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"RIVISTA MILITARE"

THE ENGLISH EDITION IS FULLY AVAILABLE Â· ON THE ITALIAN ARMY SITE

ESERCITO.DIFESA.IT

URNAl OF 1111 IJAUAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1B56

2/2010

CONTENTS

July - December

Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

Interview With the Chief of the Staff of the Army Lieut. Gen. Giuseppe Valotta

p. 2

The Army and the Future: Digitized Medium Brigades and «Freccia» VBM by Pietro Botacchi

Planet Afghanistan by Daniele Ce/lamare

p.20

p. 70

Cluster Bombs and Humanitarian Demining b y Francesco Vetere

ag Grou p of the 7t h Be r sag lieri Regient at the parade of Ju ne 2, 20 10 . ,e " Plu med So ldiers" - since t heir rth o n Ju ne 18, l 836 ti l l today - have ritte n the most magnifice nt pages of ir Cou ntry ' s historr,1e "Crimson Badges', who cherish their icient trad itions, continue w ith their 1mistakable "double march" to reprent Italy stridin,J t he roads of the world.

Analysis of the Productivity In Humanitarian Demining by Leo nardo Lizzio

pplement to numbers 4, 5 and (i of Riv ista ilitarc Italian Edit ion

b y Giuseppe Poccio

ditor in Chief: farco ClAMPINl

Interview With the Commander of the Serbian Army by Marco Ciampini

1lvertising

ire or the Secretariat ofRivista Militarc tone 0039-06-47358139

·inter ]LGRAFICA srl ./33, Via lgnazio Pettinengo 1) 59Roma tone 0039-06-43588200 m1il: segretcria@stilgrafica.com

p. 89

Interview With Marc Bonnet Programme Manager of UNMACC UNIFIL, Naqura - Lebanon by Marco Ciampini

p. 95

p. 32

·is Democracy Exportable? p. 40

by Giovanni Cerbo

The Anthropologists' Contribution to Peace Support Operations by Chiara Galli

p . 48

onditions for 2011 nly Italian Edition: 1c number : Euro

p. 85

From to Humanitarian Ordnance Clearing to Operational Demining

IX-MONTHLY

anagcmcnt and Editorial Ofl1ce via di San Marco - 00186 Rome tone 0039-06-47357373

p. 80

Legio VII Gemina and the Hydraulic Mines by Flavia Russo

p. 100

Principles of Military Art: Cannae, 216 B.C., the Outflanking Manoeuvre

2, I0

ie back number: Euro 4,20 .bscription rates:

ly: Euro 8,00 a year >road: E uro 11,40 a year yment must by made on posta l

by Riccardo Coimmi

p. 108

Conveying Consensus

~ount No.22521009 - SME ,ntro Pubblicistica dell' Escrcito

by David Bastiani

p. 118

3/ A, Via XX Sellembre - Rome

:sidcnts abroad may remit payment ·ough bank cheq·Je or

ernational postal order 1torized by the Court of Rome der No. 994 of the Regist1y by

The «Tactical» Legal Advisor in Land Military Operations Abroad

,crcc 7-6-1949.

by Enrico Dubolino

2 01 1

p. 56

The Italian Army in National Emergencies. A Resource for the Country by Giuseppe Fernand o Musi/lo

COLUMN

p. 62

I n-dcpth Studies

p. 130

INTERVIEW - 2

Interview with the Chief of Staff of the Army

Lieut. Gen. Giuseppe Valotto The professionalism and competence of Lieut. Gen. Giuseppe Valotta, to give an accurate picture of the real dimension of our Army. An Army where the focal point is, and always will be, Man in his many-fold components. From international tasks to Homeland Security; from the excellent interaction with the other Services to the transformation in a net- centric key. What emerges is an "!Army system" that can meet with effectiveness and timeliness every need, deserving constant acknowledgements and always upholding the prestige of our Country on the international scene.

era! Petraeus, have several times manifested their satisfaction for the activities carried out by the Italian military in the area of responsibility of the Regional Command West, maintaining that the Italian approach is a model to be exported also in other areas if the Country. These are affirmations that make me proud as Commander but that arc not something new. In fact, as Commander of the Summit Operational Joint Command before, and as Army Chief of Staff now, I have personally witnessed the evolution of our employment in Afghanistan and ' ' .. . In Afghanistan, both have been able to verify on the My judgement on the conduct General McChrystal and his field that the choices we have made are good, and also the of our soldiers in "out of area" successor, General Pe- scrupulous and precise prepaoperations is absolutely positive and springs from reading the traeus, have several times ration of our personnel, who is results obtained, especially from manifested their complete conscious of the importance of the confirmations by my foreign satisfaction for the activi- the mission and the related counterparts, as well as from ties carried out by the Ital- risks. Especially in the field of the reports that I get from the ian military in the area of security, besides the standard operations of patrolling and pCommanders from other Naresponsibility of the Re- resence in the sensitive areas of tions to whom our contingents the Afghan Country, our solare subordinate. It is not there- gional Command West .. . ,, diers operate in training of the fore a partisan opinion, but it is local security forces. Wei/formed on objective data that trained and efficient local Army and security show tangibly the professionalism and the excelforces are fundamental for the stabilization of the lent level of our soldiers. Country and the enforcement of the law. MoreAs regards the specific case of Afghanistan, both over, the actions aimed at allowing the Afghan soGeneral McChrystal as well as his successor, Genciety to start again from the social and economic viewpoint are indispensable. There have been up to now many humanitarian interventions in favour Lieut. Gen. Giuseppe Valotta, Chief of Staff of the Italian of the underprivileged, and contributions to the eArmy.

General, our Army is engaged in many operational theatres abroad, among which two emerge for the importance and intensity of the operations carried out: Lebanon and Afghanistan. The latter, in particular, has proved to be very dangerous for our soldiers, engaged in activities of control and security of the territory, of reconstruction, as well as support of the Government and the civilians in many fields, in a high-intensity background, characterized by many and multiform risks . How do you consider the conduct of our soldiers in these scenarios?

3 - INTERVIEW

Afghanistan. A CH- 47 helicopter escorted bv two "Mangusta" A - l29s.

conomic recovery which have resulted in the re construction of the fundamental infrastructure and the re- establishment of the essential services. Our national contingent has built bridges and roads, schools and hospitals, dug wells and irrigation canals, promoted ,the cultivation growing of saffron to prevent the diffusion of the opium poppy, distributed indispensable goods and carried out activities of medical assistance to the popula tion. The effectiveness of our intervention is also witnessed by the recent decision of the ISAF Command to widen the zone of responsibility entrusted to our national contingent to two provinces to the east of Farah, which, although administratively in the Western zone, from the military viewpoint were included in the Southern sector. We have therefore increased the number of soldiers and constituted the fourth manoeuvre Task Force (TF) because it is our intention to intensify the action of conquest "of the heart and mind" of the Afghans, in order to be able to give to the Afghan Government, Police and Armed Forces, between 201 I and 2014, the exclusive task of fighting terrorism. Our goal is to be able to make that Country autonomous in the capability not only of political control, but also of military, police, territory and city control. Afghanistan: A roadblock near Shindand. One can see a "MRAP" vehicle, a "Freccia" VRM and a bomb- disposal robot.

INTERVIEW - 4

As regards Lebanon, on the contrary, already since the times of UN/FIL 1, the Italian presence has always gained not only esteem and appreciation by the United Nations but also, and above all, by the local Authorities and population. I do not believe it is by chance that in the areas of respon sibility presently entrusted to the two Italian manoeuvre units, no significant violations of Resolution 1701 are reported and, on the contrary, with in the civilian - military cooperation, important works in favour of the local community have been carried out. This is a further element that reaffirms the absolute effectiveness of our conduct and also new evidence of the capabilities and professionalism of our soldiers who - and I strongly underline it - know how to communicate with everybody, animated by that culture, that respect for all populations, with their habits and customs, and by that true democracy, which, for 3000

years has been a historical heritage of our people.

In the operational scenarios it is often spoken of the advisability of changing or adjusting the Rules of Engagement (ROE), even if until now our soldiers have been confronting hostile actions with determination and success. To talk only of ROEs frankly seems to us a little !imitative. What is, in your opinion, the problem for our military in those difficu It environments?

To tell the truth, the requests related to a change of the ROEs have never been advanced by military circles but, on the contrary, have come up in the wake of debates within the public opinion when tragic losses of soldiers in operations have occurred. I believe, on the contrary, that, for each area of employment, where our soldiers have been called to operate, we have established ROEs absolutely pertinent and suited to the level of the risk and threat of the moment. One should not forget that, besides the punctual respect of the ROEs, what is most important is the capability of making a correct evaluation of the contingent situation by the Commanders on the ground, who must decide what reactions and measures should be adopted. A decision that is the outcome not only of the correct interpretation of the events, but is also the resultant of the previous training for that specific mission and the professionalism of the personnel. And I want to point out a concrete example that can better explain what I am saying. In July 2009, in Lebanon, in the sector of the French battalion under the command of the Italian brigade, there was the explosion of a hidden storage of weapons and muni tions referable to Hezbollah. The UN personnel in charge started immediately the investigations in order to verify the possible infringements of Resolution 1701, but was violently contested and opposed by part of the population that wanted to prevent the investigative activity. On that occasion, also Italian units wer e called in to restore order and security but they were defied with unusual violence. Despite the occurrence of events which, vis - a- vis the current ROE, would have permitted to open fire in order to guarantee the safety of the personnel, all our soldiers managed to keep an enviable cool blood and, with activities of deterrence and talks with the local authorities, they managed to defuse the situation: howeve r this choice entailed an "overexposition" of our military with the subsequent wounding - a slight injury luckily - of some of them. I believe that this episode is emblematic of how necessary it is, besides the full knowledge of th e ROEs, the scrupu-

lous preparation of the mission in terms of training, but also of study and understanding of the social environmen t where one is going to operate; and is, moreover, a clear attestation - the umpteenth - of the levels of professionalism and excellence reached by our military. A regards the "hot spot" of the moment - and I obviously refer to Afghanistan - I can, also in this case, observe a comprehensive correspondence of the ROEs to the present threat, as is confirmed by the reactions, always targeted, measured, successful and risolutive, that our soldiers have carried out. In this background the real problem, unfortunately, springs from the deceiving threat of the /EOs, in front of which it is misleading to discuss of ROEs, while it is more correct to speak of measures of protection for the personnel. As Commander and Chief of Staff of the Army I have the moral duty and the responsibility to do

Lebanon: A 4x4 "Puma" VBL.

all that is possible to safeguard my men and allow them to operate with as little risk as possible, also and above all in the most insidious operational Th eatres. ft is no accident that, within the project of renewal and improvement of the equipment, the most weighty programmes are constituted by the new "Cuardian " jammers", that are significantly improving the passive protection of the vehicle, and of the vehicles themselves, protected with characteristics of high resistance against ex plosions and mines: it is the "Freccia", an 8x8 medium armour ed vehicle, which has recen tly come into service and has been immediately deployed in Afghanistan, and the already very well known

5 - INTERVIEW

"Lince", which has been nicknamed "Saint Lince" by our soldiers, due to the particular resistance of its cockpit. But not only that: the soldier of the future will have more and more technologies at his disposal, allowing him to better interpret the local situation and act in full autonomy. This will undoubtedly imply also a greater capability of discrimination of the situation and of the targets, protecting our soldiers and obviously protecting

the local population, that will be less and less involved in collateral effects. In this regard I want to underline that the need to safeguard the civilian population - envisaged by the principle of proportionality of the response, included in our ROEs represents a moral imperative for every soldier and is a distinctive feature of the Italian approach to peace operations, by now known around the world as the Italian way to peacekeeping and is an integral part of the training that our men, even the most expert ones, carry out during the months immediately preceding their deployment in the area of operations. In short, a "targeted" training, specific for a given Theatre, which puts our soldiers, already from the first moments of the mission, in a condition to be included in the military contex , but especially in the social environment of the critical area.

Today's operational environments make the "Man" factor, with his peculiarities, the first factor and the key element for an effective and efficient Army. But it is also true that the present world

Below. A VBM 8x8 "Freccia" on training. Left. Lebanon: A "Centauro" armoured car of the "Lancieri di Novara" Regiment. I

....

INTERVIEW - 6

turns more and more towards extremely sophisticated and complex levels of technology and the Armed Forces cannot ignore that. The Army is already getting ready with programmes such as the "NEC Force" (Network Enabled Capabilities). What is the level of the technology existing in the Army at the present time? Can â€˘ it keep pace with the present and future technological evolution of society as a whole, particularly as regards the systems of Command, Control and Communication , as well as the capabilities of the weapons systems and means of transport?

Before entering into details about the impact and the technological im print in t he present and future programmes of the Army, I wis h to underline that focal point of the whole "Army system" remains and will always remain Man and Woman. In fact, and especial ly the intervention in Iraq and Lieut. Gen. Giuseppe Valotto attending the presentation Afghanistan have proved that, if on the one hand of the 8x8 "Freccia" VBM at the Torre Veneri range on it is indispensable to have availability of sophistiOctober 7, 2009. cated technologies, in order to have a clear and univocal reading of the situation, as much as to prevent the enemy actions as to increase t he pronecessary not only for t he already mentioned tection of the forces, on the other hand it is necneeds of situation awareness and increased proessary to return to the conquest and control of the tection of our soldiers, but also for ensure a full territory, the only measure that can guarantee the interoperability of our military instrument wi t h the success against an "asymmetrica l" adversary all ied and friendly Armies. I can which, unab le to compete in an assert, with a certain pride, that equal manner, has recourse to ' ' Our feather in the cap . is with provident planning and non-conventional war methods wise choices, we have managed represented by the "Forza - g uerrilla warfare - and terrorto bridge the technological gap ism. NEC" project ... which reprethat distanced us from the As Donald Rumsfeld, former sents the fundamental proArmies that had started before US Undersecretary for Defence gramme for the evolution of us import ant projects of hig h said, the "revo lution in military the land component of Detechnological contents. In paraffairs" must be something more than the mere creation of more fence and is aimed at consti- t icular the "feather in our cap" and more tech nologically so- tuting a force at Division lev- is represented by the "Forza phisticated weapon systems; the el ... that can be projected NEC" project, divided into three revo lut ion must be identifi ed operating in a digitised ma- phases (Study of Feasibility, Project Definition , Implementawith a new way of thinki ng and noeuvre space and ensuring t io n by "sp ires" (l) of the NEC planning, as well as fighting, full interoperability at joint un its) , which represents the employing the most advanced and multinational level ,, fundamental programme for technologies , together with tacthe development of th e land tics and techniques be lieved by component of the Defence and now by the Western Armies. In is aimed at constituting a force at Division level (3 other words, technology is ok, but our centre of Land Brigades, one amphibious landing force and gravity is , and always will be, t he individual sol relevant supports enablers within 2031) that dier, he who with his presence on the terr itory can be projected operating in a digitised manoeu boots on the ground, to say it with an old saying vre space, assuring ful l interoperability at joint - is the only "weapon system" t hat is sure to be and multinational level. At the present moment we successful. are impleme nting the Project Defin ition phase, To go back to your question, since years the which envisages the "development" of the ini tia l Army has started specific projects of moderni zacapabi lities of the force and the start of t he activtion, adaptation and acquisition of capabilities ities for t he implementation of t he Integration that rest on a sou nd technolog ical foundation,

7 - INTERVIEW

components, the first Major Unit involved in a "NEC' reconfiguration is the "Pinerolo" Brigade, which will be followed by the "Aosta" and "Sassari". At Barletta, the 'Torino"82nd Infantry regiment of the "Pinerolo" Brigade has started to receive, since May 2009, the first "Freccia" 8x8 Medium Armoured Vehicles. Once the 82nd is completed, the 9th Infantry regiment "Bari" in Tran i and the7th Bersaglieri regiment in Bari will follow, thus completing the digitisation of the regiments of the basic units of the "Pi nero lo". We succeeded in keeping our timetable entirely. The schedule envisaged the employment of the first medium component, at company level, belonging to the ''Torino" 82nd Infantry Regiment, in the Afghan operational theatre, starting from the second semester of 2010. T herefore we can consider ourselves ab-

Above and right. The "Future Soldier" prototype.

Test Bed. Th is phase will be concluded with the federation of the structure within the architecture of joint Modelling and Simulation. Afterwards, during the present year, the re will be the beginning of the phase of Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) which is placed between the Project Definition and the implementation of the first spire and, in fact, takes the shape of a real activity of risk reduction , aimed at avoiding to launch programmes on a large scale without having first assessed on a smaller scale the capacitive coherence of the various components. Up to now the financing prog ramÂˇme appears to be adequate, thanks to funds taken from the ordinary budget as well as financings coming from the Ministry for Economic Development (MSE). In fact, the re sources necessary for the development of the Phase of Project Definition are already available and also the first rate of the MSE funds, necessary for implementing the CD&E phase, will be made available shortly. These resources allow us to be substantially in li ne with the times of the project. As regards the operational employment of the first

INTERVIEW - 8

solute ly satisfied of the way the project is proceeding, for both the joint characterization and for the synergy of goals between the Service and the Raggruppamento Temporaneo d'lmpresa RTI (Temporary Group of Enterprise) based on FINMECCANICA, the industrial firm of reference of the project. Closely connected with t he "Force NEC' project there are other projects of modernization, characterised by such an advanced tech nological content, which, in some specific sectors, can indeed lead us to have a primacy as compared to allied and friendly Armies. I refer, for example, to the systems of Command and Control and CIS (Com munication and Information Systems), which are

already equipping the "Freccia", and which also fit the prototypes of the "Futu re So ld ier", which ensure a complete digitisation and an abso lute interface with the analogous systems t hat are soon to be introduced in othe r Services, both national and foreign. Subsequently the renewal is goi ng to go through the programmes of upgrade and the acq uis it ion of weapon systems and vehicles : the new "Centauro" armoured cars and the "mi ni" Unmanned Aerial Veh icles (UAV), t he Unmanned Gro und Vehicles (UGV), the kits of land sensors to be integrated within th e explori ng modu les of more t raditional connotation, th e modern isat ion of the fleet of CH47 he licopte rs CH47, the VTM-X, t he 81 mm mortar, the "Vu lcano" munitions and so o n. Next to these projects, already in a finishing phase, there is a prol ific activity of study that results in proposals deservi ng further investigation I refer particularly to var ious hypotheses for the renewal of t he artil lery - we are seriously considering the idea of bei ng able to fit out a vehicle of the Frecc ia/Centauro family with a l 55 /39mm light gun , with evident spin-offs in terms of log istic support, training procedu res and interoperability - and a series of evaluat ions and research about the develop m ent automated systems of protection of bases and compounds from the

threat of ind i rect fire. In short, I can say t hat the Army hci:s faced and continues to ma ke remarkable efforts, i n full agreement with th e Defence and in close synergy w it h the Industry, in order to secure that vanguard that i n t erm s of technological contents is now indispensable, but having always in mind that technology must be subordinate to Man, t he true and sole "weapon system" of the land mi litary instrume nt .

The Army is integrated in the "Defence System" where , since some years the "interforces capability", i.e. the ability to operate in full integration with the other Services, is the norm and is about to become complete. What is the level of the Army's interaction with the other Services, including the Carabinieri? The process of making the Service "interforces capable" has started under the spur of a necessary capability to operate together with Units of the General Valotta inspecting a bridge just built on the Po river by the 2nd Pontoneer Regiment. Piacenza, Julv 2, 2 010.

9 - INTERVIEW

Exercise "Fa/zarego 20 I O": General Valotta meets the Alpini of the 5th Regiment. Torri de/ Falzarego, July 9, 20 I 0.

various Services and is now expanding also to other sectors, first of all that of the "superstructure". It is an irreversible process, dictated not only by operational needs, but also by the pursuit of rationalization and optimization, with the well defined aim of saving financial resources that could be diverted to other sections of the budget. From the operational viewpoint, the employment on the field of joint contingents has shown very soon, already in the operations in the Balkans, the necessity to adopt shar ed procedures and a common language. This need has entailed common training programmes and an advanced joint standardization, which today allow us to have at our disposal an excellent training- operations interaction with the other Services and the Carabinieri. Evidence of this are precisely the joint activities carried out in the operational Theatres and the willingness to further increase such osmosis. For example, in Afghanistan, besides the TF45, which sees, at the side of the 9th "Col Moschin" Regiment and of the 4th Alpini Paratrooper Regiment,

INTERVIEW - 10

also assets of the special forces of the Navy, and besides the Joint Air Task Force, which deploys aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy, we are planning together with the Navy the employment of the "San Marco" Regiment as manoeuvre Task Force, similarly to what was already done in Iraq. The joint connotation of some training courses must be strenuously pursued in order to make absolutely natural the creation of joint operational "packages". In this sense we have the very good example of the Joint NBC School of Rieti, which has proved a happy choice, a forerunner of re quirements that would come up later. For this rea son, there are at present in progress a series of studies and analyses at Defence level, aimed at exploring the possibility of setting up further joint school bodies: from the language sector to the training of personnel assigned to the VA Vs, from the Medical Corps to the centres of excellence for specific operational capabilities, assuring anyway the full safeguard of the specificities required by each Service. In the near future enti re sectors of the support could be reconsidered in a joint key, in order to streamline the structures, optimising the result and gaining economies of scale. I think, for example, of a joint Medical Corps, of specific

sectors of Logistics, of Commissary and of the Infrastructure shared by all the Services, i.e. of typical activities and services that can be carried out by a single Service to the benefit of the whole Defence, envisaging suitable forms of compensation.

institutions- perhaps the only one - that can act quickly and with assured efficiency at the occurrence of serious events. I think, for example, of the tragic earthquake of 7976 in Friuli, which brought out the indispensable work of the Army, inciting the political Authority to take some ideas from our organization, in order to implement the But many operational activities are also carried service of national Civil Defence, which, although out on the national territory. In fact, the Army openvisaged by the law, had not yet been put fully erates together with Civil Defence in support of into practice. A capability of intervention - as in seismic events - confirmed also by operation the populations hit by natural calamities or, autonomously, in a more general support of the "Cran Sasso", for the earthquake that has hit Abruzzo in 2009: a Task Force of 2000 servicecommunity, such as, for example, in clearing unexploded devices. We have seen men and more than 400 special machines, as well as the directhe Army working with skill and expertise in operation "Clean ' ' Safe Streets ... The sum- tion of two of the five compartStreets", helping to solve the mary data of our interven- ments responsible for the reproblem of the environmental tion, updated to September construction. Without consideremergency in Campania, with all 2010, are considerable and ing that, at the same time, tothe related plans and operagether with the Police we have provide the correct meas- been tions, and in operation "Safe called to organize and enStreets" together with the police, ure of the effectiveness of sure the security of the area of in contrasting crime, organized the work of our soldiers : the CB Summit: an absolutely or not. Can you give us a thor- about 6000 arrests; over demanding task, as testified by ough picture of the results? 4500 holdings; a little less the approximately 3000 serWhat is, in your opinion, the than 5000 charges; con- vicemen engaged. Army's future projection in this Streets", on the contrary, trols on about 900,000 is "Safe field of activity? only the last operation, in orpersons and half a mi Ilion der of time, of a long chain of vehicles; confiscation of interventions made together In the past, when the Government, on the wave of specific 120kg of drugs, and more with the police in the activity of events, has decided the employ- than 300 weapons and prevention and fight of illegal ment of the Armed Forces, and 4000 vehicles ,, activities, as well as for the proof the Army in particular, inside tection of objectives of strategic the national borders, it has ofinterest. Also in this case there ten happened to hear within the public opinion was no lack of critical comments on the actual casome voices in disagreement or, indeed, unrealispability of the military to be employed in such an tic fears of "militarization ". Actually, this type of operation (the re have been critical comments also employment is envisaged among the institutional at the beginning of Operation ''Vespri Siciliani'' tasks entrusted by the law to the Military Instrubut, to be true, less than before). The summary ment and specified, within the 4th mission pointdata of our intervention, updated in September ed out by the "Blue Book of Defense" - ed. 2005, in a series of activities in cooperation with the Police Forces and other Ministries for the maintenance of public order, for fighting illegal activities (crime, illegal immigration, etc.) and for assistance to the population in case of accidents and calamities. This said, it is equally important to re member that the Service has a long tradition of interventions within the national borders, that springs from the fact of being, due to its organization, for its widespread presence on the territory, for professionalism, capability and availability of equipment and materials, one among the fe w

Patrolling the streets of Turin.

11 - INTERVIEW

20 70, are considerable and provide the correct measure of the effectiveness of the work of our soldiers: about 6000 arrests; over 4500 detentions; a little less than 5000 reports to the Police; controls on about 900,000 persons and half a million vehicles; confiscation of 720 kilos of drugs, of more than 300 weapons and 4000 vehicles. One should add to this the surveillance of fixed sites, which has permitted to release hundreds of Carabinieri, policemen and custom officers, to be appointed to tasks of higher investigative value on the entire national territory. "Clean Streets", instead, has evidenced the capa bility of intervention of our Engineer units: during the first six months of 2008, the Task Force, set up for that emergency, has managed to gather and dispose of about 40,000 tons of garbage, has contributed to the works of adaptation of dumps,

materials: I refer to the - alas - numerous employments for removing the consequences of geological instability and floods in Sicily, Calabria, Veneto and Tuscany, as well as the participation of aircraft and crews of the Army in the yearly fire fighting campaigns, promoted and directed by Civil Defense. And how to forget, finally, to mention the clearing of unexploded devices, a task wrongly believed a routine job, which gets the attention of the media only when, for better security, it is necessary to make large evacuations of people. On the contrary, for the Army this is a significant task in terms of human, material and financial resources employed. Just consider that, only during the last five years, our EOD teams intervened to neutralize and decontaminate 75,000 devices: an average of 8 devices a day! I believe, therefore, that these data, although partial, clearly show that the employment of the Army on the national territory is anything but a secondary task. We have given, and are continuing to give, thanks to the professionalism of our men and women, a picture of absolute competence and incomparable capability. All this is a further proof that the Army is not an Institution cut off from the civilian society and that the "beacon " of our work is that of the service to the citizen and to the national community: in a sentence, as proudly reported, among other things, on the internet site of

Gen. Valotta visiting the / / th Sapper Regiment engaged in support of Civil Defence. Montaguto, May 7, 20 I 0.

has made over 300,000 radiological controls on the loads of waste material, and continues to provide the surveillance of the dumping places. Therefore, it is a capability to intervene effectively not only for solving emergencies, but also for protecting the environment. A further example is the employment of the Engineers for containing and removing the hydrocarbons, which, poured into the Lambro river , were risking to damage irreparably the whole eco- system of the fluvial basin of the Po. I could mention, moreover, the intervention at Montaguto, in the province of Avellino, where another Engineer task force has been engaged for months in removing and securing a road from a landslide that hit the state road and the raiway, actually breaking the connection between Campania and Puglia. And this without forgetting the "minor" intervent ions, so called because they entail a limited cost of personnel and

INTERVIEW - 12

our Service: ''The Italian Army is a great asset to the Country"- and I firmly believe in this concept - any activity, if well done, is a manner of training and, therefore, of improvement of our already excellent professionalism.

Man, with a capital M, with his potentialities, his professional and emotional world) proves to be the first value of the Army structure. In what sense do you mean the centrality of the Man factor in the value of the Service? And what type of provisions do you intend to adopt to pursue the full centrality of Man in the modern contexts? In particular, what message do you intend to send to the families of the soldiers of every rank, who operate daily with so much tenacity and sacrifice?

On the occasion of various discussions during public debates - including the recent hearing before the Defence Committee of the Senate - I have always underlined with force that the fundamental goal of the Army is to guarantee the level of operational output that the Nation requires of us in order to perform effectively the tasks entrusted to us. This product of the "Army system" can be achieved only by harmoniously developing the

three fundamental components of the system itself: the conceptual, the moral and the physical ones. Two of these components - the physical and the moral - concern directly the personnel and their training, organization and welfare. Moreover, let's add to this that, unlike the other Services, the Army is markedly "man-centric" and its capabilities are connected not only with the availability of a suitable equipment but also, and above all, to the qualitative and quantitative dimension of the human resources. Therefore the first effort must be made in the recruiting phase, making the choice of embracing the military life "winning" and competitive; be-

the employment in operations, equipping our soldiers - the Commanders first of all - with the best instruments, thanks to which it is possible to operate as best as possible in the most difficult missions and compare openly with the co/leagues of the leading friendly and a/lied Armies, having on our side an accurate and appropriate training that is even envied by many. In this regard I would like to underline that the discrimination between success and failure of our "investment" on personnel is represented by the capability of training our men and women, creating and maintaining a virtuous osmosis between Operational Area and School Area, which is essential for a correct professional growth of the new generations and for a precise application of the lessons learned in the operational Theatres. Also in the field of the instruments to be put at the disposal of the personnel, the Army - as I have already had the opportunity to remark - is working effectively to secure, through important programmes of development and acquisition, suitable materials and systems that are effective and technologically in the fore front. What I have il!ustrated is only the "tip of the ice-

Above. Gen. Valotta conversing with the representative of an Afghan village. Rig ht.

Gen Valotta meets the troops during a visit in Afghanistan.

sides, there should be instruments for the selection suitably weighed for finding the personal ski/ls and characteristics that are best suited to our needs. Once recruited, the personnel must be prepared and well trained: in other words, must be "formed". Today, much more than in the past, the operational needs indicate the type, depth, and measure of the formative-training proposal that we are going to present to our men. Thus the Army is compelled to continuously adjust its programmes according to the complex and changing realities where our contingents have to operate every day. All considered, the Schools and the training Institutes are playing a decisive role, for they are the real breeding ground for our personnel, in any role and rank. Starting from these assumptions, we have managed to orient the entire formative offer and the training courses towards

berg" of a series of measures aimed at preparing a military instrument which should better meet the present needs, be highly projectable and able to counter the new and the more and more complex threats. In order to achieve this, we need an Army made up of we!! trained personnel, highly motivated and with a marked capability to operate in any operational environment, using a we!! balanced whole of human resources and technological!y advanced systems. The Army must therefore undertake - and is seriously doing that - to ensure an adequate human and professional development of its personnel, taking advantage of their excellences and inclinations: in short "to have the right man in the right

13 - INTERVIEW

The CH-47 is one the most rapid means of transport and liaison on the Afghan mountains.

place". This objective can only be reached by proposing to each man a "targeted course", a sequence of well defined tasks that entail increasing responsibility and difficulty, a continuous selective course. In short, it is necessary to have at our disposal a clear and transparent career management, already since the initial phases of the enlistment, which should consider the primary needs of the Institution as well as the aptitudes and the expectations of the personnel. The only "sore point" of this ambitious programme regarding the human resources is the one connected with the quality of life, which directly influence the performance and the working standards of our personnel, who, on the other hand -

INTERVIEW - 14

and I want to state it forcefully - I believe has no equal as regards professionalism and moral strength. I refer specifically to the undeniable infrastructural problems of renovation of the barracks (most of them are still located in "historical buildings" that are hardly suited for a modern Service) and, above all, the "housing problems". Our institutional obligations and moral duties towards the Country, in the past have often con vinced us to overlook the message, which has been acknowledged by other Nations a long time ago; a message that is clear, simple and loud: strong family, strong soldier, strong Army. A message that I fully share and which, vis-a - vis the negative trend of the financial resources available, sees the Army widely engaged in a great effort of rationalization of its buildings, which should allow us to keep the more suitable infrastructure, to find resources for building new ones and to intervene significantly for the well known scarcity of state-

owned housing. I must do, and I will have to do, my best so that these problems find concrete solutions or, at feast, be addressed towards a solution. This is because the military profession - I am deeply convinced of this and I claim it resolutely has its own specificity: not all people are required to spend long periods of- time away from their dear ones; not all people run the risks that, inevitably, our profession entails. It is precisely for this reason that the men of the Army need certainties, which, above aff, should mean a strong family that stands by them as much as possible. The first tangible sign of this reversal of trend, as compared with the past, is represented by the opening, in more than just a few military structures, of kindergarten destined primarily to the children of the military personnel, but made available also to the focal community: a solution that has permitted to find resources from administrations and local firms, as weff as to create closer relations between the military and the population. In conclusion, to the families of our soldiers - to our families - may be reason of comfort the certainty that their problems are weff known to us, are given due consideration and that the Service, despite budget scarcity and the consequent re duced financial capacity for welfare interventions, is seriously committed to find and implement concrete solutions to their l egitimate requests .

try, of our military traditions and the inmost sense of our life choice. I refer, in particular, to the sense of discipline and responsibility, to the spirit of sacrifice and to the unconditioned commitment to service, to determination and courage, to the absolute loyalty to the Oath and to the democratic Ins titutions, to the sense of duty, to loyalty and honour. This ethical dimension gives us soldiers who can splendidly combine the millenary history and the heritage of our Country with the modem

Sir, you have repeated ly said t he "one learns from t he past, lives in t he present and works for the future". What are the fundament al values on w hich t he military should cont in ue to lever and how, in your judgement, they can still be useful to the social fabric?

The professionalization of the Army has put at our disposal men and women perfectly trained, participative and fully integrated in the multina tional environments. But these professionals must also be carriers of ethic-moral experience, which must constitute the indispensable and inalienable patrimony of every soldier . In short, a "deontological code" that should be a re al operational instrument, a trustworthy "compass " valid in any time and circumstance, to which it is possible to refer with confidence. The difficult task of instilling the correct ethic dimension among the personnel is not only a task of the training Institutes of the Service, but is t he duty of each one of us, through the rousing ex ample of a blameless behaviour and professional conduct and inspired by the moral p r inciples that are at the foundations of the history of our Coun-

Lebanon.Âˇ Members of a patrol controlling the territory.

needs imposed by today's operational scenarios. In fact today we have at our disposal soldiers who, in any environment, are bearers of the values of tolerance and understanding of the culture and focal traditions, which have become the distinctive feature and the essence of the Italian approach to the solution and settlement of the crises. Our A rm y has become, also and above all thanks to the ethical and moral insight of its soldiers, the ex port er of a model of conduct o f the opera tions that is far away from th e Core lli figur e of "spaghetti and mandolin", a label that the few

15 - INTERVIEW

denigrators still existing try to sticl< to us. A model that, on the contrary, translates in respect and capability to establish a dialogue with all the populations. This specificity of ours, on service of the national community, as well as for peace and international security, is acknowledged by our society, which - also on the basis of recent surveys - gives us absolute trust in the panorama of the public Institutions, attributing to us characteristics of effectiveness, credibility and availability: in short, a character-forming institution, loyal and "clean", which worl<s quietly, asking very little and giving a lot.

In a difficult economic trend like the present one, inevitably also the Army has suffered considerable cuts in the financial resources, with the consequent necessary corrective measures. What incidence such cuts have had on the Organization as a whole and what measures in particular have permitted to face up to them?

Alas, this question leads us to face a reality that does not combine much with our plans, sometimes ambitious but indispensable anyway,

A "Dare.Ju" VCC in A{yl,anislan. /

INTERVIEW - 16

worked out for the full modernization of the Army. The Service is a systemic organization, which, in order to supply the operational output required, and operate and carry out its task as best as possible, needs resources that unfortunately are often inadequate. In fact, in the present period of economic slump, also the Defence sector, like all the Institutions of the Country, has been called to deal with drastic expense retrenchments. It is undeniable that the cuts in the resources have entailed inevitable repercussions in every sector of the Service. From the analysis of the trend of the ordinary budget of the last 2 5 years, one can derive a real paradox: while in the past to the possible use of force - and therefore an extremely contained operational output - corresponded substantial resources rapidly allocated, today to the actual use of force - and therefore a high rate of "decay and obsolescence" of the force itself - there is no adequate answer. The most notable aspect that we must underline is that to the quota increases for the "Personnel" sector, have not corresponded similar increases in the financial volumes allocated. The latter have instead decreased, so that the situation has reached critical thresholds, especially in the "Investment" and "Exercise " sectors, which, considering the incompressibility of the "Personnel" sector, have suffered more than proportional decreases vis-a-vis the general de-

ea/age. The said criticalities have still increased when the Defence, by now completely professionalized, has had to reckon with the general context of reduction of the resources available for the entire Country, which have not permitted to sustain the investment adequately and, above all, the Exercise. Precisely the latter sector during the last years has been significantly reduced: this undercapitalization risks to cause a heavy loss of operational capability in all sectors, from training to logistics, weighing heavily upon the operational capability and on the quality of fife of the personnel. In fact, the trend of the "Exercise" sector during the fast year has suffered a considerable contraction, decreasing by more than 70% vis - a- vis theâ‚Ź l l S0M of 2002 and dropping toâ‚Ź 337.4M in 2009, despite some corrective provisions adopted along the way. In short, the Army, in 2009, has been able to finance with the "Exercise" sector has been able to finance only requirements "not eliminable and mostly deriving from law obligations", penalizing, knowingly and forcibly: the maintenance and updating of the infrastructure, making only interventions for emergencies and to ensure the security; the welfare of the personnel, substantially limited only to the expenses and subsidies mostly deriving from legal obligations; a minimum level of functionality of the Commands; reducing a great deaf the courses of specialisation

Thanks to the revision of the entire training cycle, aimed at rationalizing the expense, we have adapted the training objectives to the missions that the units have to carry out in the various operational Theatres . All the units are assured the

and advanced training necessary for the fulfilment

necessary level of training, so that they may be

Lebanon: Controlling the territory.

of tasks also in the international area. In short, if employed in operations inside the national territhe trend were to be confirmed, one could reach tory or abroad. In particular, the Units that are to the socalled "basal metabolism", a term that debe possibly employed in missions outside the nafines the resources necessary for the functioning tional borders, complete and improve their inof the military instrument with "null operational struction with a mission oriented training, i.e. orioutput", exactly the opposite of what we all wish ented towards the tasks that the Units will have to and propose to obtain. On the carry out in their mission. All contrary, in the "Investment" , , the units of the Army are emsector, starting from 2007, also the Defence sector, ployed by turns in the main opthere has been a marked trend like all the Institutions of the erational Theatres and therereversal which , also thanks to fore must go through the releCountry, has been called to vant the conspicuous funds made training. As Commander deal with drastic expense and Chief available by the Ministry for the of Staff of the Army, Economic Development, has al- retrenchments ,, this is for me a precise moral lowed the Army to give subcommitment that cannot be stance and implement the imdisregarded and therefore I can portant programmes of modernization and acquiguarantee that the funds for meeting the training sition of new equipments. requirements, envisaged for every specific operaAt the same time, we have worked out some intional Theatre, will always be made available. ternal solutions aimed at reducing the negative As regards doctrine, I have arranged a specific repercussions of the budget cuts. From a merely study and the ensuing draft of a capstone docuorganizational viewpoint, we have implemented, ment that is in its final phase and will be issued with a greater energy then in the past, a deep rashortly. It is the "Operational Concept 201 0tionalization of the structures, affecting essential2030": a document that illustrates the concepts ly the "superstructure", through eliminations and and the guidelines that will be at the basis of the unifications of Bodies and Departments, safe development of the new capabilities of the Italian guarding the Operational Area entirely. Army in connection with the evolution of the pas -

17 - INTERVIEW

sible future scenarios. Such concepts and ideas will characterise the choices that the Italian Army will be called upon to make in order to define its priorities as regards doctrine, organisational structures, training and instruction, materials and infrastructures. In short, it will be the point of reference for a clear definition of the measures that we have to adopt in order to modernize, rationalize and increase the capability and the efficiency of the land military instrument, in view of being able to reinforce its operational output. Finally, we have made a careful survey of the policy that should be adopted also for the maintenance and logistic support in general of sys tems, vehicles and materials. We cannot prescind from a careful cost-effectiveness evaluation of the type of logistic support that should be implemented. As a rule, in order to reduce as much as

are going to develop a process of Logistic Support Analysis aimed at defining the maintenance to be made by the Service and that to be entrusted to the supplier of the system, as well as the planning of the resources necessary for sustainability. In short, I can say that our Army, like the other Services - and for some aspects, even more - although it is feeling the negative effects of the contraction of the budgets, has somehow reacted by finding solutions and mitigating alternatives.

