Issuu

CONTENTS

Number Two 2005 May - June July - August

Rivista M ilitare aims at broadening and updati ng the technical an d vocational tra ining of Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of techn ical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

Politics, Economics and Strategy Kabul, August 4, 2005: Lieuten,1111 Gener,1/ Mau,D

The Trea ty on ConYentional Arms. (Giorgio Scarchilli, Emanuele Massara)

New Iraqi Analyses and Prospects. (Andrea i'vlargelletti )

Industiial Policy (Bmno Tabacci)

Czbekistan Inflames Central Asia. (Osvaldo Baldacci)

The Reorganization of the Germ an Arm y. (Hans Otto Budde)

To Inform, Communicate and Promote. (Daniela Bracco)

D el Vecchio. Comma n der o f

ih e N RDC-I T, recei ves the Flag o n lhe occasion of Lh e

Transfer of A uthority

th e

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The "Games Theory" a Useful Professional Aid. (Giovanni Semeraro)

Technological Demin ing. (Mario Tarantino)

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History

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The Wings of the Land Forces. (Filippo Capp ellano)

108 Op eration "Shingle". (Claudio M orino).

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Signed by fifty States undler the aegis of the United!. Nations

THE ·TREATY 0 CONVENTJIO AJL A MS ment are aimed ·biting their use

ithin the in ternational Agreements on "Arms Control" , besides the Tre aties established Lo reduce the quan tities of som.e types of equ ip rnenl, i.e. the proliferation of certain categories or weapons, the re are Conventions aimed at restricting or prohibiting the use of certain weapons. The "Convention on Cert ain Convent ional Arms", which is the theme of this article, forbids or restricts the u se of some categories of wea p ons and, in some respects, broadens the principles of previous Treat ies regard ing the protection of the war victims. Suc h inten tions are not in the least recent. As long ago as m edieval times, in Europe, the "ethical principles or behavio u r in battle" wer e very popular a mong soldiers, encouraging t he comba tants to be fair dur ing the fights and lo protect the d efenceless, even at the risk of their own sa[ely. Later, wi t h the coming of the "Great \,Var", the nee d or each fig ht ing party to preva i l over the enemy determ in e d an ever-grov,Âˇi ng use of resources to acq uire sophisticated weapons wh ich, u nlike what h appened in t he p ast, \vere w ide ly let h al among t h e belligerent troops and ended u p b y involv i n g civ il ians i n the figh ting. T he Secon d World War saw th e culmination of bomb ings carr ied o u t by using con vent ional, chemical and , som e ti mes, nuclear weapons, \vhich caused unprecedented mas sacres, both among soldiers and civilians. D u r ing t h e Co l d vVar, a l though arms control was main ly d irected Lo weapons of mass dest ruct ion, mostly because of the r is k resulting from nuclear proliferation, the terrible su ffcri ngs c au sed by the use of the new weap onry du r ing the wars in the fifties and sixties (such as the Korea a nd Viel Nam wars) 3

Left. Armament mate ria ls seized in Afghanistan. Right. inspecting a depot oF T-55 nncl T-62 tanks.

drev,' Lhe attention of public opinion to the need Lo regulale th e use of conventiona l weapons as wel I. Actually, at the end of the sixties, the Internationa l Red Cross started a campaign to awaken the various Governmenls Lo th e n ee d Lo broaden the dictates of the Geneva ConvenLion of 1949, which formed the legal basis for the protection of the victims of war. After ten years of negotiations, following the adoption of two additiona l Protocols (1) to the Geneva Conventions, the United Nations Gen eral Assembly convened the "Conference on Certain Conve ntional 'vVeapons" in 1977, which, in 1980, adopted the currenl basic structure of the Convent ion . 4

THE CONVENTION The "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conv enti onal \ 1\/eapons Which .May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", best kno1vvn as "Convenl.ion on Certain Conventional Âˇw eapons" ( Certain Conventiona1 W eapon s - CCW), was negotiated b y fifty Slates from 1977 to 1980, under the aegis of the United Nations Ce ntre for Disar mament Affairs, in Geneva . Adopted on 10 Oc tober 1980, open to signing for t\.velve months from 10 April 1981 , it entered into force on 2 December 1983. It is an initia tive closely related to the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the pro-

tection of war victims, through which the international com mun ity inte nds to reduce the sufferings caused by wars to combaLants and civilians, in relation to the use o f certain con v ent iona l w eapons. The CCV,! consists of a Preamble, \vh .i ch explains Lhe object of the Treaty, eleven Articles and (ive Pro t ocols. These Protoco l s , which may be ratified (2) by each singl e State also at different times, deal with speci (ic prohibitions or restrictions. Protocol I, contextual lo the Convention, prohibits to use weapons whose primary effect is to project fragments not detectable by X - ray s. In fact, \.Vhen small parts of glass, plastic or wood penetrate a human body bul cannot be det ected, it is impossible to make a cl iagnosi s o r procee d to a treatment. This Protocol takes up again a prohibilion already established in other international Con ventions in the past. Actually, the serious i nj u ri cs ea used inside hum an bodies by deforming bullets have bee n w eJl known already since the last years of the nineteenth century. Through the so-called expans ion or fra gn,entalion o f the buUel , the average surface increased, discharging a higher e nergy on the target, causing injuries mo,--e serious than necessary, also in case of wounds limited to t he .l imbs. Moving frorn these assumptions, the H ague Declaration was issued alr ea dy in 1899 (RS O.'il.5.103) , expressing th e prohibition to use hallow pointed, half jacketed or fragm e ntation bullets, and was afterwards adopted by the Geneva Conve n tion . Protocol I

applies not only to bullets but also to any type of munitions which, by means of impact or explosion, can project fragments not detectable by X-rays. P rotocol II, which Âˇwas also drafted at the same time or the Treaty, wÂˇas issued in order to restrict the use of anti-person nel and anti-ve hicle landmines (it docs not apply to anti-ship mines or to those used to obstruct river traffic), traps and other explosive devices . In 1996, in order to broaden the scope of its application, the Slates Parties signed the "A mended P rotoco l II " (entered into force in 1998), which substantially changed t he original one, providing for the application of the above-mentioned restrictions to the interna.l armed conflicts in each indi vidual State besides the multinational ones. Such ex tension paved the way for the adoption or the a -

mendment o[ Article of the Convention during the Revje1,v Conference of 2001 . ln particular, it provides for the clearance of mined terri tor ies, soon after the e ncl of the hostilities, by the States responsible for laying the rnines . It introduces more detailed definitions of th e terms related to l andmines, stating clearl:y the differences among anti - personnel mines , boob y traps and o t her devices . They m ust be equipped with mechanisms that reduce their dangerousness (e .g . self-destruction, self-deactivation and self- neutra li ,.ation mechanisms, etc.) and positioned so as to be easily located and removed. Eightyone States, among wh ich China, India, Is rael, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, s igned the Am en ded Protocol II together vvith the United States, which, on the other hand, did not join the "Convention on the Prohibi-

tion on the Use of Anti-personnel Mines" (3), for it cons iclcrecl it inadequate . This Protocol, un l ike the "Otta\va Conven tion", does not ban the use of m ines, but sets rigid regulations on their use. The use o f landmines and booby traps is prohibited in all circumstances in which it may cause losses a mong civilians or damage their prope r ty . Mines may be used only againsl military objectives, in marked and recorded areas, through delectable devices e quipped with self-d eslruction mechanisms . Protocol III, the last to be promulgated at the same time of the Convention , limits the u se of incendiary weapons and munitions, prohibiting their use against civilians or military areas p laced near civilian settle ments. Moreover, it forbids the use o r incendiary \veapons in forests and plantat ions, unless such ar5

eas are used hy armed troops as hiding places. Therefore, among the restricted \Veapons there are only those which are incendiary as their primarv effect (such as flarnethrowers), whereas vveapons and munitions w hich may starl a fire as a side-effecl (such as illuminating devices, tracers shells and smoke bombs) are not limited. From a histori ca l point of v iew, il

1Wortar shells.

my towns or ships, boil i ng or inflammable substances we re poured on the besi egers or on their siege machines . As gunpo"vder became widespread, combining incendiary \Vith explosive effects, incendi ary Âˇweapons played a secondary role. Again in the twentieLh century they were widely used when, during the Fi rsl \ 1\/orld \A/ar, the Austrians and the Germans used flamethrowers, \Vhich, although not very effective, were quite impressive from

should be underlined that the incend iary weapons have al ways heen considered ex trernely effective and with a strong psychological i rnpact because of the sufferings they inflict to the victims and for their destructivi ty. Fire has ahvays heen used to harm the enemy by shooting incendiary arrows and shells against the structures of the ene-

a psychological point of vie\v, so much so that the lnte rnalional Community for the first time started to consider whether their use \,Vas advisable. At that time this w eapon cons isted of a tube that could shoot against the enemy, al a distance of 20-50 meters, incendiary substances, by-products of oil, \vhich were ignited when

coming out of the tube by a spark or an .igniter. The tactical use of the flamethro\,ver is mostly of[ensive, as the burst of flames is particularly suitab le for destroying positions , machine-gun nests and small fortifications. ACter the First \i\Torld War, the flarnethrowers \Nere improved and mounted on vehicles. The available quantity o[ fuel reached 500 litres, with a range of 120 metres. As petrol hums too quickly to be able to convey enough heat to the target, a mixture of aluminium dust soap, naphthene and a luminium palm itate (napalm) was chosen. Together with petrol it forms a n-1ixture that can burn at about 1000 degrees Cels iu s (against 675 degrees Celsius of petrol). In the sixties and seventies , during the Viet Nam War, in order to drive out the Vietcong fighters, the Americans used napalm on vegetat ion causing serious environmental and humanitarian consequences. Such palpable effects had remarkable repercuss ions on public opinion, which, in 1972, persuaded the Internat ional Red Cross to take an initiative aimed at proh ib iting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons . In Protocol III th e limitations regarding the prohibition or restrictions on the use of incendiary \Veapons are intentionally expressed in a very simple way. Only two articles exhaust the c lose scrutiny. ln particular, the first contains the definitions and the second describes the field of application. Protocol IV, unlike the first three, was drafted by the Slates Parties after the Convention's birth (1980) . In particular, i t was agreed upon in 1996, during th e Firs t Rev ie \,v ConferÂˇe nce, and can be considered of "historical " importance as r e gards arms control, since it was the first time that the use of a cei-ta.in category of weapons

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was prohibited before actually using it in operations. This Protocol refers to the prohibition to us e blinding laser weapons, i.e. specifically designed to cause permanenl b lindn ess . Actually, weapons thal can release an intense laser beam directed towards a distant targel, or designed to be effectively used at a distance of tens of k ilometres, can have other military uses, such as acquisi tion o[ objectives, artillery ranging or target lighting. As a consequence, because of the high energy developed hy the light beam, the collateral effect.s of some laser weapons can cause a temporary or permanenl darn age lo sight. Therefore, in order to prevent such collateral eCfects, Protocol IV urges the States Parlies to take all the necessary precautions in order to avoid the possible blindi ng e rfeels caused by laser sys tems prin-iarily designed as designators or guidance for ammunition.

Protocol V, drafted in November 2003 by the Slates Part ies which meamvhile had becom e 94, applies lo the Explos ive Remnants of War - ER\N . I ts ain-1 is lo minimize the risks of the explosive remnants of war lhal might be on the territory, including internal ,.v aters, as regards civilian personnel at the encl of a conflict. PROTOCOL V

It sterns from the wars' afterrnalh, s u ch as those fought in Cambodia, Angola, Bosnia, Erit rea, Afghan istan and Iraq, ,vhich highlighted the atrocious effects caused by the la rge amounts of explosive \Var remnan Ls present on Lhe t.errilory al the end of the conflict. In Bosnia , for exampl e, it is deemed that about 30% of the post- \var losses can be allr ibuted to the presence of Explosive Remnanis of War, whereas in Cambodia and Afghanistan the es tirnatecl figure is around

A mixed mindiekl in t.he desert.

50%. ln order to cope wit h such problems effectively, the States Parties must pledge to exchange information about the location, nurnber and typology of th e remnants, and undertake to carry out clearance activities in the areas where there might be remnants of explosive ordnance and/or abandoned explosive devices and, moreover, take all possible precautions lo protect the civilian population and the members of the international organizations. The document cons is Ls or eleven arÂˇticles, which require the States to map, clear, 1--emovc and d es troy al l the explosive remnants of war in th e tercitories under their control. In particular to: â€˘ record and retain the information regarding location, number and type of the explosive remnants; 7

• take every precaulion for the constituted by a seri es of rigid prolection of the civilian po- rul e s, in that every direction pulation and Lhe personnel of contains words such as "as far as Governmenta l and non-Go - practicable", "as far as possible", vernmen ta] Organizations it is to be regarded as polilically from lhe risks deriving from binding. In fact, should the prothe presence of remnants in visions go back to lhe Stat e the Lerritory under their con- which exercises "the control of trol; the territory" through i Ls Armed • co-operate with the other Sta- Forces and/or ils Governmental tes Parties and the reJevanl Organizations, this would result organizations operating in the in b u 1~densorne expenses in territory under thci r con lro l; terms of human and financial • exchange all available infor- resources for this State. mation about the remnanls The activities conce rning the and provide assistance to the clearing of the territory of any abovementioned States and Organizations in terms of human, financial and technological resources; • take part in general consu llations among States to discuss lhe operational aspects of I.he implernenlati.on o f the Protocol; • give to lheir Armed Forces and the civilian organ izalions concerned the appropriate ins lru ctions in order lo I.rain them to carry out their tasks in accordance wilh Lhe provisions of Lhe Protocol. The agreement is provided \Nith a lechnical Annex which suggests the best practices for achieving lhe objectives of the Protocol. To this end , lhe Technical Annex provides details on: • recording, storage and release of information for Unexplo ded Ordnance (UXO) and A bandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO); • elements to be used in information programmes about the risks connected with the presence of ER. iv; type of explosive device current• criteria lo be followed during ly rely on non -Governmen Lal 1.he production or rnunilions Organizations, ,vhich manage and Lhe application of stan - long and expensive assistance dards of qualily conlrol. in or- programmes . An idea of the size der Lo ensure the best possible of Lhe Lask is given by the exper eliability in the management rience acquired in Bosnia, procedures of munitions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Jraq, storage facilities and during where despi tc the unceasing the transport and transfer to ,vork or lhe multinational another State. Forces and severa l NGOs (Non Although the Protocol is not Governmental 01ganizations), 8

many are as are still infested with devices . For example, in Afghanistan, the substantial runds allocated b y Lhe inter national comrnunity (about 75 million dollars only in 2003) and the work of many organizalions, such as the "Halo Trust" , which has been invo l ved in A[ghanistan since 1988 with about 2000 workers and has r emoved and destroyed about one million and lhree hundred t housand UXOs and mines, have not achieved the desired effects. Jn 2003 , in Afghanislan, there

A d e vice camou(/agcd among the vegetation.

were 846 victims in accidents caused hy mines, while the esti mated number of UXOs amounts to millions. There arc aboul 300,000 mines sti ll buried and 130,000 rnines are stockpiled i.n various storages . In 2004 the e fforts made b y

the "Group of Experts" in order to identify praclicablc common measures to produce "safe" .m un i Lions, equipped with self-destruction mechanisms in case o[ malfunctioning, did not achieve the wished results. In fact, the del egations did nol manage to reach an agreement on a common standard. The Convention has examined several typologies of ordnance. Among them there a re also the so-called cluster bombs, which sp lit into hun dreds of s ubmunitions and salurate v,:ist areas. Many non-Governmental Organizations are trying to prohibit Lhe use of these bombs, as ·thev do not have effective self-d eslruclion devices. On the other hand, remark able progress has been made in th e field of anti-vehicle mines,

where the United States and some Western Nations strongly s upport the initiative of equipping such ordnance w ith mechanisms o f self-destruction, selfdeactivation and easy detection . Although these difficulties might not be overcome, the Proloco l ,vill any,vay enter into force after its ratification by at least 20 out of the 97 States Parties. Cu rrently on ly six Slates (Svv·eden, Sierra Leone, Lithuan ia, Germany, Croatia and Finland) have ratified the Protocol issu ed in 2003.

TAKING STOCK OF THE STATE OF THE CONVENTION FROM 1983 TO 2004 Some delegations had considered the birth of the Treaty as the

Sappers setting t1p a sha(l for blasth1g war n.·n:inanls.

realization of the will to have a flexible means, based on a framework that could be developed by adding new Protocols apt. lo give the adequate ans,vers to the needs that might be in store in the future as regards arms control. In other \,v ords , the hope was that a d ynamic document had been created, which could achieve an almost universal approval. But, during the twenty years of ex istence of the Convention, this enthusiastic start was never fo llowed by the hoped success, clue to the reasons ,.ve are going Lo discuss presently. First of all, it should be underlined that in order to reach 9

A soldier on watch duty .

an "agreemen t " that could be shared by as many Slate s as po ssib l e , the p rovision s en closed in the final dra ft of the document w er e les s incisive lhan the proposals subrnitte d by some Stale s In fact, th e decisions \Vere adopted by consen sus whereas , during th e pre paratory n ego tia t ion s , lh ey were ratified by lhe a pproval of lwo thirds of the dclcgal es . l'vloreovcr, in order to allow the largest possible assent, Article 4 provided that, in order to parti cipate in the Convenlion, eac h State Parly needed only to ratify at least tvm Prolocols, \Vithout necessarily endorsing the T reaty as a w hol e . Still, the "Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons", i C corn.pared to other Treaties on arms control, such as for example the "Chemical Weapon Convention - C\VC", calling for th eir lolal 10

ban, which includes 167 S lates Parties, up lo the present has been suffering fro111 a partial lack of "universalization", i .e. a limited number of Slates taking pan lo the Treaty. As a matter of fact, the initial li111ited n umber of States which signed t he firs t document in 1981 (50 S tates, 7 of which non-ratifyi ng States)) \Vas afterwards joined by 47 Nations in the per iod from 1983 to 2004, thus bringing lo 97 the number of mc111ber Countries. Bul lhese adhesions were nol as numerous as was ho p ed for . B es id es, t he adoption of l\vo Protocol s, which follmved t he firs t three, caused a divers ified and frag mented participation within the Convention itself, a s ituation which risks to reach ils climax w ith Protocol V on the postconflict explosive remn an ts. The i nacl equate adhesion Lo the enlargements (Amended Protoco l IT , Protocol IV and Protocol V) is clue Lo the lack of

mutual und erstanding on th e various issues unde rÂˇ discussion, mostly regarding the differen t approaches that lhe Nations involved have towards s uch complex problems. Obviously, as often happens in an international environm e nt , th e divergences arc cause d by t he diverse readi n e ss to employ r es ources for achiev ing the goals scl by th e Treaty and by Lhe interests conn ected with the domestic indu strial production . Sure ly, a further "weakn ess " of the Convention, compared to other Treaties on arms contro l, consists of the lack of a m echa nism Lo monitor the compliance v.iith it, in order to ascertain the correct implementa tion of Lh c rules b y the State Parties (e .g., as prÂˇov ided for by A,~t icl e 8 of the "Ottawa Convention"). This shortcon1 ing contributes to li mit the mutual lru st of the State Panics and the consequent universalization of th e Treaty. The E ur opean Union took an active

role in promoting the constitution of a Compliance Cornmittee within the Convention, tasked with monitoring the enforcement of lhe agreements and report any violations, but up to now, notwithstanding the effons of the EU Delegalion, the initiat ive has not garnered the necessary consensus. Among lh e allempts to increase the number of "adh erents" to the Conve ntion, it is worth stressing the inl eres t shown by the States Parties in contributing to the limitation of the circulation and use of s mall-calibre \veapons and muni tions. This problem was de tectable in the various regional conflicts which have been fol lowing each other, s I.art i ng from the Nineties, and is no\.\,. cause of growing conce rn with-

in the international community. Therefore, the "Convention on Cert.a.in Conventional \i\leapons" discussed the possibility to extend the scope of its application to small-calibre weapons and munilions . Many "forgotten" conflicts are fought with light weapons, d istributed to governmental and irregular troops as they are read ily available on the market, easy to carry and h ide, and quite i nexpensive. Moreover, they do not become obsolete quick ly, and arc e asy to use compared to heavy \Neapons and armoured vehicles which, moreover, need specific expertise Cor their maintenance . Light weapons can be used by a \v id e range of "adepts" , from terrorist groups to citizens who intend to exercise their "right" to self-defence.

A serviceman of a dog unj/ with his partner.

Th e almost limitless diffusion and availability of light weapons make conflicts "1nore lethal", especially lhose that c ount also irregular units a mong the contenders, makes it eas ier to v iolate human rights and humanitarian law, fosters internal destabilization and undermines all efforts to establish democratic structures, thus \,v orsening the sufferings of the c ivi lian populations involved in the wars. The iss ue of small-cali bre ,veapons and munitions has been deal t with by the CCW since the very firsl years of its constitution. But, at the same Lime, it has become the object of d iscussions in wider internationa l contex ls and has later 1I

Sounding oul /he sea bouorn.

cul 111 i nated \vithin the UN, in the world conference held in July 200 J , \vhere a speci fie "Plan of Action" for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was adopted . Th e plan provided for a series of actions and agreements, not only at regional level hut also within the individual States . Therefore, considering the abovementioned worldranging initiatives, the discussion of the issue within the inner circle of the CCW adherents played a mi nor and limited role. In this regard, the second "Review Conference" of t.he Convention (Geneva - 2001), made official the limited consensus of the States Parties in relation to s mall -calibre weapons and munitions, but reported a general consensus of t.he S tates Parties on the amendment of Article 1 of the Convention. Thus it \Vas possible to extend the application of its rules to non-international (local) arme d conflicts . As a consequence, t his in creased the interest of th e States involved in local conflicts, such as, for example, those in the African Continent, g iving a new impulse to the possible adhesions to the Convention .

THE ITALIAN COMMITMENT ltaly joined the first group of S tates Parties of the "Conven tion on Cert a in Conven tional \ 1\/eapons ", tak ing pa rt in the proceedings of the UN Conference which adopted the initial t ext in Geneva in 1980 . The Convention and it first three Annexed Protocols \Vere ratified by Law no 715 or 14 December 1994. Afterwards, Italy adhered to Amended Pr-otocol II and Lo Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons ( 13 January 1999), a mending its own national la,-vs. In particular, as concerns Protocol II, Italy is one of the S12

tales that anticipated the total ban on anti-personnel mines d eclared by the "Otta\va Convention" . Besides, it is among the States which give support to the UN organizations that help the Cou n t ries affected by mine problems, honouring the com m itment to meet the p rinciples of solidarity on which the Treaty on the prohibition of anti -personnel mines is based. As regards the ratification of Protocol Von the explos i ve rernnants of war, the Iviinist ry of Foreign Affairs submitted a bill which is current]:,, being examined by t he competent i\ilin -

istries . This was necessary in order to consider in detai l the new tasks t hat cou ld be as signed to the Organizat ions. As far as the Army is concerned, shoul d P r otocol V be nationa lly ratified , in a first analysis this vvoulcl entail: • at home, the same institutional support envisaged for· tcrr-i tory clearance, as sanctioned by Decree Law no 320 of 12 Apri l 1946; • abroad, besides carrying out the "operational clearance", also the probable mapping of the un exp loded or non -employed ordnance;

• with regard to equipment supplies, the adaptation o f the technical characterist ics o f the m un itions to the "recommen dations" o f the Technical Annex to the Protocol. FINAL REMARKS The pe c uliar irnportance of the "Co n v enti on on Certain Conventional W e apons" (also called "Convention on Inhuman Weapons") stems from the fa ct that it is a flexible legislative i nstrument th a t can co nnect the r egulations on arms contro l with the ethical p 1·inciples of the International Humanitarian Law. The CCW stresses the assumpt ion according to wh ich military requiremen ts can anyway b e met by using "minimu m force", i. e . by gaug ing efforts and technical means to the "b are minimum " , in order to reach the goals. The useless sufferings, caused by the improper use of weapons, are the h ub o n which the restrictions on their use, sanc tioned by th e r espective Protocols , are t urnin g . However, vi s-a -vis these nob le principles, aft er more than twenty years the analysis of th e state of the Convention shO\vs that the resu lts are not very encouraging. Until today the CC\A/ h as been known onlv bv some "insiders" . The reaso~1s for t his should be looked for in the past. Already in the eigh ties and in the first years of the ninetie s, the Convention suffered from a lack of interest hv the international comm unity , which fo cused its attention on "more u rgent" and pragmatic issues, such as the need to check the prol iferation of \,v eapo ns of mass destruction (n ucl ear, chemical and biological). The initial impasse, along with the o ther factors described before, d eter mined the inadequate "u niversalization" of th e Treaty . The efforts m ade by some S tates Parties in order to extend the c ons ensus have not met

with the hoped-for success, beca u se so m e S tates, already "Parties" to other ·-agre ernents, which they considered as more specific and a lso more effective, still argue about the need for a Convention wh ic h is regarded a s generic and a duplicate o f o ther Treaties. As in the case of P ro toco l V, on po st -confl i c t remnants, where there is a general lack of consensus, presurna bly du e Lo a duplication of tas ks , and/or commit ments al ready u n d ertaken w ith p r evious Treaties, as for examp le the a bove rn e nl ioned Otta iva Con vention. On the other hand, the good thing is that the "Conve ntion on Inhumane Weapo ns", thanks to its specific importance, for n1ore than tvvenly years has been a forum for discussion in w hich "militarily prominent" Nations take part. The United S lates, the Russia n Fed era tion, China, India and Pakistan, for examp le, did not join the "Convention on total ban of anti-personnel landmines", but they h ave the opport unity to discuss about la ndmine issues in this forum. Besides, we should unde rline the remarkable presence and the "att e ntiv e observation" shown towards the d evelopment of the Agreement by the NonGover nm e ntal Organi zations, involved in the field o f di sarmament and ass is tance to war victims . In this context, the Con vention cou ld be a ne,,v "launching pad " and a forum of d iscussion for Non-Governmental Or ganizations and raise funds fo r the assistance to the victims or for the clearance of lerri tories, e sp ec i a l ly i n the developing Countries. All things considered, so far the Convention does not seem to have fully met its ambitious goals, based on profound ethical a n d mora l principles . Surely , from a realistic point of view, on the one hand ,ve ,vould like eq uipment cap a ble of di sa b li n g

the com batant but, on the other, i t is not easy to prevent these instruments from be ing let h al or prnd ucing collateral effects. Per ha ps this is why the Conve nti o n, a s a resul t of th is d ichotomy, is not very convincing As a matter of fact, from an ethical point or view, this Con vention represents a fu rther and very importan t advance in the m u ch wider context of the successful efforts to rest rict and reduce conventional \veapons . ln the "humanitar ian" fi eld, \Vith its possible future developm e nts, the "Conventio n on Certain Conventional Weapons" coul d well be one or the essential instru ments for realizing a pol icy of international security. []

'' Colonel, Head, Armamenls Control Ofhce, Army General Sta ff ,,,., Captain, Armaments Control Office, Army General Staff NOTES (1) It is relevant here the "Additiona l Protocol I", Article 35 "Basic Rules" which reads : In an armed conflict, the r ig ht of the Parties Lo c hoose methods or instruments of warfare is not unlim ited . It is prohibited to emp loy \Veapons, projecLil es, materials and n1ethocls of war fare \vhich can cause superfluous injury or un n ecessary s ufferings. (2) Ratificat ion of a do c u rnenl.: it means to confo rm the national legislation to what has bee n agreed upon inlernationallv. (3 ) "Con vention on the Prohi bition of th e Use, Stockpiling, Product ion and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on lhe ir Dest ruction" - Olla 1.va Convention.

Situations, contradictions and hopes are crowding around the entire Mesopotamian area, a Theatre at the centre of our military engagement which should be studied in depth

NEW IRAQI ANALYSES AND PROSPECTS Evolution of the Sunni component of society, development of political and tribal components, protection of all the minorities scattered over the vast territory between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, have become the key issues 0

To foster stability in the Country, the international community should continue to favour the political process afoot, persisting in strengthening security and completing the social and material reconstruction. Three aspects should be aimed at: the involvement of the tribes, a more active and primary role for the European Community; a federal Constitution able to guarantee in the same way all the social components, favouring the role and importance due to all of them in a democratic society.

he [ormation of the new Iraqi Governme nt, to the same extent as the political elections of January 30, n1arked a decisive passage in the recent history of Iraq. Never before had it \vitnessed the coming to power of a Governm ent designa t ed t hrough free, though difficult elections. The long-going discussio ns which led to the formation of the Government headed by alJaafari confirm the serious difficulties the Country has been through but, at the same time, also prove the start-off of a democratic process which allows dis14

cussion and confrontation on the \vay to a possible compromise. The elections, even if held in an a tmosphere of unce rta inty and fear corning from guerrilla terrorist groups, still \vitnessed a significant turnout of voter s (about 60 %, albeit irregularly distributed over the territory). Despite organ i za lional difficul ties and the impossibility lo hold prior free discussions , a sufficient level of democracy and fairness ( 111 parties, alliances and political groups presented the ir candidates for the national Parliamen L, and 12 of them gained

the seats) (1 ). Un like what had always h a ppened in the pasl an d despite a problernatic boycott by the Sunnis, the elections produced a result which largely reflects the Iraqi social reality (with an unprecedented outright success of the Shi'ites and Curds). These results rÂˇeverberated in the fon11ation of the Government, \.vhere the Sh i'it.es and the Curds reached a majority agreement but undertook t.o involve the participation o f the Sunnis, assigning to them some important positions in the Government. All of it did not go smoothly and created

serious proble ms, not only in the dialogue betv,1een the d ifferent components, but also within them . Still, it can be nolicccl t hat to some exle nl the violent outbreak of terrorist attacks, \Nh ich between lhe encl of April and Lhe beginning o f May caused over 500 dead , witnessed how much the forces opposing stabilization fear Lhe ongoing pol iL ica l process . However, it is important not lo underestimale the existing threats, such as the armed and ter roris t slruggle, but a lso the discontent of the po1:ru l al ion 15

caused by the slowness o( Lhe process of normalization, security, reconstruction, econom ical recovery, even the supply of essenLial services. At the same time the danger of civil \va.r is still weighing heavily on the country, [or there is still a temptation to fall back on arms for those groups which did not oblain what they hoped for from the current political process. Under Lhe present difficult condition of daily 1i fe these groups can easi ly win the support of Lhe population using ethn ic and religious fac tors, a long with the simplistic call of extremist ideas. T hus, Lhe equilibrium underlying the construction of Lhe new Iraq can still be considered fragile. The aclual effectiveness of the newÂˇ Government and the Parliamentary Assembly, their ability to stabilize and nm the Country, to open the dialogue with the left-outs (starting \Vith the Sunnis), to guarantee minority rights, to open relations \Vith foreign States, and , above all, to write a Constitution laying solid foundat ions for the (ulure of Iraq, all of this still needs to be proved. In such context, some of

the outcomes of the formation process of the nc\v Government should not be necessarily considered alarming. An example could be the going over to the opposition of Lhe group headed by former Prime Minister Allawi, which will probably keep its position of polit ical confrontat ion. Other situations are more deli cate, such as the evolution o[ the role of the Sunni component, the dangerous marginalization of Lhe forces which have already proved potentially subversive in the past , as is the case for the Shi'ite movement led by al-Saclr, the rev ival of Kurd irredentism, the protection of minorities. To foster stability in the Country, the International Community should continue to favour the ongoing political process and carry on \Vith security-building, not only through military actions and the necessary contribution to the formation of the Iraqi forces, but also by re building the social structure. Three aspects should he aimed at: the invo.lvement of the Iraqi tribes, a more active and leading role for the European Union, a federal Constitution \vhich should guarantee the

protection o( all Lh e political components without any of them feeling d eprived of th e ir d emocratically du e role.

THE NEW INSTITUTIONS Th e new P ar I ian1 e n La rv an d Constituent Assembly is f;rmed by 275 deputies who, ,vith a twothirds majority vote and based on the Shi'ite-Kurd po litical agreement, se lected the Presid ency Counci l, composed of Prcsicle1{t Jalal Talabani, leader of the UPK

Kurdish party, Vice-Presiden ts Mahd i, a Shi'ite from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolu tion, and al-Yawar, outgoing President of the Republic. They gave a n,andatc lo form t he Government to Shi'ite I b rahim al -Jaafari, leader of the Da'a,,va party . His subsequent efforts p roved di ff ic ult and tricky, so much so that to reach the d efin itive composition of the Govern ment took several weeks o[ serious ten s ions wit h both Sunnis and Kurd s . The latter, [or in s tance, protes te d against t he

Shi 'i te Pri me Minister's singlehan d ed decision Lo leave lhc ,vords referring to a Federal Iraq out of the oath's word ing, thus m a king the ministers repeat the oath . T h e first lis t or m in isters ,vas sti ll lacking some key-posts clue to the tricky issue concerning th e agreement with the Sunn i representatives, who went so far as to wÂˇit hdraw from th e talks, condemning h ars h ly t he new Government, bu t eve ntually reached an agreemen t which brought t h em , among othe r things, the posts of Vice Premier 17

and Defence Minister. The Sunni problem is still open , and even Lhe United States in sists on a greater representivity, especially in the Commission in charge of drawing up th e new Constitution. In fact, despite the fact that they have a 20% quote of the populaLi on, the Sunnis have only two representatives of their political groups in the Commissio n. Th e Na tional Assembly has the fundamen tal task of completing by August 15 a drah Constitution \vhich w ill have to be approved by re ferend um in October. ln case of approval, n ew elections arc due at the encl of the year. To be effective and come into force , the future Constitution, however, will need the approval of a large part of the country: it will be invalid if two thi rds of the population of at least 3 o ut of th e 18 provinces consti tu Ling Iraq reject it. This is Lo guarantee, above all, the consent of th e Sunni Arab minority (15% of the population), which presently is sc,uÂˇcely repre-

sent.eel in the Parliament but has a lready shown signs of w illingness to participa te in the work of the neÂˇw Governm ent and, in particular, in the drawing up of the fundamental Chart. T h e United States insists on s licking to the time-l imit, and while launching extensive offensives agains t the Sunni and foreign guerrilla bases, mainly linked Lo al-Zarqm,vi, at the same time explicitly asks for strengthe n i ng the political process, as was repeatedly stressed by Secretary of Sta te Condolce7.:r.a Rice during he r visil of May 15. The declarations of the Secre lar y of State appear particularly sign i fica n l, for they underline once more the pre-erninence of politics over arms, so refuting in some way wh at seemed to be the prcva i Ii ng American choice in the Country. Thus, the United States persists on the advancement of this political p rocess which is to ope n w ide the doors to the Sunni world, includ ing the part w hic h

\Vas the cradle and point of reference for the armed insurrection, and the low-profile ex-Baat h ist reality. In this conLext th e Un ited S ta tes , also accused of secret contacts with c landestine corn batan ts , today h as a posi ti on rnore open to dialogue compared

to that of the Sh i'i te majority, whose aversion to the Baathists was one of the reasons for the exclusion of Allawi'sÂˇ party from the Government, Allavvi ,,v as considered too soh. Ho\vever, also the new insl.itu tions with a Shi 'ite K urd leadership promised th e possibility of an amnesty for excombatants, provided that they lay down thei r arms and accept to peacefully become part of the new Iraqi reality. Besides national elections, there were local ballots for decentralized administra tions. These Assemblies seem to be destined to acquire an increasing weight, not only because they are closer to the territory, \vhich at this moment need s to be controlled in order to contain the guerrilla ,varfare and to restore the functioning of the essential infrastructure, b ut also because the S tate will have a strong federal system, as requested by the political forces themselves and rec-

ommended by the UN and th e Coalition. 13 groups took part in the competition for 111 seats in the Kurdish Regional Parliament, and 99 lists for 18 Provincia l Councils, each [ormed bv 4 5 members, with the except io 1~, o [ the Bagh-

dad Council which ,viii have 99 Kurdish UPK and UDK (2), and rnembers. even more the different Shi'ite The advancement of the politi- groups \vhich, under the spiritual co-i nst i tu lional process is posi - infl uence of Grand Ayatollah altive, though it represents just a Sistani, constitu ted the Alliance fi rst step. Many real ities still wail (3) . T hi s division, in a less apparto be p roved by facts . Besides , ent but much deeper way, is still the d ynam ics insid e the new Par- present also in the essential politliament will b e more complex ical choices, rang.ing from the rethat iL may seem to a superficial lations with foreign forces (the \ÂˇVestern o bserver. In addition to coalition led by the US, and also t he marginali ty of the meagre Iran) to those with the rni noriSunni representation, it is neces- . ties, u p to th e constit utional orsary to take into account the fact der and the im portance lo be g ivthat the formations \.vhich o b- en to the lslamic law. In this contai ned more consent arc actually text certain tensions reem erge alalliances among parties \vhich so wi th i n t h e Kurdish grou p, had long been rivals, such as the where the members left on the 19

fringe and even some polit ical rcprcscnlaL ives of the PDK, less satisfied with the sharing of posts in the Govern rnenl, accu sed their leader Talabani of having r·c nouncccl th e "Kurdish motherland" in exchange For positions of power.

