Issuu

CONTENTS

Number Two 1999 May-June July -August

Rivista M ilitare aims at broaden ing and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is t hus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication o f articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista M ilitare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on m ilitary issues.

Politics, Economics and Strategy Today's opera tional contests, mainly mu ltination al and multiservice, enhance the function of the individual soldier and his personal responsibility.

FOUR-MONTHLY Supplem ent to numbers 3 and 4 of Rivista M ilitare It alian Edition

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Authorized by the Court ot Rome under No. 944 of the Registry by Decree 7-6- 1949

2 Politics, Economy, Teclmology, Strategy Four Connected Variables · (Vittorio Ba1bati) 10 Inteniew \\.'ith the Chief of the Hellenic Anny General S taff (T:11 rico ;'v/agna11ij 16 Intenicw with the Commander in Chief of the Czech Army (E11rico Mngnanij 22 The Atlantic Alliance and its Stabilizing Role (Ciova1111i ;'vfariz.z.aj 28 The Role of the Italian Armed Forces after Bipolarism (Giovanni Bucciol) 40 Defence Industry: the Latest Strategics (Franco Bal<ll)

44 International Cooperation (Omella Rola)

Science, Technology and Training The Army of the Future. Development Plan 52 Task Oriented The Army Project for Europe (Claudio Gra.z.iano) 66 The New Adherence Logistics (Claudio Cmzia110) 84 The Lessons Learned Cycle We Learn from Our Mistakes (Pierluigi Afonteduro, Michele Risi) 98 Italian CIMIC Unit The Engagement of the Engineer Corps' Officers and NCOs in Bosnia

10 I Sommaire - Inhalt - Rcsumcn

1999 © Copyright by Rivista Militare

ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE STAMPA PERIODICA ITAUANA The production of this maoazine has been supervised ~ by Omero Rampa

Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee the highest object ivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves co ntributors ample freedom , though it does not necessarily share their opinions. The Author is thus solely responsible for t he articles which, published unedited and without editorial ties, exclusively reflect his personal ideas. Articles must be original in thought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (European Military Press Association) periodicals. Articles should be accompanied by suitable photographs, illustrations, explanatory tables, together with a photograph of the Author, a brief «curriculu m vitae» and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves the right to change the title of articles and choose the ty.peface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesett ing and videopaging. In order to make the production of the articles more expediti ous, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides the text on paper, also the diskette with the text files of the article. Any system and type of computer can be used.

It is not easy to define the relations that exist among the factors which determine Âˇthe international military action-reaction lines of the Nations. In order to find a guiding thread in this maze, we must resort to a schematization procedure, dividing the factors examined into four fundamental categories: one belonging to the political sphere, one related to the economic field, and the technological and strategic ones. It is then possible to explain the fundamental choices made by the States as regards their foreign, defence and strategic policies.

t is nol easy to define the relations

that exist among the factors :vvhich determine the Nations' action-reaction m ilitary lines, be they war or non-war, when the latter operate,or are forced Lo operale, within the international sphere. There are innumerable faclors , sometimes inhe1ited from the past, sometimes proj ected in lo the fut ure, sometimes short -term, sometimes medium- long-term ones, often intertwined in inextricable entang lemenls. In order to find a guiding thread in this maze, we must resort to a schematization procedure accepting its unavoidable limits dividing, for what concerns this wiiting, the examined factors into four fundamental economic, political, technologic,J and strategic categories. But before going into the heart of the matter, an~ess;ntial point should be emphasized, Le. the risk of getting lost in a more - or less brilliant and abstract theorethical

disquisition . Here one shou ld high light - and this is indeed the author's intention - the elements that determine, or hel p to detennine, the fundamental choices that the Nations make, or are forced to make, as regards their foreign , defence and suategic policies. Pol.itics, understood as the government of public affairs, is based on d ifficult choices, on a scale of p1iorities and on a constant activity of coordination, aimed at meeting mult iple requ irements, \vhich sometimes converge and sometimes arc antithetical. There should be no dissent on this. The problems arise - it should not be forgotten that politics is the art of the possible - when, considering the scarcity of resources, (a factor that concerns, more or less, every State) a priority must be fixed in satisfy ing the requests. Still as regards our subject, it m ust be said that the impossibility of finding the necessary resources

for mee ti ng "all" the needs of a Country is, from various points of view, a determinant factor in the international options. In the first place, it can have influence on the participation in a politico-military coalition or in a more- or lessbinding economic partnership. In both cases, in fact, joining in a multinational organization means sharing, financially first of all, the efforts and therefore the burdens necessary for accomplishing one or more tasks (starting, for what concerns us, with those related to defence) . The definit ion of a range of pliorities in meeting often-clashing requirements is obviously the result of almost-always difficult choices which pertain to the responsibility of the political sphere. The factors that can influence these choices arc manifold and deserve a short examination . But, first of a ll, one should specify a fev, essential points. The growing complexity of the modem activities demands that the choices be made considering programmes projected over a rather long pe1iod, in other words over a period of several years. By BO\,\~ this applies to all the main developments. from the ones rcgarcli ng medical and biologica l research to those concerning in frast t"ucture, up to those relevant to the most important weapon systems. In many cases, these developments requ ire expe nditure comm itments stretching over many years which, at least in the countries governed by democratic regimes, a bundantly exceed the duration in office of the bodies charged, from one election to the nex t (and even excluding the hypothesis of e.:U"lier elections), with the administration of publ ic affairs: on the average the most demanding pr ogrammes - and not o nly those concerning defence - are projected overÂˇ a period of ten-fifteen years 0 1more, while the average durc:ltion of the peiiod in office of a legislature, in a democratic country, is four-five years. This inconsistency is d ue to the necessity of having t he

people's freq ue nt control on the administration of public affairs, but this doubtlessly creates quite a few problems . The first problem can be detected in the contribution that this way of proceeding (imposed, on the other hand, by compelling technical requirements) gives lo the 1igicli1y of the publ ic espense, increasingly reducing the margins of choice for the politicians ,.vho, in the really democratic countries, follow one another in Lhe government of the Country. What can the margin of choice be [or anyone who comes to power when certain programmes, started fron1 someone who had completely different conceptions (or in a very different national and international political conte?-..1:) - have reached the so-called "point of no return" (i. e. the point vvhere the interruption of a programme becomes more expensive than its completion)? Clealiy it can only be a very limited margin, which, al the most, can permit littl e-affecting emendations (besides, of course, the emendations imposed by th.e technological development and the changes that intervene in the international relations and balm1ces). T h.e international economic fa ctors, besides, influence in va ,Âˇious w a ys the States' programmes , and not only t he mili tary ones . They affect them through the bulk of the exchanges, and therefore the credit and debit of the balance of trad e and the balance of payments, through the greater or lesser solidity of the various national economies and their possible weakening vis-a-vis the internat ional organizations, without considering the currency and stock Lluctuation s, which contribute to increase or reduce the possibilities of investment inside and outside all countries and in the various currency areas (from the Dollar mÂˇea to the recently created Euro a rea). T his is Lrue in particular for the industrialized countries, especially for those poor in ra\v materials and prirna.ry energy resoLu-ces, whose economics 4

are essen tially transformat ion economies, increas ingly related to imports of raw materials and energy products a nd to exports of semimanufactures and finish ed products.

Right.

The USS "Hany S . Trunw.ii" aircraficarrie,~ eighth ship o(the "Nimitz'' class. Its gross tonnage, when fully loaded, exceeds I 00,000 tons.

Below. The French "Caesar': a wheeled 155 mrn self-propelled gun, ca11. be carried by aircraft ofthe C-130 class.

we just mentioned, the absorption of the effects of the international crises (including those originated by political or military causes) is also connected with the productive structures of the va1ious count1ies. fn fact, the nations w ith strong productive structures, not only industrial ones, can betterÂˇ absorb, in determined circumstances, the repercussions of such crÂˇises, differencing both the sources of raw mater"ial and energy supplies and the outlets of their finished products (it is worth mentioning that this is also a two-faced coin, because widen ing the sphere of imports and exports, the risk of negative repercussions originated even by far-away events also increases). As can be infeITed from what we have just said, in a context of global economy like today's , many national program.mes, especially the medium -long-term ones, are influenced, in a more or less significant way, by both structural inte rnal factors and external conjuncture factors (even if it is very difficult to separate these two types of factors, often linked by reciprocal relations of interdependence). ft should be added that, in various cases, these factors weigh also on the multinational programmes, and particularly on the military ones. Now, it must be observed that they are, in their turn, closely connected with the evolution o( the international political relations and to Lhe ensuing strategic balances, or unbalances . For example, closing, or the simple threat of closing, an important watercourse can produce an increase in price of certain raw materials or in the cosls relevant to their transport, alterating the flows and volume of the exchanges, causing currency and financial shocks and imposing after all, within the limits of feasibility, more or less important modifications in the civ il and military programrnes under way.

The effects of the modifications just considered can be faced in a more or less effective way according to the "degree of rigidity", if we can call it that, of the States' budgets and according to the greater or lesser "capability of reaction" of the pn:>ductive structure. When the budgets are excessively rigid , because of the amount or current expenses (or rnaintenance expenses) and heavy indebtedness, the States arÂˇe sometimes forced to delay even the important programmes, nol on.ly Lhe military ones, and to resort to often painful "manoeuvres", employing, in many instances, the tax lever: Besides, as

The differences that mark the various productive systems have a heavy impact on the technological evolution; and not only for what concerns the development and production of weapon systems. The productive system that best exploits the advantages of i11novation is certainly the American one. Generally speaking, one c~m say that, at least for what concerns us, Le. the defence productions, this system appears to consist, with some important exceptions, of t\.vo important categories of firms: the one including the big and very big multivalent firms, divided into specialized branches, and that of 5

specialized, mainly medimn or small firms (only a few have large dimensions), ·wh ich supply the major concerns with precision instruments, elcctr-onic systems, fittings, semimanufactures, rnetal alloys, compound materials, etc...Through complex competitioncooperation mechanisms, in the phases of developmenl and prnduction of means and of supplies and suh-s upplies , or during the phases of production of the said means, intense techno logical exchanges occur wilhin the system, which are also facilitated, as regards Lhe most importanl programmes, by the creation of powerful partnerships. Mo r·eover, leading research centres, both public and private, (besides, or course, those belonging Lo the concerns) work in support of the enlire complex. Also in the other Western Countties (considered in a politicaleconomic sense and not in a geographical sense) one can nolice similar tendencies . Mu ltivalent companies, especially in the defence secto1~ operate in various European Countries (some of wh ich, particularly those of the aerospace industry, orten work in both mil.itmy and civil productions), but only some or these reach sizes comparable to the huge US concerns. Studies and negoliations are in progTess to promote mergers and concentrations which involve not only European companies but the Soviet one, is struggling Lmder a also Arnelican ones (recently there series of i1Ternediable contradictions, has been a merger of the latter type), determined also hy a real financial but 'it may be premature to refer to a paralysis. Il is a frmdamentally 6gid pict ure which is still evolving . system, formed rnainly by Moreover, already in these past years specialized firms, vvith researd1 and some panicularly significant planning centres also specialized ( programmes have been, and are only in lhe past years they have been being now, carried ouL by permanently connected witl1 111 u.ltina tional partnerships . production £inns of the same sector). Research centres exist also in the Therefore, within this system, the West, but the structures are more technological exchanges among the modest Lhan the American ones. various sectors are rather limited, Besides, as there is no E uropean also because they are hindered by policy or research, their relations are rigid bureaucratic barriers entrusted more Lo particular (innovation, which is remarkable in initiatives Lhan to organic plans. some sectors - like the aerospace, On the opposite side, the Russian missile, nucleai~ electron ic ,md landapparatus, inherited clirect.ly from weapons sectors - remains often 6

con.lined to the areas of Lheir 01iginal application). These three types or mechanisms - wh ich are here summa r·i ly schematizecl , without even mentioning many intermediate situations - show remarkable differences, as we have just pointed out, both as regards the approach and the results. Actually, the speed and the intensity of the innovation and of the technolog ical exchanges are extremely hig h in Lhe US mechanism, significant but not so high in the other Western systems, and more limited, especiall y a s r·egards diffusion, in the Russian apparalus.

leaving to the "producer", or the "producers", ralher lin:iited margins of manoeuvre. This occurs, admilledly wit}i different modalities ,md effects, in all mechani.sn.1s - in the American and the \,Vestem ones as well as in the Russians' - which are simultaneously producers and employers of technologies and, as far as we are concerned, of military technolo61ies. But tbe relations between producer and employer do not exist only within the individual Countries. As a matter of fact, besides the industriali zed Coun t1Âˇies, several politically and economically very different countries produce little technology but use, especially in the military Geld, highly technological foreign products . Also the representatives of these employercountries issue specifications, or ask (or pr oposals, based on

Left.

The second pre-production model of the F-22 "Raptor". This aircra(l employs advanced "steal1h'' techniques and can cruise at supersonic speed.

Below. The USS "Port Royal" (CG 73) is one of the two cruisers used by the US Navy to test the "Aegis" system in the defence against theatre ballistic m.issiles.

The efficiency of these mechanisms depends on various factors, besides the ones mentioned before. It depends fi rst of all on the relation that exists between the bodies "prod ucers" of the innovation and the technological applications and the bodies, the military in particula1~ "users" of the said technologies. The roles of these two categories of bodies are closely interco1mected and, once more, it is often impossible to set a precise boundary. In fact it is the "employer" that - through th e specifications and sometimes through the results of his studies and experiments - fixes the lines of development of the technologies, 7

determined requisites, in which the industries of the more advanced Count1ies are invited to participaLe. With aU the ensuing implications. In general, the industries thaL produce male.rials for defence are subjected to strict government controls - sometimes a real supervision - with a threer old purÂˇpose: prornote innovation avoiding, as much as possible, detrirnental loss of effort (and time); prevent the exportation or Lhe technologies that are, or could be, considered vital for the security or the exporting country (and possibly of its allies); facilitate, al the same time, both for economic and politico-strategic ends, the industrial and commercial penetration in the importing Countries. These, in their turn, tend to secure economic and/or industrial compensations and acquire, in case through production licences , new technologies to be employed, when possible, in view o r a u tonomous developments or eventually to reexporL, al.I or in pmÂˇt - according to the agreements ,vith the "original" p roducer-countries the technologies acquired (it shou ld be noted that this occurs, and o n a larger scale, in the relations between the .industrialized countries, especially if the nations a rÂˇe alLied). In most cases, the relations that arc establ ished between the countries producers of technologies, especially mil itary ones, and the countries emp loying t hem are transformed in a politico-strategiceconomic bond, both because the mi litary instruments of the acquiring countries arc inevitably oriented to,vards determined directions and especially because through the technical assistance, which becomes increasingly necessary, the supplying countries tend to influence, to their own

The latest version o{the Arnerican mighty "Abrams" 1HBT is the recent~y perfecled MI A2 SEP (System Enhancemen.l Program).

The Euro/ighter 2000 (EF 2000) - seven prototypes o( which are now in e_-cisLe11.ce - is the result of' the cooperation of four European Countries (Germany, !La.ly, Spain and the UK).

advantage, the "international" choices of the acqui1ing COlmlries. A particularly important issue is the management of technologies [or military purposes. The level of the management -if we can call .it that - is connected with numerous factors and with two in particular w.bich vary from country to count ry and which, moreover, can.not be quantified: technological culture (1) and experience (2). Also in this case there is a real hierarchy, which puts the United States in the first place, follm..ved by the other \,Vestern Countries and by Russia and successively by a ll the other countries. Let us proceed methodically. Together with the factors Lhal were described before - mechanisms o r pr-od uct ion/innovation of teclmologies, economic structures of the va,-ious countries, availability of financial resources, etc. - the last two mentioned factors contribute, in a minor or major way, to determine the political, and consequ ently strategic, inclinations of all the actors of the international scene. A

few ex,m1ples can supply the key for explaining these concepts. We should once more focus our attention on the United States of

this mighty instnunent is controlled and directed by a highly efficient and flexible joint. comrnand structure. At a lesser or greater distance fo llovv the other industrialized Countr ies - the \Neste rn ones, including Japan and Russia - which, despite having obtained r路emarkahlc technological results in some sectors, sometimes comparable to those achieved by the United States, bave not been able Lo equip themselves w ith all the means necessary to implement - also when they have llied to do it (it is the case, already mentioned , of t he disappem路ed Soviet Union) - really multivalent, wide-o r ve ry wideranging stn u.egic designs.

America, the onlv nation remained to play the role ~f military (as ,vell as political and econom ic) superpower: 1l must be pointed out that only the great North American Federation has managed to integrally fulfill the assumptions doctrine, equipment, o ,路ganization of a g lobal p lanetary strategy, conceived to confront all possible war options, from total nuclem路 war to limited conflicts. This was made possible bv a sound cultural technologi;al basis, which went through a considerable development dwing and after the second World War and \Nhicb permitted, starting precisely from the enormous experience accumulated during that conflict, to b u ild and bring to perfection, along the decades, a multivalent militarv instrument which has no equal i~ the world. In the years of the "Cold War", Lhe

Soviet Union tried to give itself a planetary global strategy but il managed to construct only some components; and probably Lhe enonnous effort sustained in order to reach this objective conlribu ted to its disintegration. Resuming the thread of our speech, it should be said that only the enormous technological and operational experience accunllllated along tl1e years has permitted, and permits, to the United States to organize and govern, at reasonable costs, a mighty nuclear deterrent, a multivalent a ir"- force, land and amphibious forces equ ipped with actual planetary strategic mobility, and naval, or better air-naval, fo r-ces, in whose task forces there is a level of integration much higher Lban that of the sim il ar (and bes ides much less powerful) forces of the other cow1tries. Needless to acid that

Many pages s hould be used to highlight the numerous re la tions that exist ainong the variables we have considered in this article. But it is appropriate and necessary to dose the conversation staling that a strategic approach adequate to the needs of a Counny, or of a coali tion, can he obtained on ly on the basis of a clear political vision, which is in a position to take the best advantage of the not unlimited financial and technological resources available, in view of s hort-, medium-, and longLenn realistic oqjeclives.

D ~'Contributor to Italian and foreign milita,y magaz.ines, author of essays on international policy, economy and conte1npora1y history.

NOTES ( l ) V. Barba Li, S ic u rezza e cultura tecnologica, "RivisLa Militare", lt. Ed., no.2i1995. (2) V. Barbati. Strategia e Lecn ologia, "Rivisw !viilitare", It. Ed., no. 3/1996. l' hotos f'ro111 1he Au tho r's personal archives.

~on~rary to NATO member countries' general trend, Greece has increased the defence budget allowing the Army modernization programme. Within short time the Hellenic army will be flexible, light and well trained and capable of playing an ever-important role during Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations. We made an interview with Lieutenant General Paragioudakis, Chief of Hellenic Army General Staff, and focused on several important issues. General, did the Hellenic Army change after the end of the Cold War, the instability in the Balkans and the decision to have an AUied Headquarters in Larissa as part of the NATO re-organiz.ation?

To race new challenges lhe Hellenic Army has made steps leading to: a. the mechanization of the am1y; b. a stream lined chain of cornrn,llld vvith B1igade as basic operational Corrnation; c. an Immediate Reaction Force at Army Corps level to: â€˘ immediately inlervene in any area of the country; â€˘ meet intenmtional agreements requirements, cl. the deployment o[ a number of forces in sensi tive areas to safcg1.1ard national borders. Moreover, training is now perfo rmed accord ing to national and int e rna tio nal operational requirements a nd the Army has been equipped w ith modern weapon systems . As to the im plementation o f t h e Allied Jo int Subregional Headquar ters in Larissa, it was partially manned last Aptil and is scheduled to be fully operational 11

Cmnmandos in arnphibious training. ..

along wiLh the All ied Joint Sub,-egional HeadquarLers of Spain, Italy, and Turkey by October 1999.

. ·~. .:~..-.

. ',

Greece has assigned 1 Mechanized Infantry Division to ARRC and 1 Field Artillery Battery to AMF. Are these units combat ready today? I must say that these units were a lready combat ready before being assigned to ARRC and Al\lIF(L), but further steps have been made to meet NATO's high standards. For example I would like to focus on the improved training, the wide participation in national and allied exercises and the upgrade of equipment \Vell beyond NATO standards. The operational Lests prove that we are successful, but we must go on. Greece has a long lasting Peace Keeping tradition. Today Greece is taking part in SFOR with a transport and military police unit. Is the Hellenic anny planning to increase its support to PK in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Greece has participated in the Bosnia-Herzegov ina IFOR and

SFOR operations since December 27, 1995. The Hellenic Force (250 to 300 men) was part of the Mu ltinational Transport Un it named BELUGA (Belgium, Luxembo urg, Greece , Austria). Since July 1998 different Count1ies have participated in the group that was consequ ently renamed HELBA. Greece is in charge of the

m.u 1tinational operations co ordination and is r·esponsiblc for the military camp since April l, 1997. The 25-man transport platoon from Bulgar ia joined HELBA on the 3,-u of July 1998. It was decided and planned that Greece will participate in Phase 3 (until J une 1999). The Al liance will then decide ·whet.her to keep troops in the r egion or not, in which case Greece is ready to take further decisions. r would like to underline that d u ring IFOR and SFOR the Hellenic Transport Battalion's miss ions tota ll ed 500 ,000 kms, ,.vhich makes an examp le of successful multinational operation. Greece took part in ALBA operation with a mechanised unit which was tasked with missions also in the sensitive

011e o{ 1he first AH64A "1lpach e" helicopters in service with the Hellenic Army .llviation.

: -. .. : ·r.-.

··-

'·

_,..

I ASGR "Leopard" tank. !'vlany of" these 1ank.s, formerly in service with the Germ.an Army, and redundant according to the CFE freaty, have been transferred to Allied Armies.

area of Valona. Can you tell us any lessons lean1ed?

Greece took part in the peace keeping and humanitarian ALBA operation with a force at Regiment level (90 officers 690 other ranks). The lessons learned can be outlined as follm.vs: • the armed forces should be trained also for Peace Support Operations, which have further special requi ,-ements compared with article 5 operations. Furthermore, multinational interoperability should be a teaching topic at mil itary Schools.

• bi lateral agreements should address all aspects of logistics and be enforced since the very beginning, in particular refer-red to role 3 medical support. • a number of English speaking officers should be included in the national delegation, but also a number of officers speaking the language of the Leading Nation and the Host Nation. • criteria based on security and logistics should be agreed upon and complied with when selecting an area for the camp of the Peace Force. • there must be extraordinary cooperation and m.utual support among the multinational units. But we basically learned that when a nation really supports another nation, this is \,velcorned by the local population with deep gratitude to the peace force. And we

have got it many times in Albania. Today about 3,000 women serve in the Hellenic Army. When did women first enter the army and what have they been allowed to? Are there major problems arising from the presence of women in the Hellenic Army?

