Issuu

JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

MAY

JUNE 1987 LIRE $ D.M. E

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CIRO DI MARTINO Strategy and High Command

ANTONIO VIESTI The Development of CATRIN

GIAN GIUSEPPE SANTILLO An Army for Tomorrow

RIVISTA MILITARE

Mar20-Aprile 1987 Spedizione in abbonamento postale gr. IV-70% L. 5.000

LA PITTURA DI STORIA NELL' ITALIA DELL'OTTOCENTO

. : . _ ~ ' CONTENTS • ' -

Eu ropean Military Press Agency

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Number three 1987 May-June

The aim of Rivista M ilitare i s to broaden and. upda te the techn i ca l and vocational tra ining of Army Officers and NCOs To th is end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military th inking and as a forum of study and debate. Riv ista Militare is also intended to be a means of informi ng the general public about the A rm y an d m ilitary matters through the publication of articles of curren t techni ca l and scienti fi c interest.

8 'RIVlnA

ffllLITARE

Politics, Economics and Strategy

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BIM ESTR ALE

Strategy and High Command. (Giro Di Martino)

0irettore responsabile Pier Giorgio Franzosi

10 Olrezione e Redazione V ia di S. Marco, 8 00186 Roma Tel. 47357373

Pubblicita A cura della segretcria dell 'Uffic io Riv ist.i Mi li tare Tel. 6794200.

The Development of CATRIN. Reflections of the Automated Command and Control System (SIACCON) on the Army Automation Process. (Antonio Viesti)

22 Stampa Ti pografia Reg iona l e · Ro ma

An Army for Tomorrow. (Gian Giuseppe Santillo)

· Spedi zi one in abbonamento oosta le Gruppo IV · 70%.

Science, Technology and Training

Condizi oni di cess lone per i i 1987 Un tascicolo: Li t. 4. 000 $ 4 OM 7 £ 3 Un fascicolo arretra to: li t. 8.000 · $ 8 OM 14 £ 6 Abbonam ento I1;, lia: Lit. 22.000 est ero l it. 30.000. l ' unpono deve essere versato su c/c posta le n. 22521009 intestate a SME Uffic io Ri vi sta M ilitare Sezionc dj ammini strazione Vi a XX Settembre 123i A - Roma. I residen ti aII· es1ero possono versare l'im por to t " irnite assegno ba ncario o vag lia intern<1 ziona le.

Protection and Evacuation of Italian Citizens Abroad. ( Angelo Sion - Franco Monticone)

Report on the Employment of the "Lagunari" Units.

Ant iaircraft Defence and Self-Defence.

(Rinaldo Santini) Autori zzazfone del Tribvna le di Roma al n. 944 dc l Rcgi st ro con decreto 7-6-1 949.

Foto di copertina Giancarlo De Zanet.

The Military Academy. Past, Present and Future. (Giovanni Brugnola)

Military Report 74

Eternal Triangle '86. The Training of the Allied Tank Crews. (Paolo Valpolini)

1987

Proprieta letterari a artistica e sc ientifica riservata

Associate all'USPI Unione Starhpa Periodica ltaliana

Book Reviews.

Rules for contributors . Anyo ne can cont ribute. In the interest of the maximum ob jectivit y o f in format ion, Rivista Militare allows cont ri butors cons iderable freedo m. although i t does not necessarily subscribe to their opinions. The arti c les are p ublished unedited and free of any editori al constra ints and are therefore the sole responsibili ty of the Au thor and ref lect his personal ideas exc lusive ly. The topic must be treated in an or iginal way and the arti cles themselves should not exceed 10 typewritten pages in length. The Autho r. got his rewa rd. makes over his exclusive article ri ght to Rivista Milita re Rivista M ilitare can m ake over A uthor's exclusive art icle right to other publicat ions and to the periodicals o f EMPA (European Military Press Agency). The artic les should be accompanied by any necessary photog raphs, drawings and expl ana tory tables. Each author is req uested to send a photograph of himsel f, together wi th his "curricu lum vi tae" and a 10-line s ummary of the artic le to be published. Rivista Mi litare reserves the right to al ter th e arti cle's ti tle and to c hoose the typeface in wh ich it is se t

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Everything has been said about strategy, or almost everything. The definitions of t his "Art" (or is it a "Science"?) have followed each other starting from the Greek era, i.n which the term "strategy" was m_ostly understood as "military campa ign". To recall the numerous expressions formulated along the times, or the most significant at least. would prove a mere academic exercise if from the succession of the various definitions one could not remark the evolution of the concept itself. First of al l we must underline that "strategy" has always been distinguished from "tactics", the latter being the art of executing an action on the battlefield. Considered by some the science of the Commanding Generals, in the 18th Century strategy

appeared as the combination and synthesis of all military knowledge. That is, a kind of collection of experiences which, in epochs lacking in significant innovations (XV II and 'XV III centuries) was the only matter that one generation could hand down to the next. At the times of the French Revolution and Napoleon's Empi re, strategy was elevated to the rank of science of movements and plans and defined by Clausewitz as battle management. as compared with tactics, which concerned only the employment of troops in combat. Moltke, who could not fa il to be among those interested in the problem, with most appropriate terms attributed to strategy the power to indicate "where" and "when" to fig ht, leaving to tactics the "how", i.e. the methods of combat.

As much as the innovations in the field of armaments - and t herefore in that of doctrine progress, so does strategy become increasi ng ly the lead ing li ne which indicates the conditions most suitable for conducting a battle, and strives to make those conditions more and more complementary and closely linked together. Nevertheless the choice of this line and its adaptation to the events are more or less influenced by political considerations. This determines overlaps, in which politics and strategy interm ingle, so as to make a clear distinction almost impossible. Also Winston Churchill was of the same mind in 1945, as he maintained that it was practical ly impossible to extricate the irritating question of making a clear delimitation between the

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political problems and all other problems. A more modern position is held by General Beaufre, a wel l- known French student of high-level mil itary problems, according to whom strategy is the "art of a dialectic of wills, with the employment of force to resolve the conflicts" or also "the art of obtaining a decision through the determination and exploitation of a situation which enta ils t he moral disintegration of the adversary, to the point of making him accept the conditions that are imposed on him". It is certainly a more comprehensive vision which, within the development of the war of subversion and of nuclear deterrence, it ensures to the psychological aspect a centrestage position. A definition coined in 1963 in the United States, which belongs to the same line of thought, sees strategy as a "science or art of employing the economic, psychologic and military means in the most suitable manner for attaining the political goals, increasing the possibilities of success and diminishing the risks of defeat". The concept just outlined is clearly expressed in the work "The Great Strategy of the Roman Empire" by Edward Luttwak. In Luttwak's words "only starting from 1945, has the sprouting of new techniques of mass destruction invalidated the fundamental assumptions of the post-Napoleon, Clausewitzian conceptions of great strategy". Like the Romans, today we are not confronted by the prospect of a decisive confl ict, because the escalation has produced a lasting, absurd condition of extremely risky stability, .b ut by ~ permanent, though limited, state of war. Like the· Romans we must protect an advanced society from a number of different threats and, above all, considering the nature of modern weapons, we must restrict their use and exploit instead their political potential. The revolutionary implications of these fundamental changes have been only 4

confused ly perceived. Nevertheless it must be desumed that, "paradox ically" , the revolutionary transformation of the nature of modern warfare has managed to approach very much the strategic thought of the Romans to our own. The in-depth study of the concept of strategy and the determination of its various facets lead, through logical derivations, to the organization of command at t he hig hest levels. In fact, a general strategy must, first of all, aim at harmonizing the various individual strategies so that all concur in producing an effective unity of efforts. Among the various strategies, the military ones (those of the three Services) assume a predominant importance in case of conflict, but this, of course, never excludes the also essential functions of the other strategies (economic, industrial , psychological, etc.). No wonder therefore that a widespread and largely shared opinion should contend that the political management of a conflict should pertain exclusively to the Government, while the conduct of operations should be under the responsibility of the military authorities. But such a precise line of demarcation, albeit supported by convincing elements, is usually opposed by the democratic governments, which, in practice, prefer to have in their hands both t he responsibility of the general policy and that of managing the conflicts. That conception was concretely and effectively expressed by the British War Cabinet during the Second World War. This peculiar body had t he task of defining the objectives of the War and divid ing the said objectives in successive stages and goals. Winston Churchill. as Head of the Government. accomplished within the War Cabinet that unification of efforts which must not fail when the future of a nation is at stake. The political and military decisions where unified with

the participation in the Cabinet of the most representative political persona lities, the Chiefs of Staff (members - in their turn - of the Council of the Chiefs of Staff) and even t he leaders of the political parties. In the War Cabinet's "system" also other organizations were involved, and were requested to cooperate on a case-bycase basis, for routine problems or for questions of particular moment. These were: • National Defence Committee. for the organization and administration of the Armed Forces; it met once a week, and its members were the Ministers of the Armed Forces and other members of the Government; • National Defence Board, for major problems. which held ad hoe meetings, and included the Prime Minister, two members of the War Cabinet, the Ministers for the three Services and the Chiefs of Staff, who had consultive functions; • Council of the Chiefs of Staff, which controlled the Armed Forces and supervised the conduct of the war on the strategic plane and the operations on the tactical plane. The British solution of entrusting the elaboration of the operational plans to the Chiefs of Staff, who were charged with the organization of the forces and the releva nt logistic support, had the merit of ensuring that those plans had the guarantee of rea lism. In our epoch , marked by the "nuclear" and by "subversion", we must perhaps find a different solution. In fact. there is an increasing necessity to place, next to t he military strategists. on one side those responsible for internal security and, on the other, experts able to assess the national scientific and techn ical capabilities, comparing them with those of the potential adversary. With the advent of the nuclear factor and with the . diffusion of deterrence, we have in fact come to live in a world where the opposing parties, in

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order to avoid a reciproca l holocaust, tend to protract the feinting game indefinitely. The decision is no more to be found in active combat, but rather in the obscure and laborious preparatory stage. In other words, a new form of strategy has come into being, a sort of "genetic" strategy, which consists in exploiting and emp loying the techn ical and scientific resources of a nation in order to surpass, or at least match, the accomplishments of the adversary . This is a difficu lt art. because the limitation of resources often imposes difficult choices and conscious and unavoidable renunciations . A difficult art, also beca use the potential of "experts" does not always succeed in producing "on request" and within the desired time, what is wanted of them. As we have said, the concentration in _the hands of

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the Executive not only of the pol itical, but also of the mi litary control of the war, is the prevailing trend in the democratic countries. But in the conduct of war, a performance in terms of mi iltary "professiona lism" is req uired. In practice, th is leads to assign the Major Commands the tasks and means necessary to implement the decisions taken by the supreme politica l leadership of the confl ict. To th is end, the Supreme Command, having ensured its adv ice to the Government, devises the operational plans and - by delegation of the political authority - exerts its powers of command and control on the various operational theatres and on the special ized Commands . The arguments advanced here perm it to form a relatively comprehensive opinion about the political and/ or mil itary responsibi lity as regards the

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management of crises and the conduct of a poss ible conflict. Nevertheless a more precise reference to the Italian sit uation seems at this moment quite appropriate and useful, considering that the problem was recently brought to the attention of public opinion. The Italian Constitution, at art. 78, states: "the Chambers dec ide the state of war and confer the necessary power on the Government". The drafting of th is article reached its final formu lation only after a heated debate within the Committee (1 ). An agreement was reached when Mr. Rui ni, Cha irman of the Committee for the Constitution, sharing the opin ion of those affirming the necessity to consider that wars were not declared anymore, indeed they exploded without forewarning, stated that although the state of war was to be managed by the Executive, Parl iament had 5

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the duty to intervene as soon as possible. Proceed ing from this conception, Ru ini concluded: "We are going to have these stages: immediate defence with government actions; decis ion of the state of war by Parliament; formal declaration of war, wh ich pertains to the Head of the State (ref. 9th Comma, art. 87). Pa rliament wil l then have a further task : to g ive the necessary powers to the Government. The already mentioned 9th Comma of art. 87 of the Constitution states that the President of the Republic "has the command of the Armed Forces, presides over the Supreme Council of Defence constituted according to the law, declare·s t he state of war decided by the Chambers". What concerns our survey is the part concerning the command of the Armed Forces. 6

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A lot has been written on this subject. Among others, there are two works worth mentioning , owing to the modern and real istic approach to the problem: "The Organization of Defence" by Mario Ristori and "Institutes of Mi litary Law" by Angelo Longo. In the first of the two volumes, the author contends that the function of the President of the Republic as Commander of the Armed Forces must be related to other constitutional norms, such as: • Art. 89, which states: "No act of the President of the Republ ic is val id if it is not countersigned ·by the proposing ministers, who assume responsibility for it"; • Art. 90, according to which the President of the Republic is not respons ible for the acts done in performing his functions, except for high treason or for

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acting against the constitution; • Art. 95, which states: "The Prime Minister directs the general policy of the Government and is responsible for it". As regards how. in practice, the President of the Republic was to exercise the command of the Armed Forces, there was much discussion within the Constitution Committee of the Constituent Assembly. Two members, Terracini and La Rocca. proposed a formu la according to which the President of the Republ ic was to have the Command of the Armed Forces and, in wartime, was to exercise it through the military leaders appointed by Parliament. In this regard the Russian and Jugoslav examp les were also considered, but the proposal · was rejected. The discussion on this sub ject, taken up again by the Assembly, took the form

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of several statements and proposals. Mr. Azzi suggested the following formulation: "The President of the Republic has the command of the Armed Forces and exercises it through the Ministry of Defence in peacetime, and in wartime through the Defence Chief of Staff". Also this proposa l, which gathered a good number of assents and even today seems to have a certain log ical value, was rejected. As a matter of fact, it was said that - while it was quite clear that in peacetime the exercise of command, pertaining to the President of the Republic, had to be carried out under the responsibility of the Government and, in particular, of the Minister of Defence, in time of war the question had to be regulated according to the

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solution given by the law, but always in keeping with the identical principle of non-respon sibility of the President. In the already mentioned work by Longo "Institutes of Military Law", the subject. handled with an ample and retrospective vision, is summed up recal ling that "up unti l the end of the XIX Century the royal prerogative of command of the Armed Forces" - defined by Pierandrei (2) as "the share of those powers which are historica lly in the hands of a monarch and have not been modified, abrogated or regulated by forma l laws" - was deemed to include an actual power to control and to gu ide. Afterwards, after many contrasts, the prerogative took the shape of a real power to influence and participate in the formation of the defensive trend, excluding

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the actual command. During the Fascist period it had a completely formal value, since the powers of setting the politica l course and the deployment of the Armed Forces, as well at their direction, were in the hands of the Head of the Government. In September 1943, the King took temporarily the actual command of the Armed Forces, but this was based more on principles of necessity than on constitutional rules. A prevailing trend of thought and doctrine excludes that the presidential command entails powers and attributions of a technical-military character. V. Bachelet. in his work "Military doctrine and the State Jurid ical System", wrote that the presidential command is a merely forma l, or better symbolic, attribution. Predieri. in "Defence and the Armed Forces"

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' maintains that "the operations will always be directed by t he Supreme Commander or Chief of Staff". In reality, the President of the Republic represents the national unity and the bodies entrusted with external defence and internal order - the Armed Forces and the Judiciary rightly refer to him (10th Comma, art. 87). According to Matzo, the joint responsibility of the President of the Republic and the Government for the activities of high command should also guarantee that the Armed Forces do not get involved in politics. From this point of view, one can also desume that the power to command the Armed Forces does not place the President of the Republic at the top of the miiltary hierarchy. As a matter of fact. the positive law does not include any norm 8

that suggests a possible insertion of the Head of the State in the Organization of the Armed Forces. In substance, the presidential function of command must not be understood as the implementation of initiatives substituting those of the constitutional bodies, but as a necessary cooperation with the government for what concerns the organization and efficiency of the Armed Forces. Moreover, it must be interpreted as a verification and an incentive for Parliament and Government to ensure that the essence and constance of the government action are in keeping with the interests of defence in relation to the situation, both internal and external. The President's function of command of the Armed Forces must moreover be seen in the framework of the Atlantic Treaty and NATO.

The NATO organization, in fact, entails limitations in the technical-military activities of the Italian authorities and, particularly, it interferes between the functions of the Supreme Allied Command in Europe and those of the Defence Chief of Staff in peacetime. In case of conflict the same interferences would arise with t he National Supreme Commander (Defence Chief of Staff?). The Bill (no. 1489) regarding the reorganization of the central military structure of Defence, recently submitted by the Government, contains a more precise attribution of prerogatives and responsibilities, and should moreover permit to enhance the position of hierarchic preeminence, in add ition to the · functional one, of the Defence Chief of Staff over the Service Chiefs, emphasizing the prin-

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ciples and directions already expressed in the Presidential Decree of November 18, 1965, no. 1477. Th is Bill should bring about a more defined tendency to entrust, in case of emergency, the high command of the operations to the abovesaid authority, who - on the other hand - could not exercise it in the best possible way without the support of the consensus on the main decisions, ensured by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and by the irreplaceable technical-operationa l contribution of the individual Chiefs of Staff to solve the problems (there are many!) typical of their respective Services. It is in fact needless to remark that the figure of the Supreme Commander who. on top of a hill, on horseback, directed in person the movements and

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actions of the forces under his command, is light-years from the reality of our times. In conclusion, this short survey of strategy and command can be summarized in a few concise considerations, such as: • the increasing complexity of the concept of strategy, in whose composite multiplicity the purely military aspects vanish in a much wider context of all-around defence; • the absolute necessity that - in the democratic countries that strive for progress - it should be the political leadersh ip that manage, as a whole, · a matter which, like defence, includes numerous components of civil and military character and which would be hard to distinguish and separate into different levels and scopes; • the expedience that also

the military organization although necessari ly applying the irreplaceable hierarchical/ disciplinary principle up to the military summit - ensure the Defence Chief of Staff, who embodies this summit, the support and encouragement of a concert of technical-military voices. which in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and in the particular sphere of each Service Chief find their most appropriate and convincing express ion . Ciro Di Martino NOTES

(1I See "La Costituzione del la Repubblica ltaliana illustrata con i lavori prepara tori" (The Italian Consti tuti on and its preparation) by Falzone, Palermo, Cosentino, Ed. Mondadori. (2) "La prerogativa regia di comando delle Forze Armate e ii suo esercizio" (The roya l prerogative of command of the Armed Forces and its exercise) . Ed. 7942.

When in 1984, t he Army General Staff introduced t he CATRIN System (Transmission and Information Field System), (fig. 1) to Ita ly's industrial world, the ideas about its techn ical

and operational structure were certain ly well -rooted, so t hat it was poss ible to envision it (1) w ith in the wider picture of C" I (Command, Contr:ol, Communications and Information) .

A picture which by many parties, particularly w ithin t he All iance, was pointed out as the indispensable backgrou nd, wh ich shou ld be adapted to the modern technolog ical capab ilities for

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OF TARGETS SUBSYSTEM FOR TACTICAL ANTIAIRCRAFT SIGHTING AND ARMY AVIATION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM FOR INTEGRATED TRANSMISSION

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SOME OF CATRIN'S MAIN IMPACTS ON THE OPERATIONAL FIELD - Computerization of operational Command -- Interface with Weapon Systems - Training - Logistics - Procedures of employment - Survivability

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an updated conduct of military operations. But those were only ideas, although, on that occasion, it was possible to illustrate the Service's outlook vis-a-v is the ways of modernization in the specific field; to establish the general Military Requirements for CATRIN, to plan a structure within the Defence administration for activating the system and last (a very important element), to ask the Ita lian in dustry of this sector to form operational groups (1) with a "very agile, integrated structure at the top, capable of solving all interface problems and holding a global dialogue" with the Defence administration. Today, two years later, it can be said that Industry, albeit after some not-n egl igible toil, has accepted the invitation, is side by side with Defence, and has ou t lined a detailed plan for CATRIN, which has obtained Defence's approval. In substance, the Italian industry has given the first features of concreteness to the specific ideas of the Army General Statt. An essential part of the c:i I complex is thus wel l under way.

