Issuu

CONTENTS

"1umber Three 191>'> Scptembet - October "lovemher -December

Rivista M ilitare aims at broadening and updating t he technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of p ropagating the m ilitary way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at inform ing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

Politics, Economics and Strategy

Tod ay 's operati o nal c o ntes t s. main ly multina ti o na l and ;multiservice, enhance the function Iof the individual sold ier and his personal responsibility.

2 The Italian Armv on the Threshold of the 21 sl Century ( Presemation by f he Ch ie( of Staff of Lhe Army al 1he Cemre for High Defence Srudies)

, Supplement to numbers 5 a nd 6 of Rivista M ilitare Italian Ed itio n

10 Hungary. The New Army Intenriew with the Am1y Chief of Staff (Enrico Magnani)

' ~ditor in Chief: 3iovanni CERBO

22 The Non-Governmental lntenmtional Organizations

FOUR-MONTHLY

: Management and Editorial Office 8, Via di S. Marco 001 86 Rom e Phone 0039 0647357373 Advertising Care of the Secretariat 1 of Rivista M ilitare ' Phone 0039 066795027 Printer Fotolito Maggio 00010 Villa Adriana - Tivoli Tel. 0774 .381922 - Fax 0774 .509504

Photoprocessing Studio Lodo li Phone 0039 065898780 Subscription and forwarding By mail , Law 662/96, art. 2, para 20/c , Conditions for 1999: One number: Lit. 4,000 - Euro 2,06 One back number: Lit. 8,000 · Euro 4.12 Subscription rates I Italy: Ure 22,000 a year Abroad: Lire 30,000 a year I Payment must be made on postal , account No. 22521009 • SME Centro pubblicistica dell'Esercito 123/A, Via XX Settembre • Rome Residents abroad may remit payment through bank cheque or ' international postal order

Authorized by the Court of Rome under No . 944 of the Registry by ' Decree 7-6-1949

(1\11assi1110 Paniz.z.i)

38 Bersaglieri for Peace The "Garibaldi" Brigade in Kosovo 44 Conflicts in the World (Ornella Rota)

Science, Technology and Training

The Army of the Future. Development Plan 54 Operational Modules or the Manoeuvre Forces The Combat Function (Claudio Graziano)

70 Peacebuilding Operations (Pier Giorgio Segala) 78 The New Doctrine of the Am1y (Dome11ico Zucaro)

History 88 Roman Emperors. Gaius Julius Caesar (Carmine Fiore)

100 Roman Emperors. Octavian Augustus (Carmine fiore)

109 Sommaire - Inhalt - Resumen

1999 © Copyright by Rivista Militare

~ @ 1

ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE STAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA

The prod uction of this magazine has been supervised by Omero Ram pa

Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee t he highest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves contributors ample freedom , though it does not necessarily share their opinions. The Author is thus solely responsible for the articles which, published unedited and withol, t editorial ties, exclusively reflect his personal ideas. Articles must be original in thought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (European Military Press Association) periodicals. Articles should be accompanied by suitable photographs, illust rations, explanatory tables, together with a photograph of the Author, a brief «curriculum vitae» and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves the right to change the title of articles and choose the typeface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging. In orcler to make the production of the articles more expeditious, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides the text on paper, also the diskette with the text files of the article. Any system and t ype of computer can be used .

THE ITALIAN ARMY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21th CENTURY The project for the adaptation of the land instrument to the integrated planning model Presentation by the Chief of Staff of the Army at the Centre for High Defence Studies (Palazzo Salviati, June 21, 1999) Last year, on the occasion of the traditional conference held in this Centre, I deemed it appropriate to frame my presentation within a systematic examination of the elements which characterize the reference operational scenarios, and t herefore of the conceptual elements under study at the Army General S taff in order to define, in general terms, the policy which would condition the organizational evolution of the land military instrument in the early 2000s. Today, we see a confirmation of the general situation described last year, that can be sum marized as follows : • revaluation of the Army and, in more general terms, of the military instrument, as a concrete expression of the Country's willingness to participate in the construction of a European project of security and defence; • awareness of the validity of the "combat-approach" criterion in devising and preparing the operational instrument, as well as in defence of the national interests, wherever threatened; • need to pursue, in a more and more determined way, the capability of integration of the instrument, from both the joint and the multinational point of view; • necess.i ty of choosing - considering the lack of a threat definable in advance and the presence of diffused risks - the planning and organizational "task oriented" criterion; • more and more widespread consensus, at politico-institutional level, for a totally professional Defence Model.

In view of this, today's presentation intends, in particular, to concretely illustrate - albeit in a broad outline - the project for adapting the instrument to the integrated planning model, a model recently approved by the Defence Minister, which in substance outlines the general architecture of the Army in the 21st century. The project, on the other hand, is susceptible of adjustments, in relation to the developments of other projects, such as: • the measures for the replenishment of the units, considering the reductions in the number of conscripts in some regions, with indications on the desirable introduction of the figure of the one-year volunteer; • the possible evolution of the project into a totally professional organization, even with the "minimum-option model", meant as the last dimensional evolution of the integrated model, still capable of ensuring the performance of the tasks assigned as well as maintaining the structures envisaged by the model. • The project for the adaptation of the land instrument to the integrated planning model is a further step in the process, started in 1997, of redefinition - in conceptual and organizational terms - of the Service and its different components, known as "Operational capability packages", and is the natural development of the "Service Directive on the planning objectives up to 2005 and the programming objectives for 1999-2001" which, based on the general planning objectives described by the "Reference document for planning" (1998 ed.) of the Defence General Staff, fixed the Army's medium - and long-term planning objectives, defining the programmatic objectives that are the intermediate targets of the entire process. Therefore, the project pursues objectives which are in line with the DGS document, the 1999 Ministerial Directive as well as with the Government's recent bill on the constitution of entirely professional Armed Forces. In particular, the general objectives of the project for the adaptation of the Servi ce to the integrated planning model are: • 1st objective: realization of a "mixed model" based on 137,000 men, with the necessary flexibility, considering its

possible evolulion, within 5-7 years, to an "entirely professional model" of about 128,000 men; this could be achieved through the reduction of the structures now dealing \\lith the recruitment and training of conscripts, leaving unchanged the strictly operational component.; • 2nd objective: attribution to the forces of the operational capabilities envisaged by the "Capability-packages project" and realization of the relevant organizational sLruc.ture, whose characteristics are: •• flexibility, obtained through the applic.ation of the ''task organization" concept; •• sustainability, achieved through the realization of "capability reservoirs", consisting of basic ''employment modules" capable of can-ying out specific operational functions, whic.h provide the elements for the assembly of the necessary formations; • 3rd objective: rationali,.ation of the general support components, in order to increase their effectiveness and achieve an adequate ratio between the operational component and the mere structure of general and administrative support. In short, the pu1vose is to define and detail the concrete measures necessary [or achieving of the planning objectives just described, envisaging an employment of resources compatible with the model of "integrated planning (137,000 men of the mixed model), wh ich could also permit - without further project studies, but rather with programmed reductions - the transition to the professional model or 128,000 men. More in detail, in terms of personnel, the resources made available for the Army by the mixed model amount Lo 137,000 men, subdivided as follows : • 12,050 Officers; • 27,500 NCOs; • 97,450 enlisted men (47,470 volunteers, the others consc.ripts) In the "professional" model, instead, they amount to 128,000 men, subdivided as follo'ws : • 12,000 Officers; • 26,000 NCOs; • 90,000 enlisted men (45,000 professionals, the rest three-year or one-year volunteers). The illustration of the project will be conducted with reference to the well-known functional areas: operational, school/training, logistic support and territorial area. The last three areas, which constitute the Army component in charge of the general support to the operational forces (the "superstructure"), will be examined within a unitary picture, aimed at achieving both more rationalizations (and, as a consequence, saving of personnel) and a great.er streamlining of the Service's top-level organization. Let's start with the operational forces. The conceptual framework for their determinalion is provided , as previously mentioned, by the document on "Operational capability-packages" which, together with the "Army operational concept" fixes: • operational activities; • categorization of the forces; • primities of the forces in view of their preparation. As far as the operational activities are co.n cerned, they can b e summarized in the tasks deriving from: • partic.ipation in the common security system \.Vi thin the 1st and 2nd joint missions (i.e. defence of the national territory, of the air/maritime lines of communication and collective defence of the Atlantic Alliance); • contribution to international security and stability within the 3rd joint mission (i.e. participation in multinational operations in support of peace and collective secu rity); · • presence and surveillance on the national territory within the 4th and 5th joint missions (i.e. contributio_n to the safeguard of the free institutions and the ·welfare of the population in case of disasters). In relation to their categorization, the operational forces have been divided as follows: • projection forces (2 division-level headquarters, 4 Brigades and relevant tactical-logistic support units, whose priority tasks are at present connected with peace-support operations, but are capable of conducting traditional operations: these same forces are also suitable for the Italian participation in the construction of common defence and security in Europe ("European defence identity" or "European pillar" of NATO); • reaction forces for NATO's "Immediate Reaction Forces" (IRF) and "Rapid Reaction Forces" (RRF), quantifiable in a division-level headquarter, 5 Brigades (two of which included in the projection forces, a manoeuvre group and relevant tactical-logistic support units, for the conduct of traditional operations; • presence and surveillance forces, which comprise the two remaining Intermediate Operational Commands, 5 more Brigades and relevant support units, for the defence of the national territory. As regards preparation, sustainance and allotment of resources, the following priorities have been assigned: • 1 to the projection forces; • 2 to the reaction forces; • 3 to the presence and surveillance forces. As regards the projection and reaction forces, it should be underlined that they a.re a fundamentally homogeneous whole in their composition and characteristic.sand therefore destined, with time, to constitute a single block of forces, in relation to the progressive replenishment of the projection forces, and subsequently of the reaction forces,

\.vith volunLeer personnel. The size of the Commands and Units produces an important reference concept for planning the operational forces, the so-called "Division for Europe", whose denomination means that they are forces - as I just mentioned - that can be put at Europe's disposal, as Italian contribution to the policy of common security. Of course, "Division for Europe" is not the name of an organic unit, hut rather the expression of a "concept" which takes concrete form in the general availability of a body of forces able to set up a division-level contingenL (2 Brigades plus support units), sufficienLly flexible in relation to the scenario (l or 2 theaLres with different environmental and operational characLerislics) and sustainable for long periods of time (capabiliLy of rotation), i:e: capable of meeting any security requirement outside the national borders. The "Division for E urope", therefore, is the concepl which materializes the Army's choice of the "task oriented" system, as is Lhe case in the other European Nations: this is proved by the missions of the recent years in the Balkans. The "Division for Europe", which as a whole will be able to draw, in the present transition period, from a reservoir of established forces consisting of 2 Intermediate Operational Commands, 8 Brigades and support units, is therefore the "hard core" of the Army's operational component, able of rneeLing any foreseeable option of employment. Considering that the operational component consists at the present time of 110,600 men, in order to reach the troop s trengLh mentioned earlier (97,000 - 90,000 men) .iL is necessary to plan the reduction of about 20,000 organic positions, since this permits to maintain a ratio, between the operational forces and the remaining areas, almost near to the present one (approx. 2:1). Evidently, in order to make a reduction of this magnitude in the operational forces it is not sufficient to proceed to the requalification and rationalization of the units, but we will have to proceed also Lo a further harmonization of the various components and consequent streamlining of a certain number of organizations, mainly support units which, no more compatible with the "mixed" model of the Army (137,000 men), in the general economy of the Service appear to he less important, in order not Lo jeopardize the overall capability of the instrument of performing its tasks.

In detail, in both the mixed model (137,000 men) and the professional model (128,000 men) the 13 Brigades are the present ones, 9 of which (1 armoured, 2 alpine, 1 cavalry, 1 paratroop, 1 airmobile, 3 mechanized) are manned by professionals and 4 (I alp_ine, 1 mechanized, 2 armoured) by conscripts. As a whole, it is a sufficiently balanced and harmonic instrument, which should he improved in its armoured component, now reduced to the essential. The reference principles for the reduction of the operational component, which in practice reflect what has been discussed so far, can be summarized in the pursuit of the following criteria: • confirmation of the validity of the "Army's Operational concept" for the general planning of the land military instrument; • preservation for general employment of the complex of forces included in the "Division for Europe" concept and in the Basic-Branch manoeuvre Regiments; • conferment of flexibiliLy and freedom of action to the operational area, in order to absorb the possible transition to the professional model; • adopLion at all levels of the modularity concept in the preparation and employment of the forces.

• • • • • •

The same considerations are true for the criteria that the Service intends to adopt for a harmonic reduclion of the operational area, which ensue from the following measures: rationalization of the organization of Commands and Units, with a complete revision of the organic structures; centralized organization of tactical and logistic supports; availability of C2 resources without restraints, through the constitution of Planning Commands; this concept will he better clarified later; resort to the activities of replenishment of the existing units; maintenance of the already professional units; pursuance of a harmonic distributions of the units on the territory, taking into account the possible recruitement areas.

After having mentioned the restraints imposed on the development of the concept, let's proceed with the analysis of the individual components of the operational area, starting 1.vith the command and control structure (C2). At the present time, when we see more and more often situations of employment characterized by the use of "framework" and multinational formations, the C2 capability becomes the most critical one. In fact, the Force Commands are increasingly employed with only a part of their own "manoeuvre" units, and are complemented with units of other contributing Nalions. Therefore also in line with the often-mentioned "task oriented" principle, one should create a permanent capability of assuming the direction of the non-national forces participating in multinational operations. A further reason confirms the need to have at one's disposal C2 capabilities greater than those strictly necessary for an exclusively national instrument, i.e. the usefulness of having a fly-wheel of resources, in order to absorb possible 4

''peaks" of operational activity that could occur owing to particular and unforeseeable international situations, such as the present one, where the Service is engaged with Brigade-level headquarters in three different operations in the Balkan theatre and, at a lesser level, in a fourth theatre (Middle East: UNIFJL) .

As we said, al conceptm:il level it would be useful that the C2 capabilities be free frorn the normal attributions connected with the ordinary management of the subordinate units, thus permitting a high flexibil ity of employment - at full-staff, functional -cell or individual -element level - envisaging the constitution of division-level Planning Commands, which we shall call Operational Projection-Commands, with no dependent u nits in normal situations, therefore h-ee from the duties connected with the preparation of the forces, charged with the planning and conduct of operations outside the national borders. These "pure-employment" Staffs would be adequately supplied , when needed, with modules of Operational Forces of various types, drawn from the reservoirs containing the necessary capabilities (principle of "task organization"), This solution has been fully adopted by the French Army and is now under study in other NATO Armies. The solution proposed now is therefore a conceptual trend which must be gradually transformed into organizational solutions, also in the light of the organizational decisions made or to be made by the allied Nations, with which, at this point, we are called to operate at permanent level. Hence the Command and Control development lines of the Army's Operational Forces based on the abovementioned criteria, envisage at short/medium term, an organization based on: • 1 Operational-Forces Command; • 2 Projection-Forces Commands, only for planning and conducting operations outside the national borders, with no directly dependent forces; • 2 Defence Commands, for the preparation of the forces and their employment on the national territory; the 13 Brigades, more evenly stationed on the national territory, will be subordinate to them; • 1 Support Command, for the demultiplication of the Command and Corit.rol activities with, as subordinate units, 5 tactical-support Groups, (land artillery, A/A artillery, engineers, C4IEW and Air Cavalry) and a CSS Group which aggregates the adherence logistic support elements. In pract.ice, compared with the present situation, the evolution would involve the constitution of two Planning Commands - obtained through the transformation of two existing Intermediate Operational Commands - and the redistribution of the subordinate Brigades between the two Defence Commands, respec tively located in the northern and southern part of the Italian peninsula. As regards C4 support (command, control, communications and computers), the capabilities devoted t.o the projections for long-distance connect.ions between the home country and the operation theatres will be concentrated in 2 signal Regiments in support of the projection; those destined lo the realization of the area communication networks (network support) will be concentrated in 2 signal Regiments of tactical network, while the infrastrnctural ones will be joined in 3 infrastructural Regiments (North, Cent.re and South), with areal responsibilities. The C4 support area will also include the "TLC works" sector, which will be rationalized envisaging a structure organized on: • a National Agency in charge of the uriitary management of the "TLC works" branch, included in the C4IEW Command; • peripheral organs of control and verification. All these units will be subordinate to the C4IEW Command. The "manoeuvre forces" and RSTA components \.viii not undergo substantial changes in the number of Regiments (41 "manoeuvre" and 5 RSTA) compared to the present situation. On the other hand, the utility of redistributing units from north to south, in line with the criterion of harmonic distribution of the units on the national territory, makes it expedient to envisage the change of garrison for 3 Regiments from north to south and the transformation of 2 Recruit Training Regiments into wholly professional manoeuvre-Regiments. The Special Forces component will be subjected to organizational measures aimed at achieving an increase in the Army's capabilities in this sector, which has become particularly sensitive in the light of the lessons the Service has learned during the numerous international missions carried out in the last decade. The theory currently under study envisages the following general measures: • organic adaptation of the "Col Moschin" 9th Assault Paratroop Regiment, .in order to give this unit the capability of originating the Hq of a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF); • training and operational transformation of the "Monte Cervino" Alpini Paratroop Battalion into a "Rangers" Battalion; • organizational transformation of the 185th Artillery Paratroop Regiment into a "target acquisition" Regiment. The land-artillery component will undergo upgrading and reducti.on measures which take into account the capabilities made indispensable by the new scenarios such as, for example, the growing need of specialistic capabilities of NBC defence against the threat posed by the arms of mass destruction, as well as of "target acquisition" capabilities

for the execution of in-depth precision attacks. The "land artillery" instrument will include 13 Regiments, in part subordinate to the Artillery Group Command o[ the Land Forces for the tasks of general support, and in part included in the Brigades, for direct-support tasks. As regards lhe antiaircraft artillery, its reorganization will be centred on the availability of an efficient C2 system, capable of directing the employment of A/A syslerns with different capabilities (integrated defence at very low, low and medium altitudes) according to Lhe modern "duster" concept, or lo that of the A/A Artillery Tactical Group, integrable, when necessary, \Nilh Command and Control systems of another Service or Nation. ln relation to this, the "HAWK" antiaircraft Regiments have already the necessary C2 capability for the management of antiaircrafl clusters, availing themselves of Command Posts employing a valid system for air-space control. As regards the A/A component, a centralized organization is being adopted, putLing all the resources necessary to meet the reference operational assumption under a single organization, i.e. the Antiaircraft Artillery Command of the Land Forces. The Engineers component ensures a capability that, in the modern operational scenarios, with particular reference to "other-than-war military operations", assumes a greater importance; its tasks are enlarged and comprise activities which go beyond the normal support to military units and are directed towards the population, including, for example, mine-clearing, restoration of civilian infrastructure and assistance to civilians. Hence the need to adopt a new organization, permitting the transformation a nd, in general, the better use of resources, intervening especially in the sector of command and control capabilities. The organizational solution adopted is, on the whole, that of centralization, placing: • the resources for specialistic support (railway men and pontoneers) and general suppo11 (pioneers) included in the Engineers Group Command at Operational Forces Command level; • the resources for direct support (sappers) at Defence Operational Forces Command level. One sector where reductions are not envisaged, compared to what has already been carried out with the recent constitution of the airborne Brigade, is that of the Army Aviation (today's Air Cavalry). In the field of air mobility, with the establishment of units of different levels (Brigade, Regiment, company) the integration of the capabilities of the "manoeuvre" forces with the general-support helicopter component is increasingly required, especially as regards the heaviest units. The Air Cavalry, therefore, is only partially centralized, in order to b etter meet the abovementioned requirements of integration. It is a complex of units that by 2015 will include about 260 aircraft (between airplanes and helicopters), many of which very modern, such as the A- 129, NH-90 and the machines under study for replacing the AB-206, AB-4 12, A-109,in the ESC role and CH-47 in the ETM role. Another sector which does not undergo substantial reductions is that of "information and electronic warfare", which takes on a particular importance owing lo the "efficacy multiplie/' of this capability on the entire spectrum of military operations. The organization of this component will be strengthened through rationalizations and transformations of existing units which, because of their high specialization, will be centrally managed by the C4IEW Command. On the other hand - in order to meet the operational requirements under study, aimed at giving the cavalry Brigade better RSTA capabilities, not only at tactical-reconnaissance level but also in the electronic dimension and in the indepth reconnaissance with drones and RPVs - in the future the subordination of some of these formations and helicopter units could be reconsidered. Moving to the logistic sector, the new logistic organization of the Service results from the recent application of the new criteria relevant to the adoption of the "Reference Logistic Concept" whose basic elements are: • realization of a model of unitary management of the logistic resources necessary to replenish and sustain, for relatively long periods, the projection of the Forces outside the borders, through the application of the concept of the logistic "Great Base", whose cornerstone is the physical and logical connection between the Operations Rooms of the suppor1 and adherence logistics located at home which should be logically connected with the equivalent elements deployed in the Theatre; • careful planning of the logistic activities at the various levels; • marked specialzation of the logistic organs only in sectors where this is deemed necessary and profitable, together with ample recourse to commercial services when possible. It is worth remembering that the new logistic organization provides for an instrument established on two levels: • support logistics, subordin a te to the Logistic Inspector; • adherence logistics, under the Commander of the Operational Land Forces. In particular, since at adherence-level the various logistic units carry out activities of equal complexity, the existence of intermediate command-level - such as the Intermediate Operational Command and the Brigade - is now considered functionally unjustified, unless they are used as reservoirs of resources, necessary to adapt to the mission the capabilities of the units of a specific formation, according to the often-mentioned "task organization" principle. Hence the advisability to centralize the logistic resources of adherence, adjusting their overall capabilities to the reference operational hypothesis. Other measures concerning the operational area are connected with the rationalization of the in-gan-ison units, 6

through extensive recourse to catering for victuals and to external contractors for cleaning and maintaining, also in emergencies, the infrastructure and the relevant technologic systems. In short, as a who]~, the operational instrurnent envisaged for the inte!lrated model, in its two variants, mixed (137,000 men) and professional (128,000 men) is as follo·ws: ~ • 1 Operational Forces Command; • 2 Projection Operational Commands; • 2 Defence Operational Commands; • 1 Support Command; • 13 B1igade Headquarters; • 5 "Combat Support" Group Commands (Land Artillery, AJA Artillery, Engineers, AVES; C4IEW); • 1 "Combat Service Support" for adherence logistics; • 102 Regiments/Independent Battalions (46 for "Combat/RSTA", 47 for "Combat Support", 9 for "Combat Service Support". The objective of the reorganization of this area, which was already remarkably curtailed, is a reduction of approximately 2,500 men (to 46,500), equal to 34% of the total volume of the mixed integrated model, in line with the standards adopted by most NATO Armies. The reductions will be made through the simplification of the structures, aher determining the homogeneous functional areas that can be put under a single management for the whole Service. A delicate aspect of the reorganization of the superstructure will be the qualitative reduction of about 4,800 Officers and NCOs. This can be partially offset by e mploying regular volunteers, especially within the school/training structures. At the summit organization of the Army, subordinate to the Chief of Staff, there are 4 Commanders/Inspectors (Operational Forces' Commander, School-, Branches-, Logistics- Inspectors), responsible for specific sectors, and 3 Commanders, with similar responsibilities, distributed on the territory (Northern, Central and Southern Military Regions). With reference to the first sector, it is possible to simplify the two areas in charge of the preparation of personnel (Schools Inspectorate and Branches Inspectorate), by unifying them. Actually these sectors carry out different but complementary functions. As regards the Military Region Commands, some of their purely logistic functions in the medical and administrative sector could be assembled in the Logistic Inspectorate and some others, as we shall see, could be homogeneously grouped in areas more fitting to the organization of the forces. The school/training sector, as I m entioned, will be simplified and rationalized, envisaging the constitution of a sole organization for the management of the ~ector (called, for the time being School/Branches Inspectorate), which will include the two preexisting Inspectorates and will carr-y out the following functions: • training of personnel; • formulations of norms and procedures of employment; • experimentation of procedures of employment and new materials/equipment/weapon systems; • simulation and validation of the operational capabilities of Commands and Units; • contribution to the development of new weapon systems and materials. The school structures will be optimized by establishing, when possible and suitable, "logistic-administrative support poles", obtained through the union of preexisting bodies. All Schools and Training Centres will be subordinate to the Inspector and grouped according to their functions . · Still in the school/training area, the increasing professionalism of the Service will most likely necessitate the constitution of another Volunteer Training Regiment in addition to the present five. This will be made necessary by the suppression of the units in charge of the incorpor a tion and initial training of conscripts - such as the Conscripts Incorporation Centres and Recruits Training Regiments· with the ensuing reduction of about 4,000 positions. The logistic support area will be included in the process of simplification of the territorial area in terms of assumption of executive r esponsibilities in the medical and administrative sectors, which at present are subordinate to the Military Regions. In the administration sector, the objective is to establish a National Administration Directorate - directly subordinate to the Logistic Inspector - responsible for all the activities whose centralization is considered possible and convenient. In the medical sector, the objective is to have a structure which, compatibly with the availability of personnel (doctors and paramedics in particular), can ensure the activities of: • basic and preventive medicine at the units; • legal medicine on the territory;

• specialistic medicine, hospital.ization and treatment; • contribution to the selection and recrui tment of personnel. For organizational purposes, the managerial and executive organs of the Medical Service will depend on the Area Logistic Commands. Prerequisites of the new organization are an increase in the decision-making au tonomy or the Medical Service Officers at the units, as well as an ample recourse, when possible, to the structures of the National Health Service. AnoLh er measure for the rationalization of the support.-log.islics area could be the o utcome of a project, just being defined by Lhe Log.isLic Inspectorate, which in substance provides for: • centralizat..ion at t.he Ma.inLenance Poles of all the relevant activities, carried ou t making use also of the capabilities of the AVES and TLC SupporL Regiments and CERIMANTs; • reduction of the supply bodies and simultaneous efforts to cut down stocks, also through their automated management. Tn substance, the new logistic instrument will be organized as follows: • in the experimentation area: 1 multifunctional Centre; • in the maintenance area: 4 Maintenance Poles and TLC Support and Air-Cavalry Support-Regiments; • in the supply area: 3 yards for vehicles and materials, 2 supply and maintenance Centres (CERIMANT), 2 commissary supply Centres (CERICO), 2 POL depots (large capacity), a limited number of ammunition depots. Within the abovementioned process of simplification, as far as the territorial area is concerned the objective is to assign the residual functions (infrastructure and State property; conscription / recruitment / mobi).i7.ation, relation with civil authorities and administrations, contacts with the media, promotional and presidial activities) Lo 2 National Authorities - subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Army - whose responsibility extends over the whole national territory.

In particular, the struclure dealing with infrastructure and State property will have, besides the responsibility for the maintenance and development of the infrastructure and State-property yard of the Service, also that of the direct management of the infrastructure no longer in use. This direct responsibility will gradually be extended to all infrastructure, taking this task away from the Commanders for good. The dimension of this structure is strongly cond.itioned by the high number of the infrastructural elements no longer necessary, but still managed by the Service. Th e solution of this age-old problem 'Nill permit further and more radical s impl ifications of the area. The structure, in its final configuration envisages: • an Infrastructure Inspectorate, created tlu·ough the transformation of a Military Region Command; • Areal Infrastructure Commands and Infrastructure Commands, obtained through the transformation and rationalization of'bodies already existing in the infrastructure sector. The second national-level structure will deal - as I said - with selection, conscription, recruitment, mobilization, relations with civil authorities and administrations, contacts with the media, promotional and presidial activities. The organization will be realized by m aking recourse to the structures of the existing Military Districts and Regional Military Commands, with remarkable savings in the support e~ements~ The final configuration will be: • one Inspectorate for Recruitment and Mobilization Forces, obtained through the transformation of a Regional Military Command; • interregional and regional Recruitment and Mobilization Commands, obtained through the transformation and rationalization of existing Bodies. A number of measures concerning the employment of personnel, mainly conscripts, are made necessary in order to adapt the land instrument to the integrated-planning model just described. These measures· are needed to cope with tl1e shortage of conscripts due to the effects of the law on conscientious objectors, to the norms providing for the employment of conscripts within their region (max.100 km from home), to the provisions in favour of the areas hit by earthquakes or floods, to the too-preclusive use of medical profiles, to the confirmation of the requirement of strong contingents of auxiliaries for the Police Forces (constantly growing, especially for the Carabinieri). All this, in addition to the sharp drop in the birth-rate, typical of our society, and the consequent keen competition among the Armed Corps for the recruitment of young conscripts. As a malter of fact, the shortage of conscripts in the northern and central regions - due to the reasons listed above together with their redundancy in the south, cause an unbalanced situation between the needs and the possibility of filling the units in the north. Presumably, this imbalance will become worse with time. At the same time, it is necessary to optimize the employment of the available volunteers, both to offset the shortages and to permit the (possible) transit.ion to the professional model, taking also into account the present unavailability of the expected number of volunteers, due to the reduced number of "vocations" and to the not-so-fast replenishment of the Regular Volunteer contingent, in order to avoid the premature ageing of the personnel entrusted with operational tasks.

