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on undertaking the office of Editor-in-Chief of "Rivista M.ilitare" I express my gratitude to the Army Chief of Staff, who with his choice - and even more with his words - showed me his confidence and consideration, entrusting me with this prestigious publication, one of the oldest in our national history. "Rivista Militare" is a magazine deep-rooted and stably present in our Country; in fact, it comes from far off: founded in distant 1856, at the height of the "Risorgimento", it accompanied, and often preceded, the evolutions o f our culture, carrying out a great informative action resulting from the intellectual clarity and skill of hundreds of contributors who, in the past 146 years, have constituted the force of our periodical. Their technical and journalistic capability, together with their value and farsightedness, have greatly contributed to its prestige. Their efforts have remarkably favoured the progress of military studies and social ideas, often providing the right spur and keystone for the solution of significant problems. Today, in this fascinating historical moment, our Service is engaged in a deep and highly commendable renewal; our magazine never ceased to accompany the Army's evolution and aspirations, its turning points and its changes, great and small. The articles of our "Rivista" have always been dealing with the most diverse subjects: art of war, science, technology, military events, culture and customs. The aim of the Army and that of its periodical is, and will continue to be, that of understanding society and, at the same time, to be understood by it, in order to create a common ground for dialogue, welcoming all different expressions. Today's Army is an Institution made up of aware and participant Italian citizens, an Institution capable of realistically looking inside itself, freely and without reservations, as is necessary in the interest of the Country. The challenges of the third millenium oblige the media to have a very widespread presence in society, and each paper is an irreplaceable referen ce of the civil evolution of our Nation, where present and future are increasingly near to each other. Thanks to the abnegation and the often obscure hard ,vork of its members, the Army is the institutional reference for the safeguard of internal and international security and for the defence of peace, democracy and freedom of all peoples. But not only that. The Army is also a great human capital, an immense reservoir of individual, cul-

tural, technical and scientific resources in the service o f our Nation. At the present time a capable info rmation, b esides Lelling facts, mus L also catalyze thoughts, give exhaustive analyses and cause Lhe right sensations, bringing together Institution and Country. It must also be able to prepare th e future, by sensing and anticipating - a nd even stimulating - all possible changes, in a context which goes b eyond the borders of our Peninsula. I pledge, with God's h elp, to continue this activily, well a ware of the gre'a l responsibility entailed by this commilment. Our publication has always been open, both outwards and inwards, almost as a bridge or a link, underlining the Lypical close symbiosis that our "Rivista" will favour with simple and clear words, in order to clarify the new ideas, giving its contribution as a witness to the anticipating function of military culture along the road of man's history. But "Rivista Mililare" does not consist merely of the magazine bearing this wellknown name. We should n ot forget the English-language edition, the Army Review and the score of non-periodical works published every year with its mark. We are present throughout the whole Nation - in newsstands and with a large net of subscribers - and, ou tside our borders, we r each steadfast and keen readers, in many Countries, with different languages and cultures. Those who have the honour of belonging to the Army, as well as the numerous sympathizers not in uniform, are welcome to continue enriching our magazine with their ideas and their precious intellectual and professional vitality. This can make the "Rivista" like a real home [or all of us, I would even say like one's own village, dear to one's heart, wherein one was born or dreams of going to live. This is because, as Cesare Pavese said "everyone must have his own village, if only to leave it. A native village means not to be alone, to know that in the people, in the trees, in the soil something belongs to you and waits for you when you are not there" Like a loyal friend who will never forsake you. To Brigadier General Giovanni Cerbo, transferred from the "Rivista" and called to take on ano th er prestigious assignment, goes my cordial and well-wishing farewell. During the "stirrup-to-stirrup" p eriod, in which he passed on Lo me the indispensable "working tools," he was an attentive and scrupulous guide. Gen. Cerbo is a real master of journalism and an important reference of culture and information. To him go my deepest thanks and my gratitude. Dear Readers, to you I express my warmest greetings, together with the invitation to go on with this fascinating and stimulating editorial adventure, so that we may continu e together in the search for the good fragments which are an integral part of the reality a nd of the great mistery of li[e. Good reading to you all.

CONTENTS

'.'lumber Three 2002 September - October

Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing t he general public on the Army and on military issues.

Christmas is an impo,tant moment of reflection for the military community. ready, as always, to safeguard the needs and sec urity o f all p eoples. "Rivista Militare" wishes everybody a prosperous and peaceful future.

FOUR-MONTHLY Supplem ent to numbers 5 and 6 of Rivista M ilitare Italian Ed ition

Editor in Chief: Giuseppe Maria Giovanni TRICARICO Management and Editorial Office 8, Via d i S. Marco 001 86 Rome Phone 0039-06-473573 73 Advertising Care of the Secretariat of Rivista M ilitare Phone 0039-06-6795027 Printer STILGRAFICA 36, Via lgnazio Pettinengo, 31 00100 Rom e Phone 0039 0643588200 Photoprocessing Studio Lodo li Phone 0039-06 -5898780 Subscripti on a nd forwarding By mail Law 662/96, art. 2, para 20/ c Conditions for 2003: One number. Euro 2,1O One back number. Euro 4,20 Subscription rates: Italy: Euro 11,40 a year Abroad: Euro 15,50 a year Payment must be made on postal account No. 22521009 - SME Centro Pubblicistica dell'Esercito 123/A, Via XX Settembre - Rome Residents abroad may remit payment through bank cheque or international postal order.

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2002 © Copyright by Rivista Militare

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I Editorial

Politics, Economics and Strategy 2 Marketing, Communication, Qualitv of Life. Organizational Cornerstones of a High-Quality Army (Ro1Jerto Spee iale) 10 Who We Reallv Are. The incisive role of

the militarv Church as centre of community and fulcrum of the search for one's own course of human and spiritual life (Giuseppe Mani)

16 The Future is Already Here. Interview

with Senator Domcmco Contestabile, Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee (Giovanni Cerboj

Science, Technology and Training 22 NATO CJMIC Group South. The new Italian-led multinational Unit (Afario Ruggiero and Marco Buscemi)

Legislation 30 Military Penal Laws and International Relations (Vito Nicolc'J Diana)

History 36 Crazy Horse. The Last Strategist of the Indian People (Rocco J>amm zi wzd Michele Tomassetti)

45 Those Magnificent Roman Leiions. A fascinating joun1ev through lune, to discover their_odg"ins and identity (Gerardo Resta111.o) 59 El Alamein. When the Desert Turned into Hell 104 Interview with the Hon. Professor Gabdele De Rosa (Giuseppe 1'vfaria Giovwmi Thcarico)

Sommaire - Inhalt - Resumen Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee the highest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves contributors ample freedom, thoug h it does not necessarily share their opinions. The Author is thus solely responsible for the articles which, published unedited and without editorial t ies, exclusively reflect his personal ideas. Articles must be original in thought and st,ou ld not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (European Military Press Association) periodicals. Articles should be accompanied by suitable photographs, illust rations, explanatory tables, together with a photograph of t he Author, a brief «curriculum vitae» and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves the right to change t he title of articles and choose the typeface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging. In order to make the production of the articles more expeditious, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides the text on paper, also the d iskette with the text files of the article. Any system and type of computer can be used.

MARKETING, COMMUNICATION, QUALITY OF LIFE. ORGANIZATIONAL CORNERSTONES OF A HIGH-QUALITY ARMY Lecture by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army at the Institute for High Defence Studies / (Rome, October 16, 2002) Within the Armed Forces, promotional, public information and public relations activities have always been conducted with unquestionable effectiveness. Our colleagues engaged in these sectors worked with enthusiasm, endeavouring to offset the lack of specific skills in a field so far from our essential training and service experiences. In these sectors, the operational management is made even more difficult by the unavoidable turnover of jobs, typical of our employment but very unpractical in terms of organizational learning, which is the necessary humus for the development and growth of a culture essential for working out a strategy functional to the conception of a policy. I believe that these are precisely the reasons of the limited attention given by our system to a joint communication policy. As a matter of fact, there have been ups and downs - more ups in recent years - but we cannot say that at present there is a real culture in relation to these activities, which are recognized as highly strategic by all. This is confirmed by the examination of the presentations made by the senior representatives of the Armed Forces at the various military training institutions. The internal organization has always been discussed with reference to the operational and logistical-technological components, to training, Service models, commitment in missions and also, partially, to the quality of life. But I believe that the subject that I am going to illustrate has been discussed very rarely. All large and complex organizations, from schools to firms, from financial concerns to institutions and, recently, even ecclesiastical structures, continuously expand the strategic 2

branches of marketing, communications and quality of life. The pursued and achieved objectives in., this latter sphere, in particular, 'are certainly the touchstone for determining the real levels of.internal quality. Acknowledged social status, motivation, self-gratification, degree of participation in a common mission, quality of life - both in the strict sense of the word and in relation to family and free time - are in fact quality indicators within an organization and, if transparently perceived on the outside, become consent-producing factors. The Army had to tackle these very complex problems, with particular attention and urgency - I should say, almost in a state of emergency - in the mid-nineties. The Bosnian emergency (1995) can be considered the a quo point. In that year it became suddenly necessary to project a whole mechanized Brigade - a heavy unit - made up exclusively of volunteers, to the Sarajevo area. From the political and social viev.,point it was considered not appropriate to send conscripts to risky missions abroad, while they were still the framework of the Armed Forces and numbered about 200,000 men. The Army was not quite unprepared: the "Garibaldi" Brigade, manned by professionals, had already been constituted. These volunteers soon earned international praise as a result of their good work in a multinational context. This experience prompted the media to spread a positive image of the Italian soldier, his skill and his particular capability in peacekeeping missions. By the way, I would like to point out that many concmTent causes are indicated for this unimaginable success but, in my opinion, the fundamental factor is being overlooked: i.e. the experience gained by all Cadres from the "Vespri Siciliani" operation. I had the honour of starting this operation in 1992, as Commander of the "Aosta" Brigade. "Vespri Siciliani" drew the attention of public opinion to the particular ability of the Italian servicemen to interact with local populations and to operate in multinational environments. Their particular gifts of empathy, easy dialogue, communicativeness, mediation in solving problems, as well as the capability of creating understanding and cooperation with the other forces engaged in the fight against the Ma/fia ( Police, "Carabinieri", "Guardia di Finanza") emerged for the first time precisely in this context. All Army Cadres took turns at the command of the "Vespri Siciliani" units, acquiring a remarkable experience. · The same Officers and NCOs led the all-volunteer "Garibaldi" Brigade. The operation in Bosnia started well and was successful; nevertheless, we did not rest on our laurels. The Service Staffs were qualified for assessing the scenarios and had already all the necessary elements to understand that a serious problem was arising: that of having rapidly on hand an adequate number of volunteers, both for the "Garibaldi" and for meeting the possible future requirements that were beginning to take shape, albeit in terms of planned assumptions. There were three kinds of reasons for the urgency of this need: • the Italian society, although beginning to think highly of the Armed Forces and expressing its solidarity during the missions in the Balkans, continued to be intransigent about the employment of conscripts in risky operations and, what was more, the demands - also political - for a reduction of conscription were growing; • the missions involved had to be carried out in joint and combined multinational contexts; this implied the employment of professionals with linguistic and data-processing skills, as well as a thorough knowledge of NATO procedures; • the need to have projectable support and logistic units, made up of personnel skilled in 3

the employment and m aintenance of technologically advanced equipment, under conditions of rapid wear (highest intensity). The problem of recruitment, therefore, had to be solved. The first idea was spontaneous an d intuitive: to entrust the "recruHment" to the operational units, promoting, within their conscripts, extensions of 3, 6 or 12 months. But this soluti on turned out to be ineffec tive. The main reason for this failure was the lack of promotional aptitude of the units, owing to a physiological want of organization and preparation in th e specific field. If our units had possessed this capability, the Army, which along the years had been "host" to a lot of Italian young men , could have promoted itself very efficiently, and obtained a very different response. Some historians have defined this problem exactly, underlining tha t the Army, having been a "basin" of conscripts, had the preliminary and fu ndamental organizational prerequisite for an effective promotional activity: direct contact with the public concerned. Obviously there were valuable exceptions resulting m ostly from the personality of some Commanders. I want to mention, for example, the "Granatieri" Brigade which , in 1996, produced an entire mechanized company of conscripts on a six-month re-enlistment. The company was employed in Bosnia as the reserve mechanized minor complex of an "Alpini" Regiment. This success was the result of an ongoing internal communication activity, whose o bjective was the motivation and participation of conscripts rather than a direct response to the new recruitment policy. The problem of recruiting a sufficient number of volunteers did not concern only the Army. Our Service was just the first to tackle it and, I should add, had to do it in an emergency. The changed scenarios clearly suggested to start the rapid constitution of an Army with a strong professional component; at that time the mixed form was selected. The experiences made by the Army, therefore, represented the lessons ]earned that permitted to begin, without delay, a new policy for the recruitment of volunteers at joint level. It was decided, therefore, to untie the more or less conflictual knots, which hindered the solution of the problem, by pursuing the aim of having all Services, the "Carabinieri", the "Guardia di Finanza", the Police and the other Corps, accept the so-called "snare". In June 1998, wi th a single notice, the first joint enlistment for a short term of voluntary service was announced. It was open to young men aged 17 to 22 years, with a junior highschool diploma. Despite the good intentions, the lack of a common marketing organization in charge of the specific promotional activities, the first joint enlistment turned out to be a failure: out of 10,251 spaces advertised only 1,153 were filled (1 1,25%). The failure had the worst effects on the Army which, therefore, started to analyse its causes and to study autonomous strategies. The results were carefully examined by a team of experts in statistics, operational research and company marketing. The team's inferences suggested absolutely innovative actions and initiatives. The key-point was the reorganization of the bureaucratic and selective characteristics of the enlistment context, in order to make them closer to the potential candidates' expectations. This was a crucial challenge. It was necessary to solve the problem of remoulding an organized and strongly bureaucratic system, not devoid of conservative defences. Nevertheless, this was the precondition for the successive operations, with some possibility of success, in the marketing sector proper. The second step was to conceive and start a net aimed at developing promotional activities towards the exterior, entrusting its terminals to expert professionals.

This task was taken away from the operational units and assigned to "agencies" of the territorial Commands, which employed specifically trained teams from the units, available on-call. The third step was to introduce an efficient communication system in this circuit and to build a solid platform of external relations. Luckily, there was an eiement of strength, i.e. the new positive consideration of the new Army by public opinion. This was a very precious resource which had never been used before. In terms of marketing, ,ve could speak of an "expanding market". The campaign was therefore hinged on four directionaI lines of development: • creation of a territorial model for recruitment and external relations; • collaboration with experts from the academic and business communities, in order to acquire the organizational culture necessary for moving on to the professional model; • dismantlement of all negative stereotypes, disastrous t o any promot ional campaign (ill-treatment of recruits by older soldiers ("nonnismo"), b oredom of military life, etc); • synergies, in terms of cooperat ion, with the general directorates concerned, in order to get rid of the red tape regarding the enlistments and facilitate contacts with the applicants. All these initiatives and innovations were used - and optimized - in the extraordinary recruitments for the Army, which had the purpose of taking young men from the outside, albeit without offering any guarantee of a steady job. The results were good. In fact, thanks to these recruitments, that I would consider "bridges" towards the greatly-desired joint . recruitment (which would ensure a regular job), the Army succeeded in recruiting an adequate number of short-term volunteers. Therefore we could sustain the Balkan theatre and, immediately after, in 1997, we made the remarkable effort of operation "Alba", the first Italian-led multinational mission. This new organizational and propulsive marketing capability, although experimental, was used to suppor t t he second joint recruitment endeavour carried out in 1999, in which the Army, despite its being a pars pro toto, obtained no less than 43,835 applications for 10,545 available spaces. On this point, I want to point out that all Services and Institutions have benefited, and still do, from this activity carried out by the Army. In fact, according to the norms governing the promotional activities, the Service that announces the recruitment must inform the public about all possibilities of enlistment . To meet this requirement, we had recourse to the "Recruitment and Promotion Activities" branch (Rap) as well as to the "interactive game". The latter, which represents a kind of symbol of the second joint recruitment, was diffused through the Internet and permitted the candidates to estimate their probabilities of joining the selected Service. By now, the Army's Rap, a keystone of the recruitment, has become a real institution, highly considered by the whole Country. This is, more or less, the history of our organization and also that of a happy process which marked the transition from simple public information to a real communication policy; from promotional activity to a new marketing strategy; from public relations to an effective system of external relations, at both central and periplieral level. These "dimensions" are interconnected by the said relation. In substance, if one strengthens one denominator he should simultaneously strengthen all the others, in order to keep a constant ratio. In short, today we can count on a very efficient organizational model.

THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL As regards the first development line, i.e. the creation of a territorial model, our organization has produced three different configurations: â€˘ the first, called RFC, was devised in order to promote the peripheral activity and aims at building a system of external rela tions well rooted in the territory, in order to permit, when needed (meaning both recr uitment activity and management of p ossible communica tion crises), the active support of the mass media and local opinion leaders (politicians, headmasters, teachers, public representatives, journalists, etc). The personnel engaged in RFC followed training courses, through which they acquired action tools based on scientific methodology. The system works through the conception of standar dized tactical actions divided, according to their typology, into three kinds of events: type A (involvement of an entire city), type B (involvement of a school) and type C (activity involving a single class), depending on th e recipient targel. All activities are carried out in synergy with the other Services. To support and complete the territorial activity, all external activities carried out on the territory h ave been mapped in a special operations room. â€˘ The second, known as "Brigade model", entrusts the person in charge of Public Information of each Major Unit (selected for his professional skill and on a part-time basis) with the development of external relations for image-promotion and divulgence of the work done by the subordina te Regiments (mostly, training activities and missions abroad). In fact, the main task of the Brigade PI staffs consists in mapping and updating the media system of external relations in their respective areas. The purpose is to acquire the information necessary t o effect "active" communications, through the publication in the newspapers of articles written by servicemen (news-making) and th e formulation of ad hoe communication plans on the occasion of important events such as, for example, the departure of units for missions abroad, ceremonies and training activities. It is important to add that these personnel, like those employed in other sectors, are continuously trained and kept up to date under the direct supervision of the Army General Staff. Another achievement is the Master Degree in Communication and Public Information (Law 150/2000). â€˘ The third configuration is realized through "protocols of understanding" with the Veterans' associations. I'd like to mention here a particular successful example: the collaboration with the National "Alpini" Association (ANA). In order to proceed to the recruitment of one-year volunteers for the "Alpini" Regiments, the Army undertook a profitable cooperation with ANA, which is characterized by its particularly close relationship with the local communities and its widespread presence on the territory. Thus, the Army can recruit one-year volunteers who are the real "compensation chamber" of recruitment. The "Alpini", in their turn, ensure their own survival by basing their association on personnel who have ended their military service, mostly conscripts. Each "Alpini" Regiment is assigned an "area of responsibility" coinciding with its ten-itory, and an "area of interest" which includes regions or provinces determined by ANA, used as further "feeding basins". ANA, therefore, was entrusted with local-level communication and promotion activities. The ANA representatives to the "Alpini" Regiments work in synergy with their "colleagues" engaged in the territories considered "associated recruitment basins", availing themselves of the Rap teams of the "Alpini" Regiment concerned. Furthermore, on the territory, ANA undertakes to encourage the enlistment of young volunteers from the South through various initiatives. This form of synergy aims at producing a one-year military "voluntary service" at the end of the conscription duty, in competition with the civilian voluntary service.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE As regard~ the second development-line, I :ihust say that, in synergy with the creation of the territorial models, the collaboration \.vit h external advisers has been encouraged and strengthened through a mutual exchange of services at practically no cost. These collaborations produce analysis and m arketing studies which suggest the subsequent communication and marketing steps to be taken. However, although highly qualified, they do not experience the reality of the organization and its technical-operational aspects. Therefore, they have difficulties in translating their theories into practical solutions. The lesson learned was that it was necessary to constitute a new and very qualified military body; the first problem was to recruit this new expertise. The right opportunity came with the admission of women within the military. We appealed to the strong motivation and good preparation of the women who requested to join the Service. This was supported by a study, carried out by exper t sociologists, of the numerous letters - about 10,000 - received by the Army Staff, and by the results of the experiment conducted in 1992 at the "Lancieri di Montebello" barracks. Thus the Army, by applying the "direct commission" procedure, was able to recruit young Officers with the necessary pro{essionalism and experience. All these initiatives and innovative projects resulted in the constitution of an office for Organizational Resources and Communication (ROC), which works within the Army Staffs General Affairs Division and, being in close conta ct with the Organization and Communication leadership, gives a qualified support to the decision-making process. It is not without pride and satisfaction that I remember some results of the "new course" of the Army's communication policy, aimed at promoting the image of our Service. The inventive promotional campaigns, our presence in the media, the collaboration with public and private academic institutions, our participation in exhibitions of particular interest for the Army, are under everybody's eyes and do not need further explanations. A typical example is the first Prize for the "right to information" awarded to the Army during the exhibition on "Public Communication" in Bologna last September, where our Service competed with almost 300 other institutions. THE ANALYSIS OF NEEDS AND QUALITY OF LIFE As regards the third development line aimed at getting rid of the stereotypes concerning the military organization - first of all the already mentioned "nonnismo" - the Army carried out a complex campaign of contrast and removal, together with an effective marketing activity. First of all the Service established a study Committee, made up of experts, university professors, sociologists, psychologists and psychiatrists, with the objective of analysing and putting an end to the phenomenon. The Committee acted by opening the rniHtary world to the outside with complete transparency; the result of this well-known action was a reduction of the phenomenon below the physiological threshold and the Organization was allowed to concentrate not on the pathology but on its physiology and functioning. With regard to this subject, I should stress that no action of attack and removal of stereotypes and prejudices can be completely successful unless it is flanked by aT.1 effective activity of prevention and management of communication crises, which are real hotbeds of stereotypes. To this end, the Army long ago introduced the figure of "Army spokesman" who, in an emergency, is authorized to intervene, without hierarchical obligations, in the units and bodies involved in a crisis, in order to clarify the situation in real time, by conceiving the right communication strategy and, on authorization by the Minister's Public Information

Service and the Defence Genera] Staff, by conducting in person the necessary communication activity. This technique permits to promptly fill the information void occmTing in moments of crisis and to manage the negative events that could be exaggerated (and sometimes exploited), and often to transform them into positive cases by letting people appreciate the Army's transparent manner of communicating. The spokesman works in connection with the Committee - which has been strengthened - as permanent adviser to the leadership, adopting the name of "Permanent Observatory of the Quality of Life". In this capacity it conducts also research \Nork and prevention campaigns on drugs and road accidents. The external relations activities permitted to tackle the drug problem through a partnership with institutions that have been dealing with this question for years. Besides, the Observatory has allowed the Ministry of Social Policies to benefit from a financial support to a project regarding the drug phenomenon within the military and the relevant possible response strategies. In connection with road accidents, a similar course has been followed, by employing communication strategies, with synergic relations with other bodies (especially non-profit) engaged in the prevention of the same phenomenon, as well as through organizational strategies deriving from the data analysis made by the Observatory. The latter, which works in close contact with ROC, rightly realized the urgent need to shift the attention from "nonnismo" to the quality of life. From the analysis and monitoring of the internal needs of the organization and the continuous exchange of ideas with the outside, the Observatory defined the ideal model of "Open Barracks" as an answer to the requests of improvement in the personnel's quality of life, from the infrastructural and relational viewpoint. The model devised is centred on a military structure offering the opportunity to integrate barrack life with the social life of the surrounding territory. Practically it consists of a training area for exclusively military activities and a network of satel1ite spaces open to integration. ' The objective is to make the military structure become a space open to the exterior, a socialization area frequented by families, whose young have various opportunities of spending their free time with persons of the same age and interact with them. Besides, the servicemen's wives can meet local people and possibly find working opportunities. To achieve this objective, we need to: • realize structures with functional spaces equipped according to the senricemen's and the local people's requirements; in particular, those of the young (focusing on English, computer science and internet), on the basis of surveys made by the Permanent Observatory and various Universities; • consider the future of married volunteers, whose needs are different from those of singles; • strengthen the bonds between Army and society; • direct studies and initiatives, undertaken by public institutions, individuals and industry, towards the achievement of this objective; • affirm, and have society acknowledge, the principle that it must invest in the military presence. The model envisages the involvement of the foUowing actors: • the "Permanent Observatory on the Quality of Life", which makes surveys in order to find out the requirements of the personnel and their families; • Universities and research centres, which make surveys about needs and expectations of the civilian population vis-a-vis the new reality;

• the local political sphere (region, province, city) for t he agreements on the necessary investment~ and financial support for housing and sports facilities; • political representatives at central level (Government and Parliament) tasked with promoting the project; • schools and Universities willing to cooperate in training activities; • private firms willing to sponsor initiatives such as, for example, multi-media spaces and sports centres; • other partners willing to support th e project with agreements and contributions: i.e., transport companies, tourist offices, employment bureaus. I am very pleased for the manner in which this project has becom e concrete and is progressively overcoming the resistance of the sceptics. The case of Macomer is a good example of implementat ion: within the reorganization of the "Engineer" component, the Army Staff is considering to establish a Sapper Regiment in the "Bechi Luserna" Barracks at Macomer, Sardinia. In the near future, new activities will be carried out near Sora and in the Abruzzi. BUREAUCRATIC CONSTRAINTS As regards the fourth line of action, which tries to overcome the obstacles that hinder the implementation of effective marketing campaigns, the Army is endeavouring to facilitate the enlistment procedures by establishing a fruitful cooperation with the General Directorates, in order to streamlin e t he enlistment rul es and to find n ew elements of attraction for the military p rofession. CONCLUSION The objective of this discourse was to describe the organizational and communicative response strategies devised by the Army in order to meet the requests coming from both the external world and the military structure itself. We thought of a new organizational model, based on three configurations (RFC, Brigade and collaboration with the veterans' associations - ANA is a good example), to tackle the problem of the recruitment of military professionals. We promoted a cooperation network with external advisers , as an instrument for spreading the organizational culture needed for the functionality of th e Service in a changing world. The creation of the ROC Office was the internal response to this requirement. The negative stereotypes were removed through the institution of the spokesman, an institutional instn1ment in continuous contrast with them, as well as by focusing on a transparent policy, which led to the acceptance of all requests for a better quality of life and culminated in the elaboration of the "Open Barracks" model. The bureaucratic obstacles were overcome through the cooperation with the General Directorates, which resulted in the simplification of the enlistment procedures. All these activities, besides meeting the needs of recruitment and quality of life, also foster the virtuous circle of consent. As a matter of fact, the media become the resonance box of this public appreciation, and the political leadership cannot but take it into account when dealing with new laws aimed at improving the military status. In their turn, the improvements certainly have positive repercussions on the Service's image and will encourage a gro'v\ring number of young people to join our organization. Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale

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The Church represents a constant reference also in the military reality. The distinctiveness of the grey-green uniform must not prevent us fro1n looking outside and inside ourselves, in order to give an accomplished sense to our existence and be real participants in the professional and family life. The Church pays the greatest attention to the military, because they are guardians of high human and social values. The uniform itself is the exterior symbol of a calling which implies an inclination towards serving others. Christmas, which is approaching, and the coming New Year should give us a further subject of reflection in regard to our relation with God and the world. This is because each one of us can give an important and concrete human contribution to family and society, also by being silent. What is important is, in fact, to believe and to love.

n joining the military, one becomes a part of a particular dioc ese: the Military Ordinariate. What is, in fact, the Military Ordinariate? Many believe it is the organi za tional centre of the Chaplains who operate within the Armed Forces, who obviously attend to the spiritual needs of the mi litary, somehow as the hospital Chaplains assist the ill and the university Chaplains tend to the students' needs. No, it is not like that. The Military Ordinariate is the Catholic Church present in the mi litary world, it is all the baptized persons present in lhe Armed Forces. To be a m ilitary means to belong to a body, a category of people we ll defined and qualified, with its schools, villages, hospitals, cemeteries, its style, its traditions ,md its liturgies. The Church aJways considered the military with particular attention and asked itself who should be the Bishop of t hese

rnen, who call sea and sky their home and are characterized by their mobility on the land. The answer was a radical one: the Bisl1op of the military was the Pope himself, who has jurisdiction over the whole Earth. On his turn, the Pope was helped by the Bishops, who guided the military of each nation in his name. That is why they were called "Vicari Castrensi", that is, Vicars of the Pope for the Armed Forces. After the Second Vatican Council a nevv juridical configuration ,vas given to the military: the Pope constituted as local Churches - assimilating them to the Dioceses - the "Castrensi" Vicariates of each nation. Ecclesiastic districts were thus born wl1ich \Vere not characterized by territory, like all dioceses, but rather by the type of service performed. In short it can be said that the military as such are a particular church, with their Bishop, their priests, their Church not linked to a place but

characterized by their service. This is very fine, because our ecclesial comnrnnities are really communities entirely in the service of our brothers. This is a binding commitment, because for the Christians the military service must he a vocation and not a profession, otherwise their li ving together as Christians could not distinguish them as a Church, but they could be at most an arts and crafts corporation. Our present military Church, \.vhich as such is now sixteen years old, but behind which there arc eighty years of history, has by now its own beauliful traditions, its structures and the consciousness o[ being useful or, even better, necessary, with its service among the men of the Armed Forces. It has iLs own Curia, a pastoral organization, its own school for military Chaplains, has already held its First Synod and holds a dialogue with the sisler churches of the other Countries, besjdes having an ecumenical activity on

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the field, where our soldiers meet. and cooperate in peace operations with colleagues of other worships and different religions, ,vhi le the Chaplains of the various Ca iLhs share Logel.her and in harmony the spaces destined to them. The miliLary Church has made its choices, in ecclesiastical. lerrns it has drafted i ls pastoral plan. In the next tvvo ye a r s it wiJJ be particul a rly au e nti ve to the families of the servicemen. Th e reason is eas ily expl ained . The fami ly is in fact the fundame ntal and indispensab le support of the soldier, it is fully involved in h is mission and, alas, t oday is a subject particularly al r isk. T he pastoral visit. that I am making to the military realities has this particu lar in Le rest and its aim is to evangelize, to live the values of the fam ily and, at the same time. to make them knovvn and defend tpem. Also the Chapla ins engage in their work starting from Lhe family, with t he specifi c

programme of sustaining and wanted lo be born in a grotto , developing it and J musl say that, without a home, wiLhouL a roof, after one year~ we have ascertained and died, naked, on a cross, he the existence of a great interest in reno unced every lhi ng but one thing: his fami ly, a beautiful family. this regard. How many c h ildre n a t..e bor n The fam il y is real ly a man's greatest tre~sure . Jes~s hirnsel. C today poorer than he was! Those proclaimed il with his m.vn life. He that don't eve n see the ligh t

because Lheir mothers suppress them as soon a s they are conceived, those that many parents refuse to acknowledge and those who are lefl before the doors o f a church or dump ed in to a rubbish b in as soon as they are born. Jesus, in denying himself everything but a fam il y, told us

th at the lack of a fami ly is no t poverty, it is destitution, and each one of us has a right to a family. Nevertheless, if there is a righ t there is also a duty towards the family and this is the message that the enlire military Church wants to proclaim in Chris t's nam e . The Church says Lhat every man 1 . •• ; ' :,,

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owes his wife a fine fami ly and every ,vifc ovves a fine fam ily to her husband. Together they owe a splendid family to their children and their children owe a beautiful family to their parents, at any age. Because nobody can do without a family, everybody has a duty to the farn ily. Woi-king in this sense, the military Christians strive to build man and society according to the principles of justice and honesty, ·which are after all the principles of the Gospel. As Christmas approache s, before the great mystery of the Nativity we cannot avoid pausing and lis ten ing ils profound message of peace. From Bethlehem's grotto we are introduced into the fullne ss of Christian li fe and the perfecLion of love, which discloses t o u s God's will to share wit h man His life, His love, the sacrifice of His life for our redemption. From the contemplation of the scene of the Sacred Family gathered in the cold hut, we must learn to live in humility, in

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forgiveness and brotherhood. I wish the young soldiers to be able Lo rediscover~ thanks also to the testimony of their superiors, the allrnction of an ideal o( sanctity, of solidarity and of the va lues of love of one's country, accepting them with enthusiasm, generosity and spirit of sacrifice. To the superiors at all levels, to the educators at large, rny wish is that they may be able to offer the men in their charge positive life experiences, examples, charily, love for one's fellowme n, with the certainly of transforming themselves in sowers of hope and zealous guides in profession and life, sustained by the justness of the duty accomplished and by the support of the ir families. To the readers of Ri v ista Militare I wish therefore a Merry Christmas and a happy and serene New Year 2003, in the grace of God.

D '''Archbishop, lvliliiarv Ordinary for Italy

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by Giovanni Cerho ·/( ..