The Hellenic Anny has recruited women in Medical Service Since 1946. ln 1977 a bill was passed allovving women lo other branches of the Army. As a result, in 1979, for the first time, 80 women joined the army as enlisted volunteers ,.vith a 5-year contract. Since then, thanks to this successful expe1ience, more women have joined the army. Fu nhcrmore another bill was passed allowing a nun,ber of ·women Lo Officers and Non Conunissione<l 13

Officers Military Academics and Schools. Today about 3,000 ,.vomen serve in all branches or the Almy as officers, warrant officers and Non Commissioned Officers . O u r expe1iencc proves that women are as skilled as their male col.leagues and very successful too. As a result, military leaders arc planning to increase the nurnber of women in the army.

The Hellenic Army is based on a 95,000-men conscription. This service lasts in some cases up to 19 months and is one of the longest in NATO. Are you planning to reduce it? The conscription se rvice for en.Listed in the Arrny lasts 18 monLhs. At the moment \.Ve arc not planning to redu ce it, although bcne[i t measures have been taken, including: • partial service for the those living abroad pen11anently; • a 3 to 12-mo n th reduction and partia l service for older· soldiers; • possibility lo serve in the ne ighbourhood of the place of residence. • reduced time for those who have selious fam ily problems etc. Above.

The Hellenic Army is making a great effort to have modern equipment and structures. Are there programmes under way concerning t he Territorial

Replacing 1he e11~i11.e of a "Leopard" tank. Below. Russian-made BMP I combat/transport annoured vehicle.

Defence Units and the National Guard? Will these units be more similar to the operational ones? T here are modernization programmes ror all units of the Hellen ic Army. Obv ious ly those believed to be in c1itical area<; corne first. We planned to provide al.I of our units \.-Vith the necessary equipment to carry out their missions.

In recent years the NATO member countries' defence budgets have been cut. On the contrary, Greece has increased it. Can you tell us about the guidelines for sharing the budget among the three services, considering that also Navy and Air Force have modernization prognunmes? In Greece, the procurement of 14

T80s on parade. So rne of these tanks have been procured in orcler LO 1nake evaluations, in view of 1he renewal of the Âˇw hole tank line.

armaments for the three Services is implemente d t hrough a Defence Planning System issued by the Ministry of N at ional Defence. The army requirements are consequently met accordi ng to a three-service list of priority decided by the National Defence General Staff and procured depending on the budget. In fact th ere are no special guidelines for sh ar ing th e budget and it is worth noting that the operational req uirements of Arn1ecl Forces are met as a whole.

D ~, Journalist

Gen. Paragioudakis was born in 1938, attended the military academy and was promoted Second Lieutenant in 1960. In 1993 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. Gen. Paragioudakis attended a number of national and international military schools and has University Degrees in Political Science and Law. As an artillery Officer he has been assigned to important training and Staff posts during his career. Lieutenant General Paragioudakis has been awarded several decorations. He speaks fluent English and French, is married and has three children. 15

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In order to better know the Armed Forces of the Eastern European countries we held an inte,view with Major General Frantisek Hrabal, the Commander in Chief of the Czech Army. This inte,view gives a piece of information on the effort the Czech Republic is making to reorganise its Army. Gene ra l, th e Czech Army is preparing to join NATO. What is the on-going re organization aiming at? T he Cze ch Arm y has be e n divid ed into several forces and adjust e d to N ATO patte r n s , including Imm ediate Reaction, Rapid Re action, Main Defence and Reserve Forces. On April 1, 1999 an ABC Czech Company was ea r m arke d fo r NATO I mmediate Re act ion Forces, m eanwhile NATO Rapid Reaction Forces were assigned a Czech Em ergency Brigade. The remaining mechanized Brigades of the army make up the bulk of the Main Defence Forces. We arc shifting to NATO st a nd ards gradually and steadily as part of a long-term programme due to end by 2003. The S F OR Sou th Wes t Multinational Division includes several units from the Czech Army w hich also took part in past Peace Support operations. Are there any lessons learned? The Czech Armed Forces have been taking par t in PK-Operations 17

The Spingot Anti Tank 1\!Jissile Training System.

since 1991 and I can say it has been a goo<l experience, definitely. We have taken advantage of the lessons learned h:om UNPROFOR and UNCRO in Croatia to start with IFOR and SFOR within the SWMND in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNPROFOR and UNCRO focused on autonomy at squad level meanwhile SFOR relied on au tonomv at p lat oon and company level. At SWMND Headquarters the Czech Officers cooperated with their NATO colleagues and experienced NATO operational procedures. I am trying Lo make my best to have Officers and NCOs rotate every sixth month in order to have a wi d espread useful experience of such an in ternational environment. It is also worth noting that the Czech army is giving an important contribution to UK Forces, which makes Lhe experience more interesting and allows us to better 18

understand how NATO works. Recently Czech soldiers have participated in the Spain-based Strong Resolve exercise. Can we take it as a general test for a future integration into NATO? Are there any benefits from

these international exercises?

Strong Resolve was a Command Post e xercise also involving

The 2K 12M KUB Tank equipped w ith an antiaircraft systern operated hy a crew member.

Bosnia: 1vJP Officer with soldiers froni the 6th Mechanised Battalion participating in SFOR.

platoons from different countries. T he mission foc used on a crisis undergoing in an unidentified State . A Czech paratrooper platoon from the national Emergency Brigade took part in the exercise. During the first week our platoon got familiar with the rest of the multinational compan y and finally they conducted a common live fire exercise . During the second week the Czech platoon was tasked to work in the ÂŤZaragozaÂť area and carried out its the mission as professionally as the othe rÂˇ units. Thus Strong Resolve can be seen as a successful inLegration test.

more initiative from the soldiers who in fact must be able to make an effective operational analysis. What are the major changes in training and education? Czech professional units have already experimented the new training programme based on NATO principles. Individual and sub-unit training will be

emphasised and harmonised with the national doctrine which takes in Lo account Lhe revised tasks of the armed forces. Professionals and conscripts are being trained after NATO principles. Furthennore the qua li ty of training is being

Land Rover Defimder: Western-made equipmenl for the Czech Army.

Getting closer to NATO the Czech Republic has switched from the Directed Leadership concept to the Mission Command principle. The latter requires 19

paratrooper mechanised battalion is expected lo be fully manned by volunteers within 2001. and the Emergency Brigade within 2003. T he recruitment o f women started after the parliament had passed the required legisla Lion. Today women attending military academies are on the rise and they are mai nly employed at Staff leve l. There are a bou l 258 of them .

The Czech Republic separated from Slovakia peacefully. What did it change to the Army? Did you maintain any relationships with the Slovakian army?

1\11 i ne clearing.

enh,mced by all-level international relationships.

NATO means also standard equipment. What about standardisation in the Czech army? Communica t ions and Data Transfer are two major priorities. But languages are an important issue as well.

The Czech army is aiming at balancing the number of volunteers and conscripts. How is this process developing? Are you going to recruit women? The recruitment of volunteers started with Immediate Reaction and Rapid Reaction forces. They

Bosnia : NCO at the SFOR Communication Centre Grech.

are mainl y made up of professional N OCs and longterm vol unteers who will be squad and platoon leaders . Generally speaking the

Obviously t here are good relationships. Visits at all levels arc e xchanged and common exercises are carried on using both Czech and Slovak training are as . For exarn p le last Sept e mber Ge neral Emil Vestenic ky, Chier of the Slovak Ar my General Staff, visited the Czech army Headquarters where he was br iefed on the current reorganisation and the rÂˇev iewed institutional tasks . Genera l

Honour Guard with the uniforms adopted in 1989.

Vestenicky also observed an exercise by the Emergency Brigade. As to Defence and Security the Czech republic can refer not only to NATO but also to WEU, EUROFOR and the Italy-HungarySlovenia Force. Did you already contact these international organisations? Are you going to take part in the Austria-sponsored CENTCOOP?

Today the Czech army is nol part of any international units. The Army Headquarters is not responsible for contacting international securi.Ly organisations. The government, the Parliament, the officials in charge al the Department of Defence and the Czech Joint Sta.IT will do it.

D ;, Journalist

From 1976 to 1980 Major General Frantisek Hrabal attended High School at the Jan Zizka Military College in Opava. After that he attended the Military Technical School in Liptovsky Mikulas and was promoted to Second Lieutenant in the Signal Branch. At the 1st Signal Regiment in Plzen he was platoon and company leader and in 1986 he attended the Military Academy.in Bmo. In 1989 he was promoted to Major and appointed Chief of Staff of the 2nd Signal Regiment in Pisek. In 1992 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and commanded the 2nd Signal Brigade. In 1995 he attended the Defence Resource Management Course in Monterey. Then he was promoted to Colonel and in 1996 appointed Chie,f of the Communication Development Department at the General Staff. In 1997 he attended the National Defence University National War College in Washington and won a Master of Science on Security Strategy. After that he was in charge of the Communication Section (G6) at the Army General Staff and in 1998 was appointed Chief of Staff at the Operational Headquarters in Olomouc. After this assignment he was promoted Major General and appointed Commander in Chief of the Czech Army in 1998. Major General Frantisek Hrabal is married and has one daughter. 21

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©LJ~O[bO~Gzl@ w@[b@ by Giovanni Marizza

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The stabilizing role played by NATO for half a century is a sure guarantee for the safeguard of security and peace in the most risky areas of our Continent. Italy's support to the Countries aspiring to join the Alliance, starting with Slovenia, Rumania and Bulgaria, fits into this picture. 22

On April 4, 1999, NATO turned fifty. It has been the first half century of peace in the European continent; this result seems to be even more significant and unusual if we consider that the Atlantic Alliance is formed by Nations that from ancient times unti l 1945 have been continuous ly at war against each other. In fact, if we lake a glance at the past, we see a scenery of conflicts, more or less extended, and c ivi l wars which never ceased racking the Old Continent. Our list of past conflicts, limited only to today's mernbers of NATO, wi t hout involving the three newcomers, pn.,ctically covers the whole period, without shm,v ing any period of peace lasting longer than about ten years. The first Countries to s how restlessness were not those \Vith the most "caliente" blood but, curiously enough, the Scandinavian ones. In 1262, in fact , fce land was m ilitarily occupied by the King of

Norway, Haak.on JV, and, a few years later (1350-1370), Norway, to gain predorninance on the Bal t ic Sea, started fighting against Denmark and in 1380 it was precise ly the latter which took possession of Icel and , rÂˇeplacing Norway. Less than tvvo years later, Holland attacked Be lg ium, which was occupied from 1382 to 1389. Obviously, the Mediterranean Countries appeared ver-y soo n o n the sce ne : Spain occu pied Portu gal for no less t han sixty years ( l :, 80 - 1640), before attacking France twice, in 1659 and wi th the War of Devolution (1667-'68) , which was soon fo llowed by the Netherlands War (1672-1678 ) between Denmark (mernbe,- of a large coalition) and France. At the same time, France occu pies Luxembourg from 1684 to 1697, during the Grand Alita.nee War (.l 688- 1697) and, after that it is Spain's turn to occu py LuxernbourÂˇg from 1697 to 1714. During the same period, the Atlantic and Nort h America had their share of conflicts: they were bloodied by the colonia l ,vars b etween France and Eng land (1700 - 17 13) , th e Spanish succession war (1701 -17 14) and the Br.ilish maritime campaign

Tab. 1

SUMMARY OF PAST AR.J\tlED CONFLICTS At\.10NG PRESENT NATO NATIONS Belgium. __ llEI C....ada

I--

C.\ .'! l)F.N

Denmark

France

F l-U

Gt, R

Germany Greece ,____.

<:llF.

---·

Icel and Italy Luxembourg

~ I ITA

l .liX

Norway

NOR

HoUand

.~uaal

1101.

....._

l'OR

UK Spain

SP.t

LIS

J urio:e,l'_

I ITUR I

« INDEX

OF PAST CONFLICT SITUATIONS» OF PRESENT NATO NATIONS

Tab.2

Germany

France

Italy UK

Denmark

us t-----" Sp'-as_·n_

Greece t - - --

Turkey

-+--

+··-··-· ..... _. ..l. ____ _

-+ - ··-

- . ·- - -r--··-· .

Canada

Norway

Holland

Luxembourg _ __Bclll_!u.~- -+--- - + --l

Iceland

Ponugal

··-··-¼-- - + --l

NOTE: T},c figures sho,.,.· the number of NATO Nations against whkh the Country c.·om:emed has b('.Cll i.n confiic1io the pas1.

against Spain (1718). Then , in sequence , the Anglo-Span ish campaign of the same year for the succession in the Hapsburg dominions. We must wail until 1740-48 to see the debut of the "Italian peninsula" on the scene of in Lerna tiona l confl icts . The occasion was the Aust1ian vVar of Succession, among Nations which, tvm centuries late1~ would join the same Alliance : Prussia, France and Spain on one side, Savoy and Greal Blitain (inter alia) on the other: At the time, the most active power on the scene was France, which from 1756 to 1763 fought the Seven years' War against England, and from 1793 to 1801 again another w,u- against England and [taly. In 24

the same period, France found also the time to occupy Luxembourg from J795 to 1815, to fight against Turkey in Egypt and the Middle Easl in 1797 and to hold Portugal from 1800 to 1810. The centu ry \Vent on \.Vithout peace, with the Anglo-american War in Canada ( 18 12) and the wars betvveen Belgium and Holland (1832-'39), Denrnark and Prnssia (1863-'64), France and Prussia (1870-'71), Greece and Turkey (1897) and, the following year, United States and Spain. The events of the twentieth century, as the Ilalo-Turkish War (l 911), the Balkan war between Greece and Turkey (1912) and Lhe two World Wars are too wee! known to be dwelled upon.

This panoramic pictu re should leave no doubts about an intense continuous con.f:licl situation, even more so if one considers that the "non-war" periods were times of very relative peace. In practice, it can be said that the state of war was a "continuum" from the Middle Ages to 194 5, also because we did not consider the conflicts concerning coun.Lries which today are not in NATO (and the contribution of Austria, Russia, Bu lga r·ia or Sweden to the European wars was certainly not insignificant). Moreover, i f we e xam ine th e hislory of each country, we notice that each one of the present NATO Nations has been in conflict situations with at least two othe r· members o[ the Alliance (Table 1). If one goes to the point of rnaking a place-LisL of the various Nations, showing the number of countries with which each of them has been in conflict situations (Table 2), the result is that the most "warlike" Country is Germany, which h as been at war w.ith no less than eleven of its allies of today. France with ten, Italy with eight and the United Kingdom with seven, come on closely behind, followed by all the others, dmvn to "peace-loving" Belgium, Iceland and Portugal, which have been at war with only two of their present aJ.lies. The histo i-ical panorama up to 1945, therefore, shows an apocalyptic scene, made o f bombings of cities, terr ilor ia l changes, annexations and dismemberments of sovereign Nations, coups d'etat, forced migrations of millions of exiles, concentration camps, millions and millions of persons dead, wounded and missing. All this ended (once and for all, it seems) in the fft. id-forties, after WWH and, above all, with NATO's bi1ih. The establishment of the Allan tic Alliance indeed represented a sharp reversal of the past trend in the field of conflicts. Being members of that

Canadian soldiers disernbarkating from a wheeled vehicle during an exercise.

Alliance, which after 50 years proved Lo be the most efficient in history, has meant, for its p artners , the el i rn i nation of conflict situations, both \Nithin and withou t their borders. In its interim~ it has succeeded in keeping cohesion and peace among 16 Nations vvhich, in the past, had been "speaking" to each other mainly with cannon shots. Not only, but N.ATO has succeeded also in reducing the conflict situations to tbeir 10\vest possible leve ls : it is an unqu estionabl e fact t h at the simu lt aneous admission of Greece and Turkey has been a "winning move" of the Alliance which, by doing so, avoided at least a couple of wars between the two quarrelsome neigbbotffS across the Aegean. S till considering the At.Ian tic Alliance in internal organization, we note that th e famous "article 5" says that one

tts

attack againsl a rnember Nat ion would be tantamount to an attack against the Alliance as a whole. As a consequence, no power (not even the opposing superpo,.ver) had Lhe courage of attacking NATO's soil. That well-known article, the rnost affective one in the history of all Alliances, worked tl1ings in such a ,vay that the USSR and the

Warsaw Pact countries attacked only each other (suffice it to think or the brutal repressions in East Berlin, B ud ape st and Prague, vvhere the intervention of the WP tanks was passed off as "hrotherly help", in the name of the "limited sovereignty" doctl'ine invented by Bre1.hnev). NATO has succeeded in keeping

FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of Lhern in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the righl or individual or collective self-defence recogn isecl by Article 51 of the Charter or lhe United Nations, will assist the Party or Part ies so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parti es, s uch action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and mainLain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and aU measures taken as a resul thereof shall inrn:iecl iately he reported to the Security Counci l. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain internationa l peace and security.

a low conllicl leve l also outside its area of responsibility, mainly lban ks lo the deterrence represented by its nuclear capability and to the prin ciple that no one has been ,villing to test - of "rnutual assured destruction". No wonder, therefore , that once the USRR and the Communist regimes had crumbled - the countries of ·what was erroneously called "Eastern Europe", at last returned to the West, asked in a very loud voice for a f-t.111-pledged membership in the E uratlanlic institutions, and to join NATO first of all. Le t's now get rid of two misunderstandings that come up oflen when discussing the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance. The first one concerns the so-called "first wave" of the enlargement. To say that Czekia, Poland and Hungary belong Lo the "first ·wave" is not complete ly right, since NATO had already undergone a first enlargement in J 952 with the adhesion of Greece and Turkey, a second one in 1955 \vith the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany, and a thi rd one with Spain in 1981, while the reunification of Germany produced what could be considered a fo urth enlargement as, in a certain sense, the French "reapprochcmcnt" ·was a fifth amplification. The next wave, therefore, w ill not be the "second" but rather the "sixth" one. Another prejudice concerns the extens ion "to the East". It is nol true that the extension is directed towards the East. First o[ a ll, we define countries like Hungary and C,.e kia as belonging to the East only because we were cond iti oned by the ex istence of the former "Iron Curtain" . They are not at a ll or·iental; they are absolutely \Vestern or, at most, Cen traJ Europe an nalions . Furthermore, even if the most eastward count ry afler Russia (Ukraine) were to join NATO, 26

''Centauro" armoured car on patrol over snowy terrain.

there would still be a NATO Country located even more to the East, i.e. Turkey. So , le t's j u st call it "enlargement", without dragging in the cardinal points . Consequently, today only three applicants have been adrnilled to the Alliance, after having been kept waiting for alrnost a decade. A very lengthy wait (lasting as long as the two Wodd Wars put together) which is not very easy to und ers t and, even if we spasmodically try to j ustify it, u s in g th e mo st refined geopo litica l and geostrategic n:10tivations, slriv ing to pnwe to ourselves (and to those who don't take kin d ly to lhe e nlar·gernent) that, before being admitted, the

applicants must me et we ll defined requirements. Please, let~ leave the "convergence parameters" to the mainly economic organi,.at ions ! To demand the respect of certai n parameters could be sound in Ll1e case of a common currency (although the MaaslrichL parameters arc severely criticized by those \.vho consider them anything hut all -inclusive); but let's avoid applying the same pharmacopoeia to mainly politico-military organizations such as NATO. In this case, the principle should be that each Nation is entitled to choose the international securitysystem it p refers . To make the Countries of Central -Eastern Europe wait too long, while they insist to j oin, seems to be trag icomic, cons id ering that Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, C,.echoslovakia, Poland and East

Germany became members of the Warsaw PacL frorn one day to the next and against their will and, Lherefore, w i thou L any apprenticeship or "waiting-room". Therefore, let's adm it all the Nations ·which apply for NATO membership, w itboul flaunting hypocritica l justifications like "Country X could only give a very modest contribution to the Alliance's military capabilities ... " (one wonders: do Luxembourg or Iceland contri b ute more?) or "Country Y must make more progress in human rights and democratic control of the Armed Forces ..." (again one asks: are we really sure that all present members of the Alliance are "faultless"? The "open door" policy which on the basis of the outcome of L}1e Madrid summit (J uly '97) - must characterize the eni'argement or NATO is not only sacrosant but even physiological, and typical o[

any hea lthy orgaffism. No one questions the legitimacy of the adm ission of Czekia, Poland and Hungary, whose applications were supported with conviction by Italy. The admission of those tlu·ee Countries is right, hut not enough. It is right, since this means that three more countries will never again wage war agains t each other, that stability will extend to 485,000 more square kilometres of European tenitory an d, moreover, 60 million E u ropean citi zens w.i.11 no mo 1·e be threatened by any hostile power in the world . But this is not enough, because expanding NATO means extending securitr Projecting security to an area such as Cen Lral and Northern Europe, a lready stable per se, is not very useful; security should instead be projected to the areas which lack it, and nobody can deny that the Southeastern/Balkan

area is Lhe one most in need. And this is precisely the area which rnust be the object of the next enlargement waves. Obviously and understandably, there will have to be a kind or "c lassification list" (albeit not an "admitted" one) of applicants, but the times of their acceptance must be as short as possib le. Th e list s hould avoid letting Hungary to remain a "NATO" island, surrounded by non-NATO countries. This is why one or the very fi rst accepted countries should be Slovenia. This wil l help achieving NATO's territorial continuity and will prove to Russia that the Alliance's enlargement is nol directed on ly towards the former \,Varsaw Pact Countries, bul il serves tl1e purpose or projecting stability, in this case towards former Jugoslav.ia. For the same reason, and ·with equal speed, it is convenient and appropr iate Lo admit Rumania and Bulgaria, so as to enclose lhe Balkans w ithin a kind of "security belt" , ,vhich would serve Lo p roject stability into the area and to limit the ou LClow or instabi li ty. The admission times of the other applicants (as lhe Bailie Countries) could be longe1~ but the important thing .is lhat they shou lei not be "biblical". In Southeastern Europe time ,vorks aga inst security, and the only international organization Lhat proved to be capable of fostering security in Lhe Balkans was, and still is, precisely NATO. Everything suggesls that the Atlantic All iance w ill remain also in the futme, and for a long tirne, the only organization capable of doing this, at least until a word like CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) ceases too be an acronym and becomes a reality.

D ,·, Colonel, Chief, International Relations Office, Defence General Staff 27

THE ROLE OF THE ITAllAN ARMED FORCES ARER BIPOllRIS-----Mby Giovanni Bucciol * f it's ln1e that the three kev terms Âˇwh ich .define this declin ing era of ours are - as was stated by the seven intellectuals quoted by a daiJy son1e tune ago - "nuclear", "w:::u1' and "God" (1), certainly in the near futme there \Nill be a lot to do for the Armed Forces of the whole wodd. If, for my part, I add the terms "geological and ecological disorder'', the scenario in which the Armed Forces wiJ.I have Lo play the.i r role is not ve1y difficult to ilnagine. "At the sunset of the century", vvrites the

newspaper, "to turn and look back can make one clizZ)~ so vortical, fast and violent have been the changes occurred hetween I 900 and 2000: in the depth of the consciences, i11 the exterior aspect o{ the planet, in knowledge and in hurna.n relations". A century departs which is deeply different from the one from which it was born. One can legitimately think that the impetuosity, rapidity and violence of the changes occUITed mainly in the last 30 years will in.0uence, by inertial force, the

Dense storm-portending clouds continue to appear on the horizon of the 21st century: cultural, religious and ethnic clashes, drugs and organized crime, terrorism and environmental degradation. In this complex and wo Âˇ g scenario a dete Âˇ ant role is played by the Anned Forces of the Western Countries, and by the I Âˇ ones in particular, to defend peace and safeguard international law.

same number of years of the next ce ntu ry. Changes have been so radical that even the concept of "alliance" is changed: before, it ,vas "against", now is "for" someone. And we shall prove it. We can say that with the end of bipolarism, ended also the century of ideological wars. During the last hundred years, Democracy formed an a lliance with Commun ism , fi nding in Nazi-Fascism - which

was defeated - the external reason for the coaliLion; then, in the difficult competition for power with Democracy, Communism wore out, and iL was more like a suicide than a defeat. On the one side, the shouts declaring "the end of history" which did not really convince the intellectuals - on the other, Lhe clear voice of the Holy Father who launched the courageous idea of "humanitarian intervention" in Countries which were starv i ng because of the sudden stop in Soviet aid. In view of this, it is not only interesling, hut also useful and very important to outl ine the role that the Armed Forces will have lo play, especially in the light of both the forecasl5 for the third mil.lenjum and the interventions for protecting innocent lives from the feroc ious gTeed of ignoble rulers and from the natural disasters caused by the environment in revol t against a 30

"homo faber" gone crazy.