THE PROBLEMS TO TACKLE Th erefore, Ira q is living through a key-moment in wh ich al l Lh e forces present in the Country arc facing each oLher, competing with each other and fighting for power. In panicu lar, the most thorny problems concern the: • strictly polit ical p lan, for the management or pO\ver, both governmental and parli amentary and the clrafti ng of the Consl.itu tion; • cultural challenge lo d efine the characteristics of the future Iraqi society, in particular w ith regard Lo religion, thus to Islamic law; • effective control of the terri tory, where securi ty is Lhreate-

nee! by te rrorists, guerrillas , and territorial, party .or lriba l m ilitias, crirninal gangs and armed factions; • economic controversies for the management of the resources; • ethnic, rel igious, and tribal rivalries. All these disputes cannot be summarized in a clear-c u t and well-clcfinccl opposition between l.wo realities, for example Sunnis against Shi'i Les, o r l raqis against the international coalition . They arc a complex patclnvork, vvhere every element is on the same level, an instrument a i rned at the objective of each grou p and, al the same time, a lever that can influence all the others. The mi litary approach, lo th e same extent of the economic one, is seen as the extension or politics throu gh other means. But, if this approach was prevailing in the past years also on the part of Lh e in ternationa l coalition and the Baghdad Government, today Lhe pursuit of a poli tical solution is more topi cal. Altho ugh the rnosL violent Lerrorist attacks and harsh m ili-

tary clashes cause a high number of d eaths (increased during the month following the formation of the new Go;.~rnment, so giving the truly realistic impression of an insuffic ient l evel of security and of a situation that could come to a head at any moment), it seems possible to assert that th.is violence can be impu tecl to al Qeacla terror ist groups and to the most extremist Sunni elements, and less to the Shi'ites . Besides, w ith out forgetting the military presence, the most important. protagonists

or t h e s itu a ti on have opted for political competition. llowevcr, a sol ution is sti ll needed for the serious problems rÂˇegardi ng not only and not as much the clash of the macro realil.ies, s uch as t he Su nnis and the Shi'ites, but rather the all-i rnporÂˇtant. d isputes for leadership wit hin each community. As far as religious dynamics are concerned, 97% of the popu lation are Mu sl ims, with the major part belonging t.o the Shi'ite conress ion (about 6'i%), even if Saddam Hussein's regime favoure d t he

Sunni minority (32-35% , di vided in: 18-20% Su nni Kurds, 12-15% Sunni Arabs, 5% Tu.rkomans and others), ins uring them the predominance over both the Shi'i te n1ajority and the Kurdish component (15-20% of the population) . Christians a nd oth ers rep resent about 3% . The ethnical division in Iraq consists of: 75-80% Arabs, 15-20% Kurds 5% and 5% Turkomans, Assyrians and olhers. As for the main groups (Sh i'ites, Sunni Arabs, Kurds), their geograph ical d istribution on t he territory is not cornplelely 21

larger involvernenl. Still, the Sunnis are responsible for most or the armed struggle and terrorist attacks carried out, at least i n part, not only against the Government in office, but also against Shi'ites and Kurds, evidently trying to unleash a civil ,,v ar. Bu t their situation is very complex. The Sunnis, in fact, also clue Lo the inherited organization of the Baath party, are divided into territorial pol i tical groups which differ in area of origin and activity, and their harshest clashes are the internal ones for hegemony, although there are also fringes open to dialogue. To better understand the complex situation we s hall analyse the three main groups of Sunni guerrillas.

The Qaedists These are a terrorist galaxy of Islamic extremists referring to alQaeda, of ,vhich the group of Abu Mus'ab al -Zarqawi (Jamaal al

homogeneous, rather it has a s potted character with marked overlappings and intersections. Therefore, it is correct to speak about areas w ith Sunni or Shi'ite rnajority, and so on.

THE SUNNIS The Sunn i world harbours t\NO of the greatest clangers for the stabilization o[ Iraq: the risk of a Baathist restoration and the alQaecla-shapecl terrorist threat. Though in a numeric minority, the Sunnis have a lways don,inated the Country. Now, for the first time, they have been forced ou L or pO\ver and realistically fear to

become the victims of vengeance. This is the reason why the Arab Sunn i \vorld (different from the Arab Kurdish one) has been opposing the new order and continues to do so. The Sunni parties boycotted the elections of January 30, even if later, aCter various phases, they accepted to participate in the pol itical process, to be represented in the Governmen t and to take pan in cl rafting the newÂˇ Constitution. They entered all these processes with some difficulty and \Vith an inadequate participation which ne ither fully satisfies the Sunnis themselves nor, for example , the United States and the European Countries, whic h \Noulcl prefer their

Tawid al-Jihad, Monotheism and Sacred War) aspires to become the leader. Some other gr oups are also of particular importance: Ansar al-Sunna (DeCenders of the Tradition) founded in September 2003, of Wah ha bile or iental.ion

(Sunni radical Islamic [act.ion); Ansar al-Islam (Defenders of Islam), characterized by S u nn i extremist behaviours and considered very close to al-Qaeda; alJaish al-Islami fil Iraq (the Islamic Army i n Iraq), a panicularly

co mpl e x acron y rn apparentl y used hy tefforist groups, guerrillas and cri 111 i nal organizations, in order to mar k their activi ti es w ith an Is lam ic s tamp . The groups with the most distinctly terror ist ch aracter have no serious financia l difficulties, and their st.rategy has ceased to attempt to become institutionalised - as al-Qaeda u nsuccessfully tried in Afghanistan - in order not Lo offer targets. They may be in terested, however, in encouraging a Baa l.his t res t.oration in order to obtain in return logistic su p porl and strÂˇuctures. Th is alli ance has a lready taken place , but sometimes has a lso come to a halt, as i t was the case of Tikrit, \.vhere the c o l laboration of Saddam 's follmvers and al-Qaeda members broke off among m u tual accusations . In addition, the leaders or Sunn i Is lamic ext remism, who have opted for the terrorist struggle, could not rule l raq because they are mostly foreigners, like

Zar qa\vi h imself, a Jordanian Palest i nian . At the same time, among their goals there is also th at of keeping the American presence concentrated and busy he re rather than elsewhere, in order to have an enemy to face, ach ieving victories to be used as propaganda. The re.lations h ip between t.hese groups and al-Qaeda is also worth observing. A galaxy of autonomous entities but nol hierarchically structured organisations, a world of ideal reference \vhich federales d ifferent realilies. Th is is the situation at both the international an d th e Iraqi leve l. Zarqawi may have nouris hed the amb i tion to appear, rather than a deputy a n d probable successor of B in Laden, his pote ntial rival. Recently, tlYis rivalry has probab ly been re shaped, taking into consideration that the [oreign and ext ernal Qaedist component has prevailed in th e con d uct of the arme d struggl e vis -a -v is the religio us

Iraqi Sunni one, wh ich, as vve said, seems to be oriented towards political dialogu e. ll may a lso be thanks to this favourable context that th e mos t recent Am erican military offensives have been concentrated against the Qaedists and brought apparently posit ive results, incl uding the p robable wounding of Zarqmvi himself and the capture of some or his .lieuLenanLs. AL Lhe same time, however, this has led to an escalation or terrorist attacks which, albeit bloody and potential ly destabilising, must be considered different from the actual guerri lla warfare, less spectacular but more diffused.

The Baathists They are basically Saddam's feclclayn and secret agen ts (4) , survivors from the state-party, who manage to keep control over key-structures, safe houses, administrati ve capab ilities, huge sums of money. They have a good struclure and a centralized organization, going beyond the borders of lraq and provid ed with foreign infrastructure and contacts . They are also able Lo work out clever political argu-

mcntations, and aim a l restoring the BaaLhisL po\ver at government level. One of their s t rong points is Lhe fact that they could be a reference for all the burcaucra tic-ad 111 in.i s Lra t.i ve vvorld, which under Saddam's rcgi me was the only one capable of running the Country. They arc closely related Lo the territory and the Sunni people w hom they help with the distribution of aid, thus ensuring their collaboration and political support. If at the beginning of the year they seemed to b e the most dangerous force w hich could determine a crisis in the Country, now they have apparently faded into the back ground, owing Lo the political process credited by the Sunni \.vorl.cl . Thi s may have created among the ex-Baathists a ,vai Land-see atmosphere and a division among extremist elcmenls, who cou ld be attracted by the Qaeclist world, and pol itical elements faster in seizing th e opportunity of profiting from the ir experience in order to reenter the political and acl111 i n istn1Live h-amework of the Country. Obviously, this process is on ly al ils early stages and is easily re versible at any moment, but there

is always the risk of a return to armed struggle, more treacherous than terrorisl atlacks, albeit less spectacular. The other factions Political i1~surgents and ord inary crirninals are ,vidcly spread on the territory and are sometimes inlerconnec lecl . Having identical interests aimed al. managing th e lerrilory and its resources, they make up a large network, though different in local

sit.ualions. They have joined their forces to oppose fore ign presence, Lhe risk of Sunni and Kurdish supremacy and Lhe conlrol of Lhe lerrilory by the Government. This is a scantily organ ised and bad ly financed nebula which alternates talks (they are nol necessarily re ligious fundamentalists, even if these are a lso presen l, an d not necessarily Baathists; in any case they arc no l extremis ts, and there are even former oppos ers or Saddarn's regime) with the use of

arms lo acquire new positions, sometimes only econom ic and/or criminal ones. It feeds more on rese ntment and opportunism rather lhan on ideology. The d i Cf i cult security-situaLion fuels Lhese groups , and many recent kidnappings, bolh the spectacular ones and the less noliceable everyday episodes, have only an economic character and can be traced back lo them . The Sunni guerrillas have basically acknowledged the m istake of not participating in the eleclions and stay?_ :)

ing out of the political context. For this reason, also the politically extreme groups could make use of kid napping as a means of establishing a re lalionship \,v ith the \ 1Veslern \vorld, in ord er lo g e l a recogn it ion of sorts. Besides, the possible income deriving from ransoms could be used, accordi ng Lo a well-established tradition of the Musl irn Brotherhood, Hi:,,,bollah and Hamas, to operate in the comrnu niLy in order to bu ild a basis for consent, Vvhich \voul d transform their movements from bands of g uerrillas into pol itical organizations. For a .l ong time the three abovementioned categories of armed and su b versive opposi Lion have shared aversion to the international forces, the transitional governments, the Shi'ites and to the ongoing stabil isalion process. One o f their objectives was the isolation of the Un ited Slates, in ord er lo cause the coalition Lo \Vithdraw its troops and force the foreign firms to leave. T he strongest eollabora26

tion was reached by the first t,vo groups, which had a possible common goa l. As previo u sly sa id, now the s"ituaL ion has changed , bul this evolution is Loo recent and its roots are not deep enough lo be consi d ered established. The fallback to the old situ ation can occur at any moment , and to avoid this shoul d be th e rnain goal of the political process. Th is demonstrates how hard the competi tion is for the ru le over the Sunni ,vorl d . So, even guerr illa groups come into collision. Even more attacked are other reali ti es \~,hich, for different reasons and in differen t \,vays, could trans fer into the process of integration of th e new Iraq the varied Sunn i \,Vorld , divided in : "collaboratioll"ists", moderates, Ulema Council, political groups. These lasL realities sh ould become the focus of the aLLention and efforts o[ the Government and the international coali Lion in order to ach ieve the goal. Almost all these faction chose 1.0 boycott

the political elections, above all after their fai l ure to obtain a postponement of at leas t six months, and opposed the mil itary operations in the Sunni area, Falluja in particular. .An o pen oppos1t1on was also expressed by int e r i m Sunn i Presiden t a l-

Yawar. T-lm,vever, also in the past, in an even more dangerous situation, these factions have sho,Nn their willingness to oVin a political dialogue. Even b e fore and, again, after lhe election, the Sunni political parties (among ,vh ich the Iraqi Islamic Party has the leading role) made publ ic lheir intention of being involved in the drafting of the ne\v Const itution and poss i b ly to enter the new Government.. These signals of national reconcil ialion seem to be acceptable to the Shi'i te w i rrne1Âˇs, who have been repeatedly confirming their orientation lowards an Iraq that would guarantee all. In concrete, they decided not to punish lhe low and middle cadres of the Baath party, as a recognition of their limited involvement. in massacres, i n exchange for their essential participation in the bureaucratic and adminislralive running of the future machinery of the Slate.

In view of this, a conside rable importance is assumed bv the Ulema Council, the highest,Traqi religious author i tv, ,Nhich , though without an exJJlicit po li tical role, has a h igh conditioning po,ver. It is p recisely lh e Ulema Council wh ich gets most

frequently involved as the main interlocutor in cases o[ kidnapp ings and even of armed clashes. The Council has been th e target of threatening ,varnings by some terrorist movements, enjoining it not to get involved; this belongs precise ly in the context of the struggle for the hegemony on the Sunni ,NorÂˇld . These are the channels, in particular the Ulemas, the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Iraqi United National Movement, thal the international community should involve in order lo ravour the peaceful and full integration of the Sunni cornmunil.y, thus pe rmitting the s tabiliza tion of the Country.

THE KURDS

The Kurds make more than one ri fth of the population and are a majority in 8 out of the 18 Iraqi provinces and a substantial minority in other neighbouring areas. Their territory is a stabl e area \vhich consol idated its administrative and political pos ition in the n i nelies, thanks to the protection guaranteed by the "noflighl zon e " establi shed by the UN in 1991, under the Lu telage of the Anglo-American air forces . The Autonomous Regional Parliament (KRG, the Kurd Regional Assembly) restorÂˇecl in October 2002 and rene,ved with the elections of January 30, is now func27

lioning perfccLly. Also lhe economic development of the area is ahead of the rest or the Country. In a ddi tion, the Kurds enjoy a large international s upp ort. Elected Pr·esid ent of t he Republ ic, Jalal Talabani, leader of the UPK, has been the protagonist of a h istorical event \v hich h ad a precedent in Kurdish history only in lhe days of Salaclclin. The National Kurdish Alliance, consisting of two t raditional parlies (The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), \Vhose leader is Masoud Balzani, gained 75 seats in the National Assembly, plus lhe two posts taken by the Ku rdish Islami c Group, which la te r announced to have reached an agreeme n t with the larger group . This population could be a stabi lizing factor in Iraq also b e cause of its interest in common strategies v,·ith the Shi'ites, a imed al guarantee i ng the respective roles . I-IO\vever, there are also some elemen ts oC risk, which certai nly include the separatist drive, proved a lso by the voting of January 30 in an u nofficia l consultive referend um w hi c h revealed that. 99% of the voters expressed their choice for independence. As mentioned above, several K u rds representatives, including institutional ones, started to stir up again the idea of independence, to oppose th e power conquered by the rival groups in the new Government. Besides, there are some frictions betvveen the Kurdish rnajority and o th er ethnic minorities Iraqi federalism will be the shar(especially Turkrnen) in lhe re- ing of the proceeds from the region of Arbil, Sulairnaniya and sou rces, oil in particular. In this Duhok. Also, in many bordering situation of attrition the Kurds provinces, such as Kirk uk and rep r·esenl a decisive clement, as Mos ul, there arc sizeable Kurdish t heir aspirations concern the minorities which aspire to a clos- Kirkuk oil area. The future orgac r relationship with the au - nization of this area was one of tonomous region already granted the maj o r problems causing the to the Kurds. delay in the forrn alion of the new Actually, the ethnic rival- Government and has near· lv ries are a shield fo,· economic in- caused the breaking olI of the r~~ terests . The core of th e s uccess of lations \vilh the Shi'ites.

THE SHl'ITES T h e Ara b Shi'ites were th e clear-cut winners in the poli t.ical elec tions o f January 30, after a cen luries-old history of su brn ission to Lh e S u nni minori lv . T he Un ited Iraqi Alliance, the list promoted by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani which assemb les 20 p arties and move m ents, including SCIRJ and Da'awa, gathered half of the votes (car-ly Corecas ts had sug-

gested even a greater figure), thus gaining the maj ority in the ne,,v Parliament (140 out of 275 seats) , This success changes the balance of forces in Iraq and concerns not only the Sunn i comm u nitv but als<) the international coal ition . The electoral s uccess of the Shi'ites \vill also have an impact on the international relations of the new Iraq, considering that both SCIRl and Da'av.;a are traditionally very close to Iran ( Grand

Ayato ll ah al-Sistani himsel f \Vas born in Iran, though it should be taken into account that almost all of the Iraqi Shi'ites are Arabs and not. Persians), even though they entertain very good relations a lso with Great Britain. This is also due to the presence of a large commu nity of exiles . Besides, they are not against the fo,-e ign Lronps, including the American ones, present in the Country to guarantee the security of Iraq .

Alongside the str ictly political and economic problems, and together \Vith the assignrnent of the most po\verful posts, inside the complex Shi'ite \vorlcl the discuss ion on the possibility of adopting the Islamic law in the ne,v Constitution has also been opened. Prirne Minister a l-Jaafari, considered a moderate, is a lready known for his participation in the transitional inslitutions. His ro le was backed by SCIRI,

he put to an even harder test than the formation of the governm ent: the drawing up of t he n ew Constitution. However, s in ce a libera l democracy to b e complete must guaran tee equal r ights to all its citizens, it is necessary to constitute "chambers" of constituli onal compensation, in order to permit the Sunnis, the Kurds and lhe other minorities to have a representivi Ly of the ir own . Such "chambers" should be est a bl is h ed toget h er with the Shi'i Les and should, in fac t, b e spa ces given by lhe Shi'ites, not taken a 'w ay from them . T h e space fo r the Shi'iLes 111usl not be "granted". If the Shi'ite maj ority once again fe ll. d ep rived of sornething which was clue t o them, the risk of radica.lization a nd consequent unrest, including armed strife, would greatly increase. Political isol ation al\\!ays leads to t he raclica.lization o f pos itions . If, instead, takin g advantage of t h e num er ous openings offered by the political, religious and cultural Sh i' ite world , a real space ,-vas given to them, taking them out of isola tion, the Isla mic process could be g uid e d , otherwis e lhere would be the risk of a dangerou s drift. In this sense, the formation o[ lhe new Government led b y the Sh i'ites is u ndou b ted ly the best investment t hat could be made to test these realities . However, there is also the problem of the Islamic law. ll is inappropriate to impose a Western juridical tradition rron:1 abroad ; on the conlrary, it is desirable for a Country to fo und i Ls laws on i Ls own history and culture. Therefo re, one shou lei encourage a process that avoid s t h e imposition of a rigid rad ical Islamic lavv and gives birth to a juridical system consistent with tbe Islamic pri nciples and possibly approved by a referendum . II could prove in teresting t o p ropose a mode l similar to the curre nt. juridical system o [ Mor occo. \Nill

the majority component of the Shi'ite alliance, to avoid making the impression that they in tended Lo crush all minor allies. The Wes tern countries greatly fear a possible radical Islamic Shi'ite drÂˇil}, which is certainly s upported by the most orthodox parts of al-Sistani's group. Hmvever, most of the leaders of that alliance h a ve clearly expr essed their orientation towards a State \\!hich \NOulcl take into account the Islamic principles and, at the same time, be a guaranty for all. This is also clue to t he fact that the Shi'ite lead ers are p erfectly aware of their control over only a part of the Cou ntry and, there-

fore, they have no interest in carry ing the confrontation to ex tremes. ln this sense the \.Vestern w orld is clearly interested in [avouring th e r ise of a new democracy which sho uld no t be felt a s "fake", otherwise the resentment w ould grow, creating the opposite effect. The birth of a true democracy, which wou ld give equ al rights to all citizens, s hou ld be encouraged. Bu I. this m ust inevitably face up to the reality tha t the Shi'ites a,-e the maj ority in Iraq, an essential factor th at n eeds to be taken in to respectful consideration. These are especially important balances which nmv

THE TRIBES: A PRACTICABLE

ROAD Tribes are a fundamental reality of a ll lhe An, b world , s till Westerners tend to misunderstan d or und eresl imale them . The real control and authority outside the large ci lies, and orten inside them, are held by the tribal counc il s . Saddarn Husse in 's regime had already transferred the local jurisdicliona l Lo l ribe chiefs and founded its nde on relatives com ing from Saddam's native tri b e . The solu tion to the Iraqis' pr-oblerns also requ ires the knowledge of th eir origin, history, tradition and cu lture. The fact that the na tiona l idea is still much inferior Lo the sense or belonging Lo a tribe m ust be taken into consideration. The effective control over the territorv should be given back lo them . 路路 Therdore one should pursue an agreeme nt a rn ong lhe c hi efs of th e tribes, creatin g an equilibrium on this basis. It were in fact some of the tribes which instruct-

eel their members on whether or not to participate in the political process of forming the Government, and there were criLical moments when some of Sunni families imposed Lo their representativ es to leave the Governm ent a nd later gave them the green light. At present the tribes operate a t local level, keeping a \vay from g uerrill a v.;arfare, neither supporting nor opposing it. HO\veve r, they could d o more, if a common grou nd with them was fo und . Many American analysts are against recognizing a role to the tribal system . Taking this assu m p tion as a basis and trying lo rep roduce a party democ rncy in the short or medium term could prove extremely harm ful. One of the key slrategies lo achieve lhe s tabiliza tion of Iraq impli es a very large involvement o[ lhal wo rld . It wo u Id b e necessary, therefore, Lo d evise a sort o[ T,-aqi "Loya Jirga" , a trib al assembly, which shou ld Lind lhe adequate arrangement by itself. Their concrete p artic ipat ion co uld also

hold back the risk of a drift towards religious fu ndamentalism , as th e tribes are composed o f mixed e lemen ts and consequently are used to dealing \Vith frictions inside the Is lam ic c u lture, ,vi thout the extreme abstract strictness of radical isn1. T h er efore, in order to reach a pacl on nationa l reconc iliation, through a n initiative sponsored by Lhe E urop ea n Un ion , t he promptest promotion of a conference wilh a ll th e t r- ibe s co u ld prnve necessary. The European Union should assume a leading role as a mediator in the process of Iraq's s tab ili;ation, also because the other international protagonists ar路e seen as less reliable and are less welcome. Consequ e nt ly, t he European Union could play a mor路e active a nd p resent role, welcomed especially by the Iraqis th emselves . T he EU participation could be r eali zed through the promotion of a tribal assembly, the assumption of military command, the training of the security forces, whose 31

control could be placed at European Union level (European Military Command) rather than NATO. The la tter should give the new Iraq the poss ibility to join Lhe "Partnership for Peace" programrne.

THE FEDERALIST CHOICE It should be acknowledged that the idea of a un i Lary Iraq is still underdeveloped and \NeakeneJ by the events of the last decades, \Nith the centralist dictatorsh ip o[ the Baathist regime, the increasing autonomy of the Kurds, the repression of the Sh i'i te uprisings and the processes set off after Sadd am Husse in 's fall. On the other hand, the Country does not represent a truly historical entity, but rather an artificial union of three distinct Ottoman provinces (velayat): Mos ul , Baghdad and Basra. The West s hould admit its m istake and understand that it cannot leave out of consideration the three Oltoman vclayal. It is obvious, though, that the division into three separate s tates seems tm32

acceptable, (also be cau se the main ethn ic and religious r ealities are not always dearly and distinctly distributed on the territory). This solution \Nould probably be high ly destabilizing for the entire Middle East. The federal organization of Iraq has been the core of the Shi'ite-Kurdish confron tation in the process of formation of the majority and the Government and, as we said, contint1es to be a controversial matter. Th erefore , in order to create stability, the creation of a largely feeler-a l State should be strongly supported, providing for a central ized Government, responsible for foreign policy and defence. In th is sense the process could be fa cilitated by the willingness s hovvn by the main Traqi political forces . Th e ract tha t th e ne\V Constitution must. be federa li st has already been made clear and is also formally supported by the UN. An institutionally recognized and territorially recognizable federation would slop the disputes among the factions of the Country, which cou ld be the resul t of the clanger represent.eel by corn -

munities unevenly scattered ove1路 the territory . Regional Parliaments representing the Ottoman vclayal (North, Centre and South) could be envisaged in Lhe Constitution . An equal distribution of resources shou ld also be guaranteed. Moreove r, it must be stressed again that the constitution or chambers of institutional compensation is absolutely necessary in order lo represent all the Iraqi reali ties. LJ ,,. President, Centre for fnternational Studies (1) The Park1mcntary seats were divided as follows: the Uni ted Iraqi Alliance , led bv Shi'ite Grand AyaLollah Al i a l-Sist:ani , 140; t he Kurdish Al liance formed b:v路 two large Kurdish panics, the Kurd ish Dcmocrntic Pa r路ty (KDP) and Lhc Patrio tic Unio n of K urdistan (PUK), 75; Lhc lrnqis' List o f the outgoing Prime M in ister Tyad Allaw i: 40; the I raqis' P arty, of the outgoing Sunnite President Ghazi aJYawar: 5; t he Alli a nce of t he l r,1qi Turkm en Front: 3; the List of Tndcpenclcnt Na tional Eli tes and Cadres , close to Shi'ite r路adical leader Moqta-

da Sadr: 2; the People's Union (Cornmunist): 2; the Tslam ic group of Ku rdistan: 2; the Organizatio11 of Islamic Ac tio n in Iraq - c e'nrral Direction (Shi'ite): I; the List of tl;e Independent Dem.oc rats of Sunni Adnan Pachachi: 1; th e Natio nal Mesopotam ian List (Christian): 1; the Movement of Reconciliation and Liberation of Sun ni Mishaan a l-Juburi: L (2) The two m a in historic Kurd ish parties which in 1998, after years of conflicts, came to an agreement. (3) The U.n it.ed Iraqi Alliance consists of 20 main parties and m ove m e n Ls, mainly Shi'i t.e, two major Shi'ite parties (Al Da' ,nva and SCIRT - T h e Supreme Council for Lhe Islam ic Revolution in Iraq); the lraqi Ifo:bollah; the move m en t of a l-Fuclha la ; the Sh i'ite Political Coun cil (formed by 42 minor parties, was created by the leader ot the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Cbalab i). The list also included Sunnis, S h i'ite Kurds, Tu rkrn e n and members of the Yazidi religious minority sect, so me t:ribal chids also from th e North (mainly from t h e Mossul area), as well as numerous independe nt members. (4) Iraq had complex structures of informat ion and securi ty services a ll over the Coun try . Those who b e longed to t hat sys Le m , i.e . a great n u m b er of Sadda m 's followers, gained a lo t. o[ expe rience and now continue to exercise their authority, using struc Lu res and c.ontacts. Then there arc the main intelligen ce and security organ izat ion s of Saddam Hussein's regime , the Special Security Service (Arnn al- hass, H ijaz Amn al-kass, Preside ntial Affair Department, Special Security Organization, or SSS). lt was the most powerful security service which had unified opera tions rooms to coordinate the work of the various services, \Nith the parti.cular goal of protecting Saddam . The General In tell igence S e rvice (Mukhabaret, Dairat al Mukhabaret., Muk habaret a l-!\rnm a, or GTS), th e intelligence and secur ity service of the Baath party; the Milita ry Security Service (Amn a l-As kariva or MSS) h ad its offices in every ~ili tary uni t to perform functions of inner security and anti-corruption. L ike nearly a ll

lh e in fo rmation a nd secu rity services, it had its own paramilitary u nits. The General Secur ity Sen -ice (Al-Am n alAmn , or GSS), the secret p olice, the Service of in terna l securiLy. The Ba'ath Party Security (Arnn al Hizb) carried out informative acliviLy for the m embers of the party. The J\!lilitary Bureau of the Ba'at.h Party, acted as a system o f commissaries tasked w ith the indoctrin a tion t.he Armed Forces and control of their political loyal ty. The Tri bal Chief's Bureau (i\ilaktab al-S h u yuk h ), pa id tribal c hiefs to h ave the m cont rol Lh e ir tribes , spy on possible dissidents and provide faithful u··ibe memb ers v_rith arms in order to eliminate dissiden t

factions. Saddam's Fedaycen, led bv Uday, a son o f Saddam's, form ed mai n ly b y yo ung people from t.he area of Tikrit, \-v cre trained by the Republican Guard . Besides, the Mi nistry of I n formation control led the mass 111ed ia , and the Foreign Min istry in troduced elements of the secret services inLo the diplo m at ic cn v ir·onm ent . Al l t h e telecommunication systems. the major cicadcrn ies a nd Lhe research institutions \Vere in filtrated by security cells. There \.vas also the Iraqi Signals and E le ctronic l n t.cl ligen ce (STG 1 TiELINT) system. The Special Republican Guard reported direcLly to Sadda m .

ur c~untry is going thrnu_gh a complex econorn.ic phase wh ich, logically, affects also the possib ility of investing resources in stralegic sectors such as o f Defence. This situ ation, ho-wever, should not lead to resignation but rather induce lo find solulions an d remedies . Mostly, the difficulties derive from the loss of the competitive edge of our enlerprises, emphasized by the sudden reversing of the economic grmvth rate, which, during the lasl s ix months, began to shift toward a negat ive sign, with unavoidable repercussions on public finance. As is well known , the main difficulties are reported in lhe induslriaJ field, vvÂˇhere Lhe assertiveness and growth spaces of markets \.vith potenti alities still lo be explored, such as Ch ina, I ndia, Brazil a nd manv other countries in foll econom.ic growlh, bring e~1er 11101-e rapidly the Jtalian industry to a state of crisis, or at least., of pre-crisis. AL lhis poi nt, it is clearly needed an intervention in the industrial policy. But first of all we shou ld thoroughly analyse the reasons of the difficulties facing the Italian system. T herefore the first qu estion we should ask ourselves is how an industrial policy can be clcfinecl . Th is is the question lo \vhich we will try to give an ans,.ver, quite schematically and referring Lo a spe35

lhe European Un ion, should not cast a shaJov-1 on the peculiar aspects of the Itali an case.

THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE ITALIAN SYSTEM An analysis of lhe Italian economy and society carried out lhrough the co111pelitiveness in dexes formulated at internal.iona l level, confir111s \vhat VvÂˇe stated above. From a generall y competitive point o( view , our Country slands between the thirtieth and the thirly-third p lace al Âˇw orld level. Among the macroeconomic factors affecting the cornpetiLiveness index there is the level cific (a ct-finding inquiry carried out by the Productive Activities Comrnittee of the Chamber of Deputies. A foreword is needed: at present, the industrial policy seems an instrument too bulky on the one hand, and too scanty on lhe other. The definition of any induslrial policy must necessarily start from the general state of th e economy. So, \Ve should first of all keep in mind that ,ve are going through a negative E uropean and international econom ic cond ilion, which influences the economic growth at ,vorld level. This starting datum is essential in order to analyse the Italian econo111y and find the measures to be undertaken . The macroeconomic data at our disposal say that, ,vith i n a general context of limited economic growth, the United St.ales is better off than Europe. In short, during the last five years, it showed a growing rate of 0 .7 percentage points h igher than Europe's. The secret of these better results seems to lie in the grealer flexibility of the US economy and in its quickness in changing into a markedly postindustrial way, privilcg i ng high

technologies and services, vis-~\v is the lraditional manufacturing activities. Bolh the United States and Europe, on t he other hand, must reckon with the aggressive Asian economics, with China in the lead, as they keep on con quering market shares. During the same per iod of time, I Laly declared a growing rate about 0 .5 points lower than that or Europe, \Vh ich in the last few months has b ecom e even beLLer..... .. ... Hmvever, the fea tures shared by the countri es of

of the national d e bt and the state of public hea lth services. Th is affects the Lax load which burdens the enterprises. Further factors are the high level of the social security contributions, the labour legislative discipline (recently improved in order to make it much more flexible) and a high rnle of structural unem p loyment, concentrated in some areas of the Country. As [ar as educat ion and research are c oncerned, the expense in favour of university and

postgraduate education is 0.7% of the Gross Don1.eslic Producl, compared \Vi t h t be expense of the United Slates whic.h is 2 .5%. Moreover, it is quite lO\v the percentage of sludenls in economics, engineering and science, which are lhe Cacu I lies closest to the needs of a post- indus t rial economy. On the contrÂˇary, lhe Italian primary and secondary education , Crom elernenlary school to high school, is internationally cons id ered among the best. In addition, the relation between Universiti es and en te r- . prises is considered unsatisfactory, whereas the United States, once again, is among the most advanced counlries, because i l uses university research laboratories to supporl the e nlerprises which, in turn, guaran tee their financial backing through sponsorships. As for Research & Development, I taly spends about 1% of its GDP, compared with 2.5% of lhe llniled Kingdom, 2 .8% of the Uni ted States and 3.5% of Finland and Sweden. The expense in the field of technology is also rather ] O\N: Italy spends 5% , Germany 5.5% and Europe arofmd 6%. In conclusion, \VC have to consider that Italy absorbs only 0.9% of the in te rnational investments, in comparison with 22% of lhe Un i led St.ales, 6.7% of Germany, 4 .5% of France and 2.1 % of Spain, bu t a lso 5 .3% of China.

