JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 2006 N.2 "RIVISTA MILITARE"

JOUIIAl OF THE ITAllAN ARMY FOONDm IN 1856

2/2006

CONTENTS

May-June July-August

Rivi sta Militare aims at broa den ing and updating t he technical and v ocationa l trai ning o f A rmy personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the military w ay of thinking and a foru m of study and debate. Through the publication of articles.of technical and sc ientific interest, Rivista Militare also a ims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

Urgent Quest

A new world order p. 2

Al-Qaeda

An impo rtant exercise in t he United Kingdom

p.84

A long trail of blood p.

2

A Ranger o n exercise, \Neering the nev-.r overa ll suil. Ra ngers c rs o n elile Corps of lhe Italia n Army. highly o pprscialed in all operolionol Thea tre s.

The Australian "Tiger" The situa tion of the p rocurement programme

p . 96

FOUR-MONTHLY Supplement to numbers 3 and

4

o f Riv ista

The Media in the Theatres of Operations

.rvt ilirarc ItaBan Edition

Editor in Chief: Marco CENTRITIO Management and Ed itorial Office 8, Via di S. Mat·co - 00186 Rome Pho ne 0 0 39-06-4 7 3573 73

Advertising Care of the SeCL·ernriat of Rivista 1\/1 ii irnrc Phone 0039-06-4735813'1

Pr inter IMAGO ME l)]A 8 l0IO Orngon i (CE)

NATO: evolution and prospects

A stra tegic resource

p . 102

p. 20

The U.N. and the use of force Peacekeeping often in,poses time 1y interventions and the use of force

tel. 0039-0823-866 7 to W\\1\-V. irnago111cd ia. tt

p.30

Conditions for 2006: One n umbe r: Eu ro 2, I 0 One back n u mber: E urn 4,20

Ethics and Motivation

S ubsct·iptiou n Ites:

The way a sold ier feels during a fight

Italy: Eul'• I 1,40 a year Abro~d : F.u ro 15,30 a year

be nrnde 0 11 posfal account No .22521009 • SMF Centro Pubblicistica d,,Jl'F.sercito 1231/\, Via XX s ,, ttembrc - Ro me Res idc nts abroad rnav n.•111it p ay1n f> t through bank. c heque o,· · imem at ional post~I orrler

Payn1cnt n1ust

Authorized b v th<· Cou rt of Romt' u nder No. 994 of the Reg istry hv Oecree 7-6-1949.

Rebuilding Afghanistan

p. 114

Our Army's commit ment

p . 38 Urban Warfare in «Crisis Response Operations»

Maurizio and Ferrante Gonzaga Two unknown 'leroes

p . 122

p.48 The Terrorists' New Weapons

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og~pyright by Riv ista M_il_ita_re _ _ _ __

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The µrocludiOn o f this nmg.;._zine has. been supen:~l Uy O tnct'O Ra m pa.

Letters to the Editor

p.58 Plans and Resources

p . 134

The Army 's point of view

p. 68

Effects-Based Operations Easy victories between dream and rea lity

• il

p. 76

"

Summary

Vuio,s L"'"'"

p.

136

A NEW WORLD ORDER With the end of bipolarism, the Peace of Westphalia is again under discussion. Today we witness the success of a globalizing vision, against which its opponents will be able to do very little. The United States will naturally lead this revolution, comparable to the universalist v iew of the Roman Empire.

The world o rder, w hich was established afte r the even tho ug h some idealists ha rbour t he ambition Second World War and the Cold War, has disapto transform it into a w orld gove rnment. In t his peared . T here is not anything able to bring it back . case, it wou ld have t he r ight to v iolate t he po p ular There are "visionary" or "revo lutionary" States and sovereignty of t he states for human itarian rea«conservative» ones. The first ones w ant to build a son s. In the pol itical reality, as the exam ples of «new world order». T he others try t o re store the Ko sovo and Iraq show, t he humanitarian reasons status qua and the international laws governin g h id e othe r o bjectives. T his is not a problem. T he t he p revious w orld order . Obviously, t hey would sovereignty has alway s been li mited . Difficulties need to mak e a slight alteratio n t o their political arise from t he fact that, after the Cold War, t he set - up which reflects th e new wo r ld order, but United States does not acce pt limitations of its they are not ab le t o make it. In fact, the reform of sovereignty and freedom of action. T he United t he UN Security Co uncil proved to be a disma l fail States is the o nly sovereign power. T he most ure , in Septe mber 200 5. It has been d eprived of its important countries shou ld share the v iew of this meanin g as time has gone by. It wi ll not become a new w orld orde r. This v iew w ou ld remind us of the w orld govern m ent . If it became common interests w hich linked a w orld government, it w ou ld be the A me r icans and Russian s the end of t he Soc iet y of 'Even during the most acute after the Seco nd Wo rld War. Nations. The r ight of veto of the Even du ri ng the most acute five permanent m em bers serves phases of the Cold War, phases of the Cold Wa r, and Moscow Washingto n and Moscow their own interests. It is not 'Nashington used for estab lish ing peace and always shared the rules whic~ always shared the rules that en su rin g security. Peace and derived from their communi- de rived from t hi s co m m unity of security will su rvive o nly if we ty of interest. Among conser- interest. A mong conse rvative are able t o approach and solve vative and revolutionar) and revolutionary powe rs this globa l problems. powers this is no more possi- shari ng is no more possible . T he conservatives wou ld li ke The g eo political ri ft o ccu rred le , , to keep t hat international order in 199 1 with t he d issolut ion of estab lis hed by Roosevelt and t he Soviet Union. Since then the Truman in 1945 . T h is o nerous United States has managed t he task was giv en t o a security sy st em, w hich was w orld o rder and othe r States have had less freedom unde r the United Nations and the Great Powers of action. Many attem pts to creat e new balances of that had w o n the Second Worl d War. All th e states pow er (a European order and an As ian order) have sho uld have obeyed the rules relating t o internafailed. A lso possibil ity of a world order fou nded o n tional law . The Un ited Natio ns w as given full sova Westphalia- type balance o f power betwee n sove rere ignty. It w as the only organizatio n th at poseign States d isappeared. As time has gone by, an sessed Jus pacis ac be/Ii, which is t he power and «em pire not- emp ire» has been established , i.e. the right to use force against other co untries, except p ax americana . It has been bui lt around the sofo r self-defence. The natio nal sovere ig nty of the called «I mperial Republic», a term t hat was co ined states was defended again st external i nterfere nce. by Ray mond A ron. The United States follows a The Security Council has made attempts to «great strategy» wh ich is si milar t o that of the reform the internation al po lit ical system in o rder Rom an Empi re, as Edw ard Luttwak pointed o ut at to make the United Nat ions m ore representative of the end of the Seventies, when serious ri fts started the new int ernat ional conte xt and mo re effective, to deve lop with in the Soviet Empire. T his made it without changing its ro le and f un damental rules, impossible for the United States t o establ ish an

OIKOS - 4

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order simi lar to that imagined by Rooseve lt . Everybody knows that. Now t here are two glo bal organizations : the United States, which holds t he power; the United Nations wh ich has the legality (it has lost t he principle of legitimacy with Srebrenica and the «o il for food») ·scandal. If the United Nations had been strengthened it would have been like givin more power to the Senate, in ancient Rome , in order to li m it the power of the Emperor. A real j oke ! For this reason, the discussion about the reform of the UN was not brought up in o rder to make the Organ ization m uch more effective and to face any problems concerni ng the new order. It centred on the compos it ion of the Security Counc il. Many states wanted to become members for a matter of prest ige ; many wanted to preve nt t he others from becom ing members for the same reasons. Some states, like France, are called «conservatives» because t hey wo ul d like to keep the official ru les of the wo rld order estab li shed in 1945. Others, such as Ch i na, take advantage of its existence. They f ear that the United States can alter this order. In fact, the US has become the international institution whic h is competitive with t he United Nations. It has inherited «t he heavy burden of the white man», first fro m the pax hiberica and then from the pax britannica. As Virg ili o llari has pointed out, Miche l Hardt and Antonio Negri have drawn an analogy with t he Roman Empire adhering to an economic view accordiri~ Lo w hich Lhe US ic. a useful instrument to serve global fin ancial inte rests. T heir «Messian ic» view clashes with a new antago nistic internation alism based on t he no global people, destined to follow the same route as Christianity in the Roman Empire. T hese views are all fantasies and do not reflect the objective reality of politics. Th e radical Islamic movements (Sunn i and Shi 'ite Mus li ms) on w hich President Bush , after the terrorist attacks of September 11, has declared war, contrast w it h this new view of a globali zed world . Th is war will extend t he western modern ization , inc lud ing t he Islamic world in the g lobalization . It wi ll end in success, because a good result is in the Muslim people ' s interest. As time has gone by, this war has disclosed its ultimate ai ms. War has been declared even on «the vanguard of tyranny», in order to ensure v ictory for democracy and freedom. War has been fought not on ly by perfo rming m il itary actions, but also w ith the penetration of evangelic missions and lay organizations such as the "Freedom House" and the "National Endowment for Democracy promoters of the "coloured revolutions". T he cu rrent regimes of Russia and Ch i na perce ive the new order as a threat, exactly like the Islamic states, especially, perhaps , those that are trad it ionally alli ed with the United St ates .

Title pages. George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Vladimir Putin. Above. A patrol of the "Cobra" Task Force in the Afghan desert.

After t he v ictory i n the Co ld War, the revo lutionary feature of the history, culture and compos it ion of the US has become evident. Th is aspect had already been u nderl ined by the Prince of Metternich during the Congress of Vienna, after the end of revolutionary France. T he "Project for the New American Century" links the Jacksonian trad it ion to the Wilsonian tradition of democratic interventionism. T he world superi o r ity of the US enables it to export «the religion of freedo m» to the rest of the world. Whoever oppos es it will not be regarded as an enemy, but a criminal who must be «eradicated». This explains Guantanamo and the illegal actions carried out also on the territory allied States, but does not jus tify nor leg it imise them. As Kishore Mahbuban i observed in the latest issue of «Survival», the power of the US has become an i mportant resource for the who le world. If it did not ex ist, there wou ld not be the multipo lar world on whic h Chirac philosoph ises, but violence and chaos .

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its southern borders .. In perspective, it has to face the Ch inese danger in the Far East. A ll these factors will lead Russ ia to reach an agreement with the West, in particu lar with th e US . For th is reason it has opposed the inclusion of Iran i n the Organization of Cooperation in Shang hai, wh ich probably Ch ina would have desired . It has avoided clashing with the US . It has res isted the temptation to give Washington "tit for tat" taking revenge against the Americans who had supported the «coloured revo lutions» and had penetrated deep into the Caucas us and Central Asia. After Ukrai ne and Georgia, now these revolut ions threaten Belorussia and even Putin 's regime. Th is policy of «land versus sea» had already been adopted by Primakov. It was called th e «contine ntal d imens ion)) of the Russian fore ign policy. Th e apocryphal will of Peter the Great provides a so li d basis for it. This document said that the centra l aim of Russ ian fore ign policy was the expans ion into the Gulf and India. In add ition, it is supported by the Euro-Asians of Zirinovski and the commu nists of Zuganov. Both of them are insp ired by Tony Blair. some geopolitical theorie s w hi ch have the ir roots in history (even in t he Bible) and regard the opposition between continental and maritime powers as Facing the revolutionary "empire not empire", the real motor of change ... with the Orthodox wh ich aims to sp read t he new order of globalizaChurch's blessing. tion, the mai n conservat ive country is China. Its Western Europe be longs to the conservative bloc. remarkab le development can occur on ly w ith a It is fraught with d ifficu lt ies and internal d iv isions «peaceful g rowth)) . In other words it should take - in particular, it has to deal with lots of prob le ms place w it hin the framework of the stability guaranaris ing from its recent enlargement - its countries teed by the guardians of history not on ly in the do not share a commo n vision for the European «Asia- Pacif ic» system, but all over the world. and world future; it has ambitions that exceed its T oday China has to tack le enormous internal decision- making and operative abilities and a prob lems. Only in four or five decades w ill it poor po litical and strateg ic cu lture. T his makes it become a great global power unab le to face up to a grim real and be com petitive with the ity of a world where war and vioUnited States, provided t hat lence have erupted again. The 'Western Europe belongs partial loss of national soverthe current demographic cris is does not prevent its growth. ...o the conservative bloc. I eignty - with its formal transfer Another obstacle could be the 1s fraught with difficulties to the international organizasystem of all iances «of con- and internal divisions ... ,, tions that are respo nsible for tainment» b etween t he US, keep ing peace , but in practice to Japan, A ustralia and India, the "comfortable" Ameri can which could be j o ined also by gu arantee - has caused the paciRussia. Beijing is trying to kee p the current status fist euthanas ia of the State in most of Europe. A qua. In particul ar, it fi nances the enormous US demonstration of th is is the rhetoric of a postt rade d eficit, buying d ollars and American treasury modern and «post- heroi c» state which does not bond s. In this way, it supports t he American power have any projects and is mocked even by Iran. in t he world, natural ly in t he national Chinese The negot iatio ns of EU- 3 - whic h is t he int erest. Eu ropean «execut ive board)) composed of France, Putin's Russ ia des perately wants to keep the staGermany and Great Britain - with Iran have been tu s of the Soviet Uni on. It is in search of its own pat het ic. Th eir aim was to convince Iran to interidentity, cons ide ring that it was transformed from rupt its programmes of ura nium enrichment in a vast empire into a St at e-nation. Russ ia suffers a exchange for econom ic, technolog ica l and finan demographic crisis. It needs to invest in western cia l incent ives . After the Euro peans have technolog ies. It is u nder constant Is lamic threat on an no unced the i r a-priori intention of re no uncing

O IKOS - 6

the use of force, Teheran has started t o make fools of them. The Iran ians even asked them to apologize for their request for the demolition of the factories used for uranium enrichment. Humiliation was joined by insult. The US loo ked on , a little sceptical and a little amused. The US would be pleased to have powerful and determined all ies as Imperial Rome had. The Romans had allies who were always ready to intervene and provide them with aux iliaries in order to make the legions stronger and keep the peace. But th is is not the case . As fa r as Iraq is concerned, the European contributio n has been minor. Differently from what took place in Rome, as Virgilio llari has pointed out, it is the American «legionnaires», not the Europ ean «auxiliaries», who suffer the heaviest losses. As far as Iran is concerned, on the one hand Washington probably fee ls that it cannot stop the nuclear proliferation and, on the other, the fact that Iran is armed with nuclear weapons will legitimise the permanence of American troops i n the Gulf for decades . Europe is divided over its re lationship with the US. Some States would like to be auto no mo us. Some othe rs want Europe to be in opposition to the United States and aim to make Europe a world geopolitical actor. However, Europe does not have the unity, military resources and culture needed for this role. In the past, it even needed American help to solve serious problems concerning the «European» Yugoslavia. It is difficult to say what could happen in the Middle East. Europe is divided not only against, but even without t he United States, as in the Iraqi cri sis . Europe needs the US more than the US needs Europe. Since there is not another country like the US, t he European s have to try to get along with it. The weakness of Europe. is structural, not incidental. It will not be easy to overcome Europe 's economic stagnation, considering its worsening economic crisis which reduces its geopolitical weight and could even cause its going out of history in the second half of the 21 " Century. Europe could become a g lobal partner, respect able and therefore respected by the US. It should determine its top priorities again and be more able in the decision-making processes. At the moment it is still desperate ly clinging to the UN, as source of legitimacy. Some countries, such as France , adopt this strategy in order to put a stop to t he great power of the US. Others use the UN as an excuse for their inactivity. The inefficie ncy of the United Nations in high politics masks that of the EU. It is only an excuse in order not to support the American policy and to be "free- riders" , which means taking maximum advantage of the security provided by American

George W. Bush.

taxpayers and so ld iers. Europe shou ld focus on the «law politics» of the UN. This approach would seem more reasonable. sensible. The EU should concentrate its efforts into creating a corps of «colonial officers» within the Committee on feacebuilding, which was established in September 2005. This turned out to be successful in its colonies du ring the 19'" and 20' 11 centuries . It should wake up from the «distant dreams» of its General Staffs and concentrate on increas ing «auxi liary» m ilitary capabiliti es. It should excel in those sectors in which the US are less competi tive. Only in th is way could the Europeans become indispensable for Wash ington. T hey should regain the right of sovereignty. Today this process is much easier than before, since the dissuasive strategy of the US has become a prevention strategy. The American Army represents the least imperial part of the «empire notempire». In fact, it is too techno logical and lacking in light Infantry. It is heav ily depen de nt on reserves and the Nat ional Guard. These factors prevent the US Army from getting what is necessary for the contro l of the conquered territories, which is a strong foundation for any peacebuild ing and pol itical change. With regard to those powers th at want to change the stat us quo: they are called «vision ary». These countries hold th at they have a historic mission. On the one hand, there is the Un ited State s which, has changed radically since

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Jerusalem, the lighthouse of the world. T hey thought they had to redeem the Old Europe which was into lerant, dynastic, warlike and co lon ialist . According to them , t he American eth ical and po litical principles had to be spread across the world by giving a good example. They had no option but t o do so: they were much weaker than the great European colonial powers . They had a different attitude towards Latin America, according to the expans ive Monroe Doctrine . At the end of the l 9'h cent ury, their fundamental strateg ic objective was to defend the Panama Canal, a critical zone of «the western hemisphere». The war of Cuba against Spain and the consequent conquest of Hawaii (and then the conquest of the Phi lippines) brought about an «offensive» change of theMonroe doctrine. With the two World Wars, the US became a g lobal power. With the Cold War, it became even a European power and, with the downfal l of t he European colonial empires, the real «g uard ians of history», as Adlai Stevenson said in 1962, and «the sheriffs of the world» as Richard Haass says today. The US took the place of Europe and Japan in keeping stability in the Midd le East and East Asia. T he alliance with China, which was cemented when Nixon and Kissinger went to Peking in 1972, completed t he process of containment of t he Soviet Un ion . An iron sculpture, symbol of NATO, at the SHAPE HQ in The downfa ll of the USSR Un ion left the US Belgium. without a globa l project of fore ign policy . The existence of an enemy m akes it much eas ier to plan a project. IL i::. much more difficu lt to September 11. The US wa nt s to establish a new replace an enemy wit h positive obj ectives, such world order: a liberal, democratic and cap italist as the world deve lopment of globa lized capital globalizat ion wh ich has been promoted and ism. As Robert Kagan has pointed out, th is defended by the its wo r ld supremacy. There are event eroded t he legit imacy of th e foreign pol id ifferent reasons which can explain the process cy of the United States . For fifty years t he US of globa lization . The image of had enjoyed the r ight to intert he Un it ed States holds a powvene and ma inta in the wor ld erfu l appeal for the world . To stabi lity. It had mad e acceptgive an examp le, there are ' ' The US wants to establish ab le the American i ntervenprestigious universities from a new world order: a liberal, t ions agai nst the Franco which new members of the democratic and capitalist Brit ish expedition to Suez, ruling classes of most co un- globalization which has exactly li ke Korea and th e tries have graduated . On the been promoted and de V ietnam war. Th is legit imacy other hand , according to Hard sprang from t he fact that fended by its supremacy ,, and Negri, lots of no- global Europe was high ly depende nt movements are characterized on the US as far as security by anti-Am ericanism, antiwas concerned. So , Euro pe put capita lism , democratic and liberal g lobalization. up with it. In t he o ld wo rl d order, the Soviet Th eir main compone nt is the Islamic fundamen Union was the best al ly of the US. It legit imized t alism which is an advocate of a regeneratio n of the supremacy t hat the US had estab lis he d over Islam and oppose s th e United States that is seen th e who le wo rl d, ex cept fo r the reg ions garas «the Great Satan», co rru pte r of morality and risoned by the Red Army. T he lead ers h ip of tradition and protector of Israel , the «Little Washington mad e this situati on m o re accept Sata n», wh ich occup ies the land of Islam by force. able beca use it saved the form and d id not T he US has always been a revo lutionary power. humble its al li es . App arent ly Washingto n T he founding fathers were convinced t hat they had observed the ru les that it had imposed on the a kind of divine mission, and lived in the new wo r ld. In particu lar, the law and the internation -

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al institut ion, as well as the permanent alliances it had created. A serious spl it appeared after the Cold War. The situation changed fundamenta lly. The terrorist attacks of September 11 changed it even formally. To its great surprise, the US realized that the world was mu ch more dangerous than it imagined. It knew from the past experience in Kosovo that its traditional European allies were unreliable. The potential Soviet threat, which after all the balance of terror made less ins idious, was rep laced by other more real threats - terro ri sm and proliferation - which could neither be reduced nor «deterred».This produced profound changes: • unilateralism, considering that the freedom of action and the «mission» of the US could not be lim ited by laws and international inst it ut ions which, on the contrary, had to be respected by all other co unt ries ; • preventive attack instead cif deterrence and containment; . greater importance to coalitions «ad hoe of the willing and the able» than to permanent a lVladimir Putin. liances. Consequently, the US was allowed to ignore all ru les. The goals of this strategy were to maintain the ing authoritarian regimes allied with the US with American superiority over the world and carry others dominated by fundamentalists . It could out what the end of the Cold War should have even spark off a series of civ il wars (like in caused: the end of history, in the Hegelian Algeria). Illiberal democ racies could arise in other sense, which is the end of ideology with the countries . Afte1· Tito's regime the spread of decisive and irreversible victory of liberal democracy has brought about the establ ishme nt democracy. This policy had been already outof an illiberal democracies in Yugoslavia. The lined in September 2002 in the National Security «visionaries» also oppose the libera l internat ion Strategy - which does not concern only «the war alists (like Brzezinski). They criticize President against terror», which is a short- term objective. Bush for his aggressive policy, because it causes After the re-election of President Bush, all the the US to lose its appeal and aspects of this programme leads to the in crease of antiwere explained in a detailed Americanism across the world. way: the US would use the ' ' To implement this proThe dynamism of this policy most effective instruments even military force, if neces- gramme the US most only wrongfoots the Europeans. Th is sary - in order to spread free- overcome an internal diffi- make s it difficult for the US to dom and democracy and to culty: to persuade public form effic ie nt coalitions. In fight tyranny. opinion that the project is addit ion, it fuels antiAmericanism across the world. Th is represents a threat not North carrying out ,, For many Europe an countries only to the so-called «rogue the friendship with the US used states», but also to the all to be advantageous in their «co nservative» States, (Arab internal politics. Nowadays a close relationship states and Eurasia). To i mplement this pro with the US puts the pro- American parties at a gramme, the US should overcome only an internal disadvantage (exactly as it happened in Germany difficulty: it should be able to persuade public in 2002 and in Spain in 2004). opinion that this project is definitely worth carryNevertheless, the American po licy is unlike ly to ing out. T he so- called «visionaries», in particular change. Terrorism and proliferation are increasthe neo- conservatives, oppose the American real ingly dangerous and the United States is deterists, like Kissi nger, who are worried about the mined to root out them. However, only economic log istic burden, the internal political costs of this globalization and the spread of democracy cou ld policy and the high risks that th is project would achieve this objective. involve. Democratizing Islam cou ld mean replac-

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•

The «reawakening» of Islam has been the most important eve nt . It has been caused not only by European colonialism, which h as woken up the societies of many Islamic count ries , but also by radical Islamic movements which, in the past, were used by the West, especially the United States, in order to weaken the lay Is lamic reg imes that had supported the Soviet Un ion dur ing the Cold War. The «reawakening» of Islam has its roots in the religious persecution of the Mus lims peoples . As well as being a threat to Islam ic culture and ident ity, the West supports corrupted and ineffective dictatorial regimes which serve its interests, robbing Mus li ms of the wealth they have «inherited» from Allah. The spread of fundamental ism is due to the idea that Mus lims, unlike westerners, do not fear death. In addition , modern techno logy provides ind ividua l terrorists or small groups w ith a power of destruction which, in the past, was he ld only by governments. Therefore they could w i n, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. as they did in Afghanista n agai nst the Soviet Union . Finally, the spread of fundamentalism is faciliIts foreign po l icy w i ll not change , a lso tated by the Islamic governments, espec ially Arab because the rest of the wor ld must continue to ones, in order to divert people's attention from fund the double American deficit . Only global do mest ic problems . The o il revenue represents a superio r ity w i ll be ab le to keep the frag ile but real curse : since the governments are not obliged i ndispensable trust between the US and the rest to make the citizens pay taxes, they do not have to of thf> world. Only the expansion and defence acc_:ount for what they do. o f g lobal ization will be able to create the con The neo-Salafite terrorism cannot ach ieve its siderab le wealth which is needed to build trust. purposes . Its goals are unrealistic: unity of the Not only the US but also the rest of the wo r ld «Ummah» and the restoration of the Ca liphate wou ld benefit from th is. In fact, t h e growth of are myths . T he Islamic world is divided into difmany countries depends on the Amer ican eco ferent States which their deep roots in nationa l nomic «locomotive» . identit ies . Consider ing the econom ic force of Finally, this policy correthe West , it is not real istic to sponds to the deep roots of the expect these States to win the American ethical and po li ti cal 'Terrorism and the War war against the western culture and historical experi economies or to assume ence. It keeps the American against terror will not stop power in an Islamic country . Dream alive, so essential also the "new world order" of Now the neo-salafite terrorfor the American internal unity. globalization and the pax ism «stays on the defensive» Another global and revolu everywhere. Its gee- polit ical americana ,, t ionary challe nge is a conse impact is more and more l im quence of the revolution of ited . Apart from Palestine, informat ion whic h has removed Iraq and Afghan i stan, the all geograph ica l limitations and has made the annua l death toll of terrorism did not reach one populations much more sensitive to the reasons thousand all over the world in 2003. As far as of justice rather than to those of freedom. T his car acc idents are concerned, the number of revol ution allows the US to carry out its strategic deaths reached l .2 million . With rega rd to murprogramme. In the short term it could pose difders, the toll is even heav ier. It has risen to l .6 f erent obstacles . Becoming aware of the econommillion. When President Ahmadinejad drew ic differences might fue l further hum iliation and attention to the princip les of the Khomeinist frustration and set off national istic reactions revolutio n, this attitude high lighted an internal whose geo-politica l significance should not be conflict of the Islamic wo r ld rather than a threat underest imated. to the new world order that the US was bu ilding .

In future, Iran will be likely to have nuclear weapons, but this fact does not seem to worry the US very much. Iran cannot use them as instruments of projection, not even against Israe l, because the following day, Iran would be destroyed. Iran fears to be occupied. and could use its nuclear weap-ons as a deterrent. However, its fears are completely unfounded, because nobody has the inte ntion of occupy ing Iran, taking both into account the not very bril liant results obtained in Iraq up to now, and because Iran is still the most pro-American country in the Middle East . In the majority of Arab states, the ru ling elites are pro-American and the pop ulation is anti American; in Iran the opposite is the true, and the American nee-conservatives know this very well. In subst ance, terrorism and the war against terror will not prevent the «new world order» of globalization and the pax Americana They are just temporary obstacles on the way to t he new world order. The war against terror faci l itates the pax americana. It has greatly extended the influence of the US. It has shaped an economic policy aimed at supporting t he Ame r ican power. T he GDP (gross domestic product) has risen to 6- 7 per cent. This has stimulated the economic development of the US, has enabled the Country t o overcome the crisis wh ich existed before September 11, has restor·ed the trust of th e international finance in the United States , which has continued to play the role of «locomotive» of world economy. China and the whole of East Asia have been the strongest all ies of the US, by financ ing its doub le deficit and increasing American consumption ; however, they have left American families without any savings . The ownership of social expenses will al low the US to fund adequate ly political and m ilitary costs in the next decades , despite the demographic crisis which will hit the Country during the period 2030-2040, arise after the crises of Europe and Ch ina. T herefore the pax americana w ill dominate the world in the next decades . As Kissinger suggested , it w il l consist in a decentral ized system, when democracy is spread across the world and the process of globalizat ion is completed. Up t o that time the American «legionnaires» will carry a heavier burden than that of the «auxi liaries», and the act ion will be highly central ized in Wash ington. Of course, China remains an unknown quantity and the pred iction of a Confucian-Islamic al li ance made by Samuel Huntington could come true. However, this hypothesis appea rs to be quite un likely. In fact, it is based on lon g - term predictions. For this reason, we cannot place it i n a gee- politica l context . .. The only danger

Japanese Premier Junichiro Koyzumi.

that t hreatens the new order of globalizat ion comes from the possible «t iredness» of the American peop le. If the US decides not t o meet any more intern at ional commitmen t s, this wou ld cause the disorder and chaos desc r ibed by Co lin Gray in his book «Another Bloody Century» . This wou ld lead to pol itical , strategic and economic chaos and undo al l the advantages of g lobali zation . The revolution of information would increase the world chaos by makin g the poor m uch more aware of their si t uatio n and more impatient of l iving in penu ry. Th is would create new conflicts. Up to now, the redistribution of world wea lth has not been a decis ive factor in the fight against poverty. In fact , the poor of the rich nations have got poorer, because t heir mon ey is given to the rich of the poo r countries. As ex perience has t aught us i n t he last decades , on ly g lobalization can fight poverty . If we put a stop to glo balization, every hope of development would fade. Even wo r ld peace and stab ility would fade. For th is reason, the American supremacy represents a valuab le world resource . The Chinese know it . Most Europeans do not. The soon er they real ize it, the better for t hemselves and t he world. Carlo Jean Lieutenant General (ret.)

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AL-QAEDA A long trail of blood Its peculiarity is in its capacity to reinvent itself to match the strategic and social contexts in which it gets involved. It doesn't have flags or borders. Within its ideological 'umbrella' is the conflu ence of those terrorist groups who, through global strategy, intend to fight the moderate Islamic governments and those countries that support their power and authority.

Title pages. A patrol of the 186th Paratroop Regiment in Khwost, in the region of Paktia, Afghanistan. Above Abu Musab AI-Zarqawi.

its face Osama bin Laden, but in fact it goes much fu rther, and via the terrorism it has become an ideology ab le to inspire various groups , and via the West and its governments has made the way for a new total strategy for the Midd le East and its democratisation. Al-Qaeda has an historical core of inspiration but at the same time is decidedly modern . The media strategy, the organizational globalisatio n and the v io lence of its attacks make it singular in its field. In particular relevance is its own media strategy, the functioning of wh ich is stud ied attentively and in the types termed new media, with a variety of video messages but above all the unprejudiced and innovative use of the internet, with messages but also forums, news features , debates and other items organized by the terrorists themselves. Its peculiarity is definitely its capacity to reinvent itself to match t he strategic and soc ial contexts in which it get involves. In this way, the ' Foundation' (l iteral meaning of the Arab "al-Qaeda") differenti ates from other subversive movements that claim the region as their own. It does not have flags or borders and its men rather than constitute a complex network, are instead a number of 'islands' scattered everywhere.

THE IDEOLOGY The September 1 1 attacks marked a clear escalation in quality of Islamic international terrorism, provoking a more determined and global reaction which in fact started a large- scale cam paign, composed of various act ion plans, from truly military campaigns to Intelligence operations, to financial prevention. This terrorist phenomenon is large ly represented by al -Qaeda and

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Al - Qaeda has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from the phenomenon of terrorism in general, and in particular from those of a strictly po li tica l nature . Substantial differences ex ist, for example, between the Palestinian terrorism of the years l 970- 80 and al-Qaeda: the Pa lest inian terrorism was lay,

nationalistic and of a Marxist-Leninist style. Al - Qaeda instead is composed of religious 'revanc his m' carr ied out in a decis ion-making style that has experie nce of being i n contact with the West. Nonetheless it draws strength from a kind of 'social revo lution', in particular from those excluded from power who for this reason are against the current Middle Eastern societies (and their western "protectors") invoking a return to the mythical original Islam. To understand its nature well , the al - Qaeda structure and genesis must be viewed as neces sarily socio-political and socio-economic and with the m eans of control of power in p laces from where the ir members come from. The interpretation of the social phenomenon shows in fact, for example, that the common soc ial ranks of its majo r exponents are the middle and upper-middle classes of the Arab countr ie s. Men who have studied and often trained in the West, where at times they have refound their faith and chosen the ideals and the practising of the orthodox re l igion. T hey are cultured and Avman Al Zawahiri, Egyptian doctor, number two in the mature and have, lucidly and with full con organization. sciousness of the i r actions, chosen to enter into re al and total projects . Their projects are essentially political , and concern the internal dynamTHE HISTORY ics of division and power management. The elites that predominantly govern in the Arab The history and the structure of al-Qaeda are in countries have limited the r ich and cultured contin uous evo lut ion. For t he time being the middle classes from participating in managing majo r changes see m to concern the structure of power: The sense o f frustrat he organizat ion , the capacities tion that has been born in this and the leadership burd en , the environment, spawned from tactical objectives, the prefe rred ''To understand its natur~ settings the most extreme elements , a . They seem however to feeling of revenge and reprisal well, the al- Qaeda structure remain substantially has rebou nded with a political and genesis must be viewed unchanged , at least at the level of statements, the ideological agenda much wider and larger 1ecessarily as socio- politica in scope . and socio- economic and witr lines, the international agenda, the preferred means of commuA l -Qaeda does not suppo rt the means of control of paw free elections in which it the lines o f operation. er in places from where its nication, competes as a political party. It was in 1989 that together In such a sense it is sharply members come from ,, w ith Muhammad Atef and Abu distinguished, for example, Ubaidah al - Banshiri, that Osama from political o rgan izations bin Laden founded al - Qaeda, liteven t hough i nspired by religion like Hamas , erally 'the foundation ' , recruiting converts from t he who, also through ele ctoral process, has ranks of the mujahedin who were fighting in accepted to ente r an i nstitutionalised demoAfghanistan against the Soviets. With the final cratic system of governance and to form a defeat of the Red Army and its retreat, many of t he defined po litical plan. so- called 'Afghan Arabs' returned to their places of Ignoring these and other distinctive aspects origin, convinced that it was the moment to repeat of t he movement and of the present reality of their success in the rest of the world , starting obvithe internal Mu sli m world has always created ously with the Islamic countries. T hey soon realised confusion in the approach to problems and how d ifficult it would be, above al l they were compromised the effectiveness of all the opposed by t heir own count ries of origin. At t he strategies put into operation for tackling this time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) Osama phenomenon. bin Laden, who in t he meantime had go ne back to

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Saudi Arabia, his country of origin, offe red King Fahd to fight the Iraqi troops with the Arab international brigades based on the model of those that had defeated the Soviets in Af ghanistan. But the Saudi sovereign instead relied on the international coalition and above all on the United States. In 199 1, as a result of his growing opposition to the royal al-Saud family, bin Laden's citizenship was revoked and he was forced to return to Sudan, where he remained until 1996. The first attributable attack by al-Qaeda goes back to 1993, a partial failure, against the World Trade Center of New York, which killed six and was carried out by a Brooklyn cell under the direction of a religious Egyptian, the blind sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. From the moment of his departure from Sudan, Osama bin Lade n has remained in Afghanistan, where he joins his forces and his project of total jihad with the extremist Islamic Taleban regime, organizing an efficient international recruitment netwo rk and ensuring support and funding, through various channels, to his men all over the world. T hese are the means that allowed al-Qaeda to carry out the attack of September 11 t h, 2001 against the Twin Towers , New York and the Pentagon, Washington.

OIKOS-16

A checkpoint in Afghanistan, manned by soldiers of the American 82nd Airborne Division and Afghan servicemen.

With the subsequent attacks in other areas of the Midd le East, but above all with the t errorist actions in Europe (Mad rid , March 2004 and London , July 2005), the current al- Qaeda objectives become clear: increase the autonomy and preparation of regional and local groups; search fo r new alternative sources of funding; increase media vis ibi lity of the organization and improve, at the same time , the communication capacities through t echnolog ical tools; represent more and more a ideological ' umbre lla' to the core of various Is lamic terrorist groups, to draw them into a unified strategy of struggle against the Is lamic moderate governments and the countries which ensure their power and their authority ( i.e. the western democracies).

AL- QAEDA AND THE INTERVENTION IN IRAQ The mi litary intervention by the international coalition headed by the United States in Iraq and the consequent overthrow of the Saddam Hussein

regime, offered various chances to the system managed by the Saudi she ik. The question of hostages, for inst ance, is a good example for understanding the new al-Qaeda strategy. Even though the hostage- capture phenome no n had a spontaneous and an-archic o rigin , co nn ected to the high instabi lity of the period of post- war transitio n, it soon turned into a dead ly weapon in the hand s of t he terrorist groups and especially for the Iraqi network of Ahmad Fail al Khalailam, aka Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Through an organized management and th anks to the strong impact of te levisio n and media tools, hostages have became an instrument of decisive pressure for di rectly and frequently affectin g the decisions of the governments who concu rrently have military contingents in Iraq . The strategy of the destab ilization of Iraq by alQaeda follows two parall el paths. From the point of view of an i nternal struct ure, and accepting the hypot hesis (quite controversial, to tell t he truth) that the new al -Qaeda base is in Iraq, even though the power of Osama bin Laden is eroded and his leadership charisma is tested by his fo rced seclusion, he still remains the recognized al-Qaeda leader. The new strategy is however necessary for allowing t o continue t he phenomenon that can no longe r ' rely' on only one man and that, the refore, Osama bin Laden, Saudi, founder a nd head of al- Qaeda. needed a structure that guarantees its survival in il context much more 'fragmented ' . It must absol utely be underl ined that the Iraqi theThe attacks conducted in A rab co untries and in atre had supplied the focus for combatants to meet Europe stem from a precise and we ll outlined and t hat in this way they have been able to improve strategy. Firstly it tu rned t o t he their technical capacity, their prestrikin g t he presence o f fo reign vailing ideology and their network citi ze ns in the Islamic w orld , the of contacts, even international interna l stab il ity of Arab contacts. In this way Iraq ' ' Even though the hostagereplaced w hat Afghanistan had capture phenomenon had a regimes and im portant in dustries from an econom ic po int of offered for the movement of spontaneous and anarchic ori international Islamic fighters and gin, ... , it soon turned into a v iew, such as to urism or o il especially for al-Qaeda. It is no deadly weapon in the hands of extraction, especially in Saud i Arabia. Second ly al - Qaeda was accident that in recent years (from the terrorist groups ... , , ab le to verify what would be the 2003) many initiatives inspired by po litical and m ilit ary reactions al-Qaeda originated from Iraq, of its attacks and, above all, and that t he Iraqi model (from those of public opin ions fo ll owing terrorist action. suicide attacks to internet videos) was propagated by Before the fateful September 11 th , 2001 , t he the terrorists in neig hbouring count ries. main attacks led by al - Qaeda, were the following: â&#x20AC;˘ August 1998, American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es- Salaam, in Tanzania, with a t otal nu mTHE TERRORIST ATTACKS ber of 224 victims; â&#x20AC;˘ October 2000, in the port of Aden, Yemen, an attack The renewal o f terro rist activit ie s, with a dramatto the Un ited States cru iser USS Cole with l 7 victims. ic increase, claimed by the organization of the After September 11 th , 200 1 it is necessary to Saudi sheik is confirmation that al - Qaeda is not focus the attent ion on certain attac ks , that prodefeated and that it has changed itse lf from 'a duced a large number of victi ms, and were be cargroup' to 'a movement'.