The Italian priority objective is to build a professional Army capable of contributing to the safeguard of the Country's interests, wherever they are, of understanding the security needs of the Alliance, acting as a protagonist in the Europe of defence. What is the state of the project?

It was planned to end conscription in 2006, but lhe Minister of Defence has made the informal request to speed things up. We shall probably have professional Armed Forces by the end of 2004. The European Union wants to take the necessary steps in order to break away from the logic of "peace support" and become a fully active political subject, with a wider range of possibilities in international crises and in the fight against terrorism. This must bring forth the capability of providing the Union with a Corps-level force, capable of carrying out all the missions envisaged by the Petersberg declaration. It is a metter of creating a complex Major Unit with complete combat capabilities. What could Italy's qualitative and quantitative contribution be? Will it be comparable to that of the main European Countries? It is envisaged that the "European Army" will be made up of 80,000 men. I think that a fair Italian contribution, considering the population ratios, should be around 8%. As regards quality, we have excellent units which are now famous all over the world. A while ago, the British Ambassador lold me that in the Balkans the Italian soldiers are gaining the admiration of the world. Every time I meet with Defence officials from other Nations they 18

speak. very highly of the "Col Moschin" and "Tuscania" pan.1troopers. No doubt, ltaly will participate in the construction of the European Army vvith these and other elite units.

It goes by itself that an Italian foreign policy aimed at realizing a European political union, Âˇwith equal rights and titles, requires a gTeater financial effort. Italy, in percentage terms, assi~'lls to defence much lesser resources than those invested by the British, the Germans and the French. In your opinion, are there the conditions for coping with this situation of undercapitalization? Italy allocates to defence one half of the budget percentage compared to France, and one third of the United Kingdom's . But, in the last Financial Law, tl1e expenditures of all Mi n.istries have been cut, with the only exceplion of Defence and Justice. The Prime M.inister assured me that he intends to assign increasing percentages to Defence, in order to reach the level of France and the United Kingdom. The admission of the Eastern European Countries to NATO is a very topical subject, particularly after the entry of the Russian Federation, which became the 20th member. Do you believe that the enlargement could be a strengthening factor, or could it weaken the international stability? In view of this, what changes could take place in the relationship between the Old Continent and the other shore of the Atlantic? First of all, one should complete the inclusion of the Commonwealth of Indipendent Slates, \,v hich we call simply Russia. Right now, there is a partnership, not a full membership. In this

context our Country has played a very important role. For the first time after WWII, Italy asserted itself, with courageous choices in international policy. Therefore, we musl proceed quickly towards the full participation of the CIS. Right afler that, the States of lhe former Soviet Union must also be admitled. Italy would prefer to start with Bulgaria and Rumania. Recently I have visited the Baltic States - Lithuania, Estonia and Lalvia - which wish to join NATO. I went there precisely to put out [eelers on this issue. To answer the lasl part of your question, I want to stress thal the relations between Europe and the US will have to change. In

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Above. British and French soldiers in 1he au/skirts of Kabul.

the first place, \.VEU - the Western European Union sho uld disappear. Up to now, it has been playing a very modesl role and has become an encumbrance. The force -ratio between the US and Euro p e must change, because during the lasL fifty years most financial burdens have been sustained bv America. Preciselv for this reas-~n, the US has had ; predominant position within the Alliance. If the financial burdens are more equ i Lably shared and

Europe participates in a greater proportion (as seems to be the in t e n Li on of the m aj or European Nations), then also the responsib ili ties will have to be distributed with updated criteria. Only in this way Europe can play a more incisive role in the international context. Do you believe, then, that the prospects of enlargement could be a factor of reinforcement of the international stability?

Most certainly. The terrorist attacks of September 11 against the United States have changed the politicostrategic international scenarios. \Ve are now facing new threats

requiring a multidimensional defensive approach. According to and old saying, granaries must be defended also with arsenals. This seems to be still valid, since granaries represent not only the material well-being reached by man but, above all, the values of progress and civilization labouriously pursued along the road of history. Could you tell us your opinion on the complex problems bearing on the future of the world?

I believe that a global war, at least within the next ten years, cannot be imagined. But I a lso believe thal the conflicts of the future will have a more and more

regional c haracte riza ti on . Thi s p ro blem is of particula r inlerest to Italy. On our borders there are two reg io ns, the Balkans and th e Mi ddle -East , which are rea l holbeds of tensions and clashes . Therefore our Co u ntry, more than olher European Nations, is c alled to unclerlake direct responsibilities in peacekeeping operations in both arÂˇeas. The Mideastern scenario is very complex, to the po int t hat, if a solution is not found, the Israelis and the Palestinians arc not lh e only ones that are goi ng to pay, but we shall pay as well. Therefore

the Italian defence must he g reatly strengthened within the next 12 years , particul arly from Lh e technological viev.rpoinl. Recently we approved th e participation in a very ambitious American programme for the constitution of a low-cost, highpe r f orrnance aircraft, whic h should be adopted by lhe Italian and American Air Forces. As fo r the Navy, we started to bui ld an aircraft-carrier twice as big as the "Garibaldi", the equivalenl o [ the French "De Gaulle". The Navy is planning to introd u ce e igh t frigates, which

Above. !1alian se rvi cem en

th e !S AF

m ission in Afghanis/an 011 patrol ill the stree1s of" Kahul.

Left. A ''Guide" cavalryman in dee Afghan desert.

will be the main core of our fleet. 1\11 oreover, the Army n eeds advanced technologies, jusl like th e other Services, a nd is now ad apting its armaments to European standards. We expect that w ilh i n 1 2 years I ta ly will have a high quality Army, with n e w structures and materia ls , capable of facing the threals of the future and coping with the most dangero us cha ll enges of the present: lhe Ba lka ns a nd tl1c Middle East.

Are we actually confronted, then, by a strategic asymmetry, requiring an overhauling of the Armies, not only the Italian, but the other European Countries' as well?

Indeed. And then there will be a problem: lhe integration of the various Armies will have to take into account the balances among the different Services and also Âˇwithin the Services themselves, according to the tactical and strategic requirements. And this is not going to be an easy task. In the last decade, many international peace-missions have been following one another, and the UN has come up against serious problems that stilJ persist. Its military structure is rather weak: the contributions, assembled at the moment of need, are

inadequate, particularly as regards human resources. What is your opinion about the possibility of relaunching the role of the UN, in order to enable it to express a new policy and an updated strategy of intervention?

I don't believe iL. By now it is clear thal to take specialized units and put them under the UN aegis for peace-enforcing and peace-keeping operations is a method which is going lo become obsolete in a fevv years. I think that the endeavours to provide the UN with its own Army are useless. It will never work, because today we need macroregion-lcvel forces with an appropriate and permanent command structure.

Sen. Domenico Contestabile was born in Teano, near Caserta, on August 11, 1937. He is a lawyer and an expert in economic penal law, and a member of the Committee appointed to draw up the new Code of Criminal Procedure. As a lawyer, he attended the most important trials concerning financial, currency, corporate, insolvency and banking offences. From 1970 to 1980 he has been Chairman of the Culture Committee and Town Conncillor in Milan where, from 1982 to 1990, he also held the office of Managing Director of the ''Piccolo Teatro''. On March 27, 1994, he was elected Senator for "Forza Italia" and called to participate in the Berlusconi Government as Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Justice. In 1996, with the Prodi Government, he held the positions of Deputy Speaker of the Senate and Deputy President ofWEU. Reelected in 2001, Sen. Contestabile was appointed Chairman of the Senate Defence Committee, member of the WEU Defence Committee and of the Human Rights Committee of the European Connell.

;'Brigadier General

by Mario Ruggiero ~Âˇ: and Marco Buscemi ~-: Âˇ1:

The development of "out of area" operations is characterized by very diverse environmental conditions. Hence the need to revise the structure of the basic Branches and combat-support units. It is indispensable, therefore, to provide these units with the capability of extending their tasks beyond the traditional commitments, to include activities related to the political, social, economic and cultural reality of the Countries where they operate. In other words, it is necessary to consider also specific assets concerning forms of communication (PSYOPS), new information systems (RISTA) and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). In particular, the awareness of this situation convinced NATO to acquire a CIMIC capability, in order to better integrate the units with the population, the civil authorities and the International Organizations and to create a favourable environment for the accomplishment of the mission. In view of this, Italy has undertaken to develop the "CIMIC Group South" project and to be the "framework" Nation for the realization of a CIMIC Unit for Southern Europe, in conformity with the intentions of the Alliance. In this regard, it should be noted that this is a foremost objective, not only for overcoming the shortcomings that exist in the specific sector, but also for the ensuing good international image. It is undoubtedly a challenge, because, for the support and coordination of the activity, the capability will depend not only on the basic component of the "CIMIC Group South" but also and mainly - on the availability of specifically qualified personnel drawn from the Selected Reserve, who will have to operate in close contact with the civilian world. The training of these specialists and their availability for employment are absolutely innovative and decisive aspects, upon which a large part of the prospects of CIMIC are based. Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army

THE REQUIREMENT AND ITS ORIGINS The need of close relations between the civilian and the military has always been felt by the armies throughout history, ma.king therefore necessary an "interface" for connecting these two very different realities. This task \Vas usually entrusted to the Commanders or to the organizations in charge with the recruitment and logistic support. These relations were extremely important, not only forÂˇ controlling the occupied areas but also for the defence of the national territory. ln a besieged city the war involved everybody. Those ,.vho could do it, en listed, and the others, although remaining civilians, gave all possible help lo the soldiers who were ready to sacrifice their life to save the town. But while this was normal in the small realities, as the organization grew greater and more complex it became necessary to define tasks and procedures in a more and more detailed manne1: The armies Âˇwere becoming permanent structures which operated also in peacetime and were employed by the authorities not only to enforce the law but also to help the population hit by natural disasters, or to contribute to the Country's economic development by making the so ldiers work in fields and factories and also, more recently, to replace \vorkers on strike in vital sectors. On the other hand, in emergencies the civilian world had to be able to restore the damaged services or the nerve centres of the Country, as well as cooperate with the logistic s upport provided by the Armed Forces. Also NATO, since its foundation, has considered as a priority the need to work in cooperation with the civilian orgc:mizations. In the bipolar age, most European NATO Nations, having to employ their armies mainly on their territory or on that of other allied Nations, had come to

E as/ Tim.or. Paratroopers patrolling rugged area.

criLerion or rec iproc ity is very important: according to it, the Armed Forces give their support in case of natural calamities , casual accidents or man-caused disasters, while the Civil Defence implements measur路es for fac ing emergencies brought about by nationa l and/or interna t ional crises and conflicts. Wit h in NATO, Civi l-Mi litary Cooperation (CIMIC) has taken on a specific connotation through the concepl of "Host Nation Support" (HNS) which, on the basis of NATO SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), fixed the nature and level of the contri but ion to be given to the a llied troops operating, or clue lo operate, on the Host Nation's territory. In short, CTIVITC could be ass imilated to COCIM, with reference to foreign troops rather than to national forces. THE MOST RECENT CONTEXT

interministerial agreements permitting to s u pport, on their territory, both their own Lroops an d t h ose of ot her NATO Countries. The situation of the arn1ies from overseas - and especially the US Army's - \vas different s ince, having to ensure a permanent presence in E urope, by avai ling themselves o f local civil realities, had a lready ar路rangcd specia listic units capable o f acting as "liaison" between the "host" Country and their "g u est" army. This ocganizat ion der ived from the one adopted during WWII in the 24

occupied Le rTitocies and remained very similar in its essentia l elements. Also Italy had realized its own procedures defin ing , with t he publication SMD DC-2, CivilMi li ta,路y Cooperation (COClM) as "a complex of decisions, rn.easures and activities aimed at establishing, in view of a corn mon purpose, the forces necessary - in pe acetime, in erne rge ncies , in cr-ises or war路 for the integration and mutual compensat ion or the operational capabilities of the national str~1ct ures" . In view of this, the

A CIMIC doctrine of this kind is no more suiLed Lo Lbe ne,v strategic scenario, where NATO envisages the employment of units a lso outside its territory for CRO -lype rniss ions (Cr is is Response Operations). The dirferenL requ irement was a lready noticed in embryo in oth er non- NATO m iss ions i n support of peace . In Lebanon, Iraqi Kurdistan, Alban ia, SomaJia and Mozambique, a l beit in different forms, the necessity to cooperate \Vith the local civil structures was a lways felt, and the measures applied were practically simi lar lo those envisaged by the CIMIC doctrine . The type of cooperation was obviously very different: in Lebanon, Albania and l\llon.u n bique, even among the well-known difficulties, there was st ill a c ivili an government to

which one cou ld refer in order to decide the most appropr iate forms of cooperation. In Iraqi Kurdistan Â°lhe situat ion was very different and the operation was carr ied out in a territory occupied by force , without taking into account Saddam Hussein's regime, which was "de facto" absent from the area. On the other h and , in Somalia there were only pmver groups legitimated exclusively by force. But, even in this case, some relations vvith the local notab les were necessai-y and were indeed very effective for the blood less retrieval af the well-known "Checkpoint Pasta". It mu s t be noted that in all these cases there were not specific groups incl ud ing also civilian specialists, but the connection between rni litary and civilians was mainly entrusted to Officers skilled in inte ll igence

matters and, in some cases, lo the dip lomat ic represe ntatives cooperating with t.be lfn iLs. Nevertheless, it was especially as a consequence o r TFO R in Bosnia-Herzegovina - the first Peace Support Operat ion conducted by NATO - that the problem becarne characterized by much more marked and complex ex igencies . lt was therefore necessary to analyze the su itability of the existing CIMIC doctrine to the new situation and tackle the whole issue in a system a tic way. TL was immediately clear that the availability of adequate Cl M re resources was necessary and important and, lo this end, it was decided to adopt - with the a pp ro priate c hanges - the existing doctrine referred to a traditional con0icL Each Division was to have a company of CIMIC

experts. Actually, for the reasons a lready mentioned and for its mullicl ecen n ia l expe t..ience, only the US had the adequate r eso urces and structures. The CIMIC companies in support of the Divisions of other Countries, on the contrary, were still wanting in human resources, as regards quantity and special ization and , therefore, their activity was limited to sorne particular tasks proportionate to their actua.1 capability. THE NEW CIMIC POLICY

At a later time .it became necessary to entrust CIMIC \.vith completely new tasks. The mai n

Regular Afghan soldiers being trained by Italian ISAF personnel.

An !Lalian unit on surveillance dutv near a Kosovo township. .,

mission of a peace force, "to achieve stability in the area", but also security and freedom of movement of the personnel, can be achieved only \Nith the contribution of an adequate cooperation between the local civil society and the peace force, The soldiers often find themselves operating in territories where antiNATO propaganda may have been disseminated or where a man in uniform is seen as a bearer of death, massacres and destruction, It is therefore necessary to change the possible hostile attitude of the population, for instance through the integration of CIMIC's activities with an appropriate propaganda carried out by PSYOPS groups, in order to present soldiers as performers of "positive" activities, e ,g , reconstructors o[ co.m munication

lines or instr-uctors in the defence against mines and other dangerous explosives left behind by the war, Thes new functions have raised CIMIC from the status of simple comp !em en ta ry - i n tegrati ve activity to the rank of combat support, Besides, it must be added that in the new areas of crÂˇisis there are IT'tany other civilian protagonists, not only local but also - and mainly international, such as U,N, representatives, international police, foreign private firms for reconstruction, humanitarian organizations, Hence the need to give CIMIC a new dimension, Therefore, not only cooperation between the Army and the local Authorities, but also bet,.veen the Army and the international Organizations, These arc the lessons that, in 1997 , convinced NATO Commanders to give their armies a new CIMIC organization,

considering the growing need or interfacing with the civilian population, the authorities and Lhe international organizations, in order to create a favourable "environment" for performing the NATO force's mission, This entailed the revision of the CIMIC policy through a new doctrine (conceptual component), a new training concept (moral component) and the constitution of instruments suitable for accomplishing the tasks connected with this function (physical component), ,Nhich have become a fundamental tool in the hands of the Commanders, As regards the conceptua l component, NATO drafted several updated documents at various levels, among which MC 411, AJP-9 and Chapter 20 of AJP-1. Foe the moral component, meant as the acquisition of a full awareness of Lhe new function, annual conferences are held by the strategic and regional

Commands as well as by th e ARRC. Furthermore, specific courses are held al Lhe NATO Schoo l in Oberammergau and at tli.e NATO Defence College in Rome, while all ACE exercises include CIMIC activities. As for the physical component, CIMIC personne l wi ll be assigned to NATO and naliorial Âˇ Commands, and multinational assets are going to be consliluted at Regional Command (RC) level. SACEUR wi ll have two CIMTC groups, one for the Northern Europe RC, guided by Holland and Germany and one, Italian-led, for the Southern Region RC at Bagnoli, Naples. SACLANT will have a British-led CIMIC Group.

training and amalgamation of the regular personnel as well as of the recruitment, training and incorporation of specialists, to be found in non-military bodies. The in frastruclure of the installation is being improved in order to meet the requirements of a highly specialized international . unit, with particular reference lo the sectors of information systems, Command and Contrnl, didactics and quartering. The first operational assets are ex pected Lo be proj ecLable as from January 2003 .

THE SPECIALISTS

It should be pointed out that the most distinctive aspect of the CJMIC Group structure is represented by a completely new component of the Service's organization: the specia lists coming from the "selected " reserve o f the Volunteer Completion-Forces. They are a fundamental and very important e lement for achieving the CI M IC capab iIi ties envisaged by the specific prnject. This reserve can be joined not

THE CIMIC GROUP SOUTH

In particular, the NATO CIMIC Group South will have to be constitu Led by em ploying all CIMIC resources made available by th e Southern Na tions of NATO. The project was joined by Italy, Greece, Ponugal, Turkey and Hungary. Italy has assumed an act ive and propositional role in the specific sector and, follow ing the NATO policy, has developed t he new capabilities acting on two fronts: nationallv, for the constitution of the new .. units and the training and selection of the specialist personnel and, at international level, for the drawing up of common procedures. Furthermore Italy, as leading Nation, will have to provide the infrastru cture , most staff personnel, th e Headquarters Command and a CJ iVlTC company. In re lation to the said organization, on January 1, 2002, at Motta di Livenza, Veneto, a unit was estab lished destined to t ake the function of CIMIC Gr oup South as soon as its inclusion in NATO is completed. At present the Group is only national and takes care of the

An international \i\Torking Group - together with the representatives of all NAT O southern Nations - is n o\.v drafting the common procedures concerning the operational, training, organizat.ional and Command-and-Control aspects. The job will be completed by the end of 2003 and the uni t will start receiving the international assets. Thus the Group \.Vill be fully operational in all its joint and international components, and completely projectahlc by the end of 2003.

Engineers teaching explosive-device precautions to Kosovar citizens.

only by discharged Officers, NCOs and enlisted men buL also, or rather main ly, by civilians highly skilled in the particular fields and capable of doing a fully satisfactory j ob in view of the envisaged goals. The spec ial ists' task will be to assess the local situation in each particular sector by conducting appropriate analyses, in order to 27

find the relevant possible solutions and the best employment of the available resources . The same personnel will have to oversee the development of the proposed solutions, w ith the cooperation and in support of the local experts. The recruitment of these personnel will take place through the Comp letion Forces System and - as we have seen - is the main innovative element of the ClMIC structure, since the traditional cooperation units are formed by regular soldiers. The strong point of these reservists will be their specific experience that will lead them to operate in close analogy wit h their customary civilian activity. We sho ul d not omit the difficulties which, at least at the beginning, the recruitment of these qualified elements could

"Alpini" on training.

entail. In fact, it vvi ll be necessary to find a number of reservists far larger than Lbe positions to be filled, a number that will be beller defined through successive changes based on exp erience . This is du e to the uncertain availability of the necessary specialists who - let's not forget it - must be volunteers, as we ll as to the need to rotate the personnel in operat io ns .Th e creation of a data bank covering the definite capab il ities of the individuals will permit a good selection or the reservists Âˇwhose training, professional experience and sk ill are best suited to the specific context of the particular operational theatre. The specialists will have to tackle many prob lems concerning public affairs, civilian infrastruct u re, economy and commerce, humanitarian aid and cultural affai ,Âˇs. For each of these activities, a particular section

with its own speciali sts w ill be established. Tn pa,Âˇticular, as regards publ ic affairs , it will be necessary to consider the government's activity as well as the le gal aspects, health, schools, security and environment. Hence Lb.e need to recruit expert managers from Stale or StaLe -contrnl led structures, together with doctors, paran,ed ics, eco logists an d biologists. The civ i lian in frastructure will have to deal with: communications, (with personnel taken from all media and experts in data processing and communication sciences) ; transportations (with elements drawn from railways, highways, a irl i nes and shipping lines); energy and water resources (with personne l from Public Works, construction firms, eleclricily and oi l companies and engineers' offices). For the economic development, in the sector of economy and commerce it will he necessary to have financial an<l b anking experts, e tc.; for food and agriculture, personnel from food industries and farms; for industry and commerce, besides lhe sLa(f of the relevant ministries, managers of industrial and commercial concerns. Humanitarian aid will take care of refugees and the relevant essential supplies, of medical care and respect of human rights (with specific experts, sociologists, etc.) . Finally, also the cultural aspect will have to be considered , in order to promote the respect for historical monuments and local religions and idioms through the recruitment of students and experts in these fields. Of course, it will also be necessary to have a large number of interpreters. As we have seen, all these personnel are not permanently present in the ClMIC Group; therefore, after an ap propriate selection th ey will have to attend a training cycle

An A-129 "1'v1a.ngusfa.'' helicopler during the FMP opera1io11 in Alhania.

including a bas ic n-1ilitary instruction (if necessary) and the general CIMIC preparation fo1their introduction in the data bank. However, on the occurrence of an emergency, a successive specific training will be required. Obviously, until the importance and effectiveness of the function s of the CIMIC Group are not generally .known, pa1·ticularly in the civil society, the necessary experts will have to be found among government employees whose recrnitrnent does not hinder their normal ci,,i lian tasks. On the other hand, the remarkable interests connected with the economic, industrial and commercial development of th e crisis areas could also make private individuals to participate

actively_ No doubt, then, that a sui t·a ble inform a Live and promotional activity could be very determinant for the achievern enl of the desired results. CONCLUSIONS In the past, the ClMIC activity concerne d only the support that the Host Country had to give to the allied troops on its own tercitory within the framework of traditional operations. Today, CIMIC has assumed a greater complexity and a decis ive role within CROs, where it is extremely important to systemat ically coor-dinate the relations between operating troops, civil society - including both population and i.nsli.Lutions - and international organizations. To achieve this, it is .necessary Lo consider, besides the appropriate

conceptual and moral activities, the cr·eation of specific units, i.e. the international CIMIC Groups. One or them falls mainly within Italy's responsibility. The peculiarity of these units is their mixed structure, wh ich combines a permanent support \.Vith a specialistic comp lex taken from the Completion Forces. Finding the special ists, training them and having them ready for employment are completely new and decisive aspects. They are the foundations or an increasingly effective activity of CIMIC, and will have an extremely important influence on the conduct o[ the operations. ·-'Lieutenant Colonel, Plans Office, Army General Stafi· 1,-:.·captain, Plans Ofi'ice, Army General Sta((

â€˘ILITAIIY

PEIIALlAW

ENT&IIIIATIJO IIElA1TIOIIS The legal aspect is one of the main pillars of the Military Institution. It is necessary to know it well in order to operate profitably inside and outside the national territory. The Army is now systematically engaged in "out of area" operations; therefore the complex legal rules are rapidly being adapted to the new circumstances. Our "Laws of War" are now being adjusted taking into account the internal and the international jurisprudence. The purpose is very noble: to prevent, even in war, the indiscriminate use of force. he subject of this article i1~volve_s simult~neously a d1mens10n, a subJect matter and a scenario: international space, criminal law and the lragic scenario of war. Three profiles and a leading aclor. A shy, often mocked but obstinate protagonisl, a yardstick and an unsurpassable threshold: the international penal law, in the guise of " Law of \i\lar" or, as it is called today, "Law of Armed Conflicts". This very special juridical branch has been given many definitions: all of them very reductive and excessively disconsolate. Some have called it "lame law", since it fixes the rule but not the

....

by Vito Nicolo Diana -/( ,

sanction; olhers called il an "infant law", moreover destined never to grnw up; lhe majority irrevocably disqualified and condemned il as the "lmv of the winner". For our Law I'd like to propose a different name which, without denying its obvious limitations, could summarily explain its irrenounceable reasons. The "Law of Armed Conflicts" is a "frontier" law, in the widest meaning of lhis word. Frontie1~ because it reaches the limits of its possibilities and .is therefore highly exceptiona l.

Furthennore, it applies to extreme situations such as war and operates aslride lwo "territories": the internal one and the inlernaliona.l one. In this regard, I'd like to start from the last cons ideration. The "Laws of War" put the internal legal system of each State in relation to the international rules: hence, it is necessary to examine the main normative rules existing within the two precincts, ascertain their mutual compatibility and, in case of divergence, decide \,vhich side should prevail.

THE INTERNATIONAL NORMS In order to limit ourselves to the very essential, ,.ve can mention: • the four "Geneva Conventions" (Aug . 12, 1949) aimed at protecting the victims of war; • the "Convention of The Hague" (May 14, 1954 ), for the protection of cultural assets in case of armed conflict; • the "Convention" of December 1976 which, condemning the indiscriminate use of defoliants in the Vietnam war, forbids the 31

A sapper on a. mine-clearing operation in Afghanistan.

present time - the Statute of the newborn International Crimi na l Court, adopled in Rome on July 17, 1998.

INTERNAL NORMS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

• Articles 10, 11, 78, 87, 103 or the Constitution (Jan.I, 1948); • Law on War and Neutrali ty (July 8, 1938); · • Military Criminal War Code ( Feb. 20, 1941 ); • Law Jan.31, 2002, no. 6; • Law Feb. 27, 2002, no. 15. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR PHENOMENON

- ·

,..,.. application of war techniques liable to modify the natural environment; • the two additional protocols of June 1977; the second one is particularly important since it explicitly extends the applicability of the Laws of War to non -international conflicts, as long as they reach a sizable intensity; • the numerous conventions for the prohibition of certain weapons (explosive traps, either toy-like or concealed under protective labels, such as red crosses or white flags, or in food or religious items). They also 32

'\'S.,:...

• regulate the use of force, forbidding some forms of war conduct, either for their "wickedness" or because they are considered excessive even considering the very ample standards of "military necessity". These, and many more, contractual and positive norms must be added to the customary international laws included in the "Main legal principles recognized by the Community of Nations" or "People's Law" (i.e. the old and still valid "Martens clause"), together with the principles fixed by the Statute of the Nuremberg Court and - coming to lhe

At least since WWII, t h e positive international law has taken a formal position vis-a-vis the war phenomenon: th e traditional supreme right o[ every State to wage war (ius ad bellum ) has been generally rejecte d , admitting war in self-defence only. However, even if we have moved from "war as a right" - a prerogative of the Crown - t o "war as a crime", it has been realistically perceived that these very solemn and very important statements of principle are not enough to ward off the possibility of armed conflicts: it was therefore necessary to establish what behaviours must be prohibited, even in the admittedly tragic and exceptional junctures of war: in other words, even if the "righl to wage war" has ceased lo exist, there is slill a permanently valid ius in bello, the right within war. The Slalute of the Nuremberg International Court has very incisively established that cerlain behaviours cannot be

justified, not even by war, and must be repressed Âˇw ith the extreme and severe instrument of the Criminal Code. Therefore the Court introduced the "vvar crimes" category (art. 6, para b August 8, 1945) . The same category was considered and confirmed by the UN Committee on International Law (July 1950 principle no. VI, para b). It is a penally significant category, which was finally and generally sanctioned in the four Geneva Conventions and their two additional protocols.

causing of serious damages to physical integrily and health. Then there is a group of serious violations considered by the 2 nd , 3 r cl and 4 th Convention, i.e. the large -scale and militarily unjustified destruction or misappropriation of goods. The 1st and the 4 th Convention forbid non -impartial and irregular trials, conducled against the international provisions. The 4 1h Convention defines deportation, illegal transfer, unlawful detention and hostagetaking as serious violations.

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE "SERIOUS VIOLATIONS"

ADAPTATION OF THE ITALIAN LAWS TO THE INTERNATIONAL PENAL CODE

To stress the gravity and unacceptable nature of lhe behaviours already labelled as "war crimes", the norms contained in lbe four Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols define as "serious violations" those behaviours (and others as well) already labeled as "war crimes" , enjoining every contracting High Party - and this is the essential innovation - to take all the necessary legal measures to establish adequate penalties to be applied to the persons who committed - or ordered to commit - a. serious violation. In an extreme sinthesis, f.rorn this sel of norms we can deduce a list of forbidden war-behaviours, defined as serious violations which must be penally repressed; first of all the.re is the "hard core", which includes wi)lful murder of protected persons, torture, inhuman treatment including biological and medical experiments - and the intentional

Once the "essential core" of the international war-code is clarified and fixed, we have the ensuing and very delicale problem of measuring how much our national war-laws comply with lhe said rules. From a merely historical viewpoint, ,ve must acknowledge

that our laws of 1938 on war and neutrality, and even more those of J941 (military penal war-code) responded much more to the need of giving a "human face" to war than lhose adopted by other Nations. If this is true, and must be said, it is also true thal, al least up to the laws of 2002, the significanl gap between the two normative systems appeared no rnore tolerable. As a matter of fact, before Law no.6 and no.15 of 2002, Italy was a defaulter in the obligalion to adapt the old (and never updated) war-laws of 1939-1941 to the commitments made at international conventions, shm..,ing also a basic inconsistency with our Constitution. From a general point of view, one can notice that even when lbe war:. code sanctioned criminal deeds against protected persons, it envisaged penalties that were utterly inadequate (for example, violence against private citizens of enemy Countries was only punished with imprisonment up to two years War Code, art. 185, para I).

An Italian patrol al the form.er "Zastava"factory, in Lhe suburbs of Pee.

Jn particular, it was pem1itted to take hostages (War Code, art. 219) while this was clearly in contrast with art. 3 of the four Geneva Conven tion s; ther e were no provisions about the deportation of pr iva te c 1t1zens, ethnic discriminations, rape and/or offences agai ns the morality of wo men a nd children; finally, there was no ex plicit incrimination for acts of torture and/or medicobiological experiments not justified by objective medical needs, and much more, not listed here for reasons of necessar y synthesis. The s ituation of incompatibility decreased remarkably after the coming into force of Law no. 6 of J anuary 2002 which, albeit in a very s ummary and precarious form ("until the comi ng into force of a new a nd detailed law on the matter"), found a remedy to the worst discrepancies, so tha t today we can notice a difference between national and internati onal rules only as regards protected goods an.d areas, attacks again st undefen ded, demilitarized or dangerous areas (s u ch as dams and nuclear plants): in fact, art. 185 bis of Law 6/2002, in referring to the inter national con ventio n s, restricts this reference to criminal behaviours aga inst persons, without considering the internationally protected areas. FINAL REMARKS

We notice with satisfaction that our internal laws are being adapted - albeit not exhaustively - t o the int e rnational penal legislation and we wish and hope that this process will be fully concluded in our Nation, as well as in the others, (at least in those whi ch share with us the same

A "Centauro" armoured car in Bosnia_

An American UH-60 "Black Haw/c" and its crew in. Afghanistan. .

principles of civilization): we are actually convinced that - today and for a long time to come - the safest and operationally cas.iest way to guarantee the prevention and repression of international crime is and will be to reproduce, in the r espective nat ional laws, the criminal offences identified by the international jurisdiction. All this is true, but we must be caref-ul not to turn it into a taboo an d concl ud e tha t until everything is put into practice, the international criminal norms arc only a flatus vocis, or useless proclam ations. Ne i Lher can we agree with those who continue to believe that the recipients of the pen al norms are only and uniquely the States. The main arguments used (almost) always in good faith - Lo disarm the interna tional p enal cod e, conde mnin g it to the

---

-irreparable condition of "infant law", are usually the following: • the international space, and consequently its la ws, wou ld know as "subjects", and therefore recipients, only lhe States and the international organizations such as the UN et similia, the Red Cross and other humanitarian struclures, the religious confessions. Individuals and persons, isolated or in groups, \vould remain absent. This is not true anymore: individuals have entered the international space, albeit lhrough the worsl possible door, the criminal one. They are now internationally significant entities: the relevant rules now lake them directly into consideration, making them recipients of both protective and punitive norms. Once it was said that every

.. ····-----

soldier had in his knapsack the code of his flag: today a soldier must carry, besides his national code, also thal of the territory \vhere he operates and, above all, the international penal code: as a matter of fact, all three affect him with positive or negative consequences: • the .second a1·gument used to disarm the international penal code is that it should follow stdctly the same principles of the national codes: in particular, the legality and typicality of the norm. The ancient axiom "nullum crimen., nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali" (no crirne and no penalty un less there is a previous law) is irrenounceable and very va lu able as a safeguard against possible judicial abuses but, particularly at this time of hypertrophic

criminal laws, cannot be transferred, with the same preclusive value, to the international environment. As a matter of fact, here the penal laws arc certainly not hypertrophic but, on the contrary, rather minimal, and the few criminal conducts considered are so enormous that they are well known to any passably civilized conscience, and do not need an explicit provision by lhe respective national system. For in.stance, to say that genocide is not a crime if a national law does not sanction it, is a juridical and ethical absurdity. What is actually genocide if not mass murder? What is ethnic rape if not generalized and racially motivated rape? What is deportation if not large-scale kidnapping? • the third argument: is the craftiest and maintains that, after all, the war criminal code is the winner's law, the eternal Brennus' law, i.e. the law of the sword, not that of the balance. Unfortunately, in this disconsolate and discouraging conviction there is some truth; but we should not give it more weight that it deserves; for preventive deterrence purposes, first of all, because we know how conflicts start bul almost never how they end and therefore it is very difficult to fore.see who will be on the winning side. Secondly because, even admitting all that \Ne have said, the fact that the winner is unlikely to be punished is not a good and sufficient reason to let the loser go unpunished. Finally we should not neglect the "time factor": there is no guarantee that today's protected winner will be protected also tornorro\v. Justice,as we all know, is ... very .slow!!!