WAR FORECASTS FOR THE NEXT MILLENIUM "The main source of conAicts in the new world era created by the end of the cold war will he neither ideologic nor economic; it ,.vill be cultural" . This i.s a statement by Samuel Huntington (2), a political scientist at Harvard University, who also felt the need to demonstrate, in contrast with Franc.is F u kuyama, that hi.story seeks different ways of expression. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world has been w1der the illusion that an era of peace had begun, where capitalism, having outlived C01mnun.ism, could go arm in arm with democracy. We have aJ.I changed our mind. We are living through Lhe first post-cold -war period and, as in all post-,.v ar periods, we are in a world in ferment. Criticism, contrasts,

disputes and settlements are in reality signs of gTeat ,,itality. All the peoples in the world coagulate around cultures with well-defined features. Within these "homogeneous identities", man wants to go back to his 01-igins. This search for CL1ltural sources wilJ result in antagonistic conflicts of values, which risk to create a permanent world-disorde1~ that will not produce large-scale conflicts but rather the fragmentation of the world into different sectors. There \Vill always be military-type conflicts, conducted by the military, but they ,.vill be local. Today, already, we see warn ing signs of this: Huntington says that in the world there are eighL different civilizations: there is the Western civilization - including also the United States, Israel and Canada and the Confucian , Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slav-Orthodox, Lalin American, Afiican civilizations. The eight hundred million people of the

Facing page. Italian soldiers in Bosnia.

Right. M l.l 3 APCs equipped with TOW AIT missile systems.

Western culture seek a relalionshjp, which has proved difficult so fa1~ with the four and a half b illi on persons belonging to the other seven cultures. If in the 18th century, wars were economic and among monarchies, in the 19th century among nations, and in the 20th century among ideologies, in the 21sl centmy they will be among cultures. At the present time, a counlry is attrc.tcted by the cultural orbit of o ther countries with idenlicaJ language, traditions, customs and religion. It is precisely in the name of rdigion that the most terrible conflicts break out: in Bosnia, between Moslems and Slav-Orthodoxes; in Armenia, where Islam ic Az.ers carried out "ethnic cleansing" against Christian A1menians, as did the Abkhazians against the Georgians; in Kashmir, wiLh Hindus against Moslerns on in Russian Central Asia, where Tata rsLan's Moslem Chechenians demanded independence from Moscov/s Orthodoxes; today in Algeria, where the Islamic fun d amental is ts commit daily slaughters of compatriots of different faith; in Kosovo, and in other parts of this restless world. These conflicts, of a cullural and ethnic nature, where the Serbian o r路 Rwandan concept of "ethnic cleansing" co1Tesponds to HiLle r's "final solution", are nothing but the to Preamble o f wha L is goino路 b happen in the 21st centu rv. Conflicts will not break out in the West anymore, but move to the areas where the Nations have transformed themselves, lurnin!! from passive objects into activ~ protagonists .Funherrnore, the different civilizations will also try to join togethe1~ foUowing the rnodds of the alliances of Lhe old continent. ~

Beijing already sells sophisticated equipment and modem armamenls to Teheran, Damascus, and Tlipoli: is the Confucian civilization seeking a coalitio n with Iskm1? The Islam ic world is known for being no n -homogeneo us , and at the present time it \.vould be impossible to form coali tions for warlike purposes, but progress is running ahead at a dizzying speed . Moreove1~ in the Islamic ,.vorlcl a wider and vvidcr ditch separates the eliles and Lhe middle classes - \.\rich tend to become "wcsternizcd", unable as they a re Lo .resist Lhe fascinations of market economy and technology from Lhe 1xipular niasses, attracted by religious integralism and ethn ic factors. T he in tegralisLs, who have discovered the use of the libe ral democracy o[ lhe West for the conquest of power (3), arc e ither igno red by Lhe electorate, as in

Jordan, or outlawed, as in Algeria, because ,.vith fundamentalism the economic conditions do not improve. The Iranian leaders, in the intent of recovering traditions, tn.ith and the "straight path", incite women to go back to the chador and to b igamy, and Lo defend the solidity of the great Islamic family against the "plague of weslern [emuusm". These problems, nevertheless, don't interfere with lhe econorn.y, wluch is what matters to the people: they stop at moral a nd legal level. Islam has not only mingled with Judaism fo r irreversible reasons, but is spreading in the most advanced E u ropean counlries. A third invasion is under way, peaceful and more e ffeclive Lhan tl1e pr路eceding ones. At any rate, no one wants the Moslcms tci convert, it is sufficient that they do not ask us to respect their路 re lig io u s precepls . .Most 31

blessing of the highest authorities of the Cburch; the refusal of any arbitrariness in interpreting and distinguishing what is good and whal is evil; the Church's complaint about boll, the lack of judges ,vith the power to pass sentences and the absence of the militcu-y str-ength to enforce thern (5). The soldie1~ concerned about his role in the neax future , wonders about tbe sense of an intervention such as that predicted by the Pope, since these activities are not only risky, but they also alter the very characteristics of the military. An army engaged in mainly humanitarian operations - and it is a humanit.u-ian and ci,,i l task also to contribute to the search for victims under ruins, to remove mud, to repair a bridge, and so on HUMANITARIAN very possibly would no more be INTERVENTION S capable of hunting clown the "Hie cannot permit Lhat wars enemy and destroying it, if among Nations and internal necessary, which is the arm y's main task. The fact is that in an confli~ts condernn defenceless civilians tu starve to death for armed intervention sometimes there is the possibility and the egoistic and factional reasons. In necessity of using Lhose arms, as these circumsLances, food and was the case at Checkpoint "Pasta" medical aid must be assured at all in Somalia. Then one wonders limes, and all obstacles must be rem.oved, including those deriving whether it is right "to kill in order from the arbilrwy recourse to the to feed" starving people, and to principle of non inte1ference in the accept the risk of dying to help internal affairs of a Country. The others. In short, it is not clear conscience of m.ankind, now whether it is right to solve the supported by the norms of problem of hunger and poverty International Law, requires rhat w it h gunshots, with the humanitarian interventions be consequence of having to answer m.andatory in situations which even if j ust as witnesses -to an seriously endanger the survival of a international Court. A Court that people and of an enlire ethnic adopts the Anglo-Saxon system, group. This is a duty {or the Nations which is different h-om the Latin and for the International one (6). In this type of intervention Community (4) . The Holy Father in the internal affairs of a therefore admits armed devastated Country, the role of any interventions where defenceless Army becomes increasingly civilians suffer hunger and the di Cficult. The Armed Forces arrogant actions of others, exaCLly involved must in fact be capable, if one and a half year after opposing not of replacing, at least of finding the Gulf War, during which he had on the spot alte111ative government been urging the adverse parties to forces, able to take the place of the reach an agreement. Nevertheless remnants of a defaulting, brokenin these words we perceive: the up and incompetent local obl igation of humanitarian administration, in a Country intervention which, for the first ravaged by civil war. ln this regard, time after the Crusades, has the it must be added that it is not sure

.Moslems belong to European, ACroAsiatic, lndo-European countries, or to counnÂˇies bordering Europe. The demographic pressure at the doors of the Countries of our continent is enormous and, among them, Italy is the most vulnerable, ovving to the uncontrollable length of its coasts, open on three sides. Our dern.ographic gTowth, close to zero, will create a serious manpower problem, since sl1ortly the number of workers ,-vill be equal to that of pensioners. It will then be necessary to introduce other ethnic groups and other races in the productive chains - ir1cluding the security one reconciling ourselves also with the idea of multicontinental armed [or-ccs.

"A.riete" tanks in training.

that the alternative governrnent forces g uarantee a better behaviour than their predecessors. The peace corps in question should resort to specia.lisls of every origin, not only m ilitary, able to restart the mechanisms of a Nation, or of an entire region with a complete lv disintegrated economy due to absence of unity and soci a l cohesion. But caution is necessary. because it is not sure that the Countries that complain more a re those w hich need aid more badly, especially if the rescuers are the former colonizers, ,.vho consider their intervention a kind of du t.y:

no one ca n be certain that the experts in charge of the mission are well prepared to carry out their task. To ta ckle the first problem correctly, taking for granted that there are many Countries that r equest assistance, it is necessary to sec if there are other Countries in worse conditions, and to invest igate "why" they don't ask for aid. II. is also important lo know "who", in those Countries, are t h e promoters of those requests. It could be the leader of the Nation, starvcr or his people, who wants to profit, direclly or indirectly, from the value of the goods give n as aid . It is a lso fundam ental to know "how grcal" is the need, compared to that of other Countries which don't ask

for anything, si nce their leaders have good reasons to keep silent, as they destroy the enemy e llmic groups also by starving the m . A case in point is that of Jean Kambanda, presiden t of th e Rwa ndan gove rnment from April to July 1994, who confessed to the UN Tribunal in Arisha, Tanzania, his responsibility in organizing the gen ocide and in instigat ing the Hu tus to sla u ghterÂˇ the Tutsi popu la tion. This gave a group of French colonels "a bad quarter of an hour", sin ce they, ca lled as witn esses by the Inte rna tional Court of Ju stice of t he I I agu e, were almost put und er ch arge, because of the a bove-m entioned Anglo-Saxon system of inquiry. The answers to these ques tions may or may not be satisfactory. Jn

the latter case i t is necessary to investigate if the rescuers insist Lo ha ve the e xclusivity of the a id because they are former coloni7.crs who intend to establish a formal neocolonialism, by showing a fa lse remorse or because they want to turn the events to their advantage s ince, be ing more fam iliar than others with the p lace, the people a nd th e local customs, they cons ide rÂˇ themselves as the mos L qualified operators. To solve the second probl em, that o f the prepa ra tion of the rescuers, especially Lhe milita ry ones, it is necessary to organize masters, like those existing in many c ivilized countries . These course s s hould p re pare t h e leaders, as well as all the persons responsible for programming and 33

execut ing the assistance activities. Thi s must be done in complete security from hostile acts, and in a spirit of fairness towards the various applicants, who must be id e n tified and verified according to their real need, without political, ethnic or Mafia-type labels, making sure th at they do not disguis e personal interests be hind the intervention. Jn all this, a right balance must be found betvveen the "s tick" and the "carrot". To hun ger, misery and g reed the military oppose weapons r ather than good words, and they shoot at ma n's heigh t, not a lways rubber bullets . At any rate, I should nol want these remarks and these questions, caused by my being a miliLary man, to be the result of a "psychic conflict" deri ving from traumas suffered, if not on the battlefield, ducing the long personal experience of a slalom-li ke professional life, through a thousand difficu lties and hostilities. This psychic conflict - a great and effective Sigmund Freud wrote in 191 9 - takes place between the old peace-lowing "I" and the new warlike "J" of the soldie,~ and it becomes acute as the peaceful "/" realizes tha1 he is risking his life thanks Lo his recent parasitic double. One could say that Lhe old "/" prot ects him self from a mortal danger by -fleeing into a traurnatic n.eu.rosis".

EUROPE ON THE MOVE It is imposs ible to ),ave a complete pi cture of the Armed Forces' role in Lhe near future if one docs nol examine th e rathe r dyn am ic be haviour of the European nations (almost all members of OSCE - Organization for Secur ity and Cooperation in Europe) shown o n the map. The idea of CEO (European Defence Community) came to an e nd in 1954, thanks to the French, who acLed simultaneously as supporters and bwiers. The common CLUTency has been introduced on May 1, 34

"'Â°"""'"'

D I T A R H .i ,\

1998 and still th e re are again talks about a common defence . Accord ing to th e Europe an Parliame nt, this is Lhe other side of political integration, the only real counterbalance to the economic tmion. Common defence, nevertheless, has become a taboo for the Commission and for the member Nations, owing in pan to old neutralist reDexes and in part to Atlantic extremism. Some partners consider "political obscurantis m" the idea of strengt hening the European wing of NATO, an idea which appeared immediately after the fall of the Bedin Wall, and led many Countries to reappropriate

the Armed Forces, "renarionalizing" and "rationalizing" them. With the encl of the ideologic conEronlation, a serious crisis was triggered off by the increased US requests lo th e med ium and s mall powers to contribute to the expenses . Since th ese requ es ts coinc ide wit], a general econorn ic cri sis, rnan :v Eurnpean nations have decided to reappropriate their Armed Forces, restructuring them on the basis of" defence mode ls consid ered less expensive. So, in \,Vestern Europe, while Lhe Foreign Ministers were on their way to Maast1icl,t to work fo r a United Europe, th e Defence Ministers, through thei1- Chiefs of

.. '

' ",

\!--:~:..,_' /~

Non -commissioned officer of" the Railway Engineers on surveillance duty during 1he SFOR mission,

Staff, sp lit in two: one side following the national direclives and the other Lhose issued h y NATO, from which, to tell the truth, no Nation - playing on the ambiguiLy of the situation - has ever withdrawn, The first section of Staff ran immediately into difficulties, and was isolaLed vis-a-vis the second. All the more so because, instead of "nationaliz.ation" - vvhich very soon tw-ned out to be expensive for lack of a scalar economv - the idea of "rationalization" h;td taken root, still withi n an Atlantic strntegic picture. So the corps horn as "multinational" were nevertheless able to keep intact the nat ional independence of Lhe forces . The US superpowe1~ on its part, gave "command access at cru~ia l levels", as recognized by t he Belgian Defence Minister Guy

Coeme, making the rn.edium and small powers, always interested in the reinforcement of the Eurnpean wing of NATO, more influentia l than they should really be. The enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance, which is asymmetric vis-a -vis the present NATO, will cause the requirements for the development of defence policy to grow in d irect proportion to the adhesion of the various Countries to the ELL As a matter of fact, in the 48 years of its life, the EU has grown from the six founding members to fifteen Nations, and at the beginning of the third millenium the members ,vi11 be twenty-one, twenty-five and perhaps lwentyeight, with a population of more than 500 million , Tinclernans' document (7) proposes: integration of WEU into the EU structures ; regular meetings of Defence ministers for coordinating the restructuring of Lhe European armament-industry and the question of anns export; creation of

a European armament-agency, as envisaged by the Amsterdam Treaty ; establishment of an international police-force for rapid interventions; strengthening of the body concerned with the security issues within the Commission; restructuring of the investments for the development of the European capabilities in the sectors o[ strategic air-mobility, space information and satellite commun ications, Le . in those sectors where the Europeans are totally dependent on the American logistic support In short, Europe has been on the move since 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed, As somebody says, Europe is like a hi cycle: it works only if il moves. Without pedalling, it falls down . The "Agenda 2000", prepared in Strasbourg on July 16, 1997, marks out the road . The consequent decisions taken by the 1.3 Countries of the EU at the European Council in Luxembourg are a milestone for the future of Europe, also from the military point of view, From the

"against", but "for" someone. WHAT ARMY FOR 2000?

Recruits in training at the M.ilitary Paratrooper School.

Copenhagen summit in 1993, after the admiss ion of Austria, Swed en and Finland, to t he enlargement to the East. Th is enlargement, which has no economic j u stification (8) , has potential strategic and military reasons overshadowed by diplomatic considerations, and will anyway enta il structural reforms, not only in the cornmon defence, b u t especia lly in the agricultural policy and structural funds. To cover only the military aspect, the enlargement to the 36

East means to reach the borders with Russ ia and Ukraine, taking under NATO's strategic umbrella the former Communists, ·who have a physio logical fear of Moscow. In order to save at least Belorussia from this advance, and stop the Western po,.vers al t he eastern borders of Poland, Eltsin is giving shape to a MoscowMinsk axis . In any case, this is certainly not a utilitar· ian phenornenon bu t rather a historical one, aimed at retaking possession of a wholly European history, m u tilated by 50 years of cold war (9). The enlargement has a lso a humanitarian character, since NATO, whose characteristic is not mainly rnilitary, is no more

The role of the Army, even if we accept the principle that Nations should mind their productivity rather than war - a nd the Army cannot but vouch for this · will never be secondary as to the other institutions. In March 1998 the memb er Nations and those sharing the internal a nd external va lues of the EU met for a "mutu a l commitment to peace, secu rity, good neighbourhood, respect for soveiregnly and for t he E U's principles, for the integrity and invio lability of the external bord e rs , for the princi ples or In ternational Law which favour the peaceful sol U ti on Of international di sputes Lhrnugh the recourse to tbe fnternational Court of Justice of t he Hague. Hence the need Lo reestablish a common defence starting from the basis constituted by the WEU Countries. A m ilitary alliance ·will have to be formed, hut of a preva ilingly socio-political nature . Its structu r·e should inc lude not only elements ror mutual armed defence, but there should he also cultural, financial and industrial sectors, and even branches for environm ent protection. Th is last aspect was the object of a distressed intervention at the UN, on .lune 6, 1998, of the Vice President of the US, Al Gore. The worse n ing of L.h e "greenhouse effect" ,vas described as a hattle that must he fought hy all. "After the Soviet expansionism - he stated - we must co nta in our planet'..:; warm-up". Nature, tampered with in a heedless way, re bels and takes revenge . In the next hund red years the earth's temperature will increase by J .5 to 3.5 degrees, if the e1n.i ssion of gases and carbon oxides is nol checked. According to some scientists, "El Nifio" , mother nature's avenger, has psychological effects, exc iting

souls and causing serious tensions that may produce wars, famines and other disasters, such as the French Revolution and, just recently, the political ter-rorisrn in Indonesia, with Suharto's fall and the financial panic in the Far EasL. If seems that the Kyoto agreeements of December J 997 ,vhere the industria l powers pledged to decrease, by 2010, 5% of the gas emissions produced in 1990 - did not advance much. This is also due to the fact that many developing countries ar-e instaUing highly polluting plimary industries; those who can afford it, buy a "Trabant" car or heat their houses with coal. These countries were not represented in Kyoto or, even i[ they were, left the burden of gasreduction to the industr-ial powers. The role of the military alliances, in this sector, 路will be that o[ acting, directly and indirectly, mainly in the field of prevention. In short, this alliance will be a global one. H w ill complete, or rather change, the traditional concept of "all iance". Anyway the Eastern Countries ,,v ill fi nd a shelter in it, on the pretext of a virtual external threat against their sovereignty and independence, but in reality they will join a coalition under an umbrella or high strategic level, knowing very well that they Vvill enjoy an unprecedented global protection . In all this the Arrny cannot but have a preeminent role. The discussion of tl1e conditions that determ ine the Army's role would not be complete if one does not examine also international te1Torism, which has a planetary dimension and could be a primary threat in the 21st centu ry ll appears Lhal many Countries don't realize this fact and, in Ot'de r Lo balance their budgets, cut their military expenses for pe rsonne l, experimentations, studies, maintenance and modern ization o( their equipment. When regimes change, some m iii tary axe pensioned off, if not removed, as was the case in Sou Lh Afr ica,

where Nelson Mandela, after his election , reduced lhe ranks , discharging mainly the veterans of the special units, who had served the cause of Apartheid. These "bad mercenaries", who knew only the j ob of soldiering, joined the "Executive Outcon1.es", the most important world organization o[ "war monsLer路s", which works with Nations like holdings do w ith finns. Together wilh the British "Sandline" and some GNman, F1路ench and other organizations, it is a private concern vvhich gives internat iona l advice on the security and defence sectors. Its firs l i nlervention took place 5 years ago in Ango la, where il helped the Government to recover oil we lls and diamond mines. Since then, it has been hired by other African nations, such as Sierra Leone, where it saved 500 chi ldren when, in J 995, it reconquered the diamond mines occupied by the rebels in order to Gnance the insurrection. On that occasion, the forces or the "Ex ecutive Outcomes" freed the leaders from the s iege of the guerrillas, and were thanked by the Catholic m iss ionaries. They also fought in Papua New Guinea

Armoured car of the 19th "Cavalleggeri Guide" Regirnent in Bosnia.

and once more in Angola, signing regular hiring contracts. But they refused Lo go to Mobutu's aid, in former Zaire, because - being sharp businessmen - they knew that the West and the US would not take kindly to the rescue of the old dictator. The group includes many "stray dogs" , some freelancers, and many Serb veterans who had fought in Bosnia. If a government has a problem (suppression of an armed revolt, defence of the bo1路ders, reconquest of infrastructure held by guerril las) the organ i1.al ion examines the situations on the field, draws a cost esl.irnaLe and, if the government approves, hires the necessary personnel and intervenes. A small Army can be mobilized in three weeks, with land, sea and a ir Officers, rnilitary inleHigence, logistics (specially medical elernen Ls) and even military chaplains. Th ey go, reach tbe objective, pe1fom1 their task, cash the cheque and go back home. They do this 37

only in favour of lawful govcn1ments. The mercenaries of 2000 want to lake the place of the Blue Helmets, becoming the Anned instrument of the UN, less costly then those formed by regular wuts from different nations. They consider themselves more efficient and better trained for carrying out humanitarian miss ions, escorting food convoys, protecting c ivilians, giving technical assistance for environment protection and for preventing conflicts. And they arc much cheaper: They say that they informed Kofi Annan of their wi llingness to carry out hum an itarian tasks in Africa in p lace of th e intern at ional contingents. They reckon that the UN mission in Angola costs a million dollars a day. When the organization defeated the gucnillas in Sierra Leone, respecting human rights, it eamcd 27 million dollars in al l. They consider their .in terventions "a real bargain". Tens of curricula arrive daily on their Internet site, sent by people who want to work wi th th em . The organi zation has a n office in Pretor ia that looks like a stockbroker's bureau (10). Who can say that this fo1mula is not the good one, considering that many governmen ts have ma.in ly problems of sabotage, terrorist attacks and gue rri Ila warfare, whi c h m ust be contrasted with equally specialized and light forces, used to fight without fronts? CONCLUSIONS

In Italy n obody wants to privatize the Almy, en trusting the resp onsi b ility of defence and security to a so ciety of "holy drink er·s " such as the one described above. We might have to think about it when we realize that reducing the conscr·ipl force, ,.vithou t making the salar ies of the professional volunteer s compe titive with those pa id by the private industries, means Lo suppress - littl e by littl e - an institution which will find even 38

nature a mong ils enemies. Prospects are not rosy: a national role, a European role, a NATO role and a UN role are too much for the few operational units still in activity. We need multiple-role, variable-geometry units, promptly employable eve,-ywhere, avoiding the crises that al Limes have affected Cadres and troops also in the pasL. The Un ited Europe, once the envisaged common defence is realized, will require a su itable a llow ance for k eep ing up a n effic ient m ilitary instrument whose role will continue to be a primary one or, at leas t, on a level with the part played by oth e r institutions. Furth ermore, this role w ill become "certain", thanks to the integration between defence and protection on Lhe one hand an d, on the other, to the clear fact that all the available resources must be used. lt is then the EU wh ich will incite to employ all the reso urces available, to avoid using the false co i· recti ve of r educ ing the defence budget in o rder to red 1·ess part of the public defic it, to shut-down useless military and civilian organ izations, to s upply Lhe mi li tary w ith new and fonctional barracks - capable of accommodating also "the other half of th e sky" - through the perm ut ation and sale of old infrastructure, to uphold the competiti veness and strength or the military industry. In short, Europe wi ll implement all that was proposed in th e Tinderrians document, approved by alm ost two thirds of the European Parliamen L. ln this sense, Europe seems to be on the right pa th . Its parlamenlarians, with their vote of May 1998, proved to h ave dropped the idea of a "European wing of NJ\TO". Europe will .h ave to play its military ca rd with the US, not so much, and not only, because the Atlanti c Alliance is the onl y orga n izations whi ch keeps An glo-Saxon America in Europe, but because it is

"Leopard" tank on reco11J1aissance near 1he Sarajevo stadium .

fundan:iental for the "Western culture" to remain united in an anti-Islam fun ction. China, which is moving to a market economy, in the 21st century could become a "Confuc ia n-cu lture" military threat, giving a concrete meaning to Huntington 's theory. One can only hope that this threat does not come true, proving the American politi cal scientis t to be mis taken as Guido von List was (11 ).

