Issuu

CONTENTS

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N umbe r Two 1998

May-June .

July -August

Rivista Militare aims at broadening an d updating the technical and v ocation al training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propag ating th e military way o f thinking and a forum of study and debate. Thro ugh the publication of artic le s of technica l and scientific interest, Rivista M ilitare also aims at inform ing t he g eneral public on the Arm y and on military is sues.

Politics, Economics and Strategy

· be possible to give the Italian q in strument full validity and rveness by exaltlng professiomJ/nd enhancing the skills of the :Jual soldier.

Development and C o n flicts (1\llauri-;.io Coccia)

UR- MONTHLY

Interview with the Chief of S taff o f the Belgian Army

,lement to numbers 3 and 4 vist a Milita re Italian Edition

or in C hief: ,anni CERBO

~gem en t a nd Edito r ial Offi ce S . Marco 6 Rome e 47357373 rtisin g of the Secretariat ,ista Militare e 6795027 er it o Moggio ia Alberobello 3Rome e 20137 14 opro c essin g o Lodoli e 5898780 ,cription and forwarding ail 362/96, art. 2, para 20/ c lition s for 1998: number: Lit. 4,000 back number: Lit. 8,000 cription rates: Italy 22,000 a year 3d: Lit. 30,000 a y ear 1ent must be made on postal unt No. 22521009 in the name ~E - Centro pubblicist ica :sercito 123/ A , Via XX mbre - Rome lents abroad may remit paythrough bank cheque or 1ational postal order.

Interview with the Chief of the Ca nadia n F orces' Land S taff

Science, Technology and Training

1 di

x ized by the Court of Rome r No. 944 of t he Registry by ie 7 -6 -1949

ARMY PROJECT 2000 Capability Packages. The "Combat" Function (Domenico Villani - Sabata Errico) A.ntiaircraft Artillery. Development and Prospects (Sauro Baistrocchi) The "Combat Support" Function. The E ngineer Co rps (Ivan Felice Resce - A'1ario Ruggiero) I.and Artillery. Development and Prospects (Rocco Panun zi - G ualtiero De Cicco) Towards the N ew Anny. Review of the Situation (A m ilcare Casalotto - Nicola Gela o) Operational Planning in Multinational Contexts ( 1s t Part) (Pier Paolo Lunelli )

Rou nd Tables

Sommaire - Inhalt - Resumen

1998

ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE $TAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA

>red uction of this magazine >een supervised rnero Rampa.

Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee the h ighest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves contributors ample freedom, though it does not necessarily share t heir opinions. The Author is thus so lely responsible for t he articles w hich, published unedited and without edito rial t ies, exclusively reflec t his p ersonal ideas. Articles must be original in t hought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he los es all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other public ations and EMPA (European Military Press Asso ci ation) p eriodicals. Artic les should be acc ompan ied by suit ab le photographs, illu stration s, explanatory tables, together w ith a photograph of the Author, a brief «curriculum vitae» and a ten -line typewritten summary. Rivista M ilitare reserves the right to change the title of articles and choo se the typeface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped w ith a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging . In order to m ak e the production of the arti cles more expeditious, it is desirable that t he Aut hors provide, besides the text on paper, also the d iskette w ith the text files o f t he artic le. Any system and type of computer can be used.

Economic globalization, typical of the end of this century, is a real revolution which destabilizes the existing balances, giving us the impression of entering a radically new era, capable of realizing the global management of the resources of the planet. Actually, we are relentlessly moving towards a new form of competition among peoples, which is the prelude to serious malaise and inevitable conflicts.

f, as in one of those Wms of temporal transposition so fashionable no\.vadays, an ancestor of ours could revive and look just for a moment at our every-day activities, he would be less stunned by progress than by the unbearable acceleration of the action and by the schizophrenic behaviour of the people. On the other hand, if we stop for a mom ~nl and look back, even just to the years of this century, the accelerntion is visible and shocking. In the second half of the century every1hing has happened. Seemingly immutable certainties have fallen : nationalism, the importance of the tenitory, the very ideal concept of liberty, the flag. A good part of Lhe hopes and spurs that used to stimulate changes, have also fallen. So did religious references and socialism, as well as 2

the West's solidarity vis-a-vis the expansionist infiltration of the East. Historical enmities have ended, with no significant friendships growing up. Races, ethnic groups, religions and ideals are no more ban-iers, at the most they remain as vehicles to exploit in order to get the upper hand. The American supremacy is turning into leadership, and this is recognized

also by U.S. government officials . Every1hing seems to be at everybody's disposal, we can have all if we want it.

Everything influences everybody, suffice il to think of the Stock Exchanges. The democratic principles and the rules of the free market extend to lhe whole globe, taking with them progress and awareness. The autonomous and responsible decision-making power of the Nations grows, as does that of the individual citizen. Also problems increase, because

the way is long, even if the direclion is already decided. The future seems to depend mostly on the capability o f selfregulation and moderation of an ever-i ncreasing number of subjects. The individual comes out exalted from the evolution of this period, he is more and more a protagonist of hislory, even if not fully aware of his role, of the good and evil he can do. Time,

which was an appa r en tly immobile pedestal of history, has become a downward track on which changes have progressively increased their speed . Time is today a coprotagonisl o[ developrnent, together with the individual and information. All growths have always needed their o,.vn times, and tbese, in the present global scenario, albei t reduced, remain different from

The Command Posts for the "Shield" operations have been eslablished a l Sarajevo's Holiday Inn.

country to country and from situation to situation. Tirnes grovv longer; for instance, in the newlyestablished countries that move lo democralic and social systems from previous very di ffe1-e nt situations, characterized especially by lacking or incomplete information. These are the countries where the search for the road to foil ow is more djfficult; one can clearly see the urge to rapi dl y build global and durable ins truments, prodded by the pressing expectations of lhe people ,.vho, in their turn, are widely influenced by the s ituations prevailing around them, divided by the two extreme poles of personal gain and ideal-guided action, confused between 4

opposite forces, between welfare slale and free market. So many different situations, changes and trends - legitimate per se, but bearers of instability regain a cooperative role within the dimension of the national State, enhancing its governing role. It is always necessary to have an equilibrium of growth, a certain stability, in a lransition period. There must be, therefore, an authority, both central and d ecentra lized, capable of facilitating participation and constructive confrontation, of establishing rules and providing command, control and coordination. An authority able to encourage the involvement of the citi1.ens and to wisely manage

the areas previously occupied by ideologies, needs, strategies and differenl instruments in a situalion of different internal and international alignments. The cilizens of the world, even though they arc protagonisls of history as never before, still need the State as a point of reference; a State no more masler or goodnatured paterfamilias, but rather manager and traine r in a game whose stakes are global , universal. As such, it must justify its objectives and show adequate capabilities. When the return s are minimal, the State recedes to the still important position of a container~ Âˇwhatever it might be, it is understood that it can be changed, just as any other instrument selected for one's own needs and aims. This is another of the changes this century has presented us: from the more or less happy stability to the mobility of need, to the voluntary dynamics realizing a redistribution of people over the planel, on the basis of the respective expectations, albeit still compatible with the level of the possibilities. Those who don't do this - and there are still many - are largely restrained by ethical or emotional attrition. On the opposite conceptual versant, t hose ,.vho have the Nation as ideology are out. And the costs of this become ve ry soon unsustainable. In the state's dimension, social 1Âˇelalions and economy arc the masters, and politics adjusts to them. Primacy is an obsolete concept, because it is nol global. At global level, one can speak of power, responsibility a_n d significance. The last applies in a general sense to economy, in its widest meaning, which includes most of social life, since it

The Ar my Aviation has given its contrib u t ion to the control of the Alban ian territory du.ring operation "Alba.".

extends to democratization, pacification, participation and so on. This is also true because without social consensus it would be impossible to optimize the ecomic development and conduct a sensible policy. We know that Von Clausewitz would not like this, but we must recognize that, appearances notwithstanding, between politics and economy there is no primacy; at most, there is a grand alJiance, a continuous transfer of sovereignty. The system of relations and interactions is becoming global, since it is open, both conceptually and practically. If at State level, this does not seem to be everywhere the case, it is certainly so at personal level. And this is just the great opening that causes the turbulence we see on our planet, a turbulence that could upset our ancestors, considering that it scares us as well. The security invoked is abstract. It does not concern only risks and threats related to the military, but also attacks from every direction to the quality of hf e - achieved or just wished - as well as to the survival of the people and of the planet itself. So much turbulence requires as rnuch discipline. It presupposes, therefore, the existence of institutions endowed with enough legitimacy and credibility to influence public

must be accompanied. As a consequence, the turbulence that could be called "structural" goes together with the .stiffness that we have defined, "from attTition", as well as with a political and managerial rearguard action conducted by certain States and organizations of transnational or corporative character. At times, the diktat of national interests o vercomes any other logic, including that of survival, for countries that, at the same lime, have already renounced their national sovereignty in one or more of the classic terms o( reference: territory, resources, role, international approval, national cohesion. "Adaptation" implies a good degree of flexibility, since, whether one wishes il or not, interaction grows at all levels. IC and when this is not achieved, the

circumstance, have becorne an inadequate instrument.. For sec urity, we n eed government agencies and private bodies, civil organizations able to range over the whole spectrum or the sensitivities that give shape Lo security. Essentially, non-military security operators must be establisbed, starting with the media, which manage the strategical instrument of information. The military, with their structural and conceptual limitations, in the new cont.ext are useful essentially for balancing the military organizations or others; mainly, the others' ,.vish to use them. They are only one of the components of security. No doubt a crucial element vvhich, due lo the paroxysmal technological development, needs a continuous revision, carer ully barring it.s

opin10ns,

their

consequence is an inescapabl e

turning into something dse.

education and their adaptation to the present situation and the foreseeable future. This is why national States are still essential. "Adaptation" is a key word. Unfortunatelv, not all have already unde'rstood that the changes in progress cannot be derailed and should be not only influenced, controlled and guided, butÂˇ - first of all - they

tear in relations at all levels, from the individual to the coalition of Slates. This results in damages and in direct or indirect recourse to force.

But in the area o f risks, new forms of attack are already there, and they are no less lethal than the classic th reats. They move through the economic and social di.rnension.s, raising new needs, urging new rules of conduct and new borders not easy to cross. The organization for the defence of general and national security grows at the same rate, from year to year. It ranges from

facilitating

In this situation, security and the military are not a binomial. The military, the way they are in the present context, and due to the old, well-established practice of employing th em i n every

«Centauro» armoured cars o{ the «Cavalleggeri Guide» Regiment, one of" Lhe units o(the !FOR Italian Contingent.

· the themes on the environment to the evolution of the nonemployment of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, from the mobilization against terrorism to the refusal to use force, albeit within the scope of n ational interests; from international laws for the preservation of the constitutional state and international organizations to the mobilization of the individual citizens, taking into due account the

process

With the increase of interaction, concern also grows in a world which needs to h~ dynamic and is so only apparently, blocked as it is by many highly troubling elements, and still devoid of a vibrant and enticing leadership, since also the US must reckon \.Vitl1 a nwnber of restraints to the role that, willynilly, is compelled to play. The main trend of our actions

much as possible, all kinds of threats from affecting directly the course. Foresight is an incentive to security, and so is cohesion. Between evolution and its defence it would be necessary to have a well-tested partnership which, at the present time, is not there yet, at least at the desirable levels. In our case, there is not even an open acki10\.vledgement of the security operator·s as such. The level road is still far a\.vay. On the other h,md, the visible explosions of conflicts are there to shmv the present imperfection of the secU1ity system w1der construction.

und aspirations goes towards

ln the '90s alone there have

reduction of national sovereignty within the frame\.vork of supernational integrations, but also in that of pacification, defence or human rights and the extensive internal debate on these subjects. All is aimed at guaranteeing security, the seclllity to be able to live in a democracy ,:md, above aU, to be free to apply everywhere the mles o[ the free market. Peace, by hook or by crook. Such a peace, in

global construction. The strategy of development is in some ways hastened, and, in some others, restrained. The classic military component accompanies the change, protecting it. Military component and development resemble the bra,ke and the accelerator o[ a car on a slope: they play a worthy and cooperative role. In order to avoid departures with the brakes on, we try to prevent, as

been 98 armed conflicts in the world. More than 30 were still open at the end of 1997. An optim isti.c assessment of the human losses in these wars leads us to calculate the death of about 5,500,000 people, 75% or more of \.Vhom were civilians. In the scenario of the early '90s, Europe is one of the most violent regions. The record year is 1992, with 12 conflicts which are worth

progressive

certain conditions, could seem like forced preservation of the status quo in a rapidly changing world, and therefore an additional restraint, a forther limitation to the much necessary general flexibility.

The «Garibaldi» Brigade participClled in operation. "A lba" with its men and equipmenL.

recalling. Armenia/Azerbaijan, Bosnia Her7.egovina, dispute between Slavonia and Krajina in Croatia, \Vester.n Georgia, Northern Ossetia, Abkhasia, Moldova/Dniester Republic, Northern Ossetia/I.ngushetia in Russia, guerrilla warfare in the

ii-

Basque Provinces in Spain, South Eastern Turkey/Kurdistan, Western Turkey, Un iled Kingdom and armed conflict in Northern Ireland. These arc only lhe declared conflicts , open and recognized as such. Creeping or suspended wars, as well as situations of temporary or persisting tensions tha l could result in conflicts, have not been taken into account. Not all the str·ife siluations can be traced back to the fall of the Soviet Union, and it's not axiomatic lhat the increase in the number of conflicts is the sign thal there will be a period of greater violence compared to the past. lt is certain that a greal number of conflicts is connected with the period of transition fron, the old to the new political and economic order, so much so that we can assume thal, in lhe near future, the general contentiousness, particularly thal ex isting in Europe, could generally decrease. On the other hand, easy enthusiasms are dampened by the thought that more than half of the conflicts under consideration have lasted more than 5 years. About one third have been clt-agging on for longer than 20 years, which leads us to suppose thal the end or the residual conflicts is still far away. To all this, one should add that, ev idently, although the greatest part of the armed conflicts that started in the '80s are suspended, their originating causes are still there. Coming to the outbreak and

dimensions of conOicls and their unleashing factors, one notices a remarkable change compared lo the past, when conflicts broke out essentially among States. Today global problems ,.u-e increasing, as are internal strifcs in the various counlries, so thal lhe Stales, which were active subjects, have become mostly passive and more or less innocent victims of events which originate and develop within or above them. Victims, because lhe outcomes have particularly hard effects . At global level absolute values come into play, such as the ecosystem, the resources, the technological power and the markets that we share, nor exactly lik e brothers, with aJl the inhabitants of the planet. The repe rcu ss ions o[ the internal conflicts are no less serious; suffice it to think, for examp le, of migrations, terrorism, sanctions and their effects on neighbouring countries, changes in the economic development, commerce, need to participate in coalitions or peacemaking interventions, entailing appropriate eco nomic

and military ins truments and relevant costs. In the last years the phenomena of internal disputes and fragmentation have proved to be particularly contagious. The changes which have taken place have certainly offered unique opporlunities lo those considering the use of the military .instrument for political ends. The generating cause could have been, again, the end of the cold war, or the suspended internal disputes that have regained space and vigour just clue to the reduction of the pressure exerted by their ceferenee superpower~ or to the collapse of the central authority. This, for instance, was the unle,~shing facwr .i n the relalions \,\:ithin the Union of Sovietic Socialist Republics and the Warsaw Pact. Other factors could be the frictions raising the pressure on the relations, up lo lhe point of causing the attempt to solve the problem through lhe use of for·ce. Another breach, through which violence has found its way in order to reach its political ends, was the failure of the economic policies and the considerable gaps 7

in the prosperity of regions or the sam e country or federation of States . Su ffice it to think of Jugoslavia. Trying to set in order so many causes, one can poin t out that the econo mic ones, in the long term, are the most significant in lOday's conflicts, starting fr om the reduction of the resources on whicb the econo rn ic order must be rerounded, on to soil erosion and deforestation , frorn scarcity of water lo the exhaustion of energy sources. Also the type or political syste m has a considerable influence. As a matter of fact, it was noted that it is rare for democratic countries to be involved in conWcts among States; in particular, they almost never engage in conflicts among themse.lves. On the other hand, they are subject to internal conflicts when there are evident economic gaps, specially if they are - or can be - associated with historical claims and ethnic motivations which, as far as we can see, arc ve hicl es of conflict situations, but never originating causes. In countries that don't have democratic systems, violence is very easily combined 路with the violation of hurnan rights. Puttin g together all these assertions, one comes to the theory of double injustice, from which the present and foreseeable conflicts derive. This theory stems from the consideration that a small privi lege d Elite has too many 1:esow路ces. The systems used by this Elite to defend iLs privileges create the connections between poverty, inequality and violation of human rights. This is a double injustice. The refusal to redistribute these resources compels peoples to choose between accepting this inj ustice or trying to achieve a better distribution of 1路esources by any means, including violence. At the same time the economic problems, be they chronic or co ntingen t, produce ruptures within the Elite, and the groups 8

that form it fight against each other, to keep the possession of most of the res0:p路ces. In cases lil(e these, the easiest way to rally violence and reach consensus is the use of the etbnic lever and, where possible, the religious one. As we know, the coupl ing of these t,vo ingredients raises the level o f conflicts and greatly expands them. Injustice therefore , when it is perceived as such, is the dee p origin of conflict situations. Injustice can be exorcised only by justice, which is an absolute term and not a relative one, whose scope .is general. It can be connected with the theory or un iversal p e a ce, whose basic assumption is the fair distribution of resources and opportunities among all inhabitants of the Earth. This is a utopian concept, specially at the present time, dominated

as 1t 1s by economic laws, but still a re fere nce for the growth of man. Waiting for this realization, on which certainly everybody agrees in principle, the States behave on the basis of the resources available to satisfy the needs they recognize as such. In this perspective, they are even ready to grant help and attention Lo the countries with problems, to the point that they can med iate even with those who use violence in order to achieve an accepta ble level of growth. Since what is acceptable is discretionary, one can say that the democratic States, just because they have much to defend, are particularly flexible vis-a-vis those who, directly or indirectly, endanger their assets. Therefore they are willing to live with injustice for the sake of

;Hen o( 1/ze "San Marco" Bat1alion patrolled Albanian waters with their crafi.

resources don't s how anv inclination to give them up belo\~' a cerlain level, which is very modest and seems des t in ed to shrink even further, due to the decline of the ideal values of reference . The p resence o f injustice, as we have seen, leads to conflict situations, according to the process just described. Beyond the statements of pr inciple and the occasional mite, one ·£eels the tendency of withdravving into new towers, albeit virtual ones. Vico would be pleased. Then, nev. condotlieri will come and wrn see, with the new arms put at their disposal by technology, to the redistribution of wealth and the consequent power, correcting old injust ices and creat ing new ones. Everything will take p lace in a less cruel, bruta l and physical way, but with the same rashness wh ich prevailed in t he pas t. Another turn in the roundabou t of Ii fe, from which it seems forbidden to step down. 1

internal or general justice. On the other hand, the States, to guaranLee a progression of development adequ ate to the expectalions of their people, have very fev.l options. Either they selfishly reduce their propensHy to the exterior in Lerms of aid and socio-economic cooperation, or they pick up an even higher growth-speed, in order to be able to proceed lo a dcrapage of their

engagement towards the exterior, in particular towards areas geographically closer, generally considered more dangerous for their own security. In a general sense, injustice persists, both because resources are larger than needs, and they are, above all, greater than the egotism and greed of each inhabitan t of the Earth, and because t he holders of the

Is this pessimism? Let's try to examine a concrete case . For instance , we can analyze the economic-financial collapse of most of the Asian Countries, those that - differently from "little steps " China and well-tested Japan - have immoderately abused the rules of the free market Lo realize a chaotic and unrestrained growth. The very pillars of those sys tems are crumbling. Until the clay before yesterday, those economies were based on raw materials, on family farming and on cheap la bour. The econom ic hole is about to turn into an abyss, and the Western economies aim first of all at a short-term exploitation of the occasion. Alrea dy Wall Street and the European exchanges have rapidly

moved a,vay from the initial fall. What will happen tomorrow? There are essentially three possibilities. Isolation of the area, bypassing it from the economic point of view. We could even run the risk, in a few years' time, to discover that the emerging leadership is of a criminal mold and tends to merge into a worldwide net,vork, with a corTosive action against the development. and the expectations of the rest of the ,.vo.rkl. Intervention in support, thrnugh a risky recovery and transfer of already-spent and absorbed incomes. This is an unlikely option, considering that no Goverment can conduct such a strategy without being severely punished by the reaction of public opinion. Appoint a limited number of Countries, for example Israel, the United Kingdom, Russia, India, Japan, maybe China, to play a role of mediation and intervention in the area. This is a critical choice, because the most ev;dent malaise is economic, and none of those countries has the resources to change the situation, not even in the long Lenn . And yet, the Western and Euro-Atlantic response is fundamental for the development, in one sense or the other, of the international relations. The level of suffering to which the most involved Asian peoples are left exposed could create, for example, new solidarities, an amalgam not existing today, but ·wh ich could even become a threat to the present balances of the planet. In the perspeclive of divide et impera, the second possibility seems the most desirable, although it is not devoid of risks for security, starting with the fact that the picture we can imagine is less rosy than the present one, both in the short and in the long term.

D ··''Brigadier General, Directo1~ Military Centre {or Strategic Studies 9

THE NEW ARMY The land forces are undertaking a difficult effort for their reorganization, in order to acquire, within five years, a structure based essentially on volunteer personnel. It is the same the world over. The Armed Forces of Belgium too, have to reckon with budget restrictions. This is one of the matters we talked about with Liutenant General Roger Maes, Chief of Staff of the Army. General, some months ago the Belgian Army completed an impor tant part of its reorganization. Could you outline the basic stages of it? The reason of this reorganization originates from the strategic and geopolitical situation of the late '80s and d1e early '90s. The fall of the Berlin \,Vall caused radical changes in Europe, as well as the end of the last military tensions concentrated towards the East. In mid-92, the outlines of the Belgian Army's new structure were fixed; this caused immediate consequences on the Army. Such consequences can be summed up in three points. First of a.II, we have moved to a professional Army, keeping step

\vitl1 the abolition of the draft, starting from January 1st, 1994. Secondly, the strength of the Army has been reduced frorn 60,000 to 27,500 units in peacetime, while the organization had to adapt itself to these new objectives. And, last but not least , the budget has been restricted to a fixed amount for five years. In is also to be said that several units, with a ll the ir personnel, have been moved from Germany to Belgium.

This restructuring leads us to the present situation. How is the Army organized at present? Since the beginning of 1997 the Army is composed of a three-

Interview with General Roger M Chief of Staff of t Belgian Army

by Enrico Magnani*

pillar structure. First of all, \Ve h ave the Army Op era tional Command. This Corn rnand gua rantees the training and the readiness of most of the units tasked to take part in every kind of operation, according to the mission required by the situation. The Army Operational Command is composed of the 1st Mechanized Divis ion, of the Paracomm ando Brigade, of the Ligh t Aviation Group and of five firing a nd training ranges. The I st Division includes, in its tu rn, three Mechanized Brigades and the Combat and Support Units of the Division. The second pillar is represented by the Com bat Support Division. Tts mission is to gua ran tee the special ized and continuous training of the Army personnel, as \vell as th e basic training of most of those ,vho are going to become Non -Commi ssioned Officers . Moreove1.~ such Division supports the Army Operational Command for Operations and training and, if necessary, it can contribute to bring to full stre ngth t h e l st Mechanized Division . The Logistic Support Division

A professional i\rmy must rely on motivated an d well-trained men.

support in len11s o r supplies , maintenance and tTansportation, to the Anny, lo the Territorial Joint Command (CTT) and, parti all y, to the o ther Forces a nd the Gendannerie . Besi des these Lasks the Division obviously guarantees, also by mobile detachments, the logistic support necessary to every kind of operation. In the near future are further changes to be expected, as for the operational and support units?

represents the third and last component of the s tructure. Its task is to give direct and basic

I think that it would be wise for us to plan a period of stabilization, in order to get everything ready in detail. .Moreover~ the evolution or the geopoliti cal situa tion could lead us to reconsi de r the organization of our Arrny. The present political situation rep r esents, according to some opinions, a new kind of threat that requires a specific response. What units can the Am1y rely on in order to guarantee such response? The situation of t he p rÂˇese nt world security may require a rapid commit ment in distant places and in si tuations of crisis. We can distinguish tv,m kinds of action, according to the times of

The Belgian Army can commil, for peace support operations, lwo reinforced battalions o{ I, 000 soldiers each.

Starting from January 1st, 1994, the dra{L has been abolished i n Belgium.

bearing our proportions in mind.

intervention: an acl.ion in a very short while (only a few days); and another one, whicb requires some weeks with the commitment of more considerable means. Vve are permanently able to commit, for

In the past, Belgium counted a considerable number of draftees in the ranks of its Army. At present, the Army is completely professionaJized. What have been the steps to abolish the military service and what measures have been taken, at political and economic level, in order to improve the

peace supporl operations, two

volunteers' recruitinent?

reinforced battalions; each one includes 1,000 soldiers, who can be alternated for an indefinite period . In case of serious crisis threatening t he security of Europe and susceptible to turn into a major confl ict, we can engage up to about 7,000 soldiers; this represents more than 30% of our strength in peacetime. Such reaction capacity lo the crises is to be considered remarkable,

On the whole, I think that we have moved rather suddenly from the conscription to a profess ional Army, as \Ve know il a present. In one year and a half, we have stopped the recruitment and, one year later, the last draftee finished his military service. This has involved the shorta ge of personnel available to accomplish the functions

prev iously carried out by draftees. Now, after four years, this deficiency has not been completely fill ed yet. The political decision of restric li ng the budget has not allowed a sufficient recruitment. Consequently, five more years will be necessa1Âˇy to reach the required strength. In 1997 il was decided to take specific measures for the retirement, with the purpose , on I hP. on~ hand , to clischarge the senior personnel in excess and, on the other, lo enhance the effort for the recruitment. The effect of such a measure on the units is still negligible. Now, I would lilke to ask you a question about military women. The Army counts about 1,600 women in its ranks, that is the 5% of its strenb>th. When did the 13

The renewal of the Belgian Army in.eludes Lhe replacement of light helicopters and the acquisition of Lransport helicopters.

recruitment of women begin? What have been the main problems related to the women's

integration in the planet Army? What kind of difficulties did the voluntary service cause in this field? The women's recruitment in the Belgian Army began in 1975. There have not been specific problems, except for the

adaptation of the infrastructure and of some particular equipment articles. The voluntary service has not had any influence as, since Lhe origin, women have been admitted on ly to the career Cadres. The Army can dispose of a certain number of reserve units: now, how can all this be connected with the need of professional units, able to rapidly intervene in the new operational scenarios? It is deceptive to think that o professional Army must dispose only of rapid intervention units. It is always betler to have a force structure proportioned to the threat. The Gulf War in 1991 is an evident instance of it: its readiness

The Belgian Armed Forces s t ill consider necessary to have a reserve available Lo face any kind of 1hreal.

required several m onths, as well as the engagement of sorne US reserve units . .Moreover; we cam10t exclude more serious c r ises.. Fo r th is reason, the Belgian Armed .Forces still consider necessary Lo have a reserve available for evety kind of threat. The Belgian Army, like the Armies of the other NAT O's countries, is strongly s ubjected to e c onomi e s . H o w do y o u solve this problem? The Army h as alway s bee n strongly subjected to economies. The prese nt budget res tricti ons have mainly led us to echelon the r ec r uitmen t. as I have a lread y said. Such restriction has also led us to d istribute the a cqui s iti o n o f n e w equipment o ver a lo nger period . With the wi thdra\val o f our troops from Germany in the e arly 90's n e w inve s t me nts in infrastructure arose as necessary; they too ha d to be clis tribut;d a long a cer tain period of tim e. Some units therefore had to come back b efore l}1 e i r garrison s' infrastructure had been modified. At the end o f 1997 the Army fixed a list of equipments to get in a long time. Can you give us further d e tails on t h ese programs which w ill take the Army towards the 21st century? The ageing of our eq uipments a nd th e technol ogica l evolution h ave c o nditioned o u r p ri o rity choices . The ren evva l plans for 1997, in particulai:; co ncern: •as for the vehicles: light wheeled vehicles, tank transporters a nd heavy recovery vehicles. •as for lhe arm a m e n t : 120 mm mortars. • as for t he u ni forms : the new com ba t d ress th a t t he Arm y perso nnel w ill wear d uring the cu rrent year. At t h e b egin n ing of the 21 st cent ury, o ur pr io riti e s w ill b e m a inly oriented towards :

• the acquisition of lhe capa bi lity o f figh t ing at night or i n red uced visibi lity conditio ns; • the replacement of ,irmou red infa n try an d r eco nn a issance combat vehicles; •the replacement of light helicopters and the acquisiLion of transport helicopters;

• th e m oder n ization of o ur tTansporl vehicles; • the replacement of the antitank very-s ho rt-range m issiles with short-range ones.

