Issuu

CONTENTS

'.'-lumber Three 2000 September - October November - December

·Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the m ilitary way of thinking and a fo rum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at inform ing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

'h e Army is changi ng inio a rofessional Service, capable o f ontributing to the safeguard of the :ountry's interests anywhere, and of 1terpreting the security needs of tile tlantic .Alliance, with a main role in 'uropean Defence.

Politics, Economics and Strategy 2 The Army for Europe and for the Country The Adherence Logistics (Claudio Graz,ianoj

16 A Revolution in Military Affairs

(Pier Paolo l.unellij

=ouR-MONTHLy ;upplem ent to numbers 5 and 6 f Rivista M ilit are Italian Ed itio n

:ditor in Chief: iiovanni CERBO 1anagement and Editorial Office , Via d i S. Marco 0186 Rome hone 0039 0647357373 .dvertising :are of the Secretariat f Rivista M ilitare hone 0039 066795027 rinter IPOLITOGRAFIA S.E.A. srl ia Cesena, 4 B ) 182 Rome hotoprocessing tud io Lodoli hone 0039 065898780 ubscript ion and forward ing ymail aw 662/96, art. 2, para 20/c :onditions for 2000: one number. Lit 4,000 - Euro 2.06 one back number. Lit. 8,000- Euro4.12 ubSC!iption rates 3.ly: Lire 22,000 a year broad: Li re 30,000 a year ayment m ust be made on p ostal :count No. 22521009 - SME entro pubblicistica dell'Esercito 23/ A, Via. XX Settembre - Rome esidents abroad may remit 3.yment tihrough bank cheq ue or ternational postal order

uthorized by the Court of Rome 1der No. 944 of the Regis try by ecree 7- 6- 1949

28 Sharing Out the Ether

(Omelia Rotaj

34 Switzerland. The New Armed Forces Intenriew \\11th the Chief of the Swiss General Staff (f:nrico AJagnani)

42 Slovak R~public. Interview With the Chief of Staff orthe Slovak Annv (Enrico lv.[agnani)

48 United Europe. Between Dream and Reality (Luigi Cainpagna)

56 The Militarv Instrument's Organizational Problem (Sauro Baistrocchi)

70 International Relations in the New Millemrium (Carlo Belli11z.ona)

Science, Technology and Training 78 Command and Control The. l\fa!lliold Aspects of an Acronym and Its Denvatlons

(Angelo Paczfici)

86 The Non-Lethal Weapons

(Giovanni Carai;el/i)

94 A Reserve on a Voluntary Basis

(Luigi Semprinij

Current Events 109 Premio Giornalistico Esercito 113

Sommaire - Inhalt - Resumen

2000 © Copyright by Rivista Militare

ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE STAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA

1e produ ction of this m agazine is been supervised f Omero Rampa

Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee t he highest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves contributors ample freedom, though it does not necessari ly share their opin ions. The Author is th us solely responsible for the articles which, published unedited and without editorial ties, exc lusively reflect his personal ideas. Articles must be original in thought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (European Military Press Association) periodicals. Articles should be accompan ied by suitable photographs, illustrations, explanatory tables, together with a photograph of the Author, a brief «curriculum vitae» and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves the right to change the title of articles and choose the typeface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging. In order to make t he product ion of the articles more expeditious, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides the text on paper, also the diskette with the text files of the article. Any system and type of computer can be used.

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The possibility of a significant participation in the European Security and Defence Initiative is directly related to the operational credibility of the force "packages" that the Italian Anny will be able to supply within a very short time. In view of this, the logistic formations tasked with providing adherent support to the operational theatres are as important as the manoeuvre forces, not only to ensure the successful outcome of the mission, but also as a demonstration of the Service's capability of progressively assuming a leading role in the conduct of peace-support operations. we mentioned in the articles ublished this year on "Rivista il:itare", the implementation of the prqject knovm as "European Security and Defence Identity" (ESDI), especially in the light of the Helsinki DecJaration of December 1999, entails a selious review of the development plans of the European military instruments in general, in order to ascertain their suitability to the European directives and to the plans being worked out for achieving 2

the objectives fixed in Helsinki. In substance, Europe has decided to acquire, by the end of 2003 which, in planning tem1s, means tomorrow - a concrete capability of intervention in operations for the management of the crises included in the whole range of the "Petersberg missions". To this end, the objective is to establish a Corps-level European Force, 50-60,000 strong, with a high readmess-level, capable of intervening and remaining in a

theatre for over a year. As is well kno,vn by now, this will imply not only the preparation of a quantitatively and qualitatively adequate "capability pool", from which mission-tailored units \.vill be clra\.\m, but also the availability of an at least double body of forces, at a lower readiness-level, in order to guarantee in-theatre sustainability. Therefore, as far as land forces are concerned, we are talking about a total availability of approximately

I I

200,000 men. Although it is expected that the European-led crisis management missions should take place only when NATO as a whole is not engaged and, therefore, the possibility of drawing from the assets of tl1e Alliance could be taken for granted, it is necessary not to understimate the commitment undertaken, which is very ambitious, and not only in terms of quantity. As a matter of fact, in order to

guarantee that the necessmy European operational capabilities arc effectively and crembly achieved, the Helsinki project intends to develop the already existing capabilities, both in the national and rnultinational environment. Hence, while from now to 2003 the question will be essentially to outline the architecture of the forces, defining and selecting the national capabilities fit to carry out the task among those already

available and ready - and each partner ,.vill actually participate in relation to the quality of the packages offered - starting from now, and thinking about future developments, Lhe rnembcr Nations wbkh really have the intention of playing a leading role in the process n1usl focus their attention on seven key-sectors, which are crucial for a credible management of crises by the EU. They are, in particular (1): projectability of the forces; 3

.4 Parairooper fiÂˇom the ltal-ian Contingent during the E asi Timor peace mission..

sustainability; inleroperability; mobility; flexibility; survivability; Command and Control. A syslem of consultations will permit to evaluate Lhe results actually ach ievecl. Although it was not stated explicity, it is likely that, in the successive development of the activities, these long-term oqjectives could become at first, parameters of common rÂˇeference for national plaf'lning and then, real convergence parameters. This would be in line with the course followed in building the first pillar; the economic one, of European integration. It is easy to note that the acquisition of these capabilities, 4

made possible by technological progress, but depending on the investment of adequate fi_nancial resources, can be linked with the parallel development of NATO's Defence Capability Initiative (DCI)(2). Also NATO, in fact, for some time has been reviewing its military structure, in accordance with the new Strategic Concept, which indicates the capability of crisis management as one of the fundamental tasks for guaranteeing common security. As an immediate consequence, and for a better visibility of the Command and Control organization, the Alliance intends to achieve

soon a greater availability of projection capabilities similar to the ARRC ones. At Lhe moment, the requirement is met by two other Corps Commands, although in the future the new operational requirement \Vill probably lead to a global review of the present organization of the Commands available to the Alliance. The general terms are already knovm, but it would nol be corTect to anticipate them now. In this evolving politico-strategic context, Italv submitted its c,mdidacy, m~de official by the Alliance last spring, as '1ead nation" for the constitution in Italy of a Command equivalent to ARRC (3). In this prospect the Army is developing a project aimed at meeting the new and hmdamental obligation, which is an absolute priorily for the entire Itali,m Armed Forces and will bring about the rational ization of the human resources available, in order to ensure tbe national share of Slaff personnel for the framework. Also, suitable structures will have to be found for the Headquarters, and supports made available in their manifold aspects of general support (Hq. Command), special support (Communications and Intelligence), Combat Support (Artillery, Engineers, Air Cavalry), all within the responsibility of the lead nation. In any case, the numerous evolutionary processes both \.Vithin NATO and ESDI for the first time need a complete and Euro-Atlantic response to security requiremenls that have completely changed in the course of the last ten yem-s. Till now, the European nations responded using pre-cold war instruments, hastily adapted to the new scenarios. The crisis in Kosovo is very significant in this respect, since it affected Europe deeply, hastening

the pursuit and implementation of a coherent and concrete foreign and security policy. At the same time, the crisis urged.NATO to start a critical review of its stn..ictures, in order to adapt them to the changed security requirements of the Nations of the Al liance. Therefore, the crisis in Kosovo has been a kind of second turning point for the West, vis-a-vis the security problems o( the post-bipolar era. The first ,.vas the pe1iod going from the beginning o[ the collapse of former Yugoslavia to the Bosnian crisis, and showed that the common and collective security systems inherited from the cold ,.var \Vere substantially inadequate to manage complex crises in an effective way. There were the same limitations that, in a completely different situation, had brought about the failure of the peace mission in Somalia. This meant that, since the two concepluaJ prerequisites of "global security", i.e. "active conilicl . prevention" and "remote conflict management", had not met ,.vith a full organizational and procedmal response, it was high time to make radical and i.J.movalive decisions. The turning point took concrete fom1, fast within NATO and then in Europe through the search for new fonnulas for a more timely and direct management of the security problems, thus conceptually moving, from "peace support" to "active crisis management". Hence, a transition from emergency philosophy to planning philosophy. The concepts expounded above are not radically nevv for the Ital ian Army, wh.i.ch has been engaged for some time in a complex and ambitious process of transformation of the land instrument. If anylhing, the problem today is that of accelerating the measures and decisions that arc considered indispensable but were planned for the medium term. This should be done in order to be a ble to decorously participate in the process of realization of the European Forces. Al the same time,we are waiting for a final decision on the

Italian and French servicemen in a joint exercise.

Thus it should be made clear:; and ,{ot only to the laymen, that the espression "manoeuvre forces plus appro1xiate tactical and logistic supports" does not "dispose" of tl1c latter as a secondary component. If we look caref-ully, we can see that most of the contents, both in the convergence pararneters and in the DCI, refer more to the supports than to the manoeuvre forces. The so-called "Support Groups", therefore, are not only an important part of the operational component but also a large one and, perhaps, the costliest and detem1inanl for tl1e land instrument as a whole. This said, the term "Group", which indicates something more

Fmiherrnore, the possibility o( assuming a more impor1ant role within the Alliance and the EU does not lie only in the manoeuvTe Brigades which may not be perfecl but exist, are deployed in all the E uropean theatres of crisis and, after all , have always behaved honourably. Consequently, lhe Italian participation, ,vith combat forces, is indisputable. But, in order to be among the nations whose credibility entitles them to assume the "tactical" responsibility of the mission (ARRC level), the problem also, and mostly, concerns the nation's capabilities in Combat Support and Combat Service Support.

than a Regiment, indeed appears Lo be reductive, since it refers to capability-reservoirs which i.J.1dude units for special support (cornmunications and Intelligence), tactical support (Artillery, Engineers, Air Cavalry) as well as adherence logistics. In this sense, the Group Headquarters are real supporl Brigades. They are in fact equivalent to Brigades, owing to their organization m1d lo their great responsibility in the preparation c.U1d logistic-administrative management of the units. Fm1hennore, these Commands: â€˘ concur in t he com pletion of t he Major-Unit Comman ds des ignated for a mission,

tnms11 ,on to Fully professional Armed Forces, an issue 911 which a Jot o( work has already been done, but whose most important element is rnissing: the final dimension. In this sense much has been accomplished, and much more will be done in terms of capabili ties relevant to the various operational functions, but obviously the manoeuvre forces are only a component, probably the most visible but not necessarily the most important, of the fr1lure European Forces.

providing specialistic Command and Control modules (4); • arc the most importan t conlribulors of forces to the Corps Framework Headquarters made available by Jtaly, and to any other Italian-led TheatreCom rnand, as is the case in Kosovo. Besides, some of these Commands (certainly the Logistic ,md Artillery ones, less likely the others), must assume a complete projectioncapabi li ty if more Brigades are simultaneously engaged, within a nalional framework, in case of a major crisis. Let's now turn our attention to the logistic support of the fo ,-ccs projected or, if preferred, to the logistic support of the "Division for Europe". THE ADHERENCE-LOGISTIC SUPPORT (5)

We mentioned the fact that the political and techno-miLi tary evolutionary processes under way require a general planning activity, in order Lo have an eady outline of the structures capable of meeting the requirements deriving from the modern operational scenarios. The reorganization process of Logistics should also be considered in this context; the process, which

started in 1997 with the first definition of the Capability Packages and Reference Logistic Concept, \.viii gradually take shape with the application of the basic modules of adherence logistics. This is a model which, being destined to meet the support requirements of the operational forces w ithi n the new prnject of European securily, is necessarily projected towards the future, so as to be fitting to, and compatible with, an entirely professional Army. In other words, if the primary task of adherence logistics is that of ensuring support Lo forces projected outside the national te1Titory, and if tlie pool of projectable forces will very likely represent the Army's operational dimension, then we need to envisage right now, in this secto1~ a model as much "final" as possible. The generation of the new structures is therefore based on the lessons learned from the operations under way, on the considerations about future scenarios and commitments emerging in the multinational environment and, last but not least, on the abovcmentioned need for Europe to achieve the capability of managing the crises, either autonomously or Vvithin the Atlantic AIJ iance. The construction of force systems, in fact, is always inspired

by three orders of factors, deriving from: • lessons learned; • future scenarios; • international and internal conditions. These factors must be appropriately weighed o ut, in order to avoid, on the one hand, the construction of a theoretical reference-model not suitable for foture operations, and, on the othe1~ the reference to "false" future scemuios only partially verifiable, and, finall)~ to prevent the models from being incompatible or inadequate to the internal or exten1al conditions. Owing to this, Lhe construction process of the new systems should be divided into several phases, in order to safeguard the residual functiona lity of the existent during the transition to something different. But the key elerne nts for success are always: • the active participati on of all personnel involved in the reorganization; • the common sharing of the aims of the process and of its general and sectorial objectives; • the awareness that the achievement of the goal \,1.,ill lead to a greater general effectiveness.

THE ARMY's OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

Let's go back b1idly to the well k.J.10\Nn "Army's Operational Concept" updated in the light of the recent international developments (ESDI and NATO). This concept is a basis also for the approach to the adherence logistic support. In particular, as regards the participation in m ultinational operations of crisis rnanagernent, the concept envisages the maximum effort on:

Unloading humanitarian-aid supplies during the ".4lba" pea.ce-ni-issiOll. 6

;1 Leopard I l\5 Lank on a Bosnian road.

• a major Theatre with Divisionlevel forces (Hq and supports) including, among others, two national Brigades; • two separate major Theatres (as an alternate option Lo the above), with two Brigade-level Major Un.its; • a minor Theatre, where a possible llalian contingent should stay for a shmi. time, with B1igade-level units. The Theatre could also be considered as "minor" because of the reduced level of the national Force (combat group, staying for a medium-long period of time). The first two options are alternative, and irnply their "sustainability" for more than a year; consequently one should keep enough forces to guarantee the rotation (on a 3 or 4 basis) of the units employed outside the area, according to the most onerous hypothesis. Besides, the engagements deriving fron:i NATO Planning must also he considered as alten1atives. THE LOGISTIC REFERENCE-MODEL

Many experiments were started during 1999 which are still under ,vay and, albeit necessarily partial vis-a -vis the theoretical model envisaged, they gave a firs t validation to the logistic referencemodel. In particular; the follo,ving elements appeared to be meeting the support requirements of the units, both in the preparation phase and during the conduct of "out of area" operations: • the logistic instrument, with the presence of specialistic bodies, both in the support area and in the adherence area; • the Great Base; • the Command and Control

system for the military management of bodies and assets of the two logistic levels (adherence and support); • the procedures for operation and interconnection of support and adhe1·ence; • the scheduling of the logistic activities; • the high specialization of the logistic units. We shall go back to these elements. But we can say right now that, as was easy to expect, many lacking sectors emerged . Further improvernents ,viii be necessary in order to put the model in good ,.vorking order~ In particula1; the most ·wanting sectors seem to be: • computerization, ·which needs a higher level of diffosion, both as regards Lhe cornputerized C2 systems and the technologies connecLed wilh the compute1ized management of supplies; • logistic programming and planning at the various organizational levels; it requires not only effective procedures, but also the acquisition a planning-oriented mentality at every level; • allocation of resources for specific operations, at least as regards informatics and C2; this is the supporting pillar of any logistic manoeuvTe, by which those in charge are enabled to

know in real time whether the necessaiy matelials are available. THE LOGISTIC AREA OF ADHERENCE

Taking into accounl Lhe main task of adherence logistics (i.e. to support national contingents engaged outside the national borders), the organizational model to be achieved considers measures to be taken both in the Command and Conlrol sector and in that of logistic units. In particular: • in the Command and Control sector: •• upgrade the Command of FOTER's Logistic Supports, in order to enable it to manage the logistic units both wilhin and outside the Country, in case of emplo_y1nenl. of more than one logistic unit in the same theatre; •• establish two types of logistic Regiments, obtained through the upgrade and rationalization of the existmg logislic fonnations: one \.vill concern transport and management of the transit logistic-area (RELOTRA), and theotherwU.l deal with maintenance and supply, in the wider meaning of the terms (RELOi\tlA). Both types of Regiments will have Lo be able to assurne the role of 7

Italian soldiers patrolling a wood in East Timar.

• Commander: the Commander of REL0TRA. or REL0MA, appointed for the specific need. He ,.vill also be the logistic Commander of the conlingenl, when the land component is at Brigade level; • staff structure: the staff of the REL0TRA or RELOMA engaged in Lhe operation; • Hq and Logistic Support Company: the corresponding company of the REL0TRA or REL0MA concerned; • basic employment units (companies and/or platoons): taken from the abovemenlioned Regiments, in relation to the mission; • specialistic modules: also dravvn from the assets of support logistics.

"Adherence-Support Group Command" (GSA) in the operations zone. • in lhe other sector; the issue will be to assemble the capabilities, into battalion level monofunction units, \.\.'i.th capabilities of transport, management of the Transit Logistic Area and maintenance, supply and development of the medical activilies. ORGANIC UNITS AND EMPLOYMENT FORMATIONS

The basic element of the organizational transformation is thus the trans1t10n from polyhmctional logistic units, coherent ,.vith a threat whose size and origin is known in advance, to "logistic-capability packages", i.e. containers from which the most 8

appropriate capabilities can be drawn in order to accomplish a specific mission in a given operational situation (mission oriented). Therefore, the new Regiments will be organic units and nol employment formations, sign.if:ying that the REL0TRA or the logistic manoeuvre-Regiment ,.vill never be employed in Lheir entirety in operations. As a consequence, an employment unit can be described as a contingency formation, based on a "framework" structure taken from one of the logistic Regiments. Its denomination ¼ill be "Adherence-Support Group", and will draw the necessary capabilities on a case-by-case basis. THE ADHERENCE-SUPPORT GROUP

The organization of the AdherenceSupport ,viU be as follows:

As we can see, the GSA docs not have a standard composition but, thanks to il.S modular nature, will be snictly adjusted to the structme and task of the Major Unit it has to support. Figme A shows a GSA fit to support a standard Brigade. Anywa)~ at the moment there are other structures wilh differen t organizations; suffice it to mention the GSA-Bosnia (baltaJion level), or the support of the "Cuneense" combat group, whose organ.izalion is at company level. The logistic Regiments, therefore, musl be capable of producing different GSAs, according to the mission. OVERALL CAPABILITIES TO BE ACHIEVED

Having described the level of aggregation of the capabilities and the standard structure of the contingency unit, let's try now to summarize the overall capabilities needed by the Service for the accomplishment of the missions/commitments fixed by the updated operational concept.

In the sector of c1isis management, in general terms, the requirements are:

• 3 GSAs for the susf'ainability of a B1igade in a M,\jor theatre (on a ''base 3" rotation); • 3 GSAs for the sustainability of a Brigade in a second major theatre; • 2 GSAs for the sustainability of a contingent in a mjnor theatre, or - through the generation of battalion/company-level NSEs of rnultinational forces similar to the "Cuneense" contingent or the MLF (Multinational Land Force - Italo-Slovenian -H ungarian Brigade). Moreove,; the total nwnber of 8 GSAs can be considered adequate to the oplions of employment envisaged by the Anny's Operational Concept (participation in the Alliance's reaction forces vvithin Art.5; defence of the national territory). On the basis of the operational requirements, and taking into account the envisaged procedures for the rotation in the t,vo major theatres, the instmment's size fixed in the "Logistic Reference-Model" (Ed.'99) can be fully confirmed, since it caUed for a total number of Regiments equal to: • fom~ for the so-called transport component; • four, for the so-called manoeuvre-logistic component. The modular nature of the ref,ri.J.nental sb:ucture, and its ability to generate GSAs with different logistic capabilities, is made possible by the functional organization of the unit, based on flexibility. Therefore, three main components will be present: elementary modules, operational modules and elementary emplo:y1nent wuts. The elementary module is made up by a system (weapon/vehicle) and the minimum number of pers01mel - \.vitl1 their O\Vn leader trained and equipped to operate the system. It is strnctw·ed in such a way as to cany out elementary actions within an operational

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module: the platoon. The organizalion of the elementary module is therefore closely connected ,.vith the characteristics of the system and its function. It expresses only partial capabilities and, therefore, is not suited for operating alone, except for activities of limited operational and technical value. The operational module (platoon) results from the association of two or more rnutuallysupporting elementary modules, that could also be dishomogeneous. Its structure permits to carry out a tactical action (or task), lirnited in time and space, or to repeat tactical actions and tasks of a cyclic nature. The aggregation of a certain nun1ber of operational modules originates the elementary employment-unit: the company. It is a single-hmction unit, which can be organized in different ways, depending on the task. It can be employed in: • limited-time activities, with the simultaneous employment of all the operational modules available; • protracted activities, taking turns with similar units, or through the rotation of its operational modules.

does not have its own logistic capabilities, but its Command and Control organization is capable of managing the "ad hoe" support capabilities assigned to it, medical service and food supplies in pa1ticular. · Command and Control of more than one company is entrusted to the battalion, wluch is structured to exercise the tactical control of the units employed on the basis of the plans mid progTams worked out by the regimental staff. The autonomous Regiment/ battalion, when constituted in view of specific missions, is an employment unit capable of entirely cmTying out a whole specific operational function. It has Command, Control and Communications capabilities, as well as logistic-support assets, suited to the tasks. The st1ucture and tentative organizatioon of the elementary modules of employment, together with their level of aggregation into elementary units, arc shown at Fig.B (RELOTRA) and Fig.C (RELOMA).

The elementary emplo11nent-urul

A consequence of the envisaged

LOGISTIC COMMAND OF FOTER'S PROJECTION

Fig. B

LOGISTIC MANOEUVRE-REGIMENT (RELOMA) III

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transport-credits; • lhe co.nlribulion lo the un its in preparation in order to meet their possible requirements as regards transportation and/or specialized bodies; • support to the units engaged in operalions; • suport to the units engaged in irnportanl national or international exercises. Furlhermore, FOTER's Projection Logistic Command will have to provide - if necessary - specialized personnel to the functional areas of projected Brigade and Division Hqs engaged in important operations or exercises. Besides, COMLOG wil.l have to be able to set up the Theatre Logistic Command in case of operations envisaging the presence of more tl1an one GSA in the same theatre.

Fig. C

LOGISTIC TRANSPORT REGIMENT (RELOTRA) III

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centralization of the adherencelogistic unjts wilhin the operational forces is the need to adequate management capabilities, bolh on the national territory and in "external" operations. This· requirement will be met through the transformation of 10

COMSUPLOG into FOTER's Projeclion Logistic Command, whose task will be to coordinate: • lhe preparation and training of logistic units; • lhe contribution , in terms or capabilities, to the Logistics of Support, in lhe shape o( planned

THE GSA STRUCTURE

The GSA \Vill have to ensure ilie managernent of the command/ management/executive bodies located both on the nalional ten-itory and in the Operations Theatre. Within this Cramework the GSA, although ils structure is similar to the other Regiments', is organized i.n a different wav, in order to erntrre the correct rmmagement ,md execution of iLs activities. In particular: • the Hq. of the Regiment (Fig.D), although keeping its functional areas, will be organized, as far as its staff is concerned, as follows: •• Sl andS4 branches, whichcany out activities concerning the Regiments typical requirements; .. ADERLOG-FW (forward), which includes specialists of the functional areas (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics) m1d an Operations Room, with a Room Head (S3), who is responsible for Lbe tactical control of the activities w1der way by proxy of the GSA'.s Commander, and represents the p~jected s1:aff-com1xmenl.

• ADERLOG-GB, which is the interface of SOSTLOG (operations room of the Support Logistics set up \Nithin the Great Base) and remains on the national' territory. It is a very slender working-level structure, which normally does not carry out command or planning activities. ADERLOG-GB is the reference body of ADERLOG-FW in the Country, and ensures the coordination of the special elements r·ernai.n.i.ng i.n Italy (transit-management battalion; maintenance, recovery and supply teams); • the transit-mg!. bn \Vi.II be divided into t\VO sections: •• one, on the national territory, will be heavier in its organization, tas.ked with the preparation and dispatch of material/personnel to the theatre - according to the priorities [ixed by the GSA Commander and received through ADERLOG-GB - ,md with the collection, and subsequent delivery to the support logistic bodies, of the. materials received from the operations theatre; •• the other section, at the APOD/SPOD, \Viii manage the flow of assets and perso1mel to and from the theatre. Furthermore, there will be: • elementary units for ma'i.ntenance, supply and transport, located inside the Operation Theatre, according to the mission. Some maintenance and recovery modules could be detached to the transit-mgt bn, to deal with the [low of darnaged vehides and systems. Supply modules could be assigned to the same battalion for controlling the supplies' Hovv at the Great Base; • eleme ntary units for traffic management, normally located in the Operation Theatre, could operate both in the AOR of the national Major Unit and in cooperation with the equivalent allied units in the communications zone.

Fig. D

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ANDERLOG

Tac Control Cell

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fil!.mx CELL

PARTICULAR CASES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE LOGISTIC INS1RUMENT The location and organization of the logistic instrument, described above, refers to the most likely commitments of the Service in the near future. In these scenalios, the Italian participation is limited to Bligade level, albeit in two separate theatres. But we cannot rule out the possibility of an operation requi1ing the employrnent of a larger national contingent, i.e.: • One Division , with two subordinate national B1igades; • Two or rnore Brigades (maxi.rnum five), organized within ARRC, and therefore operating in a single theatre.

All£RLOG G.Il.

least a coordination function for the simplest case (one Division with 2 Brigades), going up to an outright Theatre LogisticCommancl, when there are more Brigades within the ARRC's multinational Divisions, or when an Ilalian-.led ARRC is activated. However~ the development of these [unctions will be entrusted Lo the FOTER's Projection Logistic Command, once it achieves its final organizational structure. In case of an Italian-led multinational Corps capability, the FOTER's Projection Logistic Command would be called upon to activate the specialistic component of the logistic staff.

TRAINING The support to a Command and Control capability con1parable to a national-framework ARRC has not been planned yet. In one of the abovementioned assumptions, the support to the entire national contingent could not be ensured by one GSA only. Therefore, the number of GSAs depends on the organization of the operations theatre but, as shown at Fig.E, it is necessary to ensure at

The adoption of a force organization totally based on the "modularity of formations", automatically meets the conceptual requirements introduced by the new scenarios but requires, or rather urges, specific training procedures capable of achie,ing the desired qualitative objective of "force generation". In other words, the "task organization" cannot be 11

A VM-90P am10ured vehicle proceeding over snowy terrain in BosniaHerzegovina.

unfit for operational employ1nent and \vill follow a specific training cycle for a certain period, which \.vill end with a new verification of the unit's operational effectiveness. REQUIREMENTS' PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

applied "una tanturn" when the emergency occurs, but must become a trainix1g and employment philosophy for the whole land instrument. Th.is means that the Regiments not deployed out of area, as well as those not in a reconditioning phase, must be permanently on training, and the GSAs \,\-ill have to be operationally controlled by tl1e Brigades, on a rotation basis. This principle should also be applied to the higher level in conceiving the projection staffs (Planning Commands, without permanently subordinate forces), \.vhich will be cyclically responsible for the operational control of the non-projected B1igades. As a first approach, the logistic units could be trained through the application of the following general principles: • participation in important international exercises: the GSAs must apply the same procedLU"es envisaged for "out of area operations". Likewise, one should consider the important national exercises as inten1al-projection operations. On the other hand, these exercises represent possible fa.1ture scemuios, considering the constant reduction of the land instrument, which could entai.1 the internal projection of units for presence and surveillance operations; • conduct of exercises typical of 12

the logistic units, also through the deployment of GSAs or pans thereof but possibly a lways under the operational control of a Brigade; • "ad hoe" training activities, in order to keep the specialistic capabilities of the elementary units, by carrying out tasks on the national territory, planned on a yearly basis, permitting - albeit in a limited measure - to perform the activities related to transport, maintenance and supply to units and organizations. For instance, these activities could concern the maintenance of a portion of the damaged assets retun1ing from the theatres and concentrated at the Great Base. Dwjng the phase of preparation for a specific operation, the GSA will obviously be asked to can-y out, at the appointed "staging area", the activity of amalgamation with the Major Unit to be supported. Also the logistic units, like all other operational units of the Anny, will have to undergo a periodical "control" of their operational capabilities. Tbis activity, for which the future Inspectorate for Specialization Training will be responsible, \,vill end v,ith the issue of a certificate of operativeness to the unit examined. In case of a negative result, the unit will be declared tempora1ily

The lessons learned from the recent "external" operations confirmed the need to realize a coll'ect cycle of planning-andprogranuning of the requirements, without which logistics would work only on request and not on the basis of previsions, thus thwarting the very essence of the Logistic Reference-Concept. In particula1~ it r:nust be remembered that, excepting the needs connected with specific preparations: • the Command of the force is responsible for the planning activities. The Command of the GSA is a tech n ical body, and contributes to specialistic planning (which comes after the operational one) and certifies the feasibility of future operations; • the programming activity concerns all equivalent Regiments , with particular emphasis on the GSA, which must produce a synthetic program of the activities of every unit of the contingent. Conside1ing what we have said so fat; we can define:

• planning, referred to the accomplishment o[ an operational task or mission, as tl;e definition of the Commander's logistic decisions, expressed through the decisionmaking and planning process; • programming: the definition of the action that must be can-ied out in order to achieve tbe objectives and meet the needs

emerged dming planning.

Fig. E

The data deriving frorn the activities desc1ibed above are used for: • planning: by the support logistics, in order Lo "destine" the necessary resources to the specific requirements, or to update the resources already assigned; • programming: by the adherencelogistic bodies present at home, in order to adjust the ±low of supplies lo the theatre in relation to consumption, drawing the necessary assets from those assigned by the support logistics for the specific requirement, on the basis of the updated provisional data; • verification by COMFOTER, responsible for the correct supplying of the Contingents. In particular, plans must avoid the occtuTence of unjustified pe~J<.S in the Gow of supplies. "ON CALL" AND "SPECIAL" SUPPLIES

Despite the most careful and detailed planning, changing situations can bring about conditions capable of rendeling inadequate the global resources available to the contingent. In particular, this could make the

1111ss1on "impossible" to carry out, because of the insufficiency of the contingent's ovvn capabilities, i.e. assets and weapon systems, and of the resources available, i.e. supplies. Owing to their different nature, the t\,VO requirements lead to a composite procedure of intervention, which envisages: • decision on merits, regarding the modifications in the additional assets needed by the contingent for accomplishing its mission, or remodulation of the operation; • start of the supply procedure

for levelling "non prograrnmecl" .requirements. In parlicula1~ the "non programmed" requirements lead Lo the start of two different procedures of special supplying: • adjustment, ,.vhen the shortage is due to the non-con·esponclance lo the real conditions of employment of the assets. This activity follows the passages envisaged for planned supplying; • on call, when the supplying is necessary for the timely accomplishment of the mission. OvJing to their particular nature, "on call" supplies are an exception, also because of their heavy impact on the transport chain, particularly from the strategic point of view. As a general rule, "on call" supplying ,>Jill have to go tbrough the following steps: • direct request by the Regiment concerned to the GSA (ADERLOG-FW) which, if the assets are nol available in the theatre, forwards it to its

Soldiers from the Italian Contingent d-istribu1ing food to the Yugoslavian population. 13

Italian soldiers wilh a Vi\!f -90 on patrol during the peace-mission 111 East linwr.