D ~-President of the Court of Appeal of Verona

HISTORY

In the culture of American natives (for convenience we shall also call them "Indians") man's history was perceived as "circular", there was no beginning, there was no end, but everything followed a cyclical course, what had occurred was destined to occur again in a successive cycle, in new forms, with new people, but in the same substance . .. Arri,,ing in the tenitories of lhe American continent, the "white man" had brought with him his culture, his religion, his customs and his law. In vievv of this, since the beginning of the colonization, the native peoples had been conslituting a "problem". Thus Great Britain first, and the Uniled States ahe1~ started, at the end of the XVII Cenlury, what was caUed the "policy of treaties", in order to force the Indians to leave their territories on the eastern coasts and move to the inter ior. Nevertheless, the treaties were never respected by the '\vhites", so that , year after year, the native populations of North America were compelled to move towards the West, to the land that Congress had defined as "Indian territories". Those who did not want to leave their land were killed or confined in special Reservations.In order to explain and justify the permanent breach of l.he treaties and the interference in the "Indian territories" of the West, between 1840 and 1850 the United States 36

talked about "manifest destiny"; a principle according to which the "Whiles" ,vere appoinled by destiny to dominate the entire continent and the Indians had to submit to the white man and disappem: We start our story from this point, from this "lin ear" and Eurocentric conception of history, where everything is undergoing an evolution, and whal occurs today will never again occur in the future. The white man's history is a straighl line, not a circle. In 1862 the United States Congress ,with the "Homestead Act", granted the pioneers, for the sum of 10 dollars, lots of 160 acres

(6 0 hectares) in the Indi an territories west of the Mississippi, on condition that the land be c ultivated for fi ve consecuti ve years: the "conquesl of the West" had begun. In fact, between I840 and 1860, an in cessa nt m igra tory flow brough t more than four million Europea ns to the United States. These poverty-stric ken emigrants came from Grea t Brit ai n , Germany and Scandinavia; they were mos tlv ab u sed a nd disheartened f;rrn crs attracted by the idea of a properly and a new life. Between 1860 and 1914 about 37

SIOUX

nmm

Territories ceded by the

~ "civilized tribes" (1829-1835) ~

Territories assigned to

~ the "civilized tribes"

100 200 300 400 500 km

14 million emigrants arrived in the United States. The US Government tr ied to convey this migratory flO\.v towards the West, in order to accelerate the occupation and colonization of the "Western territories", that ceased to be called "Indian". Already before the end of the Civil War (1865) convoys of pioneers marching towards the West had gone beyond the limit of the settlements on the other side of the Mississippi, crossing the entire continent and founding new small towns on th e Pacific coast. Howeve1~ between these two limits, distant about 2500 km from each other, there was a very ample wild area that took up almost half of the continent, which had s till to be colonized. From the geographical viewpoint, the area consisted of t hree very different physical environments: the Great Plains that ext ended from the 98th me1idian to the slopes of the Rocky Mountains; the great ranges of the Rocky Mountains and the Sierras and, between them, the Great 38

Basin, a region of arid plateaus, salt lakes and deserts . These very extensive, barren and wi ld a reas were the American "territories" destined Lo the Indians. (fig. A). Together Âˇwith the m igratory flow of the settlers, the conquest of the West was spurred by the great "gold rushes", following a se1ies of discoveries of gold and silver deposits between 1860 and 1880. The last "gold rush" started in 1874, after t,vo expeditions financed by the Government had con.finned the presence of gold in the "Black Hills", in the "terri Lory"of Dakota. It was a Sioux reservation, a sacred area for these tribes, but whe n th e nevvs about the discovery spread, the army was unable to stop the stream of gold diggers: in a few months mo,-e than 15,000 had tlO\ved to the site. The last aspect to be considered is the impulse given to industry and transports. During the Civil War, started in 1860, many businessmen began Lo press the government in order to obtain permission t o build a railway

heading towards Lhe West Coast. By 1861 a telegrapl1 li ne linked San Francisco to Saint Louis. ln 1862 the Union Pacific Railroad and the Central Pacific Railroad obtained the pem1ission to build a line from Omaha to Sacramen to through the Great Plains, the "Bo zema n Track". The works started under the protection of tl1e army, which could only employ few effectives, because of the war in the east. The importance of the mineral resources, the plols of land granted to settlers and compan ies and the creation of new States, such as Colorado , promoted a rapid advance of the works of the future tnmscontinental line . Li ttle by li ttle the whites unfolded the ample net of "modem civilization" on the Indian territory. fn moving towa rÂˇds lhe \,Vest, beyond th e M.ississippi, diggers, stockbreeders and seulers invaded the last strips of land of Lhe American Indians and destroyed their culture. At the end of the Civil War, 240 ,000 Ind ians probably lived in the Great Plains, at lhe

Left. Geor~e Armstrong Custer in a 1865 portrait. Below.

The Indian Chief Crazy Hors e in a photograph taken immediately after his surrender.

beginning of 1900 lhere remained only a few Lens of thousands inside a few reservations.

CRAZY HORSE AND "LONG HAIR"

Paha Sapa was the Indian name of the Black Hills, one or the world's oldest mountain ranges, which r·ises in the northern Great Plains. They are approximately 160 km long and less than 100 km wide. The Sioux, the Shoshones, the Crows, the Cheyennes, the Minneconjeux and other tribes considered tbem a shelter dur·ing the periods of bad weather, but the mountain territory and its [orests did not r·epresent an ideal place for t he tribes of the Plains. Thus the Black Hills became the dwelling of spirits, a sacred place thaL had always belonged to the Indians, until 1874, when George Armstrong Custer led an expedition that opened to ''w hites" a nd gold diggers the road of the Black Hills. Crazy Horse was born in 1840, in the Plains close to the Black H ills,

in a Sioux-Oglala village, and was educated to respect and understand nature. He had been acquainted with war since his youth and was a perfect hunter already in his teens. At thirteen he had entered an association called akicita ; in its tepee a member could while away time, s leep, eat, dance, sing and chat with frien ds . The akiciLa was private and could be entered only by invitation. Those who were guilty of co\vardice, murder and adultery, or w ho had accurnulated wealth without sharing it with the members of the tribe, \Vere excluded. Cu rly, Lh is was the name of Crazy Horse as a boy, \Vas shy, more quie L and reserved than the boys of his age. He never spoke at meetings and rarely participated in them, nevertheless he aspired to foll ow a line of life that he had already decided: he was going to be a warrior and a hunter, and would protect a nd help the weak members of his t r ibe . He passionately \,vanted to take heavy r isks u po n himself in order to

achieve his aim. He had had frequent contacts with the white man, but had only a very slight idea of his culture. George Armstrong Custer was born in 1839, at New Rumley, Ohio. In those years, the United States w as a Count ry that presented surprising differe nces in geographical aspects, economy a nd population. The emigrants, coming from every part of Europe and Africa, spoke a great number of languages and had as ma ny cultural traditions ; there were many religions, although they all belonged to the Christian sphere. There were two basic forms of e cono my: the labour of slaves, south of the Ohio river, and free and paid w ork in the north. Within these two worlds there was a my1iad of ways to earn a living. Also Custer, like Crazy Horse, grew in a large family, well taken care of and lovingly protected in his infancy. Both were model sons of their respective cultures: Custer lived for Lhe future, believed in progress and 39

Left. The Jndia.n Chief Sitting Bull.

Right. Indian selilements in the Grea t Plains.

in the theory according to vvhich things were continuously improving, especially thanks to man's work, his inventions, the new guns, the telegraph, the railway. Crazy Horse Ii ved for the present. History was a part of the present in which he lived, much of what he <lid was <lone in the way it had a lways been done. These two men and, together with them, these two worlds, were to clash soon. Their battlefield would be the Great Plains and the Black Hills.

THE BATTLES IN THE PRAIRIES

Between 1860 and 1870 the Sioux found thems elves in a position not only to stop the flow of emigrants through their territory but also to chive the whites out of the region of the Platte river; 路which had already been under the whites' control for ten years. 40

The war tact ic or the Sioux consisted in hitting rapidly and fleeing immediately after the attack; their greatest limit was their inability to coord inate the forces of the various tribes. In 1864 Crazy Horse decided to leave the Oglalas and join the Cheyennes in the south, in order to attack the whites and their outposts. For the Indians the attacks had become a reason for vengeance, because of the massacre of Sand Creek. In November 1864, in fact, a group of Sioux had camped in a place called Sand Creek. The Indians had no intention of fighting against the whites and this is confirmend by the fact that they had chosen Sand Creek in agreement with the "Bluecoats", who had promised that they wou Id be protected by the army for the entire winter. Black Pot, the village Chief, had even hoisted the American flag at the centre of the camp. Neverll1eless, on the 29 th of

November, at daybreak, a Regirnent of 600 frontier volunteers, who had enlisted for hundred days, fell upon the carnp where two hundred men and five hundred women and children were sleeping: it was a massacre. Crazy Horse was then a little over twenty-four but was already considered a warrior of proven courage and valour. In July 1865 Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull and Red Cloud tried,for the first time, to coordinate the Indian guerrilla warfare by attacking simultaneously and on several fronts the outposts of the American army and the supply convoys that arr ived from the east, isolating the detachments completely, breaking the communications and preventing any further advance or the whites on their territory. The scarce results of lhe army against the "rebels" induced the Government to start a new policy to solve the problem of the Indians of the Plains. Despite the opposition of Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull and others, many Chiefs signed a treaty at Fort Laramie, by \Vhich the Amer路icans were allowed to build outposts and open new roads in the Pov,der river area. Crazy Horse and the Chiefs who had refused to deal with lhe Government continued with their actions. In December 1866, Cn:v.y Horse devised a pla n to lay an ambush against the soldiers s tationed at Fort Kearny. He attacked a convoy of 路woodcutters near lh.e fort and waited for the soldiers to come to their rescue; after路 a few minutes a squad of light cavalrymen and forty infantrymen led by Lt. Fetterman left the

another in the Indian settlements. Nevertheless the Government was forced to resume the negotiations with the Indians, because the conflict cost more than 150,000 dollars a day, immobilized thousands of soldiers, stopped investments and, above all, led to no concrete results. In the spring of 1868, General Sherman was forced to negotiate a truce with the Indians, giving th em the land on the Powder river and the Black Hills, and the permission to freely bunt buffalo on those territories. As a matter of fact, owing to the unrestricted killing of these animals (Buffalo Bill was the main protagonist), from 1868 Lo 1889 the herds of buffalo were reduced from fifty million head to 54 1.

The tribes l S:1rce-O 2 Cree del!e ?'.-onwe

3 5!od:fea: ~

Gros Venlre

5 .A.ssiniboin 6 Ojibwo dere Pionure 7 C,cw 8 Sioux Te!on 9 Hido!~o

10 t.,.'ioiv.!on 11 Ar[~CfC

12 Sioux Yonbor,d

13 Siow<5onle-e 14 Cheyenne 15 Po,:a

16 Omoho 17 Sioux Yankton 18 lowo

19 Ola

20 Pow::eo 21 Arocaho 22 Kc~,o

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

23 Missov,io

24 Kiowo 25 Kiowc.Apoche

The success of Crazy Horse had a direct influence on Custer. In 1868, for the fir~c:;t time,something done by Crazy Horse had impressed him . From that moment on, the two men were imperceptibly linked by an invisible thread, they influenced each other in their actions and reactions, and studied one another in depth until they met in battle at Little Bighorn, in a fine duel of

26 Osoge 27 Cotr.onchc 28 v'l'::h;to 29 Q uoi}Ow 30 Apcche [;pan 3 } Tonkowc

32 Ki1soi

garrison. Fetterman met Crazy Horse, who directed the char<>~ 0 against the soldiers; all were killed except Fetten11an, who prefeffed to kill himself. This "massacre" greatly alam1ed American public opinion, which insisted that the Government employ a harsher policy towards the "rebels". General Shennan, the hero of the Civil War, conveyed men and equipment to the plains, in order to carry out the task assigned to him: to put an end to the Indian guerrilla warfare. His idea was a "total war". That is why, in 1867, a long seties of massacres of innocents, carried out by the American Army, followed one

Reservations

Tribes

Language groups

NORTHERN PLAINS

Blackleet Plains Cree Plains Ojibwa Gros Ventre Sarcee

Algonqu ion. Ancient inhabitants of the region. Archaeol!sical finds indicate the existence of close bon s between Black Feet and Crees, and many similarities in their milhologies. Athapaskan. In the I 9th Century this small tribe entered an alliance with the Blackfeet, as ii had done earlier with the Gros Ventre.

CENTRALPLAINS

Sioux (Lakola, Nakata, Dakota) Crow Mandan Hidatsa Arikara

Siouan. Lakotas were the westernmost Sioux tribes. Dakotas, Mandans and Hidatsas were semisedentary.

Comanche Kiowa Wichi ta Pawnee Kiowa-Apache

Uto-Aztecan Kiawan Caddoan

SOUTHERN PLAINS

Caddoan. Sometimes called "Northern Pawnees". They were semisedentary and lived south of the Mandans on the Missouri river.

Athapaskan

daiing and strategy that was going to have only one winne1: For Custer the life of his men was of no importance, what he really wanted was fame and power, his password was "promotion or death" and often, during the Civil War, he had ordered charges against adversaries overwhelming in number and strength, just to earn glory and renovvn. At the beginning of 1867, Lieutenant Colonel Custer reached his new ass.ignment at the 7 th Cavalry Regiment stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas; his task was to defend Âˇthe frontier from the Indians on the extreme southern sector of the Plains. Soon he obtained small successes dashing at the head of his men, charging against isolated Indian villages and often mowing down innocent victims. Starting from Ap1il 1867, his assignment changed and his Regiment moved north to chase the Indians, without appreciable results until 1868, when he was called by General Sherman and by General Sheridan, his comrade at the Academy and Commander of the military Division of Missouri, to lead the 7th Light Cavalry to the northern Plains to fight a "total war1 ' against the Sioux of Crazy Horse and the Chevennes of Red Cloud. In fact She1~man wanted to employ the 7 th Light Cavalry for a winter 42

campaign aimed at s triking the Indians in the places where they lived, in the villages, regardless of women and children; on the other hand, in summer the Indians were too mobile and could not be easily reached - Custer had learned it at his mvn expense - and therefore it was necessary to find the winter villages and hit the Indians there. Custer forced his men to endure exhausting marches through the Plains; some companies suffered heavy losses, clue to cold and snow, but this ,.vas not important, what counted was to find the Indians and destroy them. In the winter of 1868 Custer led the men of his Regiment in a charge to a Cheyenne village on the Washita 1ive1; killing one hundred and three Indians.Only eleven were warTiors. Between 1868 and 1869 Custer led his men far and wide in the Great Plains, never clashing with the Indians again, but compelling them to flee to the "reservations" that were assigned to them in the new frontier-States. From 1869 to 1873 there was a kind of truce, but both parties were preparing for a war that they knew was not over. During these years the Government of the United States tried to conclude new treaties with the rebel Indians of the Prairies and, in 1870, also Red Cloud signed a peace treaty in Washington \,vith the "Great Fathei-", the President. The Chief

pledged to Lake his tribe to a reservation in Nebraska. Obviously, also this time , the Indian good faith 'Was taken advantage of, in that the peace conditions ,vere immediately disregarded. In 1868 the "Great Father" had assigned the Black Hi lls to t he Indians for ever. Nevertheless, a few years late1~ gold was found in the Paha Sapa and thousands of gold diggers started to go up the Missouri and ventured into the Black Hills. The Ameri c a n Government, in the face of this situation, Ui e d to bring into question the Indian possession of the Hills. Thus a meeting wa s called and all the Indian chiefs invited, in order to draw up a nevvand we could say useless- treaty allo\,ving the United States to buy a portion of the Black Hills (1875). The meeting for drafting a new treaty failed, and the Indian chiefs residing in the reservation s brought their braves again in the vicinity of the Black Hills. Thus, the Commissioner for Indian Affairs, who not accidentally was under the authority of th e \:\Tar Department, ordered the Indians to go back Lo the reservations by the 3pt of January, 1876 , otherwise, he said, it will be the Army'.s- job to force them to do it. In February 1876 the War Department authorized General Sheridan to start military operations against the "hostile" Sioux, carrying out "the actions he deemed appropriate in order to achieve the goal". Thus General Crook and General Terry guided their men toÂˇw ards the upper courses of the Powder and Bighorn rivers. On June 16 th , 1876 Crazy Horse at the head of one thousand hrnves left the great encampment of Little Bighorn and started his march to attack the column of soldiers led by Crook. Crazy Horse's initial strategy was to keep Crook's rnen scattered; he led the charges in person, deep into the soldiei-s' ranks, so as Lo keep the men separate. The Sioux

Left.

Of/t.eers of the 7th Cavalry in a [!,roup photograph.

Right. A Blaclcfeet Indian fam.ily.

and Cheyennes knew that the soldi ers had the new breechloading rifles; thal is 'why Crazy Horse incited his men to remain near the enemy, confronting them in a hand-to-hand struggle: the Indian lactic ,.vas once more changed in accordance with lhe new situation. As a matter of fact, in that circumstance Crook was saved only by the Shoshoni and Crow guides, who put up a strong resistance against the warriors "allied" with Crazy Horse. Crook, after a few hours of combat, sent Colonel Mills, with eight Cavalry squadrons, towards the canyon to the north of the valley, because he was convinced that the Indian earn p was beyond it; he wanted to hit it before the return of the braves; he wanted to make the umpteenth massacre, but the camp was at Little Bighorn and Crazy Horse had a lready placed a group of warTiors on the sides of the canyon, ready to ambush the Bluecoats. Crazy Horse, at that point, decided to apply the fundamental principle of the art of war which suggests to concentrate the forces on the decisive point. Thus , while the Indians were withdrawing in order to follow Mill's forces, Crook guessed Crazy Horse's plan and sent immediately an Officer at a gallop to leU Mills to turn back. Mills, therefore, fell back to\,vards Crook making an ample left-wheeling manoeuvre, thus outflanking the Indians that vvere about to cut his way; this di soriented the Indians and they decided to retreat. Crook later reported that he had won a victory against the Indians

because the redskins had abandoned the battlefield. To te.11 the truth, the Army would have been ruined if it had obtained a good number of these "victories"! First of all the greatest losses had been suffered by the soldiers (38) and not by the Indians (28), secondly, the soldiers in that battle had fired twenty-five thousand shots; counting the entire expense for the campaign, each Indian killed would have cost one million dollars! Finally, the following day, Crook retreated towards the south. Cra z y Horse and h is braves returned to the camp by the Little Bighorn river, were they mourned

their dead and danced in their honour. General Terry had divided the troops into two columns, the first commanded by Colonel Gibbon, the second under Custer's orders. Custer's vanguards were commanded by Major Reno and Captain Benteen; behind Custer's column, the 7 th Light Cavalry, there was the supply convoy. On that morning of June 25 th , 1876, Crazy Horse, thanks to his expert scouls, knew very well the number and movements of Custer's forces. Custer's plan was to attack the Indians as soon as possible; he was in fact convinced that they 43

were on the run and felt hunted down. According to the information he had acquired, Custer believed he could count on surprise and therefore sent Reno to attack from the south, while sending an order to Benteen to keep south and prevent possible escapes. Custer, at the head of five squadrons totalling 265 men, quickly headed northwards , trying to attack the column on its northern side, outflanking it from behind the hills. But the real surprise for the Indians was Reno's attack. He forded the Bighorn on the south of the camp and found himself in an immense open space, an ideal site for a cavah-y charge, as Custer had envisaged. .M ajor Reno, inexplicably, ordered his men to dismount as soon as the first tepees appeared within gunshot and had them start a rifle fire against the Indians. Crazy Horse organized his men to counterattack Reno's soldiers, but his greatest wony was Custer's simultaneous advance towards the northern side of the camp. In any case it became impossible for Crazy Horse to keep his men from counterattacking. They launched themselves against the lines of Reno's soldiers with such vehemence that they were literally 44

swept a\.vay. As the first men fell, Reno ordered a retreat which soon tw11ed into a rout. While Reno was riding towards the southern side of the camp, Custer got in sight of it and realized, at that point, that everything he had done up to then was based on a VJTong assumption. The Indians were not on the run and Benteen was by now out of the game, engaged in a useless enterplise. However Custer did not lose heart and resumed his way tovvards the northern side of the encampment, where he wanted to conduct the attack in any case. Crazy Horse probably glimpsed Custer and his men marching behind the hills and sensed what his plan was. He left a few braves to chase Reno and led about a thousand of his men rushing through the camp, among the shrieks of women and children. His plan was to overtake Custe1~ ford the Bighorn and attack the 7 th Cavalry from the rear and from the right. Meanwhile Custer~ dudng his advance behind the hills, was faced by about 1500 Hunkpapa Indians, led by the Sioux Chief Fiele, who blocked his way. Therefore he tried a diverting manoeuvre to the right, towards the heights, but Fiele's braves were close at his heels and attacked in

force his rearguard. At this point, Custer's dreams were starting to dissolve, he realized that his was a struggle for survival. Thus, at the head of his soldiers, he rod e towards the summit of the hil l where he wanted to entrench himself with his men and resist, awaiting for reinforcements. Custer's men were advancing in open order towards the top of the hill when Crazy Horse, who had forded the river and gone up from the north, appeared on the summit. Âˇwhen a mass of horsemen reach a summit they usually restrain the horses before continuing in another direction. Probably this is what actually occurred tha t afternoon: when Crazy Horse and his thousand warriors reached the lop of the hill, they held back thci r horses. There was a standstill, probably Custer's and Crazy Horse's eyes met; a mass of more than a thousand Indian braves were about to rush, from a dominant position, on to a little less than 225 cavalrymen of the American regular Army. The braves could already smell the scent of victory, the scent that Custer knew so well, exactly as he knew that the fighters who feel it become invincible. The interval lasted only a few endless instants; it was broken only when Crazy Horse and his men filled the air \-\>ith their battle cries and, hurtling down from the hill, swept away everything that appeared before them. Most warriors directed their pitiless blows against Custer: the scene may have recalled a buffalo hunt; Custer entered the battle to die, and his was a superb fight. The battle of Little Bighorn was a unique moment in Sioux history. Never before had tbe S.ioux been so united and so masterfully guided and never again they would be. In the Indian tradition the victorious battle of Little Bighorn was later known as "the beginning of the encl"; from that moment, in fact, the history of the North-American natives was to

Facing page. "Custer's last battle" by Elk Eber.

Right. Lakota Oglala warrio rs on 1heir ponies. Below. The move1nents of the Federal and Indian forces at Litlle Bighorn.

undergo a long decline. Crazy Horse counted his losses, about forty, and mourned them. Not much, anyvJay, because that had been "a splendid clay to die". CONCLUSION

After this massacre, Congress decided to pass a law \.vhich forced the Indians out of the Po wder river region and the

Black Hills, conferring to General Shennan h ill powers to make the "rebe ls " see sense. The Sioux were chased closely by the Army

and , starving and with scarce munitions, decided to submit to the "Great Father" and go live in the reservations.

THE BATTLE e era HORN

OF L./TTL

JIJNE 2 5',1d7 6

CusLer Hill. Nlonumenl and tombstones in memory of G.A. CusLer and the Fallen o{Lhe 7 th Cavalry.

Crazy Horse died on the 6 th of Septem ber 1877 in an Indian reservation, murdered b y an American soldiei: Thus ended the war between "whites" and "redskins". Crazy Horse's death was more than a man's death. It was the end of the hope, history and culture of a people who had once been lord of America and was now banished to reservations, with no dignity and with a prospect of forced acculluration. The whites' vision of history, their culture and their Jaw had prevailed. But, paradoxically, history itself was to prove that Indian culture and ,,i sion of things were right. Since then, history has demonstrated that everything is cyclical and dest ined to rep eat itself, century after century. We wanted to end this writing on Cra zy Horse, proud leader of the Indian cause, with this reflection which goes beyond the boundaries of his tory and touches the frontiers of morals and the law of nations The Indians could only perform their "ghost dance" and wish to see again, one day, the buffalo galloping on the prairies of a land really fre e for all, where Crazy Horse, their "peculiar Chief", their Messiah (who died regretting he could not be useful to his people anymore), could r ide proud, indomitable and immortal.

D ''Major General, Deputy Chief; Logistic Division, Army General Staff ,.,,,, Captain, th 7 "Cremona" NBC Defence Rgt

BIBLIOGRAPHY

F.P. Pruc ha , "Indian Policy in the Uniled States: Historical essays'', University of Ne bra ska Press, Lincoln,1 98 1. F.P. Prucha, "The Indians in Ame1ica n Society: from the Revolutionary War to the Present", University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985. F.P. Prucha, "The GrcaL Father", University of Nebraska Press, 1983. H. F . Dobyns, The Navajo People, "Indian tribal series", Phoenix, I 972. J. v\iise and V . Deloria, "The Red Man in the New World Drama", Harper and Rowe, New York, 1971. Donald L. Parman, "Indians and the

Am erica n West in th e Twentie th Century", Bloomington Ind., 1994. P. Paret, "Makers of Modern Strategy", Princcton Universily Press, 1986. Stephen E. Ambrose, "Crazy Horse and CusLer", Garden City, N.Y., 1975 P.Jaquin , "His to ire des Indicns d'Arnerique du Nord", Payot, Paris, 1976. D. Brown, "Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee", Mondaclori, Milan, 1972. Mari Sandoz , "Crazy Horse", Bompian i, Milan, 1978. R. D'Aniello, "Dizionario degl i Tncliani cl' Ame rica", Newton & Compton, Rome, 1999. Malclwin A. .Tones : "The limi ts o f Liberty - American History 16071980", University College,London, 1982.

On its constitution, every legion received an identification number and often also a name. Eventually it could earn an attribute, or appellation, which, by emphasizing its merits and military virtues, made it famous and immortal. The legionaries were very faithful and had a deep-felt sense of belonging and esprit de corps. In fact, the Roman Empire, with 30 legions, i.e. only 360,000 men, controlled a territory delimited by a border of 6,400 km. Names and surnames were connected with events, geographical areas, Emperors, brave leaders or also with religious motivations. The latter was the case with Julius Caesar who, belonging to the gens Julia, protected by Venus, allowed his faithful X Legio to call itself "Veneria". THE ROMAN AR1\1Y

The legion was the heart of the republican, and later imperial, military apparatus. This astonishing war machine was the secret of the unequalled power achieved by ancient Rome. At the time of the Kings, the an11y was rec1uited only in times of war and consisted of a single legion. The legion, commanded by the King, was discharged at the end of the conflict. In the Republican era, there were t\VO legions, each commanded by a Consul. In combat, the legionaries were aligned on tluÂˇee rows: on the first line, the hastati, armed ,.vith a long lance (hasta), on the second the principes, on the third the Lriari, the veterans destined to withstand the final attack. All were equipped with a gladius, a short sword, and a big rectangular shield. The combats were opened by the velites, a corps of young men with a light annament, consisting of a bundle of javelins. In the I Century B.C., Consul Caius Marius established a permanent army of volunteers.

Roman. legionaries.

A Roman "ballista".

Thus the velite disappeared and became an infantryman like any other and there were no more differences in armament between hastati, principes and triari, but all became legionary foot soldiers. A legionary had a metal helmet and a cuirass that could also be made of leather, and his outfit consisted of a short sword, the gladius, two javelins called pilum, a long lance and a shield. The whole equipment weighed about 40 kg and, besides the weapons, consisted of ,Nork tools and a knapsack. The tools that he brought with him were: a big mace, a shovel and a handsaw. These were the implements that the legionary had lo use for his work during the marches, in

particular for Lhe fortification works of the encampments. The knapsack contained food supplies: there was ,vheat, cheese, lard, oil for condiment, a canteen for water and a small grill for cooking food over charcoal. The shield's characteristic was that it bore spikes. During the battle, the legionaries, holding it, positioned themselves next to each other in a continuous closed rank, almost like a wall and, with lances and spikes sticking up, they marched against the enemy like a kind of tank. This was an invincible war machine, for it surely frightened the unorganized barbarian populations. The advance of the legionary infantry was slow and cautious. Even with forced marches, it covered no more than 20/30 km each day, also because, as we said, each man carried a back-

pack or about 40 kg. The advance on enemy territory was made safe by an extraordinary number of expedients . For example, a fortified encampment was built every day (two posts for each legionary vvere carried by the baggage waggon) for spending even only one night. Roads were opened , bridges were built, forests were cleared. The legions' internal organization was meticulous and accurate. There were legionaries specialized in building roads, bridges and fortifications, in finding water and food, in treating the ill and wounded men, there ,vere veterinaries for the animals and haruspices for the religious ceremonies. The monthly ration of each soldier was about 25/30 kg of wheat, which meant one kilo of "placenta",a flat loaf, per day; onions and garlic were particularly appreciated as a side dish. The length of the mili Lary service changed along the centuries but, in any case, the average period was more than 20 years, the best part of a man's life in those times, providing he did not die in some battle. Each legion consisted of about 5200 infantrymen p lus 120 horsemen divided into two wings, about a hundred men assigned to the war machines, and the personnel of the headquarters. In all about 6000 men. The Command included the Imperial Legate, various Tribunes and Prefects, while, among the Officers, lhe Centurions were those more in contact with the troops. Infantry and cavalry auxiliary troops were deployed next to each legion. The Roman Army during the Imperial Age numbered between 25 and 30 legions, i.e . about 180,000 legionaries and 180,000 auxilia1ies. The immense territory of the Empire, and its borders of 6400 km, was therefore controlled by a relatively small force: 360,000 men.

THE ROMAN LEGIONS AND THE ORIGIN OF THEIR NUMERATION AND DENOMINATION.

As we said, until 104 B .C. the legions were recruited each lime accordjng to the necessity of the moment. Starting from that date, Caius Marius transformed the army into a professional body, allowing all citi1.ens to enlist. The legions that constituted the army therefore became permanent units and, as years \vent by, acquired an esprit de corps unknov,m to lhe legions prior to the refonn. Before the reform, the legions, at the moment of their constitution, received an identification number that distinguished them. As they became permanent units, the number continued to be their main distinctive element, and only later the appellations started to appear as an integral part of the denomination of each legion. As we are going to see, both number and surname revealed the circumstances o f the origin of each legionary unit and were an indispensable instrument for knowing the reasons [or its constitution. Numeration and denorninal.ion conslilute the identity of a legion. There can be two or more legions with the same number or with the same appellation, but never can legions with the same name and number coexist. THE NUMBERS OF THE LEGIONS DURING THE LATE REPUBLIC AND THE EARLY EMPIRE

A quick glance at the list of the Roman legions seems to show an evident continuity in the ir numeration which, nevertheless, does not correspond to a chronological method. Actually the legions were recrnited in different periods and for the most disparate reasons, therefore the numbering did not need to be progressive.