THE WEAK POINTS OF THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM

The reality of large enterprise represents a first element. First of all, in Ttalv there are verv few large groups i n compa;ison with other European realities. In rec ent y ears th e resources have been shifted towards the service sector regula ted on a national b asis , anLd then, d u ring the 1990s, towards a non- manufacturing ..... realitv , controlled bv .,

private societies, not yet ex posed lo domes lic and international competition . Besides, t he ownership of Lhe large national groups is still based on families, \vhereas lhe element common to European s ystems, of \,v idcsp read property based on financial intermediaries, is m issing. Among the t wenty leading l tal ian groups, in the first p lace we find FIAT. The second large man u fact u ring grou p, Parmalat, which was recently wrecked by a d evastating financial crisis , ,v as only sixth, after ex-public en terprises such as ENI, Telecom and ENEL. The var iations in added value point out an inc ,~case of 8 .88% for retail, 6. 77% for public services (,,vatcr, gas , highv.Âˇays), 3.19 % for trans p ort. On the contrary, industrial soc iet ies show a decrease of 6 .06% and make the g ran d- total negat ive . These dala show the scarcely

compct1t1vc structure of the retail trade and the circu mstance that the publ ic-service sect.or is distinguished by regulated prices and fa res. Therefore, t he difficul ties exist in market sect.ors w i th a p u re ly industrial character. .Another re leva nt. e lement is the rel ative ly small dimension 01 our large groups wh ich, compared ,vith the competing Countries, have a regional and non-global nature. .A 1ur1.her e lement of weakness is represented b y the limited number 01 pate n ts issu ed in o u r Country. This highlights the dif1icul t.y of applying al indu strial level the results of the research activity. In this respect, there is a wide gap between the European Union \vhere, for examp le, in 2001 there were 161 patents granted p er million 01 i nh a b it.a nts, \Vhereas the Italian average was 75 . 37

THE STRONG POINTS OF THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM

Obviously, n ear the weak points l here are also elements of slrength. Our product ive model proved Lo be able to adapt to several changes and evolut ions of the in lernalional context. Despite the system limitations previou sly h ighlighted, Italy pos sesses an industrial and entrepreneu rial wealth u nique in the world for its originality and orientation Lowards specific markets. Italy is, or was till a few months ago, at the top in various sectors, some of ,vh ich are distinguished by a significant level of technology. We arc, orÂˇ ,vere, lhe first in the following sectors: textile, s hoes, c loth ing, lcalher products, machine tools and instrument mechan ics. Anolher point of strength of our country is its unquest ionably s trategic position at the centre of the Medilerranean, which makes Italy a fundamen 38

tal junction of the international economic flov,,1s. Such geograph ic position, which should be opportunely developed first of all at the infraslr uctural leve l, makes Italy a natural link bet,veen Europe and Middle/Far Easl. The entrepreneurial vitality of Lhe small and medium-size en terprises is generally acknowledged and is the object of many international au.empts at copying it. The small and mediu msize enterprises are realities 1,vith their own identity and autonomy, and in our country, for a number of reasons, they find an environmenl particularly favourab le to their developmenL, ,vhich mus t he supported and consolidated.

THE REALITY OF THE SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZE ENTERPRISES

This reality lends itself to sev-

era] non - univocal eval uations, and it presents ambiva.lences that should be investigated. Also during the current phase of economic crisis , when consumption is low and Lhe service scclor determines a decrease of sales, there is reportedly an increas e in the net ba lance o f small enterprises and an expansion or the productive capacity through the creal.ion of new firms. These phenomena, positive in d eed, need a correct interpreta tion in order to understand the r-eal prospects of th is sector. First of all, Lhe increase of the net balance derives from the algebric sum of the negative resu l Ls of the textile, shoes and clothing sectors, which are having some difficulties with exportation, and the posi tive resu lts of food, building , information and technology service sectors. Th e high birth rate of enterprises, moreover, is a clear evidence of the vitality of the entre-

preneurial culture , a nd is bal anced by a percentage of closing clowns , near 50% dur in g the first three years. Moreover many small. e nterprises reporL a difficult financial situation, as they have fund ing problems and lack a strong fi nancial structure. At the same time, ,ve note the absence of a large enterprise capable of strategic innovations to be transferred to smaller enterprises, thus play ing a leading and propulsive role. A particularly negative phenomenon ,vhich concerns, e ssentially, sma ll and mediumsize enterprises, is the p e rman ence of a large underground econon1.y, ,vhich is believed to produce a turnover of 500,000 billion of old Italian Lire and lo employ on a regular basis about 3 million people. The experience of districts, an a lm ost spontaneous organizational form, is still looked upon with a p referential allenlion by

the enterprises . This pattern is how路e v e r subj e ct to var ious challenges which lead to reconsider the nature and the organi zational method of the dis tricts . They are, more ov e r, a pluralistic reality divide d into three main typologi es: lhe d istrict with a definite leadership, the district character iLed by a strong group of competing firms and, finally, the district characte rized by a v ery frag mented structure . In this r e spect, ,ve should mention that the idea o[ a productive cyc le lends to become more and more important. , with one or more firms leading the others. In gener al th e distr ict., in order to continue to be a winning model, needs to be ori ent.eel towards the innovation of processes and - above all - of products. An important factor of vveakness for the smalJ and rn e diurn -Si/.e entcr路prises is constituted b:y their being positioned in traditional sectors lacking i nnova-

tion, where it is ve ry hard to keep the pace of the developing Countries, ca pable of producing th e same goods at much lower costs . The enterprises must increase the technological level of their production, in order Lo d erea t th e realities where t he labour cost is decidedly lovv e r , but it is impossible to measure against the new technologi es. The futur路e of the district, especially in some sectors, wil l only be its internationalization. F inally, ther e is t.he funding proble m which affects not only small and medium -s i ze ente rprises, but also lar路ge ones, even though with different. characteristics. T hey meet difficulti es in getting credi t, in particular venture capital, so they run up debts w iLh the banks, which, in turn, have gr eat. proble ms in managi ng the phenomenon without limiting th e mse lv es to unload the negative effects on lhe depositors.

tackling the \.v e ak points, enhancing the strong poi n Ls o f the Italian system . In ILaly such a definition has precise consequences and i 111poses LO intervene in critical a re as, which have already bee n poin ted out long ago: high p ressure of t axation \.vhich bur d ens the en lerprises; availabi lity o f infrastruct u re; p ublic administration; lack o f dynam ism in th e university r e search system ; rigid ity of the labmuÂˇ market (actually on this subject som e progress has been made); welfare system , obj ect of a partial reform to be completed as soon as possible; high cost of energy , wh ich is a real competitive d isadvantage.

GUIDELINES FOR A REVIVAL OF THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM Industrial policy and competitiveness policy Afler defining the context., lhe slrong and weak points and the peculiarities of the ltal ian system, we can nowÂˇ turn to the possible interventions . An "old style" industrial policy cannot be suggested: the economy has been strongly privatized, and the firms must be lree Lo operate on the rnarket:, for good or bad, even when their names are FIAT or Telecom. However, there a r e sectors asking for an industrial policy. An interesting theme, d eserving all our attention, is that of energy , which was paradox ically laid aside, from a politica l point of vie\N, soon after the [arnous referendum wh.ich stopped the n uclear production ol energy, and

which shou ld have brought about, instead , a ne,v energy p olicy in order to provide the country with enough energy a t accep table prices. The not.ion o f industrial policy is however insufficient to understand all the problems \vhich the Italian system has to face in ord er Lo relaunch its p roductive machinery. Fro m the hmdamental a u tonomy ,vhich today Lends to be given Lo ecoi10rnic s ubjects, together with the ma,-ked tendency towards the expansion o[ the service industry, sterns a ne,,v approach Lo the questions we are examining. More than industrial policy as such, a "context policy" should be stre ssed, whic h should redraw the scenario within wh ich the productive activ i ties take place. I n other ,vorcls, the competitiveness po l icy should aim at

The interventions to strengthen competitiveness Beside genera l guidelines, there are more punctual themes \.vh.ich require a d e termined action . A first aspect consists in th e improvement o f the libcrÂˇaliz.a t ion process, in 01-der to guarantee a real competitive sel.-up or each market. T h.is nee d is partic ul arly fe lt by th e s e rvice

sector, where privati:ration was started and carried out quite promptly in order Lo reorganize the Stale finances , but withou t decon t rolling t h ose sectors. This meas ure, as a rule , should precede privatization. Secondly , still within the context of the safeguard of competition, an ans\.ver is needed in relation to the future set-up of the local public services. In this respect, the local authorit ies have valid reasons, also b ecause they often have LO face managing difficulties. But one should have a more wide-ranging vision, in order to devel op competition , improve efficiency, reduce costs and create the great industr ial pr-o tago-

nists desperately needed by o u r country. Thirdly,_i t is necessary to proceed with the revision and ra tionalization of all the in tervention instruments provided by the national legislation and EC regulations in favour of the enterprises (incen Lives , po Ii c i cs for the South, structural funds) , taking into considerat ion th e neVvÂˇ organ ization o f the Republic, resulting from the current

title V of the Constit ution. It would be advisable to avoid in tervention overlapping and superimpositions b_y the various government levels, leading to bureaucratic and administrative compl ications . In this connection, the Sta te and the local au t hori ties s houl d act in concert in order to id entify their re spective responsibilities, generally g iving to the for mer a str ateg ic role of coord ination and con tribution to the p r o gramme o f inle rvenL io ns, and to t he latter the task o f defining and impl e rn e nt i ng l he dec isions . A Cour l h aspecL d e als \Nith promoting and protecting Italian product s . Th e marke t s' opening to competition has ca u s e d c lea r ly unfa i r l racle p r actices, among which there are socia l and e nv i ronm e nta l "selling at a loss" and phenomena of ov ert counle rfe iLing of produ cts trad itionally produced in lLaly. On the one hand , th ese events sho\v our indus trial potentialily and ho\-v lhe "made in Italy" represen ts, in many sectors, a c lear guaran tee o f quality and reliability at international level. On the olh er, l h e re is the irreparable damage that our

domestic economy \VOu.kl suffer i n case of popularisa tio n and trivialization o f the national products, w iLh the consequence that our enterprises c ould nol. use th is unquest ionable competi tion advantage. Tn Lh is respect, it would be urgent to adopt the fo l.l ow i n g m easurÂˇes: Lhe introduc tion, in a manner consistent with EC discipli ne, of Lhe possibili ty of protecting our trademarks in \,vays similar to t hose pertaining t o a public brand; a decisive action against counterfe il ing activities, a lso calling to their duties th e institu tions in charge of in tern ationa l trade ; a European Union in i tiative LO in t rod uce a ne w discip l ine on l abelling, with the a i m or giving t he cons u mer exhaustive informalion about the or ig i n of the produ cts . At p res e nt the fiscal ins t ru ment appears to be the most efficient and appropriate in order Lo fav our dimensional growth and b oost the e nle rprise system an d districts. It seems quite urgent to introd u ce fiscal incentives for those service e nterprises s u pporting q uality, and opera t ing within dis tricts. Further facilitations can be identified in 41

tax exemptions regarding operations of constitution and increase o[ capiLal or assets, and of acquisition or con tr ibu tion of companies or their divisions, acquisit:ion or contribu tion of shareholdings, mergers, also by amalgamation, rega rding, or between, small and medium-size enterprises . Mor-eove r, one should carefully evaluate the proposal regarcli n g a further f iscal abatement of the regional tax on productive ac t ivities, which bur d e ns small and medium -size enterprises.

The centrality of research Frorn our analysis it is d ear that the promotion of the research and development activity on a large scale is vital for the productive system. It i s a commitment \vhich cannot be eluded or postponed . It refers with out any clistinc 42

I. ions Lo large and small enterprises , industry, services, the public a nd private sectors, and influences the future of the enLire national system. Large companies are the main driving force behind research in a ll developed Countries . Re search is the key of their success, \vhile its results arc for the benefit of the entire produ ctive system . The problems of small- and medium-size enterprises arc, in lurn, caused by a complete lack of investments in resca,~ch and d eveloprn enL, \,Vhich could fuel a n ew entrepreneurial activ i ty ( information and commu nication technologies and medical research) that, in all developed Countries, is the only tr u mp card in the i nternational competition . Italian producls need to be fortified h y the right amount of technology and innova t.ion, increasing their val u e and making

them unassailable by less developed economies . Moreover, this is the vvay to make companies grow w i thin innovative hightechnology dis tricts, l ocall y conce nLrated, \,\,.here the part icipants are connected in a net\.Vo rÂˇ.k and share science, services a n d finance . Research is inadequate to the economic developmen t level of our country and, to give this sector a deci s ive th r ust, apa rt frorn aknowledging the intrinsic value of basic research, iL is esse ntial lo increase the relations between productive \Âź'Oriel and research centres, using the university laboratories extens ively, in order to sustain the innovative processes of th e fi rms , hel p ing them t o promote and sponsor this activ ity. It is essentia l thal the universities open their doors to the entrepreneu rial rea.lily, and start making an effort to mee t the en te rprises' requirements of suppor t and in-

novation, and their need lo upgrade their way of being. In order to intervene e fficiently in the research de.bate, one needs to use various means. First of all, a greater employment of t he tax lever, by introducing among small and medium -size enterprises such concessions on a permanent base. The use of company profits for research should also be favoured, helping those that increase the amount devolved to research and development. New tax re ductions, ampler than what is provided by the present legislation, should be envisaged for companies that order research projects to universities and public bodies. As concerns direct interventions to fund companies, it may be necessary to review the evaluation mechanisms and introduce 1-c\varcli ng criteria, making procedures easier and quicker. It would also be very useful to envisage long-term instead of annual fu nding.

The r esou r ces necessary to develop a European economic policy vVe must acknowledge that, as we said before, though in n1any sectors th ings arc getting started, at present there are not enough publ ic resources to begin a virtuous process oC vast dimensions i n sectors that can be considered strategic: research and public works, in particular the large trans-European n etworks. I t depends mostly on a modest economic grO\.\'lh, which co incides with restric tions deriving from the Stabi lity Pact contracted within the European Union, and creales an obstacle to the development of a programme o f public inves tn1ents adequate to necessities. So the limited margin curÂˇrently at the disposal of domestic econ omic policy comes into play, just as it happens in all

European Countries within the Euro area, that have the same difficulties in meeting the requirements to s upport their economic grO\vth. It should be not iced, here, that the US economic recovery is backed b y resolute public policies, hinged on massive investments in research and the military sector, and on the reduction of the fiscal load, a lso at the expense of the balance o f public finance. At this point we may clearly pose the problem of European economic governance strategy and of the recovery of development, together with the stability . Currently, the European Union and all its member States aÂˇr e looking for

the instruments of intervention that could positively influence the economic situation . But the most recent data concerning lhe trend of the Gross Domestic Product also indicate that solu lions and speci fie interventions are needed in Italy. The course wiJ I b e reversed on ly through an assumption of responsibility by al I the Italian people, from the ruling classes to civil society. \.\/hat is really not needed, in order to come out of this d ifficult moment, is a lack of confidence \vhi ch leads to inactivity. O

,:Âˇ Chai1man, Productive Activilies Commiltee of the Cham her of Deputies 43

UZBEKISTAN INFLAMES CENTR The most denselY-POPulated nation amone the five countries that beloneed to the former Soviet Union has recently been hit bY traeic events. Demonstrations repressed by force have eiven rise to many worryine questions

hat occurred in Uzbekistan last M ay is not an isolated case hut an clement of a wider a ncJ more com plex situation which clcsc,-vcs lo be exam i ned in d e pth, also because of the important rep ercussions that t he e vents in those

Uzbekistan, together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, is one of the post-Soviet nations of the region. In this central-Asian Country, rich in natural resources and still in quest of democracy, poverty and economic crisis are persistent, while infrastructure and productive system are collapsing. The opposition is inadequate, lacking leading personalities and scarcely rooted on a territory receptive to the spreading of Islamic extremism and an area of confrontation among superpowers. The path towards democracy, opening to a non-violent Islam and religious freedom, through the assertion of human rights, remains therefore the only practicable road. Involving of course every reality, from ethnic groups to clans' representatives, from cotton growers to civil servants, from religious representatives to lay political movements. All this must be accompanied by a substantial economic development and by the concrete and evident support of the international community. 44

â€˘

*** **** *****

KAZAKHST

}spian Sea

. â€˘...,TURKMENISTAN ~

I RAN Countries, apparently far from us, can have on situalions \vhich concern llaly and the \!\lest. Economic crisis, unemploymenl, corruption, lack of freedom and disregard of the most elemenlary human righls arc a fertile ground where violent demagogu ery can grow and [ind its privileged chann els in the s ubversive Islamic radicalism. Central Asia is a fundamenlal crossroads al Lhe start of the 2 1st Century. It is the meeting point of prob.lems v,hich can be determinant for the global order. I t i.s the point of con Lael and confrontation of the strategic, polilical and econorn ic i nLcrcsts of the main \Vorl d po\,vers , United States, Russia, Ch ina and the Islamic world (especially for th e fundamentalist factions), h ut also of the European nations, or 45

Turkey and Iran . The five postSov iel nalions of lhe region , Kazakhstan , Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmen islan and Tajikistan, exposed to heavy internal and external pressures, get. by belween attempts at self-preserving ultra -cons erval.ism and r apid changes of place in the regional and internalional scenario,in order to ob tain more solid supporl. That is why they have gone from a co ndition of isolation and of Russian satellites to critical positi ons Lowards Russia. Open to grea ter international cooperation, they have mostly looked towards the United Sta tes, but also to Ch i na, and then lhey have gone back, at least partially, to a po licy of collaboration \,Vilh the Kremlin . Some Com muni s t reg im es have evolved into a u thoritarian personalisms and then, i n rare occasions, have launched tentative opening signs. From (ierce war against poli LicaJ rad ical Isl am they have pro gressed lo sl.ale alheism wilh a smattering of rigidly controlled

zinc. And also lawful and u nlawful tra de route s, from oil pipelines to drug traffic. According to estimates, the region can supply abou t 250 billion barrels of oil (as much as Saud i Arabia) and over 13,000 billion cubic metres of natural gas (on e fourth of the enlire Middle Easl) : an inestimable \Vealth whi ch , on ce extracted, musl reach the various part of the world throu g h pipe Ii nes crossing many countries. Besides, the Countries of Lhe area slill have capabilities, infras tructure, potentiali ties and special i7ed capaciti es inheri t.eel from the S oviet Union, su ch as space and missile bases, sc.ienti(ic laboratories, universities and educated and specia lized personn el. At the same time they have faced serÂˇious economic crises which, together \,Vi th a lack of democracy and respecL of human rights and persistin g instability, d ue a lso Lo a slrong and aggressive presence of a fundamen talist Islam , have thn.1\vn them lo lhe bottom of the classification of th e

tions and problems o f this geograp hical area, and is perhaps the most exp osed and central, and not only geograph ically. The mufti of Tashkent is historically the most influential authority of the region's Moslem spiritual leadersh ip, and in Uzbekistan, for example, lies the largest part of the v alley of Ferghana, t he centuries-old heart o f Islamic fun damentalism , wh ich expan ds well over the borders o f the region . It is in fact the valley where the d isorders of May 12 flared u p, when the demonstrations or lhousands o f p eop le \,v ere repressed in blood. It is therefore sui table to make a global analysis, oriented tO\varcls possible military employments.

formal Islam . Besides being placed in a stra tegic position, these Countries are rather r ich in resources, especially oil, gas, and cotton, bul also open coal p its, iron, chromium, copper, lead and

world wealth . Uzbekislan, the most d enselypopulated Country and the only one bord ering with the other four, and also w ith Afghanistan, is experiencing all the contradic-

i rnpr isonecl and, according Lo their relatives, also tortured, who are now being tried for supposed links \Vith Islamic extremism, in particular with a branch, nol necessarily fundamentalist, o f t h e

REVOLT AND REPRESSION

T h e re c ons tructi ons of the e v ents vary according to the sources. Apparently the manifest.al.ions slarlecl al Anclijan, in defence of 23 young busin essmen

movemenls outlawed by Lhe regime, called Akromia, i.e. a faction of 1-lizb ul-Tahrir. The man ifestations, expanding to the themes of th e econorn ic cris is, unemployment, lack of freedom and discrimination lowards the inhabitants of the valley of Ferghana, was dest.ined lo involve tens of thousands of civilians. The conneclions with Lhe manifestations are unknown but, during the night, a group o[ annecl men attacked the local jail and freed 4000 prisoners. Th~ [ollowing day, the Army intervened, firing on the crowd, in order lo regain control of the city by force. According lo several inlernal.ional humanitarian organizations and opposilion movernenls, both Islamic and non-ideological, the Army opened fire indisci-iminately and without provocation, also against women a nd ch il dren, causing hundreds of dead (745 according lo the opposition party Ozod dekhkonlar - Free Farmers), lo which one shou ld add the victims of the repressions in other cities of lhe valley (Korasuu, Pakhta-Abad) . According to the

Uzbek Government there were 169 dead, a numbe ,- of which \vere soldiers. Actually, the manifestations apparently ended into rÂˇevolts o[ armed Islamic movements, especially incited by the rnenlioned Akromia movement. It seems that among the victims th ere were many armed guerrillas, while the civilians were mostly killed by the "protesters" and not by the Army. According lo experts and analysts, th e truth could lie in the middle. Probably the Islamic opposition organizations, albeit widespread and inrl ue n Lia] among the population, in Uzbekistan do not have the organ izational capability needed to assemble tens of thousands of denwns lra Lors; bu t they could be at the origin of the revolt, ,vith a core or organized protest: 'which successively spontaneously spread because of the oppressive conditions. They could then have tried Lo Lake the lead of the rnanifes ta ti ons in order to exploit them politically and, possibly, also militarily, using their s uperior political and aU.racting capabilities.

It is certain that the Uzbek Government has laid the blame on Akromia and has pointed out some well-known Islami c exponents as the leaders of the revolt (ad Andijan, Kobi l ParÂˇpyiev, one of the leaders of Akromia; a Korasuu, Bakhl.iorÂˇ Rakhi mov, successively arrested, vd10, having occupied the city [or a fe\v hours, immediately proclaimed an Islamic SI.ate). Il is uncertain whether this corresponded to reality in every case or il \vas on ly an opportunity taken by the Government for- can-,ving out further repressions of dissidents, that the humanitarian organ izations and the opposition envisage as fiercer and w ider in the near future. Perhaps it is not by chance that, on the 24 th o f last May, they arrested the Uzbek la,vyer, activist: for human rights, who had given the media the figures of the massacre of the protesters at Adijan. Karimov's Government mainta in ed that the diso1-ders were organized at transnational level, in connection with w hat had happened in Kyrgyzstan a few r:nonths before. In support of this, he insisted that 47

there was a Kyrgy1. citizen among the \Nounclecl, ,vhile the rebe ls kept telephone connections with the K yrg yz tow ns of Osh and D zhalal-Abad a nd wi th Afghanistan. To b e sure, undoubtedly on the one hand the Islamic Âˇmove ments have transnatio n al links but, on the other, the ethnic and clan relations in the region are so involved that the exchange of telep hone calls across the border canno t b e consid ered a probative clement. However, on the basis o f these asse rtions, th e Uzbek regime has proceed ed Lo roundups and arrests. 48

THE SCENARIO

Uzbekistan, a former Sovie t republic of Central Asia, covers an area of 450,000 square kilornetres (one and a half that of Italy) and has an estimated popul a lion of a bout 20-25 million inhabitants . Its capital is Tashkenl. (approx . 3 million inhabitants). Other cities, important for their histo ry and monuments, are Samarkand and BulJ1ara. The popu lation consists of Vzbeks (75%) , Russians (7%) and other minoriti es, mostly from oth er peoples of Central Asia. Almos! all the inhabitants

p rofess th e n1selves Sunnit e Moslcms. The Coun Lry has been i ndcpendcnt from Moscow since August 31, 1991. A presiclen tial rcpubl ic, it has gon e from one to t\VO Chambers in 2004. S ince its independence, President of the Republic has been Is lam Kar imov (67 years old), undisputed lor d of the country a lready during t he last years of the USSR, when be was secre tary o( the Comm u nist party before converting to mod erate national is t pos itions. J n 2000 was re-elected ,vith a major ity of more than 95%. Ka,--imov, after surviving an attempt on his life in 1999, a ttr ibu ted to Islam ic extremists, has become an ally of the United States in the war against terrorism . Uzb ekis tan s tands firml y between t he second and fo u rth p lace as \vorld producer of cotto n, tha nks to the fact that the Soviet Union had rese rve d fo r this count,--y the role of sole supplier for the \,\..- hol e USSR . But thi s monoculture , already i n trouble, is experiencing now negati ve repercussions because of a very serious water cris is. There is no \,Va ter in the Countrv , and even Lake Arai, which "a fe w years ago was as big as Austria, r isks to d i sappe ar within Len years . Moreover, it is polluted by pesticides and toxic substances which h ave enormously i ncremented the disease and d e a th ra te . Also the exports of m aize and cars, \vhich in Lhe nineties had e nsured a relative economic stability, are going through a crisis. 80% of the population hardly manages to sur vive in d ramatic cond itions of unclerclevcloprnen l. In the main cities one can hope at most for a salai-y of 30-50 dolla r s per month , while in t he country the earning is one tenLh of that. Th e economic crisis and the iro n hand of the regime have thrmvn the Country down in the lowest world indexes. The opposition was exclu d ed from the elections of December

2004 . According to the inLernational observers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the elections did not conform to d emocratic rules . The press is not free and non-aligned journalists, di ssi d ents and opponents are jailed with the most diverse charges . There are doubls about th e murder of at least one journalisl who, moreover, was a Russian. According to the international h umanitarian organizations, thousands of dissidents are in jail exclusively for political reasons.

SOME DATA ABOUT ISLAM KARIMOV

Oddly enou gh, prec isely the harshness of th e regime cou ld protract its survival. There is no serious pohtical opposition, \.vell organi;i;ed and in a posi tion to make itself felt. The exist i ng groups have no financing whatsoever and have no access lo the

communicaL ion media . The regime could only be overthrown by the tribes, which are responsible fo r un lawful trafficl<ing and therefore poten tially interested in crea Ling a further inslabi liLy where they can move about. Or by Islamic f-undamentalisls, vvho can count on an transnational nelwork of support. It is therefore possible that revolts against Lhe regime could b reak out, fiercer and more v iolent, ,vhich wou.lcl hardly be able to establ.ish a new and more democratic governmental representation. Karimov's star \,vas already bor n during the Soviet era and, in particular, rose in the eighties with Gorbatchev. Âˇw ith a university degree in rn.echanical engi neering, he worked in a fac tory and then made a career in the Uzbek office of the Gosplan (lhe USSR body \Nhere Lhe rigid fiveyear plans were prepared). He has been dealing w i th politics since 1983, ,vhen he became Finance Minister in h is Republic,

before bci ng appointed Deputy Prime Minister in 1986. In 1989 he is First SecreLary of the Uzbek Cornmunist Party; a year later enters Moscow's Politburo and, appoin ted President of the local Parliament, soon becomes involved in the ethnic rivalries and in the repress ion of religious extr em ism in the rich south of Lhe Country. \,\lith the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independe nce of Uzbekistan in 199 1, Islam Karimov is confirmed mast.er of the Country. He is elected President with 86% of the votes, makesÂˇ use of the old Sovie L bureaucratic machinery and of his total control of the Army [or maintaining a b solute po\,.1er. But, lik e so many others , he shifts from Marxis.m to a confused nationalism. He keeps ll1e five-year plans (with mudd led econo mic reforms) and, above all, guaranlees the la ic ism of the Slate, even if, at the beginn ing, he ensures h is permanency in pmver thanks to

the accords ,.v ith the Islamic clergy. He accepts lo S\-vear on the Koran and go back to Islamic leaching in public education . He even reintroduces the A1'abic alphabet, \vhich had been pul aside in 1936 favour of Cyrillic. Once confirmed in power, he chooses the road of persecution ofthe non-controlled Tslam ic expres sions . Thanks to t\vo referendums (in 1995 and 2002) and an election (in 2002 with 95% of the votes), a llegedly rigged, he has managed to remain Lirrn ly in po\,v cr without in terruption since 1991, with his presen t mandate expiring in 2007. Securely in power, he proceeds to repress any dissent with greater strength. The lwo most important opposition parties, Erk (Liberty) and Birlik (Unity) arc banned soon after independence, after being forbidden even to register. T heir leaders, ,vho have chosen exile (Muharnmad Salik, head of the Erk party has taken refuge in Norway) have been convicted in absentia for subversive activity. Bul Islamisrn soon becomes the primary enemy. According to the Marx ist-Soviet tradition, only one official cult, controlled by the slale, can be admitted.

THE ISLAMIC ASPECT The re press ion of the last decades has favoured the shifting of Islamisrn Crom the i n li misl and Sufi one, which has always been pre-eminent in central Asia, lo the more extremist and politically active Tslam that refers to Wahabism. Isla.m in Cen tral Asia has its historical centre of diffosion precisely in the valley of Fcrghana, the only fertile region rich in water, even if this depends much on the artificial lakes in Kyrgyzstan. The vall ey is isola ted from the rest of the Country, hemmed in be tween Kyrgyztan and Tajikistan, with a higher degree of development and a density of population eight times that of the average o f the Country. At the same time, it has been kept by the regim e in the worst conditions and left in und erdevelop ment, w i th unemployment rÂˇates that reach 80%, and an overpopula tion which in the present situation is very serious. A first altempt at revolt had already occurred in November al Kokand, an ancient religious centre, against the new trade laws . The valley of Ferghana is the most densely-populated region of central Asia \.v ith its 12 million in -

habitants. The Sovie t. authorities, i n order to prevent the emergence of a new regional identity in the area, had decided to divide the valley be l\.veen Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However the rnajorily of the inhabitants are Uzbek, also in the zones that are noL part of Uzbekistan . The valley is an actual oasis surrounded by mountains and grows especially corn and cotton. The repression and poverty that characterize mainly the valley of Fe,Âˇghana but which, together ,vith corruption, taxalion and unemployment, is extended through the ,,v hole Country, risk Lo foster exlrernism. According to experts, the economic crisis and Lhe centuries-o ld pride of the inhabitants play an important role even beyond the religious question, but after all it is this laller which can cata lyse the consent and give an international weight Lo the Uzbe k problems. Many analysts do not exclude that, if the s i tuation \Vere lo persist, th e "strangers" could also at-r-ivc here, like in Iraq . First of all th e Afghan Taliban who have survived the fa ll of their regime in Kabul. Then the Arabs, through the al- Ouaec/a networÂˇk which, thanks to financing and propa -

ganda, could sl ip into the Country both for carrying out a fast recruitment or for promoting and supporting a new season of attacks . The lslamic revolt could expand also to traditionally laic areas which up to now have been apparently peaceful but \vhich are rapidly being lslamisecl as the economic difficulties grO\v, such as the devastated zone of Lake Ara], which, with its cotton fields, was once the mainstay of Uzbekistan's wealth and \vhich is now suffering a bad crisis . Here, like everywhere else, the itinerant preachers, espec ially the \Va habite ones, have started to work and make prosely tes, A revolt of Islamicist inspiration had already given a lot of trouble to the Soviet authorities at the end o[ the eighties. This also in relation to the war in Afghanistan and the support of third Countries. The Islamicist trends have continued to grow in the following years , both for the anti-Sovie t inves tments and for the strengthening of the lslamic groups , starling precisel y in neighbouring Afghanistan, and a.lso for a po liti-

ea! and religious revival spread in Lhe e ntire Moslem world. The corning to pO\ver in Kabul of the Tai iban has slrenglhened the lslarnic extremist groups in all the sur-rounding regions, both directly through the regime and through the al-Qaeda org!-rnization. It is in fact since the midnineties that the extremist groups have been organising and rein[orci ng themselves a lso in Uzbekistan. According to the observers, these groups did not disdain to fi nance themselves also through the routes of d r u g trafficking. The \Nar in Afghanistan of 2001 aga i nst the Ta li ban has very much weakened the groups connect.eel with them, s uch as the lslamic JVIovement of Uzbekistan, and also /-/izb ul-Tahrir. Since the fall of the Soviet Union the relations between Karimov's regime and the Moslems have always been strained: at the bottom of the Soviet policy, never abandoned by KarÂˇi mov on this subject, lied the concep t according to which ,~eligion, like any other activity, had to depend on the State. Therefore, independent

and non-recognised culls w e re not tolerated. As a consequence, there is in the Country an "official l slamisrn" opposed to the "parallel Islam", considered potentially destabilizing. The Government appoinls the institutional mufti and forbids to practise religion outside the f.ixecl places, the "State Mosques". HowÂˇever, in lhe Moslem field the sit uation has changed in comparison w i Lh L he Sovie t times. For centuries, in fact, the Uzbek version o( Ts lam has been oriented tmvards the Sufi doctrines, \vhich envision a very personal and non-rigorist observance of t he Koran, shamanist practices and cult of the saints. But b etvveen the e ighties and nineties, also under the pressure of a bad economic crisis and very high unemployment, the rnovements inspired by Wahabism started to expand. These groups tend lo a more severe interpretation of the Koran and aim at u ealing an Islamic State governed by the Sharfa, lhe Islam ic law that rollows the model of Saudi Arabia. A caliphate of Central 51

and reform society in an intransigent. Islamic sense. In 1979, after the death of his founder, Palestinian u niversity student Takieddin al - Nabahani, the group has moved under the leadership of Jordanian theologian Abdelkadirn Zal l un1 . In 1974 several of its leaders were arrested in Egypl. The organ ization proclaims itself non -v io lent but has been o u t. la\.\,ed in almost every Country of the region, accused also of terrorist activi ty. Apparently in Uzbekistan it can count on tens or thousands oC Col!O\vers, mainly among the young unemployed. f-lizb ul - Tahrfr denies the charges of terroris111 and insists on its peaceful approach to the Asia, like in the past centuries. W i th the crisis of the Soviet world and the para]lel affi rrnation of the Islarnicist Taliban in Afghanistan, \Vhile there was a rcl ig ious revival in the whole Moslem \,Vorld, a lso in Central Asia the Is lamic drive regained vigour. T he repression exercised by Kari mov's regime after the first very ti111id concessions has only radicalised the positions, giving force and violent connotat ions to lhe emarginated movements, which in the econo111 ic crisis and lack of freedom have found the most fert ile ground for their preaching.