D ,·,Major General (ret.)

NOTES

(1) See "Twentieth Century, a Black Century", by Cesare .Medail "Corriere della Sera". May 12, 1998, page 29. (2) Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs Review, September J 993. (3) Bernard Lewis, "Islam and the West", Oxford University Press ed. 1993. (4) From John-Paul Il's speech on the occasion of Lhe opening ceremonv of the International Conference on Nutrition, organized in Rome bv WHO and F.AO on Decembers,"1992. (5) As Blaise Pascal said: "Ne pouvant fortifier la j uslice, on a justifi.e la force". (6) The Anglo-Saxon procedure in force in th~ Hague and Arisha

Courts envisages Lhal wiLnesses appear at a public heming and be submitted to a cross-examination hv the public proseculor and lbe counsel for the defence . This, sometimes, can give witnesses the impression of beii;g accused. (7) Leo Tindemans, former Prime Minister of Belgium, prepared a report on "the progressive introducLion of a common WEU defence-policy", whicb was passed in mid-May 1998 by the European Parliament in full session by 340 votes to 94, and 30 abstentions. (8) When Europe is joined by the vanguard Countr ies (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus) by 2003 or 2004, and by those \.vho wish Lo join but al present don't meet the Maastricht parameters (Bu lgar ia, Latv ia, Slovakia and Rumarria) - excluding

for the moment Turkey, which is a special case because of its dispute \Vith Greece over Cyprus and for the serious Kurdish question - the EU \V.ill increase its population by 110 million, while its total income will be lower that the GNP of the Netherlands (an increase of 30% in Len-itory and population, ,md only 10% in wealth). (9) See "Now We Can Extend to the East", hy A. Bona1mi, "Corriere della Sera", May 3, 1998. (10) See "Mercenaries: UN, Help Us ... and We'll Take Care of the Peace" by Riccardo Orizio, "Sette", supplement to "Corriere della Sera", June 4, 1998, pages 110 to 117. (I 1) In "The Occult Roots of Nazism", Sugar ed. 1993, Nicolas Goodrick Klarke theorizes about a "Millenarv Reich" , which fonunately..lastecl infinitely less.

Since the end of the USA-USSR confrontatioIJ. the defence industry in Europe has experienced a deep crisis. A process was started to make industry more efficient by means of a supra-national pool of enterprises supported both politically and economically. This international cooperation aims at winning a state-of-theart, competitive and cost-effective production in the field of defence.

he polit ica l and military disruption of the Warsaw Pact culminated in t.he fall of the Berlin Wall required NATO lo review i t.s strategy, prompted co-operation 路with the Eastern European Countries and sped up the European Security and Defence Identity. The Western governments have reduced their defence budgets and started to re-organise their military forces \.vhich were intended for facing the Soviet threat and now considered insufficient for the risks exist ing in the new world theatre made up of different crisis -breed ing areas also far away from Europe. Today we need light and flexible, joint and multinational armed forces equipped with state-of-theart technology and capable of react ing lo a w ide r路ange of unexpected threats by means of wider use of compounded systems. It is also worth noting that pu b i ic opin ion calls for safe operations and that human lives can only be saved with I.be aid of sophisticated - techno l ogy weapons used Lo cl ireclly or indirectly protect troops. J\ilodern weapon systems meeting mode111 armies' requirements have high research costs and go into a small-quantity production because

or the r路educed budgets . The defence industry wants to benefit from its investrnents as much as possible and consequently uses its resources carefully. Notwithstanding article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, industry must be competitive. In fact competitiveness has become more and more important also within the Defence industry. In order to offer high-quality products at competitive prices the Italian defence industry has rationalised and reorganised itself courageously: the number of employees has been much reduced and the resources concentrated upon areas of excellence. These measures allowed the Italian defence industry into European partnership. The generally reduced defence budgets and the small-quantity production call for international co -operation and foreign markets . This cycle suggests almost all Countries, with a few exceptions for the United States, to procure the \.Veapon systems they need through international co-operation. I nternat iona] co -operation takes place on economic grounds but the participating Countries can then also implement and carry on thei ,.. ,..espective fore ign and security policies, which is import.ant. to estab lish, maintain and strengthen relations \.vith other States. Thanks to political co-operation national enterprises can take part in international programmes. And this makes possib le an exchange of knowledge a lso in terms of technology, management. an.cl procedures. The national industry benefits from this potential internationa l exchange which makes the organ isat ion better路, more functional and effective. But industry w i II JOI n international co-operation only if common operational requirements for weapon systems are agreed upon. Although this may be difficult at an early stage of the 41

programmes, products fro m diffe rent Countri es would then perfectly interfa ce when used <luring international Peace keepin g or llumani tar ia n Operati ons. Moreover~ with in the frame of international co-operation it is easier to export products to th ird Countries wh ich are not invo lved in tl,e programmes. In which case there will be an added value only if tb e co-o perating enterpr ises comply w ith common export rules and if thev <lo not import parts from Countries which can limit the end-market of the product. In th is respect France , Germ any, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. have an interest in restr uct uring the Europea n defen ce industry a nd started an impol"l an t process aimin g at harmonising the ir respe ctive national legislation. Should any of the partic ipating Countries release its produ ct ion capability it wou ld be granted procurement by an industry now existin g al European level, thus imp lementing a Europ e an exchan ge of defence products followin g rules sim ilar to those already governing the exchange of othe r Community goods. The six participating Countries expressed their- common will to refrain from past m istakes and agre e d to separa te indu st rial activities fr·om tl1ose carri ed on by governments in order to have a successful outcome in any event. As you know, sometimes polilical reasons have forced indus try to accept ill egitimate obli gations, ,-esponsibililies and cost.-;. Economic reasons were overwhelmed by political ones and this resu lted in the duplication of lines of production or logistic support. But loday gove rnments have adopted a totally different sta nce on curren t co-operation. Industry is given autonomy and generally can d ec ide h ow to j oin the programmes and how to s hare out the work obta ined from the national political commitment. 42

«Ce11u1.uro » ar111oured car.

As to the share capital of" Corporations it is wonh noting th at in llaly the pa,·t ia lly stateowned enterprises are not being imposed managerial gu idelin es any more and the executives arc b ei ng g iven more fr ee dom Lo make any necessary steps leading to a credit balance. Moreover, in the near fut ure, the new technologies implemented [or des igning, developing, producing and managing logistics step by step during its cycle will set a cliffe ,·e nt framework for cooperation progrnmrnes. l nclustry and governments will benefit from office and production automation with savings in general expenses deriving from the optimisation oF the production process and the reduced maintenance costs of the modern weapon systems . T hi s inn ovation w ill make indust ry more competitive and enable governments to acquire less expe nsive weapon systems req uirin g a reduce d logisti c support (particu larly r eferred to stocks). But the tec hn ology-based industrial co-operation requlrcs int erna t ional standards to be complied with allowing the national industry and the armed forces lo exchange informati on a t an int ernation a l level, w hich is a critical issue the European Counhies arc still focing. In conclu s io n co-operation is no t an opti on bu t a must for national governm ents and defence industry if they want e ffec tive and s ustainable armed rorces and to be compe titive on th e national a nd in ternat io nal armaments market. E urope is a multi -need area with a widespread pote ntial in the fi e ld of techno logy, industry and economy providing grounds also for defence indusny co-operation . But this will only grn w if th e national legis lation provides for the transnational in tegration of

indu stry and if e nterprises arc given an international equal status to be competitive world-wide. With the implementation of the latest design- and managementtechnologies the production and the procurement of weapo n systems will follow new procedures throu g h digital a nd standard information available to anyone,

anywhere and any rime. The It al ian governmen t coo perati on p olicy s upp orts i.nd usLria l c o-opcrn tion al the inLerna tio nal leve l. In th is framework executives can take their dec is io ns w itho ut anv political interference as to Lechnic~l and genera l policy issues. I n It a ly the reorga n isat ion

process is complete toe.lay and the Italian industry is now geared to bu ild up European Lransnational e nt erprises di ffe rent fro m an y pasl conven li onal joint ventures which caused uneconom ical overlapping of stn.1ctures. T he llali a n govern men t and indu s try a re resea rchi ng an<l developing new technologies to be

competitive both nationally and in co-operation programmes.

0 ,Âˇ, Colonel, Chief Industrial Policy omce, Technical Admi11istrative Branch, M.o.D., Italy

The targets set by socitil development are a new and widely accepted reference point to overcome the inequalities threatening our civilized way of living together. Fostering economic growth and at the same time reducing poverty and unemployment, promoting development processes and respecting different cultures, combating the causes ofvwlence, instability and conflicts actively, have become political prospects which have gathered global consensus. But a key issue is still unsolved: how to put these prospects into practice. 44

UNDP/UNOPS

h ich prob lerns could be solved a t national leve l, among Lhe rnajor issu es presently at stake? Certainly not intolerant hchaviors lr iggering acts of terrorism, nor conflicts and poverty compelling h ordes or desperate people to nee (today 200 million people at least are roam ing about the world, the highest fig~re ever r·ecorded in modem histo ry), nor illegal b:ade mai n ly drug trafficking- nor unemployment, nor enviromnental disasters or epidemics. An d which among the main assets of our time cou ld be confined within n at ional bou ndaries? Certainly not scient.i[ic d iscove1ies and research, nor technologica l achievements, nor prnfits deriving from financ ial activities and trade,

nor artistic and cul.tuntl intu itions, nor those information flows against wh ich undemocratic regirnes have ahvays tried to build bulwarks . Inter-dependence is al.ready an established phenomenon, ·which is destined to vviden its scope. Today lo co-operate with those who are worse off is proritablc both for industrialized and developing countries, besides all other considen.,tions . Decent living cond itions reduce the need Lo emigrate, quell the outburst of violence, both collective and indiv idua l, rule out a ll temptations to adopt undemocratic solutions, limit the unwise employment of natural resources (there is a lso a detail which will have significant long-term repercuss ions : 80% of the world future consumers live in developing countlies). There is no doubt that the higher the number· of self-sufficien t, conscious and responsible people, the better lire will be for all. From the second post-war peliod lo our present days global poverty levels have decreased more tban in 5 centu1ies, over 70% of th e world population live in democralic countries, the hu man r ights concept is spreadi n g everywhere and special attention is being paid to the cond itions of women. But huge tragedies arc still there: over one quarter of the developing world's populalion ( 4 billion and 400 m illion people) live on a yearly per capita income or less th an $ 750, over 850,000 people are still

suffering from hunger, 1 billion and 300 million people al least do not have dri nkable \,v ater, 880 m illi on people cannot avail themselves or a public welfare system and about one quarter of teen-agers do not attend compulsory school. In induslrial ized countries one person in 6 dies befor·e the age of 60, or under·gocs long periods of unemployment, or li ves on an income be low the nali onal poverty level , CH lacks a minimum of instruction . All over the world the poorest of the poor a re women : they make up 70% of the total, arc 2/3 of the illiterate people and own less than 1% of the Janel. Development guarantees stability, peace and sec u dty, b u t to be completely successful il cannot be limited to econo1i-1 ic growth only. It must create and maintain new jobs, (the unemployed or underemployed are 2 billion and 800 million people, i.e. 30% of the world active popL1lation), furlher enhance t he i nstrucLion, health, social organi1.at ion and environment sec tors and abolish all sorts or discri m ination sternrning from many kinds of racist attitudes. Everyth ing has changed after the fall of the Berl in wall. A Ut u rn h as been made from t h e period in w hi ch censorshi p preva il ed , political parties a nd civil associali ons were ou tlawed a nd t rnvcl restric t io ns were imposed . Probably we wo u ld never understand the e nth usiasm of those who can own a passpo rL

Poverty is not only tl1.e lack of an income, but a.Isa of tlw preconditions to live a dignified life, i.e. a decent hygienic/sanitary environment, a minimum level of instruction and security, the possibility of carrying out an adequately compensated job, being informed and taking part in community life. 1.h.e fight against poverty is the UNDP's first priority and t:lw UN devoted tlw 199.7-2006 per-iod to it. 45

for the rirst Lime. Over 400 million people from Eastern Europe and lh e Independent States Confederation (ISC, made up of 18 countries belonging to the Fonner Soviet Union) have been plunged imo the global communication era, where large capitals are moved all over the ,,vorld in real time; sornetimes these sums ar·e huge enough to inAuence Lhe performance of StockExchanges, money trends and political/economic decisions . The number or travelers has doubled. Telephone tariffs have been reduced, rollowing a conslant down-trend started from the first half of the century (3 minutes of conversation between NY and London cost $ 3 in 1990 and 20 cents today, while in 1930 the p1ice was $ 244,65). Computer prices have fallen sharply. In 1960 the price or a computer averaged $ 125,000, while in t"he '70s it lowered to$ 19,474 and in the '80s to$ 46

3,620, now it is slightly over $ 1,000. The wodd created in 1989 was there to be explored, known and tasted. ll was a new, agile and stimulating world, but il could be ruthless to the 1nost disadvantaged people, not from an economic point of view only. In fact, they reel highly vulnerable, living in an era \.vhere all must be educated and informed, time and space are shortened and role, values, life styles, working systems, personal security c1·iteria, social and cultural reference points are questioned. The globa l vil lage must be tailored to human beings rather than markets - cautions the Report on Human Development 1999, drawn up by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and presented to the general public in these last fevv days. The UNDP, under the UN General Assembly, is the main body which issues guide lines for a «sustainable human development» (i .e . taking into

account the interests of fut ure generations as well) and finances its projects . It is the largest organization established to promote co-operation world-,vide. Its central HQs is in NY, its European HQs in Geneva; there are 132 branches in several counnies where a residing representative operates and often acts as co-ordinator of UN local activities as well. Since 1989 the UNDP Report has been issued every year and translated into 10 languages. It gives a clear picture of the status and development of the countries all over the world. Main data and considerations, such as average life expectancy, instruction levels, income, women's conditions etc. are centered around a focal point . This year's topic is globalization, with the 1isk that only a minority may benefit from it. The focus is on tlu·ee main aspects: an increasingly market-oriented economy, the growing importance of teclmology and the proliferntion of local conflicts, often fueled by the interests of different Mafia groups. The report states that the prevailing requirements or a free -market econorny may de\,i ate the attention of public opinion from health, instruction and environment issues. The sudden advent of different neoliberist theories, which share the common goal or limiting the State presence, has often created a social and emotional trauma, more than an economic/ideological one. In 7 CSI countries the average life expectancy has been reduced by 5 years, while from 1989 to 1995 the percentage of 3-6 year old children attending nursery school shifted from 64% to 36% in Lithuania and from 69% to 54% in Russia. In other countr·.ies neo-liberist theories are sometimes looked upon as a dangerous vehicle of individualism and capable or threatening th e balance reached by a stiU pat1iarchal society. One of its main cornerstones is women's traditional attitude to shoulder al.I. farniliar ,md househo.ld responsibilities, without being rewarded, together with the care or Lhe elderly and the most

disadvantaged in general. This is why fundamentalist movements, which affecl the 3 rnono lheistic religions in different v:iays, share the c01.;;_mon goal of estabiisliing rules to restrict women's freedom. With the advent of the lnlernel, technology has given such a boost to man's creativeness, wh ich can only be cornpared to the invention of the press. For the first time the world is really within reach. Who will make the most of it? First of all, financial operators and their environment. It is noteworthy that in the 70's financial transactions amounted to $10/20 bill ion daily, in 1996 they averaged $ l 000 billion and 300 million and from then onward these figures have been rising constantly. Researchers and scholars, operating in the scientific field mainly, are Internet users as well. At lasl Lhey can comrnunicale overcoming all distance and cost problems. The Internet can also help specialized workers to ,viden their chances of finding an adequate position in their country or abroad . In 1998 more than 250,000 highly quali fied African immigrants with a technological specialization ,,vere employed in Europe or lhe US, where they need a special visa. Those who oppose undemocratic regimes are also advantaged by the Internet. Post, telephone and fax services can be easily kept under control. Tbjs is irnpossible with lhe Internet, especially if adequate measures m-e adopted. Moreover~ among Internet users there is a number of undefined and curious people capab le of commu nicaling in English (language used in 80% of sites), learning how to «surf» the ne t and paying both the entry fee and the telephone bill. The ,vorld of lsurfers\' comprises 30% of Univers ity graduates, mostly male (women are 7% in China and 17% in Japan). 1-ler·e are some figures: in January 1999 Internet use,-s were nol mcwe than 158 million, 88,330,000 of them lived in Canada or lhe US,

MILITARY COOPERATION OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES on January 17,1999 Name, year of establislm1ent, tasks and ernploy1nent areas, persmmel and means. National missions D.LATM (Jtakm Delegation for Tedmical-Lvlilitary Assistance):1969; advanced and operational training of helicopLer pilots; Rabat (Morocco); 1 military personnel. MIATM (Italian Mission [or Technical-Militai:y Assistance): 1988; u-aining of Maltese Armed Forces; Valletta (Malla); 47 rnilitary personnel, SO Army vehicles and 2 Air Force AB 212 helicopters. GRUPNAV 28 and Italian Delegation of Experts: 1997, anti-immigration and Albmlian tenitmial waters (Durazzo), assistance to and co-operation with Albanian Anned Forces (Tirana); 240 militmy pers01mel, several naval Lulits. Multinational missions MFO: (i\:Ussion o[ Lhe Multinational Observation Force in the Sinai): 1982; has no dead-line; control of the Su~ai.ts of Ti.ran bv the urlits of the J0th CoasLal Naval Group; 86 m ilitary personnel, Ships Palma, Bamb·, Mogano. ECMM (Ernnpean Community Monitor Mission): 1991; hac; no dead-line; EEC observation m ission in the former Yugoslavia for monitoring compliance v\~th the tem1s of the t1u ce agreement; 27 1nilitmy personnel. YIPH/2 (Temporary International Presence in the city of Hebron);started in February 1997 with a further 3 month + 3 month extension of its mandate; to ensure tl1e presence of observers for consolidating peace in that .Middle-Easlem Region; 27 rnilitary personnel. NATO MISSIONS JOINT FORCE :to consolidate and stabilize peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent the resuming of hostilities, create a safe environment and support a civil development plan; 2182 military personnel; I Brigade (Italian Army), 9 naval rnlits (Navy), 21 aircraft (Air Force). EAGLE EYE: gathe1ing inf01mation from smveillance and/or reconnaissance plat:fom1s in the Kosovo air space; 2 Bregu et Atlantique aircraft: and 1 G-222 for electronic surveillance. JOINT GUARANTOR:rcscue of OSCE ve1ifiers, if the situation deteriorates in Lheir operational areas (Kosovo);227 military perso1mcl; (J Centauro Armoured Veh icle Company, 6 armed helicopters). OSCE MISSIONS OSCE-KVl'Vl (OSCE Miss ion in Kosovo) :to verify compliance w ith UN Resolutions 1160 and 1199; 132 m ilitary personnel. WEU J\USSIONS NLI\PE (Multinational Advismy Police Element):1998; to support: Albmlim1 Police Autl101ities; 9 military personnel. UN MISSIONS UNTSO (Truce Supervision OrgailizaLion): started in 1958; has no dead-line; Lo monitor the truce beLween Arab States and Israel (Jerusalem-Israel); 8 m ilitary personnel. UNMOGIP (Obsen1er Group India and Pakistan): sta1ted in 1949, has no deadli ne; to monitor the truce between India and Pakistan (Srinagar-Pakistan); 7 military personnel. UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon); started in 1978; its mm1tfate has been extended until July, 31 1998, by Resolution 1151/98 of January 30, 1998; to m onitor the withdrawal of Xsraeli troops from Lebanon (Naqmah-Lebm10n); 44 I1.a]jan Army personnel, 4 helicopters and 4 vehicles. UN[KOM (Iraq-Quwait Obsc1ver Mission): slancd in 1998, ha5 no dead-line; Lo monitor the tn.1ce in the border-area be.tween Traq and Quwait (Ummoa<;ir-Iraq); 5 m ilitary personnel. UNSCOM (Special Commission for Disarmament of Iraq):started in 1991, has no dead-H ne; to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 688; no military pers01mel (occasional participation on UN request). MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendrnn in Western Sahara): staned in 1991, its mandate has been extended until September 21. 1998 (by Resolution 1185 of July 20, 1998), to nionitor the Referendum for the independence of Western Sabant frorn Morocco (Laayoinc-WcsLem Sahara); 5 .rnjlitary personnel. 1\IITNUGUA (UN Mission in GuaLemala): si.a.rtcd in July 1995, is still underway; to monitor human rights in Guatemala; 7 military personnel. TPFf (BRCKO), its mandate ha5 been extended until June 7, 1995, by Resolution 1174 of June 15, 1998; an Italian military contingent of Police observers is part of the IPTF; 23 militmy personnel.