A possible corrective measure co uld be that of replenishing diffe rently, the c.:onscript uni Ls destined to professionalization a nd the conscript units e nvisaged only within the m ixed "137,000 model" . In practice, the purpose is to concentrate the growing shortages in some units, reducing to the min imum the loss in the overall operational capability of the Service. • Therefore, we will have ui1iLs capable or expressing operational capabilities, and others generally unable to do so. Some of these measures will imply the adoption of temporary solutions of employment of the Office rs and NCOs o f the "under-replenished" units, in o rder to avoid the risk of their underemployment and c\e motivation. With regard to this, two different solutions have heen singled oul: • as concerns the u nits n ot oriented to e xpress s if,rnificant operation al capab ilities, the Officers and COs not employed will be included in "out-of-area employment packages" for PSOs, as staff elements and observers or, as an a lternative, in "instructor packages", for lhe employment at Schools and Volunteers Training Regiments; • as regards the units destined to express operational capabilities, albei t limited, and subsequently LO be largely professionalized (not less than 60%), the Officers and NCOs not engaged in the training of the active elements of the Unit will atte nd refresher and updating courses. As regards the e mployment of volunteers, it is essential to achieve the objective of completing the projection p ackage by the year 2000, the reaction package by 2005 and, ahenvards, the progressive replenishment of the general support areas. The proposals made by the Service on 1.he institution of the "one-year Volunteer" fit into this picture. Th is possibility will concern, when it becomes a fact, the young people willing to perform a qualify ing duty without commitling themselves for a considerable length of time, as would be the case with the three-year term. The one-year volunteer, in substance, is a conscript willing to serve for 12 months, witho ut restraints about destination and employmen t., and h is pay will be egual to 50% o( lhe salary of the short-term volunteers. This kind of enlistment should permit to partially offset the shortage of conscripts and, mainly, to ach ieve a natural progression in the com pletion of the volunteer rolls. NO\-v, let's come to the conclusions.

The different measures described will enable the Army to continue the gradual process of rationalization conceptually commenced in 1997 with the pwpose of achieving - albeit in a framework of ever decreasing resources, particularly in terms of personnel - the objectives of operational capability fixed by the "Reference Document for Planning" ('98 ed.) issued by Lhe Defonce General Staff, and deriving from the tasks required by both the international and national situation. As concerns times, the measures for the reorganization of the units will have to be applied as from the beginning of 2000, a nd take concrete form: • for the operational area: by the encl of 200 1 (not considering the transfers of garrisons, which will take place when the infrastructural conditions arc suitable); • for the general-support areas: by the end of 2003. I would like to underline the incidence of this transformation on the tissue o( the Army. In terms of positions, the adoption of the 137 ,000-men m ixed model produces a reduction of app roximately 22,600 men (14% of the present strength) roughly subdivided as follows: • 11,200 between Officers and NCOs; • 11,400 enlisted men. The red uction, after the passage to the 128,000-men professio nal model, would be o( 31,600 men (20% of the present strength), subd ivided as follows: • 12,700 between Officers and NCOs; • 18,900 enlisted men. Although some of these positions do not correspond exactly Lo physica l persons, clearly the dime nsions of the reduction are such that its impact on the organizational structure and the individual components of the Service is very strong. For this reason, a convin ced and active participation of all members of the Army, Commanders at all levels and p1ivates, appears absolutely necessary in order that this further significant transformation La kes place at the times a nd in the manners appoi nted , so that the Arn1y of the 2 Js t Cen tury is timely and fully capable of m eeting the cha llenges and carrying out the role entrusted to it by the Nation. The Army needs the collaboration of all. I trust in it.

L ieutenant General Francesco Cervoni

The meeting enabled us to acquire a good deal of information on the efforts made for the structural and operational reorganization of the Hungarian military land instrument.

technica l transfoi-mation has been started; we corn menced the elaboration of the doclJine for the land forces and lhe draft of the new regulations; we lake an active part in the military programmes of the PfP, which are a remarkable help to our integration process. What are the priorities of the Hungarian Army in orde r to achieve interoperability with the allied units?

Before

starting

job,

General, Hungary has become an offi cia l member of the Atlanti c Alliance. Could you summarize the programmes under way for the integration of the Hungarian Army into NATO?

One of t.he main fore ign-policy obj ectives of the Repu b i ic of Hungary is the integration within Europe, and in partic u lar the adhesion Lo the European Union and NATO. The organizat ion I lead certainly has a role and very important tasks in this field. It is necessary to give mili tary sub stance to th e integration measures. Conforming lo military practice, 1 prefer lo expound concrete data a nd summarize the mea sures adopted so far. Taking the NATO structures as models, we have reorganized the Army Staff which is now able to communicate and cooperate wit!, the Staffs of the other member Countries - as well as our command system and m inor units. As regards the latter, a rather long process of structural and 11

Commander fixes a priolity order, pointing out the most urgent tasks and the ones that can be carried out at a later time. Clearly, in the present conditions o( peace, we cannot overburden the economy of our countries, but it is also clear that the great number of tasks require a certain caution . I believe tha t NATO is perfectly aware of the situation: dur ing the various meetings a rnong NATO partners, the fact that integration is a long process has always been underlined. It is a process in ,vhich it is necessary to establish a priority order of the tasks to be carried out. Such an order permits to take a maximum advantage of the resources available, and helps the operators, charged w ith a quantity of urgent problems in the performance of their duties. I m u st plan the work for th e best use of the human resources. Therefore, we need to draft a real list of priorities. For example: • to real.i1.e i n tellectua l and technical compatibility (this is the most di fficult part, because we do not deal with machines or tools, but w ith military men w ho , as individuals, think in different ways and express different interests); • im prove the knowledge of languages; • obtain the national support; • organize a high-level. commandcontrol-com rnunications system; • integrate the antiaircraft defence with NATO; • set up ready-intervention land forces and rapid-intervention forces; • organize the exchage of information. Nowadays many allied armies give great importance to the participation in peace-support operations. \\That are the present engagements of the Hungarian Anny in this sector?

This is a pert inent and topical ques tion, but I would like to 12

complete it, stating that not only the Alliance, but every progressive country, and Hungary among them, attributes a great sign ificance to the peace missions. Hungary wants to participate in the strengthening of the European security, and o ur Army takes part, in proportion to our rneans, in the peace missions of the UN, NATO and OSCE. At the beginning, we participated in the UN rn issions only as observers. A great step forward was ma de in 1985, when we sent a basic unit to Cyprus, in the framework · of the UNFICYP mission. The Austro-Hungarian co llaboration of th e successive years put us in the present condition of sending on a mission a company-level unit (1 07 men) . Another significant resu lt w as achieved in 1995, when Hungary was assigned military police tasks,

Above. Russian-made 122 mm 2SI "Gvodiz/ca" self-propelled guns. Facing page.

Acrobatic para.troop-drop with "wing profile" parachute.

carried out by 38 e.lernents specialized in this sector: One of the greatest chalJenges of the past years \VclS the participation in the IFOR-SFOR mission, organized and conducted by NATO under tl1e UN aegis. In that mission, the Hungarian Armed Forces, and the Army in particular, proved their capability of working under NATO guidance, successfully caffying oul their tasks. All these missions involved the participation of hundreds of Officers and NCOs. One of your Engineer battalions is playing a very important role in the NATO Multinational Force in Bosnia. Do you envisage further foreseeable engagements,

possibly in defence of peace and stability? To give you an answer, T would further subdivide the question: what could be the tasks of an Engineer battalion? What tasks can be assigned to the Army? ln the futurÂˇe, the economy of the resources and the operational rationality of NATO will lead us to tack.le new tasks, whose nature will be established by the Government. I can assure that we are gell ing ready lo meet all the new challenges , which will not be only the technical ones. Our main purpose remains that of proving, with the performance of professional tasks, that we are able to cooperate with the NATO Nations. For instance, the Hungarian technical contingent, stationed at Okucani, Croatia, is included in the SFOR mission , and is shO\ving its capability of carrying out, together with the Allies, its Peace-keeping assignments. We want to express our will without assun1ing a provocalivc

attitude but with determination. For peace we arc ready lo take on an active role, even at the cost of making sacrifices if necessary, in this area of Europe \vhere conditions are so clifficu]L. We expect similar professional diallcnges a lso in the future. At present, the Engineer battalion is e ngaged in the construction and maintenance of bridges, in particular on the Sava and Bosna rivers, not only fo r the requirements of SFOR, but also for the civilian population. The technical battalion takes care also of the maintenance of a pontoon-bridge, and is building another in the Doboj area. ln the immediate future we will have to put back in operation several military bridges built in 1996, which are in need of technical overhaul because of the .heavy trÂˇaffic. Our battalion is directl y subordinate to the Corps, and one of its tasks is that of assuring at all times, winter included, the pracLicability of the roads assigned. Such a job, in Lhe Bosnian mountains, can last for rnonths.

Besides the technical tasks just mentioned, the Hw1gaiian battalion is also engaged in removing the debris of destroyed buildings, thus cont1ibuting to the reconstruction of the Country.

Hungary, together with Italy and Slovenia, is preparing a new multinational force, whose Headquarters will be in Udine, Italy. Although not yet assigned to NATO - since Ljubljana is a partner of PÂŁP, but not a full member of the Alliance - do you believe that this force will strengthen the solidruity among the Nations close to NATO, in a region where there are stilJ elements of instability? The accord on the creation of an Italian-Slovenian - Hungarian multinational force was born at a meeting in Budapest on September 21-23,1998. On that occasion the executive agreement was reached, and was at the basis of the trilateral agreement signed by the Defence Minister of the three Count1ies in November 1998. The next steps of this \Nork will be aimed at preparing the participating forces, \.vith exercises that Âˇwill take place each time in a different Country. This is in itself already a form of collaboration. The trilateral force does not belong to NATO, but this does not make its role less important. Suffice it to think that also within the PfP, as shown by the tasks and exercises carried out so far, everything depends on the cooperation among the participants. Collaboration in the performance of the duties is the base of success. My direct answer to your question is: yes, I believe that the Trilateral Headquarters can strengthen the cooperation between NATO and the bordering Nations. It is a plain answer; typical of a soldier, but 1 have a question for you too: what could be the ultimate purpose of the collaboration between NATO and a group of Nations, partners of the 14

Alliance, whose aim is the strengthening of European security, if it isn't the reinforcement of world security? Our relations can only be improved not by preparing ourselves to fight against each other but , on the contrary, by continuing our exercises, in order to achieve the best cooperation in maintaining peace and security.

Within the concept of the "capability packages" of a Service, the new doctrine gives a growing importance to the surveillance of the battlefield, the acquisition of data and information. What is the situation of the Hungarian Army in this area? The new doclrine describes the

,I~ -

Above. Historical uniforms. Facing page. Army female personnel at the encl o( a peacekeeping exercise.

Below. 122 m.m artillery piece.

.·

"""":