THE ISLAMIC OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS The rnain Islamic Uzbek political movements arc Sunn ite and draw their inspiration from the Moslem Brnthers. All, apart from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, claim a pol itical and social ro le and distance themselves from the armed allacks. The rnain group which covers the entire Central Asia but has its base in London is Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party for Isla111 ic Libe1Âˇation, a transnational organization \vhich aims at establ ish ing a

caliphate that should go beyond sta te borders and unite all Moslems) \vhich has been active in the Asian world for some fifty years but has grown exponentially during th e last decade. It was founded in Saudi Arabia in 1953 'within the ideological galaxy of the 1\iloslem Brothers, iL [ollows the Sunnite extremist guidelines and wants to estab li sh a pan-Islarnic Slate in Central Asia, \Vhich should replace the post-Soviet regimes 110\V in power. It preaches a strict application or the Koranic law to wipe out corruption (a topic pf great appeal in Central As ia and especially in Uzbekistan)

world problems (in London its spokesman Imran vVahid repeats: We want to ovcrlhro1,v Kai-fowv's reg i me 1,vith peaceful means) even if he ve r bally assails Jews and 1.00-luke\varm Muslims (but \Vith the purpose o[ "reconverting" Lhem) and pursues the creation of an lslamic Slate in Central Asia. Albeit denouncing th e use of violence and 1x esenting itse lf as a movemen t of poli ti ca] opposition, recently i l has as sumed more radical positions. Despite the very aggressive Lones , it is however recognized at international level as a substantially peacefu l movement, whose activ-

ity is carried out through conversion and the d iffus ion of the socalled "Islamizdat", clandestine propaganda leaflets w~~ich p.-aise the overthrow of Karimov's regime . J-li7.b ul - Tahrir, organized in five-people cells, even if its members are forced to live underground and despite the violent and ind iscriminate persecuLions suffered from Karimov, i t seem to have become increasingly popular. Almost all the other Uzbek Islam.ic movemen ts are derived from Hjzb ut-Tahrir. Other minor li mbs, wh ich i n the ir turn have an ambiguous relation ,.vith the use of violence, are the Hizbi al-Nuzra and Akromia groups . Akromia, vvhich has a lso its beadquarters in London, is a small movement founded at the beginning of the nineties by a preacher of Hizb ul-Tahrir, Akn:un luldashev, who in 1999 was condemned to 17 year s' imprison ment for subversive activity. Much more s ignificant is the role of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (TMU), which coord inated itself \Vith other groups of Central Asia in Cffder to const itute the Islamic Party of Turkestan (or Islamic Movement. of Central Asia) . Sprouted also from J-Ji zb ut-Tahrir, it has the characteristics of an armed g ucrrilla movement, and has rightfully entered al-Quacda's reality, at whose side i t fights especially in Afghanistan, after it lost the civil war waged on the Islamicists in Tajikistan. It was formally foun ded in 1997 (although it had actually been active for some years) by Joma Namangani and ÂˇTahir Yolclashev, und er the wing of the Afghan Taliban and al-Queda, but it has never been able to take root on the territory. Joma Namangarni \Vas ki 1lcd in Afghanistan in 2001 , \Vhile Tahir Yoldashev, considered number 10 in the informal hierarchy of b in Laden's gro up, escaped to Pakistan i Waziristan , together With other al-Quaec!a leaders, and there he \Nas bunted down

o+-

and wo u nded in 2004 by Pakistani troops. !MU has claimed responsibility for the attempts of 1999 against Karimov and is seriously suspected for those of 2004. lt is responsible for k idnappings (the most sensational was that of four .l apanese geologists in 1999) and armed raids. Anot her group which may be an IMU r amification is the less

knmvn Group for Islam ic Jihad in Uzbekistan, which, like others, has claimed through the internet the L\vo series of attacks in 2004, but with out fu rther proof. In Uzbekistan there are also other movements of Wahabite inspirÂˇation but, also because of the condi tions of stiff repression in the Country, they have no evident organizational and n umerical strength \vh ich as [or structures

and objectives cou ld be clearly d istinguished from the major groups.

THE UZBEK ISLAMIC TERRORISM

In 1999 the Uzbek Islamic Movement has claimed an attack with six car-bombs at Tashken t, against President Karimov, \,v here 14 people were killed. Last year, several suicide-attacks, with the participation of women bombs (Lhe "black wido\vs") which, between March 2 9 and April 1, bathed Uzb ekistan in blood (a fe\.v dozens of victims) and with three simultaneous actions (five victims) on the 30th of July, also against the embassies of the United States and Israel. That the problem of violent Islamic fundamentalism in Uzbekistan is nol a problem circumscribed within the national borders is proved by the net of Uzbek fighters outside their nation. The Uzbeks are present as Islamic fighters from Chechn ya to Afghanistan, from Pakistan t o Tajikistan. The very close links with the defeated Taliban regime in adjoining Afghanistan, the opportunity offered by the al-Qaeda net\vork, the instability of many areas of Central Asia, from Caucasus to Kashmir, have allowed the Uzbek fighters to move about, train, participate in actions, confront themselves and give-receive help from the other Moslem movements of the region. Some examples may suffice to give the dirnension of the phenomenon. The man who is considered the present leader of the ls lam ic Movement of Uzb ekistan, Tahir Yuldashev, is also pointed out as number Len of the al-Qaeda network. Charged with the attempts of 1999 al Tashkent. against President Karimmt, he has lately been reported in the tribal areas of 'vVaziristan near the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 54

where he seems to be leading the resistance of sorne international groups of al-Quaeda against the offensive of the Pakistani, Afghan and US. Forces. Under his orders there ,vere Uzbek, Chechen , Arab, Uigur and Afghan fighters . Reportedly, Yuldashev may have been vvounded during the skirmishes of the last months. lt is more than possible that Uzbek militants may be present a longside the Islamic Chechen guerrilla warfare (and possibly in the adjoining Caucasian regions of Ingushetia and Dagestan). For a certain period there have been unconfirmed suspicions have advanced the hypothesis of a possible presence of Uzbek guerri Uas in the attack to the school in Beslan, in North Osset ia. A qui le different situation, but exemplary and useful for u nderstanding the .i ndissoluble relations that cross this region, regarÂˇds the Uzbek minority in Afghanistan and its fighting forces. Their historical leader is Rashid Dostun, who is no\.v a member of Hamid Karzai's government after being a candidate for the presidency with the opposition. Ha has gone through various pol itical positions and m ilitary alliances, an inconstant member of the Alliance of th e North against the Taliban , having established var iable alliances. His feudatory role on the north of Mazar-I-Sharif (a town that he contends \vith other warlords) has been decisive in the past (also for the American victmy of 2001), and still is, for the stability in Afghanistan.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Karirnov, a Moscmv's ally at the beginning, has progressively distanced himself from the Ru ssians. Adding this line to his fear of the threats deriving from Islamic fundamentalism, in 2001 he ifftrn ediately seized the occasion for approaching the United

Slates. Hmvever, the harshness of his regime cooled the relations with the West, reopening the door to his friendship \.vith Russ i a, as well as \.vith China and even ,.vith Islam ic (Shi'ite) Iran. In 2001, Uzbekistan was among the first to offer help to the United States after September 11, particularly in view o[ Lhe war against Afghanistan, also allmving the Americans to bui ld a rnilitary air base at Khanabad. Karimov who, as we said, had already been conducting a personal ruthless war against the lslarnicist movements, even before September 11, has immediately been considered a precious ally in the war againsL terrorism due to the posi Lion of Uzbekistan, a bsolutely fundamental from the strategic viewpoint. ln March 2002, President Karimov signed in Washington an accord of "strategic cooperation". From 2001 to Ju ly 2004 Uzbekistan, a former Soviet Country and therefore coming from the Russian orbit, received from the United States more than 350 mill ion dollars to help its struggle against lslam ic extremism. In the face of the regime's despotism, the United States has progressively reduced its aid and stopped it completely in July 2004, denouncing the absence of democracy , tortures, the inefficiency of the confused economic reforms and the shameless nepotism. The revolt of May and its repression have been a further evidence which has forced the American administration (and the European chanceries) to open ly denounce the Uzbek regime. In addition, Uzbekistan had obtained benefits from NATO, which are now also being discussed. Uzbekistan has joined the "Par tnership for Peace - PFP" programme and is a member of the "Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council" which assembles the 27 members of PFP and all the 26 States members of the Organization. Within this framewo rk, Uzbekistan has undertaken LO

implement democracy and human rights. If it fails to comply, NATO threatens to cool the existing relations. The same is applicable for the other various international organizations. Already in April the European Bank for Reconstru ction and Development has cu t aid and investments because the Tashkent Government has not met the requ irements on human rights wanted by that organization. OSCE has defined as irregular the parliamentary elections held in December, because they have not complied with the international requis ites related to democratic elections. It is moreover denounced that death sentences and executions continue to take place. The High Commissary for Human Rights of the UN, Louise Arbour, has promised an i ndependent investigation on the cla shes of May at Anclijan, which has b een rejected b y Tashkent, caus ing strong protests from the ELiropean Union. The

Foreign Ministers of the Twentyfive in the Conclusions of the Co u ncil of General Affairs a nd External Relation s have ex pressed deep concern for the lasl events in Eastern Uzbekistan. On the contrary, w ithin this framev-,,ork th ere has been a rapprochernen t of Russia and China. After the l\fay clashes Beijing and Moscow have suppo rted Karirnov, even if h ey have expressed regret for th e innocen t victirns . Russian and Uzbek troops h ave carr ied out joint exerc ises tha t suppose a response to an Islamic attempt to invade the Fe rghan a valley and establish a caliphate. Once more, geopol itical and economic reasons, together \Vith fear of Islamic funclamen talism, .in lertwine in the Central-Asian scenario and in the c hoices or the Countries involved. Extremism is also the grea t enemy or Chin a which , in its Central-Asian regions faces a daily confrontation \Nilh Islamic separatism.

Another structure, very important for Central-Asia's good order, \,Vhich also shows how central in this area is the fight against separatism and Islamic extremism, is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), created in 2001 , in w hich Uzbek istan p artic ipa tes \Nith China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Taji kistan, and to which Afghanistan has been admitted as observer. The objectives of the new regional pact are economic coopera tion and fight against drug trafficking and organ i zecl crime but, a bove a ll, "against religious extremism and international terrorism" . T h e member Countries together have already drawn a black list of terrorist organizations they \vant to fight. l n September 2003 they decided to esta blish in Tashken t a common Cen tre for the fight against terrorism . As regards the relations of Uzbekistan w ith its neighbours, \Ve can mention the diffrcult rela55

tions w i Lh Kyrgyzslan where, moreover, many Uzbeks live. The recent revolution that has overthrown President Akayev has originated prec isely on the U1.bek borders and probably started within 1-cl ig ious circles and tribes not dissimilar from the ones that were the prolagonisls of the May demonstrations in the Ferghana valley. Nevertheless, and although Uzbekista n a year ago h ad physically d estroyed the bridges that. linked it to Kyrgyzstan and closed the border passes, Tashke nt has hastened to recognize the new Kyrgyz authorities. This a ltitude can perhaps he explained in two \vays. Fir st, to prevent contagion by removing the reasons of attrition . Second, no less important, the mod erate and also su fficiently pro-\A/ es L Kyrgyz political forces seem to have been able to chann el the p rotest wi thin institutional forms, taking political control of the rebellion and preventing it Lo become an uncontrollable popular, and in particular extremisl, revolt. Also the first signs of ethnic clashes and reckonings among clans seem to have rapid ly been brought under control. That is the reason why Uzbekistan docs not cl islike the ne,,v order in the bord ering Country, provided that i t remains stable. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The situ ation in Uzbekistan could seem without a \vay out. ln

the Country there is a dictatorship which, besides, has proved unable to manage the economic situation, throwing the nation in a condit ion of poverty which could appear irreversible, accompan ied by a very serious e nvironmental crisis and the collapse of the infrastructure. A reg im e that in these conditions is unable to ensure, fo rÂˇ itse lf and for Lhe international realities concerned, a

profitable exploitation of i ts resources. On the other hand, it is countered by a Mos lem and lay opposition which , a t the moment, seems unable to offer a realistic alternative, disjointed and disorganized as it is , w it h no leading per sonali ties, lacking [inanc ing and with Ii ttl e or no roots on the territory. These are element s \.vhich, together wi th the economic crisis, promo te the spreading o f Islamic radicalism . A territory, moreover, where th e superpowers compete while they risk getting in each other's \.vay, favouring the establis h ment of transnational realities like Islamic extremism . If the road to a progressive democra tic developn1ent seems

necessary, one m ust adm.it that the history of the last years has shmvn that the despotic regi111es arc unable to stand even the smallest opening to liberty. Any 111 ini mal attempt at democratic reform has led to collapse. The pa th to progr essive d e mocratisa tion and open.ing Lo a n o n -violent Islam and r eligious liberty, passing throu gh t.b e respect of human ri ghts, remains therefore the only pract icab le road. And it must be trav elled involving everyÂˇ local social real iLy, from et hn ic grou ps to trib e representatives , fr o m co llon gn)wers to b u reaucrats, from religious representatives Lo lay poli lical movements . But this must b e accompanied by a substantial

economic d evelopment and by the concrete and evident support of the interna tional community. The latter, on t he one si de, should be guarantor and participant in the transition and on the other should ease the exit of the p resent leaders, offering p rotection against possible vengeances. Only an international g uarantee, together \Vith a concre le economic d evelopment, \Vill prevent Uzbekistan from going from o ne blood b a th lo t he nex t , in the contra.position bet\.veen two opp osed extrern is ms , da ngerou s for the Co untry, for the region and for the \Nhole world. D

'Â°'Anafyst, Centre for InternMional SlucUes 57

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fact clcal'ly emerges from the guidelines issu ed in .l\ilay 200.3 by the Fcdernl Ministry of Defence, from its provisions fo1Âˇ the development of t he Bundesvvehr (October 2003) and from the ne,.v doctrine that must be applied: the international missions for the prevention and management of crises, including the figh t against international terrorism, are future tasks for the German Armed Forces. In the setling of t.he transformation process started in 2003, the Army has started a planning suitable for adapting the instrument to the new chaUenges. The first concrete steps have been taken with the "Army of the Future" organizational model and ,,vith the decision taken by the Minister on the redistribution of the forces . According Lo the political - and especially politico-financial - dicta Les, l h e land compon e nt has

A "Aiarder" 1ransporl and combal vchidc in Kosovo.

NEW CHALLENGES, NEW TASKS

already started the rationalization of i ts organ izat io n \vhich \VilJ lead , by the end of 2010, to a reduction o[ no less than 30,000 effectives, thus being able to rely on a slrength of abou t 104,000 servicemen . Like t h e other Services, also the Army, which is still the most numerous one, will be div ided into three components : operations, s ta b ili zation and supp ort. The "Army of the Futu re" conc ep t will have its place in this context . However, it is necessary to adapt the body of responsibilities and the continuum among t he fo ,Âˇces w h ich oppose the possible risks for the security of the Counlry, obvio usly laking into account the ne\v technological d evelopments and lhe modernization of equipment and weapon -sys tems, parlic ul arly against the background of a new "joint" an d "combined" d ime nsion .

T h e events of September 1 1, 2 0 01 in Nev.- York a n d Was h ington, with th e adition of the tragic episodes of Madrid and London, have dramalically shown the existence of a newÂˇ dimension of clanger threaten ing our security, international terrorism, nouris h e d by fanaticism and ethnic/religious fundamen talis m and favoured by the disintegration of many States, the encl of th e State's monopoly on the use o f force and the consequent deslabilization of e n tire regions. Taking for granted the political willingness to employ the military instrument against these threats to ou r security, it is necessary to acquire the capabilities su ited to comply with this will, such as the Special and Specialised Operalional Forces, which are already part of th e German Army. As we see the new asymmetric th reats becoming concrete, we

also witness a widespread globalization of conflicts. Against th is backgrou nd, the need l:o eradicate the threa ts at their sou rce becomes more and more urgent. ff politics wants to be in a posit ion to react to t he crises by emplo y in g the mi l ilary i nslru menL, the latter must be provided \Vith a high projectabi lity and Susla.inability for employment abroad, since lhese are ind ispensable elements for the projection of stability . ln ord er lo reorgan i 1.e the land cornponen t, one should have a well-balanced conl in u um of light , medium and heavy forces, capab le of irnplern en ling credible procedures of escalation and de-escalation. Moreover, the Army mus t b e oriented toward s the polyhedric natu re of conflicts, a phenomenon which is becoin ing more and more frequent in crisis areas. The experience mad e rnain ly by the Americans and the Bri tish in Iraq with the scenarios calJed "ThreeBlock War" , i.e. the capability of

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

GENERAL STRUCTURE AND TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION

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assuming different attitudes, at the same time, ,,1.1ithin the same scenarios, does not permit a clear dis~inction between combat operations, sta bilization measu res and reconstru ction activities, not even in limited areas.

FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

The abovesaid network of political provisions an d conceptual premises is t he basis for the ''Army or the F u t ure" project, resulting in a harmonious whole of forces and capabi lities aimed at conducting j oint and combined ope rations t hro ughout the entire range of possible engagements, from high-intensitv combat to sta biliz; tion o p e1~a tions and humanitarian assistance.

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T he heart of the "Army or the Future" will consist of five Division HQs with a total o r 12 Brigades. As regards the rnechan i z ecl forces, th e "Proj ec ti on Opera tional Forces" Division ,viii be t he central core o f t he p rojection forces. These are the actual "front line" and will be prov ided with the capabilities necessary to carry out "peace-enforc ing" m issions within high-intensity "network centric" opera ti ons, in an operational environment insp ired by bot h t he concept of "jointness" and that of "combinedness" . 'With t\vo mechani7.ed Br igades an d the p ossibly-assigned FrenchGerman Brigad e, p lus an appropriate "command and combat s upport", the P rojecti o n Fo rces Division has the units and the capabilities for "combined-a rms"

BAD REICHENHALL

combat up Lo Division level. T he range of the capabilities of the Projection Ope rational Forces is completed by the light air-mechan i zecl asse ts o r t he Spec ial Op erations Division and the Airrnobil e Operations Div is ion . This ,vill enable us to crea te, vvith a rapid ini tia l action carried out by light forces, the conditions for i mplemen tin g a st abili zation activity or, in the international environment, a larger operation of peace enforcement. The "Army or the Future", nevertheless, ,vill no more envisage the l og istic manage m e nt at Division level. This cap ability will be d irect.eel by the Joint Support Service, Âˇw hich is a perfect examp le or interaction among different forces and sp ecial branches. The Projection Operational 61

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

ORGANIZATION OF THE BRIGADES

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[Q2] ~ Forces will also be lhe bas in of the NATO Defence Force and the envisaged Baltle Groups of Lhe EU for crisis -response opera lions. The rnodernirnlion of the Proj ection Opera tional Forces \,v ill mainly concern Lhe com mand capabilities \Vi thin "net\.vork centric" operations and also the equipment needed to carry ou l the assigned tasks. Th e Speci a l O perations Division (DSO) does noL change much, since the structure and the dimension of lhe instrument, projectable for rescue and evacu alion o perations as well as for special and antiterrorism operalions , are already basical ly i n line with the requirements of the fu lure. The foci thal o ne of the two airborne Brigades \Vill be assigned lo the sla b il izat ion forces stresses the concep t tha t the u n i ts of lhis calegory m us t be capable of acting a long the

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w hole scale of inten sity. Also the Airmobile Operations Division (DLO) has undergone stru ctu ral and funcl.iona .l changes . Th e Division HQ will be conceived as a "Framework

llQ" an d w ill enable us to assume also the "lead -nation" ro le in s tabilization missions at that level. Furthermore, with the ne\v Ai r mob ilc Br igade , ne,v manoeuvre cap abilities \vill be reali zed. I n a ddition to combat and transpo rt helico p le rs, lhe Brigad e will incl ude reinforced infantry u nits. Thus, we shall be ab le to ac hi eve our fi rst a i r manoeuvre capa bi .l.iLies and reval u a te the whole air-mechanized component. As regards th e missions of peace-stabilization, the German Army has at its disposal four "Sta bilization Brigades", su bordinate to t \NO Division HQs. The relevant force m u ltip liers w ill be made available to the Command o f the Army logistic and support Fo rces . The stabilization capabilities can be inlegralecl , when necessary, ,vith artillery, NBC and antiaircrah assets. T he main task of these forces is to set up the b ases for the inslitut ion o f s tate st r uct ures a n d , finally , to starl the nal i on - b u il cli ng process, by keepi n g apa r t the conflicting forces and safegu a rding the civilian populations. Al any rate, considering lhe permanent risk of escalation, the stabi-

A 'Tiger" support. hcli<:op/cr.

A Gernwn serviceman in Kosovo.

lization forces i11usl also b e capable of carrying oi'.1t combat operations dO\-VrJ to rÂˇein[orcedbattalion level. If one compares a B1-igade of the Projection Operational Forces \Ni lh a stab ili;r alioo Brigade, it clearly emerges that the organ i;r.a Li on or th ese Un its is studied in view of their optimization according lo the ir specific tasks. For example, the POFs armo ure d Br igade co rn m a nds forces and ea pa bili ties suitable for corn bi ned operations. Fur ther elements of combat support are managed by Lhe Division, when necessary and in a flex ib le manner, accorÂˇd ing lo the "task organization" princi p le. The s Lab ili1.at ion Brigade, in its turn, has at its disposal three battalion-level manoeuvring elements, e quipped like those of the opcraL ional forces. Th is is absolutely necessary, because the units or the t\VO categories are bound by a relationship of operational interacLion . Besides the capabilities mentioned above, the stabil ization Brigad es incl ude forces and assets devised mostly in v iew of sLab iliza t ion missions such as, for instance, _a construction component w ithin the Engineer b a ttalion, or elements particularl y s u ited to guarantee the command capability and susta i nability of the Brigades in that type of missions . All the Brigades of the "Army of the F u ture" have h ighly sustainable and sturdy structures, and follow the saying "fight as you are trained and organised". The support fo rces, wh ich arc mostly assigned to the Army Central Office, among other things deal with training at the Centnd Trai n ing Schools . Also the conscripts ;f all units are grouped in the support forces. This is an important: and necessary contribution since, vvi thout

them, the missions of the longterm volunteers wou ld no t b e possible.

THE CRITERION OF AVAILABILITY FOR EMPLOYMENT

ln the Army, consc ripts hold most functiona l j obs in Headquarters and support fonnations . Furthermore, every unit receives a company fo r in -garrison support. This means that in the fu t u re t h e number or longterm personnel engaged in command and t rain ing o r conscripts will decrease and, as a conseq uence, the m1mbcr of long-term servicemen available for operational missions w ill grow.

The same goal is also pursued through th e increase in t h e number of stu d ents for the training of Cadres . \-Vith more than 20,000 positions for students, the vacancies in the train ing cou rses can be managed better. This causes an increase in t he actual presence in the units and, by and large, also the availability for emp l oyment . Altogether, the Brigades of Lh e "Army of the Future", i.e. - so to say, lhe deployab le forces formed by long-term servicemen - w i 11 b e ernployable 100% in opera ti onal missions. Des p ite the rat ional ization under ,vay, the land forces will not lose too many or the projection capabilities they need to perform their tasks. 63

Left. A German patrol equipped tviih "Wiesel" armoured vehicles in Afghanistan. Below. ;\ German infonlryman in Kosovo.

Facing page. A "Fuchs" armoured car.

THE MODERNIZATION OF THE EQUIPMENT However, the reorganization cannol be li miled lo stnictu ral planning. The resources assigned l o lhe Army compel us to fix a number of p riorities that cannot be rea l i,.ed i n lhe i mmediate future. The adaptation of equipmen land syslems lo the new challenges is based on precise and long-lerm objectives. Based on marked capabilities of reconnaissance and command skills, our efforts are aimed, first of all, at ensuring protection and ability to prevail through operational effectiven ess. Th e Army's provi sioning concept follows this simp le formula. Also in lh is case, the reference criterion is exclusively lhe m ission . The wish to improve the proleclion of the sold iers employed in a mission led to enlargement of our Cleel of arniou recl vehicles. In this sense, the acquisition of Lhe "Dingo 2" palrol vehicle, the "Mungo" for Special Operational Forces, the "Wi ese l 2" and Lhe in fantry-carrier "Hagglund" BV 2065 infanlry carrier has been a good start, which must be fol lowed by a mass procurement. Besides, we must remember the p lann ing under way for Lhe put-chase of the "Boxer" armoured personnel carrier. Very effective are the Infanterist d er Zukunft

(Fu t ure Infan try man) and the Soldal im Einsal, (Sold i er in Operations) systems, which are parL of th e modern equipment of all other Branches. For the

n1orn en t, lhe ri rst "Future Infantryman" systems will be employed mainly in Arghan islan. Another signi fican t contribulion to lhe soldier's protection is given by the collection of inforrnalion on lhe enemy. Today the integrated reconnaissance system has aJready al its d isposal a sel o r particularly efficient means, such as the "Fennek" recce veh icle, the "Cobra" counter-battery r adar

and the "KZO" an d " Lun a" remote-control mini planes for target spotting and recon noitring, soon to be integrated with the "Aladdin" very-shor t range UAVs and ,vith microUAVs. The Further net connection, finally, \ Vil! enable us lo exploi t at best the information acquired, which is a basic requ irement for the achievement of capability objectives in terms of networkcentric combat. In vie,v of this, the Armv has crossed the threshold of c"onceptual clevelopmen t long ago. Based on the already tested systems and other means, such as the "Adler" art ille,-y command-and-control systems, the C2I system and the "Faust" command svstcm for Command levels up t~ Brigade, the sim ulation centre and the combat training

centre, we are now trying to find pragmatic solutions for the integration of the individual components in a single homogeneous and effective unit. Th e ach ievement of th e capabi lity of conducting "network-centric" operations \vi ii require, also in the future, an efficient and effective

command-and-control sys tem, acting as an integral part of a C2I system for the whole d efe nce. Thus the acquisition of the Army's C2I system (FliinfoSys H) continues lo be an absolute priority. Even wi th the greatest technological progress, an undeniable truth remains: at the centre of

A "Puma" prototype.

The largest moderniza tion program me is rep resen led b y the "P u ma " sys tem, w hi ch i s the mains t ay of l h e o p erational capability. There is no possibi lity of any comprom ise as regards basic capabilities, security a ncl p rotection of perso nnel, abi lity Lo prevail, effectiveness an d ski 11 in comma ncl-a ncl-conln)I during a m ission . "Puma" is an idea l and adva nced system which integrates all these central capabilities and meets all the requirements o[ versatility and flexibili ty connecte d ·with the range of th e Arm ed F o r ces' fu ture engagements . Next yea ,· v.; e are going to buy a preliminary series of "Pu mas" for a total of 5 systems.

0 0

0 Ci

TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION

T he decisions c oncerning the territ orial dis trib u tion of the "Army of th e Future" taken in November 2004 h y the Fed e ,· a l Ministry o r Defence , are ba sed on technical, func ti onal and economic evaluation cri leria . In the fulure, the Service will he divided into 123 garrisons . loca ted all over the Country. In particula r, the Brigad es o[ Lhe Proj ection and S tabilization Operational Forces w ill be in in lerconnected geographical areas. This will provide the opp ortunity o f real izing common training and exercise cy cles, thu s e nhancing tbe p rinci p le "Fight as y ou are trained and o rgan ised".

lhe system th ere is man, the Commander, \vho will be unconditionally responsible for t h e e mployment of his soldiers and of lhe equipment and materials given to h im in view of the operaLi onal ta1·get . T hi s concept is defined as "Ne twork Enabled vVarfare", where technology is in a n y case o n ly an "enabler". N everthe less, t hi s do es not

reduce th e importance of the integrated n e twor ks, wh ich are th e decisive prerequisites for "jointness", the key element of transformations. The development of a ir·-m echan i7atio n will continue ,vith the "Tiger" and "NH90" programmes an d w il1 be com ple ted by the measures concerning the Cl I-53 he] icop ter.

THE PROCESS OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION

An importanl m e thod for the structu ra l a p proach to the process of transformation occurr ing wilhin the Army is r epresented b y the so-called process of conceptual d evelopment and

evaluation (CD&E) . The development of new concepts, procedures and operational principles aims al achievin g fut u re useful results, at the sa~1e ti"me taking into acco u nt the operational experiences already made, th e resources avai lable and, obvious l y , also the present and future capabilities. The evaluation of ne\v conceptual approaches also includes tlie whole range or notions acquired through studies, exercises and missions, or learned on the basis of models and simulations. As regards practical experimentations, w e e nvisage a gradi..1al progression : \vhen ne\v ideas are born, \Ve proceed , but when the innovations are of little significance we stop t h e experiments and try another path. In view of this, the Army takes part in joint and mult inat ional projects while continuing the developme nt of its O\vn activi ties, in collaboration with other Services and functional areas . These are mostly projects dealing w ith the new capabilities of the Army and the requirements for . the implementati on of the "network-centric \Varfare". As examples we can mention the improved interaction and collaboration, the streng th en ing of command capabilities within mul tinational cont i ngen ts , the "Joint Fires" concept , the new reconnaissance un its and the Airmobile Operations Brigade.

ECONCLUSIONS

The transformation process within the Army also extends Lo olher fi elds and sectors, s uch as command - and - con tr o l , schools/lraining as well as personnel planning and management. Cons idering the various restruct u r i ng measures which have involved the Army in the

recent years, and in view of the numerous provisions lo be taken in the near future, we must be capable of convinci ng the mili tary, men and women, to continue \vilh us th e journey we have undertaken. Otherwise , the develop rr1en 1. of all lhe concepts mentioned before \\ro tdd turn out to be use less. The projects for the realiza tion of th e "Army of the Future" have been \vorked out \Vith great care . Now we must implement them, and this will be useCu I a lso to servicemen, civil ian collaborators and their families. Th is is the only way to create transparency and confidence. All that is undertaken from now on will, obviously have to be strictly based on the requirements connected with the rnission . Taking also into account,

lVlountain training.

in the operali.onal scenario, ourÂˇ contribution to the NATO Response Force and t o the env isaged Battle Groups of the European Union. Jn short, there \Vill be a lot Lo do. But d esp i te th is intermingling of measures to be take n and the d ifferent levels of the organiza tional structure, eve rything vvil I go as planned . We must be ready to introduce corrections and fur ther adjust ments during the miss ions, in order to proceed in line with the model of transformation envisaged. ''Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff of the German Army 67

Army and Mass Media

TDÂ· INFDR-M COMMUNICATE

ANDPRDMDTE A wide-ranging strategic plan 68

The y, bearer of an atypical condition, must exploit at best the instruments providea by the media, in order to acquire consensus and relaunch the values of unity and national solidarity.

ccording to an unwritten law of cornmunicaLion, when a request for information is bor n and ignored by !lee official interlocutors, someone else will answer it, forÂˇ good or evil . Perhaps \,1,rith half truths, leaks, accusations, improvised and ill-i nformed reactions. Many choices or secrecy, press silence and Anglo-Saxon "no comment", made by lhe press offices of noble institutions and companies have been shallered by Lh is law. But the rule is that void must be fiJJed: s ilence is "deafeni ng". The first headline is the newsmaker: furlher con1rnunicaLions, no maller hovv official, will do nothing but run afler some visibiJHy wilh minimal effects. This .law is well .knovvn by the T-

talian Army, which has paid, and someLimes slill pays, 1.,vilh accusations of lack of hÂˇansparency or of commuuicalion eITiciency, lhe difficult coexistence between secrecy, inherenl Lo Lhe log ic of rnililary communication, and the media request for details. Marketing and advertising offices, Loo, know and exploit it to their advantage: they are afler the people's unconscious needs in order to find the communication key lo make a producl lake off. Therefore, as it cannol be ignored, iL is worlh using this mechanism in a strategic manner, devel-

The promotion activities m eet a o iocreasing s uccess nmong the you.ng public.

oping some issues which can be studied frw their capabil ity of producing "information needs", singling out the means and symbols \,Vhich allow to multiply the communication effects and reach the goals. By working exactly along these guidelines, the Army is in fact becoming a "news factory", reversing, at least in part, the defensive phi losophy \,Vhich accompanied the early stages of its activity of public information.

MASS COMMUNICATION IL is undeniable that, during the last ten years, the Service learned at its expenses the cost of its isolation from communication, starting to build up talking skills, responding

its ovvn identity and messages are reflected. ln doing th is, it makes clear in a modern maimer the identity of the "Army as an Institution" in the service of the Repub lic. In partic ular, it p laced in the foreground Lhe elements which unite the values of the Army with those of the individuals (as for example the advertising activity for t he recruitn 1ent. or volunteers) and those of the communi ty (national celebrations, informal.ion on lhe support to populations abroad). The \veb site, a real li trnus paper of the willingness and capability to hold a dialogue with the world outside, is the first element of comparison and should be promoted with full marks. The promotional campaign of the "New Army" - \vith its radio spots, the programmes on the

tween 18 to25( 1). Through the correct management of the rules of engagement and with the its skilled and helpful beh aviour during the operations carried out in Italy and abroad in the last 10-20 years, the Army met the need of public opinion, that wanted to have at its disposal a Service capable of providing security and professional support. A gen eral consensus inevitably developed in the press and the political world, \viping out rnany anlirnililaristic stereotypes. Hovvever, this result did not stem from plain "spontaneity": it \Vas the consequence of the deliberate and planned support to the media, of training courses for war correspondents, of the production of docttrnen ts and promotional material and the activation of specific channels of internal in formation.

OBJECTIVES

Facrs and values, tram,parenc_y and dialogue, lrusl and solidarily: these are the basic concepts of communicalinn.