Below and right.

Afghanistan: Patrols engaged in territorial control. Considering the weather conditions and the terrain, it is easy to understand how high is the wear on the equipment.

possible the operational criticalities in the "Exercise" sector, the provisioning policy of the new materials and weapon systems envisages to guarantee for an adequate period (3/5 years for the tactical and logistic-tactical vehicles, 5 years for the commercial onÂˇes) an integrated and complete logistic support by the contractor. This policy permits a progressive implementation of the model of logistic support of a given material/weapon system by the Adherence and Support bodies, reducing to a minimum, for such period, the costs charged to the "Exercise " sector, guaranteeing meanwhile an adequate flow of expertise from the industry to the Service, which avoids interruptions in the quality and adhere nce of the support. In or der to provide the supportability of the system, we

INTERVIEW - 18

I am aware, given the present slump, that I cannot give to our men and women all that I would like, in terms of equipment as well as supports to the quality of life, but I am however determined to guarantee a coherent development of the ''Army system". A coherence that starts from updating, i.e. the acquisition of operational capabilities and therefore of means, materials and weapon systems - suitable for carrying out the tasks that the Country has entrusted to us, until we achieve the availability of the personnel necessary, in quality and quantity, fully trained, assisted, supported and with adequate fife conditions, at home and abroad.

In conclusion, General, you are the Commander of the entire Army, of all the Cadres who operate every day among thousands of difficulties, but also with many moral and professional satisfactions. If you were to send a synthetic message to all of them, irrespective of their rank or functions, what message would you like to send?

The Italian Army is the protagonist of an unprecedented change, with a process of r eorgani-

zation that knows no respite and is occurring,

Alpini on training.

cunsiu1=riny th1= scup1= uf lh1= r1=furrn, in 1=xlr1=m1=ly

short times and with often inadequate resources; in this continuous rationalization it is however signment fulfilled, helps to improve our Army, our necessary to continue to ensure the intervention Armed Forces and our Country. To them, thereand operational capabilities that have allowed us fore, go my heartfelt thanks to be extended also to our families, which stand by us with love and to operate as real protagonists, at home and in intrepidation, sharing silently with exemplary digniternational scenarios. It is a demanding effort, ty our anxieties and our trepicontinuous, persistent, which involves every component of the dations. Service and shows every day ' ' I wish to testify publicly, As "Captain of the Army how the Army is able to respond without rhetoric, that I am Team" I say with conviction with effectiveness and timelines very proud to be the Com- ''Thank you with all my heart for to the requirements of the mander of these splendid your earnest collaboration!". Country, doing its utmost with undisputed capabilities, deserv- soldiers ... ,, Interview by ing continuous acknowledge Marco Ciampini ments and raising Italy's presBrigadier General, tige in the international scene. Editor of "Rivis ta Militare" Nevertheless, we should not forget that the results that we are obtaining would not be so gratifying without the loyal, generous and disinterested dedication of our men and of our women, who NOTE are more and more often called to operate in dif(l )-1 st Spire (within 207 8): first medi um Brigade, one ficult and risky environments. Landing Force and 50% of the enablers: 2 nd Spire(within Th erefore, I wish to testify publicly, without 2026): second medium Brigade and 2 5% of the enablers. rhetoric, that I am very proud to be the Commander 3 ,d Spi re (with in 2037): third med ium Brigade and 25% of these splendid soldiers, whose long-lasting work, with every task carried out and every asof the enablers.

19 - INTERVIEW

PLANET AFGHANISTAN Meeting point of the three physical and cultural regions that today outline its borders, from the Iranian plateau on the west, to the Turanian steppes to the north and from the Indian subcontinent to the southeast. Subjected to the invasions of the peoples coming from these areas, it has very much felt their influences and until the XVIII century its territory has remained divided among the most fertile and populated regions that surround it.

THE STRONG LIMITS OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The area of Afghanistan (652,225 sq km) is more than twice that of Italy. The territory has no coastal outlets and has the form of an irregular ellipse whose major axis is 1125 km, w hi le the m inor one is only 560 km. The relief constitutes the un ifying element of the Country, so much so that some historians believe that neither the Persians nor the Indians have been able to occupy durably t his ter ritory, precisely as, in the present time, ne ither the Ru ssian:, rior the British have included it in their empires, convinced as they were that it was impossible to control it and su bmit its population. Afghanistan occupies the nort heastern part of the great Iranian plateau, enclosed to the north and south by two great mountain massifs.

The greatest part of the Country (about 80%) stands at an altitude between 600 and 3000 metres). Only a small part of the territory (less t han 1%) is at less than 300 metres, i.e. the historical Baktria, to the northe rn extremity of Afg hanistan , whose territory, as we proceed towards the south, rises gradually from 300 to 600 met res til l it meets the Hindukush (the most important of t he mountain ranges, as regards dimension and historical role). Consequently, the Country is divided into two parts, and it is possible to consider it constituted by three large orog raphic regions: at th e centre the Hinduku sh range , to t he north a lowl and that slopes down towards t he Amudarya, and to the so uth a wide plateau. T he Hindukush is a watershed mou ntain chain of great im portance, because the rivers of its southern side are tributary of the lndo, and therefore flow into t he Indian Ocean, while those of the northern side flow into t he Lake Arai or, through t he Amudarya, disappear into the barren Turanian lowlands. Usually, the ch ain is divided in two sectors t hat develop at the sides of the Khawak pass. The eastern one reaches as far as the Chinese border and is the less known ; its northern side is almost dese rt while the southern area, mo re rainy, is cove red with a rich forest. Here th e altitudes are ove r 3000 metres on average, but the most important summits exceed 7000 metres and the most important passes are never below 4000 metres. Thro ugh the centuries, the valleys of this region have witnessed the great migrations of peoples and cultures, and t he passage of invading armies, as well as the long co lumns of the caravans that linked the rich and dense ly populated reg ions that sur-

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_,. _

- Âˇ Âˇ - ~t:e&Mory

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~~ 1....,.;.,,;.~

Left. Map of Afghanistan.

Title pages. A view of Kabul.

O IKOS -22

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

round Afghanistan. To the west of the Hindukush, t he chain of the Parapomiso, hi nge of the orographic system of the Country, develops without interruption. Its highest peak exceeds 5000 metres and is permanently covered with snow. Here is the source of the Helmand, the most important Âˇriver. To the north of the Parapomiso, the chain of the Band-i-Turkestan dominates the plains of Russian central Asia and shows a singular asymmetry between the southern side, deeply carved by the at-

Right. President Hamid Karzai.

Below. The Afghan Flag.

The dry beds of the watercourses are often used as roads, because in the Country the tar roads are less than one fourth of the about 22,000 kilometres that constitute the entire network (laboriously modernised with the financial support of the former Soviet Union and the United States). Bes ides, the tar roads follow more or less the same meandering courses of the traditional caravan routes. mospheric agents, and the northern side, covered with impressive layers of sand carried by the wind The only innovations of some importance have that blows on the Turan ian steppes. On t he oppobeen, in l 964, the open ing of a tunnel under the site side, to the southeast, the chain of the SuleySalang pass and, in 1982, the reconstruction of the road that links Kabul with the north of the Country, man Mountains and the Safid Koh mark the border today connected with Russia throug h a road and with Pakistan. On these mountain there are the most important historical gates of Asia: the Bolan railroad bridge that crosses the Amudarya (but Afghanistan has no rail roads). and l<hyber passes, the gateThe continental character of ways of India. ''The Country is divided inthe Country, and its mountainThe southern and western ousness, influence the climate parts of Afghan istan are occu - to two parts and it is possiheavily. Hence, Afghanistan can pied by desolate basins (steppe ble to consider it constituted be schematical ly divided into and desert): the plateau of by three large orographic three great climatic reg ions. Rigestan and arid Sistan. regions: at the centre, the The lowlands (under 300 meAlthough it is evident that the Hindukush range, to the tres) are arid, with summer relief and the deserts hinder communications a great deal , it north a lowland that slopes tempe ratures that exceed 38 is interesting to note that al- down towards the Amu degrees on average, with winready since ancient times this Darya, and to the south a ters cool on the north and mi ld on the south. The highlands country has had a ju nction role wide plateau ,, (mountains and high valleys), for very important ways of comwith long periods of intense munication. In fact, the tracks of cold and yearly precipitations that generally exceed the caravan routes that lin ked India to Bactria, to 400mm. The middle region, with hot summers and the Turanian oases, to Tu rkestan and the Iranian relatively temperate winters, with rainfal ls between plateau developed through its territory.

23 - OIKOS

The bed of the Kabul river.

had left there. The Greek formed a small but efficient ruling class that could domi nate the population, most probably of Inda-Iranian orig in, but 200 and 400 millimetres. could not resist th e attacks of the Mongolian noThe wind is a fundamental element in the Afghan mads coming from central Asia, and were therefore climate. Besides the better known "wind of 120 forced to retreat to the Kingdom of India. Even days" which blows in the summer period in the though the Hellenic cultural influence lasted a long south and west of the Country, an im portant role is time, unfortunately no trace has remained in the played also by the drop winds of the afternoon and region, apart for some Greek coins found in more the by icy winter winds coming from the north. recent historical phases. The great leader Kanishka, at the head of t he Kushan people, emerges among the conquerors A COUNTRY WITH A TORMENTED HISTORY that followed the Greeks. He had arrived to Afghanistan from his Ki ngdom Herodotus, the Greek historion the northwest of India, an, reported four centuries be' ' The first traces of the spread Buddhism through the fore Christ that this region was Country's history regard the whole reg ion, and in Bamyian called Bactria and belonged to time when Alexander the ,which at the time was a city, the Kingdom of Persia. The first had immense statues of Buddha traces of t he Country's history Great crossed the eastern carved in the rock; the biggest regard the time when Alexander provinces of the Kingdom, of them was 51 metres high. the Great crossed the eastern during his expedition to InIn the VII Century, the Arabs, provinces of the Kingdom, dur- dia, about 330 who for a greater diffusion of ing his expedition to India, in lsl amism destroyed a great part about 330 B.C. In this region he of the monuments of the Bud founded the first cities and left his garrisons. dhist culture and mutilated the face of the monuAfter his death, Bactria passed under control of mental statues of Buddha, conquered the Country. one of its Diadochi dynasties, the Se leucids and, According to some experts the destruction w as after independence was governed for about two made by the Mongols, who we re famous for their centuries by Greek military co lonies that Alexander greed for riches and believed to find great trea-

B.c.,,

OIKOS - 24

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

sures inside the head of the statues. The epoch of greater prosperity of the Country was during t he autochthonous dynasty of the Ghasnawidi, with the Kingdom of Mahmud of Ghasna, who died around l 030. Under this Sovereign of Turkmenian origin, who made as many as 17 expeditions towards tne Inda valley, gathered the greatest poets and scientists of the IslamicPersian culture. The frontiers of his Kingdom are the same that still today separate Pakistan from India. In 1220 t he hordes of Genghis Khan established in the Country the Mongolian supremacy and destroyed the numerous cities founded by the Greeks, such as Balkh and Bamiyan. After the Mongol invasion, the Country suffered the invasion of the Great Mogol and that of Persia unti l 1747, the year in which Ahmed Shah Durrani founded a powerful and feared Kingdom, thus inaugurating the modern history of Afghanistan. But during the XIX Century, following the Russian advance in Central Asia and of the British in India, the Country inevitably fell into the areas of influ ence of these two great powers : in particular, Britain tried to take possession of the Hindukush, the mountain massif that dominates the relief of the territory, with the strategic objective of arresting the Russian advance that had reached as far as the Amu Daria r iver, in order to cut the access to the corridor that would have opened the way to Persia and Ind ia. Âˇ After having fought three wars against the British, (l 838-1 878 and l 9 1 9), Afghanistan was able to obtain its independence with the Friendship Treaty of 1922, while King Mohammed Zahir Shah, descendant of the Durrani dynasty, was able to preserve the Country from the Second World War, as had done his father Amanullah for the First War. Amanullah also tried to make a thorough modernization of the Country, following the principles of Kemal's Turkey, but was opposed by the strong protests of the Muslim clergy and forced to abd icate in 1929. With the Constitution of 1931, Afghanistan became a hereditary constitutional monarchy and power was divided between the King and Parliament, constituted by 1 71 members of the national Assemb ly, elected by the people, and by 43 members of the Senate, appointed by the l<ing. Moreover, for handling the state affairs, it was envisaged the recourse to theJirga, the rep resentative assembly of the people, which made up by the chiefs of the tribes and t he members of the high Muslim clergy. T he territory was divided into five provinces and five governmental districts, administered by Governor-Generals. But the Country rem ained dependent on other States as regarded the transport of goods, and in

the fifties the relations with Pakistan were troubled by deep disagreements concerning the frontier region then known as Pashtun istan. This controversial province had been controlled by Afghan istan during the XVIII and XIX centuries, but in 1893 was divided by the Durant line and the territory thus obtained was assigned to Pakistan when this State was founded in 1947. The Kabul Government never missed the opportunity of claiming the independence of the region - the local tribes spoke Pashtun - but as an answer Pakistan closed the frontiers to the transit of Afghanistan's goods to the sea. The frontiers were reopened only in June 1957 and when it was a question of creating a free port for Afghanistan at Karachi, the relations be-

Children of the Hazara ethnic group.

tween the Countries evened out. The Constitution of l 964 established the new parliamentary institutions, but a coup d'etat of the l 7th of July 1973, while King Zahir was in Italy, proclaimed the Republic. T he former Premier Sardar Mohammed Dahud tried new progress ive roads, but the average yearly income remained always very low. A new coup d'etat made by young pro-commu nist Officers abo lished the Constitutions and proclaimed a democratic Republic, with a large politi cal and economic influence of the Soviet Union. In 1979 the power passed in the hands of Amin

25 - O IKOS

1:SÂˇ

-.::....---

the proclamation of Burhanuddin Rabbani President of the Republic. A new conflict bathed in blood the Country due to (March 1979) and successively in Karmal's (Decemthe heated divergences among different ethnic and ber 1979), supported by Moscow. But vis-a-vis the re lig ious factions, supported by Uzbekistan, Taj ikinability of the Afghan authorities to repress t he istan and Pakistan. Kabul was repeatedly bombed, ever-stronger Islamic resistance, towards the end first by the former and then by the latter, until the of 1979 the Soviets decided a direct military intercoming on stage of the Taliban. The "students of vention. the Koran" presented themselves as a movement of The USSR engaged in Afghanistan an Expedi Pashtun origin, already present in Pakistan through tionary Corps of 85,000 men without being able to the Union of the Ulemas of Pakistan. Having achieved the military supremacy subdue the rebel forces, even if they were divided in different in a short t ime, the Taliban con' ' The Hindu population quered l<abul and proclaimed groups , both politically and militarily. The invasion caused a was forced to wear a yellow the Islamic State, imposing the flight of the civilian population cloth as distinctive mark "Shari'a" with such extremist who found shelter. in the refugee and the Islamic fundamen- rigour so as to cancel all civil camps in nearby Pakistan. In and human rig hts completely. talism was especially piti- The Hindu population was 1987 the Soviets unilaterally proclaimed the ceasefire and less towards the women ,, forced to wear a yellow cloth as distinctive mark and the Islamic proposed a truce, while the new fundamentalism was especially secretary of the People's Democratic Party, Najibullah, propitiless towards the women. The last communist President, Najibullah, who had takposed to the rebel forces the formation of a provien refuge in a building of the United Natio ns, was sional government of national reconciliation. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops started in ki lled and the gigantic statues of Buddha destroyed . May 1988 and was concluded in February 1989, On the international plane, Afghanistan - whose but Najibullah was unable to handle the difficult innew power had been recognised by no one, except ternal situation and was dismissed in 1992, with A square of Kandahar.

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Pakistan - suffered heavy economic sanctions inflicted from the UN Security Council, fol lowing the Taliban government's refusal to concede the extrad ition of Osama bin Laden , the Islamic billionaire accused of being at the head of the terrorist organization responsible of the attacks on the US Embassies in l 998, and of the devastating ones of New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The Taliban responded by calling all Moslems to the Holy War if the Country were to be militarily attacked, and on October 7, 2001 the capital was bombed by the US and British forces of the international alliance activated against terrorism . With the decisive help of the Anglo- American air force, the Alliance of the North - consisting of mil itias coming from different ethnic groups but allied in a single force - conquered the main Afghan cities as far as the border with Pakistan. In December 2001 the Taliban regime was defeated and the delegates of the various ethnic groups, gathered in Bonn, appointed a provisional government led by Hamid Karzai of the Pashtun ethnic group, dynastic chief of one of the most important tribes. The LoyaJirga, the assembly of t he Afghan tribal chiefs, consisting of 1501 delegates, assemb led in 2001, in the presence of the former King Zahir, and con firmed Karzai at the head of the provisional Government, appointing him as President of the Country. Also the successive elections or 2004 and 2009 have sanctioned Karzai's victory, reconfirm ing him as leader of Afghanistan. The fai led capture of the Taliban leaders, Osama bin Laden and mullah Omar, has not yet cancelled the suspicions about their presence in the Country, and while the security is guaranteed by the forces of the international Coalition (ISAF), the process of transition towards democracy continues to present se rious difficulties, because of the irreducible disagreements among the ethnic groups and for the fresh outbreak of bloody terrorist activities.

operated in the traditional sectors of hides and karaku l wool, and successively to those linked with textiles (cotton) and food (sugar). At the end of WWII, trade was still carried out by caravans and the connections between the main inhabited centres consisted exclus ively of roads w ith natural beds, if not of simple tracks. A period of increased economic development started on ly in 1946, althoug h the rate of economic growth, in real terms, remained lower than that of the increase of the population. Besides the situation typical of the developing Countries, what has remained odd is the particular influence of the climatic changes on the rate of the economic development. The droughts of 1970 and 1971 produced a drastic reduction of the agricultural production, as well as the death of thousands of head of cattle. Only after many years has Afghan istan been able to reconstitute its livestock and reacquire its food selfsufficiency. In this period, the Afghan economy could benefit from the aid of both the United States and the Soviet Union. According to some analysts, the Americans - who have always refused to support the five-year development plans which since 1957 have tried to lead the economic development -

One of the statues of the Bamian Buddha destroyed by t he Talii.Jdn in 200 7.

A FAILED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT For centuries the te rritory's mountainousness , the difficulty of communication , the climatic excesses and the insufficient level of the precipitations - together with political instability and the fractioning of the various human groups - have made the economic development of Afghanistan very difficult. As a matter of fact, up to 1 930 the economy of the Country evidenced all the typical characters of the Middle Ages and only after 1932, with the creation of a nat ional bank, d id the Country start a slow process of modernization. The new bank promoted the birth of private societies that initially

27 - O IKOS

A group of Pashtun.

have just supported the single private in itiatives, letting the role of the USSR be praised, because the Soviet Union was more willing to assume general obligations in support of planning. The first five-year pl ans (1957- 61, 1962- 67, 1968-72), despite difficu lties and contradictions, actually produced substantial results in both theeconomic and social fields, as well as in the infrastructure of the Country. The production of cotton texti les was quadrupled , and the mining of coal and the sugar production tripled. Also the production of electrical energy received a strong boost. 3000 km of roads were asphalted, besides the con struction of dams and bridges. Two international airports became. operative and t he number of schools increased from 800 to 4000, the number of teachers went from 4000 to 20,000 and the stu dents from 125,000 to 700,000. Agriculture has always been the mainstay of the economy of the Country and, before the beginning of the eighties, the extraction and expo rtation of natural gas contributed more than 50% of t he GNP and 80% of the exports. But also the development of agricu lture has been hampered by the physical conditions of the territory: only a little more than l 2% of the entire area was deemed arable and as a matter of fact the so il actually farmed with conti-

OIKOS - 28

nuity never exceeded 6 percent. Another big problem: droug ht. The water balance was heavily insufficient and it was necessary to have recourse to irrigation, diffused over more than two thirds of the tillable land . The efforts in this d irection were con siderable, and before the Soviet invasion only a residual ten percent of the watered land availed itse lf with the traditional unde rg round conduits, called "karez". In that period the productivity, already very low, collapsed due the scarcity of fertilizers and selected seeds , one third of the farms were abandoned and many irrigatio n channels were damaged or destroyed. Ni nety percent of the cu ltivated land was invested in cereal. In the watered fields (called abi) one could obtain as many as two harvests per year, while in the dry fields (called lalmi) for every two years of cultivation were necessary as many as ten fallow years. The industrial cultivations concerned 5 per cent of the farmed area, mainly sugar cane and sugar beet, cotton and tobacco. On in the vicinity of the main cities there was a diffuse production of fruit and vegetables. Besides agriculture, one t he basic sectors of the Afghan economy was livestock farming, widespread particularly in the northern and southeastern provinces. Between nomads and semi nomads no less than three million persons worked in th is sector. Sheep and goats represented four fifths of the livestock and constituted the only source of in -

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come for the nomad populations. The karakul sheep were instead the assets of the semi nomads who adapted the rhythms of their displacements to the animals' needs, succeeding in integrating the profits from animal breeding with those from farming. The land refo rm of November 1978 was aimed at doing away with large estates , transforming into small holders and farmers a large number of land less peasants, amending in this way a situation of utter imbalance. Before, S per cent of the landowners owned a little less than SO per cent of all arable land. The secondary sector contributed to the GNP in a very modest proportion. According to the various sources, its contribution has been estimated between 12 and 25 per cent. The most important industrial section was that of textiles, which produced mainly for internal consumption. The exports consisted mainly of handicraft (carpets) and in the following years also of mineral products. Natural gas supported the exports contributing for a little less than SO per cent, and was prevailingly sold to the USSR. In the subsoil of the Country was found also the presence of other mineral resources : coal, salt, chrome, fluorite, copper and iron ore. But, besides the well-known war events, the difficulties of access and transport have left these resources more or less at a level of future potentialities.

A MOSAIC OF PEOPLES, LANGUAGES AND CULTURES According to the data of t he first national census of Afghanistan, taken in 1979, the sedentary population total led about 1 3 million, with a little prevalence of men over women, to which one had to add about two and a half million nomads. But

A typical Afghan valley.

The difficult catching of water.

more recent estimates (1988) gave numbers lower than 12 million inhabitants, excluding nomads. Probab ly th is was the consequence of the serious political instability that has forced about 3 million Afghans to take refuge in Pakistan, while one million went to Iran. On the whole, the political refugees abroad were estimated at about S mil lion. The war events, also in t his case, have interrupted a demographic trend that used to record rather high growth rates, i.e. around 2,5 per cent. As it is impossible to gdther more reLenL and official data on the population, as well as on the human settlements now present on the territory, the presence of the various ethnic groups and their territorial allocations has been worked out with data gathered before the Soviet Union's invasion. The Afghan population is prevailingly rural (83 per cent); a sure proof of the agricultural and pastoral character of the Country, but the urban population (17 per cent) has a stronger rate of natural increase. Even if generally the urban birth rates report slightly lower numbers than the ru ral ones, in Afghanistan the ru ral death rates are almost twice the urban ones. Naturally, d uring the last decades the population's t endency to move from the country towards the cities has been surely accentuated. The density is a little more than 20 inhabitants for sq km , although the datum is not very significant due to the contraposition between areas of hig h concentration (more than 1 000 inhabitants for sq km) with territories entirely deserted. The most populated residential units are in th e Kabul valley, as well as in the main valleys rich in water (He lmand, Herirud and Kunduz) where a well developed farming has encouraged a greater concentration. In this, region equal to S percent of the entire territory, lives 27 per cent of the population. Referring only to the sedentary population, the numbe r of the em ployed in the primary sector in

29 - OIKOS

The Panjshir valley.

1980 reached almost 78 per cent of the whole workforce. From the data supplied by UNESCO in 1988, in Afghanistan there is the highest rate of il lite racy (80 per cent) of the whole Asia, and less than l 4 per cent of young people of school age attend regular lessons. Infant mortality, recorded in the same year, was 1 73 per thousand, the highest in the whole continent, and the pro-capite availabi lity of calories was very low (less than 2300); t he life expectation did not exceed 42 years, also in this case the lowest in Asia. Moreover, only 20 per cent of t he urban populaJion, and 3 per cent of the rural population, can drink water controlled from the hygienic viewpoint. The most numerous ethnic group are the Pash tun, to which belong 50 per cent of the Afghan population. They are mostly livi ng in the southern part of the Country and to this ethnic group belong also the nomads that usua lly migrate towards Pakistan. The official language of the State is Pashtun (idiom of the Inda- Iran ian stock) although in the capital there are many other languages spo ken, such as Persian and Indian (lahnda). The richer landowners and stockbreeders are doubtlessly

OIKOS - 30

Pashto, as are the members of the former Royal Fam ily. Their religion is Muslim Sunnite (they follow t he Mus lim liturgical calendar), live grouped into tribes and the most numerous are those of the Durrani and the Ghilzai. Before the war against the former Soviet Union, between 1979 and 1989, the Pas htu n groups represented the po litico-tribal el ite, assimilated to t he administrative structure of the State (according to some scholars, the Taliban came from this group). They are traditionally divided into tribes, consisting of clans, constituted by large families under the authority of a chief (malik). The heads of the clans, the elders and the adult males form the assembly Uirga) where the internal disputes and the affairs of the community are discussed. Usually the controversies are regulated with sanctions that the family of the offending person must pay as compensation to t he relatives of the offended person, according to the principle of "collective responsi bility", customary among the pastoral cultures. Also the pastoral economy of these groups is reg ulated by a traditional behavioural code (Pakhtunwali), although with the introduction of the Islamic law, which has partially influenced its structure. Also in this case, the code regulates the mechanisms of the sanctions and is founded on the concepts of honour (izzat), hospitality (malm astia)

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and protection of the women, although they are excluded from public affairs. In order to settle possible inter- tribal conflicts of more serious nature, there is the recou rse to a larger assembly (loya jirga) consisting of tribal and religious leaders of the various groups. The spiritual guidance ofÂˇthe community is entrusted to the mullah, the religious experts who are in charge of the Koranic schools and preside over the ceremonies. The most important celebrations are birth, circumcision (at age seven), wedding and death. The fu nerary ceremony is interesting and reflects in part the customs of the Hebrew populations, who are also middle Easterners and of pastoral origin. The corpse is washed and covered with a white shroud, with the difference that in the case of the Pashtun the placing of the deceased must observe the direction of the face towards Mecca. Next to the Muslim religion, the Pashtun observe rites and beliefs in the pre-Islamic tradition, like those in the evil spirits Uinn), the spirits of the dead (ruh), i n fairies and witches, as well as in angels and demons. As regards demographic figures, the Tadzhik are second and represent about one fifth of the whole population. They are sedentary farmers living in the central - western provinces of the Country, speak Persian (different from that spoken in Iran) and profess the Sunn i Moslem religion. About 20 percent of the population is represent

Afghan women wearing the traditional burqa.

Russia and on the Wakhan mountains, can be as cribed to the Turkish-speaking people. Also other minor groups live concentrated in small areas. The Baluchi, a few tens of thousands, are nomadic shepherds settled in the most southern section of the Country; they speak a language of the Inda-I ran ian family, heavily permeated by Dravid ic elements, the languages spoken in the Ind ian peninsula in times preceding the Arian invasions.

The chahar-aimack are noed by the Hazaris and the mads of the Euro-Asian race Uzbeks. The Hazaris live mainly ' ' Before the war against the (Iranians) b ut with t races of in the mountain regions of cenMongol impri nt. They speak a tral Afghanistan, where they former Soviet Union, between Persian language heavily mixed practise ag riculture and cattle 1979 and 1989, the Pashtun with Turkish elements and breeding. T hey are believed Âˇ to groups represented the be descendants of the Mongol politico-tribal elite, assimi- words. Finally, the Kafir - whose oriconquerors of the XIII and XV lated to the administrative gins remain enshrouded in centuries. Their language is Perstructure of the State (acmystery - live isolated on the sian with Turkish and Mongol elmountains of Nuristan and ements. Contrary to the large cording to some scholars, the majority of the Afghan popula- Taliban came from this show Medite r ranean somatic characters . According to tradition, they observe the Shiite group) ,, tion, they descend from a group Moslem re ligion and they have of Alexander the Great's so loften been discriminated by the d iers, who had decided to settle Afghan authorities precisely for in this region. Apparently they live on agricu lture, this reason . in an almost primitive state, and speak a language The Uzbeks live to t he north of the Country and , of the Dardanic family, i.e. belonging to the Dardan together with the Turkmen, they are peoples that people established in the vicinity of ancient Mount speak the Turkish language and are settled in the Ida (in today's Asian Turkey), which derived their oases of Baktria, where they practice a flourishing name from Dardanos, the mythical founder of Troy. cotton growing and summer t ranshumance toThis name was also given to an lllyrian population wards the neighbouring mountains. They are the who in the classic age settled in the north of Anremnants of the Turkish populations that in the cient Macedonia. Middle Ages had moved towards the south , as far as reaching almost the summits of t he Hindukush. Daniele Cellamare Also two small groups, the Karacalpachi and the Lecturer of International Relations Kirghisi, respectively settled near the border with

31 - OIKOS

INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDER OF THE SERBIAN ARMY A qualified point of view is that of Lt Colonel General Ljubisa Dikovic, Commander of the Serbian Army, which permits to understand the deep process of reorganization and restructuring of the Serbian Armed Forces, and particularly of the Army, which is ready to take up the future challenges on common security, in view of a full European and UN integration and cooperation.

It is by now clear that the united Europe is opening its doors to Serbia. This is also true for the collaboration in the sector of Defence. How is your Service gearing up in its journey towards Europe?

The Serbian Republic is clearly oriented to be a European Country, not only geographically. To reach the highest democratic standards of the European Countries is also our obj ective. Besides economy, justice, human rights , culture and other sectors, the field of defence is an essential component in the eval uation of a society's readiness for a full European integration. In the past, some laws and doctrinal documents have been adopted, which have placed under civilian control the Armed Forces of Serbia and establ ished a clear chain of Command accord ing to the highest democratic standards. Through the process of reorganization and transformation of the Serbian Armed Forces , wh ich started in 2005, the Army has assumed a new face. A high number of units, of different level of deve lopment and size, have been trans formed i nto Brigades , ready to meet today's challenges, fac ing the risks and the threats to security. For the creation and organization of these Brigades, we have also m ad e use of the experience of the other Armed Forces in Europe and in the world. Certai n ly, besides a sound juridical basis and a

Right. Lt. Colonel General Ljubisa Dikovic.

Title pages. A Serbian M-84 tank.

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new organizational structure that we have been able to implement, before us there is still a lot to be done in order to reach the h ighest standards. The g lobal economic crisis has had its influe nce also on the Republic of Serbia and this has not helped us. Notwithstanding this, the Army will continue to improve its organization and in crease its training level in order to carry out ad equately the m issions assign e d. This means a lso the participatio n in the PfP Programme, through which we express our will to come close to the European values.

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Such prospect calls for complex structural reorganizations and transformation processes.You have recently visited Italy and the Italian Army which, as you have been able to notice, places the single man as "centre of gravity" of the system and of the evolution of the military instrument. What do you think about this and how does the Serbian Army propose to achieve this objective as regards recruitment, maintaining "man" as the heart of the Armed Forces system? During my visit to the Italian Army I have been able to notice, w ith great satisfaction, how much attention is paid to the so ld ier, to his train ing, his equipment and protection. The Serbian Army plans to equip itself with the most modern systems so as to incre ase the selfsustainability and the safeguard of the soldier in combat. Remarkable advances have been made

Lt Colonel General Oikovic and Lt General Giuseppe Valotta, Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, during the official visit to Italy.

in the develo pmen t of the model of the M2 1 in fantry soldier, which envisages to arm the sol dier with the modern we apon subsystems , fire management, guarantee of autonomy in carrying out combat actions, as wel l as survival on t he battlefield. Th e basic concept of th is model is not very far from the Italian set of "future sol dier", or from similar concepts in other Armed Forces. Yet, history teaches us that technology can, but not necessarily, have a decisive influence on how to win battles on the field. Man, bot h as individua l or as part of a system, or of a combat team , a Chain of Command or any other struc-

35 - LOGOS

A mi-8 transport helicopter on training.

ture, represents th e decisive facto r . The outcome of a battle depends on his ability, dete r mi nation, res istance and resolve. That is why in peacetime one sho uld put man at the centre and create around him the complete architecture of the system.

What is the Serbian Army's attitude as regards the recruitment of its personnel , particularly women, and w hat are its potentialities in terms of housing capabilities and we lfare?

Tradit ional ly, co nscription i n Serb ia has bee n compulso ry for all c it izens of age who have the necessary psycho - physic prerequisites . In the last years, the rate of the young people 's response to conscript ion has been extremely high; t h is has been an in d icator of the very h ig h esteem and trust that our society has for the Armed Forces . Neverthe less , on the basis of the evaluation of the efficiency of the system of conscript ion vis - a- v is a total ly professional syst em , we have reached the conclus ion that we shou ld gradual ly sus pend consc ri pt ion. We

LOGOS - 36

have had professional soldiers i n the past, but since 2009 the intensity of t heir admiss ion has been i ncreased. Our objective is to ach ieve by the end of 20 10 the completion of the Army un its with prof ess io nal sold iers, thus creating the cond iti o ns for mil itary se rvice "on a voluntary bas is". Among the voluntary cand idates we have also a great numb er of women. We are trying to en su re the same r ights of th eir male col leagues . Bes ides, they must be able to perform all the tasks that may be entrusted to a so ldi er . Within the limits of our poss i b ilities, we guarantee them optimal l ife and work conditio ns, considering the specificity of the fe male sex . The Army professionals are guaranteed a maxim um medical and social secu ri ty. T he professional women enjoy all the rights to motherhoo d and child care, as p rovi ded by the Labo u r Law of the Republic of Serbia. Ce rtain ly this p uts us before a certai n number of chall enges which, with th e organization of l ife and work, ought to be overcome . Through a process of se lection of the best professiona ls, we choose the Nonco mmissioned officers. Duri ng t he train ing courses, the men are taught to ass u me responsibil ities in command tasks on which t he operational r ead iness of a unit is based .

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Above. A BROM-2.

Left. An M- 84 tank throwing up a smoke screen.

training Sc hoo ls in Italy, as w el l as the partici patio n in exerc ises carr ied out by the Italian Army. A good model could be the example of coope rati on bet w een the special un its an d the paratrooper un its of Serbia and Italy where, through the common train ing, know ledge and skills have been enhanced on both sides.

Always in connection with your visit to Italy, what are, in your opinion, the forms of cooperation that you consider a top priority and most effective with the Italian Army?

The Italian Army has a lo ng tradition in multi national operations and surely the cooperation in this sector is very important for us. As possible forms of cooperation I see the education of our Officers and Noncommissioned officers at

The opportunity to interoperate within joint missions, which constitute the focus of the contribution of the military component within the initiatives of the international community for stability and security, requires concrete steps towards the development of concepts and operational capabilities coherent with those of the international partners. How are you meeting this challenge?

An interope rab le system must adapt to the various nee ds without a big preparation and be compatible for wo rking, if necessary, with ot her

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M -84 tanks on training.

military system s, irrespective of where they come from. It is, first of all, a matter of achieving a tech nologically intelligent organization, which doesn't need detailed explanations on what has to be don e, but receiv es a task that must be constantly controlled, in real time, monitoring the efficie ncy of its implementation at joint level. The smal l Countries, with Armed Forces nume rical ly scarce, with limited budgets and modest technical possibi lities, cannot afford not to be interoperable in the internati onal field, becau se in th is way they would furthe r reduce their defensive capabilities. For the Serbian Army, the ach ievement of the highest standards, result of th e scientific researches t hat most Armed Forces make as their usual practice, in different weather and time conditions, and interoperability, do not represent an object per se . For us, this is a continuous process of gradual adaptation to the standards, which will lead to the improvement of the operational capab ilities, of effectiveness, of a r ational organization and to the optimum use of the resources. Certainly, joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and defining a partn er's obj ectives has opened us the road to inte roperab ility. The organization and st ructure of the Army u nits are mo st ly compatible with the modern so -

LOGOS - 38

lution s. As w e have underlined before, we expect that , during 2010, units consisting of professional soldiers will be set up; thi~ rt!presents a step forward as regards the quality of individual and co l lective training. The changeover to a completely professional force has required the adoption of a new concept of train in g and of development of the capabiil ities.

