Issuu

CONTENTS . .

Number Two 2003

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May - June July - August

Rivista Militare aims at b roadening and updating t he t echn ical and vocational trainin g of Offi cers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating t he m ilitary way of th inking and a forum of study and debate. Throug h the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at inform ing t he general public on t he Army and on military issues.

rhousands of soldiers of the Italian

~,my, men and women, serve daily in he various humanitarian missions. Their )rofessionalism and inner strength help hem to overcome the hardships and :acrifices endured in order to bring ,eace and security to people who had ~stall hope for a civil coexistence.

=ouR-MONTHLY , upp lem ent to numb ers 3 and 4 ~f Rivista Militare Italian Editio n

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2 Address to the Ann~'

(Li.Gen. Gianfiw1co Ottogalli)

3 Address to the Anny

(!,I.Gen. Giulio Fraticellij

Politics, Economics and Strategy 4 Two Sides of the Same Coin

(Viuorio Barbati)

16 The Medite1Tanean1 a Moulder of Chilizations (Louis Godar{j

24 The Central Role of the Land Instrument Between Securitv Requirements and New Operational Capabilities

(Salvatore Farinaj

Science, Technology and Training 36 The New f rontiers of the Medical Corps Within the National System

(ivlichele TJ011.Pilo)

44 The Pennanent Evolution of the Information Systems

(Sergio Fiorentino)

Sociology 52 Work Starts Again After Service

(Vito Di Ventura)

62 The Art of Deciding

(A11ionio /vlarchetti)

History 82 ~rom the, U~~lerground Lager to the Moon (. llessandm hrwli.) 92 Two Italians Among the Heroes of Balaklava

(/1/lichele Petmloj

Special Report 101 Armv Dav - A Luminous and Beautiful Feast (Giuseppe 1\!laria Giovwmi 7hcarico) 119 Sommario - Summarv - Somrnaire -

Inhalt - Rcsumcn

2003 © Copyright by Rivista Militare ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE STAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA ·he product ion of this magazine ias been supervised >y Omero Rampa

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TWIIIIJEI 11 TIIE IIIIE ~ STRATEGY AND MAJOR STRATEGY ARE CLOSELY COMPARED IN ORDER TO CONFRONT THE CRISES LOOMING ON THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

trategy, in its accepted meaning, can be defined as the art (based on mtrnt1on) and science (based on profes sional training) of the conduct of war. Still in the classic sense , major strategy could be defined as the art and science of the political, econom ic and military conduct of war. But arc these definitions still valid ? On the whole, the answer to this question can be affirmative, as long as one does not forget that, actually, strategy and major strategy are tvvo sides of the same coin. But the real point is another: the concept of war: has changed. After WWIT, many civil, ethnic, religious and Lribal wars, sometimes fought by proxy and often neglected, have bathed in blood several continents of our planet, and continue to do so. On the contrary, the "official" wars among States and coalitions - i.e. wa,·s conducted according to the traditional canons of strategy and grand strategy - have become rar·e. Indeed, between the late forties and the late eighties of the last Century, the contrast between tvvo blocs, the "Western" bloc,

Strategy is art and science, since in its organizations and in the conduct of war operations it is based on intuition and professional training. Major strategy, instead, is the art and science of the political, economic and military conduct of war. This, at least, is the classic definition of the two concepts. Well, today it seems that those parameters are not as valid as they used to be. But actually these are only appearances, since as the very concept of war has changed, the notion of threat has changed accordingly. Let us see the reasons for it.

headed by the U.S ., and the "Eastern" one, led by the USSR, produced the so -called "co ld war", a k,nd of conflict which did not trigger acts of actual war, but in which weapons, starting from those of mass clest ,·uclion, were used as means of pressure, int imidation, threat , counterthreat or, in other words, or mutual deterrence. A NEW SCENARIO

The "cold war-" ended several years ago with the dissolution of

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THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN SHORTLY BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN IRAQ

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the USSR and its bloc, but the princ ip le of deterrence is now linked to nuclear weapons, arms of rnass destruction and, to a point, also to conventional arsenals. Deterrence continues to dominate, albeit witJ-1 different contents, the international scene, involving most ly the relations among the States, Meanwh ile, new criteria have been spreading, such ,'is the prevention of conflicts, peacekeeping - or even peace en forcing - , the safeguard of human rights and the derence of populations threatened by 5

genocide. These criteria have caused the at least partial modification of the functions, tasks and structure of the military apparatus. Furthermore, the phenomenon of globalization, with its enorn,ous political, social, economic and military implications, has made the international scene even more intricate . This is precisely th e picture which, with its few lights and many shadows, served as a background for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States. The even ts of that day have caused, and still cause, a number of chain effects . But , b efore deali ng with this fundamental issue, we should take into account the international and multinational organi1.at.ions, the Alliances and the Countries d i ,-ectJy or indirectly affected by those consequences. And, at this point, a short digression seems to be appropriate. lt is common knO\vledge that the international relations should be regu la ted - the conditional mode is necessary! by the UN Charter and therefore by the United Nations Organization, whic h was established precisely on the basis of that Charter. The UN Security Council should - conditional again ! - guarantee the sta ble and orderly development of relations among the actors on the wo ,-ld scene, be they b ig, medium or small. Unfortunately, the function of the Council, consisting of fifteen members five permanent and ten elected by rotation - is hampered by t\vo negative factors : the so-called right of veto given to the five pe rmanent members and the a b s enc e of a m i I i ta ry force capab le of enforcing the r eso luti ons adopted by th e Council. And nO\V we can close this digression and pick up the thread of our d iscussion. In particular, there a,Âˇe two international bodi es in a 6

pos1 t10n to wor k o u t and implement advanced models of strategy and grand strategy. Th ey are NATO and the Euro pean Union (EU), which a,-e made up largely of the same mem bers (and the same candidates for mem b ership) . The p roblems of these two organizations are at least p artially different but c losely correlated. But let's proceed methodically. Accepting the limits of this proceeding, it is necessary to schematize our reasoning. Starting from NATO.

A POWERFUL ALLIANCE

NATO is a military alliance which is assum ing increasingly po! i Lico-military characterist ics . It is now in an expansion phase and, with the Rome Declaration of May 28, 2002, has reached a cooperat ion agreement \Vith Russia. The en largement of the Alliance and its cooperat ion with the Russian Federation are two interconnected processes with interes ting prospects, but they also entail a number of serious

Opposite. An ATACMS emplacemen/.

Right . .4n F-35 Join/ Strike F(~hte1 and its X-35A demonstrator.

problems. The major member of NATO is a non-European Country, i.e. the U.S. giant, which by itself is more powerh.tl than all the other membe,-s put together. Furthermore, it is the only one equipped, albeit not as much as needed , with the instruments necessary for implementing a planetary strategy, both conventional and nuclear. After the collapse of the USSR, the United Slates has in fact assumed the role of so.le world-power: a political, economic, military and technological superpower, since in many sectors it has acquired a practically unreachable advantage over all the ot.ber Countries, be they allied, friends, neutral or enemies. However, in spite of this and for reasons that we shall consider later on, the U.S. does not want, at least in some cases, act by itself. T his factor affects its strategy and ils higher strategy. On the other hand, the same factor affects also NATO and the European Union . Let's now examine briefly the last part of this concept.

THE ROLE OF EUROPE As we mentioned - and is, after all, well knO\vn - also the EU is going through a phase o[ expansion, but is also in a difficult moment of transition. The EU is certainly an economic reality, but is having difficull ies in achieving a real political and military dimension. As a consequence, for the rnoment, it seems unable to set up either a strategy or a higher strategy on a wide range. In addition, many of its members, starting from tbe most important ones, are also

NATO members. This introduces further complications in an already very intricate situation. To begin \Vith, the non -NATO rnembers of the EU could disagree with the most farreaching strategic decis ions. There are also rernarkable gaps in the standardization of materials and logistics, as is the case also within NATO. This produces a dependence, especially in air-s t rategic transport, on lbe U.S . logistic system and also, albeit to a lesser degree, on the Russian one. At technical level, the EU m ili tary (particularly EU-NATO) are certainly capable of devising a far-reaching strategic doctrine, but th is is linked - and could noL be otherwise - to the decisions of higher strategy w hich fall within the responsibility of the politicians. To decide whether the future EU forces will have to be employed in wide - or limitedrange actions, in operations of one type or another, are tasks that do not belong lo the military, ,vhose job is, once a decision is taken, to study the technical implications of the dec isions (force organizat ion , armaments and equipment, standardization). This is one or the critical points

of the problem, since the EU does not have a real centra l political pO\ver. (Il is highly desirable that the Convention, which is a t work al the present t ime, succeeds in defining its main li nes as soon as possib.le; otherwise, things would become even more complicate d , considering the envisaged enlargement of the Union). FurthernwrÂˇe, in a mutual causeeffect relation, the EU strategic pro bl em intertwines witb NATO's, since both, as we said, are in an enlargement phase and n-1ust define, or redefine , their respective roles in tbe internationa l arena, in order to effectively coordinate their plans on strategy and major s trategy, at the same time lin king them with the U.S.' decisions (and possibly Russia's) . It is at least questionab le w h ether other international organizations have the technical capabilities necessary for adopli ng am bilious decisions of strategy and major strategy, even if some of thern - as is the case with the Ara b League established a Common Defence Counci I and a Permanen I. Mi li tary Committee. However, some organizations - and here 7

we can mention the Arab League again - an d some Countries are in a posi Lion, fo r geostrategic or economic reasons (i n particular, because they can control de!icate sea/air rou tes or territories in especially important positions) to influence, i n a more or less in cisive manner, the poli t icostrat eg ic condu c t of the most impo rta nt Countries and coalitions. LONGING FOR UNION

Ho wever, in certain cases, some info rmal international organi lations, not born ou t of any treaty .- e. g., in the past, the Cont act Group in the Balka ns

and al presen t the GS (Group of the m os t ind ustrialized Countries , wh ich at th e June 200 2 Summi t welcomed R ussia as a fu ll-fledged member) - appear to be capa b le of adopting imporLa nt d ecisions of hi gher strategy, such as the one taken by the G8, of f inancing wi th ten billion do llars , over a peri od of ten years, the destruction of the N BC weapons of t h e former Soviet arsenal , also in onler to prevent some of these weapo ns from fa lling into the hand s of terrorist organizations . 8

The creation o f inform al orga nizati ons (if we ca n cal l them so) is mo ti vated in many cases by the need to avoid the involved procedures - essentially im posed by political a nd lega l requirem e n ts - wh ic h ofte n slacken and complicate, besides the activity of the States, also th a t o f t he inte rnation a l orga nizati o ns , whi c h arc th e outcome of complex and binding agreements. Thus , in case of n ee d, the formali za tion of particu la rl y importan t agre ements takes place w he n the

acco rds have bee n info rma ll y concluded. The mech ani sm is spreading. Its most recent a pplication was the so-ca lled "Madrid Quartet", composed of the 1Âˇepresenta tives of the UN (Secretary General), the EU (Officia l res ponsib le Cor Foreign Policy and Security), the Rus sian Federat ion ( Fore ign Minister) a nd the U.S. (Secretary of S tate) . As is known , the "Quarte t" was born in order to solve the very intricate a nd dangerous I srae l i-P alcstinian crisis. It is also worth noting that it is co mpos ed of t\VO organizati ons (UN and EU) and two great Federal Nat ions (the U. S. and Russia). Obviously it is not possibl e to have here a thorough discussion on the in forma l orga nizat io ns operating in the international arena. He re we can only observe that their act ion ca n produce rema rkab le effects, not only political a nd economic (maj or s tra tegy) but a lso m e rely strategic, and thi s is the reason for mentioning them . EASTERLY WINDS

Later on we arc s hall dwell on

Opposite, above. An H1';J1\tJWV wilh ''Hellfire" missile

launcher. Opposite, below. Âˇ CH-53 and "WIESEL 1" with TOW missile-launcher.

Right. "Peacel<eeper" ICBi\11 system .

the political, economic and strategic importance of the Middle East - an area the Europeans should call, more coITectly, Near East - and, in that framework, on the implications of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. For the moment , let's turn our attention to the United States which, as we said , is playing the role of single p lanetary power. The reason is very simple: the decisions on strategy and major strategy made by the U.S. are directly connected with the plans of all other actors on the international scene . In view of this, we should exam ine, albeit very synthetically, the genesis of the most recent American decisions, starting from a long time ago. During the decades of the Cold War, the U.S. developed, es sentially in anti -Soviet perspective, a complete p lanetary strategy.(in the same period also the USSR tried to implement a similar strategy, but only with partial results) . STRATEGIC RAMPARTS

This strategy was supported by several pillars. First of all, a planetary sensor system which, together with an equally planetary telecommunications network , operates for an extremely functiona l politicomilitary command apparatus. Secondly, the U.S. availed itself of a mighty strategic and nuclear "Triad", consisting of manned bombers , land -based ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines

armed Âˇwith the same weapons. A very important role was also p layed by a large conventional system air, land and amphibious forces - stationed overseas and s uit able for interventions in any possible situation, climate and environment. Moreover, there \.Vas an airnaval system , capa b le of operating at planetary level, for controlling t he air-maritime spaces and for offens ive proj ections on land . It was an imposing b ulk of forces, part icularly air and naval, structured for the purpose of providing the fighting forces with

an adequate log istic, strategic and tactical support anywhece in the world. Finally, a worldwide system of bases and installations ensuring the total mo b ility of the operating forces. This form idable bulk of forces and equi p ment reached its maximum expansion during the Reagan Administration. Then, for a number of technical and economic reasons, there was a certain decline. Le t's see these reasons in sbort. With the disintegration of the Soviet Un ion and the \,\larsaw Pact , the need for the U.S. Lo consider a global war in a ,vorld 9

Left. C-17 {<)ur-jet transport aircrafi.

Below. J-JJMARS (High MobiliLy Artillery Svstem) rockeL launcher. employs a MLRS launcher.

fr.

Facing page. A11 ;\,f /09/13 selfpropellecl gun .

new purposes and cannot be promptly replaced . These problems concern main ly the U.S. but also, directly or indirectly, Lhose Countries and coalitions which could be called to confront, side by side with the scenario came to an end, but a different and twofold need arose: first, to maimain an adequate strategic nuclear force capable of deterring any possible enemy; second, to retain the capability of carrying out sizab le conventional interventions in order to be a ble lo fight and \vin simultaneously t\vo important limited conflicts.

SUCCESSION OF OBJECTIVES

These objectives, pursued by President Clinton in the nineties, have partially lost thei ,- validity because of the progressive red uction of the forces which were to ach ieve them. Afterwards, with the defence plans launched by the Bush Administration· for the defence against ballistic missil es, a big change took place, confirmed at first with the "Quadrennial Defence Review (ODR) of 200 1, completed after September 11 and, later·, with the "N uclear Posture Review" (NPR) of 2002, which should be completely adopted in 2012. But what is the s ituation today? How is it going to develop? The events of Sept em ber 11 have caused, as regards hoL h strategy and majo r· strategy, radica l changes, whose importance cannot be easily

determined yet, and this creates prob lems which, at first sight, could seem dcnvnrigl1t unsolvable. On the one hand it is in fact necessary to proceed q uickly but, on the other, medium- and longterm solutions are needed, owing to the long times required by doctrinal e laborations and the time, even longer, necessary for developing modern weapon systems. EveryLl1ing must be done while taking into account the lim itations imposed by the a lways inadequate f i nancial resources and th e existence or systems which, having been originated by differe nl goals, are on ly pa rtially adaptable to the

American superpower, the new threats represented by terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destrnction. In this picture, the U.S. po licy \Vill condition the decisions of all the other actors on the international scene. Today, the U .S. strategy is based, first or all, on what is already available. An this shows sorne of its limits. GLOBAL CHALLENGES

To rneet the new challenges, the U.S. has at i Ls disposal the same means that were available to race the old threats pr-ior to September 11. The advantage is that , in most c ases , th ey are

systems very advanced from the technolog ica l viewpo int (suffi ce it to say tha t in many cases the ga p between the American equipment and that of the other Co un tries can be meas u r ed in decades). A disadva ntage is tha t the equ ipment avai lable is not always completely adaptable to the new requirements, while the de velop rne nt of ne w syst ems requi res relatively long periods o f time. Th ere is, mo reover, another i mportant fa cto r to c o n sid e r: q ua nt ity. The America n nu clear arsenal is certainly sufficient for a valid deterre nce agai nst any e nemy, and i L \Nill co ntinue to be so e ve n afte r t h e re du c ti ons agreed upon with Russia, with the Treaty of May 24, 2002; but it is a n a n:;e na l whic h is gr o wi ng o ld. Sooner or la te r·, it vvill have to be renewed, albe it on a scale smaller than the present one. On t he oth er hand , t he sy stem o f de fence aga inst balli stic miss iles, once operational, will not be able to conf,·ont the deterrent that, after the agreed reduc tions, w ill r e main in Russ ia n ha nds . H owe ver, ,v i t h 200 o r 300 antimissile missiles, it will

certainly be ab le to effective ly fa ce the ar·se nals for mass d est nr c lion o f all othe r Countries, including Ch ina. The main problems concern the con ventional foi-ces. Th e U.S. has ap prox im a te ly 20 0 h eavy bombers - about ninety B-52Hs (the last one was produced in July 1962) about ninety B- 1Bs (to be c ut clo w n to s ix Ly a nd accOl'd ing to reliable information - not to he reconverted for nu clea r employment), plu s twe nty-one B-2As. These a ircraft are the only ones capa ble of longrange interventions, thanks to inni gh t refue lli ng (by Lhe way, it is worth mentio n in g that a ls o the nu mbe r o f a ir- tanke r s is decreasing) . The opposite is true for tactical a ircraft, both fig hte ,·s and g round -a ttack, w hich , a lthough they can be r·e('uellecl in flight, need bases not too distant from the operation s area. B ut h e re w e mu st speak of maj or st ra tegy, co nsi de r ing th e necessity to purs u e a po! icy which can ensure the availabilitv ·' of bases on the ter ritory of allied and/or friendl y Countries . Besides, there is the problem or the aircraft-carriers . The Ame-

rican u nits are form ida ble, but t he re a re fe w of th e m . Considering rotat ions, shi ps in dockyards and units in training, the U.S. Navy docs not succeed in hav ing th r ee of th em comb a tr·eady (one in the Med iterranean, one in the Persian Gulf-Tndian Ocean area and one in Western P acifi c), unless it. ex tend s the operationa l cycles, w ith sure no npositive consequences. Bes ides, without an adequate air support from th e Air Fo rce a nd Nava l Aviati o n, the land a mphibio us forces opera t ing in faraway theatres could find themselves in critical situations . It is p r·ecisely these latter fo rces w hich arc undergoing a fast and sharp qualitative adjustment, lay ing stress espec ially o n fl exibility a nd on s trategic a nd tac ti cal n1o bil ity. The resu ]Ls of this process, which anyway req ui res extensive experiments a nd n ew materi a ls, c ould be jeopardized, at least partially, by some negative elements, starting from the progressive obsolescen ce of a sizablc portion of the stra tegic -transpo rt air fl ee t, the inadequa te number of the new aircraft under construction 11

Left. H/1\tlARS Rocket Launcher. Facing page. French "Leclerc " ianks durinf!, an exercise.

extending tl1e operating life of im po r ta nt, but ra the r old, systems. Not even the Âźmerican super power can a fford too many luxuries . DIPLOMATIC BALANCES

(C-17 Glo bemasters III, capable of transp orting the h eavies t pieces of equiprnent of the U.S. Army a nd Marine Corps to and fro m rough a irstrips) and, last but not lea s t , by tbe politica l problems con nec ted wi eh the availability of bases in areas d ose Lo the operations zone. Thi s synthetic and necessarily in complete assessment of the situation has served to poinl out the main difficu lt ies Lhat the Ame1Âˇican "traditiona l" ins tru me n t, hovvevcr power(ul , mus t face . But the two factors mentioned before - proli feration of weapons of mass destruc tion and terro rism - c om pel lo con sider the s ituatio n from a new angle. These factors force Lhe U .S. nol only to acq u ire adequate de fensive armamen ts (anti-ballis tic missile systems), 12

but also to develop more special forces, to bolster its intelligence systems ( t h ro u gh a better coord in ation of t he various services t hat o pera te in this field) and to aclopt difficult measures for internal security. Cl ear ly these requi remen t s create a very difficu lt problem of burden-sharing, from both the financia l and the s ci entific technological viewpoin t, even considering the increases in budget appropriations which are a lready taking place . Economy is not an exact science, even if it has large reco u rse co n1athemalical methods. No one can g ua rantee t hat po ss ible i nc rÂˇeases in costs - especially for the experirnen ts on new programmes - will nol end up by p ena lizing other p rojects, beginning w ith those aimed al

The U.S - and here we enter the field of politics, and therefore of major strategy - cannot ac t a lon e . It nee d s the politi ca l s upport of NATO, t he EU, the Asian allies (with Japan in the forefront) , the "moderate" Arab Co unt ries a nd, possib ly, also Russia and cerlai n e x-Sovi et Republics. It needs furthermore the support of those Cou ntries w hich, even witho uL formal agreements of a.lliance, are under it s ec onomic and milita ry influ e nce . And here the intertvv101ng of probl ems, concerning bolh the U.S. and all th e other Co untries , risks to become really inextricable. Let's try to proceed in an orderly manner. In the long years of the Co ld War, the strategy of NATO was actually a fundamental element of t he U.S. global strategy: in practice, each Country took care of the defence of its territory and airs pace, helping at the sa me time to con trol the maritime areas and protect the sea rou tes converging towards its own ports . The Am erican forces supported all the allies since, for their st ructure and equ ipment, they ,vere the only ones suited for worldvvide in cerventions . This was due to the fact that the threat was well defined and , therefore, the stra tegy a dopted assigned precise tasks to the Alliance as a whole and lo each of its members.

DOCTRINAL CHANGES Today the situation has radically changed. vVe can even talk about a reversal of requirements. Yesterday the forces of the European members of NATO could essentially operate in a national context, and this made acceptable, within NATO, a standardization based on the fact that eac.h Country could procure, for- its particular needs, materials provided by its own industries. The planetary strategic mobility, mostly based on air and naval systems, practically concerned only the Americans, since their forces were the only ones that could be called to move from one theatre to another. Now, on the conlracy, most frequently the discussion regards out-of-area interventions, and this is not a maller of words only, as proved by the Gulf War of 199 1, the operat ions in tbe Balkans, the recent war- in Afghanistan and other minor operations. Consequently and first of all, it is necessary to decide the range of action of the NATO forces a;;d, in vievv of this, that of the forces of Lhe NATOEU Countries (or, if possible, of

all the EU Countries) . Every decision is obviously retracea ble to a political responsibility (and things could become thornier with the furtherenlargement of NATO and EU), hut invo lves also enormous technical implicat ions: on the one hand, it concerns the problem of armament production in all its financial, industrial and social aspects because it is necessary to achieve, at least for the project ion of forces, an acceptable .l evel of standardization; on the other, they make even more complex and we could say dramatic - the problem of logistic, strategic and tacticaJ support, which Jias to he organized in order to provide these rocces with an adequate and timely mobility. It isn't inopportune to mention that the solution of these prob lems requices a close Eurnpcan and transatlantic coordination. lt is also worth stress ing that any solution in this sector rn ust be pursued with a spirit of sincere collaboration at all national and supranational levels. We can say that these aspects are internal to the part or the \.Vest which includes NATO and

the EU (here the term "West" is not meant in a geographical sense, but is extended lo every CountrÂˇy with Western-type political and economic systems) . Then there are the essential ly political aspects, which belong to major strategy and which lead to consider suitable, and sometimes indispensable, the conclusion of difficult compromises. The very intricate Midd le East question is parl of this picture. lt is comrnon knowledge that the Middle East is the strategic fulcrurn of the cont inents Europe, Asia and Africa - \vhich gravitate on the area. Furthermore, it has huge reserves of oi l (and oil is, at least for U1e moment, a practically irre placeable source of primary energy) . Finally, it includes a waterway - the Suez Canal which is vital for the economies of all the industria l ized Countries, from North America and Europe to Asia and the Far Easl. TRANSVERSAL SCENARIOS But this is not enough . The strategic imponance of the area 13

is determined by two fundamental factors: Lhc possible availability o( a ir and naval bases and Lhc practicab ili ty of t h e Canal, in both direclions, by \varships. It is worth noting that while both factors were all important, in 1991, for the success of operation "Desert Storm", the laLLer' played a nonnegligib le role in the recen t "Enduring Fr路eedom'' campaign. In addition, the 5 Lh Fleet of the US Navy, reconstituted a few years ago for operations in the area encompassing the Red Sea, lhe Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, consists of ships coming from the Pacific Fleet. Should the Lraffic through the Suez Canal become risky or downright impossible, the 5 th Fleet's act1v1t1es could be seriously jeopar'dized, and so \vou Id he the operations of the US Central Command, whose Headquarters at Tampa, Florida, extends its jurisdiction to the Middle East area. For Lhe above reasons, it is abso lu tely necessary foe the United States and the West as a whole (meant, as we said, in a non-s trictly geographical sense) to defuse lhe Israeli-Palestinian mine (a task in \Vhich the US role is certainly determinant). \Ve \Nish and hope that a fair and well-balanced solution to this crisis is found, both to avoid tensions in the international relations (and , therefore, nol only among the Countries of the area) and to save some important econorn ic programmes (such as tlie construction of oil and gas pipelines coming from the ex Soviet Republics of Central Asia).

CONCLUSIONS To end t his long, albeit summary, discussion, instead of drawing conclusions it is perhaps more a pprop1路iate to make some closing remarks. First of all, we should note that 14

here the aim 路was to point out the international subj ects who - at least in ll1e writer's view - are in a pos ition to adopt, practically or potentially, important decisions on strategy and majo1~ strategy. Other 路 subjecls, however important, or very irnportant, \,v hose spheres of action do not affect the options of the forme r subjects - or can do it only in a limited form - have been excluded. For example, it is difficult to think that China, whose enormous military apparatus has limited strategic mobility and is very interested in exploiting inlernational stability i n or de r to carry out i t s programmes of economic development , vvould reall y oppose any possible initiative of the West, \.vith wh ich it has closer and closer relations (even though China, as a permanent rnember of the UN Securily Council, can exercise the so-called power of veto, it is doubtful thal the Chinese leaders \vould take advantage of this right). It is also difficult Lo think that the rulers of some big Lat in Amer ic an Countries, like Brazil and Argentina, w hi ch, besides, are struggling against serious economic problems, could adopt measures capable of interfering. with the decisions of strategy and major s trategy taken by the most irnportanl actors on the internaLional stage. The latter - at least as concerns the subject of our discussion can be id entified in some informal organ izations such as the GS and the "Quartet", in the United Nations, in NATO, the European Union, Ru ssia and especially the United States. For different reasons, all these actors to not want lo clash, nol even when their interests do not coincide or arc down eight conflicting (as is Lhe case wilh the Middle East, where the in terests of the US and Russia are at least partially conlrasting) . In this field there is an

Aircraft on board 1he USS Jin1e1prise.

interweaving which, from several angles, compels the prolagonists to act more or less together: the G8 includes six NATO Nations (Canada, France, Germany, the UK, Italy and the U.S.), a NATOassociate Country (Russia) and an ally of the U.S. (Japan); the "Quartet", as we said, inc ludes the UN, the EU , Russia and the U.S.; all GS and EU Counlries are UN members and fo ur of them (France, the UK, Russia and the U .S.) are nuclear powers and

permanent memb ers of the Security Council. This docs not mean that there a re no differences in ideas and interests within the various formal and informal organizations, or outside them. Bul it means that the com mo n int eres ts - crisis control , prevention or the proliferation of ,-veapons of mass des tru ction , fi gh t again s t terrorism mu s t n ot be overlooked, even at the cost of difficult compromises. In an international picture where, as we repeated ly said, Lhc war phenome non has assum ed radically new features togetherÂˇ

with the traditional ones, the main difficulty lies in singling out the priorities, defining the roles of the various actors, States and O rganizations, and in the political, economic and technical coordination of the sh ort-, m ediu m an d lon g -tern, ini tiatives . Without forgetting but here, in a way, we leave our argument - that many crises can be av erred lh 1Âˇo ugh a mo re equitab le di stribution of the resources of our planet, w ithin what we call today a sustainable deve lo pme n l.. The prob le m is en ormo us and can not b e thoroughly investigated here.

Nevertheless, h ere it is not useless to und erl ine that, in tod ay's world, also this probl em concerns, a lbeit indirectly, both strategy and major strategy.