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and a video message from the leadi ng al - Qaeda figure in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The bin Laden audio messagge was t ransmitted by al -Jazeera o n April 23rd, t he dat e of the record ing remains for the moment unknown., However, one infers from the content of the mes sage itse lf, it must necessarily have been made in the five weeks prior to its transmission, since in the recording aud io, bin Laden refers to the episode of the Israeli swoop on the prison in Jericho, happening on February 14th. Instead, the

Above.

New York, September I I, 200 I: The attack on the Twin Towers. Right

Madrid, March I I , 2004: A carriage destroyed in the terrorist attack.

ried out also on European territories. This list is not exhaustive and several other terrorist acts , some of which luckily fai led , were carried out in other countries during t he last five years : • Onober 2002: attack on a discotheque in Bali , Indonesia, w ith 202 v ictims; al-Zarqawi d is play message was found on the · May 2003: four bombs kill 33 people in internet (on an Arab site), from some Italian Casablanca, Morocco; Int elligence agents on April · March 2004 ten bombs 25th, but it was dated April 6th . placed on four train s exp lode T here are three key points to ' It must be underlin d that the in the rush hours in Madrid, bin Laden message . he Iraqi he ·re suppl·e Spain, kil lin g 202 people and He, as he had already done in he focus for rombatd.n s t wounding more t han l 400; his previous message in • July 2005: terrorist attack on meet and that in this wa, January, turns to the weste rn three underground trains and hey were able to improve peoples and not only to his a bus in London, Great .heir technical capacity leaders. In parti cu lar this time, Britain, with 52 victims; however, unl ike the previous · July 2005: a series of car Lheir ideology and their net messages, whe re his tone was bombs explode in Sharm el works of contacts, even in more agreeab le and in a certain ernational contacts,, Sheikh, Egypt, killing 90 people sense more pe rsuasive, he was and wounding more t han l 50; almost accusatory. • November 2005 : 57 victims in The um ptee nth charge is made three American hotels in Amman, Jordan. to the western governments, with regard to the We must finally remember the rece nt kamikaze campaign against t he Palestinian government of attacks in the Dahab to urist resort, in Egypt , with Hamas which, even though was freely and demo18 victims. cratically elected via elections that t he West recog ni sed as be ing free and democratic, it withd rew the ANP fund ings, as well as nearly completely isolated THE AL- QAEDA LEADERS' RECENT MESSAGES the Palestinian government diplomatically. Fi na lly, another important accusation that In April it was distributed, with lim ited intervals Osama bin Laden made was this time against the from each oth er, an audio message from Bi n Laden w ho le Mus lim community, concerning Darf ur and

O IKOS - 18

•

Osama bin Laden with his heir apparent, Ayman Al Zawahiri.

the difficult Sudanese situation. The al - Qaeda leader makes a true and honest appeal to all t hose of a Muslim faith to go to help those Muslim's fighting. 13esides the hard and very strong tones which bin Laden uses in respect to the West, the message seems almost to want to confirm that his leadership is not under discuss ion. In this regard and also in the declarations

London, July 7, 2005. A bus destroyed by a bomb.

regarding Hamas we real ly notice a f ew substantial d ifferences from the al-Zarqawi message. In particular, he affirms that one must not to fall into the trap of those who want to f ight the jihad throug h institutional means, because the parliamentary system is 'tyran nical'. Therefore the jihad, for the Iraqi leade r, is eminently social and popular, and not political and institutional; one fi ghts shouldering a kalashni kov ( like thos e who .:i.lwu.ys u.ppcu.r next to the al - Qaeda leaders in t he videos) and not d ream ing of votes and democracy. The importance of such affirmations about Hamas has several aspects and lends itself therefore, to different analyses: • in stark contrast with the Bin Laden declarations , it highl ights a d ivergence of core op inion, showing different outlooks and approaches which the two have always shown in respect to the concept of the struggle and the j ihad; • the expressed contempt for the parliamentary system and for institutional processes cou ld be a message to the Iraqis, and in particular to the Sunnites who voted in last December elections. • the criticism of Hamas is the most i mpo rtant part of al-Zarqawi's message, since he points out (like bin Laden) that the enemy of the 'dear Islamic nation' is the Zionist crusader and that, like the Prophet, they fight in Iraq, but have Jerusalem in their heart. Like bin Laden with regards to Darfur, at the end he appeals to t he Muslims of al - Abnar and the other Iraqi regions, urging them to join the mujahidin armed struggle.

Andrea Margelletti

President, International Study Centre

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NATO: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS

The fight against terrorism, the characteristics of the new operational scenarios, the integration of the Eastern Countries, the policy of dialogue with the Arab world and the South Mediterranean Countries, have forced NATO to make a radical change, which has strengthened its power and influence. But there is still a long way to go, particularly in order to achieve a full cooperation with the European Union.

On September 12 , 2001, surrounded by the Russia and China, nor the English, even, who affection and honoured by the regret of al l those operated with in the coal ition, managed to exerthat owed it more than fifty years of peace and cise a substantial influence on the United States freedom, the o ld Atlantic Al liance passed away. at the more decisive moments. Therefore, at the There are some that die badly, enclosed in a end, Washington's dec ision to reject the idea of myopic ego ism . And there are others that die well, a reaction carried out under the flag or the aegis after a life devoted to their fellowmen . NATO died of NATO resulted into the fu ll and open taking well, offering to the United States , attacked by the on of the central ro le by the Americans, with all Islamic extremism, the application of Article 5, the consequences that such a decision entai ls. which automatically transformed the war of one On the one side the United States at the centre of into the war of all, allowing at the same t ime the everything and as mover of everything , on the Atlantic Council to remain the political hinge of other a group of minor peripheral powers, which every military action undertaken by the West. at the crit ical moment of the decision never con Unfortunate ly the United States declined the offer, sidered the hypothes is - which indeed concreteadducing as offic ial justification that - in the fight ly existed - to try to act together as counteragainst a sh ifty and mu ltiform weight of the sca les. In such a terrorism - it had to avoid the situation, the primary function length iness and uncertainties ' ' Washington's decision to of NATO, which the "Report of deriving from the adoption of reject the hypothesis of a re- the Three Wise Men" in 1957 decisions whose main characaction carried out under the had defined as the main politteristic was that they had to be ical decisional court of the always universally shared . The flag or the aegis of NATO re military actions of the West, so-called war by committees, sulted into a full and open automatically lapsed . As just to be clear. taking on of the central role German Chancellor Schroeder Besides the motivat ions proby the Americans, with the compla ined a few years later, duced, the American choice consequences that such a dethus the Alliance ceased to be transformed the A lli ance , the political and dip lomatic cision entails , , which until then had been a forum where the most imporgalaxy of equivalent relations tant problems concerning the among a multitude of partners general security cou ld be dis of different weight, into a so le big star of bilatcussed. At this po int what was left to NATO was eral relations, with the United States at the cen the fact of being the on ly mi litary organization tre and all the other allied Countries at the capable of effectively expressing the common periphery. How difficult it was for this periphery force of its partners . But to what purpose? The to count, was verified after the beginning of the quest ion - certainly intriguing - had actually Iraqi conflict. On this occasion, in fact, neither been there a long time . From 1989 to be precise, the French nor the Germans, who acted from the when the fa ll of the Berlin Wall had ended the outside, re inforced on the mu lti lateral p lane by fundamental raison d'etre of the two opposing the United Nat ions and on the bilateral plane by Alliances . And in fact the Warsaw Pact had come

O IKOS - 22

to an end almost immed iately and in full consonance with the logic of the events. NATO instead had survived, appeal ing at first to an improbable offensive return of the Soviet Union and afterwards progressively transforming itself into an effective instrument for managing the crises that were becoming in creasi ngly dangerous and numerous. Considering the dim ens ions and hys teresis of t he structure , the transformation of the military component of the Alliance had been fast enough, having been almost completed in six years. In 1995 a NATO fundamentally modified in its structures and its lines of action had in fact been able to show itself on the Balkan zone , which the disintegration o f the former Yugoslavia h ad set on the path of an unending rosary of wars. From the political viewpo int the change had instead required lo nger times. In fact, only in 1999, in Washington, when the Heads of State and Government signed the New Strategic Concept of the Fiftieth Anniversary , could the Alliance have again at its disposal a systematic strategy, later integrated with a coherent doctrinal body. As well made as it was, in any case the transformat ion of the old lady d id not succeed in keeping the pace of the unceasing change in progress. In Art.23, for example, the "New Strategic Concept" already clear ly pointed out the terrorist threat, including it among the new worries of the coming years. But the subject was dropped there, without proceeding to further invest ig ation, without deducing,

Title pages. Prague, November 2 I , 2002: Summit of the Heads of State and Government. Above. Washington DC. April 24, I 999: NA TO is fifty years old.

from the observation, all the consequences that pe r haps could have been presumed already at that time and cou ld probably allow the West to have clearer ideas and prevent the event of September 11 from producing the devastating impact of a t otal st rategic surprise. As almost always happens, also in this case the facts, i.e. real ity, clearly proceeded at a speed hig her than that of the organization of the res ponse, at least until such response remained in the fie ld of speculation and theory. The attack on the Twin Towers later tragically changed the entire perspective, while the problem of structuring itse lf according t o a totally new operational scenario appeared before the A llian ce in all its entirety. In theory, the task of waging war on terrorism, with its corollary of resi stance to the pro liferation of the weapons of mass destruction, was only added to the old tasks of NATO, with out replacing them. However, in practice the idea that in the short or medium term one could fight again a nuclear and/or conventional war against a bloc or an alliance of equ ival ent power seemed a thing overco m e once and for all. The war on terrorism therefore went together only with the

23 - OIKOS

t asks of crisis management . Nevertheles s the should also consider how the problem of the nature of the subjects invo lved changed radicalinclusion of the other Mediterranean shores ends ly, o w ing to which the adve r sary stopped to be up by deep ly affect ing the parameters of the necessarily a Westphalian State and became NATO action in Eastern Europe. The comp lete something much more fluid, somet imes a bankintegration of the ex - Communist Eastern rupt St.at e, somet imes an extremist ideological European Countries and the ir full fledged acces s m ovement, a rogue State or a terrorist ga laxy. to the common defence instrume nt, at t his poi nt Al so the characteristics of the possible operabecomes more urgent t han before. Only t he tio nal theatres changed radically. The A l liance defin itive , complete clos ing o f this process wil l in coul d be called to intervene everywhere. At home fact permit to orient towards the south and overf irst of al l, on t he nationa l territories of t he seas all the available resources, at the moment m em ber St at es w h ic h had to be constantly proalmost totally committed to the East. t ected with an act ion in which it was difficult to NATO proceeds, and will continue to proceed, un de rstan d where the boundary between defence along this line, side by side with t he European fo r ces and police stood . And perhaps this Union, in se rted in a package where t he adhesion bou ndary does not exist anymore, when one to the Alliance represents fo r the newcomers the speaks of prevent ion and repression of terrorism. access to security, wh ile the EU membership is Co n sidering that the terrorist extremism cou ld considered a hope of prosperity. A last problem choose it s targets anywhere, consequent ly one will be that of defi ni ng precisely t he boundary sho ul d h ave been ab le to extend the response between NATO and the EU as regards security. It im m ed iately and without d iffi has been a moderately im porculty to t he whole wo r ld . This tant matte r until the attacks on ma rked the en d of all the geo' ' NATO proceeds, and will the Twin Towers . Unti l NATO g r aphic li m itat io ns that had has been t he main pol iti cal condition ed the action of the continue to proceed along forum of Western security and side with defence, its und isputed primacy All iance sin ce its const it ution this line, side and whic h had been partially the European Union, inserted has never been challenged . In reviewe d only in t he nineties, in a package where the ad- this climate the points of fricwhen it had become clear that hesion to the Alliance repre tion bet ween t he two it was n ecessary to choose sents for the newcomers the Organ izations have mainly conbet wee n "to go o ut of area or cerned the coordination issu es, access to security , , go out of business" . In view of which must be def ined with t he new occurrence that influ rapidity if one wants to avoid enced the scene of internathe risk of wasting resou rces. t io nal security, also the list of desirab le all ies and Even the Un ited States, before September 11, friends chan ged considerably . Thus it became shows if not a lik ing at least neutrality towards the im p ortant and urgent to manage, if not to total growth of th e so-called European Identity of ly integrat e, at least to assimilate in some form Security and Defence . If anything, the difficulties al l that Arab trans - Mediterranean world to which derive from the initiatives of those Europeans, like NATO , al l in all , during the last fi f teen years had Turkey for example, wh ich, as members of on ly give n a ben ign as much as vague attent ion. In the one of th e two Organizat ions, fear t hat they w ill be fi nal ann ou ncemen t s of t he recurrent summits of at a disadvantage, being excluded from some part th e A l liance o f that period , the hints at the soof t he process. As a consequ ence of the change cal led "M editerranean Dialogue" initiative are in that occurs on September 12 - when t he choice of fact always co nsigned to one of the last parathe United States changes the nature of the graph s. Usually t he second- last, since the last is Alliance comp lete ly, giving it an official Ame rican avo ided o nly for d iplo mat ic bon ton . Not to spe ak centra lity, hardly cons ist ent with a precise align of t he ext ensio n of the Dialogue, limited to six, ment between NATO and the EU - all t he protagoand o nly later to seven Countries, and of the nists , i.e. the Organizations as well as the States , contents, anythi ng but significant. T he events of have to define again and w ith rap idity a relation September 1 1 em phasize instead the importance ship that before had appeared well - estab lished of "hold ing on at all costs" in the mod erate Arab and firm . Countries i n o rder to check t he advance of Thus a new period of radical renewal opens after the Islami c extre mism . Th erefore one should someattack of September 11, 2001 and t he US decisions of how includ e thi s "belt of friend ly Countries" in the next day. In t he fol lowi ng years NATO changes the peri meter o f t he All iance , anchoring this belt almost integrally. The overhaul goes so much in de pth to NATO m ore secu rely t han t he Dialog ue has that this is probably the most complete transformaever been able to do. As a consequence , one tion occurred in an Organization, which on the other

by

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hand has never managed to remain without radical adaptations for more than a decade of its long and troubled history. If this were not enough, for the first t ime the change, and the consequent transformation that must constantly derive from it. are identified as part of an incessantly open process, wh ich will have to be followed and explored with continuity in order to avoid the new surprises of a reality that knows no respite in its evolution. The opening of the discussion on the subject within the All iance is almost immediate and it is a difficult and very hard debate, which in some moments risks becoming a d ialogue of the deaf, or at least of people that do not want to hear. In such complex organizations th e definition of new tasks , of new lines of action, of new structures ends by becoming naturally also the d efinition of new internal balances, entirely disliked by those destined to lose power, influence and resources. As we said before, o n the spec ific occasion the affirmation of the fi ght aga inst terrorism as main task of the All iance, on the one hand shifts towards th e south and overseas an attent ion traditionally concentrated on conti nenta l problems while , on the other, considerably reduces the times of the integration of the so-ca l led "Mitte leuropa" w ithin NATO. However at the

NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson.

Prague Summit, in the autumn of 2002 , t he A lliance is ready to adopt t he first spat e of fundamenta l decisions. First of all the enlargement, which is extended as much as possible, to the point of including States that a litt le lat er and in the same conditions the European Union wi ll deem sti ll immature, such as Bulgaria and Rumania. The possib le limit s of NATO's expansion towards th e East are also o utlined, albeit informa lly, on th is occasion, envisaging a later integration also of the Bal kan States, born of the dismemberme nt of Yugoslavia, and Albania, which have now become the rea r li nes of the Al l iance . There are still the open questions regardi ng Ukraine , Georg ia and , above a l l, Russia . But if Russia had to be in t egrated, one mi g ht as well have done it at the beg inn ing, when to modify the A lliance it sufficed to extend the members hip t o the so le Soviet Union, whic h was then relative ly solid, and th e history of the last fifteen years might have been different. In Prague the structure of the Alliance Command also changes substantially. The two Strategic Commands are replaced respect ive ly

25 - OIKOS

2005 and 2006. Expecting that terrorism may sooner or later acqu ire also NBCR weapons , the A lliance strengthens its equivalent compon ent. NATO equi ps itself w ith NBCR batta li on s and mobile labs , which turn out t o be very useful when they are put at t he disposal of m embe r Countries and provide preventive assistance on t he occasion of the Athe ns O lympic Games and Turin Winter Olympics. A particular attention is also given for the fi rst t ime to the probl ems of th e Southern Mediterranean and t herefo re to the i nit iative of t he co rrespond ing "Dialogue". Moreover there are ta lks about th e possib i lity of t ra nsforming t he dialogue into a partne rsh ip, making the South Medite r ranean follow the co urse towards a co mp lete i nteg ra,tio n, as outl in ed in t he past for Eastern Europe. The process , roughly sketc hed at the t ime , would be revived at late r t imes and , on the, one hand, on the occasion of another Summit generated the "Istan bul Initiative" and on the other corre sponded with the idea of Enlarg ed Middle East, which would later be advocated by President Bush. At the same t i me al so t he integrat ion between NATO an d the European Union advances , a process that t he permanent tens io n Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the between France and th e Unit ed States keeps in a Europea n Union. cons tant unpredictable state . On the other hand, considering how each o f the two Organizations has fi na lly taken shape, it is quite by the Command for Operations and t he log ical that t his should occur. Thei r very n;Hure Command for Transfor m ation , precisely desoften leads them to oppose each other. NATO is t ined to follow with continuity the change in no mo re a po lit ica l forum; the po li cy of the West progre ss , reflecting it almos t im med iately on its matures elsewhere, in different m u ltilate r al structures. A t t he same t ime t he number of the summits or through bilateral co ntacts. T hat Commands at lower level d rops and t hey are emphas ized t he milita ry aspect of the A ll iance more ratio nally d ist rib uted according t o t he new but makes it si ngle - sided and ve ry much un fit needs. The ax e cuts the dead wood pitilessly, to dialogue with someone who speaks lansparing the life and f unct ions guages t hat deal on ly with the of only those structures that force of weapons. If t his did actually have a ro le to play in not suffice , th e cont i nuous the new situation. In th is new â&#x20AC;˘' NATO is no more a politi pursuit of improvement s in setting of the key p ill ars of cal forum, the policy of the t his sector has ended by t he A ll iance, the Country that West matures elsewhere, in expanding the civil and mili seems most advantag ed is different multilateral sum- tary bureaucracy of th e strucperhaps Italy, which in t his mits or through bilateral ture , to the detrime nt of the occasion profits by its characi nfl uence of the member contacts ,, teristic of hinge between the Cou ntries. T hus today the two two Mediterranean basins and strategic Comman de rs enjoy a that of bridg e between Europe power and an influe nce incon and the ove rse as Is lam. At t he same time , the ce ivab le until five years ago while, at t he same Al l ian ce de cides also that t he constant immatime, has correspondingly decreased what the ne nce of t he possible threat req uires the avail Atlantic Council can express . Not to speak of ability of rapid reaction fo rces . T hi s leads to the t he Military Committee, which just now starts t o planning of a NATO Reaction Force (NRF), wh ich re - emerge from a shady area which has lasted only recently has beco me fu lly operat ional and som e years. A precise id ea of the situation ca n has been emp loyed for th e first t ime in Pakistan be obta ined from the way the Command for in a humanitarian mission i n the period betwee n T ransformatio n sometime ago went as far as

OIKOS - 26

developing an actual Strateg ic Concept. This is a fact that constitutes a serious " invas ion o f the pitch" in an area pertaining typi cal ly and exclu sively to politics. In the same period, on the contrary, the European Un ion was c haract erized by a progressive resumpt io n of control by its member States , whic h, to use th e EU jargon, led it to "be less community- minded and more intergovernmenta l", probab ly exaggerating to the po int o f being involved in a sem i-pe rmanent cr is is. Even if t h e EU Strategic Concept worked out by the Secretary General, "Mister PESC" , Solana, at Thessaloniki, has done away with all the remaining misunderstand i ngs about the Union's wil lingne ss to employ the m ilitary force, if and when ind ispensable ; the same document has affirmed once more that Europe is and wa nts to be essentially a "civil power" . Equipped , that is, with a very large panoply of means of interven tio n , and conce ives its military assets, the headline goal, only as an instrum ent of peace or of self- defence at mo st. Hence t h e difficulties in the relations between the two Orga ni zations , difficulties that do not preve nt the everyday cohab itation and cooperation but which become stronger and lead to open d is putes when the word "war" is pronounced. A clear example of t his was the Iraq i conflict, wh ich h as torn the co nsc ience of almost eve ry Country of t he Union, as regards governments, political forces and public opinions. However, in the At lantic Alliance as we ll as in the European Un ion things are p roceedi ng, while the mentio ned day by day coope ration starts to delineate a harmonious whole , desti ned to be f ul ly reali zed in a future that seems still undetermined, but which should not go beyond t he medium t erm . Between the t wo , the distribution of the forces and operations on the ground is increasingly identifying the European Un ion as the o rganization most su itable for taking care of the confl ict with all its countles s facets and a reconstru ction, which is too co mp lex an action for an exclusively mi litary logi c. It is no accident, but it is entirely w ithin this perspective, that the re sponsibi lity fo r the m an agement of Bosn ia sho ul d have been transferred from th e Alliance to the Union. And when one speaks about prospects of independence for Kosovo, o ne again t urns t o the EU and not to NATO for the contin gents that should keep a watch on the re spect o f t he rig hts of the mi norities, especially the Serb one. NATO would retain instead the most t ypica lly mi lita ry f unct io ns, i.e. t he prepa rat ion of a common i nstrument capable of faci ng all events, as well as interve ni ng in cases of actua l co nflict. In a certain sense, it is what Rumsfe ld, the American Defen ce Secretary,

Decontamination activities conducted by the NATO multinational NCBR Battalion.

p redicted an d envisaged already a few years aqo, when he spoke of "those who wil l have to cook dinner and t hose who wi ll have to was h u p and t idy the kitchen" . As regard s the contents of t hat famous (and contested!) statement, at prese nt there are two fundamental diffe re nces. The first is that next t o its warlike vocation , NATO is now discove ring also a profitable poss ib ility of trending towards the sector of Civil Def ence , which in the past was totally alien to t he Alliance. T he matter may seem a little untimely. But one should consider how the "co nsequences management", aimed at minim izing the loss of human lives and material damages in case of NBCR attack - which all the Alliance's handbooks point out as NATO' s main task in such ci rcumstance - wou ld p recise ly take the shape of an interve ntion of Civil Protection . The experiences connected w ith the most recent annual CMX Exerc ises, which envisage always at least one terrorist event with employment of no n conventional weapons, have led to a fast develop ment o f the whole sector of the Alliance that had been envisaged for these matters and the n d isre garded or forgotten for about fifty years . In view of this, t h e Senior Civi l Emergency Plann ing Committee (SCEPC) and the Euro At lantic Disast er

27 - OIKOS

already the signal s that come from the last European Summit, with a Community budget approved and, above all, with Angela Merkel determined to give Germany its historical driving function, appear very promising. This does not mean that we at present can count on a Europe so cohesive as to really represent a pillar of the Alliance , opposed, when indispensable , and cooperating, whenever possible, with the American mainstay. It only means t hat we can keep on hoping, which is already a big deal. Fi nally, a few indications at what will probably be the main development trends of the Alliance. At present the most urgent point, which needs a great deal of working on, is apparently still that of the transformation of the fo rces of the member States. Even if much has been done in th is sense, both on the plane of the organizational structures and on that of training and preparation o f the personnel, as well as that of materials updating, the body of the allied forces is still very far from that ideal exped itionary force that is considered the ultimate goal. There are still several obstacles to the change, first and most important the financial ones. In some countries there is still the idea that "la victoire soit aux grands bataillons", with the ensuing reluctance to give up conscription and count more on quality than on mass . Next there is the refusal - almost general at present - to give up once and for all Specialists of the NBCR Batta/inn nn trainina. the expensive and useless models of defence self-sufficient at national leve l. If one day there were to be a single model of defence, the Relief Coordination Center (EADRCC) have proeconomies of scale and those deriving from a gressively gained importance. Also politically the sharing of the tasks amo ng the members, in operation has soon produced accordance w ith the particular its fruit. In fact, the Alliance is at valuable special izations the moment in Pakistan, ' ' If one day there were to be towards which each Country engaged with a section of its could orient itsel f, this would NATO Response Force in help- a single model of defence for be extraordinary, to say the ing the victims of the earth- the Alliance, the economies of least. To the point that one quake that has recently hit the scale .. .would be extraordi asks why our governments up entire area. It is a humanitarian nary, to say the least. To the to this day have not realized it 1 operation, certainly, but is has point that one should ask why According to the programmes also political aspects that our governments have not re- that are now being outl ined in should not be underesti mated . Brussels, NATO should tac k le Moreover, this new and alized it up to this day,, the question of the renewal and unprecedented drift seems to change of the nature of the be destined to bring NATO and forces in the Summit of 2006, the EU nearer and nearer. Also a consolidation of program med in Riga, afte r Portugal has withdrawn the European Union could in the future act in Lisbon's candidacy. favour of an improvement of the dialogue between The problem of the enlargement, partially me nthe two organizations. tioned before, will instead be discussed in 2008. It is true: the t imes do not seem to be very It is an issue much more intricate than appea rs at favourable for an opening in this direction. In first sight. In fact, given for granted the opening any case Europe is following the law of t he pen of the doors of the Alliance to Albania, Croatia dulum, which once it has reached the lowest and FYROM, there is still to decide what and how point of its course can only go up aga in. And much purgatory should st ill be inflicted to Serbia

OIKOS - 28

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Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina. Moreover, there is still to study in depth the if and when for two Countries such as Uk rai ne and Georgia, deeply convinced that they have recently acquired, with their respect ive ly "orange" and "tulips" revolutions, every r ight to enter into this exclusive cl ub. Moreover , also the relationship NATO - Russia w ill have to be red efi ned on the basis of the dec isions concerning Moscow's "near abroad" adopted by th e Alliance. The "Istanbul initiative" will also have to be reconfigured, accepting a partnership that should include the Islamic Countries of the Mediterranean basin or nearby. It will also be necessary to make clear, and possibly somehow institution al ise the relations with protagoni sts such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, whose troops are more and more frequently implicated in the same crises across the world , where the Alliance, which now has no geographical lim its to its range of action, is present. Finally, also NATO's interaction in the multilateral field will have to be re-examined: i.e. NATO's relations with other organizations, such as the Un ited Nations, the European Un ion - but we have diffusely dealt about this point befo re and others, such as, for example, the

French soldiers of the NATO Response Fo rce (NRF) during an exercise at Doganbey, Turkey.

Organizat ion for African Unity, for which NATO is already working in Sudan in the logistic sector. As one can see , it is an extremely crowded programme, certainly very ambitious for a single Summit. Howeve r , one should also consider that the 2008 Summit will be the meeting that, in a certain sense, will prepare t hat of 2009, i. e. that of the sixtieth anniversary. NATO's intentio n, o n that occasion, would be to succeed in projecti ng itse lf clearly towards the future, outlining a scheme of political - strategic development of the Alliance which should be valid for at least ten years , or even longer. As a matter of fact, a change, as deep and as necessary as it may be, can in no way be eternal, for now and the n there must be pauses that permit to consolidate the results acquired, to restock, to real ize and accept what has occurred up to that moment. And finally to be ready to go ahead in case a new change became necessary. Giuseppe Cucchi

Lieutenant General (ret.)

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THE UN AND THE USE OF FORCE Peacekeeping often imposes timely interventions and the use of force Along the years the face of peacekeeping has deeply changed. The food-distributing blue berets today are patrolling the streets, supported by attack helicopters. This different employment produced a sense of peace and stability. Peace and stability worth fighting for. United Nations Peacekeep i ng Operations ally lead by the UN, is increasingly also conducthave changed in the past decade and will coned by reg iona l organizations, usua lly based on a tinue to do so, to incorporate many elements, Security Council resolution. This article w ill m i litary and civ i lian, working together to focus on UN led peacekeeping operations: currestore peace. This increased rently there are 16 ope rations complexity of the peacekeepwith over 80.000 peacekeep ing env i ronment has resulted ers deployed. in more complex mandates ' ' Peacekeeping activities, :.:~d a new name : multi- traditionally led by the UN, dimensional peacekeeping . are more and more con PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES Since the end of the Cold War, ducted also by regional orCONDUCTED BY THE UN such complex and risky man ganizations, usually on the dates have been the rule With the end of the Cold basis of U.N. Council resorather than the exception: War, the Security Council United Nat ions operations lutions,, looked at UN peacekeeping as have been given relief escort the instrument of choice fo r duties where the security sitinternational conflict man uation has proved too r isky for h umanitar ian agement. UN peacekeeping successfully trans personnel. These m iss ions have been given the formed itself into a mechanism for not on ly mandate to protect the population and to conobserv ing cease-fire agreements , but for trol heavy weapons in possession of local parimplementing comprehensive peace agreeties when those weapons were being used to ments. In Namibia, El Salvador and threaten the m iss ion and the local population. Mozambique, UN peacekeeping was quite sucIn two extreme situations, the United Nat ions cessfu l and achieved qualified success in were given executive law enforcement and Cambod ia as well. In these complex and dan admin istrative authority where lo cal author ity gerous missions, peacekeepers were regularly did not exist or was unable to function. authorized to use force in the context of their This article analyses some of the challenges for mandate. The humanitarian mission in Northern peacekeepers in the grey zone between peaceIraq was the first mission authorized to use keeping and peace enforc ing. It also includes a force, not as a measure of peace enforcement few observations on the participation of some but to guarantee the protection of t he populacountries to UN peacekeeping operations ¡ in tion and the delivery of assistance. Traditional Africa, and on the UN Strategic Reserve. Peace UN peacekeeping operat ions have shifted, in the enforcement, in appearance and execut ion not course of an evolving conflict, from Chapter VI much different from war, is usually conducted by to Chapter VII, as was the case in Somalia (l ). a multinational force and commanded by a leadOther missions have been transformed into nation. Examples inc lude Korea (1950), carried hybrid operat ions including both peacekeeping out by a group of States on the invi tation of the and peace - enforcement elements . State concerned, and¡ Kuwait (1990), authorized These changes i n mand ates transformed the by the Security Council. Peacekeep ing, traditionpeacekeep in g m iss ions into someth ing c loser

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to peace-enfo rcement. From then on , most new peacekeeping m is sions were directly authorized to use force. Fol lowing the events in Rwanda and Srebren ica, the Brahimi report confi rmed that message by stating 'Once

deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their. mandate professionally and successfully. This means that the United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers'. Mandates t hese days include rout inely an operational paragraph on the protection o f c iv il ians under i mm i nen t threat of physical v io len ce (2). A slightly different paragra ph, bu t aiming at the same resu lt, was included in the UNPROFOR mandate (3).

TODAY'S VOLATILE ENVIRONMENT The recent pol it ical developments may have improved the security situat ion , but a Country remai n s very unstab le if armed groups, organ ized mi litia and cr im inal elements are present throughout it. Exact figures are no t always available regarding the st rength of th e various armed groups that may include chi ld sold iers and param il itary personne l. Armed e lements and crimina l gangs may have been moving in and out of the country and neighboring coun tries . Such armed groups generally have weak Command and Contro l mechanisms and poor communicatio n systems . In Hait i, Cite Solei l , an inaccessible sl um area of 1 00 .000 inhabitan ts with roadb locks and barricades manned by armed gangs , is present ing ser ious c halle nges to peacekeepers. Poverty , high unemp loyment

and a large number of small arms compound the insecu rity . Institutions of justice m ay have suffered a breakdown as a result of the con fli ct and the disregard fo r the rule of law. It may also have suffered from corrupt practices and p¡ol itica l interference. Frequent ly, irregular milit ias and smaller fact ion s do not r espect the ceasefires, d isagree with the major parties or act independently. In the case o f minor resistance, co nsist ing of isolated acts of violence and band itry, peacekeepers must deal w ith the situation on th e basis of 'self- def ense', backed by c lear and robust rules of engagement. It is precisely in these circumstances that field intelligence assets are needed, to find out where the spoilers are and what there i ntent is. 'Intelligence' for long time has been a word hard to accept i n th e peacefu l UN world . Still today it is a sensitive issue , as openness is the name of the game . But in fact, i nform ation gatheri ng never has been the problem in UN Peacekeeping: our mi litary observers are topclass HUM INT people. It is the analys is, evaluation and- d istr ibut ion phase where we continue to exper ience d ifficulties. Poor intelligence means you wi ll not have the right forces w ith the right eq uipment at the right t ime and at the right pl ace. Th is has too often resulted in casualties - peacekeepers lives - or the lives of innocent civilians as we have seen in Rwanda, Soma lia and Srebrenica. The cornerstone in improv ing this capabi lity is the estab lishment of what we now call the "Joint Miss ion Analysis Cell"UMAC), an in tegrated Title pages. "Alpini" on duty with the ONUMOZ mission patrolling a road in Mozambique (1 994).

Below. The Blue Helmets are engaged in many peacekeeping missions.

33 - OIKOS

structure, in co rporati ng representatives, military and civilian, from key elements of the miss io n. The task of the JMAC is to handle information, cond uct and present analyses and provide advice at a level that will ensure that decisions are made with awareness of all available and rele vant factors . It provides in-depth current and longer-term analysis of all issues affecting the mission . As such, the JMAC is at the heart of any operation and it requires highly trained intel ligence professionals. After the disaster in Baghdad - the attack that killed 22 UN staff - the ambush on Bangladeshi peacekeepers in March 2005 that killed ni ne , and other tragic incidents, we are forced to acknowledge that the UN sometimes has become a target of vio lence, challenging the long-held perception that we are protected by our flag and by our status as an impartia l actor. This new reality provided a compelling rat ional e for security reform. The General Assembly t herefore approved in December 2004 the estab lishment of a new Department of Safety and Security. It is om1sP amon designed to ensure t hat we are ~etT'bers o e organized to provide rel iable threat and risk analyses.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT The Security Co uncil resolution for a new peacekeeping operation is no less than a comprom ise of the deliberations of the fifteen Members of the Council. T he Mandate therefore leaves much room for interpretation by m ission planners when developing an in itial concept of operations. Secondly, a concept of operations will leave t he necessary operational space for planners at Force Headquarters level, adjusting plans to situations as they occur. Despite the necessary room for inte rpretation, clarity is needed when it comes to the authority to use force. Not only will this clarity protect individuals against excessive use of force, it also protects peacekeepers from prosecution when force is used within the parameters of t he Rules of Engagement. Rules of Engagement must be based on the mandate, t he operational circumstances and by Troop Contributing Countries' accepted legal norms . The Ru les allow peacekeepers to use up to deadly force, to defend themselves and other UN or international personnel and installations against a hostile act or a hostile intent. Moreover, it accepts the use of force, even deadly force, to protect United Nations installations and areas, or goods designated by the Force Commander.

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T hese rules may seem relatively easy, but when it comes to application in the field, soldiers may be confused. What constitutes a hosti le act? How to recognize hostile intent? Even with clear-cut definitions, simple answers are not always possible in certain situations. A hostile act is defined as: 'An

attack or other use of force, intended to cause death, bodily harm or destruction. How will the ind ividua l soldier make his split-second decisions when an action is likely to demonstrate hosti le intent? Hostile intent is defined as: 'The

threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act'. The soldier will be backed by the remainder of the defini tion , namely: 'Only a reasonable belief in the

hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized'. Whether or not

ni g p ra but a corn t e fif ee Coun 1 ,

~

host ile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by th e on-scene Commander, on the basis of one or a combination of factors, i nc ludi ng: the capability and preparedness of the threat, the available evidence which ind icat es an intention to attack and the histor ical precedents within the Mission's Area of

Res pons ib i I ity. Applying these rules in a correct way is one of the most daunting tasks for the Commander and his unit and may determine the success or failure of a mission. Every incid ent involving peacekeepers and their excessive use of force may quickly run counter to the aimed outcome of a peaceke.eping operation. It cannot be emphasized enough that applying the rules means learning the rules first. Unfortunately, recently a newspaper interview held with a 19 year old peacekeeper revealed an almost incred ible perception of that soldier on the use of force in self-defense. The soldier ind icated that he was told to wait until a shot was fired at him and then could respond . Moreover, if a hand grenade was about to be thrown at him, he was supposed to aim at the grenade, not at the opponent.

THE USE OF FORCE IN THE CONGO The Democratic Republic of Congo has roughly the size of Western Europe. MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo) is, with 16.500 peacekeepers from over 50 contributing countries, the largest UN operation today. T he challenges faced by the soldiers on t he

ground are manifold, and mu st deal w ith very risky situations. Though thousands of militia members have been disarmed so far, the situation on the ground remains volatile and unpred ictab le. Increas ingly, MONUC is deve lo pi ng pre- emptive tactics to stay ahead of militia and spoile rs. Key is actionab le intelligence and the capac ity to evalu ate and analyze the information. He licopters have also proven to be a successful tool when it comes to dete rrence. Demonstrations and low flying m issions have give n a clear sig na l of this. In peacekeeping operations , necessi ty and pro portionality are key principles w he n force is appli ed. T his implies t hat u si ng attack helicopters as a weapon is a means of last resort, as it inevitably could come with certa in risks of collateral damage and alienat ion of the civil ian popu lation. Rwandan Hutu rebe l s, known as the Democ rat ic Forces for the Liberation o f Rwanda (FDLR), have operated in Eastern Congo and many o f them took part in the 1994 genoc ide in Rwanda, during which 800,000 Tutsis and mod erate Hutus were k il led. Aft er a d ecade of preying on Congolese civi li ans and fo ll owi ng a series of massacres in Easte rn Congo this year, they are under increasing pressure to f u lfil l a promise to d isarm and go home. MO NUC Eastern Division has laun ched a series of operations to pressure gunmen to lily down the ir wcilpons and ret urn home peacefully. During these operations, rebels are searched fo r weapons and their huts are subsequently torched in an 'It 1s an attempt to deny renewed use of the bases by ret urn in g :Je end rebels. In these actions, attack tl C hel icopters routinely back- up omp c , advancing ground troops and provide c lose ai r support if hey are need b e. Th e Congo lese v il -hilddi lagers have been happy t o see the arrival o f the peacekeepers. At the same t i me there is concern that t he Rwandan rebel s may react by stepping up operations aga in st the UN by targeting civi lians .