•

ADERL0G-GB; real-time transmission of the requesl lo S0STL0G (co-located with ADERL0G -GB), \Nhich checks whelher the ilerns arc available on the national lerrilor-y or rnusl be procured; delivery of the material to th e lransit-managemenl battalion (Italy) and immediate notification to ADERL0G-GB; S\,Vift shipment, and notification, to both ADERLOG-GB and the recipient Regiment, that the requested items have been sent to the theatre; "home" delivery of lhe m,uerial.

The policy of "on call" materials, intended as the number of hours fixed for the in-theatre flow of materials, is set up by ISPEL and POTER, on the basis of the operational situation. The "on call" policy is therefore a dynamic one, and cannot remain stable for a long time, since it is closely connected with the operational requirements. This aspect is particularly important in case of employment of strategic aircraft, wh ich imply costs that could be redeemable only for the fulfilment of operational

'?vfangusta" A-129 helicopter flying at low altitude. 14

requirements capable of conditioning the operalions under way.

COORDINATION ACTIVITIES AT THE GREAT BASE

The Great Base is not a real logistic body, but rather a container of control and execution capabilities typical of the two logistic areas. Within this framework, the Great Base should not be considered as another intermediate command, but as an interface where the logistic - support m-ea and lhe adherence area can interact, both for the solution of problems and to optimize the activities connected

\vith lhe support of out-of-area contingents. Unli l the computerization of logistics reaches an appreciable diffusion, both lSPEL and F0TER, in the course of operalions, must have at their disposal procedural channels capable of giving prompt and effective responses to the coordination needs, deriving, (or istance, from the request of critical materials by forces deployed in different theatres. In this case, just as an example, S0STL0G - by ISPELs delegation, and taking into account C0MF0TER's binding opinion will organize the shipment of mate1ials only to the highest-priority theatre (or theatres).

CONCLUSIONS

Till loday, but perhaps we could say "yesterday'', logistics, in international missions, was considered a national responsibility. More and more frequently, and in numerous highly competent fora, many experts put forward the idea that this is a very old conception. There is no douht that the complete integration in

A "Camilli no'' VCC- 1 armoured vehicle at an Italian chec kpoi nt in EasL Timor.

multinational contingents can be achieved only in Lhe long term, and after the general integration of the security instruments. Bul, on the other hand, the need for coordination, espec ially when transport assets and supply routes are scarce, becomes more and more pressing. Besides, particularly within a rnultinalional contingent, any shortcoming in the support of a component could cause a sharp reduction in the operativeness of the entire system. Therefore, all partners have the 1ight to insist on the good operation of Lhe various organizations. Furthermore, in order lo achieve at least the indispensable interoperability, the organizations may continue to be different, but not too different 01~ to put it betle1~ they should be as similar as possible. It is not by chance that, when an allied nation adopts certain measures in this secto1~ the others ask for clarifications and details, in order to gel ideas and bon-o,.v initiatives but, certainly, mostly to understand and be aware of the problems. All this is multinational integration, an example for the h..itme of the Italian Army, to which our resources, both institutional and personal, ,viii have to he devoted.

D ·:, Colonel, Chief; Plans Offi.ce, Army General Staff

NOTES (1) See the article "An Army for Europe" - Rivista Nlilitare, Eng. Ed., no. 1/2000. (2) The "Defence Capability Initiative" (DC]) aims at giving impulse and

A convoy of" "Centauro" a rmoured cars in Yugoslavia.

incisiveness to the process of renewal and rnodcm.ization of l11e Alli.mce's militm)' instrument<;. In particular, DCI intencl<, to strengthen the projection capability of the Europe.an Armed Force..<;. a<; well a<; their ability to face new risks, especially through the reduction of the technological gap with Lhc United States. The initiative covers five areas:

• • • • •

mobility; sustainability; effective engagement; protection of forces and stn.tctures;

command, control and infonuation; and is linked to the 1-e:-uiwtion of 58 ''items" or ''sub areas'', concerning both the technologic.:-u a<;pect of materials and the

cooperation capability of Commands and Un.its. In this sense, l11e "Initiative" helps to increase the contr ibution of the Eumpean allies to the global efforts of the Alliance and permit5 to acquire autonomous capabilities, as a premise for a "European" management of c rises. (3) See the article "The Army for Europe and for the Country. The Conm1ai1cl ai1d Control Arch.itect1U--e'' Ri vista Militare, Eng. Eel. no. 2/2000. (4) ibidem. (5) The present article is a development and a deeper s tudy of the subjects cliscussecl in the article 'The New Adherence Logistics" - R.ivista .Militai--e, Eng. Eel., no. 2/1999.

IN MILITARY AFFAIRS The world has become smaller and is controlled by a powerful oligarchy: more than 500 Earth-orbiting satellites are watching us. Facing the prospects of a disquieting future, how should the military organize themselves? 16

The year is 2015 (1). - Somewhere in Australia the moonless night is teni.bly d.-:uÂˇk ,md cold. The platoon leader, a Lieutenant, increases by a couple of degrees the temperature in the system of his protective suit. His helmet, a concentrate of technology, is equipped ,vith an infrared sighting device, capable of directly projecting on the retina a tridimensional image, together ,vith the digital map of the surroundi ng area: a psychotechnology based on virtual reality There is no apparent sign of the enemy, but a locally orbiting unmanned aircraft can provide real-time data on their possible location. "There is

something strange about ten kilometres fom my position, but the electronic identification i.s negative", says the Lieutenant through a cell phone connected by satellite with his Headquarters, located at a distance of about 300 kilometres. "I wait for instructions". The enemy have run into a minefield . Each mine, of the intelligent type, covers a range of a hundred metres. TluÂˇough a set of sensors that include racla1~ infrarecl displays, acoustic and seismic receivers integrated with software based on expert systems and artificial neural nets, the mines can identify the objective and select the

appropriale response, which could also include the use of a special type of immobilizing foam . Only Lbe friendly forces, identified through an IFF (Idenlificalion P'riend or Foe) system, can cross the minefield unscalhed. The platoon leader observes his suil, \Ve ighing one fourlh o[ Lhe original ones in use several years befo1Âˇe. This model adjusls to lhe colours of the environment: The ternperature control is excellent, and so are the transmission, data base and data assembling systems. The laser, coaxial to the individual weapon and inlerlocked with the infrared sight of the helmet, permits to poinl the gun without being seen. The system for the production of energy, much smaller than the original, consists of a small cell, 1Âˇechargeable every two days. A few moments later, Headquarters orders him to capture the enemy. Initially he considers using a non-lethal gas, in order to reduce their fighting will, but now the \.vind has 1isen and that ,.vould be unsuitable. The Lieutenant calls the closest airfield and asks for the intervention or a V-22. This is a lightly armoured aircraft which, besides firearrns and lase1~ can also employ a dreadful noise-producing system. The V-22 arrives about one hour later and begins to emit a low-frequency, high intensity directional sound. The enemy try to break contact, but the immobilizing foam discharged by the intelligent mines inesorably stops them, together with their vehicles and equipment. Afler Len hours of psychic torture the enemy surrender, s howing no evident physical damage. The whole operalion has been recorded on a computer terminal. Back to the base with the prisoners, the commander can see the action again, make a simulation, verify the effectiveness of the opernlion and learn the approp1iate lessons." All this is not out of a sciencefiction book. On the contrary, it is a

Fig.1

The Current Revolution in Military Affairs (William Owens' "System of Systems")

description of some technologies or the Era of Information, which could be available by 2015 and probably even earlie1: According to Carlo Maria Santoro (2), the Institute for National Strategic Studies, which deals with the culture of defence ,vithin Washington's National Derense University, has afready anticipated the concept of military "revolution". It is based on the strategic challenge that the United States is facing, i.e., transforming the Military Technical Revolution (MTR) into a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In this respect, Santoro says (3): "The Americans are interposing, between us and them, a technologic and intellectual distance of s idereal dimensions, which creates a political and even a cultural power capahle of affecting the future of everybody, Westerners included". This article consists of two parts, and intends to verify if all the emerging technologies can bring about a "revolution in military affairs". With reference to military history, the article analyses how technology has influenced in the past - and could influence in the furure - the ,vay of planning,

organizing and conducling war operations.

THE "SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS": IS IT THE PHILOSOPHERS' STONE?

The evolulion o[ Lhe technology of the ail~ land and naval systems and the irnprovernent of objective acquisition capability, together with the global connection of the communication systems are already considered by many a real revolution. In particulai~ Admiral William Owens (4) defines the socalled Revolution in Military Affairs (RJ\IIA) as the "system of systclllS", whose main components (Fig. l) are (5): (a) Intelligence Collection, Reconnaissance, Surveillance; (b) Technologies and C4 systems (Command, Control, Com.rnunjcalion, Computer) for the analysis and synthesis of information; (c) integrntion in real time of information systems; (d) "surgical" attacks carried out with Precis ion Guided Munitions (PGlVls); (e) development of docnines, strategies and tactics that Lake these technologies into account. Conside1ing the single components, 17

no one of them in itself appears particularly revolutionary. Nevertheless their synergic combination could have the characteristics of a real revolution in military affairs . .In this regard, it is common knowledge that the US, Great Britain,Ca n a d a, France and Australia are studying the military application of the technologies deliving from the era of in.formation and the equipment of the soldier of the future (6). The military technologies of the postindustrial era are: • the development of missiles and devices with tem1inal and standoff guidance capabilities, but also equipped with an objectiverecognition system. They will be able to employ a combination of technologies using infrared sensors, radar, patterns and shapes recognition, everything connected with artificial intelligence systems (expert systems, neural netv.rorks) and virtual reality. They will be able to decide the best type, moment and place of the attack, • high-power lasers, with high energy concentration, also portable ones, suitable for employment on land - or aircaniers; • remote pilot vehicles (RPV) and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) in various configurations with RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition) and precision bombing tasks . They \.Vill have a very long range and the capability of transmitting pictures and information in real time, without endangering the pilots'life; • increase of the stealth capability (7), in order to reduce the electronic signature; • explosive fluids and cluster bombs employable by manned or urn11anned aircraft; • personal weapons capable of shooting a laser beam instead of bullets; • development of a technology which, through a digital transmission system , could connect the soldier on the field 18

GLOSSARY Antimissile Capability The antimissile capability is expressed by a defence (carried out with antimissile missi le systems) accompanied by another offensive activity envisaging the preventive destruction of the delivery means on the enemy territory. The US provides NATO with an intell igence network based on infrared satellite systems capable of locating the enemy missiles' launching pads and the probable points of impact. Artificial Neural Net

lt is a new-generation, artificial-intelligence technology,wb ich a ims at emulating the physiology of the human brain, based on the connection of biological neurons. An artificial neural net consists of a certain number of computerized knots, linked through flexible interconnections (a lso called neurods). It doesn't elaborate information as normal computers do, but very much like the human brain does, organizing connection models of different weight between their neurods. A neural net learns from examples and from its own errors, i.e. is capable of modifyng the weight of the interconnections between neurods. Neural nets are employed for the acquisition of sensorial capabil ities (sight, hearing), identification of characters, such as the optica l identification of signatures and postal codes; identification of spoken languages; intelligent weapons, such as the guidance of a cruise missile, carried out by comparing the actual flight route with a digitized map; improvement of radar and sonar technology; automatic translation, etc. Computerization of the Battlefield This precedure goes back to the origins of alphabetic writing, which cuts reality into letters which by themselves would have no meaning. The first transformation of the alphabet in a digital form was carried out by Morse, who reduced the 26 variables of the alphabet LO a code of just three variables (long-short-zero signal) to be employed by the telegraph: The infonnatic engineers have furthe r reduced the three signals to two (yes-no) The computerization of the battle space envisages the employment of virtual realiLy, expert systems and artific ial neural nets. Expert Systems These are programmes for solv ing speci fic problems, based on the knowledge of experts and implementation of human processes, such as deduction, inferences, analogies and generalizations. In other words, an expert system is a hierarchical whole of data; governed by routine-type logical procedures (such as: if.. .then): The shaping process of these systems requires the assistance of experts responding to ad-hoe questionnaires, synthesis of knowledge, selection of the type of representation (frame rules, semantic nets), compilation, codification, verification and validation or the programme. Some applications are: help to doctors in the formu lation of d iagnoses on the bas is of a set of symptoms, realization of certa in engineering projects, support to military decision-making.

with a netv.iork of helicopters, tanks, and other air, naval and space assets . In particular the self-location system called Global Positioning System (GPS) could be employed universally, vvith the possibility of preventing the adversary from using it;

• computerization of the battle6eld, so as to integrate all the infonnalion corning from the various sensors and sources . Artificial intelligence and expert svstems will automatically a;rnlvse the situation an2l sugg-e st the possi ble lines of

Global Position System (GPS) The system consists of a group or 20 geostationary satellites covering the whole surface of the Earth and a ground ins ta 1lation which:,can receive data from al least (hree sate lli tes, determining the coordinates of the objective with an accuracy varying from l 00 to 300 metres.

immobilizing foams, liquid metal, polymers, superadhesive agents, anaesthetics , devices for producing low-frequency sound, super-caustic acids that can attack metals.

Psychotechnology It em ulates, extends and amplifies the senso-motory, psycho logic and cogn itive functions of the mind . It inc ludes Artificia l Inte ll igence techniques, expert systems, artificial neural nets and virtual real ity. In the military sector, psychotechnologies will allow commanders to manipulate the perceptions and beliefs of their soldiers and also those or the enemy and the TV media.

This outline is in itself s ufficient to assert that a revolution in military a ffairs is before us. Nevertheless, before proceeding, it seems suitable to define its domain and essential characteristics.

"Stand-off" Systems They can be launched from land, naval and air platforms located at great distances from the obj ectives and are equipped with homing systems. The launching pad is generally at such a distance that it cannot be engaged by the enemy. Classic ex,amples of stand-off systems are cruise and ballistic missilies, and air-surface missiles with homing systems that gu ide them to their target. Targeting It is a process that identifies the enemy obj ectives and selects the best system to neutralize or destroy them . It is genera lly divided into four phases: (I) selection of the enemy targets, considering their importance only in vie w of the mission's s uccess; choice of tbe best system for locating and attacking the objectives, not only with lethal weapons but also with non-lethal on es, s uch as SEAD (Su ppression Enemy A ir Defence and Information Campaign); (3) result to be achieved in terms of destruction, delay of the enemy action or limitation of their freedom of action; (4) assessment of the effects, generally realized wi th !MINT (Imagery Intelligence) systems . Virtual Reality

Called by some "Artificial Imagination" or "Artificial Conscience", by analogy with ArtiCicial Intel ligence. With Virtual Reality it is possible to create visual , auditory and tactile artificial sensorial inputs. The technical obstacle, which will be overcome shortly, is the. in sufficient power of computers. Its applications are: identification of voices, high-definition v ideo technologies, tridimensional vision, robotics, flight-course-lan ding simulations, training, artificial vision, olfactory and tactile simulations optical-fibres technologies, visualization of surgical operations from within the organ, etc. Since it is a technology capable of adding touch and smell to sight and hearing, it is so close to real ity that it will s ucceed in drugging the human nervous system as no other technology has ever clone before. action to the commander; • massive employment of satellites for targeting acti,,i ties. It will be possible to utilize such technology, coupled with highpower laser systems, for developing antimissile systems planned to hit in-flight missiles;

• simulators, for various employments in individual and collective training, based on the technology of virtual reality; • non-lethal weapons (clu bbed sofi-kill ,veapons), particularly suitable for pe acekeeping operations, such as adhesive and

DEFINmON, CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION

As things are, there is no definition for the term "revolution in military affairs": According to Alvin and Toffler (8) a revolution "

.. .occurs ·when a new civilization emerges, when society is tranformed and the Armed Forces adjust to the ne,v culture rnoclifying organizational structures, strategies, tactics, training systems, doctrines and logistic support ... ". In this outlook, Alvin and Toftler point out two revolulions in h istory. The first occurred with t he birth of agricultural sociely and the second with the industrial revolution. The third is corning. According to Kreprenevich (9), instead , a revolution in military affairs consists of the application of new technologies wh ich, combined with innovative opera tional concepts, new doctrines and organizationa l structures, can modify the eCGcacy o[ the military instrument. Kreprenevich, on the bas is of this definition, sees ten revolutions of this type as from the XIV century. We agree with b oth analysts , considering that the first speaks of "great" revolutions , while the second means a series of "minor" ones , such as, for example, Napoleon's revolution. Anyway, each "minor" revolution is accompan ied by a qualitative evolution in the military instnunent's 19

efficacy, a ''cumulative" evolution, as clearly shovv11 at figure 2. On lhe same subject, Whitaker (1 O) reminds us that, in the past, technological innovations have produced transformations in the ways or planning, organizing and conducting military operations. He maintains that the most recent ones had already been prefigured by the Soviet mi litary theorists (11) towards the end of the seventies. Whitaker stresses that "The transforrnations in warwaging derive from. the explosion of technology which brings about innovations in the operational and organizational fields". As regards the reasons of th is technological explosion we can agree with Tilford (12) when he says that the present Revolution of Mi litary Affairs Information War (RMA-hvar) is the result of three combined factors (13) (Fig.3): • the end of the co.Id war; • the reduction of the financ ia l resources destined to defence; • the advent of the information era. Tilford underlines that, while in the industrial era the main goal was the containmenl or the Soviet Union, in the post industrial era such objective is embodied by the Power Projection in the areas at risk. In this regm·d, WiUiam Cohen (14), US Defence Secretarv, states that, in future conflict, it will be impossible to relay on a six-month delay before deploying the forces in a Theatre, like it happened with the Gulf War and, therefore, the concept of employment of the reaction forces must be reconsidered in terms of reaction forces , mobile in a reasonable time. According to many analysts, the current Revolution of Military Affairs - Information War (RMAI war) (15) has three main characteristics (16): The first concerns the modification of the relation between accuracy and d istance, envisages the employment of pre,cision weapons and will

Fig. 2 The Cumulative Character of Technological Revolutions

Efficacy

of the Military Instrument

Time S()urtt: Strattg)' and the R.c\'olution in Military Affairs

Src,•.-c:n Mct'.L& .James Kitl•h, M:tr" L4, 1996

probably be predominant over the other two. The second is centred on the information war (lwar), to achieve its control, also through the C3 I systems. Information has ahvays been a vital component of m.i.lilary operations, both in the form of intelligence and in that connected \,vith psychological operations. The new frontier of RMA-Iwar, therefore, consists of a massive counterinformation activity aimed

at eroding and destroying the adversary's capabilty of collecting, analysing, preserving and spreading information, accompanied by an aggressive information activity. The third and last characte1istic or the RMA-Iwar is related to possibility of lim iting both the human losses (17) and lbe collateral dmnages associated with military operations by employing non-lethal weapons. The insn·L1ments for achieving this objective , . Fig. 3 .

Origins & Characteristics of RMA-Iwar (*) ORI GINS

END OF COLD WAR

CHARACfERJSTICS

[)

Change in relations between accuracy and distance

(>P Eit,\ I 10'\A L

,~s nH :i\ tE~i

Prcdsiun weap(m.s and mun i tions (e.g. stand-o ff)

A DVENT OFTHE INFORMATION E RA

l{f:DUCTION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE

WINNING HORSE

CAl'AlllLITY OF ·' POW ER PRO.J ECTION"

••

Sca,·ch for control of information

Containment of human losses and colluternl d:mwges

CJI - C-11 Sysr(·nl,

[)

O ffc-nsh·c_, info acti\'ity

Counu.- r -info :u:th'i1y

Emplo~m1.·ot «'If nc,o -h::1lt.1I ,, capom ("'111~1~s

1)rotcction \\l)ns·')

(*) RMA-fwa,.., Revolution in Military Af.fairs' - lnforqiation War

Rangers exercising in a built-up area.

paradoxicaUy caUed "an11s of mass protection", will consist of kinetic, electromagneli.c devices and nonlethal chemical substances. Such means, destined to reduce to a minimum the impact on civilians and environment, will be deten-ent, dissuasive elements used in support of diplomaUc actions. Among the latter we can mention lasers, systems for producing lowfrequency noise, non-nuclear ElVIP (Electro Magnetic Pulse), highpower disturbances, smoke bombs, etc. However, their minimum impact on the population and on the environment has still to be demonstrated. On the organ i1.ational plane, Elioth Cohen (18), ,.vell-known American commentator, has compared the structure of the Armed Forces with that of big concerns such as General Motors. Cohen maintains that in the fifties the administrative structure of the big companies ,.vas similar- to the Armed Forces', since both had a pyramidal organization. On the contrary, in the nineties organizations ,like Microsoft, Motorola and many others were characte1ized by a compression of the intermediate levels and a great interpenetration bet \Neen management and ,vork. Despite the impossibility to compare the military organi1,ation with that of a firm, o,.ving to different purposes and objectives, Cohen says that also the Armed Forces must continue to restructure themselves in order to get 1id of inefficiencies end to stop the growth of activities that have nothing to do with their key func tions. Among the most opportune measures, he suggests a be tter joint approach, to be implemented not only through the elaboration of a joint doctrine, but also through the centralization at high leveJ o( some support functions (e.g. the logistic sector), in order to maximi1.e the mi litary

instrument's effectiveness. Therefore, according to many, the present RMA-hvar appears as the last born of a family of "cumulative" military revolutions which have followed one another in history until the present postindustiial era. CLASSIFICATION OF THE REVOLUTION

The classification of the so-called Military Revolutions has not found consensus among the analysts. Among the many interpretations, in our opinion, t'wo of them seem worth mentioning. ln the first, Jonathan Bailey maintains that lhe XX century has

witnessed only one genuine military revolution, ,vhich occurred i_n 19171918, i.e. at the end of the first World Wai~ ,.vhen, as Bailey says ".. .the developmenr of the modern style of warfare vvas the consequence of the indirect fire of the artillery, because it m.odified the planning doctrine at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. .. " This was certainly a technologic revolution, but it was also and above all a conceptual one, because, for the first lime, it was possible to hit with precision objectives in depth by employing the third d imension . It was, in substance, the concept of tridimensional war, which was successively monopolized by 21

aircraft and missiles. According to Bailey, in 1914 the war had a linear characte1~ in other words it was bidimensional. It was based on physical engagement, in which the manoeuvre of the infantry and the cavalry was supported by the direct fire of the artillery, generally deployed at short distance and Âˇwithin optical range of the oqjective. Howeve.r; the aircraft, used for reconnaisance purposes, was unable to detect and hit indepth objectives (20). Moreover, fire planning was almost absent at operational level and only a few countries had general support artilleries at a level higher than division. The main consideration emerged in 1914 was t hat the artillery fire was inadequate to overcome the stalemate deriving from the failure of the first offensive operation. The solution, which took four years to develop, is still valid today: the capability of detecting and hitting objectives deep into the adversary deployment (deep operations) by using the "system of systems" of the time, in other words the technology of indirect fire (21) ( throu gh the manoeuvre of Lrajectories and guns). In substance, Bailey stresses that this philosophy a ppeared so revolutionary at the time that the employment of tanks, aircraf L and nuclear weapons did not acid anything conceptually new to tl1e original tridirnensional model of war; if anything it only improved the model's efficiency (fig.4). A second classification, complementary to the preceding one, is formulated by Kreprenevich (22), who indicates ten revolutions in military affairs beginning from the XIV century. Nevertheless, in our opinion, there arc thirteen of them in a chronological order of appearance (23).

THE CHANGES FROM THE XIV CENTURY UNTIL TODAY During the Middle Ages the Barbarians introduced the harness 22

Fig. 4

THE MODER~ CONCEPT OF TRIDilVfENSJOJ\'AL WAR IJ

AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES

for horses but, above all, the cavalry established its superiority. The impact of the cavalry maintained its decisive importance in the battles of the time until the advent of the infantry revolution, in which the soldiers on foot took on a predomiJ1ant rnle vis-a-vis the cavalry; owing to the f:,'Teat influence of archery used with g1Âˇeat skill in the XV century by the English and Dutch bowmen against the French cavalry, and by the Genoese crossbowmen. The diffusion in the same century of the first fire-arms brought a bout a remarkable progress in shooting and the consequent artillery revolution, which nevertheless did not substantially change Lhe conduct of battles, which were still bound to the trnditional schemes that were to .remain unchanged until the XIX century. (24) The first World War w itnessed a considerable development of the cu-tilley, Lo the point that within the English and German annies, the ratio between gunners and infantrymen doubled and, within the French and the Russian armies, triplicated. (25) New gigantic arms and munitions industries were born out of nothing. The main characteristic of the employmenL of artillery were the enormous convergences of fire

against fixed and preestablished positions with the purpose or preparing the assault of the infantry. (26) Between the two World Wars, there had been a tendency to further increase Lbe power ,md mobility of the guns, in keeping with the more and more widespread military motorization. When the conflict broke out, the artilley confirmed its destructive function, which was effectual also in the dark and in bad weather conditions.(27) On the maritime Cront, the naval revolution came about when the ships were transformed into platforms with guns (XV century) used to sink or damage the enemy ships before the boarding action. The necessity of sLeering the ships according to the guns' direction of fire entailed giving up Lhe "front line" and adopting the "row line" position as typical formation, because the artilleries were aligned sideways of the-ships. The fortifications revolution, started in Italy du.ring the Conm1Unes period, asserted itself in the XIX and XX centmies (28), in order lo face the threat of the artillery. The continuous front fell into disuse and was replaced by fortifications \.vith separate strongholds. However, during the

An Italian soldier in East Tirnor.

last world conflict, t1fere still existed a line of continuous forrifications, the famous Maginot line. This line - built belween 1930 and 1937 - did not change th e landscape/environment since all the defensive structures were set deep into the ground, thus constituting a continuous defensive front. Al the time the Maginot line was considered storm-proof, being based on centrali zed command, integrated communication system, defence capability, high fire-powe1; possibility to manoeuvre lhe reserve, as weU as logistic supp01t. Although the in-depth deployment of armoured forces provided it \-vith a certain resilience, the fortificalion concept lost importance with the arrival of the Blitzkrieg ( 1940-1941), to such a point that, since then, it has been considered a taboo. Between the XIV and the XVII centuries, we had the gunpowder revolution and the evolution of the infantry weapons. The units were equipped with sidea.rms (pikemen and balberdiers) and with firearms (arquebusiers and musketeers). The latter had the task of breaking lhe enemy lines, which were then charged with sidearms . The invention of the bayonet fixed on the gun-barrel increased the importance of the infantry that was used \Ni.t.b great skill by great leaders, like Frederick II of Prussia and Napoleon 1. Since the FrenchPrussia n war of 1870-71, the infantry \,v eapons underwent a remarkable evolution, increasing considerably their firepmver (29). The infantry, protagonist of the first World War, improved the attack systems by replacing the dense assault waves with more streamlined and thinned-out assault formations and lhe defence was focused on the points of greater t actical interest., giving up the continuous-cordon defensive formation. The experience of the first World War orienled the organization and lraining of the

infantry towards an in creased interdependence bet\veen fire and motion. The traditional function of lhe infantry seemed nevertheless cancelled by Lbe vehemence of the German tanks ,.vhich, by applying the innovative Blitzkrieg concept, overwhelmed the Polish, French and Russian infanltÂˇies. The balance was successively reestablished through the slrengthening of the antitank weapons and of lhe artillery in supporl of the infantry units. The Napoleonic revolution assumed its organizational and

logistic aspects at the beginning of the XIX century. One of Napoleon's charactelistics was the constant search for the enemy and the pursuit of surprise. He made estimates regarding the time necessary for the movements and for the concentration of his units, as well as the time required for the outflankings and smroundings, his intention being that of weaiing oul the forces and moral resources of the enemy. The revolution of the land operations started at the beginning of the XIX century and concerned 23

the firepower and the transports and communications systems. H.K.B. Moltke, who had become Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army in 1858, perfected the perfommnce of commands, establ ished the General Staffs for coordination, emphasized the sense of responsibility and initiative by applying the Au{tragstii.tig philosophy (30), took care that the mobilisation operations 路were prepared in detail ,md expanded the railway network and transports. Moltke put Clausewitz's doctrine into practice, adapting also Napoleon's conception (31). In a certain sense, the first World War led to a regression owing to the static nature of operations (32). In the second World War, the employment of the German mechanized forces according to the Blitzkrieg concept succeeded in combining fire with manoeuvre through tactics based on offensive, speed and accuracy of fire. The naval revolution (steamers, battleships and submarines) occurTed in the XIX century with the adoption of steam propulsion and \Vith the employn,ent of iron for the construction of hulls. The ships strnnger, u路avelling at greater speed, capable of making long voyages in all 路weather conditions - started to have a remarkable offensive powei: The advantages ,-vere nevertheless reduced because these ships had a lesser autonomy as compared v.ith the sailing-ships and needed a widespread network of fuel supply bases. The first submarine weapons (mines and torpedoes) were also introduced in that period. Finally, in the lactical field the evolution has never had a pause (33): i..e. the employment o[ aircraft, aircraft carriers, missile systems and amphibious operations. The aircraft revolution, if one disregards the sporadic employmenLs during the Italian-Turkish conflict and the Balkan wars, occured during the first World War~ where the aviation showed its enormous capabilities (34). At the outbreak of the second World Wai~ the air force 24

proved itself as one of the most powerful strategic and tactical offensive means (35). The war experiences that fo llowed the second World \Alai~ from the Koreai1 war to the Middle East conflicts, consolidated. the doctrine of employment of the aircraft according to five fundamental tasks : reconnaisance, bombing, attack, fight and transport. The most recent experiences have confirmed the vvide development of joint operations with the Army or the Navy, or with both simultaneously, according to the rule that the forces in combined operations, however employed, act as a unitary system, under the orders of a single commander. The first and main objective that the forces must achieve ,vhen they operate in a determined geographical area or operational theatre is to acquire control of the skies and keep it, in order to create the necessary environment of air security, so that the air forces themselves, together with the land and naval forces, may develop their operations (36). The operational principle of the air forces' command and control unity is particu larly valid in the conception of the modern conflict, which has ceased to be a sum of land, naval and air battles, conceived and conducted autonomously, but it is now the product of the results of the air, land and naval operations, conceived together and conducted in an integrated and interdepent manner in space and time. Finally, we have the nuclear revolution which started at the end of the second World War. The arrival of the atomic weapon marked the begimring of a new era, in which the United States had an absolute supremacy; but soon also th e Soviet Union contrived to realize it, thus determining the division of the world in two great blocs. The discovery of the thermonuc lear weapons, the employment of long-range aircraft and, successive])~ of missiles able to

Italian Paratroopers' checkpoint in East Timar.

to reach any area of the globe, wo1路sened the threat for th ey became a danger for the ,vhole mank ind . This produced a complete overturn of the conceptions regarding the employ1nent of forces, because they had to scatter on wide spaces , concentrating only on the vicinity of the objective for the lime sLrictJy necessary and successively spread out, so that they would remain exposed as little as possible, thus making the employment of the nuclear weapon unprofitable (37). At present, a n uclear conflict appears improbable. Nevertheless the nuclear weapons remain instruments of deterrence and/or containment of co.nilicts that could

involve the vital interests of the nations that possess it. If, on the one hand, the availability of nuclear armaments influences the international rank of the States and widens their freedom of action in the international relations, on lhe other, it causes a widespread tendency to proliferation (38). The last two decades of the century, with their great historical events (disintef,1-.ration of the Sm,i et power and breakaway of all the countries previously under its influence, independence movements of vmious ethnic groups, fall of the Berlin Wall, etc.) have \,vitnessed a continuous change in the military strategies which continue to evolve according to the historical-political situation. In particulm~ air powe1.~ nuclear weapons, outerspacc and control of the electromagnetic fie ld have added new dimensions to the military power, granting a

substantial advantage to those Lhat have these instruments.