37,760,000 in Europe, 26,550,000 in Asia or the Pacific, 4,630,000 in South An,er-ica, 1,140,000 in Africa, 780,000in the .l\falclle Ea,;;t. Projections forecast that Lhey vvill reach 700 million in 2000, wilh growth peaks in Canada, the US and Europe main ly. In fact, 96% of the glo ba l trade of high -tcch equ ipment is concentrated in these areas, where another \Vclleslab li shed I.rend has gained ground: offering services inslead of finished goods, especially in the informalion , communication, publicity and entertainment sectors. As rega rds civil con (I icts, anolher distinguishin g aspect of 48

«Moreove1: mercenaries exchange their se1vices for mining and energy concessions mainly. They become an important economic presence in a count1y, by establishing subsidiary companies operaling in the ai,~ transport, road building and trade secto1·s ». A growing number of rnultinational companies operating in dangerous areas turn to mercenaries to protect thei r interests. «1vfilitaiy companie.s, such as Executive Outcomes, Sancll ine Internat ional and Militarv Professional Resomces Incorporated (MPRl) - goes on the Report - offer military services and training to gove1-n ments and large organizations. They have been pm1icul.arl)I active in A/i'ica. These hired military groups have no political goals, but pursue their personal gains only. In 1997 M PRI's turnover was over $48 billion. ..!fired military sen;z:ces are a threat to man's safety. In fcict, they are not under the control of a superior authority and can be regulaled with diffh:ulty. National and international bodies of legislation trying to limit rnercenary actions have proved to be highly ineffective so far» . In a world which has changed so greatly and is still changing, it is unconceivable that ways of cooperation and their underlying concepls arc not deeply modified as wel l. Multilateral co-operation , for instance, will take on growing i 111 portance, rnai nly because it. is typically tailored Lo operate in our time, the UNDP Report really critical areas, outside Lhc underscores a nevv elemen l: the scope of bilateral co-operation. In this respect t he issue o f inc ,-easing interaction between governabil.i ty is a typical example violence and business. How many of the 84 conflicts (79 arc internal) and a pivotal po in t of UNDP's which have broken out in 3 years philosopby and program agains t a n d caused 90% of civi lian poverty. In fact, providing the casualties, have been fueled by the under-privileged with a niinimurn interests of several Mafia groups, amount of resources and credi t operating at various levels and in grants is indispensable but not sufficient to redeem them. This w ill differcnt sectors? Another nlorc recent and worrying only be poss ible if a nation sets phenomenon is the proliferation of favorablc political and legal private mil itary companies wh ich conditions, its private sector operate internationally The Report's produces income and jobs, its civil soc ie ty is sensitive to issues of 1st Chapte r; «Civil confhcts, global inte1·ests» Section , page 12 of the public interest and takes on a proEnglish ed ition, reads as follows : active attitude towards thern. The

interaction of lhese three components allows a country to be governable. Obviously the related advantages will not blmefit nalional citizens only; in fact, govemability requires a system based on the rule of law, reliable transactions, ,vide investment-boosting conditions. Only a multilateral effort can promote very demanding projects, such as studying how to reorganize the executive, legislative and judiciary sectors, establish effective Chambers of Commerce, rehabilitate degraded social environments and carry out other equally difficult plans. The UN's blue banner guarantees pol itical neutrality, competence and impartiality. Besides govemability, there are other guidelines underlying the UNDP' action, such as job creation, better conditions for ,.vomen, safeguarding the env ironment. These objectives inevitably take on a cross -seclorial dimension. All projects must be drawn up with and endorsed by the government authorities of the countries concerned, which usually bear over half of the overall costs. The implementation phases are supervised by experts, either national citizens or organizations. The UNDP is financed by voluntary contribut ions from governments almost all over the world; the amount of these sums varies from one year to another, depending on political/economic decisions. Besides funds allocated to fulfill the institutional task of promoting world development, other contributions come from goven1ments vvishing to implement special projects in some countries, through the UNDP (the so-called multi-bilateral system). Italy plays an active and constant role, both in terms of financing and ideas. Our country, for instance, is a reference point for the methodology of decentralized development, after the outstanding results achieved by PRODERE between 1990 and 1995. It was a

In 1994 the 200 richest people in the world owned

$ 444

billion in all,Âˇ in 1998 t/ie overall amount reacl'led $1,042 billion . Of tl'lese people 65 live in 1Vortl7 America,

55 in

Europe, 3 in Eastern Europe and in th.e Independent .States Confederation, 43 in Asia and the Pacific Regions,

16 in Arab Counfries, 17 in Latin America and 1 in SubSaharan Africa .

program, experimental at thal time, implemented by Ilaly to rehabilitate a region in Central Africa \,vhich was corning oul of a conflict situation. Local communities are the foundation of decentralized development. Together with UNDP representatives, nalional government and donor countries' authorities, they must identify critical requ irements, resources and potentialities of the ir respective territorÂˇies, propose new prngrams and supervise their irnplementation. This system offers a series of advantages, if applied to social environments often suffering from isolation, rivalries, century-old disputes and conflicts. In fact it reestablishes the habil of talking,

stresses the importance to living together peacefully, rather than building infrastrncture works. This method may also increase the amount of stale contributions received, as Municipalities, Provinces , Regions, Non Governrnental Organizations and other associations belonging to several COLmhies are often willing to liaise with local counte1varts and set special relationships in particular sectors. Reconstrncting a cow1try's social texture allows for the reentry of refugees, also to the advantage of Lhe nations which have received and still host them.

D 1 '

Journalist

Continuing with our effort to encourage the expression of different opmions and discussions on the most important subjects relevant o the structural and operational reorgru ization of the Service, iu I is second installment we present two articles by Col. Claudio G.1·aziano: • "The ony Project for Europe", which describes the functions of "Combat Approach", "Multinationarty" and "Task Oriented" in the transformation under way. • "The New Adherence Logistics", which provides an analytic picture of the new logistic reference-context, stressing the importance of the four pi inciples on ,bich the support of the units operating outside the national territory is based: Great Base; Command and Control; Activities' Programming} Specialization of the Organizations. C

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n the previous installments of this series vve outlined tbe reasons for the n!newal of the Service and the consequent structural adaptations deriving from the new concept of dynamic security. But what are the conceptual parameters that our Army must adopt in order to be fully entitled to play the difficult role of defender of stability and peace in the Balkan-Medite1Tanean area? The article "The Army Project for Emope", by Col. Claudio Graziano, gives us several elements for a clear comprehension of the issue. The work desc1ibes the ftmction of "Combat Approach'', "Multinationality" and "Task Oriented" in the transformation under way. After a reference to the French model, the Author describes the new "Operational concept of the Italian Army'', with particular regard to the problem of Command and Control.

THE REFERENCE PICTURE

During the forty years of bipolar confrontation in Europe the Italian Army, like those of other NATO nations, has been engaged in the preparation of a defence, as effective as possible, against a threat which, as regards origin, direction and intensity was clearly defined. Consequently several generations of brave Italian soldiers took turns along the northeastern border, for a battle which was won but never fought. Those were the tin1es when the Italian Army was de facto ghettoizecl at the margins of the Alliance's militarv instrument, while the destiny of the West was decided in the great Central European Theatre. This was also due to die-hard stereotypes about the efficiency of the Italian Armed Forces. Today all has changed, at least at strategic level, so much so that our Army, perhaps for the first time

after the end of WWII, is considered, by the Country's political leaders, as the concrete expression of the Country's will to participate in a European project, both within and outside NATO. This decision is made mandatory by the very position of our Country, at the centre of the great BalkanMediterranean area, the only one from which, at the present time, real risks for the Old Continent's stabiUty could originate. These considerations alone would be anough to assign the Army a much more significant national and international role, i.e. the potential r9le of protagonist in the ne,.v policy of common security, as a clear and fundamental

Paratroop-rangers on iraining in a wooded area.

instmment of foreign policy at the Country's disposal. As we said, in all this the real change is that, perhaps for the first time, also the political leadership seems to share these ideas, and probably agree vvith the military on subjects like the need of professjonalizing the forces and assigning to the security sector resources adequate to its tasks. Resources which should be at least comparable to those allotted to the equivalent European Armies (France, Germany, United Kingdom). On the other hand, these ideas

1Âˇ

have been expressed mainly as principles but have not yet been translated into actual and concrete realizations, which can only be substantiated with the allocation of sufficient funds, i.e. increased and comparable to the average appropriations of the abovementioned European allies. In short, all - or almost all - have become convinced that to build and maintain m.ilitary forces adequate to the prestige of the Country, it is necessary to spend a little more; what is lacking is the will - or perhaps the possibility - of giving the military expenses a higher priority over others that, although infinitely less important, have a high profile and a significant return at the social level. Unfortunately the examples are numerous, and this is not the

place to mention them, but certainly they are such that there is not much room for optimism, in the short term at Âˇleast. There are, nevertheless, some pos1t1ve indications in the planning sector, with the recent issue of the first Ministerial Directive, signed by the Minister of Defence, which deals with security requirements and programmatic indications. Although still al an embryonic stage, the directive represents an ambitious and absolutely correct experiment, i.e. that of confirming annually the strategic-military directives on which the processes of general and operational planning should be based. This circula1~ furthennore, will permit the creation of the longa wai tecl cascade of directives, starting from the gujdebnes set by

the politico-strategic summit and then translated into increasingly specialized programme lines at the different Staff levels. AN EPOCHAL CHANGE

The limits and the persistent problems outlined in the introduction, far from slowing down the course of renewal undertaken by the Service, must represent instead a spur and an incentive to change and to propose to the politicians, as soon as possible, that long-term development plan which the Army has always been missing (this is a little less true for the Navy and the Air Force). Once approved, this plan could become really binding and,

Facing page. M / 09 selfpropellecl gun of the IFOR Italian contingent. Right. Italian armoured cars on patrol during the "Albatross" mission in Mozambique

therefore, concrete. This possibility has today more chances of being developed, precisely because of the recent Minister's Directive. In vjew of this, the Army has changed all references on which it b ases the restructuring of t he forces and defines the operational concept in support of the transformation plan. If in the long term the Service continues to be a producer of forces trained for deterrence, on the much more pressing front of probabilities and times of intervention and of multinational control of conflicts the Army must become an instrument capable of bringing forth real operational capabilities at short notice. The supporting parameters of t he conceptual change can be summarized in the following three concepts: combat approach, nutltinationality, task oriented. COMBAT APPROACH

As for as the first concept is concerned, the experience gained in the peace support operations conducted in the past nine years clearly indicate that success can only come from the deterrence capability of the contingents in the operations area. Tilis, in turn, is the result of the forces operational credibility and, in the final analysis, depends on the real combat capability clearly shown by the formations engaged in operations and visibly supported by an adequate politico-nlilitary mandate. Therefore, both within the framework of the new activities of collective peace and security and the more general aims of defence against any possible aggressor, the

"combat capability" reasserts itself as an ever indispensable prerequisite for the conception and constitution of any military formation. The consequence is obvious but, sometimes, neglected: the soldiers of the future wiJl have to be also operators of peace, capable of integrating and working in the social sphere, but they are - and ahvays will be - requested to be essentially warriors, fighters ready to risk their life, but sufficiently trained to avoid losing it. Also this simple rediscovery is essential for finding and travelling the 1ight route of renewal. In any case the achievement of the combat capability cannot be taken for granted because, at training level, it means hardshlp, ligour, Jabour as well as a renewed and serious

iliscipline. An English saying, coined by the best soldiers in the world, affirms: "more sweat, less blood". MULTINATIONALITY

As regards multinationality, the reasons for its growth, which was unthinkable even for the most convinced and utopian champions of the "common European house" lie in a widespread sharing of strategic security objectives within the international community. In other \Nords, the areas of instability that concern the V\Test European Countries are basically the same for all Nations and - albeit in a slightly different measure - all of them are equally and greatly interested in controlling the crises

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in those areas. Furthermore, the absolute need of achieving success in peace operations and the always limited resources at the Armed Forces' d1sposal, are some of the motives which induced the main European Nations to accept a configuration of the military instruments reduced in size, but joint and decidedly open to rnultinationality. In this respect, suffice it to think of the German Army which, for a while now, has placed all its forces within multior bi-national formations. The issue of multinationality has already been discussed, and will probably be taken up again, on these pages. As a matter of fact, it is an ambitions challenge, and not all the relevant initiatives seem

capable of "taking off" right away and in a positive manner. Besides, its development is affected by political considerations and cultural legacies whose importance cannot be disregarded. So, whithout entering into any polemic evaluation but, rather, analyzing reality Âˇwith simple objectivity, it appears much more complex to think of bilateral formations, for example, with Germany - a Nation which has a different geostrategic perception of the importance of Eastern Europe as compared with the Mediterranean area - than vvith nati.ons sharing similar geostrategic interests: in these terms, the reference to France is aU to clear. To conclude this subject, suffice it to mention that, in all the latest

peace missions, the Franco-Italian military forces have always operated under the same command. Also today, the extractiori force is commanded by a French general, with an Italian Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander, while in the Alba mission, in Albania, France accepted to place its units under the command of the Italian "framework", and Germany, on the contrary, had declined to participate in the stabilization mission in the Adiiatic. One should not overlook the composition of the "Salamandre" multinational division in. Bosnia: the components are many, but the "framework" is basically French and, after France, Italy is the Nation with

Facing page. "Bersaglieri" during the "ibis" 111:ission in Somalia.

Right. AB205 helicopter in landing.

the largest contingent. An obvious lesson can be learned from all this: the knovvledge of languages must be improved. While within the Service it is necessary to create the capabilities to deal with practically all languages, all Cadres and regular troops must have the operational lmowledge of English and French, the two languages that our soldiers will have to use in combat, or even just in the defence of peace. TASK ORIENTED

The last parameter, ''task oriented", has the strongest influence on both the new doctrine and the modern structure of the forces in the Italian Army. lt is, furthermore, a parameter which most interferes with the other tv10, imposing a confrontation ,,vith the Allies, at concepts and solutions level. Nor would it be conceivable, within the present multinational framework, not to strive for the highest possible integrability in the international environment. On the other hand, the multiform operational requirements and the a bsolute lack of a weJJ defined threat, as regards dimensions and source, implies the capability of rapidly and timely assuming the task-oriented configuration most suitable to exploit, in the best possible way, the limited resources available. In other words, the previous organization of the Italian Army; based on fixed "task forces", preconstituted at Brigade level, oriented to conduct a defensive battle on the Fr iulian-Venetian plain, against a perfectly known threat, has lost most of its "raison d'~tre". This is proved by the fact

that organic units have never taken part in any of the missions carried out by Italy outside the national borders, and the command and control system has always required specific adjustments. This was the case for the first and by now glorious mission led by Gen . Angio:rri in Lebanon: ITALCON was a Brigade-level unit, but was not based on any Brigade. In the "Airone" mission, in assistance of the Kurdish populations, forces and capabilities were drawn from different structures, while in Somalia and Mozambique the base was closer to specific Brigade Headquarters, but within the contingents there were units from the whole Army. We can conclude with Bosnia, where it would be difficult to find, among the Brigade

Headquarters which have rotated in the Theatre, one having more than 20% of its own organic forces. Therefore, having to guarantee a high functional flexibilty both towards the e:,...1:erior (multinational integration) and towards the interior (capability of changing the structures according to the tasks) and all this in times coherent with the intervention options - the land force complexes must be more and more fully integrable in the joint and multinational formations where they are called to operate but, at the same time, they must be .integrated, i.e. must ensure the highest internal effectiveness in aU the different and not known in advance configurations of employment. "The Italian Army's Capability Packages", is a project which 57

starts precisely from the three abovementioned parameters, with the purpose of defining and realizing the programmes for the reconfiguration of the Army according to the new scenarios of employment. This means that the project as a whole intends to transform the Service from a traditional military instrument, organized and trained for the defence against a predetermined and direct threat to the national borders, into a completely different organization, able to express complex, integrated and integrable operational capabilities. An instrument, therefore, intended not only for the military defence of the Country, but rather for its global security according to the new Italian strategy, within the NATO and ESDI {European Security and Defence Initiative) strategy, in support of peace and for the preventive and remote control of crises. THE FRENCH/MODEL

In connection to the need of stmcturing the forces in relation to a specific mission which cannot be assigned in advance to anyone in particular - since it refers to an unknown option of employment the French Army is the one that has made very interesting decisions, from which it is at least possible to learn some lessons; also because the size of the :future transalpine military instrument is completely assimilable to that of the desired Italian model. Furthermore, also very similar are the operational concepts and the strategic perception of the importance of the Mediterranean basin or, as it is called today, of the concept of an "enlarged Mediterranean". Thus, although the Italian Army will probably not be identical to the French one, it certainly will have to be able to integrate more and more with it. Consequently, it will have to be not too dissimilar, at least as

Fig. 1

The operational organization

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regards the principles of force employment. Considerjng only the operational component, we notice that France's transfom1ation process is based on two concepts: the .first, "Task Oriented", has already been widely introduced and the second, "Planning Commands", is following the first in the consideration that, once the former is adopted, the latter becomes practically mandatory. The new operational stmcture of our transalpine Allies envisages four main organization levels, subordinate to the Chief of the Army Staff: Operational Forces Command, Division-level Planning Staff, Brigades with their subordinate manoeuvre forces and, last, the Regiment level (Fig.l). Among these, the only one ,-vith a fixed and complete organization is precisely the Regiment, which is by far the most important operational and organizational level of the French Army. Its subordination can change, and it can receive additional forces in relation to the mission but, in the end, the manoeuvre will be

conducted by the Regiment's Commander. Therefore, the core of the change is formed by eighty single-branch Regiments (there are a couple of multibranch ones at Djibouti and in Polynesia), each consisting of about 1000 men. The immediately higher level is the multibranch Brigade, obtained by reducing the preexistent divisional level, with the majn purpose of establishing a demubplicator meant also, or mainly, to avoid the dispersion of the fundamental cooperative capability of the different operational functions. Thus the Brigades are organizations light in command and Staff, flexible in their employment, without units and responsibilities for logistic support, and can be completed according to the miss.ion. The command function pe1fom1ed by the Brigades over a certain number of Regiments already in peacetime, must therefore be considered essentially related to the preparation phase. Afterwords each Brigade will be called to operate with forces that could be very different form those 01iginally assigned.

Ranger of the "Col J\lloschin" 9th Regiment training iri a wooded area.

As regards the four Division Headquarters, they don't control any unit responsible for the manoeuvre. They are therefore virtual planning commands, which become operational only when the ''Task Oriented" principle is fully applied, assembling, under the Major Unit's command, the operational and logistic forces suited to the envisaged mission. One must remember that the operational concept of the French Army always envjsages the participation in a mission of at least a Division Hq., even v,rith only one subordinate Brigade Hq. In this way, the Division is responsible to act at operational level, if no higher organization level is present in the Theatre, leaving to the Brigade only the responsibility for the tactical level. On the other hand, this is a moment of great changes also in France and , ther efore, some of these concepts could be subject to variations. In this respect, and for some minor missions, the divisional level could for example find its place within the "Mounting Headquarters" function, without therefore envisaging its deployment in the operations zone. The last is the "Operational Land Forces Command" level, whose functions are identical to those of the Italian FOTER in Verona, with the only - but important difference that all Brigades are subordinate to that Com~and. To conclude the French example: a clearly expressed strategic consideration deems most unlikely a threat capable of directly involving, in the next fifteen years, the securjty of the metropolitan territories. Hence the absolute uselessness of an organization structured for this case. What has been said so far originates the operational concept of the French Army, which in

substance envisages three possible security scenarios: one of European interest (multinational), one of extra-European interest (multinational), and finally one still outside the metropolitan territory, but with an exclusively national configuration. For each option, exhaustive studies have been conducted on the maximum level of the forces available and these studies have been submitted to - and approved by - the political authorities. In substance, the number of theatres that can simultaneously be sustained does

not vary according lio the availability of manoeuvre forces, but is rather related to their logistic sustainability and to the availability of Command and Control organizations, considering also the requirements of rotation in the theatre. THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TODAY AND TOMORROW

The New Defence Model, recently approved by the Government, entrusts the Italian Armed. Forces

Left. A "Centau ro" arm oured c a r in Mozambique. Facing page. A u nit o f the contingent.

with five joint missions: • defence of the national territory; • participation in the collective defence of the Atlantic Alliance; • participation in multinational operations in support of peace and international security; • contribution to the safegu ard of the Institutions; • contribution to the relief of the national community in case of disasters. Among t h ese, o f parti c ul ar importance are, at planning level, the s ec ond joint mission (parti cip a t ion in the com m on s ecurity system) and the third one (contribution to the defence of the external interests and of th e international secu r ity a n d stability) . These are in fact the two types of m issions whi ch potentially include the peacesupport military operations that a re by far the m ost probable

ones. If the need arises to include with i n the third mission a reference - improbable, perhaps, but not imp ossible - to the conduct of security operations always within the framework of the indispensa ble and required international legitimation, but carried out only by national forces - these missions give a wide set of employment options for the Army, derived fron the possib le comb inations of the pa r a meters which characterize them, such as: • type of the operations, which can go from a traditional conflict to the whole spectrum of the socalled other-than-vvar operations, the latter being, by fm~ the most probable, if not exclusive, option; • the operations theatre wh ich, \Nithin certain limits, could even be located on the n ation al territory or within the NATO area

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of responsibility; but the latter option is not very probable in the short term. The theatre could also be located out-of-area, as has been the case for all operations - past, under way or presumable - in which Italian military formati.ons have participated; • finally, the operational context, whid1 can be, joint, multinational, or have a Service configuration. As we have seen, the n.orm \.Vi.11 be a joint and integrated context, \.Vith a prevailing land component. On the basis of the assigned missions, and taking into due account the lessons learned from past operations, as well as of the above considerations, also in the light of the experience gained by the Allies, it is possible to derive the employments which shoul d be met by the Army formations. As we underlined several times, the wide spectrum of tasks and the marked differentiation of the employment scenarios require formations specifically structured to answer the needs . This means that the units, even if assembled in standard formations at their garrisons for reasons of discipline, training and administration, must be appropriately selected and organized into task forces on the basis, and at the moment, of the operational exigencies. The preparation for this is called "force generation", and is also characterized b y times of readiness, mixing and deployment. The observance of these times implies the assignement of a readiness category and status to the forces and imposes the adoption of exacting organizational measures. It must be added that, as we have

learned from the Bosnian example, peace support operations are often long but do not imply, a priori, an active armed confrontation. The military formations involved, therefore, are essentially subject to wearing out, owing to the duration of their employment. Thut one should envisage their periodic rotation, orga.nizating the capabilities and functions to be projected into several groups (as a general rule, there should be three echelons: preparation, employment, reorganization). On the basis of the elements pointed out and keeping in mind that the military instrument as a whole will have to be able to concur to the common defence in case of direct threat, today the operational units of the Army are organized into three Capability Packages, according to the foremost options of employment:

â€˘ projection forces for out-of-area operations, made up of projectable commands and units, rapidly employable and capable of operating in multinational and joint contexts, manned by volunteers; â€˘ reaction forces earmarked for NATO's Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces, for the management of crises in the contingency areas of the Alliance, also constituted by volunteer personnel, but as a second p1iority; â€˘ presence and surveillance forces for territorial control, manned at present by conscripts and capable, in an emergency of helpjng to meet the needs of coinmon security and defence. The last package of capabilities, the "Defence Package" includes, if needed, all the forces and capabilities necessary for the unitary

employment of the whole military instrument in defence of the Italian teiritmy. The Capability Packages are therefore the first attempt at finchng a solution to the problem of generctl planning, acknowledging that, as we said before, there is not a definite adversary anymore and, as a consequence, the operational missions can be expressed only in general terms. Thus the military instrument caimot be built according to a specific mission, nor can it be quantitatively and qualitatively adjusted against a specific enemy. It was therefore necessaiy to go, from the so-called planning on the threat of the past, to the present system of capabihty planning. It should be considered moreover that, in a moment of extraordinary dynamism such as the present, one should pursue flexible solutions, capable of undergoing successive

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adjustments. In this sense, the distinction between reaction and projection forces appears to be essentially a planning device, since it refers mainly to the availability of professionals and modern materials. As from the year 2003, this distinction will have no meaning, if not that of attributing to certain units a greater inclination towards some missions rather than towards others. Likewise, if the Army, as it seems certain, were to become entirely formed by professional forces, there would be the immediate need to assign the missions for the control of the tenitory indifferently to any unit of the Army. The details regarding the number of theatres and the employment options, envisaged by the Army's operational concept, will be discussed in another

----<'- -

article; now we can say that the Italian Army's staunch support of the "task organization" principles have led to the planning concept that envisaged, for the operational forces, the achievement of a precise objective: a "Division for Europe". This should not be intended as the establishment of a standard formation, but rather as the availability of professional forces capable, for their size and professionalism, of sustaining long-lasting operations, at the maximum level of a Division, to be employed within NATO and WEU initiatives, also in application of the "European Initiative of Defence and Security" project. As regards planning and preparation, the projection and reaction forces, at least until the complete transition to professionalism, can be based on a

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complex of eight Brigades of different types, plus support units. A reservoir of forces where lhe modular operational capabilities can be located, in order to assemble different types of "Task Force" for employment in all scenarios, outside the national territory, presumably in a mediumterm perspective. We are therefore discussing the forces necessary to realize the "Division for Europe", capable of operating in any operational environment outside the Country, always keeping in mind that other forces must be available for strictly national tasks. In conclusion, the concept is based upon the availability of two Division Hqs which, at the start of the project were divided - because of their structural affinj ty and employment orientation - into tvJo Division-level groups, a heavy one

Facing page. Men and equipment of the Italian contingent in Mozambilljle.