•

~~~-=·:

road that through dialogue, collaboration and colleotive defence capabilities, leads to security, combining the political and military elements of NATO's policy. This doctrine is an integral part of the Alliance's strategy, and offers forms of cooperation to the Central European nations on their way to democratization. In the changed conditions of security, the new military strategy describes not only the existing challenges and risks, but also the potential. ones. The capability of rapid reaction in case of crises or risk situations is deternuned, among other things, by the effectiveness of the recorm.clissance activity. ln order to meet this requirement, the members of the Alliance need a unitary and sound system for the acquisition of data and information. Clearly the other members of NATO are much mo r·e advanced than we are, since they can avail themselves of both Lhe national and the NATO systems. Linking up with various great-capacity

data banks they can gather precise information and electronically transmit them to Commands at all levels, both in peacetime and in the course of cr-isis or war: The Hungarian Supreme Military Command is aware of Lhe high priority attributed to reconnaissance \.vithin the "capability packages" and has already taken the measures necessary to implement the directives of compatibility and interoperability (it is a question of learning and adopting NATO's reconnaissance bases and procedures, using the computer and transmission systems, updating the information acquisition system, making systems and procedures compatible in order to connect them with each othe1~ and setting up the elements necessary for the forecast and warning system). Our conunitment has been underlined also by the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces in his presentation on the occasion of the meeting of the NATO Military Commitlee in May 1998, to which also the three Chiefs of Staff of the Nations in 15

the adhesion phase were inv ited for the first Un-1e. changes will be produced by the adhesion to NATO? \ \1hat

We have analyied with care our present capabilities, and made proposals for the rnodernization of structures, equipment, technical instruments and elements for the acqu1s1t10n of data and information of Lhe Am1y Staff, in order to be able to work well also in the changed security conditions, both nationally and within the Alliance, as well as in cooperation with other organizations of the member Nations. We have no shortage of human resources. The professional preparation is constant, in particular as concerns the reconnaisscmce forces. l n 1999 we have commenced the preparation of the infonnalion-reconnaissance system by creating the conditions of compatibility with the con-esponding NATO systems; this phase of Lhe process will be

concluded by the end of the year 2000. Taking into account the financial prob lems, we shall concentrate our attention mainly on the modernization of the equipment and techno-scien Li [ic i nsLrumcnts already in our inventory. We wi.11 probably deal with Lhe units after 2003. Which are the elite units of the Hungarian Army? There is never been a distinction of this kind amongst the troops of the Hungarian Armed Forc es although, with the performance of different tasks, a healthy spirit of competition exists among the units. In any case a special mention is deserved by the 34th Reece Battalion, the 88th Rapid Interven tion Battalion and the 25th Mechanized-Artillery Brigade which, in the last years, has proved many ti rnes its capability of cooperating also with Czech and Polish units . l n this perspective, I can say that

Above. Air-cooperation exercise with an Air Force 1'vll 17 "Hip" helicopter. Left. Training with a D44 85 mrn antitank gun.

all the formations earmarked forÂˇ the multinational contingents are elile un its. How long have female personnel been in the Army? 16

What are the roles assigned to women? What problems were caused by their inclusion in the Service? The Army, because of its special commitments of a moral, physical and psychological nature, is a traditionally male institution. Throughout history, women's main task has been that of taking care of children and the household. 'With time, separate professions have thus taken shape: i ( a woman chose

a typically masculine job, she ,vas considered with bewilderment, almost as a kind o( witch. This was true also for the Anny. On the other hand, women have taken up arms in many crit ical moments of Hungarian history: for example, Katica Dobo and the women of Eger castle in 1552, Ilona Zrfnyi , who for three years (1685-1688) defended Munk.lies castle, "Lieutenant Maria" who, disgu is eel as a rnan, fought bravelv., durinÂ°0 the liberation war

(1848-49), etc. Anyway, the tragic hurnan losses sufferecl during the two World Wars, modernization and the democratization process have modified the conception of fighter and soldier. Th is occurred also in Hungary. Not only physical qualities have acquired importance, but a lso the intellectua l capabilities. This, in the Army, has produced jobs that can be carried out by men and woJT1en alike. I refer to .Medical Serv ice , 17

Education, Administration and Perso1mel. Therefore we had lo review the entire mobilization system, in order to make up for the losses suffered in the two wars. The military service for women is regulated by laws which speci(y what tasks they can carry out, both in peacetime and in lime of war: vVomen have always been present in the Hungarian Arrned Forces albeit, up to W\VII, in a limited number. The transformations in the Anned Forces laid the foundations for a new economy of human resources. Following the example of NATO , the ratio between Officers and NCOs has changed, and voluntary service has been introduced. The Constitution and the new Regulations provide the legal frame,.vork for these changes. Since the end of 1995, the Above.

Mechanized in{anliy with BMP 1. Left.

ivlilitary ceremony at an infantry unit. Since 1989 the old militarv traditions have been rediscovered. Âˇ

number of women in the Army has increased remarkably. Many serve in Headquarters as non commissioned officers. At the operational un its manned by volunteers, ,vomen often carry out typically male jobs (i.e. in antitank, missile or machine gun units) . Many women apply for posts in technical contingents or peace missions. The female perso1mel in the Army works ,,vith honesty and precision. They want to prove their worth and are as re liabl e as the men . A problem is posed by female NCOs introduced into the units without an adequate military preparation, be it basic or specia list ic; sometimes physical characteristics could be a problem as regards, for example, physical-training tests. The employment of women in the Armed Forces does not follow, 18

as yet, precise rules. Often it happens that a female NCO obtains more than a male colleague, since she does .not have the same professional obligations: the fact that she is a woman is considered more important then her rank or her position . In several cases the recruitment of women is not possible for financial resons (quarters, sanitary and recreation facilities etc). Frequently, women decide to join tJie Armed Forces because of social coercion. In the future, we wi ll have to : • eliminate the difficulties connected vvitl1 the increas ing number of women, providing the opportunities fixed by law, so that they can have the same rights and duties as the men; • specifically qualify the female personnel assigned to NATO. Are there plans for the future assignment of Hungarian units to other allied operational Commands, such as ARRC and AMF-L? Is a contribution to the main defence forces envisaged?

•

As is known, in Ju ly 1997 Hungary was invited to join the political and military organ ization of NATO. This means that, once we become full members of the Alliance, we'll participate in its political and military o r·ganization, with al I the resulting rights and duties. My job is just that of preparing the Army for its integration with the Allied Commands. I am not really disclosing any secret if 1 say that there are intense negotiations on the times and ways of the integration. This will be our next target.

the participation of the Italian "Centauro" B r·igade, a Hungarian mechanized platoon from the 25th "Klapka Gyrgy" Brigade and an artillery battery from Szigetvar's 101 st "Zrfnyi Miklos" Brigade. Interoperability was extremely good: the Hungar ian units adjusted ,.vell to the \.vorking system of the Italians, and performed their tasks without problems. The Ttal.ian Cornrnand conm1ented with satisfaction the cooperation wl.h the Hungarian uni Ls.

Can the "Balaton '97" exercise be considered a test for the improvement of interoperability between Hungarian and Allied land forces? What were the "lessons learned" in this type of exercise?

The international scenado has brought about remarkable reductions in the Hungarian Army, as in many others, especially as regards personnel. What were the guidelines followed in the realization of these programmes?

Exercise "Balaton '97" included

The main purpose is that of

Fire training with "Spigot" AIT rnissile sys1e111.

creating Armed Forces based on national traditions in the spirit of democratic institutions, capable of meeting the requirements ty pica l of the encl of the 20th cenLury. In this transformation process, it is important to establish a mi litary organi:t,alion open to future developments, founded on u p -to -elate intellect u a l and technical capabilities. One of the elemenLs of these modern Armed Forces is precisely the Army. The international and internal changes occmTe<l in the '90s, as \vell as the radical transformations on the scene of European security have forced - and made possible - the restructuring or lhe Arrned Forces. First of all, we transformed the n,ilitary instr u men L i n to an "organization for defence". The 19

objective was the creation of a force capable of expressing the Country's capabilities, smal ler compared to the past, but more modern and more credib le. A force able to safeguard the national institutions and interests, to manage low-intensity conflicts, crisis situations and to intervene in case of disasters, lo fulfill the obligations connected with the international treaties and capable of easy integration within the NATO structures. App lying the appropriate legislative measures , Hungary established a mixed system of conscripts and volunteers, dividing its land forces into the following structural elements, which meet the modern requirements: • reaction forces; • main defence forces; • territorial-defence forces and reserve. The reaction forces are constituted by troops on a lert status and by rapid-intervention troops, consisting largely of professionals and contract volunteers. T he main defence forces include the mobilization combat troops as well as those in support. Among the tasks of the territorial-defence forces are the defence of the rearlines and the various services, whi le the reserve forces replace the losses. As regards the future, the tasks of the Hungarian Armed Forces, and of the Army in particular, can he summarized as follows: • safeguard of rree institutions and national security, \vilh a deterrent power; • participation in regional confl icts and management of crisis situations both within and without the territory of the Allied countries; • reaction to attacks against NATO countries. All this can be included in the

following tasks: • colleclive defence; • strengthening of peace; • national security (non -war military operations such as the prevent ion of disasters, search and rescue, fight against terrorism, etc.). The Italian Army is increasing its professional component, and the conscription time has recently been redu ced to I 0

Preparation for fire training wiLh automatic weapons.

months. What is the situation in Hungary in relation to the professionalization of the Army? Will conscription remain in force? Reduct ion of conscription and voluntary serv ice arc an international trend, \.vhich shows

â€˘â€˘

the will to create Armed Forces smaller in size, but more efficienl and on an alrnosl .completely professional basis. Also in Hurwar-v b ..; there is ' 'a ..stron<.r b tendency towards the elimination of conscription and the reduction of its length. As far as the Army is concerned, in 1997, after the conclusion of the qualitative modifications, a nine-month conscription was introduced, while basic and specialized training centres for conscripts were established. Conscription is based on threemonth echelons, which guarantee a regular and cont inuous flow of sold iers to the operational units. This syslem permits to distribute the engagements in a balanced way, as well as to envisage a reserve, necessary in case of mobilization, and periodic call-ups for training. At the present time, the Army consisls of 14,388 conscripts and 3,238 contract volunteers, for a total of 17,626 elements, of \.vhich 6,581 are on training at the various Centres. The conscripts of the different Branches now on duty at the operational units are 7,537; they mix well with the volunteers, and assure the operativeness of the units. The replacement o[ conscripts with volunteers, or soldiers belonging to other categories, would increase the operational capability of Lhe units, but would entail considerable costs. In order to achieve this, it is necessary, first of all, to define the ratios or the Armed Forces' personnel, both in the medium and in the long term. As regards the first phase, i.e. within 2003, we envisage Lhe introduction of about 10,000 volunteers. The institution of the so-called "contract conscription" depends on the political will. This change would influence all the sln1ctures of the Armed Forces, including the reserve service. Last but not least, doubts could arise about the social usefulness of

maintaining conscription. The decisions in this sector will affect the future of the Armed Forces, and that of the Army in particular. But radical changes should be introduced also in other professional fields. It .m ust be specified that conscripts cmmot be employed in irnrnediatc and rapid intervention forces, and that volunteers assure a be tter performance also in peacetime. Âˇ With a system based on volunteers - disregarding numbers - \.Ve would have full-strength units, operationa.1 at all times. An Army no more based on conscription can be gradually realized in the space or 10-15 years, if the government guarantees Lhe appropriate economic resources. In fact, the transformations ,ve

are discussing depend on the economic situation of the Country, the labour market, the conipletion of the integra tion process, the legislative changes, the technical and infrastructural modernizat ion prncess, the training and specializalion system, the career opportunities, the organizational struclures, the autonomous organization or recruitment, the rise of professionalism. We can gradually and successfully obtain a professional military force, only if, on the labour market, we are able to guarantee high-level salaries, equipment and careers, also in comparison to the civilian world.

D ~'Journalist 21

ZATIONS T

he K~sovo cri_sis, "''.ith ~11 its ensuwg tragic reflections, has been emb lematic in highlighting the issue of humanitaiian aid lo Lhe populations suffering the consequences of modern conflicts. The threats that, at present, the international community is called to face, such as regional crises, etlmic conflicts and the u ncontrolled flow of immigrants require frorn of all those who, ,.v ith differenl responsibili ties, work in the context of peace missions a greater and more coorrunated commitment in promoting slability and securily. For this reason, it becomes more and more necessary that tbe military and civilian bodies (both governmental and non governn1.ental) acquire the habit of cooperating in international environments. In fact , lacking adequate coordination, the context in which they operate could become uncontrollable and chaotic. Furlhermore, vvithout precise rules aimed a t rationalizing the functioning of the whole system of relations, even the most comme ndable humanitarian initiatives run the risk of being not only unproductive but indeed counterproductive. Which could jeopardize the result of the entire operation. Th erefore, the civilian and m ilitary authorities engaged in Peace Supporl Operations (PSOs) should have a common goal and,

r·especting their particular mandates, pursue complementary objectives, vvithin the framework of a harmonic and exhaustive prqjecL The necessary precondition for achieving thi s is tb e rnut.ua l knowledge and collaboration of the various actors present on Lhe scene, as regards objectives, roles and working procedures of the bodies involved, getting rid of the prope nsity to see things unilaterally, which is often the modus operandi of institutions, organi1.alions and agencies. As regards the Armed Forces, although Lhe presence of civili a n organizations in the operations theatre is not an absolu te novelty, much can be done in o r der to adjust the necessary coordination activities. This contribution sterns from the awareness that the capability of cooperating ·w ith th e so -called humanitarian organizations is a very important factor· of success that a military Commander must take into account when p lanning and conducting a missions. The contribution derives also from the experience ga..ined dming the recent Peacekeeping miss ions in w hich the Italian contingents \,vere protagonist, and had to face the difficulties due to the scarce mutual knowledge of militar-y and civilian operators. The ol:>ject of this study is to help improve the military personnel's knowledge of the international and non-governmental Organizations' complex reality. In order to pennit a closer approach to the recent developments of the problem, it was useful to contact direcLly some represent.atives of the Foreign Ministry, the U N InforrnaLion Centre in Rome, the Federation of Christian Agencies for Internat ional Voluntary Service (F.O.C.S.I.V.), the CNR Institute of Legal Studies on the International Community and the St. Egidio Comm uni ty. Fu rthermore, the

A 6614 armoured car during the SFOR mission.

Fig. 1

SIMPLIFIED SCHEME OF THE TYPICAL ELEMENTS OF A PSO

collection and consultation of the most updated documents on this sul:>jecl w,LS made easier by the use of the Internet. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS

The typical scenario of Peace

Support Operations (PSOs) includes very different actors, as well as a complex of activities w hich have sorne elen1.en Ls in comm.on, whi le others are very specific to each branch/organization as can be seen in the simplified diagram at Fig.l. Arnong the p rotagon isls of lhese operations we generally find: • national and local autborities;

GLOSSARY INTER ATIONAL ORGANIZATION An inte rnatio na l organi7.ation is a voluntary association of interna tionally acknowl edged subjects, con s tituted through international acts a nd regu lated, as regards the relations among the parties, by norms of international law. It is a stable body, with its own legal organi7.ation, agencies and institutes, through which it pu rs ues the common ends of the associates, carrying o u t particuJar functions and exercising the powers conferred to it. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS They are envisaged by Articles 52 and 54 of the UN Charter, with uni versal vocatio n as regards th eir functions (therefore, of a poli tical natu re). The regional organizations aim a t ensuring the maintenance of peace and international security in a determined geographical area . Tb ey are institutionalized groups of States, created with general purposes of cooperati on, which include procedures for the peaceful solution of disputes and a system o f common defence towards the exterior. SPECIALIZED INSTITUTES Mon ofunctional, mainly technica l organizations , constituted through intergovernmen tal agreements. They cooperate with the UN on the basis of Artides 57 and 63 of the UN Charter and, in conform ity with their s ta tu tes, ca n carry o ut far -reaching international tasks in many sectors: economi c, social , cultural, educational, medical, etc. UN SUBSIDIARY BODIES Special bodies instituted in order to manage specific func tions included in the activity of the Organization. They are established by a unilateral act of the main body, and are an integral part of the UN structure, rrom both the financial and the administrative point of view. NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS The non-governmental organizations are associations of private citizens from different Nations and, a lthoug h they carry out an activity o f a transnational character, they are governed by the interna l laws of the home State. The arc unconsequential from the point o f view of international law. The enjoy a "consultive status" with the UN, the specialized institutions, the European Council, the OAS and other governmental organizations. The NGOs can be structu red either on regiona l or on global bases; they are mocl e le d in confo rmity with th e patter n of the governmental organizations. They are financed by private contributions; the allowed percentage of public contributions generally d oes not exceed a dete rmined ceiling, in order to safeguard the independence of the organ.i zation. As regards cooperation-to-development, the NGOs are national or international orga ni zations, c h aracter ized by th e commo n comm itmen t t o support the development, by th e lack of institutional ties vis-t.-vis the governments and their policies and, above a ll, by their non-pro l'it nature.

• form e r belligerent faction s and forces; • inte r-vcntion Force, with its more-or-less complex Command and Control structure; • interna tional government.a l and non-govermental Organizations. As regards the latter, it is not easy to sec things clearly without havin g first und e rstood Lhc differences between the various organizations, assign ing each of them to the "family" it belongs to. As a matter of fa cl, it is possible to hear inappropriate and indistinct tal ks aba u t international and human ita rian orga ni zations, volunteer groups, governme ntal, non-govern m en lal, regional, religious organizations and agencies , etc. It is use r ul, there fore, to call the organizations using the name or their "category", in order to put them in the appropriate legal and institu Lional context, know ing in advance what is their role, task and mandate in the operational theatre in which they operate. lL is a lso important Lo be clear about term inology: to this end, the most recmTenl lenns used in the present study arc listed at left, together with their definitions.

THE "ACTUAL" INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

From the term "international" can be inferred that the fundam e ntal characteristic of the organizations is the institutional cooperation among Nations th rough the creation of one or more bodies. These bodies arc depu Led by the Nations to represent and manage the common interests that they have defi ned and wish to pu rsue by establis hing an interna tio nal organizat ions . The fact that the International organizations manage the collective interests of several memb ers of the internatio na l community rathe r than individual interests, implies that they perform 25

Fig. 2

Main Subsidiary Bodies established by the UN General Assembly DENOMINATION UNCTAD (Conference on Trade and Develooment) UNDP (Development program) UNHCR (High Commissioner for Refugees) UNICEF (Children Fund) UNEP (Environment Program) UNITAR (Institute for Training and Research) WFP (World Food Program)

ACTIVITY Promotion of international trade

LOCATION GENEVA

Technical assistance to developing Countries Assistance to refugees

NEW YORK

Prntection of children Protection of the Environment Training of officials of developing Countries Promotion of development of food-aid pro.grams

NEW YORK NAIROBI NEWYORK

a public function. In other words, the international Organizations perform an international public service. Therefore, the inte rnational organization replaces the member States in the m anagement of the unitary interest and, in consenting to this, the States i mplicit.ly accept the possibility that this replacement be to the detriment of their particular interests which might possibly clash with the unitary interests. As regards structure and operation of the International Organizations, there are no internationa l laws concerning their structure, so that in practice there is great variety of bodies. Since they are functional, and not territorial, their structures are very different as they reflect the vaiiety and diver sity of the functions entrusted to them, on a case-bycase basis, buy the member States. The UN and the Subsidiary Bodies

Th e UN is an international political body with specific r esponsibilities , institutes and organs for maintaining international peace and security, since it has adopted the repudiation of force as a means for solving unnecessary disputes, promotion of human 1ights etc.

GENEVA

ROME

Therefore the UN constitutes the foremost international organization, fo r- it is the concrete expression of the universal \.vill to renounce the employment of force to solve the controversies among the states.

Therefore the UN is concerned with all the world political questions that could endanger ,vorlcl peace. To perform its functions, the UN can establish the Subsidiary Bodies that are deemed necessary. This possibility is provided for in Articles 7 and 22 of the Charter: These are special organs, constituted with the purpose of managing special functions that pertain to the organization; they are an integral part of its structure, both from the financial and the administrative points of view. This characteristic distinguishes them from the Specialized Institutes which, instead, are born as intergovernmental organizations, operate in specific sectors, and

Italian. soldiers distributing cmn/<Jrl goods to some Bosnian children.

Fig. 3

. INSTITUTE FAO (Food & Agriculture

UN Specialized Institutes

TASKS

LOCATION

Improve human alimentation and promote agricultural production Ornanization) Strengthen collaboration among States PARIS UNESCO (UN Education, Science and through culture, science and education Culture Organization) GENEVA . Promote iJ1ternational cooperation in the WHO (World Health Organization) medical sector WASHINGTON Foster international monetary cooperation, IMF (International Monetary Fund) expansion of international trade and stability of cxchan!!e rates WASHINGTON Grant loans for productive investments and IBRD (International Bank for promote the expansion of international Reconstruction and Development) trade Promote industrial growth of developing VIENNA UNIDO (UN Industrial Development countries Onzanization) ROME

subsequently establish a connection with the UN. Some organs instituted by the General Assembly have acquired a remarkable importance, owing both to the scop e of their activities and to the large resources at their disposal. Fig.2 shows a list of some of the main Subsidiary Bodies created \.vithin the UN. The Specialized Institutes

They are international, intergovernmental bodies with well d efined tasks, created by some Nations - independent of the UN - in order to reach common objectives. Althought they are not members of the UN, these bodies maintain close relations with it, as provided for by Articles 57, 58, and 63 of the Charter. Considering the Institutes' and the UN's common interests, il was deemed expedient to increase the coordination of t heir action by liaison agreements of lhe single organizations ,.vith the United Nations. As regards the slructure of these Institutes, is should be noted that, in general, they envisage an Assembly (or Conference) of the r epresentatives of all member States, a restricted executive body (Council , Administrative or

Executive Council), and an organ with representative and coordinative functions (Secreta1iat, International Bureau etc.). Therefore, it can be concluded that, despite their being autonomous organizations, born of accords made by Nations autside the Charte r, also the Specialized Institutes - like the Regional Organizations, which will be discussed later - function as decentralized bodies of the UN. In fact, the liaison agreements in

Art. 57 envisage that the Specialized Institutes be subjected to the United Nations ' power of coordination and control. This power consists essentially in the issue of non-binding norms by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN, as well as in the Institutes ' obligations to submi t regular reports to ECOSOC, according to the proviso of Art. 64. Furthennore, according to Art. 17, the General Assembly should examine and approve all the financial and budgetary agreement s made with the Specialized Institutes listed in Ali. 57, as \.vell as the budgets of the same Institutes, in order to make the necessary recommendations. As concerns the actual activity of the Specialized Institutes, the Charter only makes a general reference at inter national tasks in the "economic, social, cultural, educational, medical and similar sectors" . The Institutes carry out also operational and auxiliary activities, aimed at fostering and promoting cooperation and development. In particular, the

Fig. 4

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• UNIVERSAL-VOCATION ORGANIZATIONS (FUNCTIONS) • INSTITUTIONALIZED GROUPS OF NATIONS CREATEO WITH GENERAL-COOPERATION PURPOSES lN A GEOGRAPHIC ARF'A • ENVISAGE.I) BY ART. 52 & 54 OF UN CHARTER • EXAMPLES: NATO, Ell, WEU, OAS, ASEAN, NAFTA • JNCLUOE PROCEDURES FOR PEACEFUL sotUTION OF DISPUTES AND COMMON DEFENCE-SYSTEM TOWARDS THE EXTERIOR

II I

•

PEACEKEEPING

PURPOSE:

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

CONSIDER4 TlONS ON THE FILM

"1he Thin Red Tine" /1 may happen somelim.es /0 see films 1;1,hich, although s1irring co111radic101)1 feelings, leave _you wi1h the sensation o(iwvi11g witnC?ssed a [!,re(l/ pe1fcmnance, even if imperfect in some parts. This is wha1 happens with "the Thin Red Line': Terrence Malick's latest work. This hif!,hly suggestive fi/111, amhitiom in i1s inspiring projec;, 01iginal in contents and form, s1rong in i1s emotional impact, surely will 11ot leave the audience indi/leren1. Cawlogued arnong war-movies, which lengthens ;he already long list o( war-.genre fil111s, likened to and compared (as could be expected) with Spielberg's recent "Saving Private Ryan", i; definitely di/Ters fivm ii, and not only /()r the di!/erenl war evenl ii represents (the American landing a; Guadalcanal, in the Pacifk i11 1942) but, above all, for ;he director's objective. In fact, ,'vfa.lick neither simply wants to narrme a tragic page of hisw1y, nor seems par;icu.larly won-ied abolll fc1i1hfi.1lly reconstructing c1.11 importam episode of lfw Arneiican 1var his101y; his is a 1-var-111ovie bw 110/ precisel-v a movie on war. Acwally, in scene after scene, war increasi11gly appears ins1rumental to the direc101; so dw.1 he can transmit his personal message: 1he incomprehensihle coexistence of Good and .evil in 1he histOJ)' of rnankind, among ,nan's conzm11ni1ies and in !he hw11an soul. Jn. this sense the conflict 1/im opposed Americans and Japanese in So1tth Pacific seems 10 answer the philosopher-direc1or's spiritual need, in that war represems tow! degenemtion, an insane break of the harmony which ;he Grea1 engineer of Crea1ion had wa.nied and been able to construcl fionz ils origins. "17w Thin Red Line" (the line thcu, according lo surne, represents ;he impercep1ible boundmy between Good and Evil} becomes then a film life, on 111ankind. Mankind which along 1he centuries, so ufien, imerrupterl the natural course o( events wi1h fatricidal jl[!,hts and tremendous conflic1s. Such irrational /i'acwre is show11 as an inexplicable physiological necessity that emerges - i!s hows, whys and wherefores unbeknown - bw ii emerges powerfit!ly. The epic o( Guoddcanal - where ;he effects of 111an's slupidi1y were so devns1ating and violem so as lo make one lose his sense of life - can become n symbol of all wars. '1he hunwn bloodbmh of !he Second World War, the hnrshness of combm and 1he destructive violence of the weapons ernployed are, for the film 's director, !he ultimate s1age of a selfdesm,.ctive folly, which has loo often chamcterized 1he his101y ofthe world. The film 's ouverwre is one that c(1mwl be easily forgotten. A panoramic look on the 11atuml environ111en1 (the film's coprotagonisl) which, a{·companied by a suggestive music (Paradise, /inn, Faure's Re;;uieill) and l~v !he offscreen 1vo1ds of a deep, oracular voice (al times even 100 oracular), is the e.xlmordina1y introduction 10 1he drama that will develop in the successive scenes, 1hrough 1he actions of the American soldiers thai 1hrow themselves mu/ die in conquering the island's hills. War as extreme expression ofthe fi-aelure between Good and Evil, therefore. Bw the rup1ure uccw:~ also among the fighting groups and within the. soul of each prowgunist. The mili1a1)1 wo,M offers the director 1he insnuments he needs to show all the Good and all 1he Evil man is capable of Among the mili1wy we /111d the Bafia/ion Commande1; fi·11s/ra1ed by 1he disappointrnents of a long 1.m.mccessful career (an outstanding Nick Nolie} who, in 1he Gl!adalcanal landing encounters his last real chance o{ emerging and 1nakinf!, up for !he disappointrnems suffered until then; m 1ha1 point, his u nbridled ambition comes to lighl and he is inesorab~v led lo lll/er insensibility towards the des1iny o/his so/die,"~ sem lo drnth. lJ.Col. foll, in !his sense, represents a par! 0{1he mililwy "logic", where the stric1 applica1ion of' the military mles allCl lhe degenerations deriving /inin the. abuse of awhority lead to absurd, catastrophic decisions; but then we also find ;he C0l/rage and 1he mos; typical values of the rnilitaiy; anwng which the selfde11ia/ and gmwiwusness, the will 10 sw7Jass one's limits, of Sergeani Welsh (played by a greai Sean Penn) and Capwin Ga/1's heroism. Capt. Gaff· (John Cusack), is an ernblem of the everlasting appeal o( !he true milita1)' le,ader. Jn the same ac1ion !he dir<!clor tmnsmits io the audience fear, sacrifice, rage, pain, hale ai,d compassion for zhe enern.y, all enclosed within a single, wide picture; and !he sensation one feels when Ga.n; defea.1ed, shows the sarne hwnan features and tveaknesses of1he soldiers 1now11 down by the hundred by the mortars' and machine guns' defensiFe crossjlre o{!he Japanese. The re.conslruction o{lhe ba11le although il'npe,fect, os ii sometimes appew~s - offe1'.s moments of remark.able visual and emOlional i111pact and reaches its maxirnwn narrati1 e in.le11si1y in 1he 111as1er/y scenes o(the assa.ul! on 1he hill by the "team of heroes". The milita1y universe, which is revealed 1hrou.gh the nw11erous ac/ors cast hy 1\4a.lick, offers once more the opponu11ity to pene1ra1e into some dimensions ofliving which have alwa_ys characterized a soldier's life, SllCh as being away f,-om home, 1he aching and exlliting rnemories o/the loved one, the longing for a leuer that helps lo revive the onlv sensations that can. make up for the sacrifices of' the 1110me11I; and 1he11 like an ineluctable destiny, !he despair 1ha1 {i.Jllows desertion. There, on. one 0(1he splendid Solomon islands, all mankind is presenl, 1vith its pas;, presen.1 and future hiswries. The objecl o{discussion is not so much war in itself' but the e.xtraordinwy complexity of lf-1.e hwnan soul, so many-sided a11d fi,t!l of foreseeable and unfc1reseeable manifestmions. Malick gives us a great pic1ure o/ the men and u{the nalure that surrounds the111 (1he partic11larly luxuriant and sugges1ive nature of the 1ropical island). Hu111an beings in hannony with Creation and with 1he1nselves al 1he bef!,inning, olher human beings cu war; aj1erwards. '1he director's expe11 eye penetra/es into the heart of the problem, looking (or an answer to 1he Good-Evil dile111nw, yearning for Trwh. l3ut 1here is no cerla.in ansiver, because in the human situmions represemed and in the chamclers of the soldiers the two poles meet and superimpose on each 01her 1-vilhou/ any logic. The old artisl makes his journey through the eyes ofpriva;e Will (Jim Caviezel), the idealist, who first deser/s and then decides to throw himself headlong in the desperate a.c1ion o/his baualion. What w:ges him is his longing 10 know and experience a.ll human. si/ua.tions, in the vas1 range of sensations be1ween joy and pain. Through the eyes o(llzis soldier we seem sometimes to perceive God's eye bent on his creatures, who are redly capahle of cmylhing. 111e 1nercifid eye ofa Fa1he1; that sees evetything and does not judge, 1ransmilling us !he hope of redemption and the inn10s1 feeling !hat, afiercatharsis, eve1y1hing could reiurn to 1he bosom of Mother Nature and iO the harmony ofilie primeval Design. An ambitious project, as we said, bw fasci11a.ti1zg: never, pedwps, had an artist - ihrough 1/ze cinema - dare,! to condense in a single work !he complexity ofhu.man. life, symhetizing in almost 1hree how'.S of filrn some of!he most significant events, si1ua1ions and sensations that a ma,1 lllCI.Y experimem: the purity and the esse11.1ia/i1y u/'life in 1he heart o{inco111ami11a1ed na/ure, 1he grace offemini11ity and !he swee/11ess o{the rnomems of love, the peace ofGod and, l~v comras/, wm; con1.pe1i1io11, desertion, Fiolent death, and fina!Zv, the annihilmion. of human beings. ,vloments o(greal cinema, where war im.ages and panoramic sho1s on !he radiant nawre ofihe island, music and wo,ds mell imo a "imicw11'' o( exlraordinmJ in1ensi1y and aliernate with othe1:~ in which the rythm o{ !he s101y is excessiFely slow, the idea does no/ come ow, the inirospective research appew:~ excessive and !he words of the off:screen voice seem overflowing, superimposing on the images and depriving thern of some of their force. But it is a film really unique in. i!s kind, which, safeguarding some positive aspecls of 111ilita1y life, reproposes a re/7.eaion on 1he pas/ and presenl role of the Armed Forces and which swnds out for some ex1raordinmy intuitions and 1he ability to transmil a 1imeless message.

