stages of the Juclean war, which he would describ e precisely in a famou s ,vork, leaving one of the most interesting and certain witnesses of ancient history. Meanwhi le, the Roman legions carried on with their victorious advance. More than six thousand J ews were deported as slaves to Corinth, other thou sands died as they were bravely trying to protect their homes. However, in lhe spring of 68, a sudden and grave announcement stopped the tri umphant campaign: Nero had died and a violent civil war had broken out in Rome for the succession to lhe throne. Vespasian, whose soldiers wanted him to become a candidate immediately,

Reconstruction of a sliding lx11telingram.

invited everyone LO remain calm and waited Fo r the u nfold ing of events. Three Emperors, one after lhe oLher, were elected and deposed. In the spring or 69, the legionaries of th e East look action and designated lhc ir com mander as Empe ror. Vespasian went l.o Rome immediately a nd gave his son Titus the responsibility of bringing the Judcan war to a conc lusion. The military operations took off again at a faster pace and the territori es that were still [rcc were su bjc c ted Lo the Ro m an power. On the eve of the [ull moon, in lhe spring of 70 A. D., the legions assembled under the fortified \.Valls o r J erusalem and started one of the mosl memorable wars of all Li mes.

A PITILESS SIEGE

Approximately 60,000 people, civilians a nd military, barricaded themselves into the fort ifications or the Jewis h capital. They were so n umerous because the period, unfortunately, coincided w ith Eas le r and dozens o f thou sands of pilgrims had arrived in the city lo pray, as had been doing for centuries, in the magnificent Temple, heart of the Jewish religio n. No less than three circ le; of forti fi cat ions clefen ded the centre of the ciLy and, howe ver critical th e s ituati o n, because of excessive crowding and lac k of a dequate s upplies, the Jews fe lt sure Lhat they could erreclively de fend themselves frnm a ny allack. Rome had lined up an arm y of m ore t han 8 0, 00 0 men, who were among th e most trained a nd skilful soldi ers at that m oment, unde r command o( an intrepid, c lever a nd genial general.

After a first request for surrender, greeted with jeers, the Romans prepared ror the at. Lack. Along Lhe whole belt or walls, Lhc big m ilita1y machines lay in wait; balfistae and scorpion es were used ror atta c king th e.: c ity. ll soon began to ra in, but i( rained stones, rocks and clans. Each mach ine was capable of throwing, at a dis tance of about 180 metres, hea,~, stones up Lo half a quintal and Lhc ir dead ly action was supported e ffective ly by the work of calapults and enormous ballering rams that slarted a s low work o r di s ma n tleme nt of the firÂˇs t wall, beginning from Lhe North side. In the first days of May, Titus personally took parl in the a ttack of the lroops thal were t1Âˇying to

conquer the second wall, but the defenders were able Lo avoid the \Norst, ,vilh a viole nt co untcrottack. After a kw days of work by the hellish military mac hines, the whole northern area of Jerusalem ,vas c onquered. ln th e hope or avoiding a rurther bloodshed, Titus ordered a truce. As Flavius Josephus was trying LO persuade his fellow ciLil'.cns to accept a honourable surrender, the Roman soldie rs, wearing their s hining a rmour, paraded around Lhe wolls of the c ity, ror four s uccess ive days, giving rise to a wonderrul shO\v of rn ig htines s, disciplin e and wealth. /-lard-hearted men, fa_,. down vour arms, have m ercv on vour VCo u ntrv Lh a t r un s tl; e r i,;k o[ falling into Lhe abyss. Look

Reconslniclion of :.in onagcr.

camp, vvhere they killed the soldiers in their sleep, sel tents and \Var machines on fire, wiping o u t in a few minutes the resu lt or a dangerous and in tense da :v 's work. So Tit.us, with iron energv, ordered that any Je,v fo u nd in the Roman camp, would be ew cuted. About 500 victims, day after clay, were cruelly nailed to girders and crosses, a few metres from the ci ty, as warning and example: There 1vas no longer space fo r crucifixions nor crosses For the victims. The situation of the besieged was getting more and rnore terrible and dramat ic ever:,.1 single day, and hunger d rove th em to Above and right. 1-Jand,vorks From Herod's time.

around y ou at the beauty of 1v lwt y ou ,vant lo betray. .. Oh, obstin:Jle creatures, more callous than stones! Joseph went on shou ting, but the military parade and hi s appeal did not obtain any results. Tilus, tireel of waiting, ordered to reopen h os tilities an d new siege mac hines and nevv Lowers ,vere brought near the walls of the city. A great number o f c i t izens tried to escape bu t only a few of them had good luck because the rebels did nol permit it, especia lly a t the beginning of the siege, since they regarded th e flight as a betrayal. Matthias, an important person of the city, bad helped the rebels and was suspected of having the intention of fleeing. For this reason he was immediale ly sentenced to death \,vith his three sons. He implored to b e killed before his sons in view of his past merits, bul he \Vas not granted this: his three sons were killed first and he \vas the last lo Ca ll upon them. It was necessary to give a terrib.le example, to discourage any idea of surrender. At first, lhe Romans allowed lhe fu gitives to pass through th e 100

lines and go away from there, until a new clanger cropped up . During eac h night, under cover of darkness, among hundreds of hungry and d esperate fugitives, fierce rebels esc aped t h e city through secret undergrou nd passages and arrived al the Roman

th e \.vildest and most. horrible actions. Al l of them fought: for the few leftovers, first by using money, then by violence. Friend s and relatives fo ught each other and, a t times, th e husband took t he rood ou t of his \Vife's mouth and so did the \Vi fe and, worst or all .

Above and left.

Titus wd1 and some of its details.

so did parents wit h thei r so ns. T he sl.rnngesl. prevailed over the weakest, and the arm ed re be ls were able to sustain themselves because I hey took the food a\vay from clefenceless men. When one

found som e food, immediately he lockeu himsell' up into the house to cat it. Bu t w hen the d oors were seen to close , at once despe rate a nd armed people broke into the house and took Lhc food

away from the mou th of the unfortunate people. Lois of armed men, then, began to rturing their fell ow citi ze ns, in the hope of finding some hidden food somew here, and so many d ied in an at.rncious agony. The J ews not only ate everything edible, but they had come to co nsider I he sanda l's leather and the hay left by the a nimals a del ic io us food . Fl avius J osephus , impotent w itness of so mu c h ruin, wrnte: Their hunger \Vas so intolerable as lo induce them to che\V anyl hing; th ey pic k ed up s t urf thal even lhe m ost unclea n animals wou ld neither touch nor, even less, e:c1t... There was someone 1,vho picked up b/;Jdes of g rass 10 sell 101

Above and right . Remains of tombs in Jerusalem.