Right. Soldier of the "Lagu.nari" Regiment during the SFOR mission in Bosnia.

and a light one. Considering the subsequent changes, such aggregation does not have a particular raison d'etre, and it seems that the moment has come for at least a partial evolution towards the French model, adapted to the national characteristics. A model envisaging two Division-level planning commands, to which the number and types of units required to carry out any specific mission would be aggregated . Since the two Divisions must have "a priori" the capability of rotating in the Theatre, both should be able to express identical capabilities. COMMAND AND CONTROL

In the near future the number of aggregations of forces will not be so important since, as is known, the strength of a Brigade can vary from 3000 to 8000 men . What will actually make the difference is the principle of complete modularity of the formations which, within certain organizational limits, will result in the creation of force basins which will include all the operational functions - starting with command and control - to be credited to command and control systems tasked, in advance, with planning activities only. In other words, and this shows the real change of mentality occurred within the Italian Army, the authority in charge of the preparation vdll no more the one that leads the forces during the mission, but that which supplies a preparation service to another body, actuaily responsible for the employment in an emergency. This concept corresponds in

many ways to the one derived from a dynamic conception , which distingujshes the most modern organization systems and, in the medium term, will bring about the end of the "staff and line" system, upon whkh all the annies in the world have been traditionally based, in order to proceed to a better performing system, albeit more difficult to manage in the first phase of its introduction. On the other hand, also the Law on the Reform of the Military Summit has given the responsibility for planning and

employing the Armed Forces, as a whole, to the Chief of Staff of Defen ce, leaving to the Service Chiefs only the responsibility for their preparation. As is known, the present Command and Control Organization of the Army envisages a command structure (COMFOTER) responsible for the preparation and employment (and the possible management) of the operational land forces; the latter option could be adopted in the rather unlikely case of a warrant by the CHOD. From the organization point of

..â€˘ view, the Operational Forces are subordinate to four Major Unit Commands, the Intermediate Operational Commands (COI). One of them, the Projection Forces Command (COMFOP) can be expanded in a Jomt and multinational sense, and is responsible for out-of-the-border operations , as Command of a generic intervention-force or of the Italian Division assigned to the NATO Reaction Forces. The Alpine Troop Command (COMTA), potentially projectable and expandable, is instead earmarked ÂŁ01; taking turns with COMFOP in case of long missions, or could also be called to replenish it in the theatre. The two Projection Commands have their own forces. On the other hand, considering what has been said so far, the assignment in advance of units to the projection commands is, at this

point, conceptually incorrect and not in line v..rith the basic principles of the new Army. Thus it would be indispensable to see the two Projection Commands as the sole assignees of the divisional level, and therefore transformed into pure employment-Staffs, in conformity with the French model. If not directly involved, in relation to the size of the mission, the Projection Forces (FOPs) would also be capable of performing the task of Mounting Headquarters, without having to endure the distractions connected with the management of resources not relevant to the operations lmder way. The requirements of the other two intermediate-level command structures, the Defence Operational Forces Commands (COMFOD) are different, since they must meet the operational needs on the national territory and,

therefore, they could easily assume responsibility for the preparation of all operational forces in peacetime, passing the necessary ones to the two FOPs for external projection, or keeping the responsibility for them in case of operations on the national territory. For these levels, the appropriate rank of the commanders should be that of three-star general. Below the COI, the importance of the Brigade level appears to be confim1ed, both for the preparation of the forces and for their coordination in operations even just a little above the regjment level. Also in this sect01~ there are still problems of organizational simplification and optimization, c01mected with the impossibility of employing an organic Brigade. There are practically two possible solutions, integrated with each

Facing page. The activity of territorial control was of great Âˇimportance during the 1nission in 1Wozam.bique~

Right. An NCO of the Italian contingent making friends with two Mozambican children.

other and gradually achi.evable with the transitjon to a professional Army. The first one is the transformation of one or tvvo commands of the level considered into further planning-commands, after the subtraction of their manoeuvre and support forces. The second solution is the employment of modular packages of cadres provided by the planning Major Units and by other commands, possibly deprived of the regimental level in order to reinforce the Brigade Hqs to be tasked for a specific mission. These are not yet acquired concepts, but they can generally represent the evolutionary trend akeady in the short term. CONCLUSIONS

The references and concepts outlined in this article certainly describe a ctutmal revoJution in the real conception, preparation and employment of the forces. It is a modern and logically correct project, albeit not the only one possible. But what really counts is its :irreversibility after introduction - unless one is willing to accept confusion and, therefore, a reduced effectiveness of the system - and the need to adopt the project in its conceptual essence. In other words, the ''task oriented", or if one prefers, the "modwarity" principle, functional to the task or to the economy of formations, requires an application as precise as possible. Above all, the personnel in charge of planning should strongly believe in the new model and, therefore, determinedly pursue its

implementation. On the other hand, and contrary to the indisc1iminate distribution of resources made inÂˇthe past, the project has already permitted to apply the criterion of progressive achievement of capabilities, complete and ready for employment, according to the "Capability Packages" concept. As a reswt, the Italian Army has already attained a level of operational effectiveness and international credibility higher than ever before. This should be amply sufficient to dispel the possible remaining

doubts about the reasons and objectives of the change in progress, and should be an encouragem.e nt to work hard for its realization. We must remember, besides, that the present one is perhaps the Ital.ian Army's last opportunity to cross with dignity a ford which, although not easy, is certainly within its reach.

D ;,colonel, Chief, Planning Office, Army General Staff

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Among the various sectorial projects, individually aimed at achieving partiai pragmatic objectives in the diverse functional areas of the Army, of particular importance is the project of renewal of logistics in general, and of adherence logistics in particu.lai: As a matter of fact, these are projects that, as a whole, have the purpose of giving shape to the medium-term general planning objective: the realization of the integrated Army model of 137,000 men of all categories, as approved by the Minister of Defence. A model proportionate to the resources assigned and capable of accomplishing its tasks. In this sense, within the framework of the global revision and rationalization of the Service, and in line with the "Capability Packages" project, Âˇwhich started in 1997 and, at this point, is the supporting frame of the Army Project, many conceptual and organizational resources have been devoted to studies on the adjustment of Lhe Army's Logistic Organization to the changed needs of the operational forces. In substance, it is a matter of pursuing, also in the logistic sector, the development and the concrete realization of working principles and organizational structures possible change introduced later consistent with the missions and on should not modify the employment scenarios assigned, fundamental concepts. Thus, the purpose of the present and compatible with the available article is to summarize the resources. In this introduction it is guidelines and basic concepts of necessary to underline that, the renewal, keeping in mind that precisely because of the growing some final organizational solutions importance and complexity of the could be somewhat different from '1ogistic support" problem and the those desclibed here. constant increase in the number of missions outside the national territory, logistics is one of the THE LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION functional sectors of the Service - OF THE ITALIAN ARMY which have been more thoroughly As we mentioned before, in the revised within the evolutionary projects under way. Therefore, last years the logistic organization many nations and concepts has undergone a significant process expounded in this article are still of rationalization with the purpose being tested, but the basic ideas are of simplifying the procedures and well-established. Consequently, any making the system more reactive

A/T team with a "Folgore" gun.

and flexible. In other words, a system capable of fulfilHng, with a good cost/effectiveness ratio, the numerous employment options which have replaced the past fundamental ones, based on the defence of the Gorizia Threshold. Dming the bipolar confrontation, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the operational land -instrument, including its logistic organization, was carefully and specifically structured for a particular threat, well-known as regards size and origin. The logistic organization was therefore gauged on average instances of employment, thoroughly planned and that could

very probably occur, while the logistic support to units employed outside the border was conceived only in favour of a limited number of fom1ations, for a limited time and at short distances. It might be worth remembering that, besides the delivery of a field hospital during the Korean war and the deployment of a helicopter company at the border between Israel and Lebanon, the only peace 111ission carried out by units of the Italian Army before 1989 was the one in Lebanon between 1982 and 1983. Mter that date, there have been so many that it's difficult to count them. Putting it simply, from a strictly logistic point of vie,,v the situation implied: • allocating to all organizational levels the organic resources necessary to meet the support requirements connected with 68

employment plans, logistic and operational doctrine, and Intelligence assessments . For example, each Brigade had at its disposal a logistic battalion, capable of meeting the basic requirements of the logistic activities, \-Vithin a conceptual organization which envisaged, among other things, medium transport-distances, well-defined medical requirements and so on. In other words, since the place and the manner of employment of the various operational units were sufficiently known, all logistic aspects, starting with the organization, could be structured and arranged in view of a wellknown mission; • allocating equipment and materials to the units, and establishing stocks at the various logistic levels, on the basis of assumptions of national employment and allied

i\bove. "lslrice" minelaying system on M 113 hull. Facing page.

APC assigned to the !FOR mission in the landing phase.

requirements. This involved the immobilization of considerable assets, ·whose maintenance and technological updating was very costly in tem1s of resources; • adopting a support chain which was identical during the operational pauses and in operations, with the ensuing difficulties in training the logistic personnel, since the executive organs were constantly engaged in real support activities. It must be underlined, anyway, that despite the well-knowi:i lack of human resources and materials

which for decades has been a constant factor with the Army, the logistic organization described above was conceptually suited to the .requirements of that period, and proved fit for the p erformance of the tasks assi?ned. But today the geost:rategic situation is different, involving an epochal trasformat ion of the missions entrusted to the Army, especially as regards the new ftmctions of crisis prevention and control of confiict situatjons. The lack of a clearly defined threat and the absence of real external dangers for the Country's integtity, together with the wide diffusion of risks concerning Europe's security and the s u pern a ti onal/rn ul tin a ti onal globalization of the security needs has oriented the Army towards a concepl1.ially new choice, implying

original solutions in the organization of the Italian military sphere. The solution adopted similar to what is under study in the Allied Cow1hies, and particularly in France - is a wide introduction of the principles of "modularity" and "task organization" which , at operational-force level, led to a planning system by Capability Packages. This system aims at realizing actual capability basins represented by basic modules conceived in accordance with each operational fonction - containing all that is needed for the constitution of task forces suitable for a specific mission. Thus, this criterion has been amply introduced also in the new logistics of the Italian Army. The lack of a standard type of employment does not permit to organize the logistic forces on the basis of that assumption. As a consequence the basic modules, i.e.

the Regiments, wiJJ need their own logistic bodies, which are adapted to the mission on a case-by-case basis, dravving from resource basins realized for that purpose. Now, some recent history. Up to 1991, the logistic-support chain was strnctured on four levels (rings) Battalion, B1igade/Corps, Military Region, Central Organization within which several levels of specialization were realized for the development of the various logistic activities (degrees of the logistic activities) . This oranizatioo has been simplified and streamlined from 1992 to 1995, jojning the 1st and 2nd ring in a common organization, where the logistic battallons of the Brigades and the logistic battalions of manoeuvre (2nd ring) assumed the preerninent role of reserve basins, in support of the Regiments' own capabilities, although they carried out similarly

complex logistic activities. Thus, there ""as no more a cascade of activities, but rather resource basins to draw from, in order to achieve the specific capabilities required by the operational situation. Afterwards, in a step-by-step rationalization process which is practically still under way, once the concept of the logistic rings was overcome, the logistic organization has been divided starting from 1996, in two main parts: • adherence logistics, which includes all the executive organs of the operational component, as well as the activities in direct support to the units . In the multinational environment, the adherence logistks is generally called "Combat Service Support"; • support 1ogistics, which sustains the operational component from the outside. This form of support is often called "home base support" or "st,rategic support".

responsible of Support Logistics, performs the tasks of the Central Organizations , those of the territorial support (previously assigned to the Military Regions), as well as those of a certain number of installations of the Technical - Administrative area which carry out maintenance activities that interest the Service which were transferred to the Technical-Operational area. In practice, .the Logistic Inspectorate is responsible for defining, obtaining and allocating the resources for logistic support (in operations, in training and in garrison), for the issue of technica.l guidelines (ILE series) as well as for the "home delivery" of supplies to the users. Directly .subordinate to the Logistic Inspector are two Area Logistic Commands, scaling-down organs with the task of managing on the territory the supply, maintenance and transport logistic formations assigned to the area.

One of the most important measures recently taken in the renewal of logistic - which is part of the general revis ion of the Command and Control structure of the Service - was the placement of all the organs of support logistics under the responsibility of a sole Commander: the Logistic Inspector (Fig.1) . This permitted, among other things, to separate studies, planning and management, activities which,· before, were concentrated at the Logistic Support Division of the Army Staff. The Logistic Inspector is an essential element, which gives the Operational Forces the possibility of expressing all their potenti_a l capabilities , corresponding to modular capability-packages suitable for any form of employment, and also expandable by including support elements provided by other Services or Allied Countries. The Logistic Inspectorate, as

NEEDS FOR CHANGE

Despite the significant innovations described above, th e operational

experience of the Army in the last years has shown both the persistence of some shortcomings connected with a residual gravitation to the North-East of "mentality" and resources, and the existence of some functional discontinuity between the two logistic components (i.e. Support, subordinate to the Logistic Inspector, and Adherence, controlled by the Commander of the Operational Land Forces). Even the direct support to the forces (adherence logistics) seemed to perform less efficiently than expected, considering the remarkable weight of the logistic system as a whole. Therefore the need emerged to devise a new and far-reaching project, with the objective of achieving a reorganization of logistics, in line with the emerging operational requirements and based on the priorities fixed during the planning process relevant to the "Capability Packages". In view of this, the highest p1iority was given to the elebomtion 0£ a logistic concept for the support of the forces that are to be projected outside the national borders. The '1ogistics project", therefore, intends to structure the logistic organization as a whole in such a

THE PRESENT •

Fi . 1

REORGANIZATION OF C2

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ARMY COS LAND FORCES COMMANDER BRANCH INSPECTOR

SCHOOL INSPECTOR

way as to enable it to produce "logistic systems", i.e. "organized aggregations of procedures, personnel, equipment and resources , corn mitted to the support of specific missions. In this perspective, the concept aims at realizing a "home delivery'' logiJtic in the true sense of the Âˇword, through the development of preventive activities carried out by the Mounting Hq in favour of the projection force and the tendential annulment of the requests submitted by the user in order to concentrate primarily on a planned and preventive type of logistics. In this way, a specific distribution of resposibilities is achieved benveen the forces destined to the actual projection and the Command (generally one step higher) responsible on the national territory for all the activities necessary to make the projection possible.

In devising the "logistic system" that had to be activated for conducting operations outside the national tei-;ritory, a preliminary evaluation was made of the overall size of the forces that the Italian Army could be called to project outside the national borders. THE AR.t"1Y'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT On the basis of the assigned missions and keeping in mind that the military instrument as a whole must be capable of contributing to the common defence in case of direct threat, the Army's operational units are organized, according to their envisaged employment, in three Capability Packages: Projection Forces, for peace and security operations outside the national

Heavy ACP 6 x 6 truck, equipped with a pla.tform for transporting "Leopard" tanks.

borders; Reaction Forces for employment Âˇwith the !mediate and Rapid NATO Reaction Forces; Presence and Surveillance Forces, for territorial control. The last body of capabilities, the Defence Package, includes- the Command and Control structures as well as the tactical and logistic support elements indispensable for the "connection" and the unitary employment of the military instrument, as a whole, in defence of the Italian territory. In this sense, the Army's Operational concept envisages the availability of units capable of: â€˘ accomplishing Peace Support Operations outside the national territory producing as a 71

M 113 APC, armed with a TOW A/T missile system.

maximum capability, in a single Theatre, a division-level complex of 2 Brigades (or 2 Brigades in different Theatres). This complex Âˇwill be organized as a Task Force, possibly multinational, projectable and sustainable from the logistic viewpoint and from that of the units' rotation, in case of long operations. Of course there could be other options envisaging more than t'wo Theatres at the same time: in this case, some limitations ,.vill have to be accepted, in terms of flexibility and, above aJl, of sustainability in the long tenn; â€˘ contributing, together with the 72

other partners, to deterrence, crisis management and possibly to the defence within NATO, through the engagement of the units assigned to the Reaction Forces of the Alliance or, in case of threat to the national territory, with every resource available; â€˘ performing the tasks connected ,.vith the defence of the ten-itory, employing primarily - either in turns or as a mass, according to the contingency - the forces taken from the two remaining divisional units. In short, the planning system organized by "Capability Packages", which is already working, intends to maximize the effectiveness of a dimentionally modest military instrument vis-a-vis the complex operational requirements that are

only partially foreseeable and somehow subject to changes both in time and in space. The reference objective of the planning - in the medium term, and for the operational forces - is the "Division for Europe", not intended as an organic Major Unit, but rather as a virtual complex, based on the availability of professional forces, able to sustain, for long peliods of time, Division-level units to be employed within the framework of NATO or WEU initiatives, also in application of the "European Initiative of Defence and Secmity". THE REFERENCE LOGISTIC CONCEPT

With reference to the requirements

described above, the logistic concepl adopted as reference concerns the S-Upport of formations outs.i de the "national terd tory, and is based 0,1 four principles (Fig.2): • Great Base; • Command and Control; • Programming of the activities; • Specialization of the organizations. The Great Base

The Great Base (Fig.3) is the model of organization of the available logistic resources, destined to support the projection of the forces outside the national borders and their sustainment in peace support operations and crisis management activilies. The possibility of predetennining the points of probable exit of the forces that are to be projected basically located in the South East of the Country - is one of the most important points in support of the renewal of the logistic instrument. The possibility of planning in advance the procedures for the use of port and airport infrastructure, as well as of organizing the necessary resources , is an indubitable advantage, both in tem1s of efficiency and in terms of economy. The Great Base is therefore a complex organizational structure of support logistics, prepared in advance, in periods of operational stasis, which is fully activated only at the onset of an emergency. In its . most complete configuration, it consists of: • G.B. Command; • Operations Room for Support Logistics and Operations Room for Adherence Logistics, logically connected and physically close to each other; • all the necessarv resources wherever located o~ the national territory; • G.B. management unit. At conceptual level, the Great Base should be the prepositioning place of all the equipment,

THE LOGISTIC CONCEPT

Fig.2

CORRECTIVES

SHORTCOMINGS \.::o.LL!.al..1.1'1al.lJ.:.I..IJ ~I.Ll.:.I..I.I.IJu-t..:.,.i;:.&J

GREAT BASE

. __ _ __ _ . ~

,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ , ~

PROGRAMMING

____.~>

,.__ _ ...._= _ _ _ _ _

SPECIALIZATION

THE GREAT BASE

Fig. 3

SPECIALIZED UNITS

materials and weapon systems necessary to realize the projection force for a particular employment and for supporLing .it during the operations. To carry out the allotted tasks, the Great Base \>Jill need executive bodies in the supply, maintenance and transport sectors, as well as strnctures for the quartering and training of the units.

The idea is to organize areas and capabilities specifically assigned, capable of receiving the forces to be projected, complete their configuration (and possibly their preparation) for the mission, project and support them during the operation, up to their redeployment (Fig.4). At first, the Great Base \,\rill have an essentially "virtual character",

since it will be realized through the centralization of the control of resources and capabilities located all over all national tenitory. In the medium term, the structure can take on a more physical form, in order to make the most of the economy deriving from the concentration of materials and equipment, and to optimize the perfonnance of the support units. Command and Control Organization Within the picture just outlined, a very important role is played by the "Command and Control Organization" which is the very essence of the working mechanisms both of the Great Base and of the adherence logistics in the Operations Zone. It is based on the availability of Operations Rooms, one for adherence and one for support, specifically designed for the logistic funct ion . The Operations Rooms permit to concentrate and control the activities and/ to manage the resources , and consequently to achieve the,integration between support logistics and adherence logistics, as well as the optimization of the system's effectiveness. The organization is centralized, and envisages the development of the programming, preparation and control functions - the latter both as pilotage and feedback - appropriately subdivided into operational control and tactical control. The activity of the Operations Rooms, during the various phases of the action, consists of four stages, in relation to the unit to be projected: • preparation; • projection; • Transfer of Authority (ToA); • development of the operation, in that the Great Base must exist albeit not in its most complete version, prescinding from the occuffence of an emergency.

When there are no operations in 74

DIAGRAM OF SOLUTION OF THE LOGISTIC PROBLEM

"7~

'--·----v_.,

of the units' !i -maintenance operational capabilities

(a~ailability in the GB the resources for

he enth-e ope,atk>n 1 _"'.':'_"~~

Fig. 4

Logis::~:ansit

~s;Et-1

t.OG\S1\C S

Distance=time=autonomy

progress, only one Operations Room is active in the Great Base: the support one. On issue of the warming notice for employment, the preparation phase starts, and the first step is the activation of the logistic system and, therefore, of the adherence Operations Room. The support Room deals with the transfer of the force to be projected and with the resources needed by the adherence to form and sustain the force. As a result of the reconnaissance activity carried out, when possible, in the employment zone 01~ otherwise, on a previsional basis - the allocation to the adherence of the necessary resources will then be completed. While the adherence Operat ions Room is activated within the Great Base the deployment is also started - beginning with the logistic and security systems - and therefore the first logistic measure will be the activation of an Operations Rooms of the intheatre adherence (ADERLOG F). This should be the last activity necessary to complete the deployment of the bulk of the projection force.