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TO MAINTAIN PEACE, SOMETIMES IT IS NECESSARY TO ENFORCE IT MONUC is auth o rized to u se up t o deadly force to protect civilians under im minent threat. But how immi nent is im mine nt? Should it be instant and overwhelming or do we ne ed to wait fo r the "smoki ng gun"? T he answer wi ll have to be g iven

The distribution of food in villages and cities requires remarkable economic and organizational efforts.

by Commanders on the ground as th e situation develops , in line wit h the overa ll m ission strate gy and t he Mand ate, worked out in operation p lans and in li ne with th e Rul es of Engagemen t . If , for i nstance , intell ig ence reveals p lans an d credi ble evide nce th at m ilitia is mou nti ng an attack on civi lians two m iles down the road, t he Commande r w i ll maintain that the thre at is i mminent. No time sho uld be lost at that stage an d the m il itia shou ld be engaged, if necessary by using dead ly force . Rebel - contro lled radio statio ns, broadcasti ng inc it ing language and ordering vio lence should be stopped as well. This m ay eventually inc lude the use of force , proport ionate and necessary. Whe n info r mat ion revea ls t he location of weapon caches, Comman ders are supposed to act and not wait unti l t he weapons are dist r ibuted and used agai nst the pop ulation . A ltho ugh nowadays ap proach may deviate from UN operat ions a decade ago , t he m an dates and ru les have not changed that muc h. The autho rity to act is in t he reso lutio n and t he pe r m ission to use force is in the RoE. What is new is the aware ness at both

35 - O IKOS

A "Hind" Mi 24 combat helicopter.

political and military levels that peacekeepers cannot stand idle when civilians are t hreatened. Soldiers and thei r Com manders i ncreas i ng ly realize that it is better to fight and die than to survive and revive images of slaug hte red and burned mothers and children. It is standard practice for UN peace kee pers t o def end themselves against hostile acts or hosti le intents. Complications are to be expected when peacekeepers are confronted with threats from child so ldiers. Peacekeepers sho uld real ize that armed children could be more volatile and unpred ictab le than adults. They are poorly trained, often forcefully recruited and so me may be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. When chi ld sold iers use force, peacekeepers w ill be authorized to act in self-defense. As is the case w ith al l engagements, the respo nse should be proportionate to the threat. At the same time, peacekeepers will have to cope with the personal trau ma and public reverberations from child casual ties Fai lure to act adequately and appropriately may also resu lt in extreme reactio ns both in t he Mission area as well as from public opinion.

TURNING ANOTHER PAGE In Congo, Cote d'Ivo ire, Burundi and Liberia, peace keepers are turning another page in UN peacekeeping histo ry. It's a farewell to "western boots on the ground". Inc reasingly, developed Countries are turning their back on peacekeeping in Africa. With the exemption of a few Countries like Ireland and Swede n, the others are generally

OIKOS - 36

trying to ca mo uflage their absence by pointing t o thei r fi nanc ial contributions and commitments in UN-mandated m ission s elsewhere, led by a Coalition or a Regional Organization. At t he same ti me, EU and NATO are scrambling to offer log is tic support to the African Union mission in Darfu r. T he d ilemma of absence is partly an issue of solidarity: t he UN Charter demands a collective response t o t hreats again st internat ional peace and security. "Collective" however should also be seen as an equal share in taking r isks on the ground. The absences result in a lack of qualityimpulse in UN operations. While our top-ten t roop contributors are experienced fighters for t he most part, the dynamics of mu lti- dimensional situat ions require a rig ht mix of troops and force enabler s and high ly trained p rofessionals (management, t echno logy and language skills are the key) at sector, divisional and force Headquarters leve l. These staff Officers shou ld be capable of comm unicating effectively with all actors, and work shoulder t o shoulder with highly qualified civilian staff, adapting plans when the situation on the gro und changes . T hey mu st be ab le decision makers, understanding the ramifications when things take a t urn for t he worse. Both dilemmas are tro uble some for all miss ions and should be solved by developed Co untries , bringing in troops, force enab lers and staff.

THE UN STRATEGIC RESERVE Cu rre ntly, the only way to react to an eme rging crisi s in a mission area is through an ad-hoe decision on a new mandate with an expanded fo rce, or to req uest extern al ass istance from the international community. T he political and fo rce generat ion process required t o deploy additio nal units can take too much t ime to allow a reaction in t he critical early stages of a crisis. As a res ult of th is delayed reaction, crises often deteriorate, risking mission collapse and requiring an eve n larger or more capable force. The lack of a re liable reserve o r reaction capability for respon d in g to crises remains a major obst acle to th e effective ness of UN peacekeep ing operations. In order to fi ll this gap, peacekeeping planners have develop ed t he con cept of a Strategic Reserve (SR) , a m issi on-spec ific , preplan ned and rapid ly deployable "over-the-horizon fo rce" . T he Strategic Reserve would be held in a con tributing country with prior agreement to dep loy to certain specific UN m ission s. It would be deployed on the recommend ation of the Sec retary- Gene ral and under Security Co unci l authority fo r a specific task or duration. T he SR

must be equipped, trained and prepared to deploy in Chapter VII environments. Once deployed, the reserve would be placed under UN Commandand-Control and Rules of Engagement. Potential tasks could include: respond to crises situations beyond the capacity of existing m ission resources, deter new,or evolving host ile elements in a mission area, re inforce sectors in case of increasing hostility, intensify tactical activities in one or more sectors, increase visibility of force, replace or reinforce the committed operat ional rese rve, protect key facilities or establ ish a new sector. The SR would be made up by a n umber of task forces of about l ,250 soldiers on short notice to move. Each task force, with the nucleus of a mobile infantry battalion with adequate combat and service support elements, would have a composition which provides the capability to react to different scenarios in a hostile environment. Duration of deployment is expected to be no more than six months. Peacekeeping Plan ners are currently exploring the modalities of such an initiat ive with Member States , and have formed a working group that will address a broad spectrum of concerns and will be utilized to further work out the details of the initiative.

ation of the civi lian population. It is this fine ba lance that creates challenges for peacekeepers on a daily basis.

Patrick C. Cammaert Major General, Commander, Eastern Division, Deputy Commander, MONUC

Ben Klappe Lie ute nant Co lo nel, Special Assistant to the UN Military Advisor

NOTES

(1) UNOSOM (United Nation's Operation in Somalia) was established as a humanitar ian mission with the Security Council Resolution no.751 (1992). The Security Counci l accepted the US. offer to contribute to the c,eation of a safe environment for distributing humanitarian aid in Somalia, and authorized, in line with Chapter VII, the employment of "al l necessary means". President George W. Bus h responded to the resolution by deciding t o start operation "Restore Hope", whose unified command would be assumed by the U.S. (UNITAF / Restore Hope, Security Council Resolution no.784- 1992). ' ' The use of force is still an After a transition period, UNISOM II CONCLUSIONS issue with political, legal and Wu5 constit uted according to operational limitations. The Chapter VII (Security Council Costly peacekeeping lessons have been learned during the Rules of Engagement aim at Resolution no.814-1 993). last decade. In particular on the providing clear and precise (2) Security Council Resolution use of force, peacekeepers have directives on when and how no. l 542 of April 30, 2005, Haiti(. .. ) in order to protect the civilian popcome to realize that the main to apply it ,, ulation threatened with physical purpose of them being, well armed and equipped., in that violence, within its capabil it ies and t he deployment areas ... Security war- torn Country, is to provide stability and to protect civilians unde r imminent Council Resolution no.1565 (2004), Democratic Republic threat of violence. Efforts are made at various levof the Congo .. .in order to assure the protection of the els to guarantee preparedness of troops. This civilians, including those in charge of humanitarian operincludes visits to contributing countries, preations, when threatened with physical violence (. ..). (3) Security Council Resolution no.836 (1993), Republic deployment training and in-mission training programs. of Bosnia Herzegovina, Para 5: ... to prevent attacks against protected areas, control the "cease fire", further Use of force rema ins an iss ue entang led with policy, legal and operational restraints . The the withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces not under the Government of Bosnia Herzegovina, and Rules of Engagement aim to provide clear and occupy some key point on the ground ... Para 9: ... in unambiguous directions on when and how to use force. Commanders and so ldiers do realize implementing the mandate defined at the preceding that re luctance to use force may resu lt i n loss Para 5, acting in self-defense, take the necessary measof life of fellow peacekeepers or innocent civil ures, including the use of force, in response to bombians. At the same time, they are aware that ings conducted by one of the factions against the proexcessive use of force may result in the alientected areas, or (in response) to armed raids within such areas, or when de liberate obstacles are set against the The opinions expressed in this article represent excl ufreedom of movement of UNPROFOR or protected sively the thought of the Authors and do not necessahumanitarian convoys, both inside and i n the proximity rily reflect the viewpoint of the Peacekeeping of such areas. Operations Department or the United Nations.

37 - OIKOS

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REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN Our Army's commitment Managing peace is much harder than managing war. In a country absolutely collapsed, the rebuild ing work can only happen in a frame of stabil ity and security. It's not an easy task, but rather a complex chal lenge that requires a large expenditure of resources and energy.

In Ap ril t his yea r the Consort ium Military History The peace can be a peace imposed, for instance, Wo rking Group, of pfp, to which vari ous Institutes by the victors: in t his case, for those who are subof Strat eg ic-defence Studies, not only in Europe, jected to the peace it is often an even b itterer finand Historical Offices of a few Armed Forces is h to a conflict; the peace can be im posed by an adhere to, met in Bratislava (l ) to study and dis international organizat ion and in this case the difcuss, w ith the he lp of ex amples from the past, the ficulties which fol low can be lighter because in this new tactics put into place to "exit" from recent scenario the humanitarian concerns are treated as con flicts, notably in Iraq and Afg hanistan. a priority. The conc lu sions of t he ana lys is from the Then there is the "exit" from war or from mi litary experts, are in sho rt the following obviously this intervent ion, based on th e consent between t he is a pro blem whose current sol ut ion is in itinere victors and the defeated, witho ut the populace and subject to remar kab le changes, as many facbeing totally in favour o f t he "agreement". to rs vary, at least on pape r , from what has hapHow is it possible to manage t he p eace in a colpen e d in the recent and d ista nt lapsed state whe re th e fi t¡st past. They were and there are thing is to provide the basic various scenar ios for exiting a ' ' The end of a conflict im - services (water, electric it y, food war. First of all remember that distribution) and simultaneousbefo re a war is a m ilit ary act it is plies means severe economic ly restore state structures or a po litical act, t hat ut ilises con- consequences, essential for create ex novo, im pos ing the fli ct as an i nstrument to achieve the rebuilding of destroyed so-called governance, which is its objectives , for examp le the property, where the humani- the idea of the authority of t he stab ility of an important stratetarian "vocation" and national State? gic area, w hen othe r means are The end of a conflict imp lie s or regional interests are dee med ins uffic ie nt. A nd it is seve re economic consequences , tightly intertwined , , also an act that is wit h various essential for the rebuilding of eco nomic co nsequ ences o f destroyed propert y, whe re the many types, bu t t he b iggest humanitarian "vocation" and impacts are on t he life o f t he territory where th e nat ion al or regional interests are t ightly interco nfl ict takes place and on the St ates which have twined . participated . The rebuilding needs stab ility and security : The "ex it" from a co nflict implies the managebecause o nly in this way can it proceed to a recon ment of p eace , perhap s a thi ng even mo re diffistruction that activates t he financ ial markets and cult than conflict, for the vi ctors and the def eat att racts a sizeab le vo lume of big and small "busi ed. Who can't re m ember t he serious soci al, eco nesses", that can guarant ee both a stable society nomic and po lit ical p ro b lems from t he demoband an economy based on legal fou nd ations. bing of troops in Europe after the First an d The comp lex era in wh ich we are living is Second World Wars? An d what can be sa id abou t undo ubt edly also an "ex it" from a war, t he "co ld t he retu rn, after long periods far from fami liar war" of the two bipolar superpowers , the United places , of th e prisone r s. Equ ally as complex is States of America and the Soviet Un ion. At the end the return o f ethn ic groups previous ly expe lled of the "cold war", we are faced w ith a multipolar from t heir co unt ries of origin. "huma nitarian vocation", that doesn ' t forget

LO GOS - 40

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t national and supranational security, stability and possible markets interests. This period is based very much on intern atio nal cooperation , be it based on fixed coalitions or mu lt inational coal itions formed for specific objectives, w ith at times some problems w ith the unit of command or at the level of tactics, t hat could eventually compromis e t he political and diplomatic decisions from the top, making it even harder to return to a normal stabil ity. If the peace in Iraq today seems unmanageable then t he situation in Afghan istan seems, at least for the moment, relatively more promising and receptive to the efforts of the international community.

A LAND OF SECULAR DISPUTE Afghanistan, an encl ave State (with all the weaknesses of being an en clave) has always been a land of "interposition", almost a buffer zone, between the expansionistic vitality of the czarist empire towards the Indian Ocean, India and China, and t hat of the British , who spread out from Indi a east to China, Burma and T ibet and west to modern day Pakistan, Iran, the Caucasus, Mesopotam ia and the Gulf: a geopolitical situation termed the Big Game. At the end of the First World War Afghan istan managed to get real independence, trying also to modernize society and the government struct ures . It was a quite short period. After the Second World War,

Title pages. Afghan servicemen in rock-climbing training. Above A joint project between Italy and Afghanistan.

w ith the ret reat of Great Brita in from India and the beginning of the "col d war", that territory became, again , a region of high ly significan t strategic importance, especia lly because o f its border with t he "Imperial" Soviet. After the war the territory continued to be a territory in which a lot of pressure was appl ied, from Iran, from Pakistan , but above all the attempted soviet i nvasion, a consequence of the geopolit ical vision of Moscow, inheriting t h e same hegemon ic impu lse as Czarist Russia to move forward towards the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. It is his torically recognized that from 1978 on, the eve of t he Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the end of the governme nt of Daoud, which Zah ir Shah had t urned over with a coup d ' etat in 1 973, the "Country system" was completely collapsed and there was no longer any managerial capac ity from the local aut horities. The withdrawal of the Soviet army and t h e following rise of the ''Taliban " made it even harder in t his lan d, devastating the populatio n. Then with the break-up of t he Soviet Un io n five new repub lics were created, three of which share frontiers with Afghanistan territory; T urk menistan, Uzbekistan and Taj ikistan : here it is worth noting that al l the large ethn ic groups are present in the

41 - LOGOS

Afghani population. The structure of t his state, in fact, has always been founded o n t he rule of t he Pashto t r ibe over the othe r ethnic groups, Tagiki , Uzbe k, Baluci, Turk men note this how a Sh iite minority can r ise up from the m ountains. Afghanistan can actual ly be considered in a geopoliti cal point of view, the most central Asian state of all the states in the area. T he Tagika and Uzbek Diaspora was very important and in thP case of the solving of the Afghan pro blem based o nly on the affinity of the Pashto would mean a se rious impact on the territory if there w as a growth in Tagika or Uzbek nationalism. The othe r Afghan frontiers, Iran, Pakistan and for 76km China, are very permeable, porous, j ust like t hose with the ex- soviet Republics: with above all a constant interchange with Iran, facilitated by the fact that Dari, one of languages neo-Persian used, is a variant of Farsi the Iranian lang uage. At present, howeve r, t he frontier with Iran is not as open as in the past and workers who want to leg ally cro ss the border queue for the Teheran Embassy in Kabul to o btain a visa. Despite this, the religious influence of Shiites especially on the Herat area is remarkable, just as the Shi ites exercise on the Dhi Kar area in Iraq: both these areas are in the zone of Italian res pon sibility. It is not poss ible to forget t he "Taliban" element, not co mpletely vanquished, but actually still active in com mitti ng acts of civi l disturban ce and guerrilla warfare. There were and there are sizeable potential ris ks all over Afghanistan, not only t he backwardn ess of its society and th e economy wh ic h negatively affects t he development of the commun ication ch annels and oil routes in the direction of the south (to Pakistan and India). The

LOGOS - 42

A group of Afghan women awaiting to attend a meeting called by the ISAF Command.

cultivation of poppy (papavero), with the larg e and continual drug traffic has important repercuss ions on neighbou ring states as well as Afghan istan and the international economy. Then we must mention the growth of cross- bo rder te rrori sm, bound to Islamic political militancy. Besides it is clear that the population considers religion and nationalism the same thing and views religio n as a part of the state, just as obligatory as following the prescriptions of Islam, the sharia.. Another ele m ent which threatens the sought after stabi lity in t he area is presence of the armed militia, from the various wars in the region: a secular tradition of bei ng personally armed, not in the se nse of a regular army, but of a mil itia, if not feudal certainly of a t ribal or confessional style and its not easy to disarm them o r fo rce t he m to conform to the law, the rules of w hich result at ti mes with are difficult to comprehend for men used to obeying a charismatic chief and not an imposed govern ing bureaucr acy.. This ter ritory was, and is still threatened with being, the ideal battlefie ld for the geostrategic rivalries in central As ia, above all for its ethnic heterogeneity and the still fe udal structure (the New Big Game). In fact another important element which is necessary to take into account is the current Af ghan social structure, moreover the diffe rence betwee n the tow ns and the countryside: while in t he t owns the con ception of government authorities is in some way accepted, in the hinterland the on ly authorities which are recognized are

either those of the village chief or tribal chief (in the case of a mono-tribal village), elected with the conse nt of the local population or via religious procedures, and invested wit h a large moral authority even if the legal authority is lacking . Therefore the dialogue, out sid e of the towns has to be held with these individ uals , and this is often as not done with much tact and abi lity by our soldiers ; at t imes lacking the bureaucracy to help achieve the prefixed objectives, if they are not acceptable from the religious part, for instance , taking into cons ideration the above mentioned sharia as being an absolute iuri corpus to be followed.

A CHALLENGE TO BE WON In this comp lex picture , w ith many vo latil e factors to be taken into account, are the Itali an Armed Forces who must operate and be effect ive with in the framework of the NATO Internation al Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2). Bearing in mind the comp reh ensive article from Colonel Sperotto, then comma nder of PRT in Herat, cit ing his own w o rds , t he Provinc ial Reconst ru ction Teams (PRT), the current means to "ex it" t he Th e Chief of a village. conflict, are a mixture of civil and military personnel with t he remit of augmenting the auth o rity of the central Afghan Government, of prohaving been ent r usted wit h the ro le of moting and strer19Lt1ening security and of facil iCommandant de l NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, tati ng the channels of human itarian aid and of as we ll as ltalfor (4) and thirty assuring support to the soldiers from the Kab ul rebuildi ng act iv ities by national and intern ational ' ' ... to create a framework of Multinational Brigade, it has organ izatio ns work ing in the stability and security at the assumed coordi nation of PRT in area. Complex tasks, above all basis of any possible and re latio n to the Herat area : RACWEST, one of four expected for a nation which has the sustainable reconstruction, Command posts, the other leadersh ip and thus the three be ing near the capital responsib ility of an area, and and support the local insti Kabu l, Maza r-e - Sharif and assuming t he coord in at io n tutions ... ,, Kandahar. (Reg ional Area Coordinator It is certain ly not a b ran d RAC): t he NATO strategy t hat new method for rebu ild ing and guarant eeing aims that ISAF ex pands its responsibility to the security in a count ry, as hig hl ig hted by Anto nio who le Theatre, to help the Afgha n government in Ciabattini Leonardi in his article in S.A.S . on PRT the work of consolidatio n of its authority on all (5), what is bei ng carried out in Afghani stan has the territory, thro ugh a process arti cu lated in some cha racteri stics in common with ot her four Stages that, movin g anticlockwise starting reconstruction attempts, but in conte xts com from the north of the country (already in operapletely differe nt and in situations with speci al tion) to all of the Afghan territo ry. the objective factors, tru ly derived from the Country' s ind ividis to create a foundation of stabili ty and securiual stru ct ure and history. ty wh ich can be the base of the subseq uent posIn the context of Stage II of the NATO / ISAF missible and sustainab le reconst ruction , and that sion , Italy took the respons ibi lity of the He rat PRT gives support to t he local inst itutions, freely with t he fol lowing mandate:" ... help t he Afghanistan elected so that they obtain and keep the authorGovernment extend its authority with the purpose of ity necessary for governing t he Co un t ry. facilitati ng the creation of a stable and safe environItaly, w hich from last Aug ust until May 4th of t hi s ment with in its A rea of Operat ion and support, us ing year, had the responsibil ity for the who le of ISAF,

43 - LOGOS

• o in the town of He rat, in the sector of Police and Security Forces, it has arranged the supply of ve hicles, motor-vehicles, radio equipment for telecom munications, gasoline and Police uniforms. T he purpose of the project was to provide the Police in the province of Herat with an operations room for the management of emergencies (electio ns, floods, fires, earthq uakes), providing the te lephone connections, the motor vehicles and the re levant equipment for t he purpose of allowing t he development of activities of contro l and security, important iss ues for the realization of a sustainable stability i n the t erritory, and achieved by the same Afghans. • o in t he town of Herat, in the area of health , it supplied t he Emergency Ward with suitable materials and instruments to guarantee its effective operat ing ; it had purchased electrical radiators for the paed iatri cs and plastic surgery for the beds in emergency, it's waiting for a MAE project for the general restructuring of the heating for the same department; it has supplied support mate rial for t he Ce ntre of Mental Disorders; it has developed coo peration activities among Afghan med ical staff; • o in the Shindand district, also in the area of health, it bought an electronic generato r for the hospital and sanitary material of several kinds, with the aim of improving t he functionality of the district health facility; • o from a typically social point of vi~w. regardThe opening ceremony of a school. ing the weakest parts of the po pulation, it donated nonexistent tools and equ ip me nt t o help a military presence, the correlat ed activit ies as per the i n- patients ce ntres for the "martyr s" and the invalids; the program Secu rity Sector Reform (SSR) (6) and the p rocess of rebuild ing of the o in t he sector of justice seccountry ... " In this t ask PRT is tor, in the town of Herat, it supcomposed of civilians (the Civil ' ' ... what is being carried plied the local cou rt with f urn ishOffice of PRT, l'Ufficia/e Civile de/ out in Afghanistan has ings; for the civil administration PR7) fro m the Ministry of t he gave the Government a secure some characteristics in itinternet Foreign Affairs (Ministero deg/i point and paid the conAffari Esteri MAE), in various common with other recon nection for five months ; with the projects in which professional- struction attempts, but in a aim of helping to rebuild the loism, t echnical know how, mi litary completely different con cal administration it began as competence an d the CIMIC text ... ,, quickly as possible to implement (Co /laborazione Civile Militare, bas ic computerizatio n ; in t he Military Civil Coo pe ration), area of emergency prevention it whose work is al ready well known in other co untries, supplied two Toyota pick- ups, for winter, with the are all injected. purpose of allowing transport between the isolatTo talk about concrete activities, above all from t he ed villages in case of snow; it has also supplied humanitarian point of view (7), PRT / CIMIC, in the materials and equipment t o combat the cold ; framework of Operatio n Quick Impact Project • o still in t he town of Herat, with regards to the (Projects completed in quick time, but that have a so- called Soc ial Deals (Affari Socia/1) , like the big impact on the local commu nity, rei nforcing support to Women Affairs Department, for t he amo ng the local populace confidence in t he foreign d istri bution o n the intern ational day of wo men civilians and military who are responsible for their (March 8th) 180 bags containing various ite ms of primary needs) has completed for example the folpersonal hygie ne (soap, shampoo , nail-clippe rs, lowi ng(8): cloth, towe l, toothpaste, toothbrush);

LOGOS - 44

• o in t he district of Qara Bagh, on co mpletion of the project of rebuilding t he local school build ing, it provided desks, chairs and desks, in such a way it cou ld guarantee t he school actually started life as a school · Another three projects are still going on at the moment: • o for t he Herat town, it is aiming to provide the municipality with 3 compacting lorries and l 50 rubbi sh ski ps for rubbish, t o start a urban street cleaning and refu se collection service vo t he purchase of two ambulances to ensure t he speedy transport of the wounded from nearby villages to the reg ional Herat hospital: • o it is completing the project of reorg ani zatio n of several school buildi ngs (e ig htee n) and, on com pletio n of the structure, f urniture and auxil iary items to help start the schools, is nearing completion. Reading about the projects, fo r those who don ' t know the real ity of Afg han istan wou ld probably bring a smile to many when they con side r how small the projects are , but they are exce llent projects which can be completed rapidly and above all with iden tifiable objectives from the Afghan govern me nt itself; these are three clear guidel ine specifi catio n decided upon i n meeting

An Italian soldier on patrol duty near the village of Pashtun- zargul.

held in Londo n at the end of 2006, d uring which it was also decided upon a Provincial Development Committee that mu st act as body of Coordinator and the achievement of the con struction of projects for ensuring securit y, with Military and Pol ice tra ining; ensu r ing that it starts with Eng li sh governance terms , and so reinforces and strengthens the A fg han govern ing structures in the opi nio n of the pop ulatio n in general , an obj ective not particular ly easy if one cons ide rs Afghan soc ial structures. So to ensure that t here is rule of law, that is th e observance of the laws, the respect of human rig hts , economic and soc ial deve lopme nt, thro ug h edu cation, i ntegrat ion of women into th e Afghan system, the deve lopment of infrastructu re, the mou ldin g of the manag ing classes and the correct use and development of water re so urces. T he re are also some precise indications for indi vidually req uested projects: acceptance in terms of public usefulness and their sustainability in t he futu re. T he project validity is examined by an assessment team, experts that study and evaluate

45 - LOGOS

the request according to those concepts. This was the training of 40 Afghan soldiers in rock t eam has recently rejected a project fo r the creclimbing , carried out by four Italian Alpine Of ficers at the ltalfor cam p. ation of 16 w ater wells on private land thu s not falling into the catego ry of "Public Utility" . Whe n a project is accepted, it mu st be agreed on by the local author ities, which must undertake to make CONCLUSIONS efforts towards t he realization of the project with the supp ly of tools. A brief stay in Kabul and Herat allowed me the As regards the activity CIMIC in Kabul, in t he op portunity to evaluate on t he ground so me of t he per iod February 2004- February 2006, between many in itiatives which have been completed by the what was created it is interesti ng to remember that He rat PRT / CIMIC. I was present at an inauguration the following were bui lt (9) 16 schools, two of a sc hool about twenty minutes by car from orphanages, two schools for bl ind and one for He rat. T he local Afghan authorities were present, it t hose deaf without speech: in total about 40 classwas a sizeable event, and the o pening ceremony rooms in masonry, 2 5 of wood and about 30 othw as heralded wit h words from the Koran. It ers were rebuilt with m inimum costs, with the seemed to me an important event that t hey were cooperation of local companies and the help of prese nt, even if the men, children, girls and you ng Ita lian military eng ineering. They distributed women were separate ; if the primary instruction is 1,600 desks; stationary (26,000 exercise books, consented by local custom to the female sex it . 30,000 pens, 30,000 pencils, 30,000 erasers, means that an im portant m es sage has bee n l 0,000 folders, 400 black boards) for about 7,600 rece ived even outside the main cities, where tradichildren. T hey gave a total of 20 com puters, 6 tio ns are more entre nched. T he Village Head then w ater t an ks and 2 small electri cal generat ors. 29 invited "the Italians" to eat at hi s house. A symbol water wells were built. About 3,500 sheep and ic gesture from the village and its notables who oxen w ere treated by veterinariw ere also present at the meal . ans. Also for t he road network It was a simple meal si mple, the re have been projects; mili- ' ' ... to bring Afghanistan out but with the warm hospitality tary eng ine ers rebu ilt three from a remarkable backof one who recognizes, as in all bridges (activities based on the the Middle East, the guest is a wardness and a from a situ - "g indicati ons of CIMIC) and other ift" fro m th e Divi ne One. ation where this territory is Anothe r intPresting moment j obs were carri ed out in th e road sector. There was the tittle tasks like a crossroads of drug was the visit to a school build of water run offs and m inor and arms trafficking,, ing in t he Pas hto-Zargul terrimaintenance programs in 12 tory, about three ho urs from neighbouring vi l lages of the Herat: t hey are organiz ing two mi litary compou nd and in t he peri phery of Kabul. toilet facilities, o ne for the males and o ne for the The health sector was given two dental studies females, to avoid the double turn here (men in th e for the local hos pital and a sufficient q uantity of mo rning and women in the afte rnoon ). Another medicines. There were also so me military doctors' small but significant project; t he construction of a actions, among other things they founded , a little restraining w all to avoid the possib le wandering outside the remit of ltalfor, the clinic "Hope" off of small rivers that could feed ho uses in small (derived from a Ind ian NGO project) for t he treatlow populated villages in the Pashto area . me nt of lesmaniosi, very common in the populati on du e to the promiscuity w ith animals. Also in Kabul and it s surroundings the projects For t he University o f Kabul t wo class rooms and are oft en geared toward s sc hools, like fo r example a library w ere built in cooperation with the the school in the m ilit ary co mpo und bui lt by the "Gar ibaldi" Brigade. Facult y of Veterinary Science of t he Universities Of Mes sina and Padua. To the poorest parts of It is obviou sly not pos si ble to outline al l the the po pu lation, to the child re n in th e or phancompleted projects but what appears clear is that ages, in schools for deaf wi thout speech, th e t he path undertaken by the internat ional co mm ublind and boys in th e j uveni le j ail ; 3,000 kg of nity, partly realized by the Italian Armed Forces , var io us foods, 7,200 pai rs of shoes, 33,600 garcan be the only so lution to bring Afghanistan out ments of cloth ing, 19,2 00 p ieces of baby cloth fro m a remarka ble backwardn ess and a sit uation ing and 6, 300 toys . which has this t err itory like a drug and arm s 40 Afghan students wer e bro ught t o Italy, at the crossroads . It is significant that the 'Taliban " tried University For Fore igners Of Perugia, to learn and to recently destroy a school i n the north of t he improve the knowledge of the Italian language. Country; ed ucation allows the population to begin Among many oth er performed activities, t he re to "thi nk" and "eval uat e".

LO GOS - 46

l

.

'F~otf

ootUNLEGAMETRAPop,. v11

' ... .

A commemorative plate on a building just reconstructed by ISAF with the support of local workers.

The challenge is hard, but they are on a good course, even if it is long and full of dangers, as shown by t he recent attack o n Camp Vianini in Herat: but the challenge must be overcome in order to g ive the next gene rations a greater secu rity and international st ab ility.

Maria Gabriella Pasqualini Teacher of History and Institutions of Mediterranean Africa and the Near East at the University of Palermo

NOTES (l) "6th International Conference", Exiting War. Post conflict military operations, Bratislava 3- 7 April 2006. (2) lsaf and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the military mission led by the United States, have separate mandates and missions: ISAF must focus its action on the stabilization and security of the territory , while OEF w ill continue in its

established objective, the struggle against terrorism. (3) The article was published in "Rivista Mi litare", no. 2 / 06, It. Ed. , to w hich one can apply for more details. In the text, the objectives concern ing ou r Armed Forces in the ISAF and PRT scenario are only br iefly outlined. (4) Composed , at the moment, of the 132nd Armoured Artillery Regiment "Ariete", t he 7th NBC Reg i ment "Cremona", the 6th Engineering Regiment "Pion ieri", the 4th Alpine Parachute Regiment, the 1 st Commun ications Regiment and the Carabinieri as Military Pol ice. (5) QV "Rivista Mil itare", Novem ber / Decem ber 2005, It. Ed., pages 40- 49. (6) The SSR has f ive mai n objectives: anti- drug (Great Britain), jud icial reform (Italy), disarmament, demobi l izat ion an d re i nstatement Uapan), training of the Afghan Army (Un ited States), training of the Afg han po l ice (Germany, wh ich will probab ly f ini sh at t he end of the year. Italy has been asked to take over this objective). (7) The fo llowing list is obviously not exhaustive about what has bee n or is being done, es pecially in con nection with the cu ltivation and t rafficki ng of drugs. (8) Data provided by the PRT Command in Herat. (9) Figures reported by theCIMIC ITALFOR cel l in Kabul.

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URBAN WARFARE IN

<<CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS>> The reduced distances of engagement, the difficulty of telling the enemies from the population and the hos tility of the environment stress the difficulty of putting into practice the training schemes. The recent experience of the "Ariete" Brigade in Iraq prompts its former Commander to make some reflec tions that could prove useful without altering a still valid and topical doctrinal body.

Sun Tz u, theoretician of the art of war, fre quently quoted but rarely listened to, in one of its maxims states ... the worst policy is that of

London and New York; now Cairo, Istanbul, Mexico City and Shanghai exceed these numbers. Therefore more and more frequently o ne is attacking the cities ... attack faced by very large urban con only if there is no other possitexts, wh ich not only repre bility. Al l t he military sent an im portant demo Commanders have cons idered ' ' Urban fights seem to be graphic concentration, but are these words drops of wisdom, changing the rules of comalso communication knots , but indeed, also in recent con- bat, reducing the differences economic and business ce nflicts, often the combats have of the adversaries as regards tre s, poles of development fo r taken places precisely in the equipment and preparation,, the entire surrounding region . cities. Actually the process of T herefore it is very difficult to urban migration of the last achieve the contro l of the terdecades has concerned a high ritory if one fails to get hold of number of megalopolis es. In the not too distant the important cities , which increas ingly become past the only cities that neared the considerable the key elements that were once represented by dimension of ten million inh abitants were mountains and dominant positions. The refore, Sun Tz u's m axim, always i nsp ired by commo n sense, does not lose its value . Nevertheless, at Title pages. the present time, it is difficult to find alternaNassiriya: One of the bridges on the Euphrates. tives to urban warfare. On t he other hand , urban fight s seem to be Below. A "Bersaglie re" on surveillance duty. changing t he rules of combat, reducing the differences of the adve rsaries as regards equ ipment and preparation. As a matter of fact, any unit that finds itself involved in actions where the engagement d istances appear extremely short, where it is difficult to tell the enemy from the population, where the whole environment appears hostile, can find it difficult to put into practice the schemes learned before. On the other hand, everything seems t o favour an adversary, even if not m ilitari ly prepared , who can take advantage of a deep knowledge of the environment and moves unconcernedly amon g the population until the moment he chooses to hit. It is t he refore normal that, particularly in CROs (Crisis Response Operations) one may have to face

LOGOS - 50

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visio n o f t he obj ectives . But w hat are t he pos si ble armed m ilitiamen , who choose to operate inside a obj ectives i n a city1 It seems a t ri cky q uest ion but town, in order to ex plo it its characteristics and actua lly it is not so . The pote nt ial groups of make up for the ir insufficie nt preparation, giving insurgents will undou bted ly t ake po ssess ion of more visibility and resonance to their o perations, sqme bui ldings that have symboli c and fu nct ionand trying t o appear before the popu lation as the al im port ance, w hic h therefore "power holders" . wi ll constitute the key eleme nts The recent expe rience of the of their orga ni zation, as ve nu es "Ariete" Brigade at Nassiriya, ' ' As in all military opera"insurrect ion a ry move Iraq, leads to make some tions, also in urban combats of reflections that cou ld be useful it is essential to have a clear ments", gat hering p laces or anyth ing else. T h ese place s are even if they do not intend to and precise vision of the ob- k nown in advance, preci sely alter a doctrinal body still valid because of th ei r i mpo rta nce and topical. From these reflec- jectives ,, and are t herefo re easily locatt io ns we will see how, after all, ed. T he other obj ectives are t he fundamental principles of those w hose possession can h inder o r paralyse training can also be applied in urban environthe city life or the peop le's moveme nt, g ivin g the ments . One must only bear in m ind t he characterim press ion that th e groups co ntrol t he city : I istic elements of such engagements and cons ider refer to the seats of t he local Ad m inistration , the environmental differences. bridges , obl ig atory roads, Po li ce Centrals. T he re are , on the other hand, the b uild ings that h ou se the offices or the de legations of the Cont ingent SURVEILLANCE and the T rans it ion Authority. T h ese are paying objectives for the adve rsary and the refore they As in al l military operations, also in urban comm u st be caref ully cons idered and in clud ed in t he bats it is essential to have a clear and prec ise list that wi l l have to be made. Once the list is made, the elements identified w ill be highlighted on the city m ap and t he stro ng A patrol in "hedgehog" formation.

51 - LOGOS

A "Centauro " heavy armoured ca r on patrol.

points and vu lnerabilities (su perelevation, proximity of other bui ldings, intrinsic structu re of the construction, access and escape ro utes) carefully studied. It is important, mo reover, to systematise such elements in order to see how the potential adversary will be able to move by exp loiting some of them. Once the map is obtained, one starts by putting such elements under surveillance, that from dis creet can become more and more intense and evident as t he events develop. In periods of operational stand still or relative calm, the points located can be subj ected to a discreet surve illan ce by the intelligence and be inc luded in the p lans of t he patrols that cover the city. Should the situation seem to deteriorate, it would be necessary to se nd teams of specia lists (norma lly spec ial - forces observers) who should put the co ncern ed points under a continuous surveillance wi th optical and electron ic eq uipment, during daytime and nighttime. However, it should be remembered that th is intense observat ion is very onerous for the units and therefore cannot be continu ed for long periods . The refore, if the situation worsens t he surve illance must be maintained at all costs, but if it improves one must go bac k t o a discreet surveillance as soon as possibl e.