This emb lem atic picture bears witness of the h11111anilaria11 acti1 ity of our soldiers.

Specialize<l l nstitutes.

The regional Organizations and OSCE (Fig.4) Spec ialized Jns titutes can decide and provide technical a::;sistance, loans and aid programmes. Finally, Art. 59 of t he Char t.er establishes that th e UN c an promote negotiations, among the Nations concerned, in order to creat e new Ins titutes for Lhe achievemen t of the goal::; pursued b y the economic and socia l cooperation, as pointed out in Art.. 55 of the Charte1: Fig. 3 shows a lis t of some of the best known

Article 52 of the Charter envisage::; the possibility of es tablishing regional organization to tackle the questions concerning peacekeeping and international secmity, provided they conform to the purposes and principles of the LIN. In particuhu~ the Security Council encourc1ges the development of peacefu l solutions of local disputes, through regional organizations a nd agreernents: â€˘ on the initiative of the Nat io ns

concerned; â€˘ on entrust m enl from the SccuriLy Council. In short, Lhese organizations are i nst it uti onal groups of States, creaLed with genera l purposes of cooperation, including procedures fo r the p e acefu I so lution of dis putes and system of common de fence against foreign threats. A regional orga nization is normally c ha racterized by a treaty w hich cstabl is hes permanent institutions with a legal international personalily. The emp loym ent of R egional Organizations is envisaged by the Cha1ier a t para VIII Ar t. 52.

the moment the ro le of th e organization in Peacekeepin g Operations is only theo1-etic a s regards operations and sponsor.

ASSOCIATIONS OF PRIVATE CITIZENS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

SUBJECT TO THE INTERNAL LAWS OF THE HOME NATION

THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) (Fig.5) The NGOs' role in the present-day context.

ADVISORY STATUS WITH UN, SPEC. INSTITUTES, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, OTHER GOVT ORGANIZATIONS

There are several organ izations capable of meeting the requirements mentioned above: in the American continent, OAS (Organization of American States), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement); in South-East Asia, ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) ; in Europe, among o thers, EU, OSCE, WEU, NATO. The growing role of the Regional Organizations could lead to their representation at the UN Security Counci l, where they would su bstitute the non -permanent members, wich are now striving to give expression to the various geopolitical regions. Examining the Regional Organizations, one can see the differences existing among them, as regards their structure and the tasks they are called to carry out. In particular and although it has "lost" part of its original role , NATO has at its disposal forces and structures which can be employed for new tasks . Other organ izations, such as EU, OSCE, WEU, although having been assigned specific tasks, up to now have not had the forces and the structures needed to perform 30

them in full. OSCE, in particula1~ deserves a closer look, since in Bosnia iL has played (and still plays) a decisive role, especially in the managernent of the electoral process . This Organization, in fact, could take upon itself the management of peacekeeping missions on behalf of the UN. As a matter of fact, its objective is not so much collective security b u t, rather, global security, considered from the viewpo int of the interdependence of its economic, environmenta l, humanitarian , political and military dimensions. The particular characteristic of globality is well shown by its tlu·ee main functions, namely: • issue of norms on international lmN, human rights, minorities' rights, democracy, market economy; • process of armaments control in Europe; • warning signals, prevention of conflicts and peacefull solution of disputes. Nevertheless, as was recently underlined by Amb . Aragon.a , Secretary General of OSCE, at

The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) arc at present an evolving sector and therefore interesting to investigate. As a matter of facL, the recent peace operations have been characterized by an evergrowing presence of NGOs; their activity is closely connected with th e governmental ones; moreover, as they are not vvithin the UN's or other reno\vned internationa l organization's jmisdiction, they are neither known (but for Lheir name) nor their role is easily identified. The reason is that the action of these solidaristic voluntary associations is not coordinated, fo~Lhis is not provided for by international law (even through their employment in crisis areas must obtain the agreement of the host Country). Nevertheless, for the military authorities to underestimate their existence and their importance would be a great mistake, especially considering the more and more impoi-tant role played in the cooperation to development , which is a fundamental part of a country's foreign policy. In addit ion, one should emphasize that, vis-a-,,is the governmental organizations, NGOs often have the adv,:mtage of being able to work with greater flexibili ty. The General Assembly of the UN, with a 1988 resolution, has exhorted all nations to facilitate the access to their territory of all NGOs working in the humanitarian field, such as Meclecins Sans Frontieres. Also other Organizations are noteworthy, [or they carry out important actions (Amnesty lntemaLional in the field of human

right s, Greenpea ce a nd WW F which work for the environme nt and Transparency I nternational which fig hts againts il'l ternational corruption) and have relatiohs with the governm en ts' in te rnational or ganiza ti ons vvh ich promote similar initiatives (the UN, firsl of all, and the Specialized Institutes). As for the International Red Cross (one of the most important nongover nmenta l organization s, constituted by the various national Red Cross societies, the League of t he Red Cross socie ties and the Red Cross In ternational Committee), the Gene,,:a Conventions of 1949 on int ernat ion a l human ita1ian law contemplate its fun ctions , which must be respected internationa lly by a ll countries. Recently, during the Gulf cris is, in Somalia and fo1mer J ugoslavia, the NGOs r ep resentat ives have always been present next to the international officials, helping to alleviate the crisis situations. Tod ay's fe e ling is that th e international importance of NGOs ought to be revalued also from a strictly juridica l point of vie w. Therefore it seems appropriate to t ackle t his subject in order to clarify the institutional roundalions of these organi1.a tions, outlining their limits and scopes v.rithin the PSOs. NGOs and UN (Fig.6). NGOs are associations created on the in iti a tive of pri vat e persons w i th the purpose o f s e tting up transnational ties among individ uals or bodies of different nationalities. T he distinctive element is that they are associations of private bodi es belon g ing to di ffe r e nt nations, which fee l they need an interna tional-level coordination of their activity. They are also disti nguish ed by tl1 e fact th at they see k no profit; apart from that, they may pursue the mos t differe nt goals, among which : • a religiou s aim, like the

Ecumenical Council of Churches; • a hu manitar ian a im, like the International Red Cross; • a scientific goal, li ke the Institute of l ntemational La1V; • a social aim, like Greenpeace; • an econom ic go a l, like the professional organizations.

Accor ding to the provisions of Ar t. 71 of the Charter, ECOSOC can make th e necess ary a1Tangemen ts to consult the nongovernmental organi zation conce rned wi th th e issues that may be within its jurisdic tion . 31

NGOsINITALY • ITALIAN COOPERATION COUNTRIES .WITH _DEVELOPING ___ __

COOPERAZIONE ITA LI ANA

,~' *"-

~i111sttJl> l,gti,.Jjf!irilf.sttri ~~ •

~ \~

'VffaiDX'III

: · · ·\ \-

;'.;cz

• , . ~ -·

' ,,

:'<I

.-_ r-

-.: ~ : .-~

... ..

Lawno.49 '--_o_fF_e_b_.2_6_,_19_8_7--1

,;>

Office XI (Development) Office XIV (Emergency)

Management of NGOs' Peace Missions

By law NGOs need ''qualification" certificate awarded by Foreign Ministry The agreements can be made \.vith international or national organizations, upon consultation of the concerned UN partner: The UN resolut ions of June 21, 1946 and February 27, 1950, implemented what the abovesaid articl e provided for. In the two resolutions there is a distinction between: • organizations that have an interest in most activities of the Economic Council; • organizations that operate only in some sectors of ECOSOC activity; • organizations that have only a consultive status and may be consulted by ECOSOC as regards particular aspects of the latter's activity.

NGOs in Italy (Fig.7 and 8) Havi ng stated that NGOs arc associations which deliver services useful to the collectivity and perform a function of support and stimulus to the Institutions, one can add that in Italy they are guaranteed by our Constitution (Art.18), precisely because of the ir·

status, and acknowledged as legal subjects, in a position to receive funds from the state and from private individuals. Generally tl1e organizations are constituted by religious, religious and .lay, onlylay persons or by volunteers and technical cooperators. They work with .i n the Nations and in peace missions. The implementation of the NGO prnjects and interventions in the developing Countries is bas e d on Art.49 of the Law of February 26, 1.987 which regulates Italy's cooperat ion with the developing Countri es and constitutes the instrument through which the Italian government can make up for the lack of a Ministry for Cooperation to Development. As regards financial resources, the NGOs, according to Art.288 of the Law of August 1.1., 1991 on voluntary organizations, clrnw their resources from contributions [,-0111 the State and other private and public bodies, which support e xclusively specific and documented interventions and projects; from contributions frorn international bodies, donations and testamentary legacies, refunds derived from commercial and

secondary pr-oductive activi t ies (wiLh purposes consistent vvith the statute of the organizations). The volunLary organizations are entered in the registers of Regions an d Autonomous PrO\,inces and have a National Observatory which attends to their census and soci a l promotion. For emergency interve ntions abroad the NGOs refer to the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitari an Affairs (O.C.H.A.) and the European Community Humanitarian Office (E.C.H.O.). In Italy they refer to Lhe General Direction for· t he Coopera t ion to Developn1 ent (D.G.C.S .) constituted at the MinisLry of Foreign Affairs , according to the mentioned Law no. 49. Within the DGCS of th e Foreign Ministry, two offices are entrusted with the management of NGO peace missions: Office XI and Office XTV (Emergencies) which avail themselves of the contributions of the Foreign Ministry's Crisis Unit and of Civ il Defence. Office XIV manages the hurnanitalian resources. The Ital ian NGOs currently aknowledged by the Foreign .Ministry as qualified are 129 , grouped in federations and coordination centres: • FOCSIV (Fed eration of Christian Organizations fo r International Voluntary Services) which coordinates the catholic Organizations and operates through volunteers and technical contract cooperators: • COCIS (Coordination of Organizations for Internationa l CooperaLion and Development) which coordinates lay organ i1.al.ions; • CTPSI (Coordination of PopulaiInitiative s for International Solidarity), wh ich coordinates small lay-organizations, fostering on-the-spot activities. There a r·e, moreover; other NGOs which work outside the Federations and the UN Volunteer Associations, a special corps not. provided for by Law 49. Lastly, we

Fig. 9

EXAMPLES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN CRISIS ZONES IN THE BALKAN AREA

NGO

SECTORS OF [NTERVENTION

Food distribution: (powdered milk, biscuits,etc.) Emer!!ency medical assistance Gathering information of violations of human ri!!hts BEATI I COSTRUTTORI DI PACE Food, medical assistance, social services, human ri!1hts Food transnort, clothing for children CARITAS INTERNATIONALIS Snecial food for babies and children FEED THE CHILDREN INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION Medical assistance, social services, education, food OF THE RED CROSS INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF Information, cooperation, coordination VOLUNTARY AGENCIES MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES Food distribution, medical assistance Social services, construction, infrastructure, SALVATION ARMY food Psychological assistance and education SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND FEDERATION ACTION CONTRE LA FAIM EMERGENCY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

cannot avoid mentioning a particu lar NGO, ever present in conflict areas: Caritas, an organism that coordinates the Christian groups and movements, h eaded by Caritas international (a federation of all national Caritas Organi z ations, with its ovv·.n permanent observer at the UN, constituted by the Italian Episcopal Conference). The programmes managed by th e NGOs may have been entrusted to them or promoted by them. A programme is considered "entmsted" when it is planned by the DGCS of the Foreign Ministrv but carried out bv 01;e or mor·~ .; NGOs according to its mandate. A programme is called "pron-ioted" when the NGO itself defines the project and submits it to the Foreign Ministry's approval.In the first instance the programmes are usually financed by the Foreign Ministry and the NGOs perform a kind of government function, behaving as executorv societies; in t he sec~nd instanc"'e the NGOs operate as autonomous agents of the cooperation, although with the Foreign Ministry financial support

,,v hich may amoun t Lo 70% . Tb rough the mentioned programmes, Lhe NGOs have managed an average of 150 billion lire until 1994 (approx 3% of the arnmount allotted to cooperation b y Lavv 49 ) . Contrnry to what happens in some countries, the

Italian NGOs receive no publ ic funds aparl frorn what we have just seen. Fig . 9 shows a lisL of NGOs whicl1 operated during the ci-ises in the Balkan area. Three more trade-union NGOs have the Foreign Ministry's qualification ISCOS, Project Development and Project South, which arc the direct issu e of the major Italian labour federations - and organizations like Caritas and Unicef-Tla lia, which have a q uite particular identity. The three federations, and the non-associated NGOs , since 1988 have been meeting in a general assembly a least once a year to exa.rn i ne thci r positions and define a common po licy in their re lat ions wi th the institutions. The picture of the NGOs is completed by the "private" ones, among wh ich we can mention the "Comunit~t d i Sant'Egidio" engaged also in the Kosovo area and the brancbes of the foreign organizations which have th e ir headquarters abroad and seats in various nations, Italy included. The logos of some of these NGOs (Amnesty International, WWF, Greenpeace, etc) are represented at Fig. 10.

ONGs - SOME OF THE BEST-KNOWN EXAMPLES

Fig.10

~.___ _ a_m_n_e_s_t_y_ i _n _t e_. r_ n_a_t_i_o_,c~.~,_~ ._''-'.-\'.1. ..-1-=J . ,J SA~;E~1~10 -

CARITA$ INTERNATIONAL/$

NGO's SECTORS OF INTERVENTION IN PEACE MISSIONS SECTOR

Fig.11

TY.PE OF INTERVENTION SOCIO-MEDICAL (REALIZATlON AND ORGANIZATION OF STRUCTURES, TRAINING OF DOCTORS, SUPPLY OF MEDICINES, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, VACC1NAT10N CAMPAIGNS, HEALTH EDUCATION) INFRASTRUCTURAL (URGENT SHELTER FOR EVACUEES AND REFUGEES)

EMERGENCY FOOD PROGRAMMATIC/ADDITIONAL (FOR SOCIO-MEDICAL, VETElUNARY,AGRICULTURAL, WATER-SUPPLY AND HYGIENIC ACTIVITIES) HYGIENIC/ENVIRONMENTAL (WATER, ENERGY) LOGISTIC iWJTH ARMED FORCES' PARTICIPATION) CONSTRUCTION OF PLANTS AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

PROVISION OF SERVICES AND EQUIPMENT (SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, ETC.) CONTROL OF RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONTROL O'f' REGULARITY OF ELECTIONS

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AR1\'1ED FORCES AND THE ORGANIZATIONS.

NGOs may need the military forces' protection when transporting relief goods, lo escort city convoys, to defend dist1ibution centres, ror the medical assistance that entails the employment of he.licopterÂ·s, etc. The inlerventions offered by social -assistance organizations include a very large number of senices both inside and outs ide the contrary. The NGOs interventions in peace mission can be grouped in two sectors: emergency and development. Figure 11 shows a list of some typical NGOs interventions in peace missions. The NGOs implicit impossibility of obtaining a solid structure implies that they find it difficult to operate by themselves in emergency situations. lt is also for this reason that in the crisis theatres a kind of triangular system prevails, w}iose protagonists are for different reasons and with different functions - the Italian Cooperation of the Foreign Ministry, the Armed Forces and the NGOs. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that th e humanitarian organizations, and Lhe NGOs in part icular, can be precious sources of information on the local situation and therefore can assist the military forces in tl1e 34

pe1formance of Lheir delicate task. Since they are normally present in the intervention area before th e deployment of the military units, they can realize the initi a l interface between the military Contingent and the loca l population (Fig.12). Thanks to this, it can be easier to establ ish , between the two components, a climate of confidence based on the evolution of tl1e civilian needs and on a bilateral flow of information. The introduction of the GS and the relevant civil-military cooperation in the headquarters of the M.,~jor Units, can permit a better penetration of the military

CONSIDERATIONS ON NGOs

COOPERATION TO DEVELOPMENT IS PART OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY-POLICY

• • • •

of Understanding (MoU) would be advisable); determination of common areas of responsibility; liaison, to be achieved through the exchange of liaison officers; rneet ing or th e organi za tions concerned; constitution of Civil-Mi litary Operational Ce ntres (CMOCs), Joint Commissions (JCs) an d Joint lVIilitary Commissions (JMCs).

On Lhe other hand, it is evident that the coexistence of m ilitary and civil organizations could produce problems. The differences in me ntality an d approach to the problems have sometimes become incomprehens ions on tbe fi e ld. The results of sorne surveys shovv that the NGOs accuse the military of a poor knowledge of the ground a nd a too Cast and superfici a l approach to the political and social system of the host Cou ntries. Furthermore, according to so me NG Os , the military, w ith t heir presence, would cause the bostility of the operational environment, reducing in a certain sense the s overeignty of the host CounLry (with negative repercussions on the NGOs possibility to operaLe). Fin a ll y, it may seem that the military interventions in Children are the first to suffer the nega1ive effects of conflict situations.

organization in the ex is ting situation, giving - if possible and required - concrete support to the org,mi,.ations present in the area. In order to realize the best possible coordination and sinergy of efforts b etween military a n d c ivilian organizations, so me for.m s of intervention have been detennined, deriving from solutions expanded in a DGS study on c ivil-military cooperation in humanitarian-aid operations (Fig.13): • stipulation of a prel iminary agreern ent on responsibilities and objectives (a Memorandum

CRITICISM u:@ !\TOO$

GENERAL AND UNJUSTIFIED DISTRUST OF THE MILITARY

humanitarian missions "subtract" money from cooperation (Fig. 14). According to a researcher who refers to military interventions in a broad sense, "by distributing large quantities of food, repairing and restoring infrastructure according to Wesrern standards, the Arrn.ed Forces realize highly visible interventions, which increase the approval of their operations by the inrernal public opinion, but have no prospect of continuing after their withdrawal". On the other hand, NGOs recognize the positivity of employing the military instrument in case of serious security and logistic problems and, generally, in emergency situations. In Somalia, where wi th time the relations between NGOs and military Force have progressively increased and mutual confidence improved, the NGOs were reluctant to accept the necessity to entrust the military with the distribution of part of the aid, in s isting that they had a better knowledge of the Somalis. In similar circumstances, it was stressed tha t the methods of intervent ion followed by the

military were based on quan tity, and conditioned by the fact that they had a relatively limited horizon. In that particular case, it was noted that the Italian Contingent, with its restructming activities, would have accustomed

tbe beneficiaries to standars which could not be maintained after the end of the operation al mandate. The military, on their part, criticize the NGOs for their tendency to move in a manner often incom patib le with th e security requiremen ts, th eir reluctance to submit to some form of discipline, and a general distrust vis-a.-vis the military organization in itself (Fig.15). The operations cond u cted b y IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and by the multinational Force engaged in Albania have anyvvay confirmed Lhe considerabl e progress made, in the field o f cooperation, by both civil and military organizations. In particular; both actors have made remarkable efforts in order to belter understand each other's concept of "humanitarian relief". PROPOSALS FOR BETTER COORDINATION (Figures 16 and 17)

In the light of the experience gained dwing Lhe recent PSOs, of the most important '1esson lean1ed" and

TAKE LESSONS LEAR.t~ED INTO ACCOUNT

FOSTER MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF 10s and NGOs DURING CIMIC COURSES PLAN MEETINGS WITH 10/NGOs WHEN PLANNING PSOs ILLUSTRATE TO THE ORGANIZATIONS THE PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS OF THE MILITARY

REALIZE DATA BANK ON ORGANIZATIONS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH COLLABORATIVE RELATIONS IN ADVANCE

.... ......

... .....,.. ,.,.... .,,, ,... ~

-NGOs AND ARMED FORCES PLAY A KEY ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS MUST BE OVERCOME OF 10s AND NCOs PRESENT IJ\ THE CRISIS AREA

OSTER AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MOD AND FOREIGN MJNISTRY JN ORDER TO FAVOUR

TAKE ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES TOIMPROVE MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE

, CREATE A "COOPERATION ! CULTURE" ASANINTEGRALPART OF THE MILITARY CADRES' TRAINING

considering that civilmilitary operations are an important function within the "Capability Packages" o[ the Itali an Army, it would see m suitable for the Armed Forces to give a fuither boost to the activities aimed at improving the contacts between the military and the c ivil organizat ions . Apart from the proposals made by the Commands concerned (many of wich have already been pu t into practice) and apart from Lhe consideration that, as regm-ds the UN-sponsored m issions, the H umanitarian Affairs Office shou ld be entrusted \.Vith the detenninalion of the overall strategy of the intervention in any case, it would be advisable to take initiative in order to: • foster the know le dge of the International and NonGovernmental Organizations' reality, through a greater openness of the Armed Forces towards the exterior including, in the civilmilitary cooperation courses, lessons held by representatives of the Foreign Ministry and of t he Inte rnational and Non Governmental Organizations; • organize periodical conferences

Fig.17 down to Brigade level (in th e garrisons)i nviting as lecturers important representatives of those Organizations; • inform the Organizations of the Armed Fo r·ces' willin gness to illustrate the procedures and methods of the military Contingents e mployed in PSOs, through meetings promoted upon agreements of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs; • es tablish a co nstantly updated data-bank on the Organizations, al General Staff level, with the most useful contact points, in order to maintain dose relations already before possible operntfonal emplo)ments; • realize, in concl usion, a culture of cooperation not limited to a prosp ect o f hum anitar ian interventions, but rooted in the operators' common awareness of p layi ng a key ro le in the fore ign and security policy of the Nation.

CONCLUSIONS It may happen that, through the

cooperation to development, interesl5 diffe rent from those concerning the national secLUity determine foreignpolicy commitments \vhich could ca use s uccess ive military interventions, as it occurred jn Mozambique. This is why, in Italy and in other Countries, it is possible to dec ide the employment of the Arm ed F orces in areas of no preernine nt strategic interest . Therefore we can deduce that the relationship between Aimed Forces and NGOs in the Lheatres of crisis is o ne aspect of the co,nplex relations exisLi ng between the cooperation and the defence policies, as weU as between the different state and nonstate sources of foreign policy. We can conclude, therefore, that the policy of cooperation to development will continue to be a fund amental aspect of the Ita lia n security policy, \>.1ith a more and more diversified and flexible employ111ent of the military; in this sense, it could seem a ppropria te that, at central level, the roles of the civil and military organizations in PSOs be determined in advance a s r egards cooperation Lo development and, in general, humanitarian relief, in order to waste no resources. In some recent NATO exercises, s uch as "Dyn am ic Mix 98" , the operational assumption consisted of scenarios where the hLU11anitarian a nd military aspects were closely interconnected . Most social indicators point to the possibility of crisis situations where the joint employment of military contingents and civi l organizations could be one of t heir distinctive c haracters. It ·w ould be highly desirable that th e culture of coope ration a nd integ ration coul d becom e an integral part of tbe preparation of the Cadres of the Armed Forces and o[ the leaders of the Organizations, in-espectivc of Lbeir characteristics.

D '''Lieut. Colonel, Army General Staff

B,ERS,AGLl'ERI . ' .' .· , .·. i . . ·. · · • . •. ' . . raR PEACE :

•.

·.;

-.-:

.....

,,.

,-.

·::

....... ·

_:;

The <<Garibaldi>> Bri.g ade in Kosovo 38

w::::;:~~ -

Since last December the Garibaldi Brigade has been committed to the Balkans. Soldiers from the Garibaldi Brigade have been delivering humanitarian aid to refugees from Kosovo in Macedonia under a general consensus by the international observers. On the 10th of June soldiers from the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Argentinean armies arrived in Pee, which was considered to be the most dangerous area, and started their difficult mission. Once again the Italian soldiers have proved their vocation for peace, justice and solidarity to suffering peoples.

Corporal / " Class Antonello Man ca on the Cover o{ Time magazine.

n the month of December 1995, after _the Dayton Accord had been signed and the war in Bosnia come to an end, Bersaglieri from the Garibaldi brigade arrived in Sarajevo. The city had been totally destroyed by the war between Serb and Muslim parties and Bersaglieri got control over an area where Lhe horrible crimes requiring the involvement of the international communily had been committed. The Italian Army volunteers were al their first mission and managed to perfectly balance Lhe opposing parties who had laid down their arn1s reluctanlly. They shO\,ved the world the smiling face

of Lheir country and at the same time folfilled their mission. The Garibaldi brigade was successfu l basically because il realised that during t he peace Keeping missions soldiers musL focus on human beings, on those who have suffered the horrors of the war. The Italian volunteers were as successful as the Ita lian Army vvhich has been modernising itself and played an increasingly important role within the NATO missions in the Balkans. In the month of December 1998 the Bersaglieri were given another task: they had to protect the OSCE observers who were in

charge of monitoring Serb units . Let's make a brief history: the ethnic Albanians had been cruelly treated in Kosovo since long time and the international community knew it. The ethnic ma le Albanians could join tl1e Kosovo Liberal.ion Army and Lhat is why the Serb illegal troops imprisoned them. Those who had carried out atroc it ies in Sarajevo and Srebrenica belonged to the illegal Lroops. Ethnic Albanians were imprisoned, tortured and finall y killed. Women were raped, humiliated and set free in order to let everybody know \,vhat was the destiny of ethnic Albanians. The international community did not pay attention to the war in Bosnia and decided to commit a number of observers from OSCE to Kosovo who were tasked to check whether the Serbs had really made Lhe atrocities they were accused of by the international media and by the Kosovars fleeing the country. On this occasion those who worked for the media proved they had become aware of the tragedy thaL was taking place in Kosovo. The media managed to focus on .it and asked the internatio n al community to do the same. The OSCE observers began the ir mission in Kosovo and a NATO multinational force from the Joint Guarantor Operation was ready to evacuate them in case of troubles. The ltalian Army took part in it with 250 soldiers from the Garibaldi Brigade who, as internationally agreed, were committed to Skopje, Macedonia. There were few of them but they were of basic importance to the mission : there were a Battalion Com mancl Post ;ind mechanised

companies fro m the 8th Bersaglieri Regiment which had been reinforced with some annoured vehicles, engineer units and helicopters. Âˇ The Italian Army Volunteers proved to be professional soldiers who carefully looked after people suffering from Lhe war as jc had already happened in Bosnia. They were calm, well trained and ready to face the most dangerous situations. The Ttalian Bersaglieri were appreciated by th e peo ple in Macedoni a, also because of their behaviour as human beings. They were also highl y apprec iated by the commander of the International Contingent. There was not much time and they learned Lo patro l th at country, which would turn out to be very impo r tant during the second phase of the operation when Lhe Italian contingent was committed to Kosovo. In the mea nwhi le the OS CE observers found evidences of the horrible crim es against ethnic Albanians. The observers discovered many graves and the Serb authorities were becoming ever more hostile to them. The observers were partly deprived of th eir freedom to move \.\lithin the country

Above and Below. Bersaglieri patrolling the territo1y.

and were also threatened. Finally the observers left the country. Since that moment there was an escalation of the war which ended w.ith NATO bombing mrntary

targets in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The Italian soldiers Âˇwere moved along the boundary line between Serbia and Macedonia where they supported and gave secwity to thousands of Albanians wbo h ad fl ed the reg ime a nd persecution. The Italian contingent was increased up to 1,100 men mostly belonging to Lhe Garibaldi Brigad e an d equipped with modem weapons. The Italia n contingent was equipped with m ode rn vehicles such as the armoured VCC 1, M 113, M 106, Leopard, light armoured vehicles, Centauro and the w heeled VM 90 to carry personnel. The war increased and at the same time diplomacy tri ed to establish a dialog with Belgrade but at that time the Kosovars had already fled to Albania, Macedonia and Montcneb1ro where the refugee camps did not became lagers only thanks to the Ilalian support. Diplomacy and military actions did their job. The Jnternational public opinion, includin g the I talian one, thou ght a gro und troops invasion was inevitable. 41

But jt was thought a UN resolution was necessary for the refugees r e Lurn to Kosovo and also to have the United Nations back to the role of guardian of internaLional security. Russian diplomacy and NATO resolu Leness allowed the internat ional community to understand whether Belgrade ,,vas really going to decide for peace and accept both the G8 conditions and the UN-resolution. Yugoslavia was asked to stop the violence in Kosovo and w ithdraw the troops from the region. NATO would stop bombing under these conditions. Finally .Belgrade accepted the conditions set by the international community allowing ethnic Albanians to return to Kosovo within a security frame by a NATO-led international force. 48,000 soldiers will take part in the Joint Guardian Operation. So, the Serb Military officials signed an accord that would bring peace to the region. They \Vere in a tent on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia and General Del Vecchio, commander of the Gaiibaldi Brigade, was there too. The Serb troops agreed to withdraw \Nithin 11 days and the KFOR ,Nas ready to enter the

.-.

-"1..-t ~

.. .. t-;~ . --.., ~

-~ Âˇ~

.. . - ;~

a,~: --~~.;.;f f~r~f:.::: -

region. The Italian contingent commanded by .Brigadier De l Vecchio played an important role within KFOR. During the first phase of the Operation the Italian soldiers were tasked to reconstruct roads and bridges, to clear a 20-km-long strip from mines and booby-traps. Since we knew the Serb troops had posed mines along the border before withdrawing, the Serb military officials were

---

asked to give the maps of the minefields in order to make our job easie.c As it had happened in Bosnia, we found that homes and trees had been booby-trapped after the Warsavv Pact techniques. The mine clearing allowed refugees to return home and il was carried out by the Italian BOE special forces, the Italian world - famous mine-clearing specialists w h o had already worked in Bosnia and Afghanistan in the past. First of all they cleared the main roads in order to allow aid to be delivered. The Italian troops managed to disarm also the UCK troops who were unw:illing to accept an accord which did not mention Kosovo's independence. This was an important and difficult job. The Italian troops prepared hundreds of shelters for the refugees returning home from the camps in Albania and Macedonia. As it had happened in Bosnia, the Italians were assigned the most dangerous secto1~ the Pee

Left, Above antl Right. Bersaglieri from 1he Garibaldi B1Âˇigade in Kosovo, a very insidious place.

region in the North of Kosovo where few hours before the parties had been fiercely fighting aga inst each other. As many as 6,000 men from Ita ly are taking part in the greatest mission since \Norld War II. They belong to the Garibaldi Brigade, to the 152nd mechanised infa ntry Sassari Regiment and to the 3rd Alpini Regiment. But also A 129 Ma ngusta helicopters, engineer, ~BC and s ignal units make up the Italian contingent. The Italian contingent, along with the forces From other countries, has the great responsi bility to biing a devastated country back to civil life. lt is perhaps a good omen, in view of the difficult tasks ahead, that "Time" magazine put 1". cpl. Antonello Manca -a "Bersagliere"on its cover, almost as a testimony of the impo rtance of our Country's rol e in the Balkans and o( the cul Lure of legality a nd tole rance shown by our soldiers, capable of putting fo rce at t he service of peace a nd juslice.

Ten years have passed since the Brandenburg Gate was opened in Berlin, which was cheered all over the world. The cold war came to its end and it seemed a new era made of peace, progress and stability was to start. But we were \\rrong because there are thousands of wars, massacres, atrocities and deportations still taking place in the world. How can we prevent a general catastrophe?

en years have. passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and our plane t is still tension-stricken. In this respect we can make some general remarks. First, as there are no more wars between slates we can assume thal Democracies do not fight against each other. Second, there are a number of national

conflicts taking place. Third, such a fierce violence is caused by simultaneous glo balisation and (ragn1entation which have been taking place since the cold war came Lo its end. This friction may pose a threat lo great po,.vcrs and states as well, also because of econom ic reasons and criminal

by Ornella Rota *

organisations cla iming their interests. Con trary to the past the victims of today's wars are civilians and deportations can be considered as the original cause rather than the consequence of wars. Ethnic cleansing is the horrible keyword of con tempora ry world, as S a d ako O ga ta , th e UN High Com missioner for refugees, said. Mos t of the times soldiers bru talise civilians by m eans of systematic rapes, atrocities, by d e p rivin g t hem of stap les , destroying religious and historical 45