Up to this moment, the support logistics has operated under the operational Command (OPCOM) of the Logistic Inspector, while the projection force and the adherence logistics have been under the OPCOM of the Mounting Hq. Commande1~ Once the projection force has reached the Theatre, the logistic system \Nill pass under the OPCOM of the Commander of the projection force, who carries out his command acfoities through his own in-theatre Operations Room, which becomes the "master" of the system. At this point, logistics w.ill be under the Operational Control of the Commander of the projection force who, through the in-theatre "master" Operations Room, will be able to manage both the r esources inthe Operations Zone and those previously allocated to the Great Base. Logistic Activities' Programming Another cornerstone of the logistic concept is the Logistic Activities' Programming, typical of the logistics known at NATO as "Directed''. Programmes are

based on the statisticalprobabilistic analysis bf the needs related to the· evolution of the situation, and are ceritered on the development of essentially preventive interventions aimed at lowering the threshold of indeterminacy which characte1izes the support to mj I itary operations. As a matter of fact, the logistic system must fully meet (Fig.5): • fully predictable needs (those concerning normal consumption); • needs that can be predicted (maintenance activities, which are mainly centred on preventive interventions and therefore can be planned); • needs deriving from logistic stress (flow interruptions, war events, etc.). As regards the first two types of requirements, it is a matter of gauging correctly the logistic system on the basis of the capabilities, programmed with acceptable precision , with no r edundancies or deficiencies. The needs related to possible logistic stress must be instead be dealt with on a case-by-case basis in a b alanced manner, establishing capability flywheels and predisposing urgent interventions. The Specialization of the Logistic Organizations The specialization of the directive and executive Logistic Organizations (Fig.6) is at the same time the prerequ isite and the objective of the reference logistic concept. On the one hand, the complexity of the support organization and the costs of its deployment require a marked professionalism of the men and units destined to operate in the logistic sector at all levels. On the othe1; Lhe same factors and the wide spectrum of missions require the availability of a modular logistic instrument, easily assembled and integrated

PROGR~MMING OF THE ACTIVITIES

Fig. 5

•• •

•

SPECIFIC DEMAN_~o::.....J•L-_ _ __•

•

••

PREPARATION

PROJECTION

OPERATION

when a specific contingency occurs. The basic organizational philosophy in concentrating all logistic capability and resources (Fig .7) . Its end is to construct specialistic modules , to be assembled into logistic task forces suited to the most diverse operational needs, to be employed after due consideration, in order

STRESS

to enable the Commander responsible for the manoeuvre to operate with the greatest freedom of action. The task forces must integrate the different specialistic modules in a harmonious way, in order to achieve a sinergy of employment, but must also be capable of integrating in the different contexts - generally multinational - where they will

THE LOGISTIC TASK FORCE

Fig. 6

PROFESSIONALIZATION MODULARITY

•

I CENTRALIZATION OF CAPABILITIES ANO RESOURCES I

LOGISTIC TASK FORCES • SPECIALIZED MODULES • MULTINATIONAL INTEGRATION

have to operate. From this point of view, the organization of the logistic units is undergoing a complete revision, within the framework of the experimentations mentioned above . The assumption is to maintain the capabilities, albeit substanLiaJly reorganized, of the regiment-equivalent units (i.e . units at regiment or independentbattalion level with their own logistic organs). The executive organizations of adherence logistics should be relieved of the support requirements typical of the periods of operational Sapper tank on "Leopard" hull, for the Engineer Corps' activities on the battlefield.

FROM READY-MADE TO TASK ORGANIZATION Fig. 7 YESTERDAY-TODAY: DECENTRALIZED UNITS

TOMORROW: CENTRALlZED UNITS

Ill

L )

! I - - -_ _ _ ,

RELOMA

G.B.

2 RELOSU 1 UCETRA

Logistic Transit Area

LOGISTIC TASK FORCE

stasis, g1vmg to the Logistic Inspectorate the possibility of "home delivering'' what is ne-eded for the supporl of the regiment-equivalent units. In particular; the possibility is being considered of equipping the supplying organizations (mainly CERICO and CERIMANT) vvith the transport assets necessary for the "home delivery" of the normal supplies, in order to entrust the transport regiments only with the operational activities. Likewise, incontact teams must be organized and prepared for the maintenance of weapon systems and combat vehicles, while the other requirements will be met with extensive recourse to civilian £inns. The logistic adherence units, i.e. those operating in the Land Forces Command (COMFOTER) area, will be reorganized as specialized units (transport, maintenance, supply, medical corps) within four Manoeuvre Logistic Regiments (RELOMA) at Forces Command level (Fig.8). These Regiments will include a maintenance battalion, a supply baltalion, a medical unit as well as Logistic Contingency Units, and will be flanked by four Transport Regiments (Fig.9) . In short, there will be eight "reservoirs", obtained through the upgrading and reorganization of the existing logistic battalions and Regiments assigned to the various oranizational levels (Fig.10), which will provide their logistic capabilities for the constitution of the task forces needed to support the manoeuvre forces engaged in the operations. The number of units has been calculated on the basis of the maximum options of employment, taken as planning references . Practically, two Brigade-level formations simultaneously employed in long-duration peace support operations in different Theatres (therefore requiring inTheatre rotation), or the deployment of the Reaction Forces envisaged by NATO in

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS •

RELOMAs

Fig.

HIGHER

COMO

~ -LI- ,

!__ _

I RELOCO I

i MED !I I : SUP ~

I~ ~

case of "art.5" operations. In operations, RELOMAs and transport Regiments will originate, with their component modules, the so-called "adherence support groups", which must be considered variable-geometry modular

structures, organized each time in relation to the mission. The "adherence support group", established by taking the capabilities from the original logistic units according to the task it is charged with, organizes

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS

Fig. 9

Ill

•

TRANSREGT

[I]

~ TRUK-TRAILER·UNITS _ ~AP$95

00 00

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~ ATC

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"Centa.uro" armoured cars of the Italian contingen1: in Bosnia.

into a ]ogjstic system - through a telecoms net - its own resources, those of the Regiments it has to sustain, those released by the Support, the market resources, the Host Nation Support, the multinational capabili ties assigned, as well as any other type of resource available. HOW THE SYSTEM OPERATES

We shall now describe briefly the typical operation of the new Logistic System in the most probable option, i.e. a PSO, which, j n our example, is at Division level (Fig.11). The key elements concurring in the activation of a logistic system for outside - the - border operations are COMFOTER, Support Command, Logistic Inspectorate, Mounting Hq, Great Base,

each activity. Meanwhile, the Support Command prepares the logistic-administrative order. The Logistic Inspectorate activates and/or completes the prepositioning of the resources at

Projection Forces Command (FOP). COMFOTER draws up the operational planning; in this context, it points out the logistic needs to the Logistic Inspectorate and appoints a Mounting Hq to

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE UNITS

NATO (ART. 5)

-• •• •

PSO (DIV FOR EUROPE) .

~ I r~~~s I

THEATRE

MOTHER COUNTRY

I TR~~s I

EMPLOYMENT

I T~~~s I

PREPARATION

T~~~s

RECONDITIONING

I TR ~~s I

STASIS

Fig. 10

Motor column on a Bosnian road.

the Great Base, directs the gravitation of the logistic activities towards the FOP and prepares the Operations Room of the Great Base (SOSTLOG). The Mounting Hq is charged with the preparation of the operational and logistic asset5 of the Projection Force (FOP), and must carry on its activity throughout the whole operational cycle. Normally, as vve said, its level is higher than that of the forces projected. To this end, the Mounting Hq will employ its own assets' and/or the resources assigned for the specific need. The FOP Hg activates the adherence component of the logistic systems, using its own assets as well as those received as reinforcements. Normally the logistic command of the FOP is the sole "controller" of Adherence Logistics. The "core capability" of

Adherence Logistics in operations is the Adherence Support Group, whose main characteristics have already been described. The Adherence Support Group is a logistic task force (logistic

employment-unit), complete with all its functional components and especially structured for employment in a specific operational mission. The figure shows its functional

SUPPORT IN THE THEATRE

Fig. 11

SPOD (Sea Port of Disembarkation) APOD (Air Port of Disembarka.tion)

M I 09 L self-propelled gun in Bosnia.

position and the scheme by blocks in operations (logistic system). The Adherence Support Group is located between SOSTLOG, active in the Great Base, and the Regiments · it supports. The system's ·"master" is ADERLOG-F (forward), the one realized in the Theatre, which has its own "dependence" represented by the operations room "housed" in the Great Base and side by side vi.rith SOSTLOG, for the real -time control of the resources assigned by Support to the operations under way, as well as for the interface with the Support Logistics on the national tenitorv. Thus the "fracture" between S1.~pport and

Adherence is healed. The resources, stocked in the Great Base at ADERLOG's disposal, correspond to the logistic programmed requirements for the entire operation, or for an appropriately long operational phase. In order to control capabilities and activities in operations , ADERLOG-F will avail itself of a telecoms net which integrates its o·wn capabilities wi.th those of the logistic system (Adherence Management Units- UGA). In a NATO context, the Adherence Support Group generally corresponds to the DSG (Division Support Group), while ADERLOGF, which operates at national Division or Contingent Hq level, detaches part of its elements to the Theatre MJLC (Multinational Joint

Logistic Centre). A possible variation to the Logistic System outlined above could become necessary in case of a great distance between the operation theatre and the home country. In that particular case, it could become indispensable to "project" elements of support logistics, extending the Great Base to the operation theatre or its immediate surroundings. Here is a synthetic description of the main guidelines for the operation of the various branches of logistic support which work on the basis of the C2 logistic system outlined above: • Medical Service (Fig. 12): the regiment-level lmits will have their own ROLE 1 NATO capabilities

6 x 6 crane-truck.

and - if thev are isolated - wiJl have at their dlsposal the additional resow:-ces necessary for obtaining stabilization before the evacuation. ROLE 2 and ROLE 3 must be available in the Theatre, but multinational or joint organizations can be employed in order to save resomces. ROLE 4 .is represented by the territorial medical organizational of ISPEL, with particular reference to the Military Polyclinic; â€˘ Supplies: the organization of the Great Base and the organization for the transfer to the operation's commander of the resources destined for the specific logistic system, permit to reduce the in-

NATO ROLE SPECIFICATIONS

r Assembly - Evacuation to higher level.

2 3

Fig. 12

First aid and stabilization for evacuation. Routine medical support.

Assembly (direct or from ROLE 1) and sorting. NBC decontamination. Emergency surgery, to save lives and for stabilization.

r Assembly and sorting - Evacuation to higher level.

Surgery to save lives and organs (within 6 hours). Hospitalization. r

Long treatments and hospitalization. Evacuation to civilian organizations.

NOTE: Each ROLE provides also the capabilities of the lower ROLES.

The distribution of essential supplies is one of the niany activities of the humanitarian missions.

Theatre stocks to the lowest functional levels, provided that the resources of the Great Base be kept at an even level and the means for activating the flows of "urgent" supplies be made readily available. The organization will be based on units of measurement such as pallets and containers endeavouring, if possible, to prepare at home the loads destined to the final user, in order to reduce the need to recondition the loads in the Theatre. The management of the

flows will require a great effort to improve the computerized system of management and control of cargos; â€˘ Maintenance: the basic policy's goal is to achieve the efficiency of the means for the operational activity through the concentration of the preventive activities and the rotation of unserviceable matelials with others in stock. To this end, there must be an inTheatre functiona l reserve gauged on the operational requirements - both for the periodical rotations and for the actual contingencies. The corrective activities should be preferably carried out at the Great Base, through a further rotation of the in-Theatre

equipment; the execution of corrective activities in the Theatre should be considered a makeshift solution, imposed by particular situations such as, for instance, the excessive distance from the home country. Transport: the adoption of pallets, containers and dismountable platforms will reduce the loading and unloading times, optimizing the employment of the personnel involved and simplifying the system's management. In view of this, any measure for the best computerized management of the loads will have to be taken, initially at manual level and then through the implementation of the ''asset tracking" systems now under study.

Members of a logistic unit engaged in the maintenance of an armoured car in Bosnia.

CON CLUSIONS

The revision of the system of logistic support to the operational units, as was synthetically r ep resented in th is article, has the amb i tious objective of im pr oving the efficiency of the support, reducing the resources d estined to that support. It is certainly an exacting goal but not imp ossible to achieve in view of the growing professionalism and professionalization. Beyond the necessary organizational

interventions - already being applied - and the need for a radical technological growth as regards in partictdar the computerized management of logistics, the new logistics - like all other partial projects that, as a whole, form the Army's development plan Âˇ_ asks the Cadres to change their mentality, in view of an instrument which probably will not be very sjmiJar to the one we used to know. The general concept is that the forces will no more be structured on an average case of employment, but will have to be capable of carrying out a variable plurality of particular employments, structuring themselves, with high readiness standards, on the base of

the tasks assigned. To say it more simply, the Army will go from a "ready-made" organization, typical of a bipolar confrontation, to a "tailor-made" one, corresponding to the requirements of the "task oriented" period . This is true also in the sector of logistic support. It is not an easy challenge, but it is essential to meet it, in order to continue growing within a reality which, visa-vis the increasing operational tasks, does not :seem to be willing to increase the resources destined to the defence function.

D '"Colonel, Chief, Planning Office, Army General Staff

by Pierluigi Monteduro * e Michele Risi** During World War J the arrn ies fought along the Western front w1successfr1lly [our years. Both the Alliance and the Entente made their efforts to find new weapons, clocnine and operational procedures and get out of Lhal slaJemale. The Alliance opted for an indirect approach which led Lo the Gallipoli and Salonicco Campaigns, for

technology - a lank was used for the first time - and used their fire power to mechanically open the enemy's defence line. On the other hand the Gerrnan Empire reviewed its doct1ines and reorganised its arrny, also availing itself of new technologies . In

particu lar thanks to the new concept of Deep Defence it defeated the British and French troops during the bloody battles of the Somme. In 1918 lhe Germans took a d vantage of the situation and launched an allack on the base of their Deep Defence principle and also making the best o u t of the mistakes the Alliance had made previously. The thorough change in the structure of the German anned forces was brought about by the military itself. And this epoch making change paved the ,vay for a nevv warfare which would last the next 40 years. The new offensive doctrine was based on the simultaneous and targeted use of manoeuvre and fire power. In fantry attacked the weakes t points of the enerny's defence line with the support of fire adjusted to the situation. In conclusion there was no pre planned action. The nevv doctrine was not conceived by a genius. On th e contrary il resulted from common experiences of soldiers. The changes Âˇwere not just in 85

Bosnia: lialian "Carabinieri"Parat ruopers.

theory but imrnediatcly taught and experimented at schools and training centres as pai-r of a global programn-1e invoh,i ng soldiers and units. But there were no binding rules. On the contrary there ,vas an on-going adjustment to the changing situation of the ballleficld. This means that there arc lessons to be learned also in warfare. The variables the British and the French took into account were Strategy, Technology and Equipment without including Organisation. The latter was instead considered by the Gerrnan army ,vbich introduced innovations by analysing past mistakes .

THE LESSONS LEARNED CYCLE Unl.il recently past experiences were not considered as a valuable resource by the Military. In recent times out-of-area Peace Support Operations have become 11101-e frequent and allowed to understand that mistakes can be avoided. That is why the lessons learned from expe1iences have been extended to all the arrnecl forces in order to prevent mistakes from being made again in Lhe future. In the month of June 1997 the Chief of the Army General Staff set the rules lo collect, evaluate and ci1-culate the lessons learned and called them "Cycle of the lessons learned" . The maj or aims of th.is programme include: • analysing past rnisLakes to prevent them from occw1ing again; • checking the training level during operations and to give directions Lo fill the gaps; • testing doctrine and procedures in the light of past exper·iences to

consequenlly update them; • having targeted education and training to increase the unit's skills. The above mentioned directions allowed for studying past experiences systematically and disseminating the lessons learned among Officers and NCOs. Nine seminars on t.he major operations and tasks assigned to the Italian Army have taken place so [ar. Those who gave their contributions focused on mistakes which had been made and that could have been avoided. Instead of blarni ng anyone for the mistakes the seminars a.i.m at taking advantage of past experiences in order to change

mistakes into added value. Th is approach has prompted changes in doctrine and procedures which may prevent mistakes from being made in the future . At the same time it was understood that complex problems can be solved by d eep ly revising tra ining, specialisation and education of Officers and NCOs, and the organisation as well. Doctrine, Training, Education of Officers and NCOs, Organisation, Logistics [or Personnel and Equipment are the 5 pillars supporting the Army, ,vhich have Lo be reinforced depending on the situation in order to fill the gaps. Al th e beginning of the seminars the participants give

their contributions as to the tasks carried oul and the problems faced during the mission . After that, branch-oriented (G-1, G-2, etc .) vvorking parties including personnel directly or i ndirectly interested in the issue - make a final statement as to problems/m istakes, lessons learned and proposals. Said document is then delivered to a ll Br-igade Headquarters and Divisions of the Army General Staff which make an appropriate analysis and take their decisions . Later on the Tn1ining and Doctrine Office of the Army General Sta ff asks all Divisions of the A1111y General Staff to report the step made to fill the gaps re(err ed to during the semimu: These decisions are then

disseminated dowmvards to the units through the inspectorate of the Schools. In Italy seve ra l Inspec torates are responsible for collecting and processing information . And they are also responsible for implementing changes lo tra in ing, doctrine , procedures and organisation. From the lesso ns learne d schools and military education bodies have prornpted changes to doctrine, training and procedtu-es; the Logistic frispectornte and Lhe Logistic Support Division set new technical and operat ional requirements for future equipment and also changes lo the Arn,y Logistic Doctrine. Thanks to the lessons learned a

J,ebanon : Soldiers of the Italian Comin[!,e11t.

lot has been done to fi 11 the gaps. The decision s taken address the Anny as a whole, from Command and Control to Intelligence, from Procedures to Logistics which is the driving power of any successful operations. COMMAND AND CONTROL

In past out-of-area operations Command and Control were not successful. Headquarters were not sufficiently .m anned to plan and irnp lement their tasks. The Slaff

was collected among people who had never met before and Âˇwho had experieneed no common train ing and no spontaneous mutual understanding . The Command organisation \,vas never up to the situation (the Alba Operation Force Commander had lo pull as many as 22 wires!) and the des irable changes to the Command and Control organisation rcqui rÂˇed a lot of time to be implemented. Moreover the national routine duties took a great effort from the Army General Staff. Officers and NCOs at the Headquarters were not trained to ,vork autonomously and Lo co-operate with the staff from other count1ies. After such analysis a proposal was made to set t'wo Commands in charge of planning, which can pot en t'ia lly become Join l and Combined . Said Commands sho uld include no rorces and, during operations, should be only in charge of Command and Control. Within this framevvork a ll Brigades would belong to two Defence Combat Forces (FOD Fo r1.e Operative di Difesa) responsible for training the units . So lhere wou Id b e m u tual agreement within staff who wou l d be wel I trained as to pla nning and procedures and the Command organisation could then be adjusted to the d ifferent situations. From the educational po int of view maj or changes have been made a im ing at estab lis h ing a lifelong education of personnel w ho rn ust he upda ted stead ily during their careers in order to give Lhem the Know How to face a.ny situations. Tn th is respect, as far as Officers' educa tion is concerned, it sho uld be ernphas ised that currently the staff course in based on an initial 3rnon th phase aiming al harmonising the knowledge of the parlicipaLing Officers and whicb prepares to the seco nd 5-mont h phase held a L L11e War College. The course is divided into 8 sect ions addressing any possible scenarios

!FOR: .A "Bersap,liere" on duty.

from t he methodological and operational poinLof viev,i. At the War College other courses are bei ng held, in c ludin g Informative Sessions for Large Unit Cornmanders, Informative Sessions for Regi m e nt an d Battalion Co1nrnanders, Qualifying

Cours e s a ttende d by O ffic ers comm itted to headquane rÂˇs. The H igh Sta ff Co urs e its e lf wa s es tab lis he d l o harn1 o n ise th e military executives' knowledge in the Iight of m ode rn ope ra tions which are generally carried out by co m bined forces. T he Arm y Gen e ra l Sta ff has also actively supported Officers an d N COs pa r tic i patin g in in ternatio nal mee tings and

courses. The completely new training process for Marescialli, based on Lhe study of university subjects (such as: geography, history, war internalional law, planning and organisation of simple structures), enables the would-be Commander of task forces to develop a professional background that makes him able to cope with and solve problems in unsLable and changing environments autonomously.

Training courses for Sergeants and Volunteers, lasting four and two months respecLively, provide for teaching elements of humanitarian law for armed conflicts, elements of anthropic geography and history of international organisations. From a doctrinal point of view, Lhe Army staff has prepared he 1ST edition of its publication on Command and Control. It int1nduces

a new decision-making process rnore similar to that of NATO , more flexible and employable in different situations, scenarios and time limits. lt also gives new methodological instrumenLs ai mecl at co ordinating operational functions: synchronisation blueprint, target selection process, wargaming in contingency planning. Moreover, said document stated the basic c r iteri a to create

Command Posts. The most important. one is: a structure based on functions, modules and extension. Again, at doctrinal level, the Plans and Situation Office of the Army Staff has issued directives defining the tasks to be fi.tlGUed so that forces can be employed on call accord ing to pre-established employ1nent scemnios. Another lesson learned du ring the seminars is the insufficient kn owledge or roreign languages, mainly English . This drawback has im paired cornmunications between Staffs of Units employed in out-of-ai-ea operntions and within PfP programs . It has tu r.n eel out to be particularly serious \vhen personnel concerned have been assigned major functions. To over·corne these obstacles, the Army Staff and the Schools Inspect.orate ar·e following a new policy ·which stresses the importance of language training, also thanks to th e effectual cooperation of the Foreign Languages School of the Almy. Measures taken provide for new courses to he held at the School of Foreign Languages, which do not focus any longer on "every day language", but on a professional language to be used on-duty and in particular on the knowledge of prncedures in force within NATO. Therefore, the School of Foreign Languages aims at giving personnel selected to cover special positions a training ta ilored to each job description, based on their assigned Lasks. So, as the knowledge of foreign languages has been given gr·eat irnportance, one of the major goals of our training Schools is the knowledge of one of the NATO languages . Pe1·son nel wishing to all.end the Joint Staff School can be selected only if their knowledge of English is good. "Out-of area" operations have shown a lack of technical and procedural directives allowing for the interconnection and integration between different C2 systems of the

three Aimed Forces . This problem will be solved establishing a "lop.level C4I Task Force" charged vvith making the C41 systems of the three Armed Forces interoperable and with developing an operational requirement for a C4I system that can not only be used by each Armed Force but also jointly and within NATO. During territorial contro l operations and particularly duiing "Forza Paris", the need has been relt to use automated Command and Control Systems. The insufficie nt. interoperability between the Command and Control AutornaLed System (SIACCON) and the Comrnand and Contrnl Training System (SIR) is the source of the n-iost serious problems. These have been partially solved and will be further validated during exercises scheduled for this year: Even during the earlhquake in Umb1ia and in the Marches regions, some structural difficulties have come up, which have shown that the structure of the Military Region Command is not up to the required standard to cope with this kind of situation. This is why it has been necessary to ch,mge the Command structure and its functions. A "Red a lert." Force has been established and the Army is tasked

wilh providing its Franzewod< Unil. This implies the activation of one Brigade Command and or several units at Regimental level which have been selected Lo carry out tJ1e mission and are listed in the specific plarming docurnents.

