EDITORIAL "THE INTEGRATED APPROACH": ORGANIZATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND FRAME OF MIND The shortage ofjinancial resources we will be facing in the near future is leading us to reconsider the organizing strategies which direct the logic behind investments for purchasing means/materials/equipment and, in general terms, the modernization process of the Armed Forces as a whole. Acquiring a means of new generation, for example, is not a separate act but must definitely be connected to all other aspects of the organization (doctrine,forces organization, training, materials and equipment, vocational training of commanders, personnel, interoperability), or else the investment itself would turn out to be useless. If doctrine provides for a certain kind of "tactical" action and/or strategical behaviow; the number <~f new means to be acquired to satisfy the relevant operational needs will have to be suited to the latte,: This must also be applied to all other sectors, otherwise we will be compelled to buy a number of new means which exceeds "global" needs and their upkeep costs, to mention but one a$JJect, would weigh too much on our budget. This kind of approach to the establishment of the military instrument as a whole is catching on as a decisive and final working procedure and way of thinking. All in all, to be fair, this is the holistic outlook on life ("the whole is more than the sum of the parts'') which has been very success/it! in various fields, from biology to sociology, philosophy and economics (suffice it to think of Fritjof Capra~s "The Web of Life" and "The Tao of Physics", Paul Ormerod's "Butterfly Economics", il1.ark Buchanan's "Nexus". Nexus praises the role o_f networks, however contested it may be, and thus the role of interrelations among the various elements making up a system in processing the input which the system itselfreceives and the effectiveness <~(the relevcmt output). The holistic approach has won over the anglo-saxon world, including the military one, for quite some time and, no doubt, it is an effectual and efficient organizational procedure, abreast with times and extremely productive so as not to dissipate resources, not only financial ones, which are alreac(y inadequate in themselves. But is the organizational procedure enough? The holistic approach, due to its inherent rationality, may appear almost obvious, foregone, but it is not so. The enunciation of the concept is simple, but its implementation is very d[jjicult. Actually, it is a matter ofaccostuming managers in charge ofeve1y sector into taking great care over what is happening also in activities which do not/all within their competence. Of course this would mean overloading them with watch/ulness and information which might cause them to seize up. Their reaction, maybe on a subconscious level, may cause them to go back to tending their "own garden", thus giving exceeding importance to their spec(fic duty and justifying this behaviour by seemingly wellrejlected, but actually captious reasoning. In so doing, they would distance themselves ve,y much from the holistic mentality. What, then, can we do? Only by accostuming themselves to peer cooperation with flexibility ofmind and striving to reach a positive debate with one another would all the managers ofthe various departments achieve the aim ofgathering, almost naturally, the right information which would help decide "holistically": this kind of behaviour cannot be acquired in a day, but has to be created day by day, starting from educational institutes, on a daily basis, stimulating each person into tallcing to each other and cooperating in all directions and at 360 degrees. It is all too well, therefore, that we re-organize the structure according to this particular approach, which is the task ofplanners, but, jor the results to be decisive, we must be aware of the need for a mind pointing to this aim. And this is the task ofeach and every one of us. Let's go resolutely towards this target: the "integrated approach" is the philosophy oftoday and is to be that oftomorrow. An elastic and cooperative mind cannot but be good.for us all and for our Institution. THE EDITOR IN CHIEF
IOIIIUW. Of ffl ITAUAN IIIIY FOUNDED IN 1856
1/2010
CONTENTS
January - June
Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Army personnel. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest , Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues. -
The Italian Civil-Military Cooperation in Afghanistan by Manuel So/astri
What Future for UN, OSCE, NATO and UE? by Giorgio Spagnol
p. 74
p. 2
Force Protection and the Response to IEDs by Matteo Bresson
A team of rangers of t he 4'' parat roop Alpini Regiment in operation duri ng an exercise.
p. 84
S.IX-MONTHLY Supplement to numbers I, 2 and 3 of Rivista ,vlilitare Italian Edition
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The Europe of Defence. Problems and Prospects by Corio Jeon
p. 10
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Regional Command West: Account of an Experience
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The New Trends in the Field of the Western MBTs The Strategic Projection of the CH-47 of AVES by Andrea Lopreioto p. 30
p. 102
The UAV Planet: Market, Actors and Machines
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Kosovo: A Constant Commitment to Peace
p. 92
by Francesco Pa/mas
p. 110
('~.c.r-"i':.1~Ui:l•I;[•J.-.. p.40
Amedeo Guillet: A Model for Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow by Mario Mongelli
p, 122
The Kingdom of Naples on the Way to the «Risorgimenton by Vincenzo Cuomo
Julius Caesar , the Man, his Feats, the Myth
The «Acquin Division: An Operational Command for Europe by Stefano Chi/le
by GRELAUR p. 54
The Italian Officers in Kashmir by Marco Mo relli
p. 128
p .66
p. 134 S ummar y in Various Languages
e·,40
WHAT FUTURE FOR UN, OSCE, NATO AND EU? A necessarily brief description of the main international Organizations and the possible corrective interventions in a system of common interests and shared responsibilities, in order to deal with the future uncertainties in an adequate manner.