The present project will soon be followed by the construction of the indiv idual units, which will complete the system in approximately six years t ime. Undoubtedly there are all the prerequisites for success. The development of CATRIN bears a large number of connected in itiatives. In fact - as it was evidenced during the recent presentation of the new Army equipment in Sardinia - CATRIN does not only mean construction of a new weapon system, but also a cha nge of doctrines, new methods for Command and Control activities, rationalization, new mentalities, updated tra ining for the Cadres. The influences on the operational and techn ical field are so great that they entail a generalized renovation of the entire instrument of the Service. Awareness about t hese in fluences implicates a careful CATRIN does not only mean construction of a new weapon system, but also a change of doctrines, new methods for Command and Control activities, rationalization, new mentalities, updated training for the Cadres.

study in order to detect, as soon as poss ible, all the elements necessary for developing an armonious and balanced tool of land defence. This thoroug h examination, which requires diligence and time, is being carried out by the Army General Statt. We just wish to point out some of the main reflections on the operational and technical fields, dwelling a little longer on the aspects that deserve higher priority. IMPACTS ON THE OPERATIONAL FIELD (fig. 2)

The first impact represen ts in fact the foremost requirement: the harmon ious insertion of the CATRIN System between the operational Command Posts and the weapon systems. Moreover, the following impacts deserve to be mentioned: • adaptation of training; • updat ing of logistics; • evolution of the methods of employment; • survivability. For the armonious insertion between the Command Posts and the various weapon systems,

FLOWS BETWEEN OPERATIONAL COMMAND POSTS AND "CATRIN,,

Fig. 3

an updated structure, in terms of computerization, is required (fig . 3), to enable them to receive t he remarkable information inflow coming from all users and from al l CATRIN sensors, in order to avoid dangerous undecipherable, backlogs. And not only that. T he Command Posts' structu re must be such as to permit them to be in their turn producers and introducers of data (information and orders) into the CATRIN system, without laborious preliminary operations . CATRIN is already prearranged to receive. transfer and sort out compacted, target ed and selected data: in short, it is provided with a specific personalization . Therefore t he Operational Comma nd Posts must be up to CATRIN' s performance, in order to produce data packages suitable for optimal processi ng by the system as well as receive, decode and utilize the data following from the system itself. All this is of course part of the har monious pictu re C3 I we refer to. And here we see the need to conceive also a new

A SYSTEM FOR THE COMPUTERIZATION OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND POSTS

Fig . 4

computerized system for manag ing the Command and Control activities, which at present are sti ll conducted by the Ma jor Unit's Genera l Staffs in the traditional way. There are already ideas for this type of system, and they are taking shape and clarity, to be transformed into Mil itary Requ irements, employable in view of a study for the definition of a detailed system and, subsequently, for the deve lop ment of prototypes. The system, which has been named SIACCON (fig. 4). an acronym of the term "Automated command and Control System" in Ita lian. wil l have to be experimented together with CATRIN and timed compatibly within t hat comprehensive c• I vision which we have repeatedly mentioned (fig . 5) . In re lation to the structu ral configuration of such a system, it shou ld be prem ised that for an Operational Comma nd Post of a Major Un it (Army Corps or Brigade), the data flowing to CATRIN must necessa rily reach a centre capable of ana lyzing and sorting out information. From th is stems a new

unit, CASI (Centre of Ana lysis and Selection of Information) where a series of specialized functional cells must carry out a mostly automated fi ltering process of the incoming data, preventing these data from reaching the organs presiding over the formation of the Commander's decision in a raw state and in exhorbitant numbers as compared with the actua l necessities. It is also necessary that the data cleaned by CASI pass th rough another element which should act as a un ita ry concentrator and storage of all information: a Mixing Centre, where all the data cleaned by t he functional cells and the various relevant elements are gathered, and from wh ich one can obtai n · both the actual situation, with real-time updating, and the extrapolations concern ing the enemy's possible action (PAN Possibili Azioni del Nemico) and one's own possible lines of act ion (LAP = Linee d'Azione Poss ibi li) to be sub jected to the Commander's choice and decis ion . The Commander's determi nation and decisions must there-

fore concretize in the distribution of orders and sit uations which flow in a direction contrary to that described above. The data f low should go from the decisional bodies to the Functiona l Cells, on to the dependent Headquarters, passing through, and leaving at the Mixing Centre a trace of everything that has been done. Here are the elements, determi ned in the ir ma in lines, wh ich must be present in the SIACCON configuration for an operational Command Post (fig. 6) : • one CAS I; • one Mix ing Centre (CF); • one Decisional Centre (CD)). As we said, the CASI must comprise a range of specialized functional cells, for the analysis and selection of data (i.e. for the employment of f ire, engineers, communications, Army aviation, just to ment ion a few) . The Mixing Centre wi ll be a constantly updated and possibly intel ligent data bank. The Decisional Centre wi ll. be the place where the Genera l Staff officers ca rry out their exact ing task of supporting

COMMUNICATIONS

Fig. 5

CATRIN

WEAPON

"CATRIN ,, BETWEEN THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND POST AND THE WEAPON SYSTEMS

SYSTEMS

Fig. 7

the Commander's decis ions, employing graphically visualized operational situations related to t he updates sent in by the Mixing Centre issuing, also graphically if possible, the ensuing orders transmitted by the Commander himself. Only in this way can the employment of CATRIN be considered profitable and optimal. CATRIN and SIACCON will constitute for the Italian Army an indispensable symbiosis, but. as we will see later on, an "i nsufficient" one in view of a modern operational ettectiveness. The deficiencies of one of the two systems will attect the performance of both. Up to now we have been speaking about t he introd uction

of CATRIN directed towards the Command Posts. But also another side to which CATRIN is directed must be taken into consideration (fig. 7): the weapon systems (such as those employed in antiaircraft fire reaction, land fire. Army Aviation, transmission to the units, electronic warfare; again, just to mention a few). In relation to the structural configuration of such a system it should be premised that for an Operational Command Post of a Major Unit (Army Corps or Brigade), the data flowing to CATRIN must necessarily reach a centre ~apable of analyzing ahd sorting out information.

The realization of the CATRIN project, in fact, envisages that the weapon systems already in service be taken into account; for those developed later it will be necessary to impose precise specifications for this integration. All t his must be done in compliance with the principle of economy of forces and maximization of operational ettectiveness - as was said in was said in Sardinia (2).

TRAINING

When speak ing about the CATRIN-SIACCON symbiosis . as an indispensable element for a modern efficiency of the operational instrument, we said

incidentally that, nevertheless, t hat symbiosis was not a sufficient condition. The reason is that other influencing elements intervene, among which training is an outstand ing factor. Training, understood as the creation of a new mental ity, abreast of the t imes. Modern technologies imply new ways of think ing and acting, and this is even more true for the Armed Forces, wh ich

Modern technologies imply new ways of thinking and acting, and this is even more true for the Armed Forces, which are called to fulfil! - in the role most appropriate and adequate to the historical moment - the, duty of ensuring the Security and Defence. of the national interests, be they coincident or not with those of the Allies.

are cal led to fu lfil! - in tne role most appropriate and adeq uate to the hist orica l moment - the duty of ensuri ng the Security and Defence of the national interests , be they coincident or not with t hose of the A llies. In t his sector t he Service has taken important in it iatives for the t raining of both the young Cadres - starting from the Mi litary Academy and the

NCO Schools - and the sen ior Cadres. The results wil l not be concrete ly perceived before some time. Nevertheless the course has been traced : it requ ires a longlasting engagement, attent ion, a gradual reexamination of the working proced ures, with wider employment of office automation in the computerized hand ling of the management data and , above

The road to be followed to reach concrete results has been traced: it requires a gradual reexamination . of t~e working procedures, with wrdfi:r employment of office automation in the computerized handling of the management data and, above all automated command and co ntrol systems which should be set up at the permanent seats already in peacetime.

all, automated command and control systems wh ich should be set up at the permanent seats of Agencies and Headquarters, which shou ld_ ma nage them already in peacetime. LOGISTIC

As everybody knows, logistics is another element tha t comes into play as regards

cperational effectiveness. SIACCON and CATRIN are new systems, of recent conception, which require t hat the suitability o f t he present (even t he most recent) logistic systems be verified . Certai nly they entail the imp lementation of new methods (telesurveys, tele interventions, redu ndancies and others) capable of ensuring, more markedly than in t he past, t he ind ispensable services to the forces which happened to surv ive even t he most mass ive destruction, absclutely preventing t he loss of still potentially operationa l forces - as rega rds f ire and mobi lity - due to deficiencies in t he C3 I System.

-swvivability techniques (EW, EMP, TEMPEST ... } advanced coding techniques -field telefax -advanced techniques and technologies for the adaptation of materials to the battlefield -new radar techniques -evolution of RPVs and Drones -new all-weather sensors

SURVIVABILITY

T he last remarks concern the specific problem of surv ivab ility: CATR IN and SIACCON must have a high surv ivability, which must absol ute ly surpass that of any other element of the operational in strument. A surv ivabi lity which must be cons idered both from the phys ical point of view (and the qua Iities of these systems are such as to ensu re not only the compliance w ith the mi lita ry requirements as regards materials but also t he continuity of function afte r a 50 % destruction of the sys tem) and the electromagnetic point of view. Consequently, for the latter element, al l t he EMP (El ectromagnetic Pulse. wh ich deve lops during nuclear exp losions) and "Tempest " aspects must be cons idered w it h spec ial care. besides the traditiona l provisions concerning defence aga inst jamming , throug h spec ial modu lations, and tl,e security from tapp ing , through highly hermet ic code systems. THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE

C' I systems based on the w ide employmen t of computers w ill ce rta inly not affect the principles of war, wh ich rema in substant ially unchanged . But

-evolution of phonotelemetry -data correlation -continuous control of the battlefield

Fig. 8

t hey w ill undoubted ly influ ence the modes of their application , i.e. t he doctri ne of employment. The re w ill certa inl y be reve rberations on t he doctrine of employment concerning t ransm iss ions (will the Transm iss ion Cent res sti II be necessary? As everybody knows, logistics is another element that comes into play as regards operational effectiveness. SIACCON and CATRIN are new systems, of recent conception, which require that the suitability of the present (even the most recent) logistic systems be verified.

Or w ill the Command Posts be able to have direct access to t he in tegrated networks? How and to what extent wi ll the alphanumeric type of message survive? To what extent w ill teletransmitted gra ph ics rep lace t he prolix SI TRE P, INTSUM and so on?). Certa inly also the doctrin e o f land art ill ery w ill change (will all t l,e procedures of ob jective acqu isition and fi re adjustment survive the compa rison w ith CATRIN/SORAO?}; there wi ll also be re flections on the doctrin e of antiaircraft artillery and Army Av iation (lin ked today to procedures that wi ll be posit ively influer.ced by the

advantage, provided by CATRINI SOATCC, to have a timely knowledge of the updated situation of the sky above the battle area) . The introduction of systems such as CATRIN and SIACCON are likely to influence also the employment of Engi neers and combat Units. which will be in a position to know more in advance and in depth the situation of friend and foe as compared with today's possibilities .

of the Army Aviation aircraft in critical situations; • solving the problem of the techniques for controlling the friendly skies in the Army Corps' Zone in order to detect the threat, but also to be able to employ our own means in all security; • tackling and solving the difficult problem of the integra tions necessary for setting up computer networks up to the highest levels.

CATRIN'S TECHNICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE (fig. 8)

CONCLUSIONS

The technical/technological significance of CATRIN could be better evidenced by the firms of the Consortium which are interested in the development of the system. Nevertheless, here we can at least point out the most significant reflections. From this point of view, CATRIN means: • stu_dying in depth the numeric modulation transmission techniques (especially delta); • engaging in new sectors of survivability in electronic warfare environments; • developing techniques for the compliance with "Tempest" procedures; • gain ing a deeper knowledge of the emerging coding capabilities; • engaging in long-distance image transmission (telefax) in a field environment; • enhancing the techniques for adaptation of materials to the battlefield: • developing new capab ilities in the radar sector (also from high platforms); • advancing in the RPV and Drone sectors; • advancing in the night · and all-weather sensors (IRT, laser, mi lli metric waves); • improving in phonotelemetry; • making progress in data correlation; • engaging in the sector of continuous control and guide

What we have said has made clear that CATRIN's takeoff marks a deep operational and technological evolution within the Army (and not on ly the Army) and will certainly bring about a totally renovated vision of the land Service. The Army trends towards the employment of the most advanced technolog ies, towards the system contributions which are indispensable to a defensive instrument abreast of the times. The Army is therefore more than ever open to modern instan ces. There are no obstinate and counterproductive attachments to tradition which could only have a detrimental effect . Tradition is held in due esteem where it serves to consolidate a precious spiritual inheritance, as appropriate nourishment of the spirit of a Service. But tradition is

In short, the development of CATRIN must be seen as a precondition for the launching of the whole complex c :i I, sphere which is currently drawing a lot of attention, and not only among the military. Nevertheless such a system cannot be utilized only for emergencies or during periodic training activities of the Command Posts. A continuous training is required of the Commanders and Staffs, who must make themselves familiar with the new operational and managerial techniques.

set aside (and it has been for years) where it is the expression of ideas which have become obsolete. Today the Italian Army' s approach is expressed in terms of maximum incentivation and utilization of what is new, maximum openess to progress as regards the defensive instrument and contribution - for what pertains to it - to the social progress in general. Of course some more time must elapse before the fruits of these new attitudes and ideas can be fully appreciated. In short, the development of CATRIN must be seen as a precondition for the launching of the whole complex c:i I, sphere which is currently drawing a lot of attention, and not only among the military. Nevertheless such a system cannot be _u tilized only for emergencies or during periodic training activities of the Command Posts. A continuous training is required of the Commanders and Staff, who must make themselves fam iliar with the new operational and managerial techniques. The command organization, at the centre and at the various locations, must gradually adjust to the forthcoming structures, in order to take full advantage of the system's services (costetfectiveness). to focus its attention on the fundamental conceptual and organ izational problems and to relieve the daily work from a routine which is usually alienating and dispersive. Lt. Gen. Antonio Viesti

THE DEVELOPMENT tlF

ITRIN NOTES (1) Article (2) visit to

"Ri vista M ilitare" , no. 2185. by Gen. Antonio Viesti. Introduction to Gen. Viesti's Perdasdelogu on June 19, 1986.

AN ARMY

FOR TOMORROW

There is something new in the army today. A cycle is closed. After one hundred and seventy-two years of service in the Piedmontese Army, and successively in the Army of unified Italy, Divis ions exit from the organization of the Service. But the traditions, denominations and badges of these glorious Major Units will never vanish from the soldier's eyes and hearts, and will continue to live in some of the elementary Major Units of today and tomorrow: the Brigades.

Evolution is a natural phenomenon and normally we do not stop to think that the Changes concerning man inevitably Âˇ reflect on the context in which he lives, and vice versa. In general, we only take notice a posteriori of the changes which have occurred gradually and in an almost imperceptible manner .

Therefore it should not come as a surprise that when the rythm of evolution quickens, and upsets - or we tear it might upset - the environment where we operate, giving shape to blurred scenarios and uncertain times, our instinctive reaction is to refuse the new and go back to the habitual.

In countries where the institutions are founded on the principles ot democracy, the evolu tion of the Armed Forces is infl uen ced by various pol itical, econom ic, social, scien tific, technica l and psychologica l fa ctors. Therefore, it is difficult to define rea l needs and actual possibilities, because each of these two categories presents ever changing composite aspects, wh ich often interact accord ing to mode ls diffi cult to define, in most cases impossible to qua ntify, and not always con sistent with logic and rational schemes. The development of a new weapon system can engage General Staffs and industries for fifteen or twenty years from t he moment it is deemed necessary until it becomes operationally available; and probably with characteristics not ful ly in line with the requirements. The Officers attend ing the military schools today will becom e Battalion Commanders at the begin ning of the new century, when the role or the configu ration of t hese units wil l probably have undergone radical changes. The cha lleng e posed by changes is nevertheless an integral part of our daily life and must be accepted in order to control it and reduce the margins of uncertainty. Certainly we need a correct amount of rati ona lity, experience and phantasy to make the best choice among the many possible lin es of conduct, whose development becomes more and more undetermined and difficult to foresee . If correctly plan ned, changes can be a man ifesta ti on of vitality, prevent sclerosis and are proof that the Armed Forces are not getting ready to fight yesterday's wa r, as some critics maintain. Sometimes a si ngle new piece of eq uipment produces modifications that can be very deep. Currently a new automated data processing system (EAD Elaborazione automatizzata dei dat i) is showing up on the national mi litary stage; the employment of this system .

- - - - - - - . Fig. 1 CONSCRIPTION SELECTION ENLISTMENT

MANAGEMENT

,/ ---

EAD C3 I starting from the most technologically advanced applications and high-specialization areas is expanding with increasing speed through everyday life, from routine activities to the conceptual activities at the top of the organizations. The subject has been discussed also in this magazine (1) and does not need further presentation. We only want to stress that over the next few years EAD, extending to an increasing number of sectors and hierarchical levels, will produce such modifications in the operating procedures that a real leap forward in quality will occur. EAD is therefore one of the main fac tors to be considered in planning the reorganization and the development of the Army (fig . 1). Another important aspect is the progressive refinement of the "model 80" log istics, which, owing to heavy psychological and practical obstacles has had only a partial utilization and, moreover, has been employed only in commissary, transport and material servi.ees. Its development must be furthered with the adaptations suggested by experience in terms - as regards materials - of "a dhes ion logistics" within the Mayor Units and "support logistics" at the 3rd and 4th level, aiming at a more balanced rea llocation of the means and executive organs, a simplification of structures and a better compactness of the functional chain. Also within the still underestimated but fundamental

"personnel logistics" (conscription, enlistment, mobilization) an updating of proced ures is becoming more and more necessary and, especially in this field, automation is destined to play a primary role. As far as sheer organization is concerned, the process started in 1975 sanctions the defin itive supremacy of the interservice command activity, unified in the General Staffs of the Major Units, vis-a-vis the "specialized" activity of the old regimental Headquarters and the Service Commands whose functions were at least equal, if not more important, to those of the General Staff. There was consequently a gradual acknowledgement of the eccessive length of the operationa l chain of command, in which the divisional level shared the responsibilities of the complex Major Unit on one side, and those of the elementary Major Unit on the other. Squeezed between the Army Corps and the Brigade, the functiona l space of the Division Headquarters has been so reduced as to make evident the conven ience of simplifying the system, in ord er to avoid interferences and overlaps of the respective scopes. The main needs, derived from the elimination of the coordination

"A 109" helicopter. The helicopter component will be particularly important in the prospective structure of the Army.

and control levels, will be met by making recourse to automated C3 I and management systems. These three aspects (EAD, logistis and operational chain of command) are grafted on a basis characterized by a limited avai lability of financial resources (2). which is not expected to grow within a short time, even though the national economy shows signs of improvement. From this stems the decision taken by the Minister of Defence in 1985 -

-and widely commented by the press - t o help redress the country's finances by forgoing the 3% increase in real terms of the resources allotted to his department. T he incr~ase was provided for by the international commitments rega rding military defence. This decision, political ly difficu lt within the Atla ntic Al liance and in relation with the opposite bloc, can be adopted without affecting the Army's cred ibi lity prov ided that two

fu ndamental conditions are met : â€˘ first: avoid to affect the

"operationa l core" of the Army, which is already reduced to a min imum, vis-a-vis the tasks assigned to it by the mode ls of defence; â€˘ second: activate that rise in quality of the operationa l forces, which we were unable to attain with the 1975 restructuring, by planning the fina ncial programmes in such a way as to priv ilege investments (updating and upgrading of materials,

as wel l as the connected activity of research and deve lopment) to the detriment of the discretionary expenses for conscript personnel and for routine operations. This politica l decision has prompted a feasibility study, which has been developed quickly, with remarkable conceptual effort and with the participation of all high Commanders, General Inspectors and Chiefs of the Logistic Corps of the Army for every functional area of the Service .

THE TERRITORIAL AREA

Du~ng the last decade several important measures have been taken : 16 territorial Depots, 6 Military Hospitals and Medicolegal Centres, 63 Ammunition and Fuel Depots, 16 stockya rd s and 19 warehouse section s have been removed from the Army organization.· Concepts and profile of a territorial model have been outlin ed, towards which we must direct our efforts in order to adapt to the new tasks of the Armed Forces, provided tor by law 382/1978, and to harmon ize with the operational component restructured in 1975, as wel l as with the innovations introd uced by the·"model 80" logisti cs. As a consequence, the jurisd ictiona l areas of the M ilitary Regions have been establ ished according to the country's partition in to administrative Regions, and the leading organs of the Military Region Services have acqui red

tasks and structures in line with those of the Logistic Corps Commands, proceeding from an organization "by subject" to an organization "by function" . But the core of the problem has not been reached yet. and the system's configuration rema ins overproportionate as compared with the actual needs and performance. It is t herefore logica l that the most significant transformation in the next years shou ld concern the territorial area . The fundamental criterion in all sectors wi ll be to do away with the less productive or redundant organs, privileging t hose prospectively destin ed to perform primary functions in favour of the "basins of users", to be determined according to: • functional considerations; • "popu lation'. ' receiving the service, in terms of orga nizations or indiv iduals • in terconnections between the various sectors. Fig. 2

CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

PRESENT

XXX

ZMC

,.. ...JlL,

: PMC

, - - _J_

Operational sector

A not very conspicuous intervention, which is nevertheless destined to have important repercussions, is tha t which will affect the territorial chain of command. The recent specification of the functions in t he vario us sectors and t he div ision of respons ibilities between the Commanders of t he M ilitary Regions and Army Corps in the North -West and North-East Mi litary Regions (3) is certainly a step in that direction. The organ ization based, tor all practical purposes, on the centralization of all functions at the Military Region Command is being gradually replaced by another which - though respectful of the functions attributed by ministerial decree to the M ilitary Region and Garrison Comma nders - wil l carry out a more balanced apportionment of the delegable functions, reaching the administrative Provinces, in most of which - with the gradual ity permitted by needs and availability of resources a Provincial Mi litary Command has been recently established, wh ile up to now its constitution was envisaged only in case of emergency (fig . 2). In peacetime, this body will also performs the duties of a "Garrison Command", which hitherto have been assigned as "additional task" to various Commands and organizations. The simplification of functions will of course affect also the structure - or at least the number of personnel of the Region and Zone Military Commands. Administration and Roll Sector

This is one of the sectors which wi ll derive the best advantages from EAD's beneficial effects, considering that the management of both money and materials, as well as the parallel recordi ng activity, are constitutionally suitable tor exploiting the possibilities of automation. The resu lts will be:

FINAL

1st PHASE

PRESENT

Fig. 3

XXX

A.C .

l.~JJ - - Chain of commanc! Money

} Admin. li ne

Roll line

{ Materials

CJD D

Adm_inistrative conl ,gurat,on

Adm. Dir.

Organ iza tion

Detach ment

I· ,. • lighter tasks for the "admi nistration detachments" and though with lesser priority - for the "Organizations", so that the Commanders wi ll only be given the responsibility of the activity connected with discretionary expenses; • atta inment of a more marked correspondence between the chain of command and the administrative line. Next to the Pension Centres. already functioning within t he Military Regions for the · calcu lation. and payment of the provis iona l retirement al lowances (4). "Mi litary Reg ion Recording Centres" are beg inning to ·operate, they are to assume the specific tasks related to this matter, previously performed by the territorial Depots. It is the first step of a process which envisages the adoption of automated working procedu res. thanks to which the varia t ions in the service record, transmitted by t he Corps and loaded on tape at higher-level "Adm in istrative Organizations", will be gathered and sanctioned by the Record ing Centres.

Meanwh ile some Zone Mi litary Commands, Support Units Hqs. (former Service Units Hqs.) and some Service Commands of the Army Corps have been established as "Administrative Bodies" for manag ing money and materials for the lower level territorial un its and for the batta lions not incl uded in a Brigade. As a conseq uence the territorial Depots - which had been kept alive as inheritance of the period in wh ich the structure of the Army was based on regiments - have recently been abol ished . The ultimate structu re will be comp leted grad ually, owing to the need to introduce software and make t he Record Centres and the new "Administrative Organ izations" operationa l (fig. 3). This wi ll occur presumably within 1987. The logistic of materials

Wide margi ns susceptible to rationa lization have been found where there are organs overproportionate as compared to the requirements, or wh ich

have insufficient capabi lities to work autonomously, so as to be compelled to turn to private firms frequently. In some sectors, for example that of motor vehicles, there is a growing tendency toward organizational models, wh ich permit to reduce the reparation t imes, especially through mai ntenance cycles programmed at the lowest levels and the uti lization of modu lar elements. Therefore the intention is to : • complete the "model 80", incorporating as much as possible the various components of the executive organs of each logistic Service, at present sti ll sited in d ifferent locations or in t he same place but in separate st ructures . This goa l can be considered 50% atta ined - with some exceptions - for t he mixed warehouses of th e Commissary Service, 40% for the Army Repa ir Yards and for only one M ilitary Region supply unit ; • aim at t he gradual remova l of most centra l warehouses and depots of 4th level materials, transferring their functions to the

Fig. 4 INFRASTRUCTURAL UNIFICATIONS

FUNCTIONAL UNIFICATIONS

r - - - - - - -1

i I

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280RE 22Qsz. ma I L __ ______ _j

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lower- level supply organization. There are also considerations regard ing the connected necess ity to divide the stocks among the abovementioned organizations, which cou ld be developed into "Multiservice Supply Cen tres". The stocks wou ld be employed under t he strict control of t he Centra l Authorities; • further reduce t he present size of t he warehouse sections. according to the rev ision - also under way ·- of t he mobil ization organization (5). The implementation of t hese measures will occur with graduality, inf luenced as it is in most cases - besides the studies currently in progress - by heavy in frastructure obstacles. To beg in with, 2 Armoured Vehicles Yards (PVC) and 2 Central Warehouses for Combat 28

Vehicles Spare Parts (MACRICO) have been incorporated, and by 1989 there are plans to (fig . 4); • unify the infrastructure of al l m ixed commissary warehouses; • remove 7 material Depots, 2 Army Repair Yards (ORE), t he two Spare Parts Centra l Warehouses (MACRA) and 22 Warehouse sections; • give an equal and more modern configura tion to the M ilitary Reg ion Catering compan ies, wh ich are al ready subordinate to t he Directors of the Commissary warehouses; each provides services to 5000 men, bes ides having full autonomous mobi lity. At the end of the reorganization, the 3rd and 4th level of the Commissary, Transport and Material Serv ices will cons ist of 28 execu t ive orga ns instead of today's 44.

The Medical Sector

The evolutionary trend of the organization is founded on a conceptua lly simple clarification which is nevertheless desti ned to have deep repercussions on the f unct ion and structure of the medical organization. The followin g is on fact envisaged : • Some Mi litary Hospitals, transformed into "Genera l Hospitals" wil l be given t he capability to take care of a wide range of pathologies, with particular specializations (also for the dependents of the military, civilian and retired personnel of Defence), to carry out un iversity - leve l teaching and to tra in doctors and paramedics; • hospita lization and care for the personne l on active duty wi ll be concentrated in a smaller number of military hosp ita ls, which wi ll have the ful l diagnostic capabi lities necessa ry to detect the rea l pathologies, distinguishing them from the apparent ones; • t he medicolega l activity wi ll be separated and entrusted to especially designated M ilitary Hospitals. In order to synchron ize the current regu lation with that of the National Health Service of 1978, a government bill and a Parliament proposal concerning t he orga nization of the Military Health Service are being considered. While waiting for the bills to pass, exploratory attempts are being made to utilize - with in a short ti me experimentally to begin with, a Mil itary Hospital transformed into a General Hospita l. With t he pace permitted by the necessary infrastructure adapta t ions and t he avai labi lity of medical and paramedical statt (as for this, a specif ic recruitment and tra ining pol icy wi ll have to be set in motion, also to reduce the recourse to hired civ ilian doctors, who will be necessary at the start), the execution phase will be developed over the following years and foreseeably completed by 1989, incl uding also the

Fig. 5

GENERAL HOSPITAL

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Gen era l Services

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Otolarvn golcgy

Orthopedy Traumata I

Cardio logy

Neurology

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Contagious

j Diseases J

Psychiatry

(') Ea ch w ith outpatient cli nic.

MILITARY HOSPITAL

> < - - - - - - - - < Secretariat

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Medicine ,

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MEDICOLEGAL MILITARY HOSPITAL Director

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edicolega Serv ices

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Outpatien t Clinic

A "Leopard" tank on the look-out. Also the armoured component will be partially modified, with the introduction of second-generation tanks and armoured cars.

transformation al ready in progress of a M.edicolega l . Centre into a M 1l1tary Hospital for long hospital izations and the abolition of the 3rd and 4th level med ical depots exceeding the actua l needs. As concerns t he medicolega l activity, a study is being completed with the purpose t o integrate in depth the "basins of users" of the designated Military Hosp itals with those of the Conscription Counc ils and Milita ry Districts. As regards this particular aspect, which is of extreme interest for the draftees and for the Adm inistration, the· evol ution towards single-purpose "medicolega l" Military Hospita ls wi ll simplify the procedures and help to reduce the length of the conscripts' med ical exami nations. At the end of t he. reorgan ization, the medical area wi ll incl ude 4 General Hospita ls, 9 Military Hospitals {plus one for long hospitalizations) and 18 med icolega l Mi litary Hospitals, configured as shown in fig. 5. Conscription, selection, recruitment and mobilization

This sect or, one of the most important beca use it is the preferential link between the people and t he Armed Forces, on ly belatedly has started to feel the demands for renovation wh ich have pervaded the ot her sectors of the Army for a long time. Lucki ly this sector is also institutiona lly su itable for receiv ing and exploiti ng the EAD capabiliti es. The renewa l's ma in lines have been conceptual ly defined in 1981 and have become more clear after the in-depth examination carried out by the General Di rectorate of Conscription, Recruitment, Mil ita rization, Civi lian Mobil iza tion and Auxiliary Corps . At the end of an indispensable

prel imina ry experimental phase , carried . out with the effect ive support of the North West Military Region , an intermed iatelevel direct ive orga n has been deemed necessary: a Mi lita ry Region LRM Di rect ion {Leva, Reclut amento, Mobilitazi one = Conscription, Recruitment, Mobilization) recently instituted and directly subord inate to the Com mander of the Military Reg ion. Th is measure has an undeniable advantage, in tha t it concentrates, simp lifies and makes more homogeneous the compl icated rela ti ons between the command and directive organs at the various levels and the executive peripheral organizations. In the next months the LRM Di rections plan to consolidate and refine the relations and proced ures with the higher and subordinate organ izati ons and, at central leve l, to perfect t he system as a whole . As a matte r of fact, by 1989, there are plans to attain various important interconnected objectives:

• as rega rds conscription, to elim inat e all doubts about the conscripts' physica l fitness to military service, by improv ing the special istic med ical examinations {also in view of effectively helping the National Health Registry); • for t he selection of the conscripts, to reduce the theoretical tests to the essential and single out, on enlistment. on ly the indispensable parameters, on a prevail ingly practical basis. As a hig hly desirable side effect, a red uction of the· illfamed "three days" w ill be obta ined; • for the recruitment, to do away with some malfu nctions which sti ll occur by improving the cu rrent automated programmes and procedures; • for mobiilzation, complete the al ready started automation process, in. order t o optimize the management of the available personnel; • for public information and certification activities, to reduce

Fig. 6

PRESENT ORGANIZATION

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the system's "time of reaction" and lay down t he appropriate precondit ions, so that any Mi lita ry District wi ll be in a pos it ion to meet the cit izens' requests. The yea r 1986 has witnessed t he f irst steps o f t he fun ctional update, w it h t he introduction of t he Olivet t i "SP-700" medium power compu ters at the most important Mi litary Districts. In 1987 the struct ura l modern ization wi ll start (fig. 6), at the end of which the sector w ill operate w it h: • the same nu mber of M ilitary Districts, only one t hird of which wi ll deal w ith recruitment and mobilization. Bei ng essential ly con nected with the admin istrative reg ions, with the few exceptions deriv ing from the distr ibution of t he population and the number of conscripts . these will be ca llea "Regional" , to distigui sh t hem from the ones that w ill

contin ue to carry out information and certification activit ies and wh ich - in view of estab lish ing t hem also in the Provinces where t hey don't exist at present - cou ld be label led "Provincial " ; • a number of conscription organs (Conscript ion Counci ls, Conscription Offices and Select ion Groups) equa l to one t hird of the present one, and worki ng in close cooperation with t he Regional Mi litary Districts. Each of these Districts w ill t herefore become a pole of agg regation an d data ban k of a microsystem hinged on t he "SP-700" , wh ich wi ll include a Conscript ion Council, a med icolega l M ilitary Hospital and a number of Provi ncial Mil itary Dis tricts (fig . 7) . This wi ll imp ly not only a great organizational effort as regards materia ls. procedures, internal ru les and, in part,

juridica l norms, but also - and especia lly - a rad ical change of outlook. For practica l and psycho logical reasons, the new structure w ill therefore be adopted gradua lly, starting f rom t he Mi litary Regions w here cond it ions as a whole are more favourab le, and expanding t hroug h the ent ire territory by 1989. SCHOOLS AND TRAINING

A lso t he Orga niza tions charged w it h t he tasks of t raining , special ization and qualification of the regu lar and conscript personnel have been subm itted to a careful critica l examination . At first sight, their globa l size cou ld appear overproportionate as compared lijith t he req uirement s of t he Service and it must be adm itted that some areas of redundancy do exist. But what is going to be

Fig. 7

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done would especially meet criteria of rationalization and better performance, while the savings that could be made, on the whole, would be negligible. Moreover the training and school units give an essential contribution to the current system of mobilization, therefore it would be rather difficult to exclude their contribution without diminishing the response and credibility of procedures in this sensitive sector. The recruit training battalions have recently undergone significant cutbacks, considering that in 1985 three of them were transformed into motorized battalions. The· rest are just adequate to the needs of recruitment, and the desired margin of flexibility to face an emergency verges on the lower li mit. Anyway, in the attempt to further reduce the battalions, in 1985 the "direct inflow" of the

recruits to the employment units was tested at two Brigades, stationed in two different Military Regions. Actually it was a matter of extending to some battalions a procedure which is already in force in certain schools. But while the latter have no problem in accepting young men coming from civilian life, experience has shown that obstacles do exist to an extensive adoption of the "direct inflow". In fact, against the positive aspects represented by an improvement in the continuity of the command action, some reduction in the "loss" of draftees and, especially, a better unit amalgamation as well as the establishment of better relations between the soldiers' families and the units, there has been a substantial increase in the training burden and in bureaucracy which owing also· to deficiencies as regards Cadres and training

areas - could soon translate into a decline in the operational efficiency of the battalions. On the whole, the current system is therefore the most · convenient. And it seems that it is going to remain unchanged, unless a dramatic change occurs in the parameters of the situation. Also when the Service overhaul is accomplished and the envisaged economies of enlisted men are obtained (about 16,000 soldiers by 1989), the recruitment needs will diminish only by about 6%: not a negligible figure, useful to give a little resiliency to the system, but which is not easily translated into a reduction in the number of BARs (Recruit Training Battalions) . Also for Schools there have been explorative experiments between 1983 and 1985, to lighten the burden of training by transferring a part of it to the operational units, as it was for a long time with the jobs that do not require particular specializations or with which "previous experience" is a sufficient condition. But the experiments, in general, have given negative results, as it occurred with the tank crews at two armoured Brigades. With the introduction of means easier to employ, whose maintainance and reparation can take place at 1st and 2nd level, the need to have specialized personnel in some given sectors will diminish in the future, but very likely this occurrence will be offset by an opposite trend in some other sectors. Consequently the only principle on which a reductionoriented reorganization of the Schools can be founded is that of maintaining and optimizing the essential functions, in view of incorporating as much as possible, not abolishing, the existing Schools. This has proved to be technically feasible and desirable for: • the two Armour Schools (Armoured Troops in Caserta and Armoured Troop Specialists in Lecce). by implementing a measure that has been under consideration for several years .

Their unification in a sing le institute will have only positive effects. especia lly in terms of cohesion of the trained personnel, and - if the chosen location is Lecce - it will make the Caserta infrastructure available for a simi lar operation in another sector; • the Signal School at RomeCecchignola and the Signal Specialist School at S. Giorg io a Cremano which - relieved from the job of providing technicallogistic train ing and from some other tasks that can be carried out at the battalions. thanks to the simpler methods of employment of the forthcoming materials - could be concentrated between Caserta and S. Giorgio a Cremano; • the four Schools tor transports and materials (Transports and Materia l Schools, Army Motorization and Electronic Technicians Schools, all at Rome-Cecchignola, and Army Centre of Armament Specia lists at Piacenza), which will be able to better integrate and coordinate their activity, in compliance with the "model 80 logistics" also in the train ing field. at the unified location of Rome-Cecchignola . All the necessary measures require sign ificant infrastructura l adaptations and a rigid time coordination. We see the outlines .of a wide-scope programme which, although its plann ing was started already in 1986, will not be completed before 1990 or 1991 . THE OPERATIONAL FORCES

As we mentioned before, the operational forces are involved in reorganization only as far as the chain of command is concerned . The amount of "Brigade modules" (we use the term of comparison adopted in 1975, to evidence the cuts made in the combat units) cannot be reduced any further. Along these last years it has been repeatedly affirmed on various occasions. and it has been verified through painstacking operational studies, that the minimal structure needed 34

by the Army in order to ensure the implementation of the joint missions (6) is more than 24 Brigades. Therefore this configuration is already inadequate; as a consequence, many different tasks must be assigned to some Brigades, accepting the risks deriving from the simultaneity of several requirements of employment. Large-scale mobilization is unfeasible, both because in our time the manifestation of conflicts is sudden and unforeseeable and because of the geostrategic situation of our country, which does not al low longtime preparations of the military instrument. Extensive mobi lization would be onerous on the financia l plane: needs being equal as regards the update of materials, wh ich would remain substantia lly unchanged, the working expenses wou ld diminish on one side, because a lower number of men would be cal led for service, but would increase on the other - and certainly a great deal more - for the need to make recourse. more often and for larger numbers of personnel (especial ly officers and NCOs) to recal ls for training, and for the necessary expensive maintenance of the materials stored. For the operational forces - mostly in view of the planned introduction of C3 I equipment on ly a streamlining of the chain of command is envisaged, which can be identified with the pure triad "battal ion (fundamental unit of employment) - Brigade (e lementary Major Unit) - Army Corps (complex Major Unit)". The abolition of the divisional level has obviously entailed a certain reorganization of the Major Units' supports. The occasion has also been used to: • limit the quantitative unbalance between the three Army Corps (which included respectively: 4 Brigades. the 3rd Corps; 5 Brigades, the 4th; 10 Brigades, the 5th, including the Missi le Brigade); • mechanize the "Vittorio Veneto" Armoured Brigade for operational needs, as recommended by a

study carried out with the Headquarters Land Forces Southern Europe (LANDSOU TH); • increase the abil ity to react promptly in emergency condition s outside the Army Corps; • create the preconditions for correcting the functiona l deficiencies of the operational instrument which. although detected already in 1975, cou ld not be rectified for mainly technical-industrial reasons; • organize the Engineer units currently still anchored to the traditional division among pioneers, sappers and miners - in a way more in keeping with the development of the "adherence" actions in favour of the Combat Units and with the tasks of higher technological contents at Complex Major Unit level; • do away with some anomalous situations in the organization of the Service. These objectives have bee n translated into the following measures: • abolition of the Headquarters of the four Divisions, whose trad itions and names survive in as many Brigades; • institution of a FIR (Rapid Intervention Force) Command which the "White Paper 1985" had already pointed out as necessary in the framework of the fourth and fifth joint mission (7); • attribution of new tasks and a more agi le structure to the Trieste Troop Command; • abolition of the Headquarters of three Arti llery regiments ; • transformation of a fourth Artillery regiment in a unit for testing new equ ipment (fire delivery and technica l-specialistic means (which in the coming years will be employed by the land and antiaircraft arti llery, as well as the relevant technical and emp loyment procedures; • transfer of a few battalion-level units to the mobilization units; • implementation of the necessary changes in the subordination of the Brigades and their · supporting units, and minor organization adjustments in some of the latter.

-Fig. 8

ommande

ommander

Deputy Commander

Gen. Staff

Gen.

Gen. Staff

Staff

CREMONA

LEGNANO

GOITO

BRESCIA

TRIESTE

The new structure of the Army Corps is represented in fig. 8 and fig. 9. One should notice the modifications in the chain of command, which includes also an Army Corps Deputy Commander (who is the natural substitute for the Commander and is placed at his side to guide and control sectors and activities of special interest) and in which the Service Commanders assume more importance as organs of command besides acting as advisers to the Commander. Moreover another rather inconspicuous figure of the past is also emphasized : the Commander of the Support Units - former CUS whose functions are clearly indicated by his denom ination, while in the 3rd Corps the Army Aviation units are at present Âˇ coordinated by an ad hoe command. Of course also the Corps General Staff has been adapted to the increased functional requirements. Starting from 1987, the reorganization will be gradually

Fig. 9

Arty Cdr.

Eng. Cdr.

un. Spt.

completed through the acquIsItion of new means and with the consequent gradual transformation of some support units. Drones, mini-RPVs and radars will be introduced; the missile self-defence ''mix" (25 mm self-propelled gun - Skyguard/ Aspide for low and very low altitude antiaircraft defence) will be employed; the general fire support will benefit from the modernization of the technical means and the introduction of MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System); the antitank defence, finally, will be improved with the "A-129" helicopter. The indispensable framework for t he management and control of all communication systems and of most fire sources will be constituted by the Transmission and Information Field System called CATRIN (8), already under development,

which will permit to employ EAD also in the operational fie ld. Meanwhile also the tank and APC lines will ve renovated with t he introduction of the second-generation tank and armoured car in different variants, starting from the one armed with heavy weapons. Probably, as a consequence, the characters of some Brigades will have to be modified in order to obtain a better correspondence with the natural environment and the operational tasks. The mechanized and armoured Brigades, the most qualified for the arrest actions and for the development of dynamic reactions in the flatland areas of the combat zone. do not require substantial modifications. But considering that the tasks must correspond to the characters of the national territory (hills or mountains for

"6616" armoured car. This 4-wheel drive, 160 HP vehicle is highly mobile both on road and on rough terrain, is equipped with a two -man turret, and armed with a 20 mm cannon and a 7.62 coaxial machine gun.

almost four fifths, with an increasingly dense net of settlements, and with a shape elongated from north to south) it is quite evident that the tactical-logistic mobility and the armament of the other Brigades must be improved. It is a spur to develop the concept of "ligth infantry" which should be suited to the national case for special actions: against sea-and-air landings, counterguerrilla warfare, mountain combat, etc. In view of this, one sees the need to give more and more importance to the human factor: in order to achieve a given mentality and ability, training must be promoted and specialized.

CONCLUSION During the next years the Army will be untiringly engaged in the process of modernization started in 1975 and never completed for a number of reaGons, almost all of them more or less retraceable to external causes. Now we have favourable conditions for completing our design. The present state of the problems. the incipient availability of support from informatics and theâ€˘ solid prospects regarding the near-at-hand introduction of new materials make us optimist about its adequacy to the requirements and the possibi lities of success. There are still details that need defining: at this stage it could not be otherwise. In some sectors (such as the medica l and conscription - selection - recruitment ones) some regulations wil l have to be modified and. in order to overcome doubts, uncerta inties and the natura l resistance to changes of deep-rooted procedures and mentalities. prolonged efforts will have to be made in every field. But we can, and must. look at the positive aspects which are fundamental: the clearness of the fina l picture and the willingness to proceed in that direction. if we want the Army to be up to its institutional tasks. This new picture marks an important moment, which should rouse not only the interest of the experts: for the first time after many years the intention to privilege the investments will be trans lated into operative decisions, reducing the operating expenses and assigning to the operational forces the sums carved out from the support sector. The reversal of trend, already perceptible in 1986 (fig. 10) (9), wi ll be more evident at the end of the programme: there is hope to spare about 16,000 soldiers by 1989. two thirds of whom coming from the territorial-logistic and training ~reas. The consequent savings in work ing expenses. over 100 billion lire per year. will be reinvested to increase the "capital".

ALLOCATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Fig. 10

Force programmes Operation Modern ,zation and renewa Is

R&D

The officers and NCOs made available by the aboiition of many territorial organizations and Division Headquarters wi ll make up for the present deficiencies and will serve to increase the efficiency and the force levels of the operational units. Nevertheless it will not be a painless solution, and everyone will have to do his share for the benefit of the country and the mi litary community. In this regard one ought to stress that. although the Army Corps started - and wil l complete the envisaged transformations earl ier than the "support" areas, the most significant modifications will indeed concern the latter. Between the option to start the reorganization of functions and structures only in the territorial and training organization, on the one hand, and, on the other, that to act at once in every field. the second option has been chosen, because within the Army there are all the conditions to do it. The indispensable condition - the lack of which wou ld alter the whole evolutionary process must be, of course, the overcoming of every sociopolitical influence. The Country must accept the abolition of some organizations or their destination to other locations. in the

â€˘ '

superior common interest. This is a particularly important fact for the Army, for its components are institutionally fractioned and qranched out over the entire nationa l territory. Granted that due consideration must be given to the practical, psychological and sometimes even emotional bonds that grow between the population and the military-bonds that become more deep-rooted ascthe coexistence lasts in time and the continuity of relations is taken for granted - the common good cannot be placed after partial interests. At the same time. one realizes that the complex range of measures will entail inevitable inconveniencies for a part of the personnel. But. while the civ ilian staff. a minimum part of whom are in any case involved in the reorganization, will easily find reemployment in the same loca tions, Officers and NCOs cou ld be tra nsferred to other places. In order to promote the punctual and correct implementation of the entire programme. we must have. as soon as possible, the necessary normative tool which gives an adequate compensation for transfers. already envisaged in a bill presented by Defence and in various bills being examined by Parl iament.

The Engineer units. which at present consist of pioneers, sappers and miners, will be employed in a way more in keeping with the development of the "adherence " actions in favour of the Combat Units and with the tasks of higher technological contents at Complex Maior Unit level.

Also other laws currently before Parliament should be passed as soon as possible; i.e. the proposal to increase the number of NCOs in view of the prospective introduction of new and more sophisticated weapon systems and of the EAD and c:i I support equipment, the revision of the criteria on which the remuneration of the miiltary is based and the modernization of the Army infrastructure. Col. Gian Giuseppe Santillo

NOTES {1) See ''L'lnformatica nell'Esercito oggi", Informatics in today's Army, by Carlo Balsamo (Rivista Militare It. Ed. no. 6/85) and "L'lnformatica nell'Esercito", Informatics in the Army (Rivista Militare Booklet. 1/1986) . (2) The subject is discussed at length in Part IV of the "White Paper 1985 - The Defence". (3) Army General Staff, Circular no. 569/142153 of Dec. 24, 1985. (4) In the future. the Pension Centres cou ld also pay the ordinary definitive pensions and the ordinary privileged pensions. after an amendmen t of the regulations which entrusted this task to the Provincial Dire ctorates of the Treasury.

(5) After the Zone Military Commands become "Administrative Agencies", the warehouse sections could be rel ieved fro m book-keeping tasks and deal on ly with the practical management of materials. (6) As is known. the "White Paper 1985" describes five main joint missions. The Army is interested in all o f them. and particularly in the fo llowing: • fi rst (defence in the North-East); • fourth (operational defence of the territory): • fifth (peace, security and civil protection actions). Furthermore, the Army concurs in the second mission (defence in the South and lines of communications) and in the third (air defence ). (7) The new Command joins that of t he "Ready Intervention Force" (Fo.P.1.). destined to operate for the same joint mission but earmarked for cooperation with the Civil Defence organization. (8) The CATRIN system includes: , a subsystem for the Search and Acquisition of Objectives {SORAO); • a subsystem for the Tactical Sigh ting, Command and Control o f antiaircraft defence (SOATCC): • a subsystem for Integrated Transmission (SO TRIN) . (9) In 1986 the share of the Army appropriations destined to inves tme nts has gone up to 35,8% from 34,4% the preceding year. with a corresponding reduction in the discretionary expenses.

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--The economic integration of industrialized with developing countries almost always leads to the widespread presence of techn ical personnel in the latter, especially in those with a wealth of natural resources. However, the political and diplomatic relations on which this exportation of technology is based can undergo sudden transformations in the wake of unforeseeable changes in the politica l stability of the host countries, making it expedient and even necessary to repatriate such personnel. There is no need to go very far back for confirmation of th is statement. The recent cris is in the Mediterranean, which saw Italy as the unwil ling centre of tens ions , has forced the governments of various countries including Italy - to face the problem of repatriating their citizens from what had suddenly become "hot areas" . The so lution to problems of th is nature, where the need to ensu re the safety of those concerned can lead to dramatic situations, is a matter of great complexity in which the principal and norma lly decisive role is played by pol itics and dip lomacy. However, the preparation and possible implementation of mi litary action is also involved . The possibi lity of military action is expl icitly envisaged in the "1985 Defence Wh ite Paper" in the context of the 5th combined forces mission, wh ich states : "The worsening of the international situation, especially in the Mediterranean area, could require Italy, as has already happened in the past, to participate in such peacekeeping activities as intervention in support of an arm istice, guaranteeing the human rights of minority groups, or the protection and evacuation of Italian citizens abroad directly exposed to serious danger". The aim of this article is to examine whether and how such a mandate can be executed .

POSSIBLE SITUATIONS

Depending on the attitude of the local government (whether favourable or not to the repatriation of Italian citizens) and the extent of its ability to guarantee the safety of the operation , three different situations with different solutions can be imagined. The common starting point is obviously that of a country either subject to a great deal of internal tension and disorder or in open conflict with other countries. The first and simplest hypothesis assumes that the local government is cooperative and in a position to guarantee the safety of any personnel. In this case. the operation is simply a matter of the logistics involved in organizing an airlift. or its naval equivalent, of adequate size to cater for the numbers of those concerned. As the situation is not necessarily one of urgency, the facilities normally operating at the points of departure can provide such aid as may be required. It is also expedient to provide for the organization of temporary accommodation, any necessary medica l exam inations and the regulation of the flow of repatriated personnel at the points of arrival. In short. thi s type of operation presents a negligible level of risk and does not require the preparation. much less the execution , of military action. The second hypothesis assumes that the local government is uncooperative and does everything in its power, by fair means or foul, to hi nder the repatriation of foreign citizens. Th is is obviously the worst possible case as it prevents the implementation of any effective measures other than diplomatic steps, whose results are uncertain. However, military action must in any case be organized and held in readiness, whi le bearing in mind that armed intervention (by analogy with anti-terrorist operations) involves a great deal of risk for the very personnel one is trying to rescue. The repatriation of 42

nationals can only take place through the promptings of the government and the ability of individuals to exploit their every opportun ity. Of the greatest importance in such circumstances are the decisions taken by the national auth orities and the adoption, with a certai n degree of reserve, of the most appropriate measures: appraisal of the exped iency of repatria tion, choice of the moment to · invite citizens to repatriate, development of "flanking" activities in neighbouring countries with the aim of facilitating an early exodus. the level of urgency assigned to t he ope ration, and so on. The third hypothesis assumes that the local government is agreeable to the repatriation of Italian nationa ls but is unable to gua ran tee the safety of foreign personnel. This case seems to correspond best to the one envisaged in the "Defence White Paper" . The great number of parameters to be considered make this type of prob lem a point of referen ce for the identification of elements to be included in planning. However, the indeterminate nature of the parameters and the complexity of local situations mean that such planning can on ly be carried out in general terms and based on stan dardized operational procedures. ELEM ENTS OF THE SCENARIO

These may be ·1arge ly compared with the factors taken into consideration in tackling operationa l problems: natural environment (g eog raphical features of the country involved). hostile forces (situations of internal or external conflict that have brought about the crisis). friendly forces (situation of the personnel to be repatriated or the operationa l combined forces unit to be employed) . The examination of geographical features is particularly important as the conditions they determine will affect not only the type of action to be adopted

but also the feasi bility of the operation. The features of interest are essentially the following: • the distance of the country under examination from Italy, its continental position and the countries sharing borders with it ; • the possibility of internal and external links (network of communications), especially with Italy and the neighbouring countries; • the distribution of usable ports and airports and their potentia l capacities; • the presence of areas where situations of danger could arise for Italian nationals and their locati on with respect to the communications concerning us. The analysis of these factors must perm it the ide ntifica tion of: the modality of transport and possibility of concentrati ng personnel in the assembly and departure areas, the time necessary for the execution of the various measures, the level of danger involved in the operation , and the possibility of cooperation from neighbouring countries (an aspect to be evaluated with care in cases where the personnel to be repatriated is situated much nearer to such countries than to the points of departure) . The situation of internal or extern al confl ict at the origin of the problem under examination is more difficu lt to eval uate since it is normally brought about by factors which cannot be precisely determined a priori and which ca n develop and deteriorate in a very short space of time. However. the examination of constant historical factors, of traditions , of the pol itical situation of the moment and of emerg ing trends does make it possible to formulate loose hypotheses (requiring periodi cal revision) as to the existence of conditions of internal or external conflict. The former are of interest for the identification of the safest areas, those in which the chances of tension developing between opposing factions are minimal. The latter help direct the choice of

The security forces act above all as a deterrent. Around each departure area a cordon sanitaire must be created of such width as to protect the personnel to be evacuated and the carriers from automatic weapon fire.

locations least exposed to danger. The third and last element to be borne in mind is the situation of the personnel to be repatriated (close examination of the milita ry means to be used will not be carried out in this article on the assumption that the criteria normally adopted for the study of opera t ional problems will be applied) . This enables the defin ition of t he modality of personnel recovery and the eva luation of its effect on the local inhabitants, as well as predictable reactions. The parameters to be considered may be lim ited to the fol lowing : • the overall numbers of personnel, subd ivided accord ing to sex, age and distribution over the territory; • sectors of employment of individuals, with the aim of identifying elements whose removal could cause such uncontrollable reactions as to comprom ise the success of the whole operation; • links with the commu nities of other countries who might be interested in analogous measu res; • a complete list of t he means (private or company-owned) available for transporting personnel, on the assumpti on t hat transportation from the localities of residence to the departure points will have to be carried out with the means (possibly collective vehicles) ava ilable on the spot. Examination of these parameters wi ll make it possible to identify the limitations imposed by the scenario, the requirements to be met and the overa ll feasibility of the operation, i.e. a large part of the basic data essential for the correct formulation of the problem and the definition of the most appropriate line of action.

OUTLINE SOLUTIONS

The problem has two clearly distin ct facets : one logistic and the other opera t ional. The former predominates, not so much for its atypical nature as for the complexity of its organization and execution and the fact that it must in any case be put into effect in an operation of this kind . It will therefore be dealt with first. exam in ing in turn the elements involved in the development of the operation:

• departure points: the ports and airports. They are to be chosen , wherever possible , on the basis of safety from attack, suitability vis-a-v is the way personnel is distributed and the degree of feasibi lity they can contribute to the operation. The avai labi lity of a number of departure points, some of which even being located in the interior, permits the almost simultaneous flow of personnel and reduces the discomfort involved in what may be long journeys to reach the 43

departure points. It is necessary to equip each departure- point with an organization capable of providing for the basic living requirements of the personnel to be evacuated, since they will have to remain there for at least as long as it takes to load the carriers. To achieve this, rudimentary log istic organs wil l have to be set up to take care of the provision ing, medica l faci lities and control of the personnel to be repatriated; • assembly points: the loca lities in which the personnel distributed over the country must gather to be marshalled to the departure areas. They are, in practica l terms, the peripheral elements of the organ ization. Columns will be formed there to proceed, under the protection of security forces, to the departure terminals. The personnel concerned are to arrive at the assembly points from their places of residence under their own steam and in accordance with modal ities and schedules defined on the bas is of the local situation and the circumstances. It is also necessary to provide each point with someone in charge of organizing assembly and the subsequent journey to ensure that operations take place with a certain order even in the absence of military units; • routes from assembly areas to departure points: these are to be chosen above all with regard to safety requirements and the possibility of providing the col umns with assistance; • arrival areas in Italy: these wou ld normal ly be provided by the ports and/ or airports of arriva l. They must be defined and organized in such a way as to ensure a smooth and rapid flow of repatriated personnel. This means that they are to be selected above all with regard to the availabi lity of structures to accommodate the per.sonnel, albeit only for such time as is absolutely essentia l; • means of transport: th is is a matter of estimating the number of planes and/or ships necessary to evacuate the personnel from

the different departure points - if poss ible - in one trip. To achieve this, choices must be orientated towards the requisition of commercial carriers, since the military carriers will be required (it is not possible to determine numbers a priori) for the military component either employed or held in readiness for the operation . The plann ing of the means necessary is no easy matter as the· number of those to be evacuated can hardly be determined a priori. It therefore appears expedient to resort to the principle of modularity, defining a "model carrier" for each country which can be used to compare all other available means . This criterion is particularly useful for the calculation of aircraft, given their comparatively limited payload with respect to the requirements of evacuation. For example, if the "DC-9" is taken as a "model carrier" for 100 passengers, the other aircraft of the national airline will correspond to multiples of "DC-9". In the emergency, it will be sufficient to define for each airport of departure the number of "DC-9s" necessary for the number of passengers and send as many aircraft as correspond to the seating requirements. An analogous modular criterion should be adopted to estimate the mil itary aircraft required for the security contingent. In th is case, the basic modules will be provided by "model platoons" (with and without vehicles, with operational or logistic functions, etc.) related to the different types of transport aircraft belonging to the Air Force. It will thus be possible to adapt the compos ition of the contingent rapidly to the aircraft available at the moment. On the other hand, estimation of the requ ired number of ships is relatively easy given the great transport capacity of each carrier. It should be observed that the implementation of the planning outlined here assumes specific political and diplomatic

activity between Italy and the country concerned, wh ich also involves the mil itary structures. Following this order, the drawing up of plans shou ld come under, the duties of military attaches as regards actions to be carried out by the respective countries and then developed through the Ministries concerned. The Headquarters and the units to whom the mission will be assigned should also be directly involved so as to avoid improvisation and the unsatisfactory results this always leads to. The second aspect of the problem regards the operational side. i.e. the organization of the measures taken to guarantee the safety of the operation. Th is organization must be created both in cases where the local government is agreeable to the organized repatriation of Italian citizens and where there is opposition to any form of cooperation . The employment of the operational component must in any case be planned in such a way that it can be put into effect rapidly and smooth ly should the situation so demand. Analysis of this subject will be confined to aspects concerning the land, as those regarding air and sea come under the traditional criteria of employmen t of each Service. The requirements to be met regard three phases of the operation: the concentration of personnel at the assembly points, the movement of columns from the assembly points to the departure areas, and the time spent in the latter. The dangers which can most realistically be imagined are, in general, those characteristic of guerrilla warfare and street-fighting. In concrete terms these are limited to the use of automatic weapons or roadblocks. The security forces, wh ich act above all as a deterrent, must be provided with the composition, arms and means necessary to carry out their tasks. Around each departure point a cordon sanitaire must be establ ished of sufficient width to protect the personnel to be evacuated and the carriers

For operations of repatriation, it is necessary to estimate the means of transport necessary to evacuate the personnel from the departure areas in one trip, if possible. Ships are best suited to this task in view of the great transport capacity of each carrier.

from automatic weapon fire. As the function of these forces is exclusively defensive, their aims should also be made clear externally through the use of flags and notices in the local language. The protection of the assembly points should be ensured in similar fashion . The time spent t here by the security forces must be kept to the bare minimum necessary to form the columns, whose sa fety wi ll be guaranteed with the modalities laid down for convoy escort. Given the type of danger envisaged, the security contingent should be equ ipped with weapons

of great fire power and vehicles protected against fire from light weapons . The quantity and type of the latter will be defined through the modalities by wh ich they have been brought to the zone of operations: small numbers of light vehicles will therefore be employed (such as armoured reconnaissance vehicles) if air transport is used , and more powerfu l means (such as armoured cars) if brought by sea. To give an idea of the forces requ ired, one company may be considered sufficient to control a departure area (with about two platoons) and a column (with a third platoon) . In this type of operation the organ ization of command and control takes on considerable importance. On national territory, command can only be assumed by the General Staff, which

maintains contact with the politica l authorities. Such areas as those under examination require a command unit of reduced strength but highranking enough to coordinate al l the activities connected with the operation in col laboration with the Italian Embassy. Particular attention must be paid to the communications sector, which is one of the factors upon which the success of the operation hinges. The Commander of the contingent must have a clear picture of the situation at every moment and be in a position to inform the national authorities of such needs and difficulties as may arise . Given the distances at which they may be ca lled upon to operate, the units employed on this specific task should be eq uipped with adequate means of communication.

â€˘

â€˘ The planning of the necessary means for evacuation is hampered by the difficulty of determining the number of persons involved a priori. The choice should, however, be orientated towards the requisition of commercial carriers, since the military carriers will be required for the possible employment of the military component.

CONCLUSIONS

The repatriation of communities of citizens resident abroad for reasons connected with sudden changes in the local situation is a highly probable contingency, especially at present. It is not, however, equally probable that repatriation will take place in conditions of safety guaranteed by the presence of a national military contingent. Nevertheless, although un likely, this situation is neither impossible nor one that can be overlooked. It therefore follows that, in general terms, the operation

of repatriating citizens resident abroad must in any case be planned, with or without military intervention. In concrete terms, it is necessary to identify the body to be given the task of drawing up evacuation plans. There is no doubt that the original problem is one of a diplomatic nature and that the military aspects are subsidiary, contingent and play a supporting role. The Embassies are therefore the most suitable places for the development of the relevant activities, also in view of the presence of military attaches capable of acting as intermediaries between the diplomatic and military authorities. As regards the Ministry of Defence, it has already been mentioned that the need to provide protection for evacuation operations involving Italian citizens resident abroad is referred to in the "White Paper" in the context of the 5th

combined forces mission . The paper also points out that the best possible solution - already adopted by other European countries - is that of assigning this task to a combined forces unit of rapid deployment characterized by operational readiness . As is now common knowledge, such a unit was recently created under the denomination of Rapid Deployment Force (FIR). The military component of any "repatriation operation" can thus be taken for granted. The remaining organizational aspects still need to be settled and finely t uned. To achieve this, it is necessary to stimulate the competent bodies to examine the problem and outline, albeit in very general terms, its place in the context of the general situation. The aim is to avoid being taken by surprise and left behind by the stream of events. Gen. Angelo Sion Col. Franco Monticone

PUBLICATION NO. 908 OF THE DOCTRINAL SERIES

The Report belongs among the publications which, without making reference to specific organizational levels (combat group, minor complex, etc.) intend to tackle, from a prevailingly doctrinal point of view, the problems regarding sp~cia/ operational situations, environments or units. Among these, Publication no. 901 "Inhabited areas and Operations" and Publication no. 902 "AirGround Cooperation" have already come out; the publication on the "Employment of Airborne Troops" will appear soon. The Report describes, in general terms, the typical actions which can be developed in a lagoon environment or, anyway, in an environment suitable tor the employment of amphibious units, leaving out, at least in part, the contingent organizational position of the amphibious troops, since, especially for the conduct of the most difficult actions, the "Lagunari" units will need adequate reinforcements. Within this framework, the publication, although concerning specifically the employment of amphibious troops equipped and trained for operations in their

specific environment, outlines procedures that can also be applied by other forces employed in support. The text, divided into three parts, outlines the characteristics of the amphibious units and envisages their employment in "typical" situations, the tactical and logistic aspects of which are closely analyzed. In describing the typical actions of the speciality, due consideration is given to the

The "Lagunari" are characterized by the specificity of their training and recruitment as well as by the outstanding qualities of initiative necessary to face the situations of isolation in which the units may be called to operate.

impacts deriving from the employment of some special means, such as helicopters, motor-rafts, boats, amphibious tracked vehicles.

SCHEMATIC DEPLOYMENT OF THE "LAGUNARI" COMBAT GROUP

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SCHEMATIC DEPLOYMENT OF THE "LAGUNARI" COMBAT GROUP The , "Lagunari" combat group is organized in units for surveillance, conduct of dynamic reactions, defence of positions and, if possible, tor the constitution of a reserve.

DYNAMIC REACTIONS The dynamic reactions, carried out when the enemy is approaching the shore, are aimed at preventing the enemy from completing the landing and from consolidating their position.

DYNAMIC CONTRAST Should the dynamic reactions fail, an action of dynamic contrast is carried out, which aims at checking the expansion of the beachhead and buying time tor the ensuing defence of positions.

PART ONE

The first part outlines the typical features of the "Lagunari" units, as well as their organic and tactical characteristics. Three aspects are especially emphasized: • the suitability to operate as mechanized units, according to the procedures described in Pub. no. 922 of the Doctrinal Series, "Employment of the Mechanized and Armoured Combat Group at Battalion Level " , to which the Report refers as regards the actions carried out on land or, as amphibious units, in actions carried out in a lagoon or coastal environment; • the emphasis placed on the qualities of the fighter, obtained also throug h a specific recruitment and training, as well as on the qualities of initiative of the Commanders, to whom ample decision powers must be

given, especially if the un its have to operate in situations of isolation; • the particular character of the possible deployments of the forces, in relation to the situation and to the features of the natural environmen t. PART TWO

It is the fundamental part of the Report. In contains the chapters devoted to the employment of the amphibious units in specific situations, that is to say the defence of a stretch of shoreline, the amphibious actions of conquest and the amphibious coup de main. In the defence of a coastal stretch, the task consists in ensuring possession of an area of particular interest, in order to prevent or hinder landings from the sea. The forces assume a very wide deployment, formed by several units tasked

DEFENCE OF A COASTAL SECTOR

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DEFENCE OF A COASTAL SECTOR The aim of the defence of positions is to restrain the adversary as a precondition for the conduct of dynamic reactions.

respectively with survei llance, conduct of dynamic reactions, defence of positions and, if the availability of personnel permits it, constitution of a reserve. The duty of the surveillance units, made up by specialized elements drawn from the amphibiolus scout platoon or from t he "Lagunari" platoons, is to avoid surprise, promptly detecting any forewarning sign of an enemy landing . The units entrusted with the · conduct of dynamic reactions, at minor level, are positioned along the stretches more exposed to the risk of landings and intervene

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as soon as the enemy approach the shore, in order to prevent them from completing the land ing and from strengthening their pos ition. If the dynamic reactions do not succeed, the minor complexes charged with these reactions carry out an action of dynamic contrast, in order to check the expansion of the beachhead. funnel the adversary forces towards predisposed positions and gain the time necessary for the units, designated for this task, to occupy the positions that must be defended. The units for t he defence of positions, made up by minor "Lagunari" units, carry out a resistance which aims at restraining the enemy and. if possible, neutralizing their offensive capability, creating the preconditions for a counterattack, carried out by the preconstituted reserve or by units from the next hig her

organizational level. The amphibious actions of conquest are usually carried ou t in support of the main effort conducted by a Major Un it. They are of li mited duration and are developed within narrow space lim its. Their purpose is to acquire in land pos itions occupied by enemy forces, positions which are high ly important for the development of an higher-level defensive or offens ive manoeuvre. These operations entail the conduct of an after-landing action, in order to acquire an objective in depth which, as a ru le, is held by the amphibious troops unti l they are rejoined by the friendly units. An amphibious operation of conquest generally includes: • preparation; • approach from the sea; . • constitution of a beachhead; • movement inland and conquest of the objective;

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CONCENTRATION AREA In the concentration area the units tasked with the amphibious action of conquest are set up and prepared.

â€˘ defence or at least control of the beachhed; â€˘ reunion or handing over of responsibility or retreat and reembarkation. The preparation incl udes all the preliminary and organizational activities carried out by the units in a concentration area, in order to prepare and coordinate personnel and equipment for the subsequent employment. The approach from the sea is the tactical movement from the concentration area to the line of departure of the amphibious attack.

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It starts with the formation of the combat group, which is devided into battalion-level echelons, within which the waves at minor-complex level move. The approach continues with the navigation from the friendly coast to the landing zone. The beachhead is established by means of an amphibious attack, which endeavours to conquer positions at a sufficient distance from the beach, so as to acquire the necessary space for the deployment of the units that are to carry out the following land action . On completion of the amphibious attack, the tactical group proceeds inland in order to conquer its objective. This action is usually carried out following the procedures described in Publication no. 922 " Employment of the Mechanized and Armoured Tactical Group at Battalion Level". The defence of the beachhead is aimed at ensuring a base, for a certain length of time, for the tactical

and logistic supply of the forces pushing towards the objectives in the interior and for permitting the entire tactical unit to reembark once the operation is completed, if the reunion with the friendly forces is not foreseen or impossible to achieve. To this end, the consolidation of the positions attained is effected on the fore margin of the beachhead, establishing a temporary defence of positions and constituting, if possible, a reserve for facing emergencies and developing a wearying and delaying action in front of the structures. The reunion and handing over of responsibility represent the normal conclusion of all amphib ious actions of conquest. If the reun ion is impossible or the entire operation has failed, the combat group makes a retreat, which ends with the embarkation on the landing craft and the return by sea, or with the 51

FORMATION PROCEDURES

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DEFENCE OF THE BEACHHEAD

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FQRMATION PROCEDURES Adopting a formation , the combat group deploys tor navigation , with an organ ization in echelons and waves.

AMPHI BIOUS ACT iON OF CONQU EST The amphibious action of conquest consists in the constitution of a beachhead and in the subsequent land operation.

DEFENCE OF THE BEACH HEAD It is carried out by consolidating and temporaril y defending the positions on · the edge of the beachhead.

transfer to a zone controlled by guerri llas. The amphibious coup de main is a typ ical ly offensive operation essen ti ally based on surprise and marked by boldness. rap idity of execution. limited duration and particular violence. In most cases, it is in tended to: • diminish the adversary's operationa l capabi lities, through the destruction or neutra lization of importan t mi litary ob jectives on the territory occupied or controlled by the enemy; • gather information; • engage the enemy forces, distracting them from ot her tasks; • set t he preconditions for the deve lopment of a subsequent operation of conquest. The pr imary ob jectives of the coups de main are: command posts, su rveillance stations,

depots. miss ile sites. airport installations, active elements of coastal or antia ircraft defence. nava l plants and faci lities, communication centres and positions of high tactical importance . The execution is genera lly entrusted to a lim ited number of f orces. which can vary from teams of special ized men to sizeable units which . nevertheless. are never larger than a "Lagu nari " minor comp lex. In the first instance, the action is carried out by surpri se and in a special istic way; in the second. the action involves combat. in order to reach the preestabl ished aim, and implies a division of the forces into sections, the number of which depends on t he tasks t hey have to accomplish. These sections are made up by one Command team and one or more secu ri ty, assault and support groups.

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of the " Lag unari" and amph ibious battal ions. Th is zone is called tactical group service zone. This part includes also an outline of the characteristics assumed by the log istic organiza ti on in the various situations of its typica l employment (defence of a stretch of coastline. amph ibious actions of conquest. amphi bious coup de ma in) .

PART THREE

CONCLUSION

This pa rt is devoted to t he logistic orga nization of the amph ibious troops, which. in general terms. follows the one ind icated by Publication no. 922 for the mechanized units. The only differences consist in some c haracteristics of the amphibious battalion's logistic organization rega rding the activity of wa te rcraft maintena nce and the deployment in a single area of t he executive organs

The Report represents, in the genera l mosaic of the pu blications related to the va rious specialities of t he Combat Un its, a further element of the 900 Doctrina l Series. As mentioned in the foreword. we purposedly chose not to link the norms strictly to the specific establishment level s, in order to avoid linking t he description of these operations - wh ich assuredly have an ample scope -

to organizational contingent situations wh ich. inevitably, wou ld keep the development of the reasoning process within too narrow limits. The doctrine. in fact, must supply that indispensable broadness of vision. which is at t he foundation of the education of the Cadres. The Cadres and, most of all, the Commande rs at the various leve ls must. in their turn. interpret the genera l d irections and adapt them to t he specific cases , taking from them the suggestions useful for the tra in ing and employmen t of the units under thei r command . Above all, it must be remembered that the description of whatever typical operation. even if essentially mean t for the specia lity most suitable for conducting it, ca n often be deve loped - as numerous historical references confirm by other forces trained for the purpose.

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~ Associazione Nazionale lndustrie Elettrotecniche Ed Elettroniche

To foresee with sufficient accuracy the trends and ways of development of a future conflict is no easy task and this has been confirmed by the repeated tragic fai lures of the past. Shortly before the first world conflict the General Staffs had envisaged a manoeuvred campaign of movement, which in reality took on immediately the characters of a war position, practical ly spent in the trenches, owing to the wide employment of barbed wire entanglements and mach ine guns. The second world confl ict had been foreseen mostly as a war of position, and this point of view was confirmed by the fortified defensive lines that were set up. What developed was a war of movement and manoeuvre, hinged on tanks and airplanes. with rapid excursions into many theatres, from North Africa to the Sarmatian plains and Central Europe. To envisage the features of a future conflict today, even excluding the employment of nuclear weapons. is more difficult sti ll, both because no worldwide conflict has broken out in the last forty years and because of the more and more rapid development of technologies and armaments. Reining in the imagination and taking into consideration the near future, one can reasonably surmise that a conventiona l war wi ll be mostly based on armoured means and aircraft, the latter being represented not on ly by airplanes but also by he licopters. which play an increasingly decisive role due to their flexibility and multiplici ty of employment. It ensues. that the air-land battle wil l lay more stress on the integration of these two components. whose pred ispositions and capability of working together, in the spirit of an open and genuine interservice mentality, appears to be an indispensable condition for attaining pos it ive and concrete resu lts. Therefore the defence (and a poss ible intervention from

Italian -made 25 mm tour-barrel, self-propelled antiaircraft system.

our part could only have this connotation) will have to rely mostly on the effectiveness of an instrument in which the air and land components are perfectly integrated. The air defence systems, incorporated into an organization, which in the present context must perforce be interservice (manned interceptors, long, medium and short range missiles, guns) essentially aim at forestalling the enemy threat in time and space, preventing the occurrence of the offence and extending their protection over the entire area they must.defend. Antiaircraft defence, instead, is aimed at countering the air attacks against the forces in action, which are carried out at very low altitude and marked by surprise and by the highest

speed permitted by the mission. The d?fence is based on very short-range weapon systems and is predisposed and developed within the relevant Service against visually detected enemy aircraft. which have already shown and concretized their offensive attitude. In other words, it tends to hinder and possibly break up the adversary offence, at the moment of its occurrence or after it has already hit the objectives. Within this framework, antiaircraft self-defence has some features in common with antitank defence, such as direct aiming, fire distribution with preselection of the most dangerous objective, prompt action within an extremely short time. Also the four fundamental parameters of antitank defence (density, depth, effectiveness and protection) can be easily adapted to antiaircraft selfdefence. Density has a determinant influence, as the last Arab-

Isra eli conflict (1973) shows . In that war Egypt, precisely thanks to the large availability of antiaircraft weapon systems, unexpectedly achieved air superiority on the Canal and the Sinai bridgehead. Of course this favourable situation is unlikely to recur and be applicable to the operational theatres of a general conflict, also owing to the extremely high costs of antiaircraft weapon systems, even for mere selfdefence. Depth is essentially affected by the high speed of theÂˇ attacking aircraft and by the possilibity to produce the offence at a distance. Consequently the aircraft must be, first of all, promptly detected, acquired and identified by the antiaircraft defence units, which have better possibi lities of distant interventions and, successively, by the self-defence weapons iri the vicinity of the objective. Effectiveness, which is essentially determined by the

Hawk missile. The weapon is propelled by a solid-fuel rocket, and can reach a speed of Mach 3 plus.

technical-ballistic characteristics of the weapon systems, can be improved remarkably with the coupling of short-range antiaircraft missiles with automatic light guns that complement the action of the missiles - which, at short distances, are conditioned by the initial inertia of the guiding systems - and, at the same time, ensure a continuity of reaction also in case of intense electronic jamming. Protection, besides being generally entrusted to electronic countermeasure devices, must rely on the dispersal of the weapon systems (compatible with the density required), on their concealment and on the timely occupation of alternative positions. Today, self-defence at low or very low altitudes is vitally

important for the land units, because not only does it improve the liberty of manoeuvre but represents a significant guarantee of survival. In substance, self-defence differs from antiaircraft defence proper not only in the characteristics and performance of the weapon systems at its disposal, but also - and above all, I should say - in the models of intervention of the systems. The difference between the two actions, antiaircraft defence and self-defence, becomes clear and stands out with greater evidence if one considers to what extent these actions depend upon the NATO IAD Tracking and Control System. In fact the goal must be our integration with the centralized tracking and control system, in order to provide, through coordinated interventions, the necessary security to the friendly aircraft and a better distribution of the objectives among the

weapons in a position to intervene. On the other hand, this integration is not always feasible with the self-defence systems distributed among the units, since their action against direct attacks usua lly appears to be more effective if it is carried out promptly, even if autonomously. The problem of command and control for the weapons of the antiaircraft defence proper has clearly different aspects. Failure to integrate them in IAD can entail their non-authorization to fire, for they could be cut off from the flow of information necessary, among other things, to avoid shooting down friendly aircraft and overkilling . Such substantial differentiation in the employment of antiaircraft defence and self-defence weapon systems requires that they be clearly distiguished, in order to be assigned a correct position in the organization. In fact, the actual antiaircraft defence systems find in

or battalion s for the Army Corps - must be given a good start, entrusted to confident and wel l-trai ned Com manders and Cadres and be establ ished in an environment which, being capable of g uiding and supporting them, considers these units an essential tool in the economy of com bat, on an equa l sta nding with the antitank component. Rinaldo Santini

Launching of an "Aspide" antiaircraft missile.

centralization the most advantageous conditions for joining the IAD tracking and control system, wh ich is a necessary prerequisite for the accomplishment of their task. Centralization is moreover always economi cally convenient in a condition of perman ently lim ited avai labil ity of resources and is also recommended by t he characteristics of the nationa l operat ional area which is divided into two distinctly separated en vironments, one of which, that of the plain , presents the lim ited dimensions of an Army Corps sector. Finally, one must not overlook the possibility to employ, throug h centralization , the existing antiaircraft organization, which assembles expert and specifically trained cadres, rather than distri buti ng complicated and sophisticated systems in an envi ron ment hardly prepa red to receive them and not yet able to use them properly.

As far as self-defence is concerned, it seems possible - and even expedient - to de-cen tralize the weapon systems among the operational units which, in this way, can ensure, also when isolated, the ir own liberty of action and the direct protection of Headquarters, transport and combat eq uipment, logistic formations, etc .. Also peacetime tra ining deserves particular attention. In consideration of theÂˇ envisaged, short -term acquisition of defence and self-defence weapon systems, it is impossible to disrega rd the importance of rebuild ing that widespread and confident antiaircraft outlook which has been dormant for some time. The options in th is field must look at the concrete and rely on what is existing and tested , without wanting to forget the experiences of the past, which saw the antiaircra ft battalions of the artillery regiments consig ned to the lowest place in the scal e of the general consideration. The forthcoming selfdefence antiaircraft units, be they batteries for the Brigades

Major General Rinaldo Santini has anended the 8th Course of the Military Academy, the Application School, the 87 th Course of the War College and the 16th Joint Staffs Course. Gen. Santini has been Commander of the 3rd battalion of the " Ariete" 132nd Armoured Artillery Regi ment; subsequently, he commanded the 132nd Regiment and the "Mameli" 32nd Armoured Brigade. As Genera l Staff Officer, Gen. Santini ha s been o n duty at the Headq uarters of the "Ariete" Armoured Division, the Army General Staff and the VVar Coll ege. He has been Ch ief of Staff o r the "Folgore" Mechan ized Division and of the Ill Army Corps. Since October 1984, Gen. Santini has been Command er of the Army Antiaircraft Arti llery.

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The Pa lazzo Duca le, which houses the Mi litary Academy, dates back to 1634 for the earliest stages of construction . It was built for Duke Francesco I d'Este. according to the plan of the architect Bartolomeo Avanzini and under his supervision, over the foundations of an old cast le bu ilt by Obizzo 11, the Marquis of Ferrara. when he became lord of Modena . Subsequently rebui lt by Obizzo 111 , w ith improved comfort and fortification, the castle served as qua rters for the city govern ors until. with t he "devolu tion" of Ferrara to the Pope in 1598, the d' Este fam ily moved to Modena w hich became the new capita l of the d'Este Duchy . Francesco I undertook the building of the new pa lace, where he in tended to renew the splendour and pomp of the Court of Ferrara, after his predecessors had tried in vain to restore and ext end the old castle. Avanzini's origina l plan was modified to embody a number of suggestions by Bernini, Borromini and Pietro da Cortona and was carried out only in part. Paradoxica lly , the building o f the sumptuous pa lace was only concluded many years after the d' Este dukes left the lands of Modena and had been granted comfortable cond it ions of refuge in the Austria n empire. The construction work actually lasted three centuries, and it was only on the eve of the second world war, in 1939, that t he west wing w hich stopped short to the north o f the roya l staircase, now the Grand Sta ircase of Honour, was completed. During al l this t ime, slack periods resu lti ng from the financial difficulties that

occasiona lly assai led the sma ll Duchy (a nd which led to the unfortunate sale of 100 masterpieces from the ducal art gallery to the Museum of Dresden in 1745) alternated w ith those moments of real artistic magnificence and generous patronage that led to t he completion and en hancement of the bui lding . The most striki ng contributions to th is work were offered by : Francesco 11, who completed construction of the east wing, the facade of t he central tower, and t he f irst floor of t he west w ing; Francesco 11 1, respons ible for t he construction of t he "Sa lottino d'oro" (the Golden draw ing room). wh ich

reflected his taste for wea lth and splendour w it h true refinement, in 1756; and Francesco IV and Francesco V, who completed t he inner gal lery ( 1842). the eastern facade overlook ing the gardens, and the western facade. In 1860 the Palace was confiscated by t he Savoia family; two years later, they handed it over to the State to house the M ilitary School wh ich had been founded in Modena under the auspices of Genera l Manfredo Fanti. The cadets' dining-hall was bui lt in 1862 in the as yet incomplete eastern part of the Pa lace where a wood -shed used to stand at the t ime of the

Left. A cadet tra ining with a 155 mm gun.

Above right. Obizzo /I's old castle. Below right. The tacade of the Ducal Palace (from an 18th century painting/,

Giovanna Battista of Savoia-Nemour.

whether t he building could still be used for the academy courses, with its tottering structure, the building was beg inning to show its age . Moreover, it hard ly matched up to modern criteria of functionality Nevertheless, it was decided to rema in in Modena, and in the same buildi ng, despite al l the obvio us inconvenience inev itab ly caused by holdi ng cou rses and carrying out restoration work at the same time. Work began in September 1975 and is sti ll in progress. The following is what has been done so far: • restoration of t he main entrance on Piazza Roma and the opposite entrance on Piazzetta Cavour, to ensure structu ra I stabi Iity; • bracing along the main crack; • the horizontal and vertical structures have been lig htened and restored to ensu re stability; • modifications in t he restored parts to improve f unctionality, incl uding outstanding improvements in the Montecuccoli barracks, where a num ber of bedrooms with services, providing decent accommodation for about 600 cadets, have been built without altering the architectural featu res of t he outer and inner facades. Dukes. Rig ht of way across the courtyard, which the d'Estes had perm itted by day and the dictator, Farini, by night too, was now rescinded. 1888 saw the construction of the covered passageway connecting the main bui ldi ng with t he former Salesian monastery, now the Montecuccoli barracks; the passageway can sti ll be seen today. During the second world war an air-raid destroyed part of the recently completed west wing, and the Palace suffered further damage and impoverishment as a result of the German m ilitary occupation and sub-

sequently, when evacuated families were lodged in the building. This stately building, with its long, chequered history of construction, had not however reached the end of its struct ural problems. The earthquake that shook the Adriatic seaboard and Ancona in 1972, together with the subsidence affecting all the oldest, heaviest buildings in the town-centre, played havoc with the structure of the Palace, opening a large crack across it from north-west to south-east. This crack and the consequent loss of static equilibrium raised serious doubts as to

HISTORY

When a national army offering a reliable substitute for the mercenary troops t hat had hitherto been entrusted to defend the state's independence from the ma jor European powers came into being, Duke Carlo Emanuele II, the ruler of Piedmont. decided to found an Institute for the professional t raining of the new Army's officers. Thus, in 1669 t he idea of an Academy was conceived; it was to be a study and train ing centre for all t he fu t ure leaders of t he small state of Savoy -

Decree founding the Royal Academy of Turin.

mini sters, ambassadors-, top functionaries and future officers. A few years later work began on a large building to house it. Th e Duke's architect. Amedeo di Castellamonte conceived the plan. The death of Carlo Emanuele did not halt progress. which was in fact encouraged by his widow, Madame Reale Giovan na Battista of Savoia-Nemours, who acted as Regent until her son. Vittorio Amedeo II, came of ag e. On January 1st 1678 the small state of Piedmont, which had developed warlike traditions in the face of the territorial greed of France, Spain and Austria, took the lead over these far more powerful states and. indeed, over the rest of the world, by inaugurating the "Reale Accademia di Savoia". The sta tutes were sen t to all the Courts of Europe, and from them ca me the heirs to noble families, princes and "a motley crew from every corner of the earth, mainly Eng lish, then Russians, Germans, and Italians from the other states", as Alfieri, himself a cadet at the Royal Acad emy between 1758 and 1766, described them . Military training took priority in the institu te's programmes, even though the aim was the preparation of the leaders of the state. Programmes included the study of "military manoeuvres" and train ing in the attack and defence of fortresses. There were even plans to build a fort for this training. It appears that the fort was actually buil t, as an engraving at the Turin Application School shows the " Encampment and Attack on the Fort of the Roya l Academy of Savoy, established in Turin " The date given for the exercise is May 1st 1681, and the engraving clearly shows a fort like a 5-pointed star in pla n, the Headquarters where the "Signori Accademisti" were

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Prim, fcqu<"ntit anni , dies Acadt"rnlz ini rium d,b lt Oifccn t Ac~dcmi ci Do ml1urz EqucAd s Ar· ltm J difcent ,n(uper ad Annulum, a.rq; in '1.aufium Pugil cm dccurrerc , & ccrt<'r~ 1d gen us lufci lud i J: prztcrca, & numcro(e fa lure,& ludirtt.s cnf.bu1 d,miorc, 6c in cquo lignco tn gyrum urcum.1gi ex 111c: ad hrc iri Muhc rn1dds . in Graphidos fc 1cnti~, In re, Bell ,cz pafKfrr, c rcrcc bun1ur. A19 : vr (ac il iUs pct ci'p,~l'lt, v(u ipfo doccntc, qu.1 rHionc oppugnJri , dcfendiq; debea nt Ate('S 1 1(1 uptio fic t in Ci flrum,quod in hunc vfom crigetur, c-iufqodc(cnfio . HI.Jc >e ce.d<l Hiflo, ,~, ChronoJogiz, Gco• guphiz Oudium, Scurati~ tcf'ft-rz puir1a ,& Lioguu um , lulica-prz fc-rrim, & c~m,~ . qur T.aur fn, 1Um Au licis ,cU{Tl Ciu ibus fam iliarn'limr (unt. Hu um omnium Difc ipHoa,um Magi(l,i tx opcimis (, n, dd , a i (un< , lj fcili«t , i q u ibus R,g ia ip (~ Celf,1ud o d,b,1 inOitui , Oux quippe in c adcm Andcmia, qua, proindc in vno <X Rcgalibus Pa loujs tnllituerur. ft fc cum err er is uc:rcc-bic. Moder.nor Audcmtz , q ui vir crit p roculdub io m 1gni ncminis ,&'. :aullorit~t is I t~igcr i lingulis AcJ.. dcmicis, qui vnfcum r> mulum ha bucrint . annuu Hi(pan1cnfcs ('en tum Duplu rprz tcr quJs d cccm f,lt)d qui (quc in ipfo ingrd~u nurncr, b it. H oe prcrio finguli h a bi ratio nem, & ,Ii men u habcbun!, Omne(qu,, quotquot fupr, num,r,ra, (unt, fac ulw,s, & JTl <S addifre n!. ~od (, aliqu is Moderalorcm forte fuum, auc m,iorcm (cruorum numcrum (cctJm habcrcr ,illi , hib1~i rJtionc p tioru Cum• m.r,~ugcbitur pcnfio. Taurini, . Srpumbcfs l f>J1·

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encamped , the platform from which Their Royal Highnesses were to view the exercise, and the tent of the Marquls of Sa n Germano, Grand Equerry of Savoy and Su perintendent of the Academy. The first officers turned out by the institute had their baptism of fire in the battle of Turin, in 1706, with victory over the Frenc h army. As the French retreated, Prince Eugenio's march was played; th is piece of music subseq uently became the Roya l Academy' s official march . The first reorgan ization of the institute to improve the training of officers was undertaken by King Vittor io Amedeo II in 1729. Subsequently, in 1756,

cadets received a training course geared exclusively to their requirements. while theologists and top functionaries had their own classes with more suitable instru ct ions. In 1798 the Fren ch, who had occupied the state of Savoy, suppressed the Royal Academy. 120 yea rs had passed since the founding of the Academy and. despite the generally negative outcome of the clash between the Sardinian Army and Napoleon's troops, the officers of the Piedmontese army trained there had earned the merit of being the only army of the Italian States to defend the fronti ers against the French for four long years, thus outdoing 65

ICERE ET DISIICERE - EXTR UERE ET OfRUERE

Above. Crest of the Engineer and Artillery Academy of Turin. Right.

General Manfredo Fanti on a commemorative medal (by the sculptor Romano Pelloni tor Alberto Lodi of Carpi}.

some much larger European armies. The eclipse of this training school , the first of its kind in Europe and forerunner of today's Military Academy, did not last long. Immediately after the Restoration, with the decree of November 2nd 1815, Vittorio Ema nuele gave his sanction to the founding of the "Regia Militare Accademia". Castellamonte's splendid building, which had housed the Royal Academy of Savoy for over a century, was again used for these activities. There were two big innovations in the Piedmontese institute: firstly, it was dedicated entirely to training army officers and so had a more peculiarly military nature, as the name suggested; and secondly, subject to the King's approval, citizens of lower social origins could attend its courses.

The number of cadets was fixed at 200, 75 being "a lun ni" whose expenses were borne by the路 state and 16 "Paggi d'Onore del Re", who received grants from the Royal Household. The length and type of training varied according to the service chosen: adm ission was from the age of 9 to 12, and after 8 years the Infantry and Cavalry cadets were commissioned as 2nd lieutenants. Courses were a year longer for cadets of the General Staff, Artillery and Engineer Corps, who were commissioned as lieutenants. Throughout the period leading up to the campaigns for the unification of Italy, the battle-hardened Sardinian Army with its 5 divisions and approximately 70,000 men benefited from the large numbers of officers trained in that old building overlooking what is now Piazza Castello, in Via della Zecca. Here fluttered the first tricolour Flag which Carlo Alberto granted the institute in 1849 to rep lace the flag with a white cross on a red background which he路 had given the school on August 13th 1840. The regulations underwent many changes in a relatively

brief period of time (1815-1860). all aimed at raising the age of admission so that cadets entered with sounder education and greater maturity. The minimum age was first raised to 14, with 5 years' training for Infantry and Cavalry and 6 for the other Arms, and then, in 1857, to 16, and on condition that cadets had already received the " licenza di retorica". Courses were reduced to three years for cadets intendi ng to enter the line Infantry and four years for those preparing for "Special Corps" . The process of national unification, which had developed great impetus after the 1859 Campaign, accompanied by plebiscites and admissions, led to the growth of the Sardinian Army and this in turn was reflected in the activities of the Regia Accademia Militare which could no longer meet the demand for officers. As early as 1859 it was decided to institute 路a supplementary course at the Military School of Infantry in lvrea, but this proved insufficient and just one year later, on March 13th 1860, 路 General Manfredo Fanti, the War Minister, presented for royal approval a decree instituting

The Crest of the Infantry and Ca valry Academy of Modena and the Decree founding the "Scuola Militare d i FanteriaH (1860).

three separate courses· for the training of officers for tlie Infantry, Cavalry and Sp~cial Corps (Genera l Staff, Artillery and Engineers). . Infantry officers were still recru ited through a Course "Supplementary to the Regia Militare Accademia" established at the Military School for Infantry in lvrea. The min imum age for candidates was fixed at 19 (Royal Decree of March 13th 1860). "At the Military School for Cavalry in the city of Pinerolo a course has been instituted to supplement the Military Academy. It sha ll prov ide the young men with the nec_essary training to become 2nd lieutenants in the Cavalry ... " (Section 2 of the Royal Decree) . "At the Reg ia Militare Acca demia admission shall no longer be granted to ca ndidates for t he position of 2nd lieutenant in the Infantry and Cavalry, whi le a new course shall be instituted for the training of young men to become officers in the Royal Artillery and Engineer Corps ... " (Section 3 of the R.D. of March 13th 1860). However, this was a period of great upheava ls. the institutions were evolving and the territory expanding , and supplementary courses to tra in officers could not be restricted to Piedm ont alone. Thus the War Minister. General Fanti, the 180th anniversary of whose birth his hometown, Carpi, has recently celebra ted, decided to found a Milita ry School in Modena. At first supplementary courses for Infantry officers, like those held in lvrea, were provided, subsequent ly being extended to cover the same range as the courses at Pinerolo. By 1865 it was the only institute for the recruitment and tra ining of Infantry and Cavalry officers for the Royal Italian Army . The choice of Modena did not depend on chance or provincial loyalty (Carpi, Fanti's

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hometown. lies a few kilometres away from the capital of Emilia); it was determined by geographical criteria - not on ly Pied mont but the whole of Italy was to· contribute to the growth of national institu tions like the army - but above all in recognition of the town's patriotic traditions. as it already had a renowned University and Institutes for mil itary studies. In fact, the city's "Accademia M ilitare degli Estensi o conferenza di Architettura Milita re" dates ba ck to the Duke Fran cesco Ill in 1757. Here trai ning courses were held for the officers for a sma ll army (at its height it had 5 regiments: "Regg io", "Modena" , "Mi randola", "Frignano" and " Garfagnana") that w as, however. efficient. disciplined and devoted to its sovereigns; in fact, the "Rea le Ducale Brigata Est ense", with litt le more than 3,600 men. followed solid ly behind t he sovereign of Modena , Francesco V. out of sheer devotion, when he left the city for Austria's more hospitable embrace, leaving family and property behind in his Duchy. Havi ng ascertained the validity of the training it offered.

Napoleon Bonaparte had no hesitation in maintaining the sch ool, changing its name to "Military School for Artillery and Engineers". After the Restoration, Francesco IV refounded the "Accademia Nobile Militare Estense" in 1821. Like the previous ones. it was not at first housed in the Duke's Pala ce but in a noble palace and then a barracks adjoining St. Peter's church which is now the "Fanti" barracks and recruiting office. In 1852 Francesco V changed it into the "Accademia Militare Estense", granting admission to untitl ed you ng men; a few years later, together with all t he ducal institutions, the school was suppressed. However, Modena was not long without a milita ry school as. in Septem ber of the same year, General Fanti, Commander of the Military League of Central Italy, founded the city's "Scuola di Fanteria" to recru it officers for the league under t he com mand of Colonel Ruffini. Following on the inclusion of the central Italian provinces in the Kingdom of Sard inia, the school became t he "Scuola Militare di Fanteria" 67

(May 9th 1860), and had the initial task of supporting the activities of Turin's Regia Accademia Militare with supplementary courses similar to those held in lvrea. As we have seen, however, it took only a few years for the activities previously performed at lvrea and Pinerolo to be concentrated in Modena. Th is was due to the need to have one single training source to standardize the courses and overcome differences in mentality and techn ical jargon. Thus by the end of the Risorgimento upheavals a pattern emerged that was to remain until t he end of the second world war: Infantry and Cavalry officers were recruited in Modena, Artillery and Eng ineers in Turin. The two academies, in other words the "R~ia Accademia Militare" and the "Scuola Militare di Fanteria eÂˇ Cavalleria", went their own separate ways for nearly 80 years. Regulations underwent many changes as the years went by, with the constant aim of adjusting the Institutes to changing times and conditions. Thus, with the introduction of the minimum age of 17, written and oral entrance exams, and as studies were brought into line with the equivalent studies in university faculties while at the same time acquiring more specifically military features with the creation of Application Schools, the military schools gradual ly evolved, in their separate quarters, towards their present form. The need for a greater number of officers as Italy became involved in conflicts in Africa and Europe in the twentieth century was brilliantly met by the two schools. Normal courses were suspended and crash courses recruited hosts of young officers into the mobilized regiments. At the end of the first world war special courses wer.e organized to complete the training of officers who had received the rudiments of technical and professiona l training . 68

It was only in 1923 that the two institutes began regular activities once again. In that year the Modena school was promoted to "Accademia Militare di Fanteria e Cavalleria"; consequently, the Turin academy had to specify in its title, "Accademia Militare di Artiglieria e Genio", the Services for which it trained its officers. Both institutes had their own Fl ags: Turin exchanged the flag it had received from Carlo Alberto in 1849 for the new Flag adopted by the Italian Army in 1860. The substitution took place on April 1st 1894, and the old flag of the Risorgimento

Decree granting the heraldic crest to the "Accademia di Fanteria e Caval/eria" (1928).

period, which was originally kept in the Turin Artillery Museum, is now in the Historical Museum of the Academy of Modena, together with that of the Scuola Militare di Fanteria e Cavalleria, offered by the "Dame modenesi" on March 14th 1891 and given to the Commander during the swearing - in ceremony. There is an important innovation in the Modena Academy that dates back to 1936: it was, in fact, decided in that year that the recruitment

VN AAC1 E 5

Above.

Crest of the Military Academy. Left.

Consignment of the Flag to the "Scuofa Militare di Fanteria e Cavalferia" (1891 ).

and training of officers for the Royal Carabinieri were to take place here. Thus a company of cadet Carabinieri was formed and began activity in the school the following year. Today, 50 years later, we can see how valid this initiative involving the first of our armed forces was to prove. Demand for junior officers rose steeply during World War II; consequently the length of the Academy's courses was reduced and training became less theoretical and more practica l. During this period up to three courses were often running at the same time. The events subsequent to September 8th 1943 led to both Academies being dissolved.

The Flag of the 26th Infantry Regiment "Bergamo", temporarily substituting those of the two Academies, waved in greeting to the refounded "Comando Speciale Regie Accademie" on May 24th 1944. For two months this Command had combined the Âˇ two companies of secondyear cadets of the Modena and Turin academies. who had moved to the free territory after the institutes had been disolved, in the "Tenente Pico" barracks in Lecce. On December 1st 1945 the Command acquired the name of "Regia Accademia Militare" and began the first "extraordinary combat course", thus becoming the first source for the recruitment of professional army officers in active

service since the unification of Italy. Following on the institutional changes that came about with the new Republic. on June 19th 1946 the Academy was given its present name of "Accademia Militare" and in the following year, on February 2nd 1947, had back its old flag from the officers who had cut it up on September 8th 1943, each carrying a piece to safety. The end of 1947 was marked by other decisive developments in the history of the institute. In that year, on October 15th. the Academy returned to the Palazzo Ducale in Modena were work was still going on to repa ir war damage. On November 4th a new Flag was given to the cadets. and it was this flag that hailed President Enrico De Nicola when he inaugurated the new quarters arid courses of the reunited Academy with a simple, austere ceremony. On 30th May 1950 a Presidential Decree granted it a new crest representing the 69

traditions of the Modena ·and Turin schools, neatly combined and united under the motto "Una acies".

THE ACADEMY TODAY During the last few months about 300 cadets of the 166th course, "Dignita", have left the school with the rank of 2nd lieutenant to continue train ing at the various Application Schools. How did they get here, and what was their life like during these two years spent in Modena? Above all, what are t he aims of this institu te which, as we have seen, dates back 300 years? The Military Academy recruits and trains the regu lar officers in the Army Branches (Carabinieri, Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers, Signal Corps) and some logistic Corps (Motor, Finance, Commissariat). Recruitment takes place among men of 17 to 22 with secondary school certificates. Entrance to the Military Academy is granted to those passing the admission tests: • medical examination and psychological aptitude tests held in Modena with the assistance of Bologna Military Hospital; • written general education test, consisting of a composition on a subject chosen from th ree titles; the test is held at the Commands of the Military Regions; • a 40-day trial period, during which candidates can see what li fe in the Academy is like and decide whether it is for them. During this period their aptitude for the kind of life they will have to face is ascertained, and they are prepared for the last test; • an oral mathematics test covering algebra, geometry and trigonometry. Those passing all the tests and coming within the placings corresponding to the number of vacancies have the right to attend the Academy and enrol! in the various courses for which

they can make personal application. The number of places available is established each year by the Defence Ministry according to t he staff req ui rements of the Army. With slight variations depending on the circumstances, it has settled around 300 cadets per course: 50 in the Carabinieri, 200 in t he Service Arms and 50 in the Logistic Corps. One of the latest entrance tests saw about 4,300 candidates competing for 265 places - a ratio of about 16 to 1. For an average 100 candidates, selection can be summed up as follows: • 40 fa il t he medical and psychological aptitude tests; • 30 fail the general education test; • 23 withdraw or are found unsuitable during t he trial period, or fail the mathematics test; • of the seven accepted, an average of two do not complete the course (failure in tests, resignation, health reasons) and at the end of the two years only 5 reach the rank of 2nd lieutenant. The targets assigned to the Military Academy by the Army General Staff for the training of professional officers are achieved by means of a comprehensive programme covering four basic areas corresponding to the educational and technical qualities expected of future army officers: character building, tech n ica 1-professiona I training, improvement of general educational standards, sports and physical training . Character building is fundamental · to a wide-ranging course training young men for positions of command; it represents a real need, and serves to help create a spirit of initiative, a sense of responsibility and solidarity, selfrespect and consideration for others, and t he capacity to set an example at all times. Training activities also include the technical-professional education of cadets. Apart from the more strictly military subjects (mi lita ry science, weapon train-

in g, bal listics, map-reading, regulations). this also includes such practical activities as dril l practice, range practice with individual or platoon weapons, combat training, artillery, engineering and signals, training to drive motor-cycles and other vehicles includi ng tan ks, mountain -climb ing, parachutejumping and tra in ing in patrol duties. Most of this trai ning is carried out during a three-month tactical campaign after t he exams at the end of the first year at the Military Schools for Mountain Warfare, Parachute Jumping, In fantry, Artillery and Armou r. This period of intensive t rain ing ends with a study-trip, usually to units and places along the eastern border. At the end of the second year, in addition to the summer camp which lasts a month and is held at a miiltary firing-range, there is also a study-trip abroad; in recent years cadets have been to Munich and Paris. Further education takes place within the context of the previously described activities, and is based on university-level programmes covering two areas: • juridical-administrative, following some of the basic degree courses in law, politics and social sciences, economics and commerce; • scientific, including the twoyear preliminary period in engineering and mathematics and computer systems. Study syllabuses and organization are similar to those in university faculties in both content and duration. Lessons are given by university professors. Univers ity level courses end with the final exams, usually held in June. The Academy attaches f undamenta l importance to trai ning in sports and gymnastics, which are considered essential for t he psychological and physical well-being of cadets and t he character development of the f uture officer. For this reason the school offers many sporting activities based on gymnastics; the various athletic

activities also inclu de field events. The physical education programme includes gymnastics, self-defence. fencing, ten nis, basket-ball, volley-ball and marksmansh ip.

THE ACADEMY TOMORROW An institution that wants to move with the times cannot rest on its la ure ls; it is in fact obliged to look to the future to ex ploit all the cha nces progress offers to improve organization and training. The scope for our activities is ccnstantly increasing , with excellent opportun iti es for fu rther devel opment, up-dating and automat ion; this in turn implies more economica l use of men and means, and eventually a better product - i.e. the young officer himself. In terms of manage ment, the introduction of ADP has been a real step forward; withcut a battery of computers, we wou ld not be able to ha ndle all the data, app lications and communications involved in testing 4,000 cand idates. The system s have proved equally useful to keep track of the schclastic progress of individual cadets, phasing of progra mm es and control of the health and financial situation - in short, for every aspect of the life of cadets in the sc hool. Much has already been done in this field, and there appears to be practically no limit to future developments. It would, for example, be possible to streamline the mechanism for entrance tests. which has remain ed basica lly the sa me since the end of the war and is now somewhat old -fashioned and laborious. The medical examination and trial period must obviously be retained; they represent a

Above right. Parachute ;umping at Pisa's " Scuola Militare di Paracadulismo". Below right. Cadets during combat training.

direct confrontation between Does the Army really need ind ividual asp irations and the officers with degrees in sub jects institute's very high standards. equipping them for civilian life? The other tests, however (written Whi le Italy seems to be and oral exams. psychologica l producing a surplus of such aptitude tests). which now take graduates, the introd uction of up months of the candidates' civilian subjects into the and Academy's time and Academy's programmes implies resources, could very wel l be dropping some of the more replaced with a test more closely specifical ly military subjects, since the scholastic year cannot geared to the school's requ irebe expanded an infinitum. ments, with the emphas is on both educationa l standards Those who have an idea of and creative and express ive what the finished product, the capacities, and qual ities of · officer emerging from al l this character and aptitude; the traini ng, should be like, can present methods for ascerta ining certain ly appreciate this need , all this are very laborious. The as many have demonstrated in University of Commerce "Luigi the last few years . However, Bocconi", has adopted a rational many may wonder whether too selection system for its much emphasis has been placed candidates along these lines, on the officer-manager rather and the Academy might wel l try than the officer-commander. someth ing of the sort. providing basic training for managers when it might have Improved communications between the mi litary and civil ian been more usefu l to concentrate first on producing good comspheres could thus offer manders and leav ing the sort interesting examp les to those capable of benefiting from direct of profess ional training that equ ips people for civilian life contact. to a later date. The dema nd for higher The time is now ripe to · professiona l standards among redefine out finished product young officers prompts further as one with distinct professional reflection on the training qualities, already equipped with techniques the Academy might new ideas and vita lity when he consider adopting in the future. joins the unit and not wa iting Anyone thumbing through to be moulded by his experience the Academy syllabus wi ll rea lize in the un its as if the institute's what an important role genera l training had counted for nothing. further education has played in Our programmes and enhancing technical-professional activities must be geared to this train ing. new figure without discarding We can, for example, now the subjects, cou·rses and boast that, at the end of four tra ining that may still prove years in the Academy and va lid, but without getting carried Application Schools, students of away by the idea that degrees the computer science course must be obtained at all costs. need only take two exams at We must find time and the state un iversity and write space in our study plans to a thesis to qualify as graduates enhance mi litary instruction; the in mathematics and computer sort of instruction received by science. a generation of officers tra ined It may not occur to many in the 50's and 60's who have to consider the cost of provid ing never reg retted the lack of a officers with qua lifications which degree and feel no less fulfilled are more useful in civi lian life and useful than today's trainees are likely to. than in the army career, or wonder just how many officers Our subject in these congraduate and how many tend cluding remarks is the Military to neglect the institute's study Academy of tomorrow. But courses once the are caught up often, instead of dreaming of in their life in the un it. the revolutionary impact of

computer science, cybernetics, bio-engineering and ... star wars, one tends to th ink of the various little innovations and acceptab le changes affecting today's Academy; we know that the Army's future lies in the Academy today, and that this continuity is absolutely guaranteed. Fully respecting the timehonoured trad itions it rests on, but ready to receive whatever valid novelties the winds of change and progress bring without constra int, the Academy confidently looks to the future of its cadets. The Academy will respond to the requirements of the Army in the future, and in the near future the Army will be what the Academy has, through sound organization an d efficiency, succeeded in making of it. Giovanni Brugnola

Brigad ier Genera l Giovann i Brugno la attended th e 10th Course at the Mi li tary Academy. the 88th Course of the Genera l Staff and the InterService Sta ff I nstitute . He has served as Genera l Staff Officer , with the "Centa uro" tan k Division. the Milit.iry ,Academy and w ith 11 1 Army Cor ps Headquarters. He has been Deputy Commander o f the "Gorizia" Brigade and Co mmander of the "Ga ito" Brigade. He has been Commander o f the Mi litary Academy since November 1984.

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MILITARY REPORT

ETERNAL TRIANGLE '86 THE TRAINING Of THE ALLIED TANK CREWS The Âˇ annual exercise at division level carried out in Germany by th e British Ar my of the Rhine (BAOR) involves, in turn, one of the tour Ma jor Units attached lo th e combat unit of BAOR, th e First Army Cor ps: i.e. the three armoured Div isions (1st. 3rd and 4th) stationed in the Federal Rep ublic o f Germany and th e 2nd Infantry Divis ion stationed in the United Kingdom. Th e Britis h Ma jor Un it. within NATO. is subordinate to the Nor thern Army Group (NORTHAG) and is charged with the defe nce of the northern area of th e "Fulda GapÂˇÂˇ i.e. the area be tween Kassel and Hannover. The Southern flank is cove red by the I Belgi an Corps, whi le the First German Corps is deployed on th e North, followed by th e Du tch Corps . Further to the north is one Bri gade of the 2nd US advanced Division as we ll as Germ an and Danish troops wh ich do not belong to NORTH AG. Nor mally, Allied units of va r ious size, com ing from some of the mentioned M ajor Units, jo in the British troops for the exerci se. " Eternal Tri angle" is the name usually g iven to the exercise of the 1st Armou red Division. The last was carried out in 1983: most of the Divis ion's units in 1984 had per fo rm ed o rg aniza tion and umpire funct ions in " Li onheart", the most im portant exercise carri ed out by the British forces after t he war. The manoeu vres of 1986 have taken place in Lower Saxony, between Kasse l (to the sou theast) and Padeborn (to the northwest) with the participation of the fo llowing fo rces: the British 22nd Ar moured Brigade, 19th Infantry Brigade and 6th Airborn e Brigade, the fi rst rei nforced by a company o f the 43rd Dutch Tank Ba tt alion, th e second by the 1st Battalion of the Danish Life Reg iment; the Blue deployment was comple ted by the German 3rd Panzer Brigade. The Orange side cou ld rely on: two reg iments o f "Challen ger" tanks, th e Royal Hussars and the 2nd Royal Tan k Regiment, an in fantry Ba tt ali on, one reconna issance Company, plus suppor ts of artillery , engineers and services. A ll th ese troops have moved with d ue caution on c ivilian te rrito ry with their tr acked and wheeled vehicl es, transpo rt and combat helicopte rs , so as to p revent the fi nal repayme nt of damages from becom ing too hi gh, besides trying not to inco nvenience the inhabitants o f the area too much. The exercise prope r lasted one wee k and was preceded by a week of training at Brigade level, also on civ ilian terrain

The training was hinde red in part by ra in. wh ich made mo re d ifficult tor the heavy veh ic les to move on farm land. The rel ax ed c lima te at the end of the week has permi tted to gather in forma tion about the tra ining of the staff of the tank units employed an d to compare th e var ious levels of training, obviously taking into account the var io us types of enlistmen t. different from nation to nation. The Bri tish Ar my of the Rhine. based on voluntee rs. is considered one of the best t rained, owing also to the recen t part icipation of many of its men to real oper ation s d uring th e Falkland -Malvinas campaign and. in addition to this. to the periods of service in Northern Irela nd. Even thoug h these missions do not represent the same type o f action requ ired of the soldiers successively employed in centra l Europe, they are nevertheless the bap tism of fire for many of them. Th is is the avera ge trai ning curriculum of a British tank crew member, in the words of an offi cer of th e Roy al Hussars. a unit wh ich rece ived the new "Challenger" tanks between 1983 an d 7984 and is now receiving th e th ermal observatio n and gunnery system (TOGS) . First of all il must be m ad e clear th at the personnel, even it it is made up of vo lunteers . undergoes a constant rotation. due to various reasons, such as specialization courses, s hifts, etc . When the recru it arrives at the unit. he has alread y attended a basic co urse in which he has been trained as drive r or gunner and, in consequence. the regiment' s fi rst task is tha t of trai ning him in the other speciality, so as to be able to employ him in both jobs: this course. w hich lasts six weeks. is usually co mpleted within the fi rst six months from the re cruit's ar rival at the un it. Af ter a yea r of service in th is position, the soldier attends a course that lasts fro m 10 to 12 weeks at th e Boving ton Train ing Centre. at the end o f wh ich he becomes a special ist and assistant instructor as driver, gunner or rad io opera tor. With the ne xt step, after another approx ima te fo ur years of service, he qualities as instr uctor. after a cou rse of 10-12 weeks at Bovi ngton. A ltogether, the tr aining lasts about five years and on its comple tion the soldier can be employed as instructor at th e Boving ton Centre or at the regiment i tself. Th e regiment's tra ining cyc le starts usually aft er Ch ri s tmas. when the crews are set up and the new recruits are

introduced tor training; th is phase las ts until the beginning of spring and is fo llowed by the tra inng at pla toon level in the training area of Soltau and by a live tire training cam p at regimen t level, that lasts from 10 to 15 days, generally at th e Bergen-Hahne shooting range. near Falling bostel, where t he reg iment is stati o ned. In June-J uly the men re turn to So ltau fo r company -level tra ining and. at the end . regiment tra in ing, thus developing a prog ressive process. Finally in au tum n there is the Brigade and Division training wh ich takes pla ce on civilian land; th is ty pe of trai n ing has been defined by the British o ffi cers as "extremely im port an t'-', in that it per mi ts to tra in on unknown ground, and learn to exploit the rea l environment: the training areas in f ac t are only suit able for lower -level d rills, which do not permit to acquire exper ience in co mplex manoeuvres such as those car ried ou t on c ivilian land. The BAOR is making giant steps forward in the simulation fi eld: the object ive is to have a laser s imulato r on every tank. in order to make the exercises at every level increasing ly neare r to the tru th. and especiall y to improve tactics; furt hermore, it is hoped tha t in due tim e also the All ied ta nk units w ill receive compatible sys tems. This simulation is nevertheless considered only co mplementary to the fire activity: in this re gard a British crewm an during th e basi c course fires about 40 roun ds, a mixture of AP and HE shells, mostly blank The yea rly regimen tal training env isages approxima tely 70 rounds, wh ich can r ise to 90-11 O if the unit is sent to the Suffield (Canada) training area Th e exerc ises in th is h uge area of North America, which permits tire missions against moving hargets at a d istance of some tens of ki lometers. ta ke plac e, for every reg iment, every two o r three years. according to the avail ability and necessities of the units: every cycle in Canada is p reced ed by a period at the Br igade & Battle Group Trainer of Sennelager. a simulatio n system crea ted tor perfect ing p rocedures more than tac tics. also empl oy ed for permitting the var ious units to acquire th e necessary automatism in the applica tion of procedures when th ey return to thei r usual tasks afte r a period in North ern Ireland. Th e Danish crewmen are at an intermediate level between volun tary service and draft: their recruitment system is being ch anged just in th is period. In fact, up to now the tank

MILITARY REPORT

The British Tank "Challenger".

crews were made up exclusively of p rofessionals. In the future. in Zealand at least, the crewmen will be recruited for a th ree-yea rs term and follow a new training sequence. This will permit to have a higher number of really operational tanks, with capable crews. since the Danish Army has declared that it cannot operate at an accep table level with tank units whose drafted personnel serves only a 12 months term (the length of military service in Denmark). Therefore, for the futu re crews the first 12 months wil l be considered as reg ular draft service, while fo r the further 24 months t hey will be paid th e wage of a p rofessi onal soldier of equal rank, currently in service. It must also be pointed out that the professional NCOs. up to the rank of WO3, starting from the 33rd month of service accumulate one week per month. which they can use for personal education outside th e organization. During the period in which they are away fro m the unit their position is considered as fill ed: consequently a commander very rare ly can avail himself of all his men. The new course has not been precisely defined yet. Until now the tanker recruit has rece ived a basic instruction of five months before being sent to the unit where the merely technical instruc_t1on received as driver, gunner or radio operator is supplemented with the_ tactical part of the teach ing. The training has been carried out

p revailingly at the operational unit. A Danish gunner fi res 25 rounds durir.g the basic course. while during the remainder of his service th e average varies from 25 to 35 rounds per year in tactical situations varying from fixed position to s imulation of a platoon fire action. This type of trai ning is normally carried ou t at the Oksbel fi ring range, on the western coast of Jutland. No Danish unit ca rries out live-fire exercrses in German shooting ranges. The Dutch army fo llows a model of recruitmen t much similar to the Italian one, with 80% of the tank units' personnel made up o f d raftees The compulsory Service lasts 14 month s for the soldiers and 16 months for reserve officers and NCOs A tan k p latoon is cons titu ted by one professional soldier (the corn mander), one reserve officer. two rese rve NCOs and twelve privates. Th e draftee tanker's c urriculum envisages a four-month basic co urse at Ame rsfoort Training Centre: there the re cru it specializes in his role as a driver or gunner. takes part in a live-fi re cam p in the Vlieland region. an island in the north of th e co untry, during which each crew fi res fro m 15 to 20 rounds. Moreover at the Centre there are devices for the simulation of loading and other various operations which a crew member must perform in combat. In the remaining te n months the men complete their train ing. Fourteen months are considered by the Dutch army the minimum indispensable for trai ning a crew member The tacti cal training is carried out mostlv in trai n ing areas. The personnel of the 43rd tank

battalion, with whom we have spoken, are the luckiest, since th e unit is stationed very close to the best-equipped ta nk shooting range in continental Europe: the already mentioned ra nge of Bergen -Hohne. As a rule. the unit is called to part icipate in the exercises on civi lian land planned by the various Allied armies, while every five years there is an exerc ise of the I Dutch Corps (the last was in 1983). Also th e Dutch officers have confirmed the necessity and validity of th is tra ining, wh ich enables the men to verify their preparation in very real istic conditions. During the ten months spent w ith the unit, each crew. besides refin ing its tactical capabilities. takes part in numerous firing exercises. during which it fi res 70 rounds, which brings the tot al to 90 rounds in the course of the entire service. Moreover the crews tra in at the battalion with a fire simulator linked to a compu ter and they can also employ television cameras installed o n the ta nks for controlling the accuracy of the fi re s imulated during th e blank s hoot ing. Field tactica l simulators are not available ye t : the various sys tem on the market are being evaluated and the units are looking forward to acquiring them. Availability of training areas and shooting ranges at home and near th eir stations, possibility to carry out wide-range manoeuvres on open ground in the FRG, availability of advanced simulation systems: these are the ingredien ts that enable the British. Danish and Dutch tank units to attain their trai ning standard. Paolo Valpolini

BOOK

REVIEWS

"SICUREZZA E DIFESA,, (ÂŤ Security and Defense Âť

Internal and International Factors)

Franco Angeli Ed., 1986, 325 pages, 30,000 lire

PRESENTATION BY CARLO JEAN

This book takes on the issue of the re lationship between security and defense, a re lationship which in Italy - unlike the rest of the West, including the neutral countries - has yet to find an established spot on the national agenda of cultural and political concerns. Over the last decade, it is true, an arduous effort has succeeded in creating a certain amount of space for a political approach to issues of security, defence and military institutions; what is more, this has been accomplished within a specifically Italian con text as opposed to the more generic Western or Atlantic framework. The authors of the book under rev iew have themselves contributed to the creation of this space, both w ith the p resent volume and with "II Pensiero Strategico" ("Strategic Thinking") , the work which preceded it in the Ange lilSIG series. The renewed interest in security, dG!ense and the armed forces has not, however, had a signi fi cant impact on the traditional o utlooks and languages of politics. facto rs which often fall prey to the arbitrary effect of approachs and designs developed in o ther fields and then fragmented into a number of isolated sectors, supposedly, in some cases, for the sake of the technical autonomy of each area. T he truth is that a national investigation into the issues of security and defence can only be developed on the basis of an all-encompassing set of t ies be tween internal and international political facto rs, between problems of national security and reforms involving both institutional bodies and the civil service, between plannnig efforts aimed at scientific research and technology and policies governing industrial activity, international cooperation and development. foreign trade, etc.. Indeed, only through this set of ties can the country's national interests be de-

termi ned, leading to the development of a national agenda able to define Italy's international ro le as well as her policies of secu rity and defense. If Italian security policy can be said to ha,ve shown any one dominant factor in the period following the Second World War, it is the constant attention paid to the conserva tion ol domestic political equi li briums at the expense of a po tential global ro le for the country, a ro le in which Italy would become a rea l participant in the world of intern ational politics. At question is a vision of Italy as a sovereign state w ith, nonetheless. deeply-rooted ties to an alliance in which structural questions have assumed a greater importance than on pas t occasions, not only from a military point of view, but also in an economic, social and cultural context. It is no coincidence that the principal threat to national security has been perceived as the risk of internal unrest. while the country's position as a member of NATO and, more specifically, as an ally of the United States. has been considered a fundamental choice, almost as if it represented part of a de facto constitutional order, on a par with the Concordate between the state and the Catholic Church. Once made, this choice has been seen as providing a definitive solution to the country's problems in the area of national Âˇ security and defense, a development made possible by the fact that these problems have been brough t under the umbrella of the All iance's co llective security and defense systems. But national sovereignity is a condition which can neither be refused nor negotiated, at least not until such time as a set of truly representative, extra-national bodies are established (assuming, bu t certainly not conceding, that such a development is possible) whose various members are tied by

relationships of fundamenta l equality. In the event. the problem inevitably rises to the surface. especial ly in c ri sis situations, demanding that the country's leaders respond by defining the appropriate. ro les and policies. This response is particularly important in a national con text, where its absence could result in an erosion of consensus as well as a fall in the effective legitimacy of political institutions and structures, not to mention the defense and security systems themselves, both on the national and the collective levels On more than one occasion it has been brought to the attention of our country - and, at times, by our own allies - tha t our choice of the Atlan tic A lliance has not resu lted in a complete, definitive solution of Italy's every last securi ty problem, something presumably to be accomplished by shunting our national responsability onto the collective responsability of the Al liance (if not, indeed, onto the g lobal responsabi lity of the Un ited States) . This point has been made not only at junctures where Italy has been called upon to reaffirm her solidarity with the At lantic A ll iance, and the West as a whole, but also in connection wi th the bloody offensive mounted by the forces of terrorism, both internal and international, as well as the crises and tensions generated in the Middle East. It was most significant that in 7985, for the first time in seventy years, security-related foreign policy decisions threaten ed to bring down the government (though the crisis was eventually resolved). The psychological discomfort attendant upon Italy's recognition of her new responsabili ties towards herself, as well as towards the causes of Western security and peace in the Mediterranean (a discomfort. fo r that matter, analogous to the sentiments experienced in the other states defeated during the Second World War, that

BOOK

is to say, Germany and ÂˇJapan) clearly demonstrates that the country lacks the cultural and political preparation needed to meet the changing situation. One notes the need for a new political approach to the issue of security, an approach which would include a political framework for both the defense system and the various military instit utions. Furthermore, this framework should be tied back to the other aspects of internal and international politics - in particular the reform of the state and the country's industrial renewal in o rder to resolve a crisis which threatens to become a structural problem, an eventuality that would make any national project pointless. The politics of security is a global affair, determined by fac tors which differ from strictly military considerations. These last amount to nothing more than an instrumental component, representing, fo r all intents and purposes, secondary issues. The book's various chapters, each an essay on a specific subject clearly set off from the rest of t he volume (which owes its inter-d isciplinary nature to the sum of its parts), deal With important themes, all of which fit under the broader topic of a political framework for security. At issue are considera tions of geo-politics and geostrategy (Bonante and Santoro, Caligaris). technological and military-technical factors (Jean, Levi, Bisogno), internal political factors (Fisichella, Bozzo, Pelanda-Lizzi, llari, Rossi-Politi) and the contribution of diplomacy to security p9licy (Ga ja). These pieces also set out to define, or at least to outline, a unified political -strategic language which could serve as an instrument of mediation between the various problems at hand and the po tential for fac ing up to them and p roducing solutions consistent with the nation's goals and interests. By making such an effort, one can move beyond a language and an outlook which fo llows overly simplistic "Atlantic-Western" guidelines - or which amount to nothing more than tools to be used within the internal debate of a single political current - and achieve a synthesis and a level of homogeneity able to sati sfy all the nation's political forces . an indispensable step in terms of security. defense and the armed forces. Within the framework of the international political system, there is also a need for a funct ional approach to statehood which is able to reconcile the undeniable needs of national development with the attendant outside pressures at the same time as it links, or translates, domestic policy into international policy, and vice versa. Furthermore, there is no need to worry that the necessarily gradual. and undoubtedly difficult and controversi al development of a political approach '

REVIEW$

to security based on the real ity of Italy's situation rather th an on a makebelieve, overly simplistic and convent ional representation of international society and the Western world, will lead to a recrudescence of a rea l or imag ined "difference" between Italy and the West. an eventuality which would render the abovementioned course of action, if not dangerous, then at least fool ish and unproductive. A sense of belonging to the Western world, together w ith an internalization of its values. have become firmly rooted in the political outlook of the whole of Italian society. It con t rast to the situation in th e early 1950's, these principles are no longer exclusively dependent on the bonding role of Atlantic solidarity. The ideological concepts of "Atlanticism" and "anti-Atlanticism" belong to a period when the existence of a "different" path for Italy was still held to be both feas ible and meaningfu l, as it was in both Germany and Japan. In the event, this movement was defeated in no uncertain terms, as were the political regimes which had sought to express it in the three. countries. Certain currents within the ranks of the Catholic Church, as well as t he national-popular component of the Communist Party, have tried to reconcile the existence of an Italian "difference" with membership in the post-war framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Paradoxically, both groups have found the rat ional for their identity and their survival w ithin that very framework; that is to say, w ithin a society which has become Westernized in terms of its actions. its modes of behavior, its economic and psychological structures and even its political choices. thanks, above all else, to the process of ad justment sponsored by these same two groups, albeit not w ithout a fa ir amount of con t radiction, difficulty and second thoughts. All of which goes to show, despite what might appear to be the danger of a newly emerging nationalistneutralist temptation, that both Italian society and the Italian political system have entered a period of maturity and adulthood, a period which finds them less dependent on outside reference points or d irections and more aware of their own needs, their own potential and their own preconceived notions. The lingering p resence of "ideological" factors within the domestic d iscussion over fore ign policy and security issues can seemingly be traced, first and foremost. to the weight of tradition. as well as to a less than complete awareness of the transformations which have taken place and, most importantly, the lack

of a language suitable to the task of expressing the new state of things. The situation may actually have matured to a degree where ideologies with mutually exclusive points of reference can be left behind. The truth is that these belong to the past, representing, for all intents and purposes, nothing more than a vehicle fo r the abdication of our future and our responsib ilities. The fundamental problem of the day, which once involved keep ing Italy inside the Western Camp, now consis ts of identifying the country's ro le within that alliance. If it is to be productive, benefitting not only Italy, but the West in its entirety, then this ro le must be accompanied by a realistic evaluation of the nation's interests and potential. In other words, the defi nition of the role is absolutely unthinkable in the absence of a national p roject. Italy can not limit itself to supplying the political-military alliance of the United States and the other Western European countries w ith territory and military forces. Its contribution to the joint effort must include cultural. technological and industrial streng ths as well as political and planning skills, all of which w ill allow it to carve out a space of its own. The roles which cast the country as the "bridge" between Europe and the other countries of the Mediterranean, or as the "stairway to the Alps", now appear to be thoroughly inadequate characterizations which have either been outmoded or are well on their way to an obsolescence brought about by the evolving economic, political and strategic real ities. As formulated, these models show a greater concern for internal problems of a secondary o rder th an for factors of international politics. Only by adopting an active ro le, and not a passive or a subordinate position, can Italy make a concrete, original contribution in the areas of Atlantic loyalty and participation in Alliance affairs, two directions which, by now, are firmly rooted in the political consciousness of the nation. If the on-going strategic debate in Italy is to be grounded in reality, then this ro le must be accepted. Discourses concerning other people's situations, as concerning rea lities over which we have absolutely no control. rep rese nt, as always, a readi ly available, yet fru itless vehicle for escaping our own concrete p roblems, something we do by engaging in abstract debates involving grand, all-encompassing systems. We alone can solve the very real problems connected with security, national project. doing so by facing up to the commitment, the responsability and the effort which a like task is sure to entail.

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L. Caligaris, C. M. Santoro: "Obiettivo Difesa - Strategia, direzione, politica, comando operativo" ("Objective Defense Strategy, Political Direction, Operational Command"), Arel, II Mulino, 391 pages, 25,000 lire. As Alexis de· Tocqueville once noted, the cure to an army's ills must

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be found not within the army itself, but within society. This calls for a knowledge and an understanding of the real ities, problems and poin ts of view associated with the military. In other words, it presupposes the possession of a strong fam iliarity w ith things military on the part of a nation's leadership, a situation whose hoped-for advent has been postulated in positive terms - and on more than one occasion - in the pages of this very publication. In the event, this appeal has gone partially unheeded, though a certain amount of progress has been made in the past few years. A particular shortcoming has been the lack of an outside cultural contribution. Given this situation, the initiative of the Arel (The Agency for Research and Legislation, founded by Christian Democratic members of Parliamen t) deserves nothing but praise. By sponsoring a series of studies on issues of security and defense, the program is also meant to provide a stimulus for like initiatives. In addition, it could conceivably give rise to a broader, more in-d epth treatment of mliitary culture within the military itself, a development which has often

been hindered by excessive cau tion. conformity and self-censorship. I myself, being a firm supporter of free enterprise, as well as a convinced believer in the value of a competitive environment within the field of commerce, hold the same principles to be equally important in the area of culture. I also believe that institutions which have very little to say, and prove unable to give their imaginations either significant latitude or long -term range, are inevitably destined to lose prl;lstige, credibility, legitimacy and efficiency. The volume under rev iew is divided into three parts. The first, by Santoro, deals with Italy's foreign affairs and defense policy as well as the role these p lay in military policy. Three points prove particularly interesting. The first involves the con sequences of Italy's status as a "mid· size regiona l power" and the need to define a national strategic role consistent with the possibilities and the constraints generated by this status. At issue are not autarchical or nationalistic longings, but rather the need to define exactly what it is we want (and, subsequently, to organize ourselves to obtain it) , a

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r./././ step wh ich, to r that matter, our own allies have been asking us to ta ke in incre asingly insis tent te rm s. Th e secon d po int stem s from th e conf lict be tween the "contine ntalis t" and "nav alis t" currents. Tied to th e aforementio ned de fin ition of a rea listic ro le, this conflict is now giving r ise to an in-depth debate re miniscent of the disa greemen t wh ich enlivened th e rich m ilitary lite rat ure of the late eighteen-hund r~d s with i ts d iscussions of whether to opt for land or sea opera tion s in an even tu al conf li ct wit h France. Choo sin g a realistic cou rse, the author, whose views place him closer to the " Bi sso latian" c amp th an to th e "Crispi an" s chool, seem s to g ive top priority to a scen ario in whi c h an Italian rapi d -interven tion force wo uld be deployed in th e Danube basin rather th an in th e M ed iterra nean, in part because of a lack o f strategic t ra nspo rt fac ilities, as we ll as support fro m air and navy tirepower. but, above all. because of the d ifficulty involved in overcoming the nations wh ich line th e Mediterran ean·s shores , a problem wh ich hinders the ex ecution of limi ted operations. The third point: wh ile t he earlier poin ts foun d us c ompletely in agreement w ith the au tho r, his eva luation of th e sea -g oin g threat in the Mediterranean wo uld seem just a bi t exaggerated. especia lly in ter ms of surfa ce ships. W i tho ut a doubt. Santoro must have d ifficulty acceptin g the ten to fiftee n surfa ce s hips of the 5th Squadron. Indeed, he foresees a tim e wh en the Navy w ill even tu ally be

equipped with Squadron s of Tornadoes (currently the pract ice in West Germ any). not to mention planes designed for imbarcat ion o n ships wit h flig ht-decks. Two sect ions of the book were wri tte n by Luigi Caligari s, who con d ucts an examina tion into the problems found at the top lev els of the political-strategic and m ilitary establishmen ts, p roducing an in teresti ng and well -do cu mented com pari son be tween the exi sting s i tuation in Ita ly and the cu rre nt st ate of th ings in the other Wes te rn co untries. The stud y ou tlin es the pro cedural and institutio nal c hanges whi ch, ac cording to the author. m ust be implemented in our country i f we are to achieve both an effec tive coordi natio n of th e various com ponents wh ich m ak e up security policy and an adequate level of cr is is m an agement. As a means of improvin g the present politic al -s tra teg i c leadership stru ct ure, th e author p roposes the creatio n of a National Secu rity Council c harged wit h p roviding ad vice and support to those re sp on sible for poli tical decis ions. Everyo ne is in agreement on th e need for this ty pe of measure , or something along s imilar lines. The problem is w here to pl ace s uch a body institu ti on ally. In the event, the decisi on -m aking procedures will be influen ced by the special nature of Italy" s poli tic al an d institutional situati on: and it wo uld be best if the stud ies relating to constitu tio nal reform also gave due con siderati on to the requirem ent s of security policy and c ris is m ana gement.

As far as th e military leadership structure is co ncerned, the author is a decided proponent of interforce c entral iza tion Thi s is another point on whi ch o ne c annot help but agree, especially as regards th e areas o f actu al troop deployment, structural pl an ning, research and devel opment an d supplies. The day to day expe ri en ce. at ti mes truly frustrati ng, w hich is all too fa m iliar to an yone who has served in an inte rfo rce o rg an. leads the author to con sider the policy of co nsoli datio n as som ething of a panacea for the cu rrent pro blems and woes of the military' s top ech elons. This may ve ry well be true. though to my eyes su ch an o utlook appears overly optimistic. underestimating , as it does, the co mplexity of a problem w hich is cau sed les s by the structures involved than by the men. O n the other hand, I am in com plete agreement o n the Defensc Genera l Sta ffs a bsolute need for a separat e in form ation and s i tuation div ision, something it lost fo llowing the reform of th e intelligence serv ices. The book. which m akes a s ignificant contributi on to cl arifyi ng a number o f key poin ts concern ing na tional de fe nse an d s ecurity, is fu ndamental to an understanding of som e o f the principal problems c urrently affecti ng the d efense estab lishmen t. In ad dition it points to some highly inte res ting possi bilities tor eve ntual solu tions.

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