INTELLIGENCE As for Intelligence, lessons learned from recent OU L-of-area

Left. Sarajevo: "Bersaglieri" i11specting the w reck of a vehicle.

Below.

Officer talking tu Somalis.

Right. Forza Paris Operation : Parairooper PaLrol.

operations have h ighlighted t\,vQ kinds of flaws: the first rerers to the availability of an information support since the very first phase of the operation and the second refers to the structural inadequacy of intelligence agencies at Brigade and Force Cornmand level. As far as doctrine and training arc concerned, the necessity has

been confirmed for intelligence activities to start very early, since the aler1 phase, and all Command levels must he included lo allow for a proper plann ing . Based on the main m ission the uni L has been tasked with, Regin1Cnt and Brigade informalion agencies n-1ust collect all information to constantly update the situation of the area of possible deployn,ent. Moreover; PSOs, unlike traditiona l war operations, force a part or the

"insiders" to pay a greater attention to the "so-called" general issues, that is historic, sociological and cultural aspects. These must he known even al tactical level, particularly at the lowest organisational levels and must no longer be w ithin the jurisdiction of the strategic level only as, for instance, an inappropr iate behav iour can doom the entire n, ission. PSOs have also confirmed the strong segmentation of the Army Staff sections, and particularly G2, G -5 and PSYOPS and the result has been an unsatisfactory max imisation of the inteUigence sources. As for the organisational leve l, on the contrary, Regiment and Brigade Commands have turned o ut to be undersized . To date, gu idelines have been indicated to strengthen the intelligence Section of a Brigade

Command with analysts, experts in the local language, area experts, SIGINT experts, photo interpreters and experts in interrogating prisoners. Moreover, a proposal has been put forward to equip Brigades \Vith research and information collecting agencies , both organic and attached, tailored to can)' out the missions. Therefore, the possib ility has been envisaged to assign Military Police units, electronic research cells, human intelligence (HUMINT) cells and to access open and closed local sources. As for materials, the Battlefield Survei I lance and Target Acquisition Sub-system (SOR.AO) has again been considered usel'u l and, though created (or PSOs or territorial control operations, it seems to be up to the required standard. The data cross-reference cen tre (CCD) allows ror the integration of counter fire radars, 91

CRESO system and unmanned crafts like RVP and Drones. As for the training system, up to individual combat lraining level, military personnel are now trained to find o ut signs of critical situat ions as considered by lhe Commander. Multimedia aids are now being sludied to develop more effective training procedures. At operational /strategic level, u pdated information on the area or operation could he available only after a Cel l of the Joint Intelligence 92

Centre has been set up, whose intelligence activily allows for integrating and maxinusmg resources for information research and collection. Moreove1~ splitting the information flow into two parts, one for the Multinational Force and the other for the National Operational Chain, has made the information management slow and inadequate. After this experience, the need has been felt to assign a cell to the Nationa l Command of lhe Contingent for out-of-area

operations. This cell will he tasked with monitoring assets for research and information collection and Âˇwith managing the information flow, including data from exclusively nalional sources. To evalu ate the situation at strategic and operational level, joint intelligence agencies have been tasked wi Lh conducting intelligence activities a t slrategic level to fulfil the need for a constantly updated situation. Said activities are to be conducted within areas of major

strategic relevance according to the Chief of the General Army Staff in compliance with the m inisterial directives which are the primary source of the who.le operational and force planning. A solution has b een finally found to the problem created by national regulations which do not provide for the employment of crypto-approved materials for the State Secret protect ion in an interna tiona l context includ ing NATO and PtP countries. To overcome this obstacle,

ma terials app roved by the National Security Authodty are being supplied and can be used to [1-dfil specific needs, modified or alienated later on.

OPERATIONS

As regards operations, the main issue, which is the source of all other problems, is the fact that those who carried out an operation had to shoulder th e responsibility of organizing great part of it as well.

''Vespri Siciliani" Operation: Patrolling.

Other drawbacks were also the limited Lime available between the "force alert'' and the "force prepare" orders, the difficulties stemming [rom a lack of intelligence and from other unclear o rders issued during the preparation phase at home. The Command of the "Alba" mission, for instance, bad to plan, organise, set up its C2 in the field, 93

"Centaum" armoured vehicle palrollin.g a Bosnian motor-way.

projecL its Comm,u1d and forces into the theatTe and at the same time carry on its rouli.ne activities at home. The Army General Staff has adopted a series of measures mainly based on the imp lementation or Lhe following concepts: operational cycle, Mounting Headquarters and topdown planning (colloquially called the "Chinese box" principle) . The first concept tackles the problem of readiness and sustainment of out-of-areaoperations. By defmi.ng the phases of a yearly operational cycle - general preparation, pr-epar-ation based on an OPORD, employment and recove1y the airn was to allow Conm1ands and units to successfully operate and adequately prÂˇepare their forces to carry out their mission and finally recover their combaL capability and reorganise. With the i ntroduction of the Mounting Headquarters, the earmarked uniL is exonerated from all activities not deal ing wil}1 the prepal-ation and accomplishment of its assigned operat ional task. 1n essence, there vvas the need to task a Command v,ith all organisational du ties, monitoring the entry of combat-ready units into the theatTe (Mounting HQs). This Command ha5 to carry out operalions including troops' assembly, preparation, staging within the "augmentation area", movement at loading points and embarkation on carr iers to convey them into the theatre. ''Top-down planning" has allowed Commands, upon receiving a mission order, to adapt the size of their instn.unent to the time available ,md to stTeamline theirÂˇ planning phase, ruling out the teclmicalities cmmected with force generation processes. In general, both in out-of-area and territoria l control operations, or in missions to support to the earth-quake stricken population in the Umb1ia region, media rdaLions

have not been adequately developed and have sometimes become confrontational, during the alert, preparation and development stages . Moreover, psychological oper-ations (PSYOPS) have been limited during out-of-area operations. Problems of this kind, which are taking on an increas ing importance, have sparked a twopronged debate: one solution is to create a wide-spread range of capabilities, by giving a specialised training to a certain number of personnel who will attend national and international courses; the other solution is to set up a joint centre, where personnel and means earmarked for these operations will be pooled together: As regards the manoe uvre function, the main problems stern from: "limited" awareness of areas of cleployrnent and areas of responsibility at regimental level; constant break -up or the links between patrols and sub-units, lack of mater ials emp loyed in field fortifications and deployment areas; w ide-spread d ispersion of troops,

with repercussions at logistic, administrative and comm unication levels; need of marksmen and non lethal weapons and munitions. The following provisions will he adopted in the organisational sector: task forces at regimental l evel will organ icall y avail themselves of light Infantry units belonging to an armoured vehicle Company; 6 high accurate rifles will be assigned to a team of marksmen, made up of personnel capable of acting autonomously; one medical platoon w ill be set up within the Command and Support Company. In th e train ing sector t he Infantry Schoo l has a d opted a number o[ kits and simulators to enhance the training of personnel using CENTAURO armoured vehicles in PSOs, in the fie ld or convoy escort, route control and cordoning operations. A MOOTW (Militmy Operations Other Than \.Var) Centre has been established at Cesano (Center of Italy), mainly tasked \vith training units' instructors in this field. The participation of the artiJ.lery in

Engineer ordnance-disposal experts de -activalinf', explosive ord11ance confiscated durinf', a SFOR 111.issiun.

Peace-Support Operations has required doctrine and training sectors to be also revised. The Army Staff Doctr ine Training and Regulations (DAR) Office, taking into account out-of-area requirements, has drawn up a docw11enl indicating the "Guidel ines for the employment of field artillery in peace support operntions". In fact, the artillery tal(es on a "strategic" importcmce in this kind of missions, thanks to its capability of deteITence which docs not necessar ily require large deployments, but can also be exerted by employing a single tank Jn the Engineer sector, the main lessons drawn from the experience of ou t -o f-arca operations are the following: • requirement to assist in clearing areas or operations, • need to reinforce the Engineer component within Large Units; • in sufficient means to ensure water supplies; • incr·easing demand of Engineer units to carry o ut targe ted operations in supporl of ci\,i lians. These problems have been solved at organisational level by establishing one Army Operational Centre for clearance operations within t he Engineer School tasked with training ordnancedisposal personnel in the antisabotage role as we.ll; one water conditioning platoon to meet local water requirements; one Arca clearance Centre, with one mine clearnnce expert assigned to the Contingent's Operations Room and with Engineer Officers and NCOs who served in reconnaissance Learns and can organ ise an "Engineer squad" within the Civil MiIi tary Co-operation Cel I. In the training sect01~ volunteer and regular· personnel's specialisation programs have been re,.i sed. Special Lraining periods have been devoted to instruct personnel on "Engineer

works", "field fortifications" and mine clearance. As regards mate ,·ials, the need has been felt to carry out a general updating and upgrading in the sectors of water sterilisa tion equipment, high power stations cmd communication systems to be shelterised. The requirement has also been perceived to modernise the materials necessary to gmu-ctntee logistic trafficability, as those cmrenlly in use have become obsolete and insufficient.

LOGISTICS

Out -of-area operations have given a great spur to the reorganisa lion of logi stics . Drawing from the experience of the lessons learned, this sector has been streamlined and simplified, Lo overcome all functional gaps between general support and close combat support and balance the ratio between combat and logistic forces, ,.vhich was lipped in favour of the lauer. Logistic agencies have also been

downsi1.ed, to reduce the number of personnel operating in the close comba t support area and rationalise the logistic and adminisLrativc functions of a force Command in opera.Lions outside the home territory. These seminars have highlighted the facl that, clrning the operations in the Balkans, supplies, transport and general services have not always been adequate to the logistic requirements of the forces in the field. In general material supplies, especially vehicle spare parts, have met delays and dra\.vbacks. T his has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the vehicles . To overcome all supply problems, the concept of a "Home Base" has been devised, which is tasked with supporting forces' projection and sustainment ab road . The base includes an agency to co-ord inate ADERLOG (close combat support) and SOSTLOG (general suppor·t) and is equ ipped with one Operations Room f 0 1· general s u pport and one or two Operations Rooms for close combat 95

support, to ensure a seamless transition between the two. Peace support operations have also advised against carrying out ma i ntenance activities in the theatre, not to put an extra burden on the mi litary and lower its effectiveness. A so lution has been adopted to increase the number of "on-site teams " belonging lo logistics operational agencies and made up of highly spec ial ised personnel. These squads are assigned to the close combat support secL01~ when on-site maintenance is required. Moreover, as doctrine is concerned, a nevv maintenance policy has been enforced, based on the principle that a vehicle which is out-of-order must be replaced. Thanks to this solution, situations in which it Âˇwas extremely difficult for a unit to carr)' out repairs Âźith its m,vn

was the inadequacy of m ili tary and civilian carriers, as regards their transport capabi lit ies and frequency or connections . A solution has been envisaged by allocating transport carriers, such as ad-hoe units (vehicle, helicopters) or movement credits (military and commercial ships and aircraft) to rnove lroops and materials. Another problern on lhe table \,vas that of the existing regu lations . The new Army Logistic Inspectorate has studied and overcome contractual red tape linked to tender procedures, as provided for by the present rules. In fact, the compliance v,ith these rules made it difficu.lL to find companies capable of ensuring on call catering services. The regulations adopted take into account these new

Above. "Vespri Siciliani'' Operation: Roadblock. Left. Armoured vehicles o( ihe 19th Reconnaissance Regiment "Cavalleggeri Guide" in Bosnia.

resources or on-site stnictures were s uccessfully overÂˇcorne. In future, fielded units will he reinforced through a stockpile of vehicles, conm1ensurate to the time necessary to receive a piece of equipment from the home cow1t:ry and to their basic loads. Maintenance activity will be canied out \.vithin the capabilities o[ field unil'.s operational teams. Other equipment v,ill be replaced using the stocks iJl store al Lhe "Home Base". Among other problems there

requirements and have established more streamlined administrative procedures in this and other sectors, compared to the pasL Materials have been updated, thanks to the lesson learned, as in the case of the Army Aviation, which has fielded a particle filter on aircraft operating in sandy environments, or in the case of th.e Transport and Materials Branch, which has introduced into service a Tactical Logistical Truck (ACTL),

to enhance its transport capabilities, and other special vehicles (tank trucks in an ACTL version and 500 l. flex ible tanks) to fulfil water supply requirements. The field ing o[ the "CENTAURO 4 P'' is particularly noteworthy, as this vehicle has been designed to meet the need for a means capable of guaranteeing both mobility and personnel safety. The first version of the CENTAURO has been modified to accornrnodate 4 fully equipped men, besides its crew.

CONCLUSION To sum up the results of the

first round of lesson learned, we have concluded that the Army is e ngaged in a cultural revolution in whi ch the staff, tired or costarring only, ,-vant to play a leading rnlc. Certainly it was not easy fo r those who were explaining their expcti ences to the aud ience of a seminar to avow the mistak es made when they had been trying to do th eir best. They were obviously somewhat reluctant lo admit their faults, but then realised that the best way to exploit the ir experie nce was to analyse the most unsuccessful events. Units and Commands h ave acknowledged that some changes have Lo be made, notv.1ithstanding the results of the firs t cycle of lesson learned . Th e question is: vvhat was wrong with the analysis of the lesson learned? Perhaps the approach should have been more global . Each problem, e ither at C2, fire support or logistic leve l, was so lved by choosing a solution

wh ich tackled training, orga nisation a l s tru ctu rcs or materials sepa rately. A single problem has never triggered a simultaneous and synchronised r ev is ion of do c trine, Lra i ning, organisational slructures, materials and personn e l. In fact, these sectors arc still looked upon from a sta tic point of view, an d not system ically and procedurally. Seminars a lone are obviously not sufficient to fully exploit the experiences made by the Army. In fact, bo th trai ning and combat activities enable all Army personnel to co-operate in creating a more efficient 01-ganisation with their proposals and recommendations. We therefo,-e suggest Lo set up a .study, possibly within the TRADOC Organisation, permanently tasked ,,vith collecting pr-oposals coimecLed w ith problems, experi e nces and mistakes as \.vell. This wou ld allow Lhe Army to integ rate the se minars with the results reached by experts, in each operational seclor (C2, manoeuvre,

comb a t s upport, logistics, PSYOPS,CIMlC, etc).Thcy would follow units' acti vities ove r a certain period and point out tbe problems detected. Thu s an immediate l'cedbac k would be available, together with an in-depth one, In this way problems ,vould be analysed in detail (immediate feedback) but with the impaitiality deriving from having "digested" them (in-depth feedback). The second suggestions stems rrom the above-mention e d observaLion of a lack of sysLematic order. Expert teams may act as a guide and a link among doctrine makers, p lanners (of forces, training and maLerial development) a nd personnel officers, within their effort to boost and update the military.

0 * Lt. Colonel, Schools lnspecrorare .,,,., lvJ.ajor,

Schools Inspectorate

On February 13, 1997 the Italian militmy contingent in San,-yevo was supplemented \vith a Technical Team of the Engineer Corps. tasked with the planning and direction of the works of restoration and reconstruction of important socio-cultural buildings destroyed during the war. Its members were Officers of the Engineer Corps, with previous wellestablished experience in the infrastructure sector. They were immediately assigned the project for reconstructing three important buildings at Sarajevo University: the Faculties of Mathematics, Law and Engineering/Mathematics. The work ,.vas 6.nanced by the European Union, and wa5 essential for the resumption of the university courses, interrupted dLu-ing the four years of conflict. The professionalisn1 or the Engineer Team was immediately appreciated by both tbe NATO Military Auth01ities and the civilian Bosnian Authorities. The !all.er, at the encl of 1 997 issued a set of postage stamps Lo extol the diligence and effectiveness of the Italian military technicians. The projects were prepared during this first phase, and the rest1ucturing work or the Faculty of Law started in the Spring of 1998. The result5 achieved, and the need to reach as soon as possible the objectives envisaged by the "Framevvork Agreement for Peace" FINANCED PROJECTS SARAJEVO: '' Faculiy o{ Ma1hema1ics. * Facully of" !Aw. " Facully of c11ginceri11g a11d Architec/ure. PALE:

* Repair o(seconda1y roads .

* Repair ofseptic lanks and ·wafer cisferns in tl,e villages

ofH01oci11a and Rogo vici. '' Repa ir of lilnnels. * Res111,c1uring of'the Podvi1ez e/e;nenfa,y sclwol.

,., Construction o{ 1/u~ «KC'..._•uu,_ - Potob) road sec1 ion. Restructurinf!, of housing units in 1-fotocina and Bogovici. .,, Repair of1he elec1ric lines o( l-lo1ocina a nd no.~o vici. >'t

ITALIAN CIMIC UNIT ICU Chief Civil Engineer

PROJECT SECTION

COl\1MAND SECTION Clerk AdmiJ'listr;,ti\'t I Clerical

Interpreter lnr~rp~t~r

· Drtv.r Drt,tt

Infra technician l • fniT1d1t ld1:1

Infra Tecbnldan larn Tec:h1ldH

aimexec..l to the Dayton Treaty - of and the former Technical Team fundamental importance for the of the Italian Engineer Corps, resumption or the social, economic appropriately strengthened, assumed and cultural activities in Bosnia - · the name of "llal ian Cimic Unit" suggested, at the beginning of 1998, (ICU), clirectely subordinate to the to give a substantial boost to the Coordinator Office,~ Representative acth,ities caffied ouL until t.hen within of the National Authority (UCRAN) the framework of Civil Military \,vithin the NATO Hq. The Italian Cimic Unit is the key Cooperation (CIMJC). Ther-erore, the NATO Command of the Stabiliz.ation element of the Italian CINUC Activity Forces decided Lo establish a wiLh in SFOR. It pe1fonns phmning "Combined Joint CiivlIC Task Force", and managing tasks relevant to with the pu rpose of takling and bui lding reconstruction anc..l solving all the major problems road/rnilroad repairs. ln practice, the com1ected wilh .reconstruction. The JCU, after technical inspections, lays new stTucture was born in June 1998, out the projecls for Lhe various activities, directs the works including the contrn.ctual phase and PROJECTS BEING PROJECTS TO B.E FINANCED FINANCED assesses their effectiveness through the necessary teclm.ical tests. FOCA SAR.VEVO To set the said activities w1der way, Removal /1-0111 schools of Rea /i za1ion of' a suspended fomhridge in Cerenluk. the personnel necessary for the s/ructures ;101 suila.blc f<,r disabfod persons . completion of the unit were rapidly l'ALE dispatched to the area. T}1ey are Recla malion of'lhe PALE Palajanska !v/i/jacka river bed. Reclan1a1ion o{a valley. main ly Officers of the Army Engineer lhrough !he rea.li,,a1io11 o(a Corps - all grnduate engineers - later ccm1rolled dwnp for u rha11 joined by Aero nautical Engineer was1e n1ateria/s. Corps' Officers, and Engineer NCOs GORADZE as Technical Assistants, Draftsmen Restructuring o( a 111ulli(,11u:1ional a?,ric11/tural and Accmmtants. cenire. The comp lexity of the CIMIC activities, all highly technical and or BRCKO Rcda.malion o(urhan remarkabJe political value, has in/i-as1n1c1ure and open spaces. made it indispensable to institute a well-defined national interlocut01~ technically qualified and capable, 99

Comm emorati ve stamps.

from the managerial point of view, o( giving the approp1iale support to the ICU. F or this purpose , lhe fu ncti on o f "Parent Unit" ·was assigned to the Engineer School wh ich, through direcxl contacts with Arm y Commands and the possibly concerned Organizations, has the task of solving and submitting all the issues concerning personnel and logistics, as well as the typically tech nical problems relevanl Lo the ICU. In particular, the Engi neer School: • coordinates the rotation of personnel an<l issues directions for their appoinonent; • adapts "_job descriptions" to the particular functional requirements; • secures its supporl in supplying special and technical materials; • prnvides techni cal advice o n particular problems; • controls the technical and managelial aspects of the activities, also through on-the-spot iru,-pecLions. Jn little more than one year, the Italian Cirnic Unit has tackled and solved numerous problems, some of which wer·e crucial for the achievement of the poli tical and social objectives fixed by the Dayton 'Ireaty.

The Italian Military technicians have developed projects, amounting to about 7 bi llio n Lire, fo r the r e construction of University buildings an<l civilian infrasn·ucture in the urban area of Sarajevo, for· the r·epair of the road system, for the urbanization of the Pale area and for interve ntions of e nvi ronment reclamalion. The technical knowh o w of the Italian Team and its managerial skill in coordinating and directing the \-vorks are constantly praised, and are elements of 1::,'l· eat renown for the whole NATO military contingenl i.n the area. In particular~ the works for the restoration of the Law Facully in Sarajevo, planned and directed by ICU personnel, are a significant example of the enthusiasm and professionalism of 100

' ,

•.

the technicians of the Italian Engineer Corps. The work accomplished, essential for ensuring the Bosnian students the complete reswn ption of the lessons, was highly valued, so much so that Prof. Dr. Ismet Daulbasic, Dean of the Law Faculty, has personally expressed his appreciation to Lhe ICU. Soon the building will be officially inaugurated and handed over lo the local Authorities for the resumption of the nom1al didactic activities. Finally, the 1CU has been very recenlly assigned a furLher lask: to monitor the electricity dishibution network and the relevant 13 hyclroelect1ic a nd 4 thermoelectric po\ver plants of the whole Bosn iaHerzegovina, in order to create a "data base" for the development of the CIMIC activities. The efforts made by the Italians were continuos and not easy, but essential in order that the local people, coming out of a long and disasu-ous civil \.var, could accept and appreciate the presence, on their teITitory, of foreign m ili tary Contingents, and cooperate \.vith these men, in order to assure in the future a durable and constructive peace. The mccess achieved so far by the CJMIC military personnel confirms, more and more and in every circumstance, the importance of the

role played by the stru cture performing the activities of CivilMilitary Cooperation. It is a natural and very imp01taot linking element between tl1e local realities a nd the Military Contingents called to can-y out ''International Police" operalions. CIM IC, in fact, intervenes in sectors of high social interest, characlerized by important hw11,tniLarian content, tackles contingent prnblems of great interest for the population, which at times are solved only thanks to lhe enthusiasm and professionalism of the military Lechnicians and specialists of the interposition Force operating \-Vithin the individual national teams. This commitment ,vii] increase in the future, in other circumstances which, like the Bosnian one, require the presence of military forces to ensure stabi.lity, and can be fulGl led only with the availability of personne l prnfessionally prepared and trained to solve, \Vith their generous enthusiasm, lhe tech nical and operational problems. This is an obligation that alJ participants in Peace S upport missions must be able to honom; just as Lhe Engineer Officers of the Italian Cimic Unit have been doing so fa1~ together with their"badge collegues" who every day ,u·e engaged in the clifficulL Lask of clearing mined and trapped areas.