monuments, bombing hospitals and markets and mining large areas in order to pr-event them from being inhabited (M. Kaldor, A Cosmopolitan Respon se to New \,Va rs, Peace Revie\,v 8, 4, 1996). Europeans can easily make a link to Bosnia or Kosovo, which go far beyond the tribal violence rnany people have been speaking

of. The wars taking p lace in Africa or Asia are far away, but only geographically. They are made up of dead bodies, mutilated corpses, yo uth people fighting against civilians in the ciLies, desperately strugg li ng dictators, women cancelled in the name of Koran, cle r e l icts illegally smuggled lo Western Countries by the ne'vv generation

)

Also Caucasus (above) and Laos (le(t) have been affected by wars.

of slave traffickers. Und e r these condition s we cann ot say th e Nati onal Sovereignty must be respected. It is as if we h eard som eo ne screaming in a house and did noL knock on the d oor just because every one has th e r ight to do whatever he wants in his house.

In 1951 the UN General Assembly decided the High Commissioner for Refugees would assist few hundred thousands people who, after the world war had finished, were still away from their respective countries. Everybody thought that said Commissioner would be useless in the future because the world had learnt the devastating effects of wars. Unfortunately it was not so and this Commissioner has become one of the most powerful agencies of the United Nations. In 1954 and in 1981 it was awarded the Peace Nobel Prize and today is assisting more than 22 million people (without including those from Kosovo). Today there are as many as 12 million refugees. The refugee status is denied to those who committed serious crimes, war crimes and crimes against human beings. Moreover those who are given the status of refugee must comply with the laws of the host nation. Recently other categories have been included in the field of the High Commissioner for refugees such as those who have been evacuated ( there are 6 million people who left their homes and remained in their countries), those who claim for asylum (about 900,000 hosted by several countries and who are waiting to be given the status of refugee), those who have been repatriated (3,5 million, including refugees and evacuated people who were repatriated and still need help from the international community), those who are stateless and those whose nationality is uncertain (tens of thousands). Since 1989 refugees have been decreasing and those belonging to other categories have been increasing. The High Commissioner for refugees, as the rest of the UN Agencies, is voluntarily subsidised by the governments. This implies on the one hand the need to comply with all the national political and economic guidelines and on the other makes it impossible to face crisis deriving from a forced exodus as it happened with the Kosovars, the Hutus and the Tutsi. Moreover the High Commissioner for refugees receives donations from NGOs and citizens. The UN only pays for running costs. In Geneva there is a 858-person-staff while 4,670 people work at the detached offices in 118 countries. Globalisation a nd fragmentation are forcina0 manv States to disgregate as it already happened in the forme rÂˇ Soviet Un ion. These forces started wi th the fa ll of the Berlin Wall and will last for rnany ~

years allowing to go beyond the inviolability of front iers or the national sovereignty. Fo r exa mple by m ean!::i of Internet and parabolic antennas images, news and ideas arc 47

circulated all over the world and this makes people aware of the kind of political systems they live in, they understand whether the political system is corrupted or whether the economy works good or not, especially where there is no democracy, fi nally leading to

insu rrection. In this respect we can say that in the past violence was considered a way to split the old European colonial empires or the Soviet Union . Today we realise that violence leads to tragedies as it hap p ened in the former

International

organised crime aiming at wealLh. During the last Len years, for example, in Afghanistan poppy crops have doubled. In Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Myanmar and Sierra Leone , both armed groups and government. officials have gained ,veallh through their respect iv e countries' natural resources. \ 1\!ithin this framework some Multinational Companies of no scruples sign agreements with Lhe fi ght ing parties in order to have their natural resources. Then the fighting parties use the

Above.

Kosovars /leei11g to J\,foceclonia . Right. A water delivery point organised in Mosrar bi' the Jn1erna.tio1rnl Red Cross. Âˇ

Yugoslavia, Sudan, Indonesia, Caucasus, only LO say a few. In almost all the vio le ncestricken countries it is hard to understand the line between politics and crime, which remind us of lhe s ituation existing five centuries ago when modern slates were born in order lo make things clear, Lo prevent chaos from happening. Most of the ethnic conflicts have econon, ic grounds. And the ethnic reason is the n clemagogically used by those who take advantage from the violence go ing on. There is a sorl of war econo1ny supported both by government officials and

..,.

money to legally or illegally buy ,vcapons on th e in lerna Lional market. Some times viole nce is supported by expatriates from all over lhe world as it happened in the former Yugoslavia, Armen ia, Azerbaijan and Sri Lanka. Often the parties i nvo lvcd in the struggles require money from the population or even plunder c ivi lians, w hi ch paves the way to a widespread anarchy a lso thanks to the low-pric e p onab le weapons and mines. We should wonder if government officials use c1iminals to cany out

dirty jobs not to lose their reputation on Lhe internationa l scene. For example, OSCE reports ihai in Bosn ia and Kosovo there \Vere tens of criminal gangs (there ,vere 45 of them). Recent experiences prove that civ il wars do no t always end when deprived of the extern al support or Âˇwhen it is reduced . And they do not come to an encl w hen an ethnic c leansing has been carried out. On the contrary, they go on latently. There was a time when all the interest was focused on the Co.lei

Above. R11 anda Refugees f7.eei11g 10 La.ire. 1

Left. Bosnia devas1a1ed by !he Loni-lasting \Var.

'vVar but we never came lo a war and the East -\Ve sL opposi I ion finally reminded us of the

British -Russian confronlal ion which took place in Asia in 1800. Finallv, somehow, the Wesl won. MteÂˇr 1989 there was the mosl di ffic u lt pa rt because the West hat! to manage the victory. When the Cold vVar fini!shed we hoped that the Unilecl Nations could f'in cl a so lu tion to old conflicts and prevent olhers from taking place. The right to

inLerfcrc (a must, as Mitterand said) into national affairs is itself the raison <l'f tre of lhe UKO. But the states of t.he world have to make it poss ible by not exercis ing their veto anti by not deferring lhe payment of their shares.

D ,Âˇ, Journalist, Contributor to "La Sta111pa"

Going ahead with the i1 ustration of the difficult doctrina n operational rationalizatiqn process of the Servic~ Âˇn thjs fif n installme:nt we present the article "Operational d Wes th man.oeuvre forces,. The Combat function"', py Co ~ Cla dio Graziano... The work is centred on the organizati~nal cnncept on which the odules and - by successive aggTegations, tl . . ol:~nization of the various units - are based, with a.part~ula consideration for the Infantry Regiment.

iJW[E ~~ @[F Ol}{][E UD~~

a?)M[1~fB~ ~~

e studies developed by the Army Staff within the capability packages" project, have made possible to define the organization of the various functional components of the land military instrument. After this activity which was crucial for building credible bases for the development of the Anny project as a \,·hole, and having defined the fundamental concepts of "task organization" and "task oriented" as reference concepts for assembling the operational modules in order to produce "framework formations"( I), now the time has come to translate concepts into executive projects, aimed al optimizing the resources first of all personnel, the most precious one - within the different operational modules of the Service. This is the basis for an impo1tanl activity that the military planners must undertake in order to transform the Army from a basically static to a g1·eatly dynamic instrument. In this sense, even if the necessity of reshaping the modules derives essentially and mainly from operational requirements - i.e. the outcome of the definition and analysis of the operational functions, v:hich, in their turn, are conducted in the light of the doctrine of employment - one should not disregard the need lo achieve savings in personnel, obtained through the ration alization of structures and procedures and thanks to computerization, in order to make the operational forces compatible with the resources a ssigned to the Army (Mixed Model: 137,000 men altogether, which, at the moment is the mediu m-term general planning-objective of the Service). On the other hand - and this was a basic point of the study - the present modules retain their validity also in case of transition to completely professional forces, since, in the last analysis, they ,vere realized precisely for that

kind of forces. The present article, therefore, intends to synthetize the abovesaid rationaliwtion process, sketching the general criteria followed in composing the various operational modu les basic elements of force planning and emphasizing, in particular, the criteria relevant to the manoeuvre forces (corn bat function), owing to the fact that the general principles are valid for all modules, both in use or under experiment. In substance, it was a matter of working o u t the organizational concept on \.vhich the modules and, by successive aggregations, the organization of the various units are based. The methodological p r ocess was developed according to the following stages: • definition of the basic requirements

Volunteer of !he Italian co11ringe11t in Bosnia dislribwing food to the popula1 ion.

for structuring the modules; • determination of "modules" and standards for their functional assemblage; • configuration of the Infantry Regiment: modules and aggregations.

BASIC REQUIREMENTS The study is founded on basic requirements concerning reference scenarios, employment norms, personnel, forces, equipment and materials.

Reference scenarios In a post-bipolar world, the high -intensity or actually

conflictual operations have Fig. 1 changed their nature, causing the need for equally significant doctrinal and organizational MOOTWs CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT transformations of the military ~ SYMMETRJC llir,h instrument. Furthen11ore, the new WAR I C:<.>NFLl<.:T .. I u Armies must appear as tools of the OPF.RATIONS R N CO'.'lf.UCT national and collective security Peace Enforcement TJ SITl'.ATl<.>NS T policy much more often than in A E the past. These requirements are N ASY~(Mf.TRIC CONTI.IC. I' N already included in the new I Peacekooping z s "Strategic Concept of the Atlantic A I NO~-CONFl.l<.:T Alliance", and find their Humanitarian Aid t SlTUATlONS T express.ion in the remote control Non-combatant l y PRf.SEM.:r, Evacuation of conflict situations and in the 0 Ope-rations (NEOs) ANll fl ~ active prevention of crises within La SURVF.JLLAl'\CF. the framework of collective defence and security. With an I.ow Jllgi, I extreme simplification, we can say ,, that PSOs (Peace Support Operations) appear, at least in a long-term perspective, the most probable forms of military intervention - even if not operations of territorial control). WHh special regard to necessarily the only or most From these simple but well operational versatility, the modular important ones - of the new policy founded basic elements, one can organization is the basic of international secmity and of the get clear indications on the prerequisite for applying at all relevant military formations. configuration of the forces : levels the "Task Organization" The spectmm of the employm.e nt modular units, highly versatile concept which, as is well known by situations in therefore very wide, from the operational point of view, novv, is the organizational with possible operational supported by flexible, reactive, supporting framework of the engagements both in classic efficient and relatively light Operational Forces of the new conflict~ and in MOOTWs logistic instruments, capable of Army, i.e . the operational and (Military Operations Other Than expressing high flexibility of organizational choice for the War). In view of this, the national employment. forces of the 2000s. land-instrument must be structured in such a way as to Spaced-out deployments Fig. 2 express operational capabilities credible as regards deterrence and concretely employable in MOOTWs, also when they are of a conflictual character. These latter operations are ./ placed within the out-of-theborder missions as "defence of Operational islands external interests and contribution to international security" and as "presence and surveillance" on the ;national ten-.itory (Fig.I). With a view to this, the prevailing scenarios will be characterized by spaced-out fonnations and highly urbanized flexibility of employment more employment-units environments. Operations could diffused leadership also have low intensity but long internal cohesion of limited size duration (as was the case in Bosnia and like the national l.V\ \

----

Besides, the thinning out of the deployments and the widening of the spaces will force u~to operate by "operational islands", even \'Cty distant from each other, which require a "diffused leadership" as \\'ell as the capability of proceedjng in a practically autonomous way and with employment units of reduced size (Fig.2). Rules of employment Naturally, the employment procedures are continuously evolving, but this is not the proper occasion for a detailed scrutiny. The most updated reference is the NATO ATP 35/B publication, whose basic elements are included in the national "New Doctrine Guidelines of the Italian Army". As a summary, and with reference to the Army Staff publications for a closer stud), Table A shows a synthesis of the tactical operations conducted by the units, minor ones included, taken from the 1·eference norms. Personnel Personnel _is the most valuable resource available to the Service (Fig.3). Its full utilization is a primary objective, which was taken into account in the composition of

RANK

the modules. On account of this, preparation and training have been revised in line with the concept of permanent training, outlining qualification, specialization and profcssionaliza tion itineraries

JOBS

ADJUTANT

• Staff specialist-assistant • Operator in administrative or highly specialized technical areas

MARSHAL

• Platoon leader • Operator in administrative or highly specialized technical areas

SERGEANT Regular Volunteer

• • • • •

System operator, deputy platoon-leader System repairer Leader/Operator of Operational Team Instructor('') Adm and Tech Operator e)

('') After 10-15 years as Leader and Operator of an Operational Team

which precede the fundamental stages of the emplO) ment, in order to equip the personnel with the knowledge and capabilities indispensable for being able to do. The basic concept of the new training aims at the full integration within the organization of the Army - therefore ·w ith the optimal employment in the modules - of the new professional figures NCOs (Marshals and Sergeants, Volunteers) - in order to raise the global efficiency of the system through the best use of each component. For the NCOs, in fact, different rolls have been established: • the Marshals roll, directly recruited from ci\ ilians among the youth with a secondaryschool diploma, or from Sergeants and regular Volunteers; this personnel is mainly employed in command functions or io jobs requiring continuity of employment and high specialization; 1

Table A

TYPICAL PSO ACTIONS 1. CO. TROL OF

VIOLATIONS

REGIMENT

• observe armistice or ceasefu-c lines; • patrol demarcation lines; • planned inteq,osition; • su pcnision of elect ions and referendums.

2. U:-.lPLAXNED INTERPOSJTION EMERGENCY OPERi-\TIONS

3. HUMA\lTARL\X AID

4.HUMAXITARIAN RESCUE

• organization of refugee camps; • distribution of aid and medical assistance; • protection of conrnys and refugee cmnps; • search .u1d recovery of personnel; • mine-clearing.

• rescue and evacuation of threatened communities; • management of a security corridor.

Control (mainly linear) in case of: • sutveillance of cease-fire or demarcation lines; • rcali7..ation of interposition areas, sun,cillance of borders; • supervision of separdtion of opposing forces.

COMPANY

• realize contact with opposing forces; • ensure the separation of contenders; • interposition; • materialization of cease-fire line; • push back the opposing parties.

• occupation and organization of a sector against conventional threats; • vigilance over a sector; • search and recovery of refugees; • security of refugee or material convoys; • distribution of aid.

• control of a sector; • organization of a recover')' Centl'e; • security of the evacuation Centre; • control of an external sector; • control of an internal sector~ • control of a built-up area; • part of the reserve of the Command responsible for the operation.

Activation:

• bases; • pcnnanent sun•cillance posts; • temporar1' surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • patrols; • rapid-reaction platoon.

• blocking posts; • bases; • pennanent sun•cillance posts; • temporary surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • patrols; • reserve platoon.

• blocking posts; • bases; • permanent sun•eillance posts; • temporary surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • mobile control posts; • patrols.

• blocking posts; • bases; • pennanent surveillance posts; • temporary surveillance posts; • permanent control posts; • mobile coritrol posts; • patrols.

Activation:

Activatfon:

• Sur\'cillance and wamin!!' post; • external security team; • security _and blocking team; • reconnaissance team; • mobile llontrol posts.

• Surveillance and warning post; • external security team; • security ancl blocking team; • reconnaissance team; • mobile conh·ol posts.

• Sul"\lei!Jancc and warning post; • external security tear~1; • security ar1d blocking team; • rec911najssance team; • mobile control posts.

• Sun-cillance and warning post; • external sccmitv team; • security.and blockil1g- team; • reconnmssance team; • mobile control posts. '

Control (mainly areal) in case of: • supervision of cease-fu-e; • sunrcillance of deplo}111ent of military forces or instaUations; • supenision of withdrawals from appointed area~; • supeniision of evacuation of a territory; • supervision of plebiscites or elections. Control (mainly "point") in case of: • management of movement of chilians through waning Countries; • supcn~siou of exchange of prisoners of war or hostages; • surveillance of refugee camps.

PLATOOJ\'.

SQUAn

M- 113 A PCs duri Ilg an exercise.

â€˘ the Sergeants roll, manned only with Regular Volunteers. They are already experienced in the operational field, and are assigned to the employment areas called "system operator" and "system repafrcr". lt should be specified that the system operator is the leader of a team, able to operate a complex weapon system, while the system repairer is a specialized element, capable of keeping complex systems in good working order. Volunteers arc divided into two groups: â€˘ Short-Term Volunteers, who are exl)ected to attend an initial basic training at the Volunteer Training Regiments, a specialization training at the Branch Schools

and then complete their preparation and maintain their operational capabilities at the employment mli Ls; â€˘ Regular Volunteers, recruited from the Short-Term ones. Considering their three-year experience, they attend specialization, refresher and possibly requalification courses. On the other hand, in the personnel sector the activity for the best use of resources does not stop after training, since the "force multipliers" of the human element, i.e . leadership and motivation, hold an at least equal importance. As we said, the "pulverization'' of the deployments and the extreme diffusion of information in the moder-n operational scenarios, tend to shift towards the minor levels the decisional moments and centres in the

employment area. This implies the development of a so-called "diffused leadership" which, although in a position to employ advanced close-net control systems, requires highly qualified personnel , mature and well prepared, both technically and psychologically. The second "force multiplier", closely connected with the first, is motivation. Motivation stems from firm belief, enthusiasm and passion, but i l also requires faith and solid values. It is a conditio sine qua non for success. Motivation is an essentially spiritual factors, but is also rooted in reason and professionalism. Rational motivation derives from a full awareness and shaiing of the task, from the feeling of being really capable of perfon ning it and 59

Fig. 4

Materials Equipment Training

Logistics

Physical component Conceptual component

Operational capability Moral component Motivation

Leadership Training

Professionalism in possession of the necessary resources and of the appropriate expertise. The motivation level is also sustained by logistic support, good equipment and quality of the enviromhent where the man (Fig.4): / â€˘ operates, with the need to achieve the maximum performance of the weapon system; â€˘ lives, as regards quarters, messes, recreation facilities (better quality oflife).

Forces The subdivision of the operational components into force packages primarily assigned to one of the missions of the Army, is one of the cornerstones of the Army's transition phase. This organization meets the need to proceed to the reconfiguration of the instrument according to precise criteria of priority. With resources not unlimited and only gradually available, it is necessary, in fact, to proceed step by step, with projects directed towards the realization of complete capabilities, operationally employable in every phase of the programme. 60

In a medium-term perspective and expecting a further reduction (and possible disappearance) of the conscdption component, the conceptual approach to the construction of the instrument will be revised, in order to achieve a marked operational versatility, by increasing the recourse to professionalism, to technology and to the modularity of the

operational capabilities (Fig.S). From thiss viewpoint, the conceptual distinction between the organizational configuration for prepa.rjng the instrument and the organization for employing it - particularly evident at levels higher than regiment - already asserted with the task organization concept, will be further emphasized. The integration of the operational capabilities will cease to be guaranteed by the traditional bonds of the past organization but it will have to be attained through excellent command and control capabilities, tested on the field in carefully planned exercises, according to realistic assumptions and conducted also with the support of advanced simulation systems. Among the capabilities requested of the units of the Service in general, and the manoeuvre units in particula1~ ''pr~jectabilit'y" has a priority-role. It is a capability that, especially at regimental level, requires of the permanent ganisons an organization apt to ensure the management of the infrastructure, prescinding from the presence of the operationa.1 component (hotel/barracks concept). This organization, Fig. 5

VERSATILITY

TECHNOLOGY

MODULARITY

integrable by the support structure of the operational component, when present (Fig.• 6), but equipped with remarkable techno/administrative autonomy, can be staffed with civilian personnel, trying to find a not-soeasy solution for the mobility of the personnel, (conscripts until they are available, as is the case in the Air Force, Regular Volunteers at the end of the period of intense operational activity (10-15 years).

Equipment and materials Equipment and materials are an essential reference for the composition of the basic modules. This means that the introduction of new systems can require a further readjustment of the modules, just as doctrine and technology are mutually interrelated. Weapon systems and technology are the fundamental elements that give shape, in terms of quantity and quality, to the teams entrnsted with the employment of the systems. In short, it can be said that the equipment and materials representing the operational capabilities are divided into two categories, respectively destined to: • direct employment by the modules (indhidual equipment, systems and equipment of the modules); • sustainabilit) of the modules during training and operational activities (equipment or resen·es for support). The equipment and materials to be employed are quantitatively and qualitatively determined on the basis of the operational capabilities that must be expressed and of the operational scenario to which they are primarily destined. The present organizational standard envisages their complete distribution to all units. As regards the second category of equipment and materials (sustainability), the solution of

Fig. 6

COMMAND & CONTROL .\ .T

COY

Rifle

COY

COY PROJECTABL _ _ _ _ _ CO:V1PO:\ENT

COMMAND-AI\'D-LOGISTIC-SUPPORT COMPANY

IN-GARRISON UNIT

the problem depends on the availability of the basic data necessary to soh·e the problem of gauging the logistic support in relation to the units' autonomy and the effectiveness of equipment and systems. Until recently, autonomy was fixed at 30 days; this reference has not yet been formally abolished, while there are no univocal indications on the efficiency levels to maintain (2). The logistic supporl was therefore geared - at least in a doclrinal sense - for sustaining the whole instrument and on the basis of the maximum cffon connected with a conflict directly involving the national territof). The reference logistic concept, already well-established, envisages instead that the equivalent Regiments (those with their O\\O executive Adherence bodies) have a logistic autonomy, defined with mathematical and empirical models, to be adjusted and completed each time according to the mission. No "a-priori" redundance, then, but rather a modula1· logistic instrument, light and flexible, capable of dynamically adapting, in a short

STATIO~ARY COMPO"'iENT

period of time, to any possible mission. The operational scenarios summa1ily outlined could permit the introduction of substantial changes in the present organization. A possible solution couJd envisage that: • the distribution of the main equipment and materials; • the level of autonomy; • the stocks for the maintenance of equipment and systems, be gauged nol on the organic strength of the instrument, but on the size of the forces realistically employable simultaneously in the appointed operational scenarios (Fig.7). In this case, a balanced and economical configuration of the necesaI") materials could stem from a realistic planning of the maximum effort expressible by the Service in a medium- and long-term prospect (Operational Concept). The stocking of equipment and materials would therefore be programmed on that basis. It is certainly a daring Command decision, but it could become indispensable and sound so as to permit a balanced gro\,vth of the 61

Fig. 7

Instrument's size ·-

_.,_,-" ~ • - -~ ·

/I{_

, --

-~- Logistic-support size

,: "--...

Professional compon~

Forces s1multancously employable in the modern operational scenarios

Bipolar confrontation

• i4Sl•foij ' · .,,-'' ,~ -'J¥.@;"'.':f

Post cold-war

Prospects at medium-long term

Service, consistent with its commitments, as long as the risk of an aggression to the sovereignty of the Nation can be considered unrealistic for the next 15 years.

refer ence to the rank and experience of the Commander and to his hierarchical position in the Command and Con trol structure of the unit; • vertical, horjzontal and internal connections/interactions.

MODULES AND CRITERIA OF AGGREGATION

The composition of the units' organizational structures must therefore begin with the elementary module and then, starting from this and by successive aggregations, build the first complete operational modules (platoons), the basic mono-function employment units (companies), arriving at th e regimental operational module, which is the fundamental element of the "Army System". In fact, above this unit, the command levels must essentially be able to express command and control capabilities without being concerned with the different regimental modules assembled in the Brigades, in relation to the real operational requirements. The elementary module (squad, team, tank, etc.) consists of a weapon system and a very small number of personnel - with their own leader - trained and equipped to make the system Operational. It is structured in order to can-y out an elementary action within an operational

In pras:tice, the method followed fo r defining the elementary modules and their aggregation into formations was: • exact definition of the module and the successive aggregations, making as clear as possible the capabilities they must express; • describe in detail those capa bilities and the modalities for their achievement, as well as the specifications that the module or the aggregation must meet. With reference to the latler aspect, the capabilities must be defined in terms of: • autonomy, which represents the intrinsic susta inability of the module in relation to the operational capability it is called to express; • necessary training level, in relation to the individual preparation, basic and advanced training, employment exercises; • leadership , with particular

module: the platoon. Th e composition of t he elementary module depends, first of all, on the characteristics of the weapon system and on its function. It expresses partial operational capabilities, therefore it i s unsuited to autonomou s operations, with the exception of activities of little operational value and in special operational environments. The operational module (platoon) ori&>inates from the aggregation of two or more elementarv modules also if they are non-ho~ogeneous complementary with each other. I t is structured to develop tactical actions limited in time and space, an_d to repeat cy clic tactical actions . The aggregation o f several operational modules originates the basic employment-unit: the company. It is a mono-function unit, which can be organized in different ways according to the task, and it constitutes the first level of application of the "Task Organization" concept on a modular base. The company can be employed in: • limited-time activities, conducted with the simultaneous employment of all the operational modules available; the most evident case is that of high-intensity combat, durfog which the unit expends its operational capability, and after ·which it can normally b e reemployed only after its reorganization; • protracted activities, conducted by taking turns with similar units or rotating its own operational modules. These are low-intensity engagements, during which the unit does not exhaust its capabilities, but wears them out; therefore it should be replaced after 4-6 months and reemployed only after reconditioning (3-4 months) and training (4 -6 months). But this is an optimal

but rather optimistic theory. The company-level employment uni l does n ot have logistic capability of its own, but Hs Command and Control organization can manage those that can be assigned "ad hoe", in particular medical and victualling elements. The Command and Control of m ore than one company can be entrusted to a battalion, whose Co mmand structure can have tactical control of those units, employed on the basis of plans/programmes worked out by the Regiment's staff. Last, the R egiment. It is an employment unit capable of

carrying out a complete and specific operational function. It has Command, Control, Communications and logistic support capabilities adequate to its functions. Its capabilities could therefore become redundant in certain situations considering that a regiment is conceived in such a way as to be able to manage more resources than those emisaged for its own organization: eventually and if necessary, even seYeral battalions. THE MANOEUVRE REGIMENT

The Infantry Regiment and the Cavalry Regjment are the

Ranger during an exercise in a wooded area.

fundamental units for the "master" operational function: the combat function. The composition of the modules of the manoeuvre forces depend on the types of units determined by the study on the cap ability packages - combat function: • light, with VM90s and VBL Pumas; • mechanized, with wheeled and tracked veh ides; • armoured, with armoured cars or tanks. Th e configura lion of the

elementary modules was Fig. 8 therefore adapted to the type of OPERATIONAL CYCLE OF A REGIMENT vehicles available to the units. With a view to this, the light and mechanized units need different and complementary elementary modules, in relation to the complexity of the tactical actions. training In particula1~ there will be the following four types of elementary modules: employment • riflemen, with fire capability against personnel, high-angle reconditioning fire support capability up to 1200 metres, short-range antitank capability (the modules make up the three rifle companies); • riflemen, with main antitank capability at medium and long range; the question is to exploit to the maximum the coexisting maximum number of elementary some 1ifle platoons to the antitank capabilities, which can be modules, while on the basis of company. Therefore, still with expressed separately or in an the second the number should be reference to the Task Organization integrated mam1er (included in minimum. principle, the Regiment, in the antitank company); The balance between the two practice, has at its disposal four • mortars, with high -angJe different requirements has been command and control capabilities, capability up to 6000 metres considered to be 3 squad-level of manoeuvre-management level, and more, with the already elementary modules for light and that can be employed with the sanctioned (ntroduction of the mechanized units and 4 combat greatest flexibility, according to rifled-bore 120mm mortars (in systems for.armoured units. the task. These .requirements do the mortar company); The company (basic not exist, or exist at a much lower • mortafs' fire control (in the · employment unit) is a rnono- lelvel for PSOs, where the four mortar company) . funcUonal unit which can be company-level modules will employed either homogeneously mainly be called to operate as rWe For the cavalry units on tanks or reorganized by modules, units. or armoured cars, instead, the depending on task and situation. Lastly, one should point out the elementary module is only one, Therefore, this is the level where constitution of the rif1e company since the tactical actions of these the organizational coincidence on a quaternary basis, connected units entail a preeminent between composition and both to the availability of weapon capability, thrust, expressed both employment is fully realized, system and to the higher autonomously or in an integrated although different configurations operational flexibility of the context ,.vith the other manoeuvre cam1ot be excluded, albeit within formula as well as, finally, to the forces. the same operational function. selection of reduced-size The successive aggregation of The most frequent case can be platoons, albeit equipped with the elementary modules into represented by the increase of numerous weapon systems. operational modules must meet antitank fire at the longest range, As is the case for the other two basic requirements: obtained by drawing platoon-level functional components, the • effectiveness, in view of the antitank modules from infantry battalion is an extra tactical actions to be carried rifle/antitank companies. In high- capability for exercising tactical out; intensity conventional operations, control on the employment units. • simplicity of control (meant as a very probable solution could be On the other hand, it should be direction, guidance, verification the reorganization into four considered that, although it is a of results, correction) by the homogeneous complexes, valuable resource at the module's Commander. polifunctional at this point - Regiment Commander's disposal, On the basis of the first obtained by attaching antitank its employment in this function requirement, there should be a platoons to all rifle companies and would nevertheless be decided on

----

a case-by-case basis including, among the ,•arious possible options, that of not ernploying it autonomously. The regiment has c o mplete operational capabilities for performing the combat function. It is called to operate in rather wide contexts, and its capabilities are normally integrated v\rith those expressed by other functional components (combat support, reconnaissance, combat service support, etc.). Other capabilities can be added to the regiment (recce units, engineers, artillery, etc.) for the accomplishment of an autonomous task within one of the "operational islands" or for the development of PSO missions. These are possibilities to be considered as normal, since they are required by the modern scenarios and em isaged as a capability of adapting the structure to Lhe changing situations. In other words, the new configuration of the regiment modules takes for granted the impossibility of pre-structuring the organization in expectation of an average case of employment, which is now impossible to foretell; the structure is therefore only a rational assemblage of fundamental capabilities, to be completed accoding to the circumstances.