Lo external stimuli and learning to "negotiate" with the media, explo iting the media levers. Considering silence and "mas king" obsolete models for good, it developed a more dynam ic cornrnunication slrateb'Y, supported by a direct and, in most cases, effective language. The communication of the Army has foll_owed an increasingly professional modus operandi, multiplying the mirrors th rough wh ich

"RTL 102.5" radio station, the ne\vs from the theatres of operat ions, "radio West" and the "Rap Cam p Summer Tours" - h as updated and nrnde more dynamic the wa_y in which these values can be comrnu;,icaled, remembered and shared. In other \Vords, the Army has a ne\v basis forÂˇ a "continuous management" of the consensus. Th is is confirmed by the widely kno\-vn results of an EURISKO survey, ordered hy the Army General Staff in 2004, \vhich shov,r that the image, the values and the training potential of the Almy are highly appreciated among young people aged be-

Given the acceleration and proliferation of the information sources, nol only the public has become more demanding, but there is also an increase in the number of targets to wh ich comn1un icatio n should refer. Apart from public opinion, extremely variegated, the Army has to take into consideration the growing political sensitivity or military information. A phenomenon \videned by the ltal ian participation in international operations, causing an increased infonTtalion Oow between public opinion, Anny and political decision makers. A.nother target is tl1e internal one. Internal communication is the basic lever for improving the consistency of the operational behaviou rs \vith the strategies of the summit, the support to values and the solidarity bet'>veen individuals and gToups. Computerization has revolutionized the possibility to spread information from centre lo periphery, rapidly and at lm,v cost, using newsletters, inlranet and internet s i Les , mailing lists, forums and blogs. Moreover, the communi ties'

"tom-Lorn" may be a precious ally of institutional communication. To p ublic opinion and to the internal aud ie nce one s h o u ld also add Lhe international scene , to which Lhe Armed Forces belong. The communication offi ces e n trusted w iLh the monitoring activities s hould take in high consideration, pay a ceaseless attention and compare the information corning from abroad or perceived there, in particular \vhat is corn.ing through ·the press of allies or adversaries. Judging by the current o rganization of the Public Infornrntion Office of the Army General Staff a nd by Lhe activities being carried out, a lot has been accomplished in order to speed up the responsiveness of the structure and the opti mization of its func tions. \Norking there means to answer under pressure to the daily requirements of a professional public, more and rnorc variegated, needing a personalized and quick support. However, a constant care should be taken in improving two basic variables: reply lime and news-journalist relation . The first [actor - the response capability, and not only during cl crisis - is respo nsible for at least half of the n e\NS effectiveness. Even a one-clay delay in giving an ans\ver may prove u seless and damaging Lo t he image. As [or Lhe time of diffusion of the infonnation, it is d ifficult Lo estirnaLe how 111uch weight is caITied by the procedures connected with the authorizations between Army General Staff, Defence General Staff and Ministry of Defence, but it \vould be desirable to reconcile t he two typical elements of the structure - straLiCiecl bureaucracy and accurate organization i11 order to achieve effective results in line w ith the logic of communication. A possible pat h could be the strengthening of tJie current structures of Public lnforrnation. The appointment of a spokes111an, currently enjoying considerable au tonomy - especially in crisis management - has brought immediate results; hut the spokesman's involve-

ment in summit meetings could be in creased, e nabl ing him Lo poinL out possible risks or detect positive elements. In s hort, t h e communication stru c tures s h oul d effect ively he considered staff elements, closely connected 'vViLh both Lhe summit of th e Army General Staff and the Derence General Staff. They should he granted discretionary power and t he autonomy Lo carry oul quick initiatives, b ut. also the resources necessary lo accomplish their strategy. Such an architecture irnplies a sufficient nu111ber of professional figures, closely coordinated on the na tio nal terri tor·y and in t he theatres of operation, adequately trained and considered. As for the second vm·iable, i.e. Lhe re lations hip between ne\vs and journaJist, it is essential Lo develop the sensibility to appreciate the individual work of lhe journalist. Actually he needs to go back to the original source, ver_i[y the in [orrnation, obtain a direct report a nd k11ow further details. He writes for a specific ne\vspaper and has to deliver Lo his editor a n original \vork. Sometimes the strategy of the private discussion bound by the "off the record" rules, allmvs the source lo avoid risks and gel a deeper involvement of the j ournalist. In a mi li tary circle it is useless to s tress how profitable the briefing instrurnen L can be, i.e. that of meeting the press on fixed-terms or on the

The Army dcvclopccl ,1 mOl'e dynnmic comm unication s11aiegy wi1h n direel and c ffcclive fongunge.

eve of an event, a method commonly used al inLernaLiona l level. However, the eternal dilemma of (he coexistence between communication and secrecy remains in the foreground a nd it is not yet clear, to an outsider , hmv it. is managed today. On Lhe one hand Lhe in formation must be given, because Lhe Arrny is a p u blic institution an d as such it has to report its acLiviLies lo Parlia ment, ciLi 7.ens and mass media; besides, a detailed connnunica1.ion is important, as it can give ample reassurances to citizens as i.o the I.eve! of protective measures the Country can rely on and, as a conseque nce, have positive repercussions on t h e r ole of th e Arm e d Forces. On the other hand, reserve is a prime and necessary element jus Lificcl by securi ty and strategic interests. In this case, too, the Army has greatly improved its approach, considering cornmunica lion not only a duty but also an indispensable factor oC success.

CONTACT WTIH THE YOUNG Young people are in parL a new publ ic for the institutional communication of the Army since, u p to a few months ago, the military vvas 71

The briefing instrument is a method 1videlv used to strenp_Ihen the relation ,;,ith the press. "Âˇ

only i nteres Led i n attract ing a "niche" public to meet the need of a lim ited number of individuals to be assigned to highly specialized cenLres, mili tary academ ies and special Corps. Nm,v there is a sharp t urn: Lhe main airn is lo allracl an "audience" as wide as possible. Thus t here are different communication modules on which to \Vork: those a imed al lhe "before" (Lo allracl a surplus number of youths vis-a-vis the offer, in order lo improve the quality of the selection), those conce rned wilh the "during" (lo inform, involve and implant positive values and bonds) and those dealing \Nith the "after" (making the young be the first Army an,bassadors to the families, at work and in socie ty, bu l still r e maining a point of reference and cohesion). As far as recruilrnenl is con cerned, the goal is to get young people with cultural and rnoLivatjonal backgrounds up to the envisaged levels, in order lo guaranLee the fu ture operativeness of the Army. As for lhe means of communication, one must choose a model tha Lcombines the quick commun ication stream that is now familiar to young p eop.le, \.\Âˇith their expectations and the capabilities of the inslilu lion al communication. Today the internet is certainly the most 72

important channel, and this is exactly the reason why Lhe Army sile alone is not enough. Links with oLher sites or successful search engines have to be looked for and acquired, both in lhe inslilulional ;;lnd entertainment sites, getting to the heart of aU informal.ion di.reeled to yo ung people. Besides, one should not consider a secondary op tion Lo spread ne,.vs b y sms, through agreements with mobile telephone companies . Regarding the contents, it is especially with young people that communication has the difficult task of facing the suspicion caused by the old commonplaccs abo ut banacks life, and the "competition" of civilian volunteers. An appealing element can be foun d in the history of the last t\venty years, which the young can actu ally remember, with the actions and images of an Italian Army projected in a highly operational dimension, an important, international, professional and modem instrument. Then, it will also be necessary to talk about peace, describing it as an element not to be taken for granted , \Vhich has to be built through a constant defence of individual freedom and of the free institutions that are its guarantors. By using t he instruments of indirect communication, it must be made clear that peace "is nol a game", and has to be built through the cooperation and solidarity bct:ween Armed Forces ancl ciUzens. The Arn,y h as a l ready started good advertising camp aigns for

Long-Term Volun teers. By studying the young people's behaviours and needs, these promotional activities lay stress on individual ambitions: prom isi ng a non -levelling training approach and real opportunities to develop their pcrsonalily, in addition to "strong" and "ad ult" val u es . With the "Rap Camp Tour" - t he event for "recruitment and promotional activities", vvhich started in the Summer of 1997 ,vith two-day stops in the most important Italian towns - the promotional ac tivities scored a great success with the young public. In studying new \,vays of recruitm ent, the Service also cast a glance to foreign realities. But looking for models, we see thal the mosl Famous ones do not perfectly meet our requirements: the American one appeals to the feeling o f d efending the Flag ancl the Coun lx-y's role for itself and the world. This is inconceivable in Italy, where th e reciprocity between State and citizens is scarcely fel t. The British model is not compatib le either, as it appeals to a very strong historical tradition which sees I lomeland and uniform as the sides of the same coin (suffice il Lo see the relation with school uniforms, accepted as an immed iate and d istinctive social mark). Thus it is better to tun1 to our own specific traditions. We arc a Country which has vv1itten in its cu ltural code the \vorld o( Communes and Regions since ancient times: every citizen Lives h is own identity through his links with the Le1Tilory and lhe history written in every village or local border. The LerrilorÂˇi a] inslilulions - nol only those politically-01iented - work al rull capacity in order Lo be in contact with their citizens. The citizens Lhemselves show a deep sensibili ty, promo ting associations and sou rces o[ informal.ion. Il is liindarnen tal to enter this network of comrnu nicaLion opportunities. Therefore, the Army can exploit the territorial institutions in an ever more coordinate and detailed way (municipaliLies, cultural and training associations, sports clubs and

secondary schools) in order to work out plans lo promole recruitment. There are many ideas: propos ing cycles Âˇof conferences about training, opening stands at local shows (how many of them are organized every year by the municipal i ti cs of each prov ince or region?), promoting debates at civic inslitutions (on these occasions DVDs and monographs could be given out), planning more visible and widespread advertising posters. In conclusion, one can increase lhe occasions of contact with young people and their parents by providing more detailed information about the opportunities offered hy the "New Army" (2). Besides, it should not be forgotten the "reality shov/' role of tele\,i sion: that young Officers and Volunteers, properly prepared to meet the media, should he ca1lcd to tell their training experience in popular programmes and debates is an important sign. The \vomen's entry and their presence in the new milila.ry reality ca1mot but improve the quality of the d ebate, bringing it closer to the public. Television and radio programmes are situations at risk of triviality, but rejecting them a priori is of no use. Instead it is important, on the one hand, lo ansvv-e1Âˇ the need or the adull public that \Vant to meet "fine young men" like many others, \vho feel that their value is increased by the uniform and think or conLribuling lo the future, and on the other to mecl the request or the young people to "see" the exceptional nature of the experience, the human values which it might develop, the professional competence lhat can be acquired and the international projection of lhe conlexl.

A NEW COMMUNICATION

STRATEGY The Army's communication is often present on the tenitory, in an institutional \Vay, when i ls representatives take part in official celebrations or create events such as

the above mentioned Rap Camp. In some cases, its presence manages to connote massively and economically a given area, creating a \ital relationship \Nith the popu lation. Bul rnuch more can be done to increase the \.i sibility and convey an image oC Lhe Army as an element of secmity and national unity. FirsL or aJJ, lhe Army is not everyvvhere, entire areas arc nol in contact w i Lh the culture, history and activities (mostly those of suppon during emergencies) of the Anned Forces as a whole. So, the communication can start from below, trying to "beat" these territories wilh annual events and meetings, creating, where they do not exist, occasions for local historical commemorations, tracing. them on the map of the social rnem01y. Those historical events could be restored in a joint effort with the other institutions. A str-iking case or such "res toralion to communica-

"popu lar con11nunication p lan" successfully realized by the President: during his seven-year tenn he visilcd a lmost all Italian provinces and other pe1iphcral places rich in historical value, re\â€˘iving the pride for the institutions, participaling personally in a thorough tour of the memory places of the Republic. During each visil and on every occasion he magnified the event contacting people of a11 ages and any social condition, paying careful attention to local issues, talking Lo families, encouraging young people and reminding the old about the past. He has ahvays clone so, in every conlexl, from North to South, on the basis of the explanation and restoration of symbols, without rhetmic or political colorning. And, wilhoul effort, he has found in the polls an implicit n eed of adhesion to lhe values of national unjty and solidarity. The means and the mes-

lion" is the public holiday of June 2, revived v\ith new prestige by lhe Presidenl of the Republic. With all due proportion to historical value, how rnany olher occasions of local commemorations could be restored by the Army in favom of the commtmity? What other dates or places could be translated into a language of communication of events, nearer Lo Lhe cun:en t needs of the people? Or \vhere is the Army still absent and could be an instrument of national cohesion? Then we should think about the

Enterim! the network of the communicatio1; activities is fundamental for slaying in contact with the you11g.

sages through which this re,ival of an "llaly of all Ilalians" were di rfused were alJ there: the Tricolour, the National Anthem, the com memorations and the places of history. The \,\/aving of flags and the enthusiasm accompanying the President during public events astonished the observers and "forced" the media to an unprecedented amplification of the messages coming

Conferences and deha1es are necessa1y for i mpro\ling communication

and promotion.

from "the Hill". Tlu-ough lhese add resses, expression s such as "national identity", "proud of being Italian", "civil fervour", "solidmity among peoples" , "sense of the S tate", "defence of the free Institutions'', found ne\v citizenship in the homes a nd in Parliament. The main lesson learned Crom this "communication policy" is simple : it is essen tial to cul tivate image and events throu gh the net\vork o f inslitulions, letting the messages emerge as if coming from The perforrna nces or m ilitary bands are a slralegic e/emenl oF communicalion.

"one and only institutional body", and be based on laic and rigorous "super-partes' goals and values. Leaving o ut self-celebrations, when in contact with !h.e pu blic i L is important to give space to actions, n um bers, graphic displays or results an d p1Âˇogrammes under ,.vay. Y../e should a;:;k ourselves: ,vhat docs the public really knmv about the Italian involvement, not only in operational missions abroad, but also in the present system of in ternational alliances? The message is that the Army is "defence", but al.so competence and guarantee at the citizen's disposal, developme nt oC advanced tec hnologies to th e advantage of lhe system. A friend ly Army, ready to be known and seen, and willing to accept suggestions. In t his regard , i t is useful to su pport the idea or a calendar o[ peri-

odic appointments, and to "open the doors" of t he barracks or th e most significant historical buildings of the Armed Forces, \Vith possible guided lours and concerts. In short, everythin g to an svver another need or the cili/en-tax-payer: to have the evidence of the results and the e ffectiveness or lhe institutional targets of the Armed Forces. Facts and values, transparency and communication , trust and solidarity. This is what the citizens, worried by the u ncertainties of the futu re, arc asking for. This is the basic concep t of the communication t hat today speaks of an "Army of the Italians". RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMUNICATION

Th e Army has always given great importance to commun icat ion through images. The development of the activities for the production of vid eotapes and the realization of special photo-reports, to be p ut at the journalists' disposal, today is undoubtedly increasing and th e circulation of images is gu aranteed by agreem ents w ith the leading agencies. The Army web-sile has a lready has a valuable media library , b ut the Leclmologica.l inn ovations will certainly give further opportunities to develop the service and make it successful: this will have to be taken into consideration by those su bm itting the communication budget. Comp ared to th e past, the presence of uniforms on radio and TV has certai nly increased . The "exchange of sen,i ces" (materials and produc ti ons on th e operations or on the new model of Defence made availa ble by the ArmyÂˇ in exchange for airtime) is by now an establis hed rÂˇeali ty, appreciated by region al televisions. I nstead, at nationa l level it is ne ither simple nor easy to reach an old goal: to have, within the programming of t he Italian broadcasting corporation, RA!, a regular appoin tment, a sort o f special windQ\.v, where the Armed F orces could give an immediate

stream of infom1ation. This sho1..dd not be necessarily focused on Defence news only, but could range from entcrta i nni enl, in-depth analyses and high-level technical and training s ubjecLs. In pm-L, this is whal a lready happens on radio, thanks to an agrce111enL wiLh lhe indipendent nalional station RTL, but Lele.vision, with the co111rnunication "plus" o[ ils images could produce un.hoped-for results. On such a lelevision programme, the most specialized and "intellectual" part of the Ar111y cou.ld be put in the service of the Country. ln short, ii. is a co111plcx p lan v,,J1_ich could be t1ied out tlu·ough the creation of an internal \veb TV and media training (3) aimed at the top managc111cnl. From this long series of observations, it comes out that the supply of information which can be offered by the Army, though difficult to manage, is grealer than the demand. The information is a representation of values, a m,magement of the image, a restoration of identity, a display of competence and the presentation of results to the citizen, of the Army's crucial cont1ibution to success in the theatres of operations, spreading a style of excellence and of service to the State. This is the meaning of a communication \,v hich becomes for the Arn1y a wide-ranging and long-termstrategic project, to vvhich increasing resources should be destined. D * Journalist, Communica/jons expcrl NOTES (1) More than one third of the Italian young aged 18 to 25 consider the military profession appealing and a source of personal and prof'ession"tl experience. It is striking that more than one third of those who made t. his statement are women. But the consensus and a particular trust in the present r-olc o f Lhc military professional is even higher (three quarters of the interviewees). (2) Before a nd after this, the Army "back office" must naturally ensure a high degree of efficiency, being able to

give answers to user·s/vol u n tecrs through recruiting centres, offices, single staffers and toll-free telephone numbers. The in formation abo ut careers must give a practical, clear and exhaustive explanation of the "work programme", the terms ol- the contract and the prospects for the best ones (the excellence; value h as a s trong emotional impact and is always appealing). (3) Their ultimate encl is the ex ant.c prnrection of 1.he infonnation and the com rn u nication effectiveness from any type of mistake, both du ring a promotion activity and v,,hile managing a uisis. vVhiJe being trai ned, Lhc subject experiences a si.mulation of the media programme including t.he most difficult possible questions asked by the journal•

Above. The Arn1y is "defence", but also compe-

tence and a guarantee For the citizen. Below. Compared lo !he past., the presence of the militarv on radio ancl ldcvision progrnmmes ~·s conslanilv grou ing.

isLs, p,dcrabl_y formulated by an external professional. His reacLions arc cx.am i ned, both the verbal and the non verbal ones (the type of commun ication made of al.til.udcs. reactions, looks, postures and voice tones, which can tell also what we don't want to Lcll). The elerncn l.S that may distort the information or even create crises of credibility are poinlcd out and corrected.

For centuries, scholars have been trying to transform the art of war into an exact science and to frame strategic decisions into a structure of mathematical functions. To this end the "Games Theory" constitutes a new approach borrowed from the economic world. This theory, which has no relation with games, refers to situations where the decisions made by a number ,, ., of subjects are interdependent: . when taking a decision, one must also evaluate the moves of the others. In particular, the advantage of each choice does not depend only on one's own decision but also on other subjects. This is what commonly happens in military conflicts, where choices are simultaneous and indep~ndent.

Initially it was just a meeting point between mathematics and economy; now it can be effectively applied in the most diverse environments, including the military one

TJJb. ÂŤQAMb.6 ,rt,Jb.012.Y Âť A UbC:.flUL Pl20f6.b~IONAL AID From conflict situations and construction of mathematical models comes a differen_t appr_o~ch to the problem of strategic dec1s1ons. 76

u1-ally, in the present context, the themy is interesting for its applications in the strategic-m ilitary sector. The "Games Theory" ,vas officially horn in 1928 \Nith an article by mathematician Joh n von Neumann, and fo und its first important app lications during the Secon d Âˇworld War. Neumann, in facl, ,.vas one o f the fathers of the "legendary" ASCC processor (whose real existence ,,vas a military secret), a forer unn er of the Mark 1, the first "officia l" computer in history. The "Games T heory" was app lied Cor lhe first time in the military, for processing the bombing altitudes of the allied aircraft and for choosing th e convoys' routes less li kely lo be intercep ted by the enemy, A fundamen tal step fonvarcl in t he development of the "Theory" was made wi t h the meet ing in Pri nceton between von Neu mann and econom ist Oskar Morgenstern;

he "Games Theory" is a relatively young d iscipl i ne \vhich, until a few years ago, has been confined to the univcrsiry and government research circles (mostly in t he Anglo-Saxon \vorlcl). It \vas discovered by the general public and became rather ''rash ionable", thanks to a film biogn1phy of John Forbes Nash, which \,v as mad e into an American film , "A Beautiful jyJ i net", s tarring R ussel Crowe. Th e "Games Theory" is the mathematical science vvh ich analyses conflict situations and tries to fin d competitive a nd cooperative solutions through models. In other words, it s tud ies ind ividual d ecisions in situations where there are interactions among d ifferent subjects, and tl1e decisions made bv a subject can a ffect the results ti'.i at may he cichieved by a 1ival, according to a m echanism of retroactivitv. The applica Lions and in lera~tions of the "T heorv" arc manifold: from the econonic and [in ancia l

sector to the political on e, from sociology and psychology Lo data processing, from b iology to sport. NatRight. Oskar Morgenstern.

Below. John von Neumann.

in 1944, the in teractio n produced the publication "Theory of Games and Economi c Be havior", w hic h was going to completely change the relations bet\vccn rvlathcma tics a nd Economics. The idea of t hese tvm scholars can be informally described as an attemp t at mathematically clesc1ibing (mathematicizing) the human behaviou1Âˇ in those cases wh ere the in leraclion bet,veen men involves th e \Vinn ing, or sharing, of some type of resource: a situa tion, therefore, 'Which for its characteristics 77

can also include military operations. In the "Games Theory" the term "Game" has no playful meaning but, on the conLrary, points to a situation \,v here the decisions of [\VO (or more) subjects arc interdependent, in the sense thal \vhcn one subject makes a decision, he must also consider the decision

30% on a route and 70% on another; prices can be changed in rotation, and so on. In the models of the "Games Theory" everybody must know the rules ol' the game and be aware of the consequences of every single move. The move, or all the moves, that an individual intends to make is called "straLegy路".

Russel Crowe played John Forbes Nash in the movie ''.A Bcawi(ul 1\1incl".

In relation to the strategies adopted by all p layers (or agents) each one receives a "pay off' (the final \,Vinning) according to an appropriate unit of measurement, \,vhich could be positive, negative or null (victory, defeat or level).

made by the other subject/s. More precisely, the gain obtained by each choice does not d ep e nd only on one's O\v11 decision but also on lhe decisions made by the oLhcr dec idcrs. Usually, when studying these problems relaLed lo decisions, the students assume that each subject decides simultaneously and independently form the decisions of the others, without knowing their decisions, as is normally the case in military conflicts. Within this framework, each decider is a "player", i.e. a rational subjecL who can choose from vanous ''inoves". For example, if the player is a tradesman, he increases, decreases or leaves unchanged the prices of his products; a buyer's moves could be Lo change or remain faithful to a product or supplier; the moves o( ~t m ilitary logistician could be to dispatch a convoy on a certain roule rather than on another. Every "strategy" consists in adopting a move or a combination of moves. For instance, convoys could be sent, periodically,

THE VARIOUS "GAMES"

TYPES

A game is deCinecl "al. conslanl sum" if for each player's winning there is a co1Tespond ing loss for the others. In particular, a game "at zero sum" between two players represents a situation \vhere pay1nent is given by a player to Lhe other. For example, the military operations v,rhere the objective o( Lhe l.wo deciders is the total occupation of the enemy Nation can be considered "al. zero sum". The military operation \vhere two Nations arc compeLing for the occupation of a third one can b e considered a game at constant sum, \vhere the sum of the winnings is constituted by the total of the resources of the third Nation, the one that should be occupied. The military operations \vhich envisage Lhe mere reciprocal

destruction of the adversary's resources can be considered a game al non-constant sum, \vhere the total sum of the resources decreases as a result of the destructions and generally the w路inner is he who manages to '1ose less". The rnai n resu lts obtained by von Neumann concern garnes "at constanl s um" . The problem of "non-constant sum" games was lackJed in 1950 by .John Nash (later a Nobel Prize for Economy) who introduced and devel oped the "Nash equilibrium" concept. A sel of strategies adopted by all players constitutes a Nash equilibrium if for no one is profitable to change his strategy when all the others keep their choice unchanged. Let us consider, for example, a game \vith various players, each \,vith a fixed number of strategies an-angccl according Lo a certain criterion. Let us assume that the payment. rules assign positive winnings (the achievement of the respective objectives) to all players in case they, all together, select their first strategy; again positive winnings for all il they, all together, select Lhe i1路 last strategy; othcr,vise no \Vinnings for anyone. It easy LO veril~y Lhat. the set o f options for vv路hich each one plays his first strateg_y consL.iluLes a Nash equilibrium. T he same is trne for the set of choices for wh ich each one p lays his last strategy. Obviously not all games are so simple. In 1953 Nash tackled the problem of the slnttegies or cooperation among players and the sharing of winnings. "Nash cooperative solution" for t\vo-person games is an important conLribulion Lo the me thods for solving conflicts . An important aspect lo be considered in the "Games Theory" is the focl that the strategic choices refer Lo the deciders' objectives, which could be identical, common but not identical, different, contrasting, opposite. For example, allied NaLions often have common and even identical objectives, enemy Nations engaged in a limited ,var have contrasting object.ives, enemy Nations, in a total war, have opposite objectives.

An important subdivision an,ong the variou s situations is that between cooperative a nd non-cooperative games. Bu l one should notice that this does not mean Âˇthal in the cooperative ones the players are expected to have more altruistic attitudes: this is never assumed, since the basic assu mption is a l>vvays lhat each player pursues his own interest (if, on the other hand, the interest consists in doing good to fellowmen, this depends on the degree o[ satisfaction fe lt in oblajni.ng a given resull instead of another: sti II the key point is that, in these cases, doing good satisfies the d ecid er, an this is what guides his aclions, and also those of humanitatian o rganizations, for example). T he cooperative th eory stud ies the development or coalitions, precisely because they can be advan tageous for the individual members. The non -coop erative theo 1-:-' , instead, tries to explain the mechanisms o r the individuals' decisions, on the basis of personal reasoning, without a lliances among indi,,i duals. Von Neumann , in particular, had the idea o[ analysing the games by studying the birth or coali tions among ind ividuals, while Nash is the one wh o gave a strong irnpulse to the non-cooperative theorv. Another impor-tant s u bd ivision of the games concerns their description in a mathematical rorm. In that case, we s peak of games in extended form and of games in normal (or slrategic) forn1. The firs t category includes lhe games t hat can be effectively described in the form of a tree: il is a matter of making a graph ,vhich, starting from th e root, d escribes the game rnove by move, until i t comes to present all the final s ituations ensuing from cl given series of moves. This form provides an extremely effective and exhaustive way of analysing a game, b ut has

A Pnkistani "S/wheen-2" ballislic missile. The nucli:ar contraposition between lndia and Pakistan could 1.1,cll be an example o( 1hc "Games Theory".

the shortcorning of being extremely complex and practically impossible \Vhcn the v,:u-ia bl.es that come into p lay, as almost always happens in military operations, are too n umero u s and intenlependen t. In this case, one musl either recur to simpl il'ications and/or to lhe other form, the strategic one. The s trategic form specifies the number of players, the scope of t heir strategies an d t he "utility Function" of each ol them: a mathematical !:unction in ,-cal values, defined on the ''Cartesian product" of the sets of strategies. The fun damenta l difference consists substantially of t he fact that the strategies thus described are a datu m o r lhe problem (and th is is a limit because their full determination is oflen difficult), ,vh ilc in the extended form a l I p ossi b le seq uences of moves are considered and. therefore, the delicate task of

the analyst is Lo deduce from them the strategies of each player. Another possible represcntalion, almost i n termediate between the other lwo, is the "matri.,"" one, which \.\rill be adopted in the examples shown in the following pages. Another important distinction is t ha t between fu l l-i nformation games and incomplete-information ones. In this regard , we can sav that the former are a preparatory step l.mvards the latter, i.e. in Lhe direction o r a more sophisticated theory which is also more satisCactory, because ils models are closer lo reality. Actually, \Nhen studying a phenomenon, for example an economic or biological one, not all t he pieces of information are equally known Lo all protagonists. Therefore, a model tak ing into account t his fact appears more likely a nd naturally more suited lo the requi rcmenls of a military decider, since it takes the "fog or \Var" inlo consideration.

SOME EXAMPLES

,..

C .;:a

.., It

I: I:

The first situation (game) considered here has the rollowing characteristics. The players arc the 1 and 2 decid ers and each one of them must choose his strategy simultaneously a nd ind ependently from the decisions the o ther. The wi nnings (payoff) or each individual does not depend only on h is personal choice bul also on the choice or th e other. An example of this lype of game is shown at Table l , which is also an example of a "matrix" representation or the situation. I lere, as in tl1e successive examples, individual 1 is defined as "line p layerÂˇ", since he m u st choose to place himself inside one or the two lines or the \Vinnings' rnattix. Likewise, individual 2 is defi ned as "col u mn player" for he m u st choose on e of the t,vo colu mns of the same matrix. Individual 1 can choose bet\veen line A and line B. Individual 2 can choose between column A and column B. Each cell of the matrix contains an alten1a-

~·

Table 1

PLAYER 2

GAME '

...

PLAYER 1

..,.... ~.

·----·

!i, -10

-!i, -5

-!i, -15

tive combination of the t\vo players' winnings: the first figure of each combination is the payoff of irnliviclual 1, the second figu r·e is the payoff of individual 2. It is important that the structure of the matrix of the game w innings be very clear. Here is a detailed descrip tion of the two players' possible payoffs: • if individual 1 selects line A and individual 2 selects column A, the payoff of individual 1 is 20 and lhat of individual 2 is 15; • if individual l selects .li ne A and individual 2 selects column B, the payoff of individual 1 is .'i and that of individual 2 is -10, i.e. a loss of 10; • if individual 1 chooses line B and individual 2 chooses column A, the payoff of individual 1 is -5 (loss) and that of individ ual 2 is a lso -5 (loss); • if individual 1 selecls line B and individual 2 chooses column B, the loss of individual 1 is -5 and that of individual 2 is -15. vVhat strategies will the two players choose'! Let us not forget that both must choose in a sim ultaneous and independent way: a player decides the strategy Lo be followed without knowing the strate61y of tJ1e o ther. vVhat would we do if we were player 1? Our \Vin depends on the choice made by player 2, therefore i L .is logical to ask ourselves what strategy player 2 will prefer. If player 2 selects column A, our preferred stn1teg}' is line A (20 is a greater payoff than -S). If p layer 2 selects column B, our best strategy is to choose line A (5 is a greater \\·in than -5). As a consequence, the best slral80

20, 1 !i

B ~-~

'"l . "I

egy of player 1 is to choose line A independenlly of the choice made by p layer 2: the selection of line A is a dominant strategy for player 1 for il in volves the largest payoff, whichever the strategy followed by p layer 2. vVhat can \,ve say a bout player 2? Does he have a dominant strategy? In the situation sho,vn by the example, the answer is yes. If player 1 selects line A, the best strategy for 2 is Lo choose column A ( 15 is greater than -10). If player 1 selects line B, the best strategy for 2 is column A (-5 is gTeater th-m -15). Also player 2 has a dominant strategy: to select column A. The result o f the game is easily foreseeable : individual I chooses line A (his dominant strategy) and individual 2 chooses column A (his dominant strategy). The result of the game is (A.A) and tl1e deciders receive respectively a payoff of 20 and 15. It is interesting to note that this game could represent, in a very simplified manner, a situation of contrast and potential conflict bcl.\\leen two Nations, on of vv"hich (player 1) is remarkably str·onger than the other (player 2) but in ,my case incapable o( completely prevailing over it. Choice B represents the decision (or a military attack, decision A is instead the choice of a peaceful behaviour. The matrix svnthesizes the results of Lhe combi~ation o f the various possible decisions. If both select A (peaceful behaviour) both of them gain, prospering in different but nevertheless positive ways (20 and 15). If the stronger player (individual 1) altacks (selecting B) he docs not have enough strength

for v.-inning. Player 2 wil l conduct a defensive war with partial effectiveness and will suffer a loss of resources (-5 for both), with no gain at all. If t11e attacker is the weaker one (player· B), the outcome is disastrous, since an atternpL at an offensive war is much more expensive than a defensive war. Player 2 loses -10 while player 1 could have overall advantages in a possible peace treaty (+5). The worst possible situation is \,\/hen both act of[ensi vely in a global \Var, where player 2 would suffer very heavy losses (-15) but the overall outcome \,Vould be negative also ror player 1 (-5). Even from this very simple example, \,v here the sirnplification of the decisions is very rough, one can understand how the delicate mornen L of the entire process is the construction of the decision model, in practice of the matrix, both in terms of determination or the possible choices and in terms of an exact configuration/prevision of the Cina! results.