Therefore, in this direction it is necessary to proceed and invest with clarity of ideas and dynami sm also in a "net-centric" key. How are you dealing with this mentality leap - a real cultural revolution - with the active participation of the human element, w hich in the transformation must become "motor" and protagonist at all levels and sectors? When one speaks of the classic military confl icts, it is certain that the side that can gath er, work out and distribute, in real time, the largest q u antity of information on the enemy and its forces, the ground and t h e ti me cond itions, obtain s an important priority. The introduction of modern sensors, communication systems, data processing and distribut ion down to the lower levels, requires also new concepts in +plann ing the operations. Neverthel ess , in all this we must not forget man and his limits. In asymmetrical wars , the d epe ndence on technology co uld als o

Rivista Mililare English Edition 11. 2/2010

represent a limiting factor. The modern challenges, the risks and threats to security and, above all, terrorism as global

A "Gazelle " attack helicopter.

phenomenon,

ex-

ground and sports fields. Besides the units reg-

change of information at all levels, regardless of the geographic aspect or any other partnership of a Country. All this forces us, responsible for the functioning of defence, to pursue not only the technological development but aJso the new concepts and the ways of proceeding in practice, because the new approaches are reflected on all the aspects of the training and employment of the forces.

ularly present at the Base, it is our intention to train also the members of the Serbian Army, as well as those of the partner Countries, who are preparing for tasks in multinational operations. Already for some years , members of the Serbian Army have been taking part in peace missions of t he United Nations as military observers. Besides, a part of our medical military organization takes part in peace operations of the United Nations in Congo and Chad. With these engagements and the training abroad we have achieved a certain experience, which we have appl ied in our training. In any case, in accepting as partners the objectives of the units earmarked for the participation in multinational operations , we have undertaken to equip and train them in conformity with the required standards. We are intensely working on it. When and where these units will be employed depends on the decision of the competent branches of the State.

require collaboration

and

The Serbian Minister of Defence, Dragan Sutanovac, ha recently inaugurated in the south of Serbia the military base for training Serbian peacekeepers. What has been done up to now and what there is still to do for "baptizing" the first "Serbian blue berets"? The Base "South" is the most modern structure of the Army and represents a model for the new military facilities and for restructuring the pre existent ones. On an area of 35 hectares we have built an infrastructure for the autonomous accomodation of about 1000 soldiers. The lodging conditions are very comfortable, with four-beds per room. Inside t he Base one can find all that is necessary for training, including a firing range

Interview by Marco Ciampini Brigadier General, Editor-in-Chief, "Rivista Militare"

39 - LO G OS

IS DEMOCRACY EXPORTABLE? Coherent choices with no escapes A careful consideration of the dramatic situation that many Countries must face daily, especially in the Middle East, emphasizing the enormous difficulties met in effectively exporting the western democratic mo del. A question that has been analysed by two schools of thought, although from opposite viewpoints, theorizing different scenarios and finding solutions difficult to be put into practice.

journey of man, differentiated models of democracy have developed an d imposed th emselves such as, for examp le, t hat of ancient Greece and t hat of The dramati c events occurred lately in t he Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Lebanon and in many today's India. In his opinio n, t he t ruth is t hat tod ay's societie s areas of t he planet, have prompted a close debate among the intellect uals of the Western Countries are not static but evolve and experience continuous changes: with the Egyptians t he substantial who wonder: is it useful and feasible to bring democracy in areas where religiou s f undameninnovati ons occurred every 25 00 years, in ou r ti me talis ms and social extrem isms are t he direct cause they occur about every 25 minutes. of violation of the fu ndame ntal princip les of law Se n does not believe in "clashing civilizations" and of t he most elem entary fo rms of parti cipation and shu ns the idea of labe lling every man according to his ethni c and religious identity: it wou ld be of t he citizens in the life of the peoples? In ot her words, are all cultures compatible with democralike "miniaturizing" mankind in many little "boxes" co nflicting with each other. Therefore, he t hinks cy? that t he theories on mu lticulturalism are roug h, Two i nteresting and oppos ite schools of and cou nters wit h t hose of libthought, have tried to answer t hese difficul t questi ons. The eral natio nalis m, a system ope n school referring to Amartya Sen, ' ' ...democracy presupposes to t he pursuit the "new" and of Nobel Prize for eco nomic sci - the abolition of beliefs, uses social progress. ences, native of Bang lade sh; Sam uel Hungtington, on the and customs and implies contrary, wh ile accepting t he and that ins p ired by Sam uel Hungtington, the American po- the construction of a net of principle t hat dem ocracy is not relations, which, the pre rogative of t he Christian litical scientist wh o died recent - human through dialogue and toler- West, in the writings he has left ly. Accordi ng to Amartya Sen, ance, can overcome misun- says t hat democracy is born d emocracy is neit her a mon op- derstandings, mistrusts, en- and flouris hes within t he socioly of the West nor that of and does not arrive from mities and aiversity of polit- eties out side produ cing, as evid ent Christian civili zation. If we w ere to fo ll ow thi s ical, social and religious p roof of t hi s, also the fact t hat thought, and inquired into the thought,, t he elections that have taken place recent ly in Palesti ne, Iraq, history of peoples, we would risk to fal l into t he vortex of Afghanistan and ot her Islamic bleak political "determinism" , w ith the conseCountries have brought no change and induced no t ransformation in the preceding ethni c, social and quence of reducing the prob lem to a mere dicultural set - ups and in the mechanisms of the chotomous divi sion of the world; on the p lanet we functi oning of t h e Institut ions. It is t ru e - he would distinguish the democratic Countries from those with a despot ic regi me only on t he bas is of remarked - t hat in t hose realities t here is the free market and, perhaps, real forms of capital ism have their cultural and religious specificiti es. imposed themselves, but all of this has nothing to The reality of facts is a little more com pl icated. As the re now ned econom ist states "Durin g the do with democracy and d oes not constitute a suf-

TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

LOGOS - 42

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ficient condition for the development of liberal dynamics in the management of power and in the exercise of the relations among the states. In support of his thesis, the American political expert, in some of his most recent essays, has pointed out that some episodes, such as the in crimination in Kabul of Abdu l Ramman - the Afghan Christian persecuted for his conversion and therefore forced to emigrate to Italy - and the many massacres in the mosques of Iraq and other Countries, had shaken the faith in the exportation of democracy even among the American "neocons", the intellectuals who, animated by the sacred fire of redeeming the Muslim world, in the end had come to approve t he armed intervention decided by President Bush aimed at impos ing socal led "l iberal" models of life . Even those idealists - in his judgement - had later changed opinion, believing the cultural barriers insurmountable and wishing, consequently that the missionary spirit of the US Admin istration would dampe n in the realism of the inevitable dialectics of history. Huntington's thought is also supported by distinguished exponents of the "neo- lib" phi losophy,

New York: The Statue of Liberty.

Above. New York: Central Par/<.

Title pages. London Bridge on the Thames.

according to whom progress and globalisation have increased, not reduced , the cultural differences between the West and the theocratic soci eties, so that, i nsid e the sectarian States, the advent of the Internet, schooling and the economic growth have produced more intolerance and lesser propens ity to cooperation, emphasising fundamenLalisrn, nationalism and tribalism: the most e-

ducated have often become the most fanatical, precisely because fideist extremism harms reason . In the contest between the two schools, al l in all the discussion turns in favour of those that believe it difficult, if not impossible, the promotion of the liberal values - such as we understand them where, in the name of a supposed superior civilization that we assert, we discover the ine xist ence of the cu ltural assumptions . And this, accord ing to t he tendency of thought most accredited in the West, for two reasons. First, because peoples are called to make qualitative leaps in the course of their history, a history formed by class strugg le and pursuit of the new, which matures on ly when society has accumu lated sufficient forces to affirm it. If th is maturation is arbitrarily rep laced or imposed , what occurs is ex actly the contrary of the resu lt desired. Second, because democracy presupposes the abolition of beliefs, uses and customs and implies the construction of a net of human re lations, which, through d ialogue and tolerance, can overcome misunderstandings, mistrusts, enmities and divers ity of political , social and re ligio us thought. A process which, in o rder to come to an end , needs a long time and transformations t hat can promote refe rence valu es, symmetrical to the deve lo pment of principles of equity and of safeguard

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A bird's- eye view of Prague.

of the fundamental rights of man, such as the free manifestation of thought, religious freedom, equal dignity of man and woman, equality befo re t he law.

THE RELIGIOUS KNOT

Today Christian Europe has to deal with a mixture of fundamentalist ideologies. T he horror that terrorism of religious origins has managed to spread in many Countries of the world is before o ur eyes". The clash of civilizations, theorized by Huntington and before by Fernand Braudel, materializes today in a more and more linear form in the challenges that the West is called upon to meet. Evidence of it, the highly imaginative picture that Muammar Gheddafi has sketched in an interview to "Al Jazeera", reported by "La Stam pa" of May 3, 2006: "I see signs that herald Allah's victory over Europe without recourse to swords or gu ns ... We have in Eu rope fifty million Musl ims who will transform it into an Islamic continent within a few decades".

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The assert ion is disquieting and gives rise to perplexities and fears, therefore the future scenarios do not appear encouraging at all, also due to other considerations. Spain and Britain are not forgetting the bands of terrorists infiltrated and born within the immigration, who have caused horri ble bloodsheds. The Dutch remember very well the murder of Theo Van Gogh by an immigrant. France, which gives hospitality to about six millions foreigners, has to placate their sons and grandsons who, with incendiary revolts, challenge the model of "i ntegrated" society. T he Belgians and the Germans are more and more oriented to prevent the formation of pockets of illegality, before it is too late. Italy, as the fi rst landing place of the illegal immigrants, constitutes the underbelly of Europe, forced as it is to receive on its shores thousands of poor wretches (it is to be hoped that the recent provisions approved by our Parliament, particularly the agreements with the Governments of the Mediterranean Countries, wi ll prove effective for breaking off the illegal traffic in the migratory movement). But there is more than that. The greatest worry, after the failure of the experiences of British multiculturalism, French fundamentalism and the Italian

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welcome, concerns the more or less near future connected with Africa's overpopulation: according to the latest data of the De Agostini Institute, the inhabitants of the black Continent today total 852 millions (a century ago they were l 70 millions) , compared with the approximately SOO millions of the 27 Countries of the European Union, and are mostly concentrated in Western Europe, the area that attracts t he wandering mu ltitudes the most. It will be indis pensable to ponder on t he importance of such problems and prospects, avoiding simplifications and an easy optimism. The first knot that has to be solved is the religious one, then there is the culture knot, on which it is grafted the conf essional problem. The experience of these latter times tells us that the main obstacle to cohabitation, integration and development of interstate cooperation derives chiefly from problems of faith and cu lture, for the reason that the theocratic constructions are often systems close and incompatible among themselves. Need a proof? It has also been provided by Pope Bened ict XVI, when at the "Universita Gregoriana", some years ago, He sent a very strong message emphas izing the importance of dialogue: religious conflicts can be overcome only through dialogue, which must take place without ambig uity, i.e. without having to renounce the substantial truths of the creed professed. Therefore, how can a person who professes a certain faith be brought near to a person that professes another creed7 How can we prevent religious identity from becom ing an insurmountable barrier to cohabitation and acceptation of different values? How to transform into cooperation and help what appears an undue intrusion and an identity violation, which then become a reason for a cultural clash?

WHICH ROAD FOR THE WEST? Admitting t hat there are no in struments for virtuous changes from the outside, still in t he folds of idealism or political realism there shou ld be the possibility of understanding the functioning of the mechanisms of an effective promotion of democracy. In order to try to understand when it is poss ible and opportu ne to provoke a change and if there are the historical, political , social, ethnic and cul tural conditions for an intervention, let us try to play a game, trying - before "meddling" or havin g recourse , as extreme remedy, to the rifle barrels to provide an answer to four important questions. We shall ask ourselves: • Whether we have actually used al l the diplomatic options at our disposal. · Whether there are sure guarantees that political

initiatives or, at worst, a military intervention would produce the wished consequences. • Whether we are ready to sustain the financial costs and all the risks, includi ng the possible hur:nan losses in case of employment of the military. • What is the attitude of pub lic opinion in th is regard. If all the answers are affirmative or positive, th ings remain difficult but promising; if they are negative or exc ludi ng, the situation becomes rather serious and unbearable. As can be seen, political pragmatism does not admit hurried diagnoses, for the reason that there

Rome. Victor Emmanuel Bridge. In the background, the Dome of St. Peter's Basilica.

are no general formulas with d iri ment power, i.e. that can function in any situation but, conversely, in the end what counts are the differences. Isn't it true that between the change of the regime in Iraq and the future of the realities of China and Russia there are only a few traits in common? That the distances of the social, et hnic and pol itical questions between the Iranian populism and the LatinAmerican ones are such that nobody would pose himself the prob lem of "what to do" in the same identical manner? When we consider these matters, our attention goes immed iate ly to the Midd le East and its transformations, for the simple reason that we, as Eu ropeans and Westerners, have a direct and vital int erest in a democratic evolution of the region. But we must acknowledge that we are still far from being able to crow over a victory There are still some important knots that must be untied: what to do when, as in t he case of Iran, the nuclear clock and that of democracy tell different times? What to decide when, as in the case of Palestine, the democratic elections produce Hamas7

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Paris.Âˇ Place de la Concorde.

t o aim with mo re and more det ermination to the possibility of its enlargement: if t he EU were to definitively close the doors to Turkey and the Balka-

Anyway, in the face of a reality fu ll of tensions that intermingles w ith an unforeseen comp lexity, t here should be a way o ut somehow. Otherwise we

should give, sic et simpliciter, t he palm to those who t hi nk t hat democracy is a plant t hat can only grow in one's garden and cannot take root in t he neighbour's garden : to te ll the truth it is actual ly a rather rus hed way of concluding and a little aphoristic in some ways, for it is ins pired by a general principle devoid of any epistemological analys is. To move along th is line, i. e. to give up a priori any attempt at dialogue, means not t o put an end to a conception of international relat ions based , from the Peace of Westphalia onwards, on the concept of ''non-interference" in the internal affairs of the other States. T herefore, the difficulties start precisely where the general principle ends : can it be t hat for t he conviction of being unab le to export democracy we preclude the road to the right/d uty of humanitarian interference to ass ist the suffering populations? Yes, the risk exists and is endemic in certain forms of "realpolitik" of many Western Countries, accord ing to which there are national inte rests at stake, whi ch make inconvenient and inopportun e to interfere in the internal affairs of othe r States in order to correct illibe ral regimes. If we stand fast by these criteria, we can readily acknowledge t hat Europe, w hich holds democracy as a serious goal of its policy, has no other way but

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New York. The UN building.

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ns, it would have jeopard ized the very ground where th e EU can make the difference for the d iffusion of democracy. The general choice is to feel responsible for a democratic Western community, where the t erm "responsible" means having principles and trying to apply them to oneself before applying them to others: coherence in foreign policy is also measured on this.

CONCLUSIONS What should be done then7 We are convinced that there are many initiatives that can be taken in order to improve the conditions of a Country by causing shocks from the outside and supporting inside it the forces in favour of a democratic change. The past years have been dramatic but other crises are already written in our fut ure, and we will be able to face up to them on ly if we know well on which side we stand and for what. Let us continue to be idealists but not ideological, generous but pragmatic, measured and not unrealistic, stopping to believe that only with weapons one can become prophet of global freedom, getting others to transform themselves in what we would like them to be.

Strasbourg: the European Parliament.

niversity of California, who maintains t hat even within tribal societies, some predispositions of the soul- such as goodheartedness, empathy, generosity, acknowledgement of other people's rights have always dwelled in the heart of man, also in the cave- dweller's. This is confirmed by Steven Pinker, professor of Psychology at Harvard, who maintains that the moral principles that everyone feels he has to respect are pre-programmed in our brain already since birth and have neurobiological bases. Mark Hauser, also a biology professor at Harvard, ,mrl Richard Dawkins, biologist and ethologist at Nevertheless let us also strengthen our consciousOxford, maintain that some ness that in foreign policy modmoral principles - such as the esty and caution are a sure antidote to mistakes but do not ' ' ... many initiatives can be right to life, equality and peace mean a dogged defence of the s- taken in order to improve are universal values that bypass tatus quo. the conditions of a Country the geographical, cultural and Let's do our best to believe by causing shocks from the religious barriers. Quite a different thing than the more and more f irmly that, aloutside and supporting in- peace of Westphalia and the though a force intervention is not the most suitable means for "ex- side it the forces in favour of "non interference" in the internal affairs of the States! porting" systems of liberal way of democratic change , , For t he Governments of the life, one should however tenaWest, if one wants to accept Aciously pursue, encourage and martya Sen's theories, there should still be severexperiment all the possible approaches that can al irons to put in the fire, if only they were to dare spread and make appreciated the assumptions of roll up t heir sleeves, learning to "transfer" into the the democratic model, among which the respect for illiberal regimes, if not democracy tout court, at human rights assumes a prevail ing entity. least those virtuous chang es and those positive And it is worth believing it, considering that the reference values that could foster the development thing is not so absurd after all as it would be if we of social and political dynamics open to tolerance were thinking of growing sugar cane in Siberia. Such and justice, therefore standing guarantors of the an approach would not be abstract and utopian at fundamental human rights. all. We are confirmed in this also by the anthropoIf they do it - we are sure - that they wil l not, run logic, psychological and neuro logical sciences, acthe risk of returning home empty handed. cording to which, on the basis of the most recent discoveries , the human being, in any latitude, is naturaliter oriented towards good and predisposed for Giovanni Cerbo his social evolution. Brigadier General (ret.) These extrao rdinary scientific resu lts are reafFormer Editor of "Rivista Militare" firmed by Donald E. Brown, anthropologist at the U-

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THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS' CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS Cultural anthropology can prove to be useful to the personnel leaving for the operations theatres, because it makes the military acquainted with the peoples' uses and customs. It can also have a possible operational function within the decision-making process that the Commanders use in order to decide the strategies and conducts for the fulfilment of the task assigned in the theatre.

The three-year course of study of strategic Sciences at t he Turin University envisages t he teaching of cu ltural anth ropology, for the techni cal-admi nistrative and the politico-organization al courses. Also the Staff Course and the multi - thematic master that were he ld in the past years at the Appl ication School and at the Institute for Military Studies, which were aimed at supplying usefu l operational in struments to the students, provided for a module of cultural anthropology.

Certainly one of the reasons of the m il itary courses' attention to this d iscipline is that of providing the students with the knowledge commo n to the ir colleagues that come from the civilian world: in many university degrees, also different from each other, anthropology modules are envisaged. This discipline, on the other hand, provide s useful instr uments for the Army profess ionalis m. First of all, it pe rmits to understand the importance of placing oneselr in rront of the 'Other" , the foreigner, in terms of co m parison. Mankind's history stands on comparison and change. No human group, excepting those of a film's fantasy, can live completely iso lated from the others. Also the populations of the Trobriand Islands (near to New Guinea i n the Western Pacific Ocean), apparently excluded from the world, as repo rted by Malinowski (1884- 1942), interact ed with other island s and other populations, with lively trade and complex social relations. The encounter with the "Other" entails necessarily a change: its i ntensity may vary, but it occurs in any case. Mankind has met and co nfronted without interruption , and every human group has always learnt something new and give n something to the communities that has encoun tered in his hist ory. The experience of Alexande r th e Great and hi s Macedoni an Army which, as they penetrated into the Far East, unknown to them at the t im e, chan ged their attitude and behaviou r, losi ng fragments of "Greekness" and acqui r ing the cultural characters of the local pop ulations (the Pe rs ians, for examp le) can be an in-

Title pages and left.

Meeting "the Other" involves necessarily a change.- its intensity may vary but it occurs at all times.

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terest ing example . The Christianisation of the Occident and the lslamization of the Far East are examples of what the anthropologists call "cultura l globalization". It is not by chance th at among the first Christian saints and martyrs there we re many so ldiers: the first among them was certainly Saint LonginoÂˇ, the Roman legio nary who, in the Christian tradition, pierced Jesus' side and brought to Italy His blood and the lance he had used . He was martyred in Mantua for his faith , that he gained in h is encounter with Christ on the Cross. It is the m ilitary who go exploring, who in a

Above and left. Dialogue, in different and more or less dramatic manners, takes place all the time, even if often it leaves unfulfilled curiosities on both sides.

ian soldiers and the meetings of populations, which can , through a long cohab itation , give rise to a kind of different culture, to what Amselle (2001) and the other modern anth ropolog ists call "cultural half-breed", which belongs to neither group. But it is useful to remember that mil itary history goes always together with that of the community, and reaffirm the importance of con sidering the soldie r abroad the first (in the sense of "on the front line") representative of a culture that "supports him" and "exists beh ind h im".

ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE MILITARY: A COLLABORATION CREATED IN TIME

The m ilitary experience of living on a fro ntier, sense make reconnaissance for their group and not only as regards space but also among cul live for years in territo r ies at the border with othtures, has led the f irst anthropologists , or, better, er communities . It is they, not the communities th e first modern scholars to use the nu merous of origin, who first come into contact with the writings of Officers, besides new ideas and are spurred to those of adm inistrators and make comparisons. The objectives of the p resent missions '' ... in various situations the missionaries, to obtain i nforabroad provide specifical ly that colonial Administrations mation abo ut the folklore and the mi litary personnel should have made use of the an- customs of exotic populations unknown at the t ime. Neverlive in direct contact w ith the thropologists' research and theless, the exchang e has people, living together for months, if not for years , on analysis capabilities in order been reciprocal in various sitt erritories different from their to improve their knowledge uations the colon ial Adm inisown. There is always a dia- of the populations that they t rations have made use of the anthropologists' research and logue, in different and more or were to rule,, analysis capab ilities in o rder to less dramatic ways, even if it i mprove their knowled ge of often leaves unsatisfie d cuthe populations that they were to rule. riosities on both sides. The most intere sting example is certainly that It is certai nly inappropriate to put on the same of Edward Evans Pritchard (1902-1973), one of level the ex periences, limited in time, of the ltal-

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Within the military operations abroad, a fair approach to the local populations is essential.

the greatest experts on this subject, who participated, as an adviser, in various British military missions (l ). Among other populations, he studied the Azande, which l ived on the border between the present Sudan and the Congo. His results deserve to be presented here in order to i llustrate more adequately the contribution that anthropology can give to the military reality.

ence internal to every system of beliefs. Referring the whole th ing to our need, as m ilitary, to know the cultures of the populations w e meet, the attention to the coherence of the systems of credence, on the bas is of the various socio-economic, political and familial models, can be a useful instrument for our persona l analysi s and evaluation of the situation i n which we are operating. The terms of the cultural question do not concern what group is "superior" in the comparison: the discussion shifts on the consideration that every culture has its own log ical system, as much legitimate and valid, wh ich allows the different human groups to organ ize the soc ial, political, economic, familial and relational structure of the members of the community and of those outside it . In other words, every human group o rganizes its own system with cultural answers to the needs common to the entire humanity. In order to meet the different requirements, the communities work out various types of social organizations, different power managements, different production strategies and economic models; so they create various types of family organizations and kindred alliances for reproductive necess ities, but also for the logic of accords and alliances with the neighbouring communities.

Evans Pritchard pointed out in l 93 7 how that

population had a political and social system THE INTERPRETATION OF ÂŤTHE OTHERÂť based on witchcraft and magic beliefs, which In conflict situations, where there are popu lapermitted to give a meaning to all events. "This tions that live the daily experience dramatical ly, system has a logic structure. Once some postu the question is not simply resolvable by referring lates are established, the conclusions become generically to cultural relativism, today a subject valid and the action is based on them". According of ample discussions, especially as regards huto Evans Pritchard, the Azande thought had a coman rights and their respect by al l Countries. We herent and logically nece ssary character: from ce rtain prem ises derive detershould mention, at this point, another anthropologist, a con minate consequences. It is the same logic thought that be- ' ' In other words, every hutemporary, who proposes the longs, although in another di- man group organizes its theme of cultural confrontamension, to our system of betion connected with the liefs: a cause produces an ef- own system with cultural themes of the cultura l superifect. The Azande ascribed this answers to the needs comority of the West: Clifford link to witchcraft, according to mon to the entire humanity,, Geertz. As we are speaking of a non -contradictory model, the Army's movements in the that we cannot analyse thorworld, we can say that Geertz oughly here, as we would attribute it to "scie ntifis a milestone of modern anthropology because he is the theorist of "culture interpretation". It is ic" exp lanations. The problem of rationality, which had already found in Levy Bruhl references not the case to present here the stil l ongoing heated debate of the scholars , about the very to log ic thought, by Evans Pritch ard is solved as a "non problem": the question of cultural differcomplex question proposed by Geertz, which we ence (in terms of different attribution of mean can substantiate , at the cost of a cons iderable ings and discordant solution of prob lems) is not conceptual reduction, in a statement: when an based on the alternat ive: among the systems ex individual meets another individual, belong ing to a different cultural group, he sees the attitudes, pressed by the various social groups: which is true and which is false7 There is always a coherthe behaviour that the latter expresses and inter-

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prets them acco rding to his interpret ative code. The examp le use d by Gee rtz is pe rfect: we see a person t hat winks: what does this action mean? It could be a ti c, therefo re has no meanin g for us, or be a messag e sent expressly t o us, an "inviting look". In this case, of what k ind? Is it meant to be a way of starting a friendly or solid relation, an invitati on to complic ity, or sexual (as coul d be the mode l of our culture)? It is a deci sive ques tion : this is well known to people who, abroad, have lived experie nces o f w rong evaluation of gestures, symbol s and their contextual differe nt cultural meanings that have created g reat difficulti es in living t ogether with the popu lation . The question that we can ask ourselves at th is point, using the contributions of Evans Pritchard

Above and left. Paying attention to "the Other", to his system of beliefs and to his social, political and cultural models is a key instrument for an adequate analysis and evaluation of the context in which one operates.

and Geertz, is even more complex : is there the possibility to und erstand exactly and perfectly a culture different from our own and v ice versa? The difficulty of the inter pret atio n does not re sid e only in the sem ant ics of the gesture, i. e. i n the d ifferent meaning that is attri buted to it, but al so in the d iffere nt log ic systems of reference t hat are und erneath. Wh at see ms perfectly coherent to a group is not so for another group. We have to admit that this elem ent is by now well known by th e Italia n mi lita ry, who are preparing also for the cu ltural as pects and the interpretative difficulties: there are many who,

before leavi ng for a mission, feel the need to read boo ks about t he peoples they are going t o en counter. There is perhaps no occasion to make use of th e lesson s learn ed for a mo re and more updated and topical training of th e variou s expedi ti onary Forces. In other words, it is useful not on ly to say what colour is the headd ress of t he local pol itical authority, but also to teach th e personnel t o look for the signs that denote the au th oritative person, whatever the context, because th ese may vary, also owi ng to the specific stories of the various communities that live on th e terri tory. It is red uctive to th ink of fac ing a cu ltu ral con frontation w ith Guide lines wit hout d i rect ing the pers onn el' s attention on the com pl exity of meeti ng "the Oth er". If we have learnt that the reacti ons t o our be haviou rs change according to the gender of the perso ns in fro nt of us, their be lo ng ing to political , re lig io us, social majorities or m inorit ies, their deg ree of learning and edu catio n, their work responsibilities , th eir previ ous experien ces with Italian or other contingents, it is equal ly t rue that ou r be haviou r ch anges acco rding to our sex , ou r belonging to majo rities or minorities, as wel l as to our level of education and working responsi bil it y . At anecdotic level we use our ex periences to make a kind of handbook, with lists of "rig ht" and "wrong" thi ngs that do not conside r th at we are all beare r s of cultu re. We

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ing stu d ies after their return home can su pply a useful instrument fo r t he train in g an d (re)assem b ly of the retu rn ed personnel, who w ill pe rh aps have to repeat in the f uture the experience in th e same place s. To know a popu latio n, respecti ng its cu ltu re, learni ng how not t o q uesti on ou r own (no matter if with pos itive o r negative results) and fee li ng respected i n o ur t u rn , can sati sfy th e reci procal cu rios itie s in a pos itive manner an d create the prere q uisites for a profitable experience that w ill faci l itate the retu rn ho m e an d the success ive reem p loyme nt in t he same scenar io.

Above and right. The respect we wish t o show dep ends on th e mutual recognition of the diversity.

must teach the pers o nnel a ce rtai n elasticity, we need a flexi bil it y of adapt ation, k nowi ng t hat, as the re are various local cultures , so in our d ialogue we m ust take into accou nt the fact that an other cultu re is always p resent: ou r own , and not rely tenacious ly on "our common sense, typically Ital ian", as if this sh ared credence wer e not also a cu lt ural inference. T he respect that we want to show goes t hrou gh the reciprocal ac knowled gement of d iversity. Our m o st beautiful ex periences abroad have certai nly been those where the populat ion has welco m ed and appreciated our work , heedful to t he ir cu lAN EXPERIENCE IN OPERATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY t u ral specificity, b ut, at the same time , has bee n ab le t o acknowled ge our dive rsity. In those sit uAnthro pologic l ite ratu re, u nderstood as a w ations we have fel t les s the cu ltural d iscomfort of hole of real writi ngs and accounts, fru its of the t he comparison. That is w hy, th en, if on th e one ex perience on the fie ld of t he ant hropologi st, sid e it is usefu l to make l ists of w ho has l ive d close togethe r "dos" and "do n'ts", wh ich can with t he pop ulat io n fo r long give the first directi ons i n order ' ' Anthropologic literature, period s of ti me, can provide a to avoid the recu rrence of eruseful instru ment, also d iro rs of j udge m ent at every understood as a whole of rectly ope rational. Once the tu rn over of personnel , on the true writings and accounts, milit ary pe rso nn el emp loyed other side it is necessary to in- fruits of the experience on i n m i ss ion s abroad - w here stru ct the co nt in gents o n t he the field of the anthropolo- contact wit h t he popu lation is most ge neral su bject of com- gists, who has lived close necessary and env isaged by par ison and cu ltu ra l relativi sm, together with the popula- the M andate itse l f - has w it ho ut not icing the ri sk of learned and taken pos sessio n losi ng parts of ou r uni quenes s. tion for long periods of of the meth odo lo gi cal a nd If an occas ional t ou r ist can find time, can provide a useful systemat ic in struments, these instrument, also directly can and m u st be emp loyed am u sing the cu ltural d iscom fort that he feels after a j ourney operational,, not o nly at i nter- i ndivid ua l in faraway Countries, as much leve l. In a g loba l per spective, ag reeable this cann ot p robably be for th e m il itary w hich sees the A rmy inv olved on always- diffe r per sonnel who have ex perienced stro ng, if not ent territ ories, w e can say that anthro pol ogy, as dramatic, contrast wit h acute man ifest ations of a science , provides a methodology of resear ch refusal of the cu ltu ral mode l encou nt ered. Also in and analys is of ethnographic data that can be of t his case , researches on t he field and t he fol lowuse to w homeve r has t o m ake studi es on the

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operational scen arios and define action st rate gies. The potential expressed by the discipline in the missions abroad has been well understood by Gen eral Petrae us who in 2006 approved the presence in Iraq and Afghanistan of anthropol ogists embedded within tl:le Human Terrain Sys tem (HTS) u nits, an experience that apparently gives exce llent results. The project was born of the collaboration of som e American an thropol ogists, Montgomery McFate among them, w ith various Research Centres of Defence, and thei r co ntribution to so me chapters of the "Coun terinsurgency Manual" written by Ge neral Pe traeus h imself (2006) . In this case the mil itary requirement, for which the proj ect was lau nched, was to understand the cultural motivations of the popu lations' behaviours towards the Americans and manage to foresee the local response to prec ise strategic and operational cho ices. The contribution of re searchers, expert in the analysis and above all in the encounter w ith "the Other", has been und erstood not only as that of mere "cultural advi sers". Their analyses are an important elem ent of the strategic and operational choices of the Commanders themselves. The re sults seem to be very promis i ng: in the ope rational areas where there are HTS units the level of conflict has fallen significantly (measu red in Ameri ca n and non-Ameri can human casualti es) and the population's perception o f t he American p resence appears more positive than where there are no anthropol og ists.

CONCLUSIONS Cultural anthropology is a discipline that provides the analysis of popu lations and areas of interest with a precise methodology of research: from t he hypothes is, to th e acquisition and processing of eth nograph ic data supplied by real person s, contacted d i rectly, to the direct observation in t he field of human relations and of the modalities of cu ltu ral con stru ction of the surrounding world. For this reaso n it is useful in the missions abroad , both in the person ne l's re lations with t he populat ion and in the management of the cultural uneasiness that may be fe lt by the military and the persons that live in the area. It is poss ible to consider cu ltu ral anthropology also as an operational funct ion (2) within the decision - making process employed by the Commanders to define strategies and conducts for carrying out in the th eatre the assigned the task .

In a global perspective, where the Army is present in more and more varied territories, anthropology provides a valid method or research for tho se who must study the operational scenarios.

In this direction, it would be desirabl e to have embedded anthropologists (or military person nel trained for t h is purpose) w ho would meet the pop ulation with precise risol utive hypotheses of researc h and acqu ire ethnogra ph ic data, scientifically val id and useful for t he mission's aims, in a modali ty of dialogue with the civilians felt by both sides as positive and fruitful. To know how the presence of the foreign er, of "th e Other", (in this case , us; in fact, we operate outside our national borders) is perceived by the natives and what are, or could be, their concrete answers to our actions , ideal or real, could rea lly contribute in an effective way to the decis ion maki ng process i n the intervention and man agement polic ies .

Chiara Galli Captain, Army Application School and Institute for Military Studies

NOTES (1) In particular, he was called to Su dan by the AngloEgyptian adm in istration to study the Nuer, who did not accept any foreign presence, and give a report on the popu lation "who se insurrection would be violently put down if they did not understand their motivat ions" a t hing that occurred anyway. (2) The operational function is "an activity of a homogeneous military character which , com bin ed with some other activity, permits to plan, conduct and support an operation" accord ing to Publication SMD -G - 0 14 Publication "Glossary of terms and defin itions", ed. 2007.

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THE <<TACTICAL>> LEGAL ADVISOR IN LAND MILITARY OPERATIONS ABROAD Today the legal advisor is rightfully one of the essential components of the special staff of the Commander of the Contingent deployed in the Operations Theatre. The experience matured in military actions abroad during the last decade has moreover emphasized how the accomplishment of "missions" referred to the legal advisor shows a much differentiated "spectrum" of potential implementation.

LEGAL ADVISORS, CONSULTANTS AND COUNCILLORS

gents employed abroad. The Engl ish expression "Legal Advisor" is at present the most frequently used in the natio nal "The High Con tracting Parties in any time, and environment, also because there is not a correthe warring Parties in a period of armed conflict. sponding and univocal term in Ital ian. In fact, will make sure that legal advi while with "consulente legale" sors be available when necesin Italian one tends to id entify sary, in order to givP ;:irlvice to ' ' ... a position that only in the Officer w h o , at home, is in the military Commanders of the recent past has started vested with the solution of the appropriate level about the to be formally and continu - "national" lega l problems, inenforcement of the Convenstead, for what regards the tions and the present Protocol, atively envisaged also in the corresponding tasks in Operaand about the appropriate in- organizations of the nation- tional Th eatres (OT),there is contingents employed the coexistence of: structions to be g ive n on this al su bject to the Armed Forces". abroad ,, • the qualification of "legal ad T h is definition, included in visor", formally attribut ed (un art.82 of the l st protocol of der the clause of the m en June 8, 1977, additional to the Geneva conven tioned art.82 of the l st Additional Protocol of tions of August 12, 1949, includes the essence of 1977) to the military entrusted with advising a position that only in the recent past has startthe military commanders of the appropriate ed to be formally and continuatively envisaged level about the application of the Diritto lnteralso in the organization s of the national continnazionale Umanitario (DIU) (Internation al Hu m anitarian Law (IHL) (l) or, wanting to ind icate more exhaustively the entire body of the norms connected with the ph enom enon of armed conflicts, the Di r it to lnte rnazio nale dei Conflitti Armat i (DICA) (Internat ional Law o n Armed Con flicts) - (2); • the name of "cons iglie re legale" (legal advisor) (3) applies to Office rs placed directly under the

Title pages. A "Centauro" armoured car in Lebanon.

Left. An Alpine controlling the ground under his respons.•bility.

LOGOS - 58

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 2/2010

Commander i n operations abroad and charged with giving advice main ly for what regards the mandates of the m iss ions , the restrictions in the use of force, the handling of perpetrators or suspects of crimes, the applications of the Rules of Engagem ent (RO E) , the international agreements. At present, if one wants to find a denomination alternative to the English one, one could use that of "consulente giuridico" (4) (legal adviser) which, as will be better explained later on, in this sense would be indicative of th e twofold and indi ssoluble field of action (national and abroad).

ORGANIZATION, DEPENDENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES The national military publ ications regarding mil itary operations abroad refer generically to a function of "consu lente legale", introduced in the Command Module and outside the Staff, i.e to single Offi cers, likewis e directly under the Commander of the contingent, as special advisers (special staff). The National Operational Directives issued by the Comando Operativo di Vertice lnterforze (COi) (Summit Operational Command), similarly, envisage that the position be occupied by an Office r hierarchically directly subord inate to the Commander of the Contingent. From thP tech nical functional point of view, the Legal Advisor (LEGAD), in the Operati onal Theatre, is subordinate to the LEGAD of the higher Command and, as regards the Nation, depends on the Legal Office of CO i, brain and motor of al l the mi litary operations conducted abroad by the national Armed Forces. Simi larly , the legal advisor of the Contingent coordinate s and controls the corresponding Officers possibly present at the dependent Task Forces and keeps constantly in touch also with those of the collateral HQs (fig. l ). As regards responsibilities, despite the by now continuative presence of national contingents in many foreign OTs, the actual sphere of action of the LEGADS up to now has not been fo rmally sanctio ned in un ivocal job descriptions, but every time has been referred to the discretio n of the Commander, who decides if and in what terms t o make use of the services of his LEGAD, who, from the hypothesis of an ampler involvement in the comprehensive dynamics of the operations (as "filter" of the ju ridical legitimacy of th e products of all the functional areas), can limit himse lf to particular cases of "sheer" juridical advice. If, nevertheles s, one wanted to try to identify the sphere of the act ivities ordinari ly su bmitted to the LEGAD, one should distinguish aspects of both "nati onal" and "i nternational" characte r.