Fig. 9

REGIMENT C3 SYSTEM

TACTICAL COM\L\,..,1).POST

COMMAND POST

II__.-. BdeC P

Exchau~•

--•-__ •

: ·---- -·' .:

t- 1:@J I

LA N Supenision and

a -

i-·

I:@]

CASI

~ OPS

TKG INFO

Logistic$

Adm in

~ Fin

I~ I I

IZS]

Ude C P

8dcC P

• on ACTI, 4 x 4

Shelter C P •

t"-: Shelter Tech S upt (LAN Super>•ision 11ml data-ba nk)

CJ S helter C2 • (Cell and Decision Centre) THE OPERATIONAL CYCLE OF THE MANOEUVRE

REGIMENT

HF a nd VHF co nnection

both the duration capabilities of the Regiment's Command and Control organization and the Army's operational concept, in order to assess the maximum operational effort, expressed in terms of number of regiments, and to communicate it to the Political Authorities.

As we repeated!) mentioned before, the units' employment in Peace Support operations that have a low level of conflict (therefore excluding Peace Enforcement) does not exhaust them but wears their operational capabilities. The operational cycle of a regiment-level unit consists of three phases, i.e. preparation, CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE employm ent and recon di!ioning- 70 THE REGIMENT ( fig.8). This. consideration becomes important for defining The regiment, besides the

manoeuvre and combat capabilities described above, has also "redundant" capabilities in the sectors of Command, Control, Communications (Fig. 9) and logistic support, also in order to be in a position to meet the con stitutive principles of the projection forces, with reference to their ability to expand and integrate. These capabilities pertain to: • the Regiment staff ( St, S2/S3, S4, SS, Advance Command Post); • the Logistic-Support and

Fig. 10

I COMMAND-AND-LOG ISTIC-SUPPORT COMPANY C3

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS

I MEDICAL SERVICE I

Command Company ( C3 Module; Combat Service Support modules: medical, victuals and supplies, Tramat). The standard configuration of the Regiment Headquarters is based on the establishment of two Command Posts for the management of the whole manoeuvre. Tpey work within the same C2 system, and are in a position t9 share information and situatio11 picture: • a mobile tactical Command Post, sheltered if possible, normally projected near the manoeuvre forces, from which the Commander can give his orders, either directly or throt1gh his main Comm a nd Post; • a traditional Command Post, sheltered, where the staff controls the operation, on the basis of the Commander's directives. The Logistjc -Support and Command Company will be functionally organized in such a way as to entrust the most specialized logistic sectors to skilJed and competent personnel that will be fully responsible before the Commander for the logistic branch entrusted t.o them . In particular, the LogisticSupport and Command Company

FOOD & CLOTHING

TRAMAT

is organized with the following components (Fig.10): • Command, Control and Communications (Hq. platoon and signal platoon), where the necessary capabilities and resources are concentrated; • logistic support, consisting of the following elements: •• medical service, entrusted to a Director, who avails himself of a highly specialized executive staff (medical platoon); •• victuals and supplies, entrusted to the Chief of the Commissary Service, "vho avails himself of two bodies, one for victuals and the other for clothing, equipment and furniture/fittings; the Service Chief is responsible, before the Commander, for all the activities of the specific branch; • • transport and materials, entrusted to a TRAMAT officer, responsible for maintenance, transport and matetials. As we mentioned in the general part of this article, a capability which takes on a gro\.ving value, especially for the regiments of the Basic Branch, is "projectability". During the bipolar confrontation, each regiment was practically destined to operate in a specific

sector of responsibility, within which it performed its task. Also gan-isons were selected according to the geographic location of the employment sector, compatibly with the availability of infrastructure. This explains why most operational forces are stationed in the Northeast. On the other hand , the only assumption of actual employment derived from a possible aggression on the national borders . On the basis of this assumption, several activities were planned - marked by the different measures introduced in the alert plan which envisaged , among other things, to attain first the decentralized zones and then the employment areas, abandoning the garrisons at the same time. The Commander's attention bad to b e focused on his operational task, and he could be only marginally concerned with the destiny of h.is barracks. On the other hand, i n such a contingency the national interest would be at stake, and therefore the fate of the barracks ~.vould be a decidedly secondary problem. Today the employment of units for from their garrisons is a normal occurrence. Projectability is therefore an indispensble capability, especially for those units, as the manoeuvre units, which are generally employed in their full configuration. The units conducting other operational functions (combat support, RSTA, recce, combat service support), on the contrary, could also be employed by simple basic employment modules (companies). Therefore for the units of the manoeuvre forces projectability is a primary capability which does not refer only to out -ofquarters operations, but also to the continuity in t he management of the home quarters. As regards this aspect, it is a question of revis ing the

Italian soldier of the SFOR contingent surveillance duty i11 Bosni.a.

Oil

organization of the in-gar rison unit, in order to free the operational component, and Lhe Commander in particular, from the responsibility of manag ing the infraslructure, especially but not only - during Lhe operational and tratnmg activities conducted both inside and outside the national territory. Theoretically, the operational unit should have no residual conn ection wit h the h ome infrastructure, which mean s that it should not have to take any ma n agement measure after the uni t leaves the barracks for operations or training. To put it simply, the regiment can leaYe with its complete organization. In view of this, th e organization of the in-gaITison unit must be abl e to meet three main requirements: • security, especially as regards surveillance of e ntrances and ctitical areas; • management of the infrastmcture and relevant materials (furniture, fit t ings, m esses , recrea ti on equipment, etc.); • operation of the general services,

including communications · (telephone exchange). The integration of the Fig. 11

IN-GARRISON UNIT

Off

Command & Control

Adj/Mar Serg/Cpl 52 Troop

general services

security

infrastructure

capabilities necessary to meet the a bovcsaid requirements can be appropriately ensured by an autonomous and streamlined Co mmand struc ture, which envisages the essential branches for fulfilling the funclions assigned to the unit. F ig. 11 sh ows Lhc scheme "by blocks" of an in-gan-ison unit. Some additional capabilities are also concentraled at regiment level. They are destined Lo meet specific operational requiremenls connected with particular conditions of employment. We refer to: • p rec is ion fire, realized by equipping with precision rifles (6 cal 8,6x70) a team of sharpshooters, formed by dualjo b pe r s o nnel, capabl e of operating with great autonomy and effectiveness against 67

Fig.12

Fire power

protection

objectives of high operational value; â€˘ determination of position data, which will be achieved by distributing to all the fifteen squads of a company the Ground Position System (GPS) in opera-6onal situations requ1nng a continuous knowledge of the position of all the elements engaged, Another capability indispensable for operating in the modern scenarios, is "visualization", This component, for the manoeuvre forces, has a direct impact on the three peculiar and fundamental capabilities of the combat units: mobility, fire power and protection, It is easy to understand that these three. elements affect each other because a positive change in one influecences negatively the others and vice versa, Suffice it to think, in fact, that an increase in protection or fire power inevitably reduces mobility, Introducing a fourth parameter (Fig.12), i.e . visuaHzation, it is possible to achieve superiority, or at least an adequate ability to find the objective, with easily intuitable advantages, both for the possibility of striking first and, 68

consequently, for a better survivability. We are therefore discussing an incremental factor of the general capabilities of the manoeuvre Regiment, a factor able to affect the positive values of all capabilities. CONCLUSIONS

The reorganization of the operational modules concerns all f-tmctions (combat, reconnaissance, combat support, adherence

support) and, at the end of adequate e;<q)erimentations - which, as regards the manoeuvre modules have already been concluded - the relevant organization charts will be issued consequently. Within a year, therefore, all the Regiments of the Italian Army ,,vill undergo significant changes (Fig.13), entailing hard work by all ranks. Within this framework, the infa1:itry Regiment is the most significant example from the viewpoj nt of the application of the Army's operational concept, since it is the mission's basic unH, and the forces at its disposal can be adjusted or reconditioned if necessary. Within the general reorganization picture, the new composition of the operational modules of the Combat function has permitted, among other things: â€˘ the complete computerization of the forces' organization, both in the preparation phase - with preset digital cards - and, at the moment of need, for the construction of the task forces; â€˘ the availability of the updated numerical situation of personnel and equipment, based on actual resources. The changes introduced with the new operational modules are very .important and, as we mentioned, will require a great

Fig. 13

11 I II

~ I

~ITJ[Z::;]

Training of an M-113 APC over muddy terrain.

professional flexibility of Cadres and troops, together with the personal will of fully living the transformations in progress. Of course the present experin1entations will never be an exhaustive testbench for removing all possible faults: only a long application on the field, and the availability of new technologies, which are only envisaged at the present time, will permit to validate the "system" for good, increasing the Regiment's stability, which is a characteristic strongly needed in the operational units.

It should not be forgotten that the module project is based on a well-established long-term plan; therefore, for example, until the platoon-leader Marshals are not available in the expected number, certain temporary measures will be necessary. ln a similar way, the elementary modules' capability of fulfilling their mission, thanks to the mobility of the "Puma", will have to be confirmed in practice when these Pumas start operating. Our hope is that the programme responds well to all situations and that it will be possible to adjust it to the elements of the transition phase: new organization, incompletely renewed equipment, personnel roles not in the

proportions envisaged for the final organization.

D Âˇ-~colonel, Chief, Rlanning Office, Army General Staff

NOTES (1) Rivista Militare, Eng. ed. no.1/99, "Planning Tomorrow", and no.2/99 ''The Army Project for Europe. Task Oriented".

(2) Rivista Mibtare, Eng. ed. no.2/99, "The Operational Modules of Adher ence Logistics".

f~#\C~~(W~lD Of~~#\tf~O~ Concepts, considerations, lessons learned by Pier Giorgio Segala * The concept of peacebuilding appeared for the first time in the "Agenda for Peace", issued in 1992 by the Secretary General of the UN; it was later developed in the "Supplement to the Agenda for Peace" of 1995. Both documents underline the principle that peacebuilding is a complex process, "requiring integrated r,--- ---------,-- - - ----,,-----$:~ ~ actions and negotiations between the United Nations and the conflicting parties". The following notes are meantasÂˇa contribution to the study and evaluation of some of the problems encountered during the recent missions conducted out-of-area. 70

\..

he purpose of peacebui lding operaLions is to end conflicts and to avoid their recurrence, in order to create the prerequisites for development, necessary to society for the nonvio Ien t solution of its internal tensions. The essence of peacebuilding is basically of a political nature, but il includes also aspects such as cooperation for development, humanitarian aid, respect of human r ights, reconstruction of political

and social institutions. Peace building differs from cooperation for development in that iL includes, among other things, emergency aid, demobilization and re-employment of the figh ting forces, restoration of order and public safely. Unlike cooperation, whose process can only be developed in the long term , pcacebuilding operates over short and med ium periods. Lack of time is, therefore, a ty-

pical characteristic of peacebuilding operations. Peacebuilding, if one considers its purposes, could appear lo a superficial observer as a variant of the diplomatic process. Actually, the starting point is very different. Peacebuilding intervenes in situations where the worst (the conflict) has already happened, and it inherits wounds to heal, minefields to cleai~ fighters to disann, refugees lo repatriate and reintegrate, and all this in a so71

ciety that needs to be reconstrucled both rnorally and materially.

THE TIME/MANDATE FACTOR

• Freedom of the press· and access to the media - Freedom of association, expression and propaganda • Repatriation of refugees, resettlement of the population and social reintegration - Elections, international control of the electoral process

4) Military Problems - Procedures for the cessation of the armed conflict - Control of armed groups - Withdrawal of foreign occupation-troops, if any - Concentration of the forces in prearranged areas - Demobilization of the forces - Collection of arms and combat equipment - Census and disbandment of private and irregular armed groups - Release of prisoners - Control of the security services

The experience gained in Can,bodia, Mozambique, I Ia iti, .Angola, Rvvanda and, more recently, in former Yugoslavia, prove the i mportance and the need of a timelv start of the operations . One of the reasons why the UNAMlR mission failed - besides Lhe fact. thal iL was unable to prevent genocide - was that it did nol cor:nrnence witl1 lhe timeliness necessary to show the governrnenl. and people or Rwanda that it could be a tangible contribution to the reconst,·uct ion of the country. Many believe that the peace building process may begin only aftff a cease-fire agreement has been reached. Facts show the convenience of moving early, in order to limit the damages caused by the conflict and to lay the foundations of the peace process. On the other hand, especially in the developing countries, there is the strnng worry that peacebuilding operations, if started during a conflict, could turn into interventions by the international corn rn unity. One way to dispel these concerns could be the eady start of negotiations among all protagonists, both in ternal and external Lo the conflict, on the schedule or the intervention. It is also necessary Lo exarnine and solve, in tbe same framework, the problem of the duration of the operation. The practice of considering elections as the objective-date for the conclusion of the peacebuilcling activi Lies, appears lo be questionable. The early designing and planning of the operations is an irnperativc clement to ensure their tirn e Jy beg i nning. Th e cases or Cambodia, El Salvado1~ Mozambique and recently Angola (UNAVEN1 III) show very clearly that the planning or t he operaLions

must starl at the ve ry beginn ing oft.he peace negotiations . The agree ments and .rnandates of the peace missions musL inclu de a ll the e le ments necessary to frame the conduct of the operations, leaving a ce11ain flexibility of inte rpre ta tio n a nd imp le mentation, in relat ion to the preva iling s ituation . All this is certa inlv more easily said than done; on the one hand, the re is the danger of' overburden ing the peace negot iatio ns "vvith too many techno/operational ele rnents and, on the o ther, tha l of not fixing in detail the elements o f veril' ic a t io n and respec t by w hich everybody, opponen ts a nd controllers, must ab ide <luring the course or the m ission . A mandate expressed on political aspecls only is a lmost never ful ly effective. \,\lithout end a nger ing its essentially pol it ical di m e nsion, the docum e nt should consider a lso the milita ry implications and 1·epercussions, as we ll as the legal. administralive, social and temporal ones deri\'ing fro m the impl ementation of the peace agreem ents.

. -

•

',~

, .,

"'',

,,;,c'"

;..,,., '1

: _

SRSG

€ CF

- ·oNUMOZ MANAGEMENT

UNOHAe

~ Secretary

10.M

Forces' Cdr

CJV.fLP0.1!.

Adm. Dep.

ONUi\lOZ ORGANIZATION Political Level

TechnoPolitical Level

Tech Le,·el

THE COORDINATION FACTOR Peace operations must take into account, from their beginning, the non-govenunental international 0 1·gan izations (!\G Os) active in the fi eld. Their presence, a ltJiough potenliallv useful in the peace process, could make even more corn plicale a situation where the co ntrol of the internal protagonists is already ra Lher difficu lt.. Dur ing th e momenls of crisis, which inevitably occu r alo ng the pcacebuilding process, the differcnL opera tional cultures of (he va1i ous organizations become visible. Tensions a r·e a natural consequence of the d ifferent stn1ctures and strategies guiding the indi vidu a l organ iza tion s an d, also from the behavioural point of view, or the role played before and d mi ng the conflicL, as well as o r their possi-

30 men 25 men

980 men 7380 men 40 men

LEG ENDA -

Political control employment chain empl & ops chain

operation11I subordination

Exec Level

Tech Level

ble rnle a~er Lhe conclusion of the mission. In principle, the activity of differen t. non-governmental organizatio ns offers grea l opportunities in terms of dist1ibution of responsi bilities and cooperalion, as lo ng as there is a marked coordinatio n and collaboration towards an integrated approach to the effor ts. Individual outlooks and interes ts should not enda nger the achieve me nt o f the final c omm o n objective. The diffu s ion of information to

all parties involved in the operation is the best way to reach unity, nol only in intentions, but in strategy and actio ns as well. Other ways to improve the unity o( action can be foun d in a joi nt pre-m ission training, conducLed through the time, in the regular exchange of experiences m1el in a constant monitoring of the activities. In the case of UNM lH, a weeklo ng tra ining course for all me mbers of the m ission was held al Pott-au-Prince, and was attended hy

FACTORS 1) Anthropological factors - Position of the JX)pulation towards peace/war - Role of the male in society - Tri be'famil y as basic social nucleus - Ch.:tracterization or society: individual/social

ACTION - Separate population from warring parties - Find a ne-.v role for former combatants - Exalt the concept of social aggregation - Aim at peace and welfare - M ake the most of individual and collective ingenuity

OBJECTIVE - Annul control (pressure) o f the Parties on the 1X>pulation and on the Parties' followers (dissociation) 2) Social factors - Usages, customs, behaviour, beliefs ACTIO N - Full respect or the local reality · Integration oi UN operators in the local reality OBJECTIVE · Gain confidence o f the population and Pa1t ies' fol lowers

Mass media - Population's yearning for peace - Encouragement by tlie international community

ACTION - Use o f communic;i tion systems 10 inform OBJECTIVE - Inform the internal and external front on the development o f the process (good guys and bad guys) - Put pressure on the Parties' hawks through combination of internal (people) and external (international community) actions

4) Political factor -

lmpartialitv towards Parties Equal importance of Parties Fulfillment of mandate Overcoming mutual distrust Continuous support by the international community

ACTIO N - Flexibility in interpreting the agreements - Bila teral ooplomati c actions - Mediation in bilateral solutions - Enforcement of the feasible solution O BJECTIVE - Fulfil lment of the mandate - Credibility of the miss ion at internal and external level

5) M ilitary-Humanitarian facto r · Close interdependence between military and humanitarian interventions ACTIO N - Determination, resolve, immediacy and selectivity of mil itary interventions - .Adherence of humnnitMian interventions to the development of the d emobil izMion process OBJEC II VE - Demobilization and reintegration of forces · Suppor1 to the population - Cred ibi lity or the mission

6) Functional factor - Rational ization of the in1 ernational "machine" - "Debureaucratization" oi p rocedures - Timeliness of decisions and interventions ACTION - Manageria l organizntion of structures - Decentralization of the technical decision-making autonomy OBJECTIVE - Adherence of the instrument to the evolution of the process - Rationalization of resources - Credibility of the mi ssion 7) Fi nancial factor - Immediate availability of financial resources and assets - " Debu reaucratization'' of the employment oi resources and assets

ACTION - Constitution o f a tru st rund OBJECTIVE - Fin.:tncia l support for the constitution o f politica l parti es; support to the " good guys".

all members of the mission, inclt1di ng st.."lff personnel, t-epresentatives of the various rnililary police contingent~ and members of the NGOs. A joint structure ror the a na lysis of the problems connec ted with the decis ion-making process, and an exec uti ve mechani sm fo ,carrying out the activities a t local level are, for the political leaders hip responsible of the mission, instrume nts capa ble of guaranteeing a univocal course to the large number of protagonists concerned. An important lesson learned from past peace missions ,vas the so-called "emergency to relief to development continuum", which became ve1y popular in many com munities involved in the peace process. For examp le, the i m mediate need to prevent the factions from taking up arms again cannot interfere wi th Lhe long-term developmen t o bj ectives pursued b:v the NGOs. Disarming must be accompanied by the social process of integrating the fonner combata nts in productive activities, following necessar ily cadenced Limes . Emergency, a id and development activities need immedia te and simultaneous actions, conducted with integrated engagements. In principle, short-term requirements should never interfere with long-Lem1 objectives. THE LEADERSHIP FACTOR

Coordination requires the presence of an effective leadership. The role o( the "head of the family" must be clearly defined, and the general rules concerning the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Seue l.ary GeneraJ (SRSG), as weU as those of the individual Agencies, must be clearly established. Lack of a str·ong leadership gives rise to the l'isk that the parties involved in the struggle, artfull)' or not, put the various interna tional actors in conflict with each othe1: The establishment of a management structure pennits to li mit the danger of an always possible failu -

"Ce111a11ro" ar111o ured car speeding over muddy ground.

re. Each area a nd eac h conUic t has ils specific characterislics and cannot be dealL \,Vith by pre-ar..-anged structures. Different conflicts and missions need different rcspon cs . What was done in the Mozambique mission could be a good opp01tunity for reflection. The professional qualities of Lhc personnel in charge of a peace m ission are of crucial irnporlance; this aspect was some!irnes overlooked in the past. The recent tendency is to a LLribute more importance to human and professional qualities, ralher than to the cultural background. Many believe that the negotiatorÂˇ of the peace agreement s hould be a lso the S RSG of the subsequent peace-mission. The dou ble respons ibility - mediato r first, a nd then "reali ze,Âˇ" of Lhe peace agreement - makes it extremely impor-rant thal the terms of the agreement be laid down w ith Lhe greatest care, s inee the_v will have to be applied by the same authorily. Also, the selection of the leadership of a mission cannot be made only on the basis of self-declared a uthori Ly.

THE INTERNAL FACTOR

The partners One of the most difficult decisions that those in charge of a peace mission rnust make is the selection of the internal protagonists they can accept as parlne rs. Can Lhe former warring centres of power be considered Lhe only r-cferences in the solution of Lhe con.f:licl? Will they he willing and capable of playing this role? Inevitably, at the beginning of the peacebuilding operations, the concern about Lhc achievement of a positive result suggests to collaborate ,,vith all the centres of power (economic, social, pol itical, religious), including Lhosc not di rectly involved in Lhe contlict phase. This helps

to increase the prestige and author ity of all paities, making more difficult a futu re politica l emergence of only the fonner opponents. In a longer-tc1m perspective, connected with the achievement of the fin al result, the doubt inevitably a rises about the inlernational community having e nough authority to assert its auth01ily on all parties. One way is that of rewarding the factions which really cooperate, chastising those which don'L. In order to achieve this, il is necessary to supply Lhe SRSG with a special "trust fund". lt is unrealistic lo imagine to cooperale with all the parties concerned. Some times it becomes necessary to make Lhe ethically difficult decision of concen trating the efforts on the su-ong groups, excluding Lhe weak and vulnerable ones. O bviousl y, this p rinciple is not always in keeping wi Lh that of h umanitarian aid. In the Mozambique operation, ,v hi ch e nded wilh success, large groups of tbe local society were excluded from the peace process. The role of society In building the peace process

several universal factors mus t be taken into consideration. To each facto r musl correspo nd an ac lion Lo be conducted or an objective to be reached. The role of women Women are a strategic factor for peace and for the democratization process even if, in a socie ty torn by war, they are often assigned a marginal role. Jn post-con flict situations, where it is di ffic ult to distin g uish frien d from foe, women arc potentially the best allies in the realization of peaceb uilding pro gramrncs . The pay Lhe highest price, and are therefore most willing to operate in the peace process . In Lhe tradi tion al African soc iety, for instance, women play a pacification role due lo the double kinship deriving from marriage: Lhey are loyal to both the original clan and to the acquired one to which the ir child ren belong. ln El Sa lvador lhc "Patriotic Movement Against Crime" (MP DC), was founded by a group or women in November 1995. Tls imporlant

contribution in d isarming El Salvador's society and in reestablishing peaceful and civilized cond itions in the Country have a lready been acknowledged by the UN Secretary General. In November 1996 the peace agreernent in Sierra Leone was signed by the international community and the Governmenl. The accord failed. Elections did not take place. The campaigns of public education and civil resistance, organi1.ed by the \vomen all over the Country, were decisive for ensuring Lhe elections and for the return of Sie1Ta Leone on the road to democracy. THE DISARMAl\llENT FACTOR: A KEY FOR SUCCESS AND

CREDIBILITY

Dism1nament. control of arms, demobilization and reemployment of the forn1er combatants are the key for an actual solution of the conflict, for the correct conduct of the operaLions and for tl1.e implementation of a lasting peace. The lessons learned in Angola, l\ilozarnbique, Somalia, Guatemala, El Salvador and Haiti are, for better or worse, examples wich confinn this proposition. ln Somalia, the opinion prevailed that it was not worth running r isks in order Lo complete the disannarnen t of the \varring parti es . In Mozarnbique, on the contrary, Lhe disarmament was possible precisely because of the deter-

m ination with which the process was conducted. There are three im pelling reasons for this course: • the requisition of arms contributes to increase the credibility of the mission; • the non-requisition o( weapons is a potential danger also for the international operators (both civilian and rnilitary); • the lack of control and non-desttuction of arms is a potential danger for the stability and internal security of the Country after Lhe end of the operation. I n order to be e ffec tive, planning and execution of the disarmament must be an integral part of the strengthening of peace,

combin ing collection/destruction o r arms and demob ilization wi th the slart of the reemp loy ment programmes . Contrary to what has o[Len happened in the past, the reconslruction and reemployment programmes rnus t proceed at the same rate as the disar·mamen t process. There is therefore an interaction between the strengthening of peace and the progress - or non-progress of the operations of disarn1arnent,

Left. VCC- 1 arnwured personnel carrier at a checkpoint o( 1/i.e J1alia11 contin-

gent in Bosnia. Below. Italian soldier 011 1w1rol in Bosnia.

demobilization and reemployrnent of the former combalants. It is important to understand the different perception of the "economy of viole nce": the inte rnational community perceives the conflict as an irrational situation; in weslern societies the notion prevails that "violence does not pay"; in the developing world, violence is a "means for survival and ach ievement". Coercive disa rmament is r isky. The strategics based on consent, a irned at reduc ing the "value" of arms, s ho uld have priority ove r· the attempts Lo eliminate a ll weapons a Lthe same t.i rne. Clearly, Lhe need o r c onsent does not mean purs uit of conse nsus, but s hould rather cr-eate and promote the .l ocal or individual in te rest in the "advantage" o r handing in th e ·weapons. Pa,·ticular atte ntion, therel'ore, must be a ttribu ted to the social a nd economic impact of the reemployment programmes. The chances of success increase in proportion to the adoption of solutions capable o r fostering the productive capabilities of the loca l economy, invo lving the former belligerents. In short, the d isarmament and dernobilization process must be conducted together with the in1plern e ntation o f the h umanita rian aid a nd social ree rnployme nt programmes, si nee the latter are the necessary and indispensable conditions for the fu lfillment of the form er. What \vas done in l\ilozambique, w here the Chairman or the "Cease-Fire Commiss ion" and "Dernobilization Process'' was also responsible fo r the implementa tion of the "Humanitarian Development Programm e", is certain ly a valid example, to be considered in futu re ope rations .

D ,·, Brigadier General, General Officer in Charge o{ Coordination, Inspectorate of Anny Schools 77

by Domenico Zucaro

Âˇk

The issue of the publications "Doctrine of the

Italian Army" and "Land Military Operations" marked the alignment of the national norms with the NATO ones (ATP 35/B-'95 ed.). This action was necessary in order that the contribution of our land instrument in the various national and especially international scenarios of employment be kept effective and up to date. This article illustrates the essentinl contents of the two valuable publications edited 1ry the Doctrine, Training and Regulations Office of the Army General Staff. 78

THE DOCTRINE

The presenl doctrinal body presents a "tree" stn1clure, which permits to rapidly update Lhe publications already issued, and to amplify them, as well as lo probe deeper into the problems, applying the lessons learned "on the field", also with the purpose of making use of the lessons in the shortest possible lime. The first two publications fill an obvious "conceptual" gap in the previous regulations, since the 900/A series of publications limiled the emp loyment of the

military instrument up to the Corps (tactical level), without defining the aspects connected w.ith the employment of the forces at operational level. In particular, the publication "Land Military Operations" determines lh.e elem ents which must guide the operational and tactical commanders in planning and conducting any military operation. Another important characteristic of the present doctrine is the flexibility of the expressed principles, whose value can be extended to all organization levels

(certainly to Brigades and Major Units to which they are subordinate) and it is not excessive to affirm the ir extensibility to combat-group and minor-complex level. THE INSTRUMENT

Together with the change of doctrine, the Service is undergoing a radical tra nsformation, determined by several "external" factors, but anyhow connected with the configuralion of an instrument really capable of

applying the nevv doctrine. Of particular importance is the availability o[ forces qualitatively able to operate in mutinat.ional contexts, according to the "modularity" and "categorization" principles, as well as to integrate in such contexts through "capab il ity packages" suitable for performing specific operational h.mctions (I).

MILITARY OPERATIONS

In the new doctrine, military operations have been d ivided into "War Operations" - the so-called 80

"classic" operations an d "Military Operations Other Than War" (MOOTW). In particular, to the \Nar Opera tion s belong both the offensive and defensive operations, that are planned and conducted at operational and tactical level, as well as the "Delay Operations", planned and conduc ted at tactical level only. Other activities carried out lo functionally connect offensive, defensive and delay operations are tbe transition phases (movement for contact, encounter corn bat, rejoining, withdrawal, rotation of

units in contact) which in every respect can be consider·ed tacticallevel operations. · M OOTWs in c lude "Peace Support Operations "(PSOs) and t hose i n s uppon of national and/or internat ional Civil Authorilies. The ten11 "operation" deserves a reflection, in that the previous doctline fixed a 1igid con-espondence between the o,·ganization level and the exp r essio n describing the activity it performed: for instance, "Operation" ,vas associated w ith "Theatre", and "Battle" wi th "Corps".

Traini11~ o{ a 111eclwniz.ed-infi:1.mry unit.

Llie mentality or Lhe "formal compl iance" - is no longer appl icable, since "Operation" is the only term used to describe the m ilitary activ ities to be carried out al Lhc various levels. This simp lification, which is not purely semantic, gives the new doctr ine a furl.her char acteristic of flex ibility and simplicity: what is important is not what term to use but, on the contrary, the level of the responsibility in charge of the planni ng and conduct of the operation, and the objective to be reached . This means that any Corps, Div is ion, Brigade or combat group can car ry out an "Operation", whose importance is exc lusively based on the rcsponsib i Ii ty given to Lhc Commander.

THE OPERI\TIONAL

·with each other in an operational "continuum". They arc not carried out necessarily in a rigid chrono logica.l sequence and, furthermore, are not adjacent to each other. The Commander .rnust synchron i1.c them, in o i-der to e~ert the highest concentration of his Cornbat Power (2) on the surface and in the th ird dimension, striking the enemy everywhere in his AOR, depriving hirn of his freedom or action. The Corn mander coord i natcs and synchronizes Deep, Close and Rear Operations in suc h a way as to concentrate his Combat Povver in order for hi.rn to reach the decisive points (3) and then the centre of gravity (4) of the enemy. The Operationa l Frame\vork must be planned al. all organ izaticn,J levels, for a ll phases/times ,if the manoeuvre; the coordination of its component operations mu ~t take place among all the units ;•nd pursued in any circumstance. Deep Operat1vns

FRAMEWORK

In the NATO doctrine and in the present national norms, one can see very clearly that Lhe old rigid schcmatism - which could produce

The Operational Framework is the ,vho le of Deep Operat ions, Close Operat ions and Rear Operations that the Commander rnust plan in his Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order to succcssfu I ly conduct a "War" operation. Deep, Close and Rear operations m us t a lways carry o ut the basic "Discover", uFix" and "Strike" funct ions, and m ust be connected

The term "rleep" immediately expresses l he basic aspect of these operations, wide-ranging and generally conducted f'or long periods of time. in all p hases of a War Operation . The functions of Deep Operations arc to "Discover", "Fix" and "Strike" Lhe enemy forces before they are introd u ced in combat, in order to create the conditions ror the successive Close operations . They rnusl be

FUNCTIONS

ACTIVITY k

, 1 1,

• In-depth Surveillance and Target Acquisition • Air Interdiction (AINT) Offensive Air Support (OAS) Land Forces Fire and Manoeuvre • Deceit • •

~ ....

........ ....

......

... ...

....

• Discover • Disccver and Strike • Discover and Strike • Strike • Oper:1tional Function 81

DEEP performed by an Operational-level Division

-----

- --- -- . ....__

~-_i

fig. 1