them at four Allie drachmae a bundle... The terraces were full o{ women and ch ildren i n a faint; the streets of old people's corpses. Chilcfren iWd women, like ghosts, dragged themselves h ere am! !.here until they (e lf 10 the ground, exhausted. All 1vere so ,veak that !.hey cou ld no/. bury anyone ... And i t was Joseph us himself who related of one of the most terrible e pisodes which proved that hunger had started to obscure a lso the mind of t hose poor wretches . Some of them, starv in g and going round the streets desperately , smelt roas t rneat from a house. lL was the home of Mary, one of the no bles t and richest \,v on,en of the city , wise and good, and t h ose unfortunate p eople rushed to her , p l ead ing for some food. Mary, whose face showed clear signs of madness, complied \Vith the desire and offered them a meal but, \Vith incomparab l e horror , they realized that the cooked food on their plate was M.ary's little son, a few-months o l d baby who had starve d to 102

death a few hours before! T he horrible episode spread throughout the city . The besieged , who had all become crazy by no\V , started to throw themselves (a b out a hundred each day) from the very high \Valls, preferring a quick death to such a horr i blc agony . T housands of bodies fell from the walls in about five months of siege. When Titus \,v as informed of Mary's terrible story got very upset and swore to his Gods that he \Vould cover the monstrous cri me Âˇw it h the ruins of the entire city. By now t here was no longe r pity for Jerusalern, nor hope. Tts de[enders went on fighting desperately b ehind every \vall and every house, but t h e Romans ad vanced slowly and relentlessly . Even those ro ugh soldiers \,Vere tired and horrified by what they \.vere seeing ,vith their own eyes . In the ent ire city there was a dread ful smell of death, and agonizing cries echoed every\,v here, night and clay . \â€˘\ihat had been a green and luxuriant ferLi le region, rich in crops and olive groves , now was only a bare and barren land , because the Romans had uprooted all trees, for t he needs of their b ig camp.

No visitor 1,vho had seen the ancient Judea and the enchanting suburbs o{ its capil.al and th en found famself facing this deva sLalion, could hold back bis tears at the sight of this horrible transformat ion. Th e war had turned so much beauty into a desert. Nevertheless, Jerusalem still resisted. Titus had the \Nhole u rban centre, sti ll free , surrounded by a deep moat, to which a high earthen \Vall, rein[orced by thirteen outposts, was added: nothing and nobody cou ld enter o r leave the city vvithout b eing seen by the soldiers . Jn add ition, he urged his men to hurry b ecause no\v, even for hi m, the ,.var had b ecome a nightmare of \,v hich h e wanted Lo get rid as soon as possib le. The Antonia fortress , which overlooked the Temple from the north-east wi t h i t s imp osing mass, fell i n July. F rom ther e \,v ould begin t he last attack fo1Âˇ the most important conquest: the Templ e of Jerusalem, the most sacred symbol of t he Jewish people.

THE TEMPLE OF JERUSALEM ll was the centre of t he Jewish n ation a l and religi ous con-

The \A/ailing Wall.

science. The mosl famous King of Israel, David, wanted to build a temp le to his God, but his Kingdom had never had the long peaceful period needed for hnishi ng it off. God chose Solomon, David's son, to carry out his father's project. David had just completed the essential prepa rations: he had bought the land and prepared the building carefully, fixed the amount of gold needed for the sacred ornaments and assembled the material needed for the undertaking. Solomon asked Chiram, King of Tyre and a friend of his father's, to help him. So, Chiram provided him v,.Tith Lebanon cedars v.'l1ich were transported by sea like rafts, along the

JV!ecliterranean coast. They were used for the roof of the Temple. The best bricklayers, carpenters and joiners came from Tyre. King Chiram, an able crahsrnan from Tyre but of JeÂˇwish extraction, made the \vhole bronze \.vork. In order lo extract and work the stones and do the less specialized

work, Solomon recruited men all over the country. The building of the Temple took a good seven years. In the following centuries, its treasures were at li mes sacked and il was razed to the ground in 586 B .C . by Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon. It \Vas rebuilt

A model of Solomon's Temple.

103

Mu.retlu IJa\lOf'Jal o olt~ cui Mutttto l.:avor.1to olt~ cui Atrio non polff.anO P-'SS.ITl' i C<!ntiU nan poln-.ano p.au.ltC' i C cntUi 5.anlu.ario Suto dci S.1nti Atrlo d~I C<'ntili Alt.IN Atri6 dcil C,cntni Fortc-u..i Antonia dt'i !l.lcrifid

Portico ,,.ie

l'ort-'

di NJc.,nore

.. - --1>"• -·-~-~ ...

Portico

di S.:alooioM Swd.a in diAo<~

Port.a OopplA c TripLa ffil1

.a"'1 ·

Graphic reproduction of the Temple of Jerusalem.

thanks to concessions made by the Persian King Cyru s " th e Great" , in 538 B.C. He allowed the errant Jewish people to go hack to the "Land of their Fathers" after the long Babylonian exile. T his was the so-called "second Temple". Jn Jesus' times, the Temple had been entirely resto red and en la rged hy Herod the G reat, who had started the \.vork in 2019 B.C., and had finished it off in a year and half, following the t raditional Solomonic plan. The work on the remaining parts ended only in 64 A.O., a fe\v years before its defini tive d estruct ion . The Gospels make reference to the impressiveness or the work 104

41 Cl'dron

•,o sotlttranco

and to its length. Although Herod's version \vas actually the third, it is traditionally regarded as a part of the second Temple, the one built by the people vvho had returned from the Babylonian exile. It is not easy Lo reconstruct the exact location of the different b uildings, but anyway the general str ucture of the sanctuary i s known. Th e en tire compound meas u red approx.irnale ly 12 1,000 square metres and was surrounded by a \vall running for 256 x 228 x 430 x 443 metres. On the north side, the T e mple was linked with the Antonia fortress, huilt by Herod on the ruins of a prev ious tower; on the southeast, there was the renowned Pinnacle men I.ion eel by the Gospels (Matthew 4, 5; L u k e 4, 9). Th e

main ent rance ( there were entrances on all sides and each or them had a name : North Gate, Golden Gate, etc .), preceded by a room for ritual ablutions (mikvah), was situated on I.b e southern side and consisted of a huge flight of steps with two doors: a double and a l riplc one. The atrium had porticos and cover ed galler ies running along the exterior side of the building ; on the south there was the so-called Royal Portico, on the east Solomon's Ponico (John 10,23; Mallhevv 3,11), overlooking the Cedron slream . Beyond the porticos, ther e was the Atrium of t h e Gen tiles, an open space accessible also to pagans, occupied by rnoneychangers, se llers of animals for sacrifices, visitors (John 2,14; Mar k l l, 15), masters of the law (John