THE «NATIONAL» RESPONSIBILITIES The activities of a national character are those carried out by the "tactical" legal advisor at home, as Officer organizationally directly subordinate to the Brigade Commander. Thes e competences may include, in their maximum expansion, the direct handling of all the matters that have disciplinary, penal, adm in istrative, civil law, ethical - behavioural importance and, in a general sense, a juridicallegal weight. The introduction in th e OT of the legal advi sor entails therefore that he should continue to answer, also abroad, to the same activations attributed to him at home. In particular, t he fol lowing areas could be identified: • activities at the headquarters (operational standsti ll): all the activities that fall under the compe-

Fig. 1

THE LEGAD ABROAD C ONTINGENT

C Di

I 1

LEGAO

,, ,, ,,

--·-: --

~---~,, ~

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Force LEGAD

tence of the legal advisor at home; • preparation: prearrangement of Standing Operational Procedures (SOP), Directives of a perm anent character (formal set- up and norms of behaviour of the personnel inside and outside the bases; li mits to alcohol con sumption; use of pri vate video- photographic tools; sexual harassment and discriminative activities ; import/ export of goods to and from the OT; leaves, use of internet points) as well as circulars : Uust as an indicat ion: accidents / events that involve personnel and goods of the Defence Adm ini stration; insurance of the Defence personnel employed in Out-of- Area missions; internal disciplinary sanctions; discipline) aimed at stand ard ising at Contingent level the treatment of routine procedures of juridical-legal importance, or to lay down common norms of behaviour; conduct: • • drafting of messages and of the technicaldisciplinary reports/ technical re lations (i.e. coordination and control on the similar analogous activity pertaining to the subordinate

59 - LOGOS

1m.

units) in cases of accidents / events that involve personnel and / or goods of the Defence Administration ; · · monitoring penally significant events and the consequent trials (in collaboration w ith the Carab inieri); • · verification of the legitimacy of t he disciplin ary measures; procedural advice; • • participation in the commissions mon itoring the regularity of the provision of goods and

An Italian serviceman on the turret of a "Dardo".

services by civilian firms and coordination of the actions to be taken in cases of non-compliance;

· · relations with the Police Forces, the Jud iciary (in coordination with the Carabinieri), the Nat ional Lawyers Body (Avvocatura) , and, in general, with lawyers and barristers; · · issue of ethic-behavioural directives; • • juridical-legal ass istance to the HQ and subordinate units; · · possible general legal assistance to the personnel.

ing to the various levels of responsibil ity) of the personnel of the body/unit; · · participation in the t raining activities of the unit , in order to ensure its compliance to t he dictates of the law; · • verification of the implementation by the unit/ body of the arrangements regarding DICA (countermarks , protection badges, identity cards); • • updating on the subject involved, through the participation in conventions, seminars, conferences and the acquisition of documents available, both nationally and internationally; preparation : • • examine the international/ national mandate in order to verify the contents and conformity to the "Flag Right"; guide the G2 /J2 and the G3/J5 in drafting the Operation Order (OPORD) from the law standpoint; identify the juridical state of the conflicting parties and gather further information of a social nature; find out persons, places and goods needing protection; • • exam ine the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in order to identify the juridical state of the Forces and the limits of the sovereignty of the State where the mission operates ; • • draft the "Legal" and "ROE" enclosures to the OPORD; · · implement itinerant desks regarding the legal and ROE aspects in favou r of the un its ex pected

to be employed; • • prepare aju ridical vademecum to be distributed among the participants in the operation; prepare SOPs, directives, memos and documents of analysis in depth of juridical subjects and behavioural codes of the international Organizations within wh ich the mission will have to operate; conduct: · • advice to the Commander, the Cells and the Task Forces as regards the enforcement of the international law; THE «INTERNATIONAL» RESPONSIBILITIES · · issue and update of procedures and directives; • • verify the conformity to the In any case, the most peculiar law of the weapons and equipactivity of the LEGAD in opera- ''The fulfilment of the funcment employed and of the methtions abroad is that concerning tions assigned to LEGAD re- ods of conduct of the operations ; the interpretatio n ahd application quires the preparation of an • • verify of the ROE's conformity of DICA. to the law, with the detection of In particular, we can note the adequate «normative knappossible interpretative and applisack», in which to pack the cation difficulties, also aimed at following situations: • activities -at the Headquarters juridical instruments necesmaking modifications and varia(operational standstill): sary... ,, tions ; • • gathering and updating the • • intervene directly at the mopublications and documents ment of preparation or receipt of of reference; the procedures of standardization of the behav• • descript ion to the higher Authorities of the posiour of the military of the Force, when specific sible needs to update the instructions in force; events that indicat e hostilities from external • • indoct rination and updating (diversified accordsubjects occu r;

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Riv isla Militare English Edition n. 212010

.. implement briefing s/ meeti ngs with the personnel of the contingent for in-depth information ; .. keep direct contacts with the collateral, subordinate and higher LEGADS; .. advice and direct participation, for the relevant aspects, as regards t he stipulation of accords, Memorandum of Unders·tanding (MoU), protocols of understanding with the local Authorities and the warring parties; .. coordinate daily with the Provost Marshal and the Military Police; . • write the outcome of the verifications to the superordinate Authorities following accidents; . • institute and monitor the files (or activities of coordination and control on the similar Activity of the Task Force) of insurance of the Defence personnel engaged in Out- of- Area operations.

THE «NORMATIVE PACK» The fulfilment of the functions assigned to LEGAD requires the preparation of an adequate "normative knapsack", in which to pack the juridical instruments necessary for facing and solving every possible activation in the sectors of interest. In particular, there are at least three "compartments" to be filled (fig .2): international o rganization, organization of the Flag Nation and of the other Nations of the Coalition. These precincts are further connected among themselves through SOFAs, no rms of coordination of the host Nation and exchange of letters at diplomatic level. The "products" of the planning activity at strategic, operational and tactical level derive, for each Nation, from the abovement ioned norms for general reference.

CONCLUSIONS The legal advisor today is legitimately one of t he essential components of the special staff of the Commander of the Contingent deployed in the Ope rations Theatre. The experience gained in the military operFig. 2

THE "NORMATIVE BACKPACK"

lnlemofionol

Host Nation

, Otganization

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hit. HS Norm~

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!_ lnlernol

'"1. H5

Orgonliotion Coolltion Members

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low

law

-:oalltlon • . ~11 ,anco ~ ~

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International conduct

Planning Documents & National conduct

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"'-

ations abroad during the last decade, on the other hand , has shown that the carrying out of the "missions" referred to the legal advisor presents a greatly differentiated "spectrum" of potential implementation. In practice, actually, the real involvement of the LEGAD in the operations' cycle - despite the efforts, also doctrinal, made by COi, real "polestar" of the national military-juridical constellation - remains, in su bstance, in the Commander's will, also in relation to the competence and professionalism of his collabo rator. In that sense, therefore, by applying t he categories of the operational planning, it could be synthetically be concluded that - given the "End State" of the mission carried out in full legal legitimacy - the Centre of Gravity (legal advice ready, effective and adherent) will be reached only if the achievement of the first Decisive Point (formalized by a shared job description) is followed also by the organic and rational organization of the LEGADS as Corps or, at least, as a separate Roll, even if unified at joint level. Enrico Dubolino Major, Army General Staff, 3rd Division, Forces Employment/ Army Operations Centre

NOTES (1) The International Humanitarian Law traditionally included the so-called "Law of The Hague" (relevant to the discipline of the use of war violence among belligerents and the relations among belligerents and neutrals, with its source mainly in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907) and the "Geneva Law" (concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts and of the civilian population , developed by the Geneva Convention of 1864). This dichotomy was finally overcome thanks to the 2 Additional Protocols of June 8, 1977 concerning t he protection of the victims of international and non-international armed conflicts. (2) According to the prevalent doctrine, "International Law on Armed Conflicts" would be the most comprehensive expression,, for it refers to: ius ad bellum , i.e. the right to have recourse to armed force; conduct of the hostilities and the relations between the belligerents and third States (ius in bello or "law on armed conflicts", in literal sense); disarmament and control of armaments . (3) Army staff, Force Employment - Doctrine Office, Training and Regulations, Command and Control, edition 1999, Part I, Chapter Ill, par.2, p.63. (4) The adjective "juridical", etymologically understood as "of the right, related to the law" (from the Latin iu rid icus formed by ius iuris "law" and the theme dicere "to say") seems to be preferred to "legal", limited within the sphere "of the law", from the Latin etymon legalis, deriving from lex legis "law".

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THE ITALIAN ARMY IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES. A RESOURCE FOR THE COUNTRY Interview with Major General Danilo Errico, Head of the 3 rd RIF/COE Division of the Army Staff The occurrence of emergency situations for national disasters, up to this day witnesses the value of the participation of the Armed Forces to Civil Defence, which is institutionally entrusted with the responsibility of handling these interventions. In view of this, the Italian Army, on the basis of a distinctive experiential background, continues to provide cooperation with its capabilities, which are decisive in the initial phases of the intervention, and also in the successive process of normalization/stabilization of the situation. The characteristics of such interventions emphasise, as happens in the operations abroad, the distinctly interagency and civil-military character of the Service, reference parameters for the training and modus operandi of the Italian soldier. A modus operandi which, in the recent and last experiences in Abruzzo and Montaguto, despite the technological transformations being carried out, once more confirms the fundamental principle of the soldier's profession: solidarity and help for suffering people. /

The Army, in case of disasters, performs a role complementary to that of Civil Defence and to the other Ministries institutionally in charge of the various sectors of the intervention. Therefore different forces are involved, both civilian and military, differently organized. How do you implement the synergy among the various sectors concerned? Law 2 2 5 of 1992, constitutive of the nat ional service of Civil Defence (PROCIV), provides that:" ... t he operational structures ... of PROCIV ... are constituted ... by th e Fire Brigade as fundamental component, the Armed Forces, t he Police Forces, t he National Technica1 Services, the Italian Red Cross .. .". Therefore , t he Italian Army, like the other Services and Armed Corps of the State, must be seen as an integrant part of the system of the national Civil Defence , where different and num ero us agencies/ actors, both military and civilian, come together. Such multi- system and multidimensional charact eristic, typical of the interventions for national disasters, requires a synergy of. capabilities t hat can be obtained by:

LOGOS - 64

I. Above. Major General Danilo Errico.

Title pages. Equipment of the Engineer Corps for the removal of rubble.

RMsta Militare English Edition n. 2/2010

. the traini ng and cultural change of the personnel, that shou ld operate accord ing to a "one team" approach; . the defi nition of a clear chain of Command and Control dependent on the Department of Civil Defe nce: this allows unity of Command , maximization of operational performance and widespread integration among the various com ponents. Such aspect is a fundamental precondition for t he co rrect functioning of an operational instrument like the one realized by Civil Defence in the operations of assistance to the population in case natural calamities. In this regard, the sol ution of introducing liaison personnel of the Service into the Centres of Aid Coordi nation, at provincial level, and into the Joint Operati onal Centres, at local level, where the interventions of Civil Defence are handled and coordinated, allows a continuous and p romptly updated exchange of information, besides an effective and integrated coordination on the activities to be carried out, avoiding useless overl apping and waste of resources.

• psychological support to the population ; • tran sport and sto rage of Civil Defence materials ; • preparation of meals. Moreover, since mid- April, m i lit ary personnel has been employed also in control , impl em ented th rough activities of patrol and fi xed surveillance, in various zo ne s of t he town. Thi s additional con tribution has permitted to avoid the entrance into t he "red zone", i.e. th e city's historical ce ntre, crowded with unstable buildings risking imminent collapse and, at the sam e time, p revent looting , in houses and religious monuments and buildings. Furthermore, in October we have set up a Task Force of military engi nee rs (about 25 me n), con sistin g mai nly of speci alist person ne l (e nginee rs/ architects / bui Id i ng surveyors) , tasked with the planning and direction of the works for

General, the participation of t he Army in the operations of assistance to the inhabitants of the Abruzzi has started at the very beginning of the emergency with the employment of the units deployed in the region. Can you bring to light their tasks and role in the various phases of assistance and reconstruction? The inte rvention of the various units, quartered in t he chief town of the Abruzzi (33rd Artillery Regiment and 9th Alpi ni Reg im ent), has guaran teed, immediately after the seismic event, the protection of human life with targeted and risolutive actions ; the evacuation of the injured to the nearest hospitals, with both helico pters of the AVES compone nt for the most seriously injured, and with military am bulances for patients not in imminent peril of life; the removal of rubble in order to facil itate the work of the rescue teams; setting up encampments an d logistic- fu ncti onal suitable structures, in or der to provide immediate lodg ing s for tre population hit by t he earthquake. As integration of the fi rst riso lutive intervention we have deployed, in t he heavily stricken area, assets coming from engineer and specialist units, employed for: • further removal of de bris and de molition of un safe buildings; • reopening of the damaged roads; • managing of the Terni-L'Aquila- Su lmona rail road ; · implementatio n of urbanization works in the recept ion camps;

Engineer p ersonnel cooperating with the Civil Defence.

the construction of temporary housing modules destined t o homeless people and the preparation of variance valuations connected with the reali zation of temporary modules for school use. One should mention also the employment of about 20 soldiers in the implementation of the "Prefect's plan for the integrated management of t he snow-ice emergency" in the province of Aquila, carried out th rough the use of vehicles of Civi l Defence and of the Abruzzi Region, suitable for removing the snow and making the town's roads practicable also in adverse weather condi tions. In order to acquire this qualification, the se rvice men have been sent to attend a specifi c training course at the Autonomous Region of Valle d'Aosta. At the moment there is another Engineer Task Force, which, si nce the month of April 201 0, has been em ployed to widen t he road to reach a quarry in the vicinity of Aquila, adapting it, in terms of receptive capabilities, in order to allow the disposal of tons of rubble still accumulated in the

65 - LOGOS

As regards the logistic component of the Army , in this, as in other similar circumstances, its struc-

tural subdivision, the peculiarity of the assets readily available and the diversified potentiality expressed have permitted to carry out the tasks assigned in an absolutely adequate manner, both in terms of achievements and times of implementation guaranteed in the specific circumstance. The logistic support to the forces involved in the operations has been largely supplied by t he "logistic belt of adherence" i.e. by the logistics entrusted to the responsibility of t he Commander of the Operational Land Forces and directed to the immediate support of the units engaged "on the ground", which avails itse lf of bodies / assets char-

Above. Works for reopening the road system in the Montaguto area. Right. Transit of the first EUROSTAR train on the Montaguto Panini - Savignano lrpino line.

Abruzzi's capital. If we want to supply a nume rical statistic of the entire activity carried out, in the initial phase of the assistance the employment of the personnel of the Service has exceeded 1250 units daily (the equivalent of two regiments). In the months of November and December, such forces have been stabilized on about 400 elements . Since January 2010, t he participation has become fixed on an average of 1 50 men / day.

What was the organization that allowed to intervene as best as possible in the areas stricken by the earthquake, and how much influence did the logistics of the Army have, together with the presence of particular assets, such as the Engineers, among the forces engaged?

The intervention in the areas hit by the earthquake has witness·ed a subdivision of the organization of Command and Control (C2) at th e various leve ls of Command, and in particular: • the operational control assigned to the Commander of the Joint Top Operational Command; • t he Tactical Command assigned to the Coordinator General Officer, detached at Di.Co.Ma.C. (Di rection Centre, Command and Contro l, organized at t he Noncommissioned Officers School of the Guardia di Finanza at Coppito (Aquila); • the Tactical Control assigned to the Commanders of the Task Forces.

LOGOS - 66

acterized by a high mobility and projectability on both the national and t he international territory. A crucial task has been carried out by the personnel of the Engineer Corps, thanks to their capability to: · build hydraulic/electric installations and employ the equipment destined to set up tent cities; • emp loy suitable vehicles for t ransport and handling of materials and earth, removal of rubb le as well as the execution of demolitions of 1.,nsafe structures; · plan and direct infrastructural works; · ass ist/guarantee the practicability of routes oth erwise impassable; • help, with specialized person nel, the direct support of the State Railways, as occurred for the management of the railway section Aqui la-Sulmona during the seismic event in Abruzzi.

General, besides the emotional involvement and in view of your great experience, do you believe that there are differences, in the conduct phase of the operations, in the way in which the civilian and military components cooperate at home, vis-a-vis the operations carried out abroad?

Rivista Mi/it are English Edition n. 21201 O

The intervention of the military outside the national borders occurs in favour of Nations characterized by marked instabi lity or by a comp lete ly deteriorated situation due to the Country's lack of "governance and justice", for a state of deep economic crisis and, above all, for the inability to guarantee the security of its· citizens. The combinat ion of these factors, together with the possible lack of culture and professionalism for the administration and management of a Country, can create : -fragility of the governmental structures (lack of a credible governmental power, corruption, use of violence to impose "one's own law"); . social disintegration (national fragmentation, growing perception of insecurity, power in the hand s of part icu lar actors/irregular grou ps); • economic collapse (destruction of the infrastructure, currency devaluation, unemployment). All th is implies that t he strat eg ic planni ng of a mission abroad, in su ch a Country, should be necessarily of the "comprehensive" type. This aspect is dealt with in publication JIC 006 Uoint Integrating Concept), whose strategic vision provides that the planning and conduct of a campaign or of an act ivity t hat takes the shape of a national com mitment in a military operation may be managed by the Political Strategic Committee wh ich, under the guidance of the Prime Mi nister, m ust sync hronize and optimise th e engagement of th e national strategic sectors, with particular reference to the d iplomatic, informati ve, military and econ om ic ones. At operational level, such neces sity translates into the search, in a foreign theatre, of t he greatest possible integ ration betwee n the civil and military aspects of the campaign, both in the nation al and intern ational sphere. At tactical level, the modalities for implementing this integration should be looked for within CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation). In short, it is possible to recap that: · the strategic leve l outlines the comprehensive strategy of a campaign through the "compre hen sive approach"; ·the operational leve l defines the "comprehensive planning" of the specific operation ; · the tactical level implements the "comprehensive execution" of the planning. Therefore, the civilian- military cooperation is defined as "the coordi nation and the cooperation in support of the mission , between t he Commander (UN, NATO, EU) - according to the type of operat ion) - and the civil ian actors, i.e. the national population and the local authorities, as well as the international, nat ional and non-governmental agencies and organ izations. Therefore, the task of CIMIC is to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the mission, establishing and keeping a level of full cooperatio n between t he contingent

and the civilian actors present in the operations area. Therefore the unicum of intentions must manifest itself throu g h the integ ration between the civilian and military worlds. The ai m is therefore to create the conditions for allowing the Co mman der to achieve the civil objectives in every field Uustice, cu lture, economy, welfare, security) in order to promote the reconstructio n of th e socio-econom ic fabri c in the crisis area. Therefore, the political, social, cultu ral , religious, economic and environmental aspects acquire a remarkable importance, such as to require t hat the CIMIC activities be implemented by specific assets specialised in the sector. The lessons learned from the employment in the various Operational Theatres have highlighted the necessit y of a wid e range of capab ilities and special ist assets to be allocated to the management of t he activities of stab il ization and reconstruction, typical of the post-conflict phase, whose main

The railway Engineers gave their contribution providing specialized personnel.

tasks are: • provide support to one's own Forces by strengthening the civilians' consent to t he operation, facilitating and legit imising the military intervention , with immed iate pos itive spin - offs in the field of security of the forces ; • provide support to the civil environment; • establish a connection between the two components; • offer, when possible, alternative solutions to the use force ; • contribute to the development of work plans and the to re storation of the local infrastructure. The most important point in common that the civilian- military cooperation implemented within the national borders has with that carried out

67 - LOGOS

abroad is represented by its goal, i. e. t hat of creating the conditions that facilitate the Commander's mission. In the conduct phase, instead, the substantial difference consists in th e fact that, for home operations, the activities are not ai med at obtaini ng the consent of the civilian population. The civil-m ilitary cooperation at ho me is es sentially expre ssed by the support given by the Army, w hich consists normally in the employment of person ne l, vehicles and materials, but we must remember t hat the soldie rs' rol e must be considered complementary t o that performed by th e Ministries institution ally in ch arge of the various sectors of the i ntervention. The main sectors of the intervention of the civilmilitary cooperation in Italy concern : • contribution to the safeguard of the free institu-

A team of Engineers in a street of Aquila.

tions and the maintenance of public order; · protection, aid and assistance to t he population in case of natural disasters; • maintenance of the services of public utility; -cam paign against wood f ires; • emergency medical transport; . nuclear, biologic and chemical surveys; • reo pening roads to traffic, by building military bridges; • demolition of unauthorised bu ildings; . setting off war devices found on the national territory; • so lution of water emergencies in the islands. In conclusion, the civil-military cooperation is an integrant part of all t he processes of crisis management, and its role is espec ial ly sig nificant during the in itial phases, when it is necessa ry to coordinat e in detail the meeting of t he different needs of the popu latio ns and of the lo cal and regional i nsti tu tions.

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The Prime Minister, speaking of the soldiers working in Abruzzi, in Operation "Gran Sasso", on Armed Forces Day has emphasised the "extraordinary effort", the "absolute dedication" and the "great passion" with which the military "have done their work". What has been, in particular, the attitude shown by the civilian population towards the military component? The commitm ent of the men of the Army in providing ass istance to the people of Ab ruzzi hit by the earthquake, including al so the 350 men en gaged in patrolling activities and security service in various town zones to protect the historical centre , the houses, and the religious monuments.t build ing s left unguarded, has allowed the inhabitants of Aquila to return, at least in part, to a l ife which, as difficult as it was, proved to be certainly more decent and less difficult t o face. In short, the people of Aquila have never been abandoned. Certainly, we haven't been able to do "all for all" instantly. Certain ly some tent cities had no hot water during the first days, in some others ,initially, toilets were insufficient, some t ents had to wait for the installation of air- conditioners a few days more, but with time all the measures and the improvements have been adopted. To meet the needs of tens of thousand s of people and put up more than 1 50 tent cities is not certai nly someth ing that can be done in one night, uut I am sure that not a sing le person is not grateful for the excellent work done by the Service, by the other compo nents of our Civil Defence, by the volunteer organizations, thanks to which , already since the first hours after the seismic event, we have been able to deal out hot meals and staple commodities. On the other hand, the realizat ion of t ent cities that could accommodate tens of thousands of people has been an act ivity whose results have significantly exceeded t he expectations of the m 'litary Summit. In t he face of such an effort, the people of Abruzzi have unanimously ap preciated the work of t he soldiers, whose figure , as happens in the Operational Theatres abroad, stands out for professionalism, devotion t o work and helpfulness towards the needy. I deem it neces sary, at t he same time, to point out the uncommon capability of t he people of Abruzzi to endure an enormous disaster with the composure, hu manity and cal m ways which have distinguished them . This was the attitude of the whole population and our soldiers have really learned a lot from the m. What is done in a military operation remains in our "archives", so to speak, so that we may treasure it and try to do better in t he future, but the experience made by our so ldie rs in

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close contact with the people of Abruzzi is something that is going to remain for ever in their hearts and memory. Human experiences of such intensity cannot be forgotten.

In conclusion, as the Army is a precious resource for the Country and a force wholly at the disposal of the Italian people, how important, do you think, is a future closer link between citizens and the military?

The experience of crisis management and the process of reconstruction have highlighted the need to adopt a mu ltidimensional approach to the mil itary operations, through the contribution of the various actors, so as to make possible the reconstruction of the social fabric on the territories in which we intervene. Getting in touch with all the civilian bodies at the various levels, making an integrated planning with the most appropriate actors, carrying out a constant evaluation of the priority needs in order to determine the best answer in terms of contributions to be given, these are the conditions that enable a Commander to direct his decisions and actions. It is absolute ly indispensable that the mi litary know that a simple mistake can have exponential repercussions on the conduct of an operation, that every action carried out could have negative consequences, such as to jeopardize the successful out-

Removing rubble.

Army personnel have also been employed to control the access to the disaster areas with "anti-looting" tasks.

come of a mission, undermining the consent of the population and the close bond between soldier and citizen , which is dn im.l i::iperi::id!Jle racLOr ror Lhe success of any operation. In conclusion, I feel that I can assert that today the operations of the Army, be they ins ide the national borde rs or in foreign areas of crisis, requ ire adequate capabilities in order to operate in an environment characterized by countless variables, where the soldier has a task substantial ly more onerous than in the past. He must be able to "read", "understand" and "somatize" several factors, among which the economic, religious, san itary, political and ju r idical ones. In view of this, the education of the soldier "who could be defined of t he new generation", besides the typical training aimed at his specialization /e mployment, must be oriented towards the ability to operate in an interdisci plinary and multidimensional setting, where his figure should be perfectly integrated with the other "forces on the field", and not remain distant and separat e from t he society that surrounds him and for which he works . Only in th is manner, the bond that links him to the "citizen'' can at the present time, and w ill in the fu ture, be maintained firm and ind issoluble, as a g uarantee of concrete and incontrovertible results.

Interview by Giuseppe Fernando Musillo Editor of "Rivista Militare"

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THE ARMY AND THE FUTURE: DIGITIZED MEDIUM BRIGADES AND <<FRECCIA>> VBM The Italian Army is engaged in a process of transformation whose final operational result wi ll be constituted by the Digitized Medium Brigades. These units will have to ensure adequate capabilities in terms of mobility, in order to meet the expeditionary requirements matured in the recent scenarios, but also the necessary level of protection for providing increasing security to the personnel. We shall be able to achieve this result thanks to the "Forza NEC" programme, which envisages the digitization of three Brigades and the introduction in t he Service of new materials and technologies. The "Freccia" VBM certainly finds a prominent place among the latter, and on this will be based the regiments of the new Digitized Medium Brigades.

THE INFRASTRUCTURE: NEC FORCE In view of making up as soon as possible for the shortag e of forces meeting the criteria of trans formation in a digital sense and make the process of digitization less traumatic, the Army, already so mP years ag o , deci ded to la u nch the "NEC FORCE" proj ect . The programme is by now well on its way, but lately, du e to bu dget shortages has been reconsid ered , and the reconversio n of the first Medium Brigade, the "Pinero lo", initially envisaged for 2014, has been deferred to 2018, while the whole proj ect - wh ich, we must remember, envisages the dig iti zation of th ree Mediu m Brigades plus the acquis ition of the relevant "enablers" - sh ould be completed in th e period between 20 25 and 2031. Certain ly, even with this lengt heni ng of tim e, th e concept of NEC Force re m ain s u nchan ged . The objective conceived by the Army Staff is that of realizin g a mode rn force at division level, wit h state-of- the- art eq ui pment, comp letely inserted i n a net of d igi t izat ion, w h ich can work in the whole ra nge o f operat ions and ex p ress a hi gh joint connotation . Th e NEC units will be l ighter than t he mechanised fo rces (tracked), from whi ch, however, they will receive t he emphasis on protection (direct for t he quality of t he materials and indirect for the situati onal aware ness envisaged by th e NEC Fo rce), ex peri menting a di fferent method of mo bil ity, oriented toward s soluti ons traditionally associated wit h th e light forces, and will certainly more suitable fo r em ployment in operations of stabilization and reconstruction . The Dig it ized Medium Force (FOM ED) re presents

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Above and right. The goal is to realize a division - level modern force, equipped with state- of- the- art materials within a digitized net.

Title pages. A "Freccia" VBM flown over by a "Mangusta"A-129 combat helicopter.

the operat ion al outcome of the NEC Fo rce programm e, whose pawn s on t he f ield will be constituted by th e Digitiz ed Medium Br iga des. The FOMED concept is characterized by t he following aspe ct s: appl icat ion of NET- ce nt ric ope rations, which t ranslates in a sing le system of sensors, platforms and single operators, w hich will pe rmit, in parti cu lar, a great er and more rapid u nderstand i ng of the situation on the battl efield and a

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hig her speed of t he command act ion and of t he the r;rnge of the ir detection and fi re syst ems; high deci si onal process; a marked expedit ionary capasurvival qualities, such as to pe rmit to operate bility, so that the FOM ED could be project ed at wit h security als o o n battl ef iel ds m arked by a .-. .H great dist ances in short times, high level of threat. These q uali ti es w i ll necessa ri ly i n- â€˘ .an1 also for complete packages up to Brigade level, shift easi ly in''The new Digitized Medi- elude different aspects, such as side the theat re, m ovi ng w ith um Brigades will be ele- the ability to detect t he enemy agility within the manoeuvring operating with mentary Major Units pro- watidae distance, space, ensuring the turnove r of and spaced - out dep loy personnel , the efficiency of the viding qualities of mobili- ments and carry out deception mat er i a l s and the ne cessary ty, logistic sustainability activities effectively, as well as support in terms of communi- and fire power ... ,, possessing high protection. catio ns, intell igence, Com mand and Co ntro l, logistics and inTHE DIGITIZED MEDIUM BRIGADE theat re mobility; capab ility t o operate in red uced formations, with high tactical and logistic aut onoTh e new Dig itized Medium Bri gades will be elemy, easi ly proj ectabl e in an o pe rational theat re, mentary Major Units providing qualities of mobili and able to make interventions along the entire conflict range; t he capabili ty t o fi ght already since t y, logistic sustainabil ity and fire power, interme diate between the traditional heavy un its, penal the first phases of redeploymen t ; the ability to carry out deci sive act io ns maintai ning freedo m of i zed from the logis t ic and strategic-mobility manoeuvre; the capability to operate on open or viewpoints, and the l ight ones , obviously provided compartmented g rou nd or in inhabited centres, in with limited fire power an d protection. The Mediall weather cond itions ; high flexibility, so as to um Brigade, on the contrary, wi l l be easi ly proadapt t o eve ry sup posab le sce na rio, i nc lu d i ng jected in t he various external operational theatres those characterized by great fluidity, lack of linand operate, w ithin them , with g reat flexibility, so earity and presence of asym metric threats; lethalas to be ab le to co nfront, in the best poss i b le ity, so as to be able to locate, engage and neu way, a wide range to threats of different inte nsity trali ze the enemy combat formatio ns, well beyond and rapid ly, changing i n time and space.

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According to what has b een announced so far by the Defence General Staff, th e Digitiz ed Medium Briga de will con sis t of three infantry regiments on VBMs.

first batch of 54 vehicles, whose delivery should be in a phase of completion, it i s entirely financed by the Mi nist ry of Economic Develo pme nt for a total of 310 m illion euros. This amount in cludes the initial logistic support extended for two years, t he equ ipments for the maintenance, t he courses for the users, a first supply of munitions and the co mplete electroni c equipment, includ ing that fo r communications and systems of Command , Con trol and SICCONA navigation. At the moment, the contract procedu r e for further l 0 9 specimens, sti ll ch arged to MEO, is about to be co mpleted , while at the moment the last batch o f 86 armoured vehicles is still to be fi nanced. The seco nd consignment should include: 61 vehic1es in t he IFV version, 24 the i n antitank version , 12 Command Post and another 1 2 mortar carrier. Initially, the whole 249 vehicles were to be subdivided: 172 in their bas ic version, transport and combat for the infantry, 36 in the antitank variant, 21 heavy mortar carrier, 20 Co mmand Post config u ration, b ut the nume ric su bdivis io n has already underg one so me small modifications, owing to the envisaged acquis ition of a certain number of veh icles in the recovery vers ion, a variant initially not envisaged but, as mentioned, already developed for the Spanis h Army.

Accordi ng to what has been made known up to THE VBM ÂŤFRECCIAÂť now by the Defence Staff, the Digitized Medium Bri gade will consist of three infant ry regiments The fulcrum of th is transfo rmatio n is the new (on VBM), one cavalry regi ment, one regiment of t owed land artillery on ultra light howitzers, one VBM "Freccia" , the first enti rely digital veh icle regiment of sappers and a Command unit. Morei.e. con ceived from the beginning with NECover, on e should add t he enablers - which will be centric capability - of t he Italian Army and pillar organized in common with the Landi ng Force of the future Digitized Medium Brigades. incl uding one regiment of antiThe "Freccia" is, i n fact, the aircraft artillery, two AVES regi f irst vehicle of the Se rvice that ments, one SORAO regim ent, ' ' The fulcrum of this comes out of the assembly line one electronic warfare regi ompletely digitized, i .e . transformation is the new cequ ment, one signal regi ment, one i pped with system s and battalio n NBC defen ce , PSYOP VBM "Freccia", the first en- equipment that make it a funand NBC assets and one trans - tirely digital vehicle - i.e. damental eleme nt of the modconceived from the begin- ern operational system, con port regiment. The three basic regiments of ning with NEC-centric ca- sisting of th e modular whole the Digitized Med iu m Bri gade pab i Ii ty - of the Italian man - soldier, platform, air-land should have VBMS according to Army, and pillar of the fu- robot ics and Command and the types of th e IFV versions(lnControl syst em. fantry Fighting Vehicle): anti - ture Digitized Medium About 3 metres high and 2.9 Brigades ,, tank, mortar, command. metres w ide, the "Freccia" can The Ital ian Army has formu reach a maximum speed of aplated an i nitial prerequisite to proximately 110 kph, with auequip the three infantry regiments of the Pine rol o tonomy of about 800 km, and can transport, beBrigade quartered at Bari, destined to become the sides the 3 members of the crew, 8 soldiers of the first elementary digitized Major Unit of the Servinfantry squad, to whom the "Freccia" ensures an ice. The total cost of the o peration, to be divided efficien t protection, thanks to its stratifi ed arin a nu m be r of financial years, is estimated in mour- p lating and the effectiveness of the main about l 500 millions euros . Of thi s allocation, a armament, con sisti ng of a KBA 25 mm gun. These

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characteristic te chn ical specifications, together with its high flexibi lity of employment, make the VBM family perfectly adaptable to the modern operational sce narios. The veh icle combines in an optimal manner the major qualities of protection of the VTLM "Li nce", from which it derives, in particular, some of the solution s aimed at increasing its protection (such as, for example, the adoption of absorbing and deforming materials, in order to increase its anti-mine protectio n), the mobility of the armoured car "Centauro", and the fire power of the "Dard o". It is the synthesis of the ope ratio nal exper ien ce matured duri ng the last 20 years by the Italian Army, from the Somalian and Iraqi sands, to the snow- clad mountains of the Balkans and the sto ny roads of Afghan istan. On board of thi s vehicle o ne has immediately the feeling of the mode rnity and compl exity of the it s equipment, suc h as the S!CCONA, th e broad- band radio k it for receiving data and photos, and the WiFi receiver for high - speed areaconnection with th e future soldiers o n foot . Among the rad ios, the main system equipping the VBM is the HCDR (High Capacity Data Radio), the same radio of the Brit ish "Bowman " already in service with more than 4000 sets. The apparatus is the top in term s of broad - band com munication: Ethernet connection with th e USC (Commun ication

Each of the three basic-branch regiments o f the Digitiz ed Medium Brigade should have 5 I VBMs in the IFV version .

Switch ing Uni t) of SICCONA, can eas ily work on l 0/12 km of distance with a maximum speed of 500 kb ps Full Dup lex and with a range of frequen cies 22 5- 450 MHz (5 Mhz of t he ch annel). Moreover, in order to permit the communications between the veh ic les and the personn el o n the grou nd and to handle them as best as possib le, t here is in view the installation , in add ition to the USC, of a Person al Wi re less Link Bay Statio n (PWLBS). Suc h systems make t he 8x8 VBM not on ly a sol dier's mere means of transport, but the node of a net that permits the exchange of data in real time from the si ng le soldier up to the high est Com mand if necessary, contributing to the defin itio n of the gen eral picture of the situation, the Common Operational Picture, and creating at the same time the preconditions to achieve the informat ion superiority that mu st be availab le to the Com mander. Thus, thanks to the VBM , it will be possi ble to provide in real time all the necessary information, both operational and logistic, to t he various leve ls of command, also digit ized and in a

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ta rget d istance within an i nterval between l 00 and 20,000 metres, with an erro r between - 1 0 and + l 0 metres. The IR cam era permits to dis cover a vehicle at a distance of 4500m, recognise position to manage and process messages, data, it at 4000m and identify it 2 100m . The images photos, films archived or acquired during the actransmitted by the various sets, as well as the rel tion, coming from a large numbe r of land and air ev,:rnt Com mand and Control switches, are dVdilsenso rs, manned and unmanned. able on two identical consoles eq u ipped with a From a technical po i nt of view, the VBM i s a display that constitutes the man- machine interh igh-tech evolutio n of th e hul l of the armoured face, at the tank commander' s and the layer's car "Centauro", with a high er level of ballistic and disposal. A most im portant part icular is that the anti-mi ne protection . Of the Centauro fami ly it laying system is in t eg rated with SICCONA and keeps the technical stru cturing, the qualit ies o f with t he lase r-warning receiver. This al lows to manag eab ility and manoeuvrability, bu t introshare in real time with t he other nodes all the in duces t ec hno logi ca l solutions formation acquired by the layaimed both at t he effectiveness ing system and to k now if a of the actions and the security ''From a technical point of tank in a particular moment is of the perso nn el on board, view, the VBM is a high- un der atta ck and , th ere fore, which trans late in a uniq ue mix tech evolution of the hull al arm the entire Comm and and of mobi li ty, prot ection, fire of the armoured car "Cen- Control chain. On the versions power and connectivity. It is tauro", with a higher level of t he compa ny and platoo n equipped with t he "Hitfist Plus" of ballistic and anti-mine Commanders is al so avai labl e turret, a development of the th e Jan us pa norami c system , one alre ady in use in the VCC protection ,, whic h allows t he t ank Com"Dard o " , arm ed w it h the KBA mander a comprehensive view 25mm au tomati c light gun , of t he external situation, indewith th e poss ibilit y to provide it with two paired pendent of the turret's position , t hanks to t he 7.62mm - NATO machineguns. The t urret perm its possibility of rotating on 360° with a vertical secto operate day and night, with the vehicle standtor of 70°. The syst em is equipped with a thirding or movi ng , thanks to the so ph isticat ed ge neration IR camera, operatin g o n a 3- 5 m icron LOTHAR g un sig ht. The system is characterised by spe ct ral band, a colour TV camera and a laser a modu lar architecture and includes a IR channel , t e l e mete r w ith a r a nge b etw een 200 and wo rki ng on a 8- 12 micron spectral band with two l 0,000m. vis ual fields, 3,2 °x2,4° and 8°x6°, a television The vehicle is equ ipped with a Gali x system v1ith channel and a laser te lemete r that can give the 8 laun chers for smoke d ischargers. The 8x8 VBM, The "future soldier" is one of the components of the NEC Force.

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Above. A just-landed infantryman getting ready to operate with a small unmanned "helicopter".

Right. A VBM can carr y a squad of 8 "future soldiers" .

besides the pilot machinegunner and sq uad Commander, can t ransport eight assau lt riflemen, dep loyab le o n the gro und. Weighing abou t 26 / 28 tons - but homologated by the Italian Army up to 30 tons - the vehicle is equ ipped with a 550hp V6 d iesel engi ne, wh ich enabl es it to brave frontal ramps of 60% slope and lateral ramps of 30%. It can move easi ly on t he most different te rrains both on t he road and off road, with sand or mud, in conditions of scarce ad herence, also t hanks to t he centralized system of inflation of the tyres. Bes ides the bal listic and anti mine protection, the "Freccia" is equipped with a system of protect ion against nuclear, bacteriological and chemical ag ents (NBC). It has a high on-road mobi lity, a good ratio weight/ power, and an optimal autonomy a nd mobility on comp artme nted ground, w hic h make it extreme ly fl ex ib le, espec ial ly in

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Above. A member of a VBM squad throwing a "Raven ".

Right. From a technical viewpoint, the VBM is a high- tech evolution of the hull of the "Centauro" armoured car, in the picture.

Crisis Response Operations . The hu ll , common to the various vers ions, is built w ith welded ball istic iron plates, with spal l liners app lied on t he inside, which can confer greater resistance and stop possib le splinte rs and, Âˇon the outside, add- on panels t hat confer protections aga inst IEDs impacting late rally or at the back. The arrangements for the lower protection of the sides permits, moreover, the modu larity of a furt her increase of the protection of the crew. The anti- mine protection, certified according to NATO standards , is guaranteed by ext ernal panels underneath by a li ner secured on the internal floor and by the use special suspended seats, wh ich reduces the t ransmiss ion to the transported infantryman of the energy coming from the m ine explos ion .

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The protect io n aga i nst NBC agent s, the low acoustic, visual , IR and radar t raceability, together with fi re- prevention and anti- explos ion systems, make the VBM Freccia a safe veh icle, ready for the most demanding missions. Approximately, in order to complete the full operational capabi lity of the three Digitized Medium Brigades, including t he relevant supports, 650 "Freccia" armoured vehicles more wil l be neces-

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sary, in th eir different configurations, incl ud ing the eng ineers' and NBC ones, in addition to the 249 already envisaged. Besides the transport and combat versions, the VBM is available in vari ou s models: • t he Command Post version, equipped with a "remote- control" Oto Melara Hitrole 12. 7mm tu rret, equipped with the most sophisticated Command and Control system s, which, thanks to the SIACCON 2 software, i nterface with the SICCONA of the vehi cles. This versi on can carry 8 completely equipped men : a driver and 7 more members of the crew; • the antitank version is characterized by a turret which , vis- a- vis the basi c version, carries two "Spike" antitank rockets of the 3rd generation and the Jan us panoramic system. The firi ng system permits to launch two rockets, in both the "fire and forget" and t he "fire , observe and update" modalities. In fact, it can be reconfigured by the gunner's ch oice of t he weapon to be employed (gun or rocket), once more with easy ergonomics of employment through the syste m's

Th e turret of the VBM in the antitanl< version.

commands and displays; • the mortar- carrier version, which is equ ipped with a 120mm mortar TDA Thales, with sem iautomatic load ing. The positioning for firing occurs by the assisted opening of two ports on the hull's ce iling and with the automat ic positioning of the mortar on the coordinates of the target, received t hrough the data- comm unication system; • the recovery version, in its classic configuration, with fro nt shovel. This version has been ac quired by the Spanish Army which, as is known, employs the "Centauro" tank with a 105mm gun; • the Ambulance and NBC vers ions are stil l under consideration.