Activities/Functions of an Operational-level Division in a Defensive Operation. A: RSTAand INTERDICTION B:OAS C:FJX D: STRIKE E:MONlTOR F:DECETVE Deep operations of Operalional level in Offensive or Defensive Operations are preceded by RSTA activities. They are canied out beyond the RTPL, ,.vith air missions (ATNT-A) for the achievement of certain Decisive Points (elimination of air defences, command and control systems, energy sources, logistic and communication systems, etc...) as a prerequisite for the destruction of the enemy Centre of Gravity, and in the :,;ector of tb.e Area of Responsibility between FSCL and FEBA, in order to reach decisive points, such as: • destruction of some communication lines; • elimination of some enemy combat-components; • neutralizalion of some operational functions of the enemy units (Command and Control system, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Combat mlits). Between FSCL and FEBA, the Division intervenes first against the 1st echelon and subsequently against the 2nd echelon of the enemy tulits, employing the Offensive Air Support (B) and the manoeuvre of its operational functions: long-range artillery to strike (D), helicopters to fix and/or strike (C and D), infiltrated tanks to strike (D), but also to deceive (F) and the recce component to monitor (E) and survey (A).

conducted against C3 systems, Combat Support, Logistic Centres, elements of the air defence, Combat forces of the 1st echelon and, late1~ against those of the 2nd echelon. Other purposes of Deep operations are to undermine the morale and to quash the fighting will of the enemy to reduce his Combat Power, his cohesion and

the rhythm of his action, as well as to interdict his lines of communicat ion. The main characteristic of Deep Operations is that they always have an offensive nature, even when they are conducted within defence or delay operations. They take concrete form, as described in the chart below, through the

employment of air fire (5) (RECCE, Air Interdiction, TAC RECCE, BAI, CAS), land fire expressed with Combat Support (long-range artillery, helicopters, special forces) - and through tl1e manoeuvre of high-mobility Combat forces (attack helicopters, armoured and special units) , capable of conducting psychologic actions. The planning and conduct of a Deep Operation requires, besides an adequate Command and Control system, m1 effi cient RSTA function (6) developed both a t operational and tactical level, and possibly other operational functions. The definition of the reference lines, such as RIPL, FSCL, FLOT and FEBA (7) is extremely important for the conduct of the operation, in that they permit to coordinate the air and land fire with the operations carried out by the Combat forces of the operational and tactical Commanders. The Deep Operations conducted by the various units must be integrated and syncronized with each other. For instance, the Deeps of a Corps must be coordinated with those conducted by Divisions and Brigades. The realization of a Deep p lanned by Commanders at operational level must necessarily be preceded by the RSTA function, which envisages an initial Air Interdiction (AINT) . (8), with missions conducted beyond the FSCL (9), in order to acquire information, but mostly to destroy a part of the enemy's Combat Power even before its employment. Furthermore, the Deep must wear out and slow down the rhythm and cohesion of the manoeuvre of the enemy, strike enemy targets/elements capable of logistic, such as command lines, logistic resources and other operational functions. The Commander must fix, for

the AINT missions, the objectives that are to be destroyed and their priority, the p hase s of the operations, the res ults to be obtained (percentage of reciuction of the enemy's Combat Power) . The AINT missions are therefore an important and fundamental element of a Deep Operation, in order to reach particular decisive po ints and, consequently, to des troy th e enemy centre of gravity. At times, according to the situations, the Cornrnancler can consider AINTs to be the ma in activity for the destruction of the centre of gravity. D eep Operations always envisage OAS (Office Automatic System), TAC RECCE, BAI and CAS missions, as well as land operations between FSCL and FEBA , or HL(l 0), in case of defensive operations. In this case, the missions are co nducted by the air potential in support to the land forces. TAC R E CCE missions are carried out between FLOT and RIPL, before in -depth land operations, in o r·dcr to gather inforn1ation about the enemy, are include d in the wi d er RSTA act1v1ty, and are normallv conducted from FLOT to RIPL. BAI missions a re conducted astride the FSCL, against enemy units and operational functions not directly in contact with the friendly land forces. CAS arc air missions against enemy targets in co ntact wi th friendly forces. Deep Op erations arc al so conducted w ith Combat Support units, such as m issi le systems, long-range artillery, heli~opters, special forces, e lectro nic and psychologica l warfare units and, as already mentioned, with highmobili ty and high -firepower Combat fo rces, such a s attack helicopters and armoured units . The exa m ples at Figures 1 and 2 show t he Deep of an op erat ion al - level Division engaged in a defensive operation, a nd that of a tactical-level

DEEP performed by a Brigade (Tactical-level) in a Defensh·e Operation

fig. 2

Acliv.iLi.es/Functions of a tactical-level Brigade subordinate to a Division: A: OAS, BAI, TAC .RECCE B:FIX C:STRIKE D:MONITOR E: DECEIVE

The Brigade's Dec:p Operations shown are canied out in the forward zone of the Area of Responsibility against 2nd-echdon Regiments, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and other operational fi.mctions of the lst-echdon enemy Division. Deeps are carried out through BAl air missions (A), Di_recl and Possible SG Support (C), attack helicopters (C and B), high-mobility Combat tmits (D) in a monitoring role, and with other operational ftmctions employed in order to achieve the Decisive Points (c::.lirni.naLion of the Command and Control Systcrn, land and A/A artillery, mechanized, armoured and A!T units, logistic units and communication lines etc...). Evidently in a preceding phase the Brigade's Deeps were carried ou t against the l st-echelon Regiments.

Brigade of the same Division. Figure 3 shows the aspects of the Deep conducted by a Division in an offensive operation. As regards Dela y Operations, the aspects of the Deeps are similar to the ones d escribed above, but limited to the tactical level s ince these operations are conducted at that level only.

Close Operations Close Op erations d ecide the outcorne of offensive, defensive

and delay operations . They are a imed at destroying the significant part of the enemy Combat Power at close contact, and are conducted in rapid succession, ·with "less dynamic" actions ajmed at fi xing, canalizing and delaying the enemy progression with sharply offensive striking act ions (counterattacks). The results o n the enerny forces must be immediate and tangible. Closes are conduc ted wi th the manoeuv re of Combat, Corn.bat Suppor t and Combat Service Support un its, a n d with ot her 83

DEEP of a Division in a Defensive Operation

AINT

RIPL

FSCL

fig. 3 The Deep opcraLions carried oul by an operational-level Division in an Offensive OperaLion are also preceded by RSTA activities; they arc developed beyond Lhe RTPL through AINT and RECCE air missions, OAS missions and employ specific operational functions astride the FSCL, in order 1.0 achieve certain Decisive Points for the destruct.ion or the Centre of Gravitv. The tactical-level Deep operations, conducted in this case by a Brigade, arc carried out against. the 2nd echelons of the in-contacLenemy unit. The concepts on Decisive Points, CcntrÂˇes of Gravity and operational functions are like those described at Figures I and 2.

CLOSE of a multinational Corps or Division

FEBA

fig. 4

units performing the remaining operational hmclions . In general, Closes are the basic component of the defensive, offens ive and delay operations,

since they are the only ones which permil to achieve the decisive points necessary for destroying the enemy centre of gravity. In 'War operations, Closes lake

place in an AOR where, in U1e ir turn, lhe subordinale units - in the respeclive AORs - conducl Deep, Close and Rear operation at their level (fig.4) . For example,in a defensive operation conducted by a rnuJl.inational Corps, the Close is carried out in the Main Battle Area, according to the procedures of mobile or areal defence, or corn bining the two forms of defence. Figure 5 shows in detail a possible organization of an AOR. in a defensive operation, applying the mobile-defence procedures. In mobile defence, approx.irnately one third of Lhe forces is employed to manage (cana li ze, wear out, delay) Lhe manoeuvre of the enemy, in order to drive him to a special sector of the AOR., \vhere the remaining two Lhirds of the forces arc employed in decisive offensive actions (conclusive counLerattack at L.he desired place and time, conducted by an ad hoe force, quite distinct from the reserve) w.bose main purpose is the destruction of lhe enemy. Jn areal defence, aboul two thirds of the forces are used to absorb the in1pact of the enemy, strengthening and inlegrating the obstacles or "constructing" Lhem, \,v hile lhe other forces conduct local counlerattacks, wilh the main objective of preventing the enemy from gaining ground, depriv ing him of his freedom of manoeuvre. The concepts expressed above will be discussed more in detail in successive articles about the various forms of deCensive operations. As regards Closes in offensive operations, it rnust be stressed that they include a number of actions conducted from the FEBA to the FSCL, which moves according to Lhe progress o( the attack. lt is important to underline thal the objective or the whole offensive operalion is the destruction or the enemy forces in

relat ion to th e centres of gravity located at the various levels. The subordinate uniLs, in their turn, conduct the ir ~eep, Close and Rear Operations, consi6ting in preli m inary activi ties o f combat reconnaissance before the attack and, nnally, in a ttacks of different kinds (systematic, expediti ous, simulated, demonstrative) ( 11). Figure 6 s hows the examp le of a C los e con ducte d by a multinational Corps during an offens ive operation. The asp ec ts descr ib e d above keep their va lidity also w hen the operation is co ndu cted by a Divis ion or a Brigade.

CLOSE of a multinational Corps in Mobile Defence

r--- --- -- - , :

MOBILE

l _DEFENCE _ J

fig. 5

Rear Operation

The purpose of Rear Operations is to ensure freedom of action to the forces conducting "Deeps" and "Closes", preventing the destruction of their C4 system, combat supp01t, counterattack force, res erves, logi s ti c su ppo rt a nd uni ts conducting o tl1er opera tion a l functions. Rear Operations essentia lly aim at co ntrastin g d eep en emy opera! ions and arc realized by monitoring interest areas, by "prote ct in g" o pern t io nal and logi stic bases, communicati o n lines and routes, itineraries, d epots, con voys, s ensitive mater ia ls, c ivilia ns an d the su pport elements provided by the Host Nation. Rear Operations arc carried out in the back part of the AOR of the unit whic h conducts the operation. For instan ce , in defe nsive operations (f ig . 7) the R ear Opera tion takes place fro m the rear edge of the Main Battle Area Lo the rear edge of the AOR of the units conduct ing the entire operati on, in this case a multina tiona l Corps. In general, the extent of the rear area com pels the Commander to entrus t. Lhe Rear Operation to a subordinate Commander; responsible

CLOSE of a multinational Corps in an Offensive Operation

RIPl FSCL

r ~DivOEEP ----)

---

>< ><

)(

YE8A

fjg.6 SIMULA'IT.O ATTACK

SYSTEMATIC ATTACK

SIMl.11..J\TF.D ATTACK

The CLOSE shown refers Lo an OCfensive Operation concluct.ctl by a multinational Corps; neve11hclcss, in case of a simila r opera Lio n conducted by a Division, the conceptual aspects keep their full validity, once the organizaLional level of the represented u nits is appro priately adjusted .

for the surveillance, protection and monitoring acti vi ties. He can avail himself of surveillance a nd control units, as well as of forces for close defence a nd mob il e reac t.ion t.o protec t o f the deployment areas of logistic units,

Co mmand Posts, and Combat Support e le.ments. Furthe1Âˇmore, th e Comm a nder in charge of a Rear Operation must have at his dis posal an intervention force ad e q ua t e to h is level of responsibility. He controls these 85

REAR of a multinational Corps in a Defen:s.tve OÂľera.tion

1. Group of Deployment zones 2. 1\fobile Force of Deployment Zone 3. Intervention Force 4. "Surveillance and Target Acquisition" (SORAO) subsystem 5. Monitoring activity

The REAR operations shown refer to a Defensive Operation conducted by a multinational Corps; nevertheless, if the operation were carlied out hy a Division or a Brigade, the concepts expressed would remain h.dly valid, once the level of the forces were appropriately adjusted .

forces through a Rear Arca Operational Centre. Deep operations conducted by the enemy can affect the operation witb different levels of danger, which must be quashed ,..vith specific actions carried out by the Rear Forces: the first level (sabotage, terrorism, etc .) is confronted by Lhe close-defence units; the second level (regular units), by close-defence units and the mobile reaction -forces of the deployment areas; the third level (airmobile, airborne and amphibious units) is eliminated by employing the intervention forÂˇce and the support of the mobile reaction-forces . It must be noted that these principles apply also in case of offensive and delay operations (fig. 8). The princip les expressed above will be discussed more in detail in the successive articles

on War Operations. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

The flexible application of the genernl scheme of operations is one of the many changes presented by the ATP 35iB and adopted by the doctrine of the Italian Army. This flexibility, on the other hand, makes it necessary to consider the type of training necessary [or Cadres and units coming from at least thirty years of experience with norms directed towards instrumental implementation rather than towards the assumption of responsibility by Commanders at all levels. In particula r, the main characteristic of Deep, Close and Rear Operations is the es LablishmenL of the precise

objectives the various Commanders want to achieve; furthermore, Lhese objectives must be perfectly integrated \viLl1 each other; in order Lo reach the decisive points and destroy the enemy centre o[ gravity. This is very different from the almost bureaucratic positioning on the ground (as envisaged by Publication 900A, Vol.l) of a selies of strong points w hich , on the other hand, were not all rnanned and/or activated . With the new norms, operations are aimed at the "active" destruction of the enemy forces. This cornpels the Commander to envisage, in his concept of action, the synchrnn i1.ation, coordination and simultaneity of Deep, Close and Rear Operations which compose a \i\Tar Operation . Furthermore, the Commander must plan the logical succession/synchronization of activities, operational functions and air s u pport. This is very different from the defence of the ground as an end in itself, i.e. waiting passively for the enemy's initiative and d efending the ground, "counterreacting" to the last man and the last "bullet". In order to overcome the forma mentis of the strong point, the scheme of the operation should be cons idered a restraint; it is not always necessary to conduct all three operations, because if a Commander can eliminate the enemy centre of gravity with a Deep, he can suspend the planned Close and Rear. Besides, the scheme is not applied only by the Commander of the unit responsi b le for the War Operations, but a lso by all subordinate commands. Obviously, in planning and carrying out Deep, Close and Rear Operations simultaneously, is no more possible to use p lanning sequences \Vith acl.ivilies where the first one is a prerequisite for the development of Lhe second and so on (the "perfect p lan"), but it is ind ispensab le to use planning

processes (the "marching plan") with activities mutually and simultaneously interacting. This jmplies, by the Comm"l:lnders al all levels, a high capabi'l ity of assuming their responsibility and of working for a common objective, (at times not completely clear), within an operational and functional context where complete plans, formal perfection and wri tten orders are not always available. It is also eviderrl that the need to plan and develop three operations makes it necessary for the unit to command operational functions adequate - as regards their characteristics and levels of capability - to the operation to be planned and conducted. Therefore, the new doctrine could tum out to be practically inapplicable for minor corn bat-groups, if these units do not have, for example in case of Deep Operations, sufficient offensive BAI air-support, or fire granted and realized by long and medium-range weapons; or if the Commanders are not in a position to manage further "reinforcements". Nevertheless, this does not exempt a company Commander from employing, in terms of Deep, the long-range weapons at his disposal - even if they are only mortars - because he must have a forma mentis aimed at the Operational Framework.

D * Colonel, Regular Professor of Tactics, War College NOTES 1. The Publication "Militarv Land Operations" describes, in liri'e Âˇwith ATP 35/B, fourte en Operational Functions that must be wholly or partially exercised in a War Operation or in a MOOTW. 2. "Combat PO\ver" is the whole of the operational functions (Combat, Combat Support, C.S.S., C 4, morale, fighting will, intelligence . . .)

REAR of a multinational Corps in an Offensive Operation RIP!. FSCL

Corps

Rear i:\.rea

1. Group of Deployment Areas in the Waiting Zone 2. Mobile Force of the Deployment Zone 3. Intervention Force 4. "Surveillance and Target Acquisition" (SORAO) subsystem 5. Monitoring activity.

appropriately rnanoeu~red by the Commander. 3. Decisive Points: events whose occurrence is a precondition for the elimination of the centre of gravity. Combat situations that must be created or pursued in order to give freedom to one's own manoeuvre. The instruments for the achievement of the d ecis ive points are the elimination of specific operational functions of the enemv and the maintenance of control ov'er an area. When planning, they must be determined for each organization level and each type of operation/activity. They can change, or new ones can be determined also in the conduct phase. 4 . Centre of gravity: significant e lement whic h , if attacked or eliminated, leads to the inevitable defeat of the enemv; it can be its Combat Power, a characteristic, a capability or a place from which a nation or an alliance derives its freedom o f action . As a ru le, the complexity of the determination of the centre of gravity is proportional lo the level of responsibility. 5. RECCE: Air reconnaissance; AINT: Air Interdiction;

TAC RECCE: Tactical Reconnaissance; BAI: Battlefield Air Interdiction; CAS: Close Air Support. 6. RSTA: Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targcl Acquisition. 7. RIPL: Reconna issance and Interdiction Planning Line; FSCL: Fire Support Coordination Line; F LOT: Forward Line Own Troops; FEBA: Forward Edge of Battle Area. 8. Besides AINT, in an operational Theatre also COA operations are envisaged. They are necessary to control the air space with the contribution of the air defence and the participation of Army i-VA units. COAs are conducted with missions such as offens ive and defensive counteraviation and the suppression of the enemy air-defence (SEAD). 9. Generally FSCL is at a distance of 30-40 km from FEBA in defensive operations, or 80-100 km in offensive operations. 10. HL: Handover Line (for transfer or responsibility).

11. Other types of attacks, such as counterattack and disturbance, take place mainly in defensive situations.

G1\rIJ3 路路u路 r,路 rUD \

This article is the first of a series illustrating the lives of the great Roman Emperors. Tire stories, spanning over five centuries, will remind the readers of the unique destiny of a City which was capable of . expanding its power all over the world Known at that time. Caesar -was the first great Emperor. His life ivent down in history as a myth and his death did not change the course of Romes glorious path.

GERMAHIA

ARABIA

CAESAR'S MAIN BATTLES AFRICA

aim; Ju li us Caesar, unlike his successor Augustus , ,.vas never formally nominated Emperor of Rome, but is commonly considered as the first Roman Emper01: The third phase of the history of Rome begins ,-vith him . The monarchy of the Seven Kings lasted 244 years, each king ho lding power for 35 years on average, and was (ollO\ved by the Republic. Caesar came to power four centuries later initiating the Imperial. phase in the h istory of Rome. Caesar's life too can be divided inlo three phases. The first long phase vvas marked both by reproachable personal events (adultery and homosexuality) and by his stubborn will to gel wel l trained and ready for the future. Only when he was 42, he becam e the Great General who

EGITTO

conquered Gaul and eventually Britain, after a fatiguing war which had lasted nine years. Thus he became a leader who succeeded in eliminating his opponents. The short final phase of his triumph began when he was 55. ll lasted less than a year bu t it was long enough to let him frame the Empire, the nevv forrn of government which would outlive hiJn for five centuries. Just like Napoleon, I 8 centuries later, Caesar was a patric ian turned into a pop u laris ( a democrat) who fought for t he commons to win their support. While Napo leon's opponent was the late 18th century frivolous monarchy in France, Caesar's opponent was tbe selfish and voracious senatorial oligarchy. But, unlike Napoleon, Caesar had also to fight widespread and deeply-rooted republican feelings, ,vhich eventually defeated him.The more exciting were h is victories,

the more painful ·were his defeats. The triumph at Alesia avenged tbe defeat al Gergovia, as that at Pharsalus ·wiped out the memory of Dyrrhachium. He was versali le and had outstanding positive and negative qualities. We are lured by his being a genius, elegant, fearless and merciful. But there are some who regard him as an adultere1~ a homosexual, an epileptic, a tyrant, a cruel person . He had always been very determined lo bend the stream of history to his -wishes, hut when he became a I ifc-dictaLor, he was apparently overwhelmed by a sort of fatalisLic attitude.Was it mere presumption or an unconscious desire to put an end to an extraordinary life with 23 stabs? He was born in I 00 B.C. This was a strange coinc idence: nol on ly it was the beginning of a ne,v century, but a lso of a new era in the h£story of Rome and of

Cavalryman - Early Roman Imperial Age (reconstruction).

the world. THE LONG PHASE OF ms EDUCATION (100 B.C. - 58 -B.C.)

He was born in Rome. His hyphotetical "personal reports" could be as follows : ''Tall, thin but strong, even too much elegant, dark eyes, broad forehead, fierce glance, noble manners and vibrant voice . His memory is extraordinary and his turn of speech uncommon. Determined and self-possessed even

when he is fi.lled with angd'. He quickly learned Greek, Âˇwhich became his second language. Just like Napoleon, he was keen on astronomy, maths and science. Poetry was his great passion, but it could not keep him away from military exercises. His uncle Marius, who was elected General and Consul six times and was holding power in Rome in lhose years, was his mentor. He strengthened his frail body

through a tough and conslant training. He had four wives (Cossutia, Cornelia, Pompeia and Calpurnia) whom he married because of their dowries or for political reasons. ln 86 B .C . when his uncle Marius died, his name was put on the list o f proscribed persons made by Sulla, the diclalor, m1d he had to flee Rome just because of his being Marius' kin. But thanks to some friends of his (the habit of signalling people was also common at that time), Sulla erased his name from the list and saved Caesar's life exclaiming "your will be done ...you can keep him ..You'll regrel it ... I can see many would-be Mariuses but only one Caesar". How could he foresee all this in a 14 year:..old boy? There was much gossip about his boyhood, as when he was given the task of carrying the King of Bithynia a request for a fleet. His mission was successful but gossip had it that he had become the "Queen of Bithynia" (which he had been blamed for his whole life). But other episodes showed his determination and his strength, as when he was captured by a group of pirates during a journey by sea and held hostage for 2 months until a ransom was paid. Once freed, he managed to raise a fleet and , acting as an Admiral, captured his captors in their hideouts and had all of them hanged. He was only 22. Though his family was of patrician origin, he took up the cause of the "populares" and this is another reason why it took him such a long time to rise from the ranks. His political choice could not be different . He was born in the Suburra, the working class suburbs, t he slum of the wonderful City, the ghetto where poor and sluggard populace lived, the origin of all popular riots.

Rornan gladius and German sword (reconstru.cti:on ).

He was bl amed for his opportunistic an d dem agog ic political choice, which he always stuck to even al a time \vhen a volte-face was not a.s sensational as nowadays. At 31, he reached the fi rst rw1g on the Roman political ladder: He was elected Quaestor and sent to Farther Spain. The re he saw the statue of Alexander the Great, at Cadiz. He burned with rage and burst into tears. At 31, Alexander had already enlarged h is dom inion over the whole Eastern world. Caesar decided to make up for lost Lime and kept his prom ise. He was then e lected Aecl il c and, a t 37, Pontifex Maximus , the hi ghes t seat of the prin cipal college of p1iests and a lifelong post. In 61 B.C., h e went bac k to Spain as Propraelor, that is a

Govern or act ing as m ilitary commander: He fought against and defeated peoples living in the mountainous regions of Lusi tania and Galicia , who used to make sudden raids and pillages in the neighbouring Roman p ro vince. He wa s succes sful as he per form ed rapid and bold manoeuvres a lso by sea. Roma n soldiers were sail.ing tli e Atlanti c Ocean for the first time and that news excited the who le City. Having signed an allia nce (kno wn as t he f irst triumvirat e) with General Pompey and Crassus, the iichest man in Rome, he became Consul for the year 59 B.C. He was 41 , less than ten years after he had decided to speed up his career. Fro m then on, all his actions aimed at fi ghting oli garchy and win the support of the popuJares. One of his first steps was to let public opinion know what h ap pened in the Se nate and everywhere e lse within th e boundaries of the Roman dominion. He set up two publications, the Acta

Roman Legionary - 1st century B.C.

Diurna and the Acta Senatus, the forerunners of mocl.e fn Offi cial Journals. In a way , they marked the origin of journalism because they contained news about death, birth, wedding, divorce of Roman citizens. They were published daily a nd it is easy lo understand how they pleased Roman people. He then introduced an agrarian reform law e nvisagin g the distributio n of plo ts of land to urban poor people having at least three ch ildren , a Jso through compulsory expropriation. The Se nate fi erce ly opp osed this law which was all the same approve d b y the P opular Assembly. Caes a r had won the first round with the Senate! But the Sena te, the hi g hest institution of the Roman State, imm ediately tri e d to win the second round. As Consules were traditi onally assign ed a Propra e lura a year after their Consulship, the Senate proposed to give Caesar th e Propraetura for state p r op erty, park s and forests. Bu t, thanks to the effectiveness of his actions, not on ly h e was give n the mos t prestigious com mand post: the Governorsh ip of Cisalpine Gaul 91

Bridge on th<?. rive r Rhine built by Caesar's troops in abouL /0 days ( 1:30 scale 1nodel).

and Illyria with thr-ee Legions ( Cisalpi ne Gaul included the entire valley of the river Po and the nothen1 part of Italy) but it was also established that his ter-m of duty would last 5 years instead of the usual 1. He was later given Narbon ens is Gaul \vhich \Vas considered the prov ince par excellence and this is why this region is now called Provence. THE PHASE OF THE WARRJOR (58 - 45 B.C.) He was Governor of a region in the northern part of the Roman dominion neighbouring riotous tribes like the Gauls , the Germans and the Belgians. It was the same nothern border that had been crossed by those Gauls who had al most conquered the Capitolium, centuries before. 92

Those provinces gave h.im the opporÂˇtun ity lo show his militaiy skills while carrying out e ight campaigns which lasted 9 years and also a four-year long civi.l war against Pompey. It would take to long lo analyse in details each campaign. The most important aspects of his military skills together with major events will be su mmarised. He round a wonderful way to relate to his soldier-s which can be considered an example of perfect personnel management and command capability. Adherence to prescribed forrns and imitat ion of examples were of major importance to him. He paid great attention to military uniforms as he conside r e d elegance a means of shovving power. He obliged his soldiers to wea rÂˇ finely chased armours . Today, he could be considered as a perfect rorrnalist but he re pea tedly showed, even in difficult situations, what great significance was hidden behind his adherence lo forms. In fact

this forma lism was also enhanced by the example he set. For example, during the battle of Bibracte, Caesar chose not to use his horse and obliged his Tribunes to do the same convinced as he \Vas that both so ldi erÂˇs and officers had to run the same risks. He always spoke to his soldiers before a battle or a momentous even l to encourage them and explain the details of the impending battle. When he decided to give way to the civil war against Pompey, he made this decision only after "knO\.ving his soldiers' will". He was very generous with his soldiers but he expected much from them. He won their loyalty and devotion in lo ng years of uninterrupted engagement. His famous Veterans used to grumble while marching, just as good and we ll- disc ipl ined soldiers al ways do and as Napoleon's grognards will do, centuries later. How different he ,,vas Crom his

War 111ac hin e used d uring s ieges {1 :10 scale nwde{j.

enemy Pompey the Great, l he Ge n eral who li ved in an aristoc ratic Ol y mpu s where h e lost touch with rea lity. He always cared for the lives of his so ldi e rs thou g h engaged th e n, in h ero ic a nd ri s ky ventures. H e said ul t is a chief's du ty to win us ing b oth h is s,.vord and hi s wisdom" The limited number of casu alties among his soldiers, even in the most d ifficult battles is stti k.i.ng. At Pharsa lus, his most bill er victory, h e counted 200 casualties versus 15000 c asu al Lies and 2 4000 prisoners among Pompey's troops. At M und a, i n Spa i n, h is last victory, he counted I 00 casualties vers us 30000 casual Li es am o ng Pompey's troops. T he rapidity of his thinking and actions was abso lutely s tri king. Th is, togeth er w ith th e consta nt sea re h for surpri sing moves, diso 1iented his opponents. At a time whe n wars were mainly cond ucted d uring Lh e d a y and certainly in spring and summe1~ he crossed the Medite1Ta nean Sea, the snow-covere d Alp s a nd Lh e Channel many ti mes i n w inter. S ometimes, as it happened at Mund a, Spa i n, he e n gaged th e ene m y fo r c es even before th ey knew he had left Rome. I-l e coupled his co nstant effort to sur pr ise the enemy w ith hi s live ly i mag i nat ion as when R oman s oldiers, u s i ng long sickles, cul the sails of the ships of the Veneti (a Lribe in Brittany) to stop and assault them. Hi s deep i ns igh t a nd eye a l\vays e nabl ed him to fi nd the foca l point where to attack. He a lways tried to carry lhe en emy to a s ite o f his choice. This was the ve ry trap Ca esar s et fo r Verc ingetorix when he locked him u p in Alesia, after the retreat frorn Gergovi a ./\nd, again,after raising the siege of Dyn-achium,

he made Pompey follow h im to th e p lain o f Ph ars alu s a nd ann ihilated h im . According lo the Caesarian war concep l, the strategic target was the destructio n of the enemy a nd not the conquest of the e nemy's teITiLory. T his latter option might advisa b.le only when demonstrative aclio ns were LO be ca1,-ied out. The two expeditions to B r i ta nni a an d t h e Lvvo ra ids across the river Rhine are to be u nderstood accord ingly. H e constantly focused his att.e ntion on his troops' training. Ro man Legio naries had to be excellent walkers and extraordinary sappers . Th is is why lhey cou ld m ove tw ice as qui c k as th e ir e n em ies an d bu ild fie ld

forLifications which are sin1ilar to mili tary engineering works. Pontoneers shou ld appo in t him honorary member of Lhe ir speciality. Caesar was the first to bui ld a fi xed wood e n bridge o n Lh e r i ver Rhi n e. It was an incredible work fin ished in I 0 d ays only, it was more than half a kilo meter lo ng and f"r ightened the Gen11ans in Lo th i nking that Rome was so powerfu l as Lo o La me even that grea t river. W hen h e coul dn' t th row a bridge, he diverted rivers or dug ca nals to lo wer th e ,.va ter-level and allow for water-ford ing. Sailors too should pay h im a tribu te . He was the first Roman eve r to conduct a naval battle on the Atlantic ocean and the fi rst to

GU ERRA

GIU LIO

ASSEDIO (ALI St

CES A RE.

G,~LLIE.

( AN NO 52 AV. E.V. )

ALESIA

DI 5 A I N Tt

NE: LLE.

Left.

A dra wing of the siege of Alesia.

R EIN C )

CONVEfllZIONJ A.B.C. A"ampame nti d, fonto ria (sull, t lh,re) D. Acc~rn;:i. rrwn !o di.

Below. Fascine bridge huill by Caesar's troops during his campaign against the Bellovaces in 5 I B. C. to ford marsh areas (scale I :30 1nodel).

tlue legioe.i a!l~ceato di SOC(Cll'SC

da ltÂ°t rll1llta

G.H.I.K Ae<ampa menti ( p r esso le ac9ue ) !.2..1 â€˘... 23 c aslelli

n1 Manovre d'zcqua (tH? i vc:n?:?llo

It trncce,

per inondare i rossi

della <irconvatlazione

f.f.f. Fosso (romano) largo

piedi

.., lii,e, di conlrovallaziona

a h ., di circonv~ll.uion l,r ., .. rinfo rzala ,v

lead a fleet beyond the Channel to carry out a deterrent action against some tribes in Britannia. Caesar is then truly modern in that he attributed extreme importance to propaganda and to his image. During the short and busy stays of a campaign, he managed to write or dictate to one of his

Ga lli

freedmen the report of the operations and he made those reports quickly get to Rom e . Therefore his Commentaries were, in a way, "a life report" of those events. Actually, he was the first w'ar correspondent, the correspondent of "Ii is own" war. Finally, what strikes us most in Ceasar's battles is the almost

constant inferiority in number of his troops. The ultimate reason for his victories I ies in the personal capabilities and imagination of this gift eel soldier. And this will almost always true for Napoleon. His v ivid imagination, his ingenous sapper and pontoneer ,.vorks, his dexterity as skilled fencer and charisma over the crowd are all keys to his victories . Among the numerous battles he fought, Alesia, his most glorious victory, and Pharsalus, his rnost bitter victory are worth mentioning. The Battle of Alesia took place in 52 B.C. during Caesar's campaigns in Gaul. It fo II owed the unsucccss fu1 siege of Gergovia when Caesar, for the first and only time, made the mistake of dividing his Army in two parts. The anti-Roman league had

Detail of circumvallation works (siege of Alesia, 52 B.C. ). (1 :35 scale nwdel).

30,000 men a nd was led by Vercingetorix. The latter, emboldened by the success gained in Gergovia shifted his technique from guerrilla fighUn g to close combat in the fiel d. This was what Caesar hoped for. I n fact the Romans defea ted and rou ted Vercingetorix o n ce again . As Caesar had predicted, he took refuge in th e near-by fortifi ed citadel of Alesia, where he hoped to renev.i the success gained in Gergovia. On the contrary, the conquest of that a lmost unconquerable stronghold highlighted Caesar's milita ry genius. He employed a new strategy and surrounded the citadel with two lines of circumvallalion and countervailation, each 20 km long and 20 m apart, preceded by several rm.vs of booby-traps and guarded by towers dispersed every 30 m and 23 forlified redouts. Even the course of a liver was diverted so that it could flow \.\Tithin one of the entrenchments and supply water to the Legionaries. Thu s a double front was established, one to siege the city and th.e other to withstand external attacks. The works were completed in 40 days under

constant enemy assaults. Those huge fi eld fortifications accommodated 75,000 Legionaries and 6,000 Cavalry men. The two lines of fortification were linked by connecting junctions allowing for the necessary troop movements. In this way the concept of manoeuvre, exploiting internal Jines, was fully applied to a mainly static situation, such as a siege. To relax the enemy's hold, Vercingetorix made several attempts Lo break through the siege. Large reinforcement.lroops with about 250,000 men came from abroad to relieve him. He also tried to wage several joint attacks, from ins ide and outside, againsl the Romans. Bu l Caesar was able to move his men with perfect timeU ness, exploiting his ingenious works, accomplished with a rare knowledge of topography. At last Vercingetorix had to surrender: Following Caesar's victories, the Gaul province fell under Ro man influence . T hanks lo Rome and Caesar, France became p art of the Mediterranean civilisation area, but was allowed to safeguard and keep ils Cellic traditions. A great effort was being made to give Western Europe an everlas ling Latin cultu ral heritage, which would set the course of its concepts and actions in Lhe centuries unfo lding. Th e baLLle of Ph arsalus took