18, 19). All forei g ners vvho arr ived in Jerusalem did not miss the opportunity to visit the Tem ple, about which Lh e Talmud vvri tes : "Anyone who has never seen Herod's Temp le has never seen a maj est ic edifice in his life". In the midd le of the Atrium of the Gentiles, there was a superelevated place, separated from the rest by a stone balustrade that indicated the limit beyond \Vhich the pagans were not allO\ved to go. Nume r o us inscriptions in Greek and Latin warned th e foreigners, like that foun d in 1871 : No foreigner may pass within the lattice w1c/ wall around the Sanctuary. Whoever is caught, th e guilt [or the death which ,vjJJ follow 1,1,jJJ be his own. Afler the balustrade, there was anoth er atr.ium where il was possible Lo enter through nine d oors. The most famous \Vas Lbe Beautiful Ga te, w here many mendicants s tood aski n g for alms. This was followe d by the Atrium of the Women, "vhich was caJJed so because women ,vere not allowed Lo pass through i t. This internal and limited area divided the Jews from the pagans and was a sort of meeting place; there, oblations were collected in horn -s haped containers for the Treasury of the Temple, managed by the Levites ( l\tlark 12, 42-44). Some separate rooms were s ituated on the four corners: a storage of firewood, oil and wine, the Nazarites' bedroom and a room used for the examination of the lepers. Through Nicanor's Door, where mothers offered the sacri fice after t he birth o f their firsl born (Luke 2,22), one could enter the Atrium of the Israelites. T he sanctuary had the same plan of Solomon's Temple: after the parapet that led lo l he Atrium of the Priests, there was the big Al tar of the Holocausts, placed in front of the Temple's e n tranc e and the waler tank. T he altar was made o f rough s tone, \vhich had never been touched by any metal

tool, decorated w ith horn-shaped protrus.ions. Twelve steps led to the Sainl, \vhere there was the Al tar of the Sce nts, which \Vas made of acacia wood and covered \,Vi th gold (Luke 1, 9). Twice a day a special mixture of aromas was o ffered , such as the incense given by Zacharias in Lu ke's Gospel, Lhe tabl e of t h e loaves of the proposition (Ex. 25 , 23 - 30; 37,10- 16; 40, 22) and the gol den candelabrum \Vith seven b rackels (Menorah) decorated with almond b lossoms, on w hich oil lamps burned. After the altar, isolated by a thick curtain, there was the Saint of Sai nts, S ancu1 Sanctorum, a cubic room whose side measured nine metres . It Yvas bare and wi thout windows and contained the Ark of the Covena nt. From there r ose two winged beings, covered wi th gold . Thei r wings joined at the centre, above the Ark, and touched the walls of the sanctuary on the sides. Only the High Priest could enter this mosl sac r e d pla ce , on the Day of Atonement, wearing a simple white-linen habi t (Lev. 16, 12).

A Gallic imperial helmCL used by the Rorna n legionaries.

The S a ncta S anclorurn lost the Ark when Ne buchadne,.zar conqu ered .Jerusalern in 587 A.C. and remained empty. The huge compound , built by Herod the Great just a few decades before , was an impregnable fortress. The Roman baltering-rams and assault machin es could do not hing again st i ts mighty walls, made of enormous s ton e blo cks . The leg ionaries who, w ilh heavy losses, were able to clim b the high walls, were implacably d riven back by lh e dogged d efe nders. Before ordering the tola l destruction of that b u ilding , Titus hesilated because he kne\v its valu e very we ll. I t ,vas one of the most famous rnonuments of the Empire , the most. s ac red and revered . Thu s, h e gathered his commanders and, w ith their approval, invite d once more the Jc,vs to surrend er. But thal group of d esperate m en refused even the last hope or salvation and answered the words of the Roman 105

Projectiles {or ballistae.

Commander with a heavy hurling of stones and red-hot darts.

THE LAST TRAGIC ASSAULT

The Roman council examined the situation carefully, coming to lhe conclusion that tbe only ,veak points of lbe immense fortress \â€˘Vere the external "vooden doors, impregnable with the assault macliines, but surely very easy to be set on fire. Fire was used as a secret weapon. Despile the desperate efforts of lhe besieged to ext in g u is h the flam e s, the fire flared up very violently and deslroyed the enormous doors in a few minutes: finally, the Romans had no longer obstacles on their path. At that point, Titus regarded himself as a winner, but did not want to take advantage of his good luck and ordered his soldiers to get the fire under control immediately . In this way the magnificenl Temple, largely made of precious wood, ,vould 106

nol be destroyed completely. As the legionaries fought hard against the flames that had just damaged the peristyle, the Jews, \,v ith a last desperate and heroic attempt, attacked them with incomparable fury. Th e horrible slaughter lasted for a long time and th e Roman soldiers flung themselves against their enem ies violently and killed hundreds of them, chasing after the survivors as far as inside the sacred enclosures. At a certain point, a legionary, in a frenzy, threw a torch over the fighters' heads, through a big vvindovvÂˇ, very near to the Sa.ncla Sanctorum. Th e prec i uos wood panelling, the valuable cloth and the containers full of oil burst into flames instantly. Titus ordered the soldiers Weapons of the Roman legionaries: the glaclius (short s,vord aboul 50cm long) and the pugium (dagger of about 24cfo). The glaclius 1,vas ,,c/oplecl after the Second Punic ivar in place ol the Greek hoplite sword.

to cease fighting and put out t he fire, but the flames had sprea d through the Temple and now it \,Vas impossible to get the fire under control. His excited words, in the confusion, had no effect: the hatred for the Jews was too deep and the legionaries did not thin k about anything other than giving vent to their beastly instinct s. The Holy House and the whole Temple burned irreparably. According to Flavius Josephus, the destruction of the Temple ,vas caused by the soldiers' exasperation and againsl Titus' will: this is not very credible, because the siege of Jerusalem aimed also at destroying this symbol of Juda ism, considered a meeting place for those who opposed the Roman Empire. Probably, Flavius J osephu s wanted to lay on the rebels the ,.v hole blan1e for the destructio n o[ the Temple, for reasons of political propaganda . Some rebels escaped and took refuge in the back dungeons of Herod's palace. Locked there , they resisted the incessant attacks for ,veeks. Only in September their resistance was broken clown and the last doors were opened. Jerusalem w-as finished.

1-Legio IX HISPANA, York 2-Legio XX VALERIA, Chester 3-Legio II AUDITRIX, Chester 4-Legioll AUGUSTA, Caorleon S•legio XXII PRIMIGENIA, Nime gen 6-Legio X GEMINA, Nimegen 7-Legio VI VICTRIX, Neuss 8-Legio XXI RAPAX, Bonn 9-Legio XIV GEMINA, Mainz 10-Legio I AUDITRIX, Main< 11-Legio VIII AUGUSTA, Strasbourg 12-Legio XI CLAUDIA, Windish 13-Legio XV APOUINARIS, Carnutum 14-Legio XIII GEMINA, Poetovio 15-Legio VII CLAUDIA, Vinimia,um 16-Legio V MACEDONICA, Oes<us 17-Legio I ITALICA, Novae 18-Legio V ALAUDE, Danubio 19-Legio IV FLAVIA, Barnum 20-Legio XVI FLAVIA, Satala 21-Legio XII FULMINATA, Melitene 22-Legio VI FERRATA, Samosata 23-Legio IV SCYTHICA, Cyuus 24-Legio III GALLICA, Damasco 25-Legio X FRETENSIS, Gerusalemme ?O • 26-Legio XXII DEIOTARIANA,AI...nd,ia _, . 27-Legio Ill CYRENAICA, Luxor 28_legio Ill AUGUSTA, Tebesso zt' 29-Legio VII GEMINA, Leon

..I

•

i c...