TIIE "NASH EQUILIBRIUM" Not all games are as simple as the one expounded in the example above. Let us analyse the fo llowing game, Vv'iLh the association of a matrix of winnings in accordance with Table 2. Do the players have a dom inant strategy'! ln order to ans\ver, we shall proceed with a verification, starling wiLh p layer 1: • if player 2 selects column A, the best strategy for player l is to select line A (15 is greater Lhan 1O); • if player 2 selects column B, the best strategy for player 1 is loselect line B (5 is greater than -5). Player 1 has no donunanl stratcf,>y. Whal about player 2? If player 1 selects line A, the best strategy for p layer 2 is to choose column A (15 is gTeater ll1an 5); if player 1 selects li ne B, the best strategy for p layer 2 is lo choose colurnn A (-5 is greater than -10). Player 2 has a dominant strategy: lo select column A. This strategy in

fact implies the highesl payoff for player 2, \vhatever the strategy chosen by player 1. Thus, even if thei•e is no dominant strategy, player 1• could be able to foresee that player 2 has a dominant slralegy ( i .c. selecting co.lumn A). On the basis of this infonnation, the [ollowing reasoning can be developed: if player 2 chooses column A, lhe besl strategy for player 1 is to select line A. As a consequence, player 2 selects column A and player 1, [oreseeing the decision of player 2, selects line A. The result of the garne is the combinalion of winnings (A,A) and both players gain 15. This result salisfies bolh players. In fact changing the decision is unprofitable for both. lt is important to note that this is not true for a!J lhe other resulls of the game: had the choices been different , changing choice would have been profitable for at least one of the two player·s. This properly g ives to the "A,A" combination the definition of "Nash equili brium": because for neither player it is convenient to change stn11.egy, considering the choice made by the other player. This game, in its tum, can represent, in a very simplified maru,er a situation of contrast and potential conflict between two Nations, one of vvhich (player 1) is \ivdl equipped for conducting an offensive war, but woukl have shortcomings and weak points in case of a defensive limited war. The other Nation (player 2) is however much weaker than the other, especially in case of total war. Choice B always represents a decision for an offensive behaviour·; decision A, inslead, is the choice of a renunciatory, defensive and negotiation-oriented conducl. The matrix synthesizes the results of lhe combination of the various possible decisions. If both player choose A (renouncing lhe orfensivc) both gain and prosper (15 and l 5 ). lf playei· l altacks (i.e. he selects B) he has enough strength to achieve a remarkable success (10), but 10\ver, at any rate, than the grmv th he

\Notild experience in peacetime (sti ll 15 ) . Is player B attacks, he would exploit the defensive weakness of p layer 1, achieving some success (5), but lesser than the growlh he would have in peacetime (still 15). In case both Countries adopt an offensive strateg}' aimed at total war, player 1 \.VOuld be the winner but \.Voulcl suffer losses caused by his defensive weaknesses exploited by the aggressiveness of player 2, and this would lower the benefits of victory to 5. Therefore, the satisfactory solution [or bolh is still "A,A" (peaceful decisions), corresponding to the "Nash equilibrium", but in this case the peaceful conduct is not the dominanl strategy for player 1, setting aside anything that the other player could do, but he must rather foresee and rely on a "rational" decision (without self-injuring behaviours) on the part of player 2. Actually, the nuclear confrontation between two Counlr·ies of different strength, like India and Pakistan, can be consider·ed as belonging, in its lowest tenns, in the decision matrix of this example. Arc all games characterized by the presence of a "Nash equilibrium"? Also the game of the previous paragraph had a "Nash equilibrium", still in "A,A". Let us consider Table 3: Game 3 has t\vo "Nash equilibriums'': (AA) and (B,B). (A,A) is "Nash Equilibrium" because it is not profitable for p layer 1 lo change his selection of line A if player 2 has selecled column A, and for p layer 2 is not profitable to change his seleclion o( column A if p laye r 1 has selected line A. Also

(B,B) is a "Nash equilibrium" because for player 1 is not pro[ilablc to leave line B if player 2 has selected column B, and for player 2 is not pro[ilable Lo rnove from colunm B if player 1 has selected line B . One could say that in reality most p robably the result of the game \N0tild be (A,A) since 15 is greater than 10, but what would happen if the winnings of "5" were replaced by two losses of "-10", as shO\vn al Tab.le 4? If player 1 were sure that player 2 \Vas going to select column A, there \VOuld he no p roblem. But if he thinks l11at player 2 could choose column B, the strategy less risky for him would be Lo select line B, since this would eliminate the possibility of having a loss. This situation could represent the case where two Nations of equivalent sLrength arc evaluating a progi"amme of nuclear rearmament. If both decide to renounce, both gain because they save l11e relevant: costs. Tf bolh decide to implement it, they assume the costs but the force rat io docs not change and, at any rate, the period or peace continu es. Hone of them implements the programme and the other does not, lhen the Nation which does could find itself in the position of attacking successfully and destroying the other. vVhal should the decider of Nat.ion 1 do? In other words, the fear o( a loss amplifies lhe lenclen cy towards "suspicion". A game may have no "Nash equilibrium". Let us consider Table 5: the combination of the payoffs of the two players is the foUo\ving: · • (A,A) is not a "Nash equilibrium": it is better for player 2 lo change strategv; ~-·

Table 2 PLAYER2 -~-,

GAME

PLAYER 1

15, 15

-5, 5

10, -5

5, -10

Table 3 PLAYER 2 GAME A

15, 15

5,0

o, 5

1 D, 10

PLAYER 1

Table 4 PLAYER 2 GAME A

15, 15

-10, 0

o, -10

1D, 10

PLAYER 1

• (A,B) is not a "Nash equilibrium": it is better for p layer l to change strategy; • (B,B) is not a "Nash equ ili brium": it is better for player 2 to change strategy. In other words, not only there are no dominant strategics, but thc,-c is not e ven a situation \,v hen b oth players could be even only partially satisfied. This means that, in every situation, to change stra tegy would he profitable for at least one of the t\-vo players. For these types of games it is necessary to expand the concept of "Nash equilibrium" and consider most complex strategics. In this case, v-..-ha t could be the b est strateb'Y for a player? Obviously a strategy that confuses the other player, sine if the other player knows o ur choice he can exploit to his 0\Vn advantage this information. And ,vhat is t he besl way of confusing the other player? Fn:m1 the theoretical/mathematical point of view, it is to select A or B at random and \vith the same probability. This strategy is known as "mixed strategy". The game we ,u-e conside1ing has an equilib1ium

,vith "mixed strategics". Il is very interesbng to note that the compon ents related to chance and deceit of the opponent - concepts ve1y clear to military theorists li ke von Clause\vitz and Sun Tzu are beginning to enter into this type of studies deriving from economics and mathematics.

THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA 'v\/e s hall no\v examine a very famous example ,vhich can be assimilated lo var·ious contexts, also military: the so-called "Pri soner's

John Forbes Nash.

dilemma". Let u s look at Table 6. lf we analyse in detail the properties of this game, ,ve see that it is symmetric (but il must not necessarily be so), that is to say· that it is sufficient to obser·ve the rnoves of on ly one player. Let us consider player 1: in column A l he payoff of player .l is greater in line A than in line B. in column B, the payoff of p layer .l is greater in line A than in line B. Therefore, A is the domi nant strategy Cor player .l . Despite this, one should not disregard the facl that the payoff of player 1 is greater in (B,B) than in (A,A). Given the game's symmetry, selecting A is the dominant strategy also fo r player- 2, but (B,B) would be preferable to (A,A). What is our p revision? Having noted the existence of a dominant strategy for both, we must conclude that player 1 prefers to select line A ind cpen c! enlly of the s trategy of player 2; player 2 prefers to place himself in column A independently o f the strategy of player 1. T he expectation that p layer l will select line A and player 2 column A (these being t heir dominant slralegies) leads to the conclusion that the couple of \Vinnings for this game wiU inevitably be (A,A). This is the only Nash equilibrium o f the garne and actually corresponds to a much smaller payoff compared lo (B,B). But (B,B) is not a Nash equilibrium. l n fact, it would be advantageous for both players to l eave (B,B). T he decision of not moving Crom this situation should only depend on the confidence in lhe fac t that also the other player decides not to move and this is the "paradoxical" feature that makes the prisoner's dilemma verv interesting. From the military vievv'Point, a "tran slation" of this situation could be represented by an alliance between two Nations lhal fight against another. ff both Nations of the alliance (players 1 and 2) keep a re nunciatory conduct (A,A), they have few losses b u t very little hope or winning the \Var. If they attack together (B,B) they have lhc highest probability of rapidly defeating

the enemy. But if a Nation waits for the other to attack, before following it in the offensive, it would probably v,;in justâ€˘the .same, but \1/ith less losses (which will be suffered more by Lhe ally that attacked firs t) and the attack would be on the whole less effeclive. The Nash equilib1ium envisages both Nations on Lhe defensive. The besl resull for the alliance as a \Nhole ,votild be obtained if each Nation allacked al the same time, tn1sting the other to do the same. T he scenarios sim ilar to the "Prisoner's dilemma", in the last analysis, are based on lhe level of a player's confidence in the other (or others). I.n this sense, one of lhe most interesting questions on this subject is the following: i[ the players could discuss the possible outcome of the game before deciding, would this eliminate the inefficiency of the prisoner's dilemma) In other words, it is rather plausible that the level of mutual confidence increases if there is the possibility of a prelim inary comrnu n icalion among players; thus , each p layer can be sure that the o l her (or others) is aware of the advantage that each one v,mulcl enjoy in case of a selection such as (B,B) in the preceding example. At a higher level, this is to say that, although in a situation of mihtary conflict, the diplomatic channels m u st in any case remain open, in order to exploit the available opportunities only when it is possible lo rely on the enemy's rationality and on his awareness of the ad vantages of a possible "cooperative" and negotiated solution of the conflict.

CONCLUSIONS The examples of the preceding pages prove, albeit in an approximate and simplified manner for lack of space, that the study of the "Games Theory" can be extremely useful in the interpretation of military decision-making processes and in the elaboration of their doctrinal models and procedures. This discipline, also in its military aspects, is

Table 5

GAME

PLAYER 2

1 o, -10

-1 o, 10

.1 o, 1o

1 o, -1 o

PLA'fER 1

T~hlP h PLAYER 2 GAME A

5, 5

99, 0

0,99

96,96

PLAYER 1

obviously much more complex than can be perceived on t hese pages. Bu l one can say that the minimum objective immed iate ly ach ievable is the fact that if for every military decision one created evaluation tables similar to the preceding ones (b ut more realistic and complex), il would be automatically necessary to study in detail certain critical aspecls, such as the detern1ination of the level and quality of informalion, Lhe scope of the options at one's disposal, the level of m u tual confidence or mist1ust beEnnio de Giorgi.

tween th e actors, t he relations among the objectives of all parties, the possibility of deceit and surprise, the need of cornrnunication between the opponents, the possib ili ly of irrational behaviour and self-injuring choices, etc. It is true lhat many or these problems have always been present in the m il itary thought since ils beginrling, but their scientific systematisation, never successfully made up to no,v, could be at last within reach o[ the m ilitary scholars or t.he third millennium, also thanks to the contribution g iven by the "Games Theory" and its mathematical models. Oul of curiosity, it cou ld be interesting to remember that, after dealing \Villi the "Games Theory", John Nash \Vent back to pLffe mathematics and developed a theorem on differential calcu lus which would ensure him the most prestigious international ack.J.10\vledgements, when he ,vas reached by the news that the same de.monsLraLion had been reached, independently, by an obscure Ilalian mathemalician from Salento: the still little knmvn Ennio de Giorgi. D ''Lieutenant Colonel, Army General Staff

Innovative means and procedures, supported by the most sophisticated scientific and industrial discoveries, come to our aid to effectively fight the treacherous anti-personnel mines and the insidious unexploded ordnance in an effective way- - - - - - - - - - - -

TECH NOLOGICAU Italy, Europe and NATO are in the front line and give a strong

contribution to humanitarian de Âˇ Âˇng

by Mario Tarantino *

Nowadays the best technologies can be used to prevent serious injuries to people. In particular, the methods based on electromagnetic radiations and chemical sensors. The latter enable to detect . promptly the smell of explosive devices. But also nuclear physics and even dog units can be quite helpful.

ne clearance of vast areas has become a priority task or many international organizations, with the United Nations in the forefront, and has set in motion a series of research and development activities aiming at malcing safer systems to detect ordnance in the field. Conventional demining techniques are no longer effective, because new technologies have been introduced to produce anti-personnel mines. Essentially, the usual methods of identification malce use of metal detectors, which are generally based on electromagnetic induction. This method is quite useful to locate old-generation mines, produced by using a high percentage of metallic materials. Recently, the technique introduced to produce these explosive devices allowed a drastic reduction in the number and weight of the necessary metallic .parts, which are now insufficient to be located by the usual systems. Currently, the chemical detection technique is the most used in the location of mines which are mainly composed of plastic. Besides, the potential of this method is already

being exploited by using of appropriately trained dog units. But science and technology place at our disposal a growing field of research which will hopefully enable us to produce a detecting system based on chemical sensors. The point under discussion is quite interesting because it opens a new chapter in the field of demining techniques. Therefore we will give an extensive outline of the situation, trying to sum up the main features of these procedures in order to get in touch with one of the

most fascinating lines of research currently in progress, which is extremely interdisciplinary, as it involves integrated research teams of physicists, engineers, chemists and biologists. Some of the world leading research units work in our country. Among them, we think it right to mention, as national research centres par excellence the Univerities of Rome "Tor Vergata", Pisa, Brescia, Modena, Florence, Lecce, and some centres of the National Research Council.

Such nalional efforts a1--c in line with the position of the European Union which, every year, funds many internatiornil research program mes involving Italian operational units. Thanks to European Union funding, ltaly is also going to start a system for the h m-monization of the research on the so-called "electronic nose", which is Lhe best ,vay to define the efforts made by researchers of chemical sensors in order to recreate, in an artificial way, the potentialities offered by nature to the sense of smell.

DEMINING J'vline clearing is one of Lhe lypical activities of the Engineer Corps, mainly directed Lowards mined obstacles. Traditionally, it consists in d elecling explosive ordnance and breaching mined obstacles. These terms essentially refer lo a conventional rype of scenaiio ,vith a continuous and, Lo som e e xlenl, schematic mined obstacle. Breaching, in particular, implies a .large use of explosive material, be it normal or self-propelled, wilhoul any restriction clue to possible secondary damages. Today such a scenario could hardly exist. More realistically, the mined obstacle thal can be encountered in modern operational theatres is much more unpredictable, without rules, extremely difficult to locate, spread in urbanized and built-up areas, and made in a much more devious way, as the user avails himself of traps and has recourse to improvisalion. Such an obstacle cannot be overcome with conventional methods, but rather with a systematic mine clearance, carried ou L by h ighly skilled personnel equipped with materials and means \v'11ich can also be robotizecl. Du1ing Peace-Support Operations it is or rnay be necessary to meet one r equiremen l most frequ ently, i.e. route clearance for the transit of units or hurnanitarian convoys . Someti mes the clearance of an entire area may be needed, in case or deployment of

Headquarters and Un ils. UsuaUy Lhe clearance activity is directed agains t mines, unexploded ordnance and sub-munitions, but it necessarily has to extend also to anti-sabotage activities, which until yesterday were carried ou t in favour of combat in built-up areas and were carried out to limit the effects of enemy disturbing actions. Actually, the employment of saboteurs, .i( one \v.ishes to create an atmosphere of ''psychological insecu1ity'', is extremely profitable also in Peace-Support Operations, since it engages all Lhe "aclors" who operate on the territory. Therefore, antis-sabotage is an exlrem e ly d elicate activity and must be entrusted on ly to specially trained personnel, in possession of specific training and outstanding quali ties, together with courage and common sense.

OPERATIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

Demining is a difficult operation which is carried ou t in vario us phases, from the location of the mined areas, to the identification of the individual mines and, finally, mine-clearing. More specifically vvc can distinguish between operational and humanitarian demining. The most common goal of a minefield is to hamper the enerny's passage. Therefore, for military purposes, dcmining aims at realizing a sa[e four or five metre corridor, wide enough to let through vehicles and lroops, even accepting to lake some risks, \Vith a view to an adequate percentage of land clearance. The most used operational-demining methods are mechanical or explosive systems. They guarantee a 60-70 per cent reliab ility, which is acceptable in war time. Among mechanical system s Lhere are vehicles, with metal chains in the front, that beat Lhe ground causing the m ines to explode (demining vehicle \Vith flails, \.v hich can a lso "mi ll" the &'round), or roller or spade systems mounted on tank chassis. The rollers can be mounted in front of

normal trucks o r earthmover-s. Among the explosive devices \Ve have the so-called rocket systems, which, aher launching, drag a long stretching explosive rope Lhat causes the explosion on the area near the point of its impact. This action causes tl1e so-called "by syrnpatl1y" blasting of the surTounding m ines (lhe British system "Giant Viper"). The means used in the field of the so-called humanitarian demining are generally different in concepLion, also (or enviro11111ental impact reasons and because the aims to be pursued are nol the smne. This type of mine clearance, as mentioned above, a ims at bringing the minefields back to their former condition . Therefore, in orÂˇder Lo make an ag1icultural land fit for farming again, the demining activity should reach higher standards of efficiency. That is the reason why humanitarian demining is more costly and,

above all, its execution proceeds very slowly. For instance, in Cambodia iL took two years lo destroy 100,000 mines at a total cost of 14 rnillion dollars, with an eslimated 4-7 million m ines laid all over the country. Keeping this pace .it \vould take 1000 years to demine the entire country, with an expendilure o[ 5 billion dollars. Therefore clearly on ly a remarkab le technological leap forward will make the clearance o r these regions feasible.

EXPLOSIVE-ORDNANCE DETECTION The technical methods currently used to detect and locate offensive d evices, such as anti-personnel mines, can be class ified into three categories: electromagnetic methods, nuclear methods and chemical methods. Their peculiarity is that

device, providing the besl possible information wi thout causing false alan11s. Mines differ from conventional weaponry and ammunition because: • they are made to explode and, therefore, to produce their effects only when the contact with the "victim" occurs and this is normally postponed. Conventional ammunition, instead, in the majority of cases, explode on impact • they are arms which have exceedingly devastating effects and operate indiscriminately, killing both soldiers and civilians. The latter mostly during the long post-war period; • they are scattered all over the ground and, they are often invisible, either because they are covered by the surrounding vegetation or for their mimetic characteristics, so much so that mined zones cannot be distinguished from the adja- · cent areas. These are the reasons why a mined area originates a state of uncertainty, as it is scattered with mines which may be real or false. This increases the psychological effect which grows together with the intrinsic effectiveness of the mined area. A definition generally accepted by both the international and domestic legislation, considers the mine a device laid above or under the superficial layer of the ground or some other surface, put into operation or preset for exploding for the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle. Antitank mines can contain between 1 and 9 kilos of explosive and the detonation is caused by a pressure between 100 and 300 kilos, exerted on a pressure plate with a diameter of 15-25 centimetres. Anti-personnel mines are generally smaller, as they contain much less explosive (10-250 grams) and detonate under a pressure not inferior to 12 kilos, exerted on a pressure plate or button with a diameter of 2-10 centimetres. The technology of these devices is simple and cheap, does not require tools or sophisticated means, but, as they say, can be ''homemade". In the world there are more than 200 types of land mines, divided into anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. The latter are easily located by demining units, because they contain a great amount of metal. Antipersonnel mines, depending on the injuries they inflict, can be divided into two groups, blast mines and fragmentation mines. The former operate with a single upwards explosion and may cause injuries that can lead to the amputation of both legs. · The latter can explode for the pressure exerted in any way on the pressure plate, or, indirectly, by the traction of trip wire, put at a certain height from the ground, along a set course. An Italian example of this type of mines is tµe 'Valmara 69", which, cast at a certain height above the ground (about 100-120 centimetres), thanks to a secondary charge, can shoot about a thousand metallic fragments over a radius of 25 meters. They kill those who are in the immediate vicinity and badly injure all those who are within their range of action. And for a military unit, from a technical point of view, a wounded soldier is a heavier burden than a dead one.

they do not detect t he mine as such, rather they tend to detect a distinctive characteristic of the device. The electromagnetic methods detect the interaction between the mine material with the electromagnetic fields; nuclear methods detecl the prese n ce of some atomic species; chemical methods are sensitive to the presence of particular molecules. Clearly these methods 88

may also detect objects \Nhich react to then1, but which are not m ines, and lherefore each method could give an ambiguous information, producing a n umber of false alarms or unsuccessful identificalions. A correct strategy for the efficient location of mines is the combined use of several detecting techniques capable of discovering all the distinctive d1aracte1~istics of the

THE ELECTROMAGNETIC METHODS

The electromagnetic methods are based on the measure of the interaction between eleclrornagne li c fields and th e de\.ices present in the ground. In p arlicuJar, we shall mention magnetometry, electromagnetic induction and in(rared radar. Magnetometry

This method is based on the consid eration that the presence or metallic objects in the ground can cause a dis tortion of the natu ral magnetic field . It is, therefore, a matter of detecting small changes in the local magnetic field produced by metallic objects, and, as a result, it is only possible to detect mines containing metallic parts. As a maller of fact, it is a metal detector and as such can lead to false alarms. Moreover, we should consider that the anti-personnel mines can con la in extremely small numbers of metallic parts, and, therefore, it is nol possible to distinguish betv-1een them and other objects acciclenlally .in the ground . Obviously, the variation signal of Lhe environmental magnetic (ield is proportional to b o th the type of metal (consl,ml of magnelic permeability) and to its quantity

Electromagnetic-induction sensors The problem of detecting the intensity of lhe magnelic Geld, can be overcome by using the magnetic field produced by a coil instead of the terrestrial magnetism, as the above mentioned sensors do. In other words, by using alternating currenl and exploiting the pr inciple of electromagnetic induction, these systems enable lhe coil lo become the source of a magnetic field which is clislorted or attenuated by

lhe risk of increasing false alarms. The problem of false alarms is not of minor importance within the activity of humanitaiian demining. In fact, the number of m ines to be defused is so greal, Lhat the quickness of the operation is an essential component of an effec tive clearing prognunme. Ground Probing Radar- GPR

the interaclion with the metallic parts of the mines buried in the ground. These changes can be measured by a magnetic field sensor, such as those we have just described, and so the mine may be detected. This method has the same drawbacks previously mentioned, i.e. it

detects any type of metal !Jr'esent in the ground, thus leading to a high rate of false alarms. Besides, the magnetic-fi eld strength which is used is quite high, precisely b ecause of the \Vay in which it is created. As a result, the sensi tivi ly is h igher and , essentially, smaller metal objects can be d etected , al

The radar techn ique is w idely employed for probing the stn1cture of the !:,'round. The electromagnetic radiation band between 100 and 1000 megahertz (m icrowave) can penetrate the ground at a depth of many metres (obviously depending on the ground nature and its denseness); the wave may be reflected by the various discontinuous surfaces of the ground, such as the discontinuity between t,vo types of rocks or, as in our case, between a buried object and the ground V\â€˘-hich surrounds it. These reflected ,.v aves can be spatially defined and, as a consequence, they may indicate the presence, the shape and the location of bmied objects. However, the efficiency of lhis method is limited by two problems. The first one is that mines are usually laid at a litLle depth (about 20 centimetres) , or almost near the surface and, besides, they m ay be too small to give an effective signal. The limited depth of the mines cau ses the radiation qu an tity which comes in contact with the object, Lo he very small, so that it is necessary, for example, to optirnise the frequency of the incident radiation, perhaps by us ing higher frequency radiations, which a re less penetrating and can effectively probe only the surface layer of the ground. It shou ld be noted, though, that the electromagnetic \Vaves in these bands are extremely dangerous for the operators' health. Therefore, this should be taken into consideration during the planning of such systems, so thaL they may allow the efficient detection o[ the devices without endangering the personnel.

Infrared sensors for demining The infrarecl radiation can be used for localing lhcnnal maps. ll is well k.i1m,1,,11 that bodies emanate elcctromagnelic radialions, depending on t heir temperature. As far as ambienl lcmperalu ,..cs are concerned, the emission frequency takes place in the infra-red. Thus, using detectors \vhich can measure the radiation intensity, it is possible lo create real temperature rnaps. This technique is used in many rields, from environmental surveys to medicine and, in the same way, can also be used to deLecl lhe presence of objects in the ground. In prncticc we use infrarecl dclcctors in the bands o f 3-5 mm o r 9-14 mm. The gTound-penetration capability of this method is ralhcr limited, but it is adequate in the case of mines buried a few centimetres under the surface. So, if the device is made of a malerial which has a thermal capacity different from that of the surrounding ground, it will react in a different way to external heal sources, as for example lo solar light. The best results are clearly obtained in case of metallic mines, as metal warms up more than soil. The method efficiency varies in relation to a numbe r路 of factors, such as the composition of the soil, the presence of rocks with a high metallic content, the presence of vegetation and, last bu t nol least, the exposure to sunlight. To give an

Firstly, it is necessary to have the equipment and procedures which permit to identify, locate and record the mined areas, in order to proceed to their safe and efficient clearance. Secondly, it vecy important to have the means and procedures for conducting high-quality inspections of the cleared area. In this respect, it may be useful to employ a means like the airship which can fly at vecy low speed. A prototype, which was already used during exercise "Mine-seeker" (experimented in Kosovo in 2000), after which it was named, provided interesting results within humanitarian and military demining. This aerostat-borne radar system will enable to cut down on resources, setting them in order of priority, thus saving time and money. "Mine-seeker" will be able to map mined areas quite rapidly and with a high level of safety, monitoring the ground at a speed of 100 meters per second. That is to say thousands of times quicker than any traditional manual search could ever do. The high level of safety will save many human lives, because the system has no need to operate close to the ground, unlike conventional radars. The problem of images and their accurate analysis The problem of images and their interpretation is a problem which is also being faced in Kosovo. The solution proposed consists in using a radar system with a synthetic array in ultra wide band. This technology, based on the emission ofvecy short electromagnetic impulses, at high energy and in a wide range of frequencies, being able to identify and locate objects with a sufficient resolution degree, is adequate for the accurate detection of mine fields and is also capable of penetrating, just enough, below the ground surface in order to locate buried objects. This performance cannot be easily attained by the techniques based on conventional radars, as they use narrow band frequencies. 路 The radar images thus obtained, are properly correlated with other data, and undergo a process of computerized analysis, which permits to locate the mines quite accurately. In any case, to identify a minefield through the reflected image coming from the ground, or more precisely from the discontinuities between the device and the surrounding ground, is a difficult challenge for the scientists and engineers involved in the development of this technique. They also have to face another prob-

example, some research laboratories i n Canada, obtained a clelecling efficiency ranging from 20 to 100%.

Portable mine detector radar

De mining s1rip

Cercumine in iuiom:: TI1c Gr-ound Pcuellatwg. R <.'l.da.t - GPR

de tect~ tb.e prc=s eu <:e ofbo,h n1c wJlic and no n- m etallic m;:1u:: rials 路Tue dtff1t:ully t:ons 1s 1.s w mauag.ing ro d i~tinguish th e c x.plo5,i,路e dev.icc s from other matc riaJ.., pre-sent in the gr-mmd

NUCLEAR TECHNIQUES From an alomic point o( view, n.ilrogen is one of the main components of explosive substances. The nitrogen per centage varies in \Neight from 10% in gunpo,vder Lo 18% in nitro-glyce1ine and in TNT (i.e. trinitrotoluene) and up lo 30% or more in explosives such as C3 and C4. Therefore nitrogen can be considered a tracer of explosives and, as a consequence, of devices buried in the ground. Nuclear physics offers an inLeresling chance of detecting nitrogen atoms in the grou n d . lt is \vcll known in fact that these atoms have the property of absorbing neutrons, and tlus characteristic brings

j I

1 I

\lv'herc d i mens ions and weights musl be optim.ised. The necessary instruments for this type of probing are sho,vn a t Figure I. The system consists o( a source of neutrons, as for example, the 252 isotope of Cal iforn iu m (252Cf); a mod<::rator material needed to "thennalize" its energy (as for ex.ample boron), and a ray detector, e.g. a "scintillator". These are all conventional components, us ually found in nuclear physics equiprnent and arc vviclely known. This method, as aU Lhe others already rnentioncd, is not mine-selective, because it is a genera"! nitrogen detector. Therefore it is highly sensitive to everything which contains il, including soil and vegetation. So, before operating, it is necessary to measu re the nitrogen present in the ground, so as lo delect the presence of m ines through the excess of nitrogen compared lo the q uantity natu rally present in t11e sur-.rounding envirom11enl.

lem in relation to the radar system because the system conveys a huge number of data which are vexy difficult to analyse, so much so that the operation can be compared to the classic '1ooking for a needle in a haystack". The research activity After the promising results obtained in Kosovo, where near potentially mined areas it was possible to identify and locate both metal and plastic mines, an analytic technology to interpret the collected data is being developed. Certainly, researchers agree on the fact that this technology is limited by the difference existing between the various types of soil. It is easier to locate mines when operating under "controlled conditions", when one knows where to look, as compared with what happens in "complex soil", where the environment is difficult and there are electromagnetic interferences. It should also be considered that the radar system could sometimes be less sensitive and fail to locate evexy single mine in a given area. That is why it seems reasonable to use it only in order to detect the presence or absence of mines in a defined area. This piece of information, combined and integrated with the data collected by more conventional means and systems, could enable the teams assigned to manual demining, whose work will always be vital, to concentrate their search on the right area. Using the radar antenna, the dirigible could be the optimal base to probe the surface involved in the construction of the requested image. Physically, it is necessary for the antenna to move very slowly over the ground at an altitude of about 100 feet. An airplane would be too fast and, moreover, it is difficult to make it fly as low and as slowly as needed. Also helicopters, seemingly right for the purpose, cannot be used in this activity because their rotors create a vortex that could indirectly act upon tripwires or other anti-removal devices connected with the mines underneath, through the whirling movement transmitted to the foliage of the surrounding vegetation. This is particularly dangerous if the helicopter flies too close to the explosive device. Besides, a 100-feet altitude is another factor not adequate for a helicopter carrying out this type of activity in a continuous way. In case of a sudden engine failure, the helicopter, because of the limited altitude, would have no margin of manoeuvre for leaving the area which, in this case, could be very risky for the safety of the crew.

the nitrogen a lomic n ucleus to a state of energetic excit:alion, from which it goes lo the basic state through the emission of a well det.ennined ray of energy. This techn ique has been employed for some

SENSORS AND CHEMICAL DETECTION METHODS The chemical methods of detection arc based on the principle that every chern.ical compound, in its sol id or liquid p hase, prod uces a certain q_uan Lity of volatile compounds vvhich, in many cases are detecled by the sense of smell. Mines possess a peculiar smell of their own, wh ich may depend on the explosive itself or on the mine's plastic case . Mine detection t hrou gh smell recogn ilion is cur-

lime al a iq)Orts and has had a certain success in <letecling explosives in luggage. The needed technological effort consisls in reducing the s i,.e of the system in order to be able to operate on m ined ground,

Fig. 1

Gamma-rays detector

,Âˇ

--:_,....,...

.,. ,,..._,,.

- ,,,,,.,_,,,. / ,

vegetation (C, H, 0 ... )

/' neutrons

soil (Si, C, H, 0 ... )

mine (N, C, H, 0 ... ) 91

rcntly carried out using the smell system of dogs \vhich is one of tl1e most po\verfu l, as everybody knows. The drawbacks, easy to guess, arc the time needed to train Lhe ,mimals, their limited lengtJ1 of attention and, last b u t not least, the rar from remote possibility of losing the dog in action. A dog's sense or smell is certainly one of the most efficient systems of chemical detection. In the last years, though, the research in the field of chemical sensors has markedly improved the performance of artificial olfactory devices.

CHEMICAL SENSOR MATRIXES

The demand of better and better performing sensors has recently led to consider complex sensory structunos, formed by single sensors organized into matrixes. Sensors, and chemical ones in particular, are devices generally lacking selectivity. This m eans that the sensor response does not exclusive ly d epend on the chemical species for which it \Vas built, but it may a lso be influenced by other chemical species in the surroundings, vvhere there might also be other species. One of the main goals of the current research on chemical sensors is to try to obtain instruments based on highly selective mechanisms of interaction between sensor and environment. The scarce selectivity could also be remedied, for some applications, by using matrix sensors, made up o[ a certain number of sensors coupled to a mathematical procedure and data analysis. An important class of application based on the use of sensor matrixes is the one called electronic nose. These applications aim at using sensor matrixcs to detect the "chemical structures" present in the environment below a certain measure. Besides, they make it possible to realize artificial smell systems \vhich not only permit to reproduce the natural smell functionali ly, but also to widen and refine

In some territories, uncultivated and with a thick underbrush, mines which were 1.q;,U1C11._.,y laid at sowing time could be covered by vegetation, to such a point that they cannot be detected with absolute certainty by any Âˇ ent. In such an environment, experience suggests the use of a robot-snake, which can operate in different ways. For example, if in addition to the various sensors, including chemical ones, the robot were equipped also with a RF lighting device, it could locate and detect suspect chemical concentrations without physically entering the undergrowth. Otherwise, if the transporting vehicle is expendable, it could carry a counter-charge. Robot-eels, studied to operate in extremely shallow waters, could be adapted for use also in the brushwood and other types of vegetation, so as to cany out the same job in different contexts. In the field of employment of these systems there are, however, two baa sic difficulties at technological level, which must be overcome: chemical sensors must be sturdy, solid, small, reliable and transportable aboard the "snake'' "eel". Moreover, their design must be subordinated to simplicity and low costs. Active-rope mecba:llisJn The Tokyo Institute of Technology is introducing the idea of articulated artificial bodies, which had already been elaborated in the mid Eighties. This rt>_<.f~rch is based on the assumption that those structures, consisting of in-series segment chains could simulate performances similar to

those of snakes with, a technical advantage constituted by their capability of passing through narrow openings and on uneven ground, adhering to the objects situated there, as well as on soft ground, considering the wide surface of their weight distribution. Besides, having a redundant and modular structure, they are intrinsically reliable and easy to maintain as their components are mostly identical. In conclusion, this type of robot does not have transport difficulties as it is conveniently divisible into two single modules. The "NTUA" snake The Technical University of Athens (NTUA) has proposed a system fit-

ted with wheels on each of its sections, which can be activated independently. The prototype consists of 7 segments with 6 joints (it is possible to

ils detecting cap ability, including classes of m olecules which cannot be perceived by natural receplors (e.g. carbon monoxide-CO) (Figure 2).

These systems, Lh ough still in the exper imental phase, \Vill certainly he on the mar ket in the near fo ture.

DATAFUSION

add others). The joints, although unidirectional, as in the case of the ACM ill, can change their orientation and each of them can rotate on a vertical or horizontal axis. Only half of each segment is connected with the wheels, which can be operated independently one from the others, enabling the autonomous orientation, with undoubted advantages for their locomotion. The locomotion The robot-snake prototypes previously described need locomotion schemes quite sophisticated in comparison with those of other normal robots. The study of their kinematics is an activity on its own, and it is conducted by re5:eru:-chers who are not directly involved in the construction of the prototypes. By observing actual snakes, it was noted that they do not use all their locomotion potential, whereas this can be done with technological mechanisms which reflect exactly their biological shape. The methods which enable snakes to climb up obstacles, as well as their movement techniques in water were also studied. At present, these capabilities have been reproduced in a laboratoxy (except for climbing) using machines. However, it is right to specify that the construction of a device capable of doing all these movements probably represents an u.iu~ptable expense, in terms of planning, and an important increase in complexity when compared to simple movement. The technologies of robot snakes and eels have attracted much attention in the last decade, apart from their current employment. Certainly, compared with the first realizations, there has been considerable progress. From the total lack of knowledge and absence of experimental tests in the eighties, in about a decade we moved on to about ten prototypes, with tens of ~searchers active all over the world, and dozens of files dealing with the subject. Currently, within other activities concerning robotics and the fields associated with it, building robot-snakes and eels i\Al1u.Âˇu = relatively small efforts. On the other hand, they offer many advantages which are essentially connected with the ability to crawl (or swim) in a number of ways, and to operate in all contexts, in narrow spaces and underneath dangerous areas trapped with trip-wires.

All the techniques previously illuslraled , in d ivid uall y taken, proved to be insufficient to guar antee an efficie nL localization of explosive devices. Let us remember, once again, Lhal Lo achieve this goal it is necessary to use quick methods exemp l from false detections. So, the best strategy for using the systems a l our disposal seems to be the one based on the combined use o[ several techn iques at the same time, so that each of them can contribule with it.s specific character to a safe and quick identificalion. The refore, we can imagine an eq{1ipment vvhich can de Lect the prÂˇesence of metals in the ground , through magnetic techn iques, identify lhe excessive presence of nitrogenous molecules in lhe s urrounding area, through nuclear techniques, and detect I.he lypical sn1ell or a mine, through an electronic nose. So, all these lechniques cou ld cooperate syn ergistically, through a p rocedure cal led "Data Fusion", appropriate for achieving the desired result. Dai.a fusion is not per se a scientific discipline (at least. at lhe presenl Lime), but can he considered a collection of techniques and algor iLh ms perrnilting to simulate the human cognitive processes which constan tly inlegrate different pieces of infonnation Vv'i lh lhe p urpose of evaluating a complex environment.. The data to be en tered in this syslern can be provided by sensors or introduced by human operators, or else they might can be taken out a priori frorri a ny data base. In th e case o f mines one ecm lke in Lo consideration a geographical data base 93

SENSORS AND MICROSYSTEMS IN THE DEMINING AC

All living beings, in a more or less evident way, are equipped with sophisticated biological integrated systems (sensors), which they use profitably to interact with the environment. The loss of efficiency or lack of these essential systems causes a reduction of the survival capabilities and, inductivelyf a slowdown of the evolution process. These are the reasons of their utmost importance. The new-generation sensors are solid state devices, applying microelectronic technologies, and they generally enable to "read" the environment, and give answers in the shape of electronic or optical signals, useful for successive processing and for final checking and monitoring actions. Being highly complex devices, their study and development may be led only at interdisciplinary level, with competences concerning solid-state physics, chemistry, microelectronics, biology, chemical-physics of interfaces and electrochemistry. This may be explained by listing the most important features a sensor must have. It must be selective (in order to respond only to the required chemical species), highly sensitive, with high resolution, not very noisy, compatible with microelectronic technologies, neither contaminating nor contaminable, robust and inexpensive. In practice all these requirements cannot be met simultaneously, but an acceptable compromise can almost always be reached, at planning level, in relation to the specific tasks that a particular sensor will have to perform.