LOGOS- 52

Th is type of observation can be com pleme nted with u nmanned aircr aft (UAVs), which by operati ng with out expo sing the person ne l, prevai lin g ly at night - time, perm it to have v iews from different angles and thus comp lete th e knowled ge acqui r ed by t he operators on t he ground . However it must be remembered that su ch aircraft, flying at low altitud e, are visibl e and often also very noi sy. Therefo re it sho uld be consid ered that the adversary would immed iately not ice thei r employment. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a negative factor. In fact, if the situati on is already pre-conflict, and the re is nothi ng to lose i n m aki ng clear that we want to have a con stant surveillance fro m the sky. Moreover, such means are an evident sign al to everybody that th e Co ntingent is watchful and prepared for any occurrence and it contin ues to keep under con trol the nerve-centres of the city. Anot her essenti al element for acquiring a com plete p icture of the sit uation is environmental interception, w hi ch does not so much concern rad ios , for which the units are prepared, but cell pho nes . The insurge nts, in fact, are unl ikely to have radi os, whi le the use of ce ll-p ho nes is widesp read , also i n the most backward cou ntries. Du ring the Nassiryia fights, personal phones were employed also fo r surveys and for adj ust ing mort ar fire. Such interceptions requi re eq uipment and techn iques that are more com mon ly

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position of the unit's weapons, w hich on ly a platoon leader can decide. It is therefore very sensible to divide the area into "Deep Battle", "Close Battle" and "Rear Battle", assigning to each of them tbe forces necessary to achieve the specified objectives, but it is essential to bear in mind the maxim "Never come down from your Command level", expecting to teac h an NCO, leader of a platoon, how to arrange his forces. One should trust his men: the NCO was deemed fit for that task and he will certainly be able to carry it out . To appropriate somebody else's responsibilities in a situation liable to sudden changes can have tragic consequences. Any plan for manoeuvring in urban environ ments should not overlook the need to isolate the combat areas. As a matter of fact, the insurgents have a limited number of forces and rather rough logistics. Therefore if one succeeds in preventing them from receiving fresh fighters, weapons, munitions and food, very soon their action will dry up¡"motu proprio". Obviously this is true only if one has the favour of the population and if the people' s liking does not go, on the contrary, to the insurgents. In this case, the town itself becomes a supply centre for the enemy. This is very important and will be examined later on. To isolate the combat area could mean to surround a district or the entire city, according t o the extent of the fight. However, in OPERATIONS order to obtain this isolation, it is not necessary to deploy the units side by side, Operations carried out in a also because this would be city environment cannot be included in the traditional sub- ' ' In an urban environment, impossible, consider ing the of men: it will be division of "attack" and operations cannot includ- availability sufficient to control the main "defence". The outline of the ed in the traditional subdivi- routes with check points and two types of manoeuvre is watch the inte rmed iate ones vague and intermingled. It is in sion of attack and defence , , with patrols or UAVs. One will fact very common to move, in not obtain a total closure, but a order to occupy a building that control suffic ient to reduce the supplies a great represents an important defensive element, and be deal. On the other hand, a civilian truck overfired at when getting near it, and for that reason loaded with ammunitions would find it difficult to decide to go on with the action and "dislodge" the drive on a road full of holes. occupying insurgents. Everything depends on the Once the area is isolated, the manoeuvre must perception and initiative of the lower-level Commanders, who must judge and decide accordbe aimed at protecting the previously identified ingly, without being too restrained by rigid key points, preventing the enemy from taking schematisms. Thus, the planning of an operation them. One should remember that its purpose is to show to the world and civilian population that it must be doctrinal when carried out at the highest levels (Brigade/Division), since doctrine can be has achieved full possess ion of the town by occupying its most important parts. If it does not succorrectly applied also in urban fighting. On the ceed, the enemy is discredited before everybody's contrary, it must be very flexible at the lower leveyes and fails to attain its goal. T herefore the re is els, leaving ample initiative to the subordinate no need to drive it out of its hideo uts. The Commanders, so that they can adapt the directives Contingent has nothing to demonstrate, while the to a situation that is clear only on the ground. adversary has to subvert the established order and Planning at the highest levels, besides determining show that he is the st rongest. If he does not reach all the objectives to be reached, must subdivide the areas of intervention and the fo rces available, its aim very quickly, the population will leave him to its destiny and the action will rapidly end. but must not expect t o manage details such as the

employed by the Police than the Military. Nevertheless it is necessary to be prepared for meeting a threat that is becoming more and more diversified and specialized. Often the user of cell-phones does not think that military units can overhear him, because he thinks that they are not prepared for such function; therefo re he may give out important data about the preparation of possible offensive actions. This observation function is essential in order to carry out any type of action in a city, but is unlikely to give complete situation data. The adversary, in fact, moves about naturally, hiding weapons under his clothes or other mate rials, and it is very improbable that he will clearly show his intentions in advance. Therefore, while the people t hat are building barricades are supplying unmistakable elements to be considered in one's plann ing , it will be very difficult to determine how many people are going to occupy the barricades, or what functions such obstacles will have in urban warfare. Thus one can say that it is very difficult to conduct a urban combat without previously carrying out a good surveillance, but on the other hand, the latter alone is not sufficient to ensure good possibilities of success.

qe

53- LOGOS

"Door to door" mop - up operations may be necphase, could have shocking effects . essary in certain situations and must be carried Furthermore, the unit must carry bulky, heavy out carefully, and only in restricted and well weapons and, considering the lim ited availabili delim ited areas, because it can cause not only a ty of transport h elico pte rs , this reduces thei r high number of losses to the attacker, but raises number and therefore the possibility of success . the level of the fight and makes it necessary to In fact, these operations reach their goal only if employ high ly destructive weapons, suc h as everything is sent in a single wave, since it is bunker- booster rockets, demolition charges and very unlikely that the enemy will allow a second grenade throwers. What is more, in this type of journey. Besides, any operation that inserts an operations it is difficult to ensure the protection of isol ated unit in any context must guarantee its the population, as it is very unlikely that the recovery or its contact with a friendly unit with adversary w ill have evacuated civilians from the in a well-established time. It is difficult to obtai n occupied buildings, as provided for by the war these guarantees , given the ever-changin g laws. In suc h close confrontation, civilians will risk nature of the urban environment. For all thes e not on ly their safety, but also their houses and reasons airborne operations have often bee n possessions. Much as one tries to avoid risks for planned but never carried out. the civilians , the most likely result is t hat the population will turn its back on him. In a confrontation at a distance, on the contrary, it is easier to conCOMMAND AND CONTROL trol the shooting and avoid collateral damages. The employment of armour and airmobile units C2 operations in an urban context are very intriin urban contexts deserves a special note. In fact, cate, both for the considerable subdivision of the for a long time the re has been the id ea that enviro nment and for the chang eability of the operarmou red un its were not suited for this type of ational situation. Thus it is fundamental that the fight. Real situations showed just the opposite. Commanders at all levels receive clear data on th e Those who are against this employment mainsituation and fu lly understand the intentions of the tained , not without reason, that Commander of the Major Unit in a town the fields of vision are during the preparatory phase o f reduced and, while the threat ' ' It is fundamental that the the operation. Once the missio n posed by rocket lau nchers and t he development lines o f Commanders at all levels the increases also at short dis operation are well undertances, it is impossible to take receive clear data on the sit- stood, all subordinate advantage of the vehicle's uation and fully understand Commanders will be ab le t o weapons. Actual ly, in many the intentions of the Com adapt their citie s there are wide avenues, mander of the Major Unit orders to the situation, i n public parks an d open areas order to achieve the objective during the preparatory where one can manoeuvre with assigned. A detailed planning at tanks and use weapons of t he phase of the operation , , th e lower levels should be appropriate calibre to confront avoided, since not everybody t he threat. The size of the will understand it. Furthermore armoured vehicles permits the easy removal of it will probably be impossible to implement it at road barriers and gives t he crews an incomparable the moment of the action and control its conduct protection, well above our expect atio ns. None of once the operation has begun. Max imum initiative the members of the crews of "Centauro" armoured shou ld be left with the Commanders at lowe r level cars was wounded at Nassiryia, although the vehi o nce the objectives have been fixed, so that they cles were hit by several antitank rockets . may be achieved without harnessing them withi n As regards airbo rn e operations, on the con schemes conceived at higher levels. Some could be trary, one shou ld bear in m ind that urban consurprised to see how subordinate Commanders texts pe rmit to easily hide portable anti - aircraft (not on ly Platoon Commanders but also squad and rocket launchers, which, considering the continpatrol leaders) wil l cope with the situation with uing high vulnerab ility of helicopters, can determination and spirit of initiative. Obvio usly a achieve devastati ng results and be easily found preventive and effective training is necessary; al l on the black market . Twenty-one of these rockelements of the chain must know and trust each et launchers were confiscated during the period othe r well and have the feeling of belong ing to a o f the activity of th e "Ariete", at Nassiryia. In single team that works for a common goal. vi ew of the effect iveness and easy use of these One should resist the temptation of "overcomsy stems, there is a risk that a shooting down, manding" one's units and, similarly, that of reactwhich is very possible in the delicate landing ing emotionally to th e situation. In the excitement

LOGOS - 54

Italian servicemen keeping watch over a market.

of the fight, the data arriving to t he operation room are often inco mplete , distorted or exaggerated, when not entirely wrong in their basic parameters. T herefore one should avoid mak ing decisions, even when facing very dramatic situat ions, before getting a sufficiently clear picture of the situation itse lf. One should not expect a complete pattern, because this would entail a tardy decision, but at least a picture with essential and verified data. To make rapid decisions on the spur of emotionality or without due reflection can increase the risks for the units without giving them any advantag e.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT As in every type of operation, logistic support is fundamental in order to enable the units to carry out the ir mission . The main activities that deserve our at te ntion are supplies and medical support. In fact, other activities, such as maintenance, are less significant in combats with limited possibilities of manoeuvre.

Supplies are essential and one should bear in mind that, in action, the consumption of certain materials, such as ammun ition, can be very high. And he who fires to defend his life is very unlikely to spare shots. Training is obviously very important also in this sector, because well - trained personne l know how to ration their bursts, while the unskilled ones tend to shoot all they have as soon as they feel fired at. Obviously, also in this sector, the supply of ammunition mu st be regular and punctual, otherwise it is difficult to fight an enemy that seems to have always unlimited supplies at its disposal. Also food and water supplies should not be neglected, because the fighter, as capable as he may be, has the same needs as anybody el se , and if he is left without water and food for long periods, no matter how high his determination, his efficiency will irremed iably decline. One should underline the importance of water, because on conditions where temperatures easily reach 50° outs id e temperature, water becomes a conditioning factor of a man's res istance . One shou ld not overlook these things, wh ich seem commonp laces, because the unit's capability of carrying out their missio n depends largely on them, irrespective of the men 's valour.

55 - LOGOS

An efficient and timely medical assistance is also Nassiryia, however, some episodes of this kind of fundamental importance, because it conditions happened). In any cas e it is es sential that the the fighters psychologically. In fact, if a man locals do not sup port the insurgents but, on th e knows that, if wound ed, he will be speedi ly taken co ntrary, they do their best to deny them shelte r to an effic ient and clean hospital, where a surg ical and food supplies, and hamper their move t eam can promptly as sist him and, in case of comments. The insurrectional structure, very vulnerplications, can be taken home within a few hours, able on these points, wil l immediately fee l th is he w ill do his best in any circumstance. It is also lac k of su pport and the insurgents w ill find it important to diffuse information about self- help difficult to sustain the rhythm of a protracted and mutual assistance, because an immediate combat. intervention of the col leagues in critical situations helps the medical personn el in the performance of the success ive operations. This does not presume THE MEDIA a detailed clinical knowledge but only elementary notions: what should be dressed , where to tightHaving establ ished that t he favour of t he popuen , how to lay down a wounded man. These funlation is an essential factor, we must ta lk about the damental precautions can save a life. Here again media, the most important element for acqui r ing we see the importance of preventive training. and maintaining such favour. In any Country, eve n Both supplies and m edical evacuation s have an the most backward ones , there are communicatio n ele ment in common: they will pro bab ly be carried systems: newspapers, magazines, radio, television out under enemy fire. Also the militiam en know and the Internet. In Countries with a low alphathe inflow and evacuation itineraries and along betisation index, they tend to concentrate only o n these roads armed insurgents will frequently television. Actual ly thi s is a relatively cheap materiali ze and start shooting against the oncommeans , which is attractive for t he variety of pro ing and outgoing vehicles. Th us supply co lumns grammes it offers. It is wid espread in all Countries m ust be escorted and armed with heavy weapons and often one can see forests of satellite aerials and , if possible, ambulances stan ding on the roofs of rural shoul d be armour- plated . As a homes in poor areas. matter of fact the Red Cross, This situation is so well known instead of being a safe- con - ' ' If the Contingent has that one of the first objectives of duct, becomes an attractive tar- been working well ... it has urban insurrections are precisely earned esteem and consid - TV statio ns, from wh ich the disget for the rebels. eration, which do not van - senters broadcast programmes ish when the first shot is artfully prepared to m anipulate THE POPULATION information and influence public fired,, opinion. Thus it is important to It is the primary co mpon ent in know that such stati ons are urban w arfare. Its attitude can important objectives t o be decide t he outcome of the conte st. Therefore it is defended during urban combat. important to alienate psycho log ically the popu laA s regards the relations with the local med ia, th e tion from the fighters, who often d o not care fo r fundamental activity is to give them transpare nt t he civilians' needs and have no consideration for information , acquainting them wit h all that is t heir safety. Actually if the insurgents move easily being done in favour of th e population, avoiding about a city environment, this does not mean that boasting and self- ce leb rations. If the Co ntingent its inh abita nts share thei r motivations. On t he has been working well, everybody w ill clearly see contrary, they often have different political and it, because the witnesses to the events will confirm relig ious ideas , and happen to be involved in a the commun ication. The population, the refore, vio lent situation that has incomp rehens ible purcan be broug ht up to date about t he progres s poses, often very far fro m thei r feelings. If the made, and will cert ai nly know the d ifference Continge nt has been working well , meet ing the between those who work for them and those w ho people's needs , it earns esteem and consideration, have their own purposes. which do not vanis h when the first shot is fired. The attention to the media must also include a This does not auto m at ical ly mean that if the co rrect analysis of the enemy false information. At civi lians are in favour of the Contingent they wil l t imes the insurgents are in a position to introduce pick u p their guns to defend it, since we cannot in the information circu it (satel lite TV, the Intern et) think that they wi ll sudd enly become fig hters, false o r doctored news, whi ch can even be intehowever g reat the ir esteem , es peci al ly w he n the g rated wit h rigged fi lms in order to di scred it th e co m bat takes place around their homes (at Contingent. Since a neglected o r non- denied piece

LOGOS - 56

"Lagunari" on th e bank of the Euphrates.

of news gives the impressio n of being true, one must pay g reat attention to these communications and deny them as soon as possible, using the support of reality. However sophisticated the manipu lations may be , the reality of facts wi ll be soon evident to one and all.

CONCLUSIONS These notes do not claim to be exhaustive and give all the answers about a complex operational situation, such as urban warfare in "Cris is Response Operations" (CROs). Some remarks may even seem obvious and so could the proposed so lutions . But the experience gained in operations leads to believe that even the most obvious things may not seem so if one has to make important decisions under t he rush of the events. As a conclusion to this short observations, what should remain clear is that in urban combat, as in any type of mi litary operation, the fun-

damental element is the fighter. A well t rained fighter, skilled and aware of his capabilities and limits, but above all a fighter who trusts his superiors because he knows that he is not just a number, an entity in a mass , but an important ind ividu al, on whom everything co uld depend. A fighter who knows that orders are conceived so as to achieve the goal while reducing the risks for him. A man who knows that while he is fighting someone is ready to supply him with everyt hing he needs and that , if wounded, everything possible w ill be done to save him. If one man ages to obtain such a body of soldie rs, these will be able to perform incredib le actions, well beyond what is asked of them. Because they are conscious of being men, and as such they wil l respect the adversary, who is never an enemy to hate, and the civil ian population, which has already gone through many hardships and should not be subjected to further t r ials.

Gian Marco Chiarini Major General, EUROFOR Commander in Bosnia, former Commander, "Ariete " Brigade

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THE TERRORISTS' NEW WEAPONS Their use in future attacks could open the doors to the most dangerous era in the history of m ankind

The acts of terrorism that occurred i n Japan, and arbitrary v iolence, of a recourse by modern Israel, United States , Russ ia, Spain, and Great terrorists to new arms whic h are ever more diffiBritain have alarmed the world with the serious cult to pigeon hole and defend against. danger that hangs over it because of the remarkUnfortunately the weapons that could be useable in futu re attacks could open the doors to the most able escalation of thi s form of cynical, savage an d dangerous era ever in the history of mankind. determined conflict. The horror provoked by such events has made it clear that the i ntention of these terrorist gro ups is to strike in indi scri minate ways just to achieve their objectives, without MOTIVATION AND PSYCHOLOGY excluding any means of conflict, including the use of w eapons of m ass destruction. The origins It is not easy to trace a line of demarcation of terrorism is lost in the m ists of ti me; in fact, between how much could be i ncluded in the there is evidence of this phenomenon since the rati onale of terroris t actio n and what should be very beginning of humanity. Neither men nor cons id ered as an inad mis sible crime, and with regard to these forms of con Gods have been revealed as immune from the temptation flict it' s a quest ion that would be very diffic u lt to resolve. to strike the opponent from ''These acts, however dread outs ide of 'The Rules'. The use ful, never had an important Typology and te rrorist's psylogy are not easi ly d efin of potion s, philtres and poipolitical value, perhaps be- cho sons dates back to class ical ab le, in spite of t he attempts times as well as the calamitous cause they were only carried already carried out; too many events and unrestrained epi- out with traditional weapons factors c_an influ en ce t he spi rdemics fro m some an gry of limited effect ,, it and the mind of a person w ho decides to sacrifice himd ivin ity against a mortal comself for t he triumph of a cause munity tainted wit h fa ults, and for the creation of a society that matches impiety or something other. However interesting a short his torical survey of terrorist activities their imagination, purifi ed of men and doctrines which th ey automatical ly refu se to be admitted. across the centu ries could be, it is not possibl e Cesare Lombroso, the father of m odern crimihere to dwell on them, as the aim of th is piece is to look at the terrorist activities in relation to the nology, reduced crim i nality to essentially a question of genetics, but th e yardsticks used by emp loyment of non -conventional arms . Attacks , murders and fanaticism are the accompaniment the illustrious teacher has not been enoug h to to the 'old - style terrorism' . These acts, however give adequate answers when we note that the dreadfu l, in the past have never had an im portant terrorist is not the class ical cri minal but he is political value, perhaps because they were only made from a conscious decision of that it would seem to make the world a better place; it carried out with traditional weapons of li mited effect. The situat io n changes when in place of remai ns diffi cult fo r us to accept th e idea that, for the doing of good for the community, it the conventional weapons, one makes reference to 'cyber weapons' or even to nuclear, biological would be possib le to perpetrate in cold blooded d eter m inat io n horre nd ous mas sacres to or che mi cal weapons. The explosion of terrori sm defenceless populations such as those Algerian in the last ten years, the alarming speed with w hi ch the phenomenon has also spread into communities, in which women and ch ildren have paid t he ultimate p rice. T he refore if we exclude zo nes considered 'immune ', has produ ced in ou r psyche a deep anxiety, enough to make us perso nalities with extreme psychological disorbelieve we are truly living in the 'age of terrorders, of which history has sup plied us with ism', with the nightmare, on a wave of sudden m any examples, who turn to slaughtering oth-

LOGOS - 60

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ers as a way to draw attention to themse lves, or to be remembered by mankind, it is not easy to define the personality or the motives whic h turn a norma l man into a terrorist. The continual surfacing of terrorist activity compels us even more 'to search for motives and to turn to the help of psychology, psychiatry and anthropology, to expla in how much violence and aggres siveness can the human be ing be predisposed to have, or as a result from a psycho logical issue. Sit uations which induce a right-minded and intelligent person to unleash an unheard-of leve l of ferocity or submit themselves to 'l eaders' from a desk o r pulpit, of scant intelligence , modest education o r even 'lunat ics' such as Asahara, David Koresh or Ji m Jones of t he People's Temple. With regard to the terrorist backdrop, frequent ly a common matrix doesn't exist; because terrorist acts can be inspired by many motivations, from poli t ics to rel igion , terrorism of the environme nt or against the state, from narco-terrorism to transnational organised te r rorism, from psycho log ical warfare to psycotronic warfare, just to mention some terrorist typologies that can provoke more anx iety and dismay, of which those last o nes represent unfortunate ly some of the weapo ns to be adopted by the terrorist of the future. In the wide range of poss i bilities available to a terro r ist group to plan an attack, the choice of employing weapons of mass destructio n repre::.en l ::. w ithout doubt the worst option for a ferocious stri ke against human ity.

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A PLAUSIBLE DEFINITION

Above. Training a terrorist on the use of weapons.

Af ter decades of academic studies and in the light of the numerous terrorist acts in modes more dramatic from the 1960s until September 11 th, 2001, a common inte r pretation of the phe nomenon of 'terrorism' has not been reached. One scholar was able to collect more than l 00 defin itions and, having synthes ized the quintessence of them, tried to summarize them in one more or less exhaustive definition, as ' a random attack by subversive elements against i nnocent individuals, aimed at causi ng fear, death and destruction, in o rder to o btain recognition on the part of organizations o r people who were not subjects of t he attack' . T r uth or heresy, th is affirmatio n was at once attac ked by crit ics who saw it as one sided. Some have considered it right to defi ne terrorism as ' the weapon of the weak' , wh ile others considered it a 'social evil'. In the wake of definitions and philosop hical interpretations, one notices, in spite of the ever growing list of victims, t hat the phenomenon

remains quite immune from the countermeasures launc hed by the various govern m ents inte rested in handling th e pheno m enon. Also t ak ing care not to jump too quickly on the 'bandwagon of antiterrorism', we notice that only recently has terrorism sta rted to be t ake n into conside rat ion, it st ill has to be ran ked as a global problem of the first rank. T he vagueness which surroun d s the defining of terroris m cannot be desti ned to procrasti nate muc h longer, all the while a valid solut ion to the problem stays out of reach, not managing to reach a valid one, it' s true that such form s of co nfl ict cou ld be forced to undergo a serious red uction if the root of the problems are tack led w ith courage and clarity, finally surpassing those lines of thinking that want 'opt imistically' t o redu ce t he resolution of t he problem t o t he eliminatio n of t he 'roots of inj ustice', or those theories that poi nt out that hard hitting ways and rad ica l ma nne rs

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The North Wing of the Pentagon destroyed b y the terrorist attack.

are 'th e best cu re ' to cut problem at the roo t. Th e root s of terroris m g o too deep ly to be eas ily reac hed and eradi cated.

THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

The fi rst point t o be exam ined before entering the su bject is the definition of t he t erm concern ing t he d iscuss ion. We have several definitio ns at our dis posal : mega- t erroris m, super-te rroris m , terrori sm with w eapons of mass destruction, or more generic, cat astrophic t errorism . Not con ventional terrorism would see m to be the most adeq uate term inology to define in an appropr iate way the use by t errorist groups of nuclear, ch em ical and biol og ical w ea pons ba nned by International Treaties and Conventions.

LOGOS - 62

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS By biolog ical terro rism is m eant t he use of bio logical and re lated toxic agents used by terrori st g roups for t he purposes of provo king epidem ics or po isoni ng even, if not necessar ily, lethal, ag ainst a large numbe r of peo ple, animals , plants and the ecosystem in ge neral. Which are t he biological age nts most suitable for a bio t errorist attack? Lists of potential usable bio agents for starting a 'b iolog ical action ' are accessible to anyo ne . It is sufficient simply to search for them on the internet to find biological agents , vi ruse s, tox ins, bio reg ulators, if not even the hig hly patho geni c and / o r lethal prionic proteins suitable for such a purpose. The use of minor or slightly path ogenic bio logical age nts mu st not be overlooked however , because 'in the perverse game of t he b iolog ical event' eve ry ge rm, o pport unely prepared, cou ld be us ed for the purposes of starting an eve n mo re severe epidemic or t o provoke a psycholog ical effect t hat, even in the presence of

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scarce symptomatology, can be attributab le to terrorist action . Modern biotechnologies offer a full range of poss ibilities of maki ng the germ, conve niently 'treated' in a laboratory, almost invulnerable to the environmental difficulties and various antidotes .. The most important featu res a biological agent must necessarily have to be employable for the purposes of war/ terrorism are; rate of infection (capacity of a biolog ical age nt to enter, survive and multiply within the host livi ng organism); viru lence (represents the most serious clinical issue for v ictims, with respect to one micro organism compared t o another); lethality (capac ity of a biological agent to inflict death in peopl e infect ed); pathogenicity (capac ity of a m icro organism to cause an illness to people exposed to the contagion); period of incubat ion (time which exists before t he symptoms of an illness are v isi ble in an infected person); stab ility (possib ility a micro organ ism has for surviving the actio n of the environme nt factors). Not less important is the resistance of a germ to antidotes and chem icals, so called 'modified' strain , so much of which is unknown to the commu nity undergoing the attac k. Based on the above-mentioned features and th e augmentation of danger via laboratories , th ree high- risk categories were identifi ed as fo llows: â&#x20AC;˘ category A (high priority) Variola major (small pox); Bacillus anthracis (anthrax or carbuncle); Yersin ia Pestis (plague); Francise lla Tularensis (tularaemia); Botu linic toxi n; Fi lovirus (Ebola, Marburg); Arenavirus (Lassa, Ju nin or hemorrhagic fever); â&#x20AC;˘ category B (priority 2) Coxie ll a burneti (Q fever); Brucella species (brucellosis); Burkhlderia mallei (glanders); Alfa virus (Venezuelan horse en A photo of the attack on the Twin Towers that was seen around the world. cephalo myelitis of t he east and west); Eps ilo n toxin (c lostr idium perfringens); Enterotoss in a B stafilococcica; the 's ub-set' of this category also With t he t erm 'bi oregu lators' is meant those includes usab le biological agents for contamimolecules produced by the ce lls in one or m ore nating food and water of t he Salmonella variety, parts of the organism , w hic h Shigel la, escherichia Co l i have a specific and marked 00 157: H7, Cholera, Cripeffect on the regu lating of the tosporid ium parvum . bioregulato ry are biological processes. 'Modified' ¡ category C (priority 3) Virus ' ' The Nipah; Hantavirus; Encefalitis molecules produced by the forms of the original bioregulavirus; He morrhagic f ever; Yel cells in one or more parts of to r molecu le, obta ined for low feve r virus; Tubercu loses the organism which have a chemical synthesis, are defined (biological agents resistant to specific and marked effect ' analogous' and ca n have a competitive action when they chemicals). on the regulation of the bi bind t o t he t arget receptor, In additio n to the bacteria and ological processes,, causing a response similar to virus, man and terrorist have at the original bioreg ulato r orig ithe ir d isposal, as already outnal, o r an op posing action when lined above, 'other types' of t he ' analogous ' is ab le to bind to the target recepbiological weapo ns, whose nature must still be studied in a definite way, for an eventual listing on to r and block t he o riginal bioregulatory action . the CBW lists: th ese new weapons are represented T he exception al number of 'pe ptides' recently synthesized t hat are able to contro l bio log ical by 'bioregul ators' and 'prions' .

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An Italian patrol on surveillance duty.

activity have increased the dread of being possible bio log ical weapons for exploiting the capacity t hey have to interfere/change hormonal secretions and therefore the metabolic / physiological activities, if not neural (ne uropeptide and neuroreg ulators) in an organism. We owe Stanley Prus iner, with the d iscovery of the 'prion', the merit of having enriched medical science with a new concept of replicative infection, no longer reserved exclusively for the structures co ntaining genetic code s (DNA-RNA), onto which t he structure acts like a vi rus and bacteria, but also molecular structures without ge netic material, like prote in molecu les, which can replicate t hemselve s and in fect an organism until a disease sets in. T he term 'prio n' can be co ns idered an acro nym where PR is for protein, the I for infect ious, ON for particle. T he prionic protein Pr Pc is normally present in th e ne rve cell s and seems to take part in the tran smiss ion of nervous impu lses . The epidemic of' bovine spongiform encephalopathy' (BSE) better known as 'mad cow d isease', has also raised the alarm, and forced researchers to examine in detail the studies on prions, and formulate a series

LOGOS - 64

of hypothes is on t he origin of t he slow but inex orable neuropathology caused by them, without unfortunately however coming to any defin itive o r encouraging conclusions . At th e moment no on e is in the position of being ab le to inform us about the 'identity' of prions; no one can ex plain the large resistance of this 'e ntity' on a protein bas is to ultraviolet rays , on the capacity to replicate himself in absence of a genetic code and the fact of being ab le to trigger genetic m utation processes i n the protei n present in all mammals. Therefore the reason ab le doubt remains that this mol ecule, neither viru s and less so bacter ium, can be used also as a biological age nt for w ar / terrorist purposes, since medical scien ce is not yet abl e to block t he trans fo rmatio n of the normal p rion in pathologic pri on ic forms as was the case with BSE, but it is al so true that a lot of progress has be en made on improving k nowledge about prions . At least 12 il lnesses have been identified from p rions both in ma n and animals; it w as demonstrated the activity of ce rtain antitumoral prin ciples in the halt ing of t he growth and spread ing of the prions, and inf ection / transmission have occ urred more fre quently in thos e who have con sumed the parts of the animal infected.

The fine tuning of t he prion as a weapon can only be a matter of time. In concluding t he overview of the risk of terrorism with biological weapons, it is useful to remember that t he discoveries in the field of bio-technology could possibly enhance, even in a short time, 'genetic weapons' aimed specifically to strike certain ethnic or racial groups, in which the phenotypical construction is preset for certain diseases. Working with the possibilities of' DNA mix ing' for purposes of increasing germ resistance to antibiotics and environmental stability, could produce remarkab le results, to a point where it would be difficult to ide ntify any antidotes against their pathogenic effects . As a confirmation of this, it is worth remembering that scientist Andrei Pomerantsev of the Microbiological Scientific Centre of Obolensk (Moscow) revea led how vaccinal prophylaxis and antibiotics used to immuni ze the United States soldiers against anthrax in the gulf war would have been fruitless if any 'strains ' dispersed by Iraq had been previo usly treated in a laboratory to enable them to produce the toxin (CEREOLISINA) that wou ld have made the anthrax spores resistant to the prophylaxis and t reatment mentioned above.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

research and chem ic al / tech nological deve lopment which continual ly stretches the l ist of toxic substances and the related mea ns of o ffens ive opt ions . __It is worth, however, listing some of t he most dange rous toxic substances , among which there are some which have already been used in acts of terrorism and are available to terrorists on the 'death market.'

Neurotoxic Tabun (GA); Sarin (GB); Neurotoxic Soman (GD) or GF; Nerve VX; Tamme lin Ester NOVICHOI<. A lethality is attributed to the above listed toxic substances far higher than to the ot her chemical substances war usab le in war / terrorism. Th e nerve based ones cause quick death by a neuromuscular block. These, d is covered by German scientists at the eve of World War II were te rmed 'German Gas' but were never used , probably for fear of reprisal. They were however perfected in the post- wa r years with increased lethality with the discovery of VX or Amit one or Novichok, chemical weapons developed by the ex -Soviet Union and of which little is k nown of their real chemical nature and therefore o f their eventual resistance to normal antidotes used fo r the poisoning of nerves (atropine, ossime, pir idost igm ina).

By consulting 'The Non Proliferation Review' (Summer¡ 2000, vol. 7 n 2) it is seen that the WMD Terro r is m Data Base cites 175 incide nt s with various agents; Blood poisoning Biological (95), Chemical (65), Nuclear (5), Radiological (n. 5), Unk nown (n. 5). There is, Hydrocyanic acid, cyanogen chloride are comalso, a comparison between the 687 'accide nts' pound chemicals used for t he executions in gas registe red from 1900 unt il February 2000 and chambers , t hey have a very low those from January 1 999 to survival rate in the outside February 2000. The ones that happened in this last short ' ' Examining the attacks environ ment, and cause death period represent over 2 5% of carried out up to now, it by asphyxiation. the total observed in the last emerges that those with 1 00 years. Examining all chemical agents are the Choking together the set of verified accidents in the t ime period, it most numerous,, Phosgene, Difosgene and emerges that those with Cloropicrina are chem ical chemical agents are the most weapons that were largely used during World War numerous; taking into account the wide range I. They act on the respiratory system causi ng of available toxic chemical mixtures, the low death by pulmonary oedema. cost and the relative easiness of transport and 'release' it's evident why it is preferred by terrorists . Historiography provides infinite exam Vesicants ples of recourses to the use of chemical weapons for war iterrorist that, as already men Mustard gas and lewis ite, are the definite protioned , are not discussed here. Which are the genitors of modern chemical arms. most dangerous chemicals weapons used by Discovered and studied as early as the 19'" centerrorists? It 's not easy to provid e an adequate tury, t hey have been used in various conflicts, answer given the wide possibilities available by

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(Mustard gas, in particular). chemical burns.

Death is caused by

Irritant and Incapacitating Of smaller intensity but with a wider use, especially as ant iris ing agents and with possibilities of being associated with other aggressive chemists to enhance any toxic features, the noteworthy ones are the Irritant Weapons (Sternutatories , Vomitatory, Urticant, Lachrymatory) , Psychochemical or Incapacitating (BZ, LSD, Psilocybin, Mesca lin) which are substances that are able to affect menta l and behavioura l functions.

ulate the mind, and possibly be employable as 'crews'.

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

T hough the statistics would imp ly one t o think that recou rse to the use of 'nuclear' arm s for terroris t purposes represents a n ot ve ry practical hypothesis in consideration of th e scarce number of 'registered events' state d above and above all to th e difficulty of t he management of radioactive mater ial, we n otice , however, a growing concern t o the possib le util ization of radioactive material by t hose , who in extreme situations, are ready to run t he r isks of using nuc lear means. T he most realis Observing the list of chemical weapons and t ic worry, at th e mome nt , is not a nuc lea r their toxic characteristics described above all devise being detonated , but th e hypothesis o f possible terrorist uses, the first impress ion is sabotage at nuc lea r systems an d de l iberate th e heavy risk of two factors coinciding ; impos env i ronmenta l radiological contaminat io n sible traceability and the difficulty in identifying (such as aqueducts , food etc) such hypothes is and putting in action countermeasures . For a are credib le whereas if one thinks about t he larger clarification we can take for instance , trafficking of contraband nuclear materia l from among others, 'the inciden t ' in the Tokyo metro such areas as the ex Soviet Union where the to highl ight how easy it can be to carry out a emerging Russian democracy has not bee n neurotoxi c attack, here it was l uck i ly less dan successful to control yet. To stren gt hen th e gerous than the classical chemica l war weapons practi ca l ity of the thesis of rad iatio n use by and mo re difficult to hand le and transpo rt , but te rro rists, it is good to keep in mind that sinc e it could have had an effect much more severe the 1970s 'acts of sabotage' have been regis and serious. Helping to ;iggr;ivate the relative tered, perpetrated by groups ranging fr om problem of risk of terrorist attack w ith chemical ' radical eco logists' ( the occupants of th e weapons, is t he psychological impact and the Atucha nuclear p lant - 1973), to at tacks fro m uncertainty of the recourse t o unknown 'new ETA against the p lants a nd syste ms o f mixtures' unknown and heightened letha li ty. In Lemovi t z, San Sebastian, Pamplona, San tande r . addition at times the press In th e 80 years that there has constitutes a so urce of worry been registering of attacks as it divulges news regarding ,, . . . a growing concern is there have be en attack s at the possible use of chemical the possible utilization of nuclear plants South Africa, weapons of unknown types, Belgium , radioactive material by Canada , whose effects seem to exceed Netherlands , Italy a n d the those who, in extreme situ - Philippines . Omitti ng t h e the imagination of science fic ations, are ready to run 'Chernobyl i nc ide nt', wh ich tion stories. In this context it is worth remembering the risks ... ,, does not seem attr ib utable to mystery which surrounds the ' terrorist action, but which forgotten of Ka i uga ' in clea rly highlighted the conseRussia, the l 7 people who, disappeared sud quences of the n u clear accidents anyway, we denly then reappeared after about 20 days , cannot forget, as regards the ex Soviet Un ion, with, on the temples , suspicious signs of electh e threat at the time by the Chechen leade rs t o trode application , while at mental level v isible strike Moscow (1 996) with n uclear waste easi damage to that area of the personality regard ly, claiming to own rad ioactive mate r ial left i n a ing affected memory, professional identity and quarter of the town. The examples cite d above day to day functioning. According to the ch ief reflect how the terrorist threat w ith radioact ive of the health facility of Kalu ga, Alexander mater ial hangs over all and how i mpo rta nt it is Livschez, these subjects w ere used as guinea to have a security cu rta in around re fle ct in g pigs for experiments, while the Russian scholar b ack the fea r of reprisa ls with a boomerang Lev Fiodorov asserts that t hey could have been effect back onto th em, even if it i s common subjected to psychotropic substances to manipopin ion that a nuclear accident could mo re

LOGOS - 66

probably occ ur during a regional war than as con sequ ence of an attack on a nuclear plant.

CONCLUSIONS T he w ide options at the dis posal of the terrori sts t o carry out attacks with weapons of m as s destruction, induces a need to con side r the gravity of this type of risk in con sideration of the re lative easiness of finding of these 'weapons' bo th on the 'used ' market, aimed at the autonomous production , and the possibility of homemade laboratory production with little resources in the basement of a house. The 'episodes' in the metros of Tokyo and more recently, of New York, Madrid and in Londo n ce rt ainly contributed to increase anxieties and fear as they offe r obvious demonstrations of the potential capacity of terro rists to perpetrate attacks neve r seen before. The difficu lty in recognizing NBC weapons in due time, the lack of specialized personnel, and con sequently, the lack of intervention of personnel until the final moment, like in the case of Tokyo, t he inappropriate response of the com munity to put in place logistic and sanitary resources, show the diffuse lack of preparation in facing this type of eventuality. As regards public and pr ivate health, it must unfortunate ly take an act that breakdowns such services in the light of such an NBC tPrrorist attack - when t he system is not prepared to face this type of problem as an everyday event - fo r it to be t aken seriously. The increase in the number of attacks with non - conventional arms and the co rrelated problem s induced the World Health Organization to review and bring up to date the pu blicat ion ' Sanitary aspects of the use of NBC w eapons' in order to give bigger prominence to the fundamental concepts of facing any health emergency from an attack with weapons of mass destruction of all types. The publication recommend s the strengthening of the cooperation of the various national structures interested in the prevention and discovery of NBC weapons and the countermeasures to be put in place and points out the importance of internatio nal assistance both internationally and from t hose organizations that are again st the supply the chemical arms in favour of a community against chemical attacks. Finally, with regards the Eu ropean Un ion strategy, the prob lems w ere discussed in the European Parl iament w hich expressed stiff condem nation towards terrorism, with the invitation t o carry out the 'Plan of action of struggle again st terrorism', reco mme nding, anyway, the maximum attention so that the answer to this struggl e is never out of proport ion and always inspired by the principles of 'multilateralism' which must remain the

Osama bin Laden broadcasting one of his delirious m essages .

dominant principle in the perspective of developing a comm on approach in regard to global security in which the United States and the European Union proceed w ith equal and balanced positions. T he task of identifying the dee p causes of terrorism and the strugg le against viol ation s of human rights only represent som e of the fu ndamental on which pivots the EU foreign poli cy, together w ith the efforts for the solution of the conflicts of the Near East where the t errorist phenomenon have ass umed worryi ng dime nsions . International cooperation is the only way today to stem t he 'terrorism phenomenon' which with its new and terrible dimensions has meant the distortion of the world religions Uohn Paul II - November 14th, 2002).

Ulderico Petresca Captain, Italian Navy, General Directorate for Political Affairs and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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-~-.....&..---PLANS AND RESOURCES The Army's point of view Since t he early eighties, the Italian Armed Forces have been operating in every corner of the globe (East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan) in peace- support and human itarian missions, of a size and duration never expe rienced during the whole Cold War. Together with the increasing commitments abroad , the Italian Defence, in the last twenty-five years, has carried out a slow but unceasing process of transformation of the existing Military Instrument into a new, relatively smaller, highly projectable and fully professional organization. Whether this historical process is about to end, or if the tendency towards a further quantitative reduction accompc;.nied by a more marked force integration is likely to continue, is the subject of a lively debate.