D 1 '

Journalist

General Roger Maes was born in Bruxelles on April 25, 1938. After attending the junior high school at a. humanis tic

institu te, he continues his studies at the Royal Cadets School in Laek.en, w here he attends the Latin-Mathematics course. From 1956 to 1961, he attends the 11 1th Polytechnic Course, specialization Constructions, at the Royal Military School. After passing two years at the 6th Engineer Regiment stationed in Kassel, he is called at the 4th Regional Direction of Military Installations. Since the end of 1965, he is on duty at the 51 th Engineer Battalion as Staff Officer for maintenance. During this period, he attends a formation course at the French Engineer School in Angers, being qualified as "Mechanical Engineer Officer". In 1970, General Maes is mandatorily moved to the Logistic Corps. After a short period of service at the Staff of the 2nd Logistic Group, he becomes Commanding Officer of the 4th Heavy Equipment Company in Werl. Later, after serving at the Lo6>i.stic Office of the 1st Corps, he becomes Director of Logistics. After attending the Senior Staff Officers Course at the Royal High Institute for Defense, he is called at the Personnel Office of the General Staff of the Army. After having been in command at the Logistic Center no.2 in Antwerpen, he comes back. to the General Staff· of the Army as Chief of the Logistic Office. Promoted to Brigad~er General in 1989, he becomes Chief of the Infrastructure Division of the Defense General Staff. On March 26, 1993 he is promoted to Lieutenant General and on April 1st becomes the Commander of the National Forces. In the framework. of the reorganization of the Belgian Armed Forces, he becomes the Commander of the Territorial Joint Command, formed on July 1st, 1995. On January 1st, 1996, he is appointed Chief of Staff of the Army. General Roger Maes is married and has two children.

nd Force" , the chall bybu

s discusse e and other subjects. General, first of all, let's take a step backwards. It is by now almost thirty years that Canada has unified the three traditional Services into an integrated Force. What did this represent for the land forces? Your first question concen1s the unification of the three Services in an integrated Force, accomplished in 1966-1967. You are asking me ,vhat this choice represented for the Army. In all truth, I'll say that the decision to unify the Canadian Armed Forces was not well received by the military circles of the time. Nevertheless this step proved profitable for the Army and all the Canadian Forces, to the point that no,-v nobody opposes it. Besides, the unification has brought two great advantages. lt

has permitted to obtain important savings in the whole of the activities of the Armed Forces and to simplify the command and control from the political and strategic point of view. The unification has facilitated the fusion of some methods and functions that before were performed separately by each of the three Services. Among the savings realized thanks to integrntion we can mention enlistment, acquisition and management of materials, administration of the personnel and basic training. As regards the improvements obtained from the Command and control point of view, the unification has enabled us to replace three distinct institutions with a single unified structure. As a consequence, this initiative facilitates us a great deal when it is a matter of supplying the

Interview w th Lt. General Bill Leach', . Chief of th Forces' Lan by Enrico Magnani *

For almost twenty yea,:,, all Canadian milita1y, men and women, have been wearing the. same green. uniform, which brought about also a. cultural change.

political leaders with clear and unified opinions about military questions and makes il easier to make the decisions and to implement them. The unification has more than simplified many things. As a matter of fact, a fter the integration, for every military question a single set of suggestions, instead of three, went through the various hierarchical stages and therefore a single set of decisions and orders came back instead of three.

the centralization of the questions concerning personnel and equipment and the cr-eation of joint organizations and structures have altered the military ethos in Canada, for all three Services. During the last twenty years, all the Canadian military, men and women, have been wearing essentially the same green uniform, which has led to a change of culture. In someone's opinion, the common green uniforrm worn after the unification embodied its own culture. With time, a growing number or alterations have been authorized and made to the green uniform, specifically for the Army and its Regiments. For instance, in the case of the Canadian regiments of Scottish or Irish descent, the possibility to wear the kilt as official uniform, has permitted to keep their particular identity. Likewise, the armoured units have continued to wear their black beret. The units that could afford it have also continued to wear their full dress as they did before the unification . Today, with the return of slightly differentiated uniforms, one can immediately distinguish land soldiers from sailors and airmen. As each person has his own way of conceiving "the vital heart of an Am1y" it is almost impossible to probe into the question of the

The constitution of integrated Armed Forces in some ways represented a decisive spur towards a Canadian national identity. Did this choice affect the traditions which represent the life-blood of an Army, ancient

Army as a distinct service has affected the so-called "military culture". For instance, the questions related to the personnel and the policies concerning the equipment do not pertain any more only to the Army's hierarchy. Some maintain that this has produced a fundamental change in the procedures. The regimental system of the Army has been more or less preserved, especially as concerns annotffed units, artillery and infantry. The unification in itself did not cause the disappearance of the old Regiments such as the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders of Canada), the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, The Royal Canadian Regiment, Les Royal 22nd Regiment or Les Fusiliers MontRoyal. To answer to the last p,ui.

traditions such as the Scotch

of the question, the unification

impact of unification on the Army

Regiments and the French speaking units of Quebec?

did not cause the disappearance of traditions in the heart of the French-speaking units or the units of Scottish descent. Similarly the unification did not do away with regimental flags or with the military marches of the armoured regiments, of the Artillery or Infantry. Nevertheless, some will continue to maintain that, \.Vithout an onlyArmy line hierarchy or Command,

without writing a book of a hundred pages (or many books of several hundred pages; those written by Douglas Bland are certainly the best on the subject). But it must not be forgotten that thirty years have elapsed since the Canadian Armed Forces were unified. During this period, very important social and strategic changes have occurred which have led to a substant.ial

More or less complex questions can be posed as regards the effects of unification on the Army and its traditions. Many books, \vhich uphold almost as many views, have already been written on the implications of the Army's uni fication. Undoubtedly the disappearance of the Canadian

of the cold wa,~ As a consequence, the Ministry of National Defencee (MDN) and the Canadian Forces (FC) had to devise different systems to meet the challenges related to the changes brought about in the strategic sector. In order to maintain the credibility of the Ministry, both at home and abroad, we have given priority to operations in all the initiatives of change undertaken. Although a certain number of key-factors have concw:red to our success, tvvo of our most important initiatives have concerned first of all the rationalization of the infrastructure and the reorganization of the command and contTol structure. As regards infrastn.1cture, it was clear that due to dimension and age, they could not be managed v.ith the resources remained at the disposal of the Ministry. Consequently we had to take a certain number of initiatives aimed at rationalizing what we could afford and what we could not. The most important repercussion of this measure was the closing of some bases in Europe and at home. Besides these suppressions, the MDN/FC continues to study other possibilities of diversification of the ways of supplying the services reg,u-ding the support not essential to the military activities. This v1:ill enable us to devote most of om limited resources to the maintenance of oLUÂˇ combat capabilities. Following the reduction of effectives and infrastructure in 1995 the Ministry launched a large initiative of reo,Âˇganization of the Comrnancl and control, 'With the purpo!je o[ 1Âˇeducing to a

reduction in the budgets destined to defence. Due to these (actors, that have very little to do with the unification, the Armed Forces (and the Army component) are much reduced as compared with 1968. ll becomes therefore extremelv difficult to tell whether the cha;~ge undergone by the Army since 1968 should be ascribed to the unification or to the other .i mportant influences

mentioned before. For some years the budget of the Canadian defence has been subjected to heavy cuts. What are the lines adopted to maintain the credibility of the military instrument, given the reduced financial resources? The budget of defence undenvent important reductions since the end

half the number of the resources employed for the functions performed by the Headquarters. This project has important repercussions on the working methods of the MON and FC and will continue to have them along the years. Besides the changes that were, and will be, brought to the structure, the Ministry continues to make a striking progress in the creation and

putting into practice of methods for the management of the cesources. ln particular~ the planning of the activities and the acquisition of instruments that measure the efficiency and verify the costs for every specific activity contribute to improve our ability Lo manage more activities with less resources. We have not finished yet, but we are going in the right direction!

It is equally interÂˇesting to note Lbat the Government of Canada has adopted the activityplanning concept in orderÂˇ Lo make it a key-element of its renewed system of expensemanagement. The officialization of the reports on the projects published last Spring and those on the efficiency published last Autunm by all Minist1ies should considerably contribute Lo improve the Govenm1ents nianagemem of

resomces. The MDN/FC represents the most important Federal Ministry cmd has conunitted itself Lo become file-leader in the creation and implementation of initiatives for a better mcu1agement o[ the resources. The Land Forces Command is a numerically reduced force albeit with high professional and technological qualities. This inevitably entails making recourse to reserve forces which, in their turn, must be equipped and trained in order to be interoperational with the regular forces. How do you tackle this problem? The Canadian Forces adopted the concept of Total Force ,vith the White Book on Defence of 1987. This concept can be defined as follows: a combination of members of the regular Service

and of the Reserve, which constitutes an economic and polyvalent combat potential, at the wanted training level. In December 1996, the Army Command indicated that the reason of existence of the Land Force's Reserve was to be a mobilization force in case of conflict but its main task was to augment the regular Force in times of threat. The concept of Total Force shows that the Army's practice is ro !rain the regular or the reserve soldier according to similar instruction and operational standards; owing to the fact that the reservists of the Canadian Forces are volunteers and have no obligation to serve, this practice functions relatively well as far as basic training is concerned. When time becomesÂˇ a clitical factor and training more complex, the success is more moderate for obvious reasons of

The concept o( "Total Force" shows tha.L the Canadian Army proceeds in 1he training ofthe regulnr soldier or reservist according LO similar Lraining and operational rules, while maintaining, al the same time, its polyvalenl .comba1 capabili1y.

times and costs. Dming the first year of service, the reservist devotes on the average almost 100 days to his basic and specialization training. After that he will have the possibility Lo complete his training for 65 days a year, especially during the weekends from September to M.ay and in a single period of 14 days in Summe1: A contingent deployed on an operational theatre can include up to 20% of reservists. The percentage of the Rese1ve depends on the type of mission, the speed of deploy1nent, the need to maintain the integrity of the Regular Force and on the time available to train the reservists. The preparation consists in adding the reinforcements of the Reserve to the unit of the Regular Force for a peliod of pre-deployment training of ninety clays. The reservists carry out the same training as their collea1:,,ues of the Regular Force. This predeployment training and the distribution of the reservists tlnÂˇoughout the unit encourage a complete integration of the two elements in a quite efficient operational force.

maintenance of a polyvalent combat capability. This goal will not be attained without difficulty. Given the present financial situation and the absence, at the moment, of a real threat for Canada, public opinion is less indined to supporl war plans. Moreove1; the nature of the missions and tasks that the Land Force was called to carry out during the last years - generally, lowintensity peacekeeping operations -

did not allow us to devote the little time and the scarce resources at our disposal to maintain an adequate degree of preparation, in view of hjgh-intensity operations. Despite these challenges, the Service retains the main task to keep its polyvalenl combat capability and will be able to surmmmt all obstacles to be up to it. In addition to this commitment, the Army must concentrate on other activities that go from tbe

The Italian Army has committed itself to an effort of structural and operational reorganization,

order to create a streamlined, flexible instrument, which could be easily integrated within international contingents. Âˇwhat are the most important tasks which the Land Forces Command is planning or that are already in progress?

It is a very wide questfon. The most important task that the Land Force has to carry out is the

The Land Force Command has gained a vasl experience in peacekeeping opera.Lions, after the changes in the political conditions due 10 1he end of the cold war.

defence of our continent, jointly with OLff American allies (CUSRPGCanada US Regional Planning Group). The Land Forces Command has matured a vast experience in peace-keeping operations. What are the doctrinal and political lessons learned from its frequent participation in peace-keeping missions under different flags? modernization of the Service to its financial reorganization, without forgetting the improvement of operational training and the initiatives aimed at obtaining more savings in the non-essential activities. From 1949 to 1993 the Canadian soldiers have been a guarantee of the bonds between Europe and North America, by training and cooperating Âˇw ith their NATO comrades. What is

today the contribution of the Canadian land forces to the Atlantic Alliance? The commitment of the Canadian army to NATO remains as before. Since our \.vithdrawal from the European theatre, we have continued to keep at NATO's disposal a mechanized brigade and a light combat group. These two Major Uni ts are available for NATO's contingency plans. Moreove1~ we have similar engagements connected with the

The most important lesson is very simple. Only a soldier trained for war can play an effective role during a peacekeeping mission. In reality only war training gives the military the knowledge that will enable them to carry out their mandate during a peace mission. At political level, it must be evidenced that since the encl of the cold war the conditions on the terrain have changed a great deal. The two forrner superpowers are no more in a position to intervene with a mecliatorial role like they did in the past. The belligerents are free to act as they choose and can nO\.v employ military and political means which are dificult to control in particular situations (such as., for instance, that of formerÂˇ Jugoslavia). Tue operations in Jugoslavia and Somalia have taken the shape of real conflicts rather than peacekeeping operations. What do you think will be the future of these two operational profiles, initially opposed? You are mentioning two aspects \.vhich have both their own reason to exist if considered in their respective contexts. The key of

the ir success resides in the definition of the tasks in relation to the problems encountered. A task well defined and carried out by well trained and well equipped troops will have a considerable operationa l capability - therefore these two aspects ha ve certainly their place in the present geopolitical context.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall the politico-strategic international scenarios

)1ave

changed

<1nd

NATO's Strategy concept is being challenged. As a conseque nce, there is the need to find new training procedures for the military cadres. What are the present initiatives taken by the Land Forces Command to prepare the personnel? Since the 1st Canadian Division left Europe we have noticed a considerable increase in our

operational rythms, particularly in former Jugoslav:ia and Africa. This inc,-ease has produced a reduction in the quantity of efforts which we c<mld devote to the training a imed in maintaining the polyvalent interservicc capabilities. In fact we have canied out only few joint or combat group exercises, except when these were part of the requirements of operational training. As a consequence, at present the Army is training to recover certain capabilities which have been d iminishing a nd emphasizes again interservice training, and plans have been made to provide the equipment and rules which perm it to carry it out. For example we are now experimenting a set of norms of combat aptitude, desti ned to the Commanders for the assessment and improvement of the e fficiency on the fi eld. We also have a conceptual model of a Canadian Centre of manoeuvre simulation to evaluate the effects of the various

weapons and improve the collective capabili ties. Regardi ng the programme of individual training, we believe it necessary to strengthen the quality a nd quantity controls in this period of cui-tailment of resources . Moreover, various initiatives are being carried o ut by the General Staff in order to opbmi ze our investments, in relation l.o the resources available we are still convinced that vve can form h ighly q ualified and capable soldiers, among the best in tl1e world, a nd we have accepted the challenge being careful to gi ve o ur men an efficient preparation, in view o[ the roles tbey have to play, both in wartime and within operations other than war. The Canadian military effort is oriented not only towards the Atlantic scenario but also to the

Excepting the role played in Lhe Korean war; Lhe Canadi,m milita1y patiicipation in the sccwity of the Asia-Pacific area arLer v\lv\!ll \.vas limited mainly to a cont1ibution of

commitment abroad. At the same time the MDN role in the Asia-Pacific area remains 1xescntly li rnited by two keyfactors: the cut~Âˇ ;n the Defence budget and in the structure o( lhe Service, and a new \.vorld-level task fonnulated in the White Book o f Defence in 1994. If MDN is to sustain Canadas' goals in the AsiaPacific sector under the reservation of these two conditions, the Ministry vvill have to make well-

objective as fau- as foreign policy is concerned. The trade relations that it is going to establish with the countries of the Asia-Pacific area arc therefore essential. In Canad a, prosperity and employment. increasingly depend on trade. Although 80% or Canada's trade exchange is done with the United States, the greatest grnvvi:h, both for Canada and for the rest of the world, depends on the flourishing economics of a small nu n1ber of

persom1el in the vario us observation

rÂˇeasoned choices on how und

Asiatic countries. From now to the

and peacekeeping m1ss1ons, where it is going to employ its more p,u-ticulm-1.y in Pakistan, Vietnam and and more lim ited resources. Cambodia. Arter Lhe cold wai; the Canada's interest in the Asiagovernment of Canada has Pacific area is mainly econom ic. As regained interest in th is area and . a rnatter of fact, the Canadian has hinted that the Ministry of government has learnt that a National Defence has a key-role Lo country's influence depends play there. Nevertheless, this role increasingly on the solidity of its cou ld be somehmv different from economic relations. Consequently, the traditional one, thal which up the promotion of prosperity and to now MDN has carried out in employment is at the core of the Europe, principal region or its Government's c,u-es and is its first

year 2020, predictably the region will have seven of the ten most important world economics and wi ll possess 60% of the world market. Canada at present holds only 1,5% o f ll1e rnarket in the Asia-Pacific area. The MDN presence in the region remains generally modest, wi.Lh the exception of the relations of bilateral defence with the Un ited States, Australia and New Zealand.

Pacific. Will the increased strategic importance of the Asiatic area, together with the b>reat tensions that occur there, entail a reorientation of the C.:umdian Land i.nstnunent?

The Canadian A.rmy is carrying out a programrne of individual trainin..~ capable of shaping highly qualified and competent soldiers, in view of iheir future operational roles. ..

Despite its participation to the political development or the Regional Fornn1 of A.NASE (FRA), Canada does not belong to any official militmy alliance in the area, if one excludes the Canada-US cooperation for the defence of North Ame1ica and the sharing or responsibility regarding the roaiitime North Pacific frontier. The relations ,.vith Austrnlia and New Zealand constitute an extension of the .historical bonds or Canada with the Cornrnonwealth countries, together with some quad1ilateral provisions concerning the exchange of information. The Canadian military presence in the Asia-Pacific area is ensured by seven Military All.aches ,.vho are associated with 13 countlies, with the most part of which Canada has maintained bilateral relations, through rare visits made by authorities, a modest programme of exchange and liaison, some visits for technical aid and sharin!! of expeliences within the sphere o~f peacekeeping in the world. C,mada partecipates with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and recently with Chile, also in the RIMPAC exercise, organized by the US Navy every two years. Moreover, it r egularly participates to other exercises, mainly naval ones, with the United States in the Pacific

With its programme of support to rnilitary instruction (PAIM), MDN has given to many countries of the Asia-Pacific area the possibility to send their personnel to attend courses in Canada. Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal, Thailand, Singapore and South Korea arc among them; the last two participate according to a costrecovery principle (mving to their high GNP per capita). The PAIM

funds have been spent for a series of activities that go from the instruction of flight perso1mel to the peacekeeping courses offered by the Pearson Centre. Besides PAIM, other exchange programmes have been organized with Australia, India, Malaysia and Pakistan, although Lhe last three

programmes were suspended because of a reduction in the number of places for foreign students at Lhe Canadian Forces' Cornmand and Staff College.

D ''Journalist

Lt. Gen. Bill Leach was born in Sarnia, Ont. His military career began in 1960 at the College lVJ.ilitaire Royal de Saint-Jean and he graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston in 1965 with a degree in economics and commerce. In 1968 he attended the Canadian Forces ' StaffÂˇ College. Lt. Gen. Leach served in Germany and in the Near East. In Germany, among other positions, he held that of Officer Commanding the National Support Element for Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land). From 1975 to 1977 ha was Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General (Operations), 4 th UK Armoured Division, British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). He served as an instructor in the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps School, Montreal, and held several important positions in finance, supply and operational logistics. In 1986, Lt. Gen. Leach was presented with the Order of Military Merit. During the Gulf War, he was Director of Logistics Plans and Operations. In the recent past, he has been involved in major change initiatives, particularly in the materiel sector. On october 13, 1995, he was appointed Deputy Commander , of Land Force Command and Commander, 1st Canadian Division. On September 24, 1997, he was appointed Chief of the Land Staff: Lt. Gen. Leach is married and has three children.

ARMY P OJECT 2000

by Domenico Villani 28

-1:

and Sabato Errico ,'( ~'(

he Project on the «Operational - Capability Packages» has been worked out with the intention of reconfiguring lhe Army on the basis of the emerging operational requirements. The Project aims at a synergic flow of all available resources towards objectives corresponding to specific, concrete, coherent and compoundable cap;,hilities (partial objectives) achieving - on short, medium and Jong term horizons - the ,.vhole design of the Service, progressively but with accomplished partial systems, operationally employable during each phase or the programme's development. The "Capability Packages" are, in substance, the macrotargets that the Army intends to achieve in correspondence with its great institutional missions (Fig. l). As a consequence, the land military instrument has been divided into Projection Forces, Reaction Forces and Presenceand-Surveillance Forces. This division has requir·ed the definition of elementary modules which, within each package, arc called to develop a specific operational function (Fig. 2), to the development of which also other types of modules can concur. As regards the "Combat" function, the point was to determine the elements which must characterize the infantry and cavalry units, as well as the relevant ~lemen tary modules present in all packages, in order to give them the highest

functional efficiency in all the

operational contexts described in the missions assigned to the Senrice (peace, crisis, war). In r·elation to the operational capabilities that each « force package» must represent, the following studies have been conducted: • scrutiny of the "Combal" function and relevant component activities; • description of the characteristics

Fig. 1

MISSION

OPERATION

Defence of External Interests

Humanitarian Interventions Peace Support Operations Forward Presence

Presence

Concurrence in Safeguard of Institutions

and Surveillance Concurrence for Welfare of Community Deterrence

Common Defence

Prevention Direct Defence

Fig. 2

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS Support to Command, Control, Communications, Computer (C4) Intelligence Combat Combat Support Combat Service Support Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Security and Protection NBC Defence Electronic Warfare (EW) Psychological Operations Host Nation Support (HNS) Public Information Civil - Military Operations

RSTA and role of the Basic Branch in operations; • definition of types of units and their distribution in the "force packages". OPERATIONAL CAPABTLTTIES

FOR THE «COMBAT» RJNCTION The «Combat» function

This is the function assigned to the manoeuvring forces", consisting of the Basic Brnnch 29

Fig. 3 NON-WAR OPERATIONS

C:,~

I WAR OPERATIONS

Peace Enforcement

I N

Peacekeeping

T E N

ASYMMETRIC CONl' LICT

s I

Humanitarian P(H'.S£NC£ A1'D SURVHLLANCE

Aid

T y

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)

Light Aviation units, they assurne an air-mobile configuration, acquiring the ability of freein g themselves from the limitations of terrain and roads; furthermore, the presence of attack helicopters gives them greater firepow e r. Light units can also be equipped with wheeled armoLired combat vehicles, characterized by high on-road mobility, good crosscountry operation and remarkable firepower (integrated light guns and NT missile systems).

Mechanized units The

units which conduct clos e c ombat , employing mainly direct-fire weapon systems . It is the "mas ter" function in every ty pe of oper ation, envisages diversified actions in relation with the operational context (Fig. 3) and requires, therefore, the availability of Regiment-level monofunction module s, with operational capabilities characterized, in relation with their par ticular package, by a different combination of the fol low ing indicators: projectability, protection, firepower and mobility. Attributing a variable value from I to 4 to each of these indicators, it was poss ible to defin e the t y pes of units necessary for the composition of the individual force packages (Fig. 4). Forces designed for the "Co1nbat"function

On the basis or the procedure mentioned above, the infantry and cavalry Regiments designed for the "Combat" function can be classified as: light, mechanized and armoured units.

Light units The light units are e quipped with wheeled tactical ve hicles

units ,

mechanized

Fig. 4

INDICATORS' VALUE FORCES

PROJECTION

REACTION

PRESENCE AND SURVEILLANCE

(VMT, VMTK, VMP and 4x 4 or 6x6 VBL) and arc mainly armed

with light weapons. They are therefore characterized by a large degree of projectabiJily (specially when they move on aircraft) and by high mobility (mainly on roads). Their level of protection is limited lo the offences coming from individual arms, while their firepower consists of individual and crew arms as well as antitank weapon systems. \.Vhen they are employed together with

equipped with transport and comba t vehicles, on tracks or

wheels, follow the parameters of the tactica.1 formula according to the priority traditionally attributed to them by the Italian Army: firepower, mobility and protection. The first is given by the medium-calibre and A/T missile systems on the vehicles, the seco1;d by the capability ·of rnoving off-roads at a high operational speed, while the third is provided by their armour,

capable of withstanding the shots of medium-calibre weapons.

Armoured units The armoured units are equipped with high-protection, high-firepower vehicles , both wheeled ("Centauro" armoured car) or tracked (Ariete" or "Leopard'' combat tank). In particular, the heavy armoured units (cavalry regiments designed for the "Combat" funct ion) are characterized by high mobi lity (specially on roads), high firepowe1~ thanks to the guns of the heavy vehicles, and very good protection. Furthe rmo re, within this function, the attack helicopter regiments of the Army Aviation must also be mentioned. Thanks to their flexibility, firepower and mobility also on terrains "impossible" for the land forces, they are an exceptionally mighty instrument in the hands of the Commander. The modern operations of peace s upport, as a matter of fact, presuppose the availability of contingents able to express a strong deterrence in order to be credible. In this perspective, the attack helicopter units are particularly fit for the development of high-value and very visible activities (area security, armed reconnaissance, arn1ed escort to convoys and units, etc.) . In clas sic operations, attack helicopters arc likewise able to execute timely, powerful and precise interventions.

Activities o f the "Combat" function The ma in activities of the "Combat" function are those summarized at Fig. 5. The employment of light, mechanized or armoured forces depends on the characteristics of the operational environment, the presumable threa t and the

Fig. 5

CLASSIC OPERATIONS

PEACE SUPPORT

ACTIVITY

TYPE OF FORCE

ACTIVITY

TYPE OF FORCES

Control Large areas/Counterinterdiction

Light Mechanized

Observation

Light Mechanized

Defence of zones or built-up areas

Light Mechanized

Surveillance

Light Mechanized

Mobile defence /coverage

Mechanized Armoured

Interposition

Light Mechanized

Counterattack

Mechanized Armoured

Check point

Light Mechanized

A/T Action

Mechanized Armoured

Protection of refugee camps

Light Mechanized

Preventive occupation of areas

Mechanized Light

Convoy escort

Light Mechanized Armoured

Attack

Mechanized Armoured

Patrolling

Light Mechanized

Area interdiction

Light

Defence of iti neraries

Mechanized Armoured

tactical actions to be carried out. ROLE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BASIC-BRANCH UNf'f S

In the p r esent operational scenario, classic operntions - be they offensive, defensive or delaying ones - are characterized by the synchronizat ion of activities developed in depth, in contact and behind the fron t, as a harmonic combination of all elements of "Combat power". The Basic Branch is the key element in the conduct of these operations and the corner-stone of the so-called "manoeuvre forces", i.e. of those forces employing fire and movement to engage the enemy with direct hits . They are therefore different frorn the forces using indirect fire to hit the enemy or giving support to combat. The "manoeuvre forces" belong, in the Italian Army, both to the Infa ntry and the Cavalry and, as we have already said, can be light, mechanized and armoured. In non-war operations (Presence and Surveillance-PSO) the Infantry and Cavalry un its can be called. upon to carry out interventions of different intensity,

depending on the type of mission. In general, it is profitable Lo employ, in low-intensity operations, light-infantry units, more suitable for timely interventions, or deployments aimed at freezing a risky situation, in vievv of ll1e arrival of the reinforcements necessary for obtaining the final conditions desired. The rise in the level of tension (essentially in PSO) may require the employment of armour, heavy armour, mechanized and tank units - in that order - initially as deterrent elements and then to develop strong actions, typical of traditional combat. In particular, th erefore, also within the wide range of activities which go under the heading of peace support operations, the Basic Branch units , due to th eir equipment and emp loyment procedures, arc the most fit to be the "core" of the Intervention Forces. A synthetic description of the characteristics of the various types of units follows in the next paragraphs.

Light Infantry The units of light infantry and

relevant specialit ies (alpini, paratroops , contingents for· airmobile units), are equipped with tactical wheeled vehicles and/or light armoured cars with limited protection. They are characterized by high operational mobility, remarkable (] ex ibility, sufficenl firepower and limited protection. They are suitable for operations on most teffains and in different weather co ndition s. Th ey can carry out a wide range of mi.s sions within the e n t i re conflict spectrum, fro1n war to non-·war operations. In operations that have to be carried out within limited timeframes, they are the first nucleus of the forces to be projected, thanks to their remarkable lightness and capability of rapid d eployment at operati onal and strategic level. Jn the tactical field, these forces can be employed to rapidly take th e initiative in operations, acquiring and keeping control of key objectives, before the influ x of mechanized/armoured forces and tactical/logistic support units. They are particularly fit for operations on compartmented ground, w hich poses heavy limitations to off-road movements. The light -infantry forces , appropriate ly reinforced ,vith antitank ,.veapon systems can contrast th e actions of armoured/mechanized enemy units. These units are trained to move also on foot, if necessary. Their tactical mobility can be improved with recourse t o helitransport and , in re lation to particular tasks, can b e rein forced with armoured, tank, and mechanized

units. The following Specialiti es carry out specific duties within the framework of light infantry. Alpini

The alpine units are able to operate in mountain env.irorn11enls, in severe ,veather conditions, and on te rra i ns that give scarce possibilities of m ovement to vehicles.

In this context, they are suitable for: • co ndu cti ng surprise actions, o perating b etween facilitation routes of low potential bu t high yeld ; • extending their actions o utside the facilitation routes, also in winter conditions; • persisting in the operat ions, thanks to their high autonomy, both operational and logi s tic, reaching down to the lowest levels; • operating also outside Lhe Alpine R egion, in particularly compartmented areas and/o r with poor road-pracLicability. Paratroops The paratroop units are a b.le , due to their train ing, equipment and mentality, to conduct rapid and "urnpreju cliced" actions, at very short notice. In particular~ they can be employed in air·borne a nd airrnob ile o perations , and can: carry out acti vi lies of interdiction and preventive occupation of areas; • be e n1.p.loyed mainly in the first phases o f out -of-area interventions. • Beca us e of t he ir r e duc e d logistic autonomy, these units could have limitations wh en conducting protracted actions.