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion of the revolution in military affai rÂˇs, consequence of the era of information, has been fashionable s incel 995, not only in military circles but also in acade1nic arid press environments . William Owens maintains that, like any previous revolution, also this one will have an influence on lhe institutions, on the organizational structures, on the doctrine and rules of employment of the forces. Nevertheless, Owens observes thaL the main problern docs not consist so much in accepting the new bul in giving up the old. According to many commentators, the technolog ies of the future \.viii permit to gathe1; process, assemble

and broadcast infonnation in real time. This process, if carried out with accuracy and speed, is going lo have remarkab le effec ts on the ballleficld. In fact, if we know in real time ,.vhere Lhe adversary forces are and what they are doing, il is possible to surprise and hit them, reducing to a minimum the losses in the friend ly field, thus achieving a pos1t1on of superiority unprecedented in military history. l n the second part we are going lo see how a revolution in military affairs is born and developed, expounding the pros and cons and concluding with some considerations and prospects for the Italian Anned Forces.

D .Âˇ, Colonel, Chie(, Conflict Analysis Department, War College

NOTES (I) Free adaptation from Ralph Role, "The 21st. Century Soldier", Research and Analysis, Newsletter, Diredorate of the Army, Issue no. 8, July 1996.

(2) Santoro, Carlo Maria, "Perche Lm esercito" (Why an Army), p.21, on "Esercito e Professionisti" (The Army and the Professionals) edited by Ruggero Stanglini,Arrny Staff, Rom<.: 1997. (3) Santoro, ibidem. (4) Adm. Owens, on a page of the Internet, says: ".. .I would like to have an open dialogue on subjects that I consider important., in order Lo stir up ideas ... what is the impact of the tedmological revolution on military operations, what are its implications in our stTategy, mudoctrine and in the commancl-andconn路ol sn1.1ctrn路es...". See: http://www .cl tic .clla. mil/clefense link/JfS/vice-chairrnan.html. (5) Dibb, Paul, "The revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security", Survival, Vol. 39, Winter 1997-98, p.93. (6) The US follows the progrnmme called "USA 21 st Centurv Land Wanior" based on Lh.e assumplio.n that the soldier must b e integrated in the digitized svstem of the battlefield. The ccirresponding French programme is called "French Individual Warrior System", while the Blitish m路e working at the "Fight in g Infantry Soldier Tedmology" (FIST). (7) The "Stealth" technology, applied to aircraft (but not only) a ims at obtaining a low electronic signature for radar beaiing. It is realized by employing compos ite materials and especially designed aircraft. (8) Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, "War and Antiwar: Survival at the End of the 21st Cennu-.{, Boston,1993, p.30. (9) Kreprenevich, Andrew, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolution", The National Interests, no 37/1994, p.30. (10) Whitaker, Randall, "Revolution in Military Affairs", November 1995 (source: Internet). (11) The notion of "Militarv Revolution" has its roots in the Smde't culture or the 1970s and 1980s. Marshal Ogarkov was the first to analyse the potential effects of the e1nerging technologies on military operations. (12) Tilford, Earl H., "Revolution of

Military Affairs, Prospects and Cautions", S011tegic Studies Institute of the Army, .TLme 23, 1995, p.2. (13) lL is known that. the effects of the reduction of the threat and, as a consequence, of the economic resmu-ces, have entailed a general reduction of the forces (40-50%) in rnanv western Countries. This trend will co'ntinue also in the medium term. (14) Cohen, William, US Secretary od Defonce, in a statement made on March 16, 1997, declared: "... Iran is becoming a problem for the Unjted States a nd the Western world. Our forces must b e ready to be employed on the instant. We shall not have again the six-month advantage we had with Saddam Hussein. This possibility is gone forever ... ". Quoted by Jane's Defence Weekly", June 11, 1997, p.47. (]5) RMA-Iwar: abbreviation for "Revolution in Militarv Affairs lnfo1111ation wae'. ,

( I6) Metz, Steven & Kievit, James, "Strategy in the Revolution of Military Affairs from Theorv to Policv'' June 27,1995 and "Revolution in !Vlilita~路y Affairs" in Newsletter, Directorate of US At11w, Issue no 5, March 1997 (The laLLer is available on the Internet). (17) It is a matter of reproducing the conditions of Lhe Gulf War, characterized by an extremelv low number of casualties, i.e., less than ..2% of what predicted (240 instead or l020,000). On this subject, see Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: Skill, Technology and What the Gulf War Really Tells Us About the Future of Conflicts" . Institute for Defense and Analysis, Febmary 1996, p.1. (18) Cohen, Elioth, "A Revolution in Warfare", Foreign Affairs, April 1996. (19) Bailey, Jonathan, Chief, fire Coordination, ARRC: "The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of \.Varfare", Strategic Combat Institute, p.16. This thesis cmmadicts that of E.H. Tilford, who maintains that vV\<\11 caused a Lechnologic revolution, which became a Revolution in Militm~y Affairs only in 1918 (see E.H. Tilford, The Revolutio1.1 in Mili tary Affairs: Prospects and Cautions", SSI, US Army War College, .TLme 23, 1995). (20) Only some guns were able to strike the targets from dcfiladed positions ai1d fire r,mging was p1imitive, being based on the gun's commander visual appraisal. Communications with the observers were limited to a few

telephones, megaphones and semaphores, and mun itions were in short supply. In 1913, each B1iLish gun could count on 1000 rounds, 300 or which were stored in the UK and 500 \Vere to be provided by the factories v,ithin 6 months. Of these, only 176 were issued to the batteries, which used them up in 44 rni11ut.es, at the rate of 4 shots per minute, whereas in 1918 each gun received 600 rounds per day before e{ery offensive action (.T. Bailey, "Field Artillery and Firepower", The Military Press, Oxford 1989). (2:I) From the technical point of view, this revolution bro ugh L abou l.: the employ1nent of topographic maps; air observation for targeting; the definition of the effects caused by the temperature of the charges, the vaiiation in weight of the projec tiles and the weather conditions; the first firing tables; the development. of conu.nunicaLion systems between the observers and tl1e fuing line; the planning of lire, the manoem.-Te of LrajccLOries and guns. From the organizational viewpoint., ii. promoted the creation of a conunand and control structure - at operational and tactical level - together w ith a logist ic and production organization capable of meeting the enon11ous requirements due LO the number of gu ns and relative munitions (the ratio 2:u nnersinfantrymen reached an averag'e of 8:10). (22) Kreprenevich, Andrew, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolution", The National Interests, no 37-1994, p.37; E. Lee, 1994, p.3, with reference to Keprenevich (source: Internet). (23) For historical references, see GEDEA Encyc lopedia a nd various authors. (24) Napoleon incorporated some artillery units into the infan try regiments, assigned 8 to 12 pieces to each division and employed the artillery of the Imperial Guard as general reserve. In 1896 the French a1iillery produced a most modern gun, the famous "soixantequinze" whic!1\vas later used inWv\il. It was ve,y stable and had a remarkable fire-rate (24 shoL5 per minute); iL5 mount moved sideways on the axle, which was good for raking fire. Several other devices permitted to deliver indirect fire from defiladed positions. (25) Bailey, Jonathan, "The First World War and Lhe Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare", Strategic Combat Institute, p. 16. (26) A typical example or this teclmique was the concentration of 800

pieces against the fortress of Verdun. The cooperation between artillery and infann-y was raised to a very high level by the French, with the "barrage rouJant", a fire cLutain th'at smoothed the way to the advancing infant1:ymen. (27) During the conflict, the Soviet artillery turned out to be particularly effective. JL consisted of strong artillery units, equipped with tracked vehicles, am1ed v,ith a 76 or 85 mm gun or with a 122 rmn hmvitzer capable of reaching 50 km/h, \.1;ith a 90 mm annom ,md a range of 300 km. Owing to their extreme mobility, they could manoeuvTe in all sectors of the front. In July 1943, at Orel, the Soviets, on a front of 80 km, deployed a mass of 1SO pieces per km. (28) I. Hogg, "Histmy of Fortifications", Novara, 1982. (29) The employment of the machine gun, which had already been used in the American Civil War, had a strong impact on the Franco-Prussian conflict. (30) AuftragsUitig is a command philosophy according to which the c01mnander gives his orders avoiding to impose sl1ingcnt control measures, thus leaving the subordinates the possibiJitiy of making decisions, wilhin the limits of their freedom of action and the auth01itv entrusted to them. It is a concept of German origin, applied in the AngloSaxon world. In substance, the commander is more interested in the results obtained by his subordinates than in the way they achieve them. (31) After attacking the enemy with a very-high concentration of fire, tlu-ough outflanking manoemTes, he succeeded in weakening their resistance and annihilated their remaining operational capability. Moltke's success prompted the Etu-opeans to imitate the Prussian army in all fields. (32) Concurrent causes ,vere: the difficulties in breaking the enemy front, owing to increased firepower, the reduced d imensions of the formations and the success of the out(lanking manoeuvTes conducted by the enemy wings. As a matter of fact, the deplo:r111ent of the attackers was \v'ider than that of the defenders, and the latter's rese1ves were not in a position Lo intervene before the bulk of the enemy am1y completed its ouflanking action. In 1914, at the begi.J.1J1 ing of the con flict, the German outflanking manoeuvre, conducted on the basis of the plan prepared by Sclilieffen for the invasion of France by a dismounted wing, lost all its effectiveness, because Lhe outflanked forces and the reserves were able to

withdraw. T he reserves were transported to P,u·is by train and, after reorganization, became the bulk of the forces which, in their tum encircled the German out.flanking wing. The Germans withdrew and a ne"v outfl~nking 1;,1anoeuvre took elace, caus111g the rus h to the sea , the constitution of a linear and continuous front, the end of the so-called "kinematic war" and, consequently, the "trench wm-fare".Only the recourse to dynamic attacks and the employment of the artillery brought about the solution of the conflict. The great offensive battles based on a ttalJ<s in waves, with an intensive preparatory and accompanying arti llery fire, the employment of new means and the Final outflanking manoeuvTe broke at last the resistance of the enemy front which had been impregnable for years. (33) After the cannon-armour duel, which characte1ized battles up to WWI, came the time of aircraft embarked on special ships, the aircraft-caniers, which played a limdamen1.al role in WW n, by providing air cover LO convoys in amphibious operations and a lso permitting to conduct air raids from mobile bases located at great distance from tl1e objectives. The success of these ships in the fol.low'ing years, thanks also to nuclear propulsion, caused the rapid decline of the battleships, which ceased to be the hard-core of the fleets and whose role passed to aircraft carriers. The introduction of missile svstems and nuclear submarines produc~d another change in naval strategy and a different formation of the Deets. The number of light ships was increased: they were mainly destroyers, frigates and corvettes, armed ,vith missiles and equipped with electronic-coverage systems, capable of carrying out offensive actions against naval, air and submarine targets, escorting convoys and supporting landing operations. Cru isers were improved: today they are all missile lau nchers, are often nuclear-propelled and are also capable of operating by themselves at great distances for long periods of time. Some types are equipped \Vith landing and takeoff decks for helicopters and VTOL/STOL aitvlanes. Aircraft-caniers have reached a remarkable tonnage and can carry up to 100 fighter-bombers. (34) The airplane, initially used for observation, was later employed as a fighter, ta5ked with shooting down the e,~emy observers. Only towa~:ds the end of WWI, aircraft were especially equipped for bombing. Between the two world wars, the a ir forces of France, Great. Britain, Germany, the U nited States, Japan and the Soviet

Union were enormously developed. (35) Besides the cla-;sical actions - a ir bat.de and bombing - also the combination tankiattack-aircraft proved to be very effect ive. Conceived and employed by the Germans, it was the main instrument of the Blitzkrieg success (Poland, 1939 and France, 1940) The naval battles of the Coral Sea, Midwav Islands and Guadalcanal in 1942 ai1d 1943 were examples of airnaval cooperation and showed that, to win a victo1y, Lhe naval tmits had lo be supported by impos ing air forces. Another form of employment of the ailforces was the transport of paratroop units (someti.J.11es very large ones), troops and heavy mate1ials, which were also canied by towed gliders. Tn this regard, particulm·ly worth remembering are the German actions in Norway, the Netherlands and Crete, the American operations in the Pacific and in Normandy and, above all, the battle of Arnehm, (September 1944) which saw the employ ment of three airborne divisions (Lwo American and a British one) and a Polish paratroop b1igade, for a tot.al of 15,000 men.

(36) The problem of the operating range, which was o~en limited owing to the enormous consw11pLion of fuel and the scarce availabilitv of tanks due to the necessi ty of le;ving s·pace for armaments, was partially solved through in-fl ight refuelling. Aircraft arc vulnerable to the defence from ground and sea, but have on t heir side the stu-p1ise factor, on which they can count thanks to their flexibility and speed. (37) The construction of missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, which were deployed in various part of the territory of the Lwo supeqJowers (US and USSR) and satell ite countries, together with the need to escape danger, entailed the adoption of protection systems: such as the preventive des truction of the faci lities for the production a nd delivery of nuclear weapons, but this proved LO he inadequate and hardly effective, because the mm1bcr of runwavs was remm·kablv increased and th~y were w ide l)' d ispe rsed. The interception o[ Lhe nuclear weapons was also difficult to realize si nce every progress in intercep tion was countered b y a progress in penetratio n. (38) Jean, Carlo, "Geopolitica", LaLer7.a Ed., NWan 1996, p.43. (39) Owens, William, "The Ame1ican Revol ution in Military Affairs", Joint Force Quarterlv, Winter 1995-1996, p.37-38. •

hi le in the past the possess ion of the commu nication assets and product io n systems \Vas prevailingly national, during this decade a global ma1·kct has imposed itself, \Vith im plications of vital importance for the economy, information, security and financial operations, to an extent inconceivable before. There is an un interru pted increment of interactive multimedia services, ecommercc, personal computers at home and in the office, public and private TV stations (also of pirate networks), telephones, especially mobile ones . The growth and the evolu tion of the Internel are constant - in 2005 there will be 500 million users in Lhe world - m,.d by 2010, thanks to the convergence of services, many will be able to reach the net also through TV sets and cell phones, besides the compuler: The d eve lopment of this ex trao rd inary fixed and mo bil e multimedia market requires the access Lo Lbe frequencies; shortage of bands available and overwhelming costs can, in fact, en Lai I th e iso lation from the active :international society. The world conferences that UIT organizes in turn in the various contine nts arc insti tut ionally chm·ged with examining, reviewing and redefining, at global level, the situalion of the frequency bands;

The International Union of Telecommunications (UIT) is the UN body in charge of tit.is sector; its central seat is in Geneva1 where the representatives of public and private interests cooperate for the development of telecommunications and to harmonize national policies. It is the first time that UIT organizes a Conference in Turkey. 2,500 delegates representing over a hundred nations, between May 8 and .lune 2 gathered in the very modern and beautiful Congress aml Exhibition Centre of Istanbul. The delegates were met by more than 300 persons, including translators and interpreters. The papers produced during the Conference will be reconsidered in Hong-Kong, between the 4th and 9th of next December. For 2001, UIT h.as scheduled regional Conferences in Africa, the Middle East and the Arab Nations; in 2002 the meeting will be held in a still undecided locality of the Americas and then again in Asia. After Istanbul, the next world Conference will take place in 2003 at Geneva's Palaexpo, from the 12th to the 19th of October. the ultimate objective is to \Vork ou L a plan for u Lili zing the spec tr um, with the re levant d ifferent assignments Lo the various regions . This is an extremely comp I icated and treacherous undertaking: it concerns problems of national sovereignty; iLs task is lo protect the present and future allocations of services in space and on the ground; it m ust be able to guaranlee lhe exis tence or both digital and analogue systems; it is cal.led to mediate with the interests of sub-regional systems, 01iginally dev ised on the basis of fixed cove1ings that vary for each nation. With every meeting the stakes

grO\v higher: The intervals between one Conference and lhe nexl (generally 2-3 years) are needed for the concrete appl ication or the decisions that have been taken. There were as many as twentytwo items discussed in Istanbul and a JI we r·e a lso of military interest. The works \Vere focused on procedur·es and equity in the use of the spectrum bands as \.vell as on lbe new technologies w ith their applications . In order to facil itate the expansion of the existing services - from cell phones and satellite systems orbiting near the Earth to satellites for air and rna rt Lt me navigation, radioastronomy, Earth exploration and space 1·esearch - it is essential either to use a lesser portion of the spectrum or to assign it, avoiding interferences. The most complicated questions are the allocation of frequencies to the International Mobile Communication (IMT) 2000, the European satellite radiona,igation service "Galileo'' , the difficullies and problems of sa tellite broadcasting, the security and safeguard of human life. IMT 2000 is a fam ily of th i1·d-

HF periodic an Lenna used

UN!FIL

al Naqoura, Lebanon.

TCS Lite 9200 mobile saLellile Lerminal.

generation radiomobile systems (they permit a high-quality, wideband exchange of data, sound and images) . The detection of the necessary spectrum elates back to 1992, when the assessment of the necessary frequencies was based on a model where the voice services were considered the largest source of traffic. Since then, the use of mob ile services has greatly expanded, thus it has been necessary to find a number of new bands capable of meeting the growing bulk o f requ ests . I MT 2000 includes the Universal 1\tiobile Telephone S ystem (the UJ\!ITS worked out in Europe). As regards specifically the cell phones, UMTS estimates that within 2010 the ir total nurnber will be over 2 billions. Already today, in this sector, the range of functions is practically unlimited: from the stock exchange - for 30

example in Helsinki over a half of the total business is managed by firms of this sector - to the connections with isolated rural African places, where it is more convenient to install a certain number of transmitters than to set up a fixed telephone network, ,.vhose copper wires sooner or l ater would be pu ll ed off by scavenging animals. As for interactive services in general, UMTS believes that there will be an ever increasing request of personalized services and produ cts, capable of satisfyi.ng different needs and tastes. This trend requires a global harmonization of the mo bile telecommunication system . In particular, i t seems that the demand for interactive and pay-TV, as well as that for information and ente1tainment services, is destined to grow. The problem is that, in order to meet the needs and come up to the expectations, it is necessary to use frequencies that often turn out to b e a l ready

employed by other services. The GS.M phones , for instance , should avail themselves of band portions that are at presen t assigned to satellite TV (the dish antenna, precisely the device that ,.ve all use to have a relative view of the world) or allocated - by the world radioregulations - to the fixed services in general. The military services, which employ different frequencies in t he various areas of the world, are among the latter. Even if the western body specificalJy deputed to discuss their problem is NATO, and each UIT Conference is attended by the Armed Forces' representat ives of various nations, not i nfrequently it happens that a new service receives a range of frequencies which turn ou t to be employed by Lhe military. The firm opposition of those governments is inevitable and one must find ,vays to conciliate the opposing .requirements. The Italian laws allow the military approximately 35% of all bands,

Mobile ra.dio-cenlral.

a percentage lhat permits, among other lhings, the connection of tanks, ships and aircraft bet,.veen themselves and with the respective commands. The heart of the matter is if and how much such bands can be reduced in order to be transferred to the civilians. This is a most delicale operation, first of all because the various Armed Forces need to be able to carry out exercises on their own or with other NATO partners and, secondly, because some bands are intangible. For example, in this category belong the bands utilized for missile pointing and guidance, for "State" connections (transmission of confidential instructions between the government and the military and/or civilian delegations), for signals used in the c ities by the police . Finally, if and when assignab le frequencies were found , there would still be the problem of shifting some mililary services from the existing bands to others and adjusting to the new equipment. In other words, - in Italy as well as in the other European countries - it would be necessary to re-equip tanks, ships, aircratt, etc. v_,ith new frequencies. Which would entail enormous expenses, besides creating a set of very serious problems. Studied by Europe as rival project to the US GNSSl (Global Navigation Satellite Service), the "Galileo" satellite radionavigation service concerns all the vehicles that move in Italy and in other European countries. GNSSl, which was first conceived and realized for the US military, showed such potentialities that the latter were induced to extend the service to the civilian wodd, and also to open it to other nations, albeit jealously guarding its technology and management. The situation having greatly evolved with time, the Europeans

now request some frequencies of this system but the Americans refuse to transfer them. The Broadcasting Sarellite Service has been discussed especially because of the necessity of reconsidering the plan which, approved in 1977 by UIT, envisaged the availability of five satellite TV channels for each nation. Now, with digital technology, the channels can be a t least doubled - and so can lhe nurn ber of services on the spectrum - while some more-orless complex codes permit to protect the radio links from the interferences of services that are on adjacent frequencies, or even on the same frequencies. A possible option could be that of adding to the five nationa l

services an equa l number of regional ones. The Nations that have their own satellites are opposed to this, because they prefer to sell the frequencies. It is a malter of displacing hundreds of megahertz, with considerable financial operations (whose proceeds go i1~to the budget of the state, to be employed for initiatives of public interest). The discussion in Istanbul regarded a lso the French "Skybridge" system , a constellation of low Earth-orb it French satellites, which reach a minimum distance of 20 km from our planet. Sornc satelliLes of this type arc bound to disturb the satellite TV broadcasts, because they use the same frequencies; the Conference has tried to find the technical

ENAV tower controller. Uniil lhe early '80s, air traffic control in ltaly was carried out by Air Force personnel.

.Limits and the rules for sharing the two services (according to a principle that can recall that of the lan es of a highway) . As regards radio, the disorder of frequencies is probably the greatest obstacle to the fulfillment. of the frequent and repeated optimistic expectations about. :it.s future . Our national network, RAI, is regularly burdened with about 600 cases of serio u s interferences; a little more than a hundred are rectified each year but an equal number of cas es arises again. On the other hand, one has only lo make a short trip by car to realize how much the local stations disturb the broadcasts; moreover; the lack of isof-i:equency (an equal frequency on the whole territory) makes it difficult to locate the chann els. 32

Even home reception, especially in large areas of northern Italy, is not much better; the local stations , in fact, transmit generally from the town areas, "blanketing" the RAI signals which instead descend from repeaters located on mountains or hills. In the second half of the seventies, at the start of the Italian radio "explosion", 15 walls were sufficient to make oneself heard over the entire Lombardy. Today, to obtain the same result, we need many tens of kilowatts, with the ensuing serious heigthening of the e lectrosmog thresho ld. The myriad of commercial radio and TV stations, sprouted (generally wi.th no author ization) after the fall of the Wall, deserve separate considerations. Among them there are also cable and sometimes satellite channels: these are the mini-TVs . 1n the nineties, video productions have proliferated. On the one side, vid eocameras and el ectronic editing .have permitted personal

productions, (facilitated by the fact that the transmitting set can be contained in a suitcase), on the othe rÂˇ, the home dish-antennas have permitted to surreptiously capture and retransmit the satellite programmes of Eurosport, M tv and CNN. Th is ha s happened especially in Eastern Eu rÂˇope (from 1989 till today, 3000 small pirate TVs Âˇwere born in the former Soviet Union), but also in other areas, such as Kazakstan, Kirghizia, Lebanon - ,vhere the p irate stations, which during the civil war referred to almost all fac tions , have turned to more profitable programm es - and in Macedonia, which, with over 200 TVs, holds the European record. The phenomenon of p irate stations was so great that it often prompted modifications in Lhe national legislations. For example, in Prague, Radio Stalin, installed inside the base of a demolished statue of Stalin, had such a success that nobody dared close ii dO\vn, until, with the new laws,

Right. A picturesque view of an "Adelaide" class Australian /riiaw. Below. The anlenna of an UHF "SATCOi'v!"

satellite systern.

it became legal, like the other hundreds of small broadcasting stations. Somelhing Âˇ similar occurred in .Macedonia, where there is still the dilemma of how to legaJi,,e stations, which, after the war in Kosovo, address themselves to both Albanian and Serbian audiences. In Lhe Western world, radio ,md TV stations were generally developed within an old system of regulations (born when production and distribulion were expensive and complicated) which makes life difficult for the small stations . But perhaps mini TVs can appear a lso in Western Europe . ln Paris, last year, the activists of Medias Libres, who request the inlroduction in France of public information media free from the inlerferences of the State and big corporations, climbed on

the roof of a building, put up a pirate antenna and broadcast programmes of public interest to 100,000 houses, prnving that there are more free frequencies besides the authorized 7 channels. The problem of interferences becomes absolutely dramatic when they affect the primary services destined to the safeguard of human life. In the past the problems were lim ited, mainly

because the services were also lim ited . Today, with their constant increase, also the risk of interferences grows. UIT aims at standardizing apparatuses and procedures on a world basis . Another primary goal is to protect the frequencies destined to rescue operations, which, for the ground segment, are l.ocated on medium, short and VHF (Very High Frequency) waves; in the space segment, it is necessary to ensure a maximum protection to both satellite phonic services and radiolocation services. Aircraft especially suffer form interferences linked to short waves, a problem t11at depends on the different propagation, according to the time of the day, season changes and the leve l of sunspots. As for the maiitime services, there are efforts to improve tJ1e efficiency of the spectrum by introducing digital technologies which are going to replace the analogue ones . Th is will result in an increased number o( services, occupying the same section of the spectrum and, in some cases , improving thei ,quality.

D '' Journalist, Contributor to "La Stampa"

The new defence-policy strategy, centred on "security through cooperation", led the Swiss Confederation to join the "Partnership for Peace", and to participate, with due respect for the Country's traditional neutrality, in the missions in Kosovo and Macedonia. This required a thorough reorganization of the military instrument, in order to adapt it to the new requirements without disrupting the constitutional principles. In the following interview, Lt. Gen. Scherrer, Chief of the General Staff, discusses with us these and many other subjects. General, could you make some anticipations on the Swiss Armed Forces of the 21 st Centur~ to the readers of "Rivista Militare"?

In the last decade, the international situation has changed greatly. The present commitments of the Swiss Armed Forces will be confirmed, hut will have to he evaluated mid for.rnulaled anev.:, in order to hetter meet the new challenges of the 21st Century. The follmving p1inciples \vill be applied: â€˘ strenghtening of peace support activities; vTeorganization of defence; â€˘ greater contribution to t he safeguard of the general living standard. For these reasons, the Armed Forces of the 21st Century wiU bave to he characte1ized by: â€˘ multifunctionaJity and modularity: the Armed Forces are capable of conduct ing different types of missions in an appropriate manner, and according to contingent requiremenls, wi lb a brief specific preparation;

An Army Rescue unit during an exercise.

• readiness and augmentation capability: as regards the defence tasks, we can count on longer warning times, while for the employment in peace support and risk situations, a higher reacli ness is necessary and, therefore, the units musl be rapidly available; • interoperability: the capability of cooperating \,vith the security organizations in Sv,ritzedand as well as with the Armed Forces and organizations of other Countries. Basic elements are: good command of English, staff work, command and control, training and good equipment. What were the repercussions of the end of the Cold War on the Swiss Armed Forces? What are the main threats, besides the classic ones, to the security of the Confederation? I refer to terrorism, organized crime, drug 36

trafficking, illegal immigration. The conventional military threat has remarkably diminished, leaving space lo other much less foreseeable menaces, such as those you just mentioned. Ethnic conflicts are more and more causes of instability; as a mle, they affect individual Countries but, due to their repercussions (migrations, crime, te1Torism, etc.), imperil the stability of entire regions. The ve.ry

security of Switzerland is not a certainty anymore, bu l can by guaranteed only through a strong international collaboration and a realistic security policy. Switzerland partecipates in P£P. What are the reasons that

A Swiss observer from UNPROFOR meets a group of Bosnian refugees.

led a historically neutral country such as Switzerland to join this initiative? The policy of neutrality is the result or the consequence of an accurate analysis of the situation. The definition of th is policy takes place during a dynamic process, which must obv.ious]y take into due account the very foundations of the law. Precisely for this reasons, the Swiss military neutrality does not permit the Confederation to join organizations such as NATO and WEU. The Swiss strategy on security policy is expounded in Report 90, 'T he security policy of Switzerland in a changing ,vorld", which, al the very beginning mentions "the promotion of peace through cooperation and aidoperations". This guideline has been coherently pursued and, on October 30, 1996, our Parliament approved the "Partnership for Peace" programme, promoted by NATO. The Partnership was established

in order lo increase the ability of the member Nations to participate in humanitarÂˇian and peace-support operations, as ,vell as in rescue operat ions in case of natural disasters . All this, without depriving the individual Nations of their right to autonomous decisions. Therefore, neutrality is not under discussion, and the long Swiss tradition continues throughout the years. Up to a few years ago, it was very unusual to see Swiss soldiers outside the borders of the Confedcration. First, they were seen at work in Korea, then in Namibia, Western Sahara, l.\ilideast, more recently in Bosnia and Kosovo. The engagement of the S\.\riss military for peace and international stability is more and more visible, within the activities of organizations such as the UN, OSCE and NATO. What are the motivations for these

Firing exercise of armoured unils on snowy terrain. The Swiss Army has recently "put aside" a number of' tanks and M.109 selhJropelled guns.

engagements, and what lessons have been learned from these I111ssions? The "Swisscompany" with its approximately 160 men has been emp loyed in Kosovo and Macedonia since October 1999. The reasons for this decision can be found in the new strategy on secmity policy, centred on "Security through cooperation". The cooperation with other countries envisages a greater collaboration, with friendly countries and internat ional organizations, on security and peace-support. This en gagernent corresponds to our pecu liar interests, because it reduces the risk of Switzerland having to endure the consequences of instability and wai:

1\ sen1ic:emen from a special unit for the

protection of fortress units, on duty m Kulces' airfield (Albania) .

manifold, a n d we make use of them in planning and training.