D ,Âˇ,c on.lrihutor lo Italian and foreign militwy magazines, awhor ofessays on inrernat ional poliLics, ecnnom.ics and co11.lempo rc11y histo,y

l'HOTOGIUPl!S FROM THE AUTHOWS PERSONAL ARCH! Vt::S

Throughout history1 migrations have always changed societies lor the better1 turning them into h,uldoniovs compounds al many tesserae al a still growing mosaic which began thousands ~I years ago

THE FIRST MIGRATIONS The history of the Mediterranean mingles with the odyssey of the great migrations reaching the area lhat, more than any other, marked the history or ma.nkind. The first and strongest migratory rnovernent was that of the Indo-Europeans, which took p lace in two phases. The earlier one occurred from East to West between the end o( the lhird and lhe encl of the second millennium B.C. and moved Lo Anato.lia, the southern part of the Balkan peninsula, Italy, Gaul and lo the domains of the Hittites, the Hellene s, the Italics and the Ce lts . The second takes place in the fifth century of our era , at the end of Rome's imperial ex perience and causes the i nclusion , in the old territories of the Empire, of the peoples who wi ll give Europe its definitive character: Franks, Longobards, S lavs. These, Âˇ therefore, are migrations from East to West and from North to South . We shall find them again along the millennia of the Mediterranean's history. Contrary to what many believed in the past, these migrations were not sudden and destructive. On the contrary, slm.v but inexorable arrivals of new ethn ic groups slowly modified the order of the old societ ies . More than once, with my students, I have compared the transformation of the Roman Empire of the 4 th and 5 th Century, owing to the arrival of new populations, to that which is changing the physiognomy of the United States as a result of the massive migration of Hispanic populations to the southern States. The second movement is tl1at of the Arabs. They embarked on the conquest of the western territories, starting from Ll1e tropical deserts of th; Near East, J8

rapidly overcame the weary resistance of the Byzantine Empire and, in the short span of two centuries , succeeded in imposing their nevv faith and language from Baghdad to Gibra ltar-. Their expansion overflowed to the North with the occupat ion of Spain and Sicily and, with several. raids, to the coasts of Italy and France. The third migratory movement concerns the Turks who, arriving from the barren steppes of Centrnl Asia, in the ninth Century settle in Anato.li a. Three hundred years later~ the Osmanlis seiz.e the Balkans, conquer Constantinople and subdue the whole Med iterranean Islam. THE MEDITERRANEAN MOSAIC These invasions gave the Mediterranean most of its typicality up to WWII. Mare

Nostrum appears like a harmonious mosaic formed by the counlless tesserae made by peoples of different origins, but peacefu ll y settled along its northern, eastern and southern shore s. The wea lth of the Mediterranean civilizat ion is Jin keel to the exchanges and relations that different ethnic groups and peoples were capable of keeping and augmenting over the centuries, despite the many difficulties. The moments of gr eatest economic and cultural development of every region of the basin coincided always with the moments of widest openings to the culture of others. The constant exchanges and loans which enriched the patrimony of the litto r a l civilizations often make it difficult Lo identify the masters who conveyed their art and techniques to the various peoples. Only one thing is sure: the .Me d iterranean became the

Facing page. The fi,mera.iy gold-plated wooden mask of Tutankhamen was placed directly on. the Pharaoh's face, Right, . Clay sLatueUes dedicc11ed w Astartes, goddess of fecundity. Hands are kept under the hreas1, a source of life. Below

Funermy rnask o(King Agamemnon.

coffer where a great civil.izalion developed because it knew hovv to accept and im p rove other people's experiences. Let us consider some examples from the ancienL history of our sea. Today there are good reasons to

be li eve that the Neoli thic revolution, through which man was transformed from hun ter and gatherer lo breeder an cl farmer, was passed on to the p eoples of the old eastern Mediterranean by immi grants coming Cro.m the Syrian plain at

about the end of the e ight h millennium B.C. Th e first organized sta Les arc born in Lhe Aegean world at the encl of the third millenn ium B.C, in the wake of the economic and po litical experiences of ancient Mesopotamia and the Nile valley,

Around 2200 B.C ., the Aegean peop le s invent writing, an extraord ina ry instrume nL of power and a vehicle of culture, through which man can Ln.m smit a univocal message in time an d space , Unfortunately, around 1190 B .C, they forget this great conques t and brea k off the exchanges among the Med iterranean peoples. The closing of the borders produces des titution and desperatio n; ancient Greece will .h ave to Âˇwait several centuries before it rediscovers , tha nks Lo the Ph oe nicia n merc.h ants, the civilization o r writing. The brilliant Arab c ivilization, bearer oC extraordinary cullural e xpe rÂˇienc es and technical in novat.ions, ha s lit with thousand fires a West made sectarian by the fading or th e ancient values and by religious intolerance , Some texts desc.r-ibc the amazerne n l of th e Ara b phys ic ia ns vis-a -vis the customs of the Crusaders, and illust.raLe the abyssal gap between the two cultures . Fo r example. a do cu rnen t tells the s tory of a poor Frank woman suffel"ing [rorn a Le rrible migraine. Convinced that a demon had taken possess ion of the brain of tbe unlucky woman, the Frank "doctors" decided, in order to restore her to health, Lo 19

open her skull with an axe, to force the devil to leave in peace his prey: The poor woman died after a few hours, under the astonished eyes of the Arab prisoners ·who were present at lhe scene. HOW THE MEDITERRANEAN HAS CHANGED IN THE LAST CENTURIES Un li I the end of the 19 th

Century the transformations involving the peoples of the Mediterranean have been marked by the slow rhythm of long-term changes. Then, all of a sudden, everything was accelerated owing Lo three main factors: the southern peoples ' impelling need to emigrate in order to find work, the advent of mass tourism after VlWII and the attraction towards the West fell by the under privileged masses of the East and South of the wo d d. Let us examine briefly some of these aspects . At the end of the 19 th Century, the populations, that had become too dense, could not survive in a very poor land with the fifty or hundred working days of the old agricultural societies. At the time, Europe offered very liltle space to the old Mediterranean societies. Therefore the peasants from the South, in particular Italians and Greeks, in great nurnber·s t1·ied to reach the Countries of the New World. The Un ited S tate s, Canada, Latin America and Australia became the destination of masses of emigrants in quest of work and hope . After WWII, the North European Countries attracted Italians, Greeks, Spaniards, North Africans and Turks . After the migration of the end of the 19 th Century, when millions of southern citizens left. their countries and went to America, other millions of people left the Mediterranean and sought their fortune in the fogs of

the North. Thus a kind of "contrary" migration made the Mediterranean lose its primacy as po.le of attraction; the area became a reservoir of labour for the capitalist industries of the strong Countries. Italy is probably the Country that was most damaged by this recent rnobility of men . It is estimated that in just over a century (l 860J 970), about 25 million Italians left. their Homeland. They were often brave people. One needs courage Lo leave his native land, without great hopes of return.i ng, and go towards an unknown horizon . I shall quote the words of a special emigrant, old Pythagoras, who, compelled to leave his nat ive co untry and try his luck elsewhere, al the dc)wn of the first millennium B.C. ·wrote what are probably the bitte1·est vvorcls in the who le Greek literature: "If you have Lo emigrate, when boarding the ship turn your eyes away Crom the bor·clers that have seen your birth". They were desperate people . \Vherever they went, they tried to 1·ecreate parts of their lVlotherland (Little Italy, Brooklyn) and to reconstitute a common culture n1ade, in the ,vords of essayist Sergio Romano, of "some , re lig ion, some s uperstition and

some gastronomy" . Their sacri[i ces often cont r·ib uted to the respect of their "Mediterranean nature" by the implacable capitalist societies of North America and Northern Europe. I remember the story of Sacco and Vanzetti and their execution in 1927, or the death at MarcineJle, Belgium, of 253 coal -min ers, whose toil and sweat contributed to enrich an often ungrateful Nation. With their work and the diffusion of their traditions, these millions of Mediterranean citizens influenced the economy and culture of the whole \Vestern world . To deny, as some arc trying to do, the decisive contribution of the humble labourers from southern Italy, the Peloponncsus or Crete to the Europe of today and to its industrialization would be a shameful historical nonsense. Together with this "contrary" rnigrnlion, the Mediterranean has been for some decades - and today more than yesterday - at the centre of another type of m igra Lory movement. This is correctly underlined by Maurice Aymarcl in the chapter on migration in his fine collection of articles on the Mediterranean, published under the supervis ion of Fcrnand Braudel and Georges

Facing page. Egyptian limes tone s1atuettes representing lwo worn.en: one grinds wheat and 1he other prepares beer.

Right. T,'Jo Carthaginian masks rnade of polychrorne [!,lass-paste (TV and JI/ Century B.C.j

Below. Sumerian standard fiwn Ur, made o{ a mosaic of shells, lapis lawli and red limesione.

Duby, where he refers to the huge crowds that every year swarm into the cities and on Lhe beaches of the Mediterranean. A real "holidav mioTation" of millions of pe~ceable people seems Lo take possess ion of the

southern regions of France, Spain, Italy, Greece and the Aegean islands . This migration brings money and employment, and decisively contributes Lo improve the balance of payments of regions which s t ill have relatively [ew industries. As a matter of fact, this invas ion, a lbeit peacefu l, is not that innocent. lL destroys areas and landscapes with t he gaudy luxury of the reinforced-concrete hotels facing the sea, it spoils societies ,vhich had different

values an d paramete r s, and considers the .Mediterranean and its peop le a folklorisl,ic world, foreign to the European rea.li Ly, rather than the cruc ible where the cultures of t he vVesl were mou.ldecl. The young, often dazzled by the contact with modern ism and the apparently carefree and easy life led by the hordes of tourists arriving from Northern Europe, live in a kind of "apnea" tbe montbs which separate the departure of the last holiday makers from the fo ll owing spring, which will bring back to the .Mediterranean the same waves of vacationers. Thus, in the deep South, a new generation is born: it is content with leading a

working life of a little more than five months a year. .Just as the bears of the ,ibruzzi and the Pyrenees, the boys in the sout h accept to spend more lhan ha lf of Lheir life in a state of lethargy, waiting for the event that will bring back lo the Mediterranean the m igrations, bearers of currency and d reams. Besides the damages, of ,vhich the M.ed i terranean landscapes be ar the marks, Lhe migratory flows of every summer have produced, in the villages of Lhe

southern regions, a serious social phenomenon : not real unemployment, but lack of a steady job and absence of prospects for young peo p le, ,vho could use their strength in a very different way to contr i bute to the de velopment of the Med iterranean area. Aymard points out that, for the first time in history, t he Medile r ranean succeeds in seducing i.ts invaders w ithout assim il ating t.hem, and is satisfied w ith being a pure and simp le p lace for performances, peopled by actors ,vl10 spend their life in the d ichotomy t hat separates the fossil existence or 21

Left. Fa1irnite 111i11ia111re depic1ing 1he encounter o( two horsemen (X- IX Cen/Ury) .

Below. Relief represeming Sarf!,Ul'l 11, King of the Assyrians (\Ill! Cenlury B.C.) wi1h a di~nitary of'his Cow·1. Facing page. Battling gladiawrs (fimn a 111-1\/ .4.D. musaicj.

to Naples, I saw in the main squar·e of Villa Lilerno, a large rural centre near Caserta, more than 50 black imrnigrants sitting on the ground , waiting for someone to recruit them for a day's work in Lhe Lornat.o fields. I asked on of them about his daily

the tedious winters and the false life of the venal summers. Since lhe end of the eighties, and particularly after the fall of Lhe Berlin Wall, new migrations have had the Mediterranean as Lhei r a i m. Greece, Italy especially the South - Spain and France see daily landings o r thousands of desperate people arri ving frorn the Near EasL, the Middle East and Africa. They are the va nguard or Lhe infinite masses of the Third World. They knock at the doors of the affluent West and humbly ask for the leftovers of the banquet. Th ey are nol threalening or arrogant. They simply are men and women like us, who did not have the luck of being born in the industrialized Wesl; lhey often come from Countries which \Vere dominated and exploited at the time of colonia li sm . They are very similar· to those who, in the 4 t h ' and 5 th Century, pressed on the frontiers of the Roman Empire, attempting to get inside its borders . The ir· dream is sim ilar to lhat of the millions and millions of emigrants \,v ho 22

preceded them along the endless routes of desperation and pain; they hope lo [ind a modest place in our prosperous society, to save Lh eir children frorn hunger and poverty and to conquer with their work the freedorn they never· had. THE VARIOUS AND COMPLEX ASPECTS OF EMIGRATION

Emigration, \vhich should not be demon i1.ed, implies Lhe solution of some probl ems , starling from publ ic o r·der: Some political organizations believe Lhal there is a correlation between immigration and crime, and distrust the immigrants. Actually, there is no doubt lhat immigrants are often involved in criminal deeds. \i\1hy is thal? Of cours e among the im migrants, as .in every society, there are criminals. However, I am convinced Lhat desperation often throws decent men and women, coming from the West or the East ., into the welcoming arms of or·gan ized crime . One morning, at daybreak, on my \.Vay

pay and he told me that he \,vou ld earn a vvhole 10 Euros. Such an ignob le exploitation cannot but arouse violent reactions , compel! ing those wh o arc starving Lo death to turn to criminal gangs in order to secure a decenl salary. Se cond!~ the re are organ i1.ational prob lems. H has bee n repeatedly said that our \.Vestern

som e areas and Lo the tens ions that such a presence is bound to stir up among Lhe locals. .A third point d er ive s from religio us questions . The impact be tween the old Jewish-Christian socie ties and o ther re li gions is ortcn diffi c ult. I ntoleran ce is always lying in wait, and can be overcome only by ado pting the \Vords of old Voltaire : "Si1~ I am not of your opinion, but I'll fight to the end so that yo u may express your opin ion".

THE FUNCTION OF EUROPE

economies could not do without the co nLrihution gi ven by the immigrant workers. But th ese laboure i·s, who arc o[Le n very willing, are not coherent ly distributed within the mo s l economically a dvanced nations of the old con tin en t. T his inevitably causes re gre LLahl e si tu ations du e to the hig h concen tration o f immigrants in

The last point concerns the role and fu nction of Euro pe in th e complex question of the mi g ratory flovvs Lhat a re investing the old continent today. Soon after WWII, the founding fath e rs of Emope rightly decided to set up a union of the nati ons of the Old World, in the hope of avoiding trage dies like tho s e which had p lagued the plane t between 1914 and 1918, and between 1939 and 1945. Th e birth of a unite d Europe has been d ifficu lt; its las t accomplishm e nt, the creation of a common currency, gives us the oppo 1·tunity Lo look at the long

way covered since May 8, 1945 , wh e n arms were si le nced in the smoking ruins of Berlin. Howeve1; today's Europe is not the o ne m e ntioned in the Treaty of Rome of 1958. The cilizens or the European na tions belong to horizons thal arc geogrnphically, politically a nd cu lturally much w id er than those encompassing the signers of the Treaty. The poliLica l leaders must. Lake in to accou nt th e new com ponents of the present Eu ropean States, if they want Lhe struc Lur·e - which lhey labori ously sLrive to create - to have any f'ulure. ln oth er wo1·ds, Loday's qu es tio n is not on ly to find a common langu a ge capabl e of uni t ing the old populations which wrote E u rope's history. Jt is a lso necessary Lo combine in a single process of unification all Lhe peopl es who li ve in Europe bu L are fore ign to l he mille na1·y history of he Old Wo rld . .Another requ i rem ent is to p lan for t he near fu tur·e, keeping in m ind thal our Contin e nt will b ecome mu]Liethnic in t he next few years. In conclu sion, histo ry reaches us not to worry about mi gratory fl ows which are cha nging the characte1· of the Mcditerrnnean countries. We should rather be concerned about the sectarian or racist react ion s Lhat so me individuals, within Lh e old populations which contributed to the histo1y of the Mediterranean and the West, do not hesitate to have wh e n fac e d b y the phenomenon of immigration. I t is for those who are able to learn from the lessons of the past and know that a closed civilizaLio n is a dead c ivil izati on, to help Europe Lo ackn ow led ge the potential wealLh re presented by the new eLhnic contributions.

D '' Advisor to the President o( the Republic for the Preservation of I he Artis tic Patrin 10ny 23

by Salvatore Farina~Âˇ:

- -

----

When a soldier is called to intervene, he operates directly among the people and acts in environments often characterized by insecurity. He is the one who consolidates success and provides protection to those who need it. In order to better perform this duty and meet the new challenges, the Army is now equipping itself with sophisticated and technologically advanced tools, including satellite systems. This is done in order to perform the institutional duties as best as possible and, last but not least, to reduce risks.

ith in military operations, the land forces have proved,,Lheir role as a really decisive instrument in solving conflicts, and, predictably, in Lhe future this trend is not going to change. Ther-erore we must keep on strengthening and improving the capabilities of thi s fundamental military component, in order to maintain a balanced instrument, apl to carry out its tasks in the international field. Undoubtedly in the last years the themes of defence and securi ty have been attracting an increasing attention, not only in the expert circles, but also - and mainly - among operato,Âˇs and citizens of every category. The reasons for this grow in g sensitivity are to be ascribed firstly to the grea t anxieties generated by the proxin1ity of the Balkan conflicts of the '90s and, secondly, to the Country's awareness or the risks due to acts of terror or to the use of Âˇweapons of mass destruction by hostile persons or groups, poss ib ly corning from faraway bases.

The consequent, progressive need to settle crises and solve conflicts calls for a growing ernployment of the military, who are requested to bring peace, sometimes imposing it by force, or simply promoting it thn:>ugh their- 1xesence by speeding up the solution of disputes and the return to nocmal. In view of this, the Italian Armed Forces have beco1ne very popular for their professionalism and humanity. ln particular~ the Army has given a remarkable contribution to peace in terms of number and quality of personnel, and by employing its forces in all peace-s u pport missions under NATO, EU, OSCE and UN aegis, with an average emp loyment in the various Theatres of about 7000 men, Âˇw ith peaks of over 10,000, over the last ten years. Considering the ex1)er- ience gained, we can say that the land forces proved to be determinant and cn.1cia l in every circumstance: combat operations, peace enforc ing, uises control, peace support, peacekeeping, humanitarian mission and cooperation for internal security. The ana lys is or the lessons learned from every intervention provides a clear ind icalion a bout the employment of the various components of the military .i nstrurnent which can also be projected into the future. This is a possibility that pe rmits to adjust th e foreseen improve n,eots Lo our operational capabilities, so that the Army may be in a position to carry out its freq u en t missions as best as possible, vvith a view Lo defence and security. THE RECENT LESSONS

In order to fu lly understand the decisive role of the land forces, one has just to procee d to a careful rev.iew of the parameters characterizing th e recent operaLions in which the Army 25

participaled, beginning from lhe period follO\ving the Cold War. In 1991, du ring Op eration "Desert Storm", some observers he ld the view that a certain number or rirÂˇe actions carried out with "smart" sys lems and ammun itio n, launched from air and naval platforrns, would have been s ufficient to neutralize the Iraqi defensive deployment. On t he contrary, facts proved tha t only the action of the land troops cou ld disrupt and outflank the enemy defences and liberate the occupied t.erri tory of Ku\.vait, thus showing the full capability of carrying on their in -depth action. Tbe same situation reoccurred in Kosovo, when it \Vas im mediately evi dent that the lan d lVIajor Units deployed in FYROM (Forn1er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) .h ad achieved, in jusl a fc-w days, a deterrence much more effecti ve than that of the air campaign, paving the way for the successive entry of the allie d troops into Kosovo . It \Vas p rec ise ly the land contingent commanded by Gen. Jackson that, wit h Operation "Joint Guardian'', actually put an end to the fighting between the warring parties, resolving the situation or ethnic cleansing which .h ad been going on fo ,- months in t.hal tormented region. Al so the operations in Afghanistan confirm the decisive role played by the laud components of the Northern Alliance and of the US-led coalition in the collapse of the TaLiban regime. Lastly, an immediate analysis of Operation " l raqi Freedom" shows, even more clearly, that the Anglo-Am erican Arn1y succeeded in neutralizing the enemy only thanks to th e land b at.t ies, incl ud ing those in inhabit ed centres . E qua lly imporlant is the experience gain ed in CROs and PSOs, where con rlicts and risks arc at medium/low level. Suffice it to ment ion operations

"A lb atross" in Mozambique ( 1993 -1994), "Joint Endeavour" in Bosn ia (December 19 95), "Alba" in Albania (April-Augus t 1997 ) and "Interfet" in Eas t Tirnor (l 999) . Jn every mission, t he widespread p res ence of th e land instrument was decisive for ensur in g the security frame necessary for straightening out. the existing conflic L s ituations . Certainly it cannot be denied that in many cases the land forces took advantage of "long range" actions carried out by naval and air instruments, for embargo and interdiction operations. In some ways, the results \vere important, but a lmost always limited. Tndced, in most. cases, the critical conditions persisted, often to the d etr iment oC the socia l and econom ic levels of th e area concerned and, therefore, with prolonged hardships for th e civilian population. l n substance, the land option in the emp loyment of the mi.l.itary

Unloading <1 con tainer o( 1he !SA F Italian contingent fimn a commercial ai17Jlane.

Facing page. An Italian patrol on swveillanc:e duty

in Kabul.

instrument turned to b e a set pattern, adaptable to the various levels of confl ict and 1.0 the changing characteristics of the national environment of the theatres. Suffice it to consider the highly successful employment of the manoeuvre land-forces in very different operational settings, from the deserts of the Persian Gulf (1991) to the mountains of Kosovo and Afghanistan and the villages of the Bosnian vallevs. A further lesso1~ vvas learned as regards terrain. In a situation of inferioritv - at leas t from the technological viewpoint - the

enemy tend to prefer those asymmetric con f ,Âˇo n ta Lions Âˇwhich progressively push the operations towards compartmented and urban areas, where intelligence and remote -intervention tcch nologi.es are less effective. Precisely in these contexts, the army un i Ls with a marked capability of open,ting in particu l,H environments and situations - such as special forces, mountain troops, air mobile formations and armourÂˇed units - are therefore most apprec iated and requested . The experience on the field has moreover demanded other particular units apt to counter the asym n-1etric threats (NBC attacks and mines), cond uct ing, at the same t ime, an accurate tactical intelligence activity, for the interception, surveiUance and acquisit ion or particularly mobile and shifty targets. Equally important for assessing

how much the land forces arc necessary, is tl1e factor connected with collateral effects, especially at a time when the partic ipation of publ ic opinion in war events has a strong influence on many political and mi litary decisions. It is true, in fact, that the ncvv technologies pcrrnit to strike with a certain effectiveness very distant targets, but unfortunately they do not permit to eliminate the collateral damages, to the detriment or people and structures. The indiv id ua.l fighter's capability of discerning, selecting and evaluating the cornplex real ity on the field, or his ability to give a more accurate intelli gence picture are still there. The new technologies permit effective actions, but the soldier remains the mainstay of the military. Only a combination of tactical skill, excellent recru it ment and techno logical training can give 27

an effective answer to the new threats. If we consider the humanitarian missions and those in support of the internal security of sensitive areas, we cannot but realize that the higher the level o[ distress or need was, the more suited the land units were. Evident examples of this are the humanitarian operations li ke "Airone" in the summer of 1991, in Northern Iraq, "Allied Arbour" in Albania in 1999, as \vell as operations in support of home security, such as "Vespri Siciliani", "Partenope" and the very recent "Domino". The result of these missions \.vas a restored confidence and security among the population, brought about by a military presence expressed in an effective way and without arTogance. This picture clearly shows that the recent and manifold, national and international, operational activities carTied out during the last decade , con-

firmed the fact that there is no substitute for the land com ponent in modern conflicts and in crisis situations and have also emphasized its decisive cha racter. The infantryman's presence on the ground is as n1.uch necessary in medium-high intensity

conflicts as it is in peacekeeping and peace-support situations and in humanitarian and internalsecurity emergencies. It is actually the direct interaction with the enerny, the opposing parties and the civi lian popu lations that permits to achieve the mastery and contro l of the situation and therefore accomplish the miss ion, also and mostly in difficult operational scenarios.

THE FUTURE SCENARIOS AND THE LAND FORCES Having taken note of the indications issued from the recent interventions, we should now have a look al the foreseeable future scenarios and the consequent role of t.be land forces. The security context will be characterized , aL least in the near future, by several parameters which shou Id not be overlooked.

First parameter

Taking for granted that the integration among SerÂˇvices is novv necessary, it is increasingly difficult to i n-rngine nonm ultinational interventions . This implies a series of measures, the most important of which are:

revision process of the NATO force structure; creation of a EU defence p ill a rÂˇ with the relevanl military capabilities; constitution of mu ltinational formations, on bi- and multi-lateral bases, and, finally, the frequent recourse to multinational units w ithin "Coal itions of the Willing" for

An Italian Leam Afghan capiLal.

011

patrol in the

Facing p age. A helicopter o{ the Italian co11.tingent in Bosnia.

carrying o u t various types of operations. All this requires the establishment of mult inational organizational structures, particularly at Headquarters and staff level, as \ve ll as the availabilitv of combat forces Âˇwith a land c;rnponent capable of shouldering considerable burdens.

Second parameter The time a vailable fo rÂˇ inte rv e ntions in areas \.vhich could be very far from the national te rritory is very short, therefore \.Ve need forces that arc ready, mobile, projectable and sustainable. The measures taken by NATO and EU in the last four years concentrate on the availability of high -readiness and rapid-reaction forces. The develop ment of the NATO Response Force (NRF), approved at the Prague Summit last Novernber~ goes precisely in that direction . It is natural that whenever a discuss ion concerns

rapid d e ployment and intro duction of forces into any operat ional Theatre , the land component . assumes a pree minent ro le in preventive deployments and serves as a deterrent in coercive actions. Third parameter One should also consider the marked heterog e n e ity of the threat and the presence of areas w ith differe nt levels of conflict. Although, in the short-medium terrn , the chances that an interna ti onal "actor" could th ,Âˇeaten vi tal national and allied interests (such as territorial

Italian. soldie rs on pat ro l in the Afghan. desert. Facing page. A paratroope r of th e Jtalia.n contingent during the mission in Eas1 Timar.

integrity) using trad i tional methods are very low, the !\ .1ture will probably be c harncterized by more te rrori sm, more ins tabili ty, more conflicts, more proliferation, mo re internal crises . The potential enemies will try again to move their offence, or the Theatre of the action, to almost inaccess ibl e and com partmen ted environrnents, or to urban a r eas (also in o ur Country) , where the selective capability of the smart weapons is less effect ive and there is a greater possibility or offsetting the technological gap. In view of this, it will be necessary to come in contac t \,vi th t he p oten tia l enemy, showing a through knowledge and contro l of the leff itory. It is mo 1Âˇc and more probable that, Âˇwithin U1 e same operntion , t.h e re ,viii b e the simultan eous presence of highconflict situations included in amplerÂˇ but lowe r-conflic t realities a nd the pros p ec t of hav i ng to deal also ,vith humanitarian emergencies. Thus, the cautious , s e lected and reasonable use of force wi ll be even more va luable, because of the existence of areas of confl icts of d ifferent levels and the presence or civilian popula tions. Only the land units can ensure thi s hig h le vel of a cc u rnc y, flexibili ty, sens it iveness an d proportionalit y in the us e o f force . Fourth parameter

Fina lly, we s hould poinL out the g rowing r ol e of public opinion a nd the amplify ing effec L of the mass n-1edia. They 30

are, and are going to be also in the future , a delerminant fac tor, not only for secu 1Âˇing the supporl of the national comm un i ties, but als-o ror influencing the operational decisions during the actions. fn this sense there will be a strong spur towards the selections and dosage of military interventions, limiting the use of force to the bare minimum. Everyth i ng must be clone while avoiding losses within one's o\vn forces, collateral damages and civilian casualties, and reducing to the minimum the duration of the operations by having recourse to precise and decisive actions. In short, in the future it will be difficult to imagine lengthy air campa igns with repeated bombings of civilian structures, or mass-operations of air~ naval and land forces over large areas and for long periods of lirne. Better lo conduct rap id actions

with mob il e crack troops, su ited to the particu lar environment and supported by an .~1dh erent and accurate intelligence fra.rnework. ln b rie f, the picture jus t ou LI i ned confirms that, also in the future, the land forces will p.lay a cenlra l role in l.b e securily context, in confl icts of every l eve l and in any operational environment . At the same time, the various armies are required to have integrable multinational Headquarters and composite , interoperable and proj ectab le forces, equipped \vith advanced weapon systems, \Vith very good protection and f irepower, centred on the professional ski II of the individual soldier, \V ho is the rea l protagonis l of today 's operations. Therefore, in this context, the strengthening and futu re qualification of the Army is more important than ever.

DEVELOPMENT LINES OF THE ARMY'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Now, if we look at the future developments of the Army, we notice, first of all, that the reorga ni za tion of our Service, started in 1997 , in its main elements, is already in line ,viU1 the parame ters of the future strategic context. The evolu tion of the land instrument w ill certainly lake into account lhe guiding principles of the higher political and military Authorities whicl1 envisage a greater availab ility of eff icient operational uniL s, guided by joi nt command slni ctures and sustained by a schoo l, training and l ogistic organization with no redundancies. The rationalization/opti mization of the general support components is indeed the starting point for the recovery of

the resources necessary for staying within the "professionalArrny limits" (112,000 men and women) and for strengthening the operat ional component, \vhich is the real strategic objective of the renewal. Now, let us try to exam ine the evo lution of the Army's operational ca pabiliLies, on the basis of the three above mentioned directions: multi national integration, develop ment of the general capabilities, further enhancerne nL of the soldier's role. Multinational integration The road taken by the Army in its multinational integration has already achieved very i111po1--tant goals. The Rapid Reaction Corps HQ, which only two yea r·s ago was a mere intention or a paper project, is now a sple ndid Italianled multinational operational reality under NATO's operational command, and is also available to the EU. Also the Multinational Land Force (MLF), an JLalian Slovenian-Hungarian Major Unit, hinged on the "Julia" Brigade HQ, has achieved its full operational capability. In the near future, after a complete revision of the NATO forces' structure and the implernentat.ion of the European defence pillar, the Army \vill start to confer to the projectab le Division HQs ·au the capabilities needed for rnpid deployment and Command/Control in opera.Lions. The proceclur·es will be gradual and similar to those adopted for the constitution of Solbiate Olona's Rapid Reaction HQ. One Division HQ will he completed in 2004: the other will follow in the successive years. In this growth course, the Solbiate Olona HQ will be the guiding beacon as well as a training and amalgamation school for the application of NATO's procedures. This will start a virtuous circle witb repe r·cussions on every ma 32

noeuvre and support Brigade HQ and with indubitable advantages for the entire Service and for the Defence in general. Completion of the necessary operational capabilities Besides the mentioned Command -a nd-Control capabi li ties, the Army of the future will need a composite bu lk of forces, in line with the level reached by the ma.in European Countries, in order to face diverse con rli cL situations in the various operational environments. Considering the ins titutional tasks, the NATO, European and multinational engagements and the si1.e of our Army, it was necessary to envisage: sLrengthen ing the special -operation forces (a component much more in-1 portant today than in the past, since it is in a position to solve the difficult situations prevailing in a complex operational environment); completing and modernizing th e manoeuvre Brigades, making all of them projectable and sustainable (they are divided into light, medium and heavy Brigades, plus an airmobile one, in order to ensure flexibility in the various operational scenarios, and modulate the formations according lo the specific environment and level of conflict) ; shaping of Brigades and Groups (artillery, engineers, AA systems and Air Cavalry) in support to the manoeuvre forces in aU operational s ituations, from the highest-intensity ones to those in support of peace; setting up a Brigade-level bo dy o f forces, group ing together all the RISTAEW units capable of acquiring, in rea.l time, a complete informative picture; completing the equipment of a logistic Major Unit for projection and c lose support of the forces; developing and strengthening the specialistic sectors, including those charged with the secur·ity of contingen ts

Italian ser vicemen conl rolling an impurla.nl crossroads in Kabul.

and populat ion. This group includes the NBC defence uni ts, which are, al r-eacly i10\.v, a showpiece of our Army and of our Defence as a whole, and for which a reinforcement is envisaged. Another special sector, internationally on the forefront and with remarkable capabilities, which is also go in g to be strengthened, is the clearing of

--~--,._;P,.._.,"'i~

explosive devices (removal and neutralization). Finally, in order to beLLer meet tbe parameLers introduced by the presence of civil ians in the operation arÂˇeas, the civilian-military cooperation (ClMlC) is going Lo be expanded, together with the so-called Operational Communications. The former wi ll give Italy a leading role in the Southern Region of NATO, while the later will ensure Lhc support of the local populations to the naLional units in operntions, increasing

-., .. -

.â€˘

the level of prol ec tion o( the contingenLs. To sum up, our S erv ice, accepting the NATO challenges created by tlie so-called Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) an d the more recent New DCI, is now plann ing to strengthen Lhe capabilities of command/control, comrnunications, information, prnjectability, sustainability and prolection of ils contingents in operations. Thus \Ve can say that for all the manoeuvre forces we shall have

to envisage a di fferenL deve lopment or capabilities, following two complementary and converging lines. Jn the sho rt - medium term (2004 -2012) we shall have to complete and update the existing capabilities at Brigade level, and concentrate mainly in Comrnand/Control, vVarning/Surveillance and Nav igation/En gagement systems, in order to make them interoperable with those of the main European Countries. 33

fn Lhe long term (2012-2025), the Army w ill have to envisage the development of future combat capabi li Lies based on new concepts, technologies and systems apt to become completely integrated. Practically, the innovation of the long- term transformaLion will not concern the so-called "platforms" (Lanks, armoured cai·s, aircraft) but a compl ex system, including several assets, c losely .integrated through the Network Centr·ic Warfare" . The concept is therefore to focus on the knowledge of the situation on Lhe ground , in order to keep the initiative and neulralize the enemy, avoiding collateral darnages. This survey shows thal Lhe Army has, and will have, an extremely operational configu ration and a support component with no redundancies. However, the period needed y the Army to become fully professional requires some further temporary changes. Ln Lhis respect, in fact, in order to quickly overcome the moment of the end of conscription - and also expand the recruitment of volunteers - we ·wish and hope that the "Defence Bill", (the socalled Professio nal 3) is approved as soon as possible. The new law, once passed, will guarantee a working future to the personnel serving in the Armed Forces for at least one year. In practice, in order to become a regular volunteer or to join the Police forces , one ,,viii have to serve voluntarily for one year in the Army, Navy or Air Force. Strengthening the human component Precisely the human component, the third direction of the Army's development, is the hinge of the i nslrument's transformaLion. There is no doubt that man, the individual fighter, is the highest expression of operativeness and an irre34

placeable factor in any envisaged capability. The increased heterogeneity of the missions, the high profess ional level required by the complex weapon systerns, together with the lethality and multidimensionality of the manoeuvring space will increasingly affect the preparation of the personnel. The fighte1~ even when included in minor-level formations, will have to be ready to move among the various types of missions and to quickly assimilate the relevant changes. The r·eal key to success is the soJdier on the ground, the man who w alks Lhrough the mindie lcls, who must neutrnlize the enemy and oper-aLes side-byside vvith the population . He is the actual bearer or securily. To

him, our soldier, we must give the best the Country can offer for Lb e performance of his miss ion and the establishment of the values of security and peace. Therefore his prepara tion must be very extensive, because the performances r·equested of him will be wide-ranging. The fighting man will have to acquire, thanks to an appropriate and oriented trnining, the mental flexibility needed to know, at any moment, what to do and how to do i L. In substance, the objective is to give our soldie r- an all around operntiveness. Equipment is a very important aspect in the enhancement of the soJdier's capability. ln this connection, Lhe Administration has planned to acquire the "Future-soldier system" - which

Facing page. A sharpshooter an.d his observer in Bosnia. Right. . A sapper clearing a mined area. AfghanisLan.

will go into service in 2006 - and to adopt the provisional equipment for th e foot -soldi er (waiting for the "Future-soldier system " ) in order lo equip, starting from the current year, complete force -p ackages at Regiment and Brigade level. On the other hand, the lessons learned in this sector indicate that the individual fighter is not going to be rnore effective simply because he is better trained or better equi pped : he wi ll be so only - and mainly - through the enhancemen t of his human dimension, from the cognitive, professional, behavioural, ethical and moral viewpoint. Therefore, a great altcntion will continue lo he paid lo the strengthening of t he reference values, such as loyalty, sense of duty, sharing, cull of traditions, esprit de corps, solida rity, promoting also the improvement of the quality of life and the initiatives in s u pport of the servicemen's families. In short, the Army of the h.itme will maintain and emphasize the human values, the role and the equipment of the fighter. CONCLUSIONS

The lessons learned lead u s towards the b es t solutions, enabl in g the Army to provide operational responses in line with its insti tutio nal tasks and the changing limes. The analysis of the recent military operations, including those in which o ur Service participates in a multinational context, shows that the land forces arc the only component of t he military instr u ment capable of tran -

sforming a tempo rary s u peciority into a .lasting success. The land forces have p roved fun damental because t hey can simultaneously express coercion, co ntrol and a continuous presence on the territory, among the people . Th erefore they are essential in every phase: combat, pacification, and moral and ma ter ial reconstr uctio n. Âˇ Evidently a ll these activities a ,Âˇe necessary for achi eving the objectives of th e mili tary operations of defence, security and peace-s upport. The trend wi 11 also b e confirmed in the foreseeable future scenarios and, in view of this, the strengthening of the I.tal ian military instrument becomes even more important. Thus, it is not only necessary to

have on hand adequate financia l resources and skilled personnel, but also to manage and employ what is already available in th e sectors which give belter returns in terms of effec t iveness an d security. The Army has shown, on the field and in every operational situation, its full capabi lity of carrying out all its rnissions. It is nmN ready to professionali ze all its units, to modernize its \,v ea pon systems a nd to strengthen its soldiers in order to continue being a protagonist of security, boLh at home and in the future international scenarios.