Numidia

The leaders of the rebels, John and Simon, were captured, taken to Rome for Titus' triumph and then senLenced lo death, according to the cruel Roman tradition. All the survivors of the siege , w it h the exception of those who had been allowed Lo leave , remained in the hands of the Romans, \vho killed the weak and the old, saving the others Lo sell them as slaves.

Othe r prisoners were senl to all the oriental cities as presents, and many \vere killed in the arenas of the am phi th eatres. According to Flavius Josephus, the prisoners \•Vere 97,000 but the death toll, during the who le siege, was approximately 1, 100,000 . Historians consider the second figure an exaggeration, while Lbe first one could be closer Lo the truth. Actually, we wil l never know for sure hO\v many victims there were. Titus kept his word and ordered his men Lo raze to the ground w·hat was still standing. All the buildings \,Vere dismantled and the ground was completely levelled. Only a few towers \Vere spared, LO be used by the soldiers vvho remained in the area. According to Flavius Jose phu s , nobody would have believed that there had been a city in that place, because there was

nothing left: everything \,Vas taken away. Nothing remained that could testify t he ancient splendour of the city, except for a defence wall on the open space of the Temple: the famous Wailing Wall. And so the Christ's prophecy came true: " .. . No Slone upon stone will remain of thee". An Hellenistic city, called Aeki Capitolina, was [ounded in that place, from which the Jews were barred. Only with the r is e of Christianity, did Jerusalem take its name again, together with its great religious significance. History has made this city "Holy" for the three world's greatest monotheistic religion, si nee it is the Holy city for the Jews, it was the scene of Jesus' r edeeming mission and the destination of Mohammed's mystical voyage towards Allah, when he stopped on the Esplanade.

A relief purlray ing some barbarians reduced to slave1y.

''Brigadier General, Chief of Staff; Southern Military Region 107

Italian c1L1,.ens residing in Tunisia, in consideration of the great number of volunteers and the high motivation shown by the enlisted men, who were "the best members of the Italian colony, on whose sentiments one could certainly rely" ( 1) . As a rnatter of fact, the recruitmen t of vol unteers had alr·eacly started on December 9, 1942, on the initiative of the Supreme Command and ,vith the backing of Mussolini, and in a short lime it had involved thousands of men . At the encl, one could count more than 4000 of them . Lt Colonel Vinc enzo Corsin i, a reserve Officer, was appointed as chief of the 01·gani110

zation for the recruitment of the vol unteers. LL Col Corsini had been Sta te Councillor with th e Italian Comrnission for the Armistice \Vith France (CI AF) (2). At the beginning of the operations, the Supreme Com mand expected a total inflow of up to 10,000 men. The volunteers' force could not be further increased, m,ving to the logistic probl ems related to the supply of clothin g, equipment and weapons . The command of the troops v,.ras entrusted to Officers, NCOs and corporals from the "Superga" Infantry Division and to others called from Italy for tha t purpose . On December 21 , tw·enty-[our of the thirty-two Of-

fi cers destined to the command of the Tunis ian units had already left Italy. General Leone Santi, Head or the T unisian Delegation to t he CIAF \Nas tem.pornrily transferred to the "Kasbah" Barracks. On December 16, General Santi had replaced General Arturo Benigni as supervisor of the recruitment and training of the Tunisian units . The volun teers were mostly enrolled in the Army; only a minority j oined the fascist Voluntary Militia for National Security and the Navy (3). The personnel enlisted with t h e Mil it ia were assigned to the 570 th Blackshirt Battalion, the I st Blackshirt "North Africa" Legion, the 50 th

moral aptitudes, to be assigned to the 10 th "Ard iti" Regimen t being trained in Italy. The recruitment and training centre was established in Tunis, at th e "Kasbah" Barracks, on December 9, 1942, and during the same month the J, II and III Tunisian Volunteer Balla I ions were mobiliL.ed. In .J anuary the Regimen t HQ was disbanded and replaced by a T u nisian Volunteer H Q, located near Soussa.

The Army S taff-Organization Office , on April 10, 1943, sanctioned the const itution, ordered by the XXX Corps, of the Tunis recrui tm e n t/training centre and of the t hre e batta l ions . On J\farch 1, 1943, the III Battalion \vas dissolved and the II Baualion changed its d is tinctive numb e r to XI. The co ns t i tu tion , e quipme n l and training o f the volunteer units was e ntrusted to G eneral Staff Lieu tenant

Above. Enlistment. of Tunisian volunteer:,.

Right. Tunisian volunteers o( the "Red Arrows" Group.

A/A Militia Group and the 8 th Maritime Arti llery Militia . The Supreme Corn rnand assigned about 200 men lo the Navy, where they were employed as complements in M ILMART and the "San Marco" Batlalion. The General Staff also authorized the enlistment o f Tunisian recruits with particula r phy sica.l and 11 1

Colonel Massimo Invrea . T h e volun Leers willingly agreed to j oin the Ita lian Armed Forces, on condition lhat t hey c ou ld \,v ear a un i form thal \VO u lcl preserve them [ r om p ossi b le French re prisals . IL is indispensable that the recruited servicemen be jssued a uniform prior to I.heir employment, since 1.h ey have subordi-

nated Lheir engagemenl lo this condition and to the attainmenl of the l egal status of regular members of the Italian Arme d Forces. Th e use of armban ds or other questionable emblems is Lo be excluded both For the r eason expounded above, fully justified by the well-known situation and for the hatred of the French towards our compa triots who,

Above. A Format ion of Tun isian rnlun1ec1'.',. Left. 111c

"Kasbah" Barracks.