The first series of known legions' numeration appears in the army that .Julius Caesar employed to conquer Gallia between 58 and 50 B.C .. When he assumed its command it consisted of four legions: the VII "Claudia", the VIII "Augusta" , the IX "Hispana" and the X "Veneria". Following Caesar's murder in 44 B.C., his army was divided between his heirs: his nephew Octavian and his General Marc Anthony, who ended up fighting each other in the decisive civil war for the supreme power of the Empire. Some legions were split in two contingents, one for each hei1~ as was the case with the VI Legion, which or iginated Anthony's VI Legion "Ferrata" and Octavian's VJ Legion "Vi ctrix" . Moreover, both recruited new legio ns and constituted huge armies. In Octavian's army the legions' names reached up to a XLI Legion and in Antony's up to a XXX Legion. When Marc Anthony was definitively defeated by Octavian in lhe battle of Actium, in 31 B.C., the victor found he possessed an enormous army of about 70 legions, a lot more than were necessary to the Empire and could

Plan o( Lhe encarnpmenl of a legio n.

be economically supported . Octavian, (Augustus from 27 B.C.) started to disband the legions, until there were only 28 left, generally eliminating those that had been enlisted more recently (i .e. those bearing the highest identification number) and keeping the oldes t and most employed ones . Meanwhile he found no di fficulty in recruiting in the Impelial am1y also the best legions among those defeated at Actium (the III "Gallica", the VI "Ferrata" and the XU "Fulminata"). Thus he found he had various legionary unils with double, or even triple, numbers: there were two IV Legions ("M.acedonica" and "Scytica"), two V ("Alaudae" and "Macedonia"), two VI ("Ferrata" and "Victrix"), two X ("Fretensis" and "Gemina") and three III ("Augusta", "Cyrenaica" and "Gallica"). No nevv legions were recruited until 39 A.D ..That year Emperor Caius Caligula decided to reinforce the Rhine frontier and established two new legionary units: the XV "Primigenia" and

Finally, the last legion recruited during the Early Empire was constituted by Emperor Alexander Severns (222235) in 231 , and was cal led IV "lla lica". Here the number IV continues the series of the three " ltalicae" constituted by Nero and Marcus Aurelius. THE MAIN SURNAMES OF THE LEGIONS OF THE EARLY EMPIRE

Cordoba, Spain: a Roman hrid~e on the Guadalquivir.

the XXll "Primigenia". In 67 A.D., Emperor Nero constituted a new legion, the I "Italica"; nobody knows why he gave it that name. Possibly it was simply one of his whims. Two new legions \Vere recruited in the tumu I tuous period benveen 68 -69 A.D. In Spain, Servi us Sulp ici us Gal ba proclaimed himself Emperor and, to safeguard his interests, he founded a legion, the V Jl "Galbiana", to which he gave this number in order Lo give conLinuily to the legion that he kept under his comrnand, the Vl "Victrix" . When he arrived to Rome from Spain, Galha recru iLed, legally, the I Legion "Adiutrix" (which had been existing ror a short time in an irregular way) . The legion was given this number because it was the first to be recruited among the sai Iors of a fleet; its quarters were at Miseno, near Naples. In 69 ,,vith the men of a fleet (in this case that of Ravenna, on the Adriatic Sea) a new .legion was recruited wh ich, of course, received the name of 11 "Adiutrix". The fo llowing year,

Empernr Vespasian (69-79 A.D.) formed two more legions, the IV "Flavia" and the XVI "Flavia", whose numbers corresponded to the IV "Macedonica" and the "XVI "Gallica", which he was intentioned to disband due to a serious lack or discipline among its men. In 83, Emperor Domitian (81 96 A.D.) recruited a new legion which he called l "Minervia" , perhaps because it was the first founded by him or for a mere whim. In 98 or 99, Emperor Trajan (98 - 117) established the the thirtieth legion or h is army, which he called XXX "Ulpia" and, even if there was an empty space in the numbering between XXII and XXX, the second legion recruited b y him in l 08 got number two: II ''TrÂˇaiana" . No more legions were constituted until 168 A.D., when Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161 180) recruited two nev,, units. As a continuation of the numbering of the legion rou nded by Nero ( I "Italica") they were given the numbers and names of II "ltalica" and III "Italica". Almost thirty years later, in 196 A.D., Septimius Severus recruited three legions that he numbered from one to three (I "Parthica", 11 "Parthica" and 111 "Parthica").

As we said, the legions created in the last period of the Republican Age were given only a number. Surnames were assigned later or, we can say, they earned them . However, some of them did not have the time to obtain them, as \.vas the case vv'ith the XVII, XVIII and XIX, which \vere annihilated by the GerÂˇmans in an ambush in 9 A.D .and of which we ignore even the nickname . Starting frorn 39 A.D ., with Lbe two legions constituted by Caligula, all the new legionary uni LS received, together with their number, also the c01responding appellation. These surnames had various origins.They could derive from a pan of the name (nornen, prenomen or cognomen) of their recruiter or reorganizer. We find the first example of this in the legions called "Augustae". They received the appellation in honour of Emperor Augustus (27 B.C. - 14 A.D.) who reformed them during his rule. In 68, Galha, Governor of Tarraconensis Spain, when he proclaimed himself Emperor, recruited the VII Legion "Gal biana" \,v hich , evidently, received its name from the cognomen of the insurgent. The appellatives of the IV "Flavia" and XVI "Flavia" derived from the name of Emperor Titus Flavius Vespasian who had formed them. Marcus Ulpius Trajan, an Emperor of Span ish origin, recruited two new legions, the first of \vhich, tbe XXX "Ulpia", received as appellation the name 51

The si[!,nifer Âˇwas the b earer of the legion's insi[!,nia., ihe lion skin marked his {1,1.nction.

of the Emperor while the second, the U "Trajana", derived its name from the cognomen of its founde1~ Also a legion of the Republican Age had taken the narne of its founder, a rather unusual thing at that time. It was the xvn Legion "Cornelia Spinteri", which took Lhis name in honour of Cornelius Espinter, Proconsul of Cilicia from 56 to 52 B.C .. This legion did not survive Augustus' reform. Other legions already existed -w hen they received appellations based on the name of .important persons who had relations with them. Thus the XX Legion, vvhich took part in the repression of the Dalmatian- Pannonic revolt of 69 A.D ., .integrated within the army of future Empernr Tiberius, fell into an ambush and survived only thanks to the valour of its men and the command capabilities of its legate, Marcus Valerius Messalinus. From then on, to honour its commander, the legion was called XX "Valeria". In 42 A.D., Âˇwhen the VII Legion "Macedonica" and the XI camped together in the encamp.m ent of Burnum (today's Kistanje, Croatia), in Dalmatia, they were incited lo rebel by the governor of the province, Furius Camillus Escribonianus. After a day of uncertainty, both legions decided to remain loyal to Emperor Claudius and therefore the Roman Senate granted to each one of them the privilege of calling itself w ith the "Claudia Pia Fidelis"appellation. Another group of legionary surnames refers to geographical regions. Some recall the place of recruitment of the legion, such as, for example, the "Italicae" legions. Other geographical names remm1sce of places where particular legions participated in memorable battles, or of peoples

against whom they (ought, whose names deserved to be mentioned in the name of the legion . An example of this are t he legions whose name refers to the province

of Macedonia where, at Filippi, in 42 B .C. , the members of the second triumvirate, Oct.avian, Anthony and Lepidus defeated in battle the troops of Caesar's

~~!!:Jiaa_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __g~--

..,

# QC

·5

The legioncuy's lances, f1·om bouom 10 top: venabulum, light pilum, heavy pilum and hasta. The first was the velite 's javelin. The hasta was the lance o{ the triarii (the third line , made up of veterans , /asked w ith resis1ing to the final thrust). Th e pilum was int roduced during th e Empire. it consis1ed o{ a wooden stafT ending with a cone, on which an iron bar was inserted. The bar ·was fasiened by two bolts, o ne of which had a prearranged /i·acture-line. Once the pilum was launched, the fi'acture bolt broke on impact, prevenling the enemy from reusing the weapon. If the pilum penetrated a shield, it m.ade i 1s handling impossible at the moment of hand- to-hand combat. At the end of the battle, they were recovered, and easily repaired by the Roman smi1hs.

,.... 11 0

Another origin of the legionary surnames can be found in the names of the deities that were worshipped in ancient Rome. Some gods and goddesses, chosen for their bond with the founder or the reorganizer of a legion, gave their name to dete r mj ned legionary units, at the same time making the image o f the god become one of the emblems of the legion. The earliest case known regards Julius Caesar,

member of the gens Julia , a family whose protecLress was Venus. He granted to the X Legion, which he favoured so much that he made it his personal guard, an appellation intimately bound to him: Lhat of "Veneria" (Legion X "Veneria"). The narnes of another group of legions refer to the most varied characteristics of each unit or its men . This is the case with the I Legion "Acliutrix". Its appellation, which in English means "helper",

murderers, the Roman noblemen Brutus and Cassius, forcing them to su icide . In reme mbrance of that battle, various legions were called "Macedonicae": the IV "Macedon.ica'', the V "Macedonica", the VI "Macedonica" (Victrix), the VII "Macedonica" (Claudia) and the IX "Macedonica", ,vhose appellation was later replaced by that of "1:-Iispana", in honow· of the valour shown in the Iberian Peninsula. ·weapons of the Roman legionwy: the gladius (a short sword, aboul 50 cm long) and the pugio (a 24 cm -long dagger). The gladius was adopted after the 2ncl Punic Wa r, in substill.ition of the Greek Hoplite sword.

THE ROMAN LEGIONS OF THE EARLY EMPIRE

DEPLOYMENT OF THE RC

(main suramcs in capital letters)

Legio I Legio I Legio I Legio I Legio I Legio I Lcgio I Legio II Lcgio II Legio II Legio II Legio II Legio III Legio III Legio III Legio III Legio III Legio lV Legio IV Legio IV Legio IV Legio V Legio V Legio VI Lcgio VI Legio VII Lcgio VII Legio VII Lcgio VIII Lcgio IX Legio X Lcgio X Legio X LcgioXI Legio XU Lcgio XIII Legio XIV LegioXV Legio XV Legio XVI Legio XVI Legio XVII Legio XVUI Legio XIX Legio XX Lcgio XXI Legio XXU Legio XXII Legio XXX

ADIUTRJX Ciassica Pia Fidelis Constans. AUGUSTA. GERMANI CA. ITALIC<\. Pia Fidelis. MACRIANA Liberatrix. Flavia MINERVIA Pia Fidelis Domitiana. PARTHICA Nisibenica. ADIUTRIX Pia Fidelis Constans Pannonica. Gallica AUGUST A Britannica. ITALICA Pia fidelis Divitensium. PARTHICA Pia Fidelis Felix Aeterna. TRAIA NA Fortis Gcrmanica Pia Fidelis. AUGUSTA Liberatrix Pia \/index Constans Perpetua Fidelis. CYRENAICA Claudia. GALLICA Felix.. ITALICA Concors Pia Ficlelis. PARTHICA. FLAVIA Firma Felix. ITALIA Victrix. Sorana MACEDONICA. SCYTHICA. ALAUDAE Gallica. Urbana MACEDONICA Pia Fidelis Constans. FER.RATA Fidelis Constans Felix. Maceclonica Hispana VICTRIX Pia Fidelis Domitiana. Macedonica CLAUDIA Pia Fidelis. GALBIANA. GEM INA Felix Pia. Veterana Gallica Mutinensis AUGUSTA Pia Fidelis Constans Commoda. Macedonica Triunphalis HISPANA. FRETENSIS. GEMINA Pia Fidelis Domitiana. VENERIA. CLAUDIA Pia Fidelis. Antiqua Paterna FULMINATA Victrix Certa Constans. GEMINA Pia Fidelis. GEMINA Martia Victrix. APOLLINARIS Pia Fidelis. PRIM IGENIA. FLAVIA Fimrn Pia Fidelis. GALLICA Gcrmanica.

V ALERJA Victrix Britannica. RAPAX. DEIOT ARIANA. PRIMIGENIA Pia Fidelis Domitiana. ULPIA Victrix Pia fidelis.

Nuni, I recalls the fact (w ithou t precedent)that it was formed by Nero as a support to the regular troops , in a moment when the politico-military situation was adve rse to him (Vindex' insum::ction in Gallia and Galba's insu1Tection in Spain). When Caesar decided to wage war on Pompey, the urgent need of troops prompted him to recruit the entire legion among the transalpine Gauls; a m easure totally unusual because, according to the rule, the legionaries had to

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1-Legio IX HISPANA, York 2-Legio XX VALERIA, Chester 3-Legio II AUDITRIX, Chester 4-Legioll AUGUSTA, Caerleon 5-Legio XXII PRIMIGENIA, Nimegen 6-Legio X GEMINA, Nimegen 7-Legio VI VICTRIX, Neuss 8-Legio XXI RAPAX, Bonn 9-Legio XIV GEMINA, Mainz 10-Legio I AUDITRIX, Mainz 11-Legio VIII AUGUSTA, Strasbourg 12-Legio XI CLAUDIA, Windish 13-Legio XV APOLLINARIS, Carnutum 14-Legio XIII GEMINA, Poetovio 15-Legio VII CLAUDIA, Vinimiacum 16-Legio V MACEDONICA, Oescus 17-Legio I ITALICA, Novae 18-Legio V ALAUDAE, Danube 19-Legio IV FLAVIA, Barnum 20-Legio XVI FLAVIA, Satala 21-Legio XII FULMINATA, Melitene ZZ-Legio VI FERRATA, Samosata 23-Legio IV SCYTHICA, Cyrrus 24-Legio Ill GALLICA, Damascus 25-Legio X FRETENSIS, Jerusalem 26-Legio XXII DEIOTARIANA, Alexandria 27-Legio III CYRENAICA, Luxor ZS_Legio Ill AUGUSTA, Tebessa 29-Legio VII GEMINA, Leon

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" ,, , b e Roman c1t1zens and the inha bitants of Gallia, recently conque red, generally were not. This new legion started to be kno,vn by the name of "Alaudae", because its men had the habit to decorate their helmets with lark (alauda) feathers. The ,.vord derived from the Celtic language of the new legionaries. In 47 B.C., Caesar tranformed it into iusta legio , i.e. a regular legion, and gave it a number. From then on, until its destruction by the Dacians in 86 A.D ., it was known

• 25 J

by the name of V "Alaudae". As regards the origin of the name of the XU Legion "Fulminata" there is a legend that spread during the IV Century. This legion, mostly formed by Christian soldiers, was tranferred by Emperor Marcus Aurelius from its encampment at Melitene (today's Malatya in Cappadocia) to the Danubian frontier, in order take part in the operations against Lhe Quadis, the Marcomannis and the Sannatians. In 172 or 174 A.D. it was surrounded, together with other

units, by the barbarians. The situation ,vas made even more serious by the lack of water that the Romans were suffering at that moment. The Roman soldiers of the XII Legion then invoked the help of their God, who sent the rain in the form of a violent storm, accompanied by thunderbolts and lightnings. The storm helped the besieged and took the superstitious barbarians by surprise, causing their defeat. .M arcus Aurelius, impressed by this demonstration of divine power, stopped the 55

persecutions against the Christians, who were numerous among the legionaries, and in r路emembrance of that event, assigned that legion the appellation of "Fulminata". Several legions have "Gemina" as main s urname. lt appears that this name vvants to indicate "double" leg ions, refc r-r-ing to the reorganization of such legions during Augustus' reform . lt seems that when that Emperor had to reduce the almost seventy legions that were under his command in 30 B.C., in many cases disbanded some as a whole, while in other cases he considered the men's experience and age, dismissing the oldest and those with lesser military capability. With the remaining men he organized some legions, merging them two by two, and this is the reason why they were called "Geminae" . vVe ignore what legions were merged bu Lwe know the result of the fusion: X "Gemina", XIII "Gemina" and XIV "Gemina". There is a number of legions which, despite having been 56

mentioned in the preceding paragraphs as regards their surnames, must be considered separately since they have no number. These are very rare cases in the Roman army o( the Republican Age and did not survive the civil wars or the I Century B.C. Excepting the "Alaudae" Leg ion (al r eady mentioned and which later took nurnber V) there a r路e other legions with these characteristics. It is Lhe case 01 the "Gemina" Legion, which was part of Pompey's army in the battle 01 Phar路sala. Another of these legions is the "Martia", \v.h ose name r路efers to Mars, the god of war. The last of these leg ions withou t a number is the "Vernacula" Legion, very closely bound to the Spanish territories because it had been recruited in 49 B.C. in the Iberian Peninsu la by Pompey's legates among the c lients and suppor-t ers of this Roman general in the war against Julius Caesar. The name "Vemacula" refers to the fact that it was recruited among the inha bi tans o f the province,

Above.

Salcunanca: Roman bridge. Facing page. In brown, the ex1ent of the Roman Empire in the ll Century A.D.

therefore certainl y Rorirnn citizens, (let's not forget tha t Transalpine Spain war one of the most Romanized countries in the area under Roman domination) and not among natives, like the "Ala udae" Legion. THE SECONDARY SURNAMES OF THE LEGIONS OF THE EARLY EMPIRE Besides the abovesaid names, by wh ich ll1e legions were usually identified, each one of them co uld have other secondary appellations, granted to the leg ion by the Senate or by Emperors in vaiious circumstances. Sometimes a principal surname could become secondary, when

the legion assumed a new name. Among these appellations, tbose most commonly g r a,ntecl were r-elated to loyalty (to the Stale or to l he Emperor ). Tv-iO of these titles, Pia and Fidelis (virtuous and faithful) were generally granted at the same Lime. The Roman SenaLe, for example, in 42 B.C., granted these Lilies, next Lo the name "Claudia", to the VII "Macedonica" and to theXT, because of their loyally to the Emperor during Esc1ibonianus'rebellion. These two honorary titles could also be granted separately. Thus the origina l name of the I I "Italica" was "Pia", a title which, when, in l he same year of its recruitment (1 68 A.D.), the name of this leg ion was change d , remained as secondary appellation. Some years later~ the II Legion "AugusLa" and the VII "Gemina" were given Lhe same title by Septimius Severns. The surname of "Fide lis" was

given by t he same Emperor to the II Legion "llalica" for having suppo1-tecl him in his accession to the imperial Lhrone. OLher honorific adjectives of the legions re(erÂˇ to the loyalty towards this or that personali ty: "Cost.ans" (immova bl e in its fideliLy ) was given by Marcus Aurelius to the VI Legion for having re fu sed to support Avidus Cassius. There are also seco nd ary surnames Lhat refer to a place or a reg ion of the Empire, or to their inhabiLants . The V Legion ".M acedonica", starting from the I Century B.C., had "Urba na" as secondary appellat ion.Its origin is unknown , but surely it is Jinked to Rome, or urbs (the city par excellence) . "Sora na" was one of the titles of the IV "Macedonica", which probably originated from one of its armed actions of 43 B.C. in the vicinity of Soranurn (in the province of today's Grosseto), in the d ays

Roman auxiliaries.

preceding the battle of Mutina (today's Modena), between Octavian and Marc Anthony. After the invasion of Britannia in 43 A.D., some legions that took part in it (the II "Augusta" and the XX "Valeria") were also called "Britannica", in memory of their deeds in the island. The title of "Germanica" was conferred to the XVI Legion "Gallica", possibly for its intervention in the campaigns carried out in this region under Augustus and Tiberius (14-37). Other characteristics that were believed to belong to a particular legion or to some of its components became surnames of legionary units:"Liberatrix" (liberator), assigned in 68 A.D. by Clod.ius Macrus to his Legions I "Macriana" and III "Augusta"; "Fortis" (strong, valiant), confe1Ted by Trajan to the II Legion "Traiana", etc. Another group of secondary surnames originate from the names of Emperors . The I "Minervia", when it was recruited \Vas called I "Flavia Minervia" after its founder Domilian, a member of the gens Flavia. Some legions garrisoned in Germany, starting from 89 B.C., bore the name "Domitiana", derived from the cognomen of this Emperor, after the episode of Saturninus, until 96 B.C., when Domitian was assass.i nated by the praetorians. The Senate decreed for the dead Emperor the damnatio memoriae (literally, the malediction of his memory: his name was deleted from all monuments and any reference lo him in the names of legions, colonies, cities, etc. was eliminated). Starling from the beginning of the III Century, the habit of giving the military units an appellation derived from the name of lhe Emperor o f Lhe

moment began to spread within the Roman army. So we have a "Severiana", an "Alexandriana", a "Gordiana", a "Philippiana", just to mention a few. To give an example of the above , during Alexander Severns' empire, the name of the I Legion "Italica" \.vould have been I Legion "Italica Pia Fidel is Alexandriana" . The names of gods were uncommon among the secondary surnames: the only documented one is that of "Martia" for the XIV legion

"Gemina", conferred by Nero in 63 A.D.

THE NUMBERS AND NAMES OF THE LATER EMPIRE'S LEGIONS During the period of transition from the earlier lo the later Empire, known as "Military Anarchy" (235 -285 A.D.), few legions were recruited and their narnes followed Lhe pattern of the

previous denominalions, i.e. geographic or ethnic names. For example, the name of the VI Legion "GaJJicana"; where the future Emperor Aurelian us served as military Tribune, refers to Gallia. Two legions recruited in this period, the IV and the V "Martia" bore the name of Mars, the god of war. In 277, Emperor Probus recruited three legions in Isauria, a region of present-day Turkey, and gave them the names of I "Isauria Sagittaria", I "Isauria" and JI "Isauria". In 285 Emperor Diocletian obtained total power over the Roman Empire. Aware of the importance of lhe army as a support of throne and state, he started to enlarge it, a task which was to be continued by one of his successors, Constantine I (306 337). The strengthening of the army implied an increase in lhe number of units and, probably, of the legions. The numbers of the new legions raised by Diocletian only in some cases follow a welldefined logic. What he never did was to continue the numeration starting from the highest, which was the " Ulpia" . Thus Egypt, which had been garrisoned by only one legion, the II "Trajana", was reinforced by two new ones: the I "Maximiana" and the III "Diocletiana". As regards the appellations, some of the new legions adopted the emperors' names and surnames. In 286, Diocletian appointed co-Emperor one of his old fellow-soldiers, Maximianus, and both assumed, for pres tige 's sake, divine names: Jupiter (Jovis, in Latin) for Diocle lian and Hercules for Maximianus. Thus we have the III Legion "Diocletiana", the I Maximiana, the I and V "Joviae" and the II, III and VI "Herculiae". Surnames referring to gods are, for instance, the I "Martia" (or "Martiorum"), ,vhile geographic ones are used in the garrisons and legions recruited in Armenia

had overtaken the border fortifications . The first units of th is type had been troops skilled in breakthroughs, which were called "Ioviani" and usually followed Diocletian and Maximianus in their military expeditions. Those recruited in this period, instead, vvere called "Lancerii", from the "la.ncea", a launching weapon which had replaced the "pilum" (javelin) in the III Century A.D .. At any rate, this does not mean that the "la.ncea" was used only bv these units of "La.ncerii". -The number o f lhis type o f legions grew very much in the period of Costantine I and his successors. They were given no numbers but only surnames of the most varied origins. Some of them derived from the names of the border legions which had originated the new legions of the army. Other denominations referred to the legions' mission to protect the Roman world, i.e "Armigeri Defensores" (literally, armed protectors) or "Propugnatores" ( defenders). Some names supply information on the mission or the armament typical of each unit, as is the case wilh the "Ballistarii", name of several legions of the manoeuvre units. These legions had originated under Emperor Galienus, between 260 and 268, from the regrouping and reorganization of the ancient legions of the early empire into autonomous artillery legions. One of their fundamental elements ,vas a weapon called "ba.llista" . Hence their name . Other surnames of this type were "Funditores" (armed with "f·un d ae" ,s1·mgs ) , "P raeventores" THE UNNUMBERED (given to exploring) and LEGIONS OF THE LATER "Superventores" (literally, "those EMPIRE who arrive suddenly and Diocletian and Costantine I's unexpectedly", probably tasked military reforms included the with disturbing the enemy rear moulding of a mobile and guard). Some legions' names inform manoeuvring army, which had the task to resist the invasions of us about the name of the the barbarian peoples after they recruiters : "Costantini Seniores",

(I and II "Armenicae"), in Pontus (I "Pontica"), in Noricurn (I "Noricorum") and in·-Britannia (II "Brilannica"). There were also compound surnames, such as Legion I "Maximiana Thebaeorum" and III "Diocletiana Thebeaeorum", probably recruited on the basis of the I "Maxim iana" and the III "Diocletiana", and completed with Egyptian recruits from the region of Thebes, on the banks of the Nile. The legions enlisted by Constantine I or by his father Costantius Clorus are difficult to attribute to one or the other, because all of them had "Flavia" as part of their surname (lhe complete name of Constantine I being Flavius Costantinus, and that of his falher Flavius Costantius Clorus). Other legions of this period bore geographical names referring to the origin of lhe first recruits or to the units'garrison. Some legions completed their surnames precisely in this period, as was the case with Diocletian's three "Alp in ae," which became I , II and III "Juliae Alpinae" in honour of Julius Crispus, Constantine's son, who commanded them for a yeai~ or of Coslantius (Flavius Julius Costantius). Finally, some legions raised in this period attached to their names those embodying the longings of the populations in those troubled times: Peace (Legion I ''Flavia Pacis"), Virtue (Legion II "Flavia Virtutis") and Salvalion (Legion Ill "Fl avia Salutis").

"Costantiaci", "Felices Theodosiaci Iuniores", "Valentin ia nenses'', but most ne v.i legions took their name after the reg ion of thei r recruitment or the ethnic origin of their members, who were generally inhabitants of the border areas of the Rhine and the Danube . Without mentioning every legion, we can c ite as examples the "A bric anteni", recru ited in the city of Abricantum ( today's Avranches, France) and its surroundings, in the province of "Gallia Lugclunensis" II; the Dacians, r·ecrnited in "Dacia Ripensis" and "Dacia Medite rranea"; the ''Britones Seniores", recru ited in Britannia; the "Mauri Osmisiaci" prnbably made up of inhabitants of the African province of Mauritania (approximately north of present-day Morocco and Algeria) and quartered in Osmis (today's Brest, France). Several legions ,vere also recruited among the inhabitants of areas outside the empire, such as the "Tzaann i", a Caucasian population of present -day Georgia and the "Transtigritani", recru i ted, as shown b y the i r name, "bey ond t.he Tigris". Possib ly, many of these units had already existed as auxiliary format ions since the III Century A.D. and Costantine I , or one of his successors, only raised thei r· standing. Some legions had names made up by surnames of var·ious origin: for instance, by joining together their type of armament and their founder's name, we have the "Ballistarii Theodosiaci"; a type of armarnent and their ethnic origin: the "Lancearii Augustenses" (from the city of Augusta); the name of their recruiter· and their ethnic origin: the "Constantini Daphnenses" (from Daphne , today's Spant1.on, Bulgaria). From 364, several legions appeared wiLJ-1 new appellations: "Seniores" or "Iu niores". The origin of these surnames was the election, in that yea,~ of Valentinianus I.

This Emper01~ realizing that he needed help in orde r· to govern, appo int ed co-Emperor hi s brother Valcns and put him at the head of the eastern ten-itories o f the em pire, keep ing the ,vestern parL for himself. In splitting the army units, rather than applying the "this for you, that for me" system , they decided to d ivide some of the ma i n legi onary and au xili a r·y units in two parts. Those which joined the western army assumed the new surname of "Seniores", si nee Va lentin ianus was th e senior (or chief) Empernr, while those of th e eastern part were called "Iuniores" , cons id ering that Vale ns was the designate (or junior) Emperor. Examples of this arrangement are the "Ioviani Seniores" and the "Iov iani Tunio res " , the "Herculiani Seniores" and the "Herculiani Tuniores''. But there were also exceptions to the rule, as w as th e case with the " Mart.enses Seniores" and "Martenses lun iores", ,.vhere the "Seni.ores" \Vere in the Eastern Empire and the "Juniores" in the West. CONCLUSION

The Roman legions were identified through a number, a surname or both . The numbers could be repeated, but the names derived from geographical areas, Emperors, or eve n from thei r recruiters. From the end of tl,e IV Centu r·y , many leaders of the imperial army, especia lly in the Wes t, were barbarian mercenaries, ·who served in the Roman arrny with a contract or a pact (foedus) signed by the Roman State with the tribes, such as the one contracted in 382 by Theodosius I with the Visi goths. He rccru i Le d thousands of them in the army of the Eastern Empire . These new recruits wore their own garments (they did not use Roman

uniforms or, truth to te lI, an y uniform at all), carried their ow~ weapons and had thei r· ow n leaders, upon wl1om, in order to flatter t hem, the Roma n s bestowed resounding titles, such as "Magister Militum p e r Il lyricum", awarded in 401 to Alaric, King of the Visigoths. The new units ,vere nol given names anyrnore and the existing ones drown e d in the sea of th e barbar ian invasions of th e beginning of the V Century, a t least in the Western Em pire, since in the East many legions survived, a l beit only nominally, till the dissolution of this type of units, towar·d the end of the Y r Century.

L 0

'Lieurenant Colonel, Headquarters, Joint Sub Regional Command South Wesr, JVladrid '

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Liberati and P. S ilverio: "Vita c cosuirn i dci Rom ani antichi", Quasar, Rome, 1988. J. M. Roldan: "Hispania y el ejercito romano", C.S.I.C., Salamanca, 1974, page 2 10. E . R u ggiero, from Augusta, Fu!mina.la (Xii), Gallica (\/), ltalica (11), ltalica (ff!), Legio, in t h e "D iz ionario E pigrafico di Antichita Romana", Rome, 19.'59. Julio Rodriguez Gonzalez: "Historia de las legiones romanas", Si g nife r Libros, Madrid 2001. Peter Connolly : "L as leg iones romanas", Espasa-Calpe, Madrid 1986. J. A. Alcaide and F. Vela: "1000 Anos de Ejc:rcitos en Espafia" , Alamena, Madrid 1999. Various Authors : "Enciclopedia Historia de E spaf1a", Dolmen S.L , Madrid 2002, vol. 2. Various Authors : R ivista "La Aventura de la Historia" . Arla nza Ediciones S.A., Madrid 2002, no. 44.

This article was 1.vritten with the collaboration

• D1~ Carlo De Risio who wrote a pamphlet on El Alamein this editor published in 1992; • Professor Girolamo Caronna, Chairman of the Infantrymen National Association - branch of Rome - ·w ho reported testinwnies of the veterans from Northern Africa, in particular: Corporal Giovanni Pucciotti, Corporal Balilla Maurizi, Corporal Antonio Ventriglia and Sapper Giovanni 1\tlartini • Professor Gabriele De Rosa, Senator of the Italian Republic, who provided the editor with his war journal.

60 th

Anniversary of tlte Battle by Carlo De Risio Sixty years ago the soldiers of the most important units of the Italian Army Corps in Africa - and of the Italian Anny as a whole - fought a battle at El Alarnein and gave their lives for their country. Franz 23 October to 4 November 1942 the "ArieLe" and "Littorio" armoured Divisions, the "Trieste" Âˇwheeled Division, the "Trent", "Bologna", "Brescia" and "Pavia", infantry Divisions, the "Folgore" parachutists Division, the support units at Army Corps and Division level and the Germ.an "Afrilca Km7Js fought against VIII British Army. The British Anny was stronger in terms of soldiers, equipment and air fc)rce support. The Italian Army, the Navy and the Air force shared a commcm destiny in El Alamein and wrote one of the most heroic pages of our history. Those soldiers gave their lives for their country and left a moral heritage vve and the future generations shall not forget because the future of a Nation is based on its past. Today we can look at (hat battle - included in all history books - and understand what a wrong idea the British Army had of the Italian soldiers. The Italian units were not equipped fc)}' fighting in the North of Africa an.d this was the ,najor reason of their defeat. But they fought against the ene1ny heroically and - when there ivas a balance between the parties - even successfully. On several occasions Rornmel said the Italian soldiers were good fighters and also wrote that "all Italian units, in particular the wheeled ones, were doing better than the Âˇwhole Italian Army had done in the previous years". The Divisions belonging to the 10th and J2Lh Army Cmps (the "Trento", "Bologna", "Brescia" and "Pavia" infantry Divisions - each composed of two poorly manned and equipped Regiments) took part in all operations in Marmarica, Sirtica, Tobruk and in the Egyptian territory and lost all their soldiers in the battle of El Alamein. The same happened to the Divisions of the 20th Wheeled Army Corps and the "Folgore" Division. The "Ariete" armoured Division fought heroically the last desperate battle on 4 November 1942. Rommel and also the VIII British Army commanders felt great admiration for all ltalian soldiers. The silence of the 1talian, British and German Cemetery in El Alamein calls for a peaceful world. Those who gave their lives for their - and our - Count,y must not be fc)}'golten. 11

T~OFLAGS ,'El

Right. The building on hill 33 which was used by the Italians as a base during !.he rescue operation following the baule. 1his hill overlooks 1.he range of hills in front of the sea and is 500 meters far from the Sacrarium.

Below. The area of North Africa between Tobruk and the Suez Canal.