Switzerland has rea lized the best model of Militia . But the most diffused political orientations seem to prefer armed forces made up by volunteers and professionals rather than by conscripts. How do the Swiss Armed Forces consider this trend, which could deeply change their institutional character? The Militia is a f01m of general military obligation, by which the soldiers are called for relatively long periods of time Lo perform particular duties. This model meets increasing difficulties, owing to the changes in the socio-political and economic context of the young cadres as well as in the technical requirements of the Armed Forces. New mixed models are u n d er study, with a minimum percentage of regulars and a certain number of soldiers on temporary contract. The first results have been very encouraging, and the "on contrad' component will be increased. But the special q uality of the Militia As regards the lessons, let me mention just a couple of them. We have become aware that it is very important for our Officers to know the command and contro l procedures adopted a t NATOcommand level, iJ1 order to be able to opernte effectively within a CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) . Furthermore, we m ust adapt our logistic component, which was not structured for possible employment outside the national borders. The lessons that can be learned are

Forlress troops engaged i11. the external proLection of a foreign embassy in Bern, the federal capital.

A "Sup erpuma '' helicopter of the Swiss Army, assigned to the UN High Corn.m.issary for Refugees, during an aid operation in Kosovo.

must not be changed. Therefore, we will never have fully professional or volunteer Armed Forces. This defence model does nol correspond to our traditional mentality and does not make the most of the unquestioned advantages of the 1xinciple of militia.

Given the growing sophistication of the weapon systems and the continuous increase in their acquisition and management costs, do you believe it is still possible to call large numbers of reservists for training cycles? Today a soldier attends a 15-week basic training course at a Recrnit's School, and ten to sixteen 2- or 3week refresher courses in the following years. We note Lhat, in

particular during the biennial 1Âˇefresher comses, iL is not possible to keep a high-quality level for a long time. Therefore we must ve1ify \.vhethe1~ on the basis of a new training model, it would not be better to prolong the recruit's courses, reducing the number of refreshers. The latter should be he.lei every yem~ Furthermore, depending on the resources available, cadres and soldiers should have the possibility of fu lfilling their military obligations in a single pe1iod. After the completion of their military duLies, all personnel, both the regulars and those who attended refresher courses, are assigned to the reserve for a certain number of years, in order to meet possible requirements of national defence. l.t \vill not be easy Lo constitute a real "reserve", at least not in the rneclium te1n1.

What is the role of the Militia

in a Country like Switzerland, where the civilian and military worlds are so closely connected? The Militia, as an institution, is deeply rooted in our society. Bul it does not concern only the Armed Forces (citizen-soldier concept), but it permeates all our sociopolitical system. Also the members of our Parliament are "militiamen". The concept of "militia" in our country is often - and wrongly equated to military service. It is necessary lo go beyond that. People with marked command-aptitude put themselves at the disposal of others, in order lo perform managerial functions that envisage more tasks than the minimum required by law.

The air force, which is significantly strengthening its interceptor and helicopter units, has always been a component of the Army. This peculiarity, which before could be 39

Switzerland is not a member of' Lhe UN, but frequenty assignes its 1nilitary personnel to peace missions.

recently destroyed 13,500 of them. The Swiss Army has a certain number of mountain units. What could be their role in the present operational scenarios? How and in what direction can and should these special units evolve? Finally, can you tell us something about their flexibility?

Our territory is 60% mountains, and all the North-South transversals cross the Alpine region. Therefore lhe Army must have the appropriate troops. In the fut u re , the proteclion of these communication routes ,vill be very important. for the whole of Europe. As far as the specific mountain training is concerned, we qualify a small number of specialists at our "Central School [or Mountain Combat" in Andermalt. This School organizes many courses for Partnership for Peace personnel, wilh the participation of many Officers from vmious Counlries.

considered obsolete, now appears to be a good innovation, seeing that integration among the Senices is a must in the conduct of military operations. Could you illustrate the terms of this almost exclusively Swiss situation?

The Swiss Armed Forces, unlike those of the NATO Count1ies, have never been divided into Air Force, Army and Navy. Up lo now, we've had an Army, with an important infantrÂˇy componenl, in which the air forces are integrated. At present, in the wake of the "Reform of the Armed Forces of the 2 lsl Century", we are se1iously considering a new structure. But it

is still too early to discuss it. The Swiss defence model, also because of the Country's neutrality and the nature of its terrain, gives a great importance to fortifications. In a moment when mobility seems to prevail over static defence, what do you think about the future of fortifications and fixed installation<;?

It is lrue that the irnportance of fortifications is diminishing, but we want to remain failhful to the things that have given good results and are feasible from the financial point of view. We are eliminaling the obsolete installations, and have

The Swiss defence model relies on the close integration of its civil and military components. What could be the Swiss Army's contribution in case of natural or industrial disasters or emergencies on the territory of the Confederation?

The S,viss Aimed Forces are one o[ the instruments capable of achieving the goals of the security policy. Swit1.erland, in facl, considers its secmity policy as the result of the optimal concurrence of foreign policy, protection of the population, economic policy, police and Stale security, information, conu1m11ications and, naturally, lhe Armed Forces. Very recently, the military intervened massively in the surveillance of the embassies in

Swiss helicopters at Tirana airport during operation "A.Iba".

Geneva and Bern, the assistance of n u merous refugees frorn the Balkans and, finally, in support of the civilian population after the avalanches of the Âˇwinter 1998-1999. Within the sphere of population proleclion, all civilian assets are coordinated, in order to .manage natural djsasters, emergencies and consequences and an11ed conD icts (Fjre Brigades, Medical and Rescue Service, Technical Services). The responsibility concerning protection of the population are mainly assigned to the Cantons. The Anned Forces, with their specifical.ly trained troops (rescu e units, territorial infantry etc.), only intervene in ca5e of very serious events, Âˇwhen the civil authorities cannot manage by themselves. There are regular joint exercises of cantonal ,md mil itary "disaster staffs", aimed at ensuring the highest and mos t efficient cooperation.

The financial instrument is becoming more and more

important for a regular and sufficient flow of resources in order to achieve the constant modernization and adaptation of the Anned Forces. Do you think that, as regards the Swiss situation, the so-called "peace dividends" have been collected?

have 65% of the financial means we had in 1990, which is certainly in line with the international levels. Nowadays, all over the Âˇworld, the Aimed Forces must make maxi.mum use of the resources available and get better results \,vith lesser funds.

I think so. Bv 2001 ,ve are t:,noi..nl! '-' to

'~Journalist

Lieutenant General Hans-Ulrich Scherrer was born in Mosnang (Saint Gall) in 1942. Gen. Scherrer was commissioned in 1964 and in 1969, with the rank of 1st Lieutenant, commanded a mortar company. 1n 1973 became a Staff Officer in a Division and in 1980 - as a Major - assumed the command of a Mountain Rifle Battalion. In 1984 was transferred to the Staff of a Corps; in 1985 he was promoted Lieutenant.Colonel and, in 1987, to the rank of Colonel. He then commanded a Mountain Infantry Regiment until 1990 when, promoted Major General, was appointed Commander of a Field Division. In 1998, promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, he became Chief of the General Staff. In 1974 he attended the Course for Commanders at Hammelburg, FRG, and, from 1978 to 1979, the "Infantry Officer Advanced Course" at the U.S. Anny Infantry School, Fort Benning (USA). In 1997 Gen. Scherrer attended the Columbia Business School in the United States. His mother tongue is German, and he also speaks fluent English and French. Lieut. Gen. Hans-Ulrich Scherrer is married and has two children. 41

Interview with Major General Dusan Humeny Acting Chief of Staff of the Slovak Army

General, the history of the Slovak Army is not long, but it is certainly interesting. Can you summarize its first ten years, for the readers of "Rivista Militare"? You are right. The Army of the Slovak Republic is really young, and so are the structures we are building now. On January 1, 2000 we have noted, in fact, a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the changes under way in our Army. In its Programmatic Statement", the Governsnent of the Slovak Republic has manifested its intention lo reform the Armed Forces, in order to implement optimal variations which could ensure the defence of the Nation, as full fledged NATO member. Today we are adjusting the Army's strength, structure, 'Weapons and procedures so as to attain this aim. Once the reform is completed, we are going to have 2 mechanized Brigades; l artillery Brigade; 1 all-volunteer m.echanized immediate-reaction Battalion; te Home Guard Heaquarters with 4 Mobilization Bases; 2 engineer Battalions; training centres of the Army Banches; operational logistic and support units. An efficient and, a t the same lime, reachable goal : within the year 2002, it envisages 12,210 militaiÂˇy and 1800 civilian 43

personnel. There has never been a reform of such extent in the history of our Armed Forces. We are acting gradually, being aware of its importance and of the efforts it requires. We have successfully completed the first phase on April 1, 2000 when the Land Forces Command has become operational; as from that date we have created the Home Guard Headquarters and the Headquarters of the 1st Mech Brigade. The 4th Mobilization Base has started its activity, while the envisaged Major Units and formations have been placed under the Land Forces Command and the Home Guard. We are now in the second phase outside the national tenitory. How was the process of separation of the Czechoslovak Army conceived and managed? What were the most difficult problems that the Slovak Anny had to tackle?

of the reform, which calls for the disbandment and reorganization of Major Units and formations. The reorganization of the Land Forces ,. . .,ill continue in 2001, in accordance with the recommendations contained in Gen. Garrett's study and the conclusions of a special project. At the moment, I can say I am satisfied \Vith the observance of the schedule. All Slovak Officers hope and wish that by 2001 there ,,vill be all the conditions, including, 44

of course, the financial ones, necessary for the smooth completion of the reorganization. According to the S lovak Republic's military strategy, the Army must be the main component of the Armed Forces for defence, safeguard of the territo1ial integ1ity and national sovereignty. Furthermore it mu.St give a significant contribution to fulfill the requiremens of humanitarian and peacekeeping operntions

The vvhole process of separation of the federal Army of former Czechoslovakia was a very interesting and unique operation. As is lmov,11, the event was received ,.....,ith attention and appreciation by the whole world. The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic carried out the simultaneous separation of the State and the Armed Forces which, up to that moment, had been a single structure. The present Slovak Army was officially born in January this year and, as I said, is therefore very young. Actually, there had already been a kind o( "de facto" division also before. But I am happy to say that both sides have kept their values of respect, courtesy and mutual esteem, and continued in the cooperation \Vith olher Armies, especially with those of our neighboming CountTies. Since the beginning of its existence, the Slovak Army has

participated in UN peacekeeping missions and, more recently, in NATO operations. Slovak observers and units have operated and are still on duty in former Yugoslavia, Albania, Africa and the Middle East. What were the lessons learned from these missions? Training, emp loyment and activities of the Slovak Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations, be they UN or NATO, fall ,.vithin the responsibility of the Defence General Staff. The Anny participates in the missions with its personnel. At the present time, 93 servicemen a re employed with UNDOF and 43 with KFOR. The personnel for these missions are selected taking into account their moral and physical qualities and the results of psycho-diagnostic examinations . The latter are conducted both on their departure and when they come home. Based on experience and lessons

learned, the training programme is oriented, in particular, towards psychological preparation . The experience gained is not only applied to the preparation of the successive missions, but is also employed immediately, in the routine ,.vork, in order to improve the efficiency of trammg, equipment, technical support and command-and-control.

Today many Armies are oriented towards a model made up mainly of professionals and long-term volunteers. What is the prevailing trend in Slovakia on this subject? Will conscription remain in force? At present, the Army performs 78% of the Armed Forces' tasks. Generals, Officers and Warrant Officers carry out 86% of this work, ,.vhile NCOs and enlisted men perform the remaining 14%. By the encl of 2006 there will be

more Warrant Officers, NCOs and professional soldiers. Our primary objective is now that of completing the immediatereaction Battalion on a professional basis, since consc1ipts are available only for 9 months and cannot achieve the required training level. The professional character of the Army is a determinant requisite for our participation in NATO. Of course, this depends on the political will.

What is the Slovak Army's perception of the Partnership for Peace? The Pf P is one of our main activities within the cooperation with NATO and with other Countries. Our personnel have participated in training comses and international exercises. Among the most significant ones, I would like to mention "Cooperative Dragon" in Albania, "Cooperative Lantern" in 45

France, "Best Effo rL" and "Rescue Eagle" in Ru mania. By the end of this year, our forces will take part in two more exercises, which will take place in the United Kingdom and in the Czech Republic: "United Step" and "Blue Line".

The participation in NATO and the EU are two fundam e ntal objectives of the secwity policy of Slovakia. Looking at the Atlantic Alliance , what are the priorities set by the Slovak Army in order to make its structure compatible with that of the other land forces of the Alliance? What are the times involved? The Slovak Republic has always loo ked with interest a t the Europ ea n and trnnsatl a ntic security-structures, and today considers the admission to NATO a nati onal strategic obj ective, especiall y since some of o u r neighbo urs have been admitted. The Government and the Army consider the admission to NATO a guarantee of security an d sovere ignty, al so in view of a reduction of forces. For us , it represents also a verification of the operational procedures and the acquisition of more experience in

~-.,.

. .. •,f .."':;.,.·~·

comm and and control, logistics, training and managemenl/welfare of personnel. A bet ter knowledge of the operational procedures at all levels is an essential priotity. Jn particula1~ we are interested in interoperability in the commwucations sector and in the acquisition of ammunition for weapon systems. We l1ave learned a lot from our partic i pat ion in internat io nal exerc ises, a n d th is exper ience produced good spin-offs for staff and I.ra ining acLiviLies. As regards weap on syste ms, we are pruticu larly interested in improving their co mbat capahilties at night and in adverse weaLher conditions, and in the possibility of employing a standard type of ammunition for

Army is currently modernizing the T72 tanks. Does this programme have any element in common with those started in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which employ the same system?

the most imp01iant weapons. In Central and Eastern Europe several military-cooperation activities have been taken, with the objective of establishing multinational forces for peacekeeping operations. Does the Slovak Army participate in any of these undertakings?

Our presence is very active in the cooperation projects, within the framework of the multinational unit called TISA, whose purpose is to monitor and control the basin of the river after which it is named. The Main task of this unit will be that of interven ing j n case of disasters in the river basin, upon request by any of the participating Countries. A Draft of Agreement has been signed by the governments of Hunga1y, Rumania, Slovakia and Ukraine. Each Country provides a company-level unit. Slovakia will not create special units for this pi.trpose. The units of the existing strncture will be employed, starting v,,rith the Engineer Battalion of the 1st Mechanized Brigade, which will be located at Michalovce. The implementation of the system of constant mutual control of the Tisa basin is one of the activities of regional cooperation that have

produced import.ant contacts among the four participating Counhies.

The modernization of armaments is managed by an "ad hoe" Section of the Ministry of Defence, on the basis of the requirements. The Army takes part in this process by defining, in the initial phase, the techno-tactical pm-ameters, and by conducting occasional control and field tests. As concerns the cooperation of several political subjects in the moderni.1.ation process, I do not have the elements that would be necessary to give you an answer, since this matter does not fall \Vi thin the responsibility of a single Service.

D The annoured component of the

,Âˇ, Journalist

Major General Dusan Humeny was born in Liptovsky Mikulas on December 4, 1953. He attended the Military School from 1969 to 1973 and, after his comission, commanded several units until 1976, when he became Officer in charge of training at the 49 th Mechanized regiment. From 1980 to 1990 he held many command and staff positions at the 31 s t Battalion of the 331 s t Artillery Brigade, a unit of the 4 th Army (Western Military District). Gen . Humeny has been commander of the 61 st Missile Battalion and the 331 st Brigade. From 1996 to 1999 he has been in charge of the Missile Units and the Artillery Administrative Division at the Army Staff. He attended the specialization course on Heavy Artillery, the Brno Military Academy and the Foreign Languages School in Germany, where he also attended the General Staff Academy. He speaks fluent English, German and Russian. On January 1, 2000 he was appointed Acting Chief of Staff of the Army and, on September 1 of the same year, was promoted to the rank of Major General. Maj. Gen. Dusan Humeny is married and has two children. 47

Between dream and reality by Luigi Campagna

-1:

From whichever angle we look at it, Europes history has always been a very troubled one. The events that followed one another along the entire arch of its trajectory have united and divided the Europeans in so many different ways that it is not surprising if, still today, the pursuit ofpolitical integration finds quite a number of difficulties. Much has been done. But perhaps there is still a long way to go before the idea of a Europe of Nations is concretely overcome. 48

BACKGROUND It cannot be sai.d that Europe did not expe1ience in its past some kind of unity The Roman Empire, for example, embraced territories much greater then our Western Europe, even if some of its fringe areas were excluded . Thus the "unity" remained, formally at least, until the fall of the Western Roman Empire (476 A.D.). Nevertheless the union \Nas the outcome of the conquests made by the strong Roman army over primitive populations, which, above

all, were worried about the daily problem of survival, unaware of social needs and prospects and totally alien to political problems. In substance, it was a Union ,vanted and accomplished by great Leaders who, in the name of Rome, succeeded in conque1ing almost the entire Continent, imposing the Pax Romana in exchange for the concession of a kind of "Romanily", which was more formal than substantial, apart from rare exceptions. It was however a Union in which there were two important elements (lacking today): common laws

(together ,vi th the typical local ones, which were tolerated) and common Latin language (even if not generally spoken). Afterwards, Europe has been united again, at least in pmt (in the Middle Ages, for instance, with the Holy Roman Empire of Charlemagne, 800 A.D.), by the ambitions of rulers, who wanted to assert their domination through the possession of ten-itories and the subjection of populations . Populations that were indifferent to the interests of the leaders, who roused fear and terror but who could, at the same time, ensure

protection and survival, in their very limited vision of world and life. The chain of barbarian and Islru.nic invasions, of local reactions and wars of succession, of cn1sades and wars of religion or other wars, with time led to the multiplication and rise of farnilies that fragmented the territories and peoples into numerous possessions, which brought about deep diversifications in usages and customs, in laws and spoken language; the possessions were destined to become hereditary from fat.her to son and were l.he object of continuous struggles to defend or ag6rrandize them. Thus, the stronger families struted the dynasties , some of which extended and consolidated their dominions and prestige in such a way that they succeeded in involving their suqjects in a kind of "glorification" of their deeds. The answer of the populations, tepid at first , became more and more fervent and participative, to the point of acknowledging as personal the problems that troubled the dynastic families. In the collective structures that were thus formed, nevv, highly binding values converged - pride of affinity, free coexistence, ,videspread rule of legality, sp.iJ.itua.l and religious union, common language ,md customs - \.vhich gave birth to the national states. Some of them were already created in the first centuries of the second millennium A.D., such as France and Spain; others were constituted late1~ i.e. Great Britain; others, like Italy, had lo wait until the 19th century. The national States, far from being a solution for Europe's peaceful living, caused a series of dangerous turbulences, because they started disputes among themselves, owing to ambitions and assertion of power, ,,vh ich had become characteristics not only of the rulers themselves but of the peoples united into nations. ln short, examining the last two millennia, one notices that the struggles and wars that have

occurred have made Europe a theatre of continuous battles , producing deep changes, in both the civilian and the religious fields. THE 20th CENTURY

The century just elapsed, in the first fifty years has \.vitnessed Europe suffering two World Wars, with immense bloodshed and enormous destructions, such as had never occmred in man's history. Besides, at the end of the second conflict and as sad seal to its conclusion, a ne,v tremendous event

Right. i\.rmed vehicles of the "Garibaldi" Brigade on ihe road in the Bosnian coui1tryside.

Below. Spanish soldiers engaged in a joint exercise.

had appeared, which forebode no rosy prospects: the employment of nuclear power in wac The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki filled all wi Lb dismay: men on both sides, defeated or victors, of m1y political creed. The horror for the damages

caused m1el suffered, and the panic for a possible future nuclear conflict, were wise teachers for the new rulers who, in Europe, had to solve the problems of a confused and crumbled world: everything had to be reconstructed, even in the victorious countries.

The new leaders, especially the most enlightened ones, had the courage to say."No more wars in Emope". Unfortunately, as everyone knows, the conclusion of a war never eliminates all the reasons that caused its outbreak: it cancels some of them, but normally Jeaves others unchanged, when it does not generate new ones. Therefore, despite all good intentions, at the end of the second world conflict, a division in two blocs, not on.ly of Europe but of the entire world, loomed on the h01izon. The genns of this division were already alive before the war: they had only been "frozen" in order to combat the Nazi threat. As a consequence, Europe had

hardly the time to heal its wounds that it found itself in a new worrying situation, split in two parts: on the west, the Atlantic Alliance, politically liberaldemocra t ic; on the east, th e Warsaw Pact, politically totalitarian and communist. The constitution of the Eastern bloc convinced the Western countries to follow other· paths, so that, at least \.vithin their borders, they could manage to crea te structures capable of preventing possible conflicts. The structures were established, even if the partners did not start on an equal footing, conside1ing their different situations. Moreover:; they were not intrinsically strong, despite the promoters' good intentions. They were enormously

surpassed by NATO, ,,v here the Americans obviously took Lhe lead, while the Europeans were given a support role (a situation that was going to remain unchanged at least until the end of the '80s). Nevertheless, the Europeans did not carry out this role only. The nevv st1uct.ures had promoted the cooperation of people of different. nationalities in activities that were sectorial but nevertheless of remarkable strategic impo1tance. Suffice it to remember the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC, in Rome, 1957), \.vhich was firmly wanted by the often mentioned, well -known upholders of European Union: Adenauer, De Gasped and Schumann. In fact, EEC substantiated, \.vith activities of remarkable socio economic importance, the \Vestern European Union (WEU: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Holland, Great Britain) which had been born in Paris in 19 54 but s tilJ lacked concreteness. From that time, initiatives followed one another, some good, some not-so good; some slackened by the prevalence of the various interests of the moment. Until we anive to the years nearer to us with: • the revitalization of Vv'EU (19861987);

• the conception of European Union (EU) nol just WEU, constituted by the European countries of Lhe Athu1Lic AJ.liance (the members of 1954, plus Spain, Portugal, Greece and Norway) but open to all European countries wil ling Lo join (now, ,vith the admission of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, there are 15 members, bul the trend is Lo have a further increase); • the election of the European Padiament by the citizens of the member countries; • the enunciation of important. declarations (such as those of Petersberg, 1992); 51

Paratrooper from the "Tuscania" Carabinieri Regiment in Kosovo.

• the ratification of important treaties (Maastricht, 1993 and Amsterdam, 1997).

THE PRESENT SITUATION Today, Europe can pride itself on the important goals achieved, thanks to the action (/4UTied out by intergovernmental and Community bodies. Among the forme1~ the "European Council" deserves a special menli.on: it is made up by Heads of state and government, establishes the common principles, guidelines and strategies and controls various organizations, among which: • the General Secretariat of the Council; • the High Representation for PESC (Common Foreign and Security Policy);

• the Programming and EarlyWarning Cell; Among the Community Bodies, there are: • the already mentioned Parliament and Commission; • the Court of Justice; • the European Audit Office; • the E uropean Bank for Investments and the Central European Bank; • the Social and Economic Committee and the Regions' Committee; Moreover, among the resu lts achieved, one should mention the five freedoms of circulation: of goods, people, services, capitals and, soon, of Euro, the common currency. These are irnporlant goals towards a modern, real Unity, but they are sliU far from being a true supernational structure, like that of the United States of America. Much has still to be clone, both to overcome the inheritance which, as we said, descends naturally from

the past centuries, and lo meet the coordination and harmonization needs, which are paradoxically connected \,Vith the plurality of the initiatives. Among the difficulties that still exist, we can count: between • dualism intergovernmental and Community Organizations; • existence of two structures for Europe: WEU and EU; • lack of Defence and Security integrated structures; to which one can add th e [oUowing, not-negligible obstacles: • persistence of a creeping residual protectionism in the various partner Nations; • national prejudices and presumptions; • mutual mistrnsl; • different mentalities; • different guiding structures of social life; • diffecent languages. The dual ism between the intergovernmental and Community

A meeting o( Tialian and French servicemen in Bosnia.

bodies, even if in the present political situation cannot be avoided, entails complications and labourious coordinative operations. Evidently, as a rule, the intergovernmental bodies, in the decisions, prevail over the Community's ones, which therefore appear to be in a position of subjection . Moreover the permanence of this dualism leads to a proliferation of structures and offices, in contrast with the princip les of the economy of resources, also in financial terms. A rationalization, 01~ in general, a simplification, ,.vould be desirab.le, granting at the same time more power to the Community's bodies. The coexistene of WEU and EU adds further organizational structures to the already complex European world. It is of course trne that one must proceed by degrees, considering the institutional diversities of the partners. It is of course also true that, as the Community expands, its rational reorganization becomes more complicated (and there are s till many and diversified nations that knock at the EU doors). Even now, for instance, there are Countries

that proclaimed themselves neutral a[ter the second World War and which therefore caimot fully join in the initiatives of the others in the military sector; this is so t rue that, with the Amsterdam Treaty, the expression "constructive abstention" has been invented, in order to safeguard the decisions that cannot count on unanimity Therefore the i.nte!:,'Tation of WEU into EU is an additional problem, and at Petersberg the necessity to irnplernent it was stated, together with the need to establish the still lacking Common Defence. The lack of integrated Structures or Dere nce and Security involving

all EU Countries, generates many difficulties as regards an effective common foreign and mi li1.ary policy. In the E uropean sphere, in reality, some aggregating actions have been carried out, but they were alÂˇways bilateral or, if multilateral, did not involve the entire Community. In this connection, one can mention the French-German agreement for the constitution of mixed Cornrnands and units, i.e. the constitution of EUROFOR, with integrated Commands from Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. As a consequence, when problems arose in the abovesaid sectors (Defence and Secwity), the positions and the decisions of the EU Countries up to now have been marked by in1provisat ion and precariousness, with the risk of failure (which fortunate ly never occurred). In the last period, (Helsinki European Council), there has been the acknowledgement of this shortcoming and therefore of the necessity to create new structures, integrated already in peacetirne, enabling Europe to take

Bosnia. An iwliw1. officer discussing details of a common activity with a J->ortugue.se colleat?,ue.

53Âˇ

A German mine-clearing ia,-zk in the area of Mostar ai1port.

autonomous positions and initialives in case of emergencies. But the transition from the Council's decisions to facts is not a simple one. Our hopeful wish is that it may happen in a short Lime. The persistence of a latent protectionism inside the various partner Nations, produces unbalances and disproportions that are incompatible with the frec ma.rket logic within the Conm1w1ity, which should pem1it the success of productions exclusively by making the most of price and quality Fortunately, it is just a remainder of the old European system, 路which will progressively disappeai: National prejudices and presumptions lead to dangerous classifications, o,ving to which the Europeans arc divided into catcgot".ies: "coo l" or "warm", "intelligent" or "negligent", 54

"industrious" or "idle", "orderly" or ''bungling", "loyal" or "treacherous". A disitinction that exists in any community, be it small or large, and therefore exists also when it is referred to Europe. The clanger consists in attributing a single one of the abovementionecl categories to the citizens of a single country. Such an attitude, which, Lmfortunately, is not imaginary and leads to consider diversities only as negativities, separates peoples and causes mutual intolerance, preventing the amalgamation necessay to achieve the prideful feeling of belonging to the same cornmu11it路y. Mutual mistrust is related in part to what we have just said; but it is more subtle. The ex.chai1ge of ideas, of trade agreements and even of positive feelings ai路e made difficult, while there should be a maxi rn.um confidence and respect, for these arc the builders of solid societies of equals, to the advantage of all citizens. Different mentality is another big

obstacle, even \.vhen it only concerns regions of the same nation; just imagine how obst1uctivc it can be within a community that includes, for i11stance, a Scandinavian on the one side and a Mediterranean on the 01he1: How peoples from the different European Nations will mix, as regards behaviour and reactions to the numberless impulses, is a big question indeed. Besides, the structures that regulate the social life of the vaiious Countries are so different in efficiency and procedw路es that they constitute a further obstacle to a successful union of the European peoples. The obstacle is certainly not insuperable, but to surmount it one should conciliate, for example, the Germans' high cffciency with the Italians' captious red-tape. Despite the worthy efforts of the last years, we are still burdened by a bundle of bills and decrees that complicate our daily life, even for the solution of banal problems.

Engineers from the !FOR German contingent in Bosnia.

The different languages, finally, contiibute to the further complication of everything. Certainly they do nol facilitate mutual understanding, especially when the deep meaning of words can express things that cannot be understood through an arid, even if grarnmatically correct, translation. FUTURE PROSPECTS

The above considerations could make us incline to'wards absolute pessimism about the possibilities of achieving a real European union, that should be not only financial and economic but also political, social and spiritual. One could also say that, after all, to be pessimistic is the same as being realistic. A realism that, nevertheless, clashes against the will of many Europeans, who keep on hoping, nol only d rÂˇeaming, that the difficulties mentioned before will be overcome, if not downright cancelled, by a persevering vvill capable of crealing, in the course of time, in the souls of all Europeans, the conviclion of its usefulness, benefits and high value. A value deriving from the opportunity of turning diversities into elements of cullural wealth; a precious value capable of making people proud of belonging to a supernation, apt to carry out a primary role in research, product ion, civi l coexistence, defence, security, polilics and in the balance of the destinies of mankind. A Europe completely united in a11 the vital aspects of a high-level institution would express a great primary power, competing and cooperating on the same level vvith the other great primary world powers. A Europe of th is type \,vould not be, openly or covertly, compelled to take decisions in a subject condition.

One is bound to ask whether such a Europe would be truly welcome in the international assembly Public declarations seem to leave no doubts about an affirmative answer: But a reasonable suspicion does not seern completely out of place. It goes \,vithout saying that external impediments, even (and especially) if noL openly expressed, could be more hard to overcome that internal ones. But not even impediments of this kind could affect the faith of the convinced upholders of EtU"opeanism; it would be a matter of taking up a new challenge, which could certainly be difficult but not impossible to meet and Âˇwin. In this regard , it would not be inappropriate to make a careful survey to find out, if they exist, the origin and substance of these exte1nal impediments, in order to adopt time ly and adequate

measures against them. Pa11icular attention should be given in counteracting the "fifth columns" which, while apparently professing their belief in Europe, in fact generate turbulences adverse to the desired Unity, according to a logic Lhat could perhaps be explained as political opportunism , but which ca1mot ce1Âˇtainly be accepted on the plane of coherence and European expectations. Besides, and as compared to 1hat occurred recently, a united and politically strong Europe would certainly be in a position to better manage problems such as those arisen with the conflicts in the Middle East and in former Yugoslavia, and with the entrance of "Raider's right" in Lhe Austrian government.