Pietro Batacchi

Journalist

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--:[~=1~1~ SPEOIAL. CLUSTER BOMBS AND HUMANITARIAN DEMINING The Lebanese operational Theatre has witnessed the deployment of up to about 2500 Italian soldiers who, within the JTF-L, are working in synergy with foreign partners of the Peace Force known as UNIFIL. The UN International Force in Lebanon orig inates from a resolution of the UN Security Council of 1978, fol lowing t he war events that characterised this reg ion in that year, and had the mandate of confirming the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore peace and international security, and ass ist the Lebanese Government in the activities aimed at reestablishing its full territorial au thority. Fol lowing the events that marked the Summer of 2006, known as "Third Israeli-Palestinian war" and marked by a m ilitary conflict that lasted 34 days, the Security Council of the United Nations, with resolution l 701 , decided to rein force the UNIFIL and widen the mandate with ad d itional tasks, among which that of monitoring the cessation of the host i lities, supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the phase of deployment in Southern Lebanon, extending its assistance in order to guarantee the access of hu man itarian aid to the civi lian population, helping the numerous refugees to return in complete safety. The mi l itary operation, carried out on a larg e scale by the Israe li Army duri ng the last conflict,

Above. A series of photograms representing the sequence of dissemination of some cluster bombs. Title pages. An Engineer marking the safety area.

began as an answer to the attacks started on Ju ly 1 2, 2006 by Hizballah militants, and formally concluded with a ceasefire through the intermed iation of the United Nations on August 14, 2006 , with the removal of the Israeli naval strategic blockade against Lebanon. Generally the effects of the conflicts, irrespective of the intens ity and duration of the mi litary actions, drag on for a long time also after the end of the hostilities. And the Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006 (like the preceding ones) is no exception to the r ule. In fact, the war, after almost four years, is still showing its devastating effects which, unfortunate ly, affect mainly the civi lian popu lation of Lebanon, who fro m the conflict has inher ited minefields alon g the borders with Israel and wide areas strewn with cluster bombs. Cluster bombs are devices that appear on the battlefields during WWII and are dropped from air-

An M 77 cluster bomb hanging from the branches of a tree in a clusterised area.

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planes o r launched by the artillery. They contain a certain number of su b- munitions which , when the mai n wrapper (dispe nser) explodes, are thrown around and dispersed on the grou nd. As t hey impact on the ground, the sub munitions become active and explode, for a light knock, eve n many years after launching. Thei r funct ioning system is sim ple enough : on the body of th e vect or that car ri es the d evi ce s (dispenser) there is a small explosive charge, suitable for breaking the metal wrapping from which the clus te r bombs are discharged, due to their gravity. The bombs, thro ugh a procedure of Aeolian armame nt, generally explode when they hit the ground. They are employed to prevent and delay the movement of troops o n the t errain, with . -~-- âœ“~ recourse to area saturation . Their employment has evident coll ateral effects fro m th e humanitarian viewpoint. The manufacture rs envisage a percentThe situation of minefields and clusterised areas in Lebanon. age of inefficiency between 3 to 5%; this mean s that for every dispens er , whose device content is variable, the 3- 5% of them do not explod e and remain unexploded. on the ground. But the reality is su stenance for many families. different. Statistics report a 20% of inefficiencies. The refore, it is clear that the operations of clearThe reason for such dissimilar data is to be found ing the territory fro m clust er bombs and mines are in several factors: various types of devices have most im portant and prod uce a remarkable social strings or little parachutes that get entangled and and humanitarian impact. This is the reason why do not allow the su b-m unitions to impact; some UNIFIL places this activity at the top of its prioricluste rs necessitate a technical time of armament ties and why the Itali an component gives its conwhicb., for wanted or accidPntal causes, is not altribution providing all its reso urces, consist ing of equipment and, a bove all, of ways sho rter th an the falling time. The number of the unexmen of absolute excellence and p loded sub- m uni tions, wh ich ' ' Cluster bombs ... are professionalism. At the end of the co nfli ct of make the hit areas sim ilar to dropped from ai rplanes or minefield s, is incalculable. It is launched by the artillery. 2006, which has concerned the surmised that in th e world there They contain a certain num- Sou t h o f Leb anon, UNMACC are about 440 millions of unex(Uni ted Nat ions Mi ne Action ploded cluster bombs. ber of sub-munitions which, Coord in ation Cen tr e), a UN It is estimated that in southern when the main wrapper (dis- Agency that is in charge of the Lebanon, in 200 6, four million penser) explodes, are human itarian demining of the clusterbombswerelau nchedby thrown around and dis- min ed areas and of the zones Israel. Th e UN reconnaissance persed on the ground. After where t here is a high density of groups have found 359 sites in the impact, the~ become ac- UXOs (unexploded device s) , such as the "clusterised" areas, t he Cou nt ry and mor e th a n 100,000 clusters are still unex- tive and explo e, for a light has started its act ivity of hu ploded, knock, even many years af- mani tari an d emin ing to safeguard the security of t he civill srael had larg e recourse t o ter launching ' ' i an population , rel aunch the this weapons d uri ng the last war local economy conn ected with operatio ns, producing one of the most serious contaminations from un ex ploded farmi ng, and ensure the "Freedom Of Movement" devices both to the south of the Litani river and in of t he UNIFIL forces. th e areas to the north an d east of Le banon. A For its activity UNMACC avail s its el f of spe great number of incidents have been reported cialised teams of NGOs and military units of Eng isince then; they have involved the civilian populaneers. In particular, the Italian contin gent sin ce tion, w ith a high number of ch ildre n. In fact , 2007 has been supplying a platoon of highly specialised sappers, MINEX qu alified, who operate in among the most t argeted areas the r e are o live clearing clu sterised areas. Th is specialized pergroves, citrus plantations and fields destined for son nel, with t he collaboration of a medical Team cultivat ion , which constitute the only source of

83 - TECHNE

and with a sub-munition of the type looked for, placed at a depth of 20cm. Surface demining is carried out on ter rain s whose compactness is such that it is possible t o exclude with certainty t hat an unexploded submunit io n could go unde rgro und (for examp le rocky ground, well-trodden or asphalted roads); it is normally carried out by the operators placed at a security distance of 1 0 metres, provided wit h systems of temporary marking (40cm woode n sticks) in order to materialize on the ground the one-metre wide corridor just cleared. If the surface of the terrai n is not clearly and completely visible because of shrubbery and foliage, th e search activity is carried out with the help of the metal detector. According to resol utions 1701 and l 773, also regular troops of the Countries that participate in the UNIFIL mission are clearing portions of groun d that will be given back to the population t hat thus could resume the normal activities connected with An operator searching with a Schiebel AN 79/ 2 metal agriculture. detector. Starting from August 2007 also the Italian Engineers of the 8th Engineer Paratrooper Sapper Reg iment have started the clearing work, in the B.A.C. (doctor, trained nurse and ambulance assistant) (Battle Area Clearance) sites, in the territories torand an EOD Team (one 2 nd level EOD, two 1st levmented by the war of 2006. The first site cleared el EODs and a driver) form a BAC Team. The team was given back to its legitimate owner by the "Arimust pass an examination, and be endorsed by a ete" sappers during operation "Leo nte 3". mission consisting of UNMACC personnel and OfIt is a meticulous and exhausting work, which ficers of the Lebanese Army, before being able to requires continuous concentration, during which operate in hum an itarian demining. The clear ing the ballistic protection of the men is ensured by activity, in observance of the national Italian and the heavy equipment RABINTEX RAV 501. OverLebanese norms, envisages two types of search: coming the initial diffidence of the population, under surface and surface. who soon became grateful, the Dur ing the under-surface Cremona engineers of the 10th clearing the sea rch ers keep a ' ' It is a meticulous and Reg iment have handed over the minim um security distance of exhausting work, which orders to their colleagues of 2 5 metres and wear an anti- requires continuous con the 21st Regiment of the splinter protective garment that "Garibald i" Brigade. T he wor k centration, during which carried out with continuity by protects trunk and legs, and a the ballistic protection of all the Italian sappers, who v isor helmet. They clear a corridor one metre wide, marked on the men is ensured by the have taken turns in the the ground by a tape (red or heavy equipment RABINTEX Lebanese theatre , has had a white and red) tied to wooden RAV 501 ,, favourable effect on the con pegs (60cm long with the head sent of the local population on coloured in red) ; controlling the mission and on all the first of all visually, and then with the metal detecUNIFIL contingents, who sometimes are culturally tor, (the mine detector used by the Italian Army is and geograp hically distant. the AN 19). At the moment when a sound is noThe sappers of the Army, in the four years of acticed , the operator starts the search by excavating tivity, have cleared more than 60,000 square me a hole at least 20cm deep (according to the stantres , found and destroyed thousands of unexploddards envisaged in Lebanon, where it is statisticaled devices, cluster bombs in particular. ly impo ss ible to find sub- munitions below this depth). In view of this, the sensitivity of the metal detector is gauged on the basis of the contents in Francesco Vetere iron of the soil that is going to be dem ined (in orCaotain, der to avoid false alarms during the search phase) J Qth Sapper Regiment

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Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

ยงPEDIAL

ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCTIVITY IN HUMANITARIAN DEMINING During Operation "Leonte 6" in Lebanon, among the nume rou s tasks entrusted to th e Itali an Eng ineer Battalion, based on the 10th Sappers Regi ment of the 132nd "Ariete" Brigade, the one concerning the cleari ng of t he clusteri sed f ield called CBU 572 (Cluster Bomb Unit 572) in the mun ic ipality of AI- Hinniyah has assumed a particular sign ificance, because, besides the typically organizati onal and operatio nal phase, an in novative conceptual has been developed, i n order to opti mise, at platoon level, the time, vehicles and person nel resou rces. In this regard, we have initially identified all the variab les o n the fie ld and successively, using an analytic- experimental method, we have stu died the corre lation among the m in order to introduce t he suitable correctives in t he

organ ization of the demining operations, so as to increase t he pro d uct ivi t y, o pti misi ng thei r performance and the t imes of implementation. In fact, with in the framework of the activ ities regardi ng the clearing , all the t echnical parameters co nnected w ith the operati on have been take n in to con siderat ion, in order to analyse the progress of the parameter concerned constituted by the work p roduct ivity of t he demi ners (expres sed in cleared square m etres / time spent) . T herefore , before startin g the analytical - experimental tim e we have t herefore identified the variables (inde pendent, dependent and random), co ntextuali zed

A MINEX Sapper in t he prodding phase.

85 - TECHNE

RESUMPTIVE DIAGRAM OF VARIABLES VARIABLES I I

INDEPENDENT

DEPENDENT

I I

NUMBER OF OPERATOR

TIME AVAILABLE

RANDOM I

PSYCHOPHISI- . CAL SITUATION

TABLE OF NUMERICAL DATA REFERRED TO THE SQUARE METRES CLEARED DAILY IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION "A" 1 st Day 2 nd Day 3 rd Day 4 th Day 5 th Day 6 th Day Operator, 1

Operator 2 Operator 3 Operator 4 Operator 5

Operator 6 0 perator, 7

0 perator 8

7,0 8,0

9,0 8,0 9,0 12, 0 24,0

7,0

7,0 10,0

11 ,0 6,5

9,0

5,5

8,0

11 ,0

10,0 11,0 12,0 14,0

23,0 9,5

10,5

12, 0

12,5

10,5 10,0

6,0

11 ,5

18,0

19,5

12, 5

10,0 1 3, 5

13,0 12,5

9,0

8,5

9,0

8,5

7,0 13,0

8,5 7,0

13,0

6,5 106,0

10,5 123,0

Operator 9

20,0 8 ,0

Operator 10

9,5

9,0 16,0

Operator, 11

9,5

6, 0

11 ,5 6,0

TOTAL

124,0

120,0

110,00

to the particul ar situation of em ployment in t he variou s phases of the clearing operatio ns. There are two independent vari ables that have influenced the productivity: the first is the number of t he operators, who nevertheless can be employed simultaneously on the area that has to be demined keeping a security distance from each other of at least 25 metres; t he other vari ab le is the number of the periods of maximum empl oyment, regulated by t he clearing procedures for the clust erised and mined areas, in order to avoid dangerous losses of attention, equal to 40 consec ut iv e m in utes suspended by pe riods of recovery of no less than 20 minutes. Th e only de pe ndent variable i s

TECHNE - 86

7,0 8,0

METRES CLEARED

7,5

6 ,0 9,5

11 ,0

12,0 7, 5 107,5

EXTERNAL ' INTERFERENCES

constit uted by the numbe r of square metres cleared, whil e the random variable consists in the number of metres demined, w h i le th e r a ndom va riab les , concerning essentially external " interferences " (preserce of farmers on nearby fie lds, lim itations of movem ent) and the occasional psyc h o - physical state of the operator (st ress, concentratio n, fatigue) have not been assessed in the study as it has been estimated a miscalculation of plus - minus 5%. In o rder to f urther simpl ify and streamline th e model ex amined, we have considered as constant factors, which affect permane ntl y and redu ctively

DIAGRAM IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION ';A "

Trend of Productivity / Clearance 130

125 120

-t-- .~"t--=

- + - - - t - - - - t - - : ----:-=-11=--

---;

+ - - - t - - ".....~1-=-''-'-"'----+---+--+--T- + - - -

105 - + - - - + - - - + - - - - t -~ - t--- - - i f - - 100 +----t---+--- -+-10_6--+----+--1_0_7 ,5 '--l 95

+ - --

+ - - - + - --

t - - --

t---

--11---- - ,

1 st Day 2 nd Day 3 rd Day 4 th Day 5 th Day 6 st Day I-

Daily value

I Â·.. medium value j

Trend of daily productivity of team (in blue) and of the medium value of productivity referred to the clearing days (in red).

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NOON BRIEFING BY MICHELE MONTAS SPOKESPERSON FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL UN HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK Friday, September 25, 2009

BAN Kl-MOON PARTICIPATES AS G-20 MEETS IN PITTSBURGH •Secretary-Ge n eral Ban K i-rnoon is in P ittsbur1Jh today at the rneet ing of G-20 leaders. • E arlier , t he Secret a ry-General \/</tote t o t he G-20 leaders and af:ked fo r their commit ment to protect poor countries thro ugh the crisis, and accelerate acti on on c limate change an d thA tvlill,=rnnium

Develnpnrnnt C.;,1aJ,:;_ •He will be back later this aftern oon fo r a number of bilat e ral meet ing,; scheduled t his eveni ng. (ornissis)

LEBANON: U.N. MISSION HELPS CLEAR LAND OF MINES, RETURNS IT TO FARMERS • This vs1eek , fa rm ers and Ian do\•1me rs in the southern Lebanese t o\,vn of Hiniyyeh were returned s ome 7,500 squa re meters of t hei r land , which v11e re c lea red of m ines by the Italian battalion of the UN lnte rim Force in Lebanon (LlNIElL). •U~~IFIL c arries out some hu manita rian de-mi ning activities to assist the civilian po pulat io n , unde r the coordination of t he Leban on M ine A ct ion C entre..A.s a part of t his coo rdi nated effort, UNIFI L demining teams hav e t o dat e clear ed mo re t han 4 7 milli on squa re met res of affected land and destroyed more t han 32,000 une>cplo ded o rd nances an d m ines in southern Lebanon. (om isf;is)

Office of the SpokesJlerson for the Secretary-General United Nations, S-378 New York, NY 10017 Tel. 212-963-7162 Fax. 212-963 -7055

the daily productivity, the following elem ents: · p resence of fe rro us e lements in the gro un d (iron, magnetite hematite), ferrous waste (caps, nail s, wire, t infoil) and ordnance splinters; • presence of self- veg etatio n and trees; • the resistance t hat th e ground opposes to the intrusive actions with a probing rod; · t he longitudinal and transversal slo pe of the ground; · the temperatu re and atmospheric cond itions; In actual fact, leaving unchanged t he total nu mber of t he hours worked daily by t he dem iners, we

have evaluated two differe nt types of organization: • Organizational solution "A": the de miners operated in t u rns o n a li mited number of affected co rrido rs, there where no work interruptio ns ; • Organizational so luti on "B": the de miners operated contextually on al l t he corridors t hat cou ld be opened simultaneously respecting the reciprocal security distance of at least 25 metres. In the "A'' type organ izatio na l so lution, during the first period of dem ining, the sappe rs were divided int o two teams and t o ok turns inside the

87 - TECHNE

TABLE OF NUMERICAL DATA REFERRED TO THE SQUARE METRES CLEARED DAILY IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION "B"

dors were opened simult a neously (second case). This datum was presumably connected with the fact t hat th e same deminer returning to op1 st Day 2 nd Day 3 rd Day 4 th Day S th Day 6 th Day erate on the same corridor recOperator, 1 3,5 8,8 5,0 14,0 15,0 8, 0 ognized with certainty on th e 0 perator, 2 33,5 11 ,6 26,0 15,0 12,0 21,0 ground his state of advance Operator, 3 34,0 6,5 14,0 21 ,5 9,0 14,0 ment and resumed the search Operator, 4 6)5 7,5 6",0 20,0 22,0 6,'5 act ivity with greater rapidity. In Operator 5 17,0 12,5 23, 0 35,5 24,0 17,6 the first case, instead , t he al Operator, 6 11, 0 9,2 16,0 9,0 -'1 7,0 20,0 ternation of several deminers Operator, 7 26,0 3,9 37,0 41 ,0 28,0 22,6 on the same corridors entailed Operator, 8 18,0 7, 5 15,5 11,6 10,0 11,0 an understandable initial hysOperato r, 9 19,5 8,5 10,5 21 ,5 8,0 12,8 teresis in the resumption of the Operator, 10 1 5,5 11,0 19,0 16,0 29,0 20,0 advancement of the clearin g Operator, 11 20, 5 7,0 9,0 13,5 9,0 2, 5 work. The mentioned deducTOTALI 205,0 94,0 181 218,6 183,0 156,0 tions, made empirically in the initial phases of the clearin g activities, have allowed to fin d same corrido rs. This organization implied that the the most appropriate organizational solution , work could continue without interruption, in every which in the long period has produced remarkopen corridor. In the analysis of prod uctivity it able increases in productivity, punctually pointed could be verified that the daily average producout in the controls of the Quality Assurance made tion reached figures equal to 11 5m2 daily. by t he persons responsible of UNMACC, wh ich In the seco nd case, during a subsequent period have permitted to complete earlier than expected of demining the productivity was analysed envisthe demining of the 7500m2 of the CBU 572 site , aging the simultaneous employment of all deso as to deserve a specific mention in the "High miners on the maximum number of corridors t hat lights of the Noo n Briefing" by the spokesperson could be opened at the same time. In this work of the Secretary General of the UN, on September organization, t he activity was stopped simu lta25, 2009. neous ly on all corridors at the end of the periods of 40 minutes and subsequently resumed after the foreseen period of recovery. From the analysis Leonardo Lizzio of the productivity it could be observed that the 1st Lieutenant, average production was about 115m2 daily. l Qth Sapper Regiment In the second case, during a successive period of dem ining the proDIAGRAM IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION "B" ductivity was analysed by envisaging the simultaneous employment Trend of productivity / clearance of al l deminers on the maximum number of corridors that could be opened at the same time. In such wo rk organization, the activity was in terru pted simultaneously on all corridors at the end of periods of ''E 40 minutes an the11 resumed at the end of the envisaged period of recovery. In the analysis of the productivity we observed that the average production reached about l 73 sq metres daily. 1 st Day 2 nd Day3 rd Day4 th Day 5 th Day 6 st Day Comparing the data obtained and within the limits of the short I - 'Daily value medium value,! periods of observation, it emerged th at under the same hours worked Trend of daily productivity of team (in blue) and of the medium daily the productivity increased re value of productivity referred to the clearing days (in red). markably if all the possible corri -

I···

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Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

FROM TO HUMANITARIAN ORÂˇDNANCE CLEARING TO OPERATIONAL DEMINING After about 4 years from the Lebanon-Israel Lebanon, in that it does not permit the farming of conflict the presence of the UNIFIL soldiers is still t he land and the necessary resumption of producconsidered determinant for the consolidation of tion. Besides, the unexploded devices, and clu ster the results achieved until today, within the framebombs in particular, are a very serious threat for work of the difficu lt process of reconstruction and the deminers of the military contingents within stability of this area. UNIFIL and for t he numerous NGOs, due to the In a land tormented by years of civil war, terrordifficult clearing operations and the remarkable ist attacks and armed conflicts and plagued by limitation of the fre edom of movement of the mine s, cluster bombs and un troops. exploded ordnances, the sap It is well known that Italy has pers con t inue to operate for '' ... the unexploded devices, participated in and supported clearin g war remnants and for and cluster bombs in par- for a long time the internation the reconstruction of the Coun - ticular, are a very serious al initiatives aimed at banning try. The presence of cluster the cluster bombs, on a double bombs and mines is one of the threat for the deminers of negotiatin g table: the first, most concrete problems which the mi Ii ta ry contingents within the Geneva convention, still afflict Lebanon and, ac- within UNIFIL. .. ,, the second, wi t hin the socording to UN estimations, call ed "Oslo Process", while on there are st ill over l 00,000 det he field it has concrete ly tackvices scattered on the ground: unfortunately every le d the problems connect ed with clearing the single one can remain unexploded for years and cluster bombs already since operation "Leonte 2" be a problem for the civilian population, especial(in 2007), employing the MINEX assets of the Enly children. gineers of the Italian contingent in Lebanon. Th e Such contingent situation assumes not only a servicemen have carried out a constant and diffi social importance for the local population, owing cult clearing activity, winning the gratitude of the to the concealed risk of accidents, but has also a local pop u lati on and he lping sign i ficantly to very negative impact from the viewpoint of the strengthen the cooperation between the numereconomy of the small centres of So uth ern ous international organ izations and the UNIFIL co ntingent . In the complex system of explosive ordnance disposal, the MINEX assets are nevertheless an in tegral part of the wider organizational structu re cons isting of special ACRT units (Advanced Combat ÂˇReconnaissance Team, EOD (Explosive Ord nance Disposal), IEDD (Improvised Explosive Device Disposal) and canine units, which have supported all t he activities carried out i n theatre, acting as a multiplier of the capabilities expressed by the who le contingent. The Eng ineers' work represents the final act of a process that starts at home, with the training of th e personnel at the Engineer School, continues at t he units with the amalgamation of the personnel

An unexploded mortar shell in southern Lebanon.

89 - TECHNE

Clustt?r mun;tJons clearance by month and organiso!ion l..0.000

3S.OOO

•

Ut:IFIL

•

lnic1,•J;io11,1i Organi<..:1tion~

lAF

10,000

25,000 10,000

lS.000 i0.000 S.000 0 Sep 06

Nov 06

Ian 07

Ma.r Oi"

Ma•{ 07

Jui 07

Se1, 07

Nov 07

activities of experimental, tra1n1ng and operational character, in order to find out essentially the most suitable procedures as regards materials, vehic les and equ ipment of the Italian Army, in keep ing fully wit h what is envisaged by the national regulations and by the recommendations of the UN agency in charge of contro ll ing the demin ing in Southern Lebanon . In view of this, the refreshment activity ,carried out i n the Lebanese theatre by the sappers with MINEX qualification, has been of particu lar impor-

fJn 08 Numb~,

Above and right. (Source of the chart. "Landmine action", Counting the cost: The economic impact of cluster munition contamination in Lebanon, May 27, 2008, www.landmineaction.org).

LEBANON

Mnrrlt 2008)

•

!.!)

.? > 0

•

and is realized in Theatre through the chain of Command and Control. Besides, the demining activity in the Operational Theatre represents the natural contin uation abroad of what in Italy is one of the tasks of the Engineers: clearing the territory of unexploded devices and war remnants . But Operation "Leonte 6" has seen the Italian so ldiers, for the first t ime after the last world war, employed in the delicate and exacting activity of operat ion;i l demining on the "Blue Line", the withdrawal l i ne ident ified in the year 2000 by the United Nations together with Lebanese and Israeli officials, in order t o confirm the withdrawal of the IDF (Israe l Def ense Forces) in pursuance of Resolution 425 of the UN Security Council. Therefore, following a specific variation of the initial National Operationa l Directive, during the mandate Italy has hand led the recondit ioning of the assets for the transformation from humanitarian demin ing of the clusterized f ields to operational demining. T his phase has entailed the execution of several

o,r d1.•~!rr mu1,itio,1 vicr;,n5 (A11gust 2006 -

1\ug06

O<t06

Dec06

febOi'

AprOi'

1w107

l,ue07

o,t07

O~c07

feb08

tance for w idening the knowledge concerning the devices of specific interest, in order to deve lop the necessary sensitivity in t he manual approach and to acquire all the automatisms indispensable for clearing minefie lds. In th is delicate phase, the meetings with the UNMACC (United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre) personnel have been dec isive for transferring the experiences acquired in the field regarding the mines found in Lebanon, for studyi ng the spec ific dossiers on the maps of the minefie l ds , whose plans , comp l ete with all recorded data, have recent ly been delivered by Israel , for a profitable comparison of procedures, demining techniques and signalling of explosive devices. T he verification of the capabilities expressible by the sappers w ith MINEX qualification has been made together w ith t he instructors sent by the Eng ineer Schoo l in Rome to the o perational theatre and by UNMACC personnel through a complex accred it at ion ac tivity, carried out in two phases: pre- accreditation and final accreditation . The internationa l accred itat ion, although not necessary for the operational demin ing, is com pulsory for humanit ar ian demining, in order to certify t hat the personnel is qualified for this spe cific employment and has the skills necessary for

The area of operational demining between Blue Pillar 44 (2) and Blue Pillar 44 (3), close to the Israeli- Lebanese armistice line.

TECHNE - 90

Rivista Mililare English Edition n. 212010

operations with high qualitative standards. In parby the sappers themselves with the help of ticular, the internat ional Committee verifies the sq uare- mesh wooden fram es , emp loyi ng about level of train ing simulating the real situations on 80 metres of pe ntrite- charg ed detonating fus e, th e field and ass essi ng t he pe rsonne l' s behavwith a charging density 10 g / m . ioural reacti ons and the re levant times: extraction The t ests were aimed at verifyi ng the effects inof a potential wounded in a mined area, finding duced by the explosion of the detonating carpets and identifi cation of an exploin different situations, in order sive device, procedures for apto optimise the ir poss ible em proaching the unexp loded ord- ~~.an expeditious experi- ployment during the activities na nce, demining wit h EOD mental activity was also car- of operatio nal demini ng alo ng teams, evacuation of the area in ried out, aimed at testing al- the Blue Line. case of accident, acquisition of ternative techniques, proceIn short, five t ypes of tests have been carri ed out: the data necessary for mapping dures and methods for in- • the first test, aimed at deterth e area as regards possib l e UXO (Unexploded Ord na nce) terventions on difficult and min ing the possible incendiary inaccessible terrain with effects following the explosion risks. At the same time, an expedi- equipment and mechanical of the detonating carpet placed in contact with wet veg etation tious experimental activity was means for demining ... ,, also carried out, aimed at test(like that existing along the ing alternative techniq ues, proBlue Line) , has had a satisfaccedures and methods for interventions on difficult tory res ult because no fires have been generatand inaccessible terrain with equipment and maed ; chines for demin ing, o n the basis of the national • the second test has regarded the effects of t he directives, and in any case in full compliance with projection of splinters : crushed stones of small th e standards of th e Lebane se NTSG (Nati onal and medium size have been placed in t he immediate prox im ity of t he detonat ing carpet. It Technical Standards Guidelines Lebanon). Th e empirical tests and "on the field" experiments was observed t hat the shock wave generated by the exp los ion projected t he stones at a made in the firing ground of Kuni n (which has the maximum distance of about eight metres in a same grou nd morphology of the mined fields to be demincd) carried out by personnel <;neciali zed direction opposite to the primer; in EOD/ IEDD of the 1 0th Regiment Engineer sap• t he t hird test, which was aim ed at studying the pers , have p roved determinant for verifying the effects prod uced by the l 00g charges of TNT (trinitrotolu ene, wh ich, as regard s type and effectiveness of the alternative methods and have permitt ed to have a wider picture of evaluation. quantity, resulted id entical to the charge pres In this regard, during the tests made by experts ent in the min es employed in t he minefield in tris sector, also the method of demining with conce rned), had a parti ally sati sfyin g res ult, i n the employment of some explosive carpets, made that the post-explosion verification, after the

DETONATING CARPETS PENTRITE: .TECHNICAL DATA

Balance of oxidation

-10,12

Sighting temperature

215° c

Sensitivity of impact

27 cm

Velocity of explosive reaction

8400 m/s

Specific pressure

10500 atm/kg

Equivalence coefficient

0,89

Assembling phase of carpet frames with detonating ipentrite fuse

91 - TECHNE

the effects induced, we have deemed ex pedient to envisage the em ployment of t he detonating carpets on ly as ultimate choice and on ly on particular grounds in t he demining activity, when the ai m is to disarticulate a possible mine, no matter how. The conceptual activity has been completed at th e end of the ex pe rimental phase, by verifyi ng

....;

·.- ...·~~ ...............

Above and right. A just laid detonating carpet and its successive detona tion during the empirical trials.

thirty minutes envisaged for the time of saturation, al most all the charges (without primer, and placed at a variab le depth of 2 to 20cm, at the centre of the detonating carpet) have been deformed by the shoc k wave and only a few of th e no rmative reference fram ewo rk at nat ion al t hem were detonated for sympathy; level, the technical procedu res of demining and the characteristics of the equipment, exam ining • the fourth test, similar to the third with the addition of detonators to t he 1 00 grams charges t he res ults of the reco nnaissance activity carried out jointly with the personnel of the J3 Cell Comof TNT, had a partially satisfying result bebat Engineer, acquiring eve ry possible informatio n cause the post-explosion verification, after the on t he pro blem s regarding the sites and the rela30 minutes envi saged for the saturation time, tions with the popu lations living in prox imity of almost all the charges have bee n deformed by the shock wave and o nly in part were deton at t he mi ned areas . Subsequently, in the summer of 2009, the first ed for sympathy; version of the specific SOP UTF "Lebanon" Sector • the fifth te st, aimed at analysin g the effects of the explosion of t he detoWest, Standard Operating Pronating carpets on charges cedures - Mi n e Clearance p laced at the sides, always at ' ' ... the positive results Leban on - Editio n 3 1st Augu st a variable depth and without obtained as the work pro- 2009) has been wri t ten. As detonators, had an unsatis gressed have more and synthes is point of the natio nal regu lations and of the National factory re sult in that all t he more confirmed the effec- Technical Standards Guidelines charges were d eformed by the shock wave and were not tiveness of the procedures Lebanon , it ind icates t he manfound at the beginning .. .,, ual procedure as the most detonated for sympathy. suited t o the operational envi All the tests have shown a ronment , to t he equ ipment and limited projection of fragments, to the ground, envisaging a sequence of the fol at a d istance not lo nge r than eight metres, and h ad a th erm a l effec t only on the si l h o uettes lowing phases : visual search, feeler search, cutt ing t he vegetation, digging to a depth of 20cm placed at distances below five metres; the effects of the overpress u re wave concerned all the (U NIFIL security stand ard), prodding and, finally, charg es (p ri me d and not), whil e th e expl os io n th e verification with the metal detector. owing to the influence of t he TNT charges has ocOn the ground the "operational demi ning" was curred o nly in particularly favourable situation s, ca rried out by employing a group of special ists presumably for the insufficient prim ing action of called MC Team (Mi ne Clearance Team) consisting the limited q uan tity of pentrite fo r each square of a MINEX party (on e Site Supervisor - Officer, centimetre of su rface and for the scarce aptitude on e Deputy Site Supe rv isor - NC O, two Te am of TNT for explosion by influence (deaf exploLead ers - Sergeants, two squads of MINEX sapsive) . In con clus ion, o nce analysed and assessed pe rs), one EO D Team (in sup port) on e fire- fig ht -

TECHNE - 92

Rivisla Militare Eng/is/! Edition n 212010

Above. A corridor in a minefield (left); detection of a no.4 Israeli mine and the recording of its coordinates (right).

ing squad, one Medical Unit and a Force Protection Team). In the executive phase, conducted in the second part of the mandate within Operation "Leonte 6", the positive results obtained as the work progressed have more and more confirmed the effectiveness of t he procedures found at the beginn ing and, besides, the verifications on the ground have

fu lly validated the t ruth of the information on the minefields received from Israel and those of the detailed dossiers assembled by the UNMACC personnel, as regards the coordinates, the approach procedures , the schematic maps of the zone , the air photos, the accidents occÂˇurred and the general

UN/FIL Mission: In the foreground, Lt. Gen. Claudio Graziano - then, as a Major General, Force Commander of UN/FIL - with Brig. Gen. Carmelo De Cicco (right), Commander of the Joint Task Force SW Lebanon and Col. Giuseppe Poccia, Commander of the Engineer Task Force.

93 - TECHNE

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counterbalanced by the fact that the opening of the corridors in the minefields, the mark i ng , certain and agreed upon by both sides by placing the "B lue Pillars" close to the Blue Line, and information about the area of intervention. the complete imp lementation of the "Blue Line Nevertheless, the age of the mines laid i n 1 981 Marking" Project, will permit to make another in the particular area of intervention, the vegetaconcrete step forward on the lon g way of stabi tion, the impracticab le conforl ization and strengthening of mation of the ground and its the peace, wh i ch joins the modification in time, both for steps already made with the ' ' .. .the age of the mines phenomena of na ture or for numerous act ivities of infrawar events, have made the the vegetation, the impractistructure reconstr uction and manual approach particularly cable conformation of the dem ini ng of clusterised fields, difficult, because· the devices ground and its modification i n order t o avoid the recurhave been found in non - reg uin time ... have made the rence of accidents often lethal lation positions and, specifi- manual approach particularly for the local popu lation, an d ca lly, with the pressure dish especial ly for the children, and difficult ... ,, not parallel to the surface. It is for returning the land in a de licate activity carried out in Southern Lebanon to its legiti consta nt danger, whose r is ks mate owners . can be removed only through t ra ining, know ledge, and the manual sensitivity of the operator. On the other hand, the determination and resGiuseppe Poccia oluten ess necessary for carrying o ut a task as Colonel, treacherous as this, and still i n progress, are Commander, 70th Sapper Regiment Example of registration form of a minefield laid in I 98 I.

TECH NE - 94

Rivista Mililare English Edition n. 2/2010

INTERVIEW WITH MARC BONNET PROGRAMME MANAGER OF UNMACC UNIFIL, NAQURA - LEBANON What is the r o l e o f UNMACC in So u th e rn Lebanon? And how does it interface w ith the political and m ilitary bodies present t here?

successively streng thened by the opening of its Offices at Tire in the year 2002. Thro ugh planning , coordi nation an d the exce llent cooperati on with the civilian and military organizations for deminAfte r the passage between UNMACC and LMAC in g, it has been possible to achieve considerable (Lebanon Mine Action Centre) in December 2008, res ults in acceptable t imes. It is thanks to the efand the foundation of RMAC (Regio nal Mine Action forts of all the personnel in charge of the clearing, Centre) at Nabatiyah i n Jan uary 200 9, UNMACC and also thanks to t he inte rnational contri butions has become subordi nate to UNIFIL. t hat t he acc id ents d ue to mi nes have been reThe agency, through RMAC, coordinates and duced, and the cleared land has been returned to med iates with t he Lebanese natio nal civil ian Authe local popu lat ion. Durin g the dem in ing o perathority which takes care of mines (LMAC), on bet ions, unfortunately so me mishaps and accident s half of UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Engineers have occurred which have involved the deminers Mi li ta ry Ce l l (UNI FIL J3 CES and, alt ho ugh it is co mmon Combat Engineer Section) it k nowledge that t here is some suppl ies tech ni cal assistance ' ' It is thanks to the efforts risk to lerance connected with against mines to both LMAC and of all the personnel in the dem ining activities , on ly in the Engineer Section, conducts charge of the clearing, and very few cases they cou ld be and assesses the quality control also to the international avoided. an d t he accred itatio n, carried contributions, that the acciou t oy LMAC, by the deminers dents due to mines have In your opinion, is it possible comin g from Coun t ries that participate in the UNIFIL mission been reduced, and the to i m p rove t he mine-clearing and, if required, for the civilian cleared land has been re- system in Southern Lebanon? demini ng organizations. turned to the local populaMoreover, UNMACC atte nd s tion ,, UUNMACC has been an interegularly the meetings called by gral part in the development of t he Comman d of UNIFI L, t o the Lebanese nat ional stangether w ith RM AC a nd LMAC , da rd s (N at io n al M ine Act i o n and supplies important elements of information Standards - NMAS) and of the operational proceon min es, gi vi ng advice t o UN IFI L and other dures of standardization (Standard Operating Procedu res - SOP) on demining. Gene rally, the dem inBodies. ing procedures employed (i.e. for cl earing clus terised areas - Battl e Area Clearance - BAC) are After a long experience as Chief of the UNMACC standardized, but mu st be implemented with the employment of mechanical means. Nevert heless Operations, do you feel satisfied with the wo rk carried out in your period and w it h the success t here is always space for improvement and for adobtained in the demining field? vancing the knowledge of adequate tools (for example the "Large Loop Detector" for BAC) and of UNMACC, already si nce its constitutio n w ithi n the mechanical devices (for example the crushers UNIFIL occurred in th e year 2000, has maintained and the flagellators fo r demini ng). Th is should increase t he security and the efficiency in the excellent relations with the Lebanese population, with LMAC , w ith UNIFIL and with t he ot her Bodies, demin in g operations. UNMAC has int roduced more

95 - TECHNE

generic clearing procedures, derived from "better experiences" on the field, suggesting to all the Nat ions invo lved in the UNIFIL mission to use them, in order to ensure more coherence, authority and effectiveness of employment. TYPE NATIONALITY .COLOUR

What is the role of the LAF Engineers in the demining and clearing activities?

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QUANTITY Of The demining assets of the LAF 33 gr 22 gr 31 gr ,8 gr EXPLOSIVE 38 mm- -- - + - - - -- - t- _18 -m --m- - - - -+_,2- ,-,,,,- ,--------, are employed in support of the - DIAMETER LENGTH SI mm -10 mm 81 nrn·,!-:2 111111 activities of construction of the TOTAL WEIGHT 19~ or 21 8 ~r 198 er 292 er 155 mm Arty 155 mm Arty 155 mm Arty patrolling road along the border. CARRIER 227 mm rock~t projectile CARGO projectile CARGO projeclile CARGO A LAF verification team, trained by h QST UA " "'N""' 11'"' 1y , - --+S8 60 88 UNMACC personne l in 2007 , is tasked with controlling the demining standards at the end of the operations. BeAbove, below and facing page. Tables of the main types of submunition foun d sides , in the rapid reaction tasks, the LAF have the Lebanon. capability of clearing the explosive devices (EOD) ins ide their operational area.