Alamein" means in Arabic "two flags". In 1942 there vvas only a little train station along the railway ninning from the Nile Delta to Tobruk. It was 180 kms. away from Marsa Matruh and l 05 from Alexand1ia. It was only a tiny name on maps and no one could ever image that so many soldiers from different countries - more than the two (flags) recalled by the name of the place - were to fight a battle there: Italians and Germ,ms - who wanted to get to Alexandria, Cairo and Suez - were opposed to the British, the Commonwealth Coalition and their allies. In 1940 the Mid-East Troops British Commander , General Archibals Wavell and the Commander o f the French Armee d'Orient, General Maxime Weygand explored El Alamein because they thought Italy could enter the war and have the 1oth Army heading to Egypt . They thought El Alamein was an important strong position and ordered some defensive works

for possible future operations . In fact, la ter lhe Italian s discovered that some defensive works had been buill in 1940 and the defence had been accurately planned before .

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El Alamein \Vas an important position from the geographical, tactical and strategic point of view. It was 60 kms from the coast, was surrounded and protected by the 217 meters high Qaret El Hirne i mat rocky mountain , the El Qattara depression, by soft ground and quicksand. Moreover the only source of drinkable water of the West Egyptian desert was in El Alamein, as Colonel Fritz Bayerlein reported. All history books say the El Qattara depression could not be crossed. But Desmond Young, a bioghrapher, wrote that Randall Plunket, a Cavalrv officer, started from the S.iwa Oasis with his tank unit and crossed quicksand. Moreover, Rommel wrotes in his notes on the North of Africa Campaign that: "on 29 October

1942, during the battle in El Almein, I was told that the enemy was crossing the depression of El Qattara and was in the region 100 kms South of Marsa Matruh, which was an alarming news. We were concerned because there was no way to make a defence . Many rear units were sent to the threatened region but in the morning of October 30 the news from the Supreme Corn mand turned out to be false." So we can assume that Rommel thought crossing the quicksand region might be possible . Moreover, il seems that Rommel exp lored the El Qattara area several times in the Summer 1942. But in general we can say that a manoeuvre with mechanised units through El Qauara was not possible. 1n order to understand what a tragedy Italians and Germans

experienced in El Alamein Âˇwe must go back lo the decisions taken in the Spring 1942. In fact, on 29 and 30 April 1942 Hitler, Mussolini and their Staffs met in Klessheim and decided to win the match in the Mediterranean and in the North of Africa . The RAF basis on the isle of Malta were bomb ed by Kesserlings' 2 nd Fleet (he had been appointed as Chief of Southern Forces Command on 28 November 1942) and by the Italian Air Force . The Italian convoys could then go through Tripoli and Bengasi and reinforce the Italian-German armoured Anny. General (then Marshall) Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of the Italian General Staff wanted to invade Malla (the Italian nickname for the plan was C3 while the Gerrnans called it Herkules Operation). An expedition Corps was being prepared and as many as seven Divisions were marked for the C3 operation, includine special units from the "Folgore" parachutists Division, the "San Marco" R egimen t , a special Regiment of Carnicie Nere and many more specialists .. The Germans planned to take part in this operation with one parachutists Division, with amphibious troops and with hundreds of airplanes.In order to make the operation easier the RAF had to be turned out of the whole Cyrenaica and Marmarica area and Tobruk was to be conquered. So, when they met in Klessheim they decided to start vvill1 the Italian -German armoured Army and the operation was called "Aida". The aim was to defeat the British forces and take Tobruk. They planned to reassemble the troops along the Hal faya -Sollum line and start the operation against Malta . An operation agai nst Egypt was would have come later. "Aida" began on 26 May at 2 p .m ., which was unusual for an

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LIBIA

Sommergibili avversari" ...,__./ Bombardieri awe1sari p路rovenienti da Levanto

offensive operation . In fac t it was a fal se start. So, after the Italian infantry Divisions belonging to the 10 th and 21 st Army Corps moved along the coast Rom me! ordered all armo ured and mechanized units (over 10,000 vehicl es) to move in the night. The real operation s tarted wi th the keyword "Vene1.ia" . General Ritchie's 8 t h Army was positioned between Ain EI Gazala (on the coast) and Bir Hacheim, 64 kms sou t hwards (in the desert) protected by wide minefields . All battles that took place clay by clay un til Tobruk was

conquered shall not be addressed in this article. Th e quick batt le Rommel had in his mind turned out to be a long lasting struggle. On 27 May 30% of the German tanks were destroyed by the British using the American tanks "Grant" equipped with a 75 mm fixed cannon and a turn ing 37 mm cannon in t he turret. Also the Italian armotffed "Ariete" a nd th e wheeled "Trieste" Divisions (belonging to the 20 th Army Corps) took part in that manoeuvre and lost a high number of solcl ier路s and tanks. On that occasion the Italian units

attacked by the British during a withdrawal operation (ordered by Rommel to make logis ti c support easier) pushed back t he enemy and also the British units lost many so ldiers and tanks. The British thought the Italians were an easy enemy to destrny. But they were not and the British had not learned the lesson when o n 19 November 1941 (at t he beginning of the "Crusad e r" Operation) lhe 22 nd Royal Armoured Brigade attacked th e Italian "Ari ete" in Bir E l Go bi and lost more than 50 tanks . The same happened when the British and Indians attacked the Italian stronghold in Bir El Gobi and the "Giovani Fascisti" battalio ns push e d back the Briti sh tan ks a l tho u gh they were equip ped only with few 4 7/32 anti -ta n k weapons. Going back to th e June 194 2 events it is worth noting that the Italian-German Army began to break through the British defence although paying a high tribute in terms of human li ves and lank::; . The Italian -German Armv conq uered the Gott El Ual eb middle position, Bir Hacheim heroically clefended by Gener-a l Koenig's Brigade - and fina lly Ain E l Ghazala. T he Briti sh armoured units of the 7 th and the 1st Div isions along wit h 路 th e au lonomous Brigades we r e finall y defeated in a place th e Bri lis h call e d "The KnigJ-1 ts Bridge" . The British VIII Army began the battle w ith 843 (plus 145 reserve) tanks o [ wh .i ch 24 2 "Grant" and 219 "Stuart" made in the USA, w hich means the Un ited States were playing an im portant role a ls o in the North African theatr e . The Italian -Ge rma n ar moured Army began the battle wilh 560 ta nks - of which 22 8 were Ita lian - and du ri ng t he [igbLs it was given 76 more tanks both from the Germans and the Ita li an " Littorio " armoured Division which will be addressed later in th is artic le.

1\1113 Tank in 1/ze desert.

T hen the VIII Army Âˇwas stronger than the JLalian-German one, both in te rms of tan ks and so ldiers . Also t h e Desert Air Force was s tro nger t han the Italian Air Force and th e Lu ft \vaffe together, even if the latter had n{oved to Li bi a as many as 700 airplanes, w h ich had an important part in the attack operations since the very beginning. The Ax is ar-moured units were manoem,Ted wi th great skills and managed to destroy the enemy's armoured units so th at a fter the Knight Bridge batt le th e VIII Army was nmnerically superior no more. Tobruk was the n attacked by more thatn 30,000 troops supported by the air force and after 24 .h ours the battle was over. This caused a great deal of comment in the world. Tobruk may be considered as an introduction to El Alamein. The defeat in Tobruk (Rommel had been p lann ing s i ne e the

month of April J 941 ) prompted the American military industry to better support the front line in the North of Africa. Win ston Churchill was in Washington to meet President Roosevelt when he was told Tobruk had been conquered by the enemy. The British Premier vvrote in his historical record: "(. ..) and the President was given a message. He read it silently and then gave it to me: the message reported that 25,000 soldiers had surrendered to the enemy in Tobruk. ( ... ) President Roosevelt saw my painful feelings and said: "You can suffer a defeat but you cannot be dishonoured. How can we help you?" This was my ans\.ver: "You can send a ll the Shennan tanks you have to the North of Africa as soon as possible". Finally Roosevelt did more that he had promised and from the US were sh ipped also 300 Sherman w hi thout e ngines and on a different cargo were then shipped 300 Sherrnan engines to the Suez Canal. The ship carrying the e ngines was sin ked by the e nemy bu t more engines were

s hipped fro m the United States irnrnecliately. The British and the Americans did their best not to lose Egypt and to protect the countries pr oducing fuel in the Mid East (Iran an d Irak) while the Axis countries were simply enjoyi ng t heir victory and did not give enough support to the mÂˇmoured units that had taken part in lhe batt les . At the same time they decided they wou ld not attack Malta any more. It is Âˇworth noting that while Tobruk was b eing conquered l\ilussolini wrote a letter to Hitler to confirm his idea that Ma lta had Lo be conquered as they had decided in the month of April. Mu ssolini also pressed for fuel support to be delivered to the Ital ian Navy that had attacked two British convoys sailing to Malta frorn Gibraltar and Alexandria. 15 out of the 17 well escorted merchant ships were destroyed before arriving to the besieged island of Malla and the British lost also many war ships. The Italian Navy had no more fuel [or attacking Malta. 67

A 1938 postcard from the 85'h infantry Regiment, Sabratha Division (XXI Army Corps) in 1942.

the Caucasus and Stalingrad. The encryption codes the Italian Military Information Service had taken from the Americ a n Embassy in Rome were of great importance to the Italian a nd German Headquarters in Lib ia. Said codes allowed them to read the reports the American Military Attache in Cairo, Colonel Fran k Bonner Fellers, wrote and sent to the War Department. They knew hoÂˇw the things were going to the VIII British Army. This was confirmed b v Marshall of Italy Etlore Bastic;, General Governor of Libia and High Commander of I.be Arn1ed Forces in the North of Africa , when he wrote his historica l records in 1958. Bastico reports the intercepted messages : "Rommel can invade Egypt and the Axis allack Malta to have a free support channel from Italy to Greece ... The Axis flow of support to the Armies must be interrupted otherwise the Mid East will be at Rommel's mercy ...''

lv140 SelhJropelled 75118 gu 11 of the Lillorio Armoured Division.

But Hitler was as euphoric as Rommel for the victory in Tobruk and wrote back to .Mussolini that the troops must go on and completely destroy the British Army. they had seized large quantities of fuel, equipment and food in Tobruk bu t all that \,vas not enough to give a new life to the German and the Italian units. But Hitl er thought th e great offensive in Russia was to begin on 28 June and all armoured forces had to be directed against

THE MIRAGE OF THE PYRAMIDS eller repo. rts lhat 1009 out of 1142 Bri tish tanks were destroyed. In the Mid East there were only 133 la nks left. That's why Rommel said it was a n extraordinary occas ion . Th e VIII Army w as defeated in Tobruk as it h ad never ha ppened before. That was the time to attack a nd conqL1er Al exandri a , Cairo a nd the Canal. Bul neither Bastico nor Kesselring or Cava llero agreed with Rommel. On 25 June the three of th em mel in Derna a nd Kesse lring sai d: "the enemy may be capable of a massive cou nterattack. I feel it and J am scared of it. The enemy can still rely on 600 airplanes while we only have 60 or 70 and so have the Italians. Moreove r 50% of our airplanes cannot be moved after the troops because transportation is not enough. I told the Fi.ihrcr our rorces were enou gh strong lo win Tobruk but we need more fu el, bombs and airplanes to go on fighting. I th ink I was clear and honest when I said Romm el cannot go beyond El Alamein" . On 26 June Cavallero, Bastieo, Rommel and Kesselring met in Sidi E l Ba rrani for a fi n al meeting while t.he forwa rd troops were getting near lhe entrenched fields of Marsa Matruh. Rommel was i ndifferent to Kess elrin g. Bastico did nol completely share Rommel's opinion and Cavallero was ha lf way between trusting Rommel or not. Cavallero prompted 1\ll usso lini to go to Lib ia an d M u sso lini thou g ht h e w oul d ent er Alexan dria triumphantl y. But it ·w as not so and after waiting until 20 July he went back to Ilaly. Bastico's war journ al rep ort w h at they to ld each oth er.

Rommel was trusty although he knew he wouJd not be given a real sup port. He asked for more suppo rt but Kesselring told him there was too m uch to d o all around the world and he had been given only some new "Stukas". Rommel concluded: "when our Army overcomes E l Alamein whic h I do believe so - we shall be in Cairo on 30 June. I shall be waiting for you there. We shall be more comfortable in Cairo. We shall talk the re" . On 26 Ju ne th e 20 t h Army Corps Headquarters was bombed an d Ge n eral Bald ass arre, the Corps Commander, Gen e ral Piacenza, Art illery Commander, and Colonel Raffae lli , Engineer Corps Comma nder, were killed. Consequently Gene ra l De S tefani (from "Arie t e") was ap poin ted as Army Corps commander while General Arena was a ppointed as commander of the armoured Division . The Desert Air Force went on and a ttacked the Ita lia n and the German troops with 200 multien g ines ai rplanes a nd 160 hunters. At this moment t he Italian uni ts were co mpo se d of the following: • the 20th Corps inc luded the Ariete Div ision ( 10 tanks, 15 artillery guns , 600 bersaglieri fr o m the 8 th Re giment an d 1500 infant rymen) and the Li ttori o a r mo ured Divi s io n (th at had given par t of it s equi pment to "Ari ete" an d "Trieste" and consequently had only 30 tanks, 11 artillery guns and 1000 be rsaglieri from the 12 th Regiment) • the 1oth Army Corps included th e "Pavia" and Brescia" infa ntry Di vis ions with 2000

tro ops (infant ry men a nd be rsaglie ri) and 90 a rtillery guns • A group of hunters from th e 21 st Army Corp s which was composed of 1 Granatieri a ntitank battalion, 2 Bersaglieri battali ons from the 7 th Regiment, 4 battalions from the "Trento" Infantry Division a nd 8 a rtill ery group s . All th ese units totalled 3000 troops and 100 artillery guns. The DAK ( Deutches Afrika Korps) was exhausted. The 90 th Light Division diminished to less than 20% of its original force a nd the same was for the 3r cl, the 33 r cl and 580 th Reconnais sance Groups. So this was the Italian-German Army attacking on 26 May. And this is wh at Kesselring m eant when he said that the units could not be given more missions after Tob ruk. Th e Delta was 500 kms far from the Ubi a -Egypt boundary line and the RAF controlled that space . Mor eover the VIII Army was getting closer its rear base while the Ita lian Ge rman Army was dangerously m ov ing away fro m its support base. In conclu sion we may say the Italian-German Army was given no s uppor t. The Italian ta nks were wea r ed and unpro tected M 13 and L6. Mo reover, as General Giuseppe Mancin e lli , liaiso n officer at the Italia n German a rmoured Army reports in his war journal, a t the moment of the battle the German Corps only had 50 t anks becau se the remarnmg 150 were b ei ng repaired and would have been returned to the units within the next 5 to 10 days . The Wehr macht p lann ed to m ove all armou red units to the Russian front and decided not to support the Afrika Korps . Tbe Italia n authorities did the same. In fa ct the ARMIR Divisions (totally more than 16000 vehicles) left fo r Russia in the month o f Jun e 1942. It is 69

.4 1938 posLcard from the Tank

Regim.enL drawn by C. Ferrari.

worth noting that the CSIR in Russia had already been given more than 800 (almost all) modern Army Corps and Division artillery guns (210/22 and 149/40 groups, 75/32 antitank weapons, 75/18 cannons, 75/46 antiaircrafr, 20mm machineguns and rnore support weapons). We can assume that if the wheeled u nits in the North of Africa had been doubled the support load wou ld l1ave doubled as well. But in the Summer 1942 there was n o will to do that. Moreover the Germans did noL Âˇwant to take Lu ftwaffe units away from Da nemark , France and Norway although they were less important sectors. 28, 19 and 30 June ,vere crucial days to the war in the Âˇw estern Desert. Genera l Claude Auchinleck, the Mid East British Comander, dismissed General Ritchie and substituted him on the field to lead the VlIJ Anny. General Auchinleck vvas not ne\.v to similar decisions. lri. fact he had already replaced General 70

Cun ningham , Admi ral Cunningahm's brother, after the unsuccessful events of the Desert Army. We may say Auc h inleck was a destiny maker. On 29 June the poorly manned and equipped German and Italian Divisions conquered Marsa Matruh (bersaglieri from

the 7Lh Regiment entered first) and made 6000 prisoners. But th e Gerrnan and Italian forc es were not enough to completely enc i,-c le the c onqu e re d stronghold and the British Army managed lo withdraw the ir Infantry units. Since the very beginning of the war in Africa the British thought that should Lhe enemy get to Marsa Matruh the Mediterranea n Fleet would leave the Egypti an base b ecause of the possib le bombing from th e Italia n German air force. And th a t happened on the 21 st of Jun e when Ad miral Harwood ordered to move the Fleet from Haifa to Suez. Au ch inl eck had pla nned to defend the Delta (Egypt was not as important as the positio n s East of Suez, in particular Iran and Iraq) but he also prompted his troops to react against the enemy. The Br i Lish and the Commonwealth units that ha d survived the previous ba ttle s reassembled between El Alamei n and El Oattara and we r e reinforced by fresh troops. The Information Service of the VIII Army believed the Italian German Army could still rely upon 100 tanks and 2500 0 troops, although this was not and the VIII Army was actually stronger.

The first Battle of El Alamein (1-13 July 1942) The tanks were getting closer Lo El Al amein and t h e B ri t is h Embassy was celebrating wbat they ironically called an Ash Wednesday. In fact all documents were being burned in the garden of the Embassy because tbey expected thing getting worst. During the previous th ree years th ey ex p erienced a cycl e or defeats alternating with viclor.ies. But Marsa Matruh, Maaten Bagush, Fuka, El Daba, Sid i Abel

A 1940 postacard fi'om the XXT Cirenaica 1\nny Corps drawn by 1\!latta.

El Rahman had been coi1querecl by the Italian-German Army and only El Alamein, E l Hammam and Burg El Arab were left. The ships of the Mediterranean Fleer were leaving and the French were preparing to sink one of their naval squadrons that was under maintenance in the por t of Alexandria. General Auchinleck was aware of the gravity of the situation but he wanted to go on because although they had not won a battle during the past 5 weeks the VIII Army was still strong enough to defend Alexandria and the Delta. The 50 th British Division and the 1st South African Division had \.vithdrawn from Ain El Gazala and reassembled the core of their un its in El Alamein . The 2nd New Zealander Division was a l most in tact (it had been reassembled in Syria and was commanded by General Freyberg, a veteran \.Vho had taken part in many battles in the desert and who had been also wounded during the battle in Marsa Matruh). The 18 1h Indian Brigade, that had been moved from Iraq, took a position to defend Deir El Shein while the 4 th Ind ian Brigade was to defend Abu Weiss, along the border of the El Oattara depression. Moreover Auchinleck could still rely upon I 50 tanks from the 1~, armoured Division and on the 4 t h light armoured Brigade made up of vvheeled arrnoured vehicles. In conclusion, the Army was strong enough and was re liably supported by the Royal Air Force. The Italian -German Army had 55 German tanks and some light armoured tanks from the Italian Divisions "Ariete" and "Littorio". .Moreover the Italian-German Infantry units were small and could not attack the enemy along the whole North-South line (later

Rommel realised that the enemy's \.vea.k point was the Southern flank but he denied he had played a game of hazard). Rommel thought he would take advantage of the British troops' destroyed mora le . In fact the British Commander in Chief felt the troops were frustrated . General Auchin leck decided to fight with his soldiers side by side against the enemy and this was a boost to their morale. On June 30, in the afternoon, the 90Lh German light Division or what remained of it, that is one sixth of its strength, attacked the

British defense forces, marking the start of the first battle of E l Alamein . Auchinleck had forecast an attack on the center right sector of his lines and deployed his Brigades accordingly. He was right. On July 1st , the DAK tried to rap.icily burst through the British positions at El Alamein, but was stopped by the concentric fire of the British artillery, whi le the RAF launched nap of the earth attacks. Rommel's plans and the prospects of marching on Alexandria failed to be wrong at 71

111938 postcard showing Italian light armoured tanks in attack. Drawn bv C. Tafuri. ,

Deir El Shein, between El Alamein and Bab El Qaltara, west of the Ruweisat high ground. The 18 th Indian Brigade resisted bravely the whole day and destroyed 18 out of the 55 German tanks, before being defeated . In his \I\/W2 memories ,Churchill wanted to reject all accusations against the British, who re portedly made other Commonweal Lh peoples fight in their place to save their own lives. He ,vrote that the Indian divisions were made up of British and Indian soldiers, whose nationality was to be correctly indicated in official docum ents and in baLlie reports . Anyway, ,.vhether they were British-I ndian or Indian only Divisions, these units served honorably both in North Africa and in Italy. It is to be stressed that, at the beginning o f the firs l b allle of El Alamein, the 18 th Indian Brigade played an important role and disrupted the plans of the Italian-German An11y. Jn early July 1942, in terribly hot ,veather, Auchinleck realized 72

that th e Italian -German Army was on the verge of collapsing. However, the Axis forces thought that they could still win and in fact th e outcome of t he battle was uncertain. On July 2, Rom me! wrote "During the night, the Air Force Cmnmander informed me thal the fleet had left the port of Alexandria.I absolutely wanted to reach a decision in a few days. The British seemed to lose iheir confidence and apparently were about to l;\iithdraw. 1 was deeply convinced that if rny troops were able to burst through the enemy\ lines, ihe British would be panicstricken. But the poorly manned Italian -German formations were progressively thinning out. In Lhis respect, Britis h documents reported that on July 3, the Italian "Ariete" Armoured Division was des troyed by th.e 2 nd New Zealand Division, supported by tanks and artil lery assets. However, only the remaining elemen t s of the "ArieLe" were destroyed, that is a dozen tanks, thirty artillery pieces and some hundreds men. On the contrary, the 2 nd New Zealand Division was a large unit

based on three ,.ve il arme d brigades. The collapse of the I ta li a n armo ured division shocke d Rommel as we ll " This news caught us totally unprepared. I n fact, during the week-long fi:gh.ting near Knights Bridge, the "Ariele " supported by German artillery and tanks, fought bravely against the British though suffering a high number of casualties. Now the Italians are no longer up to the situation on the ground. " After the "Ar iete", the "Sabrath a "fn Canlry Division , reorganized after t he 1940-4.1 campaign, but still no t complete ly configured, Âˇwas attacked by Lhe 9 th Australian Division, (evidently, the British rese rÂˇves were in the meant im e arriving in the field). Then, it was the Lurn of the remaining troops of the "Trieste" and the Infan try Divisions. The Italians lost the Rmveisat high ground , streld1ing from east to west, w hi ch they had previo usl y occupied. Tt was a serious loss, being a key position like the Alam Haifa high ground. As it has been already said, the terrain in the northern sector of

M.I 3 Tanks preparing

allack.

the E l Alamein area is flat and uniforn,, therefore even a very low rise in the gro und assumes great tactical importance. Later on , also the Chief of the British Imper ia l Army Staff , Alan Brooke, was stunned by the low altitude of these grounds, Ruweisat and Alam Halfa included. The unbiased and fair pages written by Rommel on the events which took place in early Ju ly 1942 at E l Alamein are to be wholly reported, mainly because the Germans vvere always critical of Italian soldiers . Rommel wrote " Then, many Jtali an units collapsed. As comrade and Commander in Chief of the Italian units, I feel obliged to clearly slate thaL the soldiers are not responsible for the defeats suffered in early .July at El A.lamein. Italian soldiers are eager, generous and good comrades and performed above average given their critical conclitions. Undoubtedly, performance levels of all Italian troops, especially of

motorized units, were higher than those reached by the Italian Army over the past decades. M.any Italian Generals and Officers gained our esteem, both. fi'om a human and military point of view. The defeat suffered by the Italians was due to the deft.eiencies of their political and milirary systems, obsolete annaments and litlle interest shown for this war by rnilitary commanders and stale authorities. M.y plans were often hindered by Italian unpreparedness . Generally, the Italian Command was incapable of conducting war in a desert environmenL, i-vhere decision must be rapidly taken and implemented. Infantry forces were noL sufficiently trained to conduct a nwdern war. Troops were so poorzy equipped that they could not resist with.out the support of Lhe Germans. In facl, Lhe Italian tanks were technically obsolete (very short range cannons and loÂˇw power engi11es),and the artillery had a very reduced mobility and range of fire. The nurnber of antitank weapons was completely insuffzcient and food rations were of such a poor quality that the

!Lalians often had to rely on their German comrades' food supplies. Du ring the fighting which took place in early July, Rommel's HQ became suddenly "deaf', as it was no longer capable of intercepting updated information o n British p lans, sent to the War Department b y Lhe American military representative in Cairo, Colonel Frank Bonner Fellers . On July 10, during an attack launched by the 9 t h Australian division , the DAK "intelligence" company, under Captain Alfred Seebhom, was disrupte d at Tell El Eisa ("Jesus hi ll" in Arabic). In fact , that unit, instead of remaining in the rear area, had been incautiously moved to the front-line by the Germans. The Australians found among Seebhom's files some messages senl bv Fellers , w h ich our Military Intell igen c e Service (SI.M) had intercepted and decrypted for six months, Lo be fonvarcled to Kesse lri n g and Rommel. Captain Seebhom was seriously wounded and moved to Cai ro , where he died w ithout revealing anything to the British. A warning was imme di a t ely issued, as the "Fellers" source 73

-------

Piste

LINEA FRONTE ITAL.

Litoranea

LINEA FRONTE INGL.

Alam el Dakar

Ruwetsat Ridge

became unava ilable in such a critical moment The sudden disniption of. the intelligence company was one of the many disasters which loo k place in those days. As a matter of fact, the Italian German .Armv was reinforced bv the 164 th Ge1:man light Division -~ corning [r-om Crete - withou t vehicles , the "Bologna" Division - hastily reorganized in the rea r area - and fourteen artille ry groups. Moreove r, the "Folgore" paratroop Division and th e Paratroop Brigade under General Ramcke , which initially had to occupy Malta, were on their way to Africa. The VIII British Army, reinforced by a growing number of units, was increasingly pressing on, whil e Auchin.l eck had taken initiative again. Rommel was continuously obliged lo fill the gaps open on the front of El Alamein and started losing confidence in his v1cLory, being bitterly disappointed by his fai lure to conquer Alexandri a , Cairo and Suez. On July 17, Rommel rn et Cavallero, Bastico and Kesselring al El Daba and, for the first time, openly declared his intention to withdraw. "!L is beuer to go back on the Sollum - Halfaya line" said the Marshal. Kesselring immediately answered " If we withdraw, we will disrup! all forward air fields and the entire air force organization" Cavallero abruptly replied "J see no reason to 1vithdraw. Reinforcements will soon arrive and allovv us to keep our posi tions, at least for the time being". The clay after that meeting, three artillery groups deployed to the le ft of the "Trento" Division, placed in one of the most dangerous sectors, while the "Pistoia " Division , though not adequately equipped to op erate i o the desert, ,vas about to arrive in Libya. On July 19 , Rornn1e l rÂˇestalcd, in El Daba, his intention to withdraw, whil e Cava ll er-o

Spitffre hit by the Folp,ore anti-aircrafi guns on 9 October 1942. The piloL was taken prisoner.

confirmed his will Lo hold the ground . At thal point, polilical factors were prevailin g, as an Axis withdrawal to the Libyan Egyptian border would have serious psychological and propagandist repercussions on the cohesion or the internal front, not only in Italy. Therefore, the decision was taken to hold out, also because the British were paying a high toll, due to the fierce reaction o( the Italian-Gerr:nan units. Jn fact, the 2yd British Armoured Brii:rnde ' newly arrived from Great Britain after circumnavigating Ahica, was completely destroyed. In late July, after another British attack, the war came to a lower level or intensity. As lhings calmed down, on July 29-30, Rommel, together wilh Bastico, made an inspeclion tour of the whole ItaLian-German deployment. At that point, it was up to tbe engineer units to intervene, in order to prolect the front-line with all types of mines ~

and explosive ordnance. Thus, the "Devil's gardens" were set up in the desert. The second battle of El Alamein (August 31 - September 6, 1942)

In July 1942, only two Italian ships sailing to Libya were sunk, but all other convoys could safely carry troops and supplies to the theatre. In August, the numberÂˇ of vessels sunk suddenly rose, due to the attacks launched by British submarines, torpedoes and bombers. In fact, as Churchill said "Malta was brandishing again its blazing sword" and the British were launching devastating attacks in the Eastern Mediterranean walers from the Delta of the Nile and from Palestine. H is worth underlining that from August to November 1942, forty -two Italian and German merchant ships were sunk, many important tankers included: in particu lar,10 ships in August, 9 in September, J 2 in October and 11 in November. The war in NorLh Africa was mainly a "convoy warfare", as everything was to be shi pp ed ; therefore, the Axis

suffered heavy losses, during lhe same period in which the last Italian - German offensive (end of August) and the final battle of El Alamein (end of October) took place. Moreover, the German High Command was unable to send other armoured units to North Africa, due to its growing concurrent commitment in Russia, and keep the number of tanks in serv ice with the DAK. The level of the Italian commitment was equally insufficient, given the difficulties encountered by our national industries and the Jack of raw materials. The basic tank of our armoured Divisions was still the M-1 3, equipped with a 47/32 gun. The output of tanks achieved in 1941 (1,222 numbers) was neither surpassed nor even equalled in 1942 and, for incomprehensible reasons, the decision was taken not lo boost the production of the 75/18 self-propelled vehicle, the only one capable of countering British tanks and, above all, the new American tanks. New 90/53 self-propelled vehicles were being produced to 75

be used in Russia, where our best artillery means had already been sent. As regards the already mentioned "convoy warfare", it is ·worth recalling that, in August, the British Navy made an extreme effort to send supplies to Malta (Operation Pedestal). The warships "Nelson" and "Rodney", the carTiers "Victorious", "Indomitable", "Eagle" and "Furious", together ,,v ith a high number of cruisers and destroyers, entered the Mediterranean sea Lo protect and escort a convoy of fourteen merchant ships . T he Italian Air Force, the Luftwaffe, submarines, motor torpedo-boats ( MAS) of the llaJian and German Navy launched an attack on that 1lnnada during Lhe so-called "battle of mid -August" (August 11-14, 1942). The carrier "Eagle" was sunk, the "Indomitable" suffered severe damage, the cruisers "Cairo" and "Manchester" were sunk, the "Kenya" and "Nigeria " were torpedoed and also the destroyer "Foresight" \Vas sunk, but, above all, nine merchant ships were sunk. Jt \,vas a real disaster. Five merchant ships, though, reached

Malta and, in the end, the battle was a strategic success for the British even if at a high cost. Major changes i n the two warring Armies' top level structures were concurrently taking place. On August 12, 1942 , Lhe High Command of the Armed Forces in North Africa changed its name into The High Command of the Armed Forces in Libya having military jurisdiction over the entire territory of that colony. On the same day, the Italian- German Army, under Marshal Rommel, was cli r·ectly put under the Italian Supreme Command and a Delegation named "Delease" (Delegazione Nord Africa Egillo) was established, to liaise with that Army. Marshal Baslico, who \vas also the Governor Genera l of Libya said " The only resull was that Rommel was free to act in full autonomy. From that moment on, Italian Agencies in Africa were sil-nple Liaison Offi.ces to eslablish contact ·with the German Command, while Rommel only availed hirnself of General von Rintelen( German milita1y allache in Rom e j lo liaise with the

Supreme Command in Rom.e. lVith the new structure, Bastico added , I formally assumed cormnand of' the Arrned Force in Libya, with a territorial jurisdiction practically limited to Tripolilan.ia and th e Libyan Sahara. The top level structure of the British Army was also changed. The Prime Minister, Winsto n Churchil,l and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Ala n Brooke, slopped in Cairo both 011 their way to Moscow, to meet Stal in for high level talks and on their way back. The decision had already been taken to remove General Claude Auchinleck from his position as Commander of the Middle East and, at first, General Gott, another veteran of the \Var in the desert, was to assume command of the VIII Army and General Alexander of the Middle East. But Gott died when the plane he was on was shot clown while flying to Egy p t. Therefore, General Bernard Law Montgomery, who proposed himself as the "antiRommel", was appointed commander of the VIII Army. T h e dismissal of Auchin leck ,.vas extremely unjust, as he had

Left. M13 tanks near 1he El Qailara gorges. Righ t. Postcard ( /906) of the 19tl, Jn{tmtrv Regiment, z 711r "Brescia" Divisimi.

been the o ne who actually saved Egypt. The official hand-over took place on Au gust 15, 1942, when Auchin leck had already stabilize d the fr o nt line at El Alamei n a nd csta bi ishcd the plans to stop Rommel's expected offensive. In August 1942, other coups de theatre were staged by the High Commands. In fact, on August 22, Rommel unexpe cte dly a ske d to be replaced for health reasons. On that same day, Cavallero wrote in his Journal "Von RinLelen informs me Lhat Marshal Rommel asked to be replaced for h ea lth rea sons . Difficulties arise. I ask him if there are oth er reasons, but Von Rintelen answers 110 . Will Ro111111el launch the offensive? If not, we wi ll have to take a defen s ive position. I show him that too much power in the hands of one m.an is not the righl solution and i llustrate him t he negative consequences.. (but Cavallero too had con tributed to the extreme " person a lization " o( the Command in Africa, with the new organization he set up on August 12. Note of the Author). Rommel was tired, he suffered from nasal diphth e ria , gaslroente1itis and h ad open sores on his face caused by the sun. I !is request to be replaced showed his lack of co nfidence in a pos itive o u tcome o r th e immin en t offensive. In fact, on the eve of the attack, he cam e out a nd confessed: this is the m.o st difficult decision I've ever made; whether 10 attack or not. Either ive succeed i11 reaching Suez and our army in Russia seizes Grozny or..." and he co nclud ed h is confes sion by making a vague gesture.