Title pages. An NH-90 Helicopter taking off from Viterbo Army Aviation Training Centre.

environment there has been a growing necessity t o be able to implement an in-depth defence, projected towards the exterior, also in distant and hardly accessible areas. In substance, what is needed is a proactive approach, because security in the new internat ional scenario cannot be based on ly on the principl e of dissuasio n, but must try to preve nt some types of threat that, once they are carried out, can become highly destructive and difficult to control, owing to their intrinsic characteristics. If it is true that the initial incentive to tran sformation originated from the inability of the Military Instrument, shaped on the req uirements of the Co ld War, to meet the new challenges to security, typical of globalization, is equally true that many m easures of the reforms of the Ar med Forces ,

Since the end of the Cold War the co ncept of national defe nce has been changing sig nificantly, especially owing to the impact of globalization on the world geo- strategic situation . Globalization, understood as thP end of the USUSSR bipolarism, has in fact reduced the need to defend mi litarily the national territorial integrity of the land, sky and sea frontiers from a large- scale attack. On the other hand, such term, meant as increase of the interdepend ence of a Country's welfare w ith the events that occur in remote areas of the world, requires today an active com mit ment, going as far as employing also the Milita ry Defence Function â&#x20AC;˘ Financial Sector (Trend) Instrument in order to help ME inc rease the stability in the geographical areas still !1500 unconnected to the interna21,2" tional system. Finally, global 1 - - - - - i 21.3 1 - - - - - i n.n 1 - - - - - - , - ----.- - - f ization seen as an easier access to materials and techzsoo 1-- - -i------1- - - + -- --+-----I n,.,. 0 INTERSERVI CE 21,!i'lli nologies that can be OAF 2000 1 - - - - - i n,z,s 1 - - - - - i 21,.,.. 1--- - - i employed also in destructive â&#x20AC;˘ N AVY ZI" ways, has widened the range 0 ARMY 1500 of the threats, to the point of allowing the transnational 1000 terrorist organ izations to ach ieve effects of mass 500 destruction and carry out 0 non - convention al attacks 2002 2003 2004 2005 against the Western world. Source: Additional Note to the Defen ce E stimated Budget Within this highly g lobali zed

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Defence Function - Investment Sector (Trend 1 always imp lemented in a M @ reductive se nse, are more 4000 imputable to a growing inadequacy of the financial 3500 resources availabl e for the Defence Function (1) than to an effect ive operational logic. In the new operational con 0 INTERSERVI CE text just outl ined , the pres D AF 2000 ent "vision" of the Defence â&#x20AC;˘ NAVY Staff find s strength and 1500 D ARMY value. The idea is to co nsider the Military In strument no 1000 more as a sum of separate and indepen de nt Services, 25,2')5 - - - - - l 24,_7'5 , __ __, lZJ'l5 ,___ _..., but as a unicum, where th e various com po nents synergi0 2002 200] 2004 2005 cally co ntri bu t e t o th e Source: Addition a l Note to t h e Def ence E stimated Budget achievement of the com mon good , w ithin the same j oi nt strategic design. According to this v 1s10n, the was devel oped in parallel by th e si ngle Se rvices , requirements of the empl oyment dictate t he prio reach of which tried to p rove t hat its assets were ities of the investme nts of Defence and therefore more im portant for th e interes ts of the Country define the boundaries withi n w hic h each Service vi s-a- vis the others ': of wh ichever nature these can develop its program me s and highlight its interests cou ld be, p revai ling ly conti nental or peculiarities. From the legi slative viewpo int, the maritime. It seems useful to po int out that durmentioned "S ummit Law" has coherently con ferred ing t he fifty years of the Cold War, the old con to t he Defence Chief of Staff not only the respontraposition between the "continental ist" incl inasibility of t he "planning , preparation and employment of the Armed Forces as a whole", but also the task of preparing, having heard the opinio n.<; of the Chiefs of Staff of th e Services, the ge neral financial planning and t he joint operat ional plans, defining the consequ ent technical - financial programmes. STI\TO MI\GGJOJ-?E DELLI\ DJFESI\ This law w anted to put an end to "a budget for Ill Rl:!!¡W ll'> UFFI< 'iO / 'll\NlFl< :--v.x ).\'E Gl{.W-:.N.,1\U{ each Se rvice", that is, the allocation o n a percentage bas is (quota) of the budget of Defence to each component of the Armed Forces, and introduce a centralized ad mi n ist r at ion that assigns t he resources of Defence directly to th e sing le programmes , approved at interservice level. The imple m entati on of the "Summ it Law", carried out grad ually, this year has reached a fundamental goal with the con clusio n of t he first Cycle of Defe nce Planning and t he draft of t he final document, t he so- called "Blue Boo k" (2) or ''Com patible Mod el". A document with a time horizon of l 5- 20 years, which will be reconsidered and updated every two years. T he m ethodologi cal process developed by Defence for facing these responsibilities envisages singling o ut the Force Objectives (capabilities to be acquired) and the connected action programmes (what to acquire and how), starting from t he m iss ions assigned to the Military MODELLO COMPATIBILE Instrument and proceeding by success ive steps , respecting a series of reference paramete rs. LIBRO BLU DELLA DIFESA It is a significant conceptu al evolution comVOLUME I pared to the time s when the ge neral planning

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tion of our Country and its â&#x20AC;˘cyc llc" THREAT strate9le SOVIET/RUSSIAN vision "m aritim e" o ne , has RS" remained somehow "frozen" I Majo r oppono nl curvo by the po te nt ial threat, ff I embodied by the Soviet airI la nd fo rces l aunch ed to I I attack the thresh o ld of I Gorizia, employing the comTWO CONTRA TING bat systems typ ical of the VISIONS 1 mas s produ ction of the TO BE HARMONIZf=D indu strial era. Can this comI parison bet ween "co nti nen/ tal ist" an d "maritim e" still exist? Or, on t he contrary, is it a co ntrapos it ion out of date, because t he requ ireCurvQ of mfhor contingencios: in the world ments of th e Country that YEARS the Militar y Instr ument is Curve of Manthorpe (modifi&d) called to meet can no more be c las sified in term s of "means" (land , sky or sea) where one operates The firs t step for determining the poss ible sceand the refore of air or land p latforms , but rather narios of intervention is the definition of a strateof "effects th at o ne w ants to ach ieve"? It is und eg ic picture shared at inte rservice leve l, whi ch niable, in fact, that the nation al interests have should be a coherent t echn ical- mi litary translation become global an d hardly detectable, and t he o f t he lines of the national strategy sanctio ned by abi l ity to at tain th e wanted effects i n the desired the Government. In a historical moment such as ways and times is les s and les s conne cted with a the present, th ere can be two very different stratefixed typology of platform, be it an air, land or g ic views, based on dia metrically opposed approaches. naval one . Duri ng the analysis of the m iss ion s assigned On the one side there is th e approach that w e could define as "antagoni7ing" (from a continuou s to th e Military In strument (3) t he Defence General Staff st ates that they are "laid down in looking fo r, waiti ng for or imagining an antagonist order o f strategic priority, which does not neco n an equal level), according to which conflicts essarily refle ct the pr ior ity of occurre nce of each occur cyclically and new symmetric adversarie s mi ssion". It is a key stat ement, because it i nt roar ise period ically in some part of t he world. On t he d uces a basic dist inctio n between t he absol ute other, t he re is the "pragmatic" approach , which is importance of a task (e .g . th e supre me duty of co ncentrated o n the challenges of the present, d efen d ing th e integri ty of t he nation al t erritory) essentially on a sequence of m inor / regional co n i .e. its strategic priority and t he re levan t probaflicts that can be set within a picture of security bi l ity of being ca lled to ca rry it o ut (in th is case, destined to evolve progressively towards higher that of hav ing to fi ght within the national borand higher levels of global stability. ders against an invad er / aggressor), t hat is , its Between these two positions, clearly extreme priority of occ urre nce. Th e plan ne r that has to and th erefore d ifficul t to sh are "in toto" , one integrate the abovementioned parameters mu st should loo k for the starting point of a route th at often em ploy the co ncepts of "worst-case sceco uld perm it t o find a suffici ently real isti c nario" or '' m ost de m anding ope ration" and strateg ic pictu re. It is not a me rely ph i lo soph ic "mos t likely operation ", which ca n be co mpared, problem, because the strategi c vision adopted resp ect ively , to the macro - scen a rio th at wi ll have direct conseque nces on t he co nc rete abso rbs the total ity of t he reso urces available defini tio n of t he most effect ive Military and to th e sce nario most li k ely to occ ur. T he Instrument: the more one moves towards a configuration of th e Military Instrument should strategic vision of a cycl ical type, t he more on e be th eoret ica lly gaug ed o n t he most dangert ends to favour a hig hly tec hnolog ical mi litary ou s / onerous sit uat ion realistical ly foreseeable instrum ent with a strong com bat capab ility, (the "War of the World s" (4) is out of the ques investin g in the acqui sition of very high - quality t ion), which, by defi n ition can includ e all the p lat forms . On t he co ntrary, a vision of a more others. It is obviously an uns us t ai nable choice. evolutionary kind will induce to dimens ion the Therefore on e m ust co nsider a more prag m at ic Mi l itary Instrument on the requ irements of th e approac h. present , in troducing the techn o logies acco rding 00

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In the general planning of forc es, one starts from the EFFECT to be to a botto m-u p approach obtained and not from WHO s hould achieve it. and ensu ring a sufficie nt quant ity of r esou rces for simultaneo us i nte rve nt ions in a number of peace- sup WHERE? WHEN? WHAT? port operations, or in operations i n respon se to a cri sis in m ed ium -low inten sity conflicts. Be it either "antag and only afterwards one conside rs "WHO?" onizing" o r "pragmat ic", nei ther strat egic v ision in its elf favo urs one or a no t her Service : the d iscrimi nation , in case, concerns transversally, on the one side high cost, single- f unction, highly technological systems, opti mi sed for high - inten sity em pl oyment and, o n the other, le ss expen sive, versatile system s of lim ited technological contents. Irres pective of the theory followed, the focus of Once the reference strategic pict ure is defined, it the int erventions, today and in the near future, is wi ll be possibl e to identify t he resu lts that the decidedly centred on land. Th is does not mean Military Instrument as a w hole is, and w ill be, that there w ill not be t hreats from t he sea or fro m called to achieve and then com bine the w anted the air, but rather that the era of th e batt les on the effects with the likely scenarios of intervention, sea between opposing fleets, or that of air battles, appraised acco rding to dangerousness and pro bseems very improbable in t he period we refer to . If ability, in o rder to ascertain which "d eliverers" are from t he "w he re" po int of view t he most important the most effective in terms of cost /effectiveness sce nario (6), i.e. most onerous and demand ing , is and ability to obtain the mentioned effect s. During t hat of a non - perm issive entrance in an area with this process one sho uld consider t h;it, in se lecting no access to the sea and with no airport infraa specific platform, one mu st not merely ado pt structure, at t his point the sea becom es a stratecriteria of capability and cost / effectiveness but gic doorway into the battlespace and an area of will also have to make an evaluation between the operational deployment rather than a battlefield in need to protect his forces and that of reducing the itself. collateral effects t o a minim um , be they physical Having acce pted that t he "where" will be main ly o r perceptive . the land , w e can now proceed to the evaluation of According to the most recent doctrin es on the the "what" and ask ourselves what effects we w ill so - called "Effect Based Operat ions (EBO)" (5), by be called to achieve : to destroy or to build, ju st to "effect" on e mean s t he physical or cognitive con mention two exp lanat ory extremes? Probab ly sequen ce of on e or more mil itary actions . The both, in a co ntroversial context marked by high precise definition of the effect to be achieved is intensity islands, by the presence of opposing facverified by an swe ri ng the questions "Where?" tions, defenceless citizens, hostile elements and "What7" "When7" (in term s of t ime avai lable and very vari able t hreats in terms of degrees of symtimeliness of th e requ est) before being able to metry and recourse to non-convention al weapons. estab lish "Who?", also w ith regard to t he respon In t his scenario, whatever the effect pursued , the sible Service. presence of man will be v ital, bot h the physical There are confli ct ing op inions on "whe re" the presence, i. e. t he so- called "boots on the ground", Military In strument wi ll be called to ope rate in t he and th e log ical o ne in every decision - makin g coming years. Today, one of the most reliable theproce ss , i.e. k eeping the so- called "man in the ories is that there is an area disconnected (iso latloop". ed) from the rest of the wo r ld , which spreads from The last quest ion that we have to answer in order Africa to South East Asia, going th rough th e to co mplete th is analysis of th e effects is "when". Balkans, Central Caucasus and t he Midd le East, One must ask within what times should we be able where t he "globali zed" Countries w ill have to to intervene? One hour, one month, one year? How intervene more and mo re frequently in orde r to long shall we have t o exert t he effort? In this case progress ively reduce t he areas t hat are a res idu al the answer is not univocal. Reaso nably there is the source of international instability. need to have a capab ility of intervention t hat may

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be graduated in time and duration. The f undamental novelty is that the speed of the answer is no more as im portant as t he ab ility to achieve the w anted effects at t he want ed moment; in other words, the very con cept of readiness as defined in the NATO handbooks has changed after the disappearance of the Soviet th reat. Keeping all th e assets on t he alert is no more as fundamental as to have the proper assets for t he wid est range of intervent ions at the right time. He nce the need to launch an attack with special forces against a terrorist st ructure with in a f ew hours from its detection, or t o conduct a continuative, months- long air campaig n, started only after the methodical dep loyment o n the gro und of the nece ssary assets , or to engage fo r years in a mi ss ion in a depressed area, rotating the conting ents every four / six m onths . Once the appraisal of the effects is concluded, o ne can draw a first se r ies of co nc lusi ons which synthesize the vision of the Army as regards the future national Military Inst rument: versatile, polyvalent, proj ectable, prevaili ngly " land -and man ce ntric". Many of the character istics pointed out could seem aimed at emphasizing the land sys tems: t his is only partially true : actually they keep their meaning even if re ferred to the Navy or the A ir Force. That is , once again we do not want t o refer to the characteristics of a sing le Service, but to the comprehens ive characteristics of the instrument. Actually what we maintain is th e need to develop capabi lities and assets, easily projectable, optimis ed so as to ac hieve effects o n the ground and able to carry out the widest range of possible tasks in the most diversified envi ronments. T he ample recourse to technology should not jeopard ize t he centrality of the soldier and his ability to give a se nse of humanity to often - inhu mane situatio ns. Besides obvious cons iderations about the ability to achieve the objective (th e stand-off weapon could be the only available) and the safeguard of human lives (in t he sen se of not uselessly expos ing one's men to ri sk), the remote intervention is usually perce ived in such a negative mann er by th e population living in t he area of the operations and by public opinion at large, that it has repercus sions on the entire mi ssion and on the very secu r ity of the units that sooner or later will have to operate in t he Theatre. On the contrary, an effect achieved t h rough a contact intervention, albeit tactically mo re com plex, has more probabilities to be met w ith a "good degree of acceptation", fo r it offers the image of human beings who act in a "human" context and not machines operated from a distance, and therefore "inhumane". Once completed th e examinat ion of the effects to be ach ieved for each of the scenar ios identified

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in the geo-strategic picture of reference, we must now obtain an ideal mix of capabilities and com pare it with th e fin anc ial resources available , according to t hree fu ndam enta l parameters: accept able r isk, significance and occurrence . In this delicate phase the guiding criteria of the evaluation wil l have to be those t hat reward the polysce nar io capability, red ucing the mono-sce nario ones to t he indispensab le m inimum an d , above all , avoiding the duplicat ion of the assets that exp ress the same capa bility. It is a "painfu l" p rocess, because it t ends to li m it the internal fle x ibility of each Service, maki ng it actually depende nt on the others, but it perm its to obtain a real economy of t he forces and adopt an authentic interservice approach to t he operatio ns. And it is at t h is point that a fi r st- class i nd ependent variable enters triumphantly in the w orld of "pure" pla nn ing: the assumed budget of Defe nce. The ava ilabi lity of fin anc ia l resou rce s for the length of ti me cons idered by t he planni ng introduces an element of strong realism and compe ls to ass ign a priority to eac h programme o f action , in o rder to m aximis e the enti re resu lt of the Mil itary Instrument and not the effectiveness of its single components. In short, t he bodies most in te rested at A rmy Staff leve l, are the General and Financial Planni ng Div ision, and the General Offi ce fo r Plan ni ng, Programs and Budget for the General Staff of Defence . The comparison hPtween reqLlirements and possibil it ies s hould consid e r the sca rcity of the reso urces (poss ibiliti es), which bri ng s abou t a strong cor,:,petition among t he programmes, and the ce ntral izatio n of the au thority fo r gene ral fin ancia l p lann ing and te chn ica l- fin an cial programmes on th e Defence Chi ef of Staff, a fac t that has actual ly shifted the competit ion for such resources from within each Service to an interservice level. If one co nsiders, moreover, th at many pro gramm es m ust have a lo ng - term development, owing to the amount of invest ments req uired , one understands how the co m pet itio n can become m o re and more compl ex . Wit h the i nterservi ce central ization of t he financial p lanning, it could appear that t he Army (like th e other Services) m ay have be come a m ere Expenditure Pl ann ing Body; actu ally t he p ropositional f unction recog nized to it by the Summit Law (7) sti ll req u ires t hat it should do its utm ost to promote the approval of the program mes d eem ed esse ntial for the preparat ion of the land co mponent and dema nd an equ itab le application of the p lanni ng standards, once they have been defined by Defence. It is a matter of perform ing not only a legitimate but a rightful fun ct ion , for it does not go beyond the l imits assigned t o Defence bu t safeguards the central

ambit of each Service and i n the com parison with. the other Service s, and per mits to avoid tw o typical excesses of the milit ary instit utions: on the one hand, that of dimensioning itself on the present, ig noring t he pos sible f utu re and on the othe r t hat of- dimen sion i ng itse lf in a se lf- referential w ay, according to a vision of the future not supported by t he available indicato rs. T he Army' s po licy of general planning is therefore that of investing the resources available acco rding to a v ision mo re "p rag mati c" tha n "antagoni zing", so as t o ove rcome any rig id d ivision into compartments of the Force and critica lly appraise every pro gramme in terms of polyvalence of the capabi lities and significance of the em ploym ent . Giuseppe Maggi, Major General, Chief, General and Financial Planning Division, Army General Staff

An Alp ine paratrooper in A fgha nistan.

capab i lit ies (the so- cal led co re business) of t he organ ization. Hence t he req uest of the Army to do away with an y resid ual d iscrepancy between t od ay's sce na rios of em ploy me nt , and th ose fo reseeab le in t he medium- long t erm, and the all ocation of sign ificant fi nancial resou rce s for the acqu isi t ion o f t he we apon systems most su itab le (for quality, b ut especially for quantity) for f ighti ng high - inten sity '-Ym met ri cal conflicts, w hose o cc urrence, i n t he next l 5- 2 0 year s, is con side red low. T he Ar my deems it appropriate to ad opt a prevailingly prag matic st rategic vi sion, which should lead to gauge the military instrument on the scenarios of inte rve nt ion m ost pro bable in the coming 15- 20 years , which m ost likely w ill be ve ry sim ilar to the present ones. Wherever the threat is today , and wherever we envisage it wil l be tomo rrow, we m ust intervene with t he m ost suitable instrumen ts. Vis-a- vis t his conviction , for various reasons, among w hich t he parochial ism of the sin gle Serv ices, the com plexity of t he system of longterm investments and the requirements of the Defence ind ustry, t he t rue compet it ion about t he resources available is ve ry often developed for a type of th reat scarcely coherent with t he foreseeable scenarios. T he principle of cohe rence as key stone in the reali zation of the Mi litary Instrument, must take into account not only t he structural coherence bet w een the resources and t he configuration of the instrument and of the internal coherence between quantitat ive and qualitative di mension, but it must also con sider the coherence betwee n t he scenarios assumed and t he typology of t he capabilities to be deve lo ped. This principle finds naturally it s app licat io n both in t he

NOTES (1) The Defe nce Budget is divided into fo ur "macroitems of expenditure", the actual Defence Function, the Police Function, the e x ternal Functions and the Provisional Pensions. (2) Envisaged by the directive SMD- PG- 001, the "Blue Book" of Defence translates the politico-military and strateg ic- mi litary plan s into pro gram matic objectives of force and into action programmes for the configuration of the Mil itary Instrument. (3) The mi ssions of t he Military Inst rument are: "Defe nce of the State", "Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Spaces", "Contribut ion to t he real ization o f peace and internat ional security", "Su pport and specific tasks" (Strategic Concept of the Chief of the Defence General Staff). (4) "The War of the Worlds", renowned sci- fi novel by Herbe rt Geo rge Wel ls publish ed in 189 8 , where Ear thlings must fight agai nst Martians who, thanks to their f uturistic lethal weapon s, start a r eal extermi nation of mankind. (5) EBO: Effect Based Operation s. (6) Relevance is a p arameter referrin g to t he technological, t raining, readi ness and capabil ity levels re qu ired for carrying out a mission. (7) The Service Chiefs of Staff propose the programme regarding their respective Service for the interservice general preparation.

From a presentation made in Venice on October 6, 2005 by the Chief of the General and Financial Plans Division of the Army General Staff, during a symposium organized by the Italian Navy on the subject "Italy: its maritime character and the naval dimension of the military instrument".

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-." .

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS Easy victories between dream and reality A strategic-operational methodology is the subject of exhaustive and debated stud ies in the international context. Here we report its main points, underlining some aspects that could limit its full applicabi lity.

The so lution of crises, increasingly characterized studies also in our Co untry, where EBOs are takby asymmetric situations and the inevitable coning root w ith force in v iew of a future adoption sensus of the media and the international commu by NATO, where , on the other hand , there are nity, has led to develop a methodo logy that prom st ill severa l doubts. By also making recourse to ises success by relying on the attainment of effects recent mi litary operations, in practice we will try (effects - based) rather than on the traditional anni to point out that this new conception appears to hilation of the enemy's operational capabilities be much more mature than the technical and (destruction - based). profess ional capabilities that would be neces This was the opinion of David A. Deptu la, one sary for its fu l l and effect ive implementation. of Genera l Norman Schwarzkopf's planners during operation "Desert Storm", thus launching the fortunate concept of Effects-Based Operations THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT (EBO), which today is the subject of exhaustive and debated international stud ies . Although One shou ld have on hand Armed Forces inteacknowledging the substantial \:jrct l ec..l rrurn the intellectual, soundness of an approach operational , organizationa l , aimed at overcoming asym' ' The most recently formu- doctrinal and technical v iewmetric operat ional situations, capab le of making the lated strategic conception point, where skil l opposes will, systemat ic use of effects the for dealing with internation - fundamental element of p lan where different - if not diaal crises is based on the ning and carrying out mi litary metr ically oppos ite - basic values clash, with this writing need to have Armed Forces operations. Effects-Based we wish to contribute to the integrated from the intellecOperations belong to this conpresent discussion, po inting tual, operational, organizatext and therefore could be out some aspects, which, in tional, doctrinal and techni - defined as fo llows : "A process our opinion, could limit its full for obtain ing a desired strateappl icabil ity. In fact, if th is cal point of view ,, g ic resu lt or effect on the methodology is effectively enemy through the synergic confirmed at st rateg ic level , and combined act ion of the some doubts emerge on the operational p lane, entire range of the mi litary and non - mi litary and especial ly on the tactica l o n e, where the capabi lities, at every level of the conflict". In causal relation between m ilitary actio n and short, the effect is the phys ica l, functional or effect is often i ndire¡ct and ambiguous. psycho logical event, or outcome, resulting from Fu rthermore, the professiona l background of specific mil itary and non - m ilita ry actions. In subthe personnel in charge of the re levant eva luastance the achievement of the effects is the result tion process does not seem adequate and su it of joint mil itary, pol itical, diplomatic and eco ed to the requ irements, just as the abse n ce of a nom ic actions carried out through the analysis of standard and agreed - upon termi n ology , the goal, the avai lable means and, in the final together with the multiply ing defin itions of the analysis, of the most effective manner of us i ng related concept, appears to hamper a unitary those means fo r achieving the wanted ends . Such developme nt. In th is sense, the fo llowing con an approach necessarily imp lies the capab ility of side rat ions intend to pave the way for further understanding and represent ing the enemy as a

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compos ite and evolving system, guided by complex human interact ions , rather than seeing it as a simp le who le of objectives. The aim is to focus the operat ions in a mo re cohere nt manne r. The pri mary need is to know the enemy in its deepest essence th rough the analys is, amo ng many others, of its cu ltu re, h istory,- rel igion and its pol itical, economic and social interactions and inte grations and of the size and operational capabil ities o f its Armed Fo rces . Only after t h is kind of introspection can t he objectives be found and selected and, as a consequence , also the appropriate instruments for ach iev ing the des ired effects can be singled out. According to this methodo logy, pr im a ry targets are not on ly the Armed Forces or the enemy power centres, but also all the other actors, GOs and NGOs, mass-med ia, allied and neutral Countries, which all act, d i rect ly or indi rect ly , wit hin the context of the system. The combined and concentrated employment of al l the forces on the f ie ld, d ifferent but comple mentary of necessity, t he inte rd ependence of t h e tact ical and operat ional objectives for

Title pages.

A NA TO /ta lo-French patrol in the Afghan desert. Below.

"Ariete" combat tank.

ach ievi ng the strateg ic goal, could psycholog ically weaken the adversary from the very beg inning of a tense situat ion, stopping or sapp i ng its w il l to act, thus avoid i ng the use of f9rce. Should t his be i neffective, the subse quent actions would be simulta neously focused only on the v ital po ints of the enemy system, hindering, paralysi ng or alter ing its reaction capab ilities, shortening the length of the confl ict and , as a consequ ence, reduc ing human losses and mi litary expenses . Therefore, apparently, a decrease in risks and costs wou ld ben efit the economy in terms of necessary resources , which seem to be the factors that most i nfl uence the support and consensus of the "Country system" or the internatio nal commun ity. In fact, t h ese prove to be the predomi nant elements that suc h methodology intends to favour, a lbeit imp lement i ng the strategi c d irec tive that governs the mi litary ope ratio n. In an cient h i story t here are many examples o f this approach. Many scho lars of the time already t heorized the plans and the conduct of mil itary operations on the basis of the des i red effects . Sun Tzu , the Chinese theoretician, emphas i zed that t h e use of force had to be t he last resort : the capable ones in w a r subj ugat e the ar my of the enemy with no batt le, and maintained that the best po licy in war i s that of taking an intact State . Likewise, Prussian General Von

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Clausewitz, wh ile stressing th e significance of one ' s own mi lit ary capabilities and the phys ical destruction of the enemy forces, sti l l acknowled ged t he im portance of b ei ng able to use every "element of power", a nd there fore not military fo r ce alo ne , to achieve the desired effects. In this sense, rather than concentrating on t he destruction of the physical and opera tional capability of the enemy, the EBOs focus t hei r attention on d ifferen t and more impo rtant critical matte rs aimed at striking the heart of the enemy, mak ing it perceive t he incontrovertibil ity or the impossibility of oppos i ng something invincible, or at any rate far superior, which does not leave room to even the mos t extreme resistance . Th us , n um bers , availabil it y of aircraft , ships and tank s lo se importance and are replaced by the capa bility of selecting and str i king the targets that wil l i nev itab ly push t he enemy to the l im its at first, and then fo rce it to surrender, permitting , in the final ana lysis, t o ac hieve one's own mi l ita ry and political objectives. Therefore it rema in s t heoret ically still val id Von Clausewitz' concept, according t o which war is an instrument of pol itics, where the aim is t o hit t he ': : 1- points and t he morale of t he enemy rather than destroying its military capabi lity.

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EFFECTS IN PREVIOUS OPERATIONS A fi rst EBO- type approach can be fo un d i n t h e Anglo-American debate aimed at determ ini ng t he best targets fo r t he air campaign against Hitler' s Germany in WWII. T his occu rred precise ly during the plann ing of th e bombings and t u rn ed out to be disastrous , leading to a seri es of mistakes t hat cost an unnecessary waste of energies and resource s without achieving the fixed goal s. In fact, t he allied planners had init ially decided to concentrate the bombings on the industries producing ball bearings, be ing convinced that this would im pair th e p roduct ion of German combat airc raft and thus more easi ly obtain the wished air superiority. The ai r raids, o n the co nt rary, turned out to be extremely costly an d ineffective , forcing t he Allies to con centrate the bombings di rectly on t he aircraft factories, but also in t his case the cost was very high and the desired End State was not achieved. Actually Germany re ac hed it s highest production of com bat aircraf t preci se ly in that period, and the Allies conquered air superiority on ly t hanks to t he experi ence and sk il l of t heir pilots. In sub-

An MG 42,/ 59 in a patrolling operation in Afghanistan.

stance, Germany's productive capability and the aga in st Saddam Huss e in , th e t echno lo g ical laboriousness of its people were underestimatsuperiority of the United Stat es was clearly ed, making clear to the analyst's eyes how comshown from the very beginning. Neverthe less, o n plicate cou ld be to apply and EBO approach to an several occas ions, the less costly - if not down rj_ght archaic - Iraqi countermeasures made operational campaign of that size. The present appeal of the effects - based operathings d ifficu lt for the sop histicated American tions is probably due to the recent technological technologic system, and t he analysts had not fo reseen this. In fact , the combined conduct of developments , which could allow the electronic and satellite surveillance of the territory, the realaircraft and m issile attacks, not on ly on the Armed Forces but also on the strategical ly most t ime continuous co llection and process of information, and the adoption of aiming systems and val uab le Iraqi targets, rap idly weakened th e enemy, which, as a co n seq u ence , los t its "smart mu nitions" capable of intervening rapidly strength and will to fight, b ut the campa ig n and without errors. Thus, technology would facilitate the detection of the enemy's vital or weak turned out to be extremely costly in t erm s of points, permitting a full application of the EBOs, loss es of mate ria ls and human lives. The exten i.e. to strike only where deemed necessary for sive recourse to m ilitary technology was certai n achieving the effects wished by the plans. ly the fu ndamental element of success, but the Furthermore, t his would make easier to resolve resu lts obtained did not perfect ly match the mi litary operations in a shorter time and cons iderplan s. Also on this occasio n , the EBO methodol ogy did not succeed in gett ing over the obstacles ably lim it the loss of human lives and materials. of the app licat ion of its schemes to real \.'var sitActually, the large-scale employment of cuttinguations. edge technology not always did favo ur the attainment of the w ished results , at least not in a relatively short time. During ope ration "Desert Storm" conducted against Iraq after the invasion of A PROMISE OF EASY VICTORIES Kuwait, Commanders noticed that their analysts were only able to assess the physical dimensions The Officers of the U.S. A ir Force were the main of the results but, on the contrary, found great d if supporters of the EBO notion , which they defined as a process aimed at obtaining ficulties in forecasting t he psya strateg ic resu lt on t he enemy cho logical consequences. Effects - Base d Operat ions ' ' The current technological - the effect - through the syn ergic, mu ltipli cative and cumu were also utilized in the mili- developments permit eleclative app lication of military tary campa igns conducted in tronic and satel lite surveil and non-mil itary capabi lities, Bosnia and Kosovo, w ith "surlance of the territory, con - at tactica l, ope rational and gical" bombings carried out by tinuous gathering and pro- strategic level. t he all ied aircraft. Even thou¡g h In the concrete case of the NATO was victorious in the cessing of information in end , there were remarkable real time and adoption of war in Iraq , EBOs were precise and surprise attacks fro m great problems in Kosovo, besides sighting and smart- ammu those caused by Milos evic, who nition systems capable of dist ances, with Cruise missiles and Stealt h bombers, aimed at was conducting a repressive intervening rapidly and the "nodal points" of the enemy policy. Th ree factors heavily "subsystems' systems". This influenced t h e p lanning of the without errors , , should mean hit the heart and conflict: the lack of a long brain and paralyse the body of term st rategy, the initial want of a clear idea about the targets to be hit and the the enemy, without cutting off beforehand th e arm that defends it. Fo rmer Marine General Pau l Van political interferences in the decision-mak ing Riper was one of the protagonists of exe rcise process of the military. Ge nera l Cla r k , "M illennium Challenge", which simulated an attack Commander- in - Chief of the operat ions, on on Iraq, employing precisely the Effects Based Marc h 25, 1999 said that all had been carefu lly planned and the Serbian resistance would be Operations, testing the innovations theorized by the doctrine. Van Riper took on the role of "Enemy subdued within three days of air raids, and Com mander" and with his traditional met hod Milosevic wou ld be forced to yie ld to NATO's immed iate ly succeeded in sinking (theoretically) requests. Clark was clearly proved wrong by 16 ships of the U.S. fleet st ationed in the northern facts : as a matter of fact the operatio n s went on for eleven weeks, showing the val iant resistance wate rs of the Gulf, but during the exercise he \.vas forced to quit, si nce the "U.S. Commander'' refused of the Serbian army, whic h had bee n unde rval t o admit that his military campaign had failed. Van ued. As regards the air offensive of the Coalition

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these actors . Bes id es, we should not forg et that an Ripper claimed that all the innovations introduced exhaustive intelligence activity never existed and by EBOs are only slogans or little more. In the probably never will; eve n ifwe could obtain a thordevelopment of these new employment concepts, o ugh knowledge of the battlefield we wou ld neve r one should consider the various conditioni ng be able to full y foresee al l possible countermearestraints and focus on, and make t he most of, t he sures in t he mind of our ene my. Finally, if one capability of producing "results" or "effec ts" considers the objective difficulty that land operaesse ntial for achieving the objectives. For this reations have in order to develop as "surgical ly" as the so n the military instrument must be doctrinally, air ones, t he med ia's capabi lity of influenci ng the procedurally and technologically prepared fo r the masses, the instabil ity of political interactions, t he integrated employment of all the available means , easily-influenced political actors and t he unpreso as to favour t he attainment of the immediate d ictability of international relat ions, it can be easeffects, functional to the reali zation of the desired ily seen t hat t he con cept itself appears to b e resu lts. something st ill far from t he present Armed Forces ' With the promise of being a winning inst rument reality. The new concept stresses t he need to comin the conduct of milit ary operations , the EBO co nmand A rm ed Forces red uced in numbe r but faster, cept is now the subject of inten se studies by t he more flex ible and more specialized and, whi le international military community. On the other proposi ng a sharp red uct ion of th e expenses for hand, Commanders and their staffs at ope rational traditional weapon systems, envisages a parallel level need more t han a theoretical concept. They increase in investments for information-gathe rin g need a codified evaluation method that can be tech no log ies , t elecommunications, sighting and used during the execution of a military operatio n. precis ion ammunition . A ll this im plies eno r mous Furthermore , it seems necessary t o radically costs and therefo re , at least con sidering the change a whole cultu ral and professional legacy resources allocated at present to the Armed that characterizes the Land Forces, co ns isting of Forces, it is d ifficult to reali ze . terms such as destruction and neutral izatio n, If the most rece nt conceptions - and the EBO linked to the pr in ciple of "cause - effect", and doctrin e is t he first among them - seem to provide t herefore to t he need of quantifyi ng the results on t he best sol ut ion to the strat eg ic p robl ems the ground. The EBO concept, o n t he cont rary, expected in the imm edi ate f uture , they also presintroduces new terms t hat define th e effects in ent several risks. In th is sense, if on the one hand non -physical di mensions, such as , for example, to the position of its supporters, who emphasize t he "persuade", "deceive", "threale ri" ariu "infl uence". military advant ages, inc lu d ing the poss ibility of This terminology is not easily "digested" by t he rapid succe ss and lim ited damages in t he widest present Commanders and their staffs, who have meaning of the word, seems j ustified , on the other shown a scarce capability in evaluatin g the effects, the necessary econo m ic and human resou rces do especially as regards the psychological dimens ion. not seem to be suffic ient at t he Obvious ly, w ithout this capabilmome nt , neither in quantity nor ity t he EBO concept is not in quality. The Iraqi confl ict is a adherent to the real ity of the ' ' A revIs1on of the Cadres' significant example of how battlef ield. A revis ion - if not a training process is therefore forecasts, infalli ble o n paper, revolution - of the Cadres ' advisable, with a course of when it came to t he crunch, trai ning process is therefore necessary, or at least advisable, studies that give priority to turned o ut t o be disastrous, and with a course of stu d ies t hat the capacity to analyse a how hazardo us was the estigive priority to t he capacity of whole series of data, which mate of costs and benefits. On analysing a whole series of do not belong only to the t h e basis of t he rec ent not exciting results, t oday's soc iety data, which belong not o nly to military dimension, but also is not w ill ing to pay such huge t he military d imen sion but also to the social, psychological and to the social, psychological costs . Even the American pub li c and economic aspect , , opinion, which had accepted econom ic ones. This is neces with pat r iot ic spirit the war i n sary for systematizi ng th e Afghanist an an d Iraq, is now who le batch o f fundamental changing di rection , after realizi ng how high an d information needed to tackle the evo lution of t he dramatic was the waste of money and human lives. evaluation process. Moreover, a complete osmos is w ith t he government agencies cannot but favou r t he flow of t he information needed in order to CONCLUSIONS implement a successful EBO, but at the same time can turn out to be an obstacle to its app licability, Desp ite the p romise of becomin g an in struconsidering t he not always easy interaction w ith

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ment for easy victorie s, the EBO con cept is actually noth ing new. If we look at the past , we can find coun tless examples of operations con ducted following an approach that today we could define as EBO - type . Proba b ly , a lready at the time of the Legions, the Romans planned and foug ht wh ile trying. to carry out effect based operatio ns. But recent h istory h as also proved how difficu lt it is to fully apply this concept : t here are too many unpredictable variables in a modern operationa l t h eatre , where the interests at stake are manifold and very different. In practice it is a meth odology that goes well beyond the strictly m il itary operations and imp li es re cou rse to eve ry "element" o f natio nal power. It enta il s furthermore t he abil ity t o for esee, contro l and achieve the

des ired effects and, at the same time, be ab le to adapt to the circumstances and seize the r ight opportunities. Commanders and staffs at all levels must be able to think in an "effect-centric" manner, and not ju st tr'y to understand the intent ion of the two higher levels but, on the contrary, they must have a clear vis ion of the strategic targets , such as national security o r the m ilitary campaign as a whole. Sim ilarly , they must know all the facts neces sary for assessing the effects, in orde r to clearly understand the reasons of success or failure of a give n operation. Th e interdependent and integrated nature of the EBOs emphasizes the importance of its leaders , in the widest mean ing of the word , who must be able to gras p, instantaneous ly and continuously, the ge neral picture of the situation, and appraise th e potential i mpact of a certain decision on the achievement of a planned effect. Furthermore, the Comman ders and their staffs must be able to operate in situations of u ncert ainty, visua li ze and thin k i n a dynamic , and n ot always steadfast manner, conceiving w ith continuity any poss i bl e prospect, making sure at the same t ime that the actions carried out for the attainment of a certa in result do not cause un in tenti onal and unfores ee n indirect effects . Besides a revolutionary chan ge of mentality, a solid "e xpe rt ise" in nat ional and international po licy, dip lomacy and econo my, the m ilitary leaders nePrl c1 trai ning based mainly on the student rather than on the teac her, and must be capable of man ag ing situations where complex ity i s imm anent and not removed. Moreover, everything must be supported by a clear term inology and clear defin itions, an d by a Command-and Control syste m possibly deriving from a structural reorganization and c apab le of manag ing th is very complex process. In this se nse, at present at least, the concept can find an effective app li catio n mainly at strateg ic leve l where, i n practice , there are all the necessary in struments, albeit to be really effective - th ey should always be employed in a coord i nated, integrated and simultaneous manner. In concl usion, the EBO concept is perhaps more mature t han the capabi lities required to implement it, even though one cannot "a priori" igno re th at to overcome the diffi cul ties we just t ri ed to out line may not neces sarily be a "mi ssio n imposs ible".