D *Colonel,

Chief; Plans Office, Army General Staff

THE ACTIVITY OF INFORMATION AND PREVENTION IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PILLARS KEEPING THE MEDICAL SERVICE AT ITS WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED HIGH LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY

THE NEW FRONTlu~ OF THE MEDICAL WITHIN THE NATIONAL S Military physicians are an unfailing reference for the health of our people and for the health of entire populations of different cultures. They participate in all humanitarian missions and are noiv present also in Afghanistan and Iraq Present on the whole national territory, very active in Civil Defence and in all out-of-area missions (Afghanistan is the latest example), always ready to relieve pain and sufferings and to safeguard the physical integrity of people without neglecting the moral and spiritual implications, the Medical Service avails itself of the most innovative scientific and technological discoveries. A great importance is given to communication, in order to inform on risks and pathologies and on the way to avoid them. The Service is an integral part of the National system and cooperates with many Ministries other than Defence in order to offer an irreplaceable support to anybody in any circumstance, with altruism and generosity. 36

he .M edica l Corps is a comp lex funct iona l s tructu re which envisages the continuous renewal of men, techn iques and procedures, in order to be always "young" and ready to [ace the ever-changing needs connected witb the health of the Ital ian community, meant not only in the tradit ional military sense, but also in its civilian Âˇaspects. It is a composite organization vvhich m u st be always abreast or the times and in line with the events or the

scientific and social evolution . The Corps must also defend the important history Âˇ and the tradit ions t ha t enrich its outstanding course of growth and progressive technical and scientific evolution. l ts history corresponds, in many points, lo the history of our Nation and finds reasons for pride and valour in the countless events which occurred on the Ita li an soil dur ing the last three centuries. The med ical component of the

Armed Forces has eventually assumed a growing and dec isive role within the log istic military organiza t ion, to the po in t of being today the ol dest among the log ist ic services but also one of the most important, due to its reflections on the soc ial and professional problcnis. T he Medical Corps, in fact, has a lways had to carry out its tasks in accordance witb its prevailing institutional goal, which is that of safeguarding the most imporLant national wealth: the 37

A successful c[elivery i11. a field hospital.

healll1 and welfare of its human patrimony, both ci vilian and mi Ii tar·y. It ensures not only the health of the whole community but, in more general terms, · a psychological, physical and re la tional well-being, as described in the most modern directives of the World Health Organization. The international events of the last years have emphasized and amplified these specific functions of the military doctors, not only on the national territory, but also in a ll those Countries which needed medical and sanitary aid. lt is with legitimate pride that we underline that a good part of the H al ian military co mmitment abroad, in the various peace and humanitarian missions, is represe nted by the effort of the Medical Corps. Therefore, its history is a long

and prestigious one, connected, as it is , with the political and social histor·y o( our Country. Italy has grown and evolved in many social sec tors and has deserved international acknO\.vleclgements . This is also due to the commitment of the military physicians who, both in war and in the numerous natural disasters which have hit our Country, have done their utmost to relieve and soothe pains and sufferings. They have con1m ill ed Lhe whole of themselves : complete devotion, physi cal sacrifice and com petence. THE MEDICAL CORPS IN SERVICE OF THE COUNTRY

The institutional tasks of the Medical Corps, as they have been ultimately def in ed and characterized, envisage the medical intervention in many important sectors of the Public Admi -

nistration. In .some of these, the medical involvement is not directly related to military medicine. In this regard we can mention the forensic medicine activities carried out on behalf of rnany other Governrnent Administrations, as is the case with the Hospital Commissions called to pass their judgement on serviceca used patl10Jogies or fair compensations for civilian personne l. Worth noting also the services of urgent and emergency med icine g iven to c ivilians in case of natural disasters. The increase in the request of medical .services occurred in r·ecent years has clen,anded of the Military .M edical Administration a growing amount of financial resources and professional skilJs . The military doctor· is often alone in facing delicate and urgent situations and, besides his competence in military medicine, he must be ,.vell inform ed on every specialized branch and on the most recent resources made

available to military and civilian users. These cultural and professional demands have participaled in motivating mi litary doc-tors Lo broaden their hori1.on and go beyond the ir specialization. With the growin g information given by Lhe media on the lhemes of wel fare and health, the requirements for an adequate primary prevention and timely diagnoses has sharply increased within Lhe lta lian popu la tion. Our ci tizens, bolh n-1ilitary and c ivilians, are now more demanding in Lh e ir· request for high- leve l medical services . Therefore il has beco me necessary for the Corps Lo extend the speciali1.at ion of military doctors to branches wh ic h were new to Lhem, such as pedialrics and gynaecology, required by the human itarian missions and Lh e recent recruitmenl of women. AL the same, time also the technological content of the diagnostic and therapeutic equipment has grown . Thus, a rem arkable financial e ff orl has been made in order to meet the requests of t he civi li an and military us ers, and this also caused a positive and f'avourable change in the consideration for the military world. The m ilitary p hysicians have been capable of giving, without clamour, a very high profess ional contribution, botb in ltaly and a broad, accompanied by unanimously ack no vv ledged humanity and sensitivity. Tn the tents of the eanhquake victims, or under the sun of an African or Middle East desert, a large number of military doctors have worked in difficult conditions, placing their skills and science in service of Lheir rellow-men. THE STANDING FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS

The Medica l Corps, being direcLly in contacl wi th the social

prob lems of the young, is tackling, w ith very good results, the issue of prevenLio11 and fight against dn.1gs. ·· In order to do this, the military phy sicians, working togethe r ·w ith personnel from other M in istries interested in soc ia l issues, are engaged in promoting health education amo ng the young soldiers. As a matter of facl, the task of informing and educating has become a very importan t and

A pa1ient and his family on an

ambulance.

irreplaceable moment of primary prevention which provides a remarkable spin-off and a great benefit for the general health-rate o r the Italian society. Health information and education aim at making the young feel responsible for th e care and hygiene of their bodies as well as for tl1e safeguard of their \Nellbeing. This entails a reduction of morb idi ty besides considerable savings for the State. Our docto1·s have been working for many years in c lose contact vvil.h the Ministry of Labour and in particular with the Department of Social Affairs, and

eve 1·y year receive financial contributions lo be employed in the prevention projects for fighl i ng against the diffusion and use of drugs in barracks and other military establishments. In order to caffy out these projects, the Defence Adrnin is lration operales in cooperation with other important Ministries, such as the Ministries of Healt h, University and Research, Justice, Tn tern al Affairs and, Lh ro ugh these aclivities , gives a substantial contribu tion to the general health. The engagement o r the military doctors on these social fronts has

resulted in a progressive reduclion in the use and diffusion of drugs among the young mi li tary, as is witnessed by the yearly repons on drugs which, since 1997, the Mini str·y of Labour has been submitting to Parliament. THE IMAGE OF THE MILITARY PHYSICIANS IN ITALY

The act iv ities and tasks described above make the Medical Corps, and the men and women who be long to it, an 39

initiatives an d realizations of precious activities of psy chological support, concerning servicemen of every rank and level, under the management of th e Psycho logical Advisory Bureaus present wi thin the various Services. Also, many social initiati ves have been started i n order to safeguard the well-being of the citizens in uniform: from epidem iological surveys of every kind to the integration of mil itary medical structures with civilian ones, both public and private, [or preventing drug use. In the last years a particu lar impulse has been given to the activities regarding health education and prevention of infectious diseases, wi th specia l regard to anti-HIV measures. The same considerations regard also the study and prevention of all emerging pathologies

THE INTEGRATION BETWEEN CIVIL AND MILITARY HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS

A medical officer assisting a Kosovar inside an a.mhulance.

established social reality. For the young, to be in the vanguard of the social issues involvi ng the Country is a very interesting opportunity. Owin g to the effect of the countless images which, in the last years, have appeared in the p apers and on television, the young have started to change their mental attitude ro-wards the military world and, in particular, towards doctors in uniform . At th e same, time also the atlitude of the military towards the young has changed in a positive \,v ay, and this has produced an increase in the at ten l io n of the Defenc e Administration vis-a -vis the

youth problems . The military world, through its medical branches, takes an interest in all that occurs in the social environment and, in the selection and recrui tment phases, integrates its competences wit h activities of or ientation and preparation to the actual work. The most important task, however, is that of reducing the psychological, emo ti onal and pbysical impact that the young soldiers may experience in their contact with the military. In this regard, the medical con uÂˇ i bution was that of introd ucing psycho log ical sueen ings aimed at singling out the fragile personalities more exposed to the danger of psychologica l discornfort in dealing w ith a different life-style. There have been numerous

In order to defend and safeguard th.e health of our citizens, a Âˇdecisive role is being played by the diagnostic and clinical activities carried out at the time of recruitment. These medical examinations are very important for the young citizens' health. On the medical plane, i.e. from th e epidemiological, preventive and social viewpoints, their soundness is unquestioned and irreplaceable. In many cases, this is the first contact between the young recruit and a complete medical check-up. In particular, son1e pathologies s uc h as, for example, the urogeni Lal ones, are diagnosed and pointed out to the doctors in charge. The preventive activi t ies continue wit h further examinat ions and contro ls after .recruitment and, late rÂˇ on, with the prescr ib ed vaccinations. There have been long discussions

on how to convey these data to the National Health Service. lt was often suggested to include them in the magneti<Z card that the Ministry of Health should deliver to all citizens, which contai ns the most irnporÂˇLan l m e dical data . It was often pointed out Lhal these data, gathered during the military life, cou ld be useful also in the civilian medical sphere . Today this can be clone with the multiservice card for the rnililary, which will be described later. The integration of the Med ical Corps with the civilian organizations is also represen Led by the lots of data, diagnoses and therapies accompanying the citizen during his service and after his d ischarge, to the advantage of the doctors of the Natio nal HealLh Service. As a matter of fact, the data an d informat ion that emerge during a soldier's life can be so partic u lar and detai led that , when transferred to a more general envi ronment, can give epidemiological information very useful for the national health as a whole.

acquirable data, praclicabi lity and easiness of use. The multise ,Âˇvice card has the same value of an electronic identification doc u ment, is similar to an electronic ID card and offers the possibi lity of managing more eleclronic signature applicat ions and cerlificaLes, in order Lo granl access to restricted areas, personal computers and remote data banks. It may be used to collect equipment an d fue l, to

A paediatric control in Kosovo .

"Net.link System" through whicl1 data arc introduced in the net according Lo Lhe international standardization protocol of the medica l data). The med ical personnel can use palmtops to gain access to the data contained in the card and, through w i- fi systems, connect themselves to the Hospilal's servers, so as to facilitate all operations of ad mission and assistance . ln emergency situations, when the wo u nded soldier cannot speak, the card provides the rned ical data and al l the necessary information for an immed iate intervention. Furthermore, it

messes, to buy goods at military slruclures in Âˇoperations and gain access to the services Lhroug h the Data Transmiss ion Network. The card gives also the possib ili ty of knowing the data of the medical logistic system, since iLcan manage a ll the information relevant to prescript.ions as well as medica l and special ist's examinations. The whole system is consistent with the inte.rnaLionaJ project for a civilian medica l card (the

permits to add more data for a possible s u bseq u ent hospital treatment . It was also decided U1at Lhe m ultiservice card should be legally valid not only [or the Defence organization but for the other Government Adm in istrations as well. Therefore, it can be used b oth on sigh L and in its electronic form and, at the same time, it is an identity document and a sma ll information-bank providing the data necessary to ens ure the functions of an

IT IS EASIER WITH THE MULTISERVICE CARD CONTAINING THE MEDICAL DATA

The Military Administration is rep lacing t h e o ld identity documents with a more functional chip-card , which includes the digiLal signature and all that is necessary for personal identification. In view of the many humanitarian missions abroad, a mu.ltiservice card for all Defence personnel has been realized. Th is doc u ment will perm it the o p timal and Limely management of a ll medical data. It was experimented on the field by the ISAF personnel in Kabul and the positive results have bee n very useful for perfecting its completeness as regards

JOlll

Medical examinaLion o{ a little patient.

emergency care!. It is completely interoperable at naLional (as electronic ID card) and int ernational level (being compatible wi th the "Netlink" medical data structure), as well as in a joint setting at the Ministry of Defence. The access to non-medical data is possible only after typing in special codes, ,vhile the emergency rned ical data are available to all through the hardware now being read ied by the National Health Service. GENERAL EMERGENCIES AND NATURAL DISASTERS

The Medical Service gives a [undam enLal cont.ribuLion to the activities of Civil Defence, since it is a medical sL.ructure that can 42

rapidly reach the site of the event and provide an effective medical and surgical assistance in case of urgent national and international emergencies. The Service can therefore offer an o,Âˇganizational model capable of giving timely and effective answers, not only to the military users, with a performance similar Lo that of the National Health Se rvice, bu L a lso lo the populations hit by natural disasters, as is the case with the frequent earthquakes that afflict the lla.lian Lerritory and involve entire cities or even regions. In this regard, a strong impulse has been given to the Military Trans(us ion Service and its tasks, with the establishment of four Transrus ion Centres, whose main duty is to make the Armed Forces completely self-sufficient in this sector. Once this primary requirement is met, the Centres give a significant contribut ion

also lo the c ivili an o,..ganizations. The production of transfusion units and hemo -derivates ensures the functioning or the Medical Corps' surgical activity, both at home and abroad. Th e stocks are also used in case of disasters, in cooperation wit h the Nationa l Health Service and Civil Defence. For the management of the blood s u pplies, according to the National Health Board, a no,v of informa tion on Transfusion Medicine is now in force and very important services of irnrnuno-hematology have also been activated within the Armed Forces. To offset the chronic shortage of blood in our CounLry, the Medical Corps has made an agreement with AVTS , Lhe national association of voluntary blood donors. The in Le rest about this specia l issue has also been aro u sed by means of a joint campaign and use of common AVJS-Arn1 e d Fo rces posters, which has obtained a fa ir increase in vol untary donations by both servicemen and civilians. The capability and competence of dealing not only with singl e patients, but with ent ire populations in dillicu I ty or in rneclical emergency situations, is a dislinctive quaJily o r Lh e military medical Organization. THE CITIZEN'S MEDICAL EDUCATION

Health protection, to which we have often referred, is implemented with the activities of primaTy prevention, through the programmes of heallh education set up for both conscri pts and vol.u nlee.rs . Medical Officers, particularly trained and pre pared for this task, regularly inform all military personnel on very complex social subjects, such as drug addition, psychological malaise, sexually transmitted diseases and so on . During the lasl years, many

conferences an d semi nars have been held on these themes. AL the moment of the discovery of HIV, the AIDS virus - just• to rnention a specific case - a vvidespread informat ive and p reven t ive campai gn was started, togeth er with the sLudy of the correlated patho lo g ies . Many rn i Ii Lary doctors were asked to give information and del iver lectures, also outside the military circle. Every year, d i fferent types of information material on subjecLs of social interest, such as drugs or AIDS , are prepared and distributed, mainly in the form of booklets, which ca n be handed out also to the young visitors of military installat ions . On th e same subjects of social interest, materials o f differen t types (slides, videota pes) have been used for lectut·es and seminars . Thus, the whole mi li tary personnel has been awakened to the general medi ca l problems afflicting our Country, to which young p e ople are the mos t exposed, and therefore more a t r is k . Also in Lhi s case the

cooperation w iLh the c ivil ian world is remarkable. The aim of the sens itis ing activityjs not only that of providing information bu t a lso that of giving answers and concrete ind ications w herever cases of infectious diseases can be foreseen, o r wh ich involve the use of drugs and situa tions of psycl10log ica l di scomfort tha t could justify the suspicion of possible s el f-destructive behaviour.

CONCLUSIONS

The closeness of the Medical Serv ice to our w hole society is the cause of legitimate p r·ide and sat is fac tion for doctors and med ical o pera to rs in general. Satisfaction, for the reason tha t all tha t rni li tar·y p hysicians have been able to achieve expresses compete nce , humanity and spiritual wealth. Prid e, for the precious \.Vork carried out, which is continuously requested a nd repaid by th e gra titude of our peop le and oC rnan y other

peoples of d ifferent lan guages and cultu re. Pride, a lso fo r· the way hope has been made to shine in so nu1.ny h ea r ts , fo r· the c apa b ility o f giving love and di g ni ly to those who had lost them, in war and in peace, after· an earthquake or along the lonely desert paths, on Lhe brink of the precipice of depression or under· the e ff eel of a drug, clay and night, during the l1ours of duty an d beyond, with altruism and serenity, in every moment . The military doctor is a source o r help, peace, relief and comfort. Because passion, love an d g r·ea L respect arc needed to be able to put aside one's own 1xoble ms in ord e r· to so lve t hose afflicting others.

D "Lieu.tenant General, MD, Director General, Medical Corps

Field hospi1als can provide excelLe11.1 paedia1ric services.

Public and private organizations are making deep changes in order to improve the efficiency of their structures Computer science is asserting itself as one of the main frontiers of the new millennium, capable of incrementing the potential and efficiency of organizations, companies and institutions. The higher and higher performance of the data-processing systems encourage their employment in every sector of activity, and the best organizations are readily adopting the computerization suitable to their reality. One of the main operational references are the Information Centres, which can avail themselves of the most modern computer technologies. In any efficient structure there are two evermore outstanding figures: the technological manager and the data-bank administrator. This confirms the farsightedness of those who, for quite a time, have been wisely investing in human resources. 44

s is already well_ known, the reasons for the increase in the dataprocessing activities can be found in the new awareness Lhal the top management of the various organizations have vis-avis the enormous potential of corn pu lerization. In general, computerization started Lo evolve with L.he automation or repetitive activi ties, such as administrÂˇative

The top managers of the various organizations, for costs and efficiency reasons began to use these analyses to support lheir decisions. This produced a remarkable rise in demands for computer systems, thus calling a greater attention on information science as a whole. At present, the cornpu ter systems' potential is considered by operators an essential factor of pi-oduction, equal to investments and Jabour. Hence the managers' increased attenlion to the developmen l of these systems, because the productivily of the whole organization depends also on the timely acquisit ion of updated information on the real trend of the various activities. Tn vievv of this, the implementation of a policy of systems developmcn t has become one of the n1ost important functions for the managers of large organizations . As a consequence, those in charge of the structures tasked with developing information systems (IS) have been raised to a higher functiona l level and have assumed the responsibility for the whole data-proccssi ng organization.

sectors' management and materials handling. Late r路 on , the data produced were used ror a number or statistical investigations, ,vhich perm itted signiGc;nt analyses of the activities carried out. With the widespread use of computer systems, the number路 of sectors interested in their analyses has grown to the point that now thev cover everv sector of activity. 路路 , 45

This is proved by a survey made at some large compan ies, w hich showed that the level of the managers of the rnrormation Systems struc t ures had bee n raised from lJ-ie non -executive rank of Office i\llanager to lhaL of AssisLanL Director. T his change is not at tri butable to a term i no logical problem but to a real change in the activ ity of th ese figures. In fact, Assistant Direclors define Lhe mediu .m - long -term policy of their sector, while Office Managers are only responsible for the development and management o r the vario us sec tor·s of the company, according lo the directions given by the forme1:

nition could be: "Technologicallyproduced sem i-orderly chaos" . The balance po int b e t ween "chaos" and "sem i-order" varies from one organi1.ation to another, according to the degree of utilization o( the new technologies : Nevertheless, mosl st ructures in charge of the Information Systems suffer from this trou ble, even if in different proportions. For instance, il is difficult to find a computational organization which of late has not bee n compelled to transform itself one way or anot h er, in order to be up to the new possibil ities offere d by th e market. I n the most important

the PC sector is relatively stable and con troll ab le . The first generation of IS managers had to deal only with data-processing on large computers. Today lhe same persons rnust manage several systems, very diverse as regards processing ca pabili ty (large , medium, small) an d tec hnology employed. At the moment, t he answer given to these growing pressures from the various organizations is represented by the insUtu tio n or the so-called information Centres (IC). The first structure of th is kind was organized by an important US company (IBM) in the early 80s, and envisaged the establishment o[ a n organization concerne d only with the new technolog ies , mostl y PCs, in order to meet the requirements of the fi nal users at th e right time, and applying the slogan "If you don't knO'w where to turn to solve your problems, call us" . An i ncreasing number of organizations, a lb eit in different rorms, have been adjusting their structures precisely in that sense.

THE LATEST STRUCTURAL CHANGES

THE INFINITE OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY MODERN TECHNOLOGY

Toge th er w ilh the mana gement's increased attention a nd expectat ion s , lhere has been a boos t in the operalional possib ilities offe ,·e d by the new technology. H one we r·e to describe with a single sentence the presen t state of the information organizations deriving from the emerging technologies, a possible defi-

industries, the expenditure for persona l computers - a sector w here, until a few years ago the investments were practically null - has now reached almost 3.8% of the budget. Even more amazing is the software marke t, which is currently estimated at one billion€ a year, wi th an annual growth of approx. 100%. Also office au to1.rn.1tion and data-transmission technology are two particularly active areas in th e deve lopment of the "semiorderly chaos" rnentioned above. Compa red to these two a reas,

At th is point, one could ask if the solutions adopted in order to adjust to the new situation are appropriate and , if the answer is "no", what else can be done. Rising the structures in charge of JS to a hi gh er level can by itself a ttract rnore attention to lhis sector and bring about some changes. Neverth eless, as for the rea l effects on the e ffi c ie ncy of the syste m, very little is to be e~pec ted or this sole variation . On the contrary, the increase of the management's anticipations will probably cause a subsequent disappointment for not having attained them. The mos t immed ia te consequence of rising the SI structure's top Lo a higher leve l - considering a typical

... .-----+

路-----.. +--pyramid-shaped structure, with the Office Chief al the summit, the manager in the middle and the executives at the basis - is the separation of the last two levels from the first. In vie\.v of this, the Chief of the structure dea ls ,vi th the mosL important problems (policies, strategies, etc .), ,,v hile the other路 two levels must tackle the tasks and responsibil iti es deriving from the new environmental situation. Clearly, in his ne\v rnle, the Chief is very busy and can devote very little time, or no time at all, to "h is guiding [unction which, on the contrary, the other two levels continue Lo pe1路form. The fact that the IS Chief is more of a manager than a technician is a rea l step forward, but nevertheless the improvement expe cted of his new position with in the compan y's orga nization is very limited, owing to

his com ing apart from the other levels. Furthermore, one can for路esee that in the long-term a manager of the computer systerns of the past, by becoming a manager of the future systems, will increasingly move away from the managerial roles . 'Whi le he was used to decide the em ployment of simple computers, novv he will have to deal with systems that su pp ort his decisions: therefore he w ill tend to be less responsible for the employment of advanc e d technologies and more oriented towards the global model of the structure and the data necessary for its management on order to link the IS requireme nts to the pu q)oses, objectives and strategies of the organization. In a word, he w ill move towards information engineering. The second change in the informat ion structures was the

introduction of the abovesaid Information Centre (IC) concept. Actually, this Centre is the response of some structures to the greater opportunities offered by the continuous scientific discoveries . In particular, the IC operates in the field of the new technologies which optimize the productivity of the final users. In short, its task should have been that of "providing the users' community with the information and ass istance on elec tronic systems so as to obtain a production increase" The b asic intention was to augment the users' autonomy in their access to t he data , th u s reducing their needs for assistance from the information stn1cture. But th e ICs have two weak points. The first point is that this a utonomous body is added to the present IS structures as they are

now, without changing them; therefore neither is there a real advantage in all sectors of the new techno logies nor a better support is provided to the IC's new strategic role. The presence on the market of new technologies widens the range o[ action of the IS structures, and this leads us to the second weak po.i nt of the Information Centre: the nevv technologies a1-e i ntrÂˇoduced in the sys tem without a formal definition of responsibilities within the structure. An or-

productive for the organ izalion. Finally, the IC activities arc focused at present only on the use of Lhe nevv technologies and are not backed by a general u tiIization policy. The operational personnel have actually widened their responsibilities as regards the new technologies employed by the structure, but the organization has not made the corresponding corrections at its higher ]eve.ls. This is, by itself, an aspect which could cause rather serious problems within the structures in

this sector wou ld make hi s qualification insufficient. When all this coincides wi th th e separation caused by tl1 e elevation of the organization a l level, the effect on the I S structure is such that th e connections arnong the various parts become too weak and have an inadequate reactivity to all the internal and external demands. On the grounds of the above considerations, we can conclude that the changes made in the 1S structures, even if springing from tbe best .in tentions, are not sufficient to respond to Lh e abovesaid pressures since they solve the existing difficulties only parÂˇtially and, moreover, produce more problems. SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS TO DIFFERENT REALITIES

ganization may have hundreds of PCs and not a specific com ponent of the organizational structure officially responsible for them. Software products (SW) are installed, training is c arri ed out, ma intenance is provided, but nobody is accountable fo 1- ascenaining if wha t has been introduced is consistent with the w hole system and if the cost of the operation is

charge of the development of data-processing systems. The above reflections are even more important if one considers that normally the Office Chief of an IS structu1-e is not qua lified for managing this new technology. But even if he had been an expert at the moment of the system's appearance on the market, su1-e ly the many and considerable changes occurred in

The scrutiny of the functions of the IS top managements of the past shows that they are responsible for the activities of research and study on a single system, which was normally set at central level, or on a certain number of similar systems distributed ove1- several sites. Thus they did not have to deal with a lot of systems - as happens today - each of them characterized by different technologies, nor did they have to face a continuous scient ific evolution. Today, the Head of an 1S structure must be able to handle the to p management's policy problems, fac in g, at the same time, the continuous and rapid evolution of technologies. ,Many of these are very special and meet exactly the requirÂˇements of the most diverse sectors of the firm. Actually the swift success ion of these transitions has caused t he loss of an ancient figure: "the technologica l expert". We have lost sight of the fact that, while technology is changing, a ma.nagement remains a

managemenL Still, there has to be someone who has the real technical and specific knowledge in the various Lechno logical sectors! 路 Technology does not change this aspect of management. The function of technological expert, which was once entrusted to the Office Chief of the computer systems. today is no more performed by the Head of the Information Systems: he is too high up, and the technological basis is too ample. Besides, this is not a Lask that can be carried out by a single individual. Necessar ily, there must be a number of persons, because the technologies are diffe r路ent, much w ider and more complex .than they were in the past. Unfortunately, those in charge of the IS cannot perform these tasks, and nobody else does it. As regards th e possible solutions, one should make sorne preliminary statements: usually when changes in the organizational structures are decided, they normally concern Lh e institution of a ne,v sector or a new post related Lo a particular activiLy within the staff. Another method consists in assigning a ne,v role or a new sector of responsibility to the preexisting structure. Il is precisely this latter method which, owing to habits originated from routine activities and from the organi1.aLions' inertia, rnost frequently led to entrust IS managci-ial responsibiliLy to persons not rea lly capable of handling them. Through the scrutiny of the organizations charged wit h developing information systems, one can see that most of them have remained unchanged all along this period of transformations. At present, most 1S structures are divided in two segments : "Resource Mana gement" and "Application Development". In s uppon of these two main components,

there can be some additional ones, such as the ICs. The increased demand for centralized an d de centrali zed dataprocessing, office automation, data-transm iss ion (DT) nets, are at present met by the same structures designed 30 year路s ago for managing systems based only on centralized computer路ization and (or solving re p etitive/administrative problems . A harrnon ic development of the structures in charge of processing systems into struc Lures dealing with information systems

establishing an intermediate level of technologica l managemenL which p ermits to maintain a connection between the top or the organizaLion and its basis . The creation of the figure of Data-Bank AdminisLrator allows the IS manager to meet the information requirements of the whole enterprise (information engineering). Finally, the presence of technologica l managers and relevant suppon personnel clarifies subordinations and respons ibilities, ensuring at the

/ should have envisaged also the conversion of the functions at all levels (top, managerial and executive) .

same time a fair balance between the activities of control and managem ent w ithin the informaLion system .