It is certain by now that none of the ex1st1ng that phenomena like political extremism and international, multinational or reg io nal Organizanationalism return to be the scare of t he Western tions, acting unilaterally, will be able to face up to world in particular and the whole Earth in general. the challenges of an unforeseeable future, fu ll of On what should one rely, then? On a drastically dark forecasts. re invented global political architecture, reformu Following the proliferation of new power centres lated in suc h a way as to maintain those valid and at sub- state level, the ideological nature of inte rindispensable elements on wh ich to hinge the national dispute s and the indiscriminate recourse process of strengthen ing and optimization aimed to violence, the world has become more unruly, at guaranteeing both the capacity to face unexunjust and turbu le nt. pected events with reactivity and prevent the The system of values on which the western civiappearance of new scenarios of crisis. lization is based manages to stay afloat with great There are , in fact, examples of efficiency and difficulty: but what will be its f uture in an increasre liabi lity for what concerns co llect ive defence, ingly globalized world? A world daily faced with and NATO's Article 5 stands out among them . terrorism , organized crime, Perhaps less known, but of no nuclear proliferation, em igralesser importance, is Article V tion, demographic growth and of the Treaty of Brussels dating ' ' The UN is the only orenvironment pol lution? back to l 948, accord i ng to ganization universally re As a matter of fact, the which al l partners of the cognized that can legiti- Western European Union (WEU) national governments are rapidly losing control of the events. mise, legalise and autho- undertake to provide reciprocal T he existing international strucrise the use of force ,, military sup port, "collective and tures are unable, or too slow, to aut omatic", in case of aggresadapt to the developments of sion by th ird parties. the global situation, in a world that is moreover We have just brought up the question of NATO, dominated by private capital , with the World Bank and WEU (whose military prerogatives were inherand the International Monetary Fund reduced to ited by the EU) and, once ascertained that the aboplay a less and less incisive and more limited role. li t ion of both the Atlantic Alliance an d the Anyway, it would be a mistake to observe European Union would be counterproductive motionless the progressive deterioration of the (since, despite t heir faults and incompleteness , global situation, rejecting an intervention aimed at they have p layed their respective roles egregiousrestoring a world order based on democracy, jus ly), it must be specified, however, that there are tice and respect for human rights. two essential needs: It seems therefore necessary to be able to count • t he coope ration , not only theoretical but above on international Organizations that possess, or are all practical, between NATO and EU; in a position to gain , t hrough accords of coopera• t he acknowledgement, even reluctantly, t hat the tion among themselves or with third parties, United States is and will remain the most po lit iaccess to political instruments that can manage cally important ally, pragmatically ind ispensable and normalize the international situatio n, avoiding and culturally closer to Europe .
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In short, one sho ul d find an area of common interests and shared opportunities that should invo lve the Western world, forcing it to face up together with us to the uncertainties of the future : however, all this should occur without putting up any initiative against anyont; but, on the contrary, open to whomever shares the Western values of democracy, justice and respect for human rights. Let us now proceed to a summary examination of the peculiarities of the main international organ izations and the possible interventions that could optim ise the ir efficiency. The UN is the only organization universally recognized that cou ld legitimise, legalise and authorise the use of force . It has moreover been successful in the sector the Post Conflict Operations (PCOs). A possible drawback in both cases is represented by the need to come to a reso lut ion voted in a short time and unanimously by the Security Council (SC). And this occurs very seldom. A furt her inconvenience is that the Nations that do not participate in an operation have the possibility to express their opinion on its conduct, and often create difficulties to the regular start and the following management of the operation. The possible correctives are: • should a significant necessity of great humanitarian importance be determined, and should the SC be unable to come to a timely resolution, the use of force should be authorised "a posteriori", when the operation has already started; •the decisions about the conduct of the operations should rest on ly with the Nations that contribute to them; •the SC should appoint an Organization or a Nation to lead the subordinate Organizations of the UN, such as UNHCR, IAEA, FAO and others, which operate o n the Operational Theatre at issue; • in order to red uce frictions/rivalries and increase the efficiency of the cooperation, one could organ ize an exchange of liaison teams between the UN and other international Organizations such as NATO, the African Union, EU, ASEAN and OSCE. After the UN, OSCE represents the largest international Organization; it reaches from Vancouver to Vladivostok, it counts 56 member States and includes all the NATO and EU Countries, as well as Russia and other Countries that do not belong to NATO and the EU . It is instrumental in being ab le to prevent conflicts at their start: anyway its role of go- between could be reinforced through improvements to the decision- making mechanisms and by increasing the possibility of app lying sanctions. Another important role of OSCE consists in the PCO interventions, especially the stabil isation and reconstruction ones . Within th is framework, it
•
8
Above. An ISAF convoy in Afghanistan. T itle pages. A UN Observer Team on the border between India and Pakistan.