B as tico adde d th at after Rommel 's request to be replaced "The choice was made to appoint 1\tfarshall Kesselring and this was the reason why Rommel put aside his intention to leave command and decided to launch the offens ive ahead o{ s chedu le . In fact, on August 28, , the "deserI fox" issue,d the order to a/lack and established the firsI clay of the ball le on August 30." The forces on bo th sides oC th e fron t lin e were mad e up as follows: â€˘ on the Italian-German side: 6 7

Infantry Battal ions (30 llalian) , 536 g uns (336 Jlal ian), 5 15 tanks (281 Italian), 1 19 armoured cars (72 Italian) and 777 aircraft, among bombers, figh ters a nd reconnaissance aircraft; â€˘ on the British side: 66 Infantry Battali ons (rully man ned unlike the Italian - German ones), 576 guns, 450 tanks, 150 am1oured cars and 200 aircraft. The las t Ita l ian- Germ a n offensive started on August 30, in 77

Left. Postcard drawn by Paolo Caccia Dominioni in 1966.

Right. 1vf 13/40

the evening, with a series of attacks staged by the Italian "Trento" Division the 164 1 h German Division , paratroop units of the "Folgore " Division and the " Ramcke" Brigade. Once again, the maneuver forces operated within the southern sector. Together with the entire DAK, the attack was launched by the XX Italian .Motorized Corps , with its "Ariete" and "Littorio" Armoured Divisions, and the "Trieste" motorized Division on the left side of the 15 th and 2P 1 Panzer Divisions.

Italian and German Divisions get immediately entangled in minefields which were wider and deeper than expected, while the RAF staged powerful night attacks and the British artillery started a robust counterfire action. According Lo General Freddy de Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of Staff, all difficulties met by the Axis forces at the beginning of the battle were due to a clever ploy. As stated by de Guingand "Jn the desert, the soil was hard in some areas but soft and impracticable in others. Therefore, we decided to modify maps, reverting the

tan/cs of" the "Ariele" Armoured Division.

indications on the nature of the soil. We marked the impracticable area close to the positions of the 7 th Arrnoured Division, known as the Ragil Depression, as excellent for the nature of its soil. One of the maps, torn and purposely stained with tea, Âˇwas pul inside a reconnaissance tank which we blew up in a nearby minefield. The folloÂˇwing morning, we found that the tank had been searched and the map ivas no longer there. As a consequence, the ma.in German connection line passed through the Ra.gil Depression, where the Germans almost ran short of petrol". This ruse de guerre - eve n though other sources deny its effectiveness reportedly hampered the delivery of supporl to the Italian-German Army. In fact, the lack of fuel has always been considered as the reason for the unsuccessful outcome of the battle which went down in hislory as Lhe battle of Ala m Halfa . But was the shortage o f fuel the only reason to spoi l Rommel's plans? According to Colonel Fritz Bayerlein, acting Chief of Staff of the Afrika Corps, the course of events was remarkably different. In late August 1942, the Afi'ika Co rps was under General Nehring. On August 31, he was severely wounded in the field and General vo n Vaerst assumed command, but it was Bayerlein who actually exercised tactical command. This phase of the entire operational cycle on Lhe f-r onl al EJ Alarne in is kno\vn as the " six-day race", indicating Lhe las t six clay effort staged by the Axis to break through the enemy's line and reach Alexandria and the delta of the Nile.

It is ,.vorth recalling that at the end of August, Cavallero, Kesselring and Rommel had an important preliminary exchange of messages concerning the support required (or the imminent battle. Rommel asked 6,000 tons of fuel and added "ihe posirive result of this battle depends on the early delivery of this quantity of fuel". Cavallero answered " Open fire, fuel is being delivered". Moreover, Kesselring granted Rom me! that even if naval convovs were destroved , the 2 nd ., Fleet would deliver the required fuel. On August , 30, at dusk, German armoured units attacked the southern secto,- of the front line, to get over the minefie lds, outflank the whole British d e ployment and reach the coastline at El Hamman in the VIJJ Armv rear area. The (5 th Pan ze r Division attacked with 70 tanks - "Ill" and "IV"types - while the 21 sL Panzer Division with 120 tanks equipped ' .,;

with guns (tanks of the "II" type were not employed due to their limited armament which made them unfit for a battle of tanks. It is to be stressed that the number of Pan z er tanks at Rommel's disposal was remarkably lower than that \,vith which he fought during the former battles at Ain El Gazala and Tobruk) . Before midnight, the spearhead of the 1sth Panzer entered into contact with the British defense forces of the minefield area. But the minefields were unexpectedly deep and the defense forces were on the alert. The ist Battalion of the 115 th Grenadier armoured Regiment, under Major Busch, was stopped by the British artillery and the infantry barrage fire , which succeeded in disarraying the German forces. The a1Tival of the II Battalion ,under Captain Weichsel, saved the sit uatio n. They staged an attack on foot, established a bridgehead and succeeded in

opening a path for the tanks of the 1sth Panzer Division. The following phase of the battle is to be described using the present tense. General Walther Nehr-ing, Commander of the Afrika Corps, follmvs the 2 1st Panzer Division on board his armoured car together with the Chief of Staff, Colonel Bayerlein, three radio operators and tvvo drivers. Mines are blmving up all around them. Nehe1ing has the Hrst sad news: the Commander of the 21 st Division, General Georg von Bismarck, an excellent officer, was killed when tl")Âˇi ng to cross the minefields with his unit. It is already past midnight, it is August 31.

The German Divisions are still figh ting in the wide minefields which are fiercely defended by the enemy forces. British aircraft born b Italian and German motorized forces and succeed in flood lighting the battlefield with a new method. An inflarnmable 79

Postcard (1940) of the 7jlh Air Reconnaissance Group, depicting one CR42 aircraft flying over two palm trees and three meharis in the desert.

material containing also magnesium is being dropped on the battlefield. It flares up only when it touches the ground and cannot be easily put out. After von Bismarck, another member of the command structure of the Afrika Corps, General Nehring, is wounded during an air bombing. Bayerlein now commands the forward armoured units. Before dawn, the British resistance in the minefield area weakens, and the armoured spearheads of the DAK reach, in full daylight, an area 1215 kilometres distant from the starting positions, instead of the pre-established 50 kilometres. We have expanded on the difficulties encountered by the DAK, as the German armoured Divisions were the spearheads,

while the "Ariete", "Folgore" and Trieste Division covered the entire left flank of the battle. However, all reports concerning the battle confirmed that the Italian units met th e same difficulties as the I s th and 2 pt German Divisions. Thus, Rommel's plan to deeply penetrate eastward and turn lo the coastline at dawn went up in smoke. Bayerlein said "We carefully considered to stop the battle, as the British already knew our positions. Rommel discussed the situation with me and in the end ·we decided to proceed ·with the attack. But il was then clear that the "grand solution", that is the outfl.anking manoeuvre of the VIII Anny was no longer possible, as the enemy had had enough ti1ne to take his countenneasures. The British were compelling us to choose an alternative solution, ·which meant that ive had to turn to the north before than we had planned, in order to direclly reach the high ground of

Alam Haifa, at point132, which was to be seized by direct attack". This crucial phase of the battle of Alam Haifa is marked by the facL that the fuel required was not delivered. The "Sanandrea", "Pozarica" , "Picci Fassio" and "Abruzzi" tankers were sunk or severely destroyed one after anothe1: ln the meam.vhi le, what did Kesselring do? He kept hi s promise and took action b y issuing the order that all th e aircraft of the 2 nd fleet carry the required fuel, but most of it \vas consumed dming the flight. Let's go back to the battle. On August 31, Panzer tanks attacked Alam Haifa high ground, which was garrisoned, in the central eastern sector, by the 44 th British Infantry Division and, in the th western sector bv , the 1o British Armoured Divi.s ion ( according to Auchin.leck's directives, which were confirmed by .Montgomery, who had assumed command of the VUI Anny only t\.vo weeks before). '

A sudden sand storm blew up, which grounded RAF aircraft. Taking aclvan tage of this unexpected situation,' the German tanks immediately launched an attack on the southern area of the high ground and were counterattacked bv 92 "Grant" tanks of the 22 nd British armoured Brigade, which had to delay and defeat the attackers with artillery [ires and especially ,.vith their 57 mm antitank weapons. The German aclion was unsuccessful and, in the evening, the tanks of the l 5th and 21 st Division withdrew southward to stay overnight in the Ragil Depression. In t.hose hours, Montgomery did not unbalance his forces, but moved a South-African Division from the main front line to the Ruweisat Ridge, while another Brigade was arriving from the Delta of the Nile to occupy the area east of the combat zone lefl by the 1oth Armoured Division. On September 1, the 15 th Armoured Division, under Colonel Crasemann , attacked Alam Halfa high ground and, after heavy fighting , almost reached the fatal point 132. This was the final phase of tl1e battle. Once again, it is worth describing the events of the battle using the present tense. Grenadiers, tank men, engineers are fighling under the RAF bombings. If German tanks succeed in crossing the ba1Tage at point 132, they can advance to the sea line. The 8 th armoured regiment has already penetrated the enemy lines and , on September 1, in the afternoon, stops w ith his forward units 8 kilometres from the coastline, behind the main front line at El Alamein, . But, on the left side, the 50 t h Armoured Regiment is incapable of crossing British defensive positions while , during the day, the RAF heavily bombs tanks and motorized infantry units.

Seven Officers of the DAK Staff die. The delivery of supplies and fue l becomes very difficult. On that same evening, Rommel decides to stop the offensive and gradually withdraw to his initial position . Three more days of combat follow and the "six clay race" comes to an end. A very strange close. The offensive at Alam Halfa is the most incomprehensible "African" offensive staged by Rommel, but it is not to be forgotten that the German Marshal was ill and no longer confident in his victory. The lack of fuel has always been considered as the reason for the fa ilure of this offensive. But it cannot be the only one. Fuel Right. Flame-Lhmwer operator, XXXI Sapper Baltalion. Below. Infantrym.an of the 20 th Infant,y Regirnent, "Brescia'' Div ision.

supplies were limited, but no vehicle was stalled by the lack of fuel during the withdrawal. Another reason was the depth of British minefields which deeply affected the momentum of the initial attack. Moreover , General Montgomery decided that his first priority was to defend the Alam Halfa ridge . He had repeatedly said to General Brian Horrock, Commander of the XIII Corps " Horrocks don't get "hammered" underlining the need to spare armoured forces. On September 7, shots were no longer heard in the southern sector of the front line and Italian -German forces were still in control of the Himeimat position, 217 metres above sea level. Th is greatly distressed British commanders because, from that position, Italians and Germans could easily control the area south of E l Alamein. But this Âˇwas actually what General Montgomery wanted. 81

British forces were setting the stage an d the backstage of the following grand battle. The VIII Army had planned to set u p a fake oil pipeline and large depots to keep the adversaries on the alert. Montgomery said "What's the use of this rnise-en-scene, if rhe Germans cannot see it?. Let them control Heimeimat. I want them right there." As it has been a lready underljned, R ommel showed a lack of resolution mainly on September .1. Kesselring expressed a highly critical judgement. According to the Comrnander or the Southern Forces, Rommel had no t la unched a decisive attack when the DAK was about to overcome the ridge of Alam Halfa . The "fox " had lost his lustre. Later on, Kesselring managed to d iscuss this problem in Hitler's presence. He said " The reason why R.ommel did not move on with the offensive is still wrapped up in mystery for us" and H iller

answered " / am. deeply convinced that ir is a folly to leave a man in a position of high responsibility for too long. As time goes by, he is doomed lo failure". On September 23 , Rommel left the command o f the Army on a sick leave in Germany and was rep laced by Genernl Georg Stumme, who had already gained experience on the Russian front. Before this change in the German top level structure, British forces had already tried to carry out a large -scale blitz (September 13-14) against Tobruk by staging a joint attack from the land ( units of the Long Range Desert Croup) and from the sea ( u nits of the Royal Marin es supported by a naval group). The attack was a total defeat. Infantry men, artillery men, sai lors of the "San Marco", Carabinieri and Navy batteries reacted actively. Then Italian Air F orce and Luftwaffe units intervened. The British forc es

Postcard by Paolo Caccia Dominioni commenwrati11g an almost unknown episode.

lost more than five hundred men of the special forces and the a/a cruiser "Coventry", the "S ikh" and "Zulu" destroyers and some motor-torpedo boats. At the encl of September, the charnpion or th e German air force, Captain Joachim Marseille, Lhe "star or Africa", who won 138 air battles , \.Vas shot down over El Alamein. The Italian Air Force and the German Luft-wa[{e were a lways heavily fighting not only in Africa. The decision was taken to stage a new air offensive against. Malta, given the nevv threat posed by the forces on the island. The air offensive launched on October l O was slopped few days later, given the heavy losse s sufferecl by Italian and German

A JOO!17 huwiLzer in

action agains L British a rmour.

air units. The initialivc was in the hand of Lhe British force a lso in Malta. Prelude to the decisive battle

"Th e quartermaste r prelude" was the definition given by Romme l to indicate the period between th e u nsuccessfu l "sixday race" and the decisive battle of El Alame i n . A prelude that inev itably saw the victory of the British forces from a logistical perspective. The 200 ,000 ton convo y t he allied forces were impati.ent ly waiting ror entered the Suez Gulf and discharged on the Egyptia n docks tan ks, pieces of artillery, vehicles, tons of munitions and millions of litres o( rue!. At that point, the VITI Army was really the most powerfu l war instr ument Lhe British Emp ire had ever set up. Meanwhile, training was goi ng on in t he Egyptian desert, \,v ith the employment of 300 "Sherman " tanks and one hundred 105 mm self-prop e ll e d a r tillery pieces provided by the US Army. The US Air Forc:e had also made its appearance and was going lo t ake part in many m ission s during the following British offensive. Un like t he unpre c e d en te d streng lhe ning of the VUl Army, th e I talia n and Gernrn n commitme nt to reinfo rce t heir divisions on the El Alamein rront line was insufficient. The deparlu re of Ron1rn e l who kn e,,v how to be arrogant and proactive at the same Lime wo rsene d the sit u ation and General Stu rnme did nol want or \-vas not able to asse rt himself al the High Cornmands in Berlin or Rome . ivl oreov er, British submarines and aircraft were

a lways decimating the Axis "Libyan" convoys. In September~ only 31 ,061 ton s of fuel out of 40,200 reached Libya and, in October, it was even \Norse , because 12,308 tons o f fuel o ut f 25,771 were lost. As a utumn approached and the Soviet resistance grew s lronger, the German High Command was not able to se nd nevv arnw urecl uni ts to Africa. During his leave Rommel, was shown new "Tiger" main battle ta nk s , multiple rocke t la u nche rs and s moke agents, to let him believe tha t the Panzerannee, whic h h ad been fig}Hing in Africa for t\vo years, was going to be rein fo rced. In effect, only few Tigers ma de Lhe ic

appearance in the African war theaLre, during the final phase of the battle Lo conquer Tunisia, but it was too late to change the fort unes of the war in the .lVI.eclitcrranean area. It is n e cess a ry lo de t ail the sLrength and positions of t he "ACIT"(I tal ian - German .Arn1oured .Army) and of the VIII Army, as the ..first day of the British offensive approached. Tbe ACIT d e p loyed the XXI army Corps , with t he 7ib Bersagli eri R egiment and the "Trento" and "Bologna" Infantry Divisions, on ltie northern sector of the front line. As the level of t.b e Italian armament was insuffic ient, Rorrunel alternated 83

the 10th Italian Anny Corps, 路with the 9 th Bersaglieri Regiment, the "Brescia" and "Pavia Infant ry Divisions, the "Folgore" Paratroops Division and two other paratroops Ba tt a lions of the "Ramcke" Brigade. The 21 th Panzer Division and the "Ar iete" Arrnoured Division were behind these units. In the northern sector of the rear area there were the 90 t h German li ght Di vision and the "Trieste" Motorized Divisi on, together with battle groups and reconnaissance units ,.vhich made up the reserve forces. On the northern front line, the VIII British Army deployed the XXX Army Corps, with the 9 th Australian Division, the 51 st "Highlander " Division, the 2 nd

a fmnous unit which had foug ht in previous campaigns . Behind the XXX Army Corps, there ,vas th e X Army Corps, with the pt and 1oth Armotu路ed Divisions, while behind the XIII Army Corps there was the bulk of the 7 th Armoured Division. Other uni ts were directly under the Army Corps Comma nd, namely an Indian Brigade taskc<l with opening gaps throug h minefields , one armoure d brigade, two a/a artillery brigades and one Indian in fantry brigade. To sum up, without taking into account small units , 12 Italia n - German Divisions (4 armoured) and 10 British and Commonwealth Divisions (3 armoured) were on both sides of the front line.

New Zealand Division, the 1st South African Division and the 4 th Indian Di vision. The XIII Army Corps deployed in th e so u thern area, with the so th B ri tish Division ( it also included a Greek Brigade-level group and the II Brigade -level grn u p of the "Free French" Divis ion), the 44 t h British Division and, on its left side, the I Brigade-level group of the "Free Fr路ench " Division. This group was under the 7 th Armoured Division,

T h e three B ritish Armou red Divisions and the autonomous tan k uni ts fie ld ed: 28 5 "Sherman" , 246 "Grant" , 42 1 "Crusader", 167 "S t uart" , 223 "Valentine and 6 "Mathilda" tanks , as well as the first three "Churchill" infantry tanks sent to Africa. The Axis fielded 497 tanks: 239 medium tanks and 20 Italian light tanks, which could not be compared to the American "Sherman" and "Grnnt" tanks, or to

Above.

Tank Officer of the "Ariete" Armoured Division.

Right. Italian HQ at Poinl 33, Alamein, v\!es iern Egyptian Deser1.

Italian-Germa n units, organized in groups or zones (Raum). In fact, in the northern sector, the strongholds were garrisoned by the Italian Battal ions and the German Battalions of the 164 th Division, as well as two Bat talions of the "Ramcke" Paratroop B riga de, al I entrenched behind the "devil's gardens", wide stretches of land filled with mines and booby traps. Behind the front line, always in the northern secto,~ there 路were the 15 th Panzer Division and the "Littorio" Armoured Divis ion. The southern sector was controlled by

Bersagliere on a molorcycle and SPA 1'11od.41 lighl armoured vehicle.

the "Cmsader " tanks. For the same reason, the 30 German "Mark II " light tanks were not to be taken into account, while only few "Mark III " tanlcs, out of J70, equipped with a 50 mm gun (50/60), had a certain importance. From a statistical point of view, only the 38 "Mark IV" German tanks were effective and some of them were equipped vvith a 75 mm gun (75/43). The few Italian 7 5/ 18 selfpropelled guns assigned to the "Ariete" and "Littorio " Divisions also proved to be effective. Italians opposed the obsolele 47/32 self-propelled guns to the numerous British 57 mm anti tank weapons, while the Germans used the equally ineffective 50/33 self propelled guns against the American tanks. The German 88/55 artillery piece still proved to be very effective; a

real trump card of World War Il, given its antiaircraft and antitank multi -role employment. The same applies to the Italian 90/53 artillery piece. The superiorily of the British field artillery was overwhelming, both from a qualita tive and a quantitative point of view, all the more so as the Italian a1iillery fleet was still based on old guns and very few modem weapons systems. The RAF was also remarkably superior with its 1,200 aircraft (800 first line aircraft), on ly countered by 700 Italian and Gerrnan aircraft ( 150 fighters, 180 dive bombers and fighterborn bers and 400 aircraft of different kinds). The third battle of El Alamein (October 23 - November 4, 1942)

On October 23, 1942, 8:45 p.m. (Italian Time), one thousand British field guns contemporarily

opened fire against ItalianGerman positions at El Alamein. All testimonies agree in defining that storm of fire as similar to the heavy artillery fire typical of World War I. As a matter of fact, it was an unprecedented event in the desert. The British Commander in Chief, General Montgomery, boasted that he went to sleep on the eve of the battle j ust as the Prince of Conde, mentioned by Manzoni in his most famous novel, did on the eve of the battle at Rocroi. But there is room for doubt. Montgomery had left the main HQ of the VIII Army at Burg El Arab to reach a tactical HQ at El Alamein. He was therefore near to the front line, where the deafening roar of the artillery was not conducive to sleep . General Montgomery is to be blamed - as some British authors actuallv did - not for what he said b~ t, from a m iii tary and 85

Ji _.,,, '"

,,,

"'Q,

--- ,-

profess ional point of view, fo r what ha ppened in the fol lowing hours and clays. I t is worth recalling t hat General Stumm e, Ro mmel's substitl.1le, prohi bited the use of counter-prepa rat ion fi re by Italian-German artillery units . T h us the British infantry assembly areas were not bombarded (this dec ision was harshly critici sed by Rommel after his hasty return to Africa). Once again, fortune favoured Montgo mecy, as in th e ea rly hours or October 24, General Stum me, on the front line to get a clear idea of the s ituation, was hit by enemy (ire a nd died of an apoplectic fit, fal li ng off the car he was on to rapidly leave the clanger area. Thus, Romm e l was absen t a t the beg inning of the offensive, General Stumme <lied, triggering a crisis w ithin the Command or the Ita li a n - Germa n Army and t he guns of the Ax is remained silent for some hours.

This way, the pos si bility or open ing of a breac h in the Italian -Germa n front line was envisaged, given the overwhelming superio1Âˇi ty of the VU J Army a nd the RAF, als o taking into account the threat posed by minefields. Nothing happened though. At this point, it is necessary to make a ste p ba ckward .O n October 24, Romm el, who was still convalescing in Austria, had a telephone call from. one of his assistant, who informed him that the British offensi ve had been launched. Th en, he received a telephone call from Hitler himself, who asked hirn if he wanted to assume comma nd agai n , also given that General Stumme had been declared as missing. Marshal Rommel di d not hes ita te and boarded the plane which had been put at hi s disposal. He reached Rome the fo l lowing morning a nd w as briefed on the situatio n by General von Rintelen.

R ommel was asto ni shed to discover thal the Army h ad very limited fuel stocks and that an insufficient amount of supplies had been delivered during his one month leave. H e le[L Rome, reached Crete and from there the front line. On October 25, at 11:25 p.m, all units e ngage d at E l A.lame in rec eived a sam e message " / assume Command again- Rommel" Operation "Lightfoot" planned by Mongornery's sta ff and prep ared emp loying a gre al amount of resources, envisaged the deployment of 4 Divisions of the XXX A1Âˇmy Corps and 2 Arm ou 1Âˇe d Di visions of the X Army Corps in the northern sector. These Di visions had to cross the minefield are a and rapidly reach open ground. The in fan try h ad Lo open two corridors leading to Kidney Rid ge and Mi teiriya High Grounds, to allow the armoured uni ts to enter the area . Meanwhile in the southern

Left. Postcard by Paolo Caccia Dominioni showing two vehicles of" the Italian Delegation for the Honor:s to the Fallen in the desert al Point 28 at Ala.mein, relurninf!, jl'om a ' reconnaissance mission amid the rubble o/ 1he hattlef1eld during a sand storm.

Right. Postcard 0(1he 9th Bersaglieri Regiment sketched by Lieute1wni Benso.

sector, the XIII Army Corps had to "fix" the enemy divisions with a diversionary attack, to deceive Italian-G erman Forces on the mai n axis of attack. The task assigned lo the XIII Army Corps has been sometimes considered as less important, but this opinion is not commoniy shared. An outflanking manoeuvre of the e n t ire line from t he south was envis aged, if the Italian "Brescia" "Pavia" and "Folgore" Divisi ons deployed in th e southern area collapsed. In fact, the B rÂˇ i tis h we r e deepl y convinced, though they did not confess it, that Ita lian Forces could be easily defeated. The reconstruction of historical events , mainly of military events, is always d ifficult, in Lh at th e protagonists tend to stretch the tru th . Sometimes, written testimonies coUected in the field better fulfil the need to ascertain the trnth. Li eutenan t Colon el Alberto Bechi Luserna, a paratrooper, Commander o f the 187 th "Folgore "Regiment, who died in Sardinia on Se ptem ber 1943 in the accomplishment of his tasks as Chief of Staff of the "Nembo" Paratroops Division and was awarded a Gold Medal, wrote a battle report "on the spot". On October 25,he wrole " Thanks to the inflow or reinforcement, the enemy could employ a /<)rce rnade up of five or six battalions and two armoured brigades, to widen the breach in the central sector or the "Folgore", pushing southward to reach the 186 th Italian

ft.u,,

l~tuhtk O ~f

Regi1nent which contro lled the Qarel El Himeimat posiiions. The enemy considered the collapse of this defensive stru cture as necessary to starL the outflanking manoeuvre aimed at disrupLing the entire front line at El Alarnein" l f t he Italian Forces had collapsed, Bri tish General Brian Horrncks, the resol ut e Commander of th e XIII British Army Corps, would have la unched h is 7 t h Armoured Division to the attack. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that all

British and Commonwealth units w ere motorised, unli ke Italian units. T hough lhe main effort made by the VIII Army Look place in the northern sector, \.vhere the British fi nally burst through the 164 t h German Division, Br.itis h sources never ment ion o r minimize the importance or the possibi lities offered by a breach in the southern sector. One aspect which cannot be overlooked- now that fifty yea rs have gone by- is that on October

24, at davm , the V III B ritis h Army had serio us difficulties in conduct ing the battle and th is was a strange prelude to a completely different outcome. In [act, it took twelve days of harsh figh ting for the British to clisrup L lhe Axis positions on e after the other and lilerally destroy ItalianGerman infantry, armoured and motorised divisions. The second aspect Lo highlight is that the British diversionary attack in the southe r-n area \Vas fiercel y countered b y the "Folgo re" Division (4000 men) vvhich was supported by artiller·y o[ Lhe "Pavia " Divis ion, as the main armament of the paratroops was represented by 47/32 ant itank weapons . In 1960, the Brit ish historian Ca rrelli Barnett wrote "The Desert Generals" (trans laLed also in Italian), LO properly illustrate the general po li tic a l- military framework and u phold the idea

thal the battle of E l Alamein had been perso nall y decided b y Churchill to increase his powec The British Premier, the British General Staff, General Montgomery, General Alexander and al.I other Staff memb ers knew that All ie d Forces \Notdcl land on the French North African coast on Novernber 8 and that , i n the .M editerra nean area, the command of the war would shift from the British to the Anglo Americans, ·with th e US playing an i ncreasingly important rnle. Moreover, in 1942 BriLish forces ha d s u rrendered in Singapore (more than 60,000 prisoners) and at Tobruk (33,000 p risoners) , therefore a victory was a bsolutely necessary before the end of that year. In addition lo that, after the landing o[ Anglo American Forces behind the line of Lh e Ita lianGerman Army at El Alamein, Lhe Axis High Corn mands wou ld necessarily issue the o rder· to

Postcard ( 1937) of 1he 2n d Tank Regim.e nt, depic1ing L33 light tanks advancing under enemy fzre.

evacuate th e Egyptian territory, givi ng the "Desert Fox" t h e opportunity Lo flee. Contrary to a ll expectat ion s and notw ithstanding the superiority of the British forces on the ground and in ai1~ the last days of Octo ber 1942 wen L by withou t the expected brilliant. victory by the VIII Army. The British div isions, tra pp e d in m in efields , counterattacked by enemies who where employing a ll Lheir forces w ithout hoping in the arri val o f reinforcement:, marked time. To make up fo r· it, the RAF was heavily bombing the area and British Generals had to adm it tl1 at th e Ai r Fo rc e \,v as playing a decisive role. On thi s matter, great cr·edit should be

2:iven to the 40 th and 5 th Air Fighter Wings, and the 500 th Air Assault Wing, flying their obsolete CR 42, bcl011ging Lo the Italian Air Force, for what they were able to do in those days to contain the overwhelming air superiority of the RAF ( a British Officer wrote: I see an Italian CR 42 flight formation flying above me: I do not know whether Lo laugh or be moved) . In the middle of the battle, the Divisions of the X, XXI, and XX Italian Army Corps and of the DAK ,vere engaged in a war of attrition. From October 23 to October 29, in the southern sector, the British forces fac ing the positions of the "Folgore " Division lost 70 tanks and a hundred men belonging to famous Regiments, \.vhile all Italian-G erman armoured units were engaged in the northern sector. Rommel, who had been again in command of the Army for 24 hours and launch e d a counterattack employing less than 150 tanks, sa\.v that the number of his forces was thinning ou L. Montgomery, however, did not succeed .in crossing the lines. On October 30, ,.vhen the news that the VIII Army had temporarily ,.vithdrawn the front line Divisions to reorganize them, reached London, Churchill burst out and shouted at the Chief of the General Staff, Alan Brooke " Is there a General vvho can win a batlfe?" Meanwhile, the following

Men Infbns Mach gun bus Cannons A/T light guns A/T heavy guns A.JA pieces and mach guns Tanks Armoured cars

I talian ships, steamers and tankers were sunk in the Mediterranean, with their precious cargoes of tanks, weapons, supplies and fuel: on October 23, the "Amsterdam", on Right. ''Bersaglieri" Se1:geant of the "Ariete" Armoured Division.

Below. C01poral o{the 47/32 a/1 Company, 187th Paratroop Regiment.

ITALIAN

GERMAN

TOTAL

VlllARMY

43 000 42

53 000 27

371 150

200 300

96 000 69 1 571 450

220 000 78 8 939

1 506

750 259

600 238

1 350 497 few dozens

812 1348 500

October 25 the "Tecgestea" and the tanker "Proserpina" , on October 29 the tanker "Luis.iano", on November 2 and 10 the "Tripolino, the "Ostia "and the "Zarn". When Rommel knew that the "Luisiano" had sunk he wrote "Now we have to go on foor". Montgomery, who could not hear Churchill's harsh rebukes, was preparing "Operation Supercharge", a true storm of 400 main battle tanks, supported by 15 artillery Regiments and the entire Air Force .. In those clays , Rommel was more inclined, Lo appreciate the merits of the Italian Allies, \,v ho were not only fighting side by side \.vith the Afrika Korps defending the territory inch by inch against the British - but were also destined to play a key role in the battlefield. Marshal Rommel wrote in his notes " The tanks of the "Litlorio" and "Trieste" Divisions were destroyed one after the other by the British Forces. Italian 47 mm.