Maurizio Ricco Lieutenant Colonel, Headquarters, RRC

A "Bersagliere" on surveillance duty.

Giovanni Manca Captain, Headquarters, RRC

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URGENT QUEST An important exercise in the United Kingdom "Combat identification" is becoming the fundamental capability for conducting effective operations in modern scenarios, avoiding "fratricidal fire" and using at best the available weapon systems. In this rapidly developing sector, international initiatives and activities are multiplying, with the constant and active participation of our Service.

vided by the identification system and to operate effectively in interservice /multi national coalitions. T he awareness of the complex ity of the operational scenarios and t he present lack of effective id entification systems caused the reappearance (in alarm ing proportions) of "fratricidal fire" and prompted the int ernatio nal commu nity and NATO to g ive a decisive impu lse to t he development of t hi s capab ility. A further boost to the develo pme nt of "Com bat ID instruments" came from the evol ution of tech nology and doctrine, which created the need for capabil ities aimed at real izi ng t he situation o n the ground (the so-called situation awareness), which should be conferred to the future digitalized force s, characterized by a significant increase in combat effective ness. Thus the programme "Coal ition Combat Identification-Advanced Concept Coalition Title pages and above. Combat Identi fication (CCID ACTID)" was born The "Oardo" infantry combat vehicle. under t he aegis o f t he NATO Allied Command for Transformation (NATO- ACT) and t he US Joint Force Command (USJ FCOM), and was joined by Exercise "Urgent Quest", which was conducted the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Australia, at the Salisbury Pla in range in the United Canada , Denmark , France , Germany and Kingdom from September 1 3 to October 1 0, Sweden . The aim w as to develop iden tifi cati on 2005 , has been a fundamental t echn ol o gies suitab le for step toward s the achievement operational e mp loyment in of a concrete "Combat ' ' Italy joined with conviction interservice and multinationa l Identification" capabi lity. enviro nments, with special This apparently intuitive term this programme ... in order to reference to gro und-t ogive concrete answers to the ground and air-to-g round describes a capability that perm it s to achieve the fast and urgent questions posed by ap p li cations, characterized by accurat e charact erization of the the repeated occurrence of a hig h number of losses. forces on the battlefield , with incidents of fratricidal fire ,, Italy, in particular, j oine d particular ref erence to t he sow ith conviction th is very prag cal led "friend ly" ones. Therefore , mat ic program me , in order to it is not a matter of a single, g ive concrete "answers" to the particular techno logy (or combinat ion of technolo" urgent questio ns" imposed by the repeated gies) but inc lud es doctrine, tactics, techniques and occurrence of incidents of "fratricidal fire". procedures (TTP) as well as training of person nel , The idea of carryi ng out a real exercise on the in ord er t o adequately e xploit t he capabilities proground within t he CC ID ACTD prog ramme was

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DESCRIPTION OF "COMBAT IDENTIFICATION (CID) TECHNOLOGIES

Active identification systems BTID (Battlefield Target; Identification Device): system of identifi~ation of "friend" vehicles , on mil limetric radio waves,

based on an "interrogation and answer" mechanism. A vehicle equipped with a BTID in a "transponder" vers ion, if interrogated by another vehicle with BTID (in an interrogator version) produces an automatic reply of a "friend" type. Thus the crew of the vehicle equipped with the interrogator /transponder can discriminate a vehicle equipped with a simi lar system from one not equipped with the device. In case of interrogation of a vehicle not equipped with the BTID system, the automatic response is "Unknown". If a "friend" vehicle equipped with BTID system is within the range of the weapon system of the vehicle aimed at a potential target, the BTID indicates "Friend in Range". The BTID produced by the various nations, albeit different from each other, have the characterist ic of recognizing each other. RBCl(Radio Based Combat Identification): technology developed in the U.S., based on a modified SINCGARS Combat Radio, whose software performs the interrogation - answer function. It can be either portable or ve hicular. RF TAG (Radio Frequency Tag): "air to ground" identification system, produced by SPECTRA. It can automatically answer the radar signal of an aircraft with a modulated signal in the Ku and X band, which appears on the radar display of the aircraft. OCIDS (Optical Combat Identification System): optical identification systems based on an "Interrogator / Receiver device using an "eye safe" laser that can be mounted on the rifle of soldiers on foot or on vehicles.

Passive Identification Systems JCIMS Uoint Combat Identification Marking System):"Combat Identification Panels" (CIP) thermal panels, and ''Thermal Identification Panels (TIP) for "ground to ground" and "air to ground" passive identification (through night- vision systems) of land vehicles, and infrared lights for omnidirectional signalling of platforms and personnel (Phoenix IR Light).

thus born: it was to be "Urgent Quest" (the name is not casual), the key event of t he whole programme, where equipment and forces of the part icipating nations , provid ed with identifi cation systems, were to conduct joint operations, simulating operational and environmental conditio ns as realistic and demanding as possib le (two-party exercises in real time and "live"). The objective of this exercise was to assess the "M ilitary Uti lity" on the ground of the followi ng solutions (technologies combined with procedures of e mployment) for Combat Identification (see Table): • Battlefield Target Identification (BTID); · Radio Based Combat Identification (RBC I); • Radio Frequency (RF) Tags; vOptical Combat Identification System (OCIDS);

• Visual Marking Systems: Combat Identification Panels (CIPs) and Thermal Identification Panels (TIPs), Phoenix IR Light. The exercise envisaged the e mployment of fire simulators for the weapon systems, both on vehicles and in d ividual ones, as we ll as the provision of terminals insta lled on every tank, in order to monitor the progress of the exercise and send the position and m iss ion data to t he direct io n of the exercise so as to have them memorized and analysed with scientific methods.

In this way, in parallel with the pure and simple organ ization of a normal exercise, which, as is known, still presents several problems from the v iewpoi nt of logistics, training and preparation of equipment and personnel, it was necessary to set up a mighty "machi ne", which involved Government Bodies, industries and research cen tres of the participating Countries, unde r the guidance of NATO ACT and USJFCOM, in order to: • Provide "combat identification" technologies to be employed during the exercise. • Take care of the preparation of equipment and personnel to employ t he identification systems and all t he additional technolog ies (the m en tioned fire simulators for the weapon systems , both on vehic les and the personal ones) envisaged for the exercise. • Contribute - under control of t he apposite US Joint Fires Integrat ion and Interoperabil ity T eam UF IIT), consisting of a nalysts, expert in data processing and interpretation - to define the exercise scenarios most suitable fo r getting re liabl e and exhaustive data, t he Rules of Engagement (ROE) a nd the Tact ics, Techn i ques and Procedures (TTP) to be employed during the exercise, together with t he evaluation parameters to be considered for the final analysis of the re sults. Therefore the various Nations were asked to make a remarkable work o f organ ization, plan-

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ning and coordination (at national and internatio nal level) to take part in the event, which envisaged very short times and imposed the qual ified participation in ad-hoe Working Groups to cover all the logistic, te chni cal, doctrina l and

analysis), was ready to enter the Salisbury Plain range, as Italy's representative. The "Dardos" of the platoon had become technologically advanced platforms, on which the BTID had been mounted during the previous weeks. The vehicles were also readied for the installation, during the exercise, of the RBCI, RF Tag and Visual Marking systems (see Table) and the fire simulation system, used to simulate the effects of the weapon system during the exercise . In particular, the BTID system mounted on "Dardo" consisted of: • An interrogato r system, mou nted on only two vehicles (LUPO l and ETNA), made of a directional antenna firmly attached to the barrel, for sending out the wave fo rm containing the coded interrogation message. • An omn id irectional transponder antenna (on all "Dardos" involved in the project) employed for the automatic tra ns miss ion of a coded rep ly ("friendly" response) to the query message. • A central unit for the processing / management Central unit of the BT/O system in a "Dardo" combat vehicle. of all the BTID functions. • A unit feeding system. · A GPS sensor. analytical aspects of "Urgent Quest" and the exe· A laptop PC for ma naging the following funccut ion of a number of activities, which (like pertions : visualization, on a digitalized map, of sonnel training and equ ip ment instrumentation) all identified "friend" systems, including those had to be developed in cooperation with other of the interrogated vehicles, which employ an Nations. additiona l f unct ion of the BTID, ca l led DDL Italy, in particular, had decided to actively par(Digital Data Link), in order to build a d igita l ticipate in "Urgent Quest" in 2004, singling out net in which the said vehicles t ransmit their for the occasion a platoonposition data to the others level mechanized unit with 4 through a transponder net; "Dardos" (combat vehicle for ' ' The efforts made in order collection/management of the infantry), equipped with profile containing all mission datotypes of "Battlefield Target to meet the obligations ta recorded by the system (in Identification Devices" (BTDI), were rewarded and, with terrogat ions made and reprocured through a specific the signature of the Exerce ived; DDL position mes contract with the Selex cise Directive by the Chief sages). Communication Company. of the Logistic Division of As regards its operation, the These US-mad e BTID syste ms BTD is closely integrated with the Army General Staff, are an evolution of the same the weapon system on which device employed by the US every aspect of Italy's par- it is mounted , in particular ticipation became official,, with the Laser Range Finder. Army and the US Marines. The efforts made in order to When the gun layer in the turmeet the obligations were ret moves the weapon system rewarded and, with the signature of the i n the d irection of a potential target and operExercise Di rective by the Chief of the Logistic ates the LRF, the BTID becomes act ive and, in Division of the Army General Staff, every aspect less than a second, through the vehicle's interof Italy' s participation became official" phone, provides the sight and sound in d ication After a very intensive phase of preparation of the of a "friend" or "unknown" vehicle. In the latter "Dardos", the installation of the BTIDs and the case, before opening fire, one must have the training of personne l, which took place at Cosenza confirmation, visual or through other sources, in August 2005, the Italian detachment, which that the vehicle is actually an enemy one. If a included a platoon with 4 "Dardos" of the l st "friend" vehicle equipped with BTID is within "Bersaglieri" Regiment and other personnel and range of a weapon system aimed at anothe r equipment (for technical/logistic support and data potential target, the BTID produces the in d ica-

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Pre - mission preparation of a "Dardo" at the "Motor pool" parking area.

tion " Friend in Range". Furthermore, it is also possib le for the gun layer to query the sighted targets without operating th e LFR system, to avo id being recognized. The "Bersaglieri" of the 1 st Regiment had been trained (also with help from US personnel) in the correct use of the system at thei r Caserta barracks, and tackled t he job with the usual motivation but also with a certain curiosity deriving from the attract ion of the special technology and the feel ing of being about to participate in some thing unusual. Actually, this impression proved to be correct from the very beginning. In the days following the "fateful" September 13, 2005, the arrival and settlement at the base of all contingents and personne l (civilian and military) was completed. T he participating Nations were: US, Italy, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and UK. Altogether there were 800 servicemen, 200 technicians and civi lian analysts representi ng firms, government bodies and important American univers 1t1es Uohn Hopkins and Columbia) , 94 land combat- vehicle s, 9 fixed wing combat aircraft, 3 helicopters and 1 30 identification systems.

In view of the 7 t rain ing missions envisaged (3 daytime and 4 night-time), many interesting and absorbing activ ities were carried out during t he following days with a very tight schedule. The various instrume nts and devices inst alled on the vehicles were controlled, set up and serviced in a special motor pool, where the Italia n "Dardos" stood side by side with the most different armoured vehicles: American Abrahms and Bradleys, British Chal lengers and Scim ita rs,

The exterior of a Dardo's turret equipped with antennas and systems for exercise "Urgent Quest".

89 - TEC HNE

and the pos1t1ons of vehicles/personnel learned fro m the appropriate terminals mounted on the vehicles. This would permit to see in real time, during the operational missions, t he developme nt of the manoeuvre of the combat group and of the other elements on the ground (opposing

Above. Italian serviceman practicing with British SA/80 rifles. Right. Training with NA TO C/TS.

French VABs and ma ny others) with their respective technologies, forming an assortment of vehicles that offered an unusual and almost shocking view. The Command and Control structure was being organized under a "Coalitio n Exercise Group" CECG - where all participating Nations were re presented by their respective National Senior Representatives, whose task was to control the exercise, conduct th e tactic-level functions of staff headquarter, direct the operations on the ground, solve all log istic/admi n istrative and technical problems and gather /analyse data. In a room called "Home Box Office" (HBO) the international analysts were going to receive the fi r ing data (conducted/received engage m ents)

A French VAB.

force (OPFOR), ne utral forces, NGO) with in the scenarios envisaged for "Urgent Quest" directly on a screen and locate the position and the engagements, conducted/received by each i nd ividual tank and man. In addition , through a special sw developed by the JFIIT, these data would be memorized and managed for analysis and successive evaluations. The equipment of the personnel cont inued with t he distribution of the simulator system for personnel on foot (it included a combat jacket with GPS and computer display) and of the SA / 80 British rifle, given to the Italian platoon to simulate the effect of t he individ ual weapon during t he exercise. The training of the personnel in the envisaged ROE and TTP and in the emp loyment of the "Combat Identificat ion " t echno logy was completed also with the support of a p rototypi c multimedia and multilingual software (called "NATO Identification Training System" - NATO CITS). After a few days, for a final t est of the systems and the verification of th e preparation of the personnel in situations programmed on purpose (Situationa l Exercise Scenario - STX), the free - play operatio n al missions co mmenced , with the first daytime operation (deliberate attack).

THE OPERATIONAL MISSIONS A British-led Combat Group (Black Watch Battlegroup), formed by land elements and aircraft from eight different Nations, carried out the ground activities, under direction of a CECG.

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A French VBL equipped with the system of detection of the engagements ret:PivPd (in the red circle).

make th e visu al ident ification easier for the friend ly forces . Be sid es t he forces involved i n the ex ercise, on the ground the re were "Ob server Control lers" The Canadian- led company of the coalitio n, (OC) m an aged by t he CECG , and Observe rs from which incl uded also the Itali an co mpone nt, cont he Nations that participated in t he CC ID ACTD sisted of: programm e but w er e not direct ly i nvolved i n • A p latoo n from the Frenc h Fo reign Legion, the exercise with units of the i r own (A ustralia eq uipped with VAB and VBL and Germany). recce vehicles. In the demonst rat ions (three • A pl ato on fr om the 1 st dayt ime and fo ur night- time) " Ber sag lieri" Regiment, ' ' A British - led Combat of the combat group , th e equ i pped with VCC "Dardo" Group, formed by land ele- "techn ologi c" coalition, ments and ai re raft from equi pped with ide n t ificat io n combat vehicles. • A platoo n from t he Canad ian eight different Nations, carsyste ms, simulated ope ration s Army equipped with Britis h ried out the ground activi typ ica l of a NATO t ask fo rce "Warriors". called to inte rvene in operaties ,, t ions fo r t he mai ntenance o f The Close Air Sup port (CAS) inte rnatio nal stab ility, re storand air m iss ions envisaged the in g the (imag inary) leg it imate em ployment of a Danish A rmy Fenner antitank Government of "Arnoria", threatened by forces he licopter and ground-attack F-16 ai rcraft from of the state of " Mordov ia" (represented by the Danish Air Force , grou nd- attack F- 18 and FOPFOR). l 5 aircraft from t he US, a British Harrier aircraft The miss io ns simul ated different and very real and a Br itis h "Apache" hel icopter, both for ground istic scenarios, also w ith the prese nce on the attack, variously equipped w ith syste ms for air-to ground of NGOs and elements of t he UN; t he fi rst ground id entificatio n. demonst ration was focused on mo bile def ence, The opposi ng forces (OPFOR) consist ed of a t he second on attack and th e third on PSO in British com pany w ith modi fied vehicl es , to inhabited ce ntres (both in day- and night- t ime).

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A "Bersagliere", equipped with a MILES simulator and arm ed with a British SA/ 80 assault rifle, during the Exercise.

conducted, controlling the adoption of the right proce dure and, i n that case, if tech nology had real ly helped in t he id ent ificat ion of the targets. This gat hering activity was carri ed out simu ltaneous ly with the tec h nicians, w ho u nloaded the data recorded by t he so ftware of the t echno log ical sets mou nted o n t he ve h ic l es. Once acquired by the Obs erve rs Contro llers, the data were compared with those obtained by the analyst t eam and as sessed as a whole. In this ph ase, any possib le eve nt of interest (EOI ) was analysed. For example, cases of "fratric idal fire", or instances where the t echnology had avoided them. T he matter would be exami ned in depth during the post-mission debri efi ng , wh ere the Layers and Tan k Lead ers that had been the protagonists of an event of i nt erest gave al l the explan ations necessary to clarify the occurrence and ascertain w heth er the techno logy had been some how he l pf ul in t he d eci s ion - mak ing process fo r ope n ing fire. At the end of the daytime mission, and also at night, a conclusive debriefing was held, whic h summarized t he stati stical data relevant to the identification activ it ies on the battlefi eld with the su p port of the aboveme ntioned technolo gies.

Furthe rmore, the re was a con clusive night exercise on a transit ion phase. On the basi s of the relevant Operation Order (O PORD) drawn up before each mission, and after control by the Direction of t he Exe rcise, the Italian platoon was entrusted with all the tasks envisaged with in the offensive, defensive and de laying operMAJOR ASPECTS OF T HE EXERCISE ations (fixing, attack). Th e so - ca lled "hunt in g" act ivit ies aga in st Exe rcise "Urgent Quest" ended on Octo be r l 3, enemy tanks w ere particu larly stimu lati ng for the 2005. tan k crews: they received orders (in Engl is h) by During the technological demonstration (opposthe Canad ian Co mpa ny Commande r , applied ..t h¡e ing - parties exercise) it was possible to test the m entio ne d t ec hnologi es fo r "Co m bat tec hn o logy present in t he vehi cle and ado pted Id entification", i n connectio n em ploymen t proced ures different from the Ital ian ones with the following evaluat ion (e mployment of the VCC ' ' On the basis of the Oper- parameters: "Dardo" with a 6-men co m poion al ity, i. e. whether ational Order drawn up and the Funct nent on foot and a 3-men ident ifi cation systems im controlled before each mis- plemented by the different nacrew. The prevailing situations were sion by the Direction of the tions of the coalition improve stud ied in order to prod uce the Exercise, the Italian platoon t he capabi lity of detecting t he g reatest poss i ble number of was entrusted with all the presence of friendly, enemy or "fratricidal fire" (an artificial vi l- tasks envisaged within the neutral units on the battlefield. Imp act on the units, i .e . lage, Copehill, was indeed built offensive, defensive and w hethe in t he Sali sbu ry rang e, for operr the ident ification sysations in inhabited ce ntres) in delaying operations ,, tems lowered in a significant order t o test men, vehicles and manner the number of victims technologies to th e utmost and of "frie ndly fire" and improve get a vast amount of an alysable data. the effectiveness of the un its during combat. At the end of each mi ss ion, the "Observer â&#x20AC;˘ Interoperab ility : wh ether t he id entification sys Con trol lers" of the variou s nation s, who had fol tems can be employed i n multinational units wo rking within t he same coalition . lowed t he action on t he gro u nd, were tasked to gather all data on the activ iti es of their Uni ts on T he t raining activity was carri ed out in pe rfect a Pocket PC, q uest io ni ng each Layer and Tank Leader on al l the fire engagement s received or harmony with the t echnical activities relevant to

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A "Oardo" combat vehicle engaged in "Urgent Quest".

the preparation and setting up of the vehicles and the devices mounted on them, and with the data gathering and assessment after the mission, wh ich, considering all we have said before, was the most im po rtant part of the exercise. These data, obtained through the implementation of the training missions described above, will be used by the team of intern ationa l analysts coordinated by the JFIIT, for preparing, from October 2005 to February 2006, the Final Report of the exercise, with an appraisal of t he military effectiveness of the various technologies tested, on the basis of the ment ioned parameters. The exercise was very realistic thanks to the simulators, carried on vehicles or as personal equipment. In particular, the simulator envisaged several types of situations: a tank could be completely destroyed or only have its hull damaged and maintain the efficiency of the turret, or a rifleman could be killed or only wounded, or be in a

state of shock due to an explosion nearby. The situation of every single soldier appeared on a small monitor p laced on his vest, where one could read, in English, what kind of injury or damage he had suffered. These systems, alt ho ugh presenting occasion al slight malfunctions, effectively contributed to make the activiti es very interesting, particularly for the Commanders at the various leve ls, who had to face situations where they could not employ a stricken tank or had to proceed to the rescue of a wounded soldier. For the abovesaid reasons , the training on vehicles was very profitable, owing both to the extremely accurate simulations of real operational situations and to the opportunity of increasing the professionalism of our personnel, as well as to the necessary employment of techno logy, the com parison with different employment procedures and with crews and equipment of other nations. From this viewpoint, the Italian vehicles and personnel cut a fine figure, to the point of "deserving" the task of carrying out, almost always, the "main effort" during the missions.

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An American AH-64 "Apache-Longbow" helicopter in a Close Air Support action.

As regards the specific BTID and DDL technologies, we can hi ghlight some positive impressions , although any final judgment may be premature. In particular, the BTID system and the DDL tech nology used by the Italian personne l and still in a prototype phase, proved in time to be generally re liable, without any sign ificant malfunction. The "Combat Identification" technologies proved to be easi ly and immediately employab le by the crews of the "Dardo", which could always profitably emp loy the BTID sets and the other tested technologies within the assigned ROE, that could be easily and intuitive ly applied.

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Within the very numerous ris ky situations that occur red during the missions (purposely pro grammed by the international organizers) , there were no instances of "frat r icidal fire" among Italian tanks . The occasional cases caused by Italian tanks always involved veh icles of other nations, and were almost always due to the lack of the BTID interrogator on the Italian tank ¡concerned, or of the BTID transponder o n the target. The implementation of the DDL function i n order to realize a net of data exchange / acquisition us ed for the cartographic representation of the ve hicles equipped w ith BTID proved to be reliable. The DDL function, part icularly appre ciated by the personne l , a lways worked correctly, and permitted to acqu ire data coming from other vehic les (including t hose of ot her

rience, fro m which it wil l be possible to obta in, as a t angible result, a bas ic document (Fi nal Report), which, on t he grounds of objective evaluations, can be the foundation of the futu re d_evelopmen t s of "Combat Identification" (i n terms of acqu isitions, investments , doctrin al and t raini ng implicat io ns). From the standpoint o f intang ible resu lts and LESSONS LEARNED lessons learned, the exercise gave equally important results . Organ i zatio nal structure, att ending governIn particular, th ere was the confirmation of the ment /i ndustrial bodies, number of participatvalidi ty of the progress m ad e by the Service in ing Nations, vehicles /te chnology / personnel this secto r , th ro ugh the ra pid deve lopment of a employed, characteristics a nd aims, made technology (BTID), which , albeit not yet ful ly exercise "Urgent Quest" very different from mature , was conside red valid by the p ers onnel other training activities conducted r ecent ly, who employed it, using BTID systems as a usealso abroad, by our Servi ce. fu l support for the identification of friendly T he exercise, in its different phases, was a . forces and for t he effective conduct o f the ope rchal lenge f irst of all, hard but excitin g , which atio ns . The DD L f un ction, wit h involved not only the who le t he visual ization on a d ispl ay of Service , which made the greatest effort , but th e ent i re ' ' The Italian Army was able t he posit ion of the tanks of the coalit ion equipped w ith BTID Defe nce organiz ati on transponders, could be partic(Defence General Staff, t ech - to display the level of tech ularly appreciated, provided nica l - admi nistrative area, nological update of its mathat they could be relocated in ind ustri es). terials and systems and the a position for easier reading in In this sense, the participaprofessional skill of its per- the tu rret of the "Dardo". tion in the eve nt was essen T he "Dardo" t anks pr epared sonnel ,, tial ly an important internafor the occasion were th e first tional "showcase" for the embryos of the future "d ig it aliItalian Ar m y , which cou ld sation" of the Service's vehic le s; i n t his sense, c.Ji::,pldy the leve l of t ech nolog ical update of its the exerc ise provided useful information on m aterials and systems and the professional some fundamental aspects of t ech nology- vehi ski l l of its personnel who, on that occas ion, cle in t eg ration. certainly proved to be not i nfer ior t o those of Finally, the human factor, w hic h exalts tech the other Nations. nology and proves its va lue, emerged with al l its In the sector of "Combat Identificati on", importance. The boys of the 1 st "Bersaglieri" "Urgent Quest" represented a fundamental expe Regi ment , true to their motto "lct u l mpetuque Primus", and with a lo ng experience on the gro und , have bril li an tly overcome the difficulDDL visualization in a "Dardo" turret of vehicles identities co nnected w it h the d ifferent language, do cfied as "friend" by the BT/0 system. trine, procedures of emp loyment and us e o f tec hno logy, an d competed as equa ls with the contingents o f t h e other Nations, ea rning thei r appreciatio n not only for their good hu mour and t he who lesome "Bersaglieri" spirit, but especial ly for their enthus iasm, skill and diligence, wh ich made poss ib le the great success of the Ita lian partic ipation.

Nations) equipped with BTID transponders. This was a great advantage for the "situation aware ness", des p ite the uncomfortable position in t he turret (sideways and high er than the Layer, and beh i nd the Tank leader).

Pierluigi Sticchi Captain, Corps of Engineers, Advanced Technologies Office, Army General Staff Enrico De Palo Captain, TRA EMA T, l 0th Transport Regiment

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¡¡~¡ THE AUSTRALIAN "TIGER" The situation of the procuren1ent programme In the varied world of advanced weapon systems, helicopters must provide performances suitable for employment in the most demanding operational theatres. The "Tiger", although winner of a tender for combat helicopters called by Australia, will still have to undergo important changes in order to meet the specifications fixed by the customer.

Title pages and above. A "Tiger" in the configuration selected bv Australia.

The ever increas ing complexity of the weapon systems puts to a hard test not only the engineers but also, and perhaps mainly, those responsible for the management of the programme, on both the supplier's and the customer's side. Technical problems, t imes, cost assessment, contract problems and other issues often have, as practical consequence, the delivery to the operational units of systems that do not conform to what was initially envisaged , or cause such serious delays at the entry into service that they impair the effectiveness of t he military instr ume nt. The latest of these cases exploded at the beginning of May, when the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) published a report titled "Management of the 'Tiger' Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Project - Air 87''. In the 105 pages of the

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docu ment are listed all the shortcomings that were pointed out not only by the producer but also by the Defence Administration; on the other hand, it is very clearly stated that "this report is not an appraisal o f the supplier's behaviour but rather an assessment of the management of the Project by the Defence and DMO", i.e. by the Department of Defence and the Defence Materiel Organization. Project A ir 87 proposed to provide the Australian military instrume nt with a capability o f armed reconnaissance in the third dimensio n: hence the name Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter - ARH . The new helicopter was supposed to replace t he Army's fleet of 43 Bell 2068 - 1 Kiowa and 25 UH - IH Iroquois, and join the UH - 60 Blackhawk transport helicopters. T he procurement plan envisaged the delivery of the first specimen in May 2003, in order to have a first group (eight helicopters) by June 2006 and a second one by December 2007. During the contract negot iations the dates were changed, scheduling the initia l operational

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sea up to force-5: (Actually the Defence later declared to ANAO the it wou ld be unlikely to carry out flight activities in those conditions). The OMO accepted the fi rst two specimens of the ''.Tige r", no. l and no .2, produced in France, in December 2004. At that time, France should have already accepted its first "Tiger" in Ju ne 2003, eighteen months before the Australian contract, but in practice the French specimen had only passed t he first level of the navigability certificat e, granted in Apri l 2004 by the A "Black Hawk"UH- 60 of the Australian Army. French "Direction Generale pour l'Armement". This caused an excessive load of work for OMO. On t he other hand, t he Australian aircraft were accepted capability (IOC) by July 2007 and the full capabilidespite the fact that 2 5 test ing and evaluation procety (FOC) by December 2008. The choice fell on the dures had not been completed, because they conFranco-German 'Tiger" aircraft and the contract cerned subsystems whose final delivery was envisaged for the su pply of 22 helicopters was signed in after the acceptance date. Moreover, unexpected Dece mber 2001. Eightee n of t hem were t o be shortcom ings appeared later, as shown at Table l . assembled in Australia. T he in itial worth of the As can be easily seen, some shortcomings were due project was 1.58 bil lion dollars (l . l million for the to the unmade tests while others, such as t he insuffiaircraft and 4 11 mi llion for a 13-year integrated cient power of the MT R 390 Step O turbines, were log istic support). Later the cost went up to 1.96 problems difficult to solve. Besides, a great part of the billion dollars , owing to price increases, exc hange helicopter programmes born at the t ime of the Cold rates fluctuations and other reaso ns. War (we should remember t hat a 'Tiger" mock- up was A first difference between the Australian plans and present at the French-German exercise carried out in real ity was due to the delays in the acceptance of the Germany in 1987, and that was one of the crucial aircraft by France, which was the first cl ient. In fact, moment s in the strengthening of what was then the the Australians considered the programme as an "off Bonn-Paris axis) suffer from a lack of power, having the shelf' procurement of an aircraft already in servbeen desig ned for operations in Central Europe, whi le ice with two other nations, France today they m ust fly in theatres and Germany, while in practice w here high temperatures and altithis did not occur. The delays in tudes erode the marg in of power t he de livery of the machines to ' ' Technical problems, times, calculated fo r our climatic cond ithe tvvo nations that had started cost assessment, contract tions. T here is a dispute on this the "Tiger" project compelled problems and other issues point, si nce, according to t he Australia to be the first to accept have as a practical conse report, an increased power of the the aircraft, with the relevant con- quence the delivery to the propellers would produce a rise in sequences. At the moment of the operational units of systems fuel consumption and a consecontract it was nevertheless evithat do not conform to what que nt drop in the autonomy dent that France had not yet cerbelow the limits envisaged by t he tified and accepted the project, was initially envisaged , , cont ract. According to t he thus possible deferments could Defence, the tests continue to be imagined. These delays, in show that the eng ines are below practice, t ransformed Project Air 87 into an experithe envisaged power; the problem comes up essenmental programme, increasing t he risks connected tially in flight s with a single engine and, in particular, with times, costs, capabil it ies of the machines and it is impossible to reach the cl imbing speed at full load logistic support, even if a number of modifications, while, and this is more serious, the problems of essentially concerning avion ics, communication sysred uced performance in t he torrid climate cond itions tems, integration of two voice recorders and of the of nort hern Australia remain unsolved. T he manufacUS-made "Hellfire" antitank missile, envisaged a certurer proposed a fu ture update of the propellers at tain ded icated development activity. On the whole, Step l , w ith an increase in maximu m power of about out of 900 project req uisites, the Australian requests 7 percent (against the present 3 percent power deficit, led to change l 4 of them. As regards t he operational but the modification, which involves essentially the requirements, they were a lot more stringent than the software, would have an estimated cost of 2.5 m illion Franco-German, ones since t he Australian cli mate dollars for each tu rbine, fo r a total of l l O m illion). reaches m uch higher t emperatures . T here was moreAccording to the last statements made by the maker, over the request of the Australian Navy to be able to t he problems seem to have been solved in collaboracontrol the aircraft from its amphibious units with a t ion w ith the prod ucer of the propellers.

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cation with a 6- month delay, but with some limitations due to the incomplete conformity with the performances provided for by the contract. Besides the described ones, other problems concerned t he radio- localizer at extreme te m peratures, the vocal recorder at the highest Gs, t he tests on ground impact resistance and, for the fi rst two machines, the capability of prolonged flig ht above water, due to the lack of verifications of the capabilities of escape from a submerged aircraft. Another difficulty was that in A ustralia the ru les in instrumental flight require a more complet e set of instruments, which wi ll have to be installed separately or integrat ed into the avionics suite, thus needing a partial new development of the system. At t he time of t he report, t he activity of the Australian aircraft was t he refore limited to flight tests, instruct or t raining, demonstrat ions and transfer flights. During these activities t he helicopters could not carry out long-lasting flights above water, could not fly w ith anti-sand filters installed, could not fly at night with t he support of NVGs, cou ld not fly with t he support of a radar A "Kiowa" OH- 58. altimeter, and could not conduct operations of takeoff, landing and low- altitude flights above 5000 feet . Another key point of the dispute concerns t he delays in del ivering the sim ulation system, but also in The first helicopter assembled in Australia showed this case it is not easy to dist inguish t he faults of t he even worse problems, to the point of convincing producer from the purchaser's. those responsible for the tests to The latter, in fact, has changed reject t he aircraft, whose faults many specifications duri ng t he were bound to cause security problems during t ra111111g . ''The Austral ian ai re raft manufacture. The simu latio n sysNevertheless, since the first heli- were accepted despite the tem provides for the presence of copters delivered were flying on fact that 25 testing and a mission simulat or (which was to the basis of a special air naviga- evaluation procedures had be delivered in February 2005 ), a cockpit procedu re trainer (to be bility certificate issued when t he not been completed , , del ivered in September 200 5), a first two aircraft had been acceptsecond similar system Uuly ed, the OMO considered that, 2006), besides a number of trainwithin the limits of this authorizaing systems for specialists and the installation of a t ion, there were no security problems. The helicopter was accepted in June 2005. In October, after a 2support to the software which should permit an month extension of the special air-navigability cerautonomous capability of development of t he system. T he continuous evolution of the ai rcraft's software t ificate, the aircraft were granted the military certifi-

A pair of ''Tigers" in close formation.

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Form left to right: a CH-47 "Chinook", a "Black Hawk" UH-60 and a ''Tiger".

n1v1.::.,c:1

has deferred the freeze of t he configuration, which was necessary in order to have a mission simulator corresponding to the real ai rcraft, without having to work hard on t he system immediately after delivery. Furthermore, the Australian purchaser requested many changes that went beyond their adaptation to t he configuration of the aircraft orde red; in particular, Table 2 (Source: ANAO) ~

Apperallls

Ailmft Aircraft no. I & 2 (Dcc.2004) Aircraft no.S (June 2005). Revised oontract reauircmenls Revised con1n1ct -uiremcnts maximum Yes yes

Operability at wciaht Propeller performances

No

no

Software integration (a)

Yes

yes

Emergency

radio-locali>.er

Yes

yes

Operability of voice n:corders at biRI, number ofO <c). Resistance to impact (d).

Yes

yes

Yes

yes

Plight above water (e)

No

yes

Excessive alarms by the avionic""'"""' Radio-navigation and altimetrical SV!ltcms. 30 1)111l tumtgun.

No

no

No

no

No

no

70 mm rocket system

No

Maintenance

No

no no

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managancnt

Electronic warlllre system

No

no

Ground-mission management

Yes

yes

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a. On the entiy into service the software version installed presented several problems that were known and being worked ouL The supplier was trying to solve them in view of the successive release of the software. b. The supplier still had to prove the correspondence to the envisaged military standards at 69° C, while the system bad been approved for a temperature of C,

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envisaged by the civilian PAR c. There were minor shortcomings and all aircraft were equipped with vocal recording systems, but they did not correspond to specifications. d Defence noted that this difference from the contract standard is an approved permanent-type deviation. e. Restrictions on flight above water are connected with an unsolved problem concerning the evacuation of a sunken ain:raft. Defence is not satisfied because au tests and analyses have been canied out by the supplier, and therefore imposed a flight restriction.

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t he ful l mission simulator intended for operations in Austral ia w ill have better characteristics than the French - German ones . The Australians have not j udged the accuracy of t he visual systems of the latter good enough, also because in that nation simulat ion in train ing is much more used than in France or Germany. Moreover, for the in- flight Commander's simulator, six degrees of movement have been requ ired. All these problems caused a delay of approximately l S months, five of which were due to the mod ifications requested, but now the system has left Europe, is in the assembly phase in Austral ia and should become operational in the summer of 2006. The integ ration of an American system in a European aircraft cannot but create some difficulties. The "Hellfire" system, purchased by Australia thanks to the "Foreign Mil itary Sales", was no excep'tion, especially when delkate data must be given to a potential competitor of the U.S. industry in o rderto effectively integrate t he weapo n system in the aircraft. Nevertheless, on Aug ust 9, 2005, w ith t he first launching o f a m issile by an Australian 'Tiger", most problem s seem to have been solved. One of the major economic problems seems to be the cost of t he logistic support. Actually, the reasons for selecting the 'T iger" were precisely the savings in th is sector for the 13 years following the delivery, wh ich amounted to 41 0.9 mi llion dollars and were about one third less than the competition's . The supplier, after a review of the cost s, proposed an increase of 365 mi llion, w hich was refused by OMO. Now the question is again under discussion and negotiations between purchaser and supplier are under way. Another problematic point is the support of the software, which, according to the supplie r, is not ful ly envisaged by the contract. The purchaser rejects this and, therefore, there is contention also on t his point. The A NAO report ends with a number of recommendations to Defence and DMO on the procedures connected with the management of major programmes and the conduct of t ests. It recommends moreover a better liaison between those res ponsible for the project and the Defence authorities responsible for the development of the capabilities, and more att ent ion by the OMO in drawing up the contracts, in order to avoid possible ambigu ities. Stil l, the Australian Defence is on the whole satisfied w ith the development of the prog ramme . The Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson, answering a question in Parliament, underli ned that the ANAO recommendations are in line w ith the reform of the procurement procedu res and t hat the key factor for the greatest part of t he problems that turned up is connected with the delay of the French programme, while the main worries concern the de lay of t he simu lation system.

Paolo Valpolini

Journalist

101 - TECHNE

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THE MEDIA IN THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS A strategic res ource A close collaboration between the military and journalists may turn out to be a key factor in the success of a mission a nd the best way to re port the events objectively.

... No b ig network aims to give us the world picture. Its sole purpose is not to be beaten by the competition. On on e occasio n, t he former Chief - of- staff of t he U.S. Army , General Eric Shinseki, said: «We must speak o n behalf of th e A rmy, or else other peop le w ill do it». This state ment appears t o be highly t op ical at t he moment. The mass med ia have made the world become a «g lobal village» and exercise a powerfu l in fluence on al l of us.

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ANTHROPOS - 104

Poor in format ion m a nageme nt of some event s conce rning m ilitary operatio ns had a huge im pact on the outcome of the m iss ion . In fact, massive media coverage of military act iv ities can real ly hype up sim ple routi ne operations . On the con t rary, an event which does not attract media atten t ion will seem less important than it is . Title pages. A n Italian patrol in the A fghan desert.