cou ld play an important ro le by acting as coordi nator for the NGOs that are reluctant to cooperate with potential "hard power" elements . In short, if NATO and the EU could participate in the OSCE periodical meetings and update the international situation through suitab le briefings of the three international OrganizatiQns, t his wou ld not on ly increase the OSCE potentialities to act as early- warn ing system in its area of respon sibil ity, but could also considerably improve the cooperation between OSCE and other internation al Organizations engaged in operations of stabi lization. NATO is the only Organization that binds United States and Europe to collective reciprocal defence. Despite the recent transformations and simp lifications in the military, it can nevertheless still be cons idered, thanks to its heavy political structure, a product of the Cold War. The first streamlining could concern the decision - making process : while at Military Committee leve l the decisions must be taken unanimously,
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the relevant economic resources for the ir imp lementation, and can stand comparison with any int ernational organ ization? Up to now we have been asking ourselves what NATO could do to help the EU to grow in the military field: the NATO answer has consisted in the "Berl in Plus Arrangement" an accord that all ows the EU to avai l itself of the assets, capabilities and potentialities of NATO for carrying out EU operations. Now it is probab ly the moment to ask what the EU can do for NATO in the civilian field: the answer cou ld be a "Berlin Plus Civil ian Arrangement ", w hi ch cou ld be the m irror image of the original accord , all owing NATO to have recourse to assets , capabilities A Team of OSCE Observers. and non-m ilitary pot ent ialities (police, soft- power instruments, etc.) of the EU for cond ucting NATO operations . such unanimous agreement could be abando ned For what concerns the EU, the strik ing difference at the lower levels (Comm ittee and Working Group) existing between the po litical ambitions of this by introducing t he majority vote . Moreover, simieconomic giant and its ability to transform them larly to what was proposed for the UN, the Nations into coherent and consequential decisions and that do not part icipate in an operation should have provisions is crystal clear. In t hi s regard, it must be no say in its conduct, also co nsidering the fact that specified t hat the future role and the political the sharing of costs (NATO cost-sharing system) weight of the EU will much depend on the solution envisages that "costs lie where they fall": this found for the relations with Turkey: the stronger means that the participants in an operation, the bonds, the easier will be for Europe to act as a besides shouldering the expenses, accept the risk protagonist. of losing human lives while, with the current proThe knotty point in the EU cont ext is representcedure, those who "babble" find themse lves ed by the so- called Second Pillar, concern ing the rewarded twice. Therefore one sees the advisabilCommon Foreign and Security Po licy (PESC), of ity of changing the financing procedures within which the European Security and Defence Policy NATO, by devisiflg a formula of common sharing (PESO) is an integral part. Un li ke the First Pil lar of costs . (concerning the Common A further intervention cou ld Market and the economic and regard the communicat ion ' ' NATO is the only Organiza- monetary policy), where every st rategy, wh ich should be tion that binds United States decision becomes automaticalenhanced and refined . One canly b ind i ng for the member not risk losing the people's con- and Europe to collective re- Cou ntries, within the Seco nd sent at home, even if our forces ciprocal defence,, Pillar the National Governments seem to be w inn ing in the operkeep the prerogative to ational Theatres where they are start/agree or not agree to ini emp loyed . Therefore one must diffuse weighed, tiatives in the sectors of security and defence: the incis ive and t imely messages which reach the tarmain hindrance that has to be removed is the reget (hearts and minds) of the civilian population, fore the complex ity of the decis ions to be t aken by¡ both at home and in t he operational Theatre , the single member States, owing to which every anticipating communications on the co ntrary comnational Government tends to guard its own ing from the enemy forces (Taliban , al Qaeda, sphere of influence jealously. T he definition of the etc.). Within t his framework, it should be stressed figure and the functions of the Hi gh that the recourse to military force it does not repRepresent ative for PESC, ratified by the European resent the only (or inevitab le) means for sett ling a T reaty signed in Lisbon on December 2007, do not cris is. On the contrary, in many cases th is improve the situation if one considers t hat the approach proves self - defeat ing for strategic purHigh Representative does not hold the rank of poses. T he non - mi litary means therefore m ust be Fo reign Minister of the EU (he represents its subpart of an integrated strategy and employed w ith stantial "diminutio capitis", if anything) and th us care , t imeliness and deliberation, balanc ing them the national Governments will continue to lay appropriately w ith more typically mi li tary down the law, thwarting the possib ility of coming resources . And who better than the EU has at its to a shared, coherent and realistic foreign and disposal such panoply of civilian potential ities and security po licy, which shou ld make the EU a pref-
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Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