Airmobile units The airmobile units which are now being establish ed ("Friuli" Brigade) include a land component and a helicopter cornpon e nL, as parts of a single complex subordinate to the Comrnander of the land component. The second component (Army Aviation) does not limit itseir to the heliLransport of the land component, but participates in ever-y phase of the operation. It is therefore a unit with remarkable character·is tics of mobility, flexibility and firepowe1~ which are the r esult of a

combination of th e tactical pecu liarities of hel icopters (speed, agility, high firepower) and li gh t infanti-y un i ts, appropriate ly reinforced (capability of operating in all environments, versatility of employment). They are, therefore, uni ts capable of real izing t i rn elv concentrations of power at th e wanted time and place, of acting in different operational situations and natural environments, a s well as giving concreteness to the princi ples of manoeuvre. Mechanized infantry The mechani1.ed infantr·y is essentially characterized by high off-road mobility, protection and fire power, ,vith a good antitank capa bility. It incl ud es units equ ippe d with transport and comba t tracked-vehicles , units wit h transport and combat armoured vehicles on wheels , and lagoonal (amphibious) units e quipp ed with their spec.ific vehicles (LVT-P7).

Mechanized units Armoured Combat Vehicles (VCC) :

These units have characteristics of mobility similar to the tank unit s , adequate protection, sufficent firepo,.v er and high flexibility of emp loyment. They are capable of: • working in any natu ra l e n viro nm en t, thanks Lo their capability of operating both on board VCCs and on foot;

• carrying out protracted actions; • conducting systematic efforts and dynamic actions over wide areas, mainly making us e of th e ir· mobility o n var ied ground. These units are no rma lly employed, in synergy ,.vith ta.nk units, in high-intensity oper·ations ( war, regional conflict , pea ce enforcement), hut can also he e rnploye d by themselves in

r «Ariete» tank.

peacekcping operations.

Mechanized units on Armoured Wheeled Vehicles (VBC)

The configurat ion of these units is similar to that of those on VCC, but Lhey have transport and combat wheeled vehicles

helicopter landings, with areal interdiction as well as vvith the defence of sensitive areas and points. Finally, in peace support operations, they can effectively carry ou t activities of patrol on demarcation lines, control of sensi l ive areas and points, defence of i li neraries and delicate objectives.

Lagoonal units

(VBC) .

They are therefore characterized by good protection, high mobility - specially on roads - and marked flex ibiUty. Thus they are un its capable of carryng out a wide range of tasks in all types of operations. In µarticular,

iu uffow;ive and

defensive operations, these units are fit for the preven t ive occupation of areas and points of particular importance, as well as for the contro l of large areas (empty spaces and areas behind the front) . As regards the operations for the defence of the terri tory, the mechanized units on VBC are able to perform tasks connected with interventions against landings, airlandings and

The amphibious units' configuration is similar t.o that of the mechanized units on VCC, but they are also trained and equipped for operations mainly in the Venetian lagoon and, in prospect, as amphibious units. They are fit for carrying out besides the typical tasks of the mechanized units - operations for the control of the territory, particularly in s,vampy and coastal areas.

Armoured units The armoured units include tank and armoured units, as well as those cavalry units with a comparable configuration on

armed armoured cars. They are distinguished by their specific att i tude for manoeuvred and powerful in 1.erven tion, by their potent antitank firepower and by a rnarked aptitude for operations against similar formations in movement. The armo u red units have markedly offensive characteristics, and can find their priority employment in big-intensity open., tions (wm~ regional conriict and, possibly, peace enforcement). On the other hand, these units could (ind limitations HI interventions against strongly organ ized defensive posi Lions, and in protracted operational engagements . Within the frame,vork of peace support operations, the armoured units can carry out deterrent. tasks and, if the s ituation deteriorates, develop powerful and decisive local interventions, become a reserve, contribute to the security frame. TYPES OF BASIC BRANCH UNITS

IN THE "CAPABILITY PACKAGES"

The units (Infantry and Cavalry Regiments) to indude in each capabi Ii ty package have been configured in terms of number and types of Regiments , stnicture, composition, number and type of vehicJes, arms and equipment, training to envisage in relation to the operational capabilities to be achieved . In this context, the main points for the definition of the types of units were: • subdivision of the forces into three complexes; • Projection, Reaction, Presence and Surve illance, which, as a whole, compose the Defence forces; • need to envisage "multifunctional" units in order to meet both the requirements of direct defence or the Nation and the Alliance

Fig. 6

Light infantry rgt.

Armou red rgt.

axe wheeled armoured rgt. Heavy Armoured rgt.

Tank rgt.

Reece rgt.

and those connected with peace support operations, at any rate in the perspective of the "economics of forces"; • capability of the Br igades to carry oul autonomous tasks (therefore, availability - fixed or in case -by-case basis - of three Basic-Branch elements at Regiment level); • compliance ,Nith the requirements set by the Alliance.

ESTABLISHMENT m· BASIC BRANCH REGIMENTS mech.

ligth infantry

III

1lll

tank

Fig. 7

armour (cav.)

armour

llll

Ill

Based on the operational

obj ectives of lhe Service (see table at facing page), it was ascertained that for the "Combat" function the operational land instrument will consis t , as a general rule, of 21 Regiments of light infantry (2 of which airmobile, and 3 paratroop), 9 Regiments of mechanized infantry (1 lagoonal), 3 armoured infantry Regiments, 6 tank Regiments, 3 armoured cavalry

Regiments on wheels and 1 armoured Regiment (S more cavalry Regiments ,Nill be needed for recce and surveillance) (Fig.6). The composition of the various Regiments is described at Fig.7.

It should be noted that the structure of the lifle companies of the mechanized and light infantry Regiments is "quaternary", both as regards the number of platoons and that of squads. As a .m atter of

CAPACITY PACKAGES: OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES PACKAGES

.. 1.

PROJECTION FORCES

OBJECTIVES

HQ&UNITS

11. Cap ability of 1)rojecting a complete Brigade, in tegrated bf tactical - log istic su pports necessary to perform an autonomous task for short-term operations (equal to an ope rationa cycle of 4-6 months) and with three elements of inlantry regiment level. Capability of projecting an amphibious rgt in the framework of an amphibious Brigade. Capability of meelina the orojection requirements o f the EUROFOR HQ

GAR IBALDI BDE & SUPPORTS

12. Capability of p rojectin~ a second Brigade, to guarantee the rotation of a Brigade in the T heatre, or to employ it together with the fi rst one m case o a short-duration operation (operational cycle of 4-6 months)

FOLGO RE BOE & SUPPORTS

13. C~ability of projecting - with no possibility of rotation a HQ at Division leve l and relevant supports, to assume command of the orce in multinational operations of limited size ~ -9 · ALBANIA). Or to assume command of an operational sector wit in a complex of multinational forces of higher level (e.g . the French n;\/i<inn in Bnoni~I.

FOP HQ & SUPPORTS

14. Capability of projecting a third Brigade to guarantee the rotation of one of the two Brigades (obj 11 and 12) employed in an operational cycle of long duration (more than 6 months).

TAURINENSE BDE

15: Capability of p rojecting a fourth Bri~ade, guaranteeing the ro tation of bo th Brigades (obj. 11 and 12) employed in an operational cycle of tong duration (more t an 6 months) Give the Service on air-mobile capability for the conduct of operation in multinational and possibly national contexts, requiring timeli ness o f inte rvention and rapid ity of execution, before the employment of other units, or in particula r operational situations.

FRIULI BD E

16. Capability of projecting a furthe r Division-level HQ and the essential logistic supports, to guarantee the rotation of the in· , Theatre Division HQ (see obj. 13)

HQ ALPINE TROOPS &

17. Complete the iProjection Forces, packages with all the othe r tactical-logistic elements necessary to perform its own operational functions in a complete manner 18. Capability of projecting a further Brigade HQ to guara ntee its rotation in operations of long duration

GEN. OBJ.

REACTION FORCES

ARIE TE BOE

22. Capability of provid ing a Reece Brigade for the requirements of ARRC, as integ ration of the two Brigades included in the Projection Forces (obj 11 and 15) and the armoured Bde (obj 21)

POZZUOLO BDE

23. Complete, with a 5th Bde, the capability of provid ing the AR RC the units that the Nation is committed to make available for the NATO Reaction Forces

CENTAU RO BDE

24. Capability of p roviding expected supports to the It. 3 rd Division of the ARRC

ARRC SU PPORTS

32. Capability of preparing an intermediate Command of Defence and relevant forces. able to meet the requirements of the Northern part of the Country.

34. Capability of preparing a Bde for the requirements of Sicily, in particular to conduct operations in cooperation with the Police Forces 35. Capability of preparing a Bde for the requireme nts of the Centre of the Nation. the Capital in particular 36. Capability of preparing a Bde for the requi rements of the requirement of the South 37. Capability to prepare another Bde in addition to the one already envisaged (obj 21) for the requirements of the North 38. Capability of preparing a Bde for the requirements of Sardinia . and of completing the supports of the A.T.

TOTAL

DEFENCE FORCES

A/A ARTY

JULIA BDE 1stFOD HO & SUPPORTS

33. Capability of prepari ng an intermediate Command of Defence able to manage the forces assig ned for the requirements of CentreiSouth and Island

SURVEILLANCE

FORCES

COMFOTER SUPPORTS

- The package as a whole must g ive the Army the possibility to fulfil the commitments made by the Nation within NATO, in relation with the availability of 5 Brigades fo r ARRC and AMF(L). · It must be taken into account that 2 of the 5 Brigades and the Cuneense Contingent fo r the AMF(L) are already included in the iProjection Forcesi.

3 1. Capability of pre paring a Bde fo r the needs of the Northern part of the Cou ntry, possibly ab le to participate in the establishment o f a multinational DivisioniBriaade with units o f neiahbourina Countries.

PRESENCE AND

ARI ETE BDEHQ REST 1 CP.T.

21. Capability o f providing one armoured Bde to the 3 rd UK Division of ARRC, to integrate the two Bde already included in the Projection Forces (obj 11 and 15)

GEN. OBJ.

SUPPORT

-project a Division -level HQ a nd relevant supports and two Brigades in a sing le operational theatre or in t'NO different theatres; -ensure the rotation of the HQ and units in case of operations of long duration (operational cycle of more than 6 months)

25. Capability of ensu ring to the Nation the availability of components for Defence of primary importance {it includes Units · e.g. NA arty . not in the Reaction Package bu t in the Defence Package . but included in the fo rmer due to the peculiar functions to perform .

SUPPORTS COM FOTER

The package as a whole must specifically ensure the defence of the national territory • which is a priority for the Projection and Reaction packages as well · and meet the requi rements of c ooperation for public o rder, the safeguard of public institutions and in case o f disaster

41. Complete the Command o rganization for the Nationis defence, adding all the necessary elements not included in the other Packages.

GEN. QBJ.

AOSTA BOE GRANAT IERI BOE PINEROLO BDE T RIDENTINA BDE SASSARI BOE & A.T.HO SUPPORTS

HQ & UNITS

As a whole , the Defence pack ag e includ es all Commands and Operational Fo rces of the Army (includ ing Projection, Reaction, Presence and Surveillance Packages). The Defence elements not included in the other packages are included in this ispecifici package.

«Puma » annoured vehicle, in 4 x 4 version (left) and 6 x 6 (below )

fact, the most recent le s so ns something new for our Army. learned in PSOs have confirmed About their configuration, it must the need to be able to count on be underlined that a Regimentfour "operational shifts", at least level unit is generally called to fo r minor units (the French perform a unitary task. This Regiment consists of 4 operational means that the characteristics of compan ies. In any case, shortly its elements (companies) must be this subject will be examined in basically homogenous, ensuring, depth by the Arn1y Staff, wi thin a in any case, the availability of a specific study on the "minimum number of protected vehicles. modules" necessary to perform the The solution that b est meets relevant functions. this basic requirement is that On the basis of the structure . which envisages to: and com pos ition of the Basic Branch units outlined above, the number and type of vehicles n eeded by the armoured, mechanized and tank Regiments in order to perform the "Combat" function, appears to be: • for the mechanized and wheeled armoured configura tion, 60 VCC (the future DARDO) and 60 VBC8X8 (or similar vehicles)

respectively; • for the tank configuration, 44 tanks (Leopard or Ariete); • for the annoured con figuration, 29 tanks (Leopard or Aliete) and 29 "Centauro" armoured cm·s; · • for the a rmo ured-caval ry configuration, 44 "Centauro" armoured cars. As far as the light infantry units are concerned, they are, in a sense,

• equip all companies with VM, and give to the Regiments also a protected transport capability - proportionate to the needs o( a company - to be used on a case-by-case basis. • differentiate the Regiments, from the qualitative poin t o f view, in relation to t he "capability package" they belong to, equipping the Projection ones with VM T.K (VM with added protection) and VB L (for one company) and the Presence and Surveillance ones ,,vith VM Tand VM P. As concerns arms and equipment, today's technological evolution permits us to pursue both the protection of the soldier from the offences which characterize the modern operational scenarios and , at the same time, the performance of . the task through the neutralization of the foreseeable threats . The relevant requirements have already been evaluated and defined within the modernization programmes under way. The following paragraphs \Vill

Combat vehicle VBC 8 x 8

.. ,.,

give a general view .of the programmes in progress. For the protection of the soldier, the Army has started several programmes, aimed at increasing the individual passive and active protection, through the acquisition of: • Kevlar helmets and new types of headpieces for the crews of armoured vehicles; • bullet-proof and shrapnel-proof vests; • night-vision sets. • The programmes relevant to the production of materials for passive protectio n will presumably be completed by the end of 1998. • In the sector of night vision, the acquisition of various mate1ials for the units of the Basic Branch is under \.vay. They are: • monocular individual visors v.-ith light-intensifier (1 per squad); • thermic infrared sets for mediumrange vision (J per platoon); • thermic infrared sets for longrange vision (I per company). As for the individual and crew arms, aft er the adoption of the 5.56

mm calibre in replacement of the heavier 7.62 mm, the international

Below, from left, monocular, visor with light - intensifier, binocular visor and thermic infrared set for long-range vision

trend i.s now to adopt categories of weapons (individu a l arms for combat, for crews, and for personal defence) characterized by high performance, achieved through the development of the fire-control system, and the increase of the effects of the single hit on the target. In this sect01~ the programme of the Army envisages: • the modernization of the arms for self-defence, through the completion of the introduction into service of the Beretta pistol 92 FS, and the distribution to the units of the Franchi machine-pistol LF 57 SMAL RAF, destined to persom1el with particular operational tasks; • the unification of the calibre of portable arms, through the

completion of the introduction into service of the Beretta riHe 70/90-S.56mm, the acquisition of the Minimi LM.G for th e units of the Basic Branch and the transformation of part of the MG pool from 7.62mm to 5.56 rnm for the other units; • the allocation to each infrantry and cavalry squad of a smooth-bore gun, fit also for the employment of special munitions, a 40 mm grenadela uncher attachable to the 70/90 rifle, and a day/night s ighting system for portable arms; • the replacement of the very old Garand Ml TS for sharpshooters with the precision rifle 338 calibre Lapua M.agum (8 .6 X 70),

which fulfils the modern operational requirements. As for the antitank weapons, the range of materials now in service or being procured permits effective interventions at short, medium and long distances. In particular the short/very-short range requirements will be mel by the "disposable" Panzerfaust 3 weapon system. For medium/long ranges, the Service employs: • TOW weapon system (bas ic) which will remain in service until the early post-2000 years; it \,.rill be joined by the TOW 2, mounted on Dardo VCCs and on Al 29 Mangusta helicopters, fit for launching the new TOW 2A and 2B with double hollowcharge in tandem. The activities o[ research and development in this field aim main ly at improving the effectiveness of the warheads against reactive armour and at realizing "fire and forget " munitions, capable of hitting the enemy from above, under any condition of visibility and E CM jamming. The weapon system of the new generation should be introduced into servi.ce starting in 2005 . As far as the sets for night firing are concerned, the antit;nk sit u ation is satisfactory as regards long and medium range systems, but still inadequate for the others. In particular: • the TOW systems are all equipped with a thermic infrared

visor

(IRT);

the

acquisition programme of IRT systems, to equip also 50% of the Milan systems in service, is now almost completed; • the Folgore system has a device for the illumination of the aiming grid, which pen11its to fire in poor visibility conditions (twilight/dawn), but not when there is no light at all (night); • for the antitank system at short a nd very short range, several

sets realized by specialized firms are under study; nevertheless, it \\rill be necessary to evaluate, in terms of cost-effectiveness, the convenience to equip with these costly devices the "disposable" systems, which will go into senrice in considerable numbers (approximately 13,000). As for mortars, at present the Brandt 63, 120 mm calibre, smoolh-bore, is in service. These weapons are not fit for the employment of the new types of

Panzerfaust 3 AIT rocket launcher Below: 60mm mortar on VCC armoured combat vehicle

ammunition, as those with terminal self-guidance or long-range with maximum charges; the convenience of modifying or replacing the material now in service is therefore being considered, in order to have weapons suitable for the modern operational scenarios. As regards the foing procedures of the mortar units, an automation system is now under study. It is

___...

«Dardo» tracked cornbat vehicle

integrable with CATRIN (SORAO) and with SIACCON, and ,.vill autornate their· functions. In order to enable the Basic Branch to avail itself of weapons capable of operating against tm·gets at medium ranges, the acquisition of 60 mm mortars is now under way: • "Commando" typ e for Alpin e troops and Paratroops; • "B" type, employable both from the ground and VCC, for the remaining infantry and cavalry units. The Simulation Systems, more and more hnportant for training

deserve a specific mentio1;'. According to the NATO classification, the s imulation systems are divided, in relation with the users, into three levels: • first level: individual -type simulators, as those for training with portable and Arr weapons, pilot and flight training simulators; • second level: tactical training systems, for units at platoon,

company and battalion level; • third level: training systems fo r Commands and Staffs. The systems of gi·eater interest for Basic Branch units are the filing, piloting and mission simulators, i.e. those of the first and second level. The most common firi ng simulators for portable arms (first level), also employed by the other Services, include: • complex systems, concerning particularly instinctive firing in different scenarios, such as FATS (Fire Arms Tra ining System), in service at th e Infantry School; • more simple systems, for basic training, ,vith fixed o r appearing/disappearing targets, with the indication of the firing

res ults . Micro fox and TT S (Training Target System) are now being distributed: The Arr firing simulators are specific for the weapon systems: • M70 simulators for TOW; • DX 143 simulators for Milan; • u ndercaUber systems for fire training with Folgore rocket lauchers; • undercaliber systems for f ire training with Panzerfaust 3.

As far as the armoured vehicles are concerned, there are driving and firing s imulators, as well as more complex systems, such as the mission ones, which involve the entire crew, and are able to s im ulate every phase of the operational employment of the vehicle in any scenario. For the "Centauro" armoured cars, there are interactive systems, ·which prove to be very effective training aids for operators and maintainers. In a sense, they can be compared to simulation systems, in that they offer a wide range of employment options. As regards the second-level simulators for the Basic Branch, the most effec tive ones are the MILES (multiple systems for integrated laser simulation). The first-generation MILES consist of platoon "packages" devised for: • ve hicles (tanks, VCC, VBC, armoured cars); • personnel. The second-generation MILES are characterized by marked flexibility of employment, since they permit the interaction of forces armed ,.vith the entire range of weapons in service with the infantry

unils . Therefore they require specific environments, structures and specialized personnel. From what has been described, it is clear that simulation is taking on a more and more qualifying role in the preparation of soldiers, units and staffs. On the other hand the simulation systems, which offer the best guarantees, employ valuable technologies, and therefore enlai.l very high installation and rnnning costs. ln this perspective, the allocation of so precious resources is one of the SL;ccess factors for their rational and effective employment. In substance, the issue is to find the acquisition and distribution system w hich, in line with the enunciated principles, permits to optimize the use of the resources that, a s we have said, become more and more precious, being sophisticated and costly. The criterion ,vhich seems to effectively meet these requirements is that of realizing a ·widespread di stribut ion to the users of the most simple systems, concentraling the mos t complex ones in "simulation poles". For the systems dedicated to the infantry weapons, the distribution can b e realized by assigning: • Microfox, TTS and A/T systems to the Regiments; • FATS, and other more so phis ticated systems, to the Schools. All other systems - including those for tanks and armoured cars - will be concen trated in "simulation p oles" .

Force Training The diverse and w ider range of the tasks en tailed the division of the available forces inlo "basic roles of employment", which are made even more necessary by: • transition from a system strongly conscription-oriented to a rnixed system with a large component of volunteers;

Fig. 8

c,,.

.. ~

4th

,,.

~ ~

KEEP: - high operational readiness - ready employment forces

H A

TRAINING CONCEPT

H A

. ... ~

•

3rd p

PERFECT specific operational capability

s E

, ~ ORIENT basic operational capability towards specific capability of carrying out H functions connected with: A - defence of external interests - contribution to international security s - inte9rated defence of national and E allie spaces

2nd

ORIENT basic operational capability towards specific capability of carrying out functions connected with: - presence and surveillance - integrated defence of national and allied spaces

1st p H A

ACQUIRE basic operational capability

• reduction of the conscription period; • actual availability of Cinancial resources and tra in ing equipment. It became necessary, therefore, to prepare the instrument not only for hypothetical and extensive operations, but rather for real and diversified engagements, both on the national territory and abroad. In s ubstance, we sec a new training concept, essentially based on the differentiation of the activities, in relation with the "capability packages" in which the units are located as well as with the functions which, consequently, they will be called to perform. It follows tha t the training aims for each "force package" (Projection, Reaction, Presence and Surveillance) will be different and, above all, fw1ctional to the

employment. These a ims translate into obj ect ives to be achieved at successive times (Fig.8). Practically, th e prepara tion of the units proceeds along a cycle (Fig. 9) which: • starts from the incorporation of forces "to be trained" into the units (platoon/company blocks o f volunteer or conscript personnel);

• concerns Commands , S t affs and Troops; • envisages, when necessary, prepara to ry Lra1n1ng fo r employment in operations. The length of the cycle is 10 months for the units manned by conscripts, 3 years for tho:;e incorporating short term volunteers. In particular, as concerns the latter, the three-year cycle must

END OF CONSCRIPTION

ENLISTMENT

INDIVIDUAL TNG

PREPARATORY TNG

COMMAND AND STAFFTNG

UNIT TNG BRANCH SPECIALITY

JOINT AND COMBINED

SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL TNG

envisage an "annual progran1me" of instructions and exercises essentially aimed at maintaining the units' operativeness and achieving further operational capabilities. The differentiation of the "annual programmes" must be achieved by training in different environrnents and operational scenarios, also abroad, changing the themes of the exercises as well as by using different ranges. CONCLUSIONS

At the end of this review of the "Combat" function, it is deemed appropriate to underline two f-t.mdamental aspects. The first one is of a quantitative nature, i.e. it refers to the "size" of the combat component. Its dimensions have been determined on the basis of

the objectives, which, in their turn, stem from the role that the Nation must be able to play in the international context as ,vell as from the peculiar requirements of the territory. In this perspective, having worked according to the "lowest common multiple" principle, and envisaged "multifunctional" units, presumably the selected dimension is burely sufficient to

ensure the performance of the function. The same is true for the second aspect - the "qualitative" one - considering that it was envisaged to acquire VMs (albeit in different versions) for most of the light infantry, instead of the more effective (but much costlier) VBLs, trying to reconcile the operational requirements of the Service with the resources foreseeably available for

modernization in the coming years, taking also into account the needs of all the other functional sectors. As a consequence, it will be very difficult, for the Basic Branch, to go lm.ver than the size determined and/or to proceed to further "qualitative reductions" without impairing its operational effectiveness. Thus, every possible effort will have to be made in order t o ensure the performance of this "master" [Âˇunction, at least in the terms described above. '''Brigadier General, Chief Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Slaff ~,,, Lt. Colonel, Section Chief Plans Office Army General Staff

·>4C.

'?'

,{) \

by Sauro Baistrocchi ~ J.J .

•

t wasn't his first peacekeeping operation. But after so much training and harg work he was eventually sitting 4 t the console of the Tactical Control Officer of "cluster Italia". Outside, in the dark night of a Balkan January, the cold was biting and he wasn't sorry to carry out his surveillance tour of duty in the air-conditioned warmth of the Command shelter. In the previous missions he had started from scratch with VSHORAD (1) . It had been hard, but one of the first things he was told when he had chosen to be an anti-aircraft artilleryman was that no officer could qualify for the Areal System course without VSHORAD experience . Cold, heat, snow, rain, always outside to control the fire post, ear stuck to the radio, wajting for an order that never came. So much the better! On the other hand, the Captain had seemed very assured then, when, to his ques ti on during the explanation of the Rules of Engagement: "Sir, hovv do we tell if we won or lost?", he had answered with lapidary words: "It is very simple: if, at the end of our mission, we have not used our weapons, ,ve can say we have won". That t ime they had been lucky: they had won. Only after a few weeks, going back to the subject with some colleagues, the meaning, militarily paradoxical, of his Captain's words, which at the moment had perplexed him, appeared evident u1 all its concreteness.