D ,., Lieutenant General (ret.) 55

MISLEADING BEHAVIOUR

Nevertheless, if a situation does not change for some tim e, men nalurally tend to become p1isoners of the stn.1clure which houses and feeds them, as well as of its relational models, and lose sighL of the 01iginal value of the Institution, attaching more importance lo the structure of which they arc members, and to its rules (ManStructure relat ion) rather than devote themselves to results (Mani Institution-Results relation). As a consequence, when the required results change, together with the means and limitations associated with the new problem, the strucLure's inertia tends to hinder the change, and the structuce, which was a "means", turns into a "restraint". A widespread belief mainLains that the mission of a responsible official is to respect the rules and guarantee the survival of the stmcturc, often in terms completely independent of

the resulls produced in favour of the community. This "administrative cohesion", which, from a certain point of view, could be inteqJretecl as a somewhat positive albeiL anomalous form of "esprit de corps", loses instead any institutional vaJue, considering that, within the Organization, it does not lead to a unily of intents, but rather to an inferior kind of negative competition (for the institution, not for the individuals) based, according to the current criteria of personnel evaluation, on the assumption that the rules are purposes, and on lhe segregation of knowledge ("unconsciously" legitimized by the Institution), to the advantage of the personal interest of the single official. Changes are slow and frequently produce a growth of the administrative components at the expense of the operational ones. Often, the objective difficulty in facing Lhe emerging challenges (vvhen they are evenl1.ially perceived) \-Vilh ,Ul inadequate structure causes

"Skyguard Asp'ide" antiaircrafi lif!,hl missile system.

furLher complications in the latter, which nevertheless should somehow permit to manage the new situaLion and at the same time protect the existing organization at all costs. So we reach the paradox of pursuing efficacy through the reduction of efficiency. A particularly counlerproductive and widespread fonn of transformation is that of applying ...u1 innovative technology to a structure not prepcU"ed to receive it. Fmthennore, changes are scheduled according to development programmes that arc l"igidly cadenced in lime (the well-known "short, medium and long term"), fo ll ow complicate procedures, last very long and often need a law to become operational. Therefore they lack the necessary flexibility. The capability of thes e programmes of responding to

Prototype of the "Pegaso" self propelled 155 mm gun, mounted on a 1nodi{ied "Centauro" armoured hull.

rapidly evolving requirements is very limited in highly uncertain and unstable employment contexts, such as the present ones, in lhat the requirements can he reliably defined only in the shorl term. In other words, Lhe partial and final objectives of the programme arc not defined in Lheir contents nor synchronized, as far as li rne is concen1ed, vis-a-vis specific future requirements, but refer to a generic "growth orienlation" of the Organization. It is thus important to schedule the programmes on the basis of coherent objectives (concerning Lime, contents, techno-financial feasibility) wilh employment expectations as concrete as possible. The programmes must be open to different development or reconversion oplions, derived from the assumptions expressed and their specific probability. In other terms, it is necessary to decide the direction to take, but it is possible to fix. the final goal only through the formulation of various assumptionsioptions, all compatible with the development of the programme. We must accept to live \.\lith temporary capabilities, which have lhe abil ity to evolve promptly and continuously. The military Institution cannot but grow together with the society that expresses it and in accordance with its requirements.

SOME EXAMPLES WITHIN

NATO If this picture describes to a certain extent the Italian situation, and probably that of many other national contexts, N ATO itself, which is Lhe product of its member Nations, suffers the same prnhlems. During the critical phase of the intervention in Kosovo, SHAPE's Joint Operations Centre (JOC) underwent a remarkable stress in

Âˇ":Âˇ

managing what was, after all, a minor operation, and had to resorl to substantial reinforcements, both ,.vilhin the Headquarters and outside. In this regard, two main considerations can be made. First: SHAPE organizational structure , still based on the confortable administrative routine of the Cold War period, despite the previous experience in BosniaHerzegovina was not adequately prepared for the performance of its primary task, which consisted in planning and conducting operations at strategic level. Second: SHAPE's Staff Divisions, called lo reinforce the JOC with their own personnel, opposed a strong .resistance, maintaining thal, in that case, they would be unable to perform their institutional duties in Full and, as a consequence, they implicitly stated that the daily administrative routi.ne was more important than the emergency. Another very evident example concerns the Command structure

of the Alliance. The regional and sub-regional Commands arc static, and were conceived and realized Lo meet the requirements deriving from the confrontation of the lwo Blocs. They can give only a lirnited contribution to Lhe conduct of today's operations of crisis management outside Lhe borders of the member Nations. The survival of these Commands (l) is justified by main Lai ning that it is still necessary to face possible contingencies of collective defence, the so-called Alt.5. I do nol discuss the soundness of this argument as a matter of principle, mainly at deterrence ]evel. But, on the pratical plane, it ac1itically reproduces the model of the past, completely prescincling from the important facts that have occurred meanwhile, such has, for example, the enlargement of Lhe Alliance and the PfP initiative, which have extended the borders of NATO well beyond the old 59

Helicopters of the Italian Air Cavalry.

geographic limits, and the 1999 Strategic Concept, which confirms and extols lhe strategy of prevention through crisis managemenl. In short, the decision was to keep a static and redundant Command structure planned, but only partially, for a hypothetical longtenn task, leaving to lhe uncertain and partial results of the CJTF programme the task to provide the mobile and projectable Command capabilities - constituted moreover only on an emergency \vhich are essential in order to sland up to irnmediate operational requirernents. All this is an additional burden for the Nation s (2) called to nnmage both lhe static Commands and the in-Theatre operational Headquarters which, by now, have become de-facto permanent. This example shows how strong the resistance can be, especialJy when, as in the case of the Alliance, it is necessary to rnake collective decisions, and make the decisions of 19 partners to converge. Behind this attitude there are legitimate political mot ivations, but also psychological reasons. For decades, 60

we have been accuslomed to the slructures' immutability (and trained accordingly), and erroneously tend to associate their contingent immobility, deriving from the persistence of the mission, Âˇwith a meaning of universal validity in space and time, ,Nbich is utterly unfounded. The organizational structure is an instrument, and must therefore be adapted each time to the p urpose and the circumstances of the moment. Within this framework of diffused and often latent organizational inefficiency, the pressure of the grovving operational requirements (demand of results) and the unchanging or regressing - at least quantitatively - real capabilities actually availa ble (supply of performances), move the responsible Authorities to adopt corrective rneasLuses. As a matter of fact, we must admil that the top-level militaiy are dearly avvare of the critical histo rical rnoment, and have the necessary personality. But they face a problem of a pparently unsurmountable dimensions, whose solution, in conventional lerms, would imply, together with the need lo project the whole instrun1ent "ex novo" (supposing that it could be practically possible), a drastic break

in the production of operational results, totally incompatible with the contingent requirements. Thus, they recur to the only available option, and employ their contractual strength to "squeeze" effectiveness from a structure which is inefficient as regards the new requirements. Therefore the Organization undergoes a kind of "dragging effect", resulting in an additional loss of efficiency "by att1ition". WHAT ABOUT EFFICACY?

Up to this point J have centred my discussion on effectiveness. Taken for granted that a greater effectiveness per.mits \,vith the same amoun t of resources a greater gravitation o( capabilities towards the mission and thecefore increases the likelihood of being effective, the interrogatives connected with the efficacy of the military instrument in the new employment scenarios remain unanswered. Crises cannot be solved on the rnilitary plane alone (3). Some imporlant prerequisites can be obtained through a military intervention, but it is nevertheless necessary lo have a global and differentiated approach based on a closely unitary and fully shared

strategy, as ,.vell. as adequate view, could be the basis for a defeat compromise. In a conventional resources, both human and if, for example, the achievement of process, on the contrary, the the planned mililary. objec,tives, author ity responsible for the economic. Âˇ In this respect, 'the "war" in because of the modalities applied, achievement of the "end state" Kosovo is emblematic. Ffrst of all - endangers the final objectives of must take upon itself the burden of and this applies to all "Crisis the interventions. The more convincing the parties ,vhich, on . Response Operations" (CRO) - can asymmetlical and interdisciplinary the other hand, have all interests in it really be called "war", only is the game, the more difficult it is pretending to ignore the objeclives because the military instrument to evaluate success on the basis of of the others, in order to gain the was used on a large scale? ls it right the mere technical and military maximum from the bilateral negotiations, exploiting to their to say that, in Kosovo, the West results. Obviously, if we examine them in advantage the negotiatory power of won a victory? I have no doubt that the ans,.ver to these terms, the results of the the coordinator (military power) (6). One of the most significant the first question is "no", and I think intervention in Kosovo are a far cry examples of application of this that the second qu estion is from those required for a "victory". interaction model is the "joint These considerations are premature, to say the least. Implementation Commission", an important for the evaluation of the "War'', in its traditional meaning, instrument widely and profitably military instrument's effectiveness. is a very different thing. In the case used in the Balkans. In Peace Support Operations of Kosovo, one could call it Besides the examples described, "conflictive interaction", underlining (PSOs) or, better, in CROs, the the politico-economical side of the purpose is to induce the opposing many other components and event, or humanitarian intervention", parties to cooperate; therefore one restraints, that once were practically stressing lbe emotional motivations. should be able to create the fore ign to, or at least out of, the Being aware of the ethic and necessary conditions, find and foster mi.litary world, today arc "de facto" moral dimensions of the problem strong common values ,md employ steadily .included in military (which I am in no posi tion to adequate incentives and effective operntions and influence their outcome. Just to cite some of them, tackle), l refer to the Machiavellian deten-ents. The use of force serves to impose we can mention the pervasiveness of cynicism of the adage "the Prince's will is the Law" ( 4) and I add, one's own will or to convince the political component , the role of the media, the "zero losses" optimistically, that "if the Prince is straying minor parties. restraint, which tends to include In a crisis situation, the parties enlightened (which must be also the opposing side, and many concerned are active subjects of a demonshated); the Law is just". others. caref-ufly concerned process. This However; for the purpose of this As regc:U"ds the effectiveness of Lhe article it is sufficient to accept the could introduce problems from the military instrument, we should ask procedural viev,rpoint, but redLices present historical situation as a fact, and to assume that the the 1isk of making mistakes de1iv:ing ourselves three main questions. The systern could still evolve but not go from uncontrolled assumptions and first concerns the possibility that the back, i.e. that a conflict of the kind incomplete information, thus instrument, supposedly efficient and imagined before the fall of the increasing the possibilities of fit for the purpose, is badly Berl in Wall could now be success. The game consists of the employed (7) by the polit ical impossible, and that CROs, even if decisional process itself rather than Authority The second considers the openly conflictive, contain lhe the in1plementation of the decisions possibility that the instrument, seed of a potentially revolutionary made by each party. The decisional although perfectly efficient, is nol process (the game) turns into a kind suitable for the purpose, owing to its approach to the solution of crises. Even if the emotionaJ reasons of interactive simulation invoh,ing constitution and capability. In this that precede, determine and everybody. In theory, therefore, the latter case, its optimal employment accompany a CRO are manifold, it final decision (the game's result) wou ld be dO\vnright impossible. is necessary to look for systematic cannot but be successful, since it Clearly, ther-e are also the "half was jointly agreed upon. If one tones", as would be those, probably solutions and strategies. supposes, as is hypotetically more realistic, desc1ibing a partial The "victory" concept and its possible, that all parties share the capability measure (5) are obtained from the As an example, we can consider general objectives and purposes, but comparison between the general "end state" and the one actually not necessaiily the details and the the "effective engagemen t" achieved or; to put it better, from ways, the crucial and decisive capability, one of the development the functionality of the latter vis-i::t- catalyst of the game is to compel all activities envisaged \,v ithin the vis the former. The outcome of a parties lo consider the reasons and NATO "Defence Capabilities military operation or activity, albeit the conditions presented by the In itiatives" . It refers essentially perfect from the technical point of others, inducing them to accept a t o the performance of weapon 61

VCC-80 armoured vehicle equipped with a 25 mm gun and two antilank missile launchers.

systems, but is a good representation of the problem of the suitability of the instrument, as regards the effeclive use of force in contexts greatly restricted by the "Rules of Engagement''. Finally, the third question which, by introducing the "time" variable, -reflects the problem of how an instrument which is suitable today could be maintained so also in the future. The answers to these questions certainly concern the sphere of political responsibility. But my personal opinion is that it is fundamental, both in the national and international environment, lo carefully examine in advance the possible elements of the change, not only in order lo find technically sound options, but also to take the necessmy corrective measures with due timeliness.

THE PRINCIPLE OF PREVALENCE OF IMMATERIAL

ACTMTIES Owing to the complexity and the extent of the subject, the discussion process has been developed, so fa1; in a some\.vhat fragmented way, through pactial images and exan1ples, rat.her than according to a systematic and consequential logic. After all, I only wanted lo underline the essence of a problem which is generally known, or at least perceived by many. Furthermore, I deliberately omitted some basic considerations which, as a matter of fact, are the main tesserae of the mosaic which I attempted to assemble. I place !.hem at this paint, since they are the conceptual hinge between the descriptive and norn1ative part of the survey. All the examples and considerations present.eel above have a common characteristic: the absolute, 62

uncontested and potentially that the immaterial activities are gro\.\ling prevalence, in the military the decisive m1d most burdensome activities, of the immaterial- component of the operations m1d creative component over the in more general terms - of the physical-executive one. A minimal physiologic operation of the demostration of this assertion, military instrument, we must also defined as the principle of admit. that information and prevalence immaterial activities, lmowledge, together wilh the logic lies in the consideration that before and creat1v1ty necessary to any intense material activity there is successfully handle them, are the always an at least equally intense life-blood of the immaterial immateri al activity, while the process, and are abundantly apposite p1inciple is not valid. An present in our time. But they must exceptional m.ental effort may be used appropriately. be followed by no physical The principle of prevalence manifestation. fo the same way, the applies even more to the general use of force without a guidance or garrison -type management: based on superior knowledge and activities. creative capabilities inevitably These th ings are not always brings about defeat, while the completely understood. Recently, at immaterial qualities, by themselves, NATO, a presentation of the latest can be sufficient to enable the prospects regarding the continuous physically weaker contestant to expansion of the new information prevail. technologies, someone exalted, as a All this is particularly true in decisive progress, an oncoming, today's CROs, where the military much more efficient and accurate instrument essentially operates as capability of the information an arbitrator-negotiator between system of discri.minating and the opposing parties, but the segregating infom1ation. Jt is true principle remains fully valid when that the possibility of selecting flows force is physically used, as in the air on a need-to-know basis, limiting campaign in Kosovo. ln that case, moreover unwanted redundances the en-ors were the consequence of and saturations, is certainly inunaterial activities of preparation important but it is rather worrying and control conducted in an to hear a praise of the capability or imperfect or insufficient mmmer: segregation of information through If, given a physical potential lnformation Technology devices capable of ensuring standard which, by definition, are destined performance, relatively simple in to divulge it. its execution, we agree on the fact If we consider the obvious fact

An ''.4lpino" with a 12.7 rnm "Browning" machine gun.

that Lhe prÂˇinciple of prevtuence is active within all our structures, and observe the involutionary effects of the operational behm,i our described in the first part of th is article, the spontaneous conclusion is to profitably orient the enormous production of mental energy, rather than let it translate into a sterile increase in the entropy of t he system. l believe that today it is possible to realize an appropriate field of forces fit for this purpose. In th e following part of the article, I endeavour lo outline the main features of the recurrent endogenous process through which the military instrument could acquire and maintain the ability to continuously modify its structural configuration, in order to be effective vis-a-vis the present tasks and the new requirements, maximizing, at the same time, the internal efficiency (8) of the Organization in harmony with each temporary configuration it could assume. Obviously the terms "tasks" and "new requ.irements" include every type of traditional or innovative activity, be it managerial or operational, from staff work to the

CROs in the Balkans and up Lo outright conflicts. THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL S1RATEGY

The elaboration of the instnm1ent'.5 Lransformation process takes place through four steps. The first one consists in defining the basic requisites and relevant set of impulses to which the instrument should respond. f n substance , this is the "field of

forces" mentioned above. It is then possible to proceed to the scrutiny of the behaviour/response of the Organization within the field of forces created by the requisites/impulses; in other words, to examine the concrete ,.vorking mechanisms of the endogenous transfonnation process. At this point, we can try to deduce the tendential model of structure that the process should produce. At the end, ,.ve shall be able to obtain the characteristics of the organ izational and technological platform on which the field of forces created by the requisites/impulses \Nill have to be activated. The project of this process, as a whole, represents the work of organizational engineering that must be re;;uized. Among the requisites/impulses, particular importance is given to the concept of organizational strategy, which is the synergic interaction between strategy and organization for operational and managerial purposes, where the term "strate6ry" should be understood in its vvicler meaning of "line of action", either general or parliculai~

"Bersaglieri" in a training area.

".l\riete" tanks in a training area.

FUNDAMENTAL REQUISITES AND SET OF IMPULSES. The requisites are listed belO\v, in a schematic form to make the successive discussion easie r~ They are a whole of coherent and synergic conditions and limilations, closely interdependent, so much so t.ha t th eir un ba lanced impleme ntation co uld sens ibl y affect the entire model and thwru1 its realization. They must be considered taking into accoun Lalso Lhe "principle of prevalence of immaterial activities" mentioned above. Toget her with the r equ is ites, which are the goals or basic objectives of the Orgruuzation, the impulses set up the synergic "field of forces " destined to gui de the structure's orgatuzational behaviom: They indicate "how and why" we should operate in order to meet the requirements. Rll: Orientation to Results and Gravitation

The Organization, both. as a whole and in each or its const itutive e lements, must be constantly oriented to results and capable of dealing, case by case, with new problc rns. As a normal working procedure, it must be able to gravitate, wit h all it s avai lable appropriate resources, towards the most important and urgent proble m. Reinforcements and substractions for immaterial tasks can be realized without physical movements of persons from their normal posts. "Brain augmentation" is available in real tin1e and without interruptions. The impulse related lo the requisite is determ ined by the standards adopted for the evaluation of personnel and units. The systematica lly merit-ori ented approach Lo the eva lu ation of personnel and units is centred on

the quantitative and qualitative measurements of the results in tcm1s of efficacy and efficiency, actually o btained, through the documented attribution (9) to each member o[ the Organization of the activities carried out, which must be di rectly verifiable. During the evaluation, the positive qualifications ( 10) must be coherently comparab le and compared LO the negative ones, in order to get the net result for the Institution (1 1). The outcome or Lhe eva luation is expressed by a nwne1ical score, e.g. in hw1clredtbs, and pe1iodically published on a site of the internal information-net. Man's gratification and the objective recog1ution of his merits, co nsidering also the inevitable interpersonal comparisons, arc the most powerful incentives for the functional and professional growth of the inclividuals capable of giving added value to the Organization. They also make possible the start and self-a limental.ion of the virtuous cycle which is at the very [oundation of the Organization's development. The human capital, as a whole as we ll as single individuals, is the Ins titution's most precious resource. Its optimal utilization, therefore, must be entrusted to specialized members of the Organization, and must be based on the knowledge and direct

analysis of each individual. Rl2: Organic Structure and Temporary Aggregations

The Organization has its own relatively p erma nent organ ic structure, established by taki ng into account the tasks characteiizcd by greater stability. According to the contingent requ irements, th e stru cture is in a pos it ion to confi gure, produce and con trol, approp1iatc temporary Task Forces which, in conform ity with their tasks, can have a physical, virt ual or mixed composition. Th e instrument has already its own capa bility. Bu t, in the interaction with th e other requirements, it acquires a nrnch greater potentiality; thus it guarantees a further increase in effectiveness and flexibili ty, and cont ributes to save precious resow-ces. Rl3: Organization as an Open System The temporary aggregations described above, in their working environment can integrate additional external elements (12), different in nature and capability, with which they have to interact both for opera tions and for man age ment. T hese e lements continue lo be an integral part of the

,"":,路

Salvage tank in action on Lhe firing range of the Cavalry School's Tactical and Logistic Support Battalion.

connective t issue of the Organization. The requisite permits very important applications, such as "panJlel planning" in real time between differenl cornrnand levels. The responsible officials, at all levels, are enabled to know, evaluate and use to advantage the available resources, especially the human ones. The Organization, as a whole, increases its internal cohesion and operational s111ergy. Rl6: Interchangeability and Complementarity of Resources Organization until the end of the specific interaction or requirement. The elements that for contingent reasons cannot be integrated, will have lo be approp1iately simulated within the Organization. The incorporation into the temporary sn路uctures (Task Forces) of all the interacting external elements ensures a high probability of success for the action tmder way This requirement is a necessary condition for applying the concept called "organizational strategy". Rl4: De-location and Co-location

resources, independently of their organic and physical location. RIS: Permeability and

Connectivity of the Structure A direct and constant interaction is guaranteed within the structure both in a horizontal and in a vertical sense also without the interrnediation of the organic lines of command. In particular; a close interrelation betvveen the top and the rest of the instrument must be ensured, since this is essential in order to avoid "tears" in the inlernal

All resources, and particularly the hurnan capital, wherever they are, are interchangeable and cornpl.ementary as regards employment. The control of an "operational oqject" (activity; exercise, operation, etc .) or of a simple or complex capability (individu&l, formation, mater路ial, funds, etc.) can be easily transferred from a Command to another. For inslance, the H24 control of an activity in progress can be exercised in turns by elements located in different and

The elements of the Organization, or of one of its substmctures, can be de-located both physically (13) and in their "modus operandi" (14), in order to overcome the num.erous social, financial, infrastructural and psychological restraints connected with place of duty and hierarchical subordinat ion . Co-location is necessary for the elements whose psysical interaction is needed in order to carry out the task and maximize functional effectiveness. The impulse consists of the possibility of obtaining exceptional 路 increases in effectiveness as a consequence of the total engagement of all ava ilabl e

25mm four-barrel antiaircraft light system on M 113 hull.

"Gri/fini " AB-4 I 2 helicopLer lifting a load with its barycentric hook.

permits to assemble all the subjects which contribute to the organization's success in a single corps, virtual but cohesive and synergic, activating a virtuous cycle, capable of transforming the system in a short time. Everything considered, the partial segregation and the canalization of the information flow remain possible. A limited access to information implies an intelligent preventive screening, i.e . the capability of solving in advance even relatively small problems. In any case, it implies a certain limit to imagination; in substance, i t produces mechanical solutions limiting "a priory" the human potential.

Rl9: Capability of Development remote areas but connected \'-'ithin the same structure: also, the different functional components of a working group or a Command could be virtually integrated, and operate in a synergic way and in close coordination from physically remote sites (15).

Rl7: Hierarchic or DynamicRelational Order Between any couple of elements which make up the structure, a hierarchic-relational order is established, with its own intensity and direction according to the ta5k or requirement. The hierarchicrelational system fixes the distribution of responsibility and authority within the structure. IL is an advanced fom1 of the traditional Command-and-Control approach, and includes a refinement of the well-know canons (16), deriving from the need to incorporate in the system the relations exisUng with all the different types of interacting entities (17). The functional discontinuity caused in the 66

structure by each bilateral relation must be more than offset by the added value generated by it, vis-avis the results to be achieved.

Rl8: fuformation and Knowledge A transparent structure guarantees the widespread diffusion of information and kno\vledge in real time, so as to meet the needs relevant to training, evaluation, management, administration and operation. The diffusion of Infonnation and Knowledge increases the culture and professionalism of Organizations and individuals, permits the latter to select and study in depth the most congenial sectors, and stimulates imitation and competition . Furthermore, it reduces to the minimum the time necessary for the execution of an order, permitting to take into account all the relevant added values produced along the line by the resulting orders issued by the responsible Commanders. The sharing of information

Under the impulse of the transformation motor, the Organization endogenously develops new functional capabilities, eliminating the unnecessary ones, on the basis of the efficacy and effectiveness requirements.

Rl 10: Organizational Strategy Through the potential and actual use of force, the military instrument should be able to produce project-oriented results rather than a simple capability or generic coercion, not systematically applied to the problem to be solved (general "encl state" of the mission. In the first place, the interaction with the political Autority is essential since its contribution is, by now, to be considered pervasive of the military instrument at all levels. The core business of the instrument is of course the finely graded and punctifonn management of force, but the support and subsidiary activities, which at times become important

The "Ariete" tank is armed wilh a 120mm gun.

components, cam10L be overlooked and, be they conducted on one's o\vn or entrusted in "outsourcing" (18), in operations must be kept vvithin the organizational structure of the force employed. NatwÂˇally, the main interlocutors o[ the instrument are the operational parties. i.e. the factions directly involved in the c1isis. They must be integrated \vithin the structure of the Task Force conducting the intervention, or at least effectively simulated when an actual integration is not. possible owing to a high degree of hostility. Other fundamental interlocutors are public opinion and the media. The starting model is the .Joint Comm.issions' well knO\vn model. The application of this model must. ho\.vever be hased on solid doctrinal and tech nological foundations (19), and be unitary and synergic vis-~t-vis the action of the whole Force, contributing to the

confennent of wider contents to Lbe concept beneath the so-called Common Operational Picture, now being realized by NATO. Its application requires, among other things, the development of several conceptual and procedural steps, among which very significant are: the recognition, and integration in the organizational structure, of all possible interlocutors, the negotiation of the interaction modalities, the conclusion of appropriate "cooperation contracts" (20) with the parties, bodies and agencies concerned and the decision on the level of coercion to be activated. The cooperation contracts are aimed al promoting the collaborative participation of external agencies through the creation of incentives, first of all those arising from the realization of a mutual operational advantage. In substance, the concept/requisite of organizational strategy, which is described above only \.vith reference to the activity in operations, but ,vhich can be profitably employed

also in the general management of the instrument, consists in exploiting, to the ends desired, the potential sy.nergic interaction between strategy and organization. In order lo achieve this effect, the organization which devises and implements the strategy must incorporate within itself all the elements, both active and passive, which affect the situation, and cleAne or negotiate the rÂˇelevant relation bonds with each of them. EXAMINATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR/RESPONSE OF THE ORGANIZATION

The transfonnation motor of the Organization is fuelled by the energy produced by the Organization itself, oriented by the Requisites-Impulses field of forces. The Organization, which starts from its initial configuration, essentially consisting of the structure of the moment, to which the Requisi.tes-lmpulscs field of 67

forces is applied with an appropriate platform of support, is capable of evolving "spontaneously", selfgenerating and self-feeding according to a virtuous cycle. The general course could be "launching of a great innovative project - increase of the internal motivation - establishment of synergic effects - great results qualification of Institution and Profession - moral and economic gratification - influx of elite capabilities - self-feeding virtuous cycle". In this regard, the decisive impulses are those generated by

strengthens and accelerates the process in a positive way.

DEDUCTION OF THE TENDENTIAL MODEL OF STRUCTURE

It is important to repeat, first of all, that the stmt of the transfomiation process is compatible, apart from some previous airangements, with any strncture. It is thus possible to avoid any interru pt ion in the operation of the system. In substance, the process produces

tasking of the resources assigned, from which they draw, when needed, the necessary technical expertise. The real executive capabilities consist of a Line of Multifunction Operational Units and a Line of Specialized Operational Units. A specific Agency is entrusted ,vith controlling the operational and training standards, the evaluation of the units, the coordination of the doctrine and lessons-learned cycle, as well as with verifying efficiency and effectiveness. A single Agency provides for the teclmo-administrative management of the instrument.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL PLATFORM

AB-205 ana "1Hangu,ta" A-129 helicopters flying at low altitude.

the best use of the human potential, the regained efficiency, and the gratification deriving from the excellent results gradually achieved. As an example, ,.ve can consider that substantial efficiency increases permit to free a correspondent amount of resources, that can be employed for development. The results are reflected on the visibility and credibility of the military instrument, directly gratifying the Profession and the whole Institution as well as, indirectly, the Political Authority. Both effects lead to a greater influx of appropriate resources, and this

deep effects, which are potentially revolutionary, but not traumatic, for the Organization. The following genera l model refers to the working situation of the Organjzation, i.e. it represents an appraisal by deduction of the tendential product of the t:ransfom1ation motor and, therefore, is necessarily generic. It includes a summit structure, capable of vi1tually incorporating the \Nhole capability of thought of the instrument, which has the responsibility for the development:, technical operation and employment of the ,.vhole instrument, together with personnel training. The pennanent and temporary variablestmcture conm1m1d aggTegations are suited to accomplish all institutional missions, and see to the detailed

The success of the transfom1ation process, and even its beginning, imply the preliminary realization of an appropriate organizational and technological platform within the existing structure. The RequisitesImpulses ~ystem described above, i.e. the field o[ forces aimed at orienting and promoting the evo.lu tionary trend o[ Lhe m.ilitruy instrument, is in fact capable of producing the desired effects only if it operates on an infom1ation organizational network covering all the interncting elements (users's points). The users's points are not arranged according to a prefixed relational hierarchy, but are dynamically defined according to the task (reversibility). Each point can use all the "energy" available on the entire network, i.e. on all other users' points. Thus the structure is not localized, but spread on a series of points, all with the same potential capability, which interact in real time (ubiquity). The net's "energy" consists of two ba5ic types of 1--esowÂˇces: information and control. While information (shared resource) is generally available at all users' points, conttÂˇol (assigned resource) is given when necessary, according to a "task

oriented" logic. The hierarchical relational organization of the users' points is defined . through the assignment of degrees 9( control over specific sections of the network. The entire struclu rÂˇe of the instrument its centres of information and action, the command and control lines, the individual operators - and all its work, as well as all the activities under way, are contained, discussed and represented in and by the network. This means that the instrument is constantly capable of responding with Jlexibility, versatility, timeliness, high effectiveness and efficacy vis-a-vis the G.nal goals of the mission, as well as to any other stimulus, be it internal or external, up to the limits of its capability The information network permits to give a practical functionality lo the requisites and the relevant impulses. In particular, it is a basis and a vehicle for implementing the concepts of open system and organizational strategy. The existing and already implemented information networks, for instance those ,.vithin NATO, provide exceptional capabilities, such as secure-voice communications, formatted and free-format messages, cartography, data and displays, even with moving users' points; access to well-established information systems, Âˇwhich integrate their component with common data bases, rel iable and secu re , connected with data sources; integration of external elements through gateways which allmv, if necessary, the appropriate segregation of information; on-line technical and operational assistance, directly on the desk of any users' point , by a remote "expert user", on-line simulation, trammg and evaluation of personnel and units, directly on the working desk (21). CONCLUSION

This article reflects the author's personal opinions and his subjective

interpretation of events and situations, and does not pretend to be theorel.ically hgorous or complete. It simply vvishes to be a contribution of thought - sufficiently well-pondered, but still largely und er elaboration - aimed at stimulating reflections and hope(ully capable of prm-iding the author the collaborative support of Lhose who, having had the patience to read it, share the desire Lo study more in depth the potentialities of development and achievement of the military instrument along the lines desc1ibed. If the process were really activated and kept the many prornjses that it seems to make now at theoretical level, it could bring abou t a rÂˇeal organizational and functional revolution in the instrument. Only then, in the wake of other wellestablished slogan-definitions, ,.ve could rightly dub e-militaiy the new way of doing business .in the Armed Forces. Contributions, cornrnents and critical observations are welcome.

D 1 '

Lieutenant Colonel, M.ililary Assistcmt to the Director, CJPS, SHAPE, Belgium. NOTES 1) The large majority of the static Commands resisLed remarkably well the reduction attempls envisaged by the "Long Term Study". 2) Paradoxically, tl1ey are the same Nations which approved the "Long Term Study". 3) Or, to put it better, cannot b e solved on the military plane an)-more. 4) The "Prince'' is the West. 5) "Defeat:' is a victory of a negative sign. 6) This does nol exclud e lhe possibility - which must be evaluated case bv case - of conducli1rn also b ilateral negotiations. ~ 7) At political, not at teclmical level (Laking effectiveness for granted). 8) l.e. its performance. 9) Every activi ty is "signed" hy the member who accomplished it.