Matrix of

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Environment

radio freque ncy, microwave or infra rccl radiation fields. Such techniques clim a l assembling technolog ies already available on the market, like generators, detectors a nd clcctronic-circuil components. The s ituation is different when nuclear techniques and chemical sensors arc concen1ed. The first ones are based on wellknown processes, but they exploit a technology \vh i.ch has been tested onJ.y at Lhc level of research labo ratories, where u tmost precau tions are taken, especially in relation to checking and lim iting radioactive emissions. In order to rnakc a portable cmd non-polluting detecting system, one should first of a lI make a research on the effects that the irradiation h as on the ground. lt should not be forgo u en, in fac t, thal the ma in goal of humanita rian demining is to preserve the territorial integrity and characteristics. Besides its inJJuence on the gr ound, Lhe safety of

Procedure for Sample

po:,:

Fig. 2

-+----C - 1-ass R e presenta tion

'----

Information Pre-analysis Schematic representation of an application for the identification of chemical structures: the molecules which form the chemical samp les present in the environment interact with the sensors of the matrix and produce, in each sensor, an exit signal. After a phase of preanalysis of the information, the data are processed through a procedure of sample identification which, as a result, obtains the classification of the chemical samples present in the environment. Samples are represented in an appropriate space of representation, called classes space.

containing information a bout the nature and configural.io n of the soil. At the beginn ing or the eighties these techniques began to develop p recisely in the military sector, in or der to manage the ba ttlefield s, and aftenvards t11ey \vere e mployed in other Gelds. such as, for example, rob otics.

CONCLUSIONS Among the vaiious mel110ds taken into consideration, some represen t the adjustment of experimental techniques al ready w idely k nown and employed in several fields . Th ese methods are m ostly based on th e applica tion of electromagnetic radiation, in the shape of

the operating personnel m ust be taken into consideration, as they a re in contact with these d evices for many hou rs every day, and arc virtually exposed to the r isk of contamination and to an accumulation o f radioactivity. The second category, chem ical sensors, consists of devices which, among other things, enab le us Lo

detect the explosive devices' "chemical odour". '-l'le have seen how these systems are based on animals (mainly dogs), which are already employed q uite successfully in operations of deLection and location of mines. As far as electromagnetic methods are con cerned, it is already possible to realize operational systems and , if for nuclear techniques the aspect lo be considered is essentia lly the safety or emironmenL and o p erators , in the case of chemical sensors, ins tead, research and development still have a long way to go, before an operational system based on them can be realized. It is all about a challenge that originates from the \\ill of cornpet ing with natu re, ,vhicb made and designed chemical sensors so efficient (as a dog's sense of smell) that they can scent the faint odour of a mine. Research in the fi eld of chemical sensors is an activity which already involves many researchers, both in the academic and tJ1e industrial circles. Bestdes il is clear frorn \•Vhat \Ve said previou.sly that, in order 'to realize a cbern ical sensor, specific expertise is needed in fields that are seemingly· so d ifferent from one another, such as physics, electronics, chemistry, biology and mathematics. The develop ment of the knowledge about sensors is the subject o[ constant attention, and nowadays humanita rian demining is seen as one of the rnost interesting fields of application. Coming Lo the conclusion of this review, ,.ve would like to underl ine tha t Italy and Europe have the potential to contribu te in a positive ~vay to the solution of tl,is problem, kvhich is of great importance from a social, economic and humanitaria n point of view. D 0

"Lieutenant Colonel, Chief; NATO ln frastructw-e and Resource Section, 4ih Division, Defence General Staff

TIC ARRAY RADAR- SAR What is a synthetic array radar? Environment monitoring, natural resources mapping and survey of military systems are based on the possibility of realizing high-resolution images, in very wide areas. Synthetic array radar systems represent a revolutionary version of the conventional Gronnd Penetrating Radars - GPRs, and give effective answers to this

kind of requirements. The SAR system's potentialities originate from the synthesis of the characteristic long-range propagation of radar signals and the capacity of processing the information collected by means of electronic-digital equipment. How does the SAR system operate? A detailed description of the SAR working theory is complex and goes beyond the purpose of this essay. However, we shall try to give a basic description of the working procedure. Let us consider the dirigible or any other aircraft equipped with a SAR able to send a signal perpendicularly to the speed vector. The aircraft so structured produce bidimensional images. One dimension is called range of the along track and is the distance between the radar and the objective. This distance is determined by measuring precisely the time between the transmission of the impulses and the reception of the echoes reflected by the objective. The resolution level of the traced range is determined by the transmitted pulse width - PW This means that narrow pulses originate a higher resolution of the trace. The other dimension is the azimuth perpendicular to the cross track. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the capacity of the SAR to produce azimuths with a quite high resolution to which differentiates this type of radar from the traditional ones. Jn order to obtain a highresolution azimuth one needs an antenna physically wide, able to focus the energy transmitted and the one reflected by the objective at a precise interval. Similarly, the optical systems, such as telescopes, require ample width (mirrors or lenses • equivalent to a radar antenna) to obtain high-resolution images. As SAR operates on frequencies inferior to those used by optical systems, also poor resolutions . need such big antennas (some hundred meters) that cannot physically be trans; ported by any aerial platform. However such a radar, transported by an aircraft, can collect data during the whole flight and can also process those data as if they were coming from an antenna physically as long as the movement of the aircraft during the flight. This is the reason why we speak of usynthetic array", which offers the great advantage of obtaining a finer resolution compared to what we could have by using a small antenna The possibility of attaining high azimuthal resolutions can also be explained by e · · g the survey sequence of the objective from the point of view of the Doppler-effect analysis. The position of the objective along the flight conidor determines the Doppler-frequency of the echoes: the objectives in front of the aircraft produce a positive Doppler signal, and those behind produce a negative signal. So, during a flight in synthetic array, the numerous echoes become as many Doppler frequencies which, opportunely correlated, contribute to the definition of the azimuthal position of the objective.

In conclusion, making a short synthesis of the characteristics of SAR, we could say that: • it is a radar mode which exploits the aircraft movement to get the Doppler information coming from the objective, i.e. the ground and the systems therein; • this procedure cannot be used to control moving systems, as they have rotational movements; • the frequency change caused by the fonvard movement of the radar, in relation to the ground, is used for the angular resolution needed to obtain the SAR image; • during the survey, a point in the ground is mapped and the echoes received within a certain period of time are recorded. These echoes, received simulta- ' neously from different points and from diverse azimuthal angles, are separated on the basis of the Doppler histories (phases) caused by the corresponding different range rate; • in practice, the Doppler history for each range can be thought of as a 2D image of the distribution of energy of the reflecting points on the ground (map).

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The Army Aviation, with its numerous tasks in support of land operations, has a long history and great traditions. After being part of Cavalry for a short time, in 2004 it became again an autonomous Branch. It consists of nine flying and support Regiments, plus some minor autonomous units and a specific School. Equipped with liaison airplanes and transport, reconnaissance and attack helicopters, AVES has one of the largest air fleets of the Armed Forces and of the national Armed Corps. he Arrny Aviation is one of the most recent Branches of the Army, traces its hist01ical heritage back to the firsL ascents of military aeros tats and the first combat flights in the world, made in Libya in 191 1-1912 by Almy pilots on Army aircraft. These nights can be identified with that part of the aviation history which in I 92-' led to the birth of the Air Force as the third Senice. The continuity of the flying trad ition is represented by the Army Air Observers who, in the thirties and forties, operated on the reconnaissance aircraft of the Italian Royal Air Force, until the constitution of the Army Light A\•i ation (AJ_E) in 1951 . At the beginning it \Vas equipped wi Lh light planes which, in I 9"i6, \Vere joined hy helicopters. After W\i\lJ I, ALE underwent conti nuous technical improvements and a comprehensive organizational boost. Today it is called "Army A\,iation" and is one of the spearheads of the Service,

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engaged in peace operations abroad, training activi Lies and public utility missions.

An observalion balloon employed al Saati (East Africa, I 888).

TIIE AEROSTATS

the War Ministry issued a circular for Lhc constitution of an "Aeronautical Service" al. the Rome detachrn e n t of the yd Eng ineer Regi ment. On January 1, 1885, an Aemstat Section was consti tuted at the same detachrnent, commanded by Pecori Giraldi, who is therefore to be considered the founder and first Commander of 1J1e Italian military aeronauts . The section was equipped vv·ith two S"i cubic-metre spherical balloons, called "Africo" and ''Torricelli". On .lune 28, 1886

The aeronaut Branch stemmed from the Engineer Corps and ha.:; been the cradle o[ the Italian flying traditions. The first ascent on a military aerostal in Italy dates back to November 20, 1884 \Vhen Alessandro Pec01i Girak\i, a Lieutenant in the yd Engineer Regiment, boa,-ded a French-rnade spherical balloon. Thus h e \Vas the first pilot or free-flying balloons of the Royal Italian Army (1). After his reports,

four Units : I Un it-troops and services (aerostat and photoelectric pools; field photography, radiolelegraphic m ilitary communications); II Unit-mili tary aviation (management of aerodromes, flying-school, emplo:y111ent of military a irplanes); Jll Unit-n1 ilitmy airships (management of aeronautical yards, hydrogen producing plan ts); IV Unit-factory for aeronautical experimen ts and construclions (manufact u re and repair of aeronautical materials, constru ction ol' buildings for aeronautjcal use).

THE AIRSHIPS

one of Lhese balloons made a braked ascent to 380 metres, having on board - besides the pilot th e Ministers of vVar, Navy and Finance. The First: lmv on aeronau tical matters ,vas that of .l u ne 23, 1887 \,Vh ich inslituted . within the 3rd Enoineer Regime n.t ' an "Enoiu V neer Special ist Company" \vhich, besides being charged vvith supplying clcctr·ic lighting and photography, had to deal with anything connected \,Villi aviation, \vhich at the Lime was represented by free and captive acroslat.s. So, on November 1, 1887 the Section became a Specialist Company and, al tbe end of the same year, ,vas mobili zed for the expedition in Eritrea. The aerostalic equipment landed in Africa in Januar-y 1885 and was employed near the Saati redoubt. The Company's three ba lloons, "Vo l ta", "Lana" and "Serrati" made several ascents for the surve illance of the Abyssinian lines. In 1893, Captain Maurizio Mauro Mor·is (2) replaced Captain Pecori Giraldi as Commander of the Specialist Company. The new Commander was authorized to build at his O\,Vn expenses, using the aeronauts' skilled labour, a balloon suitable for free ascen ts , ,.vh ich became t11e first balloon entirely built by Italians, the "Durand de la Penne". lVIeamvhile, on November 6, 1894, a Royal Decree es98

tablished the secon d specialis t company \vhich, together with the first one and with a ''lrain" company, constiluted in Rome an "Engineer Specialist Brigade". Tn 1897 llaly could pride i tself o f having made the first aerial sun1ey, lhe p lanimeLt·ic rnap of a section of the course of the Tiber. Th is deed v,·a.s Lo cam the world's praise in 1910, a t the Brussels International Congress. In 1896 Lhe Specia list Brigade participated in field manoeuvres with a aerostatic pool and a field radiotelegraphic section; in thal period many interesting aerostatic, racliotelegraphic and photogram metric exercises \Nere carried out employin g captive balloons. On Sep tem ber 1, 1909 the Specialist B1igade became fully autonomous and look the denomination of "Engineer Autonomous Specialist Br·igade". Exactly 12 months later, structure and name of the Brigade changed again. JI became the "Engineer Specialist Battalion", organized as follmvs: Slaff, 4 Specialis L Manoeu vre Companies, 1 Specialist \i\lorker Company, 1 photog.r aphic section, 1 radiotelegraphic section an d 1 "train" section. On October 28, 1910 an A\~ation Section was added. The Royal Dec,·ee o( March 10, 1910 provided that the E ngin eer Specialist BaLLal ion wou ld be formed by the following

The first experime nts w ith Italian-made military airships dated back to October 1908, when the "N.1" airship was flown by Lt Gaetano Arturo Crocco a nd Lt Ollavio Ricaldonj, from the Engineer Specialist Brigade, near the aeronautical yard of Vigna di Valle. The birth of this experimenta l laboratory musl be credited to Captain Moris, who had tasked the l\vo p rotagonists of the hrsLexperimental flight with starting the studies for the construction of an airship of entirely Italian conception. Previously, in Ju ly 1908, Count Almerigo da Schio had flown the "Italia" airship, built a l his O\vn expenses, in the presence o f Queen Margherita. The N-1 was rollowed by the N-1 bis, also conceived bv Crocco and Ricaldoni, w hicl1 0 ;1 October 31, 1909 succeeded in maki ng a r ecord 4 70km non-stop flight along the Vigna di Valle - Naples - Rome itinerary, remaining airborne for as n1any as 14 hours. T he N-1 bis \Vas later employed [or Lraining Officers, for whom a special fl y ing school for a irships had been established at Vigna di Valle . T he first cou rse ,vas aLLended by 8 Officers rrom the Arm y and 4 fro m the N avy. In Sep te mber 1910 a new a irshi p , th e N -2 , made its first Hight, reaching an a ltitude of 1500 metres. In 191 1 a plan for th e improvem ent of the Italian a irship fleet Vvas d eveloped ,~. hich envis-

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aged the construction of eight "Rocco-Ricaldon i" new models and one "Forlanini" (3) . The former were divided in to a small-volume version, called P l, P2 and P3, and one M-type 111ed iu 111-volu111e ve rsion. Two of these were to be used for the requirements of the ltalian Royal Navy.

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THE AIRPLANES Major Moris also gave a fundamental impulse Lo the First. experiences conducted with airplanes. In fact, on his invitation, between 1908 and 1909 a French navigation pioneer, Leon Delagrange, ar-.rived in Rome followed by the creator himself of the new technical invention, i.e. \Nilbur \\lright. Both perforrned in some shows, moving the audience to great enthusiasm. Furthennore, Moris made a contract with \l\1right for purchasing an airplane and for instructing two Italian trainees: .'Javy Sub-lieutenant Mario Calde rara and Engineer Lieutenant Umberto Savoia, who thus becan1e the first officers to obtain an airplane flying licence. Still in J 908 a plane conceived and produced in Italy, designed by engineer .Aristide Faccioli and built by Turin's SPA, made its brsl flight. .After watching the perfor111ancc of one of Faccioli's aircraft, Gabriele D'Annunzio extolled that flight in the conference "The Dominion of the Sky", held in February 1910 at Turin's "Vittorio Emanuele" Theatre (4) . .A Faccio li-SP.A biplane \Vas the first Italian aircraft. expo1·ted abroad, prec isely to Russia. After these pioneering exp erimenls, in 1910 the War Ministry decided to establish an aviation school a t Centocelle, nea r Rome T he first plane of the nnv school ,,vas Wr·ight's

number 4, built by Lt Savoia, follm-vecl by an Henry Farn1an bought in Fnu1ce. In the foUo·wing months the Specialist Brigade built th ree more Fc:uTnans and received a private plane owned by Cavalry L t Ugolino Vivaldi Pasqua. And it ,,vas in fact the latter who, on August 11, set the record of five actual niglll hours in a single day. However, after l,vo crashes ,,vhich had cost the life of Pasqua himself and that of Lt Giuseppe Saglietti, vvho p iloted a Sommer biplane, the \Nar Ministry ordered to suspend the rl ights and opened an inquiry on the tragic events. At any rate, the Centocellc School by the end of 1910 received an official acknO\vledgement as a Military School of Aviation and was equipped with eight a irp lanes, bet,veen Fannans and Bleriots. But the follO\ving year, owing to the fie ld's shortcomings, the school ,vas closed and replaced by those established a t the Aviano and i\ilalpcnsa ai rfields. The fi rst accelenll.ed training course for observer Officers \Vas held in .July 19 11 a t Aviano. In Italy, as in t.he other European Countries, given the radically revoluLiona.rv nature of t.he new means of transport, the aeronautical activity ,vas born, a nd initially developed, in the civilian environment and was practiced because o r

the spontaneous enthusiasm of young sportsmen, and encouraged and supported by the conlribulions of patrons, including members of the Royal Family. This expla ins ,vhy the number of civilian flying schools ,vas higher Lhan t hat 0 1 similar military institutions. lVlany military pilots obtained the ir li cences at foreign schools, especially Fre nch ones. By the e ncl of 1912, sixty-nine pilots obtained their lice nce at Italian mi litary schools, fiftv-one at civilian schools and seven ly-e igh I abroad (76 in France) (5).

Meanwhile, in .lulv 1910 Parliament had issued a la~v in favour or the buclcling Ital ian Aviation, appropriating 10 million lire fo,- Lhe constn.1ction o f airships, airplanes and the relevant plants for manufacture and maintenance, as ,vell as for the special allowances o r the flying person nel.

THE RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION Two important events I.hat occu1Ted in 19 11 were decisive for the rnilitary employment 0 1 aircraft.: the manoeuvres in Monfe1Tato and the ,var in Libya. During the exercises held in the Piedrnontese re99

Left. Aeronauts from the Spccialis1 Batwlion in action.

Facing page. '

A postcard o( 1he "V;J /unt eer Aviators'' F/01.ilfa in Cyrerwica.

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gion, the t\vo parties (blue and red) kept spying each other employing their tiny reconnaissance aviations, each eq~l ipped w ith five planes, an aerostatic field section and two a irsh ips wh ich wer·e assigned on a case-by-case basis. The aer ia l means had explorative tasks and the services rendered Lo the headquarters concerned were quite satisfactory, although the bad \veather conditions h indered the Rights. The expe1iment provided very interesting rnaLler or study, particularly \Vith regard to the logistic aspect of the funclioning of Flying units and airships. During those m;;tnoeuvres th e K ing o r Ita ly made his first flight on a P-2 airship. On SepLember 28, 1911 the Aviation Unit of the Engineer Specialist Battalion received the order to rno100

hilize an aiqJlane fo rmation lo be allached to the special CoqJs v.-foch \,v as going to occupy Lhe Turki sh possession s in Libya . The Commander of the Avia tion Un it, U Col. Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo, assigned the ne\v aerial fl eet the follow ing Officers: Capt Carlo Piazza (6), Capl Riccardo .Moim, Lt Leopoldo de Rada, Sub-Lt Ugo De Rossi, 2 nd Lt Giul io Gavotti . The IJight unit consisted of n ine airplanes : t\VO B]eriots, three Nieuport, two Fermans and two E trichs. On October 15 the fl otilla landed in Tripoli and a month later \Vas follmved hy a second detachment of thr·ee planes which took up quarters near Benghazi. The p ilots had no shortage of problems, owing to the scepticism that surrounded the aviaLors at t he, b eginning of their

operational cycle in Africa. The h igher Commands had doubts about exposing to [ire those f-rail and unreliable planes, \Vhich until then had been employed a lmost exclusively in sports events and experimental flights. Only the vv·ill and abnegat ion of the Officers and of the other personnel of the air wing p erm illed to go through the trial stage with success, giving also to the Commands of the Libyan Expeditionary Cmvs Lhe deserved conf-idenee in the new and revolu tionary military machine. Very soon orders were dispatched to prepare nev.- flying units in Ilaly to be sent to Tripoli tania and Cyrenaica as reinforcements to the a ir component, which had already shmv11 its effectiveness in contras Ling the s hi f1y formations of Arab guerrillas. The reinforcements, \vhose denomination was "3 rd and 4 th aviation autonomous platoons" constituted the "Flotilla of Civilian Voluntary Aviators", created on the initiative of T u r in's "La Stampa Sportiva" magazine and of Deputy Carlo MonlL1, then President of the "Aeroclub d 'Italia ", who assumed its command with the rank of Captain. The flotilla of volunteers arrived in the war zone after a brief training period al t he Specialist Ballalion, in order to offset the momentary shortages in m ili tary personnel of t he Flying units, and \Vas repatriated in March 19 12, replaced by regular squadrons. The first war Hight in history took place on October 23, 19 11: the protagonist was the fligh t Commander, Capt Piazza, ,vho had the dual task of pilot and observer·, since the aircraft v-1as a single-seater. Thus the first air reconnaissance m issions commenced wi th positive results, amazing and irnpr·essing the enemy

,vl10 saw the sky crossed by machines totally unknown to them.

THE EMPLOYMENT IN WAR On October 25, during a flight over some enemy encan1p1nents, Capt Moizo ,vas hit by rifle fire; three rou nds pierced the wings of his plane \Nit.bout causing serious damage. This must be considered the first fire test passed by the pilot of an airplane while, some days later, mtillery fire was ranged for the first time through s ignals se1i.t by a plane. On November 11 Capt Piazza, acknowledging the usefu lness of recording with photos the reconnaissance made by s ight, p laced on his pla11e a um1era pointing down\varcls: thus photo air-recon naissance was born, albeit with amateurish means. The next step was the idea of dropping bombs from the airplanes in order to seal.I.er the bands of insurgents and strike enemy oases and camps. The [ollo\ving consideration, if the Turks were also going to emp loy a irplanes in combat, was the recourse to fight between flying aircraft, devising the appropriate -defence and proposing the adoption of distinctive national markings. In this regard Capt Piazza suggested that our piloJ.s Lhernselve:,; 1vil1 take care of both attack and defence from lhe enemy plane:,;, m;;moeuvring in :,;uch a 1-vay as to leave them behind (since 1ve have the fa:,;te:,;t planes now existing) or hit them wilh fire from lhe pistols 1vhich are part of their equipment. For the bombing, special Cipelli- type hand grenades were used: they weighed 2 kilos and the pilot threw them after removing the safety catch; later, modified Haasen-model Danish hand grenades \Vere used until an a ir bon1b was devised by Lieutenant Bontempelli, an arti llery Officer. The first night flights in the war zone took place in the sp ring o r 1912 and on August 15, 1912 the first pilot lost his life in combat: Cavali-y 2 nd Lieutenant Piero Manzini crashed into the sea and

drowned, owing to a wrong nrnnoeuvre clur·ing a mission of photographic reconnaissance. On September 10, 1912 Capt Moizo was the first pilot captured by the enemy. Another historically important event ,vas the experiment o[ a radio-connection be tween an ai1·plane in flight and a warship a L anc hor in the port of Tobruk, \Vitnessed by scientist Guglielmo Ma1·con i. Furth ennore, during th e 1911-1912 Libyan campaign, it was acknowledged that the task of air reconnaissance should be entrusted to a person other than the pilot, who \Vas a lready heavi ly engaged in guiding and controlling the aircraft. The firs t aviator that per formed the specific and exclusive Lask of "observer from the a irplane" was Infantry Ll Ercole Capuzzo, Commander of the Tohruk fly ing unit. The Commander of th e cxpeclionary CoqJs, Gen. Carlo Caneva, on December 8, 19 11 , thus expressed h is appreciation for the work done in Libya by the aviators, in a congratulatory telegram to the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Alberto Pellin: To our brave companionsin-ann:,; who, with a faith equal LO their cournge, have crossed tl1e :,;ky - lirst Ln the world - under lhe storm of enem_v fire, lo tho:,;e ¼-d).deserving explorers who, braving the dangers of a noL-yet-:,;ale in:,;/n.1ment, have been capable of gather-

ing so rnany precious elements foe 1he concluct of tl1e operations, must go now, as a high praise, 1he echo of my own satisfaction toge ther ,vith that of all lhe 1roops w ho, fron1 their ITenches, cried out t:heir admincition for their superb l7ighls. The deeds of our pilots were recognized by the foreign press. On Augus l 12, 1912 , "The Times" published that "The practical resulls 1he airplanes' lligh J::,; were invaluable. In fact the Italian generals were regularly informed about tl1e movements and size of the enemy forces. The lerri/01y between the coa:,;t and the mountains was explored with great. care, and many sketches ,vere made (. .. ) Certain maps and photograph:,; taken by tJ1e Italian aviat01:c; during the batlies are sufficient proo[ oF I.heir marveJlous skill. In constiluting the expedilionary coqJs to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica it \Vas envisaged that a lso aerosl.ats and airships would be sent. On November 5, 1911 the first aerostat pool mobilized for the Italian-Turkish ,var landed in Tripoli. lt consisted ol t\vo slender Draken bal.loons followed by other fleets. The ascensional acti,,ity directed by Capl Giovan Battista Pastine star ted on November 10, when the firsl bal loon \vas infla ted and lifted to an altitucle of about 500 metres to observe the enemy positions at Ain Zara. As a resul t of this s urvey the Draken,

101

signalling wilh rlags, ranged the Cire or the guns of the bauleship "Carlo Alberto" on concentrations of Turkish-Arab troops. On December 1, the second Draken \,Vas installed on hoard the brig "Cava! Marino", 'lvhich bad been suitably dismasted an d assigned to the ranging of naval [i r e an d exploration of coastal areas. In January 1912 a Draken, mounted on a \.vagon specially equipped for easy movement, made several cxplorat.ive ascents, taking also photos or T ripoli's defensive works . Th e Order o f th e Day issued by Gen Caneva on Decen1ber 8, 1911 so commenJecl the deeds of the aernnau ls. The effecLiveness of lhc artille1y has 1ve// and often found a precious help in U1e observalion of fire comluclecl and t1w1s1nitted by Lhe Draken Balloons sent up from the ground or from special floats. Thus I associate hen: the Fearless and intelhgent aeronauts in ÂŁhe great and ve1y warm p raise lhat I hesto1N on th e Commanders, O{Dcers and all the Artillerymen of land and sea, 1-'ii thout distinction of specialization and employment. Afrer a series of m ishaps caused by bad \Neather condilions, ,vhich forced to repatriate the P-1, damaged by a storm, the a irsh ips sent lo Libya vvere ready to start the irÂˇ operational activily a t the beginning o( March 19 12. On the 5 th , the P-2 and P-3 participated together in their first war mission, whose oh102

jcctive was tl1e oasis of Zan zu r. On the l 2 th , d uring a mission against Zavia, an airsh ip was damaged by rifle fire coming from Bed ouin camps. The a ir p h otograp h ic, bornbing and liaison missions, with launching o f messages, continued intensely until Turkey su rrendered in October J 9 12. The P-2 was shot down in action, b u l managed to make an emergen cy landing beh ind the frienc.Uy li nes and, hm,i n g repaired i ts d amages, soon .relurnccl to the front. During their operational act ivity in Libya, the Lwo di rigibles made 100 ascents, launching 330 bom bs and taking rnorc than 300 photos . .Also the P-1 \Vas employed for a short time in Cyrcnaica and became famous for a night bombing mission frorn an al titude of 1000 metres. The diri gibles and, Lo a lesser extent, the captive balloons and a irpla nes helped in updating the maps made with a Gocrz apparat us from a ltitudes varying from 500 to 1000 m etres. Together ,,vith the strictly military employment, in 1912 several in !crestin g experi men ts were carried ou t in Libya about detecling su bmarine m i n es and launch ing bombs on moving lloaLing ta rgets from airsh ips, as well as experimen ts o n antiaircraft r i rlc-firc against fu ll -scale models of airpla nes hauled by dirigibles. The Libyan campaign had inclicated , albeit not completely a nd exhaustively, the capab ilities of the

Above and 1i ght. O n e of the first Ble1io 1 a irp/ancs employed by t.he Twlian Army.

An Tlalian pioneer piloi on hoard n French -made "Farman" :Jircrnft.

aerial mecms in war operations in support to the land forces. The acLivi Lies or flyers, airship crews and

aeronauls had c hanged many ideas and refuted some preconceptions; the 11 igh Corn rnands began to accept the actual value of the aircraft as a means or exploration and

bombardment. After Lhc Libyan war, until the outbreak ofV-lW1, the Engineer Specialist Battalion unde rwent sevend organizational transformations and denominations, \,vitl1 rnany changes in the unit's subordination. ln .June 1912, during the \Nar against Turkey, an Aviator Battalion was set up \Vith the exclusive task or operating airplanes, and was attached to the Specialist Battalion. Towards the end of 1912, t he War iVIinistry tasked the Aviator Baualion \Vi.lb. the study of a new organization for military aviation in Ita ly. The resu lts of this important \Vork \Vere reported hy Artillery Major Giulio Douhet, who was to become one of the n,ost important experts in air strategy and was at the time the Battalion's acting Commander. The scant financial resources available to the War 1vlinistry b locked the prac tical implementation of the plan for the development of Aviation as outl ined by Doubet, who envisaged to increase the number or squadrons frorn I 2 Lo 25. A law issued in June 1912 cstah1ishcd the instilul.ion of an "Aeronautical Service" at the \ 1\/ar fvlinistry's General Directorate for ArLillery and Engineers . Its main body was the "Inspecting Office of Aeronautical Services", in charge of the "Engineer Specialist Battalion" in Rome, the "Aviator Battalion" in Turin, the "Aeronautical Construction Plant" in Rome and an "Exper-

imental Building Yard" at Vigna di Valle. With a c ircular issued by I.he War Ministry in August 1913, the Inspecting Office ,vas transformed in "Air Force Inspectorate". In April 1913 the preliminaries or tbe CirsLItalian military competition of aviation vv·crc held at J\ilirafiori aerodrome, near Turin, \Vi.Lb the purpose of selecting new engines and aircral:L for the reequipment of the fleet of the Army air service. In June 19.13, Turin again vvitnessed the first impressive Italian a ir parade, with the participation of eight squadrons of four planes each. The precision oC the flights and tl1e perfect organization of the air parade aroused a great admiration, and the entire national press gave a particular· prominence to the event. In October Ivlajor Piazza landed near t he Mont Cenis Pass (2000111 altitude), setting the new high-altitude landing world r·ecord. During the period bel\veen the end of the Libyan campaign a nd th e beginn in g of the Firs t \i\Torlcl \-Var many experiments \Vere carried out in order to achieve the highest possible pedonnance, compatibly with the techn ical capabilities of those airplanes. Thus in March 1913 there were trials on radio transmission between a land station and an airplane in flight, while in February 19.13, al La Spezia, there was the first experimen Lal launch ing o f a torpedo from a flying plane. Other experi103

Left.

Bada.e oF an InFantrv Officer ur1 c/ufv will~ lhe Aviator Baitalion. ·· Below. The obse1vatiun balloons ,vere ,.videly empluycd in /he Liby an ,,v ar to direct. fire and observe the enemy. Right.

Officers oF the Engineer Spccialisl Balla lion.

The Office of Aeronau Lical Services was established on May 23, 191 _\ just on the eve of llaly's entry inlo t.he war, as part of the Supr·eme Command. 11. was divided into an aerostats and dir igibles branch, commanded by

ments concerned lhe installation on board of a machine gun and lhe possibility of firing aJso lhrough the propelJer, Lhe improvement and rationalization of the inslallarion of a camera and Lhe launching of h ighcaJibre bombs (100 kilos).

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AVIATION On the eve of Lhe world conflict, the reorganization of the aviation remained one of th e most urgent and important problems, and in February 1914 Lhe Advisory Comm ission for air navigation, assemble under the cha.inr1anship of General Roberto Brusati, proposed Lo constitute an aulonornous Corps and to appropriate a sum of 30 m illion lire for the aircraft industry. Alter many doubts and long parl iamentary discussions, the project \Vas approved by the Counc ilof Ministers \vith a Decrec-La,v of January 7, 1915. T he lVIilitary Aero104

nautical Corps thus established, in a priority order among Branches and Corps, ,vas placed immedialely after the En1:,r:ineer Corps, of which until Lhen the Aeronautical Service had been a branch. \i\lith the new org~u1ization, the Specialist Baualion, the Aviators Battalion, the Plant ror Aeronautical Experiences and Constrnctions and the Inspectorate for Aeronautics were dissolved. Mean,vh ile, i n October 1914, the regulations on "Service in War" envisaged ror the first time the a ir sc,vice as a combat. service, establishing thaL the exploration service is mainly entn1sted 10 cavalry, cyclists and means ofair navigalion (. .. ) Dirigibles anc.f airplanes are essentJal~y employed for strategic explorations and, in exceplional cases, also for taclical explorations. Tb e explora.tion ,vith aircra(I, besides being ,,vic/e-ranging, is also rapid and comprehensive and, in favourable conditions, can quickly give 1he Commander a general idea of the situalion.

Eng.Colonel Giuseppe Motta.and an aviation branch, commanded by Arty Colone.I Vittorio Buffa di Perrero. On the open ing of hostilities against Austria-Hungary our aeronautical forces consisted of two groups: the Royal Army Avialion and Royal Navy Aviation. Each had its own and distinct. functions and \vas su b ord inatccl to the respective Ministry. The one subordinate to the vVar Ministry included the follO\ving assets: 13 aerostat uni ts (6 rield sections, 4 fortress sections, and 3 motorized sections), 3 dirigibles, 12 airplane

squadrons (58 a irc raft), 3 seaplanes, 72 mobilized pilots and 30 r路eserves, 3 flying schools and one air-observation school, about one hundred mechanics and forty fitters. The organization \Vas as fol lows: aeroslal service, w ith its hydrogen-producing services; field pho tograph ic service, operated by the Aeronauts Battalion; dir igible services, operated hy the Airships Battalion; aviation service, carried oul by the Aviation Schools Battalion and the Aviator Squadron BaLLalion. The Aeronauts Battalion, the Dirigibles Battalion a nd lh e Aeronaut ical Constru ction

Plan l were su bordinate to an Aerona utical Command (Dirigi bles and Aerostats); the Aviator Squadrons Battalion, \Vith three Squadron Commands, the Aviator School Battalion with two School Sections and the Technical Directorate of Military Aviation \Vere subord inated lo an "Aeronau tics Command (Aviators)" . The two abovementioned Commands were super vise d b y an Aeronautical General Directorate, which was a component of the Ministry of v\Tar and was also responsible for the Cen tral Aeronautical Institute , \vhich had essen Li a lly technical/scientific character and fu nctions, and carried ou l studies and experimen ts in vie\v of ne\v cons tructions and Cor the technical preparation of Officers, both engineers a nd pilots . The Royal Navy Aviation, which was born in 1909, by the end of May 1915 mobilized 2 dirigibles, 15 seaplanes, J 1 p ilots and 130 men for var路ious services. Il would lake Loo long Lo relate all the war events that involved the Ar my Aviation in the \va r of 19151918; here we shall limit ourselves Lo a short s tat istical d escriptio n. The Royal Army's and Royal Navy's a ir asse ts, al. the rnome nl o f the armistice signed on November 4,

1918 consisted oC 1041 air路craft, incl uding those deployed in France, Alba n ia and Macedon ia . This group of airplanes was divided into recom1aissance, bombardment and fighter planes, respectively 506, 135 and 400 machines. Furthe rmore, there \Vere 514 reconnaissance and 128 hgblerseaplanes. In 1918 there were 20 airships in operation, while the aeroslal sectio ns \,ve1-c 53. T he air squadrons in operation a t the end of the conflict were 58, plus 6 sections in the Anny and 46 in the Navy. During the war about 5300 pilots were trained and 400 American pilots w路ere instructed at Italian schools. In addition, there were 500 observers, 1000 mach ine-gunners and 5000 specialists. The flying schools had inc reased from 4 in 1915 to 31 at the encl of 1918. The Army emp loyed about thirty different models of airplanes and Lhe Navy about twenty. The dirigibles made 265 raids over enerny territory. The aeronauls made 3128 ascents, for a total of alrnost 18,000 hours. The lLalian aircraft industry, between 1915 and J9 18, built almost 12,000 airplanes and over 24,000 engines. The Halian aircraft reported by Army and Navy as lost due to enemy fire or in air duels were 165, plus 11 dirigibles. The personnel fallen in a ir battles were lOS

GRADUATORIA UFFIC!ALE DELLE -VITIORIE AEREE 01\'IOLOGATE Al ?!LOT! I'l'ALIANI DELL'AERONAUTICA TERRESTRE.