erential and trustworthy partner in its interactions with NATO, the United States, the UN and OSCE. The fact is that if it is true that the European Treaty (mark the denomination: "T reaty", much milder and less binding than the preceding version, whe re t he "Eu ropean .Constitut ion" inscript ion stood out) is the best that could be obt ained following t he referendary rejectio n of the preced ing version by Ho ll and and France, it is also t rue that, as remarked by some sharp- witted character, such document resembles in fact a kind of volum inous and slavish operating manual for a pallet truck, for it includes: the treaty itself, the additional protocol and enc losures for a total of 312 pages. On the other hand, the peculiarity of the document is that, despite its fecundity and verbosity, it needs the consu ltation of the preceding treaties to be understood! Provided that it is necessary to come to an effective cooperat ion among the various international Organizations, and that two outstanding mem bers, NATO and the EU at the present time, seem to be making no particul ar effort to find common lines of action, let's try to suggest some correctives aimed at improving the transatlantic relationship. The first effort could concern the creation of a more efficient cooperation at operational level. As a matter of fact, in the operat ional Theatres, the NATO and EU Commanders and the respective Staffs have up to now successfully coord in ated the most different activit ies/problems . It wou ld be a matter of authorizing an interaction carried out wit h reg ularity and inc isiveness , which should include the developme nt of mechanisms aimed at permitting an immediate and coord inate response in cris is situations. These mechanisms should concern the areas listed below: •joint Operational Pl anning. A system intended to identify crisis scenar ios and the relevant response options could be imp lemented and tested through su itable exercises. Moreover we should focus on the implementation of NATO- EU cooperation in operations that require both mil itary and civilian assets . Within this framework, SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in . Europe) utilizing also the EU Liaison Cell, already present in its organization chart, cou ld conduct the joint civil - m ilitary operational planning, also if the EU decides to cond uct an operation autonomously; · Force Generation. A direct connection between NATO and t he EU in coordinating the force gen eration would reduce the present frictions, optimis ing the emp loyme nt of the civilian and military potentialities, avoiding the competition for the acquisition of the limited resources : in fact, both Organizations "fish" into the same (and
A Sapper of the Italian Contingent of the "Althea" OSCE mission in Bosnia proceeding to the destruction of an unexploded device.
only) "reserve"; •Jo int revision of standards and procedures: Both Organizations have scarce interest to develop different standards and procedures ; • coherent command structure. The command struct ure of the "Berlin Plus" Ag reement, w hich envisages the Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) as Operational Commander in operations carried out by the EU with the employment of NATO resources, constitutes an adequate initial model. But one could explore further command options in order to integrate operationally, under DSACEUR command, elements com ing from the General Staff of the EU (EUMS) or from operat ional national Commands t hat France, Germany, Greece, England and Italy have made avai lable for EU (EU OHQs). However, it should in any case pointed out that the latter, despite having been labelled "operat ional", have no v ision and strategic perspective, wh ich remains an exclusive pre rogative of a mu lt inational command_ such as SHAPE; • Constitution of Centre for cris is management. Once the joint plann ing and training has started, this Centre, consisting of civilian and military planners, could monitor specific critical situat ions, finding suitable corrective actions. A second effort cou ld concern the joint revision of the NATO and EU capabilities. To this end, the European Agency for Defence (EAD) and the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) co ul d cooperate in the sectors of transformation and research, creating compatible, interoperable and complementary capabilities. The same mechanism of capab ility development of both organizat ions cou ld be better coordinated .
7 - OIKOS
An Italian serviceman of the Italian contingent of the "Althea" OSCE mission in Bosnia collecting weapons.
A third effort could be aimed at integrating the NATO and EU capability to manage a wide range of operational tasks, from war to reconstruction. Within this framework, the two organ izatio ns cou ld develop mechan isms to integrate and combine military and civilian assets in the conduction of stabi lization and reconstruction operations. But the relation between NATO and EU should not be based on a rigid distribution of roles, with NATO responsible for all the military tasks and EU for the civil ian roles . One should find instead a more coordinated and comprehensive approach, through which each organization supplies its
OIKOS - 8
capabilities more suited for meeting the specific need, with NATO better equipped for rapid and resolutive responses and the EU in a position to mobilize a wide choice of military and civilian instruments, including police forces. Actually, it must be acknowledged that wh ile NATO does not see the need to develop specific capabilities in the civi lian sector, the EU can diversify its interventions among four different types of mission: Capacity building missions, military miss ions, rule of law missions, monitoring missions. At the same time t he EU can operate through a comprehensive approach, while within the PESD framework the distinction between military and civilian missions often seems unnatural. Actually, many civi lian