The peacekeeper has no enemy to

confront. He is a referee, a controller, an inspect01~ that the International Community has appointed to control the observance of an agreement, of a truce. The peacekeeper doesn't fight but is ready to fight; on the contrary, infringing the most elementary principles of secrecy of the traditional military doctrine, he must make a deterrent show of his operational capabilities, to

"Aspide" a.ntiaircra{t missile system ..

dissuade, discourage a priori any attempt to break the truce and nigger off a conflict escalation, just stopped by the international diplomacy. And if there is a violation, he must intervene, according to the Rules of Engagement, \.vith all the necessary strenght to be timely and effective vis-a-vis the subject that has broken the peace terms agreed upon . The purposes of the intervention are twofold, both fundamental for its success: first, to prevent the infringer from hitting the target; second, inequivocally identify him so that he may be subjected to the International Community's judgment. The usP. of military force remains nevertheless a second-level option, a cornpelled choice, which indicates a s ituation of growing risk, but, above all, the potential failure of the basic course of action: deterrence. The peacekeeper failure can change from potential to actual if the intervention does not attain its goals or is carried out in an unappropriate manne1: That is why the Captain maintained that to really win in

peacekeeping one should not have fired a single shot. Throwing an absentminded glance at the display, the Officer settled himself better in the confortable ergonomical easy-chair of his work station. That time they had been lucky: they had won. Now he could realize how precarious and lackjng had been the antiaircraft capabilities deployed: a command and control system only partially automated and integrated into the multinational interforce organization of control and management of the peacekeeping force's air space; a peculiar technical-logistic system not yet adequately struchtred for operation outside the national borders; but, above all, the personnel, also within the Officer Cadres. not fully aware of the air risks and of the risk of employing antiaircraft units in peacekeeping operations, ovving to want of specific experience, then insufficient from the preparation viewpoint, and not only at national level. But things had changed. The Mul tinationa l Force of Intervention was in a posi tion, through a complex, integrated surveillance system which

included antiaircraft radar, to control, in real time when necessary, the aclual deployment and the movements on the terrain and in the airspace of the military and parami.litary formations already involved in the crisis. "Clusler Italia" ,vas an integral and integrated part of the Conlrol and Defence System of the inTheatre Air Space. Placed to protect zones and points of high sensitiveness (Critical Areas), for the positive development o[ lhe pacification process, its specific task was to avoid that any form of offence could reach, through the airspace, the potential objectives. In substance, if not in form, lhe antiaircraft defence was required to constantly guarantee an actual 100% effectiveness against any type of lhreat within the limits of its Critical Areas of responsibility. THE SINGLE STRIKE STRATEGY

In the present strategic contexl, the operational problems like "cluster Italia's", are common to other aspects and sectors of employment of the military instrument, such as, for example, the elimination of human losses in operations. The arising of these problems is encouraged by the growing global and globalizing force of public opinion, with which, often and correctly (because it represents it) political opinion aligns itself, but finds a foundation in the marked character of asymmetry with which today's potential or actual conflicts tend to present themselves, due to the undisputed military supremacy of the West after the end of the Cold War: This is an operational problem (to achieve I 00% effectiveness of the intervention or 0% of losses) lacking concrete, rigorous solutions, which we could define "of perfection". The operational solutions follow a trend, and are obtainable in ter-ms of maximization of the capabilities

and therefore, potentially, of the results, within the bonds of the resow路ces available. Here we shall try, without any claim to completeness, to introduce the subject as premise and support of the concepts and structures or employment of the antiaircraft artillery, as outlined in the study "The Capability Packages of the Italian Army". We deemed it significant to tackle the "problem of antiaircraft perfection" throught the forrnulation of the "Single Strike Strategy" (2), because this approach is well suited to describe the conduct of the asymmetrical opponents involved in the "game" and the possible outcomes of the game itself. As regards the asymmetry of the opponents, it must be said that the potential attacker, if considered according to the traditional techno-military standard of force-ratios, is characterized by an absolute qualitative and quantitative insignificance compared to lhe global capabilities of defence. The attack, not necessarily associated with conflicts in progress, does not have a massive character but a selective one (the single strike) and is carried out also with relatively "rudimentary" rneans, as compared with the state of the art , against an objective of particular importance. The possible success of the attack, independent of its material effects on the objective, assumes an exceptional significance for路 the repercussions it produces on the

political and social plane, if only psychologically. The risk that the antiaircraft units must face is ambiguous and deceptive, not only for the technotactical characteristics of the risk itself (it is omnidirectional, difficult to identify, uses different carriers, employs weapons of mass destruction, etc.), but also for the nature of the attacking subject (State in hidden form,

terrorist group, political or ethnic faction , criminal organization etc.) which acts outside the bonds that influence the freedom o f action of an institutional military [orce. Paradoxically, the danger is increased by Uie undispule d airspace supremacy of the friendly pm~ty, w}iich boosts the disguising capabilities of the enemy carriers during the mission and raises the risk of a fratricidal clowning. Moreover, the range of the possible vulnerabilities (potential objectives of the attacker ) in the various scenarios of employment is very wide. If it is true that the "SingleStrike Strategy" is the one that seems to ensure the highest probabilities of success to a potential asymmetrical aggr路essor, it is equally true that the same strategy must be adopted by the attacked in defending himself, if he wants to optimize the efficiency of his resources in relation to the specific risk. Before starting to exarnine the consequences of the "SingleStrike Strategy" on the antiaircraft instrument, it remains to be said that the general scenario outlined here, despite being applicable also to conflict situations like the Gulf War, besides peacekeeping contexts, has an interpretative capability clearly limited in time. In keeping with the purpose of the "Capability Packages," this strategy is in fact aimed at suppo1iing the best ernployrnent of the antiaircraft resources available at shor路t-rnecliurn term (1-5 years), in accordance with a pragmatic approach to the operational requirements that the service will presumably have to meet within the prospected time. The present capabilities ,.vill then be connected with those of the future, on the basis of post2010 scenados already under close examination by the Army General Slaff. Within the outlined picture, the

operalional problem of antiaircraft defence against attacks carried out across the air-space r egards the n ational ter ritory, the military formations employed in outwa rd proj ec tions, the civili a n and milita ry sensilivc points in Peace Support Operations (PSO), also of a conflictive nature. The p ast n ecess ity t o fa ce a massive threat in wartime a nd in a limited a rea of the nat io nal territo1y has been replaced by the need - at presen t and presumably in the near fu ture - to confront th e risk, much s u btl e r a nd unforeseeable, of a single strike,

reasons o f space, to rnn a gain thro u g h the d e ta il ed a nal ysis made in this r egard, it will be sufficient to s ketch the logic of a pplicati o n of th e outline d strategy by tlie subject that has to defend h imself. The single strike, just beca use it is s ingl e, is lo ca li zed, i .e. it co ncerns p hysica ll y a limite d area. T he pro bl em consists in locating it in advance. Obvio u sly, it will n e ve r be possible to defend everything a ll the time. And if in a n extreme hypothesis it were possible, the solu t ion tha t w ou ld come o u t would b e of a much lesser effectiveness (3) as compared ,.vith the possibility of concentrating

in p <.:ac.:t: Liwe, a lo ng th e enti r e

the r es ources .

peninsula and ove r its borders. In qua ntit ative terms, while yesterday, th e an tiaircra ft task con siste d in imp os ing to t h e ene my air forces a certa in ratio of wear (X% of effectiveness on many attacking units), now it is a m atter of c hecking for sure a possible singl e carrier ( 100% of effective ness) or a very lim ited number of attacking carriers. H av ing n o poss ib ility, for

Secondly, the defence represents in itself only the last phase (ulti ma ratio) of the process. It is in fact a substantially reactive o pti on, which im p licitly accepts the ene my's initiative (a militar ily paradoxical condition for a subject having force superiority) and in some way increases the possibility of success of the latter. In that case, the best tiring is Lo have recourse, as priority options,

Otoma.tic antiaircraft. syslem.

to deterrence and prevention. The single strike ca n be located a nd defused al the start ing base, before it is lau nched. These are preventive interven tions that are not the object of this work and, m oreover, do not concern the antiaircraft artillery. Nevertheless, the latter can do a lot in tenns of dissuasion, which is also a fonn of prevention - albeit an indirect one - through deterrence, giving a clear prnof to the potential enemy not only that a poss ible attack on h is part would have a very high probability of failure, but that he, being the attacker~ would be undoubtedly identi fied and brought before the jud gement of public op inion a nd of the International Community. Deterre n ce d e pend s on c redibility and this, in its turn, is the result o f a real o perational capability. The real operational capability, finally, enables the defender to set up an effective response if deterrence fails. Th us we arc back to the p rob lem of the possibi Ii ty of locating the single str ike in view of the final defens ive process . The possible objectives and the relevant critical areas are detected throug h the analysis of the "fricndly" vulnerabilities, in relation to the operationa l contingency in progress, i.e. to th e goa ls of th e mission. They arc the elements of the mil itary instniment, the local so c i o- econ o nlic-po l itical organiwtion, the territory and even the former belligerent fac tions, whose protection app ea rs or vit::il importance for the success of the mission. For instance, in a PSO aimed at t h e scttle m en t of an intern al conflic t crisis , th e objec ti ves of the Single Strike Strategy cou ld be the symbolic religious centres of one or the other faction, as ,.vell as the poli tical cen tres . In ope rations where there .is a mo1-c traditional confrontation of military formations (i.e. the Gulf

War), the structure of the objectives to be defended will obviously be centred on the critical points of th e friendly military instrument. In any case, the single sensitive spots will consti.lute the gntvitalion centres of the antiaircraft capability, which will have to ensure an integrated c:u:ea-and-point coverage. The integration of the points defended by the area-coverage permits to overcome, with relative ease, also the difficulties and discontinuities deriving from the possible non-linearity of the sector assigned, \Vhich is a distinctive feature of the present operations. On the basis of the logic pointed out, the "Single S trike Strategy" expresses an antiaircraft organizational concept for a d ynamic accumulation of the capabilities, according to specific 1isk-maps, dravvn according to the analysis of vulnerability. THE CLUSTER

This concept is called "cluster" meaning the aggregalionintegrntion, by modules, of weapon systerns with differentiated and complementary capabilities, able to synergically employ, from the viewpoint of effectiveness and support burdens, a single commandand-con trol and logistic back-up structure. The "cluster" supplies an integrated antiaircraft area-andpoint coverage, in every direction, from very low to medium altitudes, which includes, if necessary, also antimissile capabilities (when available). An elementary module, generally at A/A-section level, is in a position to ensure a single antiaircraft function (VSHORAD, SHORAD, medium-altitude defence, antimissile point-defence) . Normally a cluster is closely integrated within the joint framework of Air Defence - although it can operate autonomously

DIVISION-LEVEL ILLUSTRATIVE CLUSTER (2 IT BOES+ 1 BOE other Nation)

1----------------------:NADGE (ACCS) : I I

: I

DCP

r-------- -----: _______ \: _____ . , __ _ I

I I

I I I I

I I

: :,

TACON Air Space

!VIII

v==-:J

[mrsg}

: ~

: 73

1__ Jl!QA_Tj:9

Area/ z,one def. : I

_l_~~e~~~ I

...

Point/ belt def.

c,::-=-.J

HAWK~

)

t!.dild-'

-r---------------------'

I I I

1 I

--------------.Point/adi. def.

I I

TACOM D.

TACOM B. :

I 1

1~ : ID:~ ~

...

SOTRIN + peculiar Com. â€˘

:__ -- - - - .

. - - - -- - - - - - - . (SOATSC) - - - -

CLUSTER

and can have a multinational composition. Thanks to its intrinsic organizational and tactical flexibility, it seems to be the antiai.rcrafl complex instrument more

suitable

part of land multiservice task forces at Brigade or Intermediate Operational Command (IOC) level, but can be employed also autonomously as a functional specialistic capability.

confront

Also in traditional corn bat

emerging r isk situations, typical of the "Single Strike Strategy", without prejudice to its value in the context of traditional symmetric-conflict situations, within which, besides , the concept has had historically its first formulation. Organizationally, the cluster has the dis tinctive features of an antiaircraft tactical artillery combat-group. Generally it is

situations it permits , through an appropriate centralization/decentralization of the Tactical Command (TACOM) and Tactical Control (TACON) on the modules, to adapt the requirernents of the Force Commander (elements to ,be defended, priorities, areas of deployment, etc.) to the necessity of assembling a unitary and flexible antiaircraft system and guiding its

general gravitatio n als o in the conduct phase. Technically this is . obtained through the co nnection . in a network of the constituting modules and the time-space coexistence of hierarchical (TACOM ) and distributed (TACON) processes. The cluster is in a posi tion to operate (TACON) in centralized, decentralized and au tonomous modes, w ithin the framework of Integrated Air Defence , or autonomously. It is directed by a si ngle Commander, s ubordinate to the Commander of the land fonnation and responsible for the cluster's operation in all its aspects. In some operations, the cluster Commander, or his delegate, ca n assu me if necessary - with specific limits of time and space - the tactical control of the entire cluster: Th e table on the facin g page illustrates the possible scheme of a cluster, per tin ent to a mult in ational In termediate Co mmand (Divis ion le vel: 2 Italian Brigades and 1 Brigade from another Nation) in out-ofarea operati ons. The scheme supp os es the exi sten ce of a system of airspa ce con trol and a ir defence integrated at joint level; nevertheless, all A/A uni ts, including HAWKS, are employed in tasks of adherent defence. The tactical command (TACOM) of the individ ual A/A uni ts formi ng the dus ter is entnisted to the respective Division/Brigad e Commanders (Intermediate Command and Brigades).

Th e o p e r ational con trol (OPCON) and tbe tactical control (TACON) of the cluster, as well as the Air Space Management, ar e concentrated at ACA (ITAF) level, exercised however thro ug h the C2 orga ns of the Intermediate Command and possib ly (within th e limi ts of specific time and space restrictions) decentralized to the latter leve l (4 ). Within this framework, the

"Aspide" towed antiaircraft missile system

exercise of the essential functions entrusted to the m during their movements.

Intermed ia te Comm a nd (DCP) avails itself, within the limits of the tasks received, of: â€˘ the C3I unit, for the tech nical competences concerning OPCON (general p lan of employment, areas of deployment) and the management of the air space (requests, plans, control); â€˘ of the C3I unit and the BO C HAWK, for the tasks regarding TACON.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The AJA units which make up the cluster are organized, for Lhe purposes of command and control and in particular for TACON, in a C31 hierarchical -areal network, defined each time on the basis of the tasks to be carried out and the units' deployment on the ground, and dynamically adapted to the developments of the situations. The C3I unit and the BOC HAWK m ust be also conside red as C2 centres reciprocally replaceabl e, capable of ensuring, among other things, the continuity of the

It may be interesting to outline, by way of e xample, th e basic sch eme of a n operatio nal concept concerning a hypothetical antiaircraft component of an Army or mul tinational contingenl em p loyed in a n "ou t-of-area" operation, marked by "traditional" conflicts, within the framework of a multination a l formation. This sch eme consti tutes a general theoretical rel'erence appli cable, with the appropriate simplifying changes, also in case of operations on the national teiritory: â€˘ Lhe a ntiaircraft units, o rganically available and assigned, are organized from the tactica l viewpoint (task organization) in a cluster, appropriately sized (for example, a BOC a nd a HAWK battery, a SKYGUARD ballery and an adi. battery) for the protection of a land formation at Intermed iate Command level

•

(maximwn projectable formation) and the participation in the Theatre Air Defence. The overall ava il a bility or the A/A units guarantees the rotation of the forces, as a rule, every four months (3 shifts); the antiaircraft defence is d ynamically carried out, as a balanced area-and-point defence, v.rithoul solution of continui ty in time and space, from the Point of Entry (after disembarkation) to the Assembly Areas, the Areas of Operations and the Exit Points (up to the moment of embarkation) for the units' retu m to their respective Countries or garrisons. A/A forward detachments can be possibly redeployed in Th ea tre for the p rev e ntive activation of the defence of the Points of Entry; the A/A defence gravita tes on the forces in movement and on the str uc tur es necessary for their tranfer (railways roads, port and airport installations, depots, co mmunication centres, etc.) during the phases of entry into, and exit from , the theatre area and the stops in the Assembly Areas. In these phases the land forces pcesent their highes t int rin sic vulnerability to the conventional and missile ai rthrea t; du ring the operations, t h e gravitation of the defence is bent on the critical elements of the forma tions (Headqua rters, Logistic Ce ntres, As semb ly Areas of th e Oper ation al R eserves, etc.) and o n the infrastructural e lements o f the

Theatre (lines of communication), within the Operations Area, where the m anoeuvring units have a m inimal intrinsic vulnerability to the air threat in all its forms . • the deployment and the tasks of t he components of the landformation cluster are synergically coo rd inated a nd controlled (Tactical Control) within the Integrated Air De fence of the

in plans and in conducL, the circumstances and li mitations within which the anti aircraft units can start and/or continue the engagements.

"ASTER 30" a.ntiaircra.ft missile

Theatre, in view of optimizing its overall effectiveness , always taking into a ccount th e constraints connected with the e mployment for t he direct protecti on of the Land force formations. Su ch components are employed according to the operntional plans of the Land Commander, '"'ithin the limits set by the Plan for Air Space Control and b y th e d irectives of the Commander of the Air Defence of the Theatre, which specify, both

Vlit hout prejudice to many o f the aspects hi ghlighted i n th e operatio nal concep t for Peace S upport or, at any rate, asymmetrical operations, th e antiaircraft artillery will have to be emp loyed, within the framework of the "S ingle Str ike S trategy", with the primary purpose o f preventing possible a ir attacks, convincing any potential adversary that any offens ive attemp t is destined to fai l , and that the politico-psychological effects wi ll in evitably turn against him, discrediting the party responsible for the attempt before the local and international public opinion. Should the preventive activities fail, the duster w ill be called to discriminate a nd intercept possible raiders, (aircraft a nd/or mis s i les ) with o ut coll ateral effects on the population and the friendly forces. In any case the cluster will have to be able to ide ntify the faction that p romot ed the atta ck , objectively do cumentin g its responsibility. All t hat cons idered, the employment of A/A units in PSO should conform to the following main principles: • resolutely rurther the capabilities of s u rveilla nce (al so at interservice level), air-space control and electro ni c war rather than fi re interventions, by increasing the availa bi li ty of ra dar a nd multiple ident ifi cation systems as compared with laun ching veh.icles and ammunition, which however will have to be at hand in a quantity sufficient lo ensure the necessary deterrence; • arrange the gravitation of the surveil lance an d launc hing systems acco rding to the d evelopments of the situation

EXAMPLES OF TIMES - MISSIONS - PRIORIT.JES OF THE ARMY A/A ARTILLERY

PSO MULTI NATJOl'iAL

TYPE OF lVIlSSJON TIMES-PRIORlTJES

ART.5 (RF &MDF) NATO-ITALY

ART.5 (RF) NATO

CONTROL OF TERR ITORY

Institutional role (growing from D to A) Current role (gi-owing from D to A) Requirement (short, medium, long term)

C medium

A sho11

Al A a rl . rlc fonc.,~

A short shmt contr. ofterr. months AD AiA ad . de fence

C3l

C31

long

Warning

Ion ~

med ium

Conten1Poraneity of missions Duration

none force exaustion

contr. of tcrr. months

IAD NATO

Basic tasks

!AD NATO A/A ad . defence

C31

HAWK SKYguard

short art. 5 RF/PSO !AD C 3 1 (poss. )

mm@ m

m (poss.)

ffi

(poss.)

ri:I

(rotation)

(poss.)

(rotation)

m (rotation)

(poss.)

(rotation)

m (rotation)

(rotation)

SKy : - - SS: - - adi: - - -

H: high SKy: medium SS: medium adi: medium

H: high SKy: high SS: high adi: high

H: high SKy : hi gh SS: high adi: high

Category of deterrence readi ness

H: ve1y high SKy: high SS: high adi: high

H: very high SKy : - - SS: - - -

Category of employment readiness

H: low SKy: low SS: low adi: low

General Planning priority

support, on the rnainlenance activities, in order to keep the e lectronic e quip rnent and generators in working order. ROLE, MISSIONS AND

FUNDAMENTAL TASK..', OF TIIE ANTIAIRCRAFf ARMY ARTILLERY.

After a rap id survey of the conceptual and tactical aspects of the employment of the A/A artillery in the first years of the next century, it is necessary to complete th e overall picture with a mention of 1.be role, missions and (undamental tasks institutionally entrusted to t.bis special branch, in order lo be able to configure its constitutive elements within the "Capabili ty Packages of the Italian Army". T he institutional role of the Army A/A artillery component is to protect the Land Force's units during mi litary operations on the national territory and outside its borders, against the air threat.

H: . . .

I I

(rotation)

(rotation) H: .• SKy: - - SS: - - adi: - - -

H: very high SKy:medium SS: medium adi: medium

and of the critical stages of implementation of the peace plan, also in co1mection \vith the elements of information supplied at all levels , w ith wh ich a constant link must be ensured, also through autornated means; • set up, employing every useful reso u rce and especially interoperable automated C3I systems, a multinational, joint, centralized and integrated organization of command, control and management of the airspace; • reduce to zero the r isk of fratricidal downing by applying the abovesaid principles and using , in addition, restrictive and detaile d rules of engagement (RoE), in order t o control in advance every foreseeab le contingent situation susceptible of producing unwanted consequences , and avoiding collateral effects in case of fire intervention; • gravitate, with the logistic

short contr. of terr. mon thsiyears m nltin. IAD

months

AiA ad.def (poss.} C31 (poss.)

AiA components of packages Stinger-Sidam adi

short

NATIONAL

Its standard m issions coincide with those of the national land i nstru men t, art.S NATO on Italian territory, art.5 NATO on Allied territory, control of the Italian territory, multinational and nationa l peace -support operations): In particular, the A/A artillery contributes to the missions of the military instrument, as a component of the national or NATO Air Defence System, or as an autonomous functional capability of the Italian Army, and is entrusted with the basic tasks of adherent A/A d efence, contribution to the Integrated Air Defe nce (JAD) and anti-aircraft C3I, as specified below. On the Italia n territory:

• give a direct contribution, i.ncludi ng if necessary the antimissile capability, to the national and NATO Integrated Air Defence (art. 5 and non-art. 5), a primary responsibility of

the Italian Air force, ensuring at the same time a prompt reconfigur,1.tion of the instrnment and the protection of specific sensitive points or areas, also in the framework of control of the territory; • ensure adherent A/A and possibly antimissile defence, ,vithin the Integ,lated Air Defence (art.5), of the Commands and forces of the Army (national formations, or multinational ones with an Italian Army component) engaged in operations.

Outside the national borders: • ensure adherent A/A and possibly antimissile defence, within the ACE area or out-of-area (art. 5 and non-art. 5), of the Army forces (national formations or multinational ones v,;:ith an Italian Almy component), vvithin NATO's Integrated Air Defence system or within the multinational <;:oalition (NATO, Vv'EU, UN employments etc.), as well as autonomously (national employment abroad).

On the national territory and out of area: • gum·antee the operation of the C3I system (art. 5 and non-art. 5) of the A/A ,U"tillery in order to carry out the tasks listed above, ensuring its integration in operations with the C31 systems of the land and air forces or otherwise envisaging its autonon1ous operation. THE A/A ARTILLERY CAPABILITY PACKAGES

The table that illustrates the missions, times and priorities of the Army's A/A artillery supplies a synthetic indication of the A/A component of the various Capability Packages, and permits moreover to inter relate the various quantitalive and qualitative

variables that affect the complex sphere of employment of th is special branch, in relation to the current scenarios. Generally, for each option, the units, indicated according to their comprehensive availability, are considered employed in confonnity with the organizational concept o[ the cluster. The "Control of the Territory" and the art. 5 NATO missions correspond to the "Defence" and "Presence and Surveillance" Packages, the art. 5 RF (Reaction Forces) to the "Reaction" Package and the PS O mission to the "Projection" Package. The different denomination adopted in the illustrative table has the purpose of highlighting the particular role of the A/A artillery within the various missions, permit.ting a more precise connection between missions and Packages. In short, the organization of the A/A artillery includes the following functional elements: • 1 Artillery Regiment of medium antiaircraft HAWK missiles;

• 1 Artillery Regiment of light antiaircraft SKYGUARD ASPIDE missiles; • 1. anti.aircraft Regiment of selfdefence SIDAM and STINGER; • C3I unit (SoATCC); • RR section (repairs and supplies) for antiaircrafr mate1iel; • self-defence antiaircraft battery, at Brigade and Intermediate Command level.

The "Capability PackagesAl1tiaircraft Artille1y" Project, which has recently been activated in its executive phase, is aimed at correcting some shortcomings existing at present, but intends, in particular, to realize the basic cluster· jusl described. It defines the capabilities, the structure and the functional mechanisms of each elementary typological module (individual weapon system, fire unit/section, interface arrangements etc.) and of the basic organization of the complex modules (C31, peculiar logistics, general logistic and projection requirements, inte1face arrangements, etc.) as vvel.l as the relevant modes of realization, or6anizing them in conformity with

Facing paie .. . Four-barrel anliat.rcra~ system. " Right "Slinger" antiaircraft syslem

specific objectives progressively paced according to priority. In the Project's framework, the possibile stages of activation of the cluster are estab lished according to functional capabilities (weapon systems, C3I and logistics), also in relation to the possible scenarios of employment. PERHAPS IT WAS A CRUISE MISSILE...

The brilliant dot on the monitor became more intense and roused him from his thoughts. It seemed almost to be moving. "The usual clutter.. . (5) tiredly mused the Tactical Control Officer of cluster Italia, just an instant before the radar signal turned into a ,.._inking icon. "Trace not identified. S tart evaluation" . The message of process-updat ing that pu lsed silenty on the computer display seemed deafening. He knew very well what it meant; in simulations he had seen several times the activation of this procedure. Now the trace would be transrn itted to the Joint Control Centre and this wo uld turn it to the pursuit systems of the first geometry of interceptio n , the piloted interce ptors of the Allied Air Force. The second and third geometry of intercep tio n were ins tead

with_in his province and regarded respectively the areal SAM systems and SHORAD point systems which were under his control, in his capacity of tactical controllerÂˇ of the cluster. He knew verv well what could have happen~d, but did not a bsolutely expect what actually happened. The orders of the Control Centre bounced suddenly on his

console, in a motley of labels and ikons. "Area Cluster Ita.li a : hold fire released". "Hostile trace assigned in fi re in second geometry of interception". He reacted automatically, the way he was trained to do . Instinctively he activated the firereadiness procedure, made up of logical sequences of orders and actions, wh ich to an outsider would have seerned frantic and uncontrollable, bu t th at to him were flowing as in a slow motion, allow ing him to appreciate the meaning of every step. "Battle Station". "SAM ready to fire".

"SHORAD ready to fire". "Target hostile, acquired". "Second geometry of interception not available". "Third geometry of interception activated". "Critical area "Zulu": hold fire released". "Fire Unit SHORAD "Bravo": on fire. Ins tants elapsed. Th en, unespectedly the roar reached him,

despite the shelter's soundproofing. A little later he could read the report on the display. It wasn't a Cruise missile, but an old, simple, "asymmchical" drone, loaded ,vith explosives, intercepted by Fire Un it SJ-IORAD "Bravo" well within C1i tical Area "Zulu", the m-ea of the residence of the newly elected President.

D Âˇ:Lt. Colonel Section Chief; Plans Office Army General Staff NOTES: (l) VSHORAD: Very SHOrt Range Air Defence. (2) Expression of original authorship, at leasl until somebody else lays claim

to it. (3) Critical aspect in Lhe problems of perfection. (4) The decentrali zation o f a responsibili ty to subordinate bodies implies a delegation of auth01ity, while the exercise of the responsibility through the same subordinate bodies does not presuppose any delegation. (5) Electronic background noise.

THE ENGINEER CORPS by Ivan Fe lice Resce '" and Mario Ruggiero*'" he analvsis of the modern

engagements of greater intensity

operatio-~al scenarios and of

cannot be excluded, cmnJJiisiug

the foreseeable short and medium term ones, tends to confirm the frequency of the engagement in operations other than war (OOTW), and particularly in peace support operations. On the far-away horizon (more than 10 years) the concrete engagement will in the preventive and remote management of crisis situations continue, as a primary assumption, but also o perational

those in traditiona l types o[ conflict against adversaries with capabilities substantially equal to those attainable by the national military instrument. Specific indepth studies, carried out a lso in international environmen ls, tend to qualify the present scenarios and, even more, the predictable future ones, on the basis of three distinctive characters: uncertainty, complexity, sensitiveness; these

characters permit to determine, although in general terms, the challenges that the Army will have to confront in the future and therefore the operational capa bilities it has to achieve.In this perspective, operational versatility seems to be the key of the competitive advantage over the assumed adversary and therefore of success in operations. Among the facts that concur to achieve such versatility, one m ust list the professionalism of the personnel,

the technological improvements of the existing capabilities and of the ones that wil l foreseeably be developed. As for the combat support operational function, and particularly the operalional tasks of the Engineers, the nevv scenarios confirm, as h.tndamental fields of employment, those connected with the mobility of one's own forces, the countermobility against the enemy

forces, the protection and general support of Commands and units. As regards peace support operations (PSO), to the mentioned activities, which have always distinguished the employment of the Engineers, new duties have been added, which are part of the "utility repairs" category, generally developed in the ambit of civilianmilitary operations (CMO), in direct suppmt of the mission entrusted to the force of intervention. In addition, the Engineers constitute the most valuable component for interventions in case of calamities, within presence and surveillance" missions. On the other hand , it cannot be excluded that these essentially technical jnterventions could also concern not only the national te1Tito.ry but also external theatres. Here , con trary to what was pointed out in articles published by "Rivista Militare" and related to other operational functions, we do not propose a classification of tasks connected \vith the d ifferent types of operat ions because, from the execution angle, there are remarkable similaiities between the va.iious conditions of employment, even if it is appropriate to also stress the differences of attitude and behaviour which must d istinguish the approach to the operational contexts. It seems more productive , instead, to examine in detail the activities deriving fron1 general tasks, to emphasize the new emerging elements, which compel to verify both the structures and

.,,

the procedures of employment of the Engineers.

The Enginee1-s of the /FOR 11alian Contingent ,it work to restore road practicability.

MOBILITY

The manoeuvre forces must have and adequate freedom of action in the operational theatre, in order to obtain both the concentration of the efforls and a rapid deployment, as well as the break of contact. The freedom of movement and, more generally, the movement capability can make up for the poss ible q u antita ti ve inferiority of the instrument. Mobil ity constitutes an intrinsic capability of the un its and is granted by the kind of vehicles that equip them. But, prescincling from the unit's capabilities, the te1Tain, the enemy forces and the weather conditions are elements that influence mobility in the zone of operation. The activity in (avour of mobility, typical of the Engineers, should be cons idered in this perspective. Its effectiveness is closely con-elated with the: • knowledge of the various types of obstacles that can be encountered; • type of dep loyment/tactical

organization of the Engineer units; • timely updating of the situation chart with specific reference to obstacles; • availability of effective means and employment procedures. In short, mobility is maintained through the activities liste d below. Overcoming of interruptions

It is an activity which assumes different characteristics wbether it is in favour uf t he operational units or of logistic support. In the firsl instance, the timeliness of the intervention is more important than the accuracy of the realization, also because the vehicles involved in overcoming interruptions have a high off-road mobility. As a rule, therefore, the activity is limiLed to bypassing the interru ption itself using power shovels etc. In case of necessity, the overcoming is achieved with the

Bridge-throwing vehicle derfoe d from a "Leopard'' Lank, equipped with a two-girder bridge.

essentially to a classic scenario with a continuous, mined and somehow schematic obstacle. The breaching envisages ample recourse to normal or selfpropelled explosive material, without limitations as regards possible collateral damage. It is very unlikely that a scenario like the one summarily desc1ibed wiU materialize in the near future, even if it cannot be totally excluded in a longer term prospect. The mined obstacle which c;;m be encountered in rnode.m operational theatres is more unpredictable, has no mles, is more difficult to locate, is spread also through inhabited and built-up areas; it is decidedly more misleading clue to an ample recourse to trapping and improvisation. Therefore it cannot be overcome with t.radi tional methods, but rathen.vith systematic clearing, to be accomplished by highly specialized personnel, provided with automated materials ,md equipment. The most frequent task in PSO is generally connected with route cleanU1ce for the tnU1sit of units or humanitarian convoys. 0

employment of bridge-throwing tanks or light-alloy bridges. To repair interruptions that facilitate the logistic support requir es instead more weighty and quaHfied technical interventions and therefore bridging rnaterials which permit to obtain structures of adequate length and capacity in relation, respectively, to the interruption and to the vehicles that have to go over them. Crossing of unfordable watercourses

It is an activity ,.vhich is carried out with the employment of bridging materials (which are part of the regul::ir e quipment) set on floating supports. The Pontooners are equipped with the most modern and qualifying materials in the specific sector; the Pon tooners are a special branch mainly destined to ensure the practicability across the great national watercourses, the Po river first of all. The interventions are characterized by marked technical features, because they normally take place far from

concrete and direct threats. In modern scenarios, the projection of national contingents in "out of area" theatres in Peace Support operations, also in geographical regions crossed by unfordable watercourses, may require a contribution of operational capabilities also in that specific secto1: But a possible intervention \.Vould be anythi:ng but safe. The watercourse would not be knovm as the Po and the other national rivers, while the 1iver-beds ,md the banks could be mined. In view of this, the unit will have to be re con figured according to specialistic capabilities, with structure, operational characteristics and culture updated according to the nevv reality. Operations against obstacles It is one of the traditional activities of the Engineer units, and of the sappers' first of all, which are directed primarily against mined obstacles. They take shape traditionally in survey and breaching. These terms refer

Maintenance of road practicability This is another traditional activity, wh.i ch entails monitoring of the road conditions, preparation of bypasses around the most critical structures (to be activated in case of demolition), improvement of the road-network and its constant maintenance. The activity needs units equipped with a range of mea1;1.s differentiated as regards power and characteristics, in order to graduate the interventions in accordance with situation and

Convoy of Railway En~ineer., employed for the restoration of railways and yards.

urgency. On lhe national ten-itory, these requirements could also be met wit h the help or c ivilia n organizations. Preparation, repair and management of railroads and yards.