1.viLhout a regular uniform, armament and regimentation, ,vould cert<iinly not be considered as leg itimate helligerenls and ,.vould be exposed lo the harsh punishments established (or snipe rs, and also to pit iless reta liations against their families. The volunteers are 1.villing to give everything; but 1heJ' ,.van/ to fight. and die with the honour du e to soldiers (4). 112

Because of the poor d iscipline, during the m o nth o r December the volunteers comm itted some thefts and acts of violence in the porl and centn: of Tunis, forcing General S anti to order the removal of the recruited servicemen from the city. Discipline and milila1y auitude have been very scarce while the vo.lun teers renn 1ined i n Tunis, where they committed vc,y serious misdeeds and some <.:f'im es, escapin g all sa n e/ io ns. This was due to the lack of cadres and lo the inc:.1pability of th e first Tunisian Officers f'ecruiled, 1Vho were themselves al~ fected by the same animosiiies ,.111d influ ences of' th e loca l

colony. The transfer form the c ity, the a ss umption of com mand b.,路 non-Tunisian O{ficers

and the rigour of mililaJT life, fully devoted to trnining, 1,vill certainly do a1Vay 111ilh all the encrustations that, in the nrst period, may lwve caused a n egative ev.1lualion of ihc Tunisian volunteers. Basical(v they luwc a g enerous disposition, enthus iasm and lhc 11路il/ to coopera te for the good owcome of the operat ions (5). The disciplinarv s ituation im proved rapidly, and already in December t.he Headqurirt.ers of the XXX Corps authorized I he transfer from the I Battalion of a n umber of lra inccl m e 11, in o rder

to reinfoi路ce the infantry units of the "Superga" Division . On the ca rlv phases of the rec ruitment and training, Major Leo Cataldo. Commander of Lhe T Tunisian Volunteer BalLalion, gave Lhc l'ollowing account: A good man_,. reported for clutv, and I he meclicnf cxami1wLion was jusl a Formali1y, since nil of them 11'erc enlisted, whate11er thei,- condilion (many oF them , in fact , later turned ou t lo be unfil (. . .). On December 11 General Benigni made a speech 10 1hc ,1ssembh:d volunteers, extolling the purpose of //,cir enlistmenl. On Decembef' 17, /he I Bal/,1/ion, 1vith 11vo companies, ll'DS ,,!rend,路 consLilL!ted and detached 10 Bou Fich.1 by train. The units 113

were em ployed For Jra1nmg, guard duly al the advanced ammunition post and (ue1 clepol, on nigh£ patrols and in fatigue work at the Commissary Section . Tra ining, therefore, proceeded very slowly. Furthermore, this u nit had no vehicles, materials for general use, means of comm u n icaJ ion, squad armam ent (. . .) The "T" Volunteer R egiment was conslilulec/ in a short time, ,.vith three Batta lions, at Bou Ficha, Sousse and Sfax. The R egimen t. HQ was al l-lammam Lif and in Tunis, in the "Kasbah" Barracks, there was a kind of depot. The re 1,vere 1110.reover an NCO-training school, detached at Cainµ Serviere (near l-lammam Li(), and a motorist-mechanics company (6). Because of th e shortage of ·weapons, the ballalion rece ived on ly portabl e individual arms, such as rifles and s u bmachine guns. Besides, they had no mater ials for general services and vehicles. At the end of December, 3000 r ifl es a nd "mod . 91" musket s, 50 00 hand grenades a nd l'i l'ly 8 111111 "Chau chat" s ubmac hine guns (French s po ils or \,var) vvere de live red to the battalion. The 570 th Blackshirl BaLLalio n , consisting or Tunisian volunteers and commanded by Seniore (Major) Albe rto Tetano, received part of its annarnenl on ly on February 28, 1943. Seniore R emo S caparra, e nlrusLed vvi th the recruitmen t of Tunisian volunteers, in February 1943 reported to th e General Command of the Militia that his office had received 2015 appl ications and granted 1188 of them (7). Although the effectives or the vo lunteer Battalion s appeared to b e motivated and delerminecl to fight, the Italian Command assigned rnosL of the uni ls to second-lin e duties, avoiding their generalised empl oyment against the Allies . As for Cadres, training and cohes ion of the u ni ts, Li eutenant Colonel lnvrea reported that Th e Balla/ions are

commanded by regular S enior 114

AN INTERVIEW WITH A VETERAN by Carlo Romano*

Sixty year s and one sea are not enough to separate from his past, and for good, the present of Giuseppe Vindigni, a quiet gr eat-grandfather from Catania. On the other side of the Medi terranean, in 1942, Vindigni, the son of Sicilian emigrants who ha d moved frorn Libya Lo Tunisia, discover ed for the first time the str ength of his love for his Motherland, even though he had never seen Italy. The war had reached also his city, Tunis, suddenly disrupting the reasons of a c ivil coexistence between the Italian community and the local one, closely bound to France. A great number of Italians, even those who, like him, had never been in I taly, wer e suddenly pointed out as enemies by the French, thus they had decided to enlist in the Ar my a n d defend the African fro n t. S t rolling along the seafront, still today, at 82, Giuseppe Vindigni, looking at the sea from the coast of Catania, cannot help recalling those days and his decision to enlist in the I Battalion Tunisian Volunteers, in order to support the ItaloGerrnan soldiers retreating after the de[eat of El Alamein. And the memories still Dow very lucidly.

Tell us about your experience in Tunisia before November-December 1942. I lived in Tunis with my family: father, mot her and fom- brothers. My father had met my mother in Tripoli , Libya, in 1918. Then they had moved to Tunisia, wh ere we all integrated very well, also because the Italia n community was rather numerous and \Nell seulecl. For example, my eldest brother worked as a travelling salesman for a French import-expm·t company, while I studied to become an accountant and, at the same time, served as an apprentice in the office of a notary public.

Howe were the relations between the Italian community and the French authorities? Until the outbreak of the war, r elations were rather good. Tunis was a cosmopolitan city: besides the French and the Tunisians there were numerous communities of different origin, from Ma ltese to Arabs, f-:rom Jews to Spaniards. In all Tunisia there were about 100,000 I talians who had moved there straight after the First World ·w ar, trying to escape [rom the economi.c crisis that had hit ltalv a nd to build a fu ture for themselves. Most of them came from Sicily a\1d Calabria and were highly appreciated for t heir skill in fanning: even today the vineyards and olivegroves of Tunisia are the fruit of their work. But when Haly entered the war, things rapidly changed. Why did you choose to join the Italian Army a fter the occupation of Tunisia by the troops of the Axis? The situation was rapidly corning to a head. In June 1940 the French communicated \vith posters that all the I talians working for French firm s were to be dismissed. My brother lost his job and was authorized by my father to registe1- in an Air Force course through the Halian Consulate. Vvhen , in 1942, the Italian soldiers started to retreat, I saw another poster, this time put up by the Italian consular authorities, inviting the young Italians r esiding in Tunisia lo enlist. I was full of enthusiasm and longing to render a service to Italy. Thus, on December J 2, 1942 I decided to enlisL, reporting to the Kasbah Barracks in Tunis, and joined the I Battalion Tunisian Volunteers. How did you spend the first days of military life? After the enthusiasm th ere was some disappointm ent. \11le ardently wanted to be together w ith the Italian soldiers, we listened Lo the radio to feel \.vell in form ed. We were not all young people, among us there were also fathers and professionals : even the French were amazed by our cohesion. Still the beginning of that experience was not easy: our first equipment was o ld, we were issued r ii1es dating back Lo 1899 and French machine-guns made in 1914.