THE SYSTEM MANAGERS

THE TECHNOLOGICAL MANAGERS

Th is new (igure loses the technical responsibility of the IS manager and assumes a strategic role . Thi s is obtained by

The disappearance of the single technological manager is a very significant aspect and could be

information systems. THE ADMINISTRATORS OF THE N EW DATA BANKS

crucial for the future success of the computerized organization in its new and ampler role. All the new managers have similar responsibilities, bu t in different areas, as used to be the case with the managers of dataprocess i ng. The institution of these managers should solve the problems d eriving from the indiscriminate introduction of new technologi es that have no sector officially responsible for them. These critical aspects should be successfully taken care of by the new structures, s i nee the new managers will fill the void left by the previous Chief, ,vho moved up to the top of the firm. Each manager becomes officially accountable for his division. The internal organization of the four sectors can vary, but in each of them there will have to be an appl icat ion -oriented structure and a structure for running th e 50

systems used in the specific secto1~ The manager of the office automation systems 路will head the areas ,vhere there are more problems due to PCs and office automat ion systems. The ,,vork load of this area will probably be considerable, since an increase of about 30% is foreseen for these systems. The communications sector will probably be a no velty for ma ny organizations . It will downsi ze the increasingl y c omple x aspects of the new technologies wh .ich permit to swap information among the systems . Furthermore, the concentration of responsibility for the development of all transmission systems, formerly su b divided amo ng several sectors, will avoid their wild and uncoordinated diffusion. The whole thing is even rnore crucia l where these technologies have a direct impact on the

Also this field is new for rnam firms. This function, direct I)路 subordinate Lo the top mana gement of the structures , is a n investment for路 the future. In fact , the pressure of the organization leaders is going to be increa singly focused on the necessity Lo acqui1路e information in the form more appropriate to s u ppo r t their decision. This new functi on allovvs the fo rmer IS Office Chief to avail himself of a lechnical adviser in the field of information Clows, during his advance towards the position of manager of the organization 's information systems. Moreover it is t he instrument through which the JS structure can n1tionalize the availability of information ,vithin lhe system, thus achieving the cap a bility or situal ion -data management outlined above. FOR A BETTER DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE TOP MANAGEMENT

The func t ions of the dire cl support staff consist in defining the development, acquisition and coding of the productive and methodological standards. Owing to the independent and rapidly developing technologies, it becomes rnore and more important that these functions be coordinated and carTiccl out by the top. The meaning of th e deve lopment policy is understood as identi l'ication of the evolutionary lines and not as real planning activity, w hich is a responsibility of the technological manager. Th e cen tra lization of the procurement sector permits to opportunely advise the tech -

nological managers on the purchase of nevv systems. This is an essential h.1nction, because the wide range of Lechnologi es now available on the rnarket requires a continuous screen ing before any acquisition. This involves the compatibility with the existing hardware and the assessment of the economies o[ scale that can be achieved. The Information Centre's goal is to becarne a reference point for the whole company for solving the vario us problerns arising in the field of computerizat ion ("if you don't know whom to call, cal l us"). The IC, by reporting directly to the IS manager, guarantees a balance bet,,v een the technolog ical managers and the users' community. 路w ith the introduction of thi s function among the other staff tasks, the IS structures acquire a new element representin g the firm's real world, which otherwise

would tend to develop in a steri le and autonomous manner vis-a vis the rest of the IS orga nization. It could be necessary to redistribute some tasks, which in the past we r路e typical of the In(ormation Cenues, to the respect ive technological managers. CONCLUSIONS The rise of the top's functional level and the establishn,ent of Information Centres represented effective starting points, necessary for meeLing the requ irements for increased info r mation within the organizations and for new technologies. HO\vever, these are only partial measures, taken on ly to ease the problems deriving from s u ch requirements. Further act.ions are necessary in order not to frustrate t.be expectations or the top managers and to optimize the

potential of the new technologies for the purpose of improving the product ive capabilities of the organization . The recent proposals should be in ter路preted as a first step towards a rurth er adjustment of the 1S instrument to this ever evol ving envi ronment. The proposed solution fills the void existing between the lS manager and his organization and, at the same Lime, takes i.nto accoun l the broader responsibilities deriving from the new technologies. Reorganizat ion is rare ly a panacea for all problems, and the solution proposed here should nol be considered in tha t perspective. Rathe1~ it penni ts the IS organization to recover the reference-picture necessary for handling the new technologies and, furthermore, it a llows the IS manager to take part in the highlevel decision-making process. The new and constantly changing technologies must be employed appropriate.ly in order to meet the specific requirements of the single user and of the whole organi,.ational structures. As a last remark, we can emphasize again the fact that many organizations are now proceeding to a new phase called "in for mation- source management''. T he IS manager路 is the focal point of tb is new task, and in the future we can expect to see him as the new manager o[ the firm's information. Th is change has already taken place in many large organizations, since the need for this new funct ion is wide ly acknowledged . Narnes vary, but everybody agrees on the direct subordination of t.h is function to the top management of the company. In such a situation, the role of the I S manager grows again signHicantly, to the extent of including the entire information area and not only t.be systems it uses.

D 'Brigadier General

Here is how the United Kingdom brilliantly solved the problem of using to full advantage the human resources of those who leave the Armed Forces

WOIK :STAllS AGAIN AfJEI SERVICE by Vito Di Ventura~Âˇ(

For a regular soldier , the end of active service can be a very particular moment: after devoting his best years to the Service, he is compelled to change radically the deeprooted rhythm of his life. Furthermore he is still at the height of his forces, has professional knowledge of the highest level and a long life-expectancy. Today, many Countries are endeavouring to use this immense wealth of professionalism and experience through a wise action of reemployment in productive activities, with unquestionable social advantages. The brilliant and innovative British solutions are a clear proof of it. t t he rnom en l when t he lLalia n Ar med F orces ' sysLern is evol\'ing into a fu lly professional one, i t is interesting lo sec how Lhe Britis h military, wh o have a long experience in this secL01~ tack le one of the most dclica Le and important. issu es : the r ee mp loy m e n t of Lh e discharge d servicemen in civilian life. Tltis, in fact, is the " key" thal could a ttract Lli e many yo ung peop le who, a lthough inclined to militar y Ii fe, do not c o nsider going in for Lhat "caree r", buL ra Lher w ish to live Lh a t experi e n ce as an in Lerlud e interesling b u t limited in Lime made even more inviting and less bindin g by the aware~ess that their su bseq ue nl 1·e turn Lo soc iety's productive Ii fc is ensured by a sound professional qualification, eas ily a bsorbed bv the labou 1· marke·t. This wo u l~l a lso im prove mobi lity a nd generation lLu·novers, which arc the nourishment, s trength and vigour of a n ever yo ung Arm y, without havi ng to resort to laws or oth er special measures

favour·ing only the ex it. of personnel c lose to retirement, in exchange for economic concession s . Laws th aL benefiL some but disappo int others. The in strume nt of reemploy men L would be a catalyst for those who have los t thei r initial en lhusiasm or do not have a ny further career expec Lat.ion s and, rath er than dragging along listlessly till the age of retirement, would willingly re Lu rn to th e c ivilian co ntext, kn ow in g th at they can be r e i ntegrated withi n the labour world and therefore be able to continue Lo s upp ort thei r famili es. But the r eemployrncn t programme is also for those about to leave the Arm ed Forces having reac hed their re lircmenL age. As a matter of fact, it is not unusua l for persons who were parli cula rly active d uri n g t h e i1· military !He Lo becom e complete ly idle and depressed when they retire, because the. do not find a use fu l p lace in soc iety, alth o ugh th ey s till h ave their inte ll ectual and p hysical e nergy, since there is no correspondence

be tween \vha t they have b ee n doing for ye ars an d ll1c n e w situa tion. After a ll , soldier ... 01· General, sooner or later, every mil iL ary ma n must r et u rn to civilian life! And 1.h a L clay mus t nol be lived in a "traurnalic" way, but raLher as a nalural passage to new motivations . The dynamism of th e la bour worl d is a c hara cte 1·ist ic of t h e m od e rn world and the Armed F orces, which have always been on Lhc fore fron t of r enewal, can no l av oid acce ptin g this n ew challenge.

THE BRITISH WAY

On leaving service, ei ther for having rea ched th e a ge of retirem ent or before, the British mi lit ary (Officers, NC Os a nd ,·olunlecrs) can avail themselves of an ample support structure, which he lps Lhcm to find a new e mployment in civil ian life. The resetllement's aim is not only that of giving the individual a specific.: profess ional qu a lification s uitabl e for starting a new working life but, above all, it a llows eve r y m i Ii tary rnan to se renely !'ace the passage l'ro m military to civi lian life and to en ter the soc ial fabric without anxiety. It is a very important c hange of menta Ii Ly, it m ea ns reasoning in terms of 'T' instead of "we". One shou ld consider that a mi litary person who, for years, has b ee n livin g within an organi za tion wh e r·e he was accustomed to reason in Lerms of co llectivity, of working groups, where Lhe esprit de corps and the se nse of belongin g prevail over the i ndi vidual, on leaving active service fin ds him elf facing a wo rld , t he "real \.vorld" as the c ommon jargon has it , whi c h a lthou g h brush ed again st in everyd ay life was never 1-ea lly experienced in its fullness . This is particularly true for the Bri tish mi liLary, who usually li ve in barrac ks or military corn 53

--j

The "Career Tramition Part11ership" (CTP) operates through: • 9 "Regional Resettlemel Centres" (RRC) io the UK and 1 in Germany (Herford); • I "Resettlement Traini11g Cell/re" (RTC) in Aldershot;

• Offices of the Employment Consultants of the "Reg11lar Forces Employment Associalio11" (RFEA).

pounds , where one can find everything (cine ma , gyms, supermarkets, post office) and for whom the Administration takes care of all the additional problems. Suffice it lo think that the upkeep of the housing facilities is entrusted to a civil ian firm which, as soon as a malfunction is reponed, pro mptly and automatically provides to send the staff to repair it. Every thing is charge d t o the Administration. In the real world, everyone, individually, is called to "battle" for the everyday survival, every one counting on his specific talents and abil ities. Th e r efore the resettlement assumes a very important soc ial function, both vis-a.-vis society, by giving back ready and qua lified 54

crn zens, and for· th e individu al himself, who does not see that the experience accu .r nulate d along the years of military profession is completely losl. Through re tra1111ng , each individual is enabled to fulfil his expectat ions in a particular moment of his life, such a s discharge (or retirement) is, and is not made to feel like "a fish out of water". The resettlement, moreover, is an additional va lu e (or the Armed Forces, for it acts as an incentive for rema ining in service, since it is seen as the final link of a personal learn ing and deve lopment process ,vhich has lasted the whole length or mi Ii tary serv ice. In fact, the chain o f command should consider the reset tl ement

process as an activity tha t is an integral part of the career and an appropriate perio d of lime and a d e qua te funds should be guaranteed to the m ili tary ,,vho leave aclive service so as to obtain a resettlement according lo their qualifications and entitlements. If the support offered by the resettlement progra mm e is efficient and effect ive, i.e. strengthened by the convinced action of the chain of cornrnand, i l helps to rni li gate the fear connected with post -service e rnploy rn e nl and th erefore to discourage an early exit, for fear of becoming "too old" to slarl a nevv career. T he reset tlem e nt is ,·ega rde d also as a means of improving the recruitment because, by ensuring a futu,·e, induces the young to go in for the military career with the certainty of obtaining the maximum bene fit from thei r service . Th erefore a strong and adequate system of reintegration becomes a fu ndamental pillar of tb e p ersonnel's ,.velfa re, a s tra tegic instrum e nt of tL1e quality of life. Every member of the Armed Fo rces is allowed to serve in tranquillity and security. In vievv of thi s , it sl10uld be emphasized that the professional training along the entire length of the care er concurs in the recruitment and is oriented towards the r e integration i.n civilian life. The present British regu lations which govern Ll1 e progression of the career in accordance w ith to the duration of the service are aimed at supplying a qualified professional knowledge, not only in "military" terms but also employable in a civil ian job, if one decides to intem1pt his military experience. Th e acknow le dg ement of the studies made, the twinning with prestigious univ e r·s ili es a nd institutes, the acquisition of "credi ts " of study, the parti ci pation in school and university expenses, are only a

SOME EXAMPLES OF COURSES HELD AT THE ALDERSHOT CENTRE Denomination Technical Courses Computer Repairer Household appliances repairer (kitchen) Satellite antennae repairer Cable TV technician Installer, electric household appliances Auto mechanic: electronic parts and motor systems management

Duration

No. of Attendees

4 wks 3 wks theory + l wk practice 2 wks 2 wks 2 wks 2 wks + 1 wk practice

10 12 12 12 No limit

And others ... I

1l1anagement and Public Service Adm management Institute (certificate) Adm management Institute (diploma) Service Administrator Safety and health on the job Log and transport Institute Personal files certificate Course for potential Police Officer And others ...

I I I

Computer applications European Computer Driving Licence I (ECDL) Specialist in Microsoft "Office" Basic course on computer Bookkeeping, small commercial activities I Marketing and sales, small commercial I activities And others ...

2 wks 4wks 5 wks 3 wks 3 wks 4wks 2 wks

22 18 18 18 I8

2 wks

2 wks 4 days 1 wk 1 wk

10 10

18 18

16 16

few examples of the ampler personnel "policy".

British troops stand out for 1he high level o( Lheir specializaLion and professionalism.

Defence (MOD), Lhe Coutts Consulting Group, the Regu lar Forces' Employment Association (RFEA) and the Officers' . Association. The CTP is a private agency, within the Private Pa r·tnership Programme (PPP), which has been entrusted ,vith the management of the entire re.settlement process, on the basis of the directives issued by the Director for Resettlement (Dresettlement) . Dresettle rnent is the top institute concerned with the harmonization of the resett le ment pol icy of the three Services, worked out together with the Service Directorates of Education ($DE) of the Armed Forces and included in a .special handbook (JSP 524-The Th -Service Resettlement Manual) . The goven1ing body is the Resettlement \i\lorking Group (RWG), made up of the represen Latives of each Service

process of reintegration has been developed by improving the quanlity and quality of the support offered, up to the point of reaching the presen l configuration and name: Career Transition Partnership. The CTP, founded in October 1998 within the S trategic Defence Revievv (a fundamental document for the renewal of the British Forces) assembles the Mini.stry of

who, in four·-monthly meetings, pe r·form functions of interface, en.sure that the policy is updated and applied and that the various members of tl1e organization act in an eurhythmic way. The primar·y purpose of Drescttlement is that of assisting the military person who decides to leave active service, rnaking the transition as gradual and successful as possible. Moreove1~

THE RESETTLEMENT ORGANIZATION

The British Army tackled the problem of r·esettlement already at the end of the First World \:\Tar~ precisely in 1918, with the constitution of the Vocational Tra ining Centre at Aldershot, which had the aim of Leaching discharged so ldiers a trade (plumber~ electrician, etc.) that they could use in the civilian world, being conscious that the "military trade" finds no suitable place in it. Since 1963, with the return to vo lunteer recruitment, Lhe

he is responsible for th e management and functioning of the contract with the Career Transition Partnersh ip, by making .sure thal the prod u ct offered by the latter conforms with the policy and financial re.sources allocated, i.e. that the best cost/effective service is provided. The executive structure is based on th 1·ee fundamen ta! levels: 1st level, an individual and Unit Commander's respons ibility. In every Regiment (or equivalent) of the three Services there is, even if with different denominations, a special Office, the Reseltlement Information Centre (RIS), where an Officer assigned lo the resetLlement (Un it Re.settlement Officer - URO), and his assistant (Unil Resettlement Clerk - URC), operate on beha lf of the Commander. The support offered Lo the military consists mainly in provicli ng useful information and administrative assistance. When a serviceman render·s official his decision to leave the service, his name is entered in the resettlement registry. 2nd level: within 28 days .since his insertion in the registry, the serviceman is .sent to the Army Educational Centre (AEC), where he has an interview with the Individual Education and Resettlement Officer ([ERO) . Through this per·sonal interview, which covers every aspect of the soldier's future life, this Officer' counsels and helps the serviceman to orient himself in his choices and to overcome the fears and anxieties of rein tegration in civilian life. The IERO .is a graduated Officer, usually retired and corning from the Army Educational Office, therefore specialized precisely in the management of personnel. First of all he tr·ies to find out the basic reasons that induce the serviceman to leave the Army, if he docs it before reaching the time of retirement, and what are

EXECUTIVE BODIES OF "RESETTLEMENT" UNIT &settkmeni /,ifonnadon SkJff'

1 Level

2 years

RCMO

(Military) ~ men~lCa~er..____ _ _......,__ Management Officer

2 nd Level

/nillvillual Eilucation and ksettkmeni Off,cer IER.O - (ret. Officers)

3rd Level

28 days

(3 days)

Based on the individual professional profile, aptitude and aspirations, he outlines the best package and defines areas of cxccllcuce.

He is the expert on labour market. Based on the residence of the serviceman, advises on locally-absorbablc type of work.

~~:r-- - - - - - - - - - -

~ . , 1.=Tr::::.a::.:in~i~.1g::r..sC:=o=u.::. rs:.:e.: s DISCHARGE

28 days "discharge" leave

After discharge

his expectations once discharged. If the reason is dissatisfaction, both because he finds that his task is no mor·e stimulating fo r him or because of the working environment (relations with his superiors or colleagues) , quite often the man is reassigned lo another unit or specialization, or even to another Service. T hi s is because of the need lo keep in service as much personnel as possible. Because of this function, the IERO becomes a particular "observatory", through which the Armed Forces acquire indications that may help the organization to improve its fun c tioning . Even if the interview r·emains slriclly confidential, the information usefu l for the deve lopment process are transmitted to the hierarchic chain, to the Career

Management Officer· of the Unit the man belongs to, up to the Adju tant Genernl's orfice, responsib le for p ersonnel in every aspect. Among the worries about the future there is the one about housing. Many servicemen, owing to the high costs of tJ-1e real estate market in Great Britain, cannot buy a house. The IER Officer provides iilformation a bo ul the possibilities or obtaining a loan, using , for in stance, his .severance pay. A serviceman receives a severance pay equal to three times his pension and this varies rrorn 30 to 50% of his salary, according to the years of service. The housing issue is very m.uch felt and precisely because of this there is a specialized monthly ("Housing Matters") which deals with these

2 years

problems especially for tl1e mi litary. At the end of the interview the cla ta are transrni tted to the superior level. The 3rd level, finally, .stands ,.vithin the province of the Career Trnnsit ion Pa r lnership (CTP), which acts through the Regional Resettlement Centres (RRC) and the Resettlement Training Centre (RTC), at Aldershot. TJ-i e CTP provides workshops, seminaries, employment advice and training, s tarling from two years before leaving service, and a service of research or a possible job at least six months before . T he Career Consultant and lJ-ie Employment Consultant, co n sisting of exclusively c ivilian personnel, operate at this level. The former, on the basis o r tl1e professional curriculum of the 57

REQUIRE:VIE~TS AND E\TITLEMENTS YEARS OF SERVICE

~OR}!AL DISCHARGE

After CTP 01/09/0 01/09/02 Before 2 <I I+ 3+

I s+ 8+ 12+ _ >16 ,

<l I+ 4+

GRT ('')

lRTC

DISCHARGE FOR MEDICAL REASO~S

CTP

GRT

- - '- -~O ~i-dK:_ FU _ I L __ L _____

NO O 20 - JFO - - - -FULL 20 6+ FULL 25 8+ FULL 30 12+ >1-6- -, FU-LL-. - 35 I

l_O - 1

IRTC --I

YES YES YES

NO FULL _,_ 30 _NO _ _,__FULL _ _, 30 YES --1-- -FULL 30 - - - - - ' - - -YES- - -FLLL 30 ---'--YES FULL 30 YES - Fl-JL _L_ _3_5 _____,_I

YES

YES YES )_1E_ S_

(;') The GRT is expressed in "working" days, to which week-ends (Saturday and Sunday) must be added. Therefore, the "real days" for travel documents can vary from 28 to 49.

serv iceman (speciali.1.ation , courses attende d, schoo.l d eg rees), his inclinaLions and aspiralions, ou t I ines, togetber w ith the candidate, lhe package that is b es L s uited to lhe capabilities of the individual and idenli[ies Lhe civil area in which he can excel. The Employment Consu.ltant, w ho belongs to an agency called R eg ular Fo rces Employment Association, is t.he employmenl expert. Ac cording to lhe place where the serv iceman intends lo se ttle, he suggests tl1e type o f work wh ich is most suilable, secure, easily absorbable locally and which offers guaranlees of employment. Ninely per cent of the military find a job with in six months and hundred per cenL w ithin a year: At the end o[ t he in terviews, wh ich las t three days, the serviceman is in a position lo d rm.v up his curriculum vitae and outline "bis" course of rein Le gration (Personal Reset tl ement Plan): the type of course he wants to attend, \.vhere h e wants to

atLen d it, its duralion, its cost and the fac ilitations offered by the Administration.

REQUIREMENTS AND ENTITLEMENTS Every serviceman can join the 1 s t and 2nd level al an y tim e during his career. However, th e op portuni ties and faci li tations increase in p r oportion lo Lh e number of years spent in service. In relation to this, there are Lhree possibilities (see Lable). Utili1 at ion of t he Graduate Resettlement Tim e : the number of days acquired to attend courses of proressional qualification. The GRT is structured in such a way as to reward those ,.vho have longer p eri ods of service. In o ther words, the days ava ilable for the re tra ining courses increase with the number o r years spent in service and this gives the advantage of being able Lo attend the most prestigious co urses , w h ich generally last longer and sometimes exceed the

time a ll owe d by the Adrni n istration. In Lhis case, the person concerned can ask to continue the course using the 28day ]eave granted ai Lh e end of his service, continuing to e njoy the benefits p rov id e d b y the Administn.1tion (travel docurnents, food, accommodation), excluding the expenses for additional lessons or accident insurance. The GRT is flexible and p ermits to attend spe cialization courses o rÂˇganized by the Army or o ther bodies, go to exhibitions and conferences in order lo meet possible emp loyers, work with c ivili an fi rms [o r lirnited periods of Lime , so lve personal problems connected wilh their civilian resettlement (looking for a place to live or a n ew school for lhe c hild ren, applying for a job, etc.). The GRT does not apply to those ,vho are authori Lativcly discharged . The admission to the services of t he Caree r Tra nsition Partners hi p may inclu de the complete package (Full) or only Lhe search of a job (Job Finding Only - JFO). Th e acquisition of the In dividuaJ Resettlement Train ing Cost (IR.TC) is a su bsidy of 534 pounds, grnntcd to those w]10 are entitled to it, as a contribution to the expenses for the qualification cou rses. Th e table shows Lh e requi rements and entit lements for those who enlisted be fore and after 2002, the year when lhe new norms were inlroducecl. One can clearly see that a serviceman discharged for h ealt h reasons connected with his duly is enti tl ed to the whole reset tleme nt package, even i[ he has not completed the req uired period of service. In this case, he can take advantage of the benefits acquired up lo two years after discharge and, if this is impossible o,.ving to seriou s health problems, the benefi ls are Lransferred to the serviceman's

A Âˇm achine employed by 1he Engineers of the British cominp,ent o(!SAF.

Âˇwife . In other words, his wife will attend the qua.lificalion course and receive the reimhursen,ents env isaged . Th is procedure applies also to the widows of the so ld iers who d ied while doing their duty and to those who are compelled to resign on account of serious family problems. For the latter, the concession is on the discretion of the Authority and m u st be approved by the Director of Resettlement. If a serv iceman, after start ing the resettlement course, decides not to resign, th e remaining GRT days are considered valid and, if he stays in service for two more years, is entitled to

the whole package. Officers over fifty and other ranks (NCOs and Vo lunteers) with more than thirty years of service arc allowed to start the resett.lernent p rocess before entering the last two years normally envisaged.

COURSES AND FINANCING

It is possible to attend any course of professional training, both in the United Kingdom and abroad . This means that the se lect ion is not limited to the courses provided by the Career Transition Partnership Agency and conducted at the Reset tl ement Training Centre al AlderÂˇshol or other authorized external Centres . Anyone can go lo any other organization,

provided that relia b ility and professionalism arc guaranteed. Therefore, around the .resettl ernen t th ere is a very active market a i rned at secur in g the funds made available by the Administration. As regards the administrative responsibilities, there is an ample and complex set of rules, \vhich take into account almost all possibl e cases, each requiring a special form to be filled and counters igned at the various levels. Red tape has its price but, once the "paper ,vork" is done, the .soldier receives every possible assistance. As a matter of fact, besides the said 534 pounds from tl1e IRTC, tbe service.m an can gel severa l benefits. For example: food and lodging, i r he can not be accommodated in barracks; 59

After 3 or 4 yrs' service Registration with the ·'Career Transition Partnership" I _,,/'-,.,

•

Job Finding Only

,./_,,,,.More than '"'-, :,,, 5 or 6 yrs ,.,,,-;' ,...........Service?,,..,,..,,/

I I

SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE CAREER TRANSITION P,4RTNERSHIP

.........,/,"

YES

• Attendance of Career Transition

Workshop (CTW) or equivalent

Preparation of Personal Resettlement Plan (PRP) with the Career Consultant

•

Employment Consultant

ttendance ot: • Funher CTP Workshops: • Courses at RTC and RRC: • Courses at ci\·ilian fi1111S; • F.xtcmal courses; • Ilrieling on housing and financial oppommities.

Preparation of PRP with the Consu ltant and information on regional-level possibilitics of employment

I Information on work and possible

,il,

•

...

'·---~--------------...___...-·~-....--~~-·······

available jobs

ICompilationof Curriculum Vitae and workapplicationl

Development of PRP: • Advice oo: .. Career options; .. Independent work; .. Courses; .. Spee. Stages; - • Research; • Connections with civilian world; • Advice and monitoring of progress. ,.,,.,. '··, .... .., __ ,,,,......,.,...·, ......_____........,...,.,. ......

I •

allowance fo r transporta ti on for th ose who must travel to rea c h the locati on of the co urses; a ccess Lo a S tandar d Le a rni n g Cre di t (S LC) of 175 p ou nds, as re imbu r sement o f t h e t a x requ ired for the final exa ms of a n a ti o n a lly r eco g ni zed c ou rse . With t hese and oth er s mall adva ntages , the a vailab le per ca p i ta inc o m e can r e a c h the a mount of 3,000 - 3,500 poun ds \vhic h, m u lti p li ed b y th e hundreds or thousands of persons starting the resettlement process every year, justify the spreading of a vas t c o mmercial n e t work fr om the la bo ur m arke t to real estate, from professional trai ning to financ ing - in a syste m of free competition . All courses are a lso open to disc ha rged perso n nel, but in this c ase the costs ar e Lo b e p aid c o m p le tely by t he p arty co ncerned.