The necessity to participale in the maintenance/development of railway networks is taking a new shape, no more limited to national contingencies but e xte nd ed al so to o u t -o f -area operations . Within this scope, besides, it constitules an aclivity of great visib ility and effect, which can have a remarkable weight on lhe m ission as a whole. The scenario of employment changes a lo t if compared with the traditional one. From a relatively safe condition, which characterizes the national environment, one goes on to a situation lhat may present concrete risks, deriving from the strifes exisling in theatre. In this perspective, the intenrention in the speci fie sector keeps i ls technical aspects but assumes a decidedly more tactical charaeler. The Engineer Units, moreover, supply a well-qualified support lo the updating of lhe cartographic asse ts concerning roads µracLicabiliLy. COUNTERMOBILITY

The activities connected wilh countermobilily have the purpose o f hindering the manoeuvre of the enemy, limiting its freedom of action. They refer a lmost esclusively to traditional conflicts and take shape in the building of obstacles tha t can be grouped in the

following categories: • active obstacle; • demolitions; • passive obstacles. In modem scena1ios, also in the asyrnmetric ones, countennobility must be almost entirely reconsidered, in view of the culture prevailing especially in Western societies, which dernands respect for life, environment, goods. As regards the active obstacle, one shou ld cons ider lh e banishment of inhuman weapons, in cluding antipersonnel mines, to which Italy has given its assent preparing a law that goes beyond the Ottawa provisions, which limit the prohibition only to magnetically undetectable antipersonnel mines. The mined obstacle must therefore b e redesigned on the conceptual p lane more lhan on the technical one. S tudies and debat es in progress, both at national and international level, have not yet produced concrete reference elements. It is certain tha t the active obstacle of the futur e will have to be directed only against on-vehicle mobility,

and must be planned envisaging its simple and safe disposal once it has performed its function. These two elemen ts are sufficient e,-i dence of the cultural cha ng e that must be made, considering that generalions of military have planned minefields and have be en Lrai ne d to lay th em, trying to confer them maximum hindering power, through non-detectabi Ii ty, trapping, etc. As for demolitions, it must be pointed out that the delaying plans conceived (or lhe defence of the northeastern region of the Peninsula are no more conceivable in a possible conflict, unless vital national .inleresls are al risk. L1 a11y case, demolitions must be carried ou t according to selective principles, basing their efficacy on limeliness, accuracy and integration ,Nithin the manoeuvre rather than in the number of intenuptions. The passive obstacle represents a component of countermohility which can balance the lesser effectiveness of active obstacles a nd d emoli tions, employing technologies applied to explosive

"lW.attei" en1:,, i.ne-compressor.

materials of lirnitecl environmental impact' and, espec ially, to nonlethal weapons.

PROTECTION The activi ties concern ing protection are addressed mainly to personnel, Conunands, transmission centres and, as a second priority, to arms and materials. Especially in symmetric conflicts, protection norm a lly includes deceiving measures. P ro tection must be pursued, first of all, .through measures and prov1 s1o ns ad op ted by t·he interes ted parties, who have the responsibility to safeguard their own su1vival. In view of this , the Eng in eers will give . their c ontribu tion, within the limits of the resources and priori t ies de fin ed by the Commanders a t the various organi za tional levels. The contribution, however, will have to be co n centrat e d on the activities that r equire particular means and equipments, le tting the other Services carry out the remaining activities. To sum it all

up, the activities of the Engineers in the sector of protection are: • planning and realization of field fortifications; this activity is of particular valu e in se tting up checkpoints and Cps/collecti ve works in peacekeeping operations; • realization of collective structures; • ass istance in conce a lment, camouflage and deceit; • refitting of buildin_gs destined to sheltered de fensive structures. In cas e of p r otracted operations, the interven tions of the Engineer Corps can continue, in order to add comfort to mere p rotection.

DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

• systems for finding, purifying and supplying water; • production and supply of lowvoltage electric power; • POL pipelines of lirnited length and capacity. These are activities that entail a large availability of skilled personnel and high -technology equipment and materials. On the other han d , most a ctivities concern the personnel. In view of this, it is necess,u-y to ensu1·e the o bservance of precise acciden tprevention laws which are directly under the Commanders' and the techni c ians' res ponsibility. In substance, also in this sphere, one goes from a "field" environment, in which before the main purpose was to e nsure a n exclus ively operational fun c tionality, to an environmen t where the technical contents become preeminent. Bes ides, there is a sid e t hat should not be overlooked, i.e . that of t h e operators' security. The employment of the Engineers in conflict situations of asymmetric character, in which the enemy is not clearly identified and al l the parties present in the zone of operati o ns represe nt a p oss ible threat, requires that the Engineers' means be of the protected type. The deployment-support sector is one where the Engineers arc unable to meet entirely the range of poss ible need s. Con s id eri ng this, it is often necessa ry or useful to have recourse to c ivilian

The deployment support includes every activity destined to build the structur es and to employ the equipment necessary to support intheatre military operations. In this per-spectivc, the activities concern: • logistic infrastructure, logistic and tech no - tactical road practicabi Iity; • port-and a irport-infras tructure of special interest for the Force of intervention;

resources . The implementation proce dures of th ese provi s ions, inclu di n g the possible conventions wit h public or private organizations or agencies, must be defined in advance both on the concept ual and on t he organizational plane. Utility Repairs and Disaster Relief

It is a range of a ctiviti es

Field drilling unit.

comprised within those already described; the changes are only in purposes, circumstances and, consequently, in deve lopment procedures. Procedures that will have to be studied in depth at School and unit level. THE ENGINEER CORPS IN OPERATION S

The employment of the Engineers, both in traditional and in other-than-war operations, is oriented toward the development of the same basic miss.ions: mobility, countermobility, protection and support of the deployment. T he activities that GU"e included in civil.military operations (Utility Repairs) and in those in assistance to the populations in case of calamities (Disaster Relief) are, in substance, assimilable to the preceding ones. The executive procedures are distinguished essentially for the presence of a concrete threat and the timeliness of the intervention requested. The fun dam en tal principJ es that should motivate the employment of the Engineers principles strictly correlated with operational economy and versatility - are listed below: Task Force

The varied range of activities

compose the task force, referring to both the elementary module (squad and/or team) and to the unit of employment, which can be identified with a platoon or company, according to the speciality.

needed in some phases of the operation. The effectiveness of the intervent ions therefore must be pursued by starting in advance, ,vhenever possible, the activities of the Engineers vis-~t-vis the other functional components.

Interve ntion P riority

Adherence of the Logistic Support

The bulk of requirements to be met, besides, makes it necessary to define the priority that should be given to each need. The definition of the priorities is a specific task of the Commap.ders, but "the Engineer" is a qualified adviser to help in producing them.

The accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Engineers can have a very high logistic impact because, as a rule, they must move and have at their disposal, large quantities of rnateriaJs.

that normally distinguish the

employment of the Engineers in modern operations and the need to assemble the forces according to standards of a bsolute economy demand that also the Engineers component should operate according to the principle of a task force. Âˇ Âˇ The application of this principle requires the preliminary definition of the modules that characterize the specialistic capabilities necessary to

Integration with the manoeuvre

Comprehensiveness of Command and Control

The Engineer Corps cont1ibutes, as we said, to the "comhat support" function. In this perspective, its activities must be completely integrated with the manoeuvre of the forces and the manoeuvre of fire. Usually these activities requ ire relatively long times of execution, if compared with the timeliness of intervention

The Engineer un its normally operate in very wide spaces of the operation zone. Therefore it is indispensable for the C2 structure to ensure continuity to the flow of in[ormation , both vertical and horizontal, so that the activities of Command, and especially those of Control, do not suffer solutions of continuity.

Pi oneer tank on "Leopard" hull, equipped for the Engineers' actions on the battlef'ielcl.

Recourse to local resources

The normal scarcity of possibilities as compared with the needs, compels to have ample recourse lo local resources. The Operational Capabilities of the Engineer Corps.

The type of Engineer units destined to carry out the missions entrusted to them derives from the following two factors: • belt of the operation zone

within ,-vhi ch the units are called to operate; • level of specialization 1-equired for the accomplishment of the tasks. On the basis of these two factors, there is a first difference

Italian soldiers of the JFOR contingent repairing railway tracks on Bosnian territo1'y.

emerging: • units ,vhich operate inside the manoeuvre - a nd therefore in close contact with the combat units-which have essentially tasks of adherence or direct support;

• units which operate to assis t the operation's development as a who le and perform tasks connected with general support. The direct support concern s units structu red, equipped and trained to operate in "risk" areas, both in traditional-war and peacesupport operations. Bes.ides, their action must be marked by timeliness and, in some circumstances, by boldness. The units we refer to arc the Sappers which, in prospect, v.ill see their characters of prevailingly tactical contents emphasi7.ecl, because they ¼ill have equipments marked by high mobility, good protection - including earth moving equipment - and immediate employment. The Engineer component for General Support is more complex and differentiated . The traditional specialities belonging to this category are constituted by Pioneers, Raih.vay Engineers and Pontoone.rs. The Pioneers are the speciality that encloses the most varied range of tasks: from logistic road-

Engineer NCO enga.ged in an op e ration of min_e-cleadng ar~d r em.oval of explosiv e ordnance 111 former Yugoslavia.

practicability lo obstacles, rrorn infrastructural interventions to assistance in case of disasters. In addition to these trad itional tasks, there are today also those connected with finding, producing and supplying wat;r and electric power, with the ensuing acquisition of not toocomplicated machinery and equipment which, nevertheless, need specific know-how and adequate logistic support. These materials are supplied to almost all units but prospectively it would seem more appropriate to centralize them to ensure their effective maintenance and employment. The interventions required of the Engineers, with ever increasing frequency, on structures for troop quarters, ports and airports are, from a certain point of view, a new aspect of their activity. Also in this case particular technical skills are necessary. In vievv of this, it could be suitable to reconfigure one of the two Pioneer Projection Regiments with two battalions, the firs t charged with finding producing and supplying water and power resources and the second with the repair and maintenance of routes and infrastlucture. The railway-engineers component - destined to the construction/repair

which entails a reexamination of its organic composition) and, above all, because the ways of crossing unfordable watercourses have changed a great deal. The possibility to have to operate in critical situations deriving fom environmental (landslides, floods etc.) or artificial (mined river banks or beds) conditions is anything but remote. With a view to this, this special branch v,,rj]l have to acquire a more marked operational character, with autonomous capabilities in the areas of watercourse reconnaissance cmd dead ng and in

capability was almost spontaneously obtained by the "Engineer-pole" as a result of their employment in "expert" groups, practically in every operational theatre concerned with more-orless bloody war events. Today the Army pr·ides itself on an almost unique experience, which is d eci dedly among the excellent ones, and proves very precious in modern scenarios, not only because of its essential support to lhe national contingent, but also for its contribution to the preparation and training of local personnel

rail-

the organization and management

employed fo r· th~ c:l~::ir::rnc.~ of

infrastructure and railways answers effectively both the national and "out-of-area" needs. Possible modest adaptations could regard the procurement of field material for building temporary railway stations and for the rapid repair of damaged lines. The Pontooner speciality requires a more marked reconfiguration, due both to stock modernization (it is going from Class 60 to PFM,

of the concerned areas. This is going to be obtained through both a different composition of the unit and the attribulion of specific capabilities, first of all the one regarding watercourse-bed reconnaissance and mine-cleming.

mined areas. Besides this capability, ,vhich is called operational because is closely connected with operations, in the course of time the Army has also developed the one aimed at clearing the national terrritory· of explosive devices that go back to the past conflicts. For land-mineclearing there are at present two organizations: • one under the Direction of the

and

management

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL The explosive ordnance disposal

Table 1 NATO SPECIFICATIONS

PROPOSED PATENT

ACTIVITIES

Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance

EOR

Reconnaissance and exposure of ordnance

EOD 1° livello

Disposal of kno,-1.'11 regulation-ordnance

EOD 2° livello

Disposal of all-type regulation-ordnance

EOD 3° livello

Disposal of special-charge, all-type regulation-ordnance

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

JED

Disposal of occasional or improvised devices

SUB

Underwater operations

IC - Incident Commander

Directive tasks for solution of "EOD incidents"

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Table 2 EOR - Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance

EOR

BOE personnel of the projection and reaction Engineer units

EOD 1° livello

All blasters of the Service units

EOD 2° livello

BOE teams of the Engineer units

EOD 3° livello

Teams of NBC Regiments

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

IED

BOE teams of the Engineer units of the projection and reaction forces

SUB

Reece teanis of Pontoneer Regiment

IC - Incident Connnander

Engineer Officers of the projection units

EOD - Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Engineer Corps, charged with removal/disposal of mines and bur ied devices; • the other, under CERIMANT, charged with removal/disposal of devices other than rnines. This organization, funct ional to the necessities of the second post-w ar period, owing to the m,lssive presence of explosive

devices on the national territory, appears redundant as compared with the Army's pr·esent needs. In consequ ence of the abovesaid considerations, the Ar my's sector re levant to the disposa l of explosive devices m u st be reorgan i7.ed a ccord ing to the following principles: • economy in of the employment of personnel, structures, materials and equ ipment, through th e

fusion o( the resources available in the sector and their managernent according to principles of wuty in order to obtain an upgrad ing of the capabilities that should be replaceable; • flexibility, based on the unified training of the p ersonnel, according to task-oriented common standards;

• progressiveness and priorities, in personnel training and in the restructuring process; • rigour in the periodical control of the operational standards and in the employment of the experience acquired. In this connection, th e "Engineers' pole" has worked out a project which aims at conforming the Army's capabilities to NATO specifications. According to this

project, the entire Army personnel

will have to acqu ire a high "sensitiveness" to th e dan ger deriving from explosive devices. Such capabilities must be attained through a specific training ea.tried out vvith t he he lp of highly qualified personnel. As for the men charged with the actual clearing, we pofr1t out the capabilities summarized at Table 1. The capa b ilities must be concentrated at the Army units, as indicated at Table 2. The training of the personnel tasked with clearing explosive devices is centralized at the Ar my's Opera tional Clearing Centre (in Italian, COB) . The Operationa l Cl e aring Ce nt re ca r ri es o ut a very

important function in the instruction/training held , through the formation/quali-fication of specialists and the per-iodical control of the operational effectiveness.

innovative aspects of the Service. The first resul ts of th is necessarily brief survey s ho uld prornp t the interested levels to take a closer look - from the doct r inal and organizational points of view, to the employment procedures and logistics. A special considerntion shou ld be given to the procurement of material. The times that normally characterize .

With a view to this, possible needs to introduce variants in the gene ral structure , j us t drafted following the stu dy of the capability p ackages, could emerge already during the formulation of the executive plan that should give s h ape to th e outlined setting. The capabilities typical of the Engineer units, like those of all

As should have emerged from

military supplies suggest to limit

comba t

the rapid survey of the necessities of support, of the types of activity and capabilities required, the Engineer units contribute to the development of the entire range of operations. In this perspective, they are necessaiily present in all capability packages, as shov,,rn at Fig. 1. More in-depth studies \,\,ill have to evaluate the convenience of introducing an element (at company level) of the Pontooner Regirnent (unfordable watercourses) in the projection package, naturally manning it \.vith voluntary personnel. T he firs t a pproach to the Engineer units has only wanted to focus on the most outstanding

the amount of the materials to be acquired [or each generation. In shor t, it should be necessary to start at the same Lim e both the procurement programmes and the programmes of resea rc h and development. concerning the modernization of the same materials .

primarily developed in favour of the m anoeuvre forces. Therefore they must be planned, obtained and distributed in conformity w ith the goals they have to attain and the requirements of the combat function. The experiences that the Army is making in operations on the national territory, and outside it, supply precise indications in that sense. Some capabilities of moderate technical and specialistic contents, such as, for example, the ones related to the employment of earth-moving equipment, are highly requested especially for needs connected wi th protection. These capabilities, therefore, in prospect could be permanently dccenn·alizecl to non-Engineer units . Other capabilities for example, collection, purificat ion and supply of water, disposal of explosive devi ces , res toration of river practicability, etc., - on the contrmy, must be even more centralized in or·der to foster tbeir growtl1, in both the technological and the specialized sectors. These capabilities rnust then be structured by modules of complete specialistic capabilities,

TH E ENGINEER CORPS IN THE CAPABILITY PACKAGES

EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS

The instability of the scenarios and of the operational requirements connected with them, entails the activation of continuous-cycle plmming for the timely updating of systems, procedures of employment and organizational structures. Fig.1

·THE ENGINEERCORPS IN THE CAPABILITY PACKAGES.

[!!](6)

un its,

are

upe::ratiumdly e::mpluyauk iu lht:

l! !J PROJECTION

s upport

relevant scenario, according to the principle of task organization.

Pi neers

'''Brigadier General, Head, Plans Office, Anny General Staff 1

PRESENCE & SURVEILLANCE

".Lt. Colonel, Plans Office, Army General Staff

by Rocco Panunzi ~': and Gualtiero De Cicc -:: 1(

/ /

[

ithin the measures for the r estructuring of the Service kno\vn as a whole as "Army Project 2000", the Army Genera l Staff is making specific studies on the definilion of the role of the land artillery in the future operalional scenarios, as well as on the development o[ modernization programmes in the specific sector, in line with the philosophy of the "opera tional capability packages" , alre ady presented in previous articles published by "Rivista Militare".

In this sense, the present article intends to promote a c.onstntctive debate on concepts and projecls expanded more detailedly in the recent Army Staff document "Operational capability packages - Land Artillery". ROLE OF THE ARTILLERY IN OPERATIONS

The present operational scenarios, consequent to the disappearance or a traditional threat, did not diminish at all the role of the land artillery as a fundamental componenl in the conduct or operations. It is appropriate to underline how land artillery - harmoniously structured in its essenlia l components: targets acquisition, command and control, weapon systems, teclmical support and logistic support contributed to the military instrument's credibi lily, which is an indispensable element to wield the power of deterrence which, in its turn, is a decisive factor in the preventionhnanagement of the crises that can threaten national and allied interests. ArtiJlery in war operations The conduct of mediurn/high intensity operations presupposes the availability of a wide range of land artillery systems, to meet different requirements of indirect firesupport interventions (adherent, in -

depth, areal, precise). According to NATO doctrine, the land artillery units are included in the "combat support" area and are divided, depending on the tasks, into the two classic families of general support and direct support capable, as a ,.vhole, to ensure indirect fire support up to 100-150 km from the conlact line. The general support and direct support components, normally connected lo specific tactical and tactical/operational - employment levels, become integrated th.-ough the command and control organization for fire support in order to guarantee the time ly transfer of capabilities in relation with the situation and the requirements to meet. The land artillery in general supporl develops its support, generally, in favour of a Corps. It is employed as a unit, and with a centralized direction, within complex formations (Brigades or Artillery Groups) to batter; with massive and concentrated fire, particu larly sensitive targets in the enemy deployment (C3I knots, artillery lines , incoming manoeuvre forces, logistic installations, etc.) within the in depth operations. It's barely the case to underline that, the more effective the in-depth fire-support is, the less bloody Lhe decisive in - contact operations will be. The general support artillery normally includes units with longesl-range systems , both monobarrel (cannons/howitzers) and pluribarrel (multiple rocket launchers)/ S-S missile tracks. The latter are the 1nost distinctive resource of the general-support artillery. In this respect, the experience of the Gulf Wai; typical example or medium-intensity conflict, has underlined that the units equipped with rnultiple rocket launchers and conventional S/S tactical missi les can assume a decisive role for the outcome of the operations, that cannot be

adherence of time and space , against the enemy forces which more directely and dangerously engage their elements mainly in the framework of contact operations. The direct-support artille1y for tl1e next 10-15 years wil.l still consist of single-barrel weapon systerns (cannons/howitzers and heavy mortars), with character istics o f tactical mobility and protection corn.parable to those of the units they must support. The artillery in peace-support operations

limited anymore just to the "combat support" operational function. The field of action of the land artillery must be extended not only to the RSTA function (Recoinnance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition) to which it contributes with its assets for the surveillance of the battlefield and the acquisition of the targets, but also to the "Combat" operational function, autonomously carried out through in - depth fire manoeuvres, with both cu-eal and precise interventions. The artillery units with longerrange and greater power/precision can therefore i nfluence in a decisive manner the outcome of the in-depth operations, independent of the combat activities cani.ed out by the manoeuvring land forces, mainly engaged in contact operations. This presupposes the availability of appropriate munitions, anti-personnel /antivehicles - both "area-satmation" or "precision" (guided) - for the engagement of particular targets, o f effective instruments for in-depth surveillance and target acquisition, as well as of automated procedures for analysis and targeting of the

objectives. Considering the greater fire capability and longer range o[ the w eapon systerns of the infantry / cavalry wuts (Basic Branch) in their engagements at distances from Oto 5 km, we can say that the most convenient employment of the land artillery will be that of conducting in-depth operations through the execution of actual st:J.i.kes or raids employing, with greater flexibility and freedom of action, both the manoeuvre of deployments and the manoueuvre of trajectories, in an operational environment made more dynamic by the spacing out of the elements and the non-linearity of the battle area. In the short-medium tenn, at any rate, a certain importance will be maintained by the land mtillery in the direct-support role, in relation ,vith the scarcity of air:.mechaiuzed units (combat - and attackhelicopters) which could provide the necessary dose fire support to the manoeuv1ing forces. They nonnaUy operate at artillery regiment level, reinforced if necessary, in favour a Brigade, in orÂˇder to support the action of the manoeuv1ing forces up to 10-15 km from the contact line, in

Within the peace-suppo rt operations, with special reference to peacekeeping operations, the role of the rnilitary instrument is that of contributing to th e settlement of a conflict situation prevailing in a cr itical area., in compliance with a precis e mandate r eceived fr om the supernational organizations (UN , OSCE, etc.) . To guarantee the observance of the mandate, the Rules of Engage rnen t (ROE) defined for the mission envisage, in general, the recourse to force, to be exe rted at any rate at a "minimum,level", which does not necessarily mean "low level", in relation with the actual situation. In this perspective, the cu-tillery takes on a very important role, particularly as a deterrent , achieved through the complete visibility of the formations and the carryi ng ou t of effective training activities, which can also assume the characteristics of demonstrations. In case of employment , never theless, the fire action must minimize th e risk of inflicting collateral damages to persons or things. In this regard, it is to be underlined that any unexpected damage, apart from ethical and moral considerations, could be detrimental for the outcome of the entire n1ission. In this perspective, th e interventions of the artillery must

be marked by the clear selectivily of the objectives and absolute precision. ., These results can be aÂ˝hieved through the accurate predisposition of the interventions and the direct control of the (ire by forward observers, capable of moniLoring and transmitLing data, in real time, on the objectives Lo sLrike. ln this type of operations, the single-bmTel artillery units, characLer-ized by high flexibility, can operate a lso at howitzers/mortar-platoon level, with their own command posts and observation teams in their favour; thus perm1llrng a wider distribution and, therefore, a better protection Lo their troops on the ground. The det erre nce vis-a -v.is possible hostile FacLions and the reassurance for the friendly troops are in thi s way better determined. In the ruture, the foreseeable technological developments in the sector of technical support for land artillery, deriving from the widespread employ.men t of meteoballislic computers, inertial navigators, GPS systems, orientation gyros, etc., \Vill pen11it also the employment of single launchers/guns to carry out socalled "smgical interventions" v..rith "smarL" ammunition, i.e. munitions guided during all the duration of the trajectory or in its final part (laser-gu ided ammurnt10n , fiberoptic-guided missiles, etc.) to engage also targets located near or within densely popu lated areas . Furthermore, within the peacekeeping operations, the landartillery units, v..rith their own net of observers and working together wilh the assets of the units assigned to surveillance and target acquisition (day/night vision systems , radars for bat tlefield surveillance, counterfire radars, phonotelemenic, sets, etc.) contribute to the increment of the Intervenlion Force's capability of monitoring the observance of the accords signed by the conflicting parties,

Fig. 1

ORGANIC COLLOCATION OF THE LAND ARTILLERY UNITS

xxxx

XXX/XX

LAND FORCES COMMAND

INTERMEDIATE OPERATIONAL COMMAND

c1:r"" .

.ARTY

l I

LAND F.S.O.C.

GROUP

immediaLe ly reporting violation of the agreements.

any

ORGANIZATION OF THE LAND ARTILLERY UNITS IN "ARL\11Y PROJECT 2000"

In relation with the role of the land a1tillery and the rnore general context of Lhe new stmcture of L.be operational forces , the Army General Staff has adopted an organizational solution capable of meeting the differenl requirements of fire support at the various levels, balancing wherever possible, the need of concentrating the resources with that of maintaining the "interservice culture" for Lhe developmenL of the activities of coopP.n1tion hetween Basic Branch and ArtiUery ,.vithin the Brigades. The solution adopted (Fig.1) provides for the concentration of the longer-range anillery (multiple rocket -launcher units) and the single-barrel artillery units assigned to general support (in the future, they will be totc:Jly or partially replaced hy units of SIS fiberoptic guided missiles) in a Land Artillery Group subordinate to the Land Forces

C:J

Command, while keeping in each Brigade the present regiment level artillery componenL for the direcL support role. At Intermediate Operational Command (IOC), organic arLille1y units are not envisaged. Nevertheless, studies are under way to consider the convenience of creating an FSOC (Fire Support Operation Centre: C2 element for the management of land and A/A artillery, as well as for the coordination and employment of all fire somces (land, ai1; sea) in the area of responsibility of the Division/Brigade. The FSOC could either be autonomous or acl as a cell of the MAIN \.vithin the I.O.C. Cornmand Post, and should be able to manage, from time to time, the artillery units that could be assigned to the IOC by the Land Forces Commm1d's Artillery Group, detached from the Brigades, according to the "task organization" princip le, to give a u nitary character to the fire-manoeuvre at Corps/Division level. As far as the structure of the Artillery Regiment (Fig.2) is concerned, the present organization will be maintained, i.e. the land

Fig. 2

STANDARD ESTABLISHMENT OF A LAND ARTILLERY RGT

l""'rncii.'7 U!L...I

•••

GJ artillery battalion will have three batteries with homogeneous weapon systems . This solution meets the normaJ requirements of training and teclmo-logistic support of the units in peacetime. In operations, in relation with the necessary operationaJ capabilities, it will be possible to set up, follo\.ving the "task organization" pr.inciple, Artillery Regiments with ad hoe batta lions , \Nith 3-4 batteries armed with possibly different systems (e .g. mix of 120mm mortars and 155mm howitzers for low-intensity opera tions , or 155mm self-propelled guns and rocket-launchers, or also rocket launchers and missile tracks for medium-high intensity operations). Further, the possibility is now under study of adopting, for the rnortars/howi tzers/rocket-launcher battery, a subdivision into two platoons, each w ith 3-4 guns/launchers, in order to increase its techno-tactica l flexibility.

TIIE LAND ARTILLERY IN TIIE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY PACKAGES

The militaty instrnment outlined

3-4 guns

by the model "Army Project 2000" is based, in short, on the concept of the real operational capabilities to express, according to th e fundamental principles of the modular nature of the structure and economy of formations. To this end, the forces have been divided into four "packages" (Fig.3) , in relation with the

priori.ties of their employment options: • "Projection forces" package, for "out-of-area" operations , essentia.lly related to peace support operations (PSOs); • "Reaction forces" package , destined to NAT O's IRF and RRF, for the management of crises in NATO's contingency areas; • "Presence and Surveillance" forces package, for the operations related \.vith presence and surveillance but capable, on an emergency, of g iving its contribution in "out of area" and "common defence" operations. • "Defence Forces" package, which includes the forces o f the preceding packages , the Command bodies responsible for their employment and the remaining Supports. In this picture the land artillery units play, wi thin the different packages, the specific roles and tasks described below. "Projectio n Forces" package

Within the projection forces, the possible role of the land Fig~ 3

,.___ _ _F_O_R_C_E__P_~_C_KA _ G_E_S_______.I· .

artillery is that of increasing the deterrent capabilities of a national/multivational Intervention Force, augn).enting the capability of long-range immediate reaction and protection of its units in case of deterioration of the conflict situations, always possible on account of the instability and uncertainty which are distinguishing marks of this type of interventions. On the basis of the current operational concept of the Army, the maximum size envisaged for the emp loyment of national forces is that of a Division with two Brigades. In case of protracted interventions, the artillery units must be rotated on a four - monthly basis, just like the infantry units. For Brigade-level interventions, based on the experience gained in recent PSOs, it is envisaged to have in the Operation Theatre one artillery battery with 6 -8 guns, preferably weapons with high deterrent value (155mm self-propelled artillery units, compatib]y with the operational environment, and two more batteries outside the Theatre, for rotations. For longer interventions, at Division/Intervention Force level under national Conm1and, it has to be envisaged, at the most, the inTheati:-e availability of one Artillery Regiment, plus two more Regiments outside the Theatre, for rotations. In this framework, the artillery units of the package will consist of four Artillery Regiments

organic to the Brigades of the relevant force package. In a longterm perspective, this force package will have to rely also on artillery units armed with the fiberoptic guided missile "Polifemo", suitable for longrange "surgical interventions".