Below. Also the A fg han Army contributes to the free circulatio n of the media in the territory.

not recieve much info rmation , they paint a distortJournalists report what they see without writing what the military thinks . Howeve r, soldiers want to ed picture of the events giving us partial and express opinions about the actions they perform incorrect information. and need to make them know. Journalists are always «on duty». According to th is basic rule, journal ists continue to work For this reason, journalists and cameramen shou ld col labo rate with each other as much as even during their coffee breaks . They work even while they chat with someone before going to possible to give us a faithful re prqduction of the bed. Therefore , journalists have to take a rea lity. T hey represent a strategic resource respons ible att itude towards information in thanks to which soldiers are able to give their order not to give ambiguous messages. We opinions. In some circumstance s, journalists can should take into account some ru les to avoid even co llaborate closely with the Commander of any possible misundersta nding: no one shall Contingent. exert pressure on journa list s (this cou ld damage Obviously, when a soldier is about to do an their professionalism); articles and reports can«out-of-area» mission, he has to know the not «be commissioned»; it is not convenient to ru les governing the mass media and shape h is grant a privi lege to some journal ists rather than way of thinking so that he will be ab le to deal with a continuous flow of information without others except when it is not possible to g ive information to everyone simu ltaneously (in this being overwhelmed. He has to know journal ists case it would be better to con (it is necessary to clear up any fer a grant to those journalists problems before working with them in the Area of ''1n fact, they become a who enjoy a good reputation so that they pass on the latest Operation) and what attitude strategic resource, thanks news to their col leagues). In he should adopt towards addition, an event will be them; as we l l as a system of to which the soldiers di rules for the Commanders of rectly engaged on the field reported in the extend to whatever ranks, he has to are able to make their which it is verifiable and gives us a comprehensive descripknow how to manage events voice heard,, tion of the reality. Obviously, and post-events and the funas far as possible, it is adv isdamental rules governing the able to prefer the latest news . mass med ia system: how to give an interview, how to transmit messages , or «convey» messages as journa lists say, how to WHAT MUST BE CLEARED UP WITH JOURNALISTS handle emergencies and how to avoid certa i n messages and negative behaviour. Soldiers must always take into account these Andrea Angeli is an italian official of UNO and basic rules . However, it is necessary to make it has taken part in numerous miss ion s of «the blue clear that even those journalists who work in the helmets» in different places of the world. He said: military world, especially in risky situations and «Information management is becoming more and straitened circurmstances, have to acquire a suitmore essential as an instrument for the peacekeeper. If a good article is published at the r ig ht able way of thinking. Firstly, they have to become aware of any possimoment it can help to spread peace much more ble risks without magnifying the danger. t han an armed battalion». Journalists often hesitate to get out of their safe vehicles because they are afraid of possible attacks from the enemies, even though safety WHAT IS NEEDED TO KNOW ABOUT JOURNALISTS measures which have been adopted are «attackproof», as it were, thanks to the dispos ition of solPeople say that journalists are not «friends» and, diers, equipment and armoured vehicles on the consequently, we should mistrust them . This is not ground. true. It is not useful to divide journalists into catBefore reaching a «risky)> zone , correspon egor ies , such as «friends» - «non - friends)), dents must be alerted to t he effective danger because they would continue to carry out their level and have to take the chance in advance, or own task even without the military's cooperation. else they could be a serious obstacle to the work The military should overcome any prejudices and of other journalists. Moreover, they have to have negative stereotypes on the jo urnalist figure in a comp lete knowledge of military questions, in order to become a credible interlocuto r and a privparticular political and strateg ic factors con ileged witness. cerning the specific area where they work. They As out-of-area missions have demonstrated also have to be prope rly trained to cope with (Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq), when journalists do

105 - ANTHROPOS

any physical and mental distress during t he only within the scope of their main tasks , with an operation. obvious exception the saf ety o f operations and Each int ervention involves specific environ personnel must be guaranteed . Consequently, me ntal, lo gi st ica l and operational r isks . each soldier can develop a deep interest in comConsequently, it is necessary to be well -trained munication. To be precise, he has to perform an to face any situations in the best way possible impo rtant funct ion of communicat ion observing during the mission . Some journal ists, at t imes , the two bas ic ru les cited above and establ ishing te nd t o understimate risky sit uations co nce nco ntact with jo urnalist s. trating on cultura l and social aspects and are not The message that must be conveyed is able to assess t he real risks accurately. This attianother important fact or. In iti ally , only t he tude could cause a serious danger to the military most interesting information has to be given. pe rso nne l. In fact, psychological studies have · in dicate d It is w rong to make journalists believe that t hey are that the public t ends to reme mber much better able to access any availab le information. Fro m the and for a longer time news that they hear or beg inni ng of cooperation it is necessary t o make it r ece ive fi rst. In addition, from a practica l po i nt clear t hat every single decision m ust be t aken by the of v iew, jo urn al ists have to wonder whether Commander of the Contingent and PI Officer w ho there is enough space on the newspaper or have to consider careful ly what type of news they not. Obvious ly , if t h ey h ave to cut some inforcan report in acco rdance to safety requirements. mation, they will eliminate what has been It is fundamental to guarantee not only the safe recorded or heard late r. Th ere is another fu nty of current and future ope rations but also the da me ntal quest ion . Th e lex ical aspect of an safety of all personne l. artic le can create cons ide rT he italian army has reached ab le difficulties . The la nth e same standa rd as t he most ''At times some journalists g uage is often r ich in techni mod ern european armies. For cal terms and abbrevi ation s this reason, jou rna lists should tend to underestimate risky which lead to the emergence convey positive messages in situations and, concentratof a world t hat is co mp letely order to reject co mmon ing on socio -cultural as- different from the r est of stereotypes about th e italian pects, do not accurately society. As wel l as a set of soldier who is defined as assess the potential risks,, rules, it us es rather special«mam mo n e}), « marm itto ne» ized terminology t hat and «spaghetti e mandol ino» . remains tota lly incomprehenIn t he collective imagi nation, sible to anyo ne . professionalism, efficiency, determination, up-toConsequent ly, acronyms, abbreviations, teledate equipment and advanced technologies must grap h ic names of insti t ut io n s and anything replace negative stereotypes, such as spaghetti, incompre he ns ible to civi l ian s must be avo ided «s hoes made of cardboard» and the isolatio n of in order to make a text clear and understand the italian army as inevitable result of a limited able. To give an example , th ink about what knowledge of english language. would hap pen if the m i l itary used technical terms to explain some importa nt issues to a j ourna list who does not have any military ATTITUDE TOWARDS JOURNALISTS knowledge (it is always preferable to tal k about delivery notice instead of ToA, zone of operaIn t he past, on many occasions, journalists were ti ons instead o f theatre of operations and Area treated with great suspicion. T his attitude has of Responsability i nstead of AoR; it is not wise recently turned out to be counterproductive espeto u se abbreviations such as J3 OPS, CJT F, OPS cially when negative events happen. and NCC; it would be a waste of time to talk In any circumstances, it is impo rtant to make it abo ut the approva l of materia l s used in easy for the Commander to use such a powerf u l Co stamareo airdrops). More over, it i s not tool (to give an example, taking p ictures and shot s advisable to distort the rea li ty because jourmust be allowed in accordance with bas ic safet y nal ists w i l l discover the t r uth . The more cu r irules). It is not convenient to shut up li ke a clam or ous journalists are, the more the truth wi ll «demonize» any contacts with journalists . come out. Obvious ly , the i r cu r iosity depends Journalists prefer the d irect approach by asking on the releva nce of the events that m ust be t he m ilitary personnel some very st raig ht questions re ported . Th e real profess ional of the informato create a climate of open dialogue with them. t io n, according to profess ional et hi cs and Each member of the army has to have communiduties, makes a comparison between items o f cation skil ls. T his statement is consid ered valid news , seeks confirmat ion o r denial of certain

ANTHROPOS - 106

In Hout of area" operations, children often put the mili-

tary in contact with the pop ulation.

details of t he story, ai ms to clear up any doubts or satisfy his th irst for truth by exp lor ing an y levels in the mili t ary h i erarchy (h e ful fils this purpose in t he majority of case s). T he golden ru le forbids the d is t o rs io n of th e t r u t h or the omission of impo rtan t in formation in o rde r to asce r tain the facts. T hi s is extrem ely impor tant: it is better to be ho nest enough to admit a scarse knowled ge of the facts . In t his case, journ al ists sho u ld r eport only w hat t hey really know wh ic h m ust be true to be divul ged. Even the most traumatic even t can offer some positive as pects : it is necess ary to cons ider and emph asi ze th em. A successful fi lm that was produced by Disney and entitled «Pollyan na» at the end of the Sixties provides us with a perfect example of th is. Pollyanna w as an ext remely unlucky litt le girl str uck by the most ter ri ble tragedies, such as the death of her favourite animal and the loss of her father. Neve rthe less, she was always happy and all people who came into contact w ith her were fasci nated by her lovable character which set a great example to all of them.

Any <;oldier should focus on positive aspects of a «grim» reality. Even when t hings go badly, it is important t o t ry to look on t he bright side because within this Institution there are m ec hanisms and people we can regard as highly positive . For istance, when incidents arise out of a delicate sit uatio n, they always carry o ut an extensive and thorough investigatio n in order to establish what has really happened.

RULES FOR COMMANDERS T he first rule (whi c h cannot be derogated) says that each Commande r is responsible for th e co mmu n ication of t he Contingent d uring t he operations. In o the r te r ms, t he Publi c Info rmation is l i nk ed wi th t he Co m m and. T he m ajo r consequences that foll ow m u st b e analysed thoroughly: any t ype of communication (verbal, non-ve rbal, written, i nt erpersonal) is manag ed by t he Commander. It is nece ssary t o follow so me pract ical ru les in o rder to avoid media incid en ts. ,. Firs t ly, it is impo rtant to t rust journalists and • have a co mp let e knowledge of commu nicatio n ._ and its rules (i n particular, th e rul es governing _;. the t r ai ni ng of jou rn ali st s and setti ng universal

107 - ANTHROPOS

standards of professional conduct: a code of and PIO as well as a relashionship based on et hics, a profess iona l association). Secondly, mutual and d eep respect. building harmonious relantionships with journalists is essential. Th is is of crucial importance eve n for journalists because an effective colHOW TO MANAGE THE EVENT AND POST- EVENT laboration can turn out to be fruitful in moments of crisis. In practical terms, t he What we have said finds confirmation in the way Commander should establish close contact with we deal with the event and the consequent postjournalists and try to draw event. Cons ide ring an event (it their attention to the mi litary does not matter whether it is activities , ra1s1ng burning positive or negative), we should issues and acquaint i ng them '' . . . in operations, each focus on the guidelines of the Commander is responsible media action and try to follow with military actions (obvi ously any information given for the communications of these instructions. Timeliness during the interview must be the Contingent. In other plays a key role in this context. treated in the strictest confi - words, public information Reporti ng the event immediatedence). In this way, they feel is a Command function ,, ly (even if you have just frag like being part of that system. ments of information) will proThey make a valuable contriduce a good result and bring bution to the miss ion out the effectiveness of the enhancing its quality. Another important rule information making it much more reliable in jourconcerns the mutua l trust between the nalists' eyes. Consequently, journalists will place Commander and his PIO which is the ÂŤalter much more trust in the Commander and personegoÂť of the Commander . In the Commander's nel of the Contingent. absence, he issues the same statement that the As well as timeliness, it is necessary to corn Commander would issue by using other words. This aspect is particular evident when there is a The wild nature of the Afghan territory is an obstacle to basic and great trust between the Commander the control of the territory.

ANTHROPOS - 108

USEFUL RULES FOR THE MILITARY DURING OPERATIONS • Remember you are Italian. ·"':·•

• Do not show a pathologic attachment to your mother and do not express self-pity. • Do not make a comparison with other Contingents. • Do not make foolish comparisons ( the Paratroops are better than the Alpine troops and worse than the Marines). • Project an image of efficiency and professionalism (professional competence) w ith a sense of decorum (the way you wear the uniform; the equipment). • Preserve your dignity (a sold ier wil l overcome his fears with training and brave ry). • Do not fear to say that you receive indemnities. In the western countries indemnities are indicative of unquestionable professionalism.

their behaviour and assess the relevance of a mun icate. Th is m eans spreading the news of deeper analysis according to the in stitutional events which occur or have just occured . The purposes. T he p ublic opinion spread of news is gradual and has the right t o know what slow. Sometimes, there is the happens . This is the main purreal risk of the so-cal led «gap ''1n absence of informapose of journalism and must in the communication»: when tion, usually given by the be taken consideration in someth ing im portant hap Contingent Command, order to into make the action pens, journalists have to journalists tend to gather effective. report it even if they do not Journalists are f ully aware of have any info rmation about news where and how they having undertaken a noble can, i.e. asking the first the event. In any situations, task: they guarantee a constithey have to g ive some news soldier that happens to tutiona l princip le. T hey take in order to justify the ir pres- come along ,, advantage of it whenever they ence in that particular place. regard it as essent ial i n order In other words, they have to to carry on their work . At fill t h at gap mentioned above. In .the absence of informatio n, wh ich is usual ly given by the Command, they tend to gather news In operational theatres journalists are always on duty. wherever and whenever they can, which means asking t he first person that happens to come along. Anyone can be regarded as reliable source: a Corporal who has just gone off duty or a Captain who is flattered because he has j ust bee n asked to issue a statemet before the cameras, but anyway they could be entirely in the dark about policies , what language should be adopted , @ how the event happened. Once they have become aware of the relevance of com mu nication , they have to realize how useful it is. They have to dispel any doubts and suspicions in order to convey positive messages of the Cont ingent and Armed Forces in an effective way. Journalists are able to pick up the sl ightest nuance of

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109 - ANTHROPOS

MESSAGES TO BE GIVEN DURING AN INTERVIEW The role of the military force: a good illustration of this role is fundamental in order to take an effective and posi tive media action. Internationalism: this aspect is indicative of a full integration of the country into international contexts (OTAN, UNO, Free

coalitions).

The importance of operation: recognizing the importance of an operation means being aware of one's duties; t his highlights the figure of the professional soldier who is aware of his role and tasks. Uniqueness of the Command: it is a central aspect of a military structure and guarantees efficiency. Cooperation: it is the ability to adapt to contexts in which contingents operate by using procedures wh ich can be different from national ones . Inter- collaboration: this concept derives from cooperation. The military force is not an occupying force: apart from juridical discussions about the Geneva Convention (of 1947 and additional protocols) on Human Rights and on Armed Weapons, it is necessary to stress this point very st rongly. Integration with International Organizations: the military Contingents operate with international, government and non - governmental organizations (for example, UNMIK in Kosovo). This integration shows a clear sign of professionalism and proves the competence that the Armed force has acquired in the last five-year periods. Humanitarian tasks: it is important to draw a comparison between humanitarian and operational tasks. Humanitarian aid given by italian contingents has been universally recognized as efficient and fruitful, but this aspect does not have to overshadow their military actions. Impartiality: it is a fundamental and basic principle of communication: a mi litary contingent plays an important role in bring ing peace to war zones. Professionalism and h1otivation: are the cornerstones of the Army. T hey must be regarded as effective and appropriate channels for communication. /

The importance of logistics: in the light of recent missions this sector must be highlighted. In fact, it has been al~,vays overlooked. Today logistics is an essential part of the "manoeuvre" that is performed in the 'Theatre" and serves an interservice function . Logistics is the practical arrangements that are necessary to deploy troops in the war zones in due time and operate according to the plan.

times, they tend to abuse t his «right» because they desperatly want to overcome any reluctance to give information. Nevertheless, the basis of the logical and legal procedure is indisputab le and must be observed. The last aspect to consider concerns t ime limits that change accord ing to the type of means of communication. Once news has been gathered, it must be spread and published and time lim it is very strict. It is necessary to receive the news on time before the magazine goes to press otherwise it will be published in the following issue. In the same way, a news item will be broadcasted on the evening news only if it arrives on time. This must be taken into consideration in orde r to enhance the effectiveness of communication and improve the news service significantly in the Contingent's interests.

ANTHROPOS - 110

HOW TO CONDUCT AN INTERVIEW It is the most frequent act ivity in this specific context. There are t wo type s of interview: press interview and rad io or te levis io n interview. Giving an interview is li ke entering into negoti ation wit h someone else . It is important to make journalists understa nd that it is necessa ry to gather information before starting. In these cases , it would be useful to wonder what conse quences that report could have for the Unity, the mission and even for the Armed Forces. In order to discover what the journal i sts' point of view i s, the mili tary ask questions such as : «What does this report concern?». In fact it is i m portant to kn ow what aspect of the news they want to high light and whether they have just talked about it with someone e lse. Some t imes journal-

civil society (maybe only because he wears a ists are forced to ignore information given by uniform). soldiers they know well. Are journalists well Th is moment must be regarded as a golden informed about a specific topic? What do they opportunity in order to convey importan t mesknow about the military? Providing the profes s.ages. The mi litary of whatever rank is seen as a sional with «military education» could turn out s·pokesman (but not in a technical sense) and to be necess ary. What type of articles do they witness to the Armed Force. usual ly write? Are they uitical of the military, The message mu st be supported by facts, cirwar and, in general, mil itary operations? It cumstances , reference points, information, statiswould be better to gather information about tics , explanations, citations and anything usefu l in their professional precedents. order to get that message across to national and Therefore, any soldier who has to do an inte rview international public opinion. must be informed about t he interview procedure It is self- evident that good education and and its aims. He should adopt t he following sug instructional material are needed in order to gestions: achieve this aim. if possible, he should be informed in advance In order that an interview can turn out to be inciabout the questions he will be asked. In addition, sive it has to catch the public' s attention. It is necif he enjoys a friendly relationsh ip with journal ists, essary to stir _up people's emotions. The public he can try to ask them to arrange at least some of finds mo re interesting someone who describes t he questions in order to meet the needs of both and shows their professional commitment and of them. expresses absolute loyalty towards the Institution: he should formulate an answer acco rding to in th is way, they catch the reciever's attention how much time he has. At times, a lon g and gaining his affection. detailed answer is not recorded and properly In conclusion, we have to re member an imporunderstood by jo urnalists who, consequently, tant ru le: the military has to will have difficulty making the learn how to manage an topic clear when they write an inte rview. During an interarticle for a newsp ape r . ' ' Knowledge of the general view, he has to h ighlight tactAnother problem concerns tel rules of the language is a ful ly and kindly what he wants evision reports . As far as news report is concerned, they could fundamental prerequisite journalists to high light mak have to edit some images out.

for giving an interview in all security , ,

Th ey should re member to give immed iately the information that they intend to spread. Knowing the general rules governing the language is essential for the safety when an interview is given. Whoever wants to do an interview has to learn the appropriate language that must be adopted; anyway, it would be better to educate people who are not expert in communication . The Commander and Officer PI should take on such an essential task. During t he interview, it is advisable to concentrate on the answer instead of the question (which nobody is able to hear and remember). It could seem like a contraddiction but when a question is formulated clearly and precisely (and this acts in the interest of journ alists) it is much better to th in k about what to answer carefu lly, even if this attitude means «leading» the journalist's intent ions. The public usually do not love seeing on TV someone who answers like a robot and repeats the same phrase s like a reco rding tape. Consequently, it is necessary «to launch» the message, or at least the most importan t one . When a soldier is interviewed and has to issue statements on his tasks, he acts as an intermediary between military and

ing it interest i ng and neces -

sary even in journalists' eyes. To give an examp le, we shou ld consider the following sentences: «in the first place, let's make the facts clear ... , let' s focus our attention on what is rea lly important». When these sentences are uttered with emp has is, they make people f ee l compelled to follow every word of the interview.

HOW TO MANAGE EMERGENCIES According to the principles mentioned above, an event that has had negative consequences for the Contingent involves good communication. Even in this case, we can establish a set of rules which should be followed in order to maximize th e effectiveness of communication: • transparency: a genuine relat ionship leads to pursue t he same objectives and foster a sense of solidarity among the journalists who are usu ally wi lling to collaborate actively with the m in order to handle t he crisis, making n ews filter out and cont roll i ng the flow of information which must be spread; • huge media campaign: the Command of the

111 - ANTHROPOS

A "Centauro" armoured car and a VM 90 on patrol in the desert.

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no circumstances should they receive the news of the death of a re lative from the med ia; • prov iding journa lists with a simple and obj ective description of how events have unfolded Contingent should give regular updates on the making no reference to pol itical issues which current crisis i n order to guarantee objectivity are beyond the scope of the m ilitary. In add iand transparency; tio n, stateme nts such as «no synchrony with the operating comment», «nothing has hapsector: the news given to the ' ' It is necessary to give an pened», «we don ' t know anymedia mus t be in line with objective description of the thing», should be pro sc ribed. the operating sector which of communication events, both good and bad, Absence controls the flow of informamust be avoided. A golden tion concerning the actions before others provide the rule is t o be genuinely humb le which are performed by the media with distortions or and willing to face up to your Contingent; disinformation ,, res po n sab i Iit ies . taking firm stands on some issues in accordance with what has been decided in their own country. In CONCLUSIONS these circumstances, consistency and un ivocity always repay you; The relationships between the mass med ia and the use of a simple and everyday language, es · the Armed Forces represent a long - standing probpecially in cas e of emergencies or crises; lem, as the english lessons learned about t he information must be given gradually: in case of Falklands War have illustrated. For a long time serious accidents invo lving the personnel it is journal ists have had difficulty gaining access to important to consider carefully how to give inmilitary information. There are two probable formation. A special attention must be paid to exp lanations fo r this how to inform a family of a tragic event. Under • by its very nature, the military forces do not d is -

ANTHROPOS - 112

For Journalists, the soldiers' return to base is a good occasion to get and verify information.

close confidential in formation to the enemy; • journalists are regarded with great suspicion. They are seen as antimilitarists and being able to influence the outcome of a confl ict (e .g. the Vietnam War). Up until a few years ago (during the Gulf War, fo r istance) the Commands exerted a strict control over t he flow of information and they passed on a smal l amount of info rm ation to t he press. Subequently, the military world of the West realized that it was im possibl e to hide the t ruth, ho r-

rible or shocking though it was , from the pu bl ic opinion . In t he n ineties, t he primary goal was to esta b l is h a contact between the mil itary forces and pu bl ic opi nion, strik i ng a reasonab le ba lan ce hetween the necessity of letting people know what happens and the duty t o respect t he confident ial natu re of some information . T his has been ac hieved thanks to the constant and strong presence o f journa li sts in t h e ar my bases. The media coverage of m il itary operat ions affects t he publ ic percept ion of the eve nts and the pub lic opinion can influence th e du rati on and cost of a conflict. So there is a growing awareness of t he importa nce of good information. It is necessary to give an objective description o f t he events before other people prov ide the media with a gross distort ion of the truth. Journa lists have to descri be events concern ing the Armed Forces . These journal ists ar e cal led «embedded», wh ich means «becom ing part of a spec ific unit in operation» . T hi s figure origi nates i n Afghanistan where j ourn a li sts a re a llowed to visit those places i n wh ich the mi lita ry live and operate and to fo llow the Units during mi litary operations. In th is way , t hey are able to tell stories about sold iers, how they live, what they do, who they are , how they think: it is the so ld ie rs who speak . T here is still a lot to do but «a friendly re lationship between the med ia and the army paves the way fo r a fruitful collaboration and during the operations the communication in creases the vis ibi lity o f the m ilitary and helps the pub lic opin ion know and acq uire g reater fami li arity with m ilitary activities». In Kab ul the A merican forces seized a letter wh ich Bin Lade n had addressed to Mullah Omar. He wrote: it is obvious that the media war is one of the most powerful tools to use to win the decisive victory. Media bombardment will represent 90% of our battles («Panorama», March gth 2006). It is important to reflect on thes e words in order to become f ully aware that establishi ng a relations hip with media people is much more comp li cated than we can expect.

Giorgio Battisti Major General, Chief, General Affairs Division, • Army General Staff Gianfranco Oggiano • Captain, Public Informa tio n Office, General A ffairs Division, Army General Staff

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ETHICS AND MOTIVATION The way a soldier feels during a fight The soldier engaged in combat is pervaded by a tumult of feelings, often in contrast with each other. Conflicting feelings where passion tends to overcome reason, motivation and sense of ethics. An alternation of rational and irrational predominance, which involves also the Commanders, compelled to live through even more explosive and stressing situations.

THE SOLDIER The figure of the soldier has been social ly recognized since the dawn of civilization. He d istinguished himself by his strength and aggressiveness. He stood out from the rest of the group because he was able to def end the territory and food supp lies and take food away from other groups. He was the «prince of survival» and, for t his reason , the co mm un ity praised him but at the same time it stood in awe of him. As Plutarch wrote in «Life of Lycurgus», in the 8th century BC Lycurgus aimed to create a new Spartan society whose members were invincib le warriors. T hey had to be untouched by «the superfluity and vanity»: this basic general rule operated in Egypt where the soldiers were kept qu ite separate from civil society. For many centuries, Spartan society held great fascination for all Greece and insp ired Plato when he idealized «his State» in the «Republic». According to him, society was divided into three groups dependi ng o n t he nature of each ind ividual: phi losophe rs, warriors and citize ns (farmers and crafts me n). Obvious ly, slaves were not mentio ned . Phi losophers and warriors have to lead the utopian State of Plato. Philosophers are seen as the source of all wisdom : they know what is good for all the city (they know the t ruths of li fe more than · anyone else in the world).Warriors have t he virt ue of bravery (the military must ens ure that people obey the phi losophers' w ill and t hey have to defend the ir territ ory against enemies). Th ese two classes rule the lower ones whic h cons ist of craf tsmen and far mers who produce goods for the. community. The ruling classes have to worry not only about the ir own we ll- being but also about that of the entire community. All these groups have to have two important virtues: justice, w hich means performing one's particular functions, and moderation. Contemporary society, technology and new ways

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of looking at the military world enable us to d raw an analogy between these two Platon ic virtues and those virtues that lead the soldiers du ri ng peace and through war. T he mi litary draws on its strength in the fighting and aims to win. However, his strength can act as a powerful and effective deterrent when it proves to be potentially destructive and winni ng. Fighting means be ing able to use vio lence in a sensi ble and effective way , killing only if necessary and al lowing for the fact t hat one can be killed. Winn ing means be ing the ideal instrument fo r neutralizing attacks against the community / Stat e. Neut rali zing implies aggress iveness of military sp irit and mode ration in order to achieve one 's goals witho ut going beyond humanitarian lim its. Sold iers are expert in the use of force and have to use it avo idi ng any excesses . It is w ide ly believed that in wartime everyth ing is al lowed (inter arma silent leges). Actually, there is not hing more dangerous than holding an opinion like that, not only from a «civi l» point of view but also in mil itary t erms. As General Karl von Clausewits (1 780- 1831) said, war is famously «t he contin uation of policy by other means».. By nature all human beings surrender the m se lves to pathos (passion) rather than to logos (rational ity) and ethos (ethics and morals). In particular, during the fighting human be ings reveal the ir real nature and can cause irreparable damage. For t his reason, the civilized society cal ls for ethical behaviour and principles which are transformed into regulations and guarantee humanity and justice. Th is process prov ides an effective safeguard against unjust w ars. In fact, we can question the legiti macy of a war in case t he way it is fought v iolates t he basic human rig hts (the rules of ius in be/lo), the pri nciple of proport ionality (it concerns the damage inflicted) and the principle of discrimination (between fighters and not fighte rs): «however just a war is, it wil l turn out to be unjustified if t o win it the two im portant principles of ius in be/lo are v iol ated (it does not matter how much and how often)».

THE SOLDIER, FROM INSTRUMENT TO ACTOR

Title pa~es. Iraq: A Lagunari" patrol in action.

We have to confront the dilemma about whether soldiers are just pawns in the government's plans or rational agents within «that military continuation o f policy». If we regarded sold iers as mere instruments for attaining political objectives, lifting the burden of making important decisions from thei r shoulders, this would make their tasks much easier. Choosing this option means transforming a fighter into a mere war machine which is built to win and is based on training, discipline and leadership. If we saw them as real protagonists of the war and able to solve knotty problems and make key decisions affecti ng national objectives and policies, they would be in a very delicate situation. In this case, in fact, they are no longer free to operate in accordance with international rules governing the mi litary operations (ius in be/lo), which are fundamental part of their doctrine. In addition, they are at the mercy of the public opinion and, consequently, they are burdened with responsibi lities they would prefer not to have.

Above Afghanistan. "Alpini" on surveillance duty.

Cons idering t he soldier a «thinking» being means recognizing a change of his role: from pawn to actor, «from simple cause to intelligent cause»; he can be seen as «a cause able to produce good and bad things» and not «something produced by another cause without order and objectives». This changes the meaning o f t he term «soldier». In peacet ime the soldier is only «potentially>> engaged in mi litary operations and fighting. Consequently he is able to plan his work according to his primary objectives and taking into account the effects that have been produced by his own actions. (Effect Based Operation). However, we have to consider carefu lly d ifferent theatres of operations in which a soldier can operate. In fact, he cou ld show a very rational or aggressive disposition according to the context. It is clear that

117 - ANTHROPOS

our analysis is much simpler if we take into consideration the theatre of operations in which the «thinking» and «instinctive» part of the soldier comes out.

WHO THE FIGHTERS ARE

T raining and disc ipline pull soldiers in a particular direction in the battlefield (Combat Motivation). In the sudde n quiet t hat follows t he fighting they stop to think abo ut the resu lts that have been achieved and the major objectives that must be pursued and they assess the whole situation. In this phase reason prevai ls (Mil itary Ethics) and so ldiers are able to make important decisions tak ing into consideration their humanity and, at the same time, the need to win. A ll soldiers go through alternate periods of rationality and irrationality. The graph on the next page shows the extre me levels o f these two m ental cond itions : Mil ita ry Ethics and Combat Motivation. As second figure , the Commander of Large Units w ho is able to operate without getting physically involved in the fighting. T he respo nsi bil ity o f the mission and his own troops and the res pect of law req uire a great deal o f energy. In addition, he feels a surge of pu re ad renalin during the battle because he would like to be in the front line together with his soldiers; to f ulfil this onerous task he has to get the maximum benefit out or «h i~ inner resources»: Combat Motivation and Mi litary Ethics. The Com mande r, whose so ul often surren de rs to the Combat Motivation, becomes very close to h is soldiers through this emotional involvement (pathos), and extremes meet. T his makes the structure of the Army sol id and all these eleme nt s make it an organic whole. The third and last figure we can see in the virtual battlefield shows t he soldier of staff. He works fo r the Commander in order to transform every single decis ion into actio n in accordance w ith the task and law (ius in be/lo, Military Ethics). He works in a context where there is little physical and emotional involvement and wh ere he is able to act reasonably and respons ibly following «the ratio nal path» of his heart .

WHAT LEADS THE SOLDIER So ld iers are driven by their instinct ive part whic h pushes t hem to act to pursue specific aims . This is referable to the Mi litary Eth ics and Combat Motivation. The Military Ethics is a set of rules govern ing the pub li c and private conduct of the mil itary. It consists of fundamental values such as Country, Discipline and Honour.

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In sho rt, the Military Ethics reminds so ld ie rs of «what they have t o do and for w hom». Ci rcumstances affect our choices , but anyway a soldie r cannot let t his happen during his work. He gets round this following the rules govern ing the army, t rying to predict the consequences of his act ions during the mission, t reating his comrades with great respect and taking into cons ideration the current situation . Acting like that means adopting a morally correct attitude. The Combact Motivation can be explained by offering a p recise defin it ion of both terms . Motivation derives from a Latin word motivus which means «able to make something move», that is to say a conscious or unconscious stim ul us to t he action. If this stimulus refers to the individual, it can be described as «a dynamic factor of hu man behaviour which leads an organism towards a goal». As far as the adjective «combat» is concerned, it refers to the individ ual aggressive behaviour. It is a phenomenon emerging from the state of war, it is not a feature of people who justify it . Soldiers are driven by this instinctual impulse which enables them to overwhelm the enemy with determination , afte r having received an adequat e training and under a good leadersh ip in an ideal comradely environment. The Combat Motivation regards the individual and the group at the same t ime . As far as the soldier is concerned, it appears to be a willi ngness t o win and survive. Instead, in the group it shows itself as cohesion, wh ich is <<something that re lates membe rs of an organization to each other so that all members d isplay wi ll ing ness and honour the ir own commitment to themselves, unity and objective».

CONCLUSIVE ANALYSIS What I have described by referring to the following figures: «soldier-fighter», «soldier of staff» and Commander is just abstract theory, whereas t he reality is much more complex than it seems. A soldier does not have to see himself as a war mach ine; a Commander shou ld not expect him to take decisions or make choices about simple and ideal situations. During the battle he fights bitte rly and hard again st the enemy and he moderates his aggressiveness adhe ring to simple and essential et hical princ iples. These principles must be easy to remember and comprehens ible. To give an example, in t he «Soldier's Creed» t he American Army has outl ined t he so-called «Warrior Et hos»: «I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade». Soldiers driven by t hei r inst inct and princip les of honour and comradeship are ab le to persi st in th eir actions even in bad conditions trying to w in

PREVALENT EMOTIONS IN A COMBAT SITUATION

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(ROLE) the battle no matter how difficult it is. In this case, persisting in doing someth ing is not a mere courageous action. It is moral courage; it is not o nly an energy that pushes them to take risky and definitive decisions but it is an «inner energy» which enables them to summon the will power to fight. The US Army «Soldier's Creed» mentioned above stresses t hat the modern armies tend to make the motivational aspect prevail over the ethical part of the · soldier although they recognize the need to morally respect the enemy and the rules of war. Referring to t he graph of previous page, in fact, we could move the parabola of Combat Motivation to the top of the graph (or to t he bottom) depending on whether the army aims to have (especially in the front line) soldiers driven by pathos rather than by ethos. A useful comparison will show an important po int: the American Army demands a lot of its troops in terms of resu lts. The policy adopted by our Armed Forces is q uite different. As a consequence, American soldiers put a great emphasis on the objective that must be obtained whereas Italian soldiers lay particular emphasis on how to achieve it. This allows us to notice the different deg ree of trust placed in the single individual. Outlining just a few

principles in the detailed check lists is symptomatic of an organization that does not exert a strict control over its members and allows them to operate free within lim its. This makes them feel much more involved in the pursuit of their goals and urges them to devote themselves to the operation even taki ng the in itiative if necessary. On the contrary, enunciating lots of principles without classifying standard operative procedures according to t heir features could make the single individual feel confused and bound to comply with instructions t hat are given by people who have the power to decide. Until today, this attitude towards operational problems has turned out to be able to achieve good results and it has been considered to be a good quality of our Armed Forces in t he peacekeeping missions because it has allowed them to fulfil essential and strategic aims, earning universal praise. In • future, this quality could transform into a serious handicap. The Minister of Defence said: a peace-

keeping operation does not have to impose limits to the military functions since «the combat features» of an army must be distinctive. T hese words warn the mi litary against any misinterpretation of what the battlefield is: a place of violent clash with the enemy.

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I HAVE BEEN WHAT OTHERS DID NOT WANT TO BE I WENT WHERE OTHERS DID NOT WANT TO GO I DID WHAT OTHERS DI NOT WANT TO DO I NEVER ASKED ANYTHING OF THOSE WHO NEVER GIVE ANYTHING WITH RAGE I ACCEPTED TO BE EMARGINATED AS IF I HAD MADE A MISTAKE I SAW THE FACE OF TERROR I FELT THE STING OF FEAR I REJOICED AT THE SWEET TASTE OF A MOMENT OF LOVE I CRIED I SUFFERED I HOPED...BUT MOST OF ALL I LIVED THOSE MOMENTS THAT OTHERS SAY WOULD BE BEST FORGOTTEN WHEN MY TIME COMES I WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THAT I AM PROUD OF WHAT I WAS ...A SOLDIER.

(George LSkipeck)

Once again our attention is drawn to the concept of warrior defined by Plato in «The Republic» . T hi s concept is valid even in t he contemporary society because it clears up any doubts about what view the Armed Forces have to hold on the figure of t he so ldier in order to avoid any possible m isunderst anding about some fundament al concepts whose mean ing is often twist ed . Peace considered as absence of military conflict cannot be guaranteed fo r ever. This resource m ust be safeguarded constantly adopting an adequate po licy of security, that is to say an approp riate use of force which should be used only if necessa ry .

Desktop image on the computer of the AVES component in Operation "Antica Babilonia".

The equat ion securit y -i nability to communicatevio lence represe nts the cornerstone of being warr ior. In order to avoid any possible m isunderst anding , w hen the military operates in peacekeepi ng missions they should face t hem w it h its us ual mil itary min d supported by adequate professional training and mora l creed. Former American Secretary of Defence Les Aspen said: We have to carry out a mission, we have to fight

THE FIGHTER'S TEN RULES · Act as a disciplined sold ier. Disobed ience of laws of war spo il s your unity and yourself and causes you un necessary suffering which does not discou rage the enemy but pushes him to seek revenge. • Fight on ly against your enemy and mi litary objectives. • Do not cause maj or damage when you are performing your tasks. · Do not fight the enemy who has surrendered or has been knocked out. Pick him up, disarm hi m and hand him over to sen ior officers. Protect and t reat the survivors of plane crash and shipwrecked people wit h due respect. • Treat all the enem ies and civilians who are unde r your aut hority humanely. • Pick up and provide all people (enem ies and friends) with care during t he f ighti ng or at the end of the war accord ing to your Commander's orders. • Do not tuke anyone hostage and do not perform acts of revenge. · Respect people and things marked wit h symbols of Red Cross, preservation of cu ltural heritage, civil defence and the white f lag of Purliument. Do not steal property from other people. · Inform a sen ior officer of any hosti le ucts.

ANTHROPOS - 120

Rangers of the 9th Assault Paratroop Regiment ready to depart for a mission in Afghanistan.

and win the wars of our Nation. For whom do we do it? For the American population. This «twofold ethics» justifies the American Armed Forces (.. .). Since we are able to fight and win all the wars of our Nation, we are much more capable than others of facing different kinds of mission such as peacekeeping and relief operations (. ..). Soldiers must be regarded as «combat ready» instruments, they are trained and equipped to further strategic aims. However «we cannot give a weapon to anyone. Consequently, a well- chosen selection and a rigorous moral and disciplinary training of people who pursue a military career are needed». An adequate moral «training» must be considered unequivocal point of reference in all situations, when they are on garrison duty or during a military operation, when they undertake a combat or a peacekeeping mission. To meet this objective it is necessary to explain simple and basic principles to the soldier concerning the figure of the fighter. They must be regarded as consistent and clear principles, to give an example: . I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills (US Army, Warrior Ethos), I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the US.A. in close combat (US Army, Warrior Ethos); ... the ethos of the Army is sustained by all soldiers doing their duty with an implacable will to succeed; accepting their grave responsibility and legal right to fight and kill according to their orders and their unlimited liability to give their lives for others; confident that in return the nation will look after them and their families (British Army); . In combat: you will act without re lish of your tasks, or hatred; you will respect the vanqu ished enemy and will never abandon neither your wounded nor your dead, nor wi ll you under any circumstances surrender your arms (The French Legionnaire's Code of Honour);

. A m1ss1on once given to you becomes sacred to you, you will accomplish it to the end and at all costs (The French Leg ionnaire's Code of Honour). This is important to face the difficult situations pf combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. At strateg ic leve l, the Commander has to face de licate and controversial questions. This requires a hig her standard of competence. The shift of «organizational leadership» towards real «strategic leadership» involves the development of new abilities and habits. At an o rganizational level , tasks and objectives are really clear and this requires specific competence. Consequently, tasks and standard of performance must be clear and easy to understand. The Commander finds himself in a difficult situat ion because he has to manage the most de licate resource which is the matter of ethics. He has not to adopt an immoral attitude towards the enemy, because he is a human being and has powe r to think logical ly. In other words, he has the ability to think in an intelligent way because reason is peculiar to man. He realizes that everyone is born equal. His behaviour will be ethically correct if he considers the enemy exactly like him. His behaviou r will be immo ral if he v iews him as an instrument to serve military i nte rests . The «principle» must be independe nt of specific goals everyone strives for. In this way, it is universal and ethically valid. The Commander always finds himse lf in a delicate situations which could affect his so ldiers and civilians' life as well as success and failure of strategic and political objectives of the nation. In addition, these situations are surrounded by an aura of uncertainty and ambiguity. Commanders do not play a _key role only in saving others' life but also in «guaranteeing deterrence». They have to be ready to conduct military operations involving the ki lli ng of people and destruction of property. Since soldiers have to face difficult situations in many cases, the Commander is not allowed to be in a state of inertia and paralysed w it h fear. A Commander could make mistakes when he takes decisions, which are often subjected to revision. However, this possibility does not have t o inhibit him. On the contrary, he has to give much more vigour to his conduct and adopt an attitude that seems to be wise and correct in that particular situation. In any case, taking an ethically wrong decision means increas ing the number of choices that they will have to face, as well as t he fut ure impact of those cho ices . A bad ethical decision could catch the Commander in a t rap showing him the wrong way.