I O) Particular importance should be given to creativity. 11) Today, in the comparison between an individual who has 2iven an insignificant contribution and ;ne who - Lhrough h is work - permitted the J.r1sLiLution lo save a substantial amount of money, bul incurred in a disciplinary sanction, the former is certainly preferred. Also typical is the case of a Commander who congralulates a unit on the perfect execution of an exercise, \.vithout conside1ing the useless waste of puhlic resomces involved. 12) As will he seen better later on, the innovation is that, among the external elements, we find the operational counlerparL5, the media, the NGOs, etc. 13) Meanin g that they do not necessarily .have to share the same quarters. 14) They become active parts of the Organization as a whole, or of the suhstructme to which they are assigned, th us becoming "deprovincialized" vis-avis the operational local environment. 15) Suffice it to think, for exampl.e, of tl1e possible savings in the costs of the activities, or the applications in the multinational training field. 16) Full Command, Operational Command, Tactical Command, Operational Control, Tactical Control, Coordination, Administrative Authority. 17) Many of these are external to tl1e military Organization (political authorilies, TOs, GOs, NGOs, media, local authorities, etc.), others are atypical (non-integrated units from other Count1ies, military counterparts in the conflict, guen-illas, etc.). 18) To a non-military agency. 19) For instance, the games theory and the information network respectively. 20) Obviously, the term "contracts" is used in its widest meaning, Therefore it is not limited Lo adm i~is trative or commercial relations, but includes all possible agreements and accords, including those with the operational counterparts. 2 I) In this respect, a very imeresting initiative is un de r way. It is called "inlernet -Based Distance Lear11.ing Ne1work". Fostered bv the NAT O Defence College, is also used as an instrument of knowledge and prornotion of the military reality, integration of the study and research activities conducted by schools and training cent res, interaction and cooperation with the correspondent networks of other Nalions and International Organi,.ations (UN, NATO and EU in particular), relations with marginal Countlies and communities.

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At the dawn of the third millennium, an exacting challenge looms on the horizon: global economy. Let us examine its impact on the western markets and, above all, its geostrategical significance in international relations. 70

both the sth,cturc and the security scenarios of the cuffent international system.

A very complicated activity in the field of resem-ches, but definitely the most instructive, is the one which considers tl1e long-tc1m prospectives in the inte1national relations. In this Lask, however, language itself and terminology are often imprecise and insufficient to

describe Âˇwith accmacy Lhe strategic perspectives of our era. As a matter of fact we are often forced to use conceptual schemes inhe rited from the Col d War to define todays reality, having those years as terms of comparison and it is difficult to define and interpret

Under the cultural profile we could define the period of time which started in 1989 as characterized chiefly by "a conceptual anarchy". J .in tend to emphasize by this the lack of a universally shared key to the analys is of the structure of the interna tional rela tions and, in addition, the absence of a logical scheme allowing the interpretation of the problems rising in the global arena. One thing is certain: we now notice the absence of 'tl1e preventive and miITor-like action of the bipolar Superpowers to restrain the thrusts to international destabilization. In spite of the firm belief and positive statement of President Bush aher the Gulf War; "the Nevv World Order" has not been real ised and cannot be an automatic consequence of this new context. The implosion of one of the two actors in the old system has really opened "Pandora's Box": far away from seeing this New World Order realized, though pre-announced by many, the world has assisted to a wide fragmentation and to the 1ising of new risks of tension and crisis, even though located in limited areas. Thus, it was not possible to proceed from "a vrnr that had not been fought" to a "pacific peace" . Consequently the world became more insecure. Somebody has sustained that the cause is to be found in the nature of the conclusion of this Third world war, the Cold War, when the winners did not have the political possibiliLy of imposing their own rules on the defeated, associating them to a genuinely true process of transforrnation. The theoretic model that has not been r-calized is the one of 71

complete hegemony, that is that in the post-conflict system, a single power or an alliance would have had to impose something like a "Code of Conduct", to guarantee security and order: namely stating the fundaments for a stabili tyoriented system. Th is outcome would have required both the strength to impose the ru.les, and the capaci ty of making the structure of countries adequate for the new reality, in a virtuous way and ,vithout traumas. In the meantime, we are not facing such a disoliented system to justify totally negative expressions as "geopolitique du chaos" used by Ramonet in the review "Le M.onde Diplornatique". In addition to the seed of destabilization, of cris is and tensions that produce the endemic conflicts in the pelipheral areas, we find also the basis for a reestabl ishment of the system, even though on a much broadec time scale. I would consider at least twenty yea rs as necessary. In other words, from now on we can already foresee the characteristics of a system that is able to replace itself in this confused "m iddle period": This will look like a geo-economical, multipolar system, characterized by the presence of a leading pole. Wa th are the tendencies that support this idea?: One of the features characterizing the century that just came to an end, surely is the interconnection between the economy of the various states and tl1e progressive increased permeability of borders. In the Seventies, political scientists used the expression "interdependence". Such peculiarity was confirmed and evolved in m11plitude and dimensions becoming "globalization". This si tuat ion diffuses, at least potentially, the opportunities to accelerate development. At the same time it all.o,Ns a lso a major and m uch stronger spread of the effects of local crisis, no t on ly economic, but also of a different nature. In fact, the development of the means of transportation, 72

- ,.

,..;. -::

communication and information technologies, and their progressive availability to \.vider portions of the global population are some of the reasons why the "globalization" cannot be understood as limited to the economy, but m u st be considered implicitly extended to politics. Demographic a n d migratory explosions, international flow of technologies, transfer of capitals, pollution, security... all have become global issues. In such a n uncertain and confused scenario, one single certainty has become evident: the grmving centrality of the economic factors of international relations.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

Jn this phase of transition it is

surely more difficult to define the e lements that characterize the international system . Facing the emergence of new actors such as states and inte 1Âˇnational insLitutions , the factors that represent the basis for the power's degree definition are sought to be individualized. The economy, howeve1~ is an element one cannot leave out of consideration. Even before the end of bipolarity it became clear that a state's weight, its position in the world, relies on a set of elements which are d.ifferent from those that had supported political povvers for ce n turies . The mil i tary weight diminished, due to the increased imponance gained by the economic fac tors. Countries like Japan and Germany had been d emilita r ized and still grew to become powerful economic giants, and it became clear that the fundamental tie between political

importance in the making of History, in various moments working as a major determinant of growth, fracture, conflict, emigration , revolulion. But the acceleration of industrialization and technological progress, and the shortening of the dimensions of time and space, resulted in the primary position of economy within the structLire of international relations. The process of globalization of the markets affects the or6ruuzation of the international system in a staggering manner and the economic factors achieve growing gee-strategic meaning.

Left. Deployment of i'v1-J09J self-propelled guns during a firing exercise.

Below. The crew of a "Centauro" annoured car at a Checkpoint.

and military power has changed, replacing progressively the military one \vith the economic component. Today the traditional parameters that ahvays measured the power and relevance of a state (military organization, territorial width, population) appear certainly less determining. In the meantime, the economy always can-ied out a role of extreme

The challenge of the new context will be based mainly on economic hegemony. On the other hand, the wider autonomy and freedom of initiative gained by the international actors thanks to the end of the confrontation of East and West, a lso released new tens ions and sources of conflict. We should not confront them anymore with a

dialectic of contra-position , but Âˇwithin a co-operative political framework of the right scale. In various dimensions and in various regional configurations, the "rnles" of economic globalization ,,viii push the emerging count1ies to reach forms of co-operation, to bear the pressure of international markets competilion. The i-efore, we ,.viii assist to the progressive affirmation of new actors striving to acquire a role in the new international context through the participation in processes of integration or concentration of sovereignty, to the benefit of some "pivotal States". On the one hand, compelition on a planetary scale; on the other, the need to reduce economic imbalance and to provide a system of political security in the different geographic areas, will support the creation,at a continental level ,of geo-economic poles. The long-term perspective for the world is to accept the United States, Europe to its maximum possible extension, China, Japan and India as potential actors of multipolarism, with a virtuous competition absorbing the main tensions. This mode l, considered as utopian at a first glance, shall find solid foundations. The globalized economy may favor the foundation of this new system, but it won't be able to provide it Âˇwith a "set of values", giving legitimacy and stability. Thus, globalized economic competition could create serious social tensions in areas of poverty and among different economic poles. Shortage of resources, associated to the inc1Âˇease of economic and demographic gaps betvveen North and South, could lead to a wide range of conflicts: border disputes, apparently originated by ethnic and religious cleavages but rooted in economic needs ; resource disputes; social conflicts in the developing countries ( the so-called "bread rebe l] ions", internal rebellions, civil wars).

VCC-80 combat vehicle armed wilh a 25mrn lighL gun and 2 AIT missile launchers on 1he turret.

Another source of perplexity and potential disruption of the equilibrium is the role of the multinational companies, ,.vhich wil.l constitute an even stronger element of economic superstructure. The existence of these international economic webs can create concentrations of power parallel to the States and the International Organi1.ations, even though we can't predict the effect of this phenomenon on the mechanisms of inter:.state relations. But my perspective is simple and relies on the long-term process of economic irrte6rration. Acceleration of this tendency can make interdependence between states so strong that they are obliged to avoid tensions ,vhich could othen.vise lead to violent and irreparable disruptions in the system. 74

Is this excessive trnst in a reality that could be defined - using an old terminology - as a capitalist one? I am not referring to the power of capital isrn , but to the one of rationality and to the need for equilibrium, difficult to reach on a global scale but more reasonable on a regional level. Obviously this design will be possible only if adequate schemes to organize and manage this complex phase of transition will be adopted. In the global scene we refer to, as an examp le of the multipolar perspective, there are two regions -the Un ited States and the European Union - which seem to me to be heading towards adaptation to the challenges of the fu ture long-term international context. THE UNITED STATES

For the time being, it is conunonly accepted that there is only one superpower, the United States. But

this does not mean that the international system is unipolar. It is not a contradiction. Perhaps there \.Vas a moment the Gulf war- during which the U.S. could act as the superpower of a unipolar world. But even at that moment the basic trends Âˇwere ah-eady different: as a consequence, the Americans were soon fo1Âˇcecl Lo change their position. If used according to old schemes, the two main means of compulsion that they are using economic sanctions and military intervention- seem to be losing their effectiveness. Sanctions can he correctly enforced only if they are supported by allies. As a consequence, the U.S. can impose sanctions unilaterally, to the prejudice of its own economic interests and of relations with its allies, or it can renounce to impose the respect of the sanctions. But in this case, sanctions would re present only a symbol of weakness [or the U.S.. Also from a military point of

view, the U.S. projection of power is more and mor路e bound by many different political f~ctocs. Acting alone, it undoubtedly, has the capability to attack limited enemy targets, and it did so several Limes. But if it has to irnplement massive mil itary operations, it must try to achieve an international consensus (in the context of the UN, NATO, or other international organizations), the help of allies an<l the so -called "zero dead", being their internal public opinion both influential and careful. Nevertheless , the American policy-rnakers often think as if the world were unipolar.But doing so, the US is isolating itself. The number of governments that consider their interests as be ing exactly coincident with the American ones is considerably,little by little, dropping.. During the Cold Wai~ the US could consider itself as the government of the \Vestern world, and as the promoter of a policy thal produced "public goods" , such as security, contaim11enl of Communism, open international economy, strengthening of international institutions. In the new international sil,JaLion, the US can be deJfoed as the most powerful national actor of the system, but as such it is likely to support a foreign policy that promotes only its particuhu路 interest. 1-Iovever, we are still going through a transition period, and the Americans, who have been consider.i ng themselves as a superpower for half a century, probably need more time to give a new momenlu m to their foreign policy. They have a major responsibility , because they must ]earn to p lay the difficult role of "democratic superpower", instead of the one of "The sole Guardian of stabi Ii ty".

EUROPE Disagreeing with Samuel Huntin1:,rt:on's opinion, I would like to point out that Western

Civilization, and Europe in particular, is not exhausted nor close lo collapse; neither has it lost the hope of a better路 future, the skill and the will to determine it. By contrast, Europe was re-born, ,vitl1 the intention of facing and solving the challenges of the new century, cooperating with the other po] i t ical elements of the international system. Europe \Vil! be able to occupy this new political position only if - in the mu ltipolar futme system whicb wi ll be characterized by large agglomerations-it succeeds in solving the follow ing paradox :

Wai~ between decisional capability and the extension of its geoeconomic interests,also considering the numerous new opportunities offered by the international situation. The new E urope will have to make a real effort in order Lo rea cq ui re -through scientific research- the high technological level it had to renounce in the previous period. It is beyond doubt that in the post war period Europe was forced to face challenges imposed by extraEuropean actors, and to find solutions in a system where it

Carnou/laged M-113 Armoured Personnel Cam路er armed w ith a J 2. 7 mrn machine gun.

occupied a subordinate position. The time to choose is ever closer, but I'm sure that Europe is walking on the right path , as is shown by its determination in supporting the participation of economically-weak countries and by its strong will to em body all the features of Europe's identity. Not only economy, but also shared values wh ich are equality and human 1ights. Europe is not made only of economic elements . The recent definition of common objectives had a key-role: the single market, and above all the monetary union, modified the identity of Europe in

Europe has a potentially fon11idable role clue to the very bigh level of economic integration, ,vhile its effective capability of assuming international responsibility is still underdeveloped. In the new system, interdependence between internal and foreign policy will be an essentia l factor of identity. Moreover, Europe will play a role as an effective Pole of power on ly on condition that it fills quickly the gap -consequence of the Cold

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a radical way. Nations that once played a keyrole in the international scene have now transferred some important public powers to inter-state bodies. But other powers must be acquired by European Institutions, as the common defense capability and the common foreign policy. This vvill to co-operate and to imple ment a common project of political integration has been underlined by the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, who declared: "A new era of our history has begun. We learned the lesson of

Kussuvu on the costs of a divided and weak Europe". With these words President Prodi opened last European Summit, he.lei in Helinki on December 10 and 11.

THE STABILIZATION OF THE NEW SYSTEM

Even if we accept the theory that the in ternational system ,vill evolve under the pressure of globalized economy, we do not have a "legislator'' imposing "rules

of conduct" which alJow t he system to provide stability and to obtain a large consensus. This is the reason why it is necessary to fix some kind of "code of behavior" that works in the multipo lar system, in order to avoid the global situation to be controlled, avoiding the risk of chaos and that of the race to enrichment. Without this kind of code, \.Ve would face a situation where the will o f governn:1ents to cooperate could change at any moment, crisis after crisis: the cooperation between the main actors would be contingent, and this situation cou ld be described with the famous Lord Palmerston's aphorism: "We have no eternal allies, and we have no pe17Jetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests il is our duty to follow". This sentence emphasizes the typical egoism underl:ying a limited concept of national interest, concept that was exasperated during the age of colonial impe1ialism, but could also describe the logic of future reality. In order to avoid this problem, we can find support in th e international body that would represent the main moral authority in the present situation, i.e. the United Nations. It is important to recognize that the systemic rules created by the bipolar system were so strong that they replaced the rules of the San Francisco Treaty. As a consequence, after the collapse of the bipolar system, it is urgent that the United Nations become essentially the forum to define the values of the new system, instead of the control institution for the bipolar system's behavior code. This Organisation

"fstrice" minelaying system cm /Vf- 1 / 3 hull.

"Leopard" rescue tank in opeiÂˇation on m.uddy ground.

must be a leading and crucial element, not only a controller of procedures. So we must give new power to the only body that can work on a global scale level. The failures and lhe loss of credibility during these last years are essentially due to the impossibility of defi ning procedures to make urgent decisions. That's why it is necessary to take into account the multipolarity of the new system and to redefine the power allocation within the Security Council. This does not mean,however,that you have to give more seats only to Norlhern European States, without doing the same as far as to the Southern Hemisphere is concerned. On this issue, the former Italian President stated that "an Olympus of powerful

States could enlarge the rift, and consequently reduce the excluded States' interest, frustrating their political will and isolating them, giving the unpleasant impression of considering them as rnere spectators". Such enlargement of the Security Council would lead to the marginalization of a fundamental part of the future system, making the creation of the necessary body of unanimously shm-ed rules even more difficult. What is necessary lo help transition in a non-traumatic way is probably a reform which should take into account the different regional realities, be they represented by local accords of integration, or by single Pivotal States. I'm tl1inking here aboul the Italian project \.vhich, in a way that is consistent with my reflection, proposes to add next to the five Permanent Members (as in article 23 of the UN Chai-t) ten mo re elective, non -permanent and rotating seats. These are to be

distributed Lo the different geographic regions (5 to Asia and Africa togethe1~ 2 to South America and the Caribbeans, 2 to the Western Group and 1 to Eastern Europe). This reform should be credited with the capability to revitalize the International Forum that can help stabilize the system of international relations. It is dear that only a true refonn of procedures , a real regional decision making process and the subsidiarity of organizations working in the weakest countries, could pave the way to a cooperative dimension or, at least, to a constructive confrontation. Briefly, this reform could be a m ajor detenninant of our future , but we need a global vision and a strong will to achieve it.

D ,., Major General, Director, Mililary Centre for Stralegic Studies 77

In the intricate mass of military abbreviations and terms,. interpretations are not always univocal. This can create confusion even among the experts, particularly in the sector of "Command and Control". ew acronyms have contributed to such a dialectic stonn within the military organizations as those containing several "Cs" , maybe together with one or more "Is" or other letters. I refer to abbreviations such as C2 (Command and Control), C3 (Command, Control and Communications or also Command, Control and Consultation), C4 (Command, Control, Communications and Computers) as well as to the more composite ones, such as C2I, C3I, C4I, C4I2 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information and Intelligence) besides the simpler ones like CIS (Communication and Information Systems) and those almost wrapped in a certain mistery as, for example, C4IEWSR (Command, Control, Communications, <::omputers, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) . It is curious to note that these acronyms, born in the AngloAmerican world as "powers of C" (remember C2, C2I, and C31?) turned into simple multiplications when their use spread around the world! By now, these acronyms have been adopted... but what a confusion! All Countlies, especially those whose language is of Latin origin, interpreted the abbreviations according to their perceptions, which coincide very little (or not al all) with the Anglo-American ones. But here again there are differences; suffice it to think that the British prefer CIS while the Americans favor C4, and they both mean the

same concept. And what about us? The need to acquire common concepts and terms, in particular those used within NATO, led our Army to adopt vaiious acronyms, among which precisely those relevant to communication systems and information processing. In fact the Comando C4IEW (Comando, Controllo, Comunicazioni, Computers, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare) is, in its very name, an expression of the approach to the allied terminology. Therefore, it does not seem inappropriate, availing ourselves of different glossaries, nomenclators and dictionaries, and after a research and collation work on the

various NATO and national publications, to give some of the most accepted definitions of the various abbreviations, discussing their meanings and some of the implications deriving from their use. This will likely be useful in order to consolidate the propriety of language also in this field. C2 in the archetype of acronyms. When it landed on the pages of NATO publications we (the less young) were startled: why, we were asking, "Command and Control"? If one commands, he obviously also controls! Nevertheless, in practise, there was nothing to do but study the meani ngs thoroughly, so we adopted the

Armoured vehicle of Lhe [FOR Italian contingent in Bosnia.

Conununications shelter camouflaged with sceno{!,raph.ic 11e1s.

acronym , albeit with a certa in embarassment. Now C2 is a lso mea nt as a "superoperational function". So, what is the real situation? 0 1~ as my old Company Commander used lo say: 'vVhat are we talking about?" By C2, the Allies simply and literally m ean "Com mand a n d Control". And they give the following definitions, selected among many others because they are considered more to the point, assembled into t\.vo groups. The first group could be called Definitions "by essence", and the other Definitions "as process". DEFIN ITIONS "BY ESSENCE"

• Command: an order given by a Commander (AA P-6) . The 80

Commander can issu e orders, (with all relevant impl ications) because he has been legall y attributed the n~cessary a utho r ity (and correla te d responsibility) . According to the other deCinition "by essence", "Comma nd is the authority vested in an individual for the di rection (attention to this wo r d! ), coordination and control o f military forces. Th erefore, "co mmand" is th e a uth ority to gi ve ord e rs and have them carried out; • Control: an essential component for the exercising of connnand; in simple terms a commander requires control to coordinate and monitor the actions of rorces and assets ... (ATP-35(B)). This means that "control" is an essential component o f the c omm a nd actio n , through which the Commander monitors a nd harmonizes the actions or t he forc es t hat received his orders. To be clea1; it is better

Lo a dd th al th e other two components of t he command action arc "information" to make decisions and "communications" to carry ou t and promulgate informaLion. DEFINITION "AS PROCESS"

• Command: the process by which the commander impresses his will and intentions on his subordinates (ATP-3S(B)); • Control: the process through which the commander, assisted by his staff, organizes, direc ts and coordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him (ATP35 (B) and AD P British Army "Command"). • At this poinl, doubts a re likely to be c leared and probab ly the derived concept will be better underslood. In fact, lhere arc C2, C3 and C4 systems and differenl levels of C2 authority, but a lso different leve ls of C2. Before

discussing these levels, it is probably ,.vorth dwelling on some traps that can. be met ,.vhen trying to understan9 those concepts, since they must be somehow adapted to our language. Actually, even when reading some Anglo-Saxon publications we can note some difficulties in figuring out the variegated definitions of the same concepts, especially when they arc adopted within NATO. One example is the verb "to direct" - from wh ich the word "direct.ion" derives - which ,vas mentioned in the defini tions given above. Well, if we translate this word hastily, following the assonance wilh the Italian terms "dirigere" or "direzione", we make a mistake. But, if we use a dictionary, we will see that "to direct somebody to do something" means to order somebody to do something! Another mistake, for example, is made when one tries to define "control" as an authority (as we said before, it is instead a component of the exercise of an a u thority) . Probably this error derives from the tiring series of compromises that even a simple definition must undergo in order to be accepted by all the Nations of the Alliance. Even the B1itish A1my, in its publication Army Code No. 71564 "Command", Volume 2, in defining "control" as a process (see definition above) , says that this definition should be preferred to the one contained in another publication, JSP (Joint Service Publ ication) 110, of the British Defence and published in the AAP6: ... "contro l is that authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subor-dinate organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility of implementing orders or directives...". Is the British Army right? One would certainly think so. But, where is the mistake?, a curious reader could ask. The British Army, trying to explain why it does not adopt that

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definition, insists that, al any rate, "connnand and control" are not "equal partners" as control is merely one "aspect of conunand" and adds that, as far as the British land doctrine is concerned , its publication will always use the term. "Command", except when it is necessa1y to refer to the aspects of "control" as a component of the former (ADP Command, p.1 -3) adding that. .. for this reason, this publication is entitled "Command" in preference to "Command and Control. 111is is also the approach taken by the US Army in "Battle Conunand". The US Army is also

involved, then! At this point, I believe we have enough "material" to meditale on our situation as well. So, then, where is the error? Well, we think the error derives from the fact we are trying to define the term "control" by itself, i.e. deprived of the adjectives "operational", "tactical", "administrative", etc. which, in fact by qualifying the term "control", and by being attached to it, actually give shape to a word with a completely different meaning. In other words, each one indicates a different "command authority", and it makes sense to apply the definition written in the box above to the terms "Operational Control" or ''Tactical Control", as well as to the other terms that vary the Ful l Command (FULLCOMD), i.e. "Operational Command" and "Tactical Command", while it " sense to apply does not makeÂˇ that definition to the lerm "Control" considered by itself. The fol lowing example could make things more evident. Something similar happens when one considers simple and compound words, and the mean ing of Lhe latter has no relation to that of the former: for example a "[on.do", in Italian, can be a piece of planted property, but the ''{ondo monetario" is ce1iaiJ:tly not a plot where money is cultivated. In conclusion, it seems appropriate both to consider "control" a component of the exercise of command and consider different levels of the command authority when referring to "operational control", "tactical control", "operational command" and "tactical cornmand". The latLer concept will be better clarified in the course of this article. C2 Systems The most appropriate definition seems to be the following: a "C2 System" is a whole of personnel, structures, assets, material and financial resources, procedures, which permi t a commander to 81

Operational Command, Operational Control, Tactical Command, Tactical Control. ..

are all "different levels of command authority exercised by commanders over part ofthe activities of subordinate organizations not under their (fulV command (FULLCOMD) ..." plan, issue order·s, monitor their execu lion and coordinate the activities of the forces allocated to h.i m". This is a free interpretation of the definition in ATP-35(8). Jn th is sense, by no\v the use of the double C is accepted also when one refers lo "Command and Control Organization, Command and Control Warfare", etc., even if we should add that the British doctrine refe r·s to "Command System" rather than "C2 System". The same doctrin e, on the other hand, sun-enders to the latter tem1, and uses it widely when it tackles the C2W issue, i.e . the problems of "Command and Control Warfare" (a concept of US or·igin). Still on the subject of systems, let's discuss the various acronyms , starting with CIS (Communication and Infom1ation Systems) and then moving to CCIS or C21S, i.e. Command, Control and information Systems and to C4IEWSR. Well, before looking into their different meanings, the reader should pay attention to the fact that the transition from the concept of C2 to any other derived concept with a "C ba<re'' (C3, C2I, etc.) containing the word "system", determines the transition to systems... based on IT (Information Technology), i.e. to systems of automatic coimnunication and processing of information. 82

Here are some definitions: • CIS, Communications and Infonnation Systems: "Assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organized so as to accomplish ~-pecific information conveyance and processing functions, AAP-6, Nov.l, 1990" (facing page, in the British Directorate of Land Warfare's version); in other words, CIS are automated systems of communication and processing of information; • C4S, Command, Control, Conmmnications and Computer AAP-6(UI

NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (DLW EDITION)

No1;11rr,ber 1!)97

Systems: "Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures , organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities and conununications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Al5o called C4 Systems (USA Joint Pub 6-0 (facing page), approved for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 ) or, more simply "Both the communications and the computer systems required to implement the command and control process (USA Joint Pub 6-0); in other words the C4 Systems deal \Vith th e automated commun ication and processing of information. At this point, it is worthwile to observe that the two definitions, CIS and C4, refer to analogous concepts. As mentioned at the beginning, the first acronym is preferred by the British, while the second is used by the Americans and is now widely employed by our Service. The reason for this difference could be explained by the fact that, for the Americans, informatics is a Computer Science, and for the British is an Jnfonnation Science. Going on with our panoramic

Italian soldiers on patrol during Lhe East Timar mission.

outlook, we see: • CCIS or C2IS, Command , Control and Information Systems: "A n integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, fac ilities and communications, which provides authori ties at all levels with timely and adequate data Lo plan, direct and confront their activities

(AAP-6, Sepl. l, .198 1). We can notice that this definition is very similar lo that of the C2 System, but refers in particular to those specific tech nical systems which permit the effective treatment and exchange of information. Due lo space limitations, in this article we mention only some essential abbreviations related to Systems: • C3: Command, Control and Communications or Command, Control and Consultation; • C31: Command, Control, Communications and 83

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Information; • C4: Command, Control, Communications, Computers. Let's chvell. for a moment upon the last two acronyms. The reader will note that, precisely o\.ving to what we said about the difference between "Computer Science" and "Information Science", ... the two terms, C3J and C4, ... are equivalent!! ! But things become complicated when the "I" of "Intelligence" is included. Let's see what's next: • C3I2: Command, Control, Communications, Information and Intelligence (Systems); • C4I: Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (Systems).

These two acronyms are also equivalent. Then we find the terms made up with the inclusion of other activities or sectors of application (EW, Surveillance and Reconnaissance): • C4IEW: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Electronic

Warfare (Systems); • C4IEWSR: Conunand, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Systems), is the last definition and it encloses, in practise, all fields of applications of IT (Information Technology). Authority levels of C2 By the term "authority levels of C2" , in practice we mean the different levels of auth01ity that can be allributed, both within NATO and nationally. As is well know11, the main levels of comman d authority are the following: Full Command (FULLCOMD), Operational Command (OPCOM), Tactical Command (TACOM), Operational Control (OPCON) , Tactical Control (TACON). Here we are not going to give the pure and simple definitions of all these terms (if interested, the reader can consult the publications mentioned above); we shall

mention instead the definition s which more directely concern ow· Service, because of the importance of their concepts in everyday life. Within NATO, for instance, "Full Command" means "The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services (AAP-6)" . Tl1.is authority, therefore, coincides with that attributed to our Com.andante di Corpo . As a matter of fact, he is the only commander with Full Command authority (FULLCOMD) . His authoritv is at the highest level, since he is responsibl~ for every aspect of his unit's life and employment, both in peacetime and in operations. As a consequence, a Commander not responsible for the administrative and logistic sectors is not a Full Commander and, in a wider sense, ca1mot be defined as a Com.andante di Corpo (RDM, art. 22). 0

Operationa l Control is "The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish · specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain o r assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does i t, of itself, include administrative or logistic control (AAP-6)" .

This authority is however a command authority, albeit limited, since it does not imply administrc1tive and logistic responsibilities and is restricted to the accomplishment of the m ission or its dmation. The following two examples could be useful for better w1derstanding the essence of the concept: 1st example • the Commander of a Brigade (e.g. the "Garibaldi" Brigade) in operations has "Full Command" authorily (obviously, at his level: we shall go back to lb is concept later, when we discu ss lhe d ifferent command-levels) only on the forces wh ich are normally under his Command (i.e. the forces ·which constilute the B1igade since peacetime); • the Commander of lhe "Garibaldi" Brigade i.n operations has "Operational Conlrol " auth01ity on the forces assigned to him for his mission in Kosovo; they are differenl from those which constitLtte the Brigade in peacetime (e.g. a battalion from the "Folgore" Brigade or a Regiment from another Nation); 2nd example • the Commander of a singlebattalion Regiment (e.g. Lhe 11 Lh Signal Regiment) has "Full Command" authorily on his Regiment; • the C01mnander of the "Leonessa" Signal battalion has "Operational

"Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it". Control" command authority on his battalion. This Commander is not a "Coman.cl.ante di Co,po". But he is a Commander in every respect and mm,1: not be defined, as we can read in some publications, as an "operational controller" (an ugly tenn which should not be used in the Army), bu t only has the authority to employ his personnel for the achievement of the task assigned to him. The adm inistrative and logislic aspects are a normal responsibilily of the Regiment Commander. Commanders in every respect with a similar or different level of aulhority, according to the circumstances, are also the Compan y Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders, etc.. We believe it would be useful to close our discussion on C2 and its impl ications, mentioning some other aspecls connected with it, such as, for example, the different command levels, which should not be confused with lhe just descri bed command-authority and with the various leve ls of responsibility. By command level we mean the position in the chain of command (also knmvn as "C2 chain") of a given Headquarters (company, battalion, Regiment, Brigade, etc.). At the highest, strategic, militm·y and operational leve l the Comrnander exercises his "high ·c ommand" indirectly, i.e. through his subocdinate Commanders. Al the lower levels, the Commanders exercise their command directly, leading their men in combat. Belween these two levels there are

many others, characterized by the aclion of conveyance of lhe higher Commanders' intents and by the exercise of command Lowards the subordinale formations or unils. Therefore, the command functions change according to the level. Tn fact , in the Anglo -Saxon world, there is a distinction between 1-hgh Command and Baute Command. Responsibility, at the various command levels, depends both o n the level itself and on the level of the command authority attributed to t he Commander. \,Vhen a Commander entrusts a specific responsibiltiy to a subordinate (who, as a rule, has also Lbe responsibility typical of his level, as well as that connected wilh his command aulhority), he gives him the necessary authorily, but still keeps the responsibility of his level. The s u bordinate Comrnander ans,vers lo the higher Commander but at any rate does it wilhin the laws, regulations and practices ( legitimate power) characteristic of the commandauthority level attribu ted to him (full command, operational command, etc.). It could be of some help, in grasping lhe sense of this "absolute concept of responsibi lity", to consider a sentence purportedly pronounced by Adm. Rick.over, USN, wh ich reminds us that "to command" means, first of all, "being capable of taking on responsibilities".