THE LAND ARTILLERY IN THE FORCE PACKAGES

DEFENCE

Forces fall \v.ithin the context of the activities of prevention/management of crises or of real combat activities carried out by NATO within art.5 operations (ACE area of responsibility) or non-arl.5 (out-ofarea peacekeeping / enforcement operations). For these requirements, in compliance with the obligations subscribed within ARRC, one Artillery Regiment in direct support for each Brigade, and al least 1-2 Artillery Regiments with long-range systems (missiles and/or rocket launchers) must be envisaged. These units will be taken from the Land Forces' land-artillery Group, to meet the need of general support of the 3rd Italian Division (framework) . The total requinc>ment is 6 -7 Artillery Regiments - two of which formerly belonged to the projection package - which must also carry out training activities concerning classic procedures of operational employment. "Presence and surveillance" forces package

"Reaction Forces" package

The p1iority tasks of the reaction

The land artillery units included in this package (5 Regiments plus

one "frameworÂˇk" Regin1ent), besides canying out the Branch's training activities on the national tenitory, in order to acquire their peculiar operational capabilities, in line with the objective of preparation of the military instrurnent that they are expected to reach \Nith their activity of fonvard presence, participate with their contribution in the operations for the safeguard of the free Institutions, the maintenance of law and order and the welfare of the national community, carrying out training and operational activities together with the units of various Branches that belong to the Brigades of which they are an organic componenL "Defence forces" package

The defence Forces include all units, Commands and remaining supports, destined to guarantee, in a joint and international context, the security of the Country, first of all through deterrence, achieved with a credible .military instrument and, as a last resort, through the direct defence of the territory. Jn this perspective, as regards land artillery, the package includes the

Artillery Regiments of all Brigades and the Regiments subordinate to the Land Artillery Group Command, for a total of 16-17 Regiments, since the priority requirement of defence of the territory would automatically absorb all the assets described in the preceding three force packages. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ARTILLERY SYSTEM"

The operational capability of the land artillery units is closely connected with-and depend5 on - the pe1formance of the technologically advanced materials present in the following subsystems, within the "Artillery System": • arms and ammunition; • surveillance of the battlefield and target acquisition; 68

• automation of fire, command and control; • technical support; • logistic support. Arms and Ammunition

As regards the introduction in service of new weapon systems, the Service has already found, in the

tactical missile and the "Polifemo" fiberoptic guided missile. As concerns the times connected with the present prospects of development of the different programmes, we can roughly envisage that: • in the short term (1998-2002) .it will be possible to put into service a 120mm rifled mortar

multinational envir-onment, the

for the Artillery Regiments of the

materials capabl.e of meeting its modernization requirements. At the moment, the main programmes undergoing the "Research and Development" and the "Modernization and Renewal" phases are directed towards the introduction in service of a rifledbarrel 120mm mortar, an ultralight (less than 4 tons) 155139mm towed howitze1~ the PZH 2000 (155152mm) self-propelled gun, the ATACMS SIS

"Folgore" Paratroop Brigade and the "Friuli" airmobile Brigade, which is to be constituted shortly; • in the medium term (2003-2007), it will be possible to introduce the 155/39 ultralight howitzer for the Artmery Regiments of the Alpine Brigades and possibly the Cavahy Brigade, replace the selfpropelled M109L with the PZH 2000 (155/52) self-propelled

howitzer in the mechanized / armoured Brigades included in the projection/reactiq;n packages, proceed to the reconfi1:,rursition of part of the launchers of the MLRS Regiments, in order to enable this unit to employ also the S/S ATACMS tactical missile; • in the long term (2008-2012) it will be possible to put into service the "Polifemo" fiberoptical guided missile system for l-2 Artillery Regiments in general support, subordinate lo lhe Land Forces' Land Artillery Group Command. At the same time, the M109L guns will be replaced with FH-70s, in the mechanized Brigades of envisaged transformation into armoured units, while munitions with increased range and effectivess will put in service. Therefore, the whole of the delivery means described above will be marked, in the post-2010 years, by an appropriate mix of single-barrel artillery, multiple rocket-launcher systems and S/S guided missiles, which will give the artillery units lhe possibility of flexibility carrying out tasks of general and direct support, within the framework of both war operations and PSOs. Surveillance of the battlefield and target acquisition

1·I

The "Surveillance of the battlefield and target acquisition" component of the "Artillery System" will have lo be capable of permitting the easy recourse to an integrate and effective. firemanoeuvre, characterized by the possibility of employing all weapon systems at the same time, with rapid concentrations of power at the longest ranges, as well as the saturation of areas of operational interest. To this end, the programmes in this specific sector aim at introducing in service di f[erent means and sensors, such as: • laser telegoniometers and laser

IRT: • phonotelemetric sets; • surveillance and target-acquisition radar; • drones and mini RPVs; • helicopter - borne surveillance radar; • counterfire radar, capable of enswing the coverage of the areas of operational responsibility, acquiring in - depth targets, gathering and processing information in real time,

spreading information and a global situation picture, control the effects of fire. Of the materials listed above, the radar telegoniometers are already in service, while programmes are under way for the procurement of the surveillance and targetacquisition radar, drones, helicopter borne radar, counterfire radar. This equipment will be procured within the CATRIN/SORAO

programme, which will be operational soon after the year 2000. As to the mini RPV systems, activities are being carried out with the purpose of revitalizing the "Mirach 20" system, awaiting for the introduction of the "Mirach 26" and the ((Mirach 150" longrange drone, whi le the "Creso" helicopter-borne radar system is under evaluation, together wi.th its French homologue, the "Hmizon". Automation of fire and Command and Control

The SAGAT system , fo r t he automation of the techno-tactical functions of the land-artillery battalion, is the cornerstone of the management of the entire "Artillery System". SAG AT

consists of a serk:; of computers and communication systems, able to co1Telate observation and fire control, process of the firing data, coordination of the firing units and to monitor the operational, tactical and logistic situation. Recently, a requirement for the optimi zation of the system already in service has been revised, in order to make it suitable to meet the needs of the MLRS Regiment and to get rid of the well -know limitations, due to a rigid and old software and a decidedly obsolete hardware. Technical support

It concerns equipment and materiel used for: â€˘ topographic surveys;

â€˘ meteorologic surveys; Topographic surveying

Topographic surveys will be carried out more and more by means of systems for the determ ina tion of positions, which will be widely distributed a t all lew~ls. To this end, specific

programmes are under way and, by the end of 1999, laser inertialnavigators - integrated by GPS will be put in service. Their precision is in the region of 5-10 metres , and they w ill be distributed to artillery battalions and mortar units. In the future, the same systems will be improved, and they could be directe ly installed on the guns, thus enabling crews to

carry out their own topographic preparation. Meteorologic surveying

The acquisition of meteorological data, as well as their correlation and distribution in a short lime through lhe use of formatted messages, is crucic:Ll for a correct techno-tactical evaluation. As far as the land artillery is concerned, the envisaged introduction of smart and increased range/effectiveness munitions, entails the need of new developments in the seclors of measurements and metcast. The availability in real lime of updated meteorological data is now indispensable, in order to effectively intervene from the first salvo. To th is end, a programme is under \Nay for the procurement of radiosonde systems with GPS antennas, radiogoniometers, and computer for the rapid processing of the atmospheric data. At present this equipment can be used in real time by the SAGAT automation system and, in the future, will be employab.le by all surveillance systems. Logistic support

The reorganization on a regimental basis and the incessant technological evolution of weapon systems, equipment and materiel, have imposed continuous adaptations upon the logistic organization responsible for supporting the artillery units. Particularly irnportant arc the

themes connected \vith maintenance, procurement of spare parts, and ammunition supply, which are now faced in a perspective aiming at guaranteeing the standardization and interoperability of the Components of the equipment. In this picture, an adaptation process is being carried out, with the objective of optimiz ing the functional capacity of the logistic chain.

CONCLUSIONS

Within today's operational scenarios, chmÂˇacterizecl in exu-eme situations, by t1idimensional joint operations conducted in a continuative way, the land artillery will continue to play a central role for the fire support to the land forces, either as "combat support" component or directly as a real "corn bat" component in the development of in - depth operations. The land artillery, which until a few years ago was mainly considered a resource consisting of launching - systems and ammunition, has now taken on the configuration of an integrated "system" of equiprnent, materiel and procedures. The hmd artillery, therefore,

will have to increase the performance and the effectiveness of its interventions, through a constant update of the technotactical employment procedures, which should avail themselves of the innovations and progress realized by the "Artillery System" in the sectors of command and Âˇ control, target acquisition, weapon systems, automated fire direction and control, and

logistic support. Consequently, the effective employment of the land artillery corresponds to the development and availability, in a balanced manner, of all the components o f the "Artillery System", since a shortcoming in any sector would irremediably impair the efficacy of the whole system. In particular, the optimization of the trinomial "target acquisition, command and control, fire" and the adoption of weapon systems and munitions ,.vith a better performance, gives the artillery a higher quality rate, and, as a consequence, an increased role compared to the simple mass-employment of the past, against mainly static targets, in close contact with the friendly troops.

D ''Colonel Head, Arms and Ammunition Office, Army General Staff

Âˇ"''Lt. Colonel, Plans Office, Army General Staff 71

E NE

s AR

Review of the situation by Amilcare Casalotto

Âˇk

and Nicola Gelao

-1r -:r

With the series of articles being published in the feature "Army-Project 2000", "Rivista Militare" wishes to offer the reader a complete picture of the definition of the Army operational concept and of the Command and Control structure, with particular regard to the Operational Capability Packages. The following work, avoiding all risks of redundance, wants to be just a "complementary" installment, to focus the "archetypal" aspects of the neiv Army, i.e. its neiv normative and organizational architecture in its various parts: operational, territorial, logistic, didactic, formative. By no-w -w e are in the finishing straight to-wards the conipletion of a complex operation of "remaking", in order to build an instrument that, although limited in size, -w ill be highly operational and capable of effectively meeting the challenges of the future.

CHANGES IN 11-IE REFERENCF. PTCfURE

Sinc.;e the early '90s a ra dical revision of doctrinal pic ture, Command organization and force structure has started with in the Atlantic Alliance, spurred by deep changes in the EwÂˇo-Medite1Tanean geopolitical situation. At co nceptual level, great importance is assumed by the shift from the prindple of "collective defence" to that of "coll ective

security" which e n hanced, in particular. the function of the Armed Forces as an indispensable instn.1mcnt in support of the foreign and security po! ic ies, through a more and more frequent recourse to mu lt in ational coo pera ti on, under th e aegis of internati onal Organizations or Alliances, such as the liN, NJ\TO , OSCE, EU and WEU. On the o ther han d, the basic ,Âˇcasons fo r this "change" are not only geopolitical or strategic, but

also - and the ir weight increases year by year - of an econo mi c nature . As a matter of fac t, all Weste rn Cou n tries have a dopted a strict policy of containment of mili tary expenditures, implying a rat ionalization, in a reductive s e nse, of th e ir Armed forces . But the general purpose is not limited to the achievement of a reduction in purely q uantitative t erms. I n fact , th e most irn porta n t objec tive is t hat of bein g able to ha ve at o n e's

DECREE I.AW MAY 12, 1995, no 126

fig. 1

Implementation of art.3 of the Law of l\ta,· 6 1992. «m the reorganir.ation ofrolls and changes jn 1he norms rele,·anl tothe rccruitmeol s1atus and adyanc.ement of the non-executive m•rsonnel or lhc Armed Forces. This provision derives from the Law no. 21 6 of 1992, and is aimed at achieving a substantial parity, in financial lcrms and career dc\'clopments, between the non-exccuti,·c personnel or the Armed Forces and the Police Forces.

•

The decree: • institutes the following rolls: Marshals, Sergeants and Regular Troop Volunteers; • establis hes the relevant numerical strength, and precisely: 17,000 Marshals, 10,700 Sergeants and 39,722 Volunteers (of which 16.722 regulars and 23,000 short-term).

LAW FEBRUARY 18. 1997, uo.25

fig. 2

Attributions or the Minjster or Dc(cncc. restructuring of the Armed Fo rces' lligh Ranks and of' the Administration of Defence The law: • indicates the Chief or Staff of Defence - directly subordinalc to the Minister - as the organ responsible for the employment of the Armed Forces as a whole; • places the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Nu\'y and Air Force under the Chief of Staff of Defence; • identifies in the Secretary General ofDefcnce the sole responsible (to the Minister of Defence for the legaladministrative aspects, and to the CHOO for the techno-opcrational ones) of the direc1ion and coordination of the activities connected with the implementation of the tcchno-financial programmes, within the general planning of' the milit ary instrument; • assigns 10 the Service Chiefs of Staff the res ponsibility of the organization, 1u·cpar:1tio11 and control of the res pective Service, on which they exercise their comm an d function.

DECREE LAW OF DECE:\'IBER 30, 1997, no.490

This measure derh•cs from the provision ofrhe Law of December 23, 1996 no. 662 (financial Law for 1997) and pro,•idrs for: • the reorganization or the rolls in a joint perspective, in relation to the reduction, to be effected by the end of2005, of the number of Officers (for the Army, from 16,054 to 12,050); • the confirmation of the va lidity of the norma lized promotion-system (a fixed number or promotions pcryear) and the definition of "analogous" career couUL'1i for "homologous" roles; • the institution of an administrative career, to compensate for a generaliied slowing down of careers, in order to safeguard the financial aspects.

•

fig. 3

Reorganiiation of the recruitment. legal status and advancement of the Officers in the Armed Forces

disposal milit~ ry instrum e nts that - al beit li mi ted in size are endowed wi th high -le vel operational capabilities a nd, above all, able to effectively integrate in multi national complexes in order to fac e - as happened seve ral times - c risis situ a tio ns and , by doing so, giving substance to the Europe an poli cy of corn mon security. T he trends a nd objec ti ves pointed out by NATO have been

•

synthesized nation ally with the

basic le gislative measures approved from 1995 to this day an<l, in particular (in chronological order of issue): • institution of new professional figures in the NCO and vo lunteer c ate gor ie s and relevan t assets (Decree -la w May, 12, I 995, no. 1995-fig. 1); • re form or Lhe military I-ligh Ranks, through wich planning, ma nage ment and e mploym ent

•

of th.e Armed Forces can be carried out with a unitary vision (Law February 18, 1997, no. 25fig. 2); introduclion of the New Law on the Advanceme nL of Offi cers w ich, a mong other things, has rede fin e d th e "o rganizat ional pyramids" of all Cadres ( Decreelaw December 30, 1997, no. 490fig 3 ). All these changes, of di ffer en t nature a nd wicl0. scope, have imposed the reconfiguration of the Summit and all com ponents of the Army, in 01-der to: al.ign the Command structures of the operational component to the organi za tion m o dels adopted by NATO; increase the forces' effic ie ncy and operational readiness, and the p rojection capabilities of a part of them ; impl e ment th e progra mme aimed at giving a profess ional character to the Anned Forces, changing into "all-volun teer" un its all t he con tin gents destined to o u t-of-area operations and to NAT O's Immediate-and Rapid-Reaction forces; gradua lly reduce the shortages in manpow e r, in ord e r to reach, by 200 5, the objectives of the new legislative system .

RECONFIGURATION OF THE ARMY SUMMIT

The s tructure of the H ighest Ran ks of the Army ha s been reshaped in line with the Re form Law of the Ministry of Defe nce. Th is norm ative sourc e g ives the res po nsibili ty of planning and e mp loyin g the Ar med Fo rces to t h e Ch ie f of t he Defen ce Staff, while it con fers to the Service Chie fs of Sta ff the respons ibility of the prepara tion of the respective Service. It also envisages the joint centralization of some functions that un til no\v were can-ied out by the Service Staffs. As a conseq uence: • the 2nd Division / SIOS ( Anny

Intelligence ) has been abolished; • the Logistic Inspectorate, now separated from the Army Staff, has incorporated the Commands of the Logistic Corps (Transports and Material- now Branch-, Service and Administration, Medical and Veterinary Corps ) appropriately reconfigured as Departments; • the Am1y Branch-Inspectorate has been established. The Deputy Branch-Inspectors are subordinate to it, and they also act as Commandants of the respective Branch Schools; • the Army School-Inspectorate has been reorganized; • the Command of the Technical Corps (nO\.v Corps of Engineers) has been reconfigured as "Office of the General with the functions of Chief of the Army Technical Corps (Corps of Engineers)".

fig.4

GENERAL ORGANIZATION

xxxx CHJEFOF STAFF ARMY GENERAL STAFF

xxxx

XXX

LAND FORCES COMMAND

BRANCHES INSPECTORATE

XXX

LOGISTIC INSPECTORATE

SCHOOL INSPECTORATE

fig. 5

As a consequence of these changes, the Armed Forces have now a new structure much lighter than the previous one within which the fo)lowing Commanders and Inspectors are subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff (fig. 4): • Commander, Operational Land Forces (COMFOTER); • Logistic Inspector (ISPEL); • Arms Inspector (ISPEARMI); • Schools Inspector (ISPESCUOLE); • 3 Military Region Commanders. In particular, as far as the Army General Staff is concerned, the new structure is as follows (fig 5):

ARMY GENERAL STAFF

xxxx CHIEF OF STAFF

CoS · . OFFICE

PE RSO NNEL EMP LOYMENT

DJV MATER1£L

LOGISTIC. SUP:PORT DJV

GEN li.RAI. AFFAIRS J)IY

• "Employment of Personnel Division" (1 ), \.Vich will acquire

LOGISTIC

GE:"/E RAL

F,MPl, O V~-IF.:ST

COORO

A FFA l,RS

OfFICE

OFflCE

OFFICE

"in toto" the ''employment" function of Officers, NCOs, volunteers and conscripts of the Service. Today these tasks are carried out by the respective General Directorates. The Division will consist of three "Employment Offices" (Officers, NCOs and Civilians, Volunteers and Conscripts ) and one Legal Office;

NCO& ClY F.MPI.0YMF.:'<T Of'FICE

l~ FRASTllUCT'Ull£ OfHCE

HISTORICAL 0 FFICF.

ENLISTED PERS.

ARMS&AMMO Off'ICE

ARMY PUBLICAT IO NS O Fl'IO :

C4 01'1,'IO;

RECRIJITMl<SI' PR OMOTIO N A(;t:NC Y

TACTICAi. MOBILITY OFFIC E

PUHi.iC l !IIFORMAT ION AGt:NCY

EMPLOYM F.NT OFFICE I.E<;AI. OFFICE

M 109 seff:propellecl gun in a live-firing exercise.

•

"Forces Employment Division", \Vith four Offices: Plans and Situation, Doctrine, Training and Regulations, Armaments' Control and Security - Military Police;

volunteers. It consists of two Offices (General Affairs Office and Historical Office), one Public lnformation Cent.re and two Agencies(Press and Enlistments' Promotion); • "General and Financial Planning Division": established with the reconfiguration of the General Office for Planning and Financial Programming, consists of four

lines on all sectors, coherently with the prefigured objectives and compatibly ·with the financial resotu-ces available. REORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATIONAL FORCES

The reorganization of t he operational forces aims at 'building" a land instrument capable of

• "Logistic Support Division",

offices:

carrying out the assigned tasks in

responsible for the elaboration of the logistic policy and doctrine of the Army, with five Offices: Logistic Coordination, Infrastructure, Arms and Ammunition, Signal and lnformatics, Tactical Mobility; • "General Affairs Division", which has improved its Public Information and Propaganda sector, especially as regards the enlistment of short-term

Planning, Financial Progranm1ing and Budget, Forces' Organization (fom1er Organization Office) and Administration. This is the most innovative transformation, in that this Division is tasked with the elaboration of medium/longterm planning, based on the presumable future operational scenarios and, consequently, it must lay down the programme

the best possible way, ensuring: • a qualified and active presence on the national territory, in order to exercise a constant vigilance and effectively concur to the collective security and \.velfare; • the capability of projecting forces to areas of crisis, to contribute, in join t and multinational contexts, to the prevention of situations of instability, tension or crisis, to safeguard the

fig. 6

OPERATIONAL LAND FORCES xxxx

NAT. STAFF

XXX / XX

HIGHER CMD.

PROJ. FORCES

XXX / XX

Ill

~ng. Rgt.h

Ill

xxx l xx

XXX / XX

1st Def. F.

2st Dcf. F.

Ill

I~·-~.l~&:·.b.]

OCOM

~ CENTAURO X

XX ~ I l l. C4.J£W ____ _J

f'RlULI X

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TAURIKENSE Ill

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SASSARI GARIBALDI

national interests and/or to contribute to the common security and international legality; • the defence of the national territory and participation in the common defence within the Atlantic Alliance, through the use of force, when the deterrent role of the military instruments proves lo be ineffective. On the basis of these functions, the concept of "capability packages" has been developed (see Rivista l\tlilit.are, no. 1/98), \Nilh the defini tion of groups of forces, harmonically assembled according to the requirements: projection forces, reaction forces, presence and surveillance forces. One group, named "defence forces" includes the whole operational component. The definition of the "capability packages" has been worked out

T RIO[NTINA

together vvilh the reorganization of the chain of command of the land forces, where it was established that the figure of the f-t.1ture COMJSRC (now COMLANDSOUTH) should coincide wilh that of the Commander of the Operational Land Forces (COMFOTER), thus attributing a "double hae' to a single High Cornmande1~ This decision is at the origin of lhe adj uslmer1l or lhe COIIUllallU and control organization of the Armv, ,vith the establishment of a nati"onal command-structure, capable of managing the \vhole of the operational land forces and of supervising their preparation. The same command has also been attributed the task of planning and conducting the operations thal unLiJ. now were in the responsibility of the Military Regions, in the sector of tenitotial defence.

COMFOTER's subordinates arc: • a command, expandable in a joint ,md in a multinational sense, able of both project itself to an external Theatre, thus perform ing the fu nctions of Forces Command ("projection" function) ,md to act, within a NATO operation, as the l-leadquarters of the llalian "Framework" Division assigned to the ARRC ("reac..-tion" function); • a conunand, potentially prnjectable and expandable, capable of replacing the former in case of long and/or high-attrit ion operations; • two commands in charge of the management of the operational requiremen ts connected with the "presence and surveillance" function, and the cooperation with other State bodies in case of disaster or serious disturbances of the 77

fig.7

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

tactical/logistic/training support. • 2nd Defence Forces Command in Napoli (2° Cdo FOD): now at the organizational stage, will be manned by personnel partially taken from the Southern Military Region; will inclu de the Granatieri di Sardegna, Sassaii, Pinerolo, Aosta Brigades, as well as eight regiments for tactical/logistic/trnining support. The firs t two Commands are readily employable for out-of-area operations and can expand to assume th e Joint/Combined configuration, Vvith the acquisition of joint/multinational modular cells. Fwihermore, the Commander of the Land Operational Forces avails himself of the action of the Support Commander~ responsible for the coordination and control of the Operational and Logis tic Su pports of the Land Forces, which include A/A Ali.illery, Army Aviation, Artillery and Engineer Groups, the Logistic Support Command and the C4-IEW Command, for a total of twentythree regiment-level units. REORGANIZATION OF THE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE

public orde1: As a consequence, the operational component of the Army has been divide d into fom: complexes of forces , subordinate to the same number of Intermediate Operational Commands (fig. 6). They are: • Projection Forces Conuua.nd in Milano (FOP): estab lis hed through the reconfiguration of the 3rd Co11Js Command, consists of the Garibaldi, Folgore, Friuli Bligades and eight regiments for tactical/logistic/training support. These uni ts are, or ,,vill be, completely made up by volunteers. FOP has also the task of detaching the H.eadquarters of the 3rd Italian Division assigned tothe A.RCC;

• Alpine Troops Command in Bolzano (TA), potentia lly projectable: ac tiva.ted by reco nfigu ring the 4th Corps Command, includes the Taurinense Brigade based on volunteers and two other Brigaues, Julia and TI-iclenlina, plus eight regiments for tac ti cal/1 o gi s tic/training supp01i; • 1st Defence Forces Command in Vittorio Veneto ( 1° Cdo FOD): esta blished with the reorganization of the preexistent 5t h Corps Command. I ts subordinate un its are the A1iete, Centauro and Pozzuolo de) Friuli Brigades, together with e ight regiments for

This structure, at pr esent very oversized especially in relation to the architecture that the Army will assume in the medium/short te rm, will undergo rad ical changes . This is in fact an unde layable requirement, considering the need to balance th e various components of the Service, without further cuts in the operational forces . The reorganization of the territorial component has, furthern1ore, the objective of clearly defining the three command lines "operational", "logistic" and "tenitorial" - in order to eliminate the overlap/duplication ,u-eas, thus reducing the command slluctures, as well as those related to logistic and administrative support. Based on these requirements, the reorganization project of the

sector -already sta1ted - envisages the reduction of the Military Regions from seven to three as a result of the following measures (fig. 7): • dissolution of Lhe North-West Military Region; • transformation of Lhe NorthEast, Tuscany-Emilia and South Regions, into North, Centre and South .Military Regions, whose Commands - sharply reduced will be located r espectively in Padova, Firenze, and Napoli; • reconfiguration of the Sardinia and Sicily Military R egions, which vvill become Autonomous Military Commands (respectively subordinate to the Commanders of the Centre and South Mi.litary Regions). The Central Military Region vvill become the Capital's Command, subordinate to the Commander o f t he Centre Region. The new Military R egion Commands will transfer their operational and trammg responsibilities to the Intermediate Operational Commands, and those connected with logistic suppmt to the Area Logistic Commands (to be examined later); they will maintain their functions in connection with ga rrison activities, military property, infrastructure, medical and administrative services, as weU as lhe responsibilities related to conscrip tion, recru itment and mobilization. Consequently, also the present organization of the Regional Military Conunands (fig. 8) \Nill be revised, \.Vith the obj ective of releasing the Operational Command (Inlermediale and

Brigades) from any garrison tasks, establishing, in each Administrative Region, an autonomous Regional Militarv Command e it her "centred" on the Milit;ry Region Command itself or an a School organization. The "new" Regional Military Command will function as r eduction gear of the Regional Commands, in all the sectors of responsibility of the latte1~ with particular reference to e:arrison and

fig. 8

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

xxxx CHIEF OF

STAFF

XXX

PADOVA

CMR PIEMONTE

XX/XXX

CAPITALE

coo

CMR . V.D'AOSTA

XX/XXX

CDOMIL.AUT. SARDEGNA

CMR MOLISE

CMR LIGURIA

CMR EMILIAR.

CMR BASILICATA

CMR X

LOMBARDIA

, - CMR . MARCHE

CMR. PUGLIA .

CMR TRENTINO A.A.

CMR . : -ABRUZZO 1 :

CMR CALABRIA

CMR FRIULIV.G.

)

CMR UMBRIA

infrastructure issues. REORGANIZATION OF THE LOGISTIC AREA

One of th e functional sectors which have been thorou ghly revis.e d is certainly the logistic cornponent, which is going through a deep tra nsformation, due to the transition from a static structure, largely rooted in the territory and ai rned at cleady defined possibilities of employment, to a streamlined organization, with an integrated

chain of Command and Control, efficient and \veil defined, ready to support the manifold missions that can be assigned to the Servi ce today. The preexisting situation, as a matter of fact, did not meet the criteria expounded above, in that: • at central level, the concentration in the 4th Division-ISPEL of the managerial and programmatic responsibilities implied, on .the one hand, an objective difficulty in the management of the assets and, on the other, a duplication

fig. 9

SU J"11VHT STRUCTURE OF THE ARlVIY LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION

xxxx CIIIF.F OF STAFF

LOGlSTlC INSPECTOR

XX DEP.INSP. TRAMAT

DEP. JNSP.

DEP. INSP.

MED.4,< VE1'.

SERV. &ADM .

Ofl'ISIO~ MATERIALS FO.R t----+----1 COMBAT

SKRVICE

MATl:RIAL

C4 - EW ~'IATERIEL

VE:TERIN.

' ORC.