Careu Consziltant

Support in Job Finding is available up to two years after discharge

CONCLUSIONS Those wh o m ust m ake important decisio ns a bout the ir life a re assa iled by ~,o r ries a nd doubts. To leave the m ilita ry a fte r ma ny years in uniform and wear a civilian d ress is a d ifficult step, m a d e eve n h ard er b y the uncertainties of resettlemen t, be it du e t o age (reti remen t) o r re d ucti on o f th e i n iti a l mo tivatio ns . Today's la bou r ma rket is open to "fl exi b ility" a n d " m o bili ty" , meant as possibility of rnoving, a nd no t in a phys.ical sense o nly, i.e. fro m o ne p la ce to a nother, bu t mainly in ten i-1s of new j o bs a n d p ro fe s si o n s . T he m ili ta r y c anno t re main a ncho red to the co ncept of a "stea dy job" for the wh o le life . T he mi litary \NO rl d , w hich is un dergo in g a c on t i nu o u s e vo lu t ion a s r egard s

struc tures, tasks a nd materia.ls , mL1st m eet t he nev,, c hal lenge made by volun tary recruitme nt a n d the n e vv i n te rn a t io na l di mension . I n fa ct , ·w ith c onsc r ipt ion, a large num ber of personnel, w it h t h e ex ce p t ion o f Ca dres , consis ted of you ng soldiers w ho went back to civilian Ii fe a fter a period of service of o nly one year ,,v hich , al t hou gh in so me socia.l c la sses wa s c onsidered "lo ng" , was n o t long enough fo r them to acqu ir e the mentali ty a n d "m od us operandi" typi cal of the m ilit a r y. O n th e c ontrary, the proble m with voluntary sen rice is that it r etu rns to socieLy a large nu m be r o f unp r e p ared a n d maladjusted young m en . Fu rthen11ore, the new m issions o uts id e t he na ti o nal b orders require en lh u s ia s tic a nd prepared yo ung soldie ,-s, a nd th is

A British serviceman. co11.ducl ing a survey near Kabul.

can only be obtained t lfrough continuous turnovers, to avo id the r isk, after a few years, of having to deal with t i reel personnel longing for garrison life. The inclusion of a serious and valid resettlement programme among the benefits provided by the military can meet many different needs and cases, and . concerns ll1ose who lose their enthusiasm and interest along · the way and those who go through the entire length of their career. Actually the resettleme nt courses, even when they are not direct ly connected will1 the working world and are only aimed at teaching or perfecting a hobby, contr ibute to the attendee's greater serenity and vitality; a.lso th e avvareness that,

British "Challenger" tanks pausing during Operation "Deserl Slorrn" in 1991 .