I SUPERSTITI DELLA G" COMP. PARACADUTISTI «GRIFI» ( II BATT. DEL 187° REGG. «FOLGORE», MEDAGUA D'ORO ALLA BANDIERA) E DEL 31° BATT. GUASTATORI D'AFRICA (MEDAGLIE D'ARGENTO E DI BRONZO AL LABARO) RIAFFERMANO LA LORO FRATERNITA TRENTATRE ANNI DOPO LA BATTAGUA DI EL ALAMEIN OVE FURONO TRA GLI ITALIANI CHE NON MOLLARONO 23 OTTOBRE · 6 NOVEMBRE 1942.

antitank guns just like our 50mm antitank guns were totally in.effective against British tanks. " The end was near. One of the last batLle of tanks \Vas fought at Tell El Aqqaqir, w h ere Rommel proved his undisputed capabilit ies as Cornm a nder an d o bliged the tanks Montgomery had ass ig ned to "Opera tions S u pe rcharge" to mark time once again. At this point, it was necessary to w it h dn.1\N to the line of the F uka meridian to save what rema ined o f the Italian-Ge rman Army. O rders were th erefore issued an d were a lready be ing e xecuted whe n Rommel \Vas reached by a message from Hitler w h ich sound ed fool is h in that contingence " No other way hut the one that leads to victorv or death! ". Ro mmel got angry but obeyed the ord c r-. T his was a f i rs L poli tical interference in the \var in North Africa. Also Mussolini

issued Lhe order to fight to the bitter end. All units stopped \v ithdr·awing and the result was a great confu s ion caused b y the i mp lementation of the wellknown Napoleon apho1·isrn "Order, counter:..order, d isorder". In the encl, Rornrnel disobeyed t he order from the "War lord", who wanted to interfere in the batt le which was taking lace thousands of k il on1etres away from h is "lion's den" c.;t Rastenburg in East Prussia. This happened on November; 4 . That same clay, Lhe "Ariete" An11ou 1·ed Division which was the Italian-Gcrnrnn Army's last reserve, faced its des t iny. Rornrne.l left a written testimony of this true epic. "Large clouds of' dusL could be see11 south, south -east of the Headquarters. l11ere the desperate fighting the small and poor Italian tanks of' the XX Army Corps was going on against ahout I 00 .British heavv tanks, which

Posu;arcl bv Paolo Caccia Donzinioni jiJr the 33,d a1111iversarv of die ba11le of El Alamei11.

had outflanked the flalians 01 1 their uncovered right side. 1 sent Major von Lucic to close th e breach bet 1-vee11. 1he Italians and the DA K and he told me later on 1hat rhe Italians, who at that point were our strongest motoriz.ed forces, fought 1,vith ex.traordi11arv brave1y. Italian tanks exploded or burst into flames one after the othe,~ while enemy heavy arLillery fire a.tracked Italian infantry and artillery positions. At 3:30 p.m . the last radio message was sent by the "Ariete ": Enemy tanks burst in . ". "A . " sour·/1 o t· t J'le "4 . rzete . nete encircled. approx 5 km north easr of Bir el A.he!. "Ariete" tanks are

fighting". Rommel added "In the evening, rhe XX Italian Army Corps was crushed after fi'ghting bravely and

Postcard (1938j o{the 16th "Pistoia" 1vlotoriz.ed Division.

we lost our J Lalian senior comrades who, we musl admit it, had always been asked to do much rn.ore than Lhey could with their poor annanwnt" All Italian tanks fought to the biller encl. Later on , the Cb ief of the interpreters at lhe XX army Corps, Mr Monzel wrote " As there was no possibility of surviving inside one of these tanks, the bra.very of Italian. soldiers exceed all limits". The ltalian-Gerrnan Army d id not exisl any longer. What remained of the DAK and a flood of vehicles withdrew westward along the coast mad "wi th the sun behind them and their faces looking into the night" . Notwithstanding the corps de chasse set up by MonLogornery,

the VIII British Army "followed" and not "chased" the few Tl.alian and German motorized units which had been able to get out of the theatre. On November 7, bad \\leather conditions and lhe heavy rain Lnrnsformed the desert into a quagmire and further hampered Montgomery's movements In the so ut hern sector, the X Ita li an Army Corps co uld not escape its destiny and the "Brescia", "Pavia" and "Folgore " Divisions ,vere destroyed. Just like the two infantry divisions, the paratroops divis ion counted its dead, included the brothe rs Ruspol i, Marescotti and Costantino, who were awarded a gold rnedal in the field. Later on, Rommel was accused of abandoning the Italians lo their fate, but it was no t true. He was only left with the cho ice of saving what remained of the Arm y 's motorized assets orÂˇ sacrifici ng everyone . The German paratroop br igade under General

Ramcke was a lso aband oned . Once the game was lost, General Ramcke assembled his men, assau lted the British motorized co lumns and reached friend ly lines with 600 paratroopers. \Vheo winners and losers co u nted their own losses, the I talian -German Army reported 25,000 cas u a lt ies (d ead vvounded and m issing sold iers included) pl us 30,000 prisoners ( 10,724 Gennan so ld iers including the Commander of the Afrika Korps, Genera l von Thorma). The Britisb ,Âˇcported 13,560 casualLies (dead , wounded and missing sold ie rs included) and the loss of 600 tanks. It was too high a price for the VHI Army, which should have been capable of defeating enemy (orces with ease, given the enormous imbalance bet,veen the two Arm ies' assets. Even though the bells rang all over the Uni tccl Kingdom to 91

Left. PosLcard (1940)by Vittorio Pisani, clepicLing paratroopers landing.

Right. Sergeant Major of the XXXI Sapper Battalion throwing a hand grenade.

Below. Second Lieutenant o{ the I 86 th Paratroop Regim.ent, "Folgore" Division.

soldiers are buried in a \Nhitc War M.emorial. The Point 33 Tower is placed not far from this area . It was built by Paolo Caccia Dominioni, who spent long years in the charitable search of the human remains of all those who fought in arms unde rÂˇ aU flags in the desert of El Alamein sixty years ago.

celebrate that victory, the British, given the high number of their losses, were obliged to recall the words said by the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo " The greatest tragedy after loosing a battle is winning a battle". Corelli Barnett's words are useful to sum everything up from a historical point of view '' Frmn a historical perspective, this is the last action of the British Empire, as a great united and independent power. It can be ironically 92

considered as the suicide of the old Europe; in fact, today, the Gerrnans, the Italians and the British are no longer in control of the 1\lliddle East, for which they fought so hard." Th e three cemeteries at El Alamein are a silent testimony to those historical events ; the bodies of the soldiers of the Commonvvealth are buried under an English-style lawn, a Suevian castle was built in memory of the German soldiers and the Italian

Lefl. ln/t.mlrynw11 of the "Pavia." Division. Below. Posrcard b_v Paolo Caccia Do111i11ioni, depicti11g the 1110 11wn.e111 to the "Desert Ta nkers" in the yard uf 1he Point 33 Wa r Memorial.

Above.

Postcard (.1938) by C.Tafuri, depicLing Italian light tanks in action.

Left. Pos1card (1942) of the uth Medical Company.

60th

â€˘ anniversary of tfte battle

THOUGHTS FROM THE FRONTLINE by Girolamo Caronna In the boundless Sahara, where our eyes gets lost in scanning the line of the horizon and our thoughts roam, the image of brave soldiers of warring factions fighting in the accomplish1nent of their duties could be i nterprered as a dream. The undulated and rolling dunes, the low but pretentious altitudes, -where hermils aspiring after perfection found shelter, in the past were only violated by raiders chasing migrant caravans but now they are rhe theatre of a battle which is very difficult to describe in words. El Alamein, a site between a blue sea ,white sands and a horrible depression, kingdorn of snakes and legends, was the theatre ofepoch-111,aking battles fought by powerful Armies. Those men, with their virtues and their dreams, come to life again in the following pages. In the historical recollection of the battle of El Alamein (October 23 -November 4, 1942) which culminated in the defeat of the Forces of the Axis in Africa, the celebration of the fallen soldiers and of the heroic actions performed by the 1,,varriors of both parties expresses the sacredness of the historical memory of peoples. The following testimonies give the idea of the troops' morale in those days. To give importance to individual testimonies means to pay rribute to all the protagonists of a cruel battle, m,arked by the soldiers' sacrifice, pain and blood bul also by timeless hwnan and social values. Let's listen to those me1nories which do not want to give an interpretation of the events they are describing, but only represent a warning and an incitement to rememba

leave Rome on February 6, 1940 for Salemo and then Âˇ mmediately for Libya. I land at Tripoli wl;iere I stay until June 9, 1940. When the war breaks out on June 10,1940 we immediately move to occupy Tunisia which belongs to France. We rapidly march towards the border line. We cross many cities in Tripolitanfa and I remember in particular Sabratha, an ancient roman city. Once beyond the border, we do not meet any resistance and rapidly reach Sfax. France surrenders and we go back to Lybia to be deployed on the Cyrenaic -Egyptian front line and fight the real war: Bengasi, Derna, Tobruk, Bardia, Sidi El Barrani. I take part in all operations carried out to defend or seize these cities. I have a special memory of the events of November 1941 in Marmarica The British launch their second offensive and we are obliged to withdraw. While vvithdrawing in orderly manner, we are pressed by the enemy and near the Libyan border we find our track occupied by some British tanks. We are between two fires; they are encircling us and we cannot follow our retreat way. We must reach Bardia at any cost.We counterattack with our light tanks and the British are obliged to evacuate. But they reappear here and there with their heavy

tanks and cause heavy losses. In this framework of harsh fighting, I take part in an action under the command of General Bergonzoni called "electric whiskers". The enemy is hindering all our movements and we are running the risk of losing contact with the bulk of our division and being blocked. At a certain, point we receive the order to halt the column. A group of M /13 tanks reverse its course and rapidly advances towards the area from which the fire is coming. At the same time, some light tanks of my Battalion with their 20mm gum ready to fire, are ordered to make a U-turn, reach a side track and follow the M/13 tanks. It is a raging inferno, a storm of shots are fired from our tanks and machine-guns for about thfrty minutes. We are blinded by the flashes of lightning and smoke, stunned and excited by that hell, in which we are playing a major role. All of a sudden everything is over and we hear the moaning of the wounded. As the smoke fades

A convoy of M 13 tanks advancing in the desert.

away, we can see that General Bergonzoni, at the head of his tanks, is watching the last British tanks going away. It's dawn, the sun is shedding a dim light over all the young soldiers who were alive a few minutes earlier and now lie still on or inside their destroyed or burning vehicles. Some of our comrades are dead and many others are wounded. Many British soldiers are also dead. When we look at them our anger cools down and we shed a tear. Few days later we are engaged in another action which end with another defeat for our forces. A group of tanks is crushed by the enemy and captured. The members of our crews behave heroically but the enemy's superiority is oven.vhelming, as regards both men and equipment. We are in early January and still withdrawing. Agedabia is the last war action I take part in. We are fighting strenuously not to be encircled by the British, who come from the desert and try to surround us.

Their encircling manoeuvre ends at Agedabia, where I am taken prisoner, together with many other units. No one can imagine our discomfort . I am a broken man, have lost all my strength and do not dare to walk with my head held high. But then we are able to listen again to reason ,react and show how proud we are for having honorably served our country. There is an episode that I would like to describe to show that Italian combatants knew how to make themselves respected, even when they were prisoners. Once prisoners, the British take us to Alexandria, then to Cairo and lastly at Geneifa, by the Suez Channel where there are many concentration camps. A narrow gauge railway line passes near these camps and every day, in the morning and in the evening, we see a low-sided wagon train carrying Arab workers to Suez. Few days later, they start jeering at us with obscene w0rds and gestures. They cry "Italy finish", spit at us and make obscene and threatening

gestures. We endure this situation for some days, then , through the grapevine, we reach an agreement with the prisoners in nearby camps and, resorting to subterfuge, provide ourselves with many stones. The following morning, when the train passes near the camps and the Arab workers start again to jeer at us, after a preestablished sign, we attack the train throwing our stones at them. We cause heavy damage. On that same day, in the evening, the Commander of the camp, a Maltese Marshal, shows us a newspaper, the Egyptian "Times" reporting in the headlines the news " Italian prisoners attack a train full of workers". Strangely enough, he seem satisfied, and laughs. Then we are informed that he is married to an Italian woman, The following morning, when the train passes , we get stunned by the fact that all Egyptian workers stand up and raise their arms in the typical fascist salute. We are not disturbed any longer. We have won their respect. I want to add that the Maltese Mareshal treats us with great humanity, always protects us and does what he can to provide us with the bare necessities, mainly water. For many long years, we have been prisoners and suffer pain and humiliation but, unlike many others, are lucky. We are touched by the memories of that time. I feel the need to thank those who give us the opportunity to express our pride for having accomplished our duty. We have not wasted the best years of our youth. Our nephews should be proud of our history, which is the only thing we want to be remembered for. We are not heroes, but just men who have accomplished a sacred duty to the best of their possibilities.

D 97

have the rank of Corporal and take part in the advance towards Alexandria with my company, but we are obliged to stop in the desert due to the lack of fuel. My division is deployed inward, in the Marsa Matruk area, 80 miles from El Alamein. Our line is made up of several posts, 8 miles distant, equipped with one 20mm machine gun and a couple of Austrian water-cooled machine guns belonging to WW 1. Just imagine using these guns in the desert! Each post is under an Officer and comprises one NCO and 18 men approximately. But we are only 10 in my post, the Officer included. We are all in foxholes and our weapons are covered, to prevent them from shining in the sun, be detected by the enemy and protect them from dust. We are often attacked by British aircraft and by New Zealander and Australian patrols, always particularly cruel. An Australian patrol attacks an Italian patrol, made up of few men under Corporal Marinucci from Cosenza. Italian soldiers are captured, undressed and left there naked. I would like to recall what happened on August 28, 1942. In my post, I am with Domenico 98

Clementi, from Geraci Marina, as our Lieutenant has been ordered to report to the Headquarters at Marsa Matruk and the other soldiers are patrolling the area. A "Spitfire", a British fighter, attacks and machine-guns us. We call them "Tommy". It attacks us furiously four times. We uncover our 20 mm machine gun, together with another machine gun, and return fire aiming our weapons through cross sights, as they were pistols. During the

fourth attack, when the fighter is low over our heads, I clench my teeth and, indifferent to what is happening around me, fire many shots just as Clementi does. We cheer when we see a flare and the aircraft crushing on the sand, 100 meters from us. We run towards the aircraft and find that Left.

Bersaglieri equipped with Fiat 14/26 machine gun and mod. 9Jrifles.

Below. M13 tanks in action. Sand bags were added to protect the chassis from "Sherman " and "Grant" tanks' high piercing shells.

the pilot is dead. We take him out of the aircraft, cover his body and put by his side a small bottle with a note indicating the day of the crash and the name of the unit which shot down the aircraft. Then we hand the documents we found over to out Lieutenant, who v.;rites a report and for\.vards it to General Rossi, the Commander at Marsa Matruk. We are promised a reward, but this episode is forgotten perhaps due to the

moving towards us . We cease fire and realize they are German. Once they reach our positions they insult us and threaten to denounce and shoot us. We calmly show them our orders written in Italian and German which we have to comply with. Now ,they praise us, apologize and go back. I shed some tears when , on November 4, 1942, we receive the order to leave the positions which have not been conquered by the British forces, and to withdraw to Tobruk. This is the beginning of our painful, hopeless and endless retreat towards Cirene, Tripoli , Tunisia up to Naubel, where we deploy near the "San Marco" battalion. On May 11, 1943, I am taken prisoner by a Scottish unit and brought to a concentration camp in Tunis. We carry air bombs from the depots to the fighters, which then drop them over Italy. Later on I am transferred to the camp at Orano. I am lucky because it is a camp for officers and, as I am a nurse, I enjoy some privileges. Life is easier also because the camp is under the responsibility of the Americans. After the armistice I am asked to collaborate and choose to do so. When I land at Marseilles with a formation of four Italian military companies, I wear the American uniform. We are tasked with preserving law and order. It is September 1944. Everything goes right until the Âˇ arrival of French forces, then we have to endure difficulties again. forces. We have received written I come back home in 1946. orders according to which friendly I cherish the memory of my forces, when deployed in comrades who were not so lucky formations, must not overcome pre-established distances. One day, as me . Today, I can proudly and humbly remember those events, we see a thick cloud of dust and being aware that I have served hear the noise made by armoured my country to the best of my vehicles. We are on the alert and realize that some tanks are moving possibilities. Peace to my brothers fallen in distant lands. towards us going beyond the preIt would be disgraceful to Âˇestablished distance. We forget them. immediately start firing. At a certain point, we see a flag of truce and some Officers D

seriousness of our situation. What is important for us, however, is that we are certain that \Ve have honorably served our country and our army. In that same period, on September 16, 1942, we rescue a New Zealand patrol made up of four men lost in the desert: they have no food, no water and no strength left. I remember their horror-stricken faces, dry lips and foamy tongues sticking out. We give them something to eat and drink and hand them over to the German Command, as ordered. I would like to mention another episode, to prove that we have always rigorously obeyed orders, even when dealing with friendly

,........ "' .... .,._

.. ... . .

!~ ...,

.... . ... â€˘.: ..

battalion is under Major Alberto Bechi, who died like a hero and was awarded a Gold Medal for Military Value . Also Captain Costantino Ruspoli, who belongs to the same battalion, was awarded a Gold Medal for Military Value. My battalion sacrifices itself almost completely during the three battles of El Alamein. My maimed body still bears the scars of those terrible days, which I will never forget. My mortars platoon is deployed in the far right sector of the El Alamein front line, in the heart of the desert, almost on the borders of the impassable El Qattara depression. The enemy is very active as it can operate in very large areas and gives us no respite. We constantly run the risk of being attacked by patrols or aircraft. Every day we suffer heavy losses, due to raids made by tracked vehicles, the neverending artillery fire and the 100

minefields around us. Death is always on the lurch but we are constantly on the alert, optimistic and enthusiast. Sufferings do not discourage us and we are happy when we can get out of our foxholes for reconnaissance actions. I perfectly remember the night of the full moon on August 30, 1942 when we receive the order to launch an attack towards Alam el Haifa. We immediately get entangled in a minefield. Some mines explode, but we manage to advance. In the dim light of dawn, we realize that there is an obstacle in front of us. It looks like a wall made up of sand-bags. We stop and discover that it is a small trench garrisoned by three British soldiers equipped with machine-guns. They also know that we are there, but our movements are more rapid and we capture them. However, these three prisoners hinder us from advancing; therefore we cannot take them

die. I am severely wounded on October 17, 1942. While on patrol with two other comrades, we strike a mine. The explosion is terrible; one of my comrades die and I am wounded; one of my feet is crushed and I have many splinters in my body. The other paratrooper is unhurt and with the typical courage of the "Folgore" members carries me to the first aid post, where I immediately undergo surgery. I Left. Overview of the El Alamein battle area held by the "Folgore "Division. Cars are now parked in the place formerly occupied by the mortar platoon to which Ventriglia belonged. The El Qattara depression is in the background.

Below. Ventriglia's identification tag.

with us. If we had not been Italians, they would have been killed. Our uncertainty is a stoke of luck for them, as suddenly a tracked vehicle of the "Brescia" Division arrives and we hand the prisoners over to the crew of that vehicle. The memory of Paratrooper Salvatore Ruggieri, who also takes part in this action, still moves me. Unfortunately, the overwhelming power of the British forces does not allow us to continue the offensive and we withdraw to the starting positions at El Munassit, in the El Alamein area, almost on the border of the great El Qattara Depression. Thus, this trench warfare goes on with its high number of dead and wounded soldiers. Here, on October 7, a few days before the beginning of the third battle of El Alamein (October 23) Captain Padella, Commander of the headquarters company, and General Ferrari Orsi , Commander of the tankers units,

feel now the need to highlight the heroic self-denial of the those surgeons: they operate under the fire of two British aircraft. I am extremely grateful to the soldier who gives me his blood under the fire of the machine-guns. The surgeon does not know my blood-group, but it is absolutely necessary to find a donor, given the seriousness of my situation. Only after the operation they

verify that the blood - group of that donor is the same as mine. This is the end of my campaign in Northern Africa. I cannot leave out an event which is a miracle and is worth recalling. In 1985, 43 years after the battles of El Alamein, a German Egyptologist , Professor Hubert Schreiner, during a travel for archaeological research in the area between El Alamein and the Siwa oasis, 80 kilometers approximately form El Alamein, finds my identification tag which evidently fell into the sand when I was wounded. My private data can still be easily read and therefore he can hand the tag over to the Military Authorities. On October 1985, I received my identification tag from the General Committee for the honors to the soldiers fallen in war. This most precious and dearest relic of war will be entrusted, after my death, to the Historical Museum of the "Folgore " in Leghorn. The renowned Egyptologist writes in the letter to which my identification card was attached that the place where he found my tag could be easily identified as a military position, as there were remains of Italian munitions and equipment, as well as many shell splinters. There are also many parts ofel.ectric insulators which, he adds, looks very strange. This is clear evidence, on the contrary , that it was my very position. In fact, the telephone line to Cairo passed near there and we often cut some poles of that line to cover of hide our foxholes. I am extremely grateful to the Rivista Militare which gave me the opportunity to recall an episode of my life as a combatant Paratrooper. I do not want to be at the centre of attention, but pay tribute to the sacrifices of our soldiers and to the blood shed for our country, an ever lasting heritage which must be handed down to future generations

0 101

serve in the glorious XXXI Sapper Battalion. My company is split up into sapper platoons and operates over a wide area stretching from the sea deep into the desert .As a volunteer, I attended a sapper course at Civitavecchia. Upon completion of that course, I just had the time to say goodbye to my family and was immediately sent to Tripoli. I remember total chaos, as the airport is continuously shelled by the British aircraft. We have to run away and scatter over barren and desert lands where no shelter can be found. The British hammer us with heavy fire until our fighters arrive. We move in a great hurry and, after a long march, we are carried to the operation area by truck, following the coast-line road or some prepared tracks. We have to replace the sappers who have fallen in previous engagements. We are in late 1941. The British have come back to El Agheila. We join another platoon and open fire against a British patrol trying to overtake our position. It is dark already and we shoot at random in the direction of a noise. I can only see the flames of our gunshots. I don't know whether I hit anyone, but the British have disappeared. I still remember the hissing of the first rounds; aftervvards I have become accustomed to that noise and do not notice it any more. We are tasked to build or restore defensive walls in front of our positions, mark mine sites to update minefield maps, blow up some vehicles which have been damaged or have run out of fuel. We also have to mine some tracks and dynamite antitank obstacles. More often we hide in foxholes dug on neutral ground between Italian and enemy lines. We are trained to attack tanks with the employment of magnetic mines. We wait in our foxholes for the tanks to 102

approach and come under fire. We suddenly burst out of our places and hurl the mines into the tank, if the hatch is open, or against its sides and rear. Then we quickly return to our shelters, if they are still available. I have seen many comrades die shattered by the same mines they have launched. Very often we have to recover the corpses of the fallen, even if they are enemies. We bury them, trying to leave a mark on the ground so that they may be recovered and moved to the graveyards in the rear area. In late January the offensive action starts off and we move forwards. We are always busy and progressively become accustomed to the dangers, the sand, the wind and the evening cold. Having learned how to cope with hardship, we have equipped our foxholes with whatever we need. We cross the border with Egypt and rejoice at the thought that the war will soon be over. On the contrary, the worst is still to come. We are to spare our munitions, our trucks are halted to save fuel, and patrols are more frequent, with increased risks of stepping on mines or traps set by enemy teams. At night, they attack us from behind, to spread panic and death. But we too are not joking: artillery fires last hours and the sky is always red. It is not a pleasant view, often coupled with fear. There are many casualties and the cries of the wounded are bloodcurdling. I remember the moans of one of our comrades who was hit by a fragment of a grenade burst in front of our foxhole, when he went out to check the origin of a strange noise, perhaps the hissing of an incoming grenade. Without hesitation, we rush out to carry our friend Ivano away from that hell. Unfortunately, he is already dead. One shoulder is smashed and one arm is parUally cut

away. We start crying, swearing and venting our rage by shooting at random, helplessly. This scene is permanently engraved on my mind. For some days now we have been in an area beyond the Egyptian border and have the impression that something is wrong, as there are too many orders and counterorders and we continuously shuttle between hinterland and the coast. During one of these movements to reach some hills at an altitude of 28Â°and 33Â° we witness a dreadful artillery engagement. There is a continuous chain of explosions anp the whole area is covered by a red smoke, like that of a huge fire. We are later informed that one of our cannon group has been totally destroyed. On October 23,1942 the El Alamein debacle takes place followed by an exhausting withdrawal. My only memory of those days is a hectic rush to destroy materials, connect with other units, rescue the wounded and recover dismounted troops stranded in the desert without vehicles, an easy prey to the enemy. We are in the rear guard. The enemy arrives from unexpected directions and we have to be constantly on the alert and defend ourselves not to be taken prisoners. In this chaos we also have to provide for our sustainment. To say the truth, we have always found some

food, even in some damaged vehicles left off the beaten tracks. At times, we first have to bury the corpses of those who have died. We move on to Bengasi, Derna, Tripoli and then Tunisia. We make a stop-over near Medenina and prepare to defend ourselves. We think that our withdrawal has come to an end, but the British and their allies, this time together with the French, arrive. It is January 28, 1943.Some British tanks try to wedge between our position and that at our left side. A short but violent engagement follows,

where I am seriously wounded. When the British withdraw their tanks, I am rescued by my comrades and sheltered in a foxhole where a German doctor gives me first aid. He tells me in Italian that I am done for and that my life is in danger. I hear him as he is talking to another person. I suffer terrible pain, but clench my teeth to contradict the diagnosis made by the German doctor. However, he immediately sends me to the nearest field hospital by a German motor car, where I receive emergency care and remain there for a few days, before moving to the Sfax Hospital. Luck is on my side as, given the seriousness of my wounds, I am embarked on a Hospital Ship and sent back home. The ship docks at Naples in the early hours of the day under heavy shelling. On the same day, the Hospital Ship is hit during another bombing. Many crew members are killed, as well as some hospitalized soldiers who are onboard awaiting to be moved to other cities. Once again, I am very lucky! Even today I repeat this to myself, when I remember the ordeal I went through. I am eighty years old now and, thanks God, I am able to tell my story and say to myself, my family and those who want to listen to me that I tried to carry out my duty. I am also proud of my suffering for the sake of our Flag, our Nation and the Italian Army.

D 103

Right. The front arcade of the "Honor. Courtyard" designed and built oy, Paolo Caccia Dominioni.

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105

â€˘ Gabriele De Rosa .vas born al Castellam.nwre di Stabia on June 24,1917. He was a Grenadier officer during World War Two and fought at El Alamein (Afi-ica). He taught modern history at rhe Universities of Padua, Salerno (where he vvas also universiLy Dean) and Rome. He is the Direclor of the Research lnsiiLUte for social and religious sciences in Vicenz.a, and Direcror of the SLudy Centre for Southern Italy history in Potenz.a. He is the editor of Lhe magazine "Research on social and religious studies" . Since 1979 he has been Deputy Director of the Rome Institute which bears the name of Luigi Sturz.o, wiLh whom. he cooperated from 1954 to 1959.He was elected Senator of the Italian Republic during the X Parliament 011 June 15, 1987 in the Treviso constituency. He wok part in the Educarion Commirtee of the Senate and was Chainnan of rhe Control Committee of the Senate librnry. He was re-elec:Led Senator in the XI Parliament on April 5 -6, 1992 in the Alba - Bra- Savigliano constituency and elected M.P in the consrituency "Campania 2" during the XII Parliament. f-Je wrore "History of the catholic 1nove111e11t" ( 1966), "Bishops, peo ple and m.agic in the Sou1h " (1971), "Sturzo told me" (1982),"Religious and historic time" (1987 and 1994), "Histories o{ Saints" ( 1990). f-Je edited for the "[! J\llulino" publisher 1he volume "Catholics, Church and Resistance" (1977); together with F.Agosrini, "Religious life and culture in Lombardy and Veneto during Napoleon age" (/990) and togethe1 with A. Vauchez and T. Gre,gory "Historv of religious Italy". He is rhe editor of series of publications under the name "Thesaurus Ecclesiarwn Italiae. rece11tioris aevi" (XVIII-XX centurv).He took part in the political life durin,g several Parliaments .

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anded in Africa after a five hours' fl ig ht frorn the Ta toi ..-a irport .in reece to Crete and now lo Tobruk. We are welcomed by f· ,.a. di:.e a dfu~ wind a nd th e sand, made up of ve 1·y fin e and sharp i;:..L , gral:is,·rseeps t_hrough the cracks of our l~1gg~ge ai~d gets _into the :u · " () . : . : .~ .-.. · v•; · .eyes,a11d n(!)stn ls of the men who swallow It hit by btt. Ela 1s a s tray ·Iittfo,dog ,J ith white and black spo~s which comes near me while I .~1n tryii:!_g ifo shelter unde r a sort of canopy awaiting ror the arrival -.=~-~_,._..........._......,_,.....,................a;.....o-Atr e~t:-r""..u..,ck.s. I am told that the dog has inadvertently travelled with us . Ela is a n intelligent a nd bright pup with a litt le restl ess face which he pokes everywhere. Unfortunately, he whines too often . He is a very little, light and pocketable thing, certainly no t the size of a hero ! Five days ago, the British tried to land on this area, which is s till full of battle remains; war ordnance is scatter ed everywhere, black hea ps of discarded, broken and burnt out equipment wh ich, seen from above, looks like huge spiders smashed on the ground. The flat and barren surface of the desert, whose bleakness is heighte ned hy the carcasses of m il itary veh icles, is sparsely dotted with rows of smal l and white crosses, evoking the presence of our merciful God on this harsh ground. The IV Battalion, ,.vh ic h we are to a ugment, [ought bravely in this place. Second Lieutenants Valentino Tolazzi (1), Goffredo cl'Antona and Francesco Sarace ni (2) are among our acquaintances. t.·

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All of a sudden, we arc ordered to leave; we pack up silently, Lhen sLart the engines leaving our \Norries behind us. \'ve are alone under the bright Jome of an illboding sky, which hovers over our heads, making us reel isolated and oppressed. The sun has just set and it is dark immediately, as usual in Lh is region. AfLer gelling off the vehicles, Lhe men shelter under Lheir canvases. I make a tour· to check their movemenls and [ee l that they are calmly brooding over the events. \Ve gel up al wake-up call with our limbs numbed an<l our sweaters drenched by the fog which is still lingering. In fifteen minutes we are ready to leave. We arc slightly disappointed by these hasty movements, which are contrary to our ingrained contemplat ive atliludc. And yet we also like this hectic atrnosphc1·e; we are proud o r ourselves and fee.I at the centre of an undertaking in which each action is in anLicipation of the war ahea<l. Our column slops to r·cfucl at Bardia , near a war cemetery where vvc spen<l some time in prayer. There is a row of helrnets and crosses, with no flowers , but onlv war crosses with one black shel l case. The vehicles drive along the "Balbia" road, full of carcasses

of destroyed vehic les. One orounded "Spitfire" ' thrustin° its b b propeller deep inlo the sand, exposes iLs twisted, humiliated and harmless skeleton. We reach the sea at Sollum and are suddenly overcome by the brightness of its colours: the eye-catching blue, white and red are distinct blotches with no intermediate shades, like on a Venetian palette. The rows of irregular dunes, follow i ng the coastline like a spotless shroud over this incredible land, arc chalk-\vhite; the \Vaters of this deep and inhospitable sea arc dark blue and sh ining, as if constantly polished; the land is red, and scorching as lava, which erodes and hums out all surrounding life, threatening the inviolable purily of the environment.

Yesterday it was our last stop. \Ve arr ive at the HQ towards evening (3) and immediately meet our senior comrades in the battalion. They I.each us how lo move in the desert at night following Lhe contours of the shades. We learn by ourselves to distinguish the roar o[ the <lifferent air forces and artilleries. This noise goes on all nigh L. At da\vn, the last shots fade away, when the troops wake up. AL this

South o{ El Alamein. Septem/Jer 1942: Jtalirm 7S! 18 selfpmpdled guns and ''Panzergrenadieren" u{the German 9Qih light Division, advancing in parallel columns.

poinr, we have to take a new reali ty into accou nt; in fact, until now, there ·was no war, but only colours around us. Then, at about 10 a .n1 , the air defense artillery next to our positions opens fire and two fighter aircraft start a dog-fight in the air. At first , they whirl around slowly, as two air cavalrymen, then sudden ly face each other and make steep loops, risky nose -clown and nose -up ma neuvcrs, exchanging fast volleys of shots. The "Macchi" hits the enemy's tail twice, the English aircraft goes into a climb u p in the sky, then bends lo one side, starts spinning and ends by swirling out of control. It crashes to the ground aflame two km . from our foxholes. The "Macchi" overflies the area for some Lirne to evaluate the extent of its victory.

One sold ier is woun<led amid sand and mud; tl1e radio plays "Li li Marlene". T he British have been shooting heavily but randomly for some days nmv. The aviation too i.s 109

sand, laden with electricity. I t overflows kilometres of front-line, uprooting everything, penetrating foxholes, cam1ons, crates, kitchen appliances, gun barrels and almost suffocating everyone. The storm \Vhirls ominously howling like hell and its hot and oppressing air stuns our senses. Then, it s lowly

Left. Lieu tenant of the 1\1 Battalion, 187th Paratroop Regim.ent. Below. Below: L6/40 Light Tank of the "Ariete'' Armoured Div ision.

restless and makes continuous raids. Tonight the news has come that one grenadier has been \VOunded among those who have just aJTived. He jumped on a mine 15 minutes after arriving at the front-line. He was unlucky, but is still alive, with a wound in his thigh only. There is a storm, carrying along sand and mud. It always starts from the west, with a flash of piercing light , which prog1Âˇessively burns out the sky until it becomes pitch-black. Then, flashes of appear from a d istance, like mounting flames licking the earth from all sides, while thunderclaps are roaring louder and louder. As the storm approaches, we realize that what it carries along is not water, but a huge column of reddish and fine 110

two, three hours or even days. When the first sunbeams pierce the clouds, the sky and the earth have a same ashen colour, after such a fierce clash overwhelming human lives as well. It would be very dangerous to fall ill amid these filthy waters. The amoebiasis is on the lurch and there are scant possibilities of being hospitalized. The song "Lili Marlene" echoes in our cars. It mi ldly challenges to our feelings every evening, when we meet in the officers' fox.hole to listen to the songs chosen by the soldiers and broadcasted by the Italian radio. This song is like a whisper which comes in different tones and pitches and, even today, evokes our past memories. Lale

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subsides, leaving a smell of burning behind it and a kind of dizziness in our heads, similar to a flu. After a little \-Vhile, there is a heavy downpour, which initially plays \Nith the residual sandy wind and then overwhelms it, coming do\vn in buckets, pelting the earth and drenching it to its core. A yellov,:ish mud seeps through the ground and bubbles in the drains. We are disgusted by all this filth and have to prevent it from flooding our tents cmd soiling our belongings. A storm may last one,

7RA

Ande1Âˇson sang "Lili Marlene" when I first heard that beautiful song at the front.