NAT. TRANS. AGE~CY

of the line of subordination of the Logistic Commands and Corps,

act1v1t1es, with consequent waste, excessive time spent

of the .Military Summit, have emphasized the urgent need to:

which vvere connected to the

cxan1ining requests, redundancy

• reorganize the logistic structure

Chief of the 4th Division - ISPEL only from Lhe functional point of view, while they were directly subordinate to the A.rmv Chief of Staff for all the issues ~-elated to personnel, discipl ine etc.; • on the territory, the division of the capabilities between Military Regions and operational Commands (Corps and Brigades) bindered l11e rational management of the logistic

of some stocks, accompanied by chronic shortages in others, besides d i fficu lties in the management of operations concen1ing units from different Military Regions. The req u irements of the nc\v strategic picture, together with Lhe need to achieve substantial savings - both structural and managerial as well as the necessity to follow the c1ite1ia laid dmv11 in the reform

in a reductive sense, considering a more slender functional chain, based on a largely automated command and control system; • proceed to the functional an d structural in tegration of the logistic services operating in "borderino" sectors a nd \Vhich b have s ign ificant overlaps as, for instance , Service Co rps and Administration; • reduce the men1ber of logistic

units, joining them together in a few maintenance and/or supply bodies - with areal responsibilities - and a limited n umber of national poles, "oriented". to the supply and maintenance of specific weapon systems. • grant high flexibility to the whole system, so that it can adapt to very di fferen t operational situations, with particular reference to the "adherence brackP.t", destined to face frequent projections of out-ofarea forces, with a remarkable extension of the "supply arm". • ensure, also through an accurate control of the expenses, a balanced management of the resources destined to the operating expenses, employing computerized systems all the way dO\vn to the lowest levels. In this perspective, it was decided to redefine the top of the Command and Control chain of the logist ic organization: todav there are three basic "act~rs", subordinate to the Army Chief of Staff, each with quite distinc t tasks and responsibilities: • the Logistic Support Division of the Army Staff, responsible for the logistic policy of the Army and the preparation of the financial programmes - together with the General and Financial Planning Division - in the sector of modernization and renewal; • the Army Logistic Inspectorate, responsible for all managerial activities, both at central and territorial level; in the latter case, the Inspectorate avails itself of

fig. 10

LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION

xxxx CHIEF OF STAFF XXX

LOGISTIC INSPECTORATE

NORlU LOCIS11C AREA CERICO

CERIMANT

SIG'l,\L

SERIMANT

MAT.Dlil'.

RELORE GREATCAP. POi. DEP. ARTY MATERIEi,

l)TlflilANS BN.

.CEITTR. DEP

llTH MOT. MAN.-UNIT

SPEC.MAT.

MACRA CERIMO;r 6TI.I ORE 111(TRAJ<UN,

' MONTC.l'i!ATA'

logistic activities operational forces.

the

Lwu Area Logistk Commands,

The reorganization started with

which carry out the tasks previously assigned to the Military Regions, with the exception of medical support which is still attributed to the Military Region Commands, in view of a possible joint reorganization of the Medical Corps; • the Command of the Operational Land Forces, whose Logistic Support Command manages the

the establishment of the Logistic Inspectorate, top body and sole responsible for the management of all activities related to maintenance, supply and transport. It consists of (fig. 9): • Logistic Inspector and his Office; • Coordination and General Support Division; • three Departments, one for each functional area, namely:

Transport and Material, Administration and Service, Medical and Veterinary (deriving from the preexistent Corps, which have been abolished). The logistic Inspector, in his organization, has also two Area Logis tic Commands (fig. 10 ), which act as reduction gears, manage all the logistic units located on the territorv, and are responsible for supply (depots, warehouses), maintenance (laboratories) and transport (different units); the latter \Vill be

fig. 11

LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION

xxxx CHIEF OF STAFF

XXX SCHOLL INSPECTORATE

OEl'.INSI'. &WAR.COL. COMO

ARMY FOREIGN CAl'iGUAGES SCHOO(.

NATIONAL CENTRE SELECT!Ol\ &RECR.

OEP.INSP.& COMO. SCHOO(.

XX WAR COLU:GK

ARMY ll'COSCIIOOL

111 RAV

MLLITARY ACADEMY

AP.l'LICATION SCHOOL

Ill "NUNZlATEtLA" ~UL.SCHOOL

Ill 2NOMIL. SCHOOL

integrated in a national transport agency.

is that of changing from the policy which envisaged a through initial preparation ""ith very few updating opportunities, lo a permanen t preparation, ,vhich is much more suitable for the employment o f more and more cornpos.ile and sophisticated training methods, and follows a complex road with qualification, special iza lion and professionalization stages, all aimed at equipping the personnel with a preparation adequate to the tasks entrusted to them. 1b achieve these results in a unitary vision, the whole School/Training sector has been placed under the conunand of the Inspector of the Am1y Schools, ,.vho avails himself of (fig. 11): • a Deputy Inspector responsible for the training of officers; ,vho is also the Commandant of the War College; • a Deputy Inspector~ who is also the Comn1andant of the Army NCO School, respon sible for NCOs' and Volunteers' training; he ·will have under hi s command also five Volunteer· Training .Regiments. In line with these project outlines, the School Inspectorate has taken w1der its command all educational establishments, including the War College and the National Selection and Recrui tment Centre of the Army. The Centre is the Army's organization in charge of the selection and recruitment of the young who voluntarily apply for admission to the fom1ative courses for regular or reserve Officers, .NCOs and volunteers, and can

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL STRUCTURE

fom1ation and training cycles of the perso1mel, considering: • the doctline's evolutions and the consequential procedures of employment of the forces; • that the Army is required to carry out a v,icle range of tasks,

The availability of Cadres and troops, well prepared and therefore up to the new tasks assi_gned to the Army, is a priority and an indispensable condition for achieving the objectives fixed by the "Army Project 2000". Within the framework of the Service's reorganization, therefore, the recon.fi~T\.u-ation of the school/training area is of particular value, since there is the urgent need to update the

receive and select approximately

some of which are completely different from the traditional ones (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, etc); • the introduction in the Units of new "professional figmes", such as the Marshals and long-term Volunteers, who carry out command duties at the ..lower levels. A particular objective of the reorganization of the School area

60,000 men a year. Also the Service/Branch school sector has likewise been placed under the management of a sole responsible co.rnmander; the Army Branches Inspector, who avails himself of (fig. 12): • Branches Inspectorate, established following the abolition of the former Inspectorates; the new organization ha5 taken upon itself all training, normative and

inspective general functions; • five Deputy Branch Inspectors, coinciding with the Commandants of the respective Branch Schools. Each Deputy Inspector is in.charge of a specialization/qualification pole, namelv: • Infantry pole, under the Deputy Inspector of Infantry, centred on the Infantry School (Cesano); • Armoured Pole, under Lhe Deputy Inspector of Cavalry and Armoured Troops established at the Armoured Troop School (Lecce) - which includes also the Cavalry School (Montelibretti); • Artillery pole, centred on the Artillery School (Bracciano), which includes also the A/A Artillery Training and Experimenta tion Centre (Sabaudia), (resulting from the trasformation of the Army A/A Artillery School); • Engineer pole, coinciding with the Engineer School (RomeCecchignola); • Signal and Informatics pole, resulted from the reconfiguration of the Signal and Informatics School (Roma-Cecchignola): In substance, the aforementioned Deputy Inspectorates: • are the n atural he irs of the Inspectorates, as far as "culture", traditions and "sense of belonging" to the Branch or Speciality are concerned, and function as centres for the elaboration and diffusion of the employment doctrine of the minor u nits, as well as of the relevant technical regulations; • are respu11sible not only for t he

unitarian formulation of the guidelines for the preparation of Cadres and Troops, but also for controlling the consespondence of the school/training cvcles to the general objectiv;s fixed by the Army Staff, as well as to the requiremen ts defined by the Commander of the Operational Land Forces; • carry out training, qualification and re-training activities, for all

fig. 12

SCHOOL/TRAINING ORGANIZATION

xxxx CHIEF OF STAFF

XXX BRANCHES INSPECTORATE

........ [

INFANTRY l'Ol.E DEP. INSP,JNF. & -

····\,

\ .. COMD. INF.SCHOOL - - - ~

··...................................................................................·

.... DEP.1/ISP. ARTY& C0.\10. ARTYSCHOOt

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...............................................................................

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SIGNAL POLE · ~£P.INSP.

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personnel (of all ranks) belonging to the various Branches/Specialities; • are the forums for debates and seminars on particu lar operational and tra ining experiences; • carry out experimental and illustralive activities on new materials and weapon systems.

As regards the Army Aviation, (AVES), the preexistent Inspectorate

has been tranformecl in the AVES Command, located al Viterbo, and is subordinate, for its employment, to the Support Commander (COMSUP) of the Operational Land Forces Command. The AVES Command consists of: • the Army Aviation Centre; • the AVES units in support of the Operational Land Forces. To complete the entire project, the reconfiguration of the Alpine Military School is under way - the

School was fo rmerly subordinate to the 4th Alpine Corps (now Alpine Troops Command) together with the restmcturing of the Military Paratroop School, that will becom e the "Paratroop Training Centre", still subordinate to the "Folgore" Paratroop Brigade. Final ly, as regards the reorganization of the "logistic" Schools - now subordinate to the Logist ic Inspectorate - similar reference parameters have been used, and the follow ing poles have been established: • Medical pole, centred on the Military Medical School, that ,..vill move from Flore nce to Rome, and whose Head v.rill be the Deputy Inspector of th e Medical and Veterinary Corps. • Administration and Service pole, coincident with the Comma nd of the Military Administra tion and Service Sc h ool, subordinate to the respective Deputy Inspector; • Transport and Material pole, centred on the Command of the Transpo rt and M ateria ls School , sub ordinate to the Deputy I nspector of the Transport and Material Branch . EVOLUTION OF THE TRAINING ORGANIZATION

The Trai ning Organization, directed toward s the initi al preparation of the recmit, consists at present of 25 Recruit Training Centres, a t Regiment or Ba ttalion level (RAR /BAR), attended by approximately 130,000 recruits. These units provide for the enlistment of the recruits and the connected activities, such as issue of uniforms, medical checks of all personnel, basic training. The s hape of the train ing organi:tation has been revised, based o n the decrease in the established stre ngh t of the troops (by the end of 2003 there will be 100,000 members, 40,000 of which volunteers and 60,000 conscripts) and on the following parameters:

MLRS multiple rocket-launcher during an exercise

• lenght of conscri ption no less than 10 months; • gradual tra nsition from the present situations to the final phase, in close r elation to the trend in t he enlist ment of volun teers; • selection of the BAR/RARs to be kept in operation, taking into account: .. the availability of installations in good state of preservation a nd with good reception capabilities, as well as the exis tence of training areas/ranges at short distance from the ganisons: .. the uniform distribution of trai ni ng unit s on the national territory, in order Lo achieve the highest possible rate of regionaliza tion of the military service. Once the reorganization programme is completely implemented, the Am,y will control a Ii-aining Org-d.J1imtion of 18 BAR/RARs, 5 of which will be in charge of the initial preparation of volunteers (men and wornen) and 13 for the enlistment/training of conscripts. Moreover; to reduce the effects of the reduction of conscription to 10 months, a system for governing the turnover in the uni ts has been rea lized. It overcomes the traditional division of conscription into "instruction and operational periods" , an d m oves on to a training/operational f01111ula to be completely developed al unit level. To this end, four BARs have been atlributcd the fu nctions of "Conscript Enlistment Centres", where the recruits stay for the time strictly necessary (maximum 10 clays) to carry out the activities connected with the enlistment, and then they join the units, where they cany out all training phases. The effect of this measure is that the regiment of the basic branch, whose employment is envisaged by

battalion modul es, will always count on 100% of the operationally employable force, while the remaining tact ical/lugistic support units will have, at all times, an operational manpower of 70-80 % of the established strength. CONCLUSIONS

The real ization of the "Arm y Project 2000" is an event of exceptional importance for t he Sen.ice. Lt is an extremely complex operation that, starting with the reform of the Higher Ranks, has

number of Brigades has gone dm,vn from 25 to 13, whereas this drastic reduction was not accompanied by proportional contractions, nei ther in the Territorial Organization nor, even less, in the Logistic Corps and Services. As a consequence, at the present stage of the Army's reorganization (which - among other things - must reduce, the number of Officers by 25%) it becomes inevitable to cut into the above sectors, also to achieve an harmonic balance among the different components of the Service, in line with objective criteria of rationalization of the structure and optimization of the available resources. Ultimately, every possible effort has been made to build a realistically sustainable military instrument, safeguarding the Operational Forces - which are the very raison d'etre of the Army - ensuring them, with the synergic contribution of all other components, a standard of effic.i ency and operational readiness adequate to face the large and diversified range of tasks that the Army is carrying out and will verv likelv be required to perform~ both i~ the national environment and in the wider - and more demanding international context.

D involved all components, down to the system of recrui tment of conscripts.

rigour and it affects, albeit in different measures, all components of the Army, with the foremost

In fact, doubtlessly, in order to

objective of streamlining the

change an inst1ument, which was built for the defence of frontier and territory, into a force capable of rapid deployment outside the national borders, and capable of participating - on a plane of qualitative parity - in multinational cooperation, it was necessary to undertal<.e a radical transformation of the Service's organization. The "Army Project 2000" is therefore marked by austerity and

territorial command structures, as well as those entrusted with the logistic/administrative support. This was a compulsory choice, in that the only alternative was a further reduction of the Operational Forces which, we must remember, have been affected, almost exclusively, by the great reorganizations of the Army. Suffice it to mention a significant fact: from 1989 to this day the

;"Colonel, Head, Forces Organization Offi.ce, Army General Staff **Lt. Colonel, Chief; 1st Section, Forces Organization Office, Army General Staff

(1) The Division will assume these tasks and this structure immediately after the approval of the Implementation Decree of art.10 of Law 25/97 (Reform of the Military Summit)

filI1 IfI1£il\IINITIIKI@ ---·-"'- -·

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,.._

I]RI if8]JIJJJJl~1PII®IRI&Ik-- by Pier Paolo Lunelli * PARALLEL PLANNING Actually the process of parallel planning (a NATO term) among various cornrnand levels is nothing new. It derives from. the Warning Order (WO) concept which is in fact a link of the planning cycle chain, because it supplies the subordinate command ,vith the basic elements sufficient to start a similar cycle at its level. It is applied not only in the conduct phase bu t also in contingency planning. The parallel planning model, illustrated at fig. 1 for

didactic purposes, includes in thjs specific case cm operational level (a Combat Joint Task Force - CJTF, employr.d in Art. 5 operations, a Land Component Commander LCC) and several tactical levels (1) (Corps , Divisions, Brigades, Battalions). Although this rnodel lacks the other components (air and ma1itime) the process applies also to the latte1: This process can be explained as follows: • CJTF. The Cornbined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander receives the mission from the

Theatre Commander and issues a Warning Order (WO) for the Land Component Commander. This Warning contains, at least, the CJTF mission together with additional information elements. Other \,Varning Orders can be issued later on, as the s.ituation becomes more dea1: The CJTF Commander's final act will be to issue the Ope ra tion Order (OPORD) or, according to the situation, the Operation Plan (OPLAN). Such Warning Orders which, as we shall see in the third part, are an output of the

Finished is the era in which everybody had to be able to do everything. Âˇ The planning activity for the employment of technologically advanced weapon systems, the management of the media and the relations with civilian organizations, emphasizes the need for a specialization of tasks and functions. Staff activity increasingly requires the contribution of personnel with specific experience obtained along the years in national, joint and international environments. Nevertheless, working methods are the same as before. Despite that, "brainstorming", i.e. a free spontaneous discussion trying to find and reelaborate new and useful ideas for the solution of problems, appears quite significant. This method particularly develops lateral thinking (typical of intuition and inference), in support to vertical thinking (typical of logic-analytical reasoning). The following work is only the first part of a series of articles concerning the complex problems of operational planning. The ensuing two installments shall deal with the essential concepts regardin the planning sequence and phases, with special attention to peace support operations. MODEL OF P AR.r\J..,LE..L PLAN NING THEATRE CDR

MISSION

EXECUTION

CJTF LAND COMPONENT COMMANDER CORPS

DIVISION BRIGADES BATTALIONS

CJTF: COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE

"REHEARSE" WO: WARNING ORDER

BB: BACK BRIEF

Fig.1

operational planning process , are: the Mission Statement, the Commander's Initial Inten t, the Operational Concept and others; â€˘ LCC. At Land Compon en t Commander's level, the first Warning Order received triggers off an internal planning process which produces its own WO destined to the Corps. In particular~ the model described shm,vs that the second \VO is sent out upon reception of the OPORD/OPLAN by the CJTF. The CJTF Comrnander, before the Land Component Commander

delivers his own OPLAN/OPORD, demands the so-called back-brief (BB) i.e. he makes sme that the mission has been understood and that the operational concept is in line \.Vith his orders before they are issued. At Air Component Commander and Maritime Component Commander level the process is similar; • Corps-Div-B.de. At Corps, Division, Brigade and Battalion level the process is repeated with similar. patterns. The only difference is that the lower levels must be allowed the time to make the so-called Rehearsal (2), i.e. to verify the feasibility of their Operation Order/Plan through an exercise for Command Posts (partial rehearsal) and/or with the troops (full rehearsal). The choice between the two abovesaid forms depends essentially on the time at one's disposal. It can be said, therefore, that the process of parallel planning enables the various command levels to make the most of the time available for planning, thus avoiding that the final executor lacks the necessary time. The backbrief, moreover, creates further synergies, giving the process a unitary character: The golden rule, un iversally adopted is called 1/3 - 2/3. This means that each Command level can use ony 1/3 of the time available for carryng out its planning, leaving the remaining 2/3 to the subordinate level. Indeed this rule tends to reach the values of 1/4 - 3/4. The estimate of the times can be made with a bottom-up procedure, keeping in mind that a platoon commander, or equivalent level, needs 2 - 4 hours to plan his action. At this point, there are a few questions that rise spontaneously:

"How can the Commander plan anything if he has only scarce or insufficient infonnation? How can he properly examine the situation if he ignores the size of the forces

Fig.2

PARALLEL PLANNING AND "ASSUMPTIONS"

COMMAND LEVEL "A"

[]

WARNING ORDER

approved ASSUMPTIONS become FACTS

"ASSUMPTIONS" (to be approved)

[]

and/or support available?" Well, a Commander \-vho can-ies out on his own the analysis of the mission, who writes in his own hand the directives and the operational concept, who has the ability to envisage the activities necessary for carrying out his mission, will replace facts or information, which are not yet available to him, ,.-vith assumptions (3) (hypotheses of planning, reasonable inferences derived from the analysis of the situation). Fig. 2 ·shows, as an example, two levels of command, one subordinate · to the other. The level "A" Command issues a Warning Order to level "B". The level "B" commander directs his staff according to the following elements: • Facts . obtained from the information available regarding situation, friendly and enemy deployments, available forces, operational capability, logistic support, etc. The mission received, the higher Conunander's intent and the Warning Order should be considered facts; • Assumptions. (hypotheses of planning), when "facts" are not

available and to avoid planning in a "vacuum". Jn particulm~ the assumptions formulated at the higher level should be accepted as such also by the 10\.ver level only if they are related with the level's own mission. Othen.vise they are to be accepted as facts until the contrary is proved. Assumptions, without wh.ich often the planning process cannot be properly can-led out, generally regard subjects, situations and areas outside the Commander's scope. Stil.l at Fig. 2 it is shown how assumptions are brought back Lo level "A" throught the back-brief (BB) previously illustrated, or listed in the OPLAN-OPORD draft. As can be seen in the mentioned figure, once the level "B" assumptions are approved by level"A" they can be considered "facts", i.e . sure elements of a situation. Nevertheless it should be stressed that only the assumptions important for the higher level should be approved by the latter. For instance, during the phase of projection of a force in a Theatre, the Commander of the operational level can perceive the need to

establish a n airlift crossing the air spa ce of a neutral nation , therefore he can "assume" that the said nation v..rill give perrnission to fly over its territory. The h igher level, acknowledging this, takes the necessary diplomatic steps a nd, once it obtains the a uthorization, the assumption at operational level becomes a "fact", i.e. a su re element of the situation. In peace support opera ti ons, a mandate of the Secu,ity Cow1cil of the United Nations, or a cease-fire agreed upon and implemented by the opponents, can be considered assumptions. In any case, assumptions must be pla usib.le, necessary and realistic. Listed at the beginning of the plan, they a.re generally the ou tcome of an iterative process, carried out through the analysis of the mission. Alth ough assu mptions are a n integral part of Contingency Plans, neverthe less they s hould not be inserted into Operational Plans or Operational Orders. THE LEVELS OF CONFLICT (also called levels of war)

The l eve l s of confl ict are certainly better kno\.\rn as levels of wa r, as they arc d efined in the Allied Tactical Procedures (ATPs) and in the Allied Joint Procedures (AJP-1). As they find their natural collocation also in peace support operations, from now on we shall speak of levels of conflict instead of levels of war; being understood that the first ter m includes the second. The leve ls of conflict ( 4 ) are the refore doctrinal aspects which link the strategic goals to the tactical actions, in that they facilitate the commanders in the cognitive process aimed at visualizing the logical flow of the operations, assigning tasks and relevant resources. It should be pointed out that each level (5) is defined by the effects and results that it intends to obtain and not by the number of the

Fig. 3

LEVELS OF CONFLICT

ESTABLISHES THE STRATEGIC-MILITARY OBJ

STRATEGIC

___L_E _v_E_L__ OPERATIONAL LEVEL

ASSIGNS ONE OR MORE STRATEGIC

42:·E~:::E:::::::v:~D CO]dTS CAMPAI GNS OR MAJOR OPERATIONS TO ACHIEVE ONE OR MORE STRATEGIC OBJs 2. ESTABLISHES OPERATIOt-JAL OBJs 3. ASSIGNS OPE~TIONAL ··

~- - - .- - - ·~;!}ECTIVES AT TACTICAL TACTICAL

LEVEL

PLANS, FIGHTS AND W INS BATTLES AND CONDUCTS TACTICAL ACTIONS IN O RDER TO ACHIEVE ONE OR MORE OPERATIONAL OBJs

Commander's stan:;, type of un its or forces. The logical-fu nctional relations arnong the abovementioned levels are pointed out at Fig.3. The yellow, green and blue colours indicate respectively the strategic, operational a nd tactical levels a nd the relevant activities that interpenetrate each other. As can be noticed, to realize the connection among the various levels, the strategic level assigns the strategic goals to the operational one and the operational level assigns the operational goals to the tactical one. In particular: • the strategic level is that in wich a Nation or a group of Nations form ing a coalition o r an alliance define strategic goals of security - suggested by nationa l a nd/or com mon interests - and contribute the necessary resources to attain such goals. As a rule, the level of the Minister - Chief of Staff of Defence - Military Committee of the Allian ce level is o f th e strategic kind. Nevertheless, it must be pointed ou t that th is leve l ca n b e divided into Politico-Strategic Jevel (Grand Stra tegic for France and Grea t

Britain) and Mmtary-Strategic level (Table A); • the operational level is the link which connects the strategic go a ls with the tactical employment of the forces. At thi s le vel th e e mployment o f military force is envisaged in order to attain these strategic aims through campaigns (6) and m ajo r operations (7). In particular, Liddcl Hart explains: ''111e operational level supplies the vital link between the strategic1nililary goals and the tactical employment of the forces on the battlefield through the conception, planning and execution. of major operations and campaigns". The command level related to the conflict leve l depe nds on th e nature of the conflict itself, the s trategic goals p ursued, t he dimension and structure of the T heatre and the a mount of forces involved. Even tually, the Commander of a Corps can be appoi n ted La nd Comp on e n t Command e r (LCC) , thus hi s level can become operational if it aims at ac h ievi ng str a te g ic objectives; • the tac tical level propose s to

TABLE A

THE LEVELS OF CONFLICT IN THE ALLIED DOCTRINES (UK and US)

The British doctrine recognizes four levels of conflict (8): LEVELS OF CONFLICT (UK) • Grand Strategic. "Grand Strategy" ..-- - - - --, is the employment of the national GRAND PRIME MINISTER r resources in order Lo achieve STRATEGIC objectives of military-policy. These resources include not only those relevant to the military instrument, CllfEF OF DEFRNCE STAFF but also those of a diplomatic and STR.\TEGIC economic character. The "Grand JOII\T COMMANDER MlLITARY Strategy" is conceived at government JOJ'.'IT PRRMANENT HEADQUARTERS (JPHQ) level, whether it acts autonomously or in the framework of international organizations such as the U.N., \.V:ithin JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (JFC) a lreaty like the North Atlantic one or OPERATIONAL in a coalition, such as that which took JOINT FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDERS shape for the Gulf War. In short, the (JfACC-.JFLCC-JFMCC-JFSFCC) "Grand S trategy" defines the objectives on the basis of the Government's policy, provides the TACTICAL army Navy Air Force S1>ecial Forces resources to achieve these objectives Service Responsibilities and imposes the limitations and restraints which are deemed necessary (e.g. Rules of Engagement - ROE), without discussing the manner in which these resow-ces will be spent. • Military Strategic: Military Strategy is the employment of the military resources to achieve the objectives of the "Grand Strategy''. Therefore, "Grand Strategy" and Military Strategy, together, aim at achieving political objectives. In particular, the Strategic-Military Autho1ity (9): decides which are the compaig11s to be conducted; defines the Encl State; points out restraints and limitations of a political, economic or legal nature; allocates resources and forces; establishes the command ~md control structure. • Operational level: Joint campaigns and major operations are conceived and directed, at operational level, on the basis of a strategic directive. The operational level includes the command level of the Force (Joint Force Conunancler) and that of the land, naval and air components (Joint Force Component Commanders - n ::AAC, JFLCC, JFMCC and JFSFCC). • Tactical level: Battles and tactical actions are conducted at tactical level in order to attain the operational objectives of a campaign. In short, while the Strategic-Military Authority defines the objectives, assigns the resour ces and fixes the employment restraints, 'the operational level issues the orders at tactical level, based on its own Campaign Plan. finally, it must be noted that two of the four levels are on the strategic plane. The_French doctrine is similar, albeit \.V:ith some va1iations.

The U.S. thought (10) considers instead the three classic levels of war (not conflict), arnong which the previously outlined political level, con-esponding to Grand Strategic, is missing. It must be underlined, however, that the Chief of the Defence Slaff (strategic level) develops, on the basis of the interes.ts of national security and of the objectives set by the President of the United States, the National Militmy Strategy. At this level the military requirements are defined, and the resources for achieving the objectives of the aforesaid Strategy can be employed. In fact, the difference between the t\vo doctrines is minimal, in that here the Grand Strategic is impl icit, and corresponds to the President of the United States of America - National Secrnity Council.

LEVELS OF WAR (UK) STRATEGIC

SUPREM.E NATIONAL (or ALLIED) COMMAND

THEATRE COMMAND (MULTINATIONAL)

I OPFRATIONAL I FORCE COMMAND (MULTINATIONAL)

army

TACTJC,f\L

Navy

Air Force

Special Forces

Joint Coordination army

Navy

! Air FoJ·ce

I Special Forces I

Service Responsibilities

attain operational objectives through battles (11) and engagements (12). At this level the units are directly..engaged in combat. . A single strategic concept tends not only to synchronize the actions carried out at every level, be it strategic, operational ancl/or tactical, but also defines if these actions are to be canied out jointly or in sequence. The scheme at Fig. 4 illustrates the hierarchy of the conflict levels in multinational joint operations and the relevant activities. While at strategic level we speak of military strategy of the Coalition and/or of Theatre strategy, at operational level the activity carried out is called campaign/sub-campaign planning. On a lower plane, the tactical level conducts and plans battles, engagements and actions. Actually the three levels cannot be considered as separate, but intersecting each other.

The British line of thought, of which Gen. Ash Irwin (13) is a precursor, points out that the operational level: • does not refer only to large-scale armed conflicts; • represents the connecting link between Strategy and Tactics, i.e. it links these two elements, creating areas of supe1imposition and redundancy; • is not bound to any particular level of command . The definition suggested by Liddel Hart implies the concept of sequencing (of operations) which proves the distinction between battle (tactical level) and campaign (operational level). A campaign is in fact a correlated sequence of major joint operations which confers a unitarian character to the tactical, operational and strategic actions; its end is to attain strategic goals within preestablished limits of time and space. It is generally divided into phases, each characterized by an End S tate, which has the func tion of

assessing the success obtained. In particular a Campaign: • is directed against the enemy's CentTeofGra,,i ty(14); · • is based on the combined a nd synchronized employment of all land, maritime, air and space assets, special forces included; • clearly defines the End State, i.e. what materializes the success, the conclusion of a mission or the strate1:,,y for withrawing the forces from the operational Theatre; • is the basis for the subordinate commands' planning; • at strategic level. gives a unitary character of jointedness to the stages of mobilization, force's projection in the Thea tre, employment and support to the forces, including also the campaigns and operations conceived and organized hy the subordinate Commanders of the land, mant1me and air components (JFLCC-JFMCCJFACC). The outcorne of the campaign/subcarn pa ign planning is the campaign/sub-campaign plan, which transfor m s the strategic concepts in military action plans and indicates how operations,

logistic support and available tirne ,.vill be employed to achieve the strategic goals. The levels' description could give the impression that each level constitutes an entity separate from the others. In reality this distinction rarely appem·s clearly. As a matter of fact, Fig. 4 shows t.hat there are no predefined boundaries but rather an interpenetration between the conflict's levels and the activities connected with thern. This means that an operational Commander cou Id eventually be called Lo perform some functions typical of the strategic level, and, similarly, a tactica l Commander may have operational responsib ilities in certain situations, and tactical ones in other·s. It is nevert heless important to consider that th e activities carried out at one level can have direct consequences on the other levels. Edward Luttwak desc1ibes this as "interpretation of tbe levels of ,.var", meaning that the harmony among levels leads to success ,.vhile discordance denies it, and a 1nistake made at a lower level reduces the probabilities of success of the higher one. Fig. 4

LEVELS OF CONFLICT IN JOINT MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

Interpenetration of levels

To sum it all up, the achievement of all tactical objectives realizes the operational objectives which in their turn concur in attaining the strategic goal, everything in a joint setting.