in case of need, his wife can benefit of the same rights, and work for the support of the family, increases his reliance on the security of mil itary li fe. All soldi ers, for one reason or

~~~z -'~tt½tt:?f?t:~t7{f: ~. -

,. ,,,r• -

another, go back to civilian Ji[e one clay, and when t.hey leave the Armed Forces have the right of being helped to take that step. Like any other measure, also resett lement, i n order to be effect ive, must meet w ith the firm convic tion of the hierarchica l chain, i.e. the Commanders who, acknowledging its manifold objectives (recruitment, service extension, quality of lire) should consider it as part of their command action and work lh ings in such a way as to obtain, through the efficiency of the responsible offices, that everyone knows and gets what righ tfully belongs to him . ·w hat is due can not but depend on the length of the time one has been on serv ice; that means rewarding those who have served longer and have therefore en du red more than others the hardships typical of military Iife.

D ~, Brigadier General, 1'4ilitary Allache, Italian Ern.bassy, London 61

Decision requires a complex mental process, in which many recently-identified elements concur and can be enhanced on the basis of particular elaboration procedures. Well tested techniques thus help to solve the problem of decitling in a natural and self-confident manner, also in extreme situations. Therefore, science helps to make up for scarce experience . Simple rules, which even the very young can apply during the day, are sufficient for obtaining concrete benefits in many fields with a minimum engagement.

uring one day we make many decisions. Even the reader of this article has made a decision: he has decided to read it. Certa inl y he cou.ld have avoided to do it, st ill he is reading it, and later can choose whether he wants to continue to read or to stop. Anyway, he has made a decision, he has made a choice. Making decisions is so deeprooted in our behaviour that we do not even realize i L Only when the decision has a clear priority among the many events of a normal clay does it become visible, emerging from the fog of routine and showing its irrepressible vitality. Every profession entails choices and decisions. Every profession character izes and diversifies o ur choices. Arnong the many professions where taking decisions implies a deeproo tecl capability of making d10ices in a short time and with a non-negligible emotional component, there are two preeminent ones: the physician and the so ldier. ln both cases, he who decides involves other people and

determines their physical and psycho logical life. Therefore, in orclec to be able to decide one should know the mechanisms of this fundamental ideational process. Let us try, then, to find out what a decision is, what we mean by decision -making and, above all, why \,Ve decide. THE KEY TO EVERYTHING

\Ve can say that dec is ion making implies a procedure guided by a correlative series of choices such as , for instance: solving a problem by oneself or not; finding the best strategies for ils sol ution; choosing the most effective course of action; stopping the process or contin uing it. Consequently : to make a decision, to find or reach a solution are complex icleational processes involving many factors external and internal to the human being. Whoever thinks that a decisionmak ing action could presc incl from the character and per sonality of the decider, not only does he make a serious evaluative

Jacques -Louis David: Napoleon I crowning limpress Josephine ( 18051807).

mistake but runs the risk of not understanding how, when and why a decisional behav iour is preferred to another. Thus the task of the psychology of decision consists in understanding and trying lo learn the inner mec.banisms, the infinite factors and the env ironmental influences w hich enable the individual to decide. In order to make the dec isionmaking process more visible, let us po rLray it as an end lessly moving and infinite liquid mass. Small particles of cl i rferent, apparently autonomous, sub stances , wi th their own cha racteristics and identity, move within this mass and an infinite number of forces act upon it . These particles, for rÂˇeasons unknown to us , all of a sudden begin to run togethe rÂˇ, aggregate and start to build - in an anarchic manner at first, then more rationally - a form, indefinite at the beginning , 63

wh ich successive ly becomes an image with its o wn char acLe ristics and properties. Th e l iq uid ma ss is t he en vironment in which \Ve live, our p ersonality, our nature as individuals. The particles are our ideas, our knowledge, o ur past life . The complete form is our final objective, Lhe r esult of our decision, while the forces that act on tbe system are our fears, our experience, the possible risks, Lhe like li ho o d of succes s , the uncertainty of the outcome.

WHY WE DECIDE Every pe rson, in any gi ven situation, opts for a co u ,-se of action rather for a different one

according to a pe rsonal ideati o nal pro cess lead ing lo a particular way of acting. :M any ti mes we h ave p osed oursel ves questions in c onsidering a decision ado pted by somebody else; and m any times, if ,.ve fish out of our memory facts occurred to colleagues, relatives, friends or acquaintances w ho had faced decisions, w ith positive or nega tive co nseque nces, we have wondered ,vhy they had acted in that particu lar way. Some other times even o ur own dec isi ons, ,-e -exami ned da ys, months or years later, a ppeared stra nge , a bsu rd or even c ompletely wrong. This di ffere nce of behav iour an d jud gemen t, as compared to that o[ oLhe rs, this crit ical reconsi de rati on of

ourselves encloses the core of the decision-making process. As a matter of fact, when faced by a p roblem and co mpelled to decide, each one of us a cls in a d ifferent way. Psychologis ts an d mathematic ia ns, eco no mists and s tati s tic ians , phi los oph ers and rese archers , each in hi s own p r o vince , ha ve been trying to exam ine and s ingl e o u L the various sl age s pre c ed ing the dec ision , in o rder to o btai n a fi nal ch oice as close a s possible to the optimal solution .

HOW TO DECIDE AT BEST 1t is very i mpo rtant t o underline that a decision, in order

Opposite. Eugene Delacroix: "Libertv leculin~ 1he people" (1831) .

Right. Jacques Lou.is David: "Napolec'm 1 in his sludy (18/0j .

to be implemented, requires an uncomm on mental process in order to remove and overcome the block hin der.i ng lhc achie vemenl of the result. The block is represented by a series of e lements w hich not only in terfere with the correct evaluation of the information about what we are doing, but, paradoxically, they are the very notions needed for achieving our objective. If, for example, someone is a t a tram -s top and must decide whether to wait longe r or take a taxi in order to be punctual at a n important appo intm en t , he becom es anxious, due lo his indecision on whether to take a taxi or not. Let u s examine the vario u s evaluation phases intervening in his decis.ion: the probability that, by taking a taxi, he could make up for the time lost at the tran,stop; the uncertai nty connected wit h the tram de lay; the risk of being la te for an impo rtant a ppoin tme nt; h is state of agitation. All these components (the risk of missing a deal, the uncertainty of transport, the probability of failure. lhe [ear of being unable to make it) constitule the block hindering the achievement of t.he objective, but are also , and mostly, the ele ments which make up t h e subject's eval uat ive capability. The latter, in (ac t, is not only based o n the collection a nd analysis of all possible informa tion, but also on the other options a vailab le for achieving the objective. In practice, it is a question of redu c ing to the minimum th e level o(risk and unce rta inty connecte d ,.vith the variou s 65

Jean Fran9ois Millet: Port rail of a Navv Of/tcer ( 1845).

every time one knows the results of a decision (if one wa its for a tram, one could arrive late) and the probabilities of success or failure of the pr oject associated with them (I might miss an opporLun ity). Of course, \vhat is important in the final cho ice is Lhe subjective evaluation of the risk connected 路w ith a given situation. This subj ective perception of the risk is an individual characteristic, i.e. the particular propensity towards risk. Therefore, those who enjoy hazardous challenges ,viU, more often than others, embark on objecLive ly risk ier actions. This leads to the fact that if th is type of decider is the leader of a group, the whole group \Vil! he affected by th is behav iour and will be tendentially more inclined to act in a risky manner. In our case, if the decider belonged to the above-said category, he would almost certain ly wait for路 the Lram , running the risk of being late for the appointment but satisfying his gambler's nature.

Probability 1路esulLs, and this can be done through the removal of errnrs of over- or under-estimation. This operation of coding information implies also the elaboration of a behavioural strategy for connecting the new knowledge with the pre-existent men ta! schen:ies, in order to reduce to a minimum the sources of uncertainty and, Lherefore, of erTOL

THE VARIABLES OF THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

The variables 路which most frequently interfere with the

decision -making p r ocess are : risk, likelihood of success, uncertainly, usefulness, personal choices, wrong judgements, gathering of information. experience, environment in which the aclion La kes place, psychic state of the decider. These var iables are always present in any decision we make, from the simplesL one to the most complex. Now, let us apply these factors to the example mentioned before.

Risk TJ1e risk is represented by the possibility of being late clue to tl1e tram's delay. This is present

Probabil iLy is the assessn1enL of the likelihood that a given event rn ight occur. Jn the case discussed above, it consists in the awareness that the tram 's delay could prevent the successful outcome o f an important appointment . This anticipation is based either on previous direct experiences (delay of public transport), on indirect information acquired from others, or on personal conv ict ions (usual del ays of public transport), emphasized by the emot ional character of the decider, who could be convinced of be ing dogged by bad luck.

Edouard 1\!lanel: ''A piper" ( 1866).

Uncertainty

The third variable element in the decision -making process is uncertainty. Thi s includes every situation where the decider, although know ing the outcome of h is choice (take a taxi), ignores the consequences of this alternative (being late a l I the same, owing to traffic or taxi driver's lack of skill). The problem connected with the uncertainty o[ the rÂˇes ult is the core of the study of the decisional process, both because the consequences of the act ions undertaken can extend beyond the objective (the taxi could stop for a lon g t ime due to an accident) and because one cannot be completely certain that the assumed outcome really occurs (one could take a taxi and be late anyway, or could arrive on time and not find the right person). It is precisely the impossible certainty of the result the cause that feeds and supports the uncertainty (taking a taxi and being late). This creates doubts, hesitation, wavering and, final ly, insecurity. To offset all these emotio ns which restrain and deflect the normal course or the decision making process, several techniques ea n be adopted, which put into perspective the state of tension. Thus, it is possible to employ safe and tested strategies and models (the tram has been late before, b u t we kept the appointment) or have recou ,--s e to a reassu ring deductive logic (if the tram does nol come, ,ve can make up for lost time by taking a taxi) . To sum up, the degree or uncertainty of an event is directly connected with the knowledge that each one of us has of the 67

action he is performing. The more infonnaLion we have on the case, the more ana lo go u s experience we have made, t h e easier wm be for us to rationalize the event and control, or contain , both our in security and o ur u nce rlain Ly in tackling th e problem serenely. Individual choices

F aced by a prob lem, ea ch person behaves in a di fferen t way. Jusl a s there are not two per-fectly equal persons, so there are not two equal decisions. This is true because every individu al is the living product of many small even ts that have built his life day by day, contributing Lo form his experie nce, his cult ure, his c ha rac ter, hi s personality, his so ci a l e nv ironments, his friendships . The Police forces of the who le w orld know tha t if te n p eople witness a robbery, they w ill give ten different accounts. If urged to portray the physical traits of the robber, Lhey will describe him th ro ugh the features they cons ider more important: nose, mouth , eye s, fac e . I n sh or t, a witness will be more inclined to remem b er, an d Lhere[ore descri be, those details which, by personal choice, affinity or as sona nce, he considers more fa mili ar or better known (nose, mou th, or o ther physical detai ls of the offender reminding him of other people he knows). Ne ver t heless , o ne s hould not forget that the special selecti on of so m e ch aracter is t i cs is the product of th e psychological phenomenon known as "Perceptio n" , a dy namic and active process throu g h wh ich on e becomes aware of an event. Perception is d ivided into two le arn i ng mom e nts: that of aw路areness (elaboration of signs such as nose , m outh, s houlders etc . , r e cei ve d ac cording to a perceptive scheme deriving from 68

personal expe rience) and in the active manner th rough which the perception becomes concrete (as is the case wit l1 an ic.l e nt ik it obtained from witnesses). The sensorial co ntent is a lways present in percepti on, but this acts as a filter for the incomi ng messages. The study of this filter must be conducted by taking into account the re lation s connected with the decision-making process, the mom ent of th e perce pti on and the characteristics of the inc.li v idu a l concerned. As a matter of fact, each perception is a consequence of all the preceding ones , and contributes to the c harac terizat ion of those w hich will follow in the Future.

Errors

The "error" variable is certainly im p ortant in the pre-deci sio n phase. Gene rallv, the decide r makes mistakes in assessi ng and gatheri ng data and in coordina ting information. I f the p hase of a sses sm e n t, collection anc.l elaboration of data is defccti,路e, incomplete or su perficial , the re will be errors whic h can often be fatal to the decide r. Thi s could be th e case of a mounta in-cli mber路 who, star ting an asce n t, m akes a wro n g e,路aluation o n the state of the snow, do es n ol p ay en o ugh attention to the weather forecast, does no t seek advice fro m th e

Opposite. Jacques Louis Dav id: "Army Oath administered by the Emperor, at the "Champ de 1\lla.rs" in Paris, after distributing the Eagles on December 5, JBOI': dewil (1810).

Right. Edouard M.ane t : "Execulion of Emperor M.aximilian" ( 1867).

local guides, does not employ the right eguipmen L or does noL consider Lhal the climb cou ld last longer than expected . He will commit a series of errors of evaluation, col lecLion , and elaboration of data , w hich will inevitably lead h i rn to take a dangerous decision (i .e . seL off just the same). Experience Very often the decider~ in order to l~ave th e quicksand or uncertainty, risk and indecision, resons to memories or similar situations he has previously faced. The decider is reading the menu of a seaside restaurant. He has a quick look at the list of the first courses and Ii ngers over a dish unknown to him. He wonders what it is but, con sidering that he is by the sea, thinks that it should be a fishdish (probabil ity), a food he does not like (personal choice) . Since he does not inlend to call the waiter and ask whaL the ingredients a ,路e, he orders i t anyway (error), because he remembers thal on another occasion he ate a simila r路 dish which contained asparagus (previous experien ce); but it could a lso be a meal dish. He decides to try (risk), also because he docs not \Vant to waste time (emoLionality). In orn路 example, experience was not a good counsellor: in fact, the dish was made of delicious fish from Lhe Mediterranean. Our friend made an incredible heap or mistakes: he did not ask

the waiter or galher informal.ion from the other diners in order to know lhe ingredients of the d ish. In practice he decided under the illusion that his past experience could be sufficient and, anxious to be quick, presumed that it was a dish of vcgeLables, only because the year before a s imilar dish contained asparagus. In conclusion, he was destined to make a ,,v rong decision, as inevitably happened. ll should be specified that, in order to weigh a present action against a past one, a corhparison should be made wit h similar events already occurred, held in a virtual archive located .in the mind. The comp arison takes place thanks to "Representation" , which perm i ls to recognize a fact, an object, an episode, an event, becaus e our mind has recorded it in the past. This happens because throug h our memory (a mass of chemical reactions taking place in th e brain when for cmolional, scnsorial or voluntary reasons we wish to ca ll to mind Lime, episodes, facts, circumstances , names or dates of the pas L) we

store and record actions, faces, noises, words and events . The collection of this in formation develops in our mind behavioural schemes which automatically compare themselves with the event occurring at the moment. The bulk of Lhese schemes forms the ".representation". If we associate a sound of a certain tonality, intensity, loudness and duration to the siren of a ship, we can do that only because we had already heard, id entified and memorized that signal. Rcpr路esentation, therefore, is nothing b u t the comparison between a prese nt and a past event. It inforrns us about that stimul us and what we know about it. But this does not mean that similar events imply s irnilar so lutions; on the contrary, very often the opposite is true. Past experience is only use rul in order lo make the decision-mak i ng process easie1~ not to shape it. In a word, it is a short cut in the long journey to the final decision. Environment The cnvi ronment affects the deci sion-making process . If we

go to a party where everybody is very elegant, or to a degraded area, we wi ll certainly choose Lo wear the appropriate dress. Thus the envirnnment is a cond itioning element in decisions, and often speeds up our choice. In fact , in rusl1ing to the scene of an emergency, we w ill try to activate every avai lable means in order lo mTive as soon as possible.

Emotionality Ernolionality is one of the last variable influencing a decision. At th e culminant moment it flutters, creeps, interferes, advises, suggests , and ranges over all the acts which imply a decision, imparting acceleration or braking, indecision or resignation, euphoria or d ep r essi on.

How many times, faced by a difficult decision, did we back out, and how many times again, before si Lting for an examination were we advised b y our inner emotional voice Lo go away? If \Ne could fish freely in the sea of our memories, 1 arn cenain that \Ne vvould find traces of decisions where the emo tion of the moment was about to condition, and sometimes did condition, a decision that we had already made (e .g. be about to take an exarninal ion and leave the classroom just before it). Ernotionality must be repressed and mastered. I t emerges from our depth in a spontaneous and natural way, spreading over our action w ith its i rnpalpable essence, dominating, conditioning and feeding it.

There fore , when we are about to decide, we must remember that an emotional state can affect our choice . Otherwise we \.Vo tt!d behave like the sai lor who, before setting sail, does not consider the force of the wind: iL is in fact the wind that gives speed to the boat. but the same wind can also shake, toss, ovenurn or even sink it. Emotionality is the wind of our boat of d ec isions and, precisely like a sailing ship, our decisions, hit by the wind oC ernotionali ty, endure accelerations, slowdowns, wavecings, ca,Âˇeen i ngs, hesita tions , about-turns and ship wrecks. This happens because Ll1e decision-making process is not a co ld and formal lisling of acts and assessment of events or, even less, an accurate sequence of data

Opposite. Franr;ois Gerard: "Ossi(111'' ( /80/ ).

Right. Jean-Antoi11e Gros: "The s11rre11der of' Madrid", de((li/ ( 1810).

to be ac quired, processed, examined a.ncl developed. Nor is it a s imple arrangement of tesserae in the construction of the mosaic of our decis ion, but rat her the huma n be ing in its ident ity made of soul and body, mind and substance, fears and grud ges, joy and pain, life and death, ed ucation and culture. The se quence o f' e vents , the gathering of data, the elaboration and assessment of actions, all go thro u gh the fi 1ter of the personality of the decider: T ha t is why two peopl e with equa l notions, when foci ng a problem, behave in different wa ys: th ey judge th e si tuati o n differe ntly and differen t, there l'ore, will be their decision in relation to that particular event.

DEPRESSION AND EUPHORIA One thing is t.o decide in the middle of a crisis of depression, anothe1- is to do it after receiving a good piece of news. Sorn e expert hi s to rians, after reading with a crit ical eye the decision adopted in Yalt a by Presid ent Frank Ii n De la no Roosevelt, conc luded that some excessive te1Titorial and po) itical concessions made to Sta lin originated from the very serious cr isi s of d e pres s ion that .h ad over taken him w hen h e ha d become aware that his illness a llowed him only a few clays of life. In this case, as in almost every decisional event affected by a temperamenlal negat ivity (de pre ssi ve s tate , rea r of d y in g, awareness of be ing unabl e Lo cope, insecurity, inadequacy of

one's role), e n,otionalit.y creates an icleational, co mparat ive and evaluative block or Lhe information possessed by the clecidet~ causing e rrors of ju d ge ment ch arac teri zed by pa ssiv ity or ove1Âˇeslimation of events. At the other extreme, we see the dec ision made in a phase of excessive opLimism. In Lhis case, t he decider will tend to underestimate most of th e notions in his p ossess ion, witho ut rea li z ing that e uphoria will be a bad cou nsellor. Considering all we have said so far, let us go back to th e initial examp.l e, th e c hoic e b e tween tram and tax i. The emo tional state interfered with the pro tagonist's wa il, in full accordance wirl, o ur conclus ion: it ac tually greatly accc le i-a!ed hi s fina l decision. In fact, bdorc being gri pped by th e a nxiety for the d e lay, th e dec ider was confident ly 1Âˇeady to wait for the tram, without any special emotion . Only whe n the t.i me of th e a ppointm e nt got closer, conside ring that a poss ible delay could cause him a damage, our man opted for the taxi. H ad h e been affected by a dep ress ive syndrom e, he would have passively endured the delay

a nd the loss of a favour a ble opportuni ty. For him, bearer o l' a grey and negative position on life, this would have been a furth e r s ubstanti a t ion of his inner m a laise (h e k n ew t.liat things wou Id go wrong) . He would not realize that the nonacb ievement of hi s goal was not clue to eve nts unfavourable per se, but rather lo his incapacity Lo react (overestimation of events). On the contrary, a posi tive and op ti m is t individu a l, rad ia ntly open to life, would have wa ited for the tram, trusting hi s lucky st ar (de lay of the s umm oner, accordi ng to an underestimation of even ls) and h opi ng that the tram could make up for lost time.

THE NON-DECISION The non-choice is a subject s imi lar a nd compl e mental'y to the dec ision-making process . It is an entirely normal act, one of the means of fac ing a dilemma . Why do we c hoose " not -t o choose"? Because a l the mome nt of decision we rea lize that we are not ready lo tackle the problem. This co uld depend on: in ac curate or incomplete collection of dala, wrong evalu a tion of the 71

Jean Amoine Gros: "Cavalry charge led bv General 1\tlura1 t1l Abuk ir", detad (1806j.

problem, incorrect selection of the objective, insufficient information, insufficient tim e for making a decision . Thus we can infer that there are three possible behaviours: refusal, \Nhich i rnplies the acceptance of the status quo ante, since all possibilities of deciding have been rejecLed (l arn tired and I take neither tram nor taxi); postponement, determined by the need to examine more elements, in addition to those already available (I do not go to the appointment since I am not sure about t he 72

prnposals); inattention, \Nhere the available elements are not organized in such a way as to favour a decision (no people at the stop and no passing trams). Jn lhis case the decider has been unable to connect the absence of passengers and trams to a possible imped iment (suppression of Lhe slop, strike in public transport). CONFLICTING DECISIONS

In dec id ing we are often irresolute, hesiLant, perplexed,

doubtful. On the contrary, precis e ly in these cases i l is ex lremely i rnporta n t lo know \vhat to do, how Lo behave, how to act, ,.vhom to ask for advice. In a dil emma , everyone can choose a different way of behaving, but each action w i U reflect the individual's drnra cter and way of thinking. In fact, he can opt for adhesion w ithout conflict, [o r change, or for defensive dodging. Adherence \Vithout conflict is adopted when tl1e change is Loo dsky, and one prefers to wait and see . As a result, there is no conflict, no hesitation but, rathe1~ a concrete and imme diate serenity of judgement. Change is a situation totally opposite to the preceding one, where there are valid reasons for a radical modification (extreme difficu l ty in achieving an objective, jo b is unbearable , distance from horn e , health reasons, economic grounds, and so on) . I n this instance th e decid er h as made a qualitative (scarce esteem , inadequacy, vario us tensions, distance) and quantitative (insuffic ient earning) analysis of his current job , considering the a lternative activi ty more rewarding and productive (determinate and selfconfident person). Defensive dodging occurs when there are no suffic ient elements fo r assessing the change (no knowledge about the new environment, bad ly-deCined earning). Jn this instance, the questions that the decider asks himself are appare ntly r.isolutive in order to exclude a change, but in fact they are not: they produce no val id effect, the decider is passive, undecided, self-clou bting. This is a ster-i le and useless stalemate. The decider could

have: postponed the choice to a successive moment (lcL some t im e pass and then see w ha t happens); delega ted to someone els e t he responsibil i ty of the decision (someone more expert who dec id es and advises); emphasized the favourable consequences of the d ecision , minimizing th e negative o ne s (accept renunciations and sacrifices in order t o have advantageous returns); adopted a super-vigi lance (decide without being a ble to rely on others or on anything but himself). In this latter example we are in the middle of an emotional confli ct, due to an increase in the tension lin ked to the scarce time available, the anxiety of being in a hurry and the un eas in ess of being alone ·wi th nobody else to hel p h im decide (an x ious person). Whatever d ecision is taken, it will not be the outcome of a rat ional and considered analysis of th e impend i ng situation bu t the product of the decider's ch aracter and personality. He will, or will not, change his job w it hout considering the type of activity tha t he is going to start, but following o~ly the mood of the moment.

THE EXPERTS' DECISION An expert is he wh o has experience, i.e. a direct knowledge, due to a long personal prnctice a nd study, of the phenomena of life, science and art. It is him we turn to, to Lhe man of learning, the technical expert, the advisor; the specialist, every time we wish to have a definite word on something that interests us. He is the beacon, the light we look for w hen we need someone to back our thesis, or Lo clear up our doubts. This is be cau se, owing to his cu l tu re and knowledge, we deem him able to solve and disentang le our o\vn and other people's pr'oblems.

Nevertheless, also the experts make mistake s and meet d iffi culties in a decision-making procecl ur·e, and r un up agains t difficult and intricate situat ions that lead to fai lure, even if they can avail themse lves of a wide range of inConnation. ft is not a lways tru e tha t information nullifies mistakes, because the variables of the decision-making p ro cess arc always thc,·e : uncertainty, probability or success, ris k, individua l choice, previous experience, environment, emotional ity. \Nhat makes experts less

Jean Dominique fngres: "Ossian 's drearn " ( 1813).

exposed to error is a gceater knowledge of the spec i fie issue and a customary daily practice in .solving pro blems . T hey have a greater fami liarity with a certain reality, acquired thro ugh a long practice an d per·sonal d ire ct observation. For· instance, the more culture a physician has in his field, the more capab le he is. The great surgeon is not only a professional 73

Th eodo re Gericau l! : "Officer of" !lze 'Ch.a sseurs a Ch e val' in a c h avge" (1812) .

at the top of his career, he is also the repos itory of man y no tions and h as to his credi t num erous o p era t ion s t ha t le ad h im t o foretell a p athology b e fore it becomes manifest. Experts can go wrong because the de c isi on -m aking p roc es s does n ot di verge fr o m the genera l procedure, w h ich sta ns by the in it ial eval ua tio n c a pability. T his latter is b a sed o n the collection and know ledge o f a ll obtainable in fo rmat ion and o n the possible alternative ways at the expert's disposal. 74

o the r li kely al ternati ves fo r ta ck] i ng the p r-oblem a nd re ac hi ng a solution, suc h as : diagnosis (presc rÂˇibi ng fu rth er tests, ask fo r a colleague's a dvice, h ospitali ze for a be tt er veri fi ca tio n of the cau se o f sympto m s ) ; p roj ect (ch a ngi n g t he z one of con s tructi o n, build a block of twenty storevs instead of o ne of l'o rty ) ;- p r oc ess prep a rat io n (de c id ing about m ental illness or relying on a libis a nd w itnesses). In pra ctice it is a m atter of reduci ng to a minimum the risk a nd uncerta inty conn ec ted ,,v ith the possible results, through the rem oval of possible m.is takes of u ncle,Âˇ- or over-e st im at io n: ( a pa in in th e c hest , al th ou gh present in a n infarction, can also be due to a banal in flammatio n of t he pulmo nary mus cles; the crack in the wall can be a signal o f st r ucture fai lure bu t also a plaste,- fissure). Th ere fo,- e, the exp er t, by gath e ring da ta and u sing the i nfo rma tio n acq uired, tries to c ont r ol th e error, caused by uncertai nty, in attributi ng to a result a n imp ortanc e diffe r en t from the actual one, a nd the risk t hat it m ay b e improperl y interpreted. B efor e i m ple m entin g a deTh e gathering and knowledge o f every p ossible info r mat io n cision, a cardiologist, a surgeon , a bout the case being examined is an engineer, a manager, a lawy er aime d at ga ining a p rec ise make an accurate estimatio n o f knowledge of the area w here the every poss ible solution throug h the st udy, th e e xamination and action takes place (fo r a doctor: tbe patient's anamnesis, la b tests, the eva luation of every piece of X rays , previous occurre nce of information at their disposal. Th is c o din g of in format io n the sa m e pathology, c onÂˇe la tecl e ntails the su c cessive wo rki ng illn es ses , familiarity; for a n e ngineer: r e i nforced -con c ret e o ut of a decisional a ssum ptio n, c alculation, geological situatio n w hich per mits to link the new o f the gro un d , m ateri als r es i- k no w ledg e (la b tes ts resu lts , stance ; fo r a lawy e r : judi cia l c oncrete c alculation, expertise) precedents, alibi, expert opinions vv ith the pre -e xis te nt mental schemes (acq u ired e xperience, a nd so o n). The exper t ha s al his disposal specific culture in a given sector)

Theodore Gericaul!: "Officer of the 'Chasseurs a Cheval' i11 a charge".

in order to reduce to a minimurn the sources of uncertainty, and therefore of error: At the end of all this, the expert is ready to make a decision, and the more precise the gatbering, assessment, interpretation of data is, the rnore adherent to the optimum solution the decision will be . OF course, everything ought to be sifted through one's own experience. A negative decis ion is the outcome of: inaccurate gathering of data (not a 11 Lhe necessary tests are prescribed to the patient; superficial examination of the ground; wrong choice of witnesses); underestimation of symptoms (pain in the left a n n undervalued and interpreted as cerv ical arthrosis; presence of water near the building's foundations); the expert's scarce knowledge in a given sector (gastroen t ero logist visits a cardiopath, a civil engineer plans an airplane; a criminal lawyer handles civil law); erro r路 o f judgment and elaboration of information (lowering of vo ice believed to be pharyngitis and not a possible polyp of the vocal cords; cracks in the walls considered on ly a sign of ground settling); imprecise interpretation of the results (glycaemia increase thought to be only a temporary rise and not the first symptom of latent diabetes); underestimat ion (for a doctor: ascribing the cause of a sy.rnptom onl y to the psychic-emotional state of the patient).

NEGOTIATION

Also in this case the achievement of a fixed objective is the ou tcorne of a careful decision. Contrary to the exa.rnples conce r路n ing th e decision of experts, in negotiation we face

the case 路w here it is not the individual who has to decide, but a group a persons . In this instance, the (inal resu lt is the product of thinking minds with their own charncteristics, personality, culture, social roots and different emotional states. Therefore the set of events and variab les that interfere in the decisional act, whic.h before burdened a sing le individual, now we ighs on a numbe r路 of persons, endlessly multiplying all lhe possibilities of cr-ror. The ultimate aim of a negotiation is that of reconciling several

persons on a final objective that co .m b i nes the reciprocal interests. Therefore one must coordinate the single individuals who constitute the confront ing groups a ncl see that each componen l does not feel autonomous in deciding, bu t operates as an expert in a given sector, so as to obtain a single decis ion wh ich is the product of the individual opinions. Which seems easy, but can be obtained only througli an irnrn e nse effort and a remarkable amount or experience. In case of a negotiation, th e 75

obj ective is .m ostly known (an economic rise; a discount on a purchase and so on). The complication of the problem res ides in deciding the moves that must be made in order to have our proposals accepted by the other side and, above all, convince them that their proposals arc unfeasible. In this role-playing, the decisional moves follovv one another swiftly and only an alert mind, inured and trained for that purpose, can stand the pace without making gross mistakes of under- or over-evalua tio n of his own or somebody else's offers.

HELP IN MAKING A DECISION There arc some by now welltested techniqu es, which greatly facilita te the process of making a decision. Of course this methodology is used when pursuing com p lex solutions, which positively or negatively affect many peop le . It is difficult to employ thern in everyday life, but this does not mean Lha l th ey can not be used. They in clude: ana lys is of the decision, gathering of further

Anne Louis Cirodet: "Apo1heosis of the French Heroes fallen for 1he lvlotherland during 1he War of Liberty " (/802).

in formation, focusing techni ques, artificial. syslerns.

Analysis of the decision

It entails the assessment of the various stages of the decisionmak ing process and leads to the choice most compatible vvitb the fixed objective. The evaluation envisages t he

Theodore Geric:ault: "A bugler of 1he Hussars " (1813).

structuring of the decisionmaking process, ll1e appraisal of consequences, uncertainties and alternatives and th e analys is of sensitivit ies. The structuring of the decisionmaking prÂˇocess allows an indepth analysis of t he prob lem , thus obtaining a prec ise picture of the objectives and of the various practicab le ways (one can quantify the complexity of the problem and decide th e possible inlerventions). If we go back to the first example of the tram, the tax i and tbe wo r k appointment, we can struct ure the problem by g iving priorities (one must not be late at the appointment, must ,-each the preestab I ished pla ce at the fixed time, can use a tram or a taxi) thus th e com pl exity of the problem becomes very small . The eva luation of the consequences examines the repercussions (the severe one: loss of an opportunity) . The val uat ion or uncerlainLies (is average : one can go by taxi if the tram is late) . The valuation of alternatives (none is possible : being late means loss of an opportunity). The analysis of sensitivities consists in changing the rates of probability of the events, observing how much the decision is sensitive to the fo ll owing variations : by arr iving late no opportunity is lost (it isn't true because the wa iting party likes punctuality); perhaps the waiting party ,,-.,ill be late (it isn't poss ible , the other party is always punctua l). The decision is not affected by varia bles, therefore one must he punctual.

Gathering of further information It may happen that one has not

enough time to ga ther a ll th e necessary inrorntation. In order to have a complete collection o f the needed data, it is convenient Lo split u p the problem in many lit tle gro u ps, w hi ch w ill. be exam ined sepa rately and t hen reassembled. Thus iLis easier and s im pler to make use of the information and fin d out th e sector w here our information is ,vanting. This tec hniqu e is u sually empl oyed by s tockbrokers and doctors w ho, by examining a great amount of data regarding stocks or analyses , show a high

degree of decisional uncertainty connected wit h the n u n1e ,-ous data they have to examine . In order to reduce it, they tend to rescale the ir data. Therefore, to make their task easier, they divide simpli fy. code and grou p the pieces of information, th en t hey r ecomb i ne them unti l they o b tain a simplified scheme where only the most significant pa rameters stand out . Focusing techniques

They are used to improve the 77

Theodore Gericaul1: '1,Vounded soldiers retreating from Russia".

decider's ability to bring out logic judgements, capable of p rom oting a grealer ability in sorting out the information or the group of data mo re pro fita ble for reaching a good decision . T h ey are : Lhe ana lys is of se parate in for mati on (i t e xa m ines every piece of information and for each piece expresses a decision ); m ini mu m foc using; SLtbjective a nalysis of balanced sensi tivity (summarily envisaging the final outcome by .means of all the available in formation). Artificial systems

Even if th e hu ma n m.in d has infinite resources al its disposal,

Lh ere are situa tions where, in order to imple ment a quick, safe, precise and accurate valuation of a problem , o ne must make use or artifi cial systems . Suffice it to think or the help that these forms of constrncted inlelligencc give to the astronauts in flight, th rough the fo rmulation or new routes. The contribu ti on given by art ifici al intelligence to the solution of complex problems is by now an unqueslionable fact. The systems can be di vided into E xpert S ystems a nd Decision S upport Systems. The Ex per l S yste ms \Vork in sectors where the in tervention of an experl is required. They are p rogram mes that have a wi de

ra nge o f not io ns , sele cte d by sectors of investigation, and are em plo yed when the mi nd's ca pac ity is unable lo solve a problem, or when the complexitv of the tasks is such as to make the p resence of several experts necessary. T he struc ture of an Exp ert S ystem is mad e up by an in format ion basis, concerning the notions speci fic to that sect.01~ by the set of data received fro m the o utsi de and by t he ex pl a nations a nd conclus ions on the reaso ning effected in orde r to obtain the answers. T he Decision S upport Systems, on t he othe r hand, are pro g rnm mes which supply severa l series of information otherwise u nobtainable, perm itti ng to u se them in specific cases. T hey a rc formed by a data-base, a pattern (t o w hi ch to com pa re) , an interface and a user. These Systems are particularly effect ive in solving problems in which the user's data arc scarce or disorganized; they su ppo rt rather than replace the decider's ju dge me nt, inc re menting the decisional process notably. Nevertheless, a good decision , leaving ou l arli ricial systems or exclusively h uman elaboratio ns, not always co1Tesponcls to a good result, or vice versa. Accord i ng to th e common yardst ic k a nd to the by no w fi rmly establis hed conception of everyday life, a dec isio n is considered cor r-cct if it answers th e requ isites o( us efu lnes s, op po rtun ity o r c onv enie n ce , othen1/ise it. is deemed incorrect. Th is is because in daily life, as far as our decis ion s arc concerned, \ Ve do not always value according to correctness or goodness. More frequently, we prefer values such a s usefulness and the interest of the moment, if we do not go as far as choosi ng the ready-made

Theodore Gericault: "Wounded Cuirassier seated on a mound" (J 814).

and tested solutions adop'ted in the past for similar problems. To the detriment of a serene decision, r e moved from en10 t ional impulses linked Âˇwith the decisional act.

DECISIONS IN EXTREME CONDITIONS A decision is nol a lÂˇways taken serenely, on the contrary we are often called Lo decide in a precipitous, impelling way, when we have only a few data , no information, scarce experi ence and are perhaps also in a particular psychic-emotional condition . To decide while we are sitting at our desk , serene, selfpossessed, relaxed is one thing, lo do it in extreme situat ions, in which deciding is difficult an d complicate, is another. When emotionality, insli net and fear prevail, when only the man and his soul decide, when the balance of logic and culture decreases, when rationality and experience do not counteract the fragile nature of being ourselves, probably a wrong choice will be made. Th e causes which lead to an extreme condition of decision are: age, illness, d isa bility, (physical reasons); imprudence, contentiousness, ambit ion, timidity, hale , resentmen t, (psychological reasons); wrong strategies, fa lse val uations (cultural reasons). Most of these motivations are harboured in our soul, but a norma l, averagely balanced person, controls, recombines, reins and proportions Lh em . They do not prevai l in the decisional moment, thev on lv fill the niche of variables ;vhicl1, as '.ve know, amalgamate and sometimes influence the final

choice. History is full of explicative examples or w i--cmg decisions made under the predominance of one or more of these factors. Let's mention just a few cases.

Wrong strategies The example of General Si r Reverse Buller proves a sequence of errors of eva luation, incomplete information, scarce elaboration of the data in hand which, in South Africa during the Boer war of February 1900, at Hussar Hill, resulted in an incredible massacre . A wrong attack strategy, in fact, led to the death of more than 9WY!1 of the

1700 so ldiers e ngaged in the battle. And yet Sir Reverse Bu.ller was considered an ex ceptionally capable, genial, bold and prepared slrat.egist, to the poinl that Queen Victoria, a rew years before, had awarded him the Victoria Cross, Lhe highest military decoration of the Bri Lish Empire. Genera l Buller imprudently underestimated the battle: the wrong prevision produced a strategy \vhich resulted in a crushing defeat and in Lhe death of hund reds of young Britis.h so ldiers .. Sir Reverse, in his frenzy of all powerfulness, had st ubbornly

a nd systemalic ally ignore d the informati o n in h is ha nds . Therefore he unde restim a ted lhe rough ground that the soldiers had to negotiate in order· to reach t he h i II occupied by the Boers, forced the troops c hosen for the assault Lo an a pproacb m arch of more than 40 kilometres, u nder a s corc hi n g s un a nd w ilh li ltle water for the entire day, w ith a temperat ure of 4 5 ~legrees . Moreov er, h e mini m ized th e fatig ue of h is s old ie r·s an d, instead o f mak ing use of fres h Li-oo ps for t h e atta c k, h e compelled the en tire Regiment, exhausted by t he hea t a nd the m arc h , to r ush forward a nd conquer the hill. It w a s a r eal mass ac r e . T he Boers fr om the top of the hill fired mercilessly on the British t roops th al were already at tl1e end of the ir strength . In on ly three hou rs t hey slaugh tered a n e nt ire R egiment of 1700 gallant sold iers.