Dai 24 maggio 1915 al 4 novembre 1918 L'clenco comp rende solamente le vitt ode per le q u a li ,i raggiunsero tulle le prcscritte prove d i acccrtamento e che ebbero l 'omolog azionc ufl'iciale, applicata sempre con concetli rigorosi. Sona quindi escluse dnlla presente gradua t or ia quclle vittoric. anchc attendibili, per le quali non fu possibile ottenere la complet:, provn documenta ta. 1 Maggiore 2 T enente 3 T en. 0:,1. 4 Tenentc 5 Capilano 6 Tenente 6 Sergente 7 Tenente 8 Tenenle 8 Se1,gente 9 Tenent.e 9 Tenente . ~ Tcnen,t e 9 Sollolenen!e 9 Sotlotenente 9 Sergente 10 Capitano 10 10

Tenente

Tenente JO Se·rg . Magg.

se~·g~!1te

11 11 11 II 11 11 JI 11 11 1! 12

Capitano Tcncntc Tenente Se:·gente Serge:1te Se:·ge:1\e Sergente Sergente

12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12

Sergente

Sergente Ca·p ita010 Tenenle Tenente Tenen le Tenen le T~ n~nle Te nente Sottolenenle Sottotenente SoUo\enente

BARACCA Frnncesco S CARONI Silvio P ICCIO Pier Ruggero BA.RACCHINI Flavia RUFFO DI CAL."i.BRIA Fu' co RAKZA Ferruccio CERUITT Ma:-zia:e OLlVARI Lu igi ANCILLOTTO G:ovnnni RE.ALT Antonio NOV.ELLI Gastone A VET Flaminio LOMBARDI Car:o LEONARDI Alvaro CABRUNA Ernesto NICELLJ Giovanni RIVA Antonio FUCINI Mario ELEUTERI Leopold o F ORN.AGIARI Guglielmo RENELL~ Co.simo COSTANTINI Ba r tolo OLIVJ Luigi PARVIS Giu1inno IMOLESI AHilio STOPPANT Ma rio NARDINI Guido BOCCHESE A ldo TICCONI Romolo MAGI STRINI Cesare RIZZOTIO Cosimo L·E GA GiuHo SABELL! G iovanni BUZJO Alessandro lvL'\S!ERO Guido B£DEKDO Sebastiano MECOZZJ Amedeo !vMCl-lETil Giorgio ALLASlA Michele AMANTEA Anto:iio RJESCH ."i.lessandro

34 v itl. Caduto 18- G-'18 21i )) 24 )) 21 )) 20 )) 17 )) 17 )) 12 )) Cadu to 1:3-10-'17 II }) 11 }) 8 )) 8 )) 8 )) 8 )) 8 )) 8 Caduto 5- 5-'18

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Left. List o( th e recognized air victories oblainec/ by 1he lancl-aviat.ion pilots during the Fir,l World War.

Below. A dirigible buj/t in 1912 at Vigna d i Valle. Right. A postcard o( the: Dirigible Balla/ion of the Royal T1<1lian A,my Engineer Co1ps. An air duel over the Alps during the First lVorld War.

of land operations and air-mobili ty of the troops. In 2004 it became again and autonomo u s Branch, a(ter· a short p eriod \Vilh the Cavalry, and is now one of the mos t modern con1ponents of our Service, \Vith as many as nine flying and logistic support Regiments , besides severa l a utonomous m inor units. The Army

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Scguono altri 200 militari aviatori che hanno abbattuto da 4 a uno apparecchio. II numero tota le degli apparecchi nemici abbattuti c draken distrutti da piloti ita1iani - dell'avinionc \errestre - sul c iclo d e! noslro tealro di guerra, dal 24 maggio 1915 a l 4 novembre 1918. e stalo d i 643. Le nosire perdite, nello s\esso perioclo d i tempo, per o pera del nemico hanno sommato a 128 appar ecchi.

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Zan« di Guerra 1° febbraio 1919 J L CO:\IAND,\XTE GEN£RALE Dl .-\ERO;,.."AUTlCA

BONGIOVAK:'.'i'I

98, 123 were killed by anliaircra~ rir·e, 412 in air crashes in the war zone and 304 in accidents in the territorial area. The awards and decorations conferred to the military the Aeronautical Cmvs during the \,v ar v,,rere: 54 Crosses of the Military Order of Savoy (Conunanders, Officers and Knights), 24 Gold J\lle<htls for Military Valour, 1683 Silver Medals, 1249 Bronze Medals, 329 Cr osses for Mili tary Valour, 161 solemn citations and 77 pron10Lions for War Merit. The

106

Flags of the Military Aeronautical Corps and that of the Navy Aviation we re decorated with a Silver Medal , while the 6 th Airplane Grou p was awarded a Bron ze Medal.

CONCLUSIONS In the wake oC such a past, so l uminous and rich in historical traditions, today the Arrny Aviation carries out, in a more marked \.vay, its Lasks in support

Aviation, equipped wit h liaison airplanes and transport helicopters , comman d s one of the most. numero u s fleels among those of the Forces and Armed Corps of Lhe Slate. ;'Lieutenant Colonel, His101y Olli'ce, Anny General Staff

(1) In the civilian sector, Lhe fir·st ascent o n a bulloon conceived and built in Italy went hack LO Fehr·uai_y 1784 and was m ade by Paolo And reani. (2) Mauro Mori was born in Paris

1918 he Vias promoted Major General for \.var rne ri t and was awarded the Officer's Cross o f the iVl ili tary Order of Savoy. Gen . Mori joined the Reserve in 1929, \-vich the ,ank of Lieutenant Ge nentl . (3 ) Before becoming fa rn ous for his constructio n of dirigi bles, Enri-

Brescia in the presence of the King of Italy. (5) The foundation of' the "Socieli:1 Aeronautica Ital iana" went back to March 1904. Its prornotcrs \Vere a group of Officers from the Specialis t Brigade and som e im portant scientists and arisLOc raLs . .ln 1907 the Aviators' Club was fo u n d ed in Rome and, in 1908 the "Socielii ltaliana d'Aviazione" was set up in Milan. Tn 1909 .tl so the Italian Tour'in g Club started taking an interest. in air navigation, soon followed by the Aulotnobile Club of Italy . The Aero Club of Italy was born in November 191 1 a nd assembled a ll the powers of Lhe other assoc iations concerning flying licences, aero nautical propaganda and the eonstitul.i on o r voluntary aei-o nau t and aviator corps in suppon of national de f"e nce. (6) CarJo Piazza \Vas born in Busto Arsizio in 1871 and died in /vli lan in 1917 of a disease contrac ted in the

in 1860 and was com m issioned Second L ie utenant in the Engineer Corps in 1880. From 1890 to 1915 commanded t he Specialist Brigad e . l n 19 1 l \,v.1s selectively promoted to Colonel and in 1915 was a Brigadier General. .ln war, G en . .l\ilori commanded the Engineer units o f' the I s 1 Corps and, la t;r, those of the 6Lh , 5th, 9th and s th Army. Tn Novem ber

co Forlani ni, a forme r· Lieutenant in the E ngi neer Corps, had succeeded in making the first hel icopter to rise in the a ir by rneans of a steam engine conceived and built by hirnsclf. (4) D'.A. n nunzio, ''The Poet,,, had Down for the l'irst ti m e in 1909, on a Curtiss-type airplane, d uri ng the In ternationa l A_ir Race, he ld i n

vvar. An Artillery 2nd Lieutenant in 1888, he \vas a pioneer of aviation. During the Libyan cam paign, he carried out 38 rly ing missions, earned the Knight's Cross of the JVlilitary Order of Savoy and was promoted 1\/lajor for War l'vlerit. ln the \vat· agai nst Austria-Hungary he earned two Silver Medals for Militai·y Valour.

NOTES

107

Sixty-one one years have passed since the day when the Allies, landing at Anzi~Âˇ, outflanked the "Gustav" Line and freed Rome fro Jn the Nazis

When British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was informed that the troops landed between Anzio and Nettuno on January 20, 1944 had been locked in a pocket and were fighting to avoid being thrown back into the sea, he unaerstood that his plans for a rapid conquest of Central-Eastern Europe through the Italian peninsula were falling through. Thus, the American plan for a large landing on the French coast gained ground, and Stalin could perceive the possibility of heading quickly for the heart of Europe, exploiting the different perspectives of the Allies. 108

;

name "Sh ingle" . The p lan env.isagecl the employment of two divisions p lus some armoured un its; the force would reach the Latiurn hills and \vait for the arrival of the Fifth Army, ,vh ich was blocked at Cassino . Thus the p u rpose of the la ndi ng v,.;as to cu l German supplies to the Gustav Line hinged on Cassino, and, at the same time, lav the foundations Cor a huge pock;l \Vhere all German Divisions north of Rome wou ld be entrapped .

THE PREPARATION General Mark \.Vavn e Clar k , Commander of the Fil\ 11 Army, entrusted the operation to the Corps or General Jo h n Lucas, who had und e r h is orders the 3 r路cl US Infantry Division (Ge n. Lucian Tr-

he plan abou t the landing on Lhe .Anzio and Nettu no littoral \Vas woi-ked out in a histor ical rnoment, when G reat Brilain and the Un ited Slates were discussing the priority to b e attributed Lo the already open Mediterranean-1La lian front, vis-a-vis t he 1 \ Veslern-French one, still in a project p hase. This was the reason for many missed opport un ities, battles not won and for the loss of a lot o f materials, equipment and, a bove all, men. The landing, fixed for .January 22, 1944 was given th e code

'7 had hoped that we were hurling a wildcat onto the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale". 路路 (Winston Churchill) ,.

uscoll), the ist British Infantry Division (Gen. William Pennev), the 75 1st US tank battalion, lb路~ 46 1h British "Royal Tank" battalion, the 504 1h ,mcf 509 t h US Paratroop er Regiments, t he 2 nd British Co m man d os Brigad e (4 3 rd a nd 9 th Commandos) , the 615 th Ranger Force (3 battalions), the 36Lh Engineer battalion, the 83'-d Chemical Battalion, plus Division-level a rtillery un its and supports. General Lucas, on the b asis o f lhe orders and recornmendat.ions of his direct superior and the allied Intelligence Services (which expected a very strong German reaction in the very first days aher the land109

ing), kept huge forces in reserve. In particular , Clark ordered Lucas to consolidate immediately afler reaching Lhe [irsl objectives, in order to push back possible enemy allacks. Aclually , these worries were justified by \vha t we call Lo clay "lessons learned", which the Allies had been taught by the problems Lhcy had encountered in the previous landing at S alerno. Furthermore, a p rudent conduct \Vas also suggested by lhe last report of the allied Intelligence Services on the enemy troops d ep loyed in the Rome area. This document anticipaled that, against the beachhead, the Germans would immediately send numerous units, including armour, stationed in Northern llaly and corning mostly from the Gustav Line. As a maller of fact, the information contained in this and preccdi ng reports lacked the necessary completeness, due lo lh e ir hasty compilation. For instance, the Al-

THE LANDING Albei t incomplete, the repor ts and a careful aimlysis of Lhe ground - should have suggested more approp riate tactics, different from Lhose Lhat \Vere adopted. In substance, lwo Divisions w·cre not realistically enough to ensure

THE FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE I

Employed in Italy for a long time, this unit, which belonged to the Special: Forces, consisted of U.S. and Canadian personnel, particularly trained for ' hand-to-hand fighting, for using explosives and infiltration techniques, also by airdrops. It took part in many night operations, earning the nickname of "Devil's Brigade". It ~ as first employed.for the conquest of the Aleutian Islands, in Northern Pacific, and then transferred to the Italian front with the 5th Army, just in ti·me for the attack against the "Gustav"line. On February 1, 1944, it participa ted in the landing at Anzio, taking up position on the south of the· beachhead. In was one of the first units entering Rome on June 4, 1944 and was later redeployed in southern France. 0

lies had not noticed the movement or al least tvvo German Divisions from the Rome area towards southen1 LaLium. These shortcomings were aclually the resull of the culpable underestimation made by tJ1e allied Commanders, who were certain t.hal their unquestioned s uperiority in equ ipment and p ersonnel could make up for any possible difficulty.

110

the achievernen L or Lhe in Lend ed goals. T hey could have probably been sufficien l Lo reach Rome if, be fo re la nding, they could have been sure that there \Vere no Germa n troops in the area fixed for the operation. The Allies started to engage the Gustav line some days bcfcwc the landing, exactly on January 12, ,vith the purpose of attracting the German reserves to the area, Jeav-

ing a free h and to the IV Corps ,vhich was going Lo land more to Lhc north. But th e "Gustav" proved to be a parlicula r ly hard bastion, and the Allies had to go through a difficult stalemate, characterized by a hig h degree of \Vear and Lear, both p hysical and psychological. Besides having the by-then sol id control of Lhe a ir space, the Allies, before la nding, succeeded i n paralys ing lhe enemy reconnaissance in the Anzio-Nel luno area wi th effective a ir raids ,vhich allowed the naval convoy sailed from Nap les and Salerno to approach undisturbed the Ponline coast and arrive near the s hore in the night between 21 and 22 January 1944. AL the moment of th e landing a l Anzio, the Gennans had no significan l units in the a rea since t h ey were all engaged on the fron t, more to the south. Thus th e Allies landed without mecting practically any resistance. The only effective oppos i Lio n to t h e ir act ion vms ca rried out by some elements of the 29 th Pclnzergrcnclclicrcn Di\ision. Thus the surp1ise effect was folly achieved.

THEBATILE The 3 rd US Division landed on a beach called "X-Ray" hct\vccn the city of Nettuno and To1Te Astura, a State-properly area. The Ranger Force and the 509th P,mtlrooper Regiment la nded near

Commander of the Fourteenth Germ an Army, General Hans Georg von Mackensen, after receiving the available reinforcements, prcpa1Td the co u nterattack a g ain st the beachhead.

THE GERMAN REACTION

Above and left. An Alhed unit landina· on the beach of Anzio.

the port of Am.io, \vhile the British troops went ashore, w ith no opposi tion, on th e beach of today's Lavinio, north of i\nzio. In a very few hours about 36,000 men were landed, together \.vith 3,200 vehicles and an enormous arnoun l of supp l ies. The allied losses on D-day (the landing day) were light: 13 killed, 97 wounded, 44 captured or missing. An LCJ (Landing Craft Infamry) was sunk. 227 Germans vvere taken prisoners. But the initial favourable situation \Vas not exp loi ted, O\Ving to the p ersisting worry about a possible rapid intervention of strong German reserves. Thus, the orders of the IV Corps were not chan ged a nd , in the days immediately after the landing, the a llied troops \Vere busy w i Lh the consol idation of the partial objectives and limited themselves lo sporadic actions lOwards the interior. \Nhile waiting for reinforcements (2) the Anglo-American units tried som.e offensive forays towards Cisterna and Campoleon e, which \Vere going to be used as springboards for the jump on Lo the Alban Hills. The Germans were holding strong positions almost im possible to take. The attacks of the 3 rd US Division and the 1s1 Bri Lish Division were unable to break the defensive lines facing the two cities.

Actually the Germans, who initially were nume1ically infcr-ior, succeeded in a very short time in reducing this unbalance of forces lanks to the inflm,v o f reinforcements and \vere able to neutraliie every attempt by the Allies to penetrate in depth . In p artic ular, the German defensive deployment managed to avoid the allied breakthrou gh by s plitting up into a number of fire centres reali1..ed through the forti fi cation of every house a nd every village, w ilh Lhe employment of armour, antitan k weapons, self-propelled guns and infantry, all supported by artillery. On February 1, Gene ral Alexander and Genera l Clark agreed on t he fac t I.hat th e en emy prcpanHions were forcboding a strong German count.erat:tack. Thus it \Vas necessary to take a defensive attitude, so Lucas issued his orders in t his sense. The allied units entrenched themselves, Vv·aiLing for the German attack. In th e sm all conquered area, the Allies, al. the end of February, could count on no less Lb.an 4 reinforced Divisions, for a total o f more I.ban 70,000 men, 508 guns, a bout 350 tanks a nd over 30,000 tons of rnalerials. Despite this great deployment of forces iL \vas already too late Lo carry out offensive operations. On lhe contrary, at t he beginning or February, the enemy \vas finnly conv in ced of the possibility of achieving a good resu lt, driving the allied forces back into the sea. The

The Gern1an offensive Look place in three phases. The first (3-4 February) and only successful one, resulted in the elimination of the Bri tish salient on the road Lo Albano and the re-conqu est of Aprilia. The second (16-20 February) envisaged an advance a imed at breakin g Lhe allied lines along the Alb ano-Anzio road a nd the third (February 28-March 2) consisted of an attack against the allied defensive l ines along the "M ussolin i" canal. But General Lucas' mandate was a bout to expire . ln ever·ybody's opinion he had not only damaged the offensive with his excessive hesitation, but now his VI CoqJs risked being driven back in to the sea. General Truscoll, replaced by General O' Daniel as Com mander or the yd Division, was appointed Deputy Commander of the VI Corps, awaiting to replace Lucas. The s itua tion on the field became confused, wit h a sequence of attacks and .i mmediate counterattacks. The Allies were obviously in a stale or crisis and \-Vere fighting for the very s u rvival o f the beachhead . A retreat. was now impossible. Meanwhile the Germans, even if they \vere also al the encl of their strength , were continuing with the successfu l tactics of infiltrating at night, protected from air raids and a rtillery observers . It was only thanks to the support of the 1s t A1--rnoured Divis io n that the attacks were a t first reduced and t hen stopped. But, owing to the heavy losses, it became necessary to halt the attack and withclra\v, in order to rcorganii e I.he forces. The Allies held fast and \,1-'i th support from the artillery forced the enem:y to retreat, One m orning the German

l 11

tanks r·epealedly lriecl to break through along the road to Albano, but did nol succeed. For the Allies the worst was over. On Febrnary J. 9 it became clear lhat the battle for the possession of the A11Zio-Nettuno beachhead had been won by the Allies. The XIV German Corps was dose to exhaustion and certainly could not keep an offensive thrust similar to that carried out during the last three days. Von Mackensen had not succeeded in driving the Allies in lo the sea and this vvas perhaps the only victory they could claim in the Ggh ts on the Anzio-Nettuno beachhead.

THE LIBERATION OF ROME Awaiting the resumption o( the Anglo-American offensive against lhe Gustav Line, both opponents started a patrolling activity in order lo control the enemy. This silualion ended when the Fifth Army along the coast, and the II Corps and the French Expeditionary Corps in the interior, succeeded in overcoming the tough German resistance on lhe Gustav Line, between May 11 and 12. On May 18, after the conquest by the Polish CoqJs o( Cassino and the stronghold constituted by the ruins of its tO\vering abbey, the Allies were able to enter the Liri valley ,u1d head [or Rome along the ancient Appia and Casilina consular roads. On May 24 Lhe II Corps took Terracina and joined the VI Corps, vvhich had been locked up for four months on the Anzio 112

beachhead . Therefore it was the bulk or the Fifth Army that "freed" the VI Corps, and not the other way around as originally planned. The VI Corps began its offensive on .May 23, and on Ju ne 4, 1944 the American troops entered Rome, ending al last a long odyssey started on January 24 \\ith the constitution or the beachhead on the Pontine Ii ttoral.

TAKING STOCK The report of the History Office of the US Army (3) on the landing at Anzio ends ,-vith ,vorcls of praise for a great allied victory. This clppreciation, if addressed to the tenacious action of the VI CoqJs is cer1.a in Iy well deserved . Otherwise, it was not justified, conside1ing that th e original objective ,vas not achieved. In practice, it is a recogn ilion or the heroism of those who remedied a situation which had been endangered by ,vrnng evaluations. Only after four months, thanks to the allied units arriving from the shattered Gustav Line, the VI Corps was able to join these forces, as was originally planned, and reach the less important of the pre-established objectives. Moreover, the interruption of the German supply lines, which could have hastened the fall of the Gustav Line. ,,,.as never achieved. General Lucas, who had been replaced in his cornrnaod a rnornh earlier, did not have the satisfaction of seeing lhe victory won in the

spring by his rnen. His rep lacement, after the effective defence carried out. in February, was Lhe result of th e harsh criticism ad dressed frorri many quarters Lo this General who, according to his superiors, w ith h is prudent movements had shO\vn ,vhat General I lenry Mail.land Wilson had called the "Salerno complex". On the other hand, ii. shou ld be observed that also after Lucas' replacement the situation remained unchanged for three more months. The conlainrnenl or the violent Gennan attacks ,vas 1ightly considered a great victory of the US VI Corps, but it ,vas not sufficient, s ince the goals of Lhe landing at Anzio were not achieved. To think of landing a Division at Anzio (they actually b ecame two) in order to head for the Hills because once the Casj}ina and Appia were blocked, General Alber/ Kesselring would not dare to keep his positions a,_Cassino (4) was too optimistic and probably due to the euphoria of the moment, which led to underestimate the potential and capabilit ies of the Germans, although the:y had already shown on many occasions t hat they could react with great S\¼iftness and ene11,'Y to every move of the All ies. The events demonstrated thal not even fo ur strongly reinfoi~cecl Divisions were able to approach the objectives or at least to reach the small towns of Cisterna and Campoleone. The plan of the Allies was not adequate to the forces available. The manoeuvre scheme was too bold and did not consider that in order ro se1iously threaten the Gen11ans and, by landing at Anzio (i.e. more than l 00km behind the enerny lines), to compel them to V\•ithdrmv, the forces employed were in an y case insufficient. It ,vas not considered that, for the Germans, t h e communica t ion line along the coast (the Appia) was not indispensable, and to block the Casilina at Valmontone (in the hinterland) a much larger force would be necessary. Also it was not foreseen that

by subtracting a p ortion of the landing Corps from the XV Army Group (5), the forces on the Cassi.no front \vould be dangerously \Veakened and that was ,,..'h ere the Allies had heen unable lo crush the enemy resistance. In substance, IJ1ere were two b locks very far from each other, each block lacking su[-

Facing page. A phase of the landing.

Right. The line reached on Janua1y 22, 1944 (D-Day).

Below. General John Lucas, Commander o( the VJ Corps

THE ALLIED POSffiONS

ficient [orces to decide the battle. Thus the Allies ~vere playing in the enemy's hands, since the Germans had maintained th e capability of manoeuvring by internal lines and of rapidly supplying both fronts. Nevertheless, the Allies' inertia in the advance tmvards Rome \Vas, and still is, imputed b y many to General Lucas. He \vas in fact singled out as the one and only responsible for the st.ale rnale (albeit it would be rnore c01Tect to speak of a German defensive victory). In particu lar he was accused of not having taken the initiative right away, of not. having "dared" to venture towards Rome or t.he Alban HiUs on the very first days after the landing, since the Germans did not have significant forces in the area.

Churchill was an untiring and cominced supporter of a policy of intervention in the "so rt. belly of E urope" and had strongly insisted on an operation in Italy in order to strengthen the s low climbing up the peninsula, silencing at the same time Stalin's pressing requests to open a "second front" . But the British Pri rne Minister had been farsighted in perceiving that if the Allies did not. prevent: the Red Army frorn occupying Easten1 Europe, the area would fall from the Nazi to the Communist orbit (as actually happened). For this \veil-grounded reason he prepared to intervene in Europe with the objective of choosing the shortest way to Be rlin, occupying as 111any States as possible and, above all, cutting the road to the Soviet ar111y. The A.r ne1icans \Vere not always in agreement ,,v ilh Churchill, having selected a softer and more compliant line towards the Kremlin. Hence the contrasts between London and \.'Vas hington . The former \Vas mindful of ilie \â€˘ital importance o[ the Mediterranean theatre, while

Lhe latter \Vas a clogged supporter oflancling in France. The landing at Anzio was conceived following Lhe British insistence, on condition that, at the end of the operation, Lop prioril)' would be given to the landing in Normandy. It was t herefore necessary Lo huny, although - owing to the urgency - 1.he amphibious operation was deprived or Lhe necessary intelligence, an essential prerequ isite or any military operation. As a matter of fact, some agents w ere d is patched to the a,Âˇea, in order to get inforn1ai.ion on the enemy, only a few days before the landing. Their reports mTived vvhen the forces to be landed had already been decided and only a small number of new i:neasures could be taken. Among other things, 1J1e report wTongly assumed a strong enemy reaction already in the first days of the operation. This aspect, besides raising doubts on the advantages of the operation, in an_)Âˇ case should have enta i Ied a reconsiderat ion of the forces to be employed. Obvious ly they \Vere no longer sufficient to guarantee t.he success, not even for 113

114

jus l th e landing phase. Even i f, luckily, the landing Lurnecl oul. l.o be successful, Lucas could not have at · his disposal enough residual forces to reach Lhe Alban Hills.· On the contrary, with an obvious overestimalion of the VI Corps' capabilities, the t\VO Divisions envisaged by the initial plan were considered sufficient for the expansion of the beachhead, even if Lhey had to face an enemy concentration w hich was lx:l ievecl superior. . In \•iew of these expectations, at Ajlzio it would have been better Lo h~;ve a daring and resolute Commander, capable or completing the landing in any case and evaluating rapidly the conditions necessary for a penetration into the Alban Hills. Lucas was chosen by Clark, who certainly knew his character and Above. Wounded soldiers bcin2 evacua ted and luinsfcrrcd on lhc-· "S t David" hospital ship.

Left. A destroyed a/lied tank near Apri/ia.

was probably sure that he vvas not going to take too many initiatives (Clark later maintained that Lucas was the only general availa ble at the time) or possi bly he wanted a capable but methodical Commander, \vho was not going lo run Lhe risk of landing and penetrating with scarce forces, as had been the case at Salerno, where the contingent risked being d riven back in to the sea. With these premises, and above all vvith the written words he had received, Lucas did what was in his power considering his difficult siLuation and the scanty forces at his disposal. Clark himself had urgecLhim not Lo ,·epeat the mistakes made at Salerno, where the insufficient forces landed had seri-

ously risked being thrown hack into the sea, had the guns of the ships a t. anchor not intervened.

THE SALERNO COMPLEX The "Salerno Complex" and Lucas' character could not certain!~, produce t he "wildcal'' for ,vhich Winston Churchill had b een waiting so much. On learning that the VJ Corps w as unable to break through and in racl r·isked Lo be defeated, he u nderstood tha t his idea of the .M editerranean as the main theatre of operations was in clanger and did not hesitate lo blarne Lucas, replacing h im with General Harold Rupert Alexander (Brilish

Commander above Clark). Th e lauer, who had only had a [ew days for preparing the landing (whose dale ,vas fixed only on December 28) was not sure of the success of the operation and in his diary recorded his wonies. In particular, it clearly emerges thal Alexander wanted an unconventional and aggressive action, \.vhil e Clark urged not Lo make the same mistakes as at Salerno and lo he very cau Lious. On the other hand, Clm-k himself \Vas very confident that his Fi rt.h Arrny would break through the Gustav line at Cassino a nd quickly reach the troops landed al Anzio. Nevertheless the Germans, albeit taken b y s urprise, reacted very p ron1ptly and s ucceeded in encircling the Anzio bridgehead and keeping the Gustav line. Lucas, who had been wan.led by Clark, was replaced because he \Nas considered responsible Cur not hav115

Left. A German "Tiger" lank near the beachhead. Below.

General John Lucas and his direct superior, General 1'vlark Clark.

Facing page. The Cnmpo di Carne railway bridge, limit of the deepest German penetration. Allied troops in the streets or Anzio. E vacuation of wounded soldiers at the port of Anzio

lines and bv the vulnerabilitv of Lhe porl of An;io be able to \vithstand ing exploited the scarce Geim an resistance in the first days o f t he landing by moving (with just two Divisions) towards Lhe Alban Hills. Actually very little responsibility can be attributed to h im. Like his s upe riors, he could n ot imagine that the German resislance in the first two days \vas going to be so weak. Thus he preferred , in the light of the events at Salerno, the intelligence reports and, above all, the directives and orders from his direct superiors, Lo consol idate a defensive position, instead of uselessly exposing hirnselr lo t he counterattacks he fe ared would take place d u ring his advance towards the Alban Hills and Rome. \i\lhen the situation became clear, it ,vas already too late. In short, considering the situation, the landing could n ot achieve a ll t he goals expecled by the AJlies. As a matter of fact, n ot only was the VI Co17Js blocked a few kilom etres r.-om the beach but from Janua1y to Ap1il the allied forces in the Gustav Line sector tmsuccessfully tried three times to break through Lhe enemy defences (6) . It is true that the landing at Anzio ha d d .-avv" n h uge Germ an forces (about eight Di visio ns) which had been taken away from other sectors, but it is also true lhat the landing Corps gatherÂˇed a force of approximately seven Divis ions (7) p lus several units n ot included in those Major Units. Any consideration on the employment of these 11 6

Divisions al Am.io o ,- in the battle of Cassino is out of place, but certainly the very development of the operations challen ges the soundness o f the initial strategic pla n. The o ffensive of May 1944 belied the theory according to which the VI Corps should h ave u n blocked the stalemate of the front at Cassino. On the contrary, it was precisely the breach in the "Gustav" that broke the balance thal had been created at Anzio-Ncttuno (8).

SOME CONJECTURES

Let us imagine for a rnomen t a rapid advance of the IV Corps and the attainment of the Alban H ills, wilh the e rfectives of about three Di\-i sions strongly supported by air forces and artillery. Would this very long deployment, characterized by easily vulnerable communication

the inevitable enemy counteraltack? Tn substance, t he Germans would certainly have concentrated their forces in what they considered the weakest point of th e V I Corps deployment, probably causing an improbable breal<., ,vith drnmatic consequences, far more serious than those produced by the "Salerno complex". In the light of this refieclion, Lucas' [igu re p robably takes on a different profile. Probably he 1Âˇea lized the incongruity o f the pla n but the only blame attiibutable to him - ,vas not strong enough to object. H e actually accep ted i t w ith out protest and this obedient behaviour cost him and his m en very dearly.

CONCLUSIONS

With the landing at Anzio the IV CoqJs, besides succeeding in block-

ing the German count:eroffensive, engaged abo ut eight enemy Divisions during a phase of the \var when Germany was b eginning to have serious difficulties irnen11s of h uman resources and materials. Bu t from ano t her perspec tive (probably n1ore objective and realistic) this operation can also be considered a German \,ictory, because the \!l Corps, which was supposed to force the German troops on the "Gu stav" to a h astv w ithdn.,\val, was put on the defe.nsive from the very first days. There \,vas no shortage of pol i tico-s trategic consequences. Churchill saw the decline of his strategic plans aimed at playing dovm the need of a second front in Europe (operation "Overlord" in Normandy) which, on the contrary gained even more strength until its concrete realization, to the det riment of the Italian front which became secondary, causing a grievous prolongation of t he vvar un til the last clays or the III Reich. C "i\,Ia j01~ AIA Artillery Tng & Exp Cen/Te NOTES (1) The 29 th and the 90 th (2 ) The lundin g \Vas completed h _y fanuary 23 at 1600 hrs; I.he 45 th US Infan try D ivision and t h e US I s t Ar -

mour~d Division arrived on I.he 27 th (3) ''Am.io Beachhead", Historical Division, Department of the Anny. (4) Directives issued by Gen. Alexander lo the :;th Army. Tn l~is orders, Gen. Clark requested th e VI Corps to "advance on the Alban Hills". (S. MoJTison, "History o f US N,wal Operation s in \,V\ V 11'').

(5) The OS 45 t h and l 51 Am1oured Divisio n. The other two Division (British ) \Vere coming from other sectors. (6) Tl1e landing at Anzio calls to mi nd one of the manoeuvres most dear to Napoleon: the one from the rear of the enemy (albeit in this case it was preceded by an arnp hibious operation ). Bui. Napoleon maintained that a n encircling manoeuvre, conceptually very simp le, is actually ve1)· com plex and delicate since for· it 1.o succeed one must consider very

carefully dir·eclion, forces and security. Thus Napoleon preferred to encircle the enemy a rmy wi th the bulk of his forces, leaving the minor forces in fro n t.. At Anzio the Allies d id exactly the opposite. T he fina l outcom e, accc>r·di ng to Napoleon, de pended on the possibility of cul.ti ng the enemy's communication lines. ln this regard, also von Clausewitz wrote: what profit can the au ack obtain fmm the possihilily cncirding the enernv if fro m such an attack cannol Jccivc any pauicular benefit? ln strategy an enci,cling at/ack cannot he consiclerccl a factor oF viclorv i f ils effects on

1hc lines of comm unicalion are no/ u;1ken into accoun t.. (7) Four Divisions by rhe encl of .Janua ry (US 3 rd , 45'", a nd JS 1 Armoured and the 1s t British Infantry Division); five in February (Lhe B1·iLis h 56 t h , replaced in Nlarch by th e 5 th ); six in .l\fard, (US 34t h ); seven Divisions for !he May offensive (US 361h). (8) l n May the straLegic silualion of the Allied rncmoeuvre plan had radically cha nged and it was necessary to have the 5 th US Ar my Lo make a brea kthrough in order to "help" the operations at Anzio-Nelluno.

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