The,-e are several reasons for this interpenetration of levels. In fact, the employment of precision weapon systems (i.e. smart bombs), of intelligence and communication systems and the media's dimension could eventually permit to conduct tactics from the strategic level, as in fact lfitler ,U1d Church ill cl.id during WWII, or Johnson during the Vietnam war (1965-68). President Johnson, actually, used to make his decisions every Tuesday during a working lunch. He controlled air operations, even pointing out targets, times and type of ammunition, thus centralizing not only the strategic decision but also the operational and tactical ones. The consequen ces were a lack o f flexibility at operational a nd tactical level and an inadequate cost-benefit ratio. Fi nally, the interpenetration among levels becomes of particular importance in multinational operations because the forces belonging to vatious Nations have ah.vays a high political value, also when, for numerical reasons, they have a limited importance from the tactical point of view. According to current British thought ( 15), three questions help to establish whether an action has a diinension appropriate to the

operational level: • has the action a political dimension? In conventional operations a political decision can have direct effects on the envisaged action . In the Falklands/Malvinas war, t he political decision to attak Goose Green can be considered an action at operational level because it was prompted by political directions, and so was

Volunleers in a firing exercise -with the "AR 70/90" individual weapon at Aosw's Alpine Mililary School.

the release of the hostages on the "Achille Lauro". Similarly, the command of the contingent in the recent operation in Albania had an operational dimension. • can the action have a decisive influence on the general situation of the campaign? The employment of airborne troops in Normandy, the landing at Inchon and the German offensive in the Ardennes are clearly three examples of actions at operational level. And again the air attack on Port Stanley with aircraft coming directly from the motherland, although it did not change the tactical situaLion in the Falklands, proved the capability to strike at a distance o f 12,000 Km; and a direct

consequence was that units of t he antiaircraft defence were withdrawn from the islands in order to protect Buenos Aires, thus weakening the Argentine Centre of Gravity. can the action directly contribute to acquire the strategic objective? The US decision to employ the "Patriot" missile system against Lhe SCUDs in Jsrael, during the Gulf War, concwred to the achievement of d1e political aims of the campaign, because it prevented Isra el's

interven tion in t he conflict. Such intervention, in fact, \.vould have endangered the cohesion of the Arab coalition, a long-tirnc adversary of Israel. Moreover; two forther remarks are necessary (16): • the operational level is joint by definition (often the contrary is also true); • in a coalition, as we have

Commander (PSC), to conduct a counteroffensive operation. Moreover it is acknowledged that the ARRC, in the BosniaHerzegovina operation (19951996) held the operational level both because the Commander was de facto Land Component Commander and owing to the multinational character of the operation.

THE END STATE AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE GOALS

already said, the employment of forces belonging to different nations may have a pol itical aspect, even if tactical actions are carried oul. Particularly, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and Lhe ACE Mobile Force (Land) [(AMF(L)], as mullinaliona] formations directly subordinate to SACEUR, are able to operate both at operational and tactical level, according to the situations, the strategic environment or the phase of the operation. The AMF(L) can actually be considered at operational level when it is employed to "show the flag" and at tactical level when organized within a Corps. Similarly, the ARRC could work at operational level in non-Art.5 missions until a Combined Joint Task Force is constituecl and deployed, or employed as Rapid Reaction Corps, subordinate to a Principal Subordinate

\Vhen the political establislunent of a Nation or coalition of Nations decides lo employ lhe Armed Forces for an operation it should first of all define the End State. It is envisioned as a state or situation to be reached and therefore it can have a connotation of time, space or situation. \i\Then this parameter is not defined, the Armed Forces risk being employed in a permanent manne1~ with lhe mere function of support to other institutions. The detection of the status or military situation which achieves the success related with the strategic goal (End State) derives from the analysis of the situation and is lhe basis for defining the operational objectives to be enlrusted to the tactical level. The End State concept is an integral part of the so-called "Battlefield Visualizazion Concept" (17). This is a process through which the Commander: • develops a clear knowledge of the

objectives to be assigned to the subordinate level is a factor of failure. For example, during the Allied invasion of Italy fo 1943, Marshal Montgomery \\:Tote: "... I was ordered to invade Europe, without adequate resources and without receiving any objective ... the decision to invade Italy has ernbarked us in a campaign, having no idea or plan on how it would develop ... the whole business proved itself a less than clear activity ... of typically British derivation". The decision to isolate Italy and to divert German forces from other fronts, besides generating confusion, was not in fact accompanied by an adequate allocation of resources. On the contrary, in 1943, Gen. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, received clear strategic guidelines, which nevertheless concerned only a short-term End State: "You will enter into continental Europe together with other Allied Nations conducting operations so as to strike. at the heart of Ce1many and destroy its Armed Forces". Such Encl State, based on Germany's unconditional surrender, lacked a long-term vision, i.e. did not take into account the consequences on the future balances in Europe, which led to the "cold war". Not always the strategic level is in a position to define in writing the End State and the strategic directives, due to the distance of the operational Theatre 01~ more often, for incompetence. In this case the operational Commander

existing situation in connection

can suggest them in a draft , as

with the enemy and the environment; • finds out the desired End State, which represents t he accomplishment of his m ission; • visualizes the sequence of the activities necessary to conduct his forces from the existing situation to the End State; The inability to define the End State and clear operational

Gen. Schwarzkopf did in operation "Desert Storm" (18): "the British wanted the U.S. Secretary of State to define the political and strategic aims of the coalition ... Thus I instructed the Head of the Military Policy Plans Office to prepare a draft which was modeled after the one issued by Eisenhower in Februaiy 1944". The draft, divided in three parts, envisaged:

lmem.cticm between m.en and equipment is fimdamental for success in any operation.

1.TASK. To conduct operations in ord er to compel the I raqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait in accordance ,Nith the resolution of th e UN Security Council. If necessary, on order, to conduct military operations for destroying the Iraqi Anned F orces, free K11wr1i(

,1rnl r estore the legitimate

government ... 2.AUTHORIZATION. On order~ you are authorized Lo conduct operations on Iraqi territory and lhe adjoining seas, to free Kmvait and destroy lhe Iraqi forces that threaten Saudi Arabia. The [orces must be able to start the operations no later than february 1991. r( the Iraqi forces were to attack Saudi Arabia, you are authorized to conduct land, air and naval operations in Kuwait and Iraq, in their air space and territorial waters. 3.0PERATIONAL DIRECTIVES. Th e goals of your offensive campaigns are: (1) to destroy plants capable of nuclear, biological and ch emical production a n d the re levant \.veapon systems; (2) occupy the southeastern part of Iraq until the s trategic objectives have been achieved; (3) des troy and neutralize the Republican Guard; (4) neutrali ze and disarray the Iraqi Command and Con trol system; (5) degrade and destroy I raq's air de fe nce; (6) safeguard, i f possible , the hostages d etained in Iraq and Kuwait. This strategic directive includes a clear lask, the End State, the strategic bonds and objectives, and the re ader will be able to de tect the Centre of Gravity, a concept which ,.vill be taken up again in the next paragraph. The End State, from which by definition the objectives derive, affects the three !eve.ls of the war. In particulmÂˇ: the strategic-level End State is

reached when the subordinate operational levels (if there are more than one) have achieved all the strategic goals assigned lo them, or when the conflict can be considered finished and resolved. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the strategic-level End State is certainly the stabilization of the Balkan region. For this reason t he Implementation Force (IFOR) which has attained its strategic goal , has become a Stabili zation Force (SFOR). Moreover it must be said that the Balkans' stabilization is not pursued only through military activities but includes also a mix of economic and diploma tic efforts. In the Gulf Wai~ instead, the strategic-level Encl State consisted in the ensured free access to lhe energy sources and the res pect of internat ional sovereignly. More recently, in July 1994, Presiden t Clinton de fine d lhe End State of the operation in Zaire as follo\.vs "to stop tb e cholera epidemic among Rwanda's refugees at Gona, in Zaire. But no action must be taken to restore Rwanda's government" . In that

specific case, the Encl State permitted to conduct the operation with success and without losses, within thirty clays. â€˘ at operational level the End State is reached when th e assigned strategic goal is attained. Examples of End Stale at operational level are: (1) the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration o[ the legitimate government in operation "Desert Storm"; (2) the creation of a favourable environment, where the U.N. and non-governmental age ncies can assume full responsibility for the conduct of humanitarian support activities in the "Restore Hope" operation in Somalia; (3) the achievement \.Vithin 12 months o[ the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of the forces from the Separation Zone, and departure of the forces contributed by foreign Nations, in the "Joint Endeavour" operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina; â€˘ finally, some consider the End State also at tactical level, which corTesponds to the achievement of the operational goal. Commanders at every level

must know the End State and the conditions that determine success, before starting any operation. In peaee-support operations, the End State does not consis t in victory, but in the achievement of an agreernent among the parties. Such operations in fact aim at es tablishing and keeping the conditions in which politico-diplomatic activities can proceed on th e road o f

characteristic capability or location from where the enemy or the friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical force or \.\illingness to fight. The Centre of Gravity, when attacked and destroyed, leads to the enemy's defeat or to the pursuit of peace through negotiations. The Centre of Gravity concept, wh ich is a key e lemen l for determining the goals at the

reconciliation,

together with

various st rategic, ope .-ational and

pu blic opinion can be considered

economic and hurnanitarian efforts. Consequently, when the End State is expressed in political terms, the ernpJoyment of military force alone is not sufficient to obtain it. The abstract connotation of the End State in peace -support operations not only makes its determination difficult, but can also require adjustments during the operation, especially in the socalled "mission creeping" (19). A hypothesis of End State for peaceenforcing operations cou ld be as follows: "diplomatic negotiations between the two opponents are productive; communication lines are safe; the forces in the field are beyond the Separation Zone; the ceasefire holds; U. N. troops have replaced the Force; humanitarian assistance operations are carried out without dif/1.culty". In any case the Encl State should describe a situation that is to be obtained, i.e. the result of the military force's intervention. It a lways finds its place in the Commander's Intent item of the OPLAN and/or OPORDER. There is a close connection between strategic goals and intended End State. On the other hand, both e xpress general concepts. such as not to bind the Commander as regards th e procedures he employs to fulfill his mission. Some generic examples of strategic-level End State are shovm in the Chart.

tactical levels, presents tvvo main features. The first, offensive, tends to rea li1.e th e mass against the enemy Centre of Gravity, while the second, of a defensive nature, tends to p rotect one's own . Moreover, the Centre of Gravity can be an abstract concept especially at strategic level - such as th e enemy's will and the structure and cohesion of the coalition, or a concrete element especially at tactical level - such as the enemy's reserve, command and control structures and communication lines. ln any case

strategic-level Centres of Gravity. At operational level, in an operational theatre, the Centre of Gnwity is ins tead related to the capability to concentrate the combat power (20) necessary to achieve the End State. Some hystorical examp les ca n cla1ify the concept: â€˘ in .1 97 3 the Egyptian forces established a bridgehead beyond the Suez Canal with the 2nd and 3rd Army, getting ready for Israel's counterattack. Sadat, by assigning a strategic objective limited in space, airned al going Lo the table of negotiations in a

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

Objectives/ Strategic Goals

the Centre of Gravity must not be mistaken with the ene my's weak points but , on the contrary, it concerns generally an aspect of his strnng points. Similar to what occurs with the Encl S ta te, a lso the Centre of Gravity can be located respectively at strategic, operationa l and tactical level. For example : the capital of the enemy State, the \-villingness to fight, the consent of

End State (strategic level)

Reinstate the lawful Forces of StateBravo driven out from State Alpha. democratic government in Bravo's rnilitaiy forces unable to threaten Alpha. State Alpha invaded by Bravo Peace and stability achieved in Alpha. Non-threatened free elections in Alpha.

Ensure free navigation in Threat by submarines, warships, mines and piracy international waters berween removed. State White and State Green Black naval forces unable to threaten free navigation

Protect the Brown minority t}uÂˇeatened by military actions I in State Violet.

A ir and land threat by Violet removed. Survival of Brown minority assured.

Assure the integrity of State Paramilitary forces of the mainly Purple bordering R ed threatened by conflict State driven out from Red. bet\veen the Purple, Blue and Peace agreement among mino1ities signed Tndigo minorities. Free elections guaranteed.

The Centre of Gravity is the

Th e Alpin e v olunteers, bef ore thei-r assignmeni io the various units, follow a specific training cycle at 1\osta.'s 1\lpine

/vlilita1y School.

position of force and therefore the bridgehead on the eastern bank was defended ·with a large number of antitank systems and an tiaircraft missiles. This bridgehead, the Egyptian operational Centre of Gravity, was so well defended that the Israeli decided to conduct their counteroffensive applying the combat power on a weak point, as was the margin between the two Armies. The consequence was that the Centre of Gravity lost its cohesion, became vulnerable and the Israelis obtained such a success that only the superpowers' intervention managed to impose a ceasefire. It must be pointed out that the Centre of Gravity neither coincided ,,vith the boundary line between the two Armies, nor with the antiaircraft defence systern, nor ,.vith the communication lines. vVhilc the first of these three factors was vulnerable, the second ·w as actually a strong point which, if attacked with aircraft, would have entailed considerable losses on the Israeli side; • the Centre of Gravity can change during the campaign, as it was evident in the Falklands/Malvinas war. On October 6, 1982 the British had prepared a task force to free the islands conquered by Argentina four days before. Th.is task force consisted of more than twenty ships, including two air cra ft carriers. The amphibious component, a Brigade, was carried by a requisitioned commercial ship, the ''Canberra". One can therefore assert that sinking one of the two aircraft carriers or the "Canben-a" would have meant victory for Argentina. During the first phase o f the operation the t\vo aircraft caniers

were the Centre o f Gravity at operational level because, without them, the British would have been unable to project their task force in the successive amphibious operation. The "Canbe1Ta", which p.-ofited from the protection provided by the aircraft carriers, was not vulnerable and therefore could not be defined as Cent r e of

Gravity even if it carried the entire amphibious Brigade. In the second phase instead, the Centre o f Gravity shifted to the Amphibious Brigade, because the air supe1iority alone would have been insufficient to vvin back the islands. Argentina could still have won had she been able to defeat the amphibious unit, but she did not have forces adequately trained to oppose that threat;

• Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his book "It doesn't take a Hero" (21), in connection with the "Desert Storm" operation writes: ... " ar strategic level we decided that Saddam Hussein was the keystone, but we could not act against hirn. for ethical and legal reasons... thus Saddam was whar the military theorists call the enerny Cent.re uf Gravity (strategic) ... For our purposes it was sufficient to ''silence" Saddam, destroying his ability to exercise his command, based on an extremely centralized strucLure ... and the Republican Guard, although not deployed in KuwaiL, constituted the Iraqi strategic reserve for counterof(ensive operaLiOnS, and consequently was the Centre of Gravity at operational level ... If we could realize the mass against

the Republica n Guard with out having to fight agai11 st other forces, we could assuredly have achieved success ...• bur if the Republican Guard abando1:1ed the Th eatre, surrendered or was defeated, we could have equally obtained it"; • in peace-support operatio ns, such as Lh e c urrent ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Centre of Gravity of the coalition and that of the OP1,onents take on an abstract characler; as becorncs apparent in Fig.5. In particular, the term "enemy" is replaced by "opponents/warring factions" and the Cent.re of Gravity of the opponents must. not be hil but safeguarded. l n the "Restore Hope" operation in Somalia, the Centre of Gravity al operational leve l \Vas in s tead aimed at controlling the rout es and securing the freedom of movement of Lhe population. This condi t.ion ,vas in fact the n ecessary prerequisite for the disLr-ibution of humanitarian aid; • the danger <>f escalation is the key factor in internal conflicts marked by the absence of the State's authority. as was the case in Somalia and in Bosnia . In th ese asy1n.m elrical con l'l icts, military intervention in a climate or anarchy is justified more hy the people's consent than by th e U.N . mandate; a consent that may vanish in case of escalation of the con flict. Mis takes like the "Aid id hunt" in So mali a or L.he "bloo dy Sunday" in Northern Ireland in 1972 (22) h ave led to loss of c o n senl, nnd the r efo re of legitimation, Lo the p oin l that often the only way oul is that or withdrawing the m i Ii tary mission (23). From Lhe historical examples just described, some consid e rations emerge; • the Centre or Gravity is where the enerny ha s c oncentrated his combat power to attain his goals.

Direct attack is certainly the best choice, un less Lh e Centre or Gravity is well defended, or if one has not sufficient forces or forese es to suffer excessive losses. In s uch cases, t h e best soluti on is Lo attack the vu lnerabilit ies a ffecting the cohesion of the enemy Cenlre of Gravi ty; • the Centre of Gravily is not perman ent and can chan ge according to the phases of the campaign, as it happened in the Falklands war; • there is a close relation between the strategic-and operationa llevel Cen tres of Gravity, as in the case of "Desert Storm". In fact , the destru ct ion of the Centre of Gravity at operational level (Rep ublican Guard ) ca n becom e decisive for the elimination or the Centre of Gravity at strategic level (Saddam Hussein's leadership); • the combat power or Lhe enemy can derive from his capability to concentra te his forces by manoeuvering and th erefore must no t be considered a static clemenl, like a capilal c ity or an industrial centre. Consequently also the Centre of Gravity can

change in Li me and space, in synchro ny with the operation, as in the case of the Republican Guard in the Gulf \i\lar; • the Centre of Gravity is not a compo nent of the enemy combat powet~ as for example, the antiaircraft defence system in the Sinai, because its desLn.tction alone does n ot lead to victory. In any case it is essential not to wea,- out one's own combat power attacki n g ene my vulnerabiliti es in order to gain and keep the in itiative o r to obtai n a tactical s uccess; • every level of conOict has its m-vn Centre o f Gravity. At strategic leve l the people's or the government's w ill and the consent of public opinion are essential factors, as ,..vas proved by the Vietnam war; • to correctly identify the Centre of" Gravity. to attack it if it is vu lnerable or if one has sufficient forces to do it, is a decisive factor of success, especially at operational level. If this is not possible, one should strike at the vulnerabilities that constitute the adversary 's Achilles' heel in such a way as lo neutralize his Centre of Gravity forcing it to implode, Fig. 5

CENTRE OF GRAVITY The case of Bosnia COALITIO OPERATING ON UN MANDATE Polit ical cobfsion, unity ill tbf ,coalition·s pur·poscs in s uµµon of rhe peace operation.

CENTRE OF GRAV IT Y

The world watches how

STRATEG IC LEVEL

Capability of c(111qu erlng a nd maintainin g the initiative over the OJ>ponents. Cohesion of the multinational force. Sin gle ch ain of command.

OPPONENTS, WARRING FACTIONS

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

the Dnyton ogrc-o rncnts

arc honou red in ord er to end t he conflict and contain violence.

l'(:rception by the opponents that the peace agr ceme11t a nd it s implcme11tion are in their actua l interest.

as it happen e d in ope ra tion "Desert Storm". • it docs not suffice to detect and h it the enemy Cenn·e of Gravity, it is also necessary to safeguard and protect one's own; • the Centre of Gravity in peacesupport operations takes on an abstract characte,~ in that it aims at obtaining the cooperation and consent of th e waning parties, encouraging their abil ity to exercise command and control instead of destroying it. Moreover, the legitimation of the use of force obtained through a U.N. Resolution, the support of public opinion and the co hesion of the coalition form the friendly Centre of Gravity, an element that must be protected. lf the legitimation fails, both dip lomatic and military actions will also fai].

Fig. 6

AREA OF ACTION OF THE OPERATIONAL ART STRATEGIC DIRECTIVES AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

ACTIONS AT OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL

OPERATIONAL ART

THE OPERATIONAL ART

The Operational Art consists of the coordinated management of all military activities. Through this, the strategic goals are transformed in tactical actio ns, in order to achieve the End State. The Operational Art concept, a pre rogative of the Soviet military doctrine up t o 1980 , has bee n adopted by the Western d octrine in the last twenty years. The Operationa l Art is based first of a ll on strategic directives and on the all o t m ent of t he resources necessary to achieve the goals ass igned. Such goals are trans la ted into operationa l-level decisions (white ar ea at Fig. 6), decis ions t h at in th ei r t u r n produce actions at operational and tactical level, everything within the fram ework of the achievement of the strategic-level End State. T he application of the Operational Art requires n ot only an understan ding of the confl ict/war levels but also the con c r ete employment of th e concepts of operational design, such as: Centre of Gravity, Decis ive Points, Lines of Opera tion, Sequence, P hases, Operational

END STATE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Pause, Culmi.nan t Point, Contingency Planning. T hese instruments for pla nning w ill be examined more closely in the second part.

the End State are the key elemen ts that pcr-m il to carry through, in due time, the planning process for the employment of force. (to be continued)

CONCLUSIONS

D True a s it is that the Arm ed Force s arc a tool of forei gn policy, it is equally tnie that they w ill be emp loyed as a l ast resource . Accord in g to q u alified commentators, th e diplo m a ti c management o f a cris is uses up 97% o f the time a vailable w hi le the remaining 3% is left to military intewention. The start of "parallelp lan ning" as soon as the crisis breaks out, the empl oyment of assumptions, the detection of the strategic, operational and tactical levels and relevant g oa ls, th e implementation of th e Campaign Planning and a clear definition o f

.,,. Lt. Colonel, Chief; Air Defence Section ARRC

BIBLIOGRAPHY Internet, at entry: TRADOC Combined Joint Task Force Concept Combined Joint Task Force Doct.Jine Newsletter Dec 1993 Operations Other Than War Multinational Joint Operations Doctrine FM 100-5 Operations Joint Doctrine Capstone and Key.,1.one ATP-3S(B)

Command and Staff Decision Processes Battlefield Visualization Concept Peace Suppmt Opcrations..DoctJine The Center of Gravity is not an Achillesf Heel, Janum.y, 1988 Army Doctrine Publication Vol I Operations (British Doctrine Ed. 1994) Ash Irwin, The Levels of War, Operational Arr and Campaign Planning, Strategic Combat Studies Institute Ed. 1993 Nom1an Schwarzkopf: It docs not take a Hero, Bantam Press, 1992.

NOTES (1) As we shall see later; operational and tactical levels are not associated ·w ith specific command levels. The reader, therefore must not be misled by the association shown in the model. (2) Rehearse, (or Rehearsal or also Rock Drill) is a process through \.vhich the operational plan or the operation order are tested with Cornmand Post or Field Exercises. This activity must always be conducted at tactical level (full rehearsal) while at operational level it is possible to test only the key aspects (partial rehearsal). During "Desert Storm" the 7th Corps, which was making the main effort, caffied out a full rehearsal from the Assembly areas to the attack positions with the same deployment that \.Vas going to be applied in the subsequent offensive operation. (3) According to JP- 102 (US) "assumption" is defined as a "conjecture deriving from the CUffent situation, or a surmise on the fu ture course of events, both accepted as truths in the absence of proofs to the contrary". They allow the Commander to proceed with his planning, evaluate the situation and make the appropriate decisions . The assumptions arc nothing new, having been applied also to other fields, as medicine, economy, etc. An internist often makes assumptions, that he later confirms or discards according to

the results of clinical tests. ( 4) The British doctrine }1as already implemented this concept. See "British Army ·Doctrine Publication Vol.1, Ed 1994, pages 2-3". (5) For practical purposes, from now on we shall use the term "levels". (6) A "campaign" is a series of correlated joint military operations, ,Nith the purpose of achieving strategic and/or operational objectives within time and space limits defined in advance. A "campaign plan" desc1ibes hovv these operations arc conducted in time and space. The synchronization of air; land, naval and special operations into a multinational picture must be in keeping with diplomatic and economic efforts, in order to achieve the objectives of the coalition. (7) "Major Operations" are a series of coordinated actions, limited to a single phase of a campaign. They are usual.ly decisive for the development of the campaign. (8) British Army Doctrine Publication, VoLI, Ed. 1994 page 2-3; (9) It generally coincides with the British Chief of the Defence Staff. (10) "Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations". ( 11) A ''battle" consisLs of a succession of correlated engagements. It involves forces at Division or higher level, and can be fought in limited areas and times (for instance, on the Golan heights in 1973) or can last weeks and affect large areas. ( 12) "Engagements" arc limited conflicts or skirmishes, normally

Combat Institute No 5 Ed. 1993". (16) "British Army Doctrin e Publicat ion, Vol. l Ed. 1994, pages 3-5". ( 17) "Battlefield Visualization Concep t, TRADOC Pam 525-70 1997 (available on Internet). ( 18) Norman Schwarzkopf: "It does not take a Hero "Bantam Press, 1992, page 468. (19) The term "missiong creeping" is used , in peace-support operations, when the mission is modified during the operation with the addition, for instance, of other tasks such as the management of elections, the search for persons wanted by the Intenu1tional T1ibunal for war c1imes, and their arrest. "Mission creeping", which .m ust be considered a norrnal occun:ence in future operations, can have fateful consequences, as was the case of UNPROFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina, where the Blue Helmets were placed in a "Peace Enforcing" condition without the personnel and means necessary to can y out the task. (20) According to the U.S. publication "JCS Pub. 1-02: "Combat Power (DOD, NATO)", "Combat power" is the whole of the destructive force that a military formation or unit can apply against the enemy at a given moment. It is closely connected with the mass, which refers to the application of combat power at a place and time decisive for the achievement of success. (21) Norman Schwarzkopf: "It does not take a Hero", Bantam Press, 1992, page 396. (22) The employment of military

of short duration, fought at

foi-ce, which caused numerous

Division or lower level. They don't necessarily lead to battles. (.13) "The Levels of War (or Confl.ict), Operational Art and Campaign Planning, Strategic Combat Institute No 5 Ed. 1993". (14) The definition of "Centre of Gravity" will be given in the following paragraphs. (15) "The Levels of War (or Confl ict), Operational Art and Campaign Pbnning, Strategic

losses among the catholic population of Northern Ireland, was recently reexamined by Tony Blair's government in a speech at the House of Commons on January 29, 1998. Many commentators believe that the escalation of the conflict up to these days was originated by that fact. (23) Cristopher Lord: "Intermediate Deployments, Strategic Combat Institute", Carnbr·idge, 1996, page 18.

projett

munlcat

•

In a spirit of continuity with the round table held in Rome last year, on November 19th, at the Central Military Library of "Palazzo Esercito", "Rivista Militare" has promoted three more study meetings, with the intef")t of activating a circuit of internal communication, favouring interdisciplinary studies, stimulating and encouraging an in ten s e intellectual tension and a fruitful discussion of ideas.

ROUND TABLES

«The Military today: •

•

mot1vat1on, • • tra1n1ng, •

•

commun1cat1on>>. he study meeting, held in the presence of Lt. Gen. Francesco Cervoni, Chief of Staff of the Army, witnessed the participation of the students of the 124th Staff Course and of the representatives of the formative, academic, operational, logistic and territorial areas of the Service.It was an extraordinary opportunity to testify the Army's commitment to invest the most brilliant intellectual energies in a lively and constructive confrontation of opinions, with no censorship or reservations.

T ea

Introduction: Lt. Gen. Roberto Altina

Schools Inspector Introductory Remarks Col. Giovanni Cerbo Editor of "Rivista Militare" Participants: Prof. Vincenzo Fiore (Moderator) Gen Sen. Umberto Cappuzzo Prof. Flavia Russo Dr. Danilo Moriera Capt. Pasquale Sotgia Capt. Luigi Piantadosi Capt. Giovanni Semeraro W. 0. Agostino Ranucci 1st Cpl. Giovanni Del Regno Pvt. Marco De Querquis Conclusions: Lt. Gen. Francesco Cervoni Army Chief of Staff

t ' ural

c:=a,e Round Tables were attended by the Student Officers of the Application School and the Cadets of the Military

meetings concerned the concept of "expectation", apr0blem sy,rgistically related to those

tormative appeal, requirements of tommunication as a function of the individual role, are_r fact linked to the legitimate -": rked of life projects within a system of shared values, as well as the anxieties, the expectations and life prospects of the young

students and cadets. The two meetings - aimed at developing, especially in the younger Cadres, a more spontaneous and aware participation in the _ _ _ _ _ __J needs of the organization, encouraging a stronger

and Social P~ participation of all, speakers anmaudience, in a lively and dialectic confrontation of ideas. With these initiatives,

sl'locks, laur.ch disruptive mad splinters, light the fire for study and knowledge, develop mechanisms of ip1plosion and explosion of thoughts, ideas and passions, as wetl as to prime a cultural "fall-out'', capable of capturing tfie mind ar:id the heart of the young, who are the dawn of our Institution. Let us hope we have succeeded.