How was the morale of the Tunisian volunteers? We realized immediately that we were seen as 2nd class soldiers: since we were volunteers, many considered us a bunch of poor devils who, re-

'\i I

I I

d uced to desperalion, were looking for a way to make ends meet. Some called us baslards. However, the arms we received during training were mor e m odern, Breda submachine guns, Ber elta rifles and bells packed with hand grenades. For many of us, who were impatiently a\vaiting to go into aclion, lhis was the. sign t hat our devotion to Italy was beginning to h e underslood . In particula r , I r emem ber the day when I. saw for lhe first lime what were going to be our uniforms: as soon as I noticed the three-coloured ba dges on the grey-green jacket and the plus-fours J felt tha t a t the moment I wore Lhem I, also, could a t last be an Italian soldier. And indeed it was jusl so. How wer e your relations with th e Comm ands and troops of the Regio

Esercito? As I said, a l the beginning things were very difficult. In fact, precisely to overcome the m istr ust of the Army lowards u s, we asked, a nd obtained to have Tunisian Officers. A Lieutenant called Ingrassia , one of us, was selected as Commander of the I Battalion, which was my unil. I remember that he never missed the o pportunity to encourage us and treated us witl1 gr eat respecl and fir mness. J rem ember General Messe of the Regio Esercito: d uring the retreat, he chose ou r Battalion to m ount guard to his Headquar ters, and for us this was another very im por tant token of apprecia tion. Did you have a ny combat exp erience? Where and h ow did your Unit op erate? AL the beginning, also because of my knowledge of Arabic, I was asked to join the commandos tha t were to infiltra te the enemy lines. Bu t 1 wanted, at all costs, to wear the uniform with Lhe tricolo ur bad ges. So, I joined the I Baltalion Tunisian Volunteers, and I still remember perfectly the n ight we depar ted for the front line. As we arrived near Ma teu r, we were attacked for th e first tim e by the French Army, commanded by Gener al Juin. After that, not a single day went by without a bo mbardment by the American ar tillery. At night, it was the Algerians and the Moroccans who attacked us al close qu arters with t heir scimitars. Many of our comrades lost their life, among them a c hildhood friend of mine w ho ha d enlisted with m e. We wer e decidedly less than the enemy troops and moved mostly a t night, to cover the withd rawal of the Italo-German units . One of the missions J rem ember best is one we carried out at the c:nd of March 1943: moving on all. fours among scrubs and fissures we succeeded in blowing u p an enemy fortified -post camouflaged among the rocks. I got a special lea ve of 8 clays and the Com mander's praise. What is your opinion of t he enemy troops? I rem ember it was an unequal contest. In the hand-to-hand fighting, we con fro nled Algeria ns and Moroccans; the Americans and the B1itish, inst ead, were st;iking us with artillery and a ircraft. By then, our airpla nes had been wiped o ul and so were General Rommel's . At the moment of t he final surrender, we wer e 220 ,000 against 1,200,000. What happened to you after the Italo-German surrender in May 1943? Al first I was take n prisoner by the Britis h. They were no t doing very well e ither, and as regards food they needed Lhc help of the Americans. But they treated us rather well and kept us in a camp at Bona . Then in J uly 1943 we ended up under the French and the situation worsened: they wanted us to en list in the Foreign Legion, we were h ungry a nd m any of us fell i!J. I caught diphtheria, but we had no m edical assistance. For treatment, I ate the lemons sold by the Arab s hepherds who were corning up to the ca m p. We had no thing to give them but our clothes. In February 1944 I escaped with a friend of mine, hea ding towar ds Libya. First, we s tole an American jeep and then, w he n the gasoline was finished, we walked 80 ki lo m etr es in the desert . Tn Tr ipoli we \Ver e captured by the Br itish a nd my parents bailed us out. In 1949 I arrived in Italy: in Africa, after t he depar ture of the Americans, there was no m or e work. [ joined lhe civil aviation and t hat, in a sense, was the beginning of my second life: the life that took me here, to Catania, wher e I live wilh my three daughlers and my grandchild ren, on the other side of the sea. "J ournalist

Officers. The lower-ranAing Ofhcc1s arc numerous but their quality is generally poor (. .. ). The Ira in ing o[ personnel leaves much to be desfrecl since the uni ts, immediately after their constitu tion, have heen employee/ in various services, such as coastal defence, labour, elc.). Aclually the 1 Rifle Battalion could start train ing onl_v on A1arch 2. lvlost volunteers are prompted by a very good spiril, and the units have rem arkable moral cohesion (. .. ) To improve their tra in ing, lhe u nits should he exempted from any employment for at least six weeks (8) . In March t he I Rifle Bat talion, wilh its 7 00 effeclives was statio n ed al Ma hclia , 50 km southeast of Sou sse for the defence of th e coast , whil e the XI Coas ta l Batta li o n , ,vith 400 men, was posted b etween Her!!ba and Djebema n e . The 5 7 (/G Black s hirts ,vas garrisoning Camp Servie r e ,vith 500 men. More volunteers were at the Train ing and Recruitment Centre in Tunis and ass ig n e d as rein forcemenl s t o various un its of Mari time Militia, terri torial AJA defence and Blackshir ts . About 400 men went to reinfor ce t he T unisian Volun teers Assault Ba ttalion, which had just arrived fro m Ita ly . T he latter, a Special Forces unit, \Vhich h ad b een organi /.eel in Rome since 1942, ,vas trained by t he Mi lilary In tel] igence S ervi ce of the Supreme Comman d. Th e u nit was called Centre 'T" and was a comp onent or the lVlili Lary CenLres Grou p, which included Arab v olunteers a n d Ind i an former p risonerÂˇs of war, ,vho had chosen to be employe d against the Allies, in p a r ticular t h e British and t he Fre nch, in o r d er to support the cau se of nat io n al independence of Lh e ir Countries. Also the Ita lian volunteers, and t hose of Italian origin , former Far and Mid d le East residen ts, were associate d lo the Group. I n p art icular, the "T " Mili tary Centre , locat ed on the via Appia, consiste d exclu115

Tunisian volunteers on parade t.hrough 1.hc sirecls of Tunis.

companies and a compan_y o f Mil iliamen . Some effectives also attended a parachuting course aL Tarqu inia (9) . Some volunteers \Vere employed against the Allies o lready in December 1942. Th e few members oF the "T" Assault

Balla/ion assigned as guides and informers to the "Superg;.1" Division J-10 perform extremely well. The d ispal.ch of lhe whole Balla/ion 1.vould very usefol, because the u11.il, besides providing more guides and informers, could be ve1y useful also in other employmenu;, such as, for example, in mopping-up operaLions. Belwecn the 10 and 16 January 1943, the Gn)up l lq and lhe 'Tunisia" Battalion (Headquarters, 2 companies and a mixed unit - 440 men in all) arrived in the operations zone by sea and air. Nlajor Cataldo's report on the spirit and morale of the volunteers continues : On January 21

sively of Italians born in Tun is ia, Alger ia, and French or Spanish Morocco, and by individuals who knew lhose reg ion s v.;ell. In August 1942, the strength achieved by Lhe lhree CenLres: A (Arabs), T 116

(Tun is ians) and l (Indians) constituted the "Red Arrows" Group . The same Group in cl uded also the "Tunisia" Assault Battalion, formed by llali ans only (former "T" Centre) , \Vith three assault