Massimo Scotti Captain, Modena Military Academy

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.:•••

MAURIZIO AND FERRANTE GONZAGA Two unknown heroes Few people know the extraordinary epic deeds of Maurizio Gonzaga and his son Ferrante, Officers of Italian Army, who fought the two World Wars earning Gold and Silver Medals. There is a surreal dimension to their deeds. Their figures exude a magical and legendary aura of antiquity and magnificence.

A faint and emotional atmosphere pervades it, ing the German and Italian occupation of making people perceive that something great Europe. It has left a deep mark on our memory, happened. Gazing at Mo unt maybe because it was Vodice covers the whole gamut exhausting, painful and even of emotions. It evokes the ' ' The First and the Second cruel. The decisive factor was ind elible memory of an impor- World War, history and mem- a strong sense of solidarity tant event and bears the ory, the battles on the slopes among peop le, which made imprint of history, which is the enemy feel a distressing slowly disappearing into the of Mount Vodice and the consensat ion of constant danger intricate maze of legend. tinuing fighting during the and isolat ion. History becomes legend and Resistance. These events reIn Italy, the Resistance had legend creates the myth. T he mind us of the epic deeds of unique features. It developed fleetingness of historical two brave soldiers who into an armed struggle after the experience and the remarkable marked the military and po- dissolution of the Army, which persistence of memory. The had lost its leaders and atmosphere of t his place litical progress of our country, Commands after the armistice leaves an indel ible imprint on even though they lived in difof September 8, 1943. our memory. Mount Vodice is ferent periods of history , , Large and cohesive groups situated in the Julian Alps, in formed within the population in former Yugoslavia, on the left order to defeat the former- ally bank of the lso nzo. During the First World War it who had occupied the national territory and had was the stronghold of the Austrian defence, committed horrible crimes against Italian soldiers. «incorporated» into the second line, o rgan ized around Gorizia. Its slopes were the theatre of bitter fighting, especially during the l oth battle of the lsonzo (May- June 191 7). Although its peak was conquered in August 1917, it was abandoned the following October, after the disaster of Caporetto. Events like these «colour» our books, giving us strong emotions. Another important event of Italian history was the Resistance. This movement deve loped dur-

Title pages. From left to right, Major General Prince Maurizio Gonzaga and his son Ferrante, Brigadier General. Right. A second-line trench on the Carso.

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nificent and romantic cities in the world. His The First and the Second World War, their histomother, Domenica Priamo, married Antonio ry and memory, the battles on the slopes of Mount Gonzaga, the only descendent of the House of Vodice and the continuing fighting during the Vescovato still alive. Although he came from a rich Resistance. These events remind us of the epic family, Maurizio worked very hard to obtain deeds of two brave soldiers who marked the m i liimportant results. His entire life was studded with tary and political progress of our Country, even success and remarkable achievements, t hanks to though they lived in d ifferent periods of history. which he was worthy of genuine ad miration . Maurizio Gonzaga was t he able Commander of the He was only 18 when he enrolled at Military 53rd Infant ry Division, which was called ÂŤLa School of Modena. After two years, in April 1881, FerreaÂť, during the First World War. His son, he achieved the rank of Second Lie utenant and was Ferrante Gonzaga del Vodice, was a brave ass ign ed to the 44th Infantry Regiment in Alba. Brigadier General during the Second World War. After two years, in July 1883 , he was promoted to Both of them left an indelible mark on the historithe rank of Lieutenant. Th is rep resented the first cal events of that period. step towards the considerable success that he The celebration of these personages, whose herowould achieve in his life. In ism is largely unknown, marks October he married Ferdinanda not only their deeds, which took place in the battlefield, but also ''Their life, which was dedi- Alliana. T hey had two children, their striking personality. It is no cated to the respect of the Maria Giuseppina and Ferrante would follow in his coincidence that Maurizio military values and the safe- (who father's steps). Gonzaga has been the most decOn December 2, 1913 he orated General in Italy. He was guard of national integrity awarded two Gold Medals and can be regarded as an exam- became Commander of the t hree Silver Medals for Military ple of virtue and distinction , , Military Zone of Tobruk, where he dist inguished himself for Valour. His son was the first his great m ilitary and political General to be decorated with the skills. Th is is what earned him a challenging task. Gold Medal after the Nazi occupation of Italy. He was transferred to Benghazi, where he took Actually, something of a mystery surrounds their the place of the Governor of Cyrenaica during his figures. There is almost a surreal dimension to their absence. From April 1914, he assumed the com deeds. Their figures exude a magical and legend ary mand of the zone of el - Me rg (Barce) whPn" hP aura of magnificence and antiquity. Examining their was able to defeat the rebels in Kasr T ecass is and deeds requires, first of all, referring to their origins. Lezga. After attaining the rank of Major General, They came from the House of Gonzaga, a noble he won the battles of Gerdes and Bernia. During family t hat reigned over Mantova from l 328 by popthis fighting he showed a real charismatic leadular demand, and from 1433 with an imperial title ership, which earned him the Kn ighthood of the until July 1 708, when the small state was annexed to Military Order of Savoy. In November, he the House of Austria. assumed the command of the "Salerno" Infantry From the beginning, lo ng lines of descendants Br igade for a short time since the General Staff originated from the secondary branches of the soon recalled him. House of Gonzaga. The two Genera ls were descended from the branch of Vescovato, whose origins dated back to John (1525), son of Frederic THE GREAT WAR I and brother of Francis II. Their life, which was dedicated to the respect of The political a nd diplomatic situation was military values and the safeguard of national getting worse in Europe . In fact, i n 1914 the integrity, can be regarded as an example of virtue First World War broke out: a new event in the and distinction. In every single deed there is history of humanity. For th e firs t time, all t he something important and memorable, as well as states fought a global war. It was an ai r, naval u_nmistakable signs of greatness. They performed and land war. New and powerful weapons we re extraordinary actions on and off the battlefield deployed. On one side Germany and A ustriaand their behaviour was always exemplary; they Hungary, on th e oth er Serbia, Montenegro, had special virtues. Each aspect of two Generals Russia, Fra nce , Belgium and Eng land. Italy, reminds us of their noble origins. which had entered into an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary with t he Triple MAURIZIO GONZAGA Alliance, declared its neutrality. It j ust if ied t his decision by saying that t he Allies had not con Maurizio Gonzaga was born on September sulted it about this important step and that the 21,1861 in Venice, which is one of the most mag-

125 - ANTHROPOS

war was extremely aggressive. The fo llowing ery because he distinguished himself during the year Italy went to war breaking off the alliance fighting in t he Plateau of Tonezza and Mount with the Central Empires and supporting the Cimone. Great military and interpersonal skills, powers of the Entente. In April, Italy had signed demonstrated after «the punitive expedition» of the Pact of London. After having found that Austrian General Conrad, when he was seriously Austria had the i ntenti on of extending the inj ured in the conquest of Mount Vod ice, earned negotiations, it rep udi ate d the treaty of the him the first Silver Medal. On l st June he was proTr ip le Al liance . Even if lots of politicians promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General and was claimed their neutrality, Italy declared war on reappointed as Commander of the 9 th Division. In Austria-Hungary on May 2 3, l 91 5 (but it came January 191 7 he was no minated Commander of into effect the followi ng d ay) . Our country went the 53 rd Infantry Division, which would be called thro ug h a terrible experience, which would lead «La Ferrea» because «it neithe r surrendered no r to chaos and a complete lac k of certainty as disbanded even afte r Caporetto» tak ing part in t he well as to catastrophic economic, po l itical and mi litary operations to conquer Mount Vodice. social consequences. Since t hen Maurizio Gonzaga has passed into legMaurizio Gonzaga played a leading ro le in the end and his epic deeds has been memorable. conflict, showing military and political skills On 1 s th May, on the front of the 2nd Corps, and preserving h is human and moral values. the 53 rd Division occupied the summit of When Italy went to war he was appointed Vodice, which was a well - fortified post of the Intend ant of the 2nd Army. On October 21, he Austrian defensive system. On t he evening of the 15th May General Capello iss ued the fol rose to the rank of Commander of the 9 th lowing orders: on the day of 7 7th May the 2nd Mobilized Infantry Divis ion. His charismatic lead ership brought out the Corps will have to take up its military greatness of the strategic position and will Prince. He solved extremely ' ' Maurizio Gonzaga played make its glorious advance dangerous situations on the a leading role in the con towards Monte Santot on the 1sth_ General Badoglio battlefield. It is an arduous flict showing military and task to explain how complex a that the 3rd Division political skills and preserv- ordered military operation is, and it is should occupy the mount at even more difficult to get ing his human and moral an alt itude of 363 metres, across how exceptional their values ,, north of Paljevo; the Br ig ade deeds were. Human actio n is «Avell i no» of the 50th definite and lim ited. Only the D ivision should continue to brief perception of the event can lead us to strengthen its position at an altitude of 592 grasp its significance and greatness. If the metres; and General Gonzaga with his t roops, readers had l ived through the deeds of on the night of l th , sh ould cover that part of Gonzaga they would have been able to underthe front occupied by Br igade «Ave ll i no » in stand . The historical narrative de scribes a parorder to consolidate the operatio ns of reinticu lar event, takes a picture of a memory and forcement and organize an effective defence provides us with a mere documentation . between the south - facing slopes of Mount Kuk Instead , th e art of poetry «ennobles» the event and the altitude 592. The following day, beca use it celebrates heroic deeds. Only im me Badog lio o rdered that the Brigade should ta k e diacy makes us undergo the experience of real orders from the 53 rd Division. He aimed to ity in absence of which we can just use our cont inue to stoutly defend the impo rtant imagination totally lacking in objectivity. We stronghold of altitude 592 d u ring the attack tend to regard Prince Gonzaga as a brave that the 53 rd Division would have to launch leade r. Maybe he was much greater than histoagainst Mount Vodice. With the 53rd D ivisio n, ry books have been able to convey. What hapthe Command of the 50th Division was forced pened in Podgora, Peuma and Val d'Astico, on fo g ive ground. Consequently, t he front line of the attack of the 2nd Corps was un der the 3 rd the Trentine front, provides us with a perfect example. He was a fantastic leader of his Division Command , on the left side, from i nfantryme n by exposing hims elf to the enemy Globna to Kuk, and under the 53 rd Divis ion in the trenches and giving peop le enormous Command, on the r ight side, from the southern help when a cholera ep idemic struck i n the win- · slopes of Mount Kuk to Mount Vodice. ter. He was a real leader because he was ab le to General Gonzaga carried out t he orders that set a great example to h is so ld iers : he always the Command of the 2 nd Corps had issued and fulfilled their expectations. in Zagomila where he had transferred his During the same year he was decorated for bravtroops, at 7 pm on l 7 th May, he gave the order

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res istance but it was ready to try again as soon to conquer Mount Vodice. The Armed Forces as the central co lu mn had reach ed t he summit of consisted of the following Brigades: «Teramo)) the mount. At the cent re, two Alpine battalions, (241 st and 242 nd ), «Girgenti» (24 7 th and «M. Levanna» on the left side, 243th) and «Avellino» (2 31 st and «Aosta» on the right side, and 232 nd ), the 5th Alpine Group (battalions «Levanna>), ' ' Gonzaga had the merit of headed fo r the opening n. 5. «Aosta» and «V. Toce»),. two conducting the operations Although they were unde r constant fire from enemy mountain batteries and all the of May-June 191 7 with great weapons, they were able to field artillery of the 50th Division (one Regiment of skill and bravery, repulsing reach the opposite line of field artillery, three mountain the enemy counterattacks defence rapidly and stopped to batteries and one battery of and spurring his soldiers up be reorganized. At l pm, they conquered Austrian trenches, l 05 calib re). to the front line , , situated on the slopes of the Although the 241 st Regiment mount, ra pid ly. After a few had suffered heavy losses durminutes they succeeded in conquering the sum ing the attack of l 5th May, morale was still very mit of Mount Vodice break ing down the fierce high and othe r troops were in good conditions. enemy res istance. The siege artillery of the 2n d Corps opened fire The t iredness of the troops and heavy losses at 6 am and used 28 medium and large cali bre did not allow them to complete the conquest of batteries. After three hou rs, they mad e the range Mount Vodice. When the colum ns of th e mythic of the siege artillery longer and the n it was sup53rd Division, which aimed to conquer the ported by t he divisional artillery. The left column Mou nt, started to perform their action, Austrian encountered stiff resistance. For this reason, a troops t ried to occupy the altitude 592 by a viocompany of the Alpine battalion "Val Varaita" lent attack. However, the infantrymen of the re inforced it. At 5 pm it managed to conquer a Brigade «Avellino» managed to preva il again and part of t rench but after a while it was forced to re sisted the ene my attack. The following day, the abandon it because it was counter-attacked by 53rd Div is io n was ordered to proceed to Mount the Austrians. On the right side, even the battal Saint i n order to cooperate with the 6 th Armed ion «Val Toce» had to stop because of the enemy Corps i n the attack. Gonzaga was able to co nduct the operation of A monument to the Messina Brigade in a suburb of May- June 19 1 7 with good skills and bravery by Corizia. Its memorial plaque carries the inscription: repulsing the enemy counter- attacks an d by «Mount Vodice. monument to General Prince Maurizio spurring all the soldiers. The bravery shown in Gonzaga». · the fighting and his m ilit ary skills earned him the Gold Medal. In August, du ring the 11 th battle of t he lson zo , the 53rd Divis ion fought against the enemy on the top of Mount Kuk and was able to reach the slopes of the plateau of Bainsizza. On that occasion Gonzaga was decorated with another Silver Medal. During the retreat of Caporetto , the 5 3 rd Division pushed as far as Stupizza, in Val Natisone, in order to stop the enemy advance. On 2 5 th October, he was badly wounded during the fighting for the third time . A shower of splinters lodged in his body. He lost his right hand but continued to fight until his state of health enabled him to do it. In fact, he was soon taken to mil itary hospital of Udine after he had been reli eved of the Command an d there he foug ht for his l ife. Then he was taken to Genoa where he spent a long convalescen ce . The he roic episode of Stupizza earned him the second Gold Medal (until that mo ment he was t he only one to have won two Gold Medals) and made him one of the most decorated Officers of Italian Armed Forces .

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A f ter his accident, he recovered ve ry we l l an d although he had been ser ious ly d isab led during that f ig hting , he was able to lead h is so ld iers int o t he fina l successf ul batt le of Vitto r io Venet o . On 23th August 1918 he went back to the fro nt as Comman der of t he 14th Div ision which was mobi l ized in the zon e of Grappa . During the last offensive , h is m il it ary ski lls led h im to ex cel again in t he fighting of Mou nt Valbel la. T his earned h im t he third Silve r Medal. What made Gonzaga a great Genera l were not only his unqu est ionable mili t ary sk i ll s but also h is ext raord inary humanity t hat made h im ve ry popular among his t roops . People say that on t he top of Mou nt Vodi ce, which had been j ust con.quered, Gonzaga want ed to l iste n t o divisiona l music. He st arted singing the national anthems (such as «Brothe r s of Italy» and «the Ant hem of Gariba ld i») infus ing courage i nto his infantrymen w ho s ucceeded in repu lsing violen t enemy count er-attacks . An art icle, which was written in 19 1 7 by a correspondent of «Gazzetta de l Popo lo» , makes his

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The Army Chief- of- Staff, General Cadorna, inspecting t he Carsic front.

port rayal much mo re accurate: This brave and

famous man who bears a big name and had a great military success gives us an immediate good impression. It is like meeting an old fa mily friend. He is not very tall but young and vigorous even though it is difficult to say how old he is. He has a tremendous spirit, which makes him much younger then he is. Gonz aga is good- natured and intelligent. He is still ginger- haired and has got thick eyebrows and moustache. The expression in his eyes is lively. In his look, exactly like in his behaviour, everything is indicative o f humility, modes ty and kindness. And they are unmistakable signs. A faded uniform «which smacks of storms»; a crumpled cap that h e usually pulls over his eyes: it reminds us of that worn by the Bersaglieri; he keeps «the popular ciga rette», which is always lit, in a note shaped like a tube, exactly like a man who smokes 80 ciga-

rettes a day. He has lots of powerful cars at his disposal but he has chosen the smal!est one by which he goes everywhere. When you talk with him, you realize how optimistic, loyal and kindhearted he is. He seems somewhat old-fashioned in his attitudes. His big voice which makes us think of years of struggle•in the streets, is mitigated by a slight regional accent and a fatherly tone in which he tells stories, explains and asks questions. Each word is spontaneous and natural. No word is difficult, no idea is complex: it is interesting because it makes us live through the reality and touches us because it discloses goodness of heart. There is a strong emotional streak in his character. He has got a son, who is Captain of Artil!ery and in charge of a Command that is situated next to him. However, he can see him rarely and he consoles himself by taking care of a filly that his son has entrusted to him. He gives fatherly advice even to his soldiers. The poetry of Giovanni Bertocchi p ublished by «La Domenica del Corriere)) makes the figu re of Gonzaga mythic and romantic and the art of poetry revives enduring memories of his deeds: «O

Prince leader, one day / when the sorrow of the heroic mountains, / towering above noble cities, / will be dispelled beyond the broad horizons, / with you I will return, / to Mount Vodice which I saw / still desirous of epic deeds, injured / by the barbarian lurking in the shelter» . T hese are the first verses of a successfu l attempt to mythologize his entire life.

THE POST-WAR YEARS After the First World War, Go nzag a became Commander of the Terri torial Military Division o f Genoa where he would stay for three years. During the conflict he had gained immense prestige. He was regarded as a cha rism atic leader. He used common sense and impartiality as powerful po litical weapons t hat would help h im to co pe with difficu lt situations successfully on many occasions. In 192 1, for in stance, he manage d to prevent the Summit of Rapal lo and Genoa from degene rating into chaos. The n, he was transferred t o t he Command of the Army Corps in Florence. Once aga in he demonstrated t o be up to the task, he managed to calm people down after violent clashes that had led t o the kil lin g of some fascists. In Florence, the land of art and culture, history and literatu re, he ordered to erect a Monument to Mother Italy, as a war memo rial . On l l th June l 9 22 he was appointed as Senator of the Kingdom of Italy and attai ned the rank of General of the Arms Corps .

From 20th February 1924 he cont inued t o do his jo b as «a Disab led serviceman)). During that period he came to contact with Mussolini, who was Pri me Min ister. The latter invited him t o give f~vourable opinion about Di Giorgio's project concern ing the reorgan ization of the Army, which was discussed in t he Senat e those days and about which all the Generals had given an unfavourable opinion. He worked for t he Council of Ministers and was soon appointed as Comm ander of the Voluntary Militia for the Fascist National Security, as a subst itute for Gene ra l Gandolfo who had d ied sudden ly. Gonzaga t ook a moderate attitude and, for t his reason, encountered lots of difficulties in his wo rk. In accordance w ith t hese rules and political and m ilitary values, he accepted the assignment only after the authorization of the king and Ge neral Armando Diaz. He te nded to place military issues above political ones. His attitude clashed with strategies and plans of the reg ime . Soon he was re lieved of his important pos ition, but anyway th is fact did not lead to t he end of his relationsh ip with the reg ime. The government had not wanted to treat him with contempt. This decision was just the inevitable conseq uence of a strict and authoritarian policy that was based on a rigid observance of the law. There was not any doubt about his hum an and profess ional skills. His hero ic deeds were not forgotte n. After bei ng appointed as auxili ary because of his age, he was recalled on tem porary service. On 29 th Decem ber 1932, he was awarded by the ki ng with the t itle of «Marqu is of Vod ice». On that occas ion, as P. Crocian i has highlighted , the Presidence of Council paid the high tax concession (about 36 000 lire). In addition, the

government gave Gonzaga two grants (about 200 000 lire) in December 1934 and in September 7935. Gonzaga received a generous salary even when he was recalled on temporary service after being appointed as auxiliary because of his age. He was awarded other honorific titles such as: «Prince of the Ho ly Roman Empire», «S ir of Vescovato», «Patrician of Veneto», «Count of Vil lanova», «Count of Castelnuovo» ; as well as with two Gold Medals and three Silver Medals he was decorated w ith the Officers ' Cross of the Military Order of Savoy (and later of Italy) w ith the following reason : «he was Major Commander during two

years of war. He was able to lead his troops bravely in any dangerous situations achieving remarkable success». He was conferred the Badge of • invalid and five Badges of inj ured. In particular, he had three serious accidents and faced up to the situ at io n heroically: on 22 nd August 1 9 1 7 • Gonzaga «was hit by a piece of shrapne l of a grenade in the central region during the fighting of Vodice» : on 23rd August «he was hit by shrapne l from bullets in the right mammary region when

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Ferrante was already Colonel and was going to become Genera l of Arti llery. Like his father, Ferrante embarked on a mi litary career and devoted his entire life to h is country and his patriotic duty. He graduated in i ndustria l eng ineering and invented lots of devices , which would be used in Artillery. He was very young when he took part in the exped ition of Fezzan , during the ltalo-Turkish war, and he was awarded a Silver Medal for bravery. Even during peace he distinguished himse lf by his generos ity and a deep sense of duty. He wat ched a submarine nation mourn his death. General Maurizio sink beneath the waves and managed to save the Gonzaga was one of the heroes of the First World Commander's life. For h is bravery, t he M inistry War and one of the most representative brave figof the Navy gave him the third Silve r Medal. ures of our country. They also paid tribute to his In 1907 he went to the Milit ary Academy of extraordinary deeds : [. . .] the conquest of Mount Artille ry and Engineers where he attained the Vodice was memorable; it was an heroic deed perrank of Second Lieut enant. In formed with vehemence and l 912 he was made Lie utenant bravery, during a month of blood and fierce fighting on the ' ' There was never any and went to Libya when war out. He was given the top of the mount which was doubt about the General's broke second Silver Medal and two desperately defended by the enemy. The strong courage human and professional Bronze Medals fo r his particishown by the infantrymen on skills. His heroic deeds were pation i n the First Wor ld War. At the end of war he reached the battlefield was fuelled by never forgotten ,, the rank of Major and attendthe remarkable example of the ed all the courses of th e General. He was always present School of War. He served as Major in the Staff at and vigilant on the front line although he had been the Big Un its. In l 926 , he was made Lieutenantinjured twice during the fighting; after the conCo lonel and after three years he become quest, the force of the attacks turned into an Co m m ander of th e M ilitar-y Division of Genoa unshakeable resoluteness that enabled them w and later of lm peria . keep their defensive position in.order to resist the In May 1936 he was promoted to he rank of enemy violent counter- attacks. Even in Mount Kuk Colonel and became Commander of the Army where he was injured twice he distinguished himCorps in Rome. On l sth December 1938 he was self by his bravery. His behaviour was admirable appointed Ch ief of staff of the Divis ion «Aqui» during those terrible days of October 19 I 7 when in Merana and during the Second World War he his troops did not have to win a glorious victory, was entrusted with the Command of Artil lery of they just had to bar the enemy's way and stop the 1 3 th Army Corps in Sardinia and later t he their advance to combat national terrorism: this Command of the 2 5th Army Corps on t he was a tough and thankless task without any hope Graeco-A lbanian front. Once he returned to of being rewarded. At the Stupiz za Pass he directItaly, he put his professionalism at Ministry of ed his efforts towards the enemy and abandoned War's disposal. the battlefield only when he was forced to do it. In

he was fighting in the zone between Vodice and Mount Kuk»; on 25th October «he was hit by machine- gun bullets in the hand and right thigh, during t he fighting that took place one kilometre away from Stupizza in Val Natisone». When he died on 24th March 1938 in Rome, people paid their last respects to him. In his will, he expressed his desire «to be buried in Mount Vodice where he had performed his glorious deeds in 191 7». On the day of his death, the Senate paid tribute to the great General: Today the Senate, the Army and the entire

fact, ·he was seriously wounded by Austrian bullets and remained mutilated. It was the most terrible moment of the war. The strong defence of Gonzaga and his brave soldiers in that difficult period heralded the miracle of the Piave [. ..].Just on the Piave, afte r the disaster of Caporetto in 191 7, the honour of war was redeemed thanks tO t he heroic and brave deeds performed by great figures such as Maurizio Gonzaga.

FERRANTE GONZAGA When Maurizio Gonzaga died, amid sorrow and nosta lgi c memories of his deeds , his son

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THE HEROIC END On 26th February 1943 he became Com mander of the 222 nd Coast Division, which was situated in Salerno. As Command er of this Division he fell on 8 th September l 943. He was the first fallen of the war of Liberation, the first nationa l hero of the Resistance which would give future generations peace and freedom. On the evening of z9th July 1943, the king authorized Badogl io to separately negotiate a peace treaty. He d id not know that Hitler had already decided to carry out four mi litary operations aimin g at destroying our Army

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Wounded soldiers are rushed by ambulance to a military hospital in the rear lines.

against our sold iers . An Ital ian Unity occup ied the power plant in M ignano and a Company that had been sent there to re - estab li sh the order was routed. During the night, as the Allied land ed at and occupying Italy. When two SS German the plateau of Battipaglia, the Germans occupied Divisions reached Ital ian borders, the risks our the port of Sa le rno and managed t o disarm the country was running became clear. A general 3 rd battery in Vietri su l Mare. An Officer of strike brought Torino to a standstill. Th is strike, Pa nzerd ivisi on , Major Udo van A lvens leben, in support of a more intense anti - fascist action, ordered Gonzaga to lay down his arms and surthe release of political prisoners and the peace render. The great General refused po int-b lan k to process, took place on l 7th August 1943. On 2 nd obey. His heroic resista nce was the cause of his Sept ember Italy signed an death. He was ki lled by a rapid arm1st1ce with the Ang loburst of machine - gun fire. Americans who should have ' ' Like his father, Ferrante Other Officers tried to resist • made it effective from l 2th Gonzaga took up the mili- the enemy and were ki l led September. However, they d id instantly. tary career and devoted his not honour the commitment The Italian army was in a • and announced the arm istice entire life to Country, duty state of chaos and lots of so lafter four days. On the even in g and military honour ,, d iers were sent to the concent ration camps . This was the of th September the Germans mounted a treacherous attack darkest period in the country's

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the enemy from inflicting an ignom in ious and history. However, from th is moment the situation shamefu l def eat. He had an «aristocrat ic» att ichanged radically. T hese terr ible exper iences t ude which is typica l of peo ple who know what urged people to win back their freedom and cou ld happen to the m an d do not fear «to read rebui ld the ir national identity. the cl o sing chapter of the ir l ife». No man can After his death Ferrante Gonzaga was hailed as a escape his destiny: a heroic end that made h im hero . On t he evening of 3th September he perpass into leg end. He shared the same fate of formed an act of outstanding bravery that earned his father whose l ife became legend t hanks to him the Gold Medal fo r mi litary valour. It was the his ep ic deeds. A typical example of hi story first Gold Medal of the Italian army after the repeat i ng itself. Both of them were charismat ic Ge r man mi litary occupat ion. He dist ingu ished leaders and did nobl e and memorable deeds. himse lf not o nly by his m ilitary skill s but also by They loved facing death and we re heedless of his communicative and i nterpersonal skills . His the danger but they always made rat iona l a nd deep humanity and sensitivity never weakened his w ise decis ions. In addition , t hey had a kind and resol uteness and willpower. When everyone was in sympathet ic at tit ude towards othe r people. the dark about the negotiations with the AngloMau ri zio and Fer rante Gonzag a seem to be int iAme ricans , he wrote a letter to his sister Maria, in mat ely re lated to each ot her. In actual fact , a w hich he high li ghted the imminent threaten of a c lose and strong link connect s German attack: If they make a a ll t he great leaders w ho were move, I'll open fire on them. There is another examp le of his ' ' The heroic behaviour of ab le to do extraordinary d eeds tenacity. On t he even ing of 3th don Ferrante in the evening from the Middle Ages . T he House of Gonzaga boasts a September he revealed strong of September 8 earned him great many he roic leade rs w ho determination when he had to the first Gold Medal for Mil- changed the course of h istory. issue the o rders that Badog li o had not had the courage to itary Valour awarded in the The prin ce ly title, which i s Italian Army after the Ger- sign of nob ili ty and disti nc give. He o rdered that his so ltion , gives the deeds of diers sho uld res ist all attacks man Occupation , , Mauriz io and Ferrante on Italian arms. In fact , the Gonzaga a d ifferent d imen 239th battalion (Salerno) and sio n . T he respe ct for tradit ion, the se nse of the 162 nd (Ag ropo li), which belonged to his dut y , and t heir nob le o ri gins all ow us to read Divi~ior1, Juring that night, fought br-avely against the ir ep ic deeds i n a different way . There is no the Ang lo- Amer icans, who were go ing to land , and longer object ive and unb iased description of again st the Germans . It is no coinc idence that historical fac t s. referring to the arm istice Pao lo Monel li wrote: If T hei r deeds assume new sign ificance and Gonzaga had been in Rome on that occasion, the insp i re our imaginat ion because they have history of Italy would have been different. become legend. It is difficult to distinguish The official news of hi s death came after several betwee n legend and rea lity when we ta lk abo ut months . On 25th Ju ly 1944 , Princess Lu isa t hem. History becomes lege nd and lege nd creGonzaga (she is still alive in Rome) rece ived the at es the myth . The border between imagination official letter by wh ich she was informed of her and real ity is ofte n cros sed. T h is depends on husband's death. The king and the army offe red how much the reader's attention is captured. her their heart fe lt condo lences. Luisa Gonzaga Th eir deeds are surrounded by a mag ical aura, rep lied to that lette r in t he following way: Your wh ich gives those events a partic u lar fascinat ion Excellency, I would like to thank you for your letand d oes not obscure their hist orical relevance . ter that unfortunately gives me confirmation of my They are two d ifferent ways to ce lebrate t he i r husband's death. His end was heroic exactly like magni f icence . Narrat i ng the i r dee d s mea n s his life. He never abandoned the battlefield and emphasizing t he ir m i l itary sk ills . Our h istory is served the country faithfuffy. As weff as intense f ul l of these qua lities and important message s pain there is great pride in my heart. I feel and its ai m is to hand down them to posterity. immensely proud of what he did. One day I wiff tell The deeds that are performed by great men like my children that their father preferred death to Mauriz io and Ferra nte Gonzaga are ind icat ive of dishonour. important va lues such as bravery, honesty and courag e and g ive the concepts of Count ry and Nation enormous significa nce . CONCLUSIONS T he ir deeds rem i nd us of the two Wor ld Wars , wh ich, in t he f irst half of the 20t h century, covA hero ic death, an i nel uctable desti ny. His e red lots of nations with b lood spread i ng re f usa l to g ive up and lay down arms prevents

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hatred and vio lence across the wor ld . T hey A regimental band on the front line. were the most d readfu l events in the history o f human ity and left a deep mark on the popu laces' spi r it. The consequent destruct ion and remarkable ac hievements. The events that took devastation are an enduring and ho r rific memp lace during the night of sth September 1943 ory for peop le who lived throug h those events . ga lvanized people i nto act ion. T h ey wanted to The condemnat ion o f those terr ib le actions redeem the honour of war. perfor m ed by c ruel and Great leaders like Ma urizio insane peop le must be una niand Ferrante Gonzaga were mous. However, radica l and 'Great leaders like Maurizio ab le to preserve our patriotic abrupt changes carry out a ues by giving the ir soldiers and Ferrante Gonzaga were val useful and v ital funct ion in considerable encouragement order to make the socia l able to preserve our patriotic and sett ing a good example of struct ure deve lop . In fact, values by giving their soldiers v i rtue and w isdom . T heir after violent conflicts a strong considerable encouragement det erm ination prevented our sense of coope rat ion preva ils , and setting a high example of Nat ion from succumbing and peop le feel the need to p ick virtue and wisdom ,, made the consequen ces of war t hemselves up to bui ld some less devastating . Paying tribthing important and s hape ute to them is right and proptheir own future. Loya lty, er. T he noble and stern figure â&#x20AC;˘ strong alliances determinatio n, unity and coheof t he leader is unrelated to fou l deeds. T he sion take root when there is a commo n enemy heroic deed obscures any poss ib le t ragedy and to defeat. Determ i nation and b ravery play a key ennobles the m il ita ry personage perpetuati ng ro le i n a batt le . D uring t he conquest of Mount h is myth. Vod ice and the hero ic defence of Grappa and Platea u s, the strong des i re to defend his Sara Gregg i Country and the loyalty to mi lita ry values led to Journalist

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE... ... THEY JUST FADE AWAY Colonel Rosner leaves Italy First of all I would like to extend my warm g reetings to all the pe rso nn el of the Italian Army. I ideally warm ly embrace you all. Officers, NonCommiss ioned Officers, Soldiers and Civilia n Personne l, who , during t hese last three years have demonstrated the best one can imagine in t erms

Colonel Elliot J. Ros ner.

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of professio nalism, dedication and loyalty to t heir profession and the ir Country. Much t o my regret, this outstanding assign me nt as U.S. Mi litary Attache in Italy is about to end: I am going to leave at t he end of June. I would like to tak e this moment to thank all those that sup ported me d uring th is except ion al experience . To the Chiefs of Staff, Lie utena nt Generals Ottogalli, Fratice l li and Cecchi, who opened all doors to me and made me feel part of the Italian A rmy, go my heartfelt t hanks fo r having created the best wo rk con di tions for br inging t ogether our Armi es and our Countr ies. I hope that t he com m itment we shared in journeys , meetings and j oint mis sio ns in t he Un ited States and Germany meas ured up to your expectat ions. My assignment start ed in A fg hanistan with T ask Force "N ibbi o" , the 9t h A lpini Regi m ent and its Commander, COL Cl au d io Berto . Before coming to Italy, in the Spring of 2003, I spent 14 days in Bag ram an d in Kabu l - but especia lly at the "Salerno" Forward Operative Base, 14 kilometres from the Pa k istani bo rder - w ith t he me mbers of t he Ita lia n Cont ingent, whose com mand er was Brig adi er General Giorg io Battisti . I have warm memories of the time spent together, in between rocket explosions, whi ch at night enda nge red our lives. I re me m ber very we ll our pat rols and especial ly the Easte r lunch , with t he traditiona l cake , t he "colomba''. In a Country at war we pa used in order to apprec iate something be lo nging to the Itali an tradit ion. I shall always be proud to tell everyon e that I was in a combat zone w ith the Italian Army (A lpini, Rangers and Pa ratroop ers). I am a Paratrooper by p ro fess io n and Special Fo rces qualifie d and, as such, my q ual ification jump with the 9th Reg ime nt of the "Col Moschin " Spe cial Fo rces Reg iment in Pisa was very special . Howeve r, I also trained w ith the 1 sth A irborne Company of th e 183 rd Reg iment at Grafenwoehr, Germany and observed the 1 85 th RAO Reg iment several t im es . T hose who wear the maroon beret have something specia l.

. To you, a toast with you r i ndex finger held h ighl Among my best memo ries are the events in wh ich I took part during my ass ign ment: the Army celebrat ion s and concerts, the three June 2 parades in wh ich I marched , the Army 1 0-mile r I ran and t he RAP Camp I have seen. Above all I remember your kindness during t he ceremonies wh ich I had t he honor to participate in, in every corner of Italy. Historical moments cannot be forgotten. I thank you and te ll yo u that I was pro ud to be a soldier, particularly an American sold ier, when taking part in all t hese events' The jo b of Military Attache in a fo reign Country is not easy but with the help of many peop le - and I' d like to me ntion t he Army Staff, the person nel of t he Ch ief's Offi ce and t he Defense Staff - we worked very well toget her. My warmest and sincere thanks go to General Claudio Graziano and to General Paolo Serra. You supported me in all my initiatives, showing a high sense of collaboration and friendship, especially on t he occasion of visits from my countrymen. Ju ne 30 marks the end of my caree r in uniform. I have been very fortunate in t hese last 30 years, having had the honor to command soldiers at every leve l: comp.:i.ny, b.:i.tt.:i.lion .:i.nd Brig.:i.dc, .:i.nd also served as operations officer fro m battalion to Division. I could not imagine a better job t han the present one to complete my career. I am t he son of a Triestine woman and an American soldier who fought on yo ur land during t he Second World War. My father served in Trieste with T RUST (U.S. T roops in T riest e), Verona (LANDSO UT H), attended the War College in Civitavecchia and was also an Italian "Alpino" and Paratrooper. Now I have t he privilege of concl uding where I started: in the land of my origins. T hanks for your friendship, comradeship and profess ionalism. I shall never forget you. For me th is was t he most precious experience. 0

The U.S Delegation parading in Rome on June 2, 2005.

They know what it means to be well trai ned and ready to defend the Country. T hey know no limits ; they can push themselves farthe r because t hey are ai rborne of special forces. You are all ext reme ly good and I wish you nothing but soft landing zones and calm winds. Pe rsonally I have te n international jump wings, but the o nly one I wear on my uniform is the Italian military one. To the gentlemen of t he mountains , the "Al pi ni", I say: I fee l part of you . You are the pride of the world. I skied with you in the Dolomites and the Alps, observed the CaSTA, visited the "Alpini" of Balzano, T urin, Cuneo, Pinero lo and L'Aq ui la and I learned a lot from all of you. The "Black Feathers" are except io nal in everything t hey do. The Officers are too many and I cannot mention you one by one, but each one of you has a special place in my heart for al l you have done for me personally and professional ly.

Elliot J. Rosner

Colonel, Military Attache, U.S. Embassy, Rome I wish to thank Anna Maria El metti of the Public Affairs Office (U.S. Embassy) and Major General Giorgio Battisti, Chief of the General Affai rs Divi-: sion of the Army General Staff, for thei r valuable support.

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