D ,,, Brigadier General, Operational Commarule1~ C4 Infi'astrucru.re Group

by Giovanni Caravelli *

or some years there have been talks of "third ,vave", "fourth era", "cybenvar", change in the "systematic paradigm" of international relations; "out of the box" visions, mean.l to emphasize, with a pinch of foturolog)~ a great conceptual phenornenon existing within the evolution of modern socie ty and inside the concept of war and the ways to conduct it. Experts and analysts of military questions Lalk about a real Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA) , to point out the radical change occurred in this sector, following the realization or highly sophisticated weapon systems or high-qua li ty technologies . Such capabilities could permit also "covert", computerized allacks, capable of bringing an entire nation to its knees. Nevertheless, a lso the fo.mous "system of systems" worked out by Adrniral Owens of the US Navy is actually an integrated supersystern of very sophisticated weapons, p lanned Lo conduct a

traditional conflict. But if it is true that "revol ution" means in substance a sudden transformation, a drastic replacement of the old by the nevv, an area of potential "revolutionarity" cou ld be constituted precisely by developments in the field of "non-lethality". It is a family of technologies th at perm it to disable, neutralize and block rather than injure, kill or destroy enemv and/or non-combatant troop;, 0 1Âˇ military structures and

should be watched with allention. The res ult of lt1 is evolution o f The evolution of technology has produced international relations, parallel to the one forrnally recogn i,.ed, an extraordinary thrust towards instruments consists of an increas.ing conflict of interests. expectations and disputes, capable of disabling, neutralizing and such as may be brought about by blocking men and assets, without causing the emergence of a different way of plann ing and, al the same time, of irreversible damages. challenging world order; stability, Non-lethal weapons show prospects of peace and securi ty. This "explosive mixture" is ultcriorly fuelled by a set widespread employment together with of potential conditions of instability traditional armaments, but this should not that can be summaiized in: marked and increasing economic induce us to think that, in the near future, the • disparities, especial.ly between the Third World Countries and the former could replace the latter. economically advanced ones. • persistent disparity in the disLribution of water; food, oil and direct conjugation of the use of critical mineral resources; force w ith the moral, legal., economic and environrnental • continuing poli tical repressions by some governments, vvhich princ ip les that arc at the appear reluctant to follow with foundations of the modern western decision the road of democracy; democracies: first o r all, the use of • extreme demographic turbulence, force for peace enforcement deriving from w idespread migrations, "explosive" birth-rate in the Third World, dangerous AN ERA OF CONFLICTS city overpopulation and grO\ving malnutrition, ill iteracy and The post bipolar period was, and diffusion of epidemic d iseases, still is, characterized by the sense of especially in sorne African and strnctural collapse that follO\ved the Asian countries; end of U1e Cold War, when the Superpowers imposed their· • increase of diCf erences and divisions by sects, classes, age, discipline and almost "scientifically" growth, ethnic affinity, religion, conlrolled the impact and size of political creed, ideological collective violence around the world. conv iction and geographical Even if ,ve are now witnessing a position, w ith the consequent continuous dismem berment of augn1entation of the "evils" o[ the composite Nations, \.vith t he century (e.g. a lienation and proliferat ion of regimes that are anomic). unable to manage their power, on the other hand we also observe the These conditions undoubtedly equipmenl. Starting from simple grnwth of supernational coal itions, produce and nourish injustice, real which could take on legitimately and relatively harmless materials o r on ly perce ived, deep -felt recognized non-territorial forms . (rubber bullets, resined blocking resentment and antagonism And w.hi le the conlin uation of a nets, d isabling gas, etc .), could between peoples and nalions "statccentric" international system, lhese non -lethal tecb nol ogies and/or blocs of nations that, if nol i.e., devoid of a true supen1ational completely alter the aspects of war and, more in general, the use authority, seems secured for the concretely confronted at the world future, today the "non-state" actors hi ghest decision-making leve ls, of force? Ccr1ainly, in the first place, they and the great centres of power - could lead to a dangerous increase cou ld increase the al ternatives global corporations, international in the nu.rnbcr of dramatic confl ict available to the governments and governmental and non-governmental siluations. Al lh is very moment we transnational witness the progressive crnn1bling military leaders lo intervene in organ izations, movements - have developed ,vith a of entire African nations, which are crisis situalions and \.vou ld pem1it, moreover, a simpler and more frequency and effectiveness that a prey to civil war-s, appare ntly

tout court

lmerior of a Daw Correlation Centre (SOR1\0 Subsyslem).

outside a ny concrete control and possible solution.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONLETHAL WEAPONS

On the global scenario that l have just outlin ed, the non -lethal weapons (NL\,\') cou ld represent an effective tool for meeting the complex challenges that arise especially withi n the sph ere of other-than-war operations, as well as in the recent tendency to find credible alternatives to anti personnel mines, becau se an increas ing num ber of Nations refuse lo employ them . The Lenn "non-lethal" should be understood as a function of the intention: zeromortality and no permanent dam age are th e two extremes which are not in the range of objectives that one wants to achieve with such weapons. At this point, one spontaneously asks : what is the real reason for developing non-lethal weapons? The most direct and immediate answer is: the soldier. In substance, there is an increasingly impellent necessity to supply the modern combatant with the instruments that e nable him to carry ouL his task, overcoming the problem of physically destroying the adversary and his stru ctures . Bu t it is necessary to go beyond that: in fact, today's soldie1~ engaged in difficult peace operations, owing to the significance and consequences of his act ions h as assumed an importance much greater than he had in a classic war. As a matter of fact, I would say he has assumed a cmcia l irnportance, because of his possibility of gra duatin g the "response" to the contingent and innumerab le situations that he could have to face, the outcome of \vhich often have also a politicostrategic effect. From this point of

. .

view, the present equipment or letha l weapons does not allow much flexibility. Clearly, today we face a new concept as regards war-\,Vagi ng or, more in genera l, crisismanagemcnl. Our soldiers face new situations, environments asymm etrical and totally different from each othe1~ which do not exclude discouraging situations and may present challenges never experienc ed before. It is therefore important for the Commanders to have at their disposal a new range of "instruments", in order to face the crises - especially in Peacekeeping (PK) and humanitarian aid operations - in a more "humane" and, at the same time, more efficient way; while a lways keeping adequate force-protection capabilities. The most recent PK operation s - Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo - prove it. But oth erÂˇ scenari os of equal complexity arc appearing and will have to be taken in greater considenHion. In fact, examining th e evo lu t ive pro cess of the globa l community, one can

'c ".

observe that there is an increasing movement of large masses of people from J:\ation to Nation and, within each Nation, towards the citi es. Also th ese movements contribute to produce a more and more asymmetrical environment. Urbanization, especially in the western world, com bined with the growing importance of "non-state" actors (terrorist groups, intranational forces, etc .), increases the possibility that the Anned Forces, and the Army above aU, could be called LO support the Police forces, in controll ing the territory and maintaining public order. In a rnore and more bu ilt-up environment, where our operational tasks - that only a few years ago were almost unthinkable - entai l a more frequent and direc t interact ion with the civilians, often accompanied by an extensive media coverage, our sold iers must have a better understanding of the situation and, above a ll, be ab le to make a complex evaluation of the possibilities they have to employ force. In this new environment, fire power. or the threat to use it, may

no longer be sufficient (for a long time to come) for a basic solution of all c1ises and/or problems. The higher-level Commanders must face a new type of public sensitiveness and a constant, often pitiless, critical examinalion, boLh concerning the correct employ1nent of the military instrumenL as tool of "national power", no more understood as a projecLion of force for expansionist and utilitaiian ends, but as an expression of foreign policy and national secrnity, for controlling and managing crises and for strengthening international peace and stability. The Com.manders on the field must be aware of these new sensitivities and prepare an absolutely controllable m.ilitary force. The Commanders of the minor units must apply the directions and deriving orders with good sense, in circu mstances often full of uncertainties and clanger: Throughout history, the changes in culture and technolgy have affected the characteristics of military force and the way it is employed. These changes are an effort to optimize its employment according to a new vision of the conduct of operations. As I mentioned before, Lhe incremented interactions between milita1y mlits and populaLions have become a fundamental feature of the present o perational environment, which will likely remain the basic element of the foreseeable future. Tv. 0 factors justify this forecast: â€˘ the spreading of urban cullure inside the industrialized count1ies and also the expansion of man y preindustrial and emerging societies of the Third World constitute a world-level example of the growth of populations and migrations. The prevalence of urban izat ion in many crisis regions of the planet engenders a potential for large and vulnerable groups of noncombatant civilians, who must be reached and controlled in the possible strifes in which the military forces could be engaged; â€˘ the Armed Forces increasingly 1

carry out the ir tasks in the complex operational enviromnent of "m il itary operations other than \var" (MOOT\,V), a category that includes missions of humanitarian aid, cooperation in disasters, evacuation of noncombatants and various Lypes of peace -support operations. Some MOOT\.\1 scenarios inc lude the presence of paramilitary forces , arff1ed factions and/or c1imi.nal/te1T01istic elements, which represent an uncertain but constant threat to our forces. Jn such circumstances the lnission of the military forces envisages "preventive" tasks, meaning that the military units perform a function of constant presence on the territory and control of the single elements and/or factions, in order to keep them from carrying out absolutely unwanted actions, such as triggering-off riots, attacks, violences \.vith ethnic or sexual background, etc. Sometimes the rough elements m ingle with the genera lly innocent and unwitting loca l population, Âˇwhile in other circumstances, groups of locaJ people may revolt against the military units and lake an active part in the acts of \iolence. The various factions, the levels of ,,iolence and the latent threat to the mission could change frequently and with very little forewarn ing. Tn such circumstances, the identity of the possible "enemies'' is uncertain and the employ1nent of lethal force for purposes olher than selfdcfence could be drastically and sternly l.imi ted by the Ru les of Engagement (ROE) or by the evaluation nrnde by the Commanders in the area. Clearly, the non-lethal weapons should never be deployed without a conventional let ha l force. They increase but do not replace the "lethal force"; as a matter of fact, it is indeed the lethal capa bility in our possession that gives credibility to the employment of

non-lethal weapons, making them even more effective. It is true that this double availability must not be an "overload", or a limitation for the Commanders. In sh01t, the Commanders must be in a position to deploy and employ non-Jethal systems without giving up other conventional offensive and defens ive capabilities and options . In substance, the concepts of mobility, resistance, sustainability of the forces musL not be negatively modified by the presence of non-lethal systems. Next to the principle of the nonlethal (or soft-kill) weapons' complementarity, we find the fundamental one, wh ich can be summed up in the fact that any effect produced by them must be reversib le . The closely interconnected concepts of "reversibi lity" and "effect duraLion"are in fact very important: I would say that they are the fundamental concepts of "nonlethality". In border--line cases, and despite the best intentions, it could happen that the employment of non -lethal weapons, precisely because of the circumsLances, had an effect different from the one technically indicated. Jn other words, on the battlefield, or during a particular operation, there is no absolute guaran tee that nonlethality will be the fina.J outcome of the employment of these anns. It is therefore evident that the conceptual objective and the realization effort are a imed at maxim1zmg precisely the "humanitarian" aspect of these weapon systems. The soft-kil l weapons are explicitly realized and employed, first of all, and as minimum effect, to discourage and, as maximum effect, to disable personnel and/or materials, minimizing human losses and unwanted damages t.o structures and environment. They bring flexibi lity to the combat and increase the protection of the unit, because the friendly troops can anyhow engage objectives that constitute a threa t, keeping an

extremely low risk of civilian and combatant and civilian casualties non-combatant losses, as well as will continue to be the regreltable of collateral damages. but often inevitable outcome of From the historical point of view, the use of military force, even if the use of non-lethal weapons is nol soft-kill weapons are available. new. As a matter of facl, in the past This principle, closely connected the military forces have already with that \.Vhich considers nonused non-lethal means to influence lethal weapons as an "incremental the behaviour of populations and and flexibility factor" of the lethal nations, in order to initially weaken force, is essential for planning and and subsequently defeat them with carrying out any operalion that conventional weapons. Examples of emisages the employ1nent of nonclassic non-lethal means are: show lethal capabilities, especially as of potential force, physical regards the preparation of the obstacles, noise lo create and ROEs. increase psychological effecls, In short, the main advantages smoke and fog bombs to cover deriving from the availability and operations or to neutralize the employment of non-lethal systems enemy surveillance, control and can be sunurnuized as follows: guidance systems . These are • the Commanders can have a examples that constitute a more humane behaviour, remarkable basis of experience, coherent with the political and both for future operations and for social implications implicit in the evo lu tionary process of peace-support operations; development of these weapons. • the possibility of employing nonThe involvement of the military lethal weapons permits to potential to solve crises has assume a more active attitude, traditionally entailed the and give a quicker and more employment of lethal force, or the effective response, being well declared implicit or explicit threat aware that there will be no to use .il. The military units are in irreparable damages and fact organi zed , trained and injuries. But there is also the equippelfor this purpose. A force clear perception that one can armed only with traditional have a better control of the ·weapons has two options: threaten situation, avoiding its reaching to use the lethal force or apply it. the very dangerous point where Such limitation generates a it is necessay to employ the "critical" vulnerability that the lethal force to end a conflict adversary could rapidly find out which could have got almosL out and exploit to his own advantage. of control; The "non-lethal" capabilities, on the • tendenLially, the non -l e Lhal contrary, provide a wider range of weapons appear less choices which increases, but does provocative; not replace, the traditional lethal • the contingent necessity of forces. resorting lo lethal forces, after The option of res01iing to lethal having employed non-lethal force must therefore always be weapons with scarce resul ls, available, when the Commanderwould be perceived with less deems it to be more appropriate doubts and restraints; and/or necessary in order to carry • non-lethal weapons can facilitate out his mission. One should make a more rapid stabilization after this concept very clear in order to incidents, reducing the hostility dispel any doubt: the existence of of the populations and collateral non-lethal capabilities does not damages. represent a potential factor for expecting " a non-lethal conflict" Another ve1y important concept, and completely unrealizable connected with the employment of anticipations. Unfortunately, non- soft-kill weapons, is their "social 90

acceptability" and concerns both the local population and the entire international community. In fact, the decision to employ force in defence of international securi ty and naLional interests, and also how this force is exercised, is generally the object of extensive examination and public debate. An analysis of wheLher to employ or not to employ non-lethal weapons geometrically increases the number of the available options. The basic problem is that the effects of the non-lethal weapons should b e generally acceptable, both by our society and by the international community. The purpose of the non-leLhal weapons is that of augmenting the Commanders' pos sibilities o f carrying out all the mission s envisaged along th e range o f military actions. The most recent military operations - especially Lhe peace-support ones - gravitate on the lower part of this range, where Lhe ROEs are very restlictive. The non-lethal weapons meet precisely the particular requi rements and needs of this low-intensi ty environment. They provid e instruments to the single soldier; to the squad and to the unit, that permit to anticipate and/or answer possible provocations - withou l increasing the levels of tension with means more appropliate than those r·ealized for the employment of lethal forces. The core capabilities of non-lethal weapons must envisage flexible means/systems of action/response in order to protect the friendl y forces and/or affect the actions of the potential enemies and noncombatants. These objectives can be achieved without resorting to lethal force and in such a way as to rninimize collateral damages. Such core capabilities, together with th e effects of soft-kill weapons, fall within two main ca tegories: antipers01mel and anti material. Antipersonnel Capabilities

Considering that this non-lethal

Many laser weapons are considered "soft-kill''.

\.:

'' ,''

•

capability is aimed at permitting the application of military force witl1 a very limited risk of casualties among the civilians and the noncombatants and, in sorne cases, also among the enemy forces, the Geld of research and development is very wide, u p to the point of even envisaging means capable of in0uencing the behaviour ,rnd the activities of a potentially hostile crowd or regaining contro.l o r a 1ioting mob. The main capabilities required of antipersonnel non-lethal weapons are: to disable personnel in a non-permanent way, prevent personnel from enter·ing a given area ( through physical barriers or other systems), capture persons, clear occupied infrastructure. Antimaterial Capabilities

These capabilities must perm it to render materia ls, structures and equipment useless without causing their destruction . This allows the employment of military forces in those circurnstances in \.vhich the level of indetem1inacy is such that the employment of lethal force could prove counterprod uctive.

They envisage the capability of preventing the access of vehicles to an area and or neutralizing systems and structures. Considering these indications and directions, it can be stated that the employment of non-lethal weapons could meet - and therefore one should try to overcome - three substantial types of limits: conceptual, physical and tactical. The conceptual limitation is due to the fact that the political leaders and the media could be unable to understand, or could misinterpret, the correct application of the nonlethal \.veapons to tl1e total range of military operations. The wrong perception that the non -l ethal weapons permit to conduct and/or carry on wars and MOOTWs wi tJ1o u t losses , cou ld induce misleading and conflictua l expectations among political and military leaders. Such conflictuality cou ld trans late into a greater vulnerability of the military forces, du e to ROEs incompatible and incoherent with the mission assigned. All the political and military leaders involved in the

planning and conduct of military missions must understand that "non-lethal operations" cannot exist. The physical limitations of the present non -lethal \.veapons are: their limited range, thei r· short-time effect and the relative ease with which expert fighters can thwart them. On the other hand, some of the non-lethal capabilities could also be deadly, if not correct ly applied. The tactical limitations concern the loss of the crucial moment for achieving the mission, during the possible transition from non-lethal to lethal force. The limitations v,rill be overcome only through a clear representation of the objectives and capabilities of the non-lethal systems while, from the operational vie\vpoint, continuous training and an ever increasing and positive field experience will produce a greater farni li a r·ity in the use of the systems. SOME LESSONS LEARNED

The employment of soft-kill weapons , also at experimental level, especially by units of the US Armed Forces on various operational theatres, has already supplied important indications, not only on their operat ional effectiveness but particularly on their employment. First of all, it emerged that the use of non-lethal options must be based on tl1e principle of a gradual and pr-oportionate response, prefe1Ting the employment of the m inimum force necessary to counter the threat. On the other hand, the attempt to control and determine every aspect of the employment of non-lethal forces can prod uce remarkab le drawbacks for the Commanders on the field. For example, it is an 91

The employment of missiles for deliverinf!, chernical and biological agents permits "surgical" interventions.

ascertained facl that in Somalia the ROEs of the US contingent caused an arbitrary and inapplicable distinction between the situations that justified Lhe recourse lo lethal force and those where different means could be applied, and with lower mortality. The contradictions of some ROEs \Vere evident when the employment of non-l ethal means for controlling crowds was contemplated in cases related lo the employment of lethal force. In fact, the soldiers asked themselves why they should employ non-lethal weapons in general, when they had to wait for a warrant to employ lethal force before being allm.ved Lo shoot a "beanbag"(l). Experience has also evidenced that the use of particular means produces eccessive ,:md dangerous reactions. The viscous immobilizing foams are a we llknown case: lhey were employed only as lethal force, owing to the severe sense of suffocation they caused. Because of this, the foams 92

\Vere removed from the list of the non-lethal weapons available Lo the US forces in Somalia. fo substance it is indispensable to \Nork out ROEs that perm.it the use of force without solution of continuity, envisioning a gradual response related to the types of threat, and allowing the Conu11anders to employ non-lethal weapons to boosL flexibility, dete1Tence and reaction to uncertain situations. In vievv of this, it is fundamental that the decision to employ nonlethal weapons be delegated to the lowest possible tactical level. The decision must be taken as quick.l.y as possible , because the levels of violence in situations of extreme fluidity can sway in boLh directions along the theoretic axis of the employment of force. For instance, a platoon leader could order the employment of non-lethal weapons, successively decjde to react with lethal arms against a sudden and increasing threat, and fin ally reemploy non-lethal means to respond to hostile but unanned individuals. Taken for granted that non-lethal weapons are a compone.n t in the scale of the

Commanders' g1-adual response, it is equally evident Lhat such systems do not represent the "solution o f solutions", a panacea in the hands of the Commanders for· solving every problem in the present operational scenarios. They should rather be employed in close connection and synergy \Nith psychological operations, intelligence activities, public information and CThUC. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

The introduction of non-lethal technologies will probably raise a series of questions that comprise all sectors of a nation. The main issue5 could be. • strategic questions: will nonlethal weapons project an image of force or of ·weakness, o f aggressiveness or tranquilli ty? Will Lhey be regarded as se1iously a.s lethal weapons are? Will they dimi n ish or increase th e propensity Lowards violence of the users and their adversaries? Will they allow the adversaries to repair more easily the damages they could have possibly suffered? Will they foster an

•

escalation or a reduction of violence? Will they expand or restrict the decisionmakers' flexib ility? Will they have an appreciable influence ori national interests (meaning that national interests are often defined in terms of access to "critical" materials and resources needed to support large military instruments)? Will they augment or diminish the acceptance of independent international police or sccrnity forces (e.g. under UN authority) if these were mainly equipped \Vith non -lethal weapons? military questions: will non-lethal weapons increase or reduce the effectiveness of military missions? Will they be particularly easy or difficult to use? W.ill they reduce or increase the risk of frien dly casualties? Will they weaken the fighting spirit or attitude? Will they promote or hinder interservice cooperation? Will changes be necessary as concerns military missions and rules, force structure, operational doctrine and training? Will they weigh on the Nation's ability to mobilize the resources necessary to respond to large-scale emergencies? Will they create special necessities for intelligence, effective engagement and post-engagement damage evaluation? diplomatic questions: will nonletl1al weapons be useful tools in negotiations? Will they provide sufficient leverage to obtain concessions? Will they influence the negotiation strategies? Will they be considered positive or negative propaganda? Will they contribute to open or to isolate diplomacy? political questions: \.vill non-lethal weapons influence public opinion for international interventions? Will they weigh on national will and cohesion? Will they affect relations among coalitions (compatibility of equipment, burden sharing, transfer of technologies, etc.)? economic questions: will non

lethal -weapons have a considerable effect on the economic growth· and on industtial cornpatibility? Will they have a measurc:1ble impact on the expenses for Defence, as complements and substitutes of lethal weapons? Will they facilitate the transfer of teclmologies from the militruy to the conm1ercial sector? Will they influence the dependence on foreign technologic resources? \ 1Vhat is their exp01t potential? • internal questions: will nonlethal weapons weigh on the incidence, nature, extent of organized criminality and internal terrorism? Will they have particular repercussions if they were to fall in the hands of criminal groups? Wil.l they affect tl1e citizens' chil libe1ties? In the police's ha nds, ·will they influence the procedw-es of lawenforcement or the definition of "eccessive force"? Will they have an impact on the acceptability and legality of employing the Armed Forces in internal activities? Could they contribute to a mortality typical of police states? The legitimation and the probable and hoped-for effectiveness of "non-lethality" will very probably depend on the answers to these and also to other crucial questions, especially for the remarkable potential that these technologies offer in view of a revolutionary transformation in the conduct of "military affairs". Although non lethal weapons were deployed by US troops in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, they have not yet been given adequate evidence and imp01tance e.ither by the military world or by public opinion. A greater attention to these issues in effectively defining their real military capabilities should be developed within the military institution itself. The cold war was a period of transition from the modern to the post-modern era, with particular regard to the questions of national

security. It was a pe1iod in which public opinion regularly saw that action was replaced by rhetoric, substance by sy111bolism , reality by image. What I mean is that the confrontation of the two blocs implied a complicated diplomatic, strategic and mili tary play, where every geographically located action was to be counterbalanced ,.vith ,mother by the opposite bloc. The declarations of intentions in themselves came to have the weight and value of an action of strategic import,mce. In this kind of "blocked" scenario, the non lethal technologies, which did not con-espond to the "philosophy" of the moment, could find no space. The post cold-war world needs instead a "revolutionary" answer - a radical and strategic distancing from the past - a revolution, regarding no more polities or history but a reality that must be reconstructed, a menLality that must be replannecl. Therefore, as regards "military affairs", the non-lethal systems in the making offer precisely an innovative ansvver to the requirements of security and control of regional crises. It may appear an utopian argument, but a close analysis will clearly prove that one can gradually introduce them into service, without the overambitious attempt to anticipate tl1e times, but convinced to offer an extremely flexible tool to the contingents engaged in restoring peace and stability in the different areas of c1isis.

D Lieutenant Colonel, Office of the Army Chief of Staff 1 '

NOTE (1) The 'bean bag" is a particular 1:)1JC

of round, whose bulle L is a container filled ,vith dry legume pellets. Contr ary to rubber bullcls, they do not wound and rarely can they injure delicaLe pm"ts, such as the eyes.

n the post Cold-\Alar years the Âˇ military instruments. Within this innovative framework, risk of a ,.vorld conflict has diminished, but new tensions, a review of the Army's mobili1.ation detrimental to the stability and system has also become necessary, peace of many areas of our planet, in view of the new operational have appeared on the international options and the n10re and more scene. The nature of the threat has irnportant role that man must play changed, and many Countries, in today's Anned Forces. Therefore, including 1taly, have adopted a review of the conceptual, new defence models, based on functional and organizational smaller but highly professional approach is needed, together with a

new organization capable of rneeting the modern automation requirements using the most advanced technology. In order to tackle the problem correctl)~ one should remember that, in the past, large mobilization pools were envisaged, which in.eluded the youngest classes discharged to the reserve, ,.v hich were kept up to date through mandatary refresher95

Reece vehicles disem.ba.rking {rorn a transport ship.

training periods. Mobilization took place in emergency situations, caused almost always by the risk of involvement in a serious armed conflict. It was realized through massive and compulsory recalls to arms, ,,vith a scarce selection of the "youngest" reservist, who were employed in the constitution and completion, in very limited peliods of time, of numerous operationaJ units, agencies and territorial formations. The arms and the equipment of the un.ils were stored and kept in working order by the socalled Mobilization Depots. Up to WWI, annual training recalls to arms took place in coincidence with the summer manoeuvres. They lasted 2 to 4 weeks; at times, the reservists were recalled in order to face serious disturbances of public order (1898, 1902, 1904 ). Dodging reached peaks of 40%. Between the two ·world wars , there were only large training recalls in 1932, 1934, I 935, 1937 and 1938; the last peacetime recalls took place in 1954 during the T1ieste c1isis and in 1964, ,vith the purpose of postponing the dra[ting age from 20 to 21. Dilling the Cold War, recalls were discontinu ed , because of budget difficulties, and also nol Lo arouse the appt·ehension 96

of a public opinion which tended to perceive them as symptoms of serious international tensions, foreboding a nuclear conflict. In the past, the expenses for the organization and management of mobilization were rather heavy, but went down after W\l\'Il, because the training recalls and mobilization exercises had come to an end. Also the expenses for the acquisition of arms and equipment diminished, since the1·e was plenty of them, as a consequence of the frequent Armed Forces' retrenchments. In fact, in the last decades, the only expenses left ·were those concerning the maintenance of the arms and equipment stocked at the Mobilization Depots. From 1953 Lo 1998, mobilization followed the rules of publication 8/S "Provisional instructions on the Army mobilization" ("provisional" in that it was never comp leted ·with the logistic part) . Under those ru les, an almos t completely regional mobilization system was created, which in an emergency made possible to establ ish new formations (from the framevvork units), to complete the existing units and to replace the losses suffered in case of armed conflict. Each "mobilization organization" (command, U11i.t, etc.) determined its own needs, kept the discharged

servicemen "connected" and contacted the Military Districts in order Lo obtain t he necessary reservists. All the organizations concerned with the operation of the system carried out an intense routine work, aimed at setting up the annual mobilization preparations; this activity became complex and laborious in case of important changes in the organization (which, unfortunately, were quite frequent) or when new-generation weapons or systems went into service. In those circumstances, t he innate fimmcial difficulties did not permit to carry out the necessary recalls for the reservists' retraining, nor to ve1ify the readjusted system's vali di Ly through mobilization exercises; for the same reason, and because of the massive character of mobilization, the idea of establishing a voluntary rese i-ve (even a reduced one) has ahvays been discarded. In the imminence of conflicts, there have been cases of "volunta1ism" inspired by patiiotic spirit, but it was not possible to rely on them for mobilization, considering their aleatory nature. On the eve of WWI, 340,000 Italian emigrants, many of them reservists, voluntarily returned to their Mothedand to fight. FROM MOBILIZATION TO COMPLETION

Considering the new orga11i.zation of the Army and its possible operational options, the great mob.ilizations of the past seem useless, while the careful and timely completion of the existing uni ts remains essential. Therefore, the massive recalls of roughly trained reservists, meant to multiply the land units, must be replaced by limited but selective recalls of reservists (having the approp1iate rank, specialization and

training), aimed al completing units which will have to constitute the most heterogeneus complexes of forces. · The system must fill both the physiological and institutional gaps deriving from an insufficient supply of personnel and the contingent gaps, caused by resignatio ns, medical reasons etc. The former are the most difficult, especially when they concern highly specialized individuals. · The gaps "Lo be filled" are many and very different: therefore, the number from which to choose must be large, and certainly cannot be linnted to the regional environment. Thus, there must be a syslem capable of directly drawing the necessary elements from the whole national reservists-pool (centralized system), and of completing, in optimal quantitative and qualitative terms, a nwT1ber of Ltnits suitable for ca1Tying out specific missions, in often very alypical environmental and operational situalions (versatile system). The reservists pool \vill contain all the discharged servicemen, as well as the officers, NCOs and volunteers formerly on active duly and still holding a special status, and the militarized civilians. T hese personnel constitute the National Reserve Force (FRN). (For other abbreviations, see "Acron_y1ns" box at the end of the rutide): All arms and equipment for the recalled servicemen are kept at the units to be completed; therefore, the mobilization depots are suppressed. As regards completion times, we went from a short 20-dav limit 'to no less than 180 days, ~hvays fully complying ,vith our NATO commitments. The activities for the completion of a section or of al.I the existing units must start at the first forevvarnings of a crisis, by issuing the measures listed in the completion regulations, with the possible changes required by the actual situation. Besides the recalls, these measures could include also non11s for voluntary extensions of

Fig. 1

. ·.