What is the perception of UNMACC about the work carried out by the Italian engineers?

What are the effects of the demining activity on the socio- economic recovery of Southern Lebanon three years after the end of the war?

The Italian engineers have always shown a pos itive and professio nal approach d uring their de111ining

There have been the following effects: the return of t he population t hat had been evacuated (after the clearing of roads, houses and land) ; building (houses , infrastructu re);land cultivation (bana na plantations, citrus groves and tobacco fields); stabi l ity and resumption of normal activities (t rade, schools, transports, electricity); lives saved, reduction of dead and inj ured.

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activity. They have been extremely helpful and cooperative in the activiti es performed with UNMACC (train ing, supervis ion, operations of clearing and demining). The Italians have bee n employed in operations of clearing in clusterised areas in the area of Al Hinnayah until September 2009, thus permitting to return t he farmland to its owners for the successive and safe cultivation. In September 2009, the Itali a ns started the clearing operations of the corri dors le ading to th e Bl ue Li ne in order to permit the posi tionL1g of t he Blue Pillars , following the trilateral accords (Lebanon - UNIFIL - Israel), for marking out the border between Israe l and Lebanon . BLU 63 Th e Italians have shown t heir verUSA groy/sky•blue green satil ity i n passing from clear ing Alluminium cl usterised areas to operationa l Im acl Splinter effect like dem in ing, an d have recently Blue 26 achieved their objective.

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TECHNE - 96

Do you think it could be possible a cooperation between Lebanese engineers and Italian engineers for a common development of the demining procedures?

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

A good coo peration Italian and Lebanese engi effects on the security of the population in Southneers is possible and sustainable. As regards proern Lebanon and on the resumption of trade and cedures, there is always an advantage in sharing agricultural activities? knowledg e; nevertheless, on e should realize that the operational procedures of the LAF are not forYes, as I mentioned before, the demin ing activimally approved by LMAC. In order to develop their ties have achieved positive results. procedures , the not accredited LAF Teams should collaborate with t he Italian in t he clearing and dem i ning acti vities. As I mentioned before, UN What is the rol e of UNMACC in wor ldwide MACC has introdu ce d guid edemining? What are its main lines that shou ld be used (tofunctions? gether with the Lebanese stan- ' ' The Italians have been dards) for the development of employed in operations of In short, UNMACC coordinates the procedures. The main lim i- clearing clusterised areas in the humanitari an operations intation t hat concerns t he current the area of Al Hinnayah un- volving civil ian and military orItalian p roced ure on demining on behalf o f UNtil September 2009, thus ganizations consists in the fact that it must MAS (United Nations Mine Acconform to the Italian national permitting to return the tion Services) and represe nts regulations , which restrict the farmland to its owners, for NMAA (Natio nal Min e Action use of som e dem in ing tech- the successive and safe cul- Authority) in h is abse nce . n i ques in particul ar circum - tivation ,, Moreover, UNMACC ass ists the stances . humanitarian demining according to the i nte rnation al stan dards against mi nes (IMAS - International Mi ne In the wider context of the demining carried out Act ion Standards); develops, adm in isters and suby the various contributing Countries, what have pervises the standards for ensuring security, perbeen the most significant elements of the profesformance and effective ness i n demining operasional bond that has been created between UNtions. For more details, refer to the re levant UN MACC and the Italian engineers? documents or go to the UN website. In g~neral, it seems t hat there is a clear understanding of t he contributing Countries about the role of UNMACC within UNIFIL, on the programme against mines in Lebanon , on t he benefits due to the cooperatio n among the various Nations and UNMACC. As regards the re lations between UNMACC and the Italian engineers, it should be underlined t hat : the Italian engineers are always wil ling to be involved and to cooperate with UNMACC, which acknowledges t heir efforts and rectitude; a good working rel atio nship has been estab lished with tim e, with effort5 from both sides, permitting a large cooperati on among the agencies during the training and operationa l pha ses. This has opened the road to collaboratio n among the agenci es; in fac t , a good example of this has been the IEDD activity (Improvised Exp loCASIN_G_ _ _ __ sive Device Disposa l), organ ise d FUSE-=-=--=EfFECT by the Italian IEDD Team and UNEXPLOSIVE MACC on March 1, 2010, for UN QUANT~ EXPLOSIVE MACC, UNIFIL and RMAC.

What has UNMACC been doing from the end of the clashes of 2006 until today? From the war of 2006 until Decem ber 2008, UNMACC, based at Tire, has coordinated (p lanned and monito red) the cleari ng operations and, in particular, the organi zations for civil ian demining on behalf of LMAC. From January 2009 til l today, UNMACC has come under control of UNIFIL.

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97 - TECHNE

Inauguration of the Battle Area Clearance (BAC).

What are the next objectives planned by UN-

MACC? Some examples of the future objectives proposed by UNMACC are: setting aside resources for the demin ing assets, in order to assist the demining of the minefields situated to the north of the patrolling road of t he LA F, and to enhance the clearing carri ed out by UNIFIL for the demarcation of the Blue Line with mechanical assets.

According to your experience at the UNIFIL Hq, can the road map selected up to now be implemented in order to solve the cluster bombs problem?

There are exhaustive data that concern the dan ger of clu ster bombs in Lebanon. They have been gathered d uring t he clearing , before and after the conflict of 2006. This information was entered and recorded by UNMACC, LMAC and the demining organizations in the data bank of the Information

TECHNE - 98

Management System for Mine Action, which is handled by RMAC. The further information on the bombings, which has been provided by the Israeli Forces to UNIFIL in May 2009, has contributed to t he process of rationalization of data, of maps and t he recordi ng of minefields. These data are availab le to UNMACC, UNIFIL and to t he civilian dem ining organizations, in order to facilitate the planning process of t he clearing.

What are the main precautions for reducing the risks of demining accidents, which have unfortunately taken a heavy toll as regards the local population, and also the deminers?

The examples for redu cing th e acc ide nts in dem in ing could be: exhaust ive and pertinent procedures; sufficiently trained and qualified (accred ited) personne l who know the procedures; tested equipment and p ro ced ure s; accu r ate improvements in procedures, monitori ng and supervision ; control an d verification of internal and external quality (QA); accurate assessment of the threat. Examp le s for reducing the mine accide nts among civilians could be: awareness of the danger

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

(edu catio n an d informat io n abo ut mine risks); inform of the presence of m ined and / or dangerous areas for t he subseq uen t marki ng; k nowledge of t he sig nals of dangerous areas and of danger ind icators; close connection and cooperation w ith t he loca l authorities, NMAA, UNI FIL and with t he demining organizations and all the other bodies.

From a strictly technical view point, do you think that it could be possible to adopt more expeditious systems in the operations of clearing clusterised areas? Generally, t he procedures for BAC (visual or inst r um en ta 1) de vel op ed and implemen te d i n Lebaron are carried out, as m uch as possible , in relation to t he threat (type of explo sive ordnance EO), the depth of t he d emi ni ng and t he grou nd. Bes ides the manual clearin g, mechani cal mean s have been employed to implement t he dem ining, and they have provided mo re security and effi cie ncy in th e activity . The t ech niq ues and t he eq u ipment emp loyed for clearing, altho ugh they meet the standard s, may vary a little among the various demi ning organ izations. In order to im prove the dem in ing process, one shou ld conduct an adequate training (in realistic ground Lo ndi t io ns), and eva luate app rop riate threats (co rrect procedure s and t ech niqu es for employment).

Could you describe the main problems for the standardisation of the demining procedure pointed out in the NTSG document with those of the single contributing Countries?

Fi rst of all the purpose sh ould not be t hat of sta nd ard is ing t he NTSG to th e p ro cedu res, but that of making sure t hat they conform to t he standards. The main difficulty in ach ieving this is generally t he incompre he nsion of t he Lebanese nat ional standards and of the requisites of a procedure. The Lebanese national standards are written i n compl iance wit h t he i ntern ational on es and supply the m inim um requisites and t he exam ples of t he best techn iques/ procedu res . There should be no difficulty in obtaining the minim um requisites, in that they are realist ic and have emerged after years of experience on the fie ld. Th e main requis ite for drawing up the procedures, describing "wh at " (procedures and techniques) and "how" (proceed ings and requisites) to reach the objective (clearing of m ines/ UXO), according to t he required stand ards (NMAS and IMAS) . Th e p roce du res shou ld be sufficiently exhaust ive, so as to allow

A MINEX sapper during the calibration of a mine detector.

the user and the other parties involved to clearly understand t he requisites t hat permit to reach t he objectives (fo r examp le: survey, d em arcati on, clearing) and should be used as reference during t rain ing. Gen erally the mai n limitations in the procedu res of the Nati ons are "self- im posed", meaning that t hey do not contain sufficient informat ion (t ech nical) an d not eve n t he nati on al "l es so ns learned". Thi s, in its tu rn, cou ld lead to inconsiste ncies and m is understand ings, especial ly duri ng the rotation of the personnel (TOA).

The d emining activity, accord ing to you r long ex perience, by w hat aspects has been characterized? In short: dedicaon to work; good will and readiness to learn and share knowledge; accurate under stan din g and impl ementati on in p rocedu res; objectivity. Interview by Marco Ciampini Brigadier General, Editor- in-Chief, "Rivista Militare"

99 - TECHNE

LEGIO VII GEMINA AND THE HYDRAULIC MINES The hydraulic mines of the Romans produced such powerful effects as not to be outdone by th e horrific landmines used during World War I. But what is so strange and amazing is that this was achieved without the use of explosives.

On 27 November 1495, the blasting of some barrels of gunpowder placed at the end of a tunnel underneath Castel Nuovo in Naples, caused a large section of it to collapse, so much so that the French garrison barricaded inside would surrender. It was the first mine explosion in history. Its architect was Francesco di Giorgio Martini, who used an idea already design ed by Mariano di Jacopo. Since then the mine was associated with a blow, although the result produced should be considered as an im p los ion r ather than an explosion since t he structures or rock formations above collapsed under their own weight. This, if nothing else, justifies the continuity of the name. In fact,

i n the pr evious two mille nnia, mines were j ust tunnels conducted under t he wal ls of a vainly besi eged town : setting fire to the tunnel prop s caused its sudden collapse, which also drew a large portion of the wall, thus opening a gap. Mine, etymologically derives from the Latin verb "m inuere", which means to decrease, remove, excavate. In reality, it meant a planned tunnel collapse. Ambiguity between tunnel and powder keg ceases when, in mining activity, both civilian and military, progress is achieved through unde rground explosive charges. It is of no coincidence that St. Barbara is the patron saint of both artillerymen and miners. Putting the question this way, it would seem that the true corn mon factor b etween ancient and modern mines is the fire of ignition, set eit her to the props or to the fuse, but this conclusion is in correct. In Roman times, in fact, incredible hydrau lic mines were ad opted, so powerful as not to be outdone by those ho rrific o nes used during World War I: about 30 000 m3 each muzzle the first on es and about l 00 000 m3 the second ones! This deserves to be stressed, since it see ms in credib le that the outcome was achieved without explosives of any k ind, although even the architects were militarymen, almost certainly the tech nicians of the Legio VII Gem ina. The unit, in fact, is still based in Leon, (from Legion), at t he end of the fourth century, to carry out its usual territorial control and that of the mining di strict of Las Med ulas, near the prese nt town of Ponfe rrada, a major gold -bearing basins of t he Empire. An im porLeft. Mariano di Jacopo: Drawing of an explosive mine Set off underneath a fortress.

â€˘ I ~I

ANTHROPOS - 102

Titles pages. Dura Europos, Syria: Effects of a mine explosion under a section of city walls.

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 2/2010

Left.

Emblem of the Legio VII Cemina. Below. Specks of alluvial gold.

them. It is no wond er, then, that Pliny, both for institut ional duty and scientific curios ity, went to in spect the m in ing area an d saw some mu zz le, perhaps not accidentally coi nciding with the visit. The ext raction of gold from the gangue, wh ich contain s it in variou s quantiti es , become s eco nomically advantageous when its concentration is greater th an 0.5 pp m (0.5 parts per mi ll ion , or half a gram per ton , which is less than the head of a match per m3 of gang ue). In today's large opencast m ines, t he typical concentration is between 1 and 5 ppm; in underground ones, however, the average is about 3 ppm. In order to be disting uis hed wit h t he nak ed eye , the conce ntrat ion should not fall below the 30 ppm: t his explains both its i nvisibility even in the richest deposits, an d t he im mense mass of gangue to be t reated to ,Âˇ, Âˇ..~ Âˇ-~'' free it. Therefore , fo r a gold mine to be profitable, tant witn ess to the great technique , not surprisit is essential, rather than a rare high concentraing ly, was a sen ior careers office r, on site bet ween t ion, the ab ility to hand le th e vast am ount of 73 a1d 75 d.C. , who had the task of Prosecutor gangue with the lowest number of miners in t he and who is best known as a naturalist: Caius Pliny shortest t ime. The low concentration of the rocks t he seco nd, who wou ld perish in 79 on the coast of Las Medu las being known to the Romans , for of Pompcii, during the firs t t he cultivation of t he site im pli es operation o f civil protection they adopted colossal demolition wh ich he carried out wi th a ' ' Mine, etymologically de- techn iq ues, on wh ich Pliny focusteam of quad ri remes take n ives from the Latin verb es, handing down a couple, both from the first im perial fleet, t he purpose. 'minuere", which means tc fitAfor of wh ich he was th e Com conservative estimate lead s us m ander. Despite his un - decrease, remove, exca- to believe t hat at Las Medulas the doubted rel ia bil ity, his de- vate. In reality, it meant merger was just one quarte r of a scri pt ion s of th ose mines planned tunnel collapse,, gram per ton of gangue, so tun have always been cons idered nels had to be built to fo llow the a sort of fairy t ale and only trend of t he vein s , blocks of the uneq uivocal morpho logical consequences , still gangue were broken off t hem by a pi ck and t he very evide n t after t wo mi lle nn ia, care full y re excavated material was then removed from the searched an d evaluated , al last cou ld co nfirm wells. The gangu e was then trans ported to the

103 - ANTHROPOS

Representation of miners at work: Their lamp and baskets are evident.

mi lls by using sheer force. According to modern available data, which in essence do not differ much from the ancient ones, the transport of the ore, known as a "hu man chain" is carried out using iron pots or baskets. The maximum distance is currently estimated to be of l 0- 1 5 meters at t he most but in the past it cou ld draw much hig her values. Along t he abovemention ed l 5 m, a row of labourers stood abou t 1. 50 m ap art and passed t he pots from one fe llow labourer to another, and sim ultaneously passed along the empty ones i n the opposite d irection. The baske ts, or tops have a capacity of 7 or 8 liters, thus contain ing fro m l O to 12 kg of mate rial, while th e iron

pots have a capacity of abo ut l O / 1 5 lite rs and contain l 8 to 2 5 kg of material. With t his method, about a dozen ton s of material can be carri ed within an hour em ploying 8- 10 men l 5 meters apart. Obviously on the horizontal sections. But if the system is the simplest and most convenient for sh ort distances, fo r narrow spaces and steep se gme nts it req ui res t he avail ab il ity of a large number of men (if they were slaves nothi ng changed as they had a purchase and mainte nance cost), to the point of t hwarti ng any profit . At Las Medulas al most a hundred baskets would be needed for just an ou nce of gold! And here the mil itary practical approach, al most certai nly from technicians of the Legion VII Gemina, sett led the affair, inspired by anti siege implosi o ns of si milar d esig n bu t with mu ch broade r em ployment . In practice, ju st as Pli ny remirded in detail, at the basis of the gold- bearing rock formation, probably 20 to 50 m below the surface and near the hil lside, numerous and intercon necting coplanar tunnels were dug. The result was a ki nd of low and many aisled basilica, whose pillars were t he posts of rock left to support t he mou ntain above. A criterion which is si mi lar to that of the prop s, leaving aside the remarkable differences of strength, number and non- com bu stib ility. After this stage, the w hole formation stood on those suprorts on t he limit of collapse: t he teams th en began to d emo l ish th em start i ng from t he innermost ones, whi le an expert miner, placed at the mountainside, watched the sl ightest change Below left and right. Virtual reconstruction of the "ruina montium": Above the dam s, and i n section the sha f ts, tun n els and cavities for flooding.

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in the structure, prem ise of the incipient co ll apse. As he noticed that thin sign, with a sou nd warning, perhaps a forerunner of a min ing horn, he ordered immediate evacuation, which was fol lowed a few moments afterwards by the t erri ble and deafening collapse of the whole wall. And Pliny, for the first time, was able to hear and describe the deafening roar of the mine and the resulting blast. Once the dust was di sso lved, the rock lay at the foot of the mountain, crushed and ready for grind ing. It ooes not t ake much imagination to estimate the enormous risks of thi s mining techn iq ue, since just a slight delay or a false assess ment was enough to bury the entire team of miners. Sign ificantly they were not slaves but free men : the death of the former had a cost, unlike that of the latter! And perhaps it was to contain the number of v ictims that the technicians themselves introduced, afte r a series of refinements, the hydraul ic mines. Simple as it was their informant criterion, the ir implementation was, however, extreme ly complex and articulated, and was in all like li hood suggested by nature itself, being impossible to invent anything of the kind through mere reaso ning. In order to somehow su mmarize the ope ration , one mu st go back to the cask of Pascal: the miners dug, on top of the formation, at about ten meters from its edge, a number of wells, making narrow tunnels depart from their basi s and converge into a sin gle la rg e cavity. Meanwhile , through extremely long channels - up to 140 km - great reservoirs were filled . The reservoirs were always placed on top of t he format ions, but much more in side , and their capacity , acco rding to Pliny, was about 11 000 m3 each, and often much greater, judging by their remnants whose discharges, governed by sluice gates, were connected to the wells. Once the work was completed and the gates lifted , t he wat er rushed into the cavity which was qu ickly filled, compress ing the air, which ended up by assuming the same pre ssure of the water at every point, depending on the drop between the mouth of the wells and t he cavity. Exemplifying, if the drop was of just l O m, on each m2 of cavity su rface, it would have acted a pressure of 10 tons, and ass uming, for convenience of calcu lation, of a volume of 1 0 met ers each side, on its 600 m2, it would have acted 6000 t. With a drop of just 50 m, which is the most likely for the reality of the hydraulic mines, the tons of pressure would have ascended to 300 000, which are more than enough to crush a rock wall about ten meters t hick. The entire formation, dep rived of its basis , would lose its stability and collapse under its own weight. The water of the apical bas ins, finding vent, would flow with great vio lence in the tunne ls, eroding and en larging

A rock face demolished by hydraulic mines: The flooding cavities and tunnels are still evident.

them, and carrying with it huge quantities of debris that, when added to those produced by the collapse, would form a huge alluvial cone, a huge reserve of gangue ready for the grinders. The just outlined process , which made the wall to ass ume the morph o logy of a cliff, was repeat ed until! exhaustion of t he cone, removing each time whole slices of rock (hence the unus ual name of ruina montium, given to it by Pliny), which in fact altered profoundly the morphology of enti re reg ions, li ke in Las Medu las. T he re is a famous sketch by Leonardo da Vin ci, interpreted as a depiction of the flood, whi ch r epre sents precisely this terrifying moment when the force of nature unleashes with the water that causes the rock to blow up. It shou ld be noted that Pliny was among the boo ks read by Leonardo and that he knew Spain well enough. One last pecu liarity abo ut that system has been found in the fact that it was in- â€˘ vented anew during the gold rush that began in the late nineteenth cent ury in Cal iforn ia, and t his was the context in which th e label of hydraulic â€˘ mines was coined . Wishing to provide an account of the activity of gold extraction in Las Medulas during almost two centuries, it is essential to remember that Pliny

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California: Injection of water in the cavities of hydraulic mines.

ascribed to the provinces of Asturias, Galicia and Lusitania, the extraction of 20 000 pounds of gold every year, equivalent to about 66 tons, which is about the same amount of that removed today from countries that produce gold today such as Mexico or Colombia. Other assessments by scholars reveal that in that same period of t ime the only mining area of Las Medulas returned a total productivity of between 800 000 and 960 000 kg of gold in 200 years. That gold , as far as we know from the sources, was used to pay the immense military establishment of Rome, and this was a good reason to entrust the control and accountability of the mine to officers of Legio VII. To achieve such a result as many as 60 000 workers were employed in excavations which, taking 2 grams of gold per ton of gangue , give a total volume of rocks demolished and transported to an area of about 5 km from the original site which goes from 1 00 to 240 million m3. This is more than enough mass to justify the deep erosion that is observed today. And precisely because of such amazing evidence, since 1996 the whole area is under UNESCO protection as historic and cu ltural landsca pe. In fact, Roman mining ceased around the third century and the villagers returned to their previous activity, leaving the entire basin intact, which is altered on ly by vegetation growth. The site is thus a rare example of human impact on the territory in pre-ind ustrial t imes. A reasonable curiosity remains at this point: is there really a natural hyd raulic phenomenon from which the Romans could draw inspiration for the invention of hydraulic mines? 1922 is remembered by almost all chronicles as a particu larly wet year, especially during autumn, in late October and early November. In Rome, for

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example , in the October of that year, there Vâœ“as a peak of uninterrupted precipitations over many consecutive days resulting in 425 mm of rai nfall there has been nothing like it throughout the en tire century. The same phenomenon occurred in Emilia Romagna as we ll as in Campania an d Abruzzo. The lack of overview maps does not allow accurate assessment of the causes of th e phenomenon , but only to make some assumpt ions based on its striking connotations. A dee p depress io n, which is fully reflected in the systematic measurements , and which had already bee n carried out regularly in various parts of Italy, settled down over central and southern Europe in an almost permanent way. The Capodimonte Observatory in Naples gives a pressure, on the 4th of November, of only 998 millibar, the lowest of the year. It is of no coincidence that on Novembe r 4th, there is a violent storm in Naples that, with a rainfall of 97 mm : this is among the heaviest of all recorded, about thirty in total, between 1885 and 2003. Even more significant is t hat, in 1922, the amount of rainfall for the month of October was 249 mm, against 86 the same month of the previous year and 34 of the following year. In particular there was an average value of 104 .2 , between 1 878 and 2007. An extraordinary event that was mainly due to the abovementioned low pressure, but this was not the only cause. What is certain is that huge masses of water were discharged all across the Peninsula, particularly close to its maj or mountain systems which physically hindered the advancement of Atlantic fronts. Passages of great intens ity followed one another during that October espec ially on 9, 1 2 and 18 and they further intensified on the 22, 25, 26, 28 and 30 of the same month, welding together in a single catastrophic flood . The situation was to worsen, if that could be possible, in

View of the mining area of Las Medu/as.

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Above left and right.

tude of around 700 m, the slope of Mount Erbano, made up of solid layers of strong limestone, had been shattered and thrown into the air, falling back on it se lf, to form a so rt of alluvial cone, which was not formed by mud, but by boulders , early November, lasting through to t he second up to an altitude of 675 m, with a fron tage of half of the month. Th en, due to the already coneighty feet. As for the vertical th ic kness of the siderable drop in tem perature caused by the rain, wall which had exploded , it stood at fifty feet, winter coldness came well in advance. Meanwhile giving to the whole formation the connotation of a large number of streams and rivers were overa giant sc ratch, capable of r e mov in g about flowing, with extensive damage to infrastructure 30,000 tons of rock. The water continued to flow and crops (many areas cou lrl not be seeded acabundantly and violent ly among thos e boulders cording to the traditional cal for several days, escap ing from endar, but only in Decembe r, a kind of mouth, w hich did not with he avy cuts of crops) . ' ' A reasonable curiosity exceed one m2 in section, right Ironically a few weeks before, emains at this point: i5 at the base of t he cusp of the to be exact on 1 September, in there really a natural hy- cut. T here was no doubt: it had Libya, the highest temperature only b ee n th e wate r which :Jraulic phenomenon from caused ev er recorded on ea rt h is the explosion, suggestRomans coulc ing its immense press ure. recorded in Al Aziziyah, ap- Nhich the proximately 58 Âˇc. The deep draw inspiration for the inIn fact, as outlined , a relatively hydraulic low pressure was enough probarometric alt eration in the vention . ? whole of the Mediterranean is mines. vid ed t hat inside t he mountain ,, also evident from this therthere was a fair- sized cavity mic singu larity. and , of course , a s uffi cie nt amount of water to fill it completely: this condiIn the early afternoon of November 4, 1922, a deafening roar propagated in the valley of a small tion is perfectly compatible with the local karstifitown perched at the southern foot of th e Matese, cation. This makes that unique karst phenomenon in t he central-southern Apenn i nes, rebounding particultaly akin to the mining technique of the Romans, described by Pliny the Elder as "rui na from mountain to mountain. It w as not like the typical explosion of mines or, rather, the only difmontium", and to similar previous sources from ference was its intensity, since anything like that which the contemporary engineers drew inspirahad never been heard and it was followed by a tion. swarm of minor crashes and booms, which lasted Flavia Russo several seconds. If anything, it was like the t hunder of avalanches of rock, com pleted by the roar of rush ing water, which is also typical of streams in full spate swee ping away rocks and tree trunks . When at dayb reak it was possible to examine Contributor for virtual graphics: Ferruccio Russo. what had happened, it was seen that, at an altiVirtual reconstruction of the explosion of water at Cusano Mutri (Benevento), November 4th, 1922.

~ ;. ~-~:l~lâ€˘Jilâ€˘~...,_ 1.1~'

PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ART: CANNAE, 216 B.C., THE OUTFLANKING MANOEUVRE Among the fundamental principles of war that of manoeuvre has always been particularly important to assure commanders victory at a tactical and operative level; in addition, in many cases the application of this principle has allowed them to achieve also strategic success, which, as everyone knows, depends on lots of factors. To understand the correct exploitation of the manoeuvre, it is necessary to start from what was said by General Antoine Henry Jomini (1779- 1 864), of Swiss origin, who was a great scholar of military doctrine. According to this Official, who was less known than the Prussian Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831 ), who today is appreciated in the same way, the general theatre of operations has only three zones: right, left and centre: it is also a subdivision of defensive lines and of each tactical line of battle. From this one can infer that each problem of manoeuvre comes down to determining whether the main effort, by combining the relations of the objectives with the enemy positions and the geographic points, must be made gravitating towards the right or left extremity or towards the centre. The following article is about the victorious application of the principle of manoeuvre in the battle of Cannae and about the trainings which have been drawn from this battle in the following centuries and which are still valid.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Carthage was a colony which was founded by the Phoenicians a century before Rome. It rose on the African coasts, in front of Sicily and in the 3rd- cen tury before Christ estab lished a large empire in the western Mediterranean. It was a Republic, which was ruled by a rich and su perb oligarchy of merchants and which exploited lots of rich colonies. Its t roo ps , which were foreign and mercenary, but hig hly selected, were mai nly made up of t he Hispanics, Gauls , Greeks, Mauritanians and Numidians, which were almost always commanded by Captains who were chosen from the patricians of Carthage. Du ring the first Punj c war the Spartan General Xanthippus led the Peloponnesian militias against t he Romans and taug ht the Carthagin ians about Greek tactics; from the Greeks the Carthaginians learned the use of engines and war elephants. When Rome clashed with Carthage for the first time, in 264 before Christ, it was a land power with a budding mediterranean vocation and had already set under its own aegis the Italian peninsula, unifying it throug h federative structures, municipal organizations, the granting of cit izenship and spreading colon ization. Afte r the first Pu nic war, which ended in 24 l B. C., Rome pursued at a fast pace its

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THE FIRST PUNIC WAR It started in Sicily owing to the support that Carthage gave to the Mamertines of Messina, where the Punics deployed a fleet: since Rome did not tolerate Carthaginian forces placing themselves too close to Roman territory aiming to obtain full control over Sicily, it sent its troops to t he island, as a support for its allies. War broke out. Rome defeated Syracuse, which then would become a loyal al ly, and beat the Carthaginians in Agrigento. Once the Consu l Marcus Atil ius Regulus landed in Africa, he conquered lo:s of cities, but he was defeated by the Greek Xanthippus near Tun is: a fleet wh ich had been sent by Rome defeated that of Carthage and could repatriate the survivors. In 249 B.C. Carthage sent General Hamilcar t o Sicily, who put his enem ies under pressure. War continued even on seas: the Romans, thanks to their abil ity to transform the maritime fig ht in g, through boarding (Polybius wrote about the "corvi" in the third book of Histories), into hand-tohand fighting between soldiers, won in 241 B.C. in the Egad i Islands even the last naval battle of this war. The Carthaginians obt ained a very onerous peace. Once Hannibal Barca had received the command of the army and passed through Spain, founded Cc.rtagena, expanded t he possessions of his country, gathered money for revenues and soldi ers, in order to restart the war: before his death, he left the command to his son Hannibal that he had persuaded to swear eternal avers ion to Rome. T he Romans expanded to the is lands, to the eastern coasts of the Adriatic Sea and to north of the Po towards t he Alps, forcing the Carthaginians not to cross the Ebro.

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expansio n into t he Med iterranean: once it had conquered Sicily, it took cont rol o f Corsica and, in 2 382 37 B. C., of Sardin ia (Sici ly and Sardinia had the provincial ord eri ng fi rst, in 227 B. C.), starti ng the penetrat ion into Dalmatia and Cisalpine Gaul. According t o Titu s Livi us, in 2 18 B.C. Rome reformed the organ ization of t ri bes and centu ries, establ ishing new p rincip les w hich aimed to reg u late t he exercise of polit ical, m ilitary and financial rights and dut ies of its peoples. However, at t hat t ime t he solidity of Roman State was t hreatened by t he conflicts between patricians and plebeians : during t he Second Punic war th is rivalry turned out to be baleful because the two Consuls, who w ere elected an nually and normally were one aris tocrat ic an d th e ot he r o n e ple be ia n , demo nstrated to have not only a different political view but also different ideas about the conduct of operat ions. In "De vit a Hannibal" Corneliu s Nepos summarized the stag es of t h e victo r io u s cam p aign t hat th e Cart hag in ian General led in Italy: "Hann ibal (247183 B.C.) fought near t he Rhone against t he Consul Publius Corneli us Scipio forcing hi m back; once he had crossed t he Alps he clashed with him again in Casteggio, near t he Po, putting h im to flight. When Scipio faced him for t he thi rd ti me near t he T rebbia riv er w ith his colleag ue Tiberios Lo ng o, defeated both of them. So he crossed the Apen nines passing through the terrilory of the Ligurians and head ing

T HE SECOND PUNIC WAR While he was ru ling Spain and was just 26 years old, Hannibal in vain tried to push the Carthaginian Senate to war. Taking advantage of the fact that t he Romans were concentrated on Cisalpine Gaul and were threatened by the Macedonians, he assaulted Sagunto, on t he right bank of the Ebro, and after eight months he conquered it. War broke out again but the winter from 2 1 9 to 2 18 B.C. elapsed getting things ready for war. In the initial phase Hannibal's forces were made up of 12 000 Libyan and Spanish soldiers, 16 000 cavalrymen and 58 elephants; in addition he had 50 big ships , 32 of which were armed. Once he had passed the Pyrenees with only 50 000 infantrymen and 9 000 cavalryme n, he cleared the way for himself using gold and force: Rome sent Pu blius Cornelius Scipio to counter him. After having gone up the Rhone, Durazia and lsero, passed the Alps throug h the Col de Montgenevre (accordi ng to Livius), Mont Cenis (according to Polybius) or Col Clapier (according to other people) and went down to the plain with 24 000 infantrymen, 6 000 cavarlymen and some elephants. After a short rest he defeated the Gauls Taurini and then gave battle, on the Ticino, to the Romans, who were led by Scipio: they came off the worst, were forced to back away and then were reached by Consul Sempronius; however the armies t hat had been com missioned to stop Hannibal's advance were defeated again in the battle of the Trebbia (218 B.C.) and of the Trasimeno (21 7 B.C.).

Title pages. Graphic representat ion Cannae.

of Hannibal's victory at

Below. Remain~ nf the ancient port of Carthage.

11 1 - ANTHROPOS

A curved Iberian sword dating back to the second Punic war.

for Etruria. During the journey he contracted a serious disease which impaired his rig ht eyesight forever, so that he had to be moved by litter. In Lake Trasimeno he outflanked the Roman army and, despite his disease, won and killed the Consul Caius Flamin ius (before he could join the army of the other Consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus). Not long after he also defeated the Praetor Caiua Centenius, who occupied the passes with a selected formation, and reached Apulia". In the third book of the first volume of "The Histories" Polybius tells us that even though the Italian cities had suffered some defeats, none of them, despite the retaliations, was handed over to the Cartaginians, because the Roman Republic enjoyed respect and admiration. Since Hannibal's plan did not envisage attacking Rome directly, seeing that Spoleto and other cities had withstood the siege, the Carthaginians headed for Ca-

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pua, in the plain Flegrea, which was devastated , taking immense war booty. Quintus Fabius Maximus's army, who in 217 B.C. had been elected dictator, followed the enemy from t he hi lls and put them under pressure only in order to weaken them, without fighting . Once he had arrived at the back of the Roman army, Hannibal resorted to an exped ient to disengage from it: he ordered that faggot s be tied to two thousand oxen ' s horns and after havi ng burned them, sent the heads of cattle into a m ad night run which disoriented and frightened the Romans: they interpreted the fact as a possible sign of the Gods, considered it prudent to follow Fabius' plan and not to go out of the camp, so al lowin g Hannibal's army to reac h (through the Vo lturno , Passo Eribiano, Mount Callicula, Venafrum) the plain of Falerno in the Samnium. After six months Fabius Maximus gave the insignia back and the command, for the rest of the year, was assumed again by the Consul Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, who was as signed Marcus Atilius Regulus, who had been elected in place of Flamin ius. To prevent Hannibal from obtaining re inforcements, Rome did a victorius battle with the Punic fleet near Italian coasts and countered the Carthaginians in the Iberian pen insu la, where Hasdrubal Barcid, who had been defeated in Cissa and Barcino, lost a part of the fleet at the mouths of the Ebro. In Italy Hannibal, after having passed through the Matese with all his forces and conquered Gerunio, was counterÂˇed victoriously by Minucius Rufus, who was Fabius' Magister Equitum. This led the Senate itself to elect a dictator which turned out to be a bad decision. In Rome there had never been two dictators at the same time, as Polybius tells us. Marcus, who had been encouraged by th is partial success, went into battle again, but the Carthaginians made things difficu lt for his troops so much that they could disengage only thanks to the intervention of Fabius' troops. With t he time of meetings (216 B.C.), the dictators relinquished the command and in Rome two men, who were almost incompatible, were elected: Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who was a nobleman and hostile to plebeians, and Gaius Terentius Varro, who was of lower class and of humb le beginnings. Their forces faced those of Hannibal, but the two armies remained encamped, one in the face of the other, for the whole winter and the following spring. To force the Romans to fight , Hannibal seized a stronghold which was cal led Cannae where the leg ion na ires had got th e wheat and other provisions coming from Canusio (Canosa); since this made the army's sustenance precarious, some messengers were sent to Rome in order to receive instructions: the Senate decided that it must fight. From the Greek Polybius, who was expert in m ilitary things, we learn that Rome rounded up eight leg ions of 5 000 soldiers, in addition to the allies.

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THE BATTLE

The Battle of Cannae - Hannibal in Italy, Capitoline Museums.

Among the Roman classics, Cornel i us Nepos presents, in short, the picture of the battle of Cannae, saying " ... in Apulia [Hann ibal] went against In Cannae the armies had a similar battle order, two Consuls, Gaius Terentius and Lucius Aemilius. with the infantry that was dressed in the centre and With on ly one battle he put both of the armies to the cavalry on the w ings. This was the deployment flight. He ki lled Consul Paullus and some ex Conthat was adopted by the Romans: Varro and Paullo, s u Is : among them there was after having o r dered 1 0 000 Gn aeu s Se rviliu s Geminus, who soldiers to keep guard on the had been Consul the previous ' ' At Cannae the armies major (west) and minor (east) year". This lapidary saying, from Nere in a similar battle orcamps alongside the Ofanto or which we can perceive f ully the der, Aufidio bank (b ut today, acwith the infantry rout that had been suffered, is cording to some peop le) of the aligned at in the centre and Fortore), deployed their 70 000 not able to explain the tragedy of the heaviest defeat that was in- "he cavalry on the wings ,, soldiers on the left bank of the flicted on the Roman army during river. The legions and the alae, its history: almost 50 000 dead which were made of l talic and 28 000 prisoners, which constitutes a tol l that Latins, were placed in the centre, on three lines, cannot be compared with that of the defeats of the with narrow intervals and distances. The first line â€˘ Teutoburg Forest in 9 A.O. (which was caused by was made up of handfuls of hastati, the second line treason against the allied Germanic tribes) or of of princeps, the third one, where there were the less Adrian op le in 378 A.O. (which was caused by young people, of triarii, while the reserve, which â€˘ Goths). There was a heavy death tol l and even the was t he rearguard, was made of light troops withRoman army, which became an extraordinary and out armour, the velites, who were also placed on the front; the cavalry of the socii and of the Romans unrelenting war machine, was not able to inflict so many losses on its enemies that had been defeated. was placed on the sides, with the best turbae on the

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left wing, under Varro's orders ; the right wing was under Aem iliu s Pau llus ' orders. With his 40 000 infantrymen and 10 000 cavalrymen, even Hannibal

mai ls or breast-p late, a convex oval sh ie ld with metal supports on the borders, greaves and gl adio; hastati and princeps were also armed with pilu m, while triarii, which constituted a sort of line of consolidation and derived from the ancient hoplite infa nt ry, with the hasta. Once they had thrown javelins, the cavalries combated with cold steel . The Carthaginians had an excellent lig ht cavalry and another cavalry that was improperly defined "heavy", which was equipped with light armour and hel met and armed with spear and sword; in the hand-tohand fight the Roman caval ry, which was smal ler than t hat of soci i, was armed with a long sword and for the defence it had both a lig ht armour and a small round shie ld . When they came to grips with each other, wind blew on t he Romans raisi ng annoying clouds of dust, but the position of the sun did not favour any of the two armies and t he ground which was w ithout re lief, lent itself to the manoeuvre. Hasdrubal exerted maximum effort on Aemi lius Paullus' cavalry, which was outnumbered by that of Varro and was arranged in echelon, and covered the interval between the Roman infantries and the bank of the Ofanto; once he had slashed his way through the legions with repeated charges, at least three, Mahrbal passed fast behind the legions and was suddenly behind Varro, who was fig hting against the Numidian cavalrymen , and his cavalry, so break ing the formation. At t his po int, the le-

d eployed the infantries in the centre b ut they were

gions, which had pushed t o the centre gainin g

in a convex o rder, to protect the flanks. Under his brother Magone's orders, he placed th e Celts and the Hispanics in the centre and the heavy infantry, which was made up of the African veterans, on the sides. T he Celtiberian cavalry, which was placed on the left w ing and outnumbered that which was on the opposite side, was under the command of Hasdrubal, who was not Hannibal's brother but another Carthaginian General, as Gennaro Moreno has highlighted in his "Mi lit ary History"; the right wing, wit h the Numidian cavalrymen, was under General Maharbal's o rders. With regard to armament the Celts a nd the Hispan ics were equipped with simi lar shields, the former used long swords which were suitable to de liver hacks, the latter used curved and shorter swords, which were double-edged and suitable to hit with thÂˇe point. T hanks to t he booty of th e previuos battles, the Lybi an infantrymen were heavily equipped with Roman material. T he Balearic slinge r s, the archers and the light troops which were armed with j aveli ns, which were deployed effectively by the Carthagin ians on the front, had the task of bombarding the enemy with stones, darts and javel ins, and so of returning to the ir deployment. The Ro man vel ites had a small round shield, a hel met, a dagger and a jave lin, hastates, princeps and triarii carried a helmet, an armou r with iro n

ground, were hit by t he Africans on the side and by Hasdrubal's cavalry in the back, while the Numidians ran after the rest of the Roman cavalry. In t hat crush, the Roman infantrymen , who were too serried, were not able to manoeuvre to cover t he flanks and to handle the tactical situatio n w hich had ch anged. The formatio ns of the Roman infantry, which were disarranged, pressed , followed closely by the enemy and unable to manoeuvre broke ranks and the scenery became that of indescribable carnag e, a Dantesq ue bolgia of howls, dust, blood, moans of the injured, invocations and crashes of weapons. In the large area outside the epicentre of the battle the disbanded and the fugitives fell easy prey to t he Punic cavalry. Althoug h the Carthaginians lost about between 6 000 and 9 000 soldie rs, t hey carried out a massacre of the enemies: Aemi lius Pau llus was killed , Terentius Varro escaped from death with very few survivors (taking refuge in Venusia, the present Venosa) and Hanni bal, o nce he had surrounded the l O 000 Romans that he had left in the camp, remai ned master of the grou nd. The Carthag inian Commander, gradually absorbing the strike of the Roman infantry and moving its centre of gravity upset t he enemy army and beat it with a perfect pincer movement, which w as distinguished by power and rapidity ; t he tactical gen iu s of t his great enemy of Rome had triumphed.