place in 48 B.C. , as p art of the civil war, and for that reason was Caesar's sourest vic lory. In fact a defeat was once again followed by a success. Caesar had surround e d Pomp ey's troops e ntrenched at Durazzo, but they succeeded in raising the siege . Also on that occasion Caesar let his enemy foUow him lo a point of his choice, selected for the final outcome of the batlle. He could rely on 22,000 In fantry and 1,000 Cavaky men, a gains t Pompey's 45,000 Infantry and 7,000 Cavalry men. The balance of forces was in Pompey's favour, two to one for the J nfantry and seven to one for the Cavalry. Caesar immediately unde rstood that Po mpey would exploit his Cavalry superiority a n d devised a completely new d epl oyment. To co un ter a foreseeabl e Cavalry attac k, he deployed his 1,000 Cavalry men, mingled hundreds of In fantry men among their lines and, what is more importanl, deployed 6 selected cohorts - about 3,000 men - to avoid being encircled by enemy Cava lry. The battle developed exactly as Caesar had predicted. After the central bulk of Infantry troops engaged in a close combat, Po mpey's Cavalry tried an outflan king manoeuvre. But a t that point he clashed with the limited Roman Cavalry forces and the deployed 95

Bust of Pompey the Grea.1 (Hadrian period). t

_:;;:,-..

.,. I

I /

cohorts, which held out bravely; then the Roman Cavalry staged a counterattack. Pompey's Cavalry w as r outed and th e 6 coho r ts could outflan k and attack Pompey's Infantry from the rear. Enem y troops vvere dis ru pted and fled disorderly, Pompey ran a way. T hanks to his brilliantly conceived and per(ectly perfonned manoeuvre, Caesar had only 200 casualties, against Po mpey's 15,000 casualties and 24,000 prisoners . Pompey's army was disbanded after fighting a few hours only. Caes ar fo ughl his last battle at Munda, Spain, in 45 B.C. By coinc idence this place was near Cadiz, where 24 years earl ier he had wept in front of the statue of Alexander the G rea t and promised he would start a new life. In fact he kept his prorn ise. 96

. ..,,

During the 4 years of civil ,var (49-45 B .C. ) Caesar, though c on stan tly enga ge d in war operations, had also to deal wi th Slate affairs . During th os e 4 years he came Lo Rome only 2 or 3 times, for not more than 10-15 days , Lo make very i rnportant p rÂˇovisions. Roman citizenship was extended to Cisalpine Gaul. It was the first time that all the inhab iLan ts of th e Italian Peninsula ha d been u nder a common rule of law. Thus it can be said that not only Caesar ,,vas a greal Roman, but also the first Italian citizen. He took a series of organisational s teps, among which the reform of the Senate, where the n umber of members was increased , lo i ncl ucle re presentatives from Gaul and Spa in . Thal provisi o n clearly

.sho,.ved Lhat Caesar had a farreaching vision of Rome's international and imperial role. Structural provisions were also required to heal economic and .social conditions. In Rome free wheat rations were handed out to a certain number of dispossessed and in do len t citizens. Ab o ut 360,000 peop le were enti tled to receive th ese fr umenta ciones . Caesar ordered an investigation into the matter and it turned out that not a ll the recipients needed such State allowances (evidently "false pens ioners" date back to those times !) T he number of wheat ration recipients was then reduced to 150,000. He assigned plo ls of land in conq u ered provinces to Lhe m.os L needy peop le, to free Rome from their presence . He a lso Lried to c urb lhe gre edin ess of pro vincial governors, by limi ting their ten u re of office to a two -year period. To foster birth-rate growt h , he assigned specia l bonuses to large fam ily owners . Th e real nature of the new Caesarean orde rÂˇ was c learly shown by two provisions : lhe property of lhose w ho attempted to put State security at risk was .seized and po litically oriented associations were disbanded. The new rules governing administrative activities were evide nce of a chang ing and more permissive attitude. There was Lhe trend to equalise the rights of Roman and provincial citi1.ens, ruling out old Rep ublican criteria, which gave more privileges Lo a lim ited ci rcle of selected people. This way Caesar was trying to lay Lhe foundations of a new State organisation. The political structure envisaged by the Roman Republicans had been in.spired by and established around the principle of divide et impera . On lhe contrary, Caesar's new imperial vision turned that

Sta tu e u f .Julius Caesar wearing a military uniform (Trc1ja11 period). -

con cep t inlo "unite, do not di vide". Th is was the motto on which to build a new imperial so ciety. Caesar adopted a new calendar which lasted unti l 1582, when il was modified by Gregory XII l. In ract, he considered the calen dar as a rurther sign of J1is power. Thal reform was based on scienLific grounds, as it integrated both luna r· a nd sola1· cycles . The previous calenda,· dated back to the king Numa Pompilius and was ba sed on 355 days, plus an additional month, which followed n o es tablished rules . Caesar adopted the present year of 365 days and introduced it into all Roman domains, to replace the several and sometimes odd local calendar systems. T here is no doubt that that provision had a unifying effect, which ,vas h.11·thcr enhanced by the reorganisation of the monetary system . Gold coins were minted on a systematic basis, and not occasionally as in the past. A fixed exchange rate between the gold coin (aureo) a nd the silver coin (denaro) was established. Both coins were gradLially circulated all over the Empire and slowly replaced all other monetary syste ms. Allied sovereign States were allowed to mint silver coins, but only Rome had the right to coin gold money. It is note-worthy that Caesar was a precursor a lso in this sector. In fact h e clearly understood the impor-tance of a single currency, both at social and economic level. There is a telling s imilarity, both fun ctional and phonctica l, betwee n the words Euro and Aw·eo. Thanks to Caesar, another new system was adopted. In those time::; papyrus scrolls were \.vrapped around ivory or wooden stick::; and had different lengths, depending on their writLen texts. Caesar introduced a new method employing papyTl1S sheets of equal dimensions, w}1ich were heaped up

and bound logether. A book was born! He may have conceived that idea during o ne or his several campaigns. He moved on root or hor-se-back a nd was follow ed by carts packed with a large number of blank papyms scr-olls, to write his commentaries, verses, poems, and other papyri containing Greek and Latin works. Papyrus scrolls were ce rtain ly cumbersome. The

idea of a book was perhaps inspired by Lhe requ irem en t to gain space and reduce their volume. A FLEETING MOMENT OF

GLORY At the beginning or October 45 B.C. , Caesar came back to Rome,

Caesar's Forum (I :250 scale rnodel).

where the civil war was ove1~ and eagerly threw himself into putting into effect the several projects in his mind. He was extremely anxious to carry out his plans, as if he had some misgivings. In fact, his life would last 6 more months, the only pe1ido during which he was able to exert his sole power over Rome. As he cumulated olher assignments, he always managed to place his men in key public positions. Bu l a hidden conspiracy against him was taking shape. Pompey's supporters and Republicans started fuelling a lalenl and wide-spread hostility against dictatorship . Caesar, unlike Napoleon, had nol 路been defeated in the battlefield, but his real enemy was embodied in that Republican vision, which slowly

emerge d from the events lhat occurred during the previous 5 centuries of Roman history. Caesar instead, dazzled by his

__,s

glory and victories, blinded by cajolery and flattery, was not able to evaluate the danger of that little black mole ,vhich, in a few months, would grow into a cancerous lump. He also received the title of Emperor, only to give more lustre to his glorious actions in war, but was not conferred full powers as in the case of his successor, Augustus. Caesar's same name became a synonym for imperial power and the words Kaiser and Czar etymologically derive from it. The definition of "Caesarism" equally indicates any illegitimate monarchy based on weapons and people's support . Caesar's personal power deeply hurt Republican feelings which, though being on decline in a moribund Republic, could still aggregate his citizens' consensus . Caesar, who had never betrayed his democratic ideals during his political career, started behaving as an absolute monarch.

~ ,1 ) ~,路~ \,,_

'""'

~ / ,

-..-\

/ 路路, . I.,

Map of Caesar's campaigns in Caul, referring lO operations against \lercingetorix.

\~ . .

........ _ _

~............... .

.. ..,

Testudo /iJrmation (from the Trajan column).

(

I I

ThereCore those who could nol accept a Gover·nment w here power was in the hands of a single man, were increasingly hurl. Every day there was evidence of Caesar's in tolerant be]1aviour, which was both unpleasant and hurni I iating. From being generous, humane and extremely kind, once the most outstanding aspects of his character, he became irritable, vain and rnde. Perhaps this was due to the fact that his sporadic epileptic hts were worsening over the years. Caesar was also envisaging a new ,.var expedition. It was a grand project, beyond all imagination, even greater than Alexander's ambitious schemes. He had in mind to wage a war against the Parlhians to avenge the defeat at Carre, where Crassus ,vas killed . After overcoming the Parthians, he would cross the Caucasus and reach the German territories Crom the East, to subdue them definitely. It was a wide-range manoeuvre, spanning over tens of thousands of m iles, which could have overshadowed Alexander's glorious deeds.The same operation was mainly attempted by Hitler, from an opposite direction, invading Russia during World War II. But on the ides of Marcb in 44 B.C. a handful of conspirators and stabbed him to death 23 times. He was fated to die at the feet of Pompey's effigy, the n1an he had lo deal with during his whole life. Caesar's overarching po litical vision, the structure to ·which he could only lay the foundations, was not doomed Lo die with its creator, bul was built up by the man chosen by Caesar to succeed him: Octavius Augustus. Caesar singled him out as his heir, despite his young age. Jn fact he recognise d that that young,

fragile and sickly lad had exceptional but still unnoticed qualities. As Sulla read in Caesar's eyes that he would become a Dictator, Caesar was equally able to foresee Augustus' futur·e as an Emperor in his eyes. Caesar was killed under the ac cus ation of exerting a dictatorial power. He became a Dictator a~er 55 years of political and military battles, but had not acquired a full -fledged title yet. Whal a differen t fate from that or his nephevv and successor, Augustus, who suddenly came to power when he was still very young, and was able stay in power, though unscrupu lously and very skilfully, for 44 years. Caesar, the would-be Dictator, was killed by 23 stabs. On the

contrary, Augustus, who became a real Emperor, almost without making the Romans notice it, died of old age in his quiet country- house. The empire, initiated by Caesar and built up by Augustus, lasted 5 centuries in the West and 14 in the East. In that respect Caesar surpassed Alexander. On the ides of March a human life was pu t to an encl. ft was the best script ever written by History, to exemplify the glorious but also perishable nature of man's life. That, however, was the life of a great man.

D ,., Major General, Chief; 4th Division, DGS

e can only look at Augustus by cornpaa·ing him wi Lh Caesar. They were very di ffe rent ·from each other : their they were physical ly different, their characters were different, they grew up differenlly and their lives fo llowed different paths. The history of the Rornan Empire celebrates them equally. It never happened that a man from the same family succeeded his predecessor at the head of a State implementing very different principles while carrying out the greatest project in the world's history. Caesar's genial in tuition v-1as followed by Augustus' sagac ity, perseverance , fl ex ib ili ty and balance . No twi t h standin g the differ ences both or them \vorked for Rome's sake and etern ity. iv lorality and 1nysticism are the pilla1·s support ing their actions and they only foc used on the wrongs w ithin t he State. They understood the same but acted very differently. Caesar· used 1.0 work alone, on the other Augustus b.rrn ly believed in team play. I Iistory does not tell any thing of any Caesar's lieutenants. On th e contrary Augustus was supported by skilled and absolutely faitbfo l partners. Caesar ruled o nly fc'w mon ths and was tragically assassinated. Augustus ruled for 57 years, ]1ad a peaceful old age and died clasped · in his w ife's arms.

THE SITUATION AFTER CAESAR'S ASSASSINATION

After Caesar had been assassinated on the 15'1' of March of the year 44 BC the political struggle seemed Lo take place only within Caesar's part)~ nO\N headed by Antonius and other conspirators. Th e Senate had to ,·epud iate either Caesar or the conspirators. Finally it found a solution and said that Caesar had not been a dictator and had not tried to seize the pmver; but at the same time the conspirators were not accused

because they did not acl in their own interests but ror the sake of the State a nd ·were granted amnesty. Seemingly the situation was back lo norrnality. SuqJris ingly Caesar disposed by \-Vil! Caius Octavian to be his successor: Who was Caius Octavian? Caius Octavian ·was born in Vellctri, a village near· Rome in 63 BC and was al most 18 years old al that time . It seemed he ·was destined to loose \vhen compa!'ed \Vith Antonius and the conspirators. He was Caesa11s grand-nephew (the nephevv of Caesar's sister) and Caesar· had loved him and wanted him to take part in the expedition to Spain against Pompey's f'oll owe1-s. Caius Octavian had been sent to E pi r us by Caesar· for the military train ing and to prepare himse lf to fight aga in s t t he Parthians. He ·w as in Apollonia when he was told or hi s un c le's assassination. His friends pushed him to take the c ornma nd or the legions in Ep i n1s and march agairisl Rome. On the contr·ary,

Stawe of J\u[!,ustus at Prima Porta: hody annour dewil represeming 1he reJurn of the symhols take11 fiom ihe Romans.

his relatives in1plorecl him to s tay there a nd not to join politics. Finally he d id not accept any or th e su ggestions and took a f irm decision: he we nt to Italy al one without threatening any body but did clain.1 hi s rights. Caius Octavian a rrived in Rome at the beginni ng of the month of May in the year 44 BC a nd met with Anton ius and called [or the cornitia curia ta in order to have Caesar's will carried out and also asked to have all the money that had been foun d in Caesar's home. AUGUSTUS IS APPOINTED AS CONSUL

The political struggle between the conspirator·s and those supporting Caesar got. worst. Oct.avian realised that l.l1er·e were tWO roca] points. First, there was no way to avoid 101

Triumphal Arch in Orange, the ancient Arausio, rich in images representing the conquesl of Caul (Augustus Age).

AND THE CIVIL WAR

contrasts \.vith Antonius; second, at the moment he was noL in the strongest position. So he had to gain people's consensus. And he did it awkwardly and demagogically. Was Antonius refusing to return him Caesar's money? Then properties were sold and money borrowed in order to carry out Caesar\ will and give 300 sesterces as a gift to each Roman. This donation won him the people's support and Octavian became very popu lar: Anloni.us realised Lhat Lhe Octavian could not be underrated any more: Octavian, allhough young and in poor health, ,vas as strong a leader as Caesa1~ Octavian thought that he could reinforce his position only by means of an army. So he was helped by some veterans and his adoptive father and daringly managed lo enrol a (ew thousands of soldiers to finally bave an army. Th is was an absolutely new decision allowing him to enforce his power. The political struggle turned into a milita1·y baule and the Senate was then forced to justify Octav ian's decisions by entit li ng him to act as praetor. In the meanwhile Antonius wa.s marching 102

against Decimo Brutus ,vho had organised the defence of Modena. The Senate tried to mediate but Antonius rejected all t}ie proposals. The Senate ordained that a riot was go ing on and asked the two nevv consuls and Octavian himself to r·estore order. The battle took place in Modena. Antonius was defeated and his troops withdrew to the Narbonese Gaul while being p u1·s u ed by Decimo Brutus (April 43 BC). Both the consuls died dui-ing the battles. Octavian cooperated with Caesar's enemies only to tactically reduce Antonius's power. Now he was in the best position but did not decide to pursue Antonius . The consuls had been killed and Octavian could now be appointed as consul! Some days later he arrived in Rome along with his legions in ocder to support his appointment as consul. The Senate was bevvildered and frigh tened and Octavian was elected consul on the 1o:" of Au&rust, 43 BC. Seventeen months after the Ides of March Octavian \vas not even tvventy years old! He could now start his life as an adult.

THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE

Oc.tavian had the situation under his control in Rome and had a bill passed condemning th e assassination of Caesar and those who had assassinated him . Not even Antooius had dared lo Lake that decision fearing to trigger another civil war: Tt was necessary that Octavian and Antonius made peace in order to reorganis e Caesar's party and to finally defeat the conspirators. He met with Anton.ius and Marcus Lepiclus near Bologna and signed the agJ:eement known as the Second Triumvirate . They agreed that in order to reorganise the State lhe Triumviri's special power would be above the Senate. In the month o( November 43 BC the Senate which was achift ralified lhat a&rreen1.ent. The po litical adversaries had been put as ide and their names included in the proscription lists. Now iL was the time to fight against Cassius and Brutus in the East. The battle took place in Filippi. Brutus fought against Octavian and won. On the contrary, Cassius was defeated by Antonius and com1T1.ilt.ed suicide. Some clays later another battle took place; this lime Brutus was d efeated and, abandoned by his troops, conunitted suicide. Antonius has to take the credit for this success. It was the month of October, 42 BC. After 30 months Caesar's assassination was completely avenged.

THE HARD LIFE IN COMMON WITH ANTONIUS AND THE AZIOBATTLE

At this point the triumviri agreed to different tasks: Anton.ius was responsible for the East, where military skills were most needed. Octavian was sent to Rome, where

L. Munazio Planco 1'1t1ausoleurn in Gaeta (first Augustus Age): Trigliph and metope Âˇwith crossed lances.

political requirements were of basic importance and Lepidus was given Afiica. From 42 to 31 BC Antonius had a hard life in common with Octa,,ian. They ,.vere completely differenl in theii- culture, style of life and feelings for Lhe state. Within such a framework Cleopatra weakened Antorrius' energy and personality. In Azio, Greece, took place Lhe unavoidable battle bet\veen the two triumviri. Although Antonius' sea- and ground-strength was superior, he did not take advantage of that because of an increasing state of apathy. He had no more the decision - making skills he had learned from Caesar. Antonius finally decided to fight a sea-battle, also being suggested by Cleopatra. In any case he made a lot of mistakes. For example, he had 500 warships but all of them were anchored in a gulf whose opening to the sea was very naIT0\v. On the 2nd of September of the year 31 BC the ,.varships exited the gulf ,.vhere the !battle took place. The situation rernained uncertain until noon when Cleopatra left the area of the battle and sailed southwards. Cleopatra took with

her 60 Egyptian ,.varships. Moreover, Antonius absurdly followed Cleopatra and this caused disheartenment among Antonius' soldiers. At the end of the day Antonius was defeated and the soldiers surrendered. Antonius committed su icide in Alexandria and after some time Cleopatra did the same. The threats posed by the conspirators and Antonius did not exist any more. It was time for peace, it was time to close the Janus Ternple (after the religious rituals it used lo be opened during war times) which had been closed only t\vice since the foundation of Rome.

THE REORGANISATION OF Arch of Orange (Augustus Age): Images representing Rom.ans fighting against Gauls.

THE STATE

difficult task: to reorganise a large state wasted by 20 years of civil wm:

First he had to reorganise the Senate no\v composed of about 1000 members. Many of them were suggested to resign 6:om the post and he then singled out 30 senators of great integrity. These 30 senators were Lhen charged Lo single out 30 more senators of great integrity and so on until the number of 600 was reached. New f-tmctional rules were sel for the Senate, including charges for those not attending the seats, the compulsory monthly seats were reduced to two and it was decided that the less important businesses had to be ca1Tied out by a council made up of a number senators selected by lot (Consilium. Pri.ncipes).

Octm;ian was 3 3 and had a very

In 29 BC the Senate awarded

103

The Julian ivlausoleum in Sain/ Remy, Provence (Auiuslus A!!,e ) : images representing Ro rnans fif;hiing

against Gauls.

to Augustus. Augusts managed to keep and reinforce his power by means or another acLion: in 23 BC, when he renounced his formal powers, he renounced the appointment as consul and was given the tribunicia potestas which actually gave him more power as he could veto any decision taken by the Senate. As a final result Augustus had an absolute power ,vithin a constitution which had been brought back to it.s basic original fonn. There was a s011 of diarchy (the sovere ignty was shared between Augustus and the Senate).

THE EMPJRE ADMINISTRATION AND CIVJL SERVANTS

Octavian 'with the title of Emperor which he could pass on to his heirs. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFOR.t\11

Until thaL moment Octavian had maintained the old republican constiLu t.ion and made his best to have it more functional. Now he realised the state needed a new constitution. The boundaries of the Roman state had enlarged and were not those of a city-state but of an Empire. So many different peoples could not be ru led by Roman magistrates who were replaced by new ones yearly. This state required insLitutions based on regularity, continuity and stability. BuL this goal was Lo be reached gradually, without taking drastic actions. F irst of all the state of emergency had to come to an encl. And Octavian made this step during a meeting on the 13'h or 104

June, 27 BC when he said: "I am thoroughly laying down the power, the arms and all the subject peoples''. This decision brnught the constitution back to its original form. From this poinL on it could be reviewed politically and not with force. The Senate asked AugusLus to go on ruling the provinces which could cause some problems. Augustus accepted to do that for the next 10 years. Because or this decision there vvere two kinds of provinces: â€˘ the [i rs t , con trolled by the Senate which appointed ex consu Is or ex-p raetors as governors yearly; â€˘ the second (provinces along the boundaries and troubled ones) cont.ro lled by Augustus who appointed li eutenants for as long as needed. This paved the way to a new kind or official who were not Magistrates but high-level officials paid on a regular basis. As a matter of fact the legions committed to these provinces belonged directly

Caesar had fought against and humiliated the officials working for the s late . On Lhe contrary, Augush1s welcomed the aristocracy's support in ord er to restore an ancient system and tried to involve it even in the ruling of the provinces. But the aristocracy had been weakened by a comfortable life and Augustus got. no feedback from aristocrats. The importance of aristocracy begins to decli ne and will be finally erased by the French revolution 18 centuries later: Since mistocracy was indifferent to reforms, officials and civi I servants necessary to operate such a complex organisaLion were chosen among plebeians (e.g. Agrippa) and those belonging to the equestrian order (e .g. Maecenas). The new organisation of the state favoured commerce and helped the equestrian order which wiJl later turned into bourgeoisie. Now the empire ,vas operated by permanent officials who will

creale the civil servant class in the future. THE REORGANISATIONÂˇOF THE ARMED FORCES

Augustus also focused on Lbe reorganisation of the an1,ed forces (arrny and navy) and took outstanding decisions in this respect. The legions were reduced from 50 to 28 and finally to 18 (as you see reductions \vere also made in the past) but in this way and for the first time tbe army became a permanent organisation. Before that soldiers (conscr ipts and volunleers) had been called up upon need. Augustus realised thal a permanent army \vould have prevented Lhe boundary territories from being invaded and atLacked. The armv was then. bÂ°iven clear , tasks, ideals and moral rules Âˇwhich \Vere appealed to by commanders instead of promising money and war booty. These p1inciples \vere at Lhe base of the army reorganised by Augustus and which managed to drive back barbaric peoples for four centrnies. The legionaries served for 16 and later for 20 years. They were well paid and at the encl of their career the received a number of benefits. Under these conditions there \vere e nough volunteers and only rarely it was necessary to turn to conscription. The first boundary line was controlled by means of castella placed at a distance of not more than one day v.'alking from each other. Within said castella there were a number of smaller detachments. On the back and in a barycentric position there were the castra with one or more legions. The legions were posted to the provinces of the Empire and belonged directly to the governor in order to have military and civil power in the same hands. Augustus set the rules for recruiting reserve soldiers who were posted near the legions along the

boundaries of the Empire and naturalised at Lhe end of their service. Also the navy was reorganised on a permanent basis and made up of two fleets. The Headquarters were in Ravenna and Miseno. The navy was also to patrol in the Mediterranean sea for protecting the commerce. The service .in the navy lasted 28 years. Augustus a lso introduced the praetorian cohorts into the slate organisation. There were 9 of them: 3 in Rome and 6 in the olhers residences of the emperor. The praetorians served for 16 years and ,,v ere paid more than double compared with the legionaries who served for 20 years. The money for running lhe army in the different provinces came from the provinces themselves and this fell within the competence of the procuratores Augusti.

PROPAGANDA AND CULTURE CONTROL

Caesar and Augustus had the

Traian Column: Im.ages representing Slings men.

same kind of insighl for propaganda. Caesar did every thing by himself. In fact, for example, during the Gaul campaigns he used to write commentaries wbjch \Vere then released and circulated. Augustus was more successful because of a sublle propaganda spread through a controlled culture (today we would rather say that h e had his control over the intelligentsia). Augustus did it with the support of an exceptional and faithful aide whose name was Maecenas. Maecenas was Auguslus' minister for propaganda and culture who subsidised all the cultural happenings, in particular lhe literary ones. This allowed lhe flourishing of writers and immortal poeLs (Virgi l, Horace, Ovid, Lucretius, Propertius, Catullus, Titus, Livy). It was the golden age of the Latin literature. Notwithstanding the printing had not been invented

105

Praetorium, the Headquarters at the camp of 1he Legion ill Augusta at Lombaesis, i\lgeria, Omperial Agej.

yet there were publishe1·s and the books were hand \Nritten by slaves who managed to write 5,000 to 10,000 copies of them which were sold out within few months. The uncultered and warlike Roman society became an educated and refined one. ROME , ITALY AND THE ROMAN EMPIRE

While reorganising the Empire August.us wanted to maintain a privileged posit.ion for Italy which had been equalled to Rome and not considered as if it was a province. Contrary to Caesar ·who had naturalised all the subjects, August.us was more sparing of naturalising the subjects living in the provinces. Moreover Augustus thought it \Vas the time for Roman citizens to share the expenses of the Empire. You can easily imagine the reactions prompted by this decision at a time when the Roman citizens had not been paying taxes for centuries. A very big project of public works \.Vas then started in order to make Rome more beautiful and also to reduce unemployment. 106

Rome , as it is happening for today's Jubilee, became a road yard. The Ara Pacis mausoleum and the Marcel Theatre and also the Ju li a and Emily b asilicas within the Roman Forum were built. The works for Augustus' Forum started at that time. Private investors were asked to step in the projects as it happened, for example, for the Pantheon \Nhich was supported by Agrippa. THE LAWS PROTECTING MORALS

ln Rome there was a low birth rate and Augustus considered th is trend as a threat to Roman virtues. The Romans, especially the upper class, had shifted from the old morals to an immoderate life. Men preferred to be si lg les instead of getting married and be in charge of a family. ln order to fight such an antisocial phenomenon Augustus had two bills approved: the de adulteris et de pudicitia bill and the de maritandis ordinibus one. The former condemned adultery ad crime while the latter reduced

Lhe freedom o f th e Roma n citizen. ln fact the citizens of the upper classes were forced to get married ·with their equals and the families ,vere asked to have more children. T he singles were noL entitled to come into an inheritance, were not allowed to attend public happen ings and could not be appointed as officials within Lhe public administralion . Benefits were given to those who were married and depend ing on the number of children they had. These sleps curbed widespread bad habits taken over from the Eastern socie ly.

THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

During his Empire Auguslus conquered Mesiae, the territory of today's Hungary and Rhaetia, the Alps and the area comprised between the Rhine and the Elba rivers. He did it in order to better defend the Empire . Augustus believed the Roman Empi re would be strong until it remained within the Mediterranean area and he also thought the German and the Eastern worlds would bring along with them the seeds of disintegration. So he stabilised the eastern boundaries hy means of friendly political relationships with the Parthians who had been fighting against Crassus and Antonius. On the contrary along the Northern border (Cisalpine Gaul) the secur ity could only be achieved by conquering th e t erritories up to the Danube, including the Northern part of the Tyro l, Bavaria and Lhe Eastern part of Switzerland. Tiberius, who was 26, and Druse, who \Vas 22, (Augustus' stepsons)

were given the command of the operat ion. They mad e a daring enveloping manoeuvre: Dru se moved from south to north along the Adige river valley · while Tibe1·ius moved from Gaul to attack the side and the back of the enemy. This was done in 16 to 15 BC and secured the Romans the possession of the Eastern part of the Alps. After that they conquered Pannoniae. In order to h a ve a s tron ger northern boundary it was thought necessary to pus h away the threat posed by the Germans and have the boundary li ne along the Elba river, a lso because there ,vas a shorter distance between the Elba river and the Danube. Al so on t h is oc cas ion an enveloping m anoeuvre was made and it was made bot h by the army and the navy: • the ar my move d northward from the Rhine to the Elb a river; • the navy outflanked the enemy by sailing along the North sea. It Look three years to Drusus to carry o ul the task, from 12 to I 0 BC . Unfortuna tely h e died .i n that year. Th e north ern boundary was a lways unstable and was only safe thanks to Tiberiu s' diplomatic skills. Notwithstanding th e services rendered to his counL1-y and to the Emperor, Ti be rius knew the Emp ero r di d no t like him becau se of his wife's (Augustus's daugh te r) behaviour: Tiberius we nt into a 7 -year voluntary exile l.o Rhodes although Augu stus had not agreed. T his happened in 6 BC and Octavian was remaining alone. Maece nas had died and he was ge tting older. It was necessary for him to chose his successor, also because he had no male heil: SUCCESSION TO THE THRONE

It seemed Lhat all Lhe potential

to the throne and adopted as son by Augustus with who m he led the Empire.

THE LAST YEARS

Praetorian (reproductio11) .

s uccessors were under a curse: in fact Marcel lus, his sisters' so n, Marcus Vespasian Agrippa, his b est friend, and Dru sus, Tibue rius' you nger brolher died under mysterious circumstances. During Tiberius' exi le Lu cius and Ca ius, Oclavian's nephews, also died. Bu t Augustus' p roblems were not to an end . Afte r Tiberi us had gone in to exil e Julia b ehaved even more foolish and Octavian's political adversa ri es took advantage of that, espe c ia lly be cause of the passe d morals campai g n. Augustus was informed of his daughter's behaviour and ex iled her Lo the Ve ntotene Island, along the Lazio region coast. Si nee Augustus' adoptive sons had died and Julia had been sent into exile Tiberius was destined Lo succeed

Tiberius was respectful of his r o le and ac ted on beh alf of Augustus. He was politically a nd militarily s killed, in particular referred to Germ an and Danu be situations. Nonetheless h e was respected by the soldiers. In 10 BC a rum our went around and the Empero r was told that three legions had been des troyed during a battle in the Te uto b urg forest. The leg ions were under Varus' com mand, the Empe ror's envoy. Varus' tt-us l had been bet rayed by Arminius, a German ic Comma nder. This latesl news had a striking effect on Rome and Tiberius was ordered to go and help reinforce th e clefence organisation and keep up morale. In the summer 14 AD Augustus went south of Rome and to the is lands a long the coast of the Campania region which were the places he liked most to take a r est. Then he went Lo Benevento, a city near Neaples, in order to take leave from Tiberius who was about to leave for Illyria. On the way back Augustus' illness got worsl and he stopped off at Nola where he was joined by Tiberius. They had a day-long talk, the so called Aug ustus' oral will, as they had never had before . The next d ay, the 19'" of August 14 AD , Augustus died near his wife. He was 76 years old and finish ed the job his great-uncle had begun. He managed to give a stable base to a State whic h, start in g w ith Tiberius, will be r e ferred to as Emp ire an d that w ill las t 4 centuries. When Aug ustus was alive Jesus Chr ist was born in Bethlehem w here J osep h and Mary went because Augustus had ordered a census of the popula tion. What a coincidence! At a time when the 107

A Vinea, war ma.chine used by the Roman soldiers as protection during sieges ( I: 10 model). -

Emperor consoJ idated the foundations of an mundane Empire which will last the next four centLu-ies the spiritual Emperor· was born lhanks to whom, although because of different reasons, Rome \Nill be one of the most beautiful reference points for the human civilisation.

CONCLUSIONS

Augustus cannot be considered as the "Ernpernr of the Peace". Augustus made a piece of Rome's golden history. Caesar made outlined the projecl of an Empire and only a very skilled man could finish the job. Augustus did it although he was not a General at first sight but he was a great politician. And when we foc u s on Octavian's analysis capabilily and flexib ili ty we shall realised hovv important

A helmet and a bronze shield umbo of the Legio Viii Augusla.

108

they were, how useful they were to the Empire compared to Caesar's skills and geniality. Augustus ,vas Emperor for 44 years and, if we take into account also the period when he had been acting as consul, he was Rome's leader for 57 years. Only Rarnses II and Fransis Joseph Il o( Austria reigned more than he did. He was particularly open minded and built a p e rfect political system relying on a good economy. Augustus' driving force was not as good as Caesar's but he was politically more intelligent. H e slarted his polilical caree r· in a

chaotic uncertain period and 57 years later he died after having bu ill a thoroughly stable Empire. Augustus took Rome's political, social and cultural history to its highest point. The old republican consl.itution scented to be th e same but in [act it was radically changed. This is Rome's last part of history \,\.foch in the futur·e will never be as beautiful as it had bee n at the beginning.

D '' Major General, Chief; 4Lh Division,

DGS