Ambition G e ne r al Geor ge Ar ms t ron g C uster, fierce e nemy o f the Indian Chief Crazy Horse , ·w as one of the mosl mention ed and cele brated Co m manders, a nd as fo r w ish to e xcel he was second to no-one. Everybodv knovvs the legen da r y Custe,-, the b ol d fearless hero, who stood up t o the Ind ian waves rid ing arn u nd the circle of the 71h Ligl;t-Cavalry men, whic h got narrowe r a nd nan ·o,,ver. B ut r ea lity is in d eed q ui te d iffe re n l. In Ju n e 18 76 , h is Regiment sighted a large Indian ca m p . Although he was o rdered nol lo attack it, on his way to t he battle he a nswered: "lhe 7Lh Light Cavalry fights alone". Therefo re he spli t h is Regiment in to three colu mns . W hil e the first two headed to the south a nd \,vest o f tl1e encam pment, he was drawn in to a t rnp set by Crazy Horse, ,v ho forced him to fight in the s p a ce b et w e en a t hen

.lean Antoine Gros: "The bat!lefield of Eylau " (1808).

unknovvn strea m , lhe Litll e B ig H orn, and the hills . Tw o h u ndre d an d e leve n cavalryme n died ,vith him . Only the state of blindness ind uced by a craving for personal glory, by am bition, by a pa ranoiac impulse lo slancl o ut, can explain so much ineptitude in dividing the forces, in c on fro nt ing a fifte e n- ti mes superior enemy and have himself b ottled u p in less t h an th ree h un clr·e cl square me tres of territory.

Illness Ko mili lary com mand er was ever m ore the o bject of accurate med ica l conlrol than Napoleon Bona pa rte. Even if it is impossible to assert with a bsolute certainty that his vario us p hys ica l a ilm e n ts did c ompro m ise in a de term ina nt wa y h is c ap ac ity of d ec is ion during his command action until 18 07, un d ou bted ly s ti ll to day there are questions a b out \vhy Napo le o n , in so me c ruc ial battles, a d opte d s uicid a l s trategies and prod uced a ttack plans in co ns is tent w ith hi s tactical canons . F a ct is t ha t, a fter l 8 07, the e ffects o f the ma nv hard ships , d epr iv at ions a n d ha rs h co n d itions of life a nd nourishme nt, s uffe r e d in do7.ens of mil itary campaigns, were the reasons for his decline. l;nder the effects of the p ain ca use d by duode n al ul ce r, h is m ood c hanged, and h e became grim , contem p tu ous , a rrogant. He was intoleran t of sugges tions, looked do wn o n his collaborators a nd started lo lose read iness of mind in deciding, precisely when his Ai-mies were invadi ng Europe and his po,ver wa s a t its apogee. At Borodino, Russia , in 181 3, exhaus ted by a violent prosta titis, ·which had been tormenting him

fo r da ys , he lost c on trol o f the ba tlle. At Le ipzig, Ge rmany, a "sto m ac h ac he" le ft him in s uch a state that, w hen the colic ceased . he dozed off a nd thus was unable t o organi ze a n e ffic ie n t and orderly retreat. T he c ons e qu en ces \Vere di sa st rous . Mo r·e t ha n 10 ,00 0 youn g sold iers o f the glorious

Greal Army perished. At Waterloo, Belgium, other infirrnities prevented him from riding and thus he lost sight of the battle, Âˇwhich, entrusted to General Ney, came lo a tragic end. ln non11al conditions he was an unequalled leader, perhaps the best strategisL of modern times but, in those years , the serene

days rrÂˇee from physical problems were very rare. In 18 15, at Waterloo, the letups clue to physical decline reached Lhe i r maxim urn level, to the point that Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, put off the attack on the French troops until the aches of the Emperor had reveale d all th e ir devastating presence. The French surren -

dered witboul even having the possibi lity of fighting w ith the ardour, the force and the determination that in 15 years had led them to conquer half of Europe.

D ''L ieurenant Colonel, MD, Org Reso11rces!Communicatio11. Office, A.rrnv General Sta/T

.- by Alessandro Ferioli ~Âˇ:

VON BRAUN'S SECRET UNDERGROUND PLANTS In 1917, an importanl German induslry, BASF, purchased a vast area on the Kohnste.in hill, in Thu ri ngia, and started to excavate its characLerislic rock (of a very light colour and rich in anhydrite, a mineral useful for the realization of an explosive based on ammon ia ) constructing the first rudimentary tunne ls. In 1934 , a government-owned compan y, WiFo, settled there with lhe purpose of using those tunnels for sheltering mi l itary rnaterÂˇ ials in case of need. In 1935, a massive extens ion and increase of the tunnels was planned in order Lo achieve a real

Dora: aerial photo of Lhe lager.

"sec re t underground sys tem " , co d e -nam e d "Ni l 09". Work started the following year and la id the fou n da ti ons of a structure constituti ng two main parallel tunnels, connected by a num ber of cross-galleries, w hich in 1943 reached the nu m ber of 46 . Th erefore, at the o utbreak of the war, it was natural that the responsible for the resea,-ch on the development of armaments, \-V ho had t o find i nst al la t ions where the production of the new weapons could be decentral ized, would take into co n sideration also the "Ni l 09" factory, bes ides Lhe be tt er know n o nes of Fried r ichsh afen (Zeppelin) and Wiener-Neustadt (Rax), w-hile the resea r ch c en tre, w he re t he scie ntists lived and vvorked, remain ed in Peenemuende. B ut in the summe r o f 1943, Lhe British c a,-r ie d out a ser ies of

carp et-bombings on th e bases k no w n t o th eir i ntell ig en ce service: o n June 22 the Zeppe lin in dustries were wiped out , on Augusl 13 it was the turn of Rax and in the n ight of 17 and 18 August even Peenemuende, the heart of the research o n missiles, was heavily bombed. At that po in t it b ec a me necessa ry to transfer the w hole production to "N"i 109" and Hiller entrusted the operati o n to Himmler, the SS leader, taking it away from the responsibility of Al b ert Sp eer, th e arm aments m iniste r. The reasons for this wer e o bvio us: firs t of a ll the Fuehrer w ante d to e mploy, as ve rÂˇy lo vvÂˇ -co st manpower, t he political deportees and prisoners of the nearby Buchenwald camp, managed by the SS; fur-thermore, the secrecy requi red by t he circumstances imposed a very hard regime for the management of the new camp, per mitti ng no leaks about the fac tory's existence a nd activity (therefore, from the very beginni ng, it was probably

e nvisaged tha t all t hose ,,vho w orke d in the tun nels w ou ld never leave the lager al ive). Thus a de tac h ed headquarte rs \Vas es tablished in the underground structure. lL \,v as rnu11ed "Dora" and ,vas directly subordinate to Buch e n wald . Do ra wa s a Geh eim lager, a secret camp, w here th e famous V 1 and V2 ro ck ets were going to be produced, together w ith Ju nkers airplane e ngines, synthetic gasoline and a new rocket called Typhoon (J ).

LIKE .MOLES The first deported pri so ne rs, about a hundre d, a rrived fro m Buchenwald at the end of August 1943. At that t ime only on e tunnel had been excavated and it w as necessa ry to en large an d ex tend it with more digging and dri lling . T he se tas ks we re assigned Lo the prisoners, who at the beginning d id not eve n have the necessary tools a nd ha d to

work wilh lheir bare hands. They also had to carry the machines inside the tunnels, bu ild huts and service sheds (which did not exist when they arrived), build· a rnad system, a railway station (laying platforms, tracks, sleepers and gravel) and pul up lelep.h one poles. The mach ines that had to be moved by hand were so heavy that the prisoner·s, already greatly debilitated by scarce food and by beatings, ,vere often crushed under them. To tu nnel throug h the rock-vva ll , the technicians employed mines, vv h ose explosions filled the air with dust and amm.oniac gas w}1 ich, added to the exhaust from the earthmoving machines and lifl trucks, in the long run burned the men's lungs. The r·e was neither heating nor ventilation. Work was non -stop and organized in two 12-hour shifts (day and night); about four/six

hours were used for contro ll ing the prisoners, with an enervating s uccession of roll-calls,. Since the construction of the camp itself started only in the spring of 1944, unt il then the convicts had Lo live in the tunnels , three hundred metres u ndergrnund , witho u l seeing the sunlight for months. Some of them, on leaving the tunnels, discovered that they could not tell the difference between colours. These men built two tunnels which were 1800m long and 8.50m h igh and were connected by forty-six 190m-long parnl lel galle r·ies; some of them were deeper than the others, in order to accommodate the factory and the depot of the V2s. Besides the periodical dis in fections , no form of personal hygiene was envisaged; when one's face was covered wi Lh dust, it cou ld be cleaned only with saliva or ur.ine. For bod ily needs, there were some open barrels

with a plank on lop . Those who were compell ed to use them (which happened o(ten, owing to the widespread diarrhea) had to be ready to endure the SS' jeering and were o(ten pushed into the pile of dung. Then they had to go back to their comrades, covered with excrements from head to toe, and the only way to clean up was by rolling in Lhe dust. Drinking was forbidden, because potable water· was kept ror the operation of machines and cernenl m ixers. Work was carTied out in a darkness barely lightened here and there by the faint glimmer of a kerosene lamp 0 1· an electric bulb. The psychological resistance of the internees was put to a severe rest by the deafening noise: tbe roar of machines and pneumatic

Dora: the crematory.

LaunchinJ!, o{a V2 .

drills, the exp losions, the yells of the kapos, t he moans of the dying, the bell of the locomotives were an incessa nt sound track which, endlessly resounding and grow ing thro ugh the tunne ls, invaded the ears and the brain or the workers. It was a continuous running and chasing, an unremitting hustle and bustle in a sp ectral atmosphere. "It was like being in the cavern of a sorcerer" Co l. Castillo , of the Intelligence Service of the yd US Division, said upon entering the

tunnels for the first time. Food consisted in a slice of bread, a little margari ne and a piece of wurst, which were distributed in the morning and had to last all day; in the evening each prisoner was given one litre o f turnip soup. It is disconcerting how the memorials show the difficulty for the prisoners to administer thi s scarce food which, on the other hand, was far from providing the minimum ind ispensable caloric supply: if everything was imm ediate ly eaten up i n the

morning, at m idday, during the h alf-hour break, one was overcome by the pangs or hunger; if, on the con trary, some thing w as kept in the pockets, one risked being robbed. The prisoner, the refor e, had Lo " learn how to eat", shrevv dly rationing his food, trying to appease his hunger a lso through hi s eyes and his smell, and to gratify his senses 路wi th the gesture of spread ing the margarine and then c hewing s lowly, letting the food melt li llle by little in the saliva. Then there were the continuous beatings by the k.apos and the SS (kicks, slaps, and b lows with 1路ubber cudgels) and the grm,vl of the Alsatian clogs, se t by th e Gernrnns on Lhe workers: a sound which would long torment th e nightmar路es o[ the survivors . The workers were mostly polit ical deportees a nd the leaders of the camp tended to interpre t any delay in the execution of work or any suspicious ges tu re as sabotage, wh ich was punished by hanging . The executions were carri ed out in pub lic, \,vi th pa1路ticularly dreadfol procedures, so that they could se r ve as a n example ror all: a wooden stub was poked into the sentence d prisoners' moulh, they were to line up with a noose around their nec k and fina.lly pu t to death. Often, co nsi d e ring the high number of pr isoners to be el iminated , things were sped up with group hang ings, using a sys te n:i of ropes connected to a winch, or even to a crnne. In fvlarch 1944,the Dora camp acqu ired its own furnace, s uitab le for cremating t w o corpses toge ther ; wh en the number of the bodies to b e disposed of was too high for the capacit y of the rurnace, the corpses - after the extraction of the golden teeth by the SS - were

piled up in an external area and burned in the open. The particular harshness of the discipline, exceptional even for a Nazi lager, can be explained by considedng thal at Dora the kapos were selected among common criminals ('who wore a green triangle) and lhat, at the beginning of J 945 ·when, with the advance of the Reel Army, Auschwil1. was evacu ate d , the tormentors of thal camp all \vent to Dora. To secure the prisoners' submission a net the punclual execut ion of the wor·k, the SS knew only one way: keeping the depoctees in a stale of incessanl fear. The camp had an infirmary (revier) lo which the p r·ison er could have recour·se if the ir temperature was higher than 39 degrees or if t.bey had an accident at wo1·k: the med ics were impro vised, and performed surgical operations with no competence and \ N .i thout anaesthesia, but on the contrary

they were very skilled in beating up the unruly pat ients . Those who went to the revier ..had to be prepared to endure every kind or outrage, both when they went there (a w itn ess remembers a Ger·man doctor who forced a Russian with bad legs Lo dance in the middle o[ the room) and \Nb.en they returned, in case they had been declared fakers. Several forrner prisoners declared that in the infirmary there had been experiments on lhe sick: a serum which caused death by gangrene was tested on some patienls, others were immersed in a rub full of water w hi ch \Vas then frozen while a doctor tirned their resistance. ln January 1944, since the infirmary had reached a considerable number of inmates, Lhe SS collected a thousand men between patients and healthy deportees (in order to reach Lhe planned number) and sent them by train to U1e Lublin-Maidanek lager, described as a special camp, almost a sanatorium, but

actually well - knovvn as a parlicularly efficient extermination camp. Other sirnilar convoys left Dora at the beginn ing of February and at the end of M.arch, headed to BergenBelsen: there tbe sick pdsoners, already rnoribund, were finish ed with bucketfuls of ice water en; if they did not die fast enough, with intraveno u s injections of gasol ine.

SEVEN HEROES IN GREY-GREEN On October 8, 1943 Lhe first group of Itali an military internees (lMI) arrived at Dora. They were soldiers who, after Lhe armistice of September 8 had been captured by the Germ.ans and refused to support the Nazi-

Dora: aerial view of' the Norclhause11 factory.

Deportees at work.

Fascist cause. There were 27 of t h em, bel\-vee n NCO s a nd p riva tes, a ll skilled in the bui ld i n g Lra d e; t h e y were immed iately sent to work in the tunnels, Âˇwhere Lhey ,vere soo n d e c i m ated by e xhaus tion and accid e n ts . These firs t arriva ls we re foll owed by oth ers in Novem ber. T he li ving co ndi tions

of our sol die rs \-vere eve n more tragic than the deportees', owing to Lhe speci al ra n c o ur th a t surro u nd ed t hem : i n the Germ a ns ' op ini o n t hey w ere traitor s and d ouble-crossers who, foll owing the King and Badoglio, had sold themselves to lhe AngloAmer ican s a nd deserve d to be treated as such ; even the poli ti cal

deportees d id not harbour a great li k ing fo r them s in ce t heir pol iti cal ide as co u ld no t b e recognized al once. Fu rthermore, the Italians were less n umerous than the o ther natio nals and this made the m weak; they were not ad vise d by t he ir Offic e rs an d we re not spiritually a ssisted by the ir c ha pla ins; in most cases th ey h ad little edu ca tion an d cou ld no t c o m m u n ic ate i n German . Besides, the lMis cou ld no L c orrespond w it h th e ir fam ilies or receive any a id fn:>m h u mani taria n organizations. T he tr agedy occ u r red o n De cc m her 14, 194 3 . Fo r s ome days a n half-li tre su p p lement of turnip soup h ad been dispensed to all th e prisoners assigned to d rilling, \Vith the exception of the llalia ns . T h us, seve n of these turned to their !wpo demanding an eq ua l treat ment a nd, fa c ed \Vith a fi rm refusa l, declared their int enL io n of a bsta ini n g from work . T h e g ua rd immed iately informed the SS Office r on pic ket du ty in the tu nnel , p ro ba bly wiLhout spec ifying the reason of the problem. The Germ an ca lled t h e seven Itali an s in o rder t o q uestion them, bu t they c o u ld noL u nderstand a single word of his la nguage and h e co u ld no t m a ke out t h e i r a ttem p ts at exp la inin g t hems el ves w i th gestures . Ann o yed, th e Offi ce r h a d t he m j ail ed wi th t he acc usatio n norma lly a ttribu ted to tho se who o b s tru cted w o r k: sabotage. (2) The nex t day (Dece rn ber 15), early in the a fte rno o n, the S S ordered Sergean t Lu ig i Li egi to take c omma nd o f fifty Italia ns and lead them to a s lightly raised open s pa ce near a sh e d. Once there, Liegi was told tha t he a nd hi s m en were go ing to wi tness th e e xec ut io n o f th ei r s even comrades, who \.vould be publicly sho t a s an exam ple for a ll th e

others: "You must be eyewitness, as sons of the nation which betrayed us - said the SS Major and because lhe Germans are now compelled to conlinue their fight alone, Lill the final victory''. One of them could noL even walk because he had typhus: taken out of lhe infirmary on a stretcher, he was d ro pped at the appoi ntecl place. After thal, Lhe execution took place and the corpses were sent to Buchenwald for cremation. All eyewitnesses reported lhat the seven Italian soldie1·s ref-used to be blindfolded and behaved with great dignily. Osiride Brovedani, a political deportee, reported : "They went to their execu Lion as real soldiers, without hesitation or· weakness, refused Lhe blindfold an d died like heroes"; ano ther prisoner, priva le Pasquale Romano, recalled that "Ll1ey r-dused to be blindfolded and some of them opened their shirts, exposing

300 m

thei r bare chests Lo Lhe execu tioners '' . Sergeant Liegi declared: "They faced death with an astonishing will po\ver and reCused to be blind folded" . Their names deserve rernem bering: • Baccanelli Giuseppe (s.n. 0457), 5th "Alpini" Rgt, born at Borno (B rescia) on .M arch 10, 1924; • B ianchet Erminio (s.n. 0276), Frontier Guard, born at Tar,.o (Treviso) on November 1, 1921; • De Noni Giacomo (s.n. 0456), Railway Engr R egt , born at Revine Lago (Treviso) on Apri l 20, 1921; • FlernaLti Efisio (s.n. 0275), 5th "Alpini" Rgt, born at Spriana (Sondrio) on October 17, 1924; • i\ilossoni Carlo (s .n. 0458), 74th InC Rgt, born at Breno (Brescia) on February 23 , 1914; • Cp l Moz Ernesto (s.n . 0279), 17th Sec tor, Frontier Guard, born at Revine Lago (Treviso) on December 17, 1921;

• Scola Giovann i (s.n. 0278), Eng in ee r Corps, born at Falcade (Bel luno) on April 26, 1921. Some teslirnon ies underline thaL the r·eal issue ,vas the nonapplication Lo the Italians of Lhe treatment due to prisoners of war. In fac t - as Jean Miche l, a French political deportee, says just ouLsicle the lager there was a camp for prisoners of ,var where, inilia ll y, also the lLa li an servicemen were interned. Every morning they left the compound and wenl Lo the concentrat ion camp to carry out Lheir· work, but one evening, wi thout warning, Lhey were forbidden to go back to the usua l camp and ordered to r ema in with the deporte es . Therefore, their protest should be considered a precise appeal ror

Dorn: original plan 0{1he tunnels .

--1

tunnels planned

IN VON BRAUN'S FACTORY A conversation with a survivor from Dora. Angelo Pezzoli was born in Bologna on May 27, 1922. On September 8, 1943 he was a sergeant with the ''Re" 2 nd Infantry Regt and was captured in Fiume on September I9. He a rrived at the Do.-a lager on October 10, 1944 and was registered with number 03197. He was then assigned to hard labour in the factories of Hitler's secret weapons. When he was freed by the British he weighed a little more than 31 kilos. In what sector did you work and what was your job?

At the beginning I worked as a test-driver with Volkswagen, in a secret place call ed K.d .F. (now Wolfsburg Rothenfeld). T his lasted until the first bombing, which took place on J une 20, 1944. Then T was sent to Schoenebeck am Elbe, to a Corn1e,- radiator fact ory, whcre parts o f Vis and V2s were assembled. On October 3 , 1944 r was transrerred to Dora, to test Vls and sometimes V2s. Did you ever see technicians or scientists in the Dora tunnels?

Now and the some civilians arrived; they were interes ted in the Vi s and V2s, discussed among themselves a nd went away. None of these gen tlemen ever said a \.\'OtÂˇd to us, and I don't think they were imerestecl in o ur dreadful conditions. Were there sabotages, at Dora, against the installations or against the weapons being constructed?

We could not d o any act of sabotage because the tester had to put his iden tification mark on each part; after that, the test was confirmed by a J\1fajo rÂˇ of the Luftwaffe . At most, sabotages could take place in the arsenal, \Vhere the rockets were filled with explosive. On December 1, 1944, al the encl of work, they told me to take my tools with me. I was put on a truck whose tarpaulin was rolled up (and it was cold, really cold !). Around me there was an escort of fifteen armed SS. When we arrived, I was shmvn three Vi s that had not taken off at launching, and was asked whv. I removed a finger-size little tu be, 70-80 cm long, which carried the pulverized gasoline LO the-radiator-motor of tl;e bombs: it. was full o f aluminium fi lings, a m aterial that was not used in the factory. T said to the SS Major who gucstioncd me that in our department that. ki nd of material did not even exist and therefore the sabotage had been done elsewhere. On my return, with no food and no sleep, I had to go back to work. My shift started at 9 p.m.; J arrived at 8,30 p.m. I \Vas called ou tside and the oberkapo administered 50 lashes on mv buttocks, because 1 had wasted t ime ... in proving that l was not a saboteur. In those conditions, \Vithout food and sleep, a nd with rny backside b urning badly, I had t.o carry out the usual 12-hour shift.

the SS to obs erve the n orms es tablishe d by the Geneva Convention (,vhich, as is known, the Germa n a hvays refused to a pply to the Italian prisoners) (3). Considering the testimonies, I think it is h ardly the case to ob serve th at such beh avio ur, which und oubtedly was one of the many refusals opposed to the azis by our soldie rs at the cost of their lives, was spontaneous and occurred in a condition of great spiritual isolation (owi ng to the small number of compatriots present, the lack of Office,-s a nd in that particular si tuation - also of old er men tha t c oul d b e consulted for advice) . Neverthe90

less, the seven soldiers did not rece de fro m th eir position. At th is p oint , I b elie ve that the foregone conclLision is that those brave young s oldie rs deserve eve n i f aw arded tard ily - a p osthu mo us Gold Medal for military valom~ considering that in those days no one could have m ade the proposal, since in the lage r th ere was o bvio usly no Italian military authority(4) . THE SS' LAST ATROCITIES Altogether about 138,000 men were depo rted to Dora; roughly 90,000 did not return. Bu t, more

th an from stat istic s, a ra ther clear idea of the num ber of deaths can be derived fro m a passage of Gi ovanni Araldi's presentation at a Conve ntio n of Studies held a t Salsomaggiore on 25-26 October 1997: "ln order to g ive a concrete demonstration of this mortality, I am going to read so me serial nu m bers and lhc only still -e xisting original card s of Block 18, the hut of the Italian soldier-s. These cards were drawn u p b y the blo c k-lead er, Mario Ma li, a Czech oslovak \Vith an Italia n mo ther. He ha d ma d e t he m for th e d ece ase d of the camp a nd, a t the risk of my life, I su ccee ded in c olle ctin g th em

during t h e whole time of m y imprisonment. I took them to Italy,and now I read some serial numbers o[ tl1 e deceased , in order to make yo u see that , between one numb er and the next, very little space remained for the living. We can start - let's say - frorr1 0166, 0167, 69, 71, 75, 77, moving fonNard to 185, 86, 87, 9 1, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99,200, 201, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 , 12, 16. Such ,vas th e mortality of the Italian soldiers at camp Dora: as you can see, between a number and the fo ll owing one thece arc very fe,v survivors . At th e en d of March 1945, when the troops of the Third Reich were already routed on all fronts , an order from Himrn ler arrived at the camp: all prisoners were lo be eliminated, to conceal the horrors committed by the Nazis, safeguarding at the same time the secrets of the new ·weapons. At first the SS decided to assemble all prisoners ins ide the tunnels for a general roll-call, with the purpose of blast ing the exits after filling the galleries with poison gas. Bu t once th e prisoners were inside, several trucks arrived from all over the region, full of civilians fleeing from t h e massive Allied bombings and determined to fi net shelter precisely there. While the deportees \Vere desperate Iy trying to mingle wi th the civilians , d espite their striped prisoner's uniform, the vVehrmacht entered the scene and, afte1· an argument with the SS, took charge of the tunn e ls , th us thwarting th e wicked plan. However, t he SS were not going to give in so easily. On April 4 the prisoners (about 12,000) received a piece of bread and a small tin of meat, together w ith the order to take ·wi th them a blanket and a mess tin and p re pare to d epart on catt le trailers. So, a gruesome convoy of doomed men set off, and after some days arrived in Be rgen , fro m wh ere the column

proceeded on foot towards Belsen. Those who had not d ied of hunger during the transfer by trnin or out of exhaustion during the rnarch wou ld be eliminated t h rough a distribution of poisoned bread. But the SS' plan was dashed by the continuous bombings until, o n April 15, the prisoners saw t.he Alli ed tan ks approaching, and ,vere set free . Severn! o the r· p ri soners from Dora ended up in other places and died in the most atrocious ways . Do ra had alt·eady been freed by t he British; many SS kept a ve r y low prof il e and quietly returned to their homes as normal demobili zed soldiers. And \.vhat about the scientists? At the beginning of April 1945, when the T hird R e.ich was already collapsing, Wernher von Braun escape d w ith severn l trucklo ads of papers and proj ects, hid the 1xecious documents in a cave and reported to the US Headquarters: h e ,vas immed iately recru ited and sent overseas vvith many of his expert collaborators, wilh whon, he was later to set up the NASA. Some of his co ll eag u es, lik e Helmut Groettrup, were engaged by the Russ ians and hoped to start new projects without Von Braun's cumbersome presence . The results were soon to be seen on both si d es : research and development programmes on \/2s started in the US and the USSR, with hundreds of experim ental la unchin gs . Intercontinen tal missiles equip ped wi th rocket engines similar to the V2s were built, and in October 1957 the Soviets pu t in to orb it the S p utnik, the first artificial satellite, followed some months later by an American one. Later, it wou ld be the first man in orbit and the landing on the moon. We owe all these fundamental ste ps in the history of astronautics - as well as those that would follov.i, start ing fro m space shields - to their father Wern her von Braun and to Dora.

Nevertheless, in order to send a few men to the Moon, how many men suffered on Earth and deep in its bowels, and how much blood was she d, a lso by our fellow countrymen in grey-green uniforms!

D ·:,professor ofLeuers

NOTES (1) Dora was a komrnando o r Buchenwald's u nt il October 28, 1944, whe n it became autonomous w i Lh lhe name of Do r a Lager lvfittelhau, w ith at leas t 32 "un cl ercamps". Two of them were E llrich and Nordhausen. Th e nam e Mittelbau referred to th e gro u p of installations around Dora. (2) Adually, sabotages were very freque nt and consisted i n de laying th e assemblage of missiles or damaging them . They were mainly carried out by politically organ ized grou ps of prisoners, suc h as th e Fren c h and the Russians. (3) Michel: Dora, p. I 02 and Slama: "Tears of S to n e", p .44 . The SS' conscious n ess of violating t h e Geneva Convention in denyin g the status of p risoners o[ war lo the Jtalians can a lso be seen from the [acl Lhat they changed the prisoners' se r·i a l num bers to oth ers starting with zero. At the end of December, probably owi n g also to t.h ese protests , the lt.alians succeeded in getting a separate hut (st ill insid e the lager), rnarked by n um ber 18. (4) Decorat ions for Mi litary Valour are awarded to those who h ave knowingly faced "a serious and dear p erso n a l ri sk in war events", p erforming "a d ar in g deed t hat could have been om ilLed witho ut b reaki n g the lavvs of du ty and honour", setting "an example worth i m itati n g " (a r t .3, Royal Decree November 4, 1932, no 1423). These qualifications are all there, s ince : first, an u narmed rebel li o n against the SS i s ce r·ta inly a dari n g enLe rp r ise; seco nd , the act co uld have been omitted with no detriment to m ilitarv h o nour; third, the act implied a ·very evident risk, to i.h e point that it caused the loss of the prisoners' li[e; fo u r t h : sti ll toda y, tha t. de e d is a great and n ob le exam ple lo all men in arms.

TWO ITALIA AMONG THE HEROE OF BALAKL On October 25, 1854, during the Crimean War, Captain Giuseppe Govone and Lieutenant Giuseppe Landriani took part in the battle, despite their position as liaison Officers Among the brave six-hundred who charged at Balak.lava in the ranks of the Light Brigade, two Italians decided to follow the British allies conquering, stirrup to stirrup, every inch of land battered by arrays of artillery. The many voids were filled by other horses and cavalrymen who closed ranks, thus permitting a new charge. Captain Giuseppe Govone and Lieutenant Giuseppe Landriani, wounded in the battle, deserved the gratitude of Queen Victoria. We are now able to shed light on an event which had disappeared from the history books. 92

istor y h as ap pa rently forgotlen , or at le a st overlooked, a n event that m akes us (eel closer- to one of the most famous battles of all times: the charge o f Ba laklava. Two Italia n O ffice rs , Capta in Giuseppe Go vone of the General S taff, a nd Lieutenant G iuseppe Landr ia n i, of t he "Piemon te Rea le" Cavalry R egime nt, too k pan in the fa mous charge of the S ix Hundred . An e xtrao i-din a ry a nd lit tle-k nown e pisode where two c omp a tr io ts of o u rs di stinguished themselves on the field, were wounded a nd won the

appreciation and grat it ude of Queen Victoria. A century and a half has elapsed since that tragic 1853 when, in the distant Crim e an peninsula, strategic epicentre of Lli e Black Sea, the so-called "Crimean War" flared up. France and Great Britain support Turkey in the conflict and in 1855 are joined hy the Kingdom of Sardinia. Russia has had for centuries the aspiration to become "the Third Rome" (after t h e Weste rn and Eastern Roman Em pi r es) and aims at controlling the ,vhole

Eu rnpean shore of tbe Dard anelles as Car as the Mediterranean, expanding its supre macy over the enti re Balkan peninsula which, since the VI Centur)1 has increasingly been inva d ed by Slavs. On the basis of this con siderations, Russia wants Sultan Abdu l Mejid I to acknovvledge its protection of the GrÂˇeek Orthodox subj ects. The Sultan refuses and Russia, in re taliation, occupies Walachia and Moldavia (July 3, 1853). "The Porte" (or "Subl ime Porte"), as the Court and Government

of the Ottoman Empire are called, (the term derives from the ancient custom of the Oriental Monarchs Lo administer justice sitting near the gate or their Palace), responds by declaring war on Russia. (October 4, 1853). In March 25, 1854 Turkey is jo ined by Great Britain and France, with a total force of 5 9,000 men. Austria, although it supports the coalition, remains neu tral, because Russ ia wi Lhdravvs from Walachia and Moldavia. Between April and May 1855, the Anglo-French units are supplemented by an expedilionary force sent by the Kingdom oC 93

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J'INzdo

Fcrror,uv

-mt'lilarv

Sard inia: 15,00 0 men, d rawn up inlo Lwo Divisions of Lwo Brigades each, plus a B r igade in reserve. Th e Sardini an Com mande r is General Alfonso La Marmora. T he in te rve nlio n o( the s mall Euro pean co u ntry, not d irectly int erest e d in the Oriental ques tions, is t he product of the intell igent d ip lo macy a nd farsigh ted intui t ion o f its Prim e Minister, Carn illo Benso Count of 94

Cavo uc. He u nder sta n ds t he poss ible be nefi ts o f a cl i r ec t par ti c ip ati on in the co n flic t in terms of increased consideration, aut ho rit y and pres tige of th e Sardinian Kingdom, wh ich \vas heavily p enalized by the negative outcome of the campaigns of 1848 and 1849. Cavour feels tha t there is now the possibility of obtaining Frnnce and Great Britain's assent and help to his fe rven t an d

onerous com mitment to realize a free, independe nt and united Ita ly. This expectation is certain ly met t ha n ks to t he r emarkabl e contribution given by the bravery o f the Italian Expeditionary Force in Crimea , wh ich e xc ite s th e attention and a dmir ation of tb e political and m ili tary world . The charge of Balaklava fi ts in this historical context. The event is a fu rther proof of the valo ur

Above. Uniforms of the British units which wok par! in the ba!tle of Balaklava. On horseback, from. lefi to rif!,hL: 17th Lancers, 4 th Light fJrn[!,oons, 2nd Dragoons, Jst Royal fJra[!,oons, Of/tcer of' the 1 JI" Hussars. S1anding , fi路om left to riglll: corporal of the 93 rd Scots Jnfan1rv, soldiers of the 141;, !nfanl1y and Fusiliers Brigade, Officers of' the Grenadia Guards, Royal Artillery, 26 1 h !11{antrv and Royal Horse Artillery.

Facing page. ivlap of the Sevastopol area.

and courage of our soldiers. In this regard it is worth underlining that, at the tin1e of the bauJe, Lhe Kingdom of Sardinia had not yet got into the war. In the long chain of events of the Crimean campaign, the Sardinian Army displays valour and skill, rousing

the respect and appreciaL ion of 路 allies and enemy alike. The tragic "Charge of the Six Hundred" is widely diffused and exalted in literature, c ine rna, etc. Suffice i L lo Lh ink of the famous ballad by Alfred Lord Tennyson which extols in an admirable manner the valour of the British cavalryrnen - and of the films on Lhat subject. At l.h is point one could ask: what is the meaning of the participation of two Italians, who have no obligati'on what soever? Govone and Landriani are sent on assignmenL by the Sardinian Government to tbe Turkish Sultan .. Several European Coun tr路ies have interests - sometimes conflicL i ng in the war. Consequently, the Orient becomes an inlernational dispute ground and, from lhe technicaloperaLional viewpoin t, a ve t"Y interesting manoeuvring field for

modern armies. The two Officers' rnission is part of a fa r路-reach ing programme accomplished by Cavour. Giuseppe Govone is sele ct ed because of his excellent mililary and diplomatic qualities. From the very beginning o( his career he has successrully canied out severa l assignments. He graduates from Turin's Academy in 1845 and participates in the war of 1848, fighting in violent battles. Later he takes part in the repcession of Genoa's uprising. Govone is highly though L of by General Alfonso La Marmora, who considers him one of the best Officers in the Arn1y. He goes on educational tours to Vienna and Berlin. With his studies and experiences he contributes to the reorganization of the Army and, besides, creates a modern and efficient inLelligence serv ice. He goes to Crimea as a Staff Officer.

BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA

Above. Gra phic represen tatio11 o f the positio ns held by the R ussians, and Cha rge of 1he Light Brigade (Cec il Wo oclha111-S111 ith, "Ba laklava , the Cha rge of Lhe S ix Hu ndred", ;\,Ji/an, 198 1, Rizzoli ed. ).

Left. Gen.era! Giuseppe Covone.

He takes parL in Lbe war of 1859 and successively is elected to the Charnbe i- of Depu ties . As a Division Commande1~ Gen Govone is act ive ly en gag ed in the operations against brigands in Cen tral -Southern Italy and Sicily. H e deals, with remarkable skill, wit h Prussian C han cellor Vo n Bis1mu-ck for the alliance treaty of 1866. As Com mander of the -9 th Division, he displays e xcel lent professional qualities, despite the seri ou s m is takes or t he H igh Commands that would eventua lly lead Lo cle feat. He is appoin ted Army Chi ef of Sta ff and then 96

.Minister of War. Unfortunately he dies aged forty seven. Govone's life is characterized by many reniarkable activities in the Country and Army's service; he carries out his work not only in the strictly military field but also in the political, diplomatic and social sectors, always wi th an extraordinary skill . A careful scrutiny of the various events of his life proves his high moral and patriotic qualities, together with a profound generosity and a delicate urbanily. At tJ1e beginning, the Turkish Army is concentrated in the Danubian region, between the present- Lime Romania a nd Bulgaria, in defence of the borders of the Emp ire . Its organi1.ation and training are not up to the European armies' and Govone gives a significant contribution to improve the s ituation, also by pointing out some faults in the defens ive organization and in the operational p lans . In October 1853 the war breaks out and the first border c lashes take place. Govone fol!O\vs the operations on the Danube and, in particular, he observes the battle of Oltenitza, located a rew kilometres to the south-east of Bucharest, and gives sound suggestions a bout the defensive organization of Calafat, near the border of the presenttim e Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia. After various battles, the Russians leave the Danu b ian region. The operations theatre moves on to Crimea, where the Allied forces begin the long siege of Sevastopol, whic h is firm ly held by the Russians. The situation is extremely difficult for the Allies, particularly as regards logistics . It is precisely here that they realize that they need a through reorganization. Among other complications, there

is a very serious sanitary problem which is enormously worsened by a cholera epidemic. ln the Orient, Govone, besides having very good relations with the Allies, improves his experience and his knowledge, especially with the purpose of devising new operationa l and organiza tional concepts. ln October 25, 1854, the British Cavalry Division commanded by General Lord George Bingham, Earl of Lucan, is in the neighbourhood of Balaklava, a locality near Sevastopol. It consists of : the Heavy Brigade commanded by Brigadier General James Yorke Scarlett (Scots Greys, 4 th Dragoon Guards, Royals, 5 th Dragoon Guards, Inn.is killings); the Light Cavalry Brigade cornmanded by Brigadier General Lord James Thomas Brudnell, 7Lh Earl of Cardigan (the knitted, long-sleeved woollen jacket, worn during the campaign, was named after hin1) formed by the 4 t h Light Dragoon Regiment, 7 t h Lancer Reg~ 8 th 1-lu;~ar Regt, 13 th Light t h Hussar Re路 ,,t Oraocroon Re路<rt e, 1l e 路 After several encounters between British, French and Turks on one side and Russians on the other, the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Fitzroy James Somerset, 1st Baron of Raglan (he gave his name to the loose overcoat with the slanted seams of the sleeves that extend to the neckline: he was

the Cirst to wear it after he lost an arm at the battle of Waterloo) sends to the Division Commander the order to attack the heights around Balaklava, in order Lo reconquer them and recover some cannons that had been captured by the Russians. Th e bearer of the orders is Captain Nolan, a cavalry Officer. He is a very intelligent, gifted and enterprising yo ung man, vvith a polemic and rebellious character. The typical qualities of a cavalry Officers are very marked in him. He stud ied in Milan, w here his father was the British Consul. Nolan and Govone are very simihu-, they become friends. The plan envisages an attack by two BriLish infantry Divisions and the cavalry Divis ion supported by French cavalry units, in order to reconquer some posit.ions which had been lost. Lucan, being in a loca tion lo\.ver than Raglan's, cannot grasp the situation in full. Therefore , both because the orders were not very clear and also owing to the insufficient knowledge of Lhe situation (and Lo personal incomprehensions due to a dee p divergence between the two Commanders), the events develop in Lhe ,vrong way. Lucan orders the Light Brigade to attack along the northern valley, which nms between two rises ,md, to the east, ends in bottleneck. The Russians are deployed there

The 711路1 Fa.rl of Cardigan in a hand-toha.nd exercise at Phoenix Park, Duh/in, 1843.

The Bulga n ek river, reached bv 1he Ligh t Brigade on Sep1e111ber 19, 1854. .

and on the two hills, w ith infantry and arti llery units . The a tt ack o f the c avalry Brigad e, Lhe refore, bes ides going in the wrong d irection, takes place w it ho u t i n fan t ry and c aval ry su p p o rt, . At t he la st m o men L, £\: o I a n t r i e s i n v a i n to w a r n Cardigan about the m istake and direct hi m t owa,·d s o ne of th e r ises: t h e charge al o ng the no1ihern valley continues. T ha t d a y, Govone is w i th the ligh t cavalry Brigade. Wh en the order o f attack arr ives , he and his su b o rdina t e La n d riani d o n ot hesitate to j oi n t he B r it ish Regiments in the tragic c ha,-ge. It is o ne of the b loodiest and most gl oriou s e pi s o de s in B r iti s h military h is to r y, with many dramatic imp lications . The attack is carried o ut under a fierce fi re from canno ns and 1·iflcs, co m ing from the two hills on the side a nd from the fr o n t p osi ti o n s. T h e cavalrymen suffer hea vy lo sse s . Govone and Land riani advance on the r igh t of the rorn, at io ns a nd during th e ch a rge G ovo ne is sl ig htl y ,vo u nded . L ie ute nant Landriani, seriouslv inju red , is ta ken prisoner- by t he R ussians, who attend to h is wounds o n the sp o t a nd la te r in Russ ia .

Aftenvanls he wou ld be sent back to Pied mont, where he was to die so me years later; as a consequence o f the injmies suffered during the charge. I n t hi s r egard, i L seem s apprnpriatc to quote an excerpt of Go vone's repor t lo the JV!inister· of War, Alfonso La Marmora (l ): ... the Britis h cavalry did not hesirate to advance. It consisted of the 17,lz Lancers and rhe I Jlh Light Dragoon s, who fo rmed th e firs t line, followed by the 8 th Hussars and rhe 4 th Light Dragoon s, ·w ho made up the second line. The [lrst line had jusi 111oved fo rll'arcl livo hundred steps rlw r the batreries on rhe right, left and fi··ont opened a terrible cross-fire, as \Vas expected, w ith abou l 30 pieces. At (irst tlze

vo lleys of grenades, can 11011 balls a 11d s hrapnel 1ven l lzigh, bu L ve1y

soon a n u n interr u µred h a il o f rnitraille and all /..:inds of hu llers, plus rh e infa ntry fi re fi-o m Lhe redoub1 s, ra in ed o n the 1vh ole B riris h line, 1vi1hout slo pping a s eco n d. E ve ry shot s tru c k a nd toppled men and horses. The others continued their gallop and not a single man 1hought of h olding back his horse. Both the first and second cavalry li n es, u n der fire, wen t p ast the ballerv on 1he righr, dashed pasr the o n e on the le f t a n d, almos t destroyed, reached the battery in ji-ont, slashing the gunners on their pieces, and went beyond the batre1y itself; deep illlo the R ussian fo 1es massed behind. The 17,h Lancers was reduced to a /etv men, the 4 1h Dragoons \,V(L'i more tha n halved ... the_v formed a mass of h undred horses and rushed 011 Llze ene111_v cavalry and infantry~ sma s hed them and withdrew , u nder 1/ze heavv fire st ill pouring fro m the redoubts. Th e bau ery c ove ring the {ro 111 ,vas unman n ed and red uced Lo silence: 1he 0 11e o n rhe le ft , meanwhile, had been dislodged by a French sq uadron of Chasseurs d 'Afrique which, sufrering s ome

U11loadi11p, Briiis/z supplies of Balaklava.

the port