Lieutenant Colonel Invrea asked the baualions fur ;_1 number or volunteers, needed for completing the "T'' Assaull. Balla/inn, arrived from Italy with enough cadres but. noL many solcliCJ's. On iln inquiry made in the battalions, many expressed the wish to be transferred because thev hoped lo be imm ediately employed in combat. With the e.\ ccplion of some sporadic cases of rather "tepid" soldiers, almost all had a very strong desire lo fight. They were intelligent, 1.villing to learn, keen and scrupulous in the performance of their du ties. These positive qualities were amply taken into account by the unit. Commanders, in order lo obtain the highest performance in th e shortest possible time. Nevertheless, the units ,vere al ways very s horl of the essen tials, despite the daily requests of anns, radio sets, equipment, eLc. AL the end, some mules, a Few French mach ine gu n s and light veh icles were delivered. But ÂŁhe

Tunjs ian s, besides the good ing but intimidation. The operational act1v1ty in points jusl mentioned, had also a number of shortcomings (. . .) and combat concerned mostly the I ell limes were laken by a spilit of Battalion \Vhich, havini:>: received indole nce and apathy, or hy a from the other ba Ltalions the longing For full freedom. 1-vh ich physically and morally best indicertainly did nol conlrihute to I.he disciplinarv structure of Lhe units. But these deficiencies were easil_y overcome through a persuasive and jusl authority, The relative proximity to their fwn ilies tvas one or Lhe most serious drawbacks. The human desire lo go to Tripoli, especially after the va rious bombings, to Find out whal had happened Lo their [amilies, was ihe reason for granting a great number of leaves, to the detriment of ira in ing. Furthermore, despite the many leaves, many volunteers ,venl off arbitrarilv , since they could nol understand, in spite of repeated explanations, the seriousness o[ the infiingcment commiuec/ hy leaving the unit 1vithout permission. This was the cause of some denunciations hut, since they never had any praclical effect, the soldier:c; fell that whal the Commanders ,.vere telling then1 was noth-

Above.

Di,tribut ion of uniforrns and equipm ent to the Tunisian volunteers.

Below. Volunteers in the courtvi.lrcl of th e "Kasbah" Hnrracks. Âˇ

117

Left and 1ight. Blessing and consignment of the \A'ar Flag to a Unit.

vid u als, was employed on t he fronl line agains t I.he All ies. The XI Battalion, instead, continued lo be employeJ in coaslal defence betvveen Enfidaville and the Mahdia area, while the Blacksh irts of the 570 t h Battalion were mostly used as \NOrkmen (JO) . In anticipation of the deployment on the front Ii ne, the strength of the I Battalion was raised to 4 companies, which receive d Breda "mod.30" submachine guns in place of the French automatic weapons , and ot herÂˇ heavy equipment. On .March 31, the Battalion Hq and lwo companies (3 rd and 4 t h ) wen t to the Menassir Mountains, in the sector held by the 92 nd Infantry Regiment. Beginning from midApril, the companies, assigned as r e inforcements to two different battalions, were attacked almost daily by enemy patrols and arÂˇtillery fire . On April 24 the enemy , after an intens e artillery preparation, attacked the strongpoin l held by t he 4 th company. The counterattack of a s u pport 118

platoon and the fire of 8 1 mm mortars broke the enemy on slaught. Two Tunisian volunteers died in action and four were wounded. But, on the same day, Lbe Headquarters of the "Superga" Division ordered t he retreat or the battalion to rearward positions . The movement \Vas made mostly on foot, under enemy fire, using I.he only avai lable truck for the transport: of materials . The new positions were hit sev eral times by enemy mortars and artillery, particul arly on April 27 and May 4 . Further withdrawals follmved, u p to the morning of May 10, \,vhen the battalion was engaged in a last battle in the Zaghouan a rea, logether \v ith survivors of the 91 st and 92 n d In fantry Regiments. The destiny of the other two compan ies o r Tunisian volunteers was differenl. The 2 nd company, assigned by order of the XXX Corps to a mob i le reserve column commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Guaclalupi, met with overwhelrning French forces in the area of

Ousseltia and, after a fierce figh t, \,v as surrounded and dispersed. The survivors \vho had escaped the grip o( the enemy arrived a t the Battalion Hg only some days later. The losses were approximately 25 dead, an Officer and 50 sold iers captured. The 1st company, instead, on Ap ril 13 took part in a countcrattack for the reconquest of the positions taken by the lroops of "France Libre", where it. was almost complelel:y destroyed. The action was conducted in a daring and brilliant way, so much so that ii. 1-vas pra ised by the Senior Officers present there. The [ollowing clay the company received the order to advance and occupy more heights. During 1he movement the unit was attacked on I.he front and [tanks by overwhelming enemy forces, and 1vas engaged in an unequal struggle. The valour, courage and disre gard o{ clanger s h own by all members oF the unit were above all pra ise. Two Officers were kj]Jed, together with many soldiers, whose number was uncertain, since the combal: area was alternately taken several times by the Unit and the enemy; 2 Officers and 20 soldier~,;; were wounded; 2 OHicers and 70 soldiers were captured ( 11 ). Major Cataldo thus described t he performance of the effectives of the T Batlalion: In combat they showed courage, intelligence and disregard o[ danger. But some of them, after an unsuccessful fight, dispersed easily and weni lo Tunis, coming back voluntarily after two or three days o[ absence (. . .) In conclusion, they 1vere good soldiers i f well underswocf and properly guided. They behaved ve1y well, both in aunck and defence. Also the men individually employ ed in Headquarters and Units, as interpreters and inform-

ers, behaved ve1y 1vell. Also the T unisian volunteers that in February had been incorporated in lhe "T" Assaul t Battalion fought very bravely. The unit arrived on the front line on January 26 an d already on the 2 8 111 look parl in the attack against American positions in the Gebel Halfa, vvherc it los t 65 men b etween dead and wound e d, besides 36 missing. Lieutenant Colone l Invrea made the follm,ving report to the Supreme Command: Suddcn~v in the morning of the 26th I received the order by