MEA$URES FOR THE COMPLETION OF EX[STING COMMANDS, BODIES AND UNITS J'liO

TYPEOF MEASURE

(1)

3 4

5 6

EFFECTS OF THE MEASURES Average age ofpersonnel concerned

Voluntary extension Very young of conscription for servicemen close lo discharge "Ad hoe" or general All ages, depending on recall ofrCV(2) category and rank

Employment readiness of nersonnel Ready employment

Very young

Ready employment

Suspension of retirement for age limits

Elderly

Ready employment

Coercive recalls by course/age and for snecialists

Young and middle age

Employment at the end of refresher c.ourse

Middle and relatively old

High

Ready employment High for some; after a short course of generalized training for others

Increase in recrnitment of vo lunteers Increase in recrnitment of conscriots Suspension of onrequest termination of reQular service Suspension of discharge of volunteers and conscripts

Very young

Appreciation Categories of of the 1>ersonnel interested measure l in the measure

Employment at the end of complete training cvcle Employment at the end of complete trainiug cvcle Ready employment

H igh

Reserve Officers Short-Tenn Volunteeers Conscrints Officers and NCOs in auxiliary or reserve positions Discharged short-1crm volunteers and conscrints Reserve Officers Short-Term Volunteers

Scarce

Conscripts

Certainly

Regular Officers, NCOs and Enlisted Men Reserve Otlicers Shon-tenn Volunteers and conscripts

u_ nwelcome

Unwelcome, with the exception of some volunteers Welcomed by some individuals little inclined to he nensioners Very low

Regular Officers, NCOs and Volunteers

All categories (auxiliary, reserve, i discharoed I

NOTES:

(1) Measures 1, 2 and 3 are based only on voluntariness; the others, in any case, are coercive_

(2) For recalls concerning personnel with special skills, t.o be recruited among civilians, it is necessary to contact COMFOTER, Military Regions and [uspectorates

service terms, increase in recruitments, discharge freezes, etc. (fig. I). Measures other than recalls are not very suitahle for facing w1foreseen crises, since they depend upon contingent situations (e.g. inclination to voluntary service). They will have to be adopted, nevertheless, in the extreme case of a serious shortage of reservists. The FRl"J, in its tum, should be subdivided into two large components: one made up by younger reservists, i.e. the real Completion Force(FC), and another made by older reservists discharged from the FC - that

would be recalled only on extreme national emergencies (fig.2). The FC should be equal to TO (Fe+Vc) considering that: • TO is the established slrength; • FE is the actual strength of the existing units; • Ve are the adual gaps, statistically equal to 10% of the established strength. The completion needs are calculated in relation to the type of gap, we have to fill, the type of crisis we have to face and the time available to confront both. This time, albeit now much longer as compared with the past limits,

RESERVE PERSONNEL FOR COMPLETION

could nevertheless turn out to be scarce in some circumstances, in particular when it is difficult to find elements \,vith special professional qualifications, or when unexpected training needs come up, mving to a \,\:Tong evaluation of the reservists' training level. THE COMPLETION FORCE RESERVOIR/FLYWHEEL

The FC reservists are contained in a Reservoir/Flywheel (SIV), automatically managed so as to meet the completion requirements relevant lo all categories, ranks, specializations and jobs (fig.3). The SN includes lwo compartments: • a main compartment, that includes the DAR reservists, who are the volunteer component of the FC; • a secondary compartment formed by 1'TDAR reservists. The reservists of the main component are required to confirm tl1eir DAR status at least once a year; the NDAR reservists can move to DAR status at any time, and join the main SN compartment. This division into compartments, purely formal, permits to have the numerical and qualitative perception of the FC readily available for the most tffgent recalls. Within each cornpartment the reservists are assigned to special "cell.s" according to their caiegory

Fig. 2

(officers, NCOs, troops), rank (lieutenant, captain, etc.), Branch/CoqJS (infantry, artillery, etc.) specialization (tank driver, swveyo1~ informatics assistant, etc.) and operational readiness (high or scarce). The indication of the operational readiness level is necessary also in order to schedule the training recalls. The auxiliar·ycategory officers, NCOs ,md enlisted men fonnerly on regular duty, and the civilian reservists designated as officers, NCOs and enlisted men after a militarization course, automatically join the volunteer component of the FC. It would be desirable to fill all the gaps with DAR reservists (optimal solution) and have recourse to recalls of NDAR reservists or other alternative measures (discharge freezes , exceptional recruitmens, etc.) only in situations of serious emergency. The S/V will be capable of carrying out its ta5k only lb.rough a "minute by minute" updating, obtained by means of a permanent "recording" of every reservist in the two compartments; this .means that each updating must be the staiiing point of successive elaborations, according to an intuitable and logic chain process. But the possibilities offered by informatics permit to activate a FASC process and therefore to organize and carry out, in real time, the activities for the actual

completion of the units. As a matler of (acl, if lhe output is the completion of the existing units, the input will be provided by the reservists available in the FC, whose number could rapidly be determined in relation to discharges, DAR, actual strength and other conditioning events. The system will permit to know in real time, for each category, rank, job and specialization, the possibility to fill the gaps in the existing units in relation to the establishmenl tables, and to detennine: • elements and Lirnes necessary lo fill the residual gaps through compulsory measures; • global and individual trainingrequirements; • convenience or opportunity of starting again the search within the S/V, modifying the requirements of the necessary pers01mel (v,rithout changing the DATABASE). The system, besides evaluating and updating data without need of frequent controls, will adjust the preparations for completion to the different requirements that could came up both during the annual review or in particular crisis situations. It \.\,i ll also he capable of arranging the completions by modules. The existing Command/ Organization/Units are responsible for issuing - through computerized cards - the elements necessary to form the data base of the system's sofu.vare, i.e. the number and type of their gaps (Vi and Ve) and the data concerning the discharged personnel that can be assigned lo the FC (for instance, those who have become unfit for military duty must be excluded). Each card must include: Rank, Branch or Corps, personal data, DAR or NDAR, job (assailant, artillery pointer~ sapper; etc.), courses attended (informatics, foreign languages, etc.) and any other useful data (professional qualification, activities carried out, etc.). Once the DATABASE is electronically acquired, the system

processes the data and gives its indications on the possibility of completion of the units, in both figures and percentages. Obviously, one can t ry to increase these possibilities by repeating the electronic search after reducing the DATABASE. As shovm at fig.4, the Army Staff, having acquired the DATABASE, decides on the most convenient "input" to fill the gaps in units X, Y, and Z, fixing the possible prio1ities of the necessary meastffes . If the number of DAR is sufficient to fill all the gaps, the response will be technical, and provided by the automated data processing; if, on the contrary, the adoption of coe r--cing measures is necessary (recall of NDAR reservists, compulsory extension of service, etc.), the solution ·will have to be of a techno/political nature.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM

According to Law no.25/1997, the organization for the completion of the Armed Forces must be based on the folio-wing c1iteria: • voluntariness: availability of motivated personnel, reliable for their psycho-physi cal attitude and operational read iness, immediately employable; • quality: the recalled serviceman should be employed in the job carried out during his military service, or in case there were severa l, in the one \.vhere he shovved the best perfom1ance; • simplicity: the envisaged proce dures must be cl~ar, unequivocal, realistic and highly au toma ted, therefore easily implemented . Considering the criteria listed above and the struct u re of the central and peripheral organs of the Conscription, Recru itment and Mob il ization sector, it seems convenient to centralize the completion organization by automatizing its main functions (DAR monitoring, SN, preparations,

Fig. 3

SCHEME OF RESERVOIR/FLYWHEEL

/ / / / /

/ /

./ / / /

.,,

/ ./

-·

:::, :::, :::, =>

DAR

/ ~ - ..

:-.

/.,

_/ ./

1/ :/

/ /

/ /l,I

./ ' /

l/l/

I/ ;

/ , /v V

/ / / J

~DAR

I/ ,_./ /

///./ .// /

DAR "cell" /

:/ :/

/ /

% i ,f

lY ~ ,

i'\UAR"ccll"

it /

:}~ '

"CELLS" OF THE COMPUTERIZED FILE OF DAR AND NDAR SUBJECTS

The homologous DAR and NDA R cells contain data relevant to specific: - CATEGORY (Officers, NCOs, E nlisted men); - RANK/GROUP OF RANKS; - BRANCH/LOGISTIC CORPS; - JOB/SPJ<:CfALIZATION; - OPERATIONAL READINESS.

etc .) . For this purpose, it is necessary to redefine the functions of various bodies - through organizational and technofunctional changes - overcoming the clear-cut separation between managerial, executive and inspective bodies . In particular, the new organization should assign: • manage1ial fonclions (plus some executive ones) to the Arrny Staff, the Carabinieri General Command, COMFOTER and the Inspectorates; • executive-only functions Lo the Military Districts, Unit Hqs. and Carabinie1i Stations; • inspective functi ons to the

Military Region Commands; • support functions to the Conscription, Recruitment and Mobilization Directorate, the Military Ordinariate, the High Council of Military Magistracy, the municipal administrations (for the reservists' personal data), the Branch/Corps Associations. The Carabinieri General Command is interested in the completion organization, both for the infonnation and recall activities concerning all reservists and for the completion of the Carabinieri units. Among the completion activities, a preeminent rnle is played by the Army Staff, the Branch and 99

Fig. 4

EXAMPLE Of AUTOMATED ELABORATIOi'\ OF COMPLETION DATA C O MPLETrO~ SU B,JECT: COR POR AL/CAVALRY/AMO-CAR LEADER/HIGH READI N ESS SPACES TO BE FIU, E D

U ATABASE

Unit "X" : 125 Unit "\'11 : 104 Unit "Zn: 9 (

FILLING l'OSSIIIILITIES DAR R eca lls; 180 (I )

N OAR Recalls: 340 (2)

Total:320

Tolal :7.JO

Oth("r mC:)SurL's: 210 0)

RES ULT OF 3 DIFFElm:"IIT IN PUTS TIIAT COULD BE IMPOSF.0 BY TH£ ARMY STAFF'

1st INPUT

linil

DAR

:-IDAR

8 60

45 44 SI

Il>AR 3 rd INl'lJT 1 recalls and1

2 nd INPUT recalls and other measures

recalls only

other measures

N O PRIORITY f••UOA.IT\' "X" UN IT

:-10 P1uo1t rI

NO l'RIORITV

l'JUOI-U'fy .,X.. llNl1'

Uu.il

IWAR

74 66

tJo.il

DAR

l'-'DAl<.

Unit

DAR

"1 4!~ !,U '1',!,

t25

50 40

DAR

'- t ()l11tT

Unit

Nl>ARIM~~:;nl

22 20

I I

24 28

I I I

Unit X

v DAR 125 30 25

M?~!1l::~s I 45 44

60 40

I I

01hcr .\lca i:u 1"<'~

NOT ES: (I) Priority must alway~ he gi\,c n to reservists who don't need refresher training. (2) Coercive recalls which could be :-tlfernacivc to other measm·c~. (3) A frcqucnrly ndoptcd me;1sure is the n>lunrnry or cocrci\'C extension of c<mscription.

Logist ic-Corps Units and the Military Districts (in that order). The functional centralization conforms to the present tendency of creating, for ·e ach territorial macrofunction, a unitary national organization , avoiding the subdivision by geographical areas. The realiability of the completion system depends largely on the correct and con tinuous DAR monitoring, divided in two phases (fig.S): • survey on the number and type of DAR personnel, conducted by the units as regards the servicemen about to be discharged, and by the Military Dis tricts for those already discharged, who will be given the opportunity to confir m, cancel or offer their DAR; • elaboration of DAR data by lhe Anny Staff and Military Districts. They detemline the number and type of the reservists available to the FC and "place" them in the appropriate "cells" of the two SN compartments. While the Army Staff directly 100

elaborates the data on the volunteer reservists (inclusions, confirrnations, cancelJations due to renow1ciations or unfitness, etc.), the Military Distr icts work on the data concerning the non-voJunteer reservists, trasmitting them to the Army Staff for the subsequent updating of the SN. Each monitoring act ivity ends with the updating of the reservists' records by the Military Districts, which also send any useful data on the FC to their Military Region Command, to the appro priate Carabinieri local Commands, to the local Section of the Branch/Corps Associations and to the interested municipal administrations. THE RESERVISTS' TRAINING

In order to be a full member of the FC, a reservists musl be well prepared to cany out his task. His training level is mainly affected by the time elapsed since llis discharge or the last training recall, as well as by the significant changes occurred,

dwing the same period, at the wlit to which the reservist is destined. This is particularly true if th e changes concern weapon systems or very sophisticated equipment. When the time elapsed is short (less than two years) and lh e changes occurred are minor, the reservist, upon his operational recall, can directly join the w1it of destination, where he improves his readiness through very shor t training periods; otherwise, he should a ttend a 2-3 week preliminary course at a Branch School or another m.ililary Institute. In order to realize a generalized updating of the Completion Force, and especially of its volunteer component, the training activities must be conducted, without interruptions, also during the periods of international "fair weather". If possible, recalls for this trailling should be scheduled by unit and organized by modules, taking into account the subjects availabJe for the various lask.s and the training requirements. Each training cycle

Fig. 5

CENSUS OF RESERVISTS

ARMY STAFF RGPF

=> DAR RESERVIST LISTS

\~ E 0A X R

i'\·--~~

"'-:-·\-:. . I

~\ N

• "

i"\ D

·~ <l:l'V , /

F, R

r· t

DAR RESERVIST

G~t

DAR RESERVIST

,l / ~

,,.Iii•

•

/"~ ~-v1/. .$ ,~ I

MIL DIST NDAR LIST

XXX

REGIONAL .MILITARY COMMAND

.; .>

LEGEND:

Update res situation

Useful Info for census Successive reservisb' options

aimed at generalized updating - to be programmed during the ammal definition of the completion measures - should grant the reservists a good operational readiness for at least two yems. To optimize the activity aimed at updating the reservists' preparation, it would be appropriate to employ regular Cadres with recent operational experien ce, and to schedule short, intense and practical t:ra.in ing cycles; theoretic lessons should be envisaged only for the in -depth study of weapon systems, sophisticated equipment, new techno-tactical and logistic regulations, and lo acquire a good knowdledge of the techno-tactical and logistic norms for the employment of new weapons. Nonnally, al the star1 of a crisis foreboding a possible intervention, be it peacekeeping or otherwise, the need arises of gi,,ing the "ready'' reservists an "ad-hoe" training, aimed at completing their preparation in vie\.v of the purposes of the operation, the natural environment and the political,

economical, social, ethnic, religious tensions existing in the area. This special training can last from a minimum of 2-3 clays to a maximum of 2 months (in case of Peace Support Operations). If shortages c:u·e found in the DAR com partment of the S/V, concerning particular jobs(doctors, engineers, interpreters, computer operators, etc.) they can by replaced by equivalent elements without any previous military experience, who accept to become DAR reserv.isls and to attend a militarization course. At the end of the course, they acquire the "status" of office1~ NCO or ShortTerm Volunteer and DAR reservist. Thus , t hey can be recalled for completing the units. In order to fill the gaps in other jobs (tanker, sappe1~ gunner. etc.), these tasks can be entnisted to other DAR reservists, after the attendance of a sh01i retraining course. Finally, the officers' refresher training. This particular training takes p lace when the reservist officers show a serious lack of

theoretical and pratical knO\vledge on the new equipment and weapon systems, and on the most recent changes in the employment procedures of their units. As a matter of fact, these notions are essential for any officer (even NDAR) destined to be a member of the Completion Force. PREPARATION AND STAGES OF COMPLETION

\,Vhen a requirement of completion turns up - be it important or marginal - an i.J.1sb:ument capable of promptly meeting it must automatically come i.nto operation. The annual arrangements for completion are the appropriate instruments, in that they envisage a number of measures and procedures (the so-called "drawer decrees") which permi t to start, develop and conclude the completion activities. The recall provisions include the reservists' personal data (name, rank, job, readiness level, etc.) together with 101

Italia n personnel and equipmen t engaged in a NATO mission.

the indication of the gaps they arc going to fill in the units. The annual arra ngemen ts are worked out on the basis of the technical data provided by the SN, of the completion assumptions as well as of poli tical and social considerations, especially when coercive measLu-es are programmed. The arrangem en ts' scope and complexity vary according to the numerical/qualitative ratio between the number of reservists in the S/V and the gaps to fill, wh il e thei.r reliability essentially depends on how accurately the DAR subjects and the 102

exsisting gaps were monitored. The a rrangements are worked out by the Army S taff, \V h ich avails itself of the data provided by COMFOTER, the I nspec torates and the Military Districts, taking in to account the availability of funds and other secondary factors. In particular, the Military Districts' tasks are: • t:rasmission of the recalled reservists' da ta and relevant destination units to the Carabinieri Commands and to th e local sectio ns of t he Branch/Corps Associations;

• dispatch the Destination Notice Lo a ll recalled reservists . The notice wi ll also includ e t he reporting modalities and th e indication of the Agency where t hey rnust go for medic a l examinations; • inform reservists of the annual training recalls for gene ralized updating; • prepare the Recal.l Cards to be sen t at the mon1ent o f the recalling orde1: All information relevant to destination and recall can be sent by any modern means of communication (Email, telephone, mobile radio, etc.), provided that an assLmmce of reception is gu::1ranteed. The arrangements for completion are vaLid for one year, at the end of ,vhich they must be upd ated accor·ding Lo the possible vaiiations occurred (i .e . organizational changes, different locations, vaiiations in the denomination of Commands/Agencies/Units, etc.). In times of international calm, the sou nd.ness of the various measures should be controll ed through periodic exercises and, in case of anomalies or d ifficul ties, their causes musl immediately be ascertained and t he necessary corrections adopted . At the firs t forewarnings of a crisis which could entail a military intervention, the A1my Staff (fig.6): • d esignates the u nits to be employed and evalua tes the possible d eve lopment of the mission in time and space, as well as the cl i fficullies deriving from the distance between the crisis area and the nationa.1 territory, the weather and environment conditions of the region, the satellite coverage, etc.; • verifies the s ui tabili ty of tbe measures envisaged in t he arrangements and, if necessary, improves them; • initiates the actions for the completion of the units concerned,

Italian paratroopers on patrol in East Tim.or.

pointing out the exact starting time and the rime available to complete the who.le operation; â€˘ issues the training directives for the "ad hoe" training. T he completion could follow different steps, according to its duration: if there is no urgency, there will be tests aimed at ve1ifying full validity of the complet ion arrangements, detailed activities for "targeted" updating, officers' courses, etc.; in case of urgency, only the essential activiUes will be carried out, envisaging, for instance, to carry out the "targeted" updating at the units to be completed, and d ispatch the recall cards by courie1: Any inconvenjence in the course of completion must be reported and removed irnmediate ly; in this respect, the activity of the Military Regions and Military Districts is particularly important, since they have to control the flow of reservists from their areas of responsibility to the units. VOLUNTARY RESERVISTSNEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The DAR reservists' recall to arms aims at guaranteeing the ready and certain availability of efficient cmd well prepared men. In the past, with coercive mobilizations, this was someth ing one cou ld not expect to achieve easily. The Voluntary Reservist fonnula, albeit foreign to the Itali.an military tradition, can have the hoped-for effects only if some motivational and socio-economical conditions are realized. The motivational drive tmvards DAR normally arises in su bjects who, during their military service, lived through useful and exciting experiences on the human, ethical and practical plane in efficient u nits with a hea lthy esprit de corps and guided, of course, by

charismatic and professional Commanders . This drive can be fostered by the Associations, if they are capable o[ becoming great aggregation poles of former servicemen and an exclusive interface between the Army and the civilian world. The Branch/Corps/Category Associations, besides favoming the socio-cultural interests of their members, should keep in contact ,vith all discharged servicemen, in order to have them become a compact group, willing Lo join the vo lu ntary reserve . The best opportunities for this activity ar-e the traditional national meetings, demonstrations of new weapon systems, important trammg activities, visits to units engaged in peace missions, etc. An important conLribution in this direction can be given by the press, especially the specialized one (Rivista 1\llilitare, etc .) through periodical publ ications for the volunta1y reservists, dealing with their training and other subjects of interest (nevv weapons, organizational innovations , humanitarian laws, NBC threat, medic.al a id, etc.) One can presume, in fact, that a voluntary reservist wou ld be very interested in updating and improving h is

militmy knowledge. Radio and 1V can a lso provid e a s im ilar contribution with interviews, debates, talks with the audience, etc. But it must also be considered that the voluntmy reservists, being active subjects in the completion process, accept a "status" ,..vhich en Lails ob ligations, risks and hardships, and are therefore entitled to financial compensations and social f,rtiaran tees, as well as to some other benefits, be they norn1ative or of any other kind. The financial compensation should nol be considered a pay but rather a reward, and could take the form of an annual or biennial voluntary service reward, proportionate to the seniority attained as voluntary reservist; the rewards could by given by a mi litary agency or even by the reservists' employers, who would not only be reirnbursed, but indeed gratified for their cooperation (in the U.K. this type or reward has been in use for decades). The reward for voluntary service cannot succeed in encouraging the DAR reservists un less appropriate social guarantees are provided for. First among them, the intem1ption of the reservists' employment upon their recall. This problem does not concern 103

Fig. 6

COMPLETION OPERATIONS SMF. RPGF - RIP

xxxx

COMFOTER

NORMATIVE ADJUSTMENTS

COMl'Lt~rtOI\' OROf.R • Commands, Bodies. Units to be complct<'d • Time ~,vailnbJe .. Vari4tions ro existing norms

Units to be com1>lctcd

._·_ T_ra_in-in_g,_·,q_u_ire_"'_'"_"_.J

1st MIL

RF.C

--!]

==u

I __ j

~ -· -

,' )\ '-•

.-\

' '

C.\RABl:Xlf.RJ

STATIO.\:

L ____ _

+-·-.--~

•

.'Jon-nc and

r<•mo,·("d from FCV

LEGEND:

Complelion Order

Rel·.-tU notifications for rescrrists

- - ·· - - - -""'-, ..,.. Influx of rrst•rvists to Commands. Uodics and Units

------...,

· _ , .... Cont'r-olaC'lions

f.xch:rn~e of data on Complerion npns

civil servants (who are fuUy guaranteed) but worries those engaged in private sectors: they may fear that being DAR reservists may turn into a handicap for the preservation of their jobs (especially in medium-small companies); the independent workers, p~·ofessionals and businessmen could be reluctant to declare themselves as DAR, fearing that the absences caused by their recalls could jeopardize the competitiveness of their firms or professions. These remarkable impediments can be removed only by equitable laws involving some financial burdens. As is the case with officers and 104

Beyond the intrinsic financia l advantages, \.vhich very often are shorL-lived, their very existence gives the voluntary reservist the proud feeling of being still "part of the system".

NCOs in the auxiliary and resen1e status, also the voluntary-reservist. enlisted men could be considered for promotions in relation to their duty as recalled personnel. Similar!)~ the voluntary reservists could be offered the possibility of frequenting military clubs and resorts, shopping at Commissa1y stores and military pharmacies, receiving medical assistance at the military medical instalJations, etc. Finally, it would be rather convenient to grant special travel reductions to par1icipate in the annual meeting of the Branch/Corps Associations, or to attend important training exercises and military celebrations.

The nevv system for completing the units needs an organic legislative support capable of assuring its operation. The existing, and still valid, legal regulations musl be integrated with other rules concerning the voluntary reserve; in other words, there must be a nonnative symbiosis aimed at regulating: • constitution and tasks of the Completion Force, and categ01ies of reservists destined to join i l (volunteers or not); • training activities (recalls to arms) necessary to keep Lhe FC at an acceptab.le operational standard; • "status" of the voluntary reservists and their social protection (preservation of jobs); voluntary service rewards; • remuneration of the reservists employed in private sectors (professionals, tradesmen, businessmen, etc.); As we mentioned before, the social and economical nor·ms concerning the reservi.s ts engaged in private sectors are extremely important for the good operation of the completion system. As regards the preservation of jobs, the law presently in force (no. 370/1955) deals \.vith the subject, and in some cases refers to the most favourable non11s contained in the labour contracts; litlle or nothing is said about the facilitations [or the employers ·willing lo hire voluntary reservists, whose absences could interfere with the company's production; in other words, there should be an adequate compensation for their "wilJ.i.ngness to be \.Villing". This nom1at.ive gap could be filled by envisaging, as a compensation, tax reductions, facili.tations .in contracts with the government, etc.

In any case, very effective laws on th is subjecL can be borr o,,ved from other countries (United Kingdom, France, e tc.) where Lhe voluntary reserve has been a fact for a long time. Despile the efforts lo adopt the clearest possible n orms, t he possibility oC legal disputes cannot be ruled out, conside1ing the great number of differen t relations existing among the various subjects involved in the completion activi1:y; suffice il to thin.l.( of the relationship betvveen the voluntary reservist and the Defence Administration, or between the lat ter and private employers. In order to se llle any possible controversy, a Board of Arbitrators shou ld be appointed, directly subordinate to the Prime Minister's Office. This atypical legal inslr um enL cou ld take the fo r m o f a Consolid a tion Act which , as is knovvn, facilitates the consultation and inlerprelalion of the norms. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

In order to perfor m its inst itutional tasks, taday's Anny must have a reserve of men ready to meet the most unexpected requirements of completion of lhe existing units, i.e. a Completion Force that , albeit reduce d in compaiison with the great masses mobilized in the pa st, rn.usl be quantitatively composite and well trained, considering the wide range of jobs - many of which highly spec ia lized - env isaged by th e organization of the operational land units. The FC can be described as the sum of different subjects - selected by category, rank, branch, job, specializa tion, ecc. - sufficient to fill the institutional and conlingent gaps, and to face an y need o f rotation and/or replace m e nt of losses. The pei-cenlage of DAR subjects present in the SN can be a measure of the reliability of the FC; if it does not reach a 100% optimum, at least it

ACRONYMS 0

COMFOTER

Comando 路delle Farze Terrestri

land Forces Command

DAR

Disponibile Al Richiamo

Volunlory Reservist

Dislrello Militare

Military District

FASC

Formazione Automalizzato dei Soggelli di Completomenio

Aulomaled Training of Complelion Subjects

Forze di Completamenio

Completion Forces

FCV

Forze di Completomenio Volontarie

Voluntary Completion Forces

FCNV

Forze di Completomenio Non Volontorie Non-Voluntary Completion Forces

Forza effetliva

Acluol Strength

FRN

Forze di Riservo Nozionali

Notional Reserve Forces

NDAR

Non Disponibile ,.:\I Richiomo

Non-Voluntary Reservisl

SME路RPGF

Sialo Maggiore Esercilo - Reporlo Prograrnmaz. Generale Finanziaria

Army Stoll, Financial Plans Division

SME路RIP

Siato MaJigiore Esercito - Reparlo lmpiego el Personale

Army Stall, Personnel Employmenl Division

S/ V

Serbatoio / Volano

Reservoir/ flywheel

Tabelle Organiche

Eslablishment Tables

Vuoti Contingenti

Contingent Gaps

Vuoti lstituzionali

Institutional Gaps

VFB

Vo!ontori o Fermo Breve

Short-TermVolunteers

VSP

Vo!ontari in Servizio. Permanente

Regular Volunteers

should equal the number of voluntary reservists averagely needed in the most recurring types of crisis (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo). But this objective is illusive mil.ess the appropriate conditions for the DAR options are created, tlu-ough the pr路ovision of financial benefits and social guarantees for the voluntm-y reservists and compensation for the employers compelled to accept the damages deri,,i ng from the reservist's recalls. Fmthenn ore, the reservist should never be mixed up in btn-eaucratic complications or defaults that could d iscourage his DAR attitude. On the contTc\l)~ he must be constantly and

exhaustively informed about the problems connected w ith his engagement (work, family, etc.). The comp letion system of the existing units must be supported by a constantly rene:\-ved and trained FC, made operational by the three keyorgan izations (Army Staff, Military Districts and existing Units) , imple-Q,_':~.!!_ng, correctly and flexibl)~ the completion mrangements. This solution, which is atypical if we compare it with the traditional structural schemes, facilitates the information dialogue between the key elements of the system and the reciprocal control of data. Besides, it permits to adopt relatively simple 105

Removal and disposal o{ explosives in former Yugoslavia.

solutions and to find and correct in time anomalies and malfunctions, obtaining moreover savings in the system's management. The heaviest functional burden falls upon the Army Staff, which is responsible for the general direction and control, the coordination or the activities or the Military Districts spread throughout the Country, the direct management of the SN and the annual planning of the completions. At peripheral level, the Military Dist1icts arc, a5 in the past, Lhe vital point of the system, since they monitor the DAR reservists residing in their area, update their records, issue the recall orders - according to the completion anangements - and direct the recalled ser-vicemen Lo their units after the medical examinations. All these comp lex activities can only be entmsted to highly professional personnel. On the contrary, the Units' activity is reduced, since they are no more required to produce their own completion arrangements, but are only responsible for the correct and timely trasmission of the data concerning the discharged personnel and the difficult-to-fill gaps in thei r- organization.

The functions concerning the completion of the units (from DAR monitoring to the completion arrangements) can easi ly be automated, and can interact thanks to the centralized and tripolar configuration of the system. The automation must be based on a very accurate software, if we want to achieve optimal results as regards the numerical and qualitative level of the FC and the rational use of the resources provided by the voluntary reserve. Even the most t1ivial defect in the software can thwart the many

organizational and promotiona l efforts made in order to improve the quality of the completions ,md to encourage the establishment of a volunta1y reserve. The completion system can be credible only if it p uts "the right reservist" in "the 1ight place". This means that the reservist must have all t he requ isites prescribed, including a good and upda ted preparation. The general upd ating of the discharged servicemen requires a great organizational effort, ovving to the difficulty of reconciling t'wo conflicting aspects of the problen1: the heavy training burden deriving from the continuous evolution of equipment, weapon systems and employment procedures, and the need to avoid long and frequen t training recalls that could da1nagc the reservist's working activity, and lead him to give up his DAR. ft is therefore advisable to schedul e short and intense training periods, counting on tl1e voluntary reservis(<; interest in improving his leart1'ing and on the possibility of supp01ting

Kosovo: Italian i\t! I 13 APC passing a British m.ilitary convoy on 1he road

w~.

106

An ;lPC shortly before its deparlure from a mili1a1y base in Kosovo.

his training with modem teaching aids and advanced communication means. Like many other innovative processes, also that regarding the completion of the existing units requires the employment or advanced technology (informatics, cybernetics, telecommun icat ions, etc .), w hich is indispensable for speeding up the acquis it io n, updating, verification and exchange of data, in order lo sirnpli fy th e procedwÂˇes and increase the training and informative effectiveness. lt is easy to understand, for instance, the importance of e-mail to take care of the la rge communication flow that w ill nm between the key elements of the system, or the Âˇusefulness of an Internet site that could be contacted by the appendices of the system and by all the FC reservists. Radio and TV are also very important, in that they can be employed to encourc1ge DAR, propagate useful information and support the n--aining activities. As r egards the financial requ irements for completion, acqui s it ion and storage of

equipment and weapons, they can be considered dose to zero, while relatively high arc those for training (including completion exercises), incentives and compensations for the reservists; the credibil ity o r the new system ,.vill depend also on the adequacy of its financial support The functional requisites desired for the systen1 correspo nd to the efficiency requirements common to all modern operalional systems, and therefore they should be aligned to similar systems or the s ta te organization and of the Defence in pm-LicuJar:

The demands for regulations on the matter can be met by connecting the norms already in force for the old mobilization with the new n.des, taking into account the peculiar aspects or the voluntary reserve , as well as its socioeconomic implications. The latte1~ among other things, refer to the reward for voluntary service, to the elimination of the compensation inequalities existing among the different categories or recalled personnel (public employees, private wor kers, professio nals, businessmen, etc.) and to the relationsbip between the voluntary reservists and the Defence Administration. Th is normative picture can be valid for all Services, prescinding from the technical solution adopted by each of them for completing their- units and formations. In short, the system outlined here is one of the last goals \Ve have lo reach in order to complete the prncess a imed at giving a fully professional character to the Italian Army.

D 1 '

Lieutenant General (ret.)

Kosovo: ;,Ceniauro" armoured car on

patrol.

107