losses had charged on rhe hill, hacking the battery~, escorts. This charge of the British light cavalry is rare lO the point of being unique: without a pwpose af1d no result, ii was neverrheless an admirable proof of lhe solicliry of the British cavalry, but most of the force was lost... Lieu tenant Lanclriani of the "Piemonte Reale"Cavalry Regiment and myself were on the right o( the first line during the charge, bul could not witness the last part, since Ll Landriani fell w the ground about 400 or 4.50 steps fi-0111 the e,zemy battery, his horse 1,,vas hurt or dead and he himself was probahly wounded. As for myself; 50 or JOO sleps farther on, l had my horse injured and was slightly w ounded i11 one shoulde,~ Ll Lanclriani was le{! on the fi'elcl an.cl was probabl.v taken prison.er by the enemy. I was able to retreat on fool. Afterwards, the order of the charge was severely reproved, hut certainly no! those e,,:cellent troops. Cap win Nolan, of the Hussars, author ofa treatise on cavalry, who is blamed for that erro,; was struck. by a bullet in the heart after a few steps. It is also useful to quote parL of the letter written on November 15 by Govone to his friend .M ajor Incisa Beccaria (2) : ... a charge made under the cross-fire o{ 30 guns, where Lan.driani of the "Piemonte Reale" and 1, who had come clown inlo the valley, charged on the right of the firs! line! The unfortunate Landriani ,.vas wounded and taken prisoner; l was unable to help him, since I was also hit l 00 steps fi,1.rther, 300 sreps fi'orr1. the fi,011.L hattery, and risked being run over by 1he second line and taken prisone1~ Therefore I had to retreat on fool , m.y horse was injured and fell for the seccmd time, my left shoulder hurl for a shot thal

LOok aivay parl of my epaulets, and I had lost my cap, probably because of a grapeshot. I was very -sorry for Landriani: I sa,.v him laying on rhe ground, with a sm.iling expression., hut I could neiLher approach nor help hirn. This episode strikes the British so much that Qu ee n Victoria awards Govone the "Order of t.he Bath", an order or knighthood crealed by George I in 1725. On November 5, among the General Staff's suite of General Frarn;ois Canrobert, Commander at t he time of the French expeditionary Corps, Govone takes part in the battle of Inkerrnan, near Sevastopol. Late,路 he observes the fir路st par路t of the siege. Govone has the functions of observer, adviser to the Su ltan and Sardinian-P ied montese representative to the Allies. ln these capacities he gives a largely positive image of himself and the Sard inian Army, strengthened by the courage shown at Balaklava and in other battles. During his stay in the East, be sends to the War Minister; General Alfonso La Marmora, about a hundred letters, w ith analyses,

reports and very important information on the operations under way. They are very carefully examined, with great interest, ,dso at the Court. On account of his qualilies, the Sultan awards him the "Medal oC Si lis tria" and the "Order of the Mejidie", two important Turk ish decorations. Furthermore , he offers him t he appointment of Chief of Staff o r the Turkish Army wi Lh the rank of General. Dutifully, Govone asks La Marmora for Lhe necessary authori1.ation . The Minister refuses but, al the same time , promotes him to the rank of Maj01~ Successi ve ly Govone returns home and works at the organization of lhe Sardinian Expedit.ionary Force to Crimea. Du r路ing the campa ign, as Staff Officer of the Commancler- in Chief, Gen . Al fonso La Mar rnora, he participates in several battles, conducted by the Sard in ian -Piedmontese and b y the Allies. A devastating cho lera epidemic strikes the Armies . About 3000 men die. Among the mosL distinguished victims: Marshal

The Charge o{ the Light Brigade: deiail of a scene near the ba//ery un the Don (Warner) .

Ri 0 ht "B:rsa.gliere" at the Chenwya.

Below The / 1rst 1111.iforms uf the "Bersaglieri".

Saint-Arnaud, Commander of the Fre nc h co ntingent, who d ies on Sep t embe r 29, 18 54 . Gen e ra l Alfonso La Mam 1ora dies on June 7, 1855, after a reco nnaissance of th e Kamara c a m p, to de vis e m e a su r es fo r c o p ing ,v ith t h e e pidem ic. On June 28, 1855, a lso Lord R a gla n, the Britis h Co mmande1~dies. T he ba ttle of Chernaya (Augus t 16, 1855 ) a n d t he general atta ck o n Sevas topo l turn out well for the Allies; but the conquest of Kars by the Russ ians (Octo ber 25, 18 55) saves their national h on o ur a nd speeds up the peace negotiations. On Janua ry 16, 185 6, the Czar a ccepts th e peace term s a nd on Fe bruary 1, in Vien na, a protocol is signed . lt will serve as a b as is fo r th e f inal P e ace Tre a ty, initia lled o n March 30, 1856, a t the Congress of Paris. The treaty s anctio ns the independence a nd territoria l integiity of the Ottom an Empire, proh ibits the transit o f warsh ips in the Straits, limits the Russian and Turkis h a rma m ents o n the Blac k Sea a nd procla ims the autonomy of the Princ edo ms of Molda via and \Valachia, un der Otto man sovereignty. Thus , once more, the Russian Ern p ire h a s t o r en o unce i ts c entu rie s -ol d a spiration (or a n o utlet lo the Mediterranean .

D ,Âˇ,Historian and Researcher

NOTES (1 ) Govone's rep ort to Lhe Mi n ister of

War , Ocrober 27 , 1854, in : Um berto G o von e , G e n Giu se p pe G ovon e , rrag mcn ts o f m e mories, Turin 1902, p .80. (2) Letter to M.aj . l ncisa Beccaria in: Uberto Covo ne, ibidem, p.82.

100

great assemblage of colours, sounds and suggestions merged in an aclmirnble synthesis of past, present and future. High ternpenttures, not only on account of the torrid heat, more vigorous than usual, but also, and mainly, for the emotional warmth shown by the generous and hospitable people of Trinacria and its fascinating capital, millenary meeting point of civilizations and cultures. From April 30 to May 4, Palermo was in fact the capital of all the Italian soldiers and the echoes and sounds of the "Italian Army Day" expanded all over Sicily, with the concerts of the Band of the Army and the itinerant presentation of the volume on "Vespri Siciliani", Lhe first large-scale intervention of modern times, carried ou I. together ,vith the Police forces. The operation lasted from July 1992 to June 1998 and was the turning point between the old and the nevv concept of employment of the Army.

104

The reasons linking Palermo and Sicily to our soldiers are manifold: th.is wonderful island is a great potential recruitment basin, and this is also favoured by the great fondness of the Sicilians for our Service and by

their contribution to the nation's Risorgimenlo.

The event was further highlighted by Lhe presence of numerous military, civilian and religious auLhorilies. We wish to mention, among the distin-

guishecl guests, th e Hon . Salvatore Cic u, Under-Secretary of Defence; Cardinal Salvatore De Giorgi, Arch bishop of Pale r mo; Gen . Roland o Mosca Mos.chini, Defence Chief of Staff; Ll. Gen. GianfTanco Ottogall i, Army Chief of Staff; L t. Gen. Roberto Speciale, Deputy Army CoS; the Hon. Francesco Cascio, Regional Councillor for Tourism; the Hon . Diego Cammara ta, Mayor o f Palermo; Dr Gianfranco Romagnoli, State Comm issioner for Sicily; Senator Dante Vi,.zini, Dr Re nato Profi Ii, Prefect of Palerrno; the Hon. Sa lvatore Cardinale. BAND CONCERT AT THE OPERA HOUSE

The first. appo i ntrnen l rook place in Rome, on April 28, at the Opera House for- a meeting with the immorta l music tha t opened the celebratio ns . The Band of the Army, wi t h its performance, c onfirmed to be worthy of its fame . The concert was attended by VIPs o( the political, religious, m ili tary, intellectu a l and showbusiness wor-l d , who g r ea tly

105

concer t activi ty in the most import ant cities and t he a tres, both in Ital y and a broad. Furthermore, the Band performs an i mport a nt educat ional funclion by or·ganizing concerts and l essons in its own a u d iLorium, in coll a boration with c o n servato ries an d academics . Besides, it organizes the tests for the S tale -corn pet it ions for appointing con d uctor s and deputy -con d uc t ors of other m il i ta ry bands. Th e B a nd produces a considera ble number of record s a n d frequen t ly part icip a t es i n rad i o and televisi o n p rogrammes . S ince 1997 t h e Band of t h e Ital ian Army has been conducted bv Lt. Col. Fulvio Creux.

appreciated th e music and i ts execu Lio n. T he gues t s w e re welcomed by the Army Chie f o[ Staff. T h e rep e rtoire, presented by Michele M irab e ll a , w a s a m asterly com b inati on o[ com memorative m a rches a nd hymns, together with lyrics a nd sy mp hon ies by Verdi , Bellin i, Ross ini, Tosti, Don izelli, :'-Jovaro Brahms, Beethoven, St ravin s k y and Respigh i. The solo ists, Ri ta Cammara n o , s o p rano , and E m ilio Guidotti , bass, together with the choirs of the "Alpini " an d t he "Sassari" B ,·igacle , e a rned grea t praise. The B a n d of t h e Army \N as fo u nded o n Februa ry 1, 1964. It cons is ts o f 102 members , a 11 :--Jon-commissioned O ffi cers and music masters, most o f them gradua tes from the Conservatory and recruited thr o ugh na ti onal c omp e ti t ion s. Its conductors 106

were Am leto Lac erenza (19 6 41972), Francesco Sgritta ( 19721976), Marino B anolo ni (19 7619 94) and D orn e n ico Cavallo ( 1994 -1 9 97) . The Band has n u merous tasks, going from its insti tutiona l d uties (Swearing-in ceremonies, Honour G uard at th e "Quiri nale" Pres i dent ia l Palace, m ili tary honours to Heads of S ta te and Governmen t o n official visits) to an intense

THE PRESS CONFERENCE, AN INTRODUCTION T he Garrison Officer's Club of Pia zza S ant 'Oliva, in the h isto ri c al centre of Palermo , is an idea l "osmot ic" meeting point bet\veen the c ivilian and Lhe m il itary ,vorlds , a n d this was precisely the p lace w h ere, on Apr·il 30, a p ress c onference \vas he ld wiLh lhe purpose o r

MESSAGE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF DEFENCE TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF In today's festivity, in which the Italian Army celebrates, with legitimate pride, the anniversary of its constitution, let my personal warm greeting and that of the Armed Forces go to the Officers, Noncommissioned Officers, Enlisted Men and Civilian Personnel. In the 142 years elapsed from that distant May 1861, the Army has been a protagonist in the Nation's life, with the fundamental task of ensuring for the Country the primary good of security. In this long journey, in the critical moments of conflict or in the dramatic situations of the many national emergencies, splendid pages of military and civil valour have been written, as witnessed by the highest decorations awarded to the Flags and to individual servicemen. Aware of the importance of this luminous legacy for the Armed Forces and for Italy, we address a heartfelt and reverential thought to those who sacrificed their life in the execution of their duty. On the strong and stable basis of its traditions and values, the Army has built the structures of a modem and dynamic operational reality, constituted by outstanding human and technical capabilities, which are essential in order to operate successfully in the present difficult and increasingly intricate scenarios. In these scenarios the military instrument is more and more a protagonist, with its participation in the numerous initiatives of the international community, aimed at securing peace and stability in many regions of our planet, where situations of crisis and conflict produce devastating consequences for the local populations and severe repercussions at world level. The many Army men and women who today· operate with the enthusiasm, dedication and professionalism that have always distinguished them, in Albania, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in FYROM, in Afghanistan and in many other Countries, decisively contribute to the many successes obtained by the Armed Forces in this ulterior frontier of national security, which is an integral part the international security. In this festive day, Seamen, Airmen and Carabinieri look with gratitude and admiration to the exceptional contribution that the Army gives to the Armed Forces and to Italy and express, through my words, their best auspicious wishes.

General Rolando Mosca Moschini explaining in detail the prograrnm e of the celebrations . The representatives of the rneclia arrived in great numbers, wishing to hear, i n the best possible way, about an event that had been awaited for- years . The guests were welcomed by Lt. Gen. Roberto Speciale, Maj . Gen. Giorgio Ruggieri, Chief o r the Genera l Affairs Office of the Army Staff and by Maj. Gen . Bruno Petti, Military Com mander of S ici ly. During the meeting wiL}1 the journalists, Lt. Gen . Speciale said that "after Rom.e, Naples, Turin and Trieste, this year is Palermo's turn to celebrate lhe national Army Day. 1 {111'/ very pleased to be here, as a Sicilian and a former Cornmander of the "Aosta" Brigade, the resolute Sicilian ivlajor Unit ·which in 1992 started Operation "Vespri Siciliani". "The

arrny - went on General S peciale - comes from a far-off tinw. In 142 years of history, vve have travelled a long way. Important changes are now under way, but they respect our root.~. In an period such as the presenl, 1,vhen our Service is becoming progressively profes sional, it our duly LO remember the contribution 1-nade by the conscripts, a category which in 2005 will cease to be in our ranks. I shall always be grateful to the young conscripls who enabled the Italian Arrny to stand out, at hom.e and in the 1.vorld in general. Here in Palenno, on the occasion of this year'.<; celebrations, we shall see the first performance - after the presentation that took place last year in Rome - of the recenlly instituted military carousel, an exhibition 1vhich, I am certain, Sicily will appreciate". The Mayor of Palermo, the

Hon. Diego Cammarata, welcomed all participants and expressed his gratitude for the choice of Palermo, confirming Lhe reasons ror a bond strengthened by time. In the Mayor's words "the history of the Italian Anny and its relation with Sicily and Palenno is made not only of brave deeds and real heroism, but also of everyday occurrences. How could we forget the feats o{ the Risorgimento, the disastrous events - fi·om the tragic earthquakes of ivlessina and Belice to lhe eruptions of Mt Etna and Srromboli - and the Army 's participation in the fight against the M.a/1.a and againsl thirst? The lauer unfortunate evenr is also /1.dl of symbolic meanings, since water has been for decades one of the most diffi.culL problems for Sicily. At rhe moment, the construction of a water pipe from the Rosa w1.arina darn to Palenno is vvell 107

u nder ,.v ay. Fo r alm ost a century and a half w e have been pursuing, together wirh rhe 1lnny, a co111.rno11 objective: Lo ensure the social and civ il b0 row th o fÂˇ o u r isla n d ' s afeguarding, a l th e same ti me, democracy and liberty. Th e Arm y Day celebrations are a ver:v good opportunity ro m.ake all citizens, including the _vounger ones, a1vare o f the c ou rage, th e sp irit of s acrifice or the members o f our A rmy : O ffi c ers, N u n -co111111is sioned Officers a11d 'froops. For all of us, rep rese n la l ives o f th e lnstirurions or com m on citizens, rhe Arm y of today is a bearer of rhe values o f peace, Toleran c e an d coex.istence, ivhich. have made our Co u11 rry g rea r and f ree . M_v part ici pa t ion in Lhis eve nt as Mayor of Palermo, but also as a citi zen, is not a fo rma l acr, but rather a s ign o f the f ull and convinced appreciation of the city for the role and the activity of the fwlian Army". A suggestive rno m en l was the d irect video p hone connection \Vith the Italian Cornmander-s in 108

the Theatres of ope rations where Italy is present \Vith its personnel (8000 servicemen) to protect the peop les' r ights.

Brig. G e n . Giorg io B attisti , Co mmander of th e Ha l ia n Contingenl in Afghanistan, said that o ur p ersonnel in the area is

03/03

ARMY GENERAL STAFF ADDRESS TO THE AR1\1Y

qfficers. No11 -com111issioned Officers. Vo/wueers. Conscript Soldiers. Ciriiia11 Personnel' 011 !vlay 4. 1861. 1he lraiia11 Armv receil'(td i11 ifs ro11ks. 1111der rhe Tricolour. 111e11 and rmiis coming ji-0111 even- parr of //air. 0/ien diJ.fi,re111 as regards cuii11re. traditions a11d educmio11, ilrey ji11md. ,mired by a single ideal, 1heji1rce a11d e111l111siasm io co111p/e1e 1/re ,rork sraned br the Fou11di11g Farhers. defi11i1ively ajjirming the values of'the Risorgi111e1110.

In 1/w diUicu/; and lahorious process of 1he Coumrv 's u11i/icwio11, 1/,e Arm_,. rose 10 the role of deme111 of aggregation a11d di/li1sio11 of ethical and moral pri11cipies. from then 011, our SerFice. ,d,erever ii ,ras called 10 opera re. !,as alwavs made loyal(F. lwnour c,nd spirit of sacrijil'e its dis1i11c1ire .fi-:aiures. /11 11·ar. _figl11i11g al~o c,t 1'1e cost 1fsacrif,ci11g some ()_{ irs hest men. and i11 peace. declaring 11·iih}im·e irs /ovr.1/ir to 1/ie i11s1itu1ions and inten,enin,~ 10 help ihe 11eedies1 011es. Today. 1/re Co11111rr comi1wes lo ask its me11 1111d 11·ome11 in ar111s lo be bearers of 1hose values. At home and abroad. srfeguardiug securi~r and ji·eedom or swpping bloo<~r P,enocides. ;he men and 11·omen in rmifor111. silen1/_1• /ml ,virh 1/,e co11"ictio11 0{1hose ,dw k11ow rlwr the_,, operate in tire 1111111e and 011 belwlf'o/ a superior i111eres1. ennoble ilre prestige of 1he Na1io11 more and more. fo ail ,,(ro11, Officers. No11-co111missionerl O!Jh:ers. Volu111eers and Conscrip; Soldiers, Civilian JJersonnel. my thanks fi1r 1rhat you hare done, are doing aud iw'fl do for the wey'(,re l~/' our Couno:v, wgether trith my 1n'shes <?f.'he hesl offorfune 10 _rou and your families.

engaged in fighting against international tcrrorisrn by means of patrols, surveillance and contn:i l of the territory. "v\le are not - he explains - an occupation army. Our inlervenrio11 in Afghanistan was re que;:;ted by the local Government which wanted the presence of military forces fi'o111.. the West. Today ·we can say that the rela.l ions with the civilian population a re very po;:;ll zve. Certainly there are risks, but we must guarantee rhe return to normality and create th e best security conditions in the cities, also within the wider framework of the fight against terrorism". Brig. Gen. Claudio Tosi leads the lnLernational Contingent in Albania "We have reached 111.anv objectives - he points out confirmed by the moral, economic and social growth of the Country of the Eagles". Col. Antonello Vitale, Deputy Commander of the Italian forccs in Kosovo, is equally proud of his work: "The Army ha;:; been here

l.ong !he 1/;e flalia11 Arm,,. long lil'e Italy! lio111e. Mar 4. 2()03

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since 1999, in order to ensure security and stabilitv, in the name o( tolerance and ,nutual respect. The results are under everybody'.<; eyes " . Col.Marcello Bellacicco is the Commander of the Italian ConLingent in Bosn ia, our first out-of-area mission. "The terrilOry - he says - has been ravaged by a bloody and indiscrirninate war, but at last enmities a.re subsiding. Today our militarv efforts are less dem.an.ding bul a constant vigilance, with patrols a.11d frequent contacts with civilians, zs still necessary".

THE ARMY'S HISTORY ASSEMBLED IN AN INTERESTING EXHIBITION ln the solemn Mirrors Room of the "Giuseppe Garibaldi" Theatre there were people of all ages, but the young ·were the ones who left a special mark on the occas ion, confirming a trend Lhat somehovv had already been felt: the interest of Lhe younger ge nerations in recovering the old memories. One or the most famous centres of Palermo's culture housed, from May 2 to May l J, the exhibition "The History of the Army" . The 109

d isp lay traced a n evoluti onary path, supported by documents, relics, photographs , d rawings, arms, unifo1n1s and models from m ilitary museums and institutions, and underlined t he Sicil ian military traditions. A set of large tables depicting the Sicilian coasts assisted the vis itors in understanding th e c ontents of the successive sections . Th e in teresting description was taken from Tib ur7.i o Span nocc hi 's wo rk "Descripcion de las marinas de todo el Reino de Sicilia" (Description of the coasts of the whole Kingdom of Sicily), p ublished in the second half of the sixteenth century. The sequence illus trated the ab11.ost four centuries o[ regimental co ntinuity of som e uni ts, s till existing tocla)~ which have marked the most important moments for the Army and the Country. Among the rnany memen tos, we ca n men tio n the ca nn ons of Aduwa which, in March 1896, with "Africa 's Sicilian Mou nta in Batteri es ", bravely fou ght in E thiopi a; the u niform of Col. Cordero Lanza di Montezemolo, Gold Medal for M ilitary Valour, shot at t he Fosse Ardeati ne; the uniforms of the Eritrean Askaris, the heroic comrades-in-aims of the Italian soldiers in the colonial wars and the Second \ 1\lorld War. There were many curiosities, such as, for example, t he equipment used for the em ploy me nt of homing pigeons ( the fi rst air dispatch 1-iders which, fro m the end of the 19 th century to the mid -fifti es, p rovided a rapid correspondence among the units, supplementing the ot her means of co mm u nicatio n ) a nd the WWI scale covered protective jacket, a shield against bayonets and forerunner of the bullet-proof vest of today.

THE WHOLE "VESPRI SICILIANI" OPERATION, AT LAST IN A SINGLE VOLUME On May 2 the "lmperia" moviethea tre wa s the setting of t he 110

pres entatio n of "I Vespri Sici l ia ni" a vol um e desc ribing t h e main elements of the well-known ope ration in support of the Pol ice F orces, which took place fro m J uly 1992 lo October 199 8 , immediately a fter the massacres of Capaci (murder of Judge Giovanni Falcone) and vi a D ' Ame li o (w he re Ju dge P ao lo B orse l l ino was k illed ) . The authors of the book, Prof. Maria Gabriella Pasqualini, a MiddleE as t ex pert, and Lieut. Gen . Giancarl o Gay, history scholar, expounded the reasons for their work t o a n au dience wh ich included in the first ro\,V, among the aut ho rit ies, the Unde rS ecretary of S tate for Defence , Salvatore Cicu , lhe Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Ge n . Gian franc o Ottogalli a nd his Deputy, Lt. Gen. Roberto Speciale. The discussion, chaired b y TV j ournalist Maria Grazi a Cap ulli, was active ly followed by the students of some second ary sch ools of P alermo and neighbouring towns. As Pro f. Pasqualini poin ted o u t "Th.is book was written applving

the rnethod of historical research. Therefore we dug into the docum.ents of the Chamber o{ Depul ies in order to find the questions and the debates concerning the operation and found that, for the whole period of the mission, i .e. until 1998, the Ann_v inlerve 1zlio11 was fully supporred by all political forces, which considered the operation in a very positive wav. Th e Un d e rÂˇ-Secr-etarv ., of S tate for the Interior, An lonio d 'AH, state d tha t for s ix years o u r .soldiers controlled the territory si d e by s id e with the Po l ice Forces . "The pages of this hook" he a dde d - "take our mernory back to so 1ne tragic moments of the h istory of S icilv, but they also re111ind us of the com.m itm.enl of our soldiers to the securiiy o{ the judges engaged in the fight against the Mafia, and to the sajetv of every citizen . '/ Jie Ministry of the Interior, thanks to their pro{essionalism, was able to couni on the co111plele integration of the Police Forces and the Army c111d, also owing lo this synergy, could

successfully complete several iniport c1nt investigations . . The name "Vespri Siciliani" was meant to represent the self~determinalion of a people, of a socieiy, who work to he free . The Sicilians must remember their history and the strength which distinguished them in their fight against enemies Âˇwho were always stronger iha11 they 1vere". Lt Gen. Gay sa id Lhat he had intend ed to satisfy the vvi.she.s of many scholars an d t"esearchers. I le also men tioned the .supporL given b y pu b lic opinion and und er lined that Op erali on "Vespr i Sic il iani " was a link between two different models Ann y, whic h now has become an efficient institu tional instru ment. U nder-S ecrerary Cic u, in hi.s statement, .said Lhal Army Day is a feast for the people and of the people. "Ji lakes place in Palermo - he went on - "to repay the willingness of the Sicilians ro en list in the Arrned Forces as volunteers, and {or the strong historical ties binding the Arm_v to this land. "Vespri S iciliani" was a

sig11if2cant moment fo r our histmy and, with its success, provided security condiiions which had been lacking before. The m.ission offered Llze people of Sicily the perception of security they needed. The operation was followed by "Forza Paris " in Sardinia and hy "Pa rtenope" and "Riace", in the most difficult areas of Campania and Calabria. This celebration also reminds us of Lhe recent re{o rm of the S ervice, which cancelled conscripli o n . Today the Army continues to evolve, thanks to its international expe rience in a number of peace 1nissicms, where it gives a reliable evidence of its pro{essional skill. Our in t ervention in Afghanistan was nol requesred by chance. More and more p rofessionalism and wellprepared servicemen w i ll be necessary in view of the great reform. starling in 2005, when conscri ption w ill end and ive '!! have only volunteers". T he Army Chief of S t aff reca lled tha t "Vespri S ici liani'' was a n import a nt waters he d. "The operation" - he explained 111

was t h e point o f n o ret u rn between the o ld a nd the new course, between past and futu re. Thro ugh th is m ission the Arrnv convinced itself; and the Count,)~ of its a c tu al capa bili ties and potentials, and entered the road of renewal a n d moder niza tion . Sicilia ns have always been close ro us and m ade O ll r soldiers {eel at h o me. An exa m ple is how th ey were easily received with in the social environ111.enl Some very in teresting a nd keen presenta tio ns were also m ade by Dr Gio van ni P e p i, co-edito r of the "Gio rna le di Sicilia" and by D r Ma ri a L u is a Ma n isc a lc o, so ci o lo g is t a n d a u th or or a spec i fie research on the military e n g a ged in " Vesp ri Si c ilia n i", who ou tl i n ed t he o p era tio n 's phenom enological conto urs . 11 â€˘

GETTING TO KNOW THE ARMY T he "R a p C a m p" , a r ea l in teractive exhibi tio n or equiprnenl 11 2

and materials, open fro m May 2 LO the e n d o f the celebr a tion s, provided a bette r knowled ge or the Service, satisfying all kinds of c u ri osi t ies . T he in itia tive was rn uc h a p p r eciale d by a la r ge n um ber of visi tors intereste d in th is expositive and pro m o tion al form ul a , w hi c h o ffe re d a lso in fo r m a t io n o n e nlistmen t and op portunities of rec ruitment and ca reers. The m ost modern devices for mi ne -c le ar ing a n d o rd n a n ce d isposal were dis playe d a t the e ntrance of "La Favo rita". Amo ng t hem a rad io-co ntrolle d s apper robot (,.v hi ch c o uld even cl im b s tairs ), bo m b p ro o f s uits a n d many other devices . The visito rs' a tte nt io n was also allr ac ted by t h e e q ui p m e nt exh ib ite d b y a m p hi b ious troo ps, "A lp ini" a nd para troopers ,vho , in order to s how the e qu ipme n t a t ,vork in th eir normal operationa l environment, m ade very a ccu rate recons lruclion s of the m os t famil iar landscapes, c rea ti ng u nexpec ted visu al effe c ts . Ch il d ren a n d

yo ungste rs we r e pa rt ic u larl y in te rÂˇes tc d in t h e "R a p Cam p" b u t , to tell t he tr u t h, th e e q u ip m e nt, m ater ia ls and techn ol o gy of t he Army were greatly adm ired by peo ple or all ages.

THE TOUCHIN G TRIBUTE TO THE FALLEN Re me m be ri ng the Fallen is nol o n ly a d u ty b u t a ls o a n e x pre ss io n o [ o u r i nt i mat e [eelings, made m ore precio us by r e as o n, w hi c h e n hances i ts s ignifi cance . To give o ne's own life fo r a d u ty o,- a n ideal is a no ble deed which ind uces us to r e fle c t a nd re m e m be i-. 1t w a s w ith these feelings that on Ma y 3, in Piazza Vittor io Vcneto, our s ilen t he roes ,vere hon ou red at t h e Wa r Me m or i a l. l n the pr esence or citizens , a u tho ri ti es a nd scho olch ildren waving little t ri c ol o u r fl ags , at th e most significa n t m o m e nts o ne co u ]d ta ngibly feel the emotion . Wh ile

a Guard of Honour of the Bersaglieri, with th e ir band, presented arms, a laurel vvreath \vas laid at the monument by Maj . Gen. Bruno Petti and Dr Re nato Profili. To Lh e sound of Taps, the Stela received the homage to Lh e Fal len of all times and all battles, to all Soldiers perished in ·war and peacetime. At the encl of the ceremony, Palennitans and soldiers sang together the National Anthem and the "Song of lhe Piave".

THE HOLY MASS "Oh Lord, we present you the bread offered by the soldiers of the peace missions, we present you, oh Lord, the wine offered by the sister of the Italian Red Cross, we offer you, oh Lord, Lhe helmet of the Cent au ro armoured car of the Lan.cieri di Montehello, engaged in the "/bis" mission. in Somalia,

we offer you, oh Lord, the helm.e t of the Pilot of the Army Light Aviation, we offer y ou, oh Lord, the trumpet of the "Bersagliere" in. Russia, 1ve offer you , oh Lord, the parachute of the El Almnein boys, we offer you, oh Lord, the water flas k of the uGranatiere" in the flalian East Africa, we offer you, oh Lord, the cape of the "Alpino" on the mountains of "Adamello ", we offer you , oh Lord, the en.trenching spade of the lialian'.fo rkish 1va1~ we offer you, oh Lord, the horsebrush and the curry-com.b of the "Voloire" artilleryman, we offer you, oh Lord, the messLin of the Infantryman of the ·wars of Independence, we offer you, oh Lord, the powder-horn of the "Dragone di Genova", oh Lord, ·we presenl you ihese flowers, offered by the Association for Lhe Spiriiual Assislance io Lhe Armed Forces".

The Offertory procession, accompanied by these touching ,.vords, opened a moving Eucharistic liturgy which offered to God the everyday Loo ls that for centuries have been accompanying tl1e wo,·k and the sacrifice of the Soldiers of Italy. The Catheclrnl, a masterpiece of Arabic and Norman art, rich with the memories and the splendour of different cultures and rasci nating spiritualities, was exceptionally crowded. T he Holy Mass of May 3, presided over by the Archb ishop of Pa lermo, .IVIonsignor Salvatore De Giorgi , was officiated in united and brotherly remembrance of the Fallen of Lhe Army. Citizens and military met in a constant emotional cre scendo. At the beginning of the holy rite, the officiating priests invited a ll parti c i pants to pray. "How 1na11y sacrif1.ces and heroic deeds were consummated to seize a piece of land fi·orn the enemy or to maintain it? As it is impossible to i1nagi11e it, let us co llect our 113

thoughts on this sole,nn Eucharistic celebration, in order lo remem.ber those we met during our life ihrough family siories, belonging ro tradition or to legend. Those soldiers gave iheir life to conquer or defend a position, to succour friends or sLrangers, al all limes and in m.any pans of the world, ·1,vilh their Couniry in iheir hearts. May our gratitude and our prayer reach then~ Lhis evening". Duri ng the sermon, the Archbishop d evo t e d profound reflecLions to the Fallen. "They left their homes and 1heir loved ones Lo offer the Country their sacrifices and even their life, following Christ's sacrificial journey. The Holy 1\!Jass - he continued, recalling the meaning of the third Easter Sunday reminds us of ihe myste1y of death and resurrectioll, the resurrection of Chris! is a sign for Lhe salvation of all. Those who devote their time to the institutions deserve our consideration and respect". He then turned his thoughts to the thousands of soldiers serving in many parts of the \Vorld, w ishing for them "God's support in the 114

accomplishrnent o{ rheir duty, which is a great act of love for the Motherland . The military - he concluded - are constructors of peace and bearers of love and solidarity throughou.i ihe ·world". The Prayer for the Fallen was sa id with the ba ckground of "Stelutis Alpinis" (edelweiss in Lh e Friulan dialect), a nioving song from \:VWI. The Band of the Army accompan ie d the main moments of the holy rite.

MILITARY CEREMONY AND CAROUSEL:TWO EAGElUY AWAITED MOMENTS

The last day of the celebrations started ·with a very intense morn ing ror Paler.m o and Sicily. On May 4, "La Favori ta" was very warm, owing boLh lo the climate (more than 30 degrees) and to the intense participation which deeply involved prota gonists and on looker"S. The rnihtary ceremony attracted, already since the eady mcn-ning, children and adults, milita1y and civilians,

young and not-so-young, who occupied the wide spaces of the n.,cecourse in order lo waLch and express their affection to an lnst itulion which in this region has always enjoyed a very high prestige. At the opening, the paratroope ,·s kept eve1-ybody's eyes turned to the sky, following the evolutions or the men who painted the sky \.vith tricolour vaults, carrying the flags of Italy, the European Union and Sici ly. The flag-rising ceremony pr·e ceded the in-flow of the uni ts, about 1000 servicemen coming from al I over Italy, the Arm.y Band and a two - Regiment Br igade. The 1st Regiment, led by the Corn rn anclanl o.f the Modena Cadet Academy, included the 1st Battalion (a company of Academy cadets wearing their historical uniforms, a company from the NCO School, a company with two p laL oons fr"Om the "Nunziatella" and one platoo n from the "Te ulie " Military College); the 2nd battalion, w.h ich included a company with a

platoon from the 1st Regiment "Granatieri d i Sardegna", a p latoon from the "Lancieri di Montebel lo" Regiment and a platoon from the 12th "·Bersaglieri" Regiment , al l wearing their historical uniforrns; a company with two platoons from tbe Infantry School and one from the Artillery School; a company with a platoon from the Engineer School, one from the S igna l School and one from the Transport and Materials School. The 2nd Regiment, led by the Commander or the 5th Infantry Regiment "Aosta" consisted of the 1st ballal ion (a company with a platoon from the 5th "Aosta" R eg imen L, one from the 62nd Infantry Regiment and one from the 82nd Infantry Regiment "Torino"); a company w ith a platoon from the 9th "Alpini" R eg iment, a platoon from the 186th Paratroops Regi rn e nL and one from the "Serenissima" amphibious R eg imen L; a company with a platoon from the "Lancieri d.i Aosta" Reg iment, a platoon from the 31st Tan.l< Regim e nt and one from the"Sirio" Air Cavalry Regiment; the 2nd ballalion was formed by a company \.vith a platoon of th~ 24th R eg irnent Land Artillery "Peloritani", a platoon [rom Lhe 7th Regiment A/A Artillery and one from the 7th "Crerr1ona" NBC Reg im e nt; a company with a platoon from the 4th Sapper Regiment, a platoon from the 6th Engineer Regirnent and a mixed platoon consisting of elements from the 2nd PonLoneN Regiment and the Raihvay Engineer Regirnent; a con1pany w ith a platoon of the 46th Signa l Regiment of the C4 Infrastructure Group, a platoon frnm the 10th Manoeuvre Regiment and one from the 10t h Transpon Regiment. After the mil ita ry honours to the Banners, Standar ds and to Lbe Army F lag, the highes t Authority present , th e Hon. Salvatore C icu (who was

accompanied by Lb e Defence and Arn1y Chiefs of Staff) delivered a speech. "Sicily has always given a generous co11trilnuio11 in men and resources to our llnned Forces he said. - Today, here in Palermo, all the men and 1vo11zen of the Army symbolicallv renew their pledge of f1.delity to their duty and lo the (ree lns1i1utio ns o{ our Countrv. A verv long stretch of lime s e p arates us {rom that distant J 861, when the forces of the pre-unitarv States ·began their incorporation into the Sarclinian Army. Thus the young Kingdom of Italy acqu ired a 111ili1ary importance equal to the Country's polenliali!_v and demographic dimension, and was ready to become cme o/ the nwin actors on the international political scene. 011 this occasion, our thoughts go to those who served the Coun.11y, proudly wearing the uniform of the Armv: fi-om the Risorgi111e11to

the World Wars and the Liberation, fiwn the long period o/ the Cold \;\far to the recent missions abroad. To the Fallen, wounded a11cl disabled soldiers we renew our heartfelt mernory and gratitude for their sacrifice, which ~-·ontinues to be the /<)1.mdation of the u11Uv, independence and fi'eedom of our Country. But, for Italy, the Arn1.y was something more than an Armed Service: It was the ve1y place ·where, already in Lhe 1911·1 Century, thousands of voung men from every re gion learned to know each other and felt that they sha red the sam.e heritage of history, culture and values. On January I , 2005, the historical institurion of conscription will he suspended, but this will not break the strong bonds belvveen the Armed Forces and the people of Italy. For more Lhan half a century, by wearing the Anned Forces uniform fc)r one yeC11; the /1alia11s have learned to love and 10

11S

u ndersta nd 1he delicate role of de fen ding their Coun try . The m emory of that period, harsh at ti mes, continues to be the patrimony and wea lth of entire ge nerations. Today o ur young people are no longer required LO serve the Count1y for a year, but we ask them to choose volunrarily th is no ble duty as a highly qualified profess ion, in a primary role for the common interest. The Army opens to society and blends w ith it, in order to au ract ne 11v fo rces by offering to many young people of every region of Italy not on ly a job, b ut also an ex traord inary opport unity for h ighly specialized training an d hu rna n gro wth . The who le Country is grateful to you, men and wom.en of our Army, for all you have done for our cornrnunity, and particularly for your generous com.mitment in over Len years of peace missions. In the Balkans, the Far Eas i, Af,-ica and wherever you have been and still are, yo u have always rep resented our Country in an excellent way . Tha nks to yo ur ivork, toda y Ita ly has a front ranking role in the international 116

arena. In the B alkan s, in Afghanis tan, we proved to be reliable and very valuable allies; this is why the whole international co m mun ity acknowle dges the leadi ng role of our Country as never before. And Italy owes this to you, who often in difficult situations and at the extreme Lim.its of our military capabilities, have never failed to guard our interests with devotion and spirit of sacrifice, a real credit to yourselves and Lo us. After th e attack to the Twi n Towers, we all fe lt in danger: a new an.cl terrible threat, capable of striking anywhere and anytime, upset the in ternational balances and the consciences of people all over lhe ivorld. Toge ther with our a llies, the It alian Government respo nde d Lo terro r w ith detdmination and resolve. At the present lime, 4000 soldiers fro m ou r Army are employed in th e defen ce and con trol of sensitive o bjec tives in Ita ly, and over a th ou san d servicemen are in Afghanistan, in the still very unsta ble area of Kost where, thanks to their presence, the last Al Qaeda members are prevented

from re cap turing thei r o ld positi on s a nd from regaining strength in order to depri ve the Afghan people of the freedom and democratic rights promoted by the Barzai Government, thus threatening the 1,v hole world again. For there is no peace 1vhere there is no freedom . Furthermore, we cannot fo rget the Army's contribution when natural disasters occw; and the support given to the Police Forces for a be ller p reve nli ve action again st organized crime and international lerro1'. I am ve1y pleased, therefore, to me ntio n what was clo ne in Lhe 90s, right here in Sicily, IVith the Operation "Vesp ri Sic ilia ni" w hich, by relieving the Police Forces of the heavy tasks of territorial control, allowed them lo concentrate on their special tasks, on investiga tio ns an d fig ht again st organized crime. That was a new ex perience, wh ere inn ovative intervention procedures and ca pabilities of co ord ination, prevention and contrast against unexpec ted risks were ra pidly tes ted. On th e other hand, we cannot hide that, even Âˇwith these important tasks and its important

role at international level, Italy desLines to its Armed Forces an am.aunt of resources much lo-wer that that of our European partners, which spend for defence an average 1.5% of their GDP. The Govermnenf, as repeatedly stated by our Prime Minisle1~ considers that reachin g an equal level of expense for defence is a fun damental objective for compleLing the modernization of the Arrn.ed Forces, making them fii fo r the i1nportant service they render to the Country and the entire international comm unity. A.s, today, security has a glohal dfrnension our response 1nust be global. In the last years, the Arm.y has faced and won this challenge, effectively cooperating with our Allies . Now it is time to take again, with force and confhlence, to the road towards the constitution of a common European defence, in order to reach together Lhe operational capabiliLies essential in order ro operate effectively 1n ihe inLernational scenarios, which exceed the range of the single European Co untries . In rhis regard, during its six -m onths

chairrnanship of the EU, Italy undertakes to give its contribution towards the resumption of the dialogue to set righ t the frictions of the last months and lead Europe to speak with one voice, as a single political subject when defence and security are involved. Therefore , we entrust to our soldiers - and to their capability of integraLion - also the polilical future of the European Union . 路with these cons iderations - the Unde r-Secretary conclud ed - I renew lo all men and i,vomen of the Arrny the warm greetings of the Governmenr, wh ich I ivish to express particularly to those 路who are now o perating outside the borders of lhe 1\llotherland, to those who give their silent contribution to our security, we lfare and freedom; Italy as a wh ole conveys to th em unanimous feelings of affection and gratitude, with the absoliue certainty that lheir commitrnenf will a lways be equal lo our traditions and to rhe nob les t examples of valour". After t he Under-Secretary's speech, the Chief of Defence and

the Army Chief of Staff delivered their messages. Particularly rnov i ng was the moment 路when Under-Secretary C icu decorated the Flag of the 4th Sapper Regiment for Civil Valour, in recogn it ion of the Unit's ope r a t ions for savi n g human lives and ensuring public safely dur ing natural disasters. Individual decorations were awarded to Lt Michele Fraterrigo ( Silver Cross of Merit or the Army) and WO Giuseppe Colangelo ( B ronze Cross) for their service in East Timm~ and to WO Antonio Martina (Bronze Cross) for his cl istinguished service in Kosovo. Cpl Fernando Giannini and Cpl Silvio Rotunno received a solemn ci tat ion for their marked public spirit. A(ter the units left the scene, the whole area was occupied hy t.h e Carousel, w h ic h went through 344 years of traditions an d historica l and socia l evolu tions . The exhibiti on wa s vei-y interesting and suggestive, and evoked old limes and doctrines in a sea of colours and uniCo ,路ms, preceded and ac companied by the offstage vo ice 117

of a s pea ker ,vh o descr ibed th e mos t s ig n ific a nL ev e nL s a n d de tails . A d io rama represen ted the "Breach of Porla Pia" w hic h was b r o k e n th r ou g h with gu nshots . This was the p relude to the final honours.

THE GREAT CONCERT AT THE "TEATRO MASSIMO" The concert of the Band of the Ar my, presented by Pao la Sal u 1.1.i , co nc lud e d th e c ele bra tio n s . T h e g u es ts t h ron g ed in to t he t he a tre , l o o ki n g fo r wa r d t o en joying the per forman ce o f o ne o f th e w o d d's m ost pres tigiou s bands , co nducted w ith m aste rly skill by Ful vio Creux . Tl1 e ri c h a n d r efi ne d s e lecti on of t h e p iec e s w as i rnpecc ably i r1L e rÂˇp re te d by highly r a ted a r tists. 118

T h e c onc ert st arted with "M a y 4 1h" by Fulvio Crcux, follo wed "Co ns e rvet Deus s u Re ", t h e Anthe m o f t he o ld Ki ngdo m of Sa rdinia, a n d "Inno Dimonios" , hy an anon ymous autl1or, su ng h y the Choi r of Lhe 152nd "Sassari" infantry Regiment; "Hymn o f the Alpini", "Be n ia C lasto r ia" a n d "Tre n ta tre" , by an ano n y mou s a u thor, su ng by the cho ir o r the "Juli a " Br ig a d e a n d Al pi n e Trnops Co mmand; "rvlus ic of the M e m o r y" . "Ad di o M i a Bella Acl cli o ", "H ym n of G ariba ld i" , "Va' Pensi e ro " , " Il Sil e n zi o (Tap s )", "Dag h e la AYanti u n P a ss o ", "Ec h o es fro m Lhe Tr en c h" a nd "The Bell s of S a n Giusto", a ll a rra nged by Maes Lro Fulvio Creu x. Afte r th e inte rmiss ion , t he c o n cert r es u m e d wi th " An H o m a ge to Bellini" by Sa ve ri o lVl e r ca dant e ; a fa n ta s ia fr o m

"Ca vall e r ia R u stica n a" a n d "Vespr i Sici lia n i" by Gius eppe Verdi. At the e nd , af te r Maj. Ge n . Bruno Pe tti's a d dre ss, Lt. Ge n . O ttoga ll i expressed his thanks lo Pa lermo and to Sic ily fo r their warm welco me. "Our Service - he concluded - represents the Italian Un ity and the fw lia n People. The ltalian A.rmv is ou r Arm y and your Army" . Gen. Otto galli took leave by in vi ting a ll pre sen t to join together in singing the Nationa l Anthe m. More infor mation and de tails on the ce lebrnLi o ns arÂˇe repone d o n n o . 2/2003 o f "Rass eg n a cle ll'Ese ,-ci to", the s u pp lerne nL to "Rivista .IVIilitare".

D ''Colonel, Editor- in-Chief; "Riv ista i\!lilitare"