H.E. Sogno to assume I he command of the operational sec/of' of Kukat Pass, 1Vhich was in a c1itical sitw.Hion. In the same evening 1 proceeded to occupy Gebel Halla, which was found cleat'. On the 27th , in an offensive action aga in sl overwhelming Nurth Amef'icc.111 forces, the t,vo "T"

companies suffered vei:v serious losses ( I 2). Arter the battle, the Battalion Hq and the 2 nd company w e re wiLhdrawn rrom the front line, and the 1st company ,vas assigned to the 9JS 1 "Su r,erga" ln ranny Regiment On Februarv 16, Major Donato left the command of the Battalion and was replaced by Major Pasquale Ricciardi, who in llalv had alreadv commanded lhe "T" l\1l ilita,-y Centre. In the nighL of March 19, the 2 nd company made a surprise allack in the Ousseltia area . On the 24 1h the Ballalion, united again, carried out some :-;couling actions in the Sidi Bon Zit sector, losing 2 men, Between Apri l I O and 12, the Battal ion fell back to the positions or Enridaville, where it carried out rearguard duties under the 1oth German Armoured Di vis ion. On April 23 the strongpoint

h e ld by lhe 1~1 and 2 110 companies was heavily attacked. Hs losses were 8 dead and 27 wounded. A 25-rnan palrol, who had carried out a night sorlie together with some German elements, was also rni ssi ng. Between April 27 "rncl Ma)' I , the new positions held b:v the "T'' Assault Battalion we1Âˇe put u nder heavy pressure by the enern v, The resistance, conducted with valour and abnegation, caused more serious losses, tolalli ng 20 dead and 53 wounded. In the night of May 3, a coup de main was conducted again st the lines occup ied by lhc enemy who, the follow ing day, responded w ith a massive attack launched bv elements of the foreign Legion, nati ve infantry a nd Ame rican a rmour. The enemy suffe,-ed heavy losses, but the "T" paid the price of I 4 dead , 37 ,.vounded and 35 missing. Almost all I he Officers or 119

Left.

Tunis ian volunt t:c rs e nlisted in th e "B/ac:ks/1irts".

Right. A f-'/::ig Croup or the "Red Arro11·s ,. during n ceremony.

NOTES ( I ) Memorandum for the Chief of the Genc1·.il Staff. C.ill-up, recall ..wd volur11 ,11:v enlis t 111 c 11t of Jwlinn resident s in Tunis ia. Surrem e Co m -

the Battal ion were disabled. On Ma_v 7 the U nit w a s called back from the fire line in o rder to 1·eorganize. On May 11 it received the order to surrender from the Headqua1·1.ers of the "Superga" Division. After the fa l l of Tunisia, in May 1943, two companies of the "T " Cent re had remain ed in Rome. One or them be longed Lo the Mil i t ia . In the s u mmcr of 1943 the "T' company or the "Regio Esc:rcito", together with the "A" Formations Grnup, cons tituted the Motorized Assault Batta lion, which took part in die fight against the Gerrnans a t Monterotondo and Por ta San Paolo. T he adventure of the Tu11 is ian \·olunteers represents an important and glorious page of the histo r y of the It a li an Armv in the Second World \\Tar, and particu lady of the patriotic fee ling of the 120

Italian populations abroad. In a c ritical and a lready co mprom ised s ituation of th e ope ra ti on s in North Afri ca, w i th the troops of the Axis crushed, with n o way out, b y th e An glo-Ame rica n tongs, th e ltal i an res idents i n Tunisia, w ith a comme ndable and spontaneous patriotic imp ulse, offered t hemselves Lo I talv, to rig ht th e last d esperate ba t ti t! against an overpowe1·ing cncmv. ft \\'as a genernus and disinterestccl voluntarism, doomed to ceru:1i n defeal and, for this reason, even m o re luminous and heroic. The lt.]/ian populat.ion in Tunisia actually prnvided an ex-

ceptional percen tage o f volun /t'e1s, 1Fhich \Vas ahove all expectations ( 13).

mand, Africa G eneral Slaff - Operation Office - Foreign Section, dated February 19, 1943. (2) Already o n November l S, 1942, Co rs ini , lh rou gh the .lLa lian Consulate in T unis, had informed the Italian residents in T unis ia - and esrecially Lhe s p ort s o,·ga n iza l.io n s 1hat ror all Lhose wil li n g to go 1.0 Ti-ipoliLania as workmen ii was possible to enlisL in the ltali..1n forces. This form of e nlistm e nt was d eviscd in o rder n o t lo r o u se t h e al. Le ntion and suspicion of the French authorities. On the 25 th of the same month, it was rn ade k n own tliat the vol untary recruitme nt. did 1101 have the purpose of finding wm·kc1·s but rathc1· men to be emplo~·ed in the military ag..1inst 'T rance Libre" und Lhe An g lo -Americans. (3) Arab-T unisian \'ol unt ccrs also joined Ge1·man units. On December 9, General von J\r11 im, Commander of the Axis 1.roors i n T unis ia, a u thori7.ecl th e enlistment of local volunteers a s re-'>e1-ves for undermanned unils. The Germans a lso d isp::itched to Tunisia a regi m e nl of Arab volunteer s w hich h ad been organized in Odessa. The unit had a strength of 3500 men of Morocca n, Alge rian and T u nisian national it.v, com manded by German O fficc1·s a nd NCOs. ( 4) Leiter dated December I , 1942 Enlistm<.'f1l and cmplo_\·ment o{ local dcmcnls, by t h e Ita lian Ge n ernl Con-

s u la te in Tunis. (5) Report on 1/w situation and or-

g,1ni/~1tio11 or the Tunisian 1-oluntc:ers

,·,ueutcmint Colonel, Hislory Office, Anny General S1c.1ff

made b_v CIAF (/\n n_v D elcgalio n for the control o f North Africa -Tun isian sub-delegation)- dated December 29,

1942 and signed by General Santi. (6) Short notes on the cnlis1me11t, attirnde, /:raining i:itld employment of lhc Tunisian volunteers. (7) The Chid of Staff o f the Militia info r med th e Chief of the Goven1m ent a lso about the applic;.llion for enlistment submitted by 42 childre n of fn;nch -nat uralized lwlians w ho, s ince they could op L for the Italian citizenship on their reaching the age o f 2 1, asked to be transferred Lo Italy and enlisted in the Bl..lckshirts. On Fehrnary 19, 1943 the Suprc1T1e Comrn,wd a ut.hori7.ed the urgent air transport of the volunteers to Italy. (8) Report da ted lvlarch 20, 1943 on

the "Organiwtion of the Units constituted so far with Tunisian volunteers (data provided by General S taff Lieutenant Colonel Invrea). (9) A Violti: "Uniforms and insignia o ( the TLal ian Arm y in WWTT ( 19401945)", Army General Staff - 11 istory Office, Ro m e 1988, p .49'i. The u niform was a khaki bus h-jacket with the 42-rnodel service cap . The badge was the gren ade o[ the G renad ie rs (later replaced by a new badge with three crossed arrows crowned by a laurel wreath). The collar badges reproduced th e national colours ,rnd the rn ili taiy stars. ( 1O) On February 1 1, 1943, th e

Supreme Headquarters - Africa Ceneral Sta ff - Opcmtions Office, authorized the gradual disbandment of t.hc ordinary "T" hattalions, \.vhose effecLives were to rei nforce the u ni ts of the "Supe rga" Division. The ''T" Assa u lt Battalio n , in stead , was to b e kept al ive, "owing to the special tasks it is s upposed to carry ou t" . (11) Summ,ff)' frorn the historical j ournal or the I "T'' Volunteer Batralion. ( l 2) Telephone m essage n o. 163/7 received by SIM on January 30, 1943. ( 13) LetterÂˇ no. 60iT dated January 21, 1943 on the "T" Volunteer Battal ion .

J21