Hannibal's face reproduced on a Punic coin.

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Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

Treb bia

LESSONS LEARNED The lessons wh ich can be drawn from the events of tha battle of Cannae are about tactics, strategy and the political - military context. With regard to tactics, Hannibal showed an amazing ability to use in droves the most substantial part of his force of manoeuvre, which was made up of cavalry, to crush the Roman right wing, wedging himself between the river and the Roman infantry and bursting behind the enemy deployment. After this first outflanking manoeuvre there was the enormous pressu re that was exerted with a pincer movement by the African veterans on the flanks of the legions, which were in a serried formation and thrusted themselves too far forward, overbalancingthe centre. Hannibal gave a very im po rtant tactical lesson, whi ch wo u ld be studied and applied even in the subsequent cen turies, though w ith variations and changing fortunes. In the battle of Pharsalus of 49 B.C., for example, the Pompeians, whose infantries had not left any corridors between them and the river Enipeus, were outflanked on the opposite side and defeated by the Cesariani, who only on the right side had been able to foil the attempt of outflanking, which had been made by the enemy cavalry. Morgarten in 13 l 5 (when the Swiss outflanked and defeated the French on a ground that was divided into compartme nts) and Kessel dorf in 1745 (when, during the War o f the Austrian Success ion, the Prussians, who had bee n repulsed to the centre, outflanked the Austro- Saxon cavalry, whose right flank was on the River Elbe) set good examples. The st udy and t he application of Hannibal's tactics in Cannae was emulated even in the naval camp: for example, in 1 799 in Abukir Horatio Nelson wedged himself between the coast and the French ships, which were riding at anchor in battle array, in orde r to assail them victoriously from behind . Outflanking the enemy and assailing them with force and rapidity where their deployment was weaker and in the point where they least expected the attack turned out to be a necessity which led to experimenting new and unusual techniques in the contemporary era. Among them, the vertical outflanking through troops which were lifted with gliders, as the Germans did in Eben Emael in Belg iu m in 1940 in order to defeat the Belgian fortress that they conquered, moving then through the Ardennes to outflank the fortified Maginot line. Hannibal's lesson was learned even in the strategic camp in order to break the whole enemy war equ ipment, throug h the manoeuvre. Another example is the German offe nsive against France in 19 14, when General H.J. Ludwing von Moltke applied the plan that had been studied by General Alfred Graf von Schliffen, who was a scholar of t he great leaders of the ancient times, although he was not a follower of Karl von Clause-

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The deployment of the opposing armies in the battles of the Trebbia and Cannae.

w itz. Von Schliffen aimed to apply, o n a larger scale, just the plan that had been implemented by Hanni bal in Cannae and that he had studied in an obsessive way. When von Mo ltke, who had carried out some modifications to Schliffen's plan, mounted the attack, the right wing of the German forces coming from the north was not able to encircle the French and British troops, or to pass the Marne to get them capitulate and to reach Paris within 40 days, accordi ng to plan. From a mil itary aspect Hannibal's experience in Cannae taught us that at all times it is up to the Commanders not only to formulate valid plan s but also to have the determin ation to go ahead with them even if they do not have overpow- • ering forces and t hey are compelled to suffer the enemy superiority. We must also consider the factor of cohesion between Commanders: in fact, it is not • a foregone conclusion that jealousy, arrogance and excessive ambit ion are fau lts since the period in which valid Consuls, elected from the party of optimates, were in contrast to their popular colleagues:

has already performed the first ro le excel lently, while it is moving in the second direction now. We have to make a glancing reference to the teachings for each soldier and for the Commanders, in particof military policy that can be drawn. T he war agai nst ular, the guideline must refer to the values of mi liHannibal and the following wars marked, de facto, tary ethics: a marked sense of the coming of the professional service , moral honesty and a army and t he emersion, among strong sense of belong ing to ' ' Hannibal's was a very the Romans, of t he figure of the the army, that is the Armed important tactical lesson, charismatic Leader, the first of Force which has offered its which would be studied whom was Publius Cornelius Scibloodshed the most to Italy. pio, who was the future winner Another aspect that must be and applied even in the against Hann ibal in Zama, who centuries, was supported in his cou ntry by highlighted is the fundamental following role that the Roman army though with variations men of the people and was conplayed, already during the first and changing fortunes,, side red as a King by indigene Punic war, in the process of Italtroops in Spain. We have to take ian unification, because it besome simmetries into account. came a vehicle of social mobility and later even a The rising of the Roman professional army at that means to assimilate the foreigner: our Armed Force time is equivalent to the recent rising of a profesFinds discovered at the site of the Battle of Cannae.

ANTH ROPOS - 116

Rivista Mi/i/are English Edition n. 212010

sional army in Italy and in the major European nations today. The charismatic leaders of that time have been replaced by the Commanders who have to possess personality and courage anyway, as well as enjoying their soldiers' esteem because sold iers, today like yesterday, do not assess the. superiors ' behavi our according to their wealth or social class to which they belong, but according to their values that cannot be expressed by money or by a lifestyle that is different from the sober lifestyle of soldiers. Hanni bal's soldiers (among whom there were several Celts from North Italy) and the Romans (who had as allies eve n Gallo- Celtic popu lations) led long and uncomfortable military cam paigns in far territories: today, in peacekeeping missions our soldiers often operate abroad in situations of danger, in degrad ing social- environmental contexts which are very different form our national context. Today like yesterday (even thoug h after Ca nnae there were defections among Rome's alli es which were not realized in reality), there is the strong need for solid alliances, w h ich are based on common principle s and va lues rather than mere se lf- interests .

A stone relief with an Iberian warrior armed with a shield and a curved sword.

CONCLUSIONS In Cannae Hannibal led a double encircling manoeuvre that was a prelude to destruction . It was stu died by generations of civili ans and military people. Among them we have to mention Sir Edward Gibbon, Napoleon Bonaparte, Sir Gavin Rylands de Be er, Adrian Gold sworthy, Gianni Granzotto, Renato Russo, Philip Sabin, Mark Healy and, more recently, Antonio Fratangelo and Gregory Daly. They have most focused their interest on the study of t he places and of the composition of the opposing armies and the close examination of the strategy that led Hannibal to defeat the enemy on the field despite being twice outnumbered. In stead the academic world has concentrated on the changes t hat occurred in the Roman political and institutional structu re during the second Punic war. The Romans, who were inferior to them with regard to cavalry, faced the battle with an unexperienced army and after a series of defeats: in fact, in Can nae they deployed eight legions, four of which had just been recru ited and, among the other four, which were already under Cu ntactor Qu intus Fabius Maximus' ord ers, there were two wh ich had re placed those legions which had been lost on Lake Trasim eno. The Carthagin-ians' morale was high because of the su ccesses that they had achieved and were well-equipped, also thanks to the materi al that they had taken away from the enemy in t he previou s battle s. Cannae was not t he last Roman defeat and in Italy and Spain the conflicts contin ued, but 207 B.C. marked a turning point: while attempting to join his brother, Hasdru bal was defeated on the Metauro by Consuls Marcus Liviu s Sal inator and Caius Claudius Nero. Hannibal did not have any other backup t roops and was recalled in Africa where in 202 B.C. fou ght against Scipio, who had landed there with an army, and was defeated by him once and for all. Many years after his death, the poet luvenalis, in his "Sat ires" observed perplexedly that nothing had remained of the great leader Hannibal apart from his ashes. Although we do not celebrate his successes, we recognize his m ilitary ge niu s and we go back over this observat ion thinking abou t that terrible massacre which was caused by a skilled and valiant Punic leader. His vali ant spirit em erges from his only portrait, whi ch was carved in marble and which we were given; the irony of fate is that now it is in the Quirinal Palace, in Rome, precise ly the city that he un- â€˘ dermined with the victory of Cannae, but which crushed him after lengthy fighting.

Riccardo Caimmi Colonel,

Amy Training Units Croup

CONVEYING CONSENSUS The connection between war and communication has changed considerably in the last decades: the new kinds of conflicts involve an active and dominant role of the means of communication, which assume a strategic importance in the production and handling of consensus. The conflict has become more and more a TV event, where reality and unreality blend together and merge into one another and the media unfolds its power acting as an undisputed arbiter in the battlefield.

sequent legitimation. On 17th February 2003 an article on the front page o f the " New Yor k Times" headlined: "A new power in the streets ". The journalist Patrick E. Tyler, who was t he author of the article, said that "the re may still be two superpowers on the pla net : th e United

"There may still be two superpowers on this planet: The United States and world public opinion ... " "The New York Times"

The penetration of modern mass media and the acquisition of greater awareness of one's rights amo ng public opi nion drive the mi l itary i nstrume nt to reach h igh levels of efficiency and effectiveness in order to perfo rm one's institutional du ties for the best and reac h a broad consfln sus among publ ic opinion and the con-

T ittle pages. United States: A demonstration against the military intervention in Iraq. Left. The front page of "Th e Washington Post" of 261/J January 799 7.

Iraq Unleashes Flood of Oi More Scud Missiles Strilie l I .

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ANTHROPOS - 120

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Rivista Militare English Editio n n. 2/2010

State s and wo rld pu b lic o pi nion ... In h is cam paig n t o d isarm Iraq , by war if neces sary, Pres iden t Bu sh appears to be eyeball t o eyebal l with a t enaci o us new adversa ry: millions of peo p le who f l ooded the st r eets of New Yor k a nd do z ens of othe r world cit ies to say t hey are again st war based on the ev ide nce at hand ". Th e question of consen su s is ce ntral by now because t he evol utio n of society does not all ow anymore th e su rvival of t ho se institut ion s t hat do not o pen up to dem ocratic confrontation . In Vietnam t he f i rst war o f the tel evision era was lo st wh en the image s of dead bodies, which had been wrap ped in plastic sacks , appeared on TV sc re en s and so burst i nto Am e rica n livi n g room s. The h ig hest po l iti cal and m ili ta ry au th o ritie s ag reed with eac h ot he r t hat t his sh o ul d never hap pen. So t ne p r o bl e m a b o ut h ow t o o btain and mai ntain conse nsu s befor, during and af ter each conflict has arisen as well as the problem about how to solicit the support of public opinion t o i nternationa l mil itary operations.

«NEWS MANAGEMENT» AND «MANIPULATION BY FLOODING»

The famous "Zippo photo" taken in Cam Ne by the correspondent of CBS, Morley Safer.

off th e current t o incu bators, prevented th e images fro m being seen o f t he 200 tho usand Iraq i who had been killed and many tim es got the Marines to act out the sce ne of the reconquest of th e American embas sy in Kuwait City. In add it ion , CNN reporters t ook a cormorant from a zoo and sm eared it with oil : t hat image went aro und the world and to uch ed p ubli c op i nion. The news became a fact and Mcluhan' s ins ig hts proved to be t r ue : " i n th e trib a l vill age o n a worldwide scale in t he absence of content the co ntainer becomes co ntent, the medium is th e message".

T he p r obl e m of con sensu s amomg public o pinion has led t o the co mmu n ication strategy of "News Management", that is t he production of events wh ich are built on pu rpose an d cannot be i gno r ed by th e informati o n w o r ld becaus e th ey meet news mak ing crite ria perfectly. In form ation i s not limite d, on th e co ntrary it is ex te n ded t o a well - defined strat e gy an d t he eve nts that have bee n built act as d evi ces by which ho rror , death and m ise ry ar e concealed. So "Man ipu lation by flooding " has started and it VIETNAM: THE FIRST TELEVISION WAR is carried out with the support of highly professio nal pub l ic r el at i on s age nci es : " Ru d e r Fi nn This war was won on th e battlefield and lost i n Global Pu blic Affair", "Hil l & Knowlt o n" an d "Wathe dinin g room. Th e lo ss of termen & Associates" . In the Gul f War t he Kuwaiti consen sus was not due to the ' ' in the tribal village on a subversive power of televis ion governm ent, which was in ex ile, entrus ted itse lf to " Hill & worldwide scale in the ab- bu t to the propaganda ca mKnowlton", whi c h i s th e sence of content the con- paign in the pu bli c re lations biggest American public rela- tainer becomes content, the c on tex t w h i ch had ai m ed to get people to accept t he offi tions ag ency that org aniz ed medium is the message , , cial versi o n of t he war, which event s i n vari o us place s to h ad given t o a ll correspon - • launch appeals for aid o n be d e nts full freedom of movement reac hing t he h a lf o f Kuw a iti b u sin es s m e n and studen t s, point where it had b ecome impossible for the st udying how to infl uence publ ic opi n ion, also a rmy t o control t hat mas s of co rre spo nden t s thro ugh the man i pulati o n of info rmati o n . T he wanderi ng a ro un d Ind oc hina (in 1968, wh ich experts of the ag ency shot fake hom e movies in was t he mo ment of t he w ide st au d ience, w ere Hollywood about a Kuwait freed from oppres sion, got the UN Kuwait i ambassad or's te enag e al most 700) . At fi r st th e war w as described as a triumphal daughter to d esc ri be how Iraq i so ld iers had cut

Another famous photo which went around the world, in which Brigadier Nguyen Ngoc Loan, South Vietnamese police chief, is carrying out a summary execution of a Viet Cong in Saigon during the offensive of Tet in 1968.

march, which was justified by the defence of democracy against totalitarism. In the Vietnam war, until 1968, horror had not been shown. Anchormen had to tell the audience about patriots, soldiers' bravery, the precision of their high technological weapons, while the enemy was demonized as crue l and fanatical, and those who dissented from the conflict were considerPrl to be u npatriotic. It was a soft television repo rt on war. Only 22% of videos showed scenes of violence, dead and injured people; the dominant stories were about "American boys" in action, not for censorship reasons, but for a sharing of culture, ideology and points of view between journalists and the army. t he following extract is an example of a television report: "Brave people need leaders. This is a leader of brave ry men. His name is Hal Moore. He is from Bardstown, Kentucky. He is married and has got five children. They are the best soldiers in the world. In fact, they are t he best men in the world. T hey are well-prepared and well-disci plined .. Their motivation is extraordinary. They have come he re to win". For Mcluhan that in Vietnam is "the first television war". The Âˇspectator had the concrete feeling that they were the witnesses of the war in its doing, participated "in each phase of war and the main actions are now fought in each American house". New technology makes fo r more and more info rmation and spectators need s impl ification because they receiv e a great number of visual and sound stimuli in a short

ARVN Rangers in combat in Saigon during the Tet offensive.

ANTHROPOS - 122

lapse of time. This is the reason why they are given stories with characters who are in contrast with each other in order to facilitate their understanding. Th is follows the narrative outline of the stories of the popular tradition, where the different parts turn into the principal antinomy o f hero /antihero. To t he comp laisance of the i nterview with the heroes correspond the denom inations of the North Vietnamese (enemy, re d , communist); damages to civilians become th e planned policy of terror on TV, i f they ar e caused by the enemy or a fatal mistake if th ey are caused by American soldiers. In this type of informatio n th ere is no room for the crit ics . "While the Americans fight and die in Vietnam , in this country there are people who sympathi ze with the Vietcong", said a news bulletin of ABS in 1965 , referring to the American pacifists . An exception to consensus was the news broadcast of CBS. In August 1965 it announced the news of the fire of Cam Ne's village which was caused by the Americans: they broadcasted the video where it was possible to see the Marines who used the flamethrower against th e inhabitants of the village, children and the el derly included, and houses that had been razed to the ground in retaliation. Calls of protest followed the broadcasting, the viewing public complained about communist propaganda and the support that had been given to the enemy. In au tumn 1967, also because of the approach of the presidential elections, the Johnson administration tried to persuade public opinio n that the war was ending successfully. But the

Rivista Militare English Edition n. 212010

land offe nsive act ion of Tet Uanuary l 968) made it cl ear to public opinion t hat America was losing t he war (as NBC had announ ced). Accord ing t o General Westmoreland "the turning po int was wi th the battle of Tet. On a military level we won it, but after two days from the beginning Walter Cronkit.e announced on TV that we had lost and that would become realit y. If I could go back , I would cal l a pr ess conference and I would give my version of events". The tacit consensua l pact between media and po lit ical power has broken by now and the loss of trust in institutions helps the emanci pation of televisio n. Television news has changed, it has become more dramatic and criti cal. T he governme nt news management comes into collision w ith the in creasing protests in univers ities, in journalism, in th e government itse lf an d among the population, which now g ives the audience t o a more aggres si v e and sc eptica l journalism. Sudde nly, the simpl ifyin g outline of a democratic South Viet nam agai ns t the invasion of the co mm unist North fe ll apart and with the intensification of j ou rnalist activity the images of civi l victims and urban destruction i ncreased : for the first ti me war appeared on TV to be a bad affai r. Th e ima ge s of field battles a nd of mas si ve American losses persuaded t he au d ien ce that the war had been lost , and fo r the army t he de-

"CNN": The planetary information.

mous extent of the potential public has made it po ssi ble for t elevi sion to develop according to targ ets, se ctors and spe cific topics . June l , 1980 is the date of the first broadcasting of CNN, whi ch is a t h ematic c hann el of news. It became t he pioneer and leader of th is sector (with regard to diffus ion and audience), spread i ng v ia satellite across th e world. In 1988 feat hud been du e to tel evi sion . CNN reac hed almost 50 mi l lion us ers in the In Vietnam mass medi a enjoyed greater au United States (mor e than half of all users) and in 199 2 1 20 m i l l ion . T he network's motto is : to nomy and at first, as always , had accept ed the language, the prospects an d the agen da of the "wh ereve r som ethi ng hap pen s, and before it happe ns!". establ ishm ent. Only in t he anomalous per iod Through CNN news was happe n ing at the 1968- 1 97 3 t elevi sio n showed that a breach had same time in wh ich peop le w ere liste nin g to it: be en o pened in the American cons ensus bri ngt h is contemporaneity of news with events has ing, according to many peop le who worked for th e me d i a and the arm y , made sate lli te tel e vision a means of internat ional dip lomacruel real ity into Ameriacan homes i n close - up and i n 'The frequent use of satellite cy (whe n t he United States in co lour, causing widespread technology for television vaded Panama, Moscow protest disillusionment with institu - broadcasting has made ed against t his action cal li ng a tion s, t he moral col lapse of communication in real time CNN correspondant). CN N becam e the imag e of th e n at ion and a n t i mi l ipossible around the world , , contempora tarism of publ ic opinion. ry information, also w i th re gard t o the actual audi ence; i t can be defined as a press agency in real time wh ich gives us images «CNN»: «WHEREVER SOMETHI NG HAPPENS... » instead of words. Deaver, presid ent ial Staff comm u ni cat ion coSince th e en d of the seventies, with the d evelord inator, plans events and actions w hich are • opment of information tech nolog ies t hat were abl e to attract media and are built like great app li ed to the arm aments, a new concept of war fi lm production s. " Photo opportun iti es" (t hat is has become established as system of informato say Reagan in "spontaneous" attitudes), the • tion, Com mand a nd Control. The freq uent use "d ay 's st ory" (whi ch is the news that has already of satellite technology for t elevi sio n broadcastbee n gath ered for the i mm ed iate j o urn alistic ing has made com mun icat ion in real time possi use) and the "day's p hrase" (that is to say the ble around the world . Satellites have become a sam e conce pt th at various politicians, local ad means of supranational diffusion and the enor-

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Pentavision: The media show.

min1stators and public figures have developed at the same time i n different p laces so that a specific topic can get extensive media coverage) set perfect examples. Beyond the concrete r esults on a political and diplomatic level , what matters is the atmosphere that is amplified by media and the atmosphere of handshakes, of facial expression and private talks. Not everything worked. During the "Restore Hope" ope r ation in Somalia Marines in action stat ion s landed on a Somali beach which had been occupied by cameramen and news photog raphers. So the story was broadcasted live and became the self-representation of mass - media, which film a story t hat becomes a show, that is to say an event that is built express ly for massmedia, obtaining an alienating effect of unreali ty. In the eight ies the direct confrontat io n between mass-media and politics was an indicat ion of the willingness to reduce information to

ANTHROPOS - 124

an internal channel of pol itical communication and, in case of war, to leave it out. The war of the Falklands-Ma ldives (1982) was the f irst invisible war in the te levision era. Only 29 correspondants and technicians (all of them were British) were accred ited and cou ld leave together with the fleet. They were submited to the board of censors twice (the articles were controlled before the b roadcasting and , on arrival in London, by the Ministry of Defence) and physically were un ab le to see the conflict . This situation created dependence on government spokepeople, who became the only sources. Other inv is ible actions were the American attack aga inst Grenada (1983) and the invasion of Panama (1989), they happened in the absence of journalists and did not awaken much interest from the media, just in the moment in which the Palestin ian question and the Roman ian revolu t ion received maximum publicity respectively. This embargo on informat ion was possible also because of the new nature of wars, which were not limited and where the a ir force was

Rivista Mililare English Editio n n. 212010

used t o make rapid and extremely pr ecise i ntervention. With the war of the Fal klands - Maldives (1982 ) and wit h the raid on Libya (1 986), new tech nologies that had developed in th e seven ties and in the ei ghties (sate ll it es, laser beams, optical f i bres , computer science, telematics, avionics) were tested. Th is l.ed to a new generation of weapons systems w hic h were focused not only on power b ut also on quality (smart weapons). Some examples are m ilitary satellites that track images (during the Gulf War the United States had si x satellites operatin g on t he zone) , spy planes t hat are abl e t o fly without p ilots at a ve ry low altitude , the stealth, that is to say invisible pl anes with aerodyn amics which is able to disperse radar en ergy, sys tem s which are able to process autonomous ly the data that have b een stored or th at hav e an a utom at ic guid e (camera- g u ided miss iles or i nfrared missi les wh ich can hit di stant targets.

cancel that annoying memory. The last act of th e Gu lf War, which was broadcasted on t elevi sio n, was the descent of American sol die rs from a helicopter t o obtain the reconquest of the embassy of Kuwait City. In the face of thi s spectacular scene, nobody wo ndered if this action was u seful or not (s ee i ng t hat the ca p i tal had al ready been free for t wo days) and it was in evitable that th is should be compared with oth er images of t h e e nd of a w ar , whic h were stamped in one's memory: for exampl e, the hu miliating escape of the personnel of t he embassy in Saigon by hel icopte r. On l st March the fro nt-page headline of Wal l Street Journal was "The vi ct o r y of th e Gulf War exorcizes the demons o f th e Vietnam years'' and the article says: "the victory is sweepi ng away the Vietnam war from the front line of the American subcon scio usn ess . For almost twenty years the Ameri cans .. . have sadly reflected on contrad ictory lesso ns an d the atmos ph ere of defeatism that it generated ... many of th ese spider's we bs have NO «CRONKITE SYNDROM E», YES «PENTAVISION» bee n removed ... w e are t he mo st powe rfu l nation of the world, this could be the begi nni ng of The Vietn am war had been lost because of the the seco nd Ameri can Century". To p reven t t he failed co ntrol of the politi cal "dange rou s" interfere nces of impact of information that had journal i sts and of public ob structed th e autonomy o f ' ' The media show of smart. opi ni on the military Com the army, instead the Gulf War bombs made them the immand us ed the two mean s was prepnred by t he gove rn - age, the war, the news, the t hat we r e traditiona ll y at its ment news m an ag em e nt , sposa l: cen sorship and pro show and publicity for the. di which ex plain ed why that war duction of an altern ative flow wa s fa i r a nd wh i ch were it s Pentagon ,, of information. It forbad jou rnalists to go to the front uno bjectives. Once they had obtained i nte r nal consensus to escorted, to p hotograph or war, after the beginning of the armed action f i lm the dead and the inj ured, to give info rma(16th January 199 1), the American government tion abou t armam en ts, equ i pment, movements t ri ed to prevent the "Cro nkite syndrom e": in this and t he nu mber of allied and en emy units, to desc ribe in detail mil itary ope rations, to give sense t he Gulf War was the first television war, becau se it explo ited to the fu ll the possi b ilit ies d ata abou t t he losses among the al lies, t o menof televi sion to be on t he f ield , to package and t io n t he base s of d eparture of miss ions and to sell the war, d iffe ren t ly from Vie t nam whe n interview soldiers without any preventive official politician s and soldiers d id not understand how autho rizat ion. the new media co uld control messages an d deSo the Gulf War was blacked out but the result stroyed an enemy of the Th ird World ( and con was not another i nvisible war because censorseque ntly without voi ce). Since then th e political ship was linked with an apparent ric hness of in formatio n , which resulted from th e mi l ita ry leadersh i p has learned t he les son; never ag ain wou ld American soldie r s be blamed for a w ar, news management through the socal led "manip ulati on by fl ooding". During th e f irst days never again wou ld a v ictory be on the fiel d and when the conflict was live, fresh news were a defeat be in the din ing room (the im plied thebroadcasted around t he world and th e aud ience • sis is: our troops have never lost a batt le, if they was t otally imm ersed i n a scenery of war. Now have lost it has happen ed because of the Conth ey cou ld follow the path of m is siles from the g r es s and te l ev i sion) . Bu sh de c l ared that he moment of lau nch until th e mo me nt of the im- • wou ld not fight w ith the i nfl ue nce of informapact. Th e med ia show of smart bombs made tion (he r emin ded people o f Rambo's joke "do th em th e i mag e, th e war, the news, th e show they let us win it th is t ime?") and he would leave and publicity for t he Pentago n at the same time; Vietnam be hind. they conveyed the mess age of t he triumph of The lesson of Vietnam was learned in o rde r to

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Sebastien, Myles C. .-\~~: 2.L

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The "faces of death", 3000 pixels. They are as many as the soldiers fallen in Iraq.

new t echnology of smart weapons, the myth of a sanitized and profe ssio nal ized war, in the absence of bloody images and visible victims. Referring to this Cumings uses the iro n ic term "Pentavision". So we can say that military powers exerted that control on information, which had failed in Vietnam and had already been expe r imen te d with th e conflicts of Grenada and Pa nama. They made news management met hods m o re refined and t ried to change t he journalist ic re port into a celebration of a media event, of which the Gulf War had some f eatures. But not everything followed t he direction that had been given by military and government news management. It is true that war does not allow the presence of journalists; however, if they cannot stay where soldiers fight they ca n stay whe re shots fall. Th is is the case of CNN, which started a new model of sup ranationa l journ al ism : neve r before had correspondents stayed there for t he durat ion of a war to send their war r eports from the capital of t he enemy. For the first time journalists were in the front li ne at t he outbreak of war: on 16th Jan uary 199 1 peop le heard. from TV that war had started (half an hour before th e Wh ite House an nounceme nt) and that CNN existed. Although the first bombardments destroyed Iraqi centres of com munication (radiotelevision stations, rad io li nk for t elep h o n ic communications), cutt i ng the "centra l nervo u s system" of the enemy, CNN continued to transmit live thanks to an in novative portable antenna for v ia sate llite comm un icat ion (TCS-Lite , which has a long autonomy of t r ansmiss ion), becoming at t h e same t ime agency (of image s) and news source . Journali sts

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could follow the bomb ardardme nts from t he hotels where they stayed. They put the ir microphones outside th e window obtaining an od d union of fixed images and kinetic audio : Bagh dad's sky which was striped with luminous trail s of bombs and of antiai rcraft defence art il lery and was m arked by the "C NN " logo and by th e writing "live"; t he no ise of missiles and siren s, the bomb explosion and the rad io commentary of correspondents. Never before had t he war been seen i n such a way: it was a fasci natin g show, which blinded t he spectator who wa s dazzled by signals t hat f il led senses but did not give any information. In the report of mass me dia war was cleaned and its obscen ity was re moved, as Robert Fisk pointed out. Purificatio n i nvo lved removal of blood, burned bodies and devastate d l i mbs. The civilians who had been kil led disap peared. It must be li ke this in order that war is to lerab le and co nsequent ly practicable. "War d epe nds o n pu bi ic op in ion's co nsens us. Consensus depends on t he ability to hide reality of war and consider how mu ch death is tolerated".

FROM «POLITICALLY CORRECT» TO «INVISIBLE WAR» War in Kosovo highlighted two different as pects which turned out to be decisive in reaching general consensus about war: first of all, th e integrat ion of ce nsors hip into news management strategy; the construction of a real "war show" through t he fusion of h ighly emot ional i mages and sounds . In th e collective memory each frame of war was vi v id but the re was no perception of horror i n the conflict. It was the f irst politically correct war of history. In terms of consensus, the success of t h is conflict depended mainly on manipulation of language. There was revisitation of langu ag e just to eliminate, or at least reduce, the possible references to "traditional " war: t hey talked about a certain n umber of missions t hat had been carried o ut, a ce rtai n numbe r of targets that had been hit and a certa i n number of damages that had been caused. When they were obliged to talk about it, war was defi ned as "fair" "to brin g about peace", "h umanitarian". Considering war as humani tari an cou l d seen a nons ense or a contradiction. Talking about a humanit arian war is al most an oxymoron. The conflict in Afghanistan distin g uished itse lf by using refined methods of concealment and manipulation of information. Actually, these met hods were a co nstant in all war contexts of t he past. What was really new was that for the first time a new way of act ion, which

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had always bee n omitted until then, was renCONCLUSIONS - LET'S LEARN TO TELL IT BETTER dered explic i t. Thi s way of actio n h ad b een omitted be cause it could undermine info rmation Communi cation has assu med a dominant ro le law, wh ich is t he mainstay of western democrain modern international relationships, both as a cies. non - mi litary factor of security, and as technolo"It will not be a war for televi si on ... when we gy that is use d in th e syste ms, to th e point of can, we will tell you what Wâ‚Ź are doing, when we changing the same way of th inking about war. cannot , we wil l not tell you anything and, if necNew for ms of conflicts require a systemat ic, essarv, we wil l lie to you ". w idwsp read and massive use of civil and social That time someth ing changed in the American actors and the mass media become active parts strategy. The ad m i nist ration cons id ered it suof these confli cts. perfl uous to advance ju st ificatio ns , as if the Some military resea r ch on communication, heaviness of the att ack, i n itself, had al lowed which are both theoretic and i n the field (for exthem to free t he mselves from the contro l of the ample som e French studies o n the management system of information : the contempt that westof com mu ni cat io n within th e SF OR fo rc e i n ern public opinion felt so unanimously for terBosnia), which have focused on the logistics of rori sts pe rs uaded the Bush admin i stration not com mun ication, that is to say the ex plicit, well to manage without legitimation of television planned and i mp l emented pr oc edur es of its cameras in Afghanistan . planning: for example, which level of hierarchy Th e Iraqi co nfli ct represents the last q ualitaand of org an iz atio n has to communicate with tive leap in t he relatio ns hip between medi a and t he ou tsid e world , whi ch on es with ci vilian s, war: from the expulsion of correspondents from w ith the ONG and the mass media; which flows the stage of eve nts to their enro lm ent in the of in form at ion have to be r egul at ed, and i n army, which i s a condition that re q uires a b iwhi ch way, from an org an izatio nal level to anased view o f events. The change of med ia sys ot her o ne: the theatre of operations extends tem wil l be co mplete when webcams will repl ace beyond th e battl efie ld, wh ich is crossed by netreporters so that t he feeling of being there w il l works of any k ind by now. be greatly heightened, w hich is a sort of media The relationsh ip between war and communivoyeurism of spe ctators of catio n, and so between war and wars, with out knowing anypo li tics, has ch anged deeply; not th ing at all. The next fron- ' ' This is the role tha only can we notice a m il itary intier o f informati on w il I be mass media play in the t erest i n commun icati o n, which drone journalism, which is preparation of war, the} has always existed (d isse min ade persona lized and devised become more and morE tion of rumours and news, inforon t he pattern of mil it ary essential strategic weap- mat ion gathering , manipulati on, p lanes without pilots. ma ni pu lat ion); but also ons in the managemen counter Thi s is the role that mass t he eme rgence of a new way of medi a play i n th e prepara- of conflicts,, con si dering war: it is defined as t i on of war , they become "softwar", which is link ed with what ex perts des cribe as " soft mor e and more ess e ntia l power", t hat is t o say a power that i s mo re of strateg ic weapon in the manageme nt of confl icts: from the socalled CNN effect, where images and re lation s and communication and less of the int eractive dialogues ("CNN war") are protagoimposition wit h mean s of direct coercion . nists, to Fox effect, wh ere Rupert Mu r doc h's Th e analysis of se lf- rep resentation of NATO, American station "Fox News" is the emblem of the it s organizatio n cha rt , highlights a particular most im pudent informative patri otism. feature: it is no more just a pol itical- military al In view of President Bu sh' s fatal appeal: "Eith er li ance, but it is also a big "ag en cy of manage ment of means". "Management of means" refers with us or agai nst us", through which they had wanted to bar mass media and public opinio n to traditional, strategic- military and cons ulting from tak in g a ne utral position, t he news in dustasks. try ma d e a choice of non - in dependence and Arquilla and Ronfeldt say that "the next war â€˘ embraced the cause of a fair, hu man itarian and wil l be won by whi is able to tell it better". 'Tell it better" does not means on ly represent ing it o r liberation war, which was agai nst te rrorism , in provid ing it with cons iderable media coverage , favour of democracy, against the evil. And yet but it means man agi ng fl ows of signs . T he im all t hi s d eployment and was not enou gh to perages whi ch were broadcas ted by cameras that suade public opinion th at war was the rig ht sowere assembled on nose- cones - whi ch reprelution to Iraqi pro b lem and not eve n that Iraq sented th e g r eat television innovati o n of t he was a problem .

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Gulf War- set a good example. "Those bombs war ... and the result was seriuos demoralization of were at the same time images, war, show and population , who started to have doubts that Am erica publicity for the Pentagon". They were weapons was able to fight against an enemy outs ide its bor which were made of texts but equipped with ders, with consensus of internal pub lic op inion. Hal l i n different features: for example, composite D. "The uncensored war. The med ia and Vietnam , "statements": "bomb plus image" with the repreuniversity of California Press, Brkeley, Londra, 198 9 sentation of its effect through images ; or "bom p.3. bardment plus news, plus NATO spokesperson's Frasca's opinion was different. He says that "the din comment". ing room lost war", that is to say it was not able to What is needed is the creat ion of a sort of find it and to answer the question "why we fight?". "institutional culture" where communicat ion Cfr Frasca G. "la scimmia di Dio: l' emoz ione dell a can have the right importance: the prolifera guerra mediale" Genova, Costa e Nolan, 1996, p. 120. tion of offices and organisms must be linked (4) Halln . D., op. cit. , p. 139. with the assimilation of a strong institutional (5) Episodes like this are very rare . Telev ision r eidentity and of the idea that each person of ports on war were rather soft at first. Only 22% of military staff is an ambassador of th is identi ty videos showed violent im ages and only 24% of them to the outside world in any moment. showed soldiers or civilians who were dead or inThe task of communicators is not to limit jured. Why so little blood? Without any doubts bejournalists ' freedom of movement strictly, to cause at first losses were actually sma ll. Besides , impose tight controls on t hem or to claim that there was no lack of critical repo rt s on the "li ttle they are the only source of dirty war" or on the Americans news that can be printable, who had been killed by "friendly but is to manage to maxi - ' ' In this context, the rela- fire" by mistake. Even if there mize the advantages that a tionship with the media was no direct ce nsors hip , jourfree system offers, by learn- must be cultivated conti- na listic rout ines and ideologica l ing to handle the flows of in- nously in order to acquire assumptions operated and were formation and, at t imes , even with the army. " II cameraprofessional credibility that shared by creating them ex nova. man era 11 accanto ai Marines ed In this context, the relation- can facilitate relationships era quello ii punto di vista dell e ship with media must be cul- with journalists and can riprese". Hallin, p. l 34. t ivated continously in order produce advantageous ef- (6) Kn i ghtley, P., «II diode/la to acquire professional credi- fects on public opinion ,, guerra . Dalla Crimea al Vietnam: bility that can facilitate relaverita, retorica e bugia nelle cortionships with journalists and rispondenze di guerra», Milano, can produce advantageous effects on public 1978, ed. orig i nale: «The first casualty», 19 75 , pp. opinion. 41 5 - 465.

David Bastiani Captain, Land Operational Forces Command

NOTES (1) Tyler P.E, a new power in the streets, new york times, l 7 Februry • (2) the bird mentioned above does not reside in the stretch of the sea of the Persian Gulf in January. Maybe the r eference is to one touch ing passage of the book "n ie nte di nuovo sul fronte occidentale" , where the author describes the massacre of horses that was done by the enemy artillery. (3) th e following is Richard Nixon's opinion: mass media gave news about the war 's events, but d id not g ive any explanation about the hidden object ives that were the real reason for the fighting. T e l evis io n showed the terrible suffering and human sacrifice of

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(7) di Giuseppe , G., Cnn L' info rmazione planetaria, Mandria, 1992. (8) According to the White Houese's spokeperson Fitzwater "the CNN has inaugurated a new method of communication which distinguishes itself by directness and frankness" ; thank s to satellites, in fact, the government use of television can extend beyond the borders, it is possible to broadcast live one's own official positio n s al l over the world. Ambassadors , politicians and soldiers follow the CNN , Mattelart, " La comun icaz ione mondo", Mil ano, 1997. (9) During this conflict between Ergentine and British troops to gain the control over the Falklands a special system of control of mass media was adopted. In sho rt, the strategy that English troops used was aimed at making war invisib le and at remai ning the main news source for journal ists. Lots of reporters were banned from entering the islands and some of them were expe lled . During the media managEment of this war, wh ich was operated by Thatcher government, NATO learned that it has to remain the main source of press agencies.