\Ve are on the front-line and dig foxholes.

Th is morning, the British have fired some shots very near our foxholes . Perhaps this is their way of saying good morning.

We learned through the grapevine that the British would at lack during the night, but nothing happened. This morning, our fighters appeared. Air shelling an d artillery fires went on all night, until this morning (8 a.m.) 1 wilhin the sector of the "Trento" Division. The British air force born bed our positions. We don't know whal is happening on our left flank.

Odc/,vi, 23-24, 11lf 2 The ne,vs spread on the frontline (lhrough the grapevine) Lhat the British would attack during the night of the full moon, probably on the 20 th of this month. But on the night of the 20 th noth ing happened, nor on that of the 2P 1, 22nd and 23 rd , except for an increased activity by the two air forces. Every morning, the Arnerican assault wings overfly our positions, perfectly aligned as in

a flypast formalion . 1n the evening, however, groups of black and frightful "Stukas" invade the enemy sky. Rows of tracer ammunition are fired along the British lines, to crÂˇeate a barrage effect. The machine guns shoot volleys of rounds whose trails stand out against the pearlgray sky and lhe flaming-red sunset. There is a myriad of bright dots wh ich go up at full speed, reach their targets and then burst with a sharp explosion, hardly perceived from our distance. The "Stukas", aher reaching the desired altitude, start a series of dreadful. nosedives and drop all kinds of bornbs, accompanied by the wailing of their sirens. During the night of Lhe 23rÂˇd, at about 10 p.m ., a burst of flashes breaks out from left to right over a stretch of about 10 km, as if operated by an alternate energy switch. A fcvv seconds later~ gun shots fol.low. There is an interrupted chain of light effects and high flames tear up the black

!'vl 13/41 Tank with crew during a. pause in the ballle on the El Alarnein fronl.

curtain of the n ight. The earth is shaken like a stonny sea and trembles as it had losL its balance. Shells drop everywhere making a devastating noise, burning and shattering everylhing, while our fox holes risk being completely wiped oul. Our lines are covered by a curtain of smoke which has the same pungent and choking smell of burnt gunpowder. If we consider that there are over 250 guns shooting at a 5 m .i nute rate of fire , abouL one million shel ls are fired (4) . At about 02 am. the enemy masses its artiller.ies against the sector of one of our divisions placed to the left of Lbe deployment. At dawn, the British tanks advance to attack, still protected by a thick curtain of fog . Our slrongholds hold out and open precision fires, blocking the 111

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friends were speaking to him in a low voice , trying to keep him awake, as if he was not dying but only suffering from a minor accident. Second Lieutenant Tosoni 路w as wounded, Second LieuLenant Feliciani was killed. Left. Point 33: a naiive leads his 1neharis on. a track in the desert. Ti,.;o signboards sho路w the distance ji-orn Nen1iano and Cairo. Below. Italian gunners firing their 149/40 artillery piece.

enemy vehicles. The British infantry troops do not even try to infiltrate our lines, as the tanks which had to support them have been stopped and knocked down by our artillery fires. The battle is raging in the sector of the "Trento" Division. The British are staging a series of attacks and delivering heavy preparation fires. Our troops are holding out, but there are many casualties in the firing areas and foxholes and men are left with no weapons and communication lines. I know this much, so far. We are in the sector of the "Bologna" Division under General Alessandro Gloria ( after the attack on the 26 th we have had only artillery engagements in this area). From our position, we can see several columns of smoke and hear the shelling of tanks coming from our left side. The division has been completely disrupted by the battle (5). On the night between the 25 th and the 26 th the enemy masses its assets in the sector of the battalion we have been attached to, in an effort to recover from the previous defeat and test new break-through possibilities. Enemy artillery preparation starts at 11 p.m. with a swift and pelting machine-gun fire The 88 type howitzers fire sharp and piercing shots which disperse burning fragments 112

everywhere. Volleys of about 20 rounds at a time pierce the air ,,vith a hissing sound and the earth makes a grumbling noise, like a huge boiling cauldron. I snuggle in a foxhole and my heart leaps at every explosion, while a hoard of senseless thoughts is crossing my mind; then a strong but well founded feeling of anger follows. I wish my hands were big enough to grab one of these guns and smash it completely. At last, preparation fir-es end and enemy infantry troops advance. At this point, one of our 75mm batteries, which is behind us, openes fire, together with 81mm mortars and 47/32 artillery pieces, machine guns and other automatic weapons. After two hours of violent fire, the British attack is repelled .

O<M/,vi, 21, 1142 I am grieved to hear the news coming from the battalion HQ. The first "Grenadiers" company is destroyed, Francesco Palladino is dead. My poor friend! An anillery shell shattered the top of his foxhole and a lm路ge fragment cut his legs off. He slowly bled to d eath, gradually losing all strength, but still made an effmi to move his head with an expression of pain and be\vildermen t. His

Nothing new has happened. The battle continues on the left of the d eployment. One infantryman killed by a grenade has been buried near my [ire position, under a stone-encircled mound of earth. In the morning, when I got out of my foxhole, I saw two stains of his blood on the ground.

Q&t,.c/,vi,

30 1142 I

This is a new exp~rience: to lie with my face on the sard under an enemy hail of bullets falling two me ters from me, whi.le my head is pelted with blasts. I wish I could hide somewhere. The blue flames of a machine gun are facing me, and I feel as 1 were observed, followed, fascinated and nailed down by its blinking eye, which is both sarcastic and cruel. I suddenly get up and run forward, to face that disgusting thing that is spitting his hatred at me, croaking ominously and

fallen fast asleep under a cliff of rock. I find my battalion commander and rea'lize that we are both saddened by the latest events. The front of the "Trento" Division has been already broken and the tanks of the "Littorio" Division are holding the enemy back. But a large number of "Liberator" aircraft are still bombing our_rear area. The y arrive in waves of 18-20 vehicles flying at very high al ti tu des and drop their ammunition following an established pattern, on the signa l of the squadron commander (green smoke). The

called "white squadrons" because the deadly bellies of the aircraft, seen from the ground when the sun is shining, looks pale white.

An air shelling started at 10 p .m and lasted until dawn. I have just got into my foxhole with Rev. Ventura, the chaplain. We only have a canvass to cover our shelter. \A/e hear the noise of a reconnaissance aircraft hovering over our heads. Then suddenly it drops some star shells which floodlight the whole area .After

shifting from green to yellow, to red ... But when I get hold of it, I can see its exposed bowels covered in mud and blood and feel its black and bot corpse . That monster has become a useless tool in a flash.

I return to the HQ under an a constant air shelling. I have

hissing of the bombs increases as they near the ground . Their explosion makes a terrible noise and scallers hundreds of burning fragments. This morning, I saw two aircraft of that type burst in the skv, deadly hit bv the fires of our ~i r defense . . They were smashed to pieces but, before crashing to the ground, they hung in the air for a while, like a red and burning blob swaying in the wind. These formations are

detecting its targets, the aircraft continues lo fly high to muster fighter bombers to the area, like a decoy bird. Their arrival is heralded by a metallic noise typical of the isochronous beats of their engines. As they reach the meeting point, one or two of them come down with their engines stopped. We can hear the angry hiss of their wings then the shrill whistle of the bombs; there are three, four or five simultaneous 113

explosions not far from our place. There is a hell-like scenario at night, when the flames given off by t he fires mingle with black [umes .It is a nerve -racking experience.

All of a sudden, we are ordered to withdraw, not to be attacked from behind. There was a heavy b ombing during the n.ight. At da\.\'11, a few km from our position, ou r vehicles are on fire, hit by the British vans, Âˇwhich are a lready beyon d our lines . O u r men immediately d ep loy in close formation to protect our veh icles and load them vvith equipment. At last, we leave the area where the B ritish made several breakthroughs. The incoming troops are from Australia and New Zealand and leave a mark wherever they push their way. They are fresh forces, proud of being well-trained and well-equi pped. For the Cirst time, I feel that we are no longer fighting against a live enemy, be it English, Indian, New Zealande1~ 114

but against a lethal war machine, which inexorably attacks our obsolete 47/32 tcu1ks, only capable of grazing, and not piercing, the armour of the "Sherman" tanks (6). We sudden ly discover a seashore near the E l Alamein palisade, created by an indentation in the desert coast-line. It looks like a mirage or a daydream. But no, I am sure it is really sea. This wellknown, beloved and even longedfor view is shocking.

We are withdrawing and are novvÂˇ in the middle of a tank battle. Armour-piercing grenades are whistling around us. Our column disperses, but regroups after a few hours. \Ve susta i n three air strikes . T he last one hits us directly, but does not cause any damage. I am left alone awaiting news from Lt. Rossa, the pace setter, who went out to establish connection with the battalion HQ. We sleep in an area sheltered from air strikes. There are noises and movements of tanks.

We are at El Dabah, tryi ng to estab lish connection with the battalion HQ. Air shelling is going on. We arc sti ll shocked and deeply saddened by the view of a b u rnt corpse, with an expression o f prayer still stuck on his face. My words cannot express the so1Tow that renders our heaits. His image is impressed in my mind, w ith bjs maimed arms stretched out, like a bridge over a useless life. His corpse is a black spot against the white sand of the beach . "Let us throw some earth over his head and that's the end of it" . At night, we move on h lindly, while the coast road is lit by enemy flares. We have miraculously escaped death. Men and vehicles are on fire .Our discarded or unserv iceable 47/32 light guns are heaped in a dump ground.

Two ballelies of the Flak Division open interdiction fire against the RAF aircraft,.near Fuka.

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Left. Pos/card o(the 61 st Jnfantrv Regimen{ assigned to the 10211d "Tre11.to " Jnfamrv Division.

. Right. Bersaglieri on the attack.

One vehicle is spot ted by the beams of a searchlighL and swerves to hide in the dark Short moments of unrest follow, when the first resistance actions are set in place. We reach Marsa Matruch in the morning. After covering 30 oLher km, 1 meet Romano (7) and am ovenvhelmed by emotion. I hate my literary culture which hinders rne fron, express ing my feelings and passions. I would like lo break lhe rigid frnme of my thoughts and make my words flow fr ee ly wiLh no academic refinement, to turn over a new leaf.

During the night, two Gern,an vehicles collided and left a beheaded corpse on the road. The British aircraft are flying over our heads. On the gro un d , the Germans have stopped our vehicles, trying to make their \Vay. A battle follows, ,vhere many are wounded or killed. We move on blindly, haphazardly and final ly reach the Sollum ridge. \Ne make a stop-over at the Capuzzo redou bt. The desert has become part of our souls, but we hate iLs vast spaces.

The grenad ier convoy leaves t he Capuzzo Redoubt after reorganiz in g its for路ces, like a family bewildered by suc h devastation but glad to meet again. It arrives at the wells of Bardia and stays for路 the night. \Ve leave early in the rnorn ing and stop at Tobruk, ,vhere some Army Corps are massing . We don't know ,,vhether we are prisoners or free men. Today, El Alamein r ecalls very sad mernor路ies, while the sound of its

n ame might evoke feelings oC love and quietness. N,(J,V~VI,

40km from Agedabia.

10, 114-2

We leave at dawn. At Barce, we rneeL lhe baualion HQ.

We stop at 35 km h:om Mar路sa el Brega. The British have resumed shelling the Balbian road. There are nevJ fi res and new casualties. Vve hear gunshots close to our veh icle. Together ,.vith some olher grenadiers, I reach the place w here these shots come from: are they British? l grip my gun and send the men up a steep cliff where the shots come from. They are Germans who are training!

We are leaving again, destination Sirte .I fol lo w the column as trail officer and have one day's delay. We stay overnight

We leave for No felia; gunfire continues along the road. The British aircraft appear suddenly from beyond the sea and swiftly

We leave for Ghemines and stop al Omerzan.

We are crossing the Cyrenaic Gebel.

N,0,i/~.(,/), 12, 114-2

115

I reach my battalion HQ which is 60- 61 km far from Sirte. I am tokl that my black and angry face looks like that of the Negus. But I am only sad and embittered. The disaster is approaching. My poor country, what will befall you? The surviving troops of our battalion can still regroup, showing their organizational capabilities under Captain Vigano.

We landed in Africa two months ago and I have grown old in these two months. Our General spoke to the troops to raise their morale. What did he say?

attack our columns shoot ing volleys of shells. Our men scatter over the desert but many of them burst into flame aboard their vehicles, suddenly immobilized by death. However, once the air raid is over; we resume our positions as nothing had happened, with a weak smile on our faces, trying to hide or dispel our inner tensions. But these are useless words 0 1Âˇ empty rhetoric which does not explain the meaning of our deeds. In fact, in those moments, ,.-ve acted without thinking and our minds were empty. The things we are telling now have happened a moment before or afterwards. The "present", instead, which is more real than any speech and str-onger than any reasoning, rests unknown, I ike a distant and inscrutable truth belonging to an unreal world. What is the "present" and what power have we over our lives? The answer are those who died and are still there soaked in blood with their heads cut off. 116

A day of rest. The order to leave for a new com bat zone may a tTive any momenL. It is mail time for the grenadiers. They ask me to write a "beautiful" letter to the ir girl - friends or parents. I have to ask how the [arm, the cattle and the grape harvest are going. Arn I not an "intellectual" who knows how to write properly? I too receive a letter from my beloved Gabriella.

We arc assigned to the 66 th reg iment of the "Trieste" Division. We stop at Buera t .

Left. Cmporal of the 40 th Infantry regiment o(the "Bologna" Division.

Right. War remains on the battlefield (M 13 and "Shen-nan" Tanks). Track links used as an added prot.ection can be seen on the M 13 tank. Below. Drawinf?, by Paolo Caccia Dominioni depicting a camp 1\!Jass on the eve of the battle of El Alamein.

Given our small number of forces and obsolete armaments, we can only hope in our good star. But is this a star still there?

Af,e.vu,,Jvi, 2 1- 7)~vi,

1, 1142 Th e operation cycle or the ba ttle of El Alamein may be conside re d as closed. Now it istimeto draw conclusions. Whatever the 1uck of our

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bordering the Balbian road, one "Spitfire" crossed the sky and its pilot waived them hello.

l)~v,,

6, 1142

Yesterday morning at 7 a.m., near Buerat, the battalion reached the roadman's house which is 12 km from Sirte and 12 km inland. \Ve are at the far left of Lhe "Trieste" di visional deployment, wh ich has to protect the withdravval of our troops west of Buerat. We set up a stronghold.

troops, f am sure of one thing: we Italians have suffered on this land and foughl this battle with all our hearts and mi ncls, an have racked our souls over it. Everyday we uncondiLionally devoted ourselves to the war, playing no tricks, but being fair to the bitter e ncl, especially because we felt that the enemy engaged this battle as it were a walk in the woods. Some grenadiers Lold me that one day, while they where on the shore

Engineer soldiers detonate mines to b ui ld weapon emplacements. In the evening, a number of firing positions are completed and the \Neapons are in place. Some mechanized vehicles, sti ll unidentified, placed al a distance on our left side, may be a threat, as the n ight approaches. There is a wide and deep field of fire in front of us and therefore the possibilities of being identified by the enemy are few. J read the speech of the Duce and \vonder whether he can be defined as an "ill-rninded man". I

interpreted his speech as a comment of psychological insight rather than a reassuring picture of military and political history. The meaning of his allegations clashes agai nst a different and more terrible truth. The policy of embellishing t he news with statistic data does not work: we are confronted with a dreadful scenario and a huge tragedy (8).

Yesterday at 10 I devoutly read St. Bernard's prayer to the Virgin (9) . The memories of the past and the sorrow of the present have rekindled familiar feelings which I thought were long gone. We are alone in this desert and the sky is too far to perceive our su ffering. For two days now we have been sharing memories with our friends and the names of our women make us feel homesick and restless. We get back 20 km from Buerat and a re awaiting for new orders.

l)~v,,

11, 1142

My friends (1 O) Magnani, 117

Bavaresco, Berlincio.ni and Piglia had the courage of eating the macaroni p ie I had cooked following my mother's recipe. At the end of that "lavish" meal, we ate one orange ,vhose exquisite fragrance pervaded our tent. 1n Africa, certain objects and household goods exert a hidden fascination on us. For instance, the presence of a can or a tin in a foxhole gives a familiar look lo the place and revives friendship feelings which reconcile us with life itself. In [act, these object are a const;;mt reference point, linking us to everyday li fe, both mentally and verbally. When we leave a foxhole a nd carry all OLff things away, i.t becomes cm anonymous pit, as its comfort depends on the 1xese nce of our inseparable belongings. We all are in a state of uncenainty, and especially Vittorio P, ,vho t u rns pa le when he imagines his fu ture life. I am sure

tha t tomorrow Captain Magnani will s t ill walk \Vith his empty haversack. I Te vv ill thn.1st his hand into it and find his forgotten youth burÂˇied the rÂˇe. Tony B. is a boy again when he lists the human and civil experiences he never had

We have lost the notion of time; the immense surface of the desert evens out both time and space in ou r minds. The vvorcl "Arab" indicates an inborn attitude of in tern al stillness an d a contemplative a pathy. We fight an unseen enemy and materialize his presence through our anxiety and concern for his supposed moves . Perhaps our imagination makes us fight a war fu ll of tensions and expectations as well. After all, this is in line with the harshness of the desert.

We are 100 km from Mis urata and d e ploy in stronghold formation . Our batta lion is augmented by a paratroop company.

Tonight troops are on aler t at the s tronghold, as a British van has o pened fire on the road. The dampness of the night numbs our bodies and soak our canvases.

1)~v,, 21,

1142

Since yesterday morning we have moved to a high ground to seal u p the deployment of th e battalion on the Zern-Zem wadi. The company is complete ly isolated and self-sufficient (11 ).

1)~v,, One grenadier patrol which was reconnoitring our su rrounding area captured a New Zealand NCO who went astray in the desert having lost his van.

Above. A drawinf!, hy Paolo Caccia Domin.ioni.

Left. Sergea11t o(the Vlll paratrooper-

sapper battalion.

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2~, 1142

"Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise : When hi s mother .Mary had been betrothed t o Joseph, before t hey came t ogether she was found wiLh c hil d of th e Holy Spirit .. ". (Gospel o[ St. Mathew, verse 18 and sqq).These simp le words h ig}1 lighL the magnitude of that miracle, w hose story rekindles o ur devotion and faith. Yesterday night at midnight, there was a pale and Lre rnbling

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moonlight crossed by a trail of pale cl ouds which cau g h t o u r attention . We fe l t th e need to share ou r sorrows and lo nel iness, perl1aps it was juvenile gloom.

J ~ , , 114,3 I n the Cath edral of Trip oli on the left side of the nave, a t the level of the high altar, th ere is a Crucifix, \Vilh t h e fo ll owing inscription:

"Venire ad nw omnes qui laboratis ei 011.erati estis" (St. Matthew)

NOTES (1) Vak:nLino Tolani was one of the most p o p ul ar figures among th e grenadiers of t he IV battalion: He fo ught in Africa, at Tobruk, El Alamein and Takroun a in T unisia, where h e

was taken prisoner. He was awarded a silver medal. Vicenza was his place o[ o rig.in; I me t h im there m a ny times and we used to recall o ur Afr ican meinories. Since 1975 1 h ave often gone to Vicenza where T a m at the head o f the Research I nstitu te for social and religious sciences. He was extreme ly reliable and humane. Tolazzi distinguished h imself d uring Lhe a ttack that Rommel cond ucted successfully in Ju ly 1942 to reach El Ala me in , ch asing the Bri tish u nits which were hasti ly w ithdrawing. The th e n Commander ·of th e TV "Gre n ad iers" antitank battalion, arrivin g at El Dabah w ith th e firs t echelon o r forces (we belonged to the second echelon), o rdered Tolazzi to advance for 40 k m . Paolo Caccia Dominioni described the operation as follows: Rernember that 1here is no one in fi-on1 o(vou - said Major Burragg.i ne Lo Tolazzi. 1l{1er 20 km Lhe Ur.rns ( the name of the t ruck) is defini1ively aba11.do11.ed. The small column moves on, under the light of 1he moon and fla res, umil it reaches its destination.

The grenadiers leave their Lancia 3 RO truck and walk the last s tretch of the road, to·wing I.heir 6 artillery pieces, be/i.n e quartering in sl.rorzghold fonnation (Paolo Cacci a Dorninioni "Alamein 1933" , Mursia, .Milano, 1962, 1992, pp.57-58). T h e ill usion las ted 3 m o n ths . Mussol ini believed tha t our troops, together with the Ger mans o f t h e v\!e~machL, would reac h El Alamein and, from there, immed iately mTive at Suez. On the con trary, after waiti ng a bout twenty days and being ignored by Ro m mel, he returned to Italy ,vith his white horse a nd the sword of lslam w hich he wanted to brand ish. Tola,.,.i wrote a w ar j ournal from December 22 1941, when he left Italy, Lo 1\.farc h 13 1943, the d ate of the surrender follm.virw the hard battle of Tak.rouna, where tl1e survivors or the "Folgore" Division a nd the rest of our bau; lion fo ught for the last time. Also my friend Li°: Delfo Diletti, who was awarded a gold medal, served with the grenadiers . Takrouna was a n import a nt high ground , a barrier prevent in g the B r itish armo ured

119

years. Tolazzi wrote his journal w hen he was imprisoned in Tun is, together w ith Capta in Attilio V iga no . It is a valuable documen t, as it is a dia rv o r an eye-witness and a man who t·~>ok p,HI.. in th ose battles . F rancesco Saraceni, anoLher gre nadier, gathered Tolazzi's memories. He followed the course of m ilita ry operations from El Alamein up to the battle of En(idaville, Ttuusia. Tolazzi died at Vicenz.a in November 2000, ass is ted by his wife Angelin a Gennari, \Nhom he loved Lenclerl y. ( 2 ) Francesco Saraceni ~v,1s a grenadier w ith the rank of corporal a nd a scholar. He fought in Tunisia, where h e was la.ken p risone r by the Americans and transferred \.o l he US. He gathered many testimonies on the war in Africa and on the life .in prison. (3) We belonged to the "Bologna" D ivision , placed at the ccrJLer of the deployment, beLween the "Trento'' and the "Brescia" Divisions. Our ba 1.r.alion operated in a decen tralized way. on platoon and comp,my basis, to supporL the "i\rie Le", "Bologna" , "Trento'· and 'Trieste" Divisions. T he "Folgo re" and "Pavia" D ivis ions were near to the El Qatta ra d epr essio n . As regards the battle o f E l Ala mein, ,M assimo Zamorani gives u s a detai led description of the British and ItalianGerman troops in tbe field, in his El Alanzein, the beginning of the end for 1he

vehic.les from reaching Tunis and Cape Bon. Diletti distinguished hi mself in that battle during the counterattack against the British inrantry Lroops. The Britis h media defined that battle as one of the tou ghest e ngagemen ts sustained by the VIII Anny against Lhe Italian soldiers: who /cJUgh t man to man as no one did before. ·oilett.i was seriously wounded and s uffered the consequences of that wound for the rest of his life. I met Diletti more often in Rome in 1972, when our t. vvo families settled clown in two attached houses in the P1ima Porta area.T was next to him when he passed away. Valentino Tozzi recounted this bat.Lle in ''The last battle in Africa", "ll Giornale di Vicenza'', February 22, 1990.He also wrote Montgomery did not keep his word al Takroww. in "II Luned1" Udine, April 18, 1949. Tolazzi asked m e Lo present. his book al Cividale clel Friuh, where he served as Chief Clerk of the Civil Court for 27

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Left. Captain, flame-thower operator and sapper of the XXXI Sapper Battalion.

Below. The 47/32 all gun was ofien in'effeclive against Lhe Lhick armour of Lhe "1\rfathilda': "Sherman" and "Granl'' tanks. ft was ernployed by the Italian Anny on all fronts during WW2.

Axis, "Il giomale", October 23, 1992. (4) The VIII British Army (New Zealand ers, Australians, Indians, South -Africans and Poles) attacked the Italian-German deployment. The British had 200,000 men, 1,500 tanks against about 500 tanks owned by the German and Italian troops, which were m uch lighter that those o f the VIII Army - 4,000 cannons, 13 ,000 trucks, 1,600 aircraft - against a total of 500 assets owned by-the German and Italian troops. Marshall Edwin Rommel led that battle fr om beginning Lo encl. He was on leave and returned immedia tely to replace General Hans Stumme, killed bv British ai1.illerv fire. Force levels were greatly unbala~ced. (5) The British bu rst through the centre of our ranks, near El Alamein. The I and X British Armies crossed the gaps opened along our lines. The Italian d ivis io ns held ou t to the utmost and staged heroic a ctions . The "Folgore" lost. 2/3 of its men and the "Trento" , "Bresc ia" and "Bologna" bravely sacrificed themselves. (6) On the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the battle of El Alamein, I praised the courage of the men belonging to the

"Folgore" (about 380 survivors out of 5,000 men) , a s well as that of the troops of the "Trento", "Ariete" and "Bologna" Divisions, who fought to the utmost in that "bloody" battle, as Tolazzi defined it. G.De Rosa, El Alamein our debacle , "Il Giornale", October 24, 1992. (7) Second Lieutenant F ulvio Romano from Asti, one of mv dearest friends, came from Italy to "join our battalion on tha t tragic clay and moment. He brought the mem01ies of ou r past glories \Nith him. Now the remains o f that generous youth are buried at Takrouna. (8) Mussolini delivered his speech, which I mentioned in my journal, on December 2 1942, during the plenary session of the legislative Committee of the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations. The text of that speech was published by the "Corriere della

sera"on December 3, with the following title: HisLoric report o{ the Duce to Italy. Today, reading it after 60 years, I can confirm the impression I had at that time: It was a comment of psychological ins ight, rather than a political-military report. In fact, the Duce opened his speech as follows: 1 am convinced that in time of war, when Lhe cannon speaks with its powerful voice, the less Âˇwe speak, the better. In any case, one should speak of past accounts and rarely or future expectations. On the contrary, he did not draw a fina l balance in d escrib ing the followimz three main events o f the war: the war-in Russia, where the Italian Army was fighting desperately; the "supremacy" of Japan and the African war afler the landing of the BritishAmerican troops in North Africa, which he did not consider as glorious, as it took place with 1he complicity of' 1he invaded, i.e. the Algerian populations. In sum, .it \.Vas a tragic comedy. When I read that speech in mv foxhole, I noticed that he never u s"ed the words d efeat, withdrawal, retreat. Mussolini did not pronounce the m, as he was convinced that the war has now assumed proportions that could be called cosmic, so universal are 1hey - a war which goes beyond the power of words, a war Lhat having spread enormously in space has, as a natural consequence, also been prolonged in Lime proportionately. From a psychological point of view, I think that l'v1ussolini did not want LO acknowledge facts that he could not accept, or else h is convictions would be thoroughly contradicted: 1 am deeply convinced that in Lhis huge game,

12 1

played LO create a 11e:1v Europe and draw the boundaries be1ween Eu rope a.nd Afi-ica, a decisive and final victmy will be on.Iv obtained 1ha n/cs to Lhe intervetition of Lhe Italian Army. Therefore he decided that his speech would not be centred on politics. but on "data, facts and figures; in other words, it vvill be a balance-shect of the first 30 months of war". Notwiths tand ing th e n umber o[ casualties, the towns destroved bv air s trikes and all the pain s uffered,· that conflict was considered as ''a legitimate war and an unavoida b le dut v" . (9) 1 carried w ith me a po~ket edition o f the "La Divina Commeclia", Hoeply Edition, 19 11. (I O) Captain Giovanni Magnani was Executive Officer to Colonel Tu lli o Gen,asoni a verv strict commander w ho appli~d dis~ipline in a rational'. and not onlv fo r ma l o r mechanica l w ay . Gerv,tsoni had a ,vicle war

the e ncl of mv Officer carcer du ring which l fought in Africa, servi,;g in th~ vo lu nteer un ivers ity stu d ents ' com pany, attach e d to th e 31·d "Gre na diers" reg im e n t. vVe were trained at Viterbo ;,~i1d Civitacastellana, and then attended the Office r Cade t Course a t Are,.zo. A[te,- Scptcmber 8, 1943, being wanted by the Nazis (my name and address were in the list of the 1st "Grenadiers" regiment Office rs) l became a clan destine and joined Badogl io's forces. During the fina l p hase of that never-ending war, the Ministrv of freed lands seconded me to the V Armv HQ as field officer of the Pes cia part isans, w ho were withdrawing from the .Modena area behind the Gothic. line. T had a lot of tro uble Lrving to calm dow n t hose resistance-hgl{ters who were chasing local fascist officials. I returned to the civilian life when Milan was freed. The university s tudents' "Grcnadiers"

exper ience, ranging from vVorld \:Var One Lo the campaign in Eas tern Africa, where he served as Cornrnandcr of th e 1 s t "Grenadiers" reg imen t , gaining the esteem of his subordinates. Magnan i knew h im well, but was a more flexi ble and friendly commander·; he too had a wide war expcrience. (l l) When serving in Tripoli, Thad a 15 -da y leave, and flew to Italy on board a Germa n pla ne, wh ic h was spotted by the British a ir defence near Malta, but was not hit. After landing at the Lecce airport, T un derwen t. a medical cxarninatio n a nd w as diagnos ed a histo lytic-vege LaLivc amoebias is . Whcn l was d is m issed from the quarantine stati o n (behind the San Camillo_Hospital) to spend a period of convalescence and undergo a series of check-ups, Africa h ad already b een conquered an d Montgo rn e ry prepared to land in Sicily. That was

company was celebrated by a speech made by one of Lhem, LL Luigi .Deserti. on March 10,1995, in the Great Hall o f t he Bologna Un ivers ity. L. Dcserti wrote lhe story of that company The young volunteer universiLy s1udents during the 1940-45 war, on the "Rivista di storia contemporanea" February 1, 1966 He also wrote "11w history of the volunteer unive1:,tiy students company, a unit which won Lhe highe.sL number of awards" on the "II Granatiere", J ul yAugust 1986. It should be recalled that univcrsity grenadier Officers served in Africa, and. a lso in Montenegro, Greccc, Russia, Albania, where my dear hiend Galdo Galderis i was killed. When we both attended the war college at Civitacastellan a, we used to d iscuss Benedetto Croce's aesthetics a nd Marxist theories. Another friend of m ine, Ste nio ConLigliozzi, was take n prisoner by the Germans a n d

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transferred to Gcrmany. My journal reports the names of some un ivcrsitv officers, such as Ugo Aprile, w ho was wound ed at E l Alamein, Fra nco Romano, E nzo Rossin i, Antonio Bavaresco and Luciano Berl incio ni. I wou ld like to close t hese notes b v cit in g th e wo rd s of Paolo Caccia Domi71ioni. He concluded his book on El Alarnein, a reference documern of that h is toric.a.I cvcnt, with a list or those, both friends a nd enemies, who Look part in that battle: the "Grana Licri di Sardegna" of the IV Battalion; the in fan Lrvrnen of the 1/19 "Brescia", J/40 "Bol()gna", Tlli6 1 "T re n Lo" and 111/65 "Tr ieste" Battalions; the Bersadieri of the VITT Armoured Battalion; t he paratroopers o [ the: 11,lV and VII "Li tto r io" Ba t talions; Lb e lancers of the TT! "Novara" armoured group; the gunners of the ''Eugenio d i Savoia"and "Duca d' Aosta" rnutorizcd regiments, as well as those of th e 132th "i\ ri cte" , 46 th "Trento", 205 th "Bologna" regimcnl5 and o f the 52 nd cannon gro up; t he sappers o f th e 3 1si and 32 nd Africa Battalions; the engineers o f 1.he 51 :;J "Trento", 17 th and 27 th "B resc ia " Batt.al io ns; the pioneers of the 15 t h company; the drivers of the: 37 th motor p o o l; th e HQ of th e Royal Navy a l Marsa Matruch and the crew of the MZ 71 5 landing craft; the pilots of the JS1, znd, 31·d a nd 4rb fighter wings and 5 0 t h assa ult w in g ; the a rm oured grena diers of tl{°e of the 1 15 th "Lanclgrav io d'Assia''regiment; t he paratroopers of the "von der Hcyd te" Bat.talion,"Ramcke" Brigade and the Scotsmen of the "Argyll and S utherland H ighla nders'' battalions.