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(l 0) Cumings, B. "guerra e televisione, bologna, 1993, (l l) Once the conflict bro ke out, con scious aware ness spread among peop le that what t he Pen tagon had forecast was not a media event but an event for the media. The military Co mm and will do anythi ng to keep journal i stic organizati ons far from the "front line" of operations, decid ing in stage s which aspects of the conflict journalists, and through them public opinion, co uld know. ( 12) Fisk. R. "Not i zie d al front e", Fandango, Roma, 2003. (13) Julian Barnes, citato in Casaccia M., "Democrazia anche liberta d'informazione", CRES , strum enti n.36 (14) Remondino E. , "La Tv va alla guerra" , Rai, Eri /Spe rlin g e Kup fe r, Milan o, 2002. (l 5) Acco rd ing to Zahama, American diplomatics made ; ome strateg ic mistakes which undermi ned the posit ive aspects of the communication strategy t hat had been followed. Firstly, communication was in one way, with an nouncements which had boom erang effects: the statement "Either with us or against us" is an ultimatum an d for this reason it cannot be pe rceived as a threat with consequent reactions of chal lenge and non cooperation. Cfr. Zahama "La diplomaz ia pubblica ame rican a nel mondo arabo e musul -

Ground Zero in New York shortly after the attack.

mano" an analysis of strategic communication, Vaccai o S. " La censura infini t a: informazion e in guerra, guerra all'informazione", Milano, Mimesis Eterotopia, 2002 . (16) Cfr, i i sito de ll a NATO: www.nato. gov (SFOR, Communication et gestion, 1997). (l 7) Soft Power is the abi lity to obtai n the desired effects, in the context of international matters, exploiting the potent ial of attraction rather than coercion. Soft Power is in the att raction that an idea can exert on people or in the ability to put things right in order to shape others ' prefe rences . If a State can see to it that its power is legiti mized by public opinion and can establish international institutions which encourag e the ot hers to cha nne l or limit on e's activ it ies , â€˘ there is no need to mobilize econom ic or miliatry reso urce s. Arquil la J., Ronfeldt D., "Cyberwar is coming!", in AA.VV. , 1998. (l 8) The two scholars are involved themselves in the d ivulgation of thi s term and are backed by Rand Corpor ation. (19) Cu mi ngs B., op. cit, p.169.

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In-depth Studies

THE DAWNING OF WAR REPORTS The first one goes back to the Napoleonic age Had not news services in the Middle East brought in the spotlig ht the image of the war reporter who, in the front line, chal lenges his fate, trying to document the facts from the bloodiest theatres of our time, someone might have thought that this profession was about to finish. Considering that the concept of war itself has changed from "ad singulare certamen" into "the war of buttons" or, what is worse, into a series of terrorist acts. After all, the conflicts of the last two decades, from Kuwait to Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan, are a demonstration that the margins of manoeu vre for journalists of war are increasingly tig ht, because of the danger they have to face. Today, the reporters of war are a group of accredited journalists, who are kept at a proper distance from the first line, who follow the briefings of soldiers and confining themselves to spread, elaborating them again, the official press releases which are furnished by the Commanders of the operations. The great reportages are not made any more, as the

Col. James H. Childs, (standing) with other Officers of the 4th Cavalry of Pennsylvania.

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editorialist Egisto Corradi said, "with the sole of the shoes". But it has not been always so. The work of the reporter of war is o ld almost two centuries. Going over that work again can help to understand our present better and to discover that the journalists always had to challenge censors hip and the competition of the new systems of communication. The first reporter sent to war, without going back to Xenophon or Sallustius, was Henry Crabb Robinson, who was sent to Europe, by the Director of "Times", John Walter, to follow the Napoleonic campaign against Prussia at the beginning of the 19th century. John Walter, with typical Anglo- Saxon ways, sent him away with these wo rds: "tell us about how that little French Emperor wins his battles". But Robinson was neither accustomed to military life nor cut out for journalism and revealed him unsuited for this job. His first reportage, devoted to the battle of Friedland in Lithuania, 14 June 1807, where the Russians were defeated by Napoleon and forced to ask the Armistice, which would have led to the peace of Tilsit, was a flop. The piece sent to the 'Times" was monotonous, boring and lacking in warmth: a little more than a bulletin. After all , Rob inson had not even approached the area of the battle. He remained in the background confining himself to collect descriptions and stories by some soldiers who had taken part, clumsy patching everything . In 1808, Crabb Robinson was sent again by the "Times" in Europe, to inform about the campaign of Spain, fo llowing the British expedition landed on the coast of Portugal, led by Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. Once more, he revealed himself as being distracted, rather indo lent and not so bright in his descriptive ability. Thus, he was fired just some time later. If someone consider Robinson the first special correspondent of war - at least from a chronological point of view and despite its modest job - other historians identify in Charles Lewis Guneison, who was a correspondent of the "Morning Post", who in 1 834 followed the Spanish civil war which had

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broken out uri Lhe deat h of Ferdin and VI I, a far more complete reporter of war . If only becau se he did not hesitate to expose himself to the risks of combat in order to see with his own eyes t he pos it ion s of the two deployme nts. He even ended up in jail as a spy and risked shooting by the hosti le Carlist faction , which was made up of the followers to new Queen Isabel the II. To pull him off from this dange rou s situat ion , the British Government had t o intervene, assuri ng the authorities that the curiosity of Gu neison had no pol it ical aim , but it was only the mai n ingredient of his work as a journalist . Th is is t he early history of the war reporters. But about who should to be considered the first true war repo rte r, there is no t rue agreement. Although Guneison proved to have t he makings of a re port er, experts and journal ists are, however, unanimous on Will iam Russell. He is considered to be t he first t rue war reporter. He was , in fact, sent by the Di rector of the 'Times", John Delane, on the battlefields of Crimea, to provide the readers with information about a conflict which was taking place so far away. The 'Times" at that t ime was, and sti ll is, t he au thoritative ex pression of the British Gove rnm ent policy. Until then, the chronicles of war were rather confused, put t ogether by journalists or editors of loca l newspapers, o n the bas is of d isco n nected

The ch arge of the British Light Cavalry Brigade at Ba.lac/ava, 1854. Painting by Richard Caton Woodville.

news and more or less reliable w it nesses, collected of second or th ird hand. There were not articles sent continuo usly but random pieces. In particular, a detailed account of defeats was never made; essent ia lly, that pre ss was used as a reso u ndin g cham ber for the Government. Of Irish origin, Russell left in the spring of l 854 from t he island of Malta with the Brit ish expeditionary force, convinced that the m iss ion was to be compl eted within a few mont hs. But he was out in his reckonings. The war had broken out in the October of the previous year between the Russian Emp ire and the Ottoman Empire. Britain and France all ied themselves agai nst Russ ia, fearing its expansionistic aims towards the Balkans. Even the ti ny Kingdom of Sardinia had exploited the internatio nal situat io n to his advantage, entering the war alongside the all ies agai nst the Russ ian "bear", so as to gain political importance in Europe. The end of hostilities was ratified on ly two years later, in March 1856, with the Cong ress of Paris. The "Times" of 14 Novem ber 1 854 publi shed the memorable chronicle of Russell about the defeat of the 600 men of t he Army light horse brigade of his Maj est y that in Balac lava were shat tered by the

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In-depth Studies

Non Commissioned Officers of the New York 93Â° Infantry Regiment, Bea/etown, Virginia, 1863.

Russian artillery. "At eleven and ten, our light horse Brigade went forth triumphantly in morning sun , haughty in their military splen dour. From a distance that did not reach the mi le, the entire enemy deployment blasted, from thirty pieces of ordnance, a hell of smoke and flames. With their ranks by this time very reduced, w ith a cloud of steel on their heads, and lifting up a cry that for these gen erous men was also the last appeal of death, t he light horsemen rushed in side the clouds of smoke. But even before we had lost sig ht of them, we were seeing a plain punctuated by their bodies ... At eleven and thirty- five, not an Engl ish soldier remained in front of the pieces of ordnance of the bloody Mu scovite guns ". The sales of the 'Tim es" went immediately sky-h igh and a short time after the arrival of Russell to Crimea, circula-

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tion of the austere paper doubled in London. His job was not easy, but Russell had not to suffer the anxiety of having to end the piece before the closing time of the newspaper. The te legraph was deve loping just in those years, but the most secure way to send a piece was the mail. That article was de livered to an officer of her Majesty, who was in charge of the communications, then to a courier, who was an officer of the Army as we ll, who had leave it to the nearest mail station, from where it was forwarded as it were a normal letter. The charge of 600, which had occurred on 2 5th October, appeared on the 'Times" only on the 14 November. The permanence of Russe ll was extended far beyond the two planned months, and reached, in the end, two years . T he secret of his success was simply in his desire to write everything he saw, even the less lofty aspects of war: the pain, the suffering, t he bod ies to rn by grenades and the screams of the injured , first of all; but also the blunders of

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the generals, the self-conceit of some Commanders of the British expeditionary force. He was a true reporter to the events he saw. Until then, war had been dealt with only by insiders or po liticians. That journalist, although paid by a prestigiou s newspaper as the "Times", was spoiling the monolithic and stereotypical image of the Army of his Maj e5ty and this see med out of any ru le. Today, however, the pieces of Russell seem of a striking ingenuousness, compared to what is now reported by our media. He used j ust a little bit of rhetoric, as it was usual at that t ime, but it was the content of his pieces that put the journalist in a bad light. Russell risked compromising the secular image of the British Army (he even dared to mention about the mutiny of an Indian Brigade). For this fact, some officers, disgruntled by his chronicles, challenged him to a duel. A solution was found by getting him out of the trenches and putting him in the background. But even that seemed insufficient. February 1855 remains a historic date: for the first time an Army Commander, Sir Edward Codrington, head of the British military expedition imposed a ban on publi cation of news that might someh ow be usefu l to the enemy: so censure was born. It is no coincidence that the appearance of the figure of the war correspondent, that is to say a journalist who is disconnected from the newsroom and power constraints of the editorial staff, coincides with the establishment of mil itary censure. Also it is no coincidence that since the Crimean War journ alists who follow an army have become legally a part of that entourage. With all of the connected risks: if they are captured from the enemy must be treated as prisoners of war. But th e confl ict in Crimea also marked anoth er im portant birth : the photo - reporter. In 1855, Roger Fenton, who was painter and photographer of the British Royal House, was sent by the British Government to remedy the rashness which had been committed by Russell. In practice, he was told to provide a "correct" image of the war, that is to say an image which was not too harsh, and especial ly which was benevo lent towards the army of his Majesty. Th e result was perfectly in line with expectations. The reportage by Fenton illustrated war clean, tidy, with British soldiers who showed off their always perfect uniforms. The consent to t he war en terprise at home also passed through the compliant photos by Fenton. This was the first tentative step towards war photography, respectful toward s military authority.

Allan Pinkerton, President Lincoln and Maj. Gen. John A. McCfernand near the battlefield of Antietam, September-October 1862.

To fincl th~ first true photo- repo rter in t he mod ern sense , such as a Russell for photography, for instance, who wants to convey to the public what he sees, a few years have to pass and we have to move t o the other side of the Atlant ic Ocean . The American civil war, fought from 1861 to 1865 between the so uthern and northern states, would offer to the press the opportunity to employ all of its best men. Suffice it t o th ink that along the two fronts there were more than 500 war correspon dents, sent from newspapers around the world. The "New York Herald" alone had sent 63 corre spondents. In 1863, the re also came Russell, the hero of the war of Crimea, the Peter Arnett of the 19th century. Its fame was so universally recogn ized that Pre sident Lincoln wan ted h is advice about mi litary strategy. The one who is considered the precursor of the modern phot o- reporter is Mathew Brady. Unlike Fenton, Brady had no links with official institutions, but only with the readers of his newspaper. He would make extraord i nary photographic re portages about the civil war, immortal izing the naked and raw reality of the fighting: devastated camps, the brutality of death, up to dismembered bodies. In term s of the written word, on the contrary, t he war of Secession showed all the problems and the vices of the relationsh ip between military and the media. Edward Crapsey, of the "Philadel-

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phia Inquirer", made stinging reportages; the goal of his criticism was General George Meade, who be lieved to be a strategist of great valour. After yet another article that demolished the high image that he had of himself, General Meade turned out the journalist, upload ing him on a mule and putting around his neck a cartel with the inscription: "slanderer journalist". His retort was not late in coming. The whole category of American journalists would join forces, in fact, against the surly military, who, from then on, disappeared from the chronicles of war. Very probably the General hoped to make of his war exploits the stepping-stone for his candidature for US President, so that the damage to his image was remarkable. General Ulysses S. Grant was definitely smarter. Aware of his need to have a favourable press, throughout the War of secession he wanted about him t he reporter of the "New York Herald ", Sylvanus Cadwallader, cuddling him and try ing to flatter him as well as he could. The American civil war introduced many innovations also about the tools of the trade. The use of the telegraph to send articles was institutionalised. It was especially the young journalists who benefited from th is new technology, since they could outclass the gentlemen of the old guard. The star of Russell declined just with the advent of this invention. The style of reportage had to be skinny and immediate to adapt to the more and more frenetic pace of processing. On the contrary, Russell was used to very long t imes and his way of writing was almost literary.

Eugene Savaistre, 1860: the hat of the Chief of the Bourbon Police hoisted on a barricade in a street of Porta di Castro, a district of Palermo, (photo by archives Crifasi).

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With the advent of the telegraph the job had to be done in real time and a newspaper editor could not allow himself to miss a news item just in order t o wait that his lead ing correspondent would finis h embellishing his piece. Another event of that period was the establish ment of the Associated Press, an agency for col lecting and providing news, (not always well docu mented and sometimes not even truthful, however), to the magazines which subscribed to it. The staff were made up not so much of good journal ists or informants, but on people who knew how to beat a Telegraph key very quickly. During the same period, namely around the middle of the 19th century, Italian journalism was decidedly more self- controlled. In newspapers and periodicals the big names were above all notaries, lawyers, politicians, teachers, doctors and some writer. The language fluctuated, without many alternatives, between a forensic style and a conceited patriotic rhetoric. The graphic design of Italian newspapers of that time was very simple. They were papers of information, often just bulletins assembled with local news and with that little which came from the rest of the country. Fresh news was very little and, also after the unification of Italy, the "special" dispatches that arrived from the Interior travelled extremely slowly and were inaccurate and irreg ular in their frequency. News coming from the rest of Italy was the result of correspondence related to events which had occurred at least five or six days earlier, which was published under the subtitle "Ritardata". In fact, it is not before 1876 than the Italian newspapers began to adopt a telegraphic service. News from abroad was published with even longer delays and, in many cases, it was nothing more than plag iarism from foreign newspapers. To ide ntify examp les of Italian war correspondents, we must go back to the Exped ition of the Thousand, in May of l 860. Among the followers of Garibaldi who took part in the adventure started from Quarto, many sent reports of the feats of arms they were engag ing in. Let's mention here Francesco Bartolomeo Savi, who used to send to the "Unita d'ltalia" , passionate newspaper of mazzinian insp iration, impressive reconstructions of the batt les engaged by Giuseppe Garibaldi's army. We may also recall the reportages by Osvaldo Viani, former Garibaldi's Red Sh irt, who too k part in the Paris Commune in l 870and offered his reports to the newspaper "II Dovere di Genova". Perhaps the first "Special Co rrespondent" of an

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Italian newspaper, in the sense that he was sent to the place in that specific cap9-city and not as a particip ant in the events, was a journalist of the "Gazzetta del Popolo", who , in 1869, set out for Suez in order to attend the ceremony of the inauguration of the Ch annel. Although there was no war to make his mi ssion a dangerous one, hi s example brought in the Italian newspapers the rule to send observers to monitor events abroad. Some years later, in 1877, it was "II Secolo", a Milanese newspaper, to se nd abroad the first larg e group of journalists. Du ring the Russian- Turkish war, which was taking place in the distant lands of Bulgaria, "II Secolo" sent to the site journalists who were expert in the art of war and drawers, (p hotographers were still to come) who would make sketches and maps about t he most important battles. Also the "Corriere de Ila Sera" was one of the fi rst newspapers to send around real correspondents. Together with the Bersaglieri who landed in Massawa in 1887 in response to the mas sacre of Dogali, came even the journal is ts Vico Mantegazza and Adolfo Rossi, who wrote a detailed chronicle of the war of Africa and the colonial adve nture of United Italy. "The Africa which emerged from th eir reportages" - Valerio Castronovo wrote - "suffered from too many suggestion s. Deformations and personal feelings of a colonialist kind or a pseudo-scientific sociologism were often added to pol itical eval uatio ns. But such attitudes were ultimately the key to t he editorial success of many newspapers". It is starting from these years t hat the Italian "travell ing editors" or "travelling columnists", as special correspo ndents were initially labelled, became a growing and increasingly hand somely remunerated party. The costs for the travelling expenses increased accordi ngly. The journey of Mantegazza in Africa in 1887, which lasted five months, resulted in an expense for the "Corriere" amounti ng to l 8 000 lire: more than l 5% of the expenditure foreseen in the budget for t he entire editorial staff. Afterwards , there wou ld come the ag e of great correspondents, such as "Luigi Barzini", but by then the season of pioneer war re porters had ended. The trade was already well defined and, with this , the tricks and t he abilities to cut a fine figure before a Director or to flash past one's competitors. History tells that during t he "Franco- Prussian", in 1870, Archibald Forbes of the "London Da ily News" wrote about a deci sive battle at the gates of Paris t he day before the confrontation really took place, thanks to the advances of an informant. With

Italian Journalists on the Ethiopian front line during the battle of Canal Doria, Ethiopia 1936.

the same ploy Fred Fergu son, correspondent of the "United Press" on the Fren ch front du ring World War I, described in detai l, 24 hours in advance, the phases of a powerfu l attack by t he All ied in front of Nancy. If since Ru ssell's heroic times many things, especial ly in terms of technology, have changed, one Âˇ thing remai ns almost unchanged :. the figure of the war reporter. Just like then, there are no trai ning schools for war correspondents. In their professionalism, many th ings are involved: cultural preparation, a good dose of "links" and lots of resourcefulness. Mimmo Cand ido, journalist of "La Stam pa", writes: "the war correspondent must also be ab le to be a reporter, the best, the most attentive and awake of reporte rs. He has to seek the facts , and tel l about them , even wh en no one is talking about them and even when his safety in jeopardy or when he is threatened that if writes those things he wi ll be expelled from the front". It is a profession, as another "great", Ryszard Kap us cin ski, once said, t hat can not do without a great deal of passion because : "the war re porte r is a profession , or a mission, that implies some understanding of human misery and which requires above all a great humanity".

Marcello Ciriminna Executive Editor of Rivista Militare

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RICCARDO DOMINI DISCUSSES HIS GRADUATION THESIS ON THE HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN ARMY SPECIAL FORCES, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE The collaboration with the Faculty of Political Sciences "Cesare Alfieri" of Florence continues, this t ime with a summary of a thesis on the history of the Italian Army Special Forces, from the "Arditi" to the "N inth".

The "Special Operations" are those operations conducted by specially trained mil itary or parami I it a ry forces, organized and equipped to achieve pol itical, military or economic goals, using unco nventio nal means in an hosti le o r politically se nsitive territory. This definition, somewhat generic, can be used throughout the historical period of t he evolution of the Italian SF (Special Forces). T hat said , however, we must note that th e objectives and training have changed over t ime. The "Arditi " of the Assault Departments, establi shed on Ju ly 29, 19 17, played a breaking role, in resolving the deadlock that had

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arisen in the trench warfare , which was very differen t from the action of sabotage and countersabotage played by the X Regiment "Ard iti" (created in April 1942 as a "Saboteur" battalion) during the second world war. The operational and doctrinal changes in spec ial operations, made necessary by the different theatre of battle and by the progre ss of techno logy, continued also after World War II. Thanks to t he ins ights of two officers of the Saboteur Paratroops Battalion (created in l 961 ), Captain Rossi and Captain An gioni (who attended some courses in the U.S.), in the mid-sixties, a "doct r ine of It alia n special operations" could be developed. T his was based on the concepts of operational bivalence (the saboteu rs had to be abl e to play both direct and indirect actions, such as guerrilla warfare o r trai ning of l ocal forc es), climatic - environmenta l multivalence of the operators (eac h company had to be able to operate in any theatre) and the use of t he operational detachment as th e basic unit. In 197 5, the batta lion changed its name to IX Assault Paratroops Unit "Co l Moschin" (in honour of the IX Assault Unit of Major Messe, who di stingu is hed himself i n the First World War) and took over the flag of the X Reg i ment "Ardi ti", carrying o n its g lorious traditions . The n in eties marked another crucial period in the professional growth of our Special Forces , thanks to thei r participation in numerous m issi ons abroad. From Somal ia (Mis sion "IBIS", 1992), to Bosnia, Kosovo and East T imor, ou r rangers gained valuable exper ience i n terms of t act ica l and operationa l procedures by the ir Ame rican , British , French and co ll eagues from other nations. T he use of Spec ial Forces (SF), given the smal l numbEr of staff and the high cost of its train ing and equipment, requi res a minim um wast e of resources in

Members of the Special Forces on training.

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both t he operational and t raining field. In We stern nations, this need has been realized w ith the establishment of centralizer.I Commands for the use of FS units of any Armed Forces (very often of Army and Navy, in some countries even of the Air Force). Since t he eighties, several coun tries started to establish Unified Commands, beginning with Norway in 1981 (Special Norwegian Defen ce Co mmand, FSK), and w ith the Un ited States and Great Britain following on in 1987. Our co untry establ ished the "Command for Special Operations Forces" (COFS) in 2004 upon the in i tiat ive of Min i ster of Defen ce, Mr Anton i o Martino, and the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Di Paola. T h e COFS pe rforms a harmonization ope ration of a procedural and tec h nical kind among the Ital ian Armed Forces (IX Paratroops Assault Unit "Col Moschi n ," th e Navy Rai ders Operat ive Group, the Ai r Force Raiders Depar tment and t he Special Intervention Group of t he Carabi nie ri) maki ng use of the FOS (4t h Alpi n i Paratroops Regiment, 185th Target Acquisition Department and Special He l icopters Operations Depart ment) to support the ir ope rat ional ac t i ors. Aft er the attack on Septembe r 1 1, 200 1, and the evolution of th e international situation, Western countries have in creased the u se of the FS to fight the non- conventional phenomenon of t e rro rism. The p resence of u nified commands (also within the NATO since 2006, with the estab lish ment of the NATO SOF Coo rdi nation Ce nter)

Th e final- year student Riccardo Domini discuss ing his thes is. Officers of t he "Folgore " Paratroop Brigate are present.

has led to a more rational use of this strategic resource . The prese nce of an el usive enemy, with a flexible and decentral iz ed organization, requi res a contr ast equally unconventio nal and specially trained men (the train ing pe riod for the raiders of the IX Unit "Col Mosch in" lasts al most two years), which th e st ates have found in the FS. In con cl usion, th is wo rk wished to hi ghl ig ht an excellen ce of our count ry, wh ich mar ked the world hi story of the specialty (the "Arditi" of the First World War have been the fi rst special forces of the twentieth century), despite negative pages (during Fasc ism) and wh ich today, too often , is seen in a bad light by public opinion . The FS, therefore , shoul d not be conside red as groups of "super- men ", who use unorthodox methods in order t o so lve any kin d of emerg ency that may arise, bu t simply as an excellent m ixture of cultu ral, t ec hnical and m ilitary ex perti se created t o achieve t he strategic objectives of their country (as defin ed by its political leadership).

Riccardo Domini

International Studies Graduate

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IVANA SPAGNA'S NOTES TOUCH THE HEART OF EVERY SENTINEL Art often becomes tinged with war contents and draws emotions from contexts which have a high level of pathos. The battlefield has always given interesting cues to express emotions . Pictorial and scu lptural representations of battles , poems and war stories set an example. Epic poems are, par excellence, the celebration of the war event and of its heroes, who are men in the flesh: they fall in love, fight, feel nostalgia for their country and for their women and perform their military duties almost risi ng to the status of divinity. "Military art", "war poetry", "songs' soldiers" def ine different contexts but all these expressions link war eve nts to art in its pure and rom antic significance. Art and war is an apparently contradictory connection, it is almost an oxymoron. Actu ally, it is a close union and it has always been an int erd1ange of similar meanings and values . War has always been an endless so urce of artistic energy, in spirat ion of thoug ht and sen sitivity. It is a source of creativity and culture, an inextricable tangle of emot ions. Emot ions dance to the notes

Above. A Bersaglieri brass band in Rapa/lo.

Below, left. Artist Ivana Spagna wearing the "vaira", the typical headgear of the Bersag/ieri.

of "Sentinel la", a song that was writte n by Antonino laria, who is Lieutenant General of the role of Honour of the Italian Army Corps of Engineers, and was performed by Ivana Spag na, who presented the song for the first time on the occasion of the third int e rreg io nal gathering of the Bersaglieri Corps in Rapallo. The Auditorium Parco della Musica in Rome is another evocative scene of another performance of Spagna on the occasion of the events which were organized to celebrate the 149th Anniversary of the birth of the army. In fact, on the i 3th April, in the presence of the Chief of the Italian Army General Staff, General of the Army Corps, Giuseppe Valotta, t he Concert of Musical Band of the Army took place. During this event military and civil figures had "a taste" of the artist's talent, who sang t he song again. Thi s was a sign of the deep respect that the artist feels for all those men and women who put their life at risk every day to bring a glimmer of hope to lots of popu latio ns who are worn out by years of war. Spagna, who is one of the most important Italian and internation -

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Sentinella Sentinella che di notte Jiii la guardia con le stelle che ti f a11no compltgnia la tua casa, ii tuo Paese, ed ii tuo amore sono attimi di grande nostalgia. Quando pensi e chiudi gli occhi per sognare pensa a me che son lontana dal tuo cuore pe11sami e se questo tu farai son sicura che 11011 ti tuldormenterai. Fai laguardia, non dormire pensa a me che son lo11tana che ti voglio rivedere pe11sa a chi 111 silenzio ti ama e se questo tu farai son sicura che 11011 ti addormenterai. Tu ti trovi in un Paese per la pace ma ogni giorno vedi morte e distruzione non capisci il J!erche di tutto questo e ti sforzi a voler dare una ragio11e. Sii tu Jiero di portare ii tricolore quei colori ii bianco, ii rosso e ii verde

Above. Ivana Spagna during the event in Rapa/lo. Below. A CD cover portraying Ivana Spagna and General !aria.

so11-o ii simbolo, il vessillo dell'ltalia

sono amore, amore di chi non si arrende Fai la guardia, non dormire pensa a me che son lontana che ti voglio rivedere pensa a chi m silenzio ti ama e se questo tu farai son sicura che non ti addormenterai.

al singers, gave voice to this extraord inary musical composition, which was dedicated to the "military family" and, in general, to emotions. In fact, love is the real central thread of the composition, from which peop le can draw courage and strength

II Paese ti ha mandato per la pace ma ogni giorno vedi morte e distruzione non capisci ii perche di tutto questo e ti sforzi a voter dare una ragione. Fai la guardia, non dormire pensa a me che son lontana che ti voglio rivedere pensa a chi in silenzio ti ama. Fai la guardia, non dormire pensa a me che son lontana e se questo tu fared son sicura che non ti addormenterai. ÂŤI giorni passano, i mesi volano, e git anni svaniscono, ma io son qui per TeÂť. Testo: A 11to11ino [aria (Cod. SIAE 44560). 1ltfusica: Ivana Spagna - Giorgio Spagna - A. !aria.

Dedicata ai Soldati d'Italia operatori di Pace nel Mondo

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wh ich is Italy, w hi ch has never cut its support and adm iration for its so ldie rs w ho are on peacekeeping mi ssions. T here is almost a sort of calm howl which is aimed at keep ing each so ld ier awake t elling him: "you are not alone, all nation is with you and is ready to support yo u in t he most d iffi cult mome nts" . General laria, who has bee n def ined by Spagna he r self "an exceptiona l perso n and a real powerho use of ideas" , has shown a deep "human" and artistic se nsitivity. Beyond any

Above. Lieutenant General Giuseppe Valotta, Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, greeting Ivana Spagna before the concert which took place in Rome on 73th April 20 70. It was the first event organized to celebrate the 149th Anniversary of the establishment of the Italian Army. Right. Th e artist during her performance in Rapa/lo.

to look ahead and do t heir dut y the best t hey can. In fact, "Sentinella" tells us about the love that a woman feels for a soldier who is far from her because he is on a peace keep ing miss ion . He can see war's destruction every day and this makes him fee l deep anxiety and above all nostalg ia fo r h i s country and her beloved . A romant ic no t e passes t hrough all t he text, pe rvades it and defi nes its deep structure. T he image of t he be loved inspires though t, motivates his actions and gives a meaning t o his future. Eve n if it is not poss ible to f ind any meanings, because the re is only death and destruction, anyway there is the desperate effort to fi nd a reaso n, t he sense of th is task , of the world ' s destiny and of a peace t hat is co ntinuously den ied. T he love for the woman who is d istant co incides and interweaves with t hat for his country, which is no less romantic, because those colou rs, wh ite , red and green are t he symbo l and t he bann er of It aly, they are love, the love of those who do not surrende r. From t he notes of this song, wh i ch are simp l e but very touch i ng, a t h read u n ravels. This thread ideal ly links each "sentine l" to his beloved , to hi s women , to each compone nt of his fam il y and to th at big fam ily

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rhetorical speech, hi s figure strikes everyo ne. In fact, not only has he a prestig ious role and a posit ion of responsibi lities in the Ital ian army, but he is a real "perpetual mot ion" in culture and art. He has lots of deg r ees (seven degrees i n hi s showcase), he is ve rsatile , always ope n to new 2x periences and always ready to rei nvent himself. He was o n t he 19th co urse of t he Mil itary Academy of Modena and is st ill li nked with t his context as supervisor and sup port ing supervisor of grad uation theses of lots of youn g Officials of Mi litary Academ ies. In addition , he works for lots of uni vers it ies of d ifferent Italian cities, both as professor and comm ittee mem ber . This has not pre-

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vented him from having anothe r great passion, which is strong as wel l, for music, which is the leit-motiv of his existence . It is a genuine passion, which interacts, almost chemically, with mathematical genius. There is no repulsion between these two substances but a perfect union, a mixture of elements and a perfect assonance . "A mathematician, exactly l ike a painter or a poet, clears some paths . If his paths last much more than t he irs , it is because t hey are made up of ideas", the British mathematician Godfrey Harold Hardy has written, but Sofia Kovalevskaya's words seal the subtle link: "It is impossible to be a good mathematician without being, at the same time, a poet a little". We cannot omit Aristotle: "In particular, the mathematical science shows order, sym metry and limitation; and these ones are the most marvellous forms of beauty". The w ho le of numbers is a work of art, harmony and perfection. Musical notes and numbers correspond t o each other and almost merge into one anothe r, as laria himself exp lains: "My music comes from my great passion for maths. Numbers, notes and harmonics converge on Fourier's transform and from here the text, which has been dedicated to al l so ld iers

Right. Ivana Spagna during the concert. Below. Lieuienant General Antonino /aria with Ivana Spagna.

who are around the world, has sprung . In particular, my thoughts are turned to those who died during all Italian missions, my aim is to keep their memory alive". Th is is a specia l and important dedication wh ich makes the song's message expli cit, the force of love, the sense of miss ion, in order that th is message can be conveyed to each sold ier's heart , who devot es himself to perform ing his duty. Th is is a further confirmat ion of the symbolic - f unct i onal l ink between music and fighter. Bes ides , mus ic has always cade nced t he most important moments of mi litary history. The presence of Mili tary Bands in the Armed Corps of our country and of other countries is emblematic. Both as war songs and as national hymns or as incitement to the value of soldiers, music always goes st raight to the heart, conveying simp le words w hich are reminiscent of our national identity. Both inflam ing troops' hearts and boosting f ighte rs' emotions, music is fascination, strengthens t he sense of belonging and gives support in difficult mome nts. However, it is also a vehicle of feelings which each country has for its Ar med Forces: proud , appreciation and support for the everyday commitment of all those who, today like yesterday, are ready to sacrifice their own lives in the name of noble ideals, of the safeguard of the country and of t he free institutions.

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MY EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN A day on patrol with the Italian Army. The account of Captain Matteo Epifani. The image taken by the U.S. satellite is clear and unambiguous. From the top it on ly looks l ike a rectangle, but the thermal sensors of the lens show an ab normal change in the spectrum, i n a point which should accommodate only water and stones. It is ammonium nitrate, a chemical compound used as fertil izer, but which, if properly treated, can be used for bomb- making. It is a cachee, a storage hidden under the bed of the Farah Rud River. It m ust be seized. It is Saturday, July 25, 2009. The sun is already high at half past six when we start moving towards t he district of Bala Boluk. Villages of ho uses crowded together, built with straw and mud, running one after the other, for about ten

kilometers, between the ill - famed Route 51 7 and the river that gives its name to the region, the Farah Rud. Endless fields of opium poppies, marijuana plantations and artificial irr igation canals, make circulation particularly difficult, often forcing us to use the same routes. There, among the houses, the most dangerous leaders

of the insurge nts in the area under the respons ibility of the Ital ian contingent are hid ing. There the attacks on Afghan security forces and ISAF troops who are here in their support are planned. Here the horrific bombs have been packaged, whose blasts have involved my company between May and July, without ever be ing able to infl ict casualties among my men. Only on July 14 we did not manage to avoid the worst and First Corporal Alessandro Di Lisio, aware of the presence of an anomaly on the road, in an attempt to save his colleagues, failed to take shelter and was hit by an explosion that I will never forget for the rest of my life. T he explosion was caused, it would seem, by ammonium nitrate. We have a duty to help our Afghan colleagues to prevent other lives being put at risk. We move on board of the 'Dart', tracked com bat vehicles, and on board of the 'Ly nx', wheeled vehicles, recently fitted with a remote control Hitrole Light turret, designed to resist what is re garded as the most likely and most dangerous threat , the IEDs (Improvis ed Explosive Dev ices). Made by hand, disguised using garbage, rocks or objects commonly found along the streets or buried beneath the road surface, the improvised explosive devices can be activated by cable or radio, or a combination of both. After about an hour on board, we pass through the village of Gerani, which a f ew months earlier had been the scene of fierce fighting between U.S. forces and insurgents. The situation appears calm, the people are on the street as usual and some kids beckon a shy hel lo. We arrive on the bed of the r iver Farah Rud and we arrange ourselves so that we can ensure a framework of security at 360 degrees, within which we are going to search for the store. As soon as we go down, all hell breaks loose. I can -

Captain Matteo Epifani.

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â€˘I ,

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not immed iately understand what is happening because, in a matter of seconds, I fee l several explosions in- the distance followed by t he im pact of four bombs a few meters from my position. Pillars of frothy water, a shower of stones and nothing mo r e. Everyone reacts promptly shouting "Activation! Activation!" and, just as I am crossing a strip of water, just a little deeper than my boot, with my personal role radio (PRR) H4855 , I am t rying to restore radio contact with my men . But it is use less because one of them does not stop shouting "Wounded ! Wounded 1". I shift my PRR on the reserve freq ue ncy in the belief that my men do the same . The adrenaline has already acce lerated my perceptions so that everything seems to go in slow motion. I get in the "Lynx" of momentum, hold the microte lephone of t he vehicular radio and immediately req uest a situation report from all of my platoon and squad commanders to understand who is injured , what are their conditions a nd what is thei r position: they on ly mention the name. I try and concentrate and then, w ith my loca l team and the team of the ambulance, I make my way towards the location of the "Dart", on wh ich the

"Dart" VCC and "Lynx" VTLM in Afghanistan.

hit soldier was travel lin g . A column of wh ite smoke tel ls me the spot unequivocally: also the 'Dart' was shot . The driver of the vehicle makes a manoeuver among the buildings drawing close to a wa ll, trying to have at least one of its sides safe . We do not make it in time for, upon reachin g the pos ition another bomb explodes j ust a few yards away , ra is ing a cloud of -dust and throwing stones and splinters in all d irections. I see some people run across the rooftops of a building about one hundred meters from o ur posit io n. T hey stop, turn towards us a nd the first, who is carrying an AK- 47, triggers a burst wh ile the other pu lls out a roc ket launcher and carries it on his shoulder. I press the PTT (Push - To- Talk) of my PRR and order to my gunner to open fire towards the threat. The shots hit the wall just below the position of the insurgents, putting them to flig ht. Through the rad io I can finally understand that the 'Dart' hit is stil l ab le to move so that I order to pull back immediately. After a few moments

143 - RUBRICHE

In-depth Studies

Two "Lyn x " VTLM. One of them is equipped with the new protection for the gunn er.

the p latoon commander tells me on the main radio that the " Dart" is in a po sit ion safe from shooting and the n I can fina l ly take ou t the med ica l team to rescue th e wou nded . I order to open f ire to cove r the movement of the means of assistance, but from a bush a rocket is shot w hich impacts in t he immed iate v ic in ity of our ve hicle , so I grab the machine- g unner and pul l h im down off the car. 'T hey see us! We need to change position! Enter that group of houses and stay cl ose to t he wal ls! Go! Go" I say to the con d uctor . As soo n as we begin the movement, at least three shot s in rapid success io n impact on my win d ow , but they ju st crack the external glass slightly. We enter the courtya rd of an seem i ng ly deserted house. "We are being ob served , we must take cove r1 Approach the house and let' s get down" . I have not even fi nished the sentence when a rain of blows inv ests us. I get out from the vehicle and crawl inside the house.

RUBRIC HE - 144

In a fraction of a second w e are al l i nside the bu ild ing. We are j ust a few mete rs from each other but are still using the PRR to m ake as l ittle noise as possible. My so ld iers are fine and the vehicle, i n front of us, is stil l in motion despite the blows rece ived. I have to ask for reinforcements. I change channel on the intern al fre quency of the second platoon. I immediate ly recei v e the commander of the platoon wh o in forms me about t he stabl e and not serious con ditions of the wounded , the request for m ed ical evacuatio n is al ready go ne and h e is ready to come to our a i d. A few minute s afterwards everyth ing around us starts to t remble, but for the first t ime that day, a smile lights up simultaneous ly on our faces: they are the 'Dart' of the secon d p latoon who eme rge from t he corner of the road at ful l speed . T hey are coming to get us out. Matteo Epifani Captain, Commander, company, 'Charlie" from March 79 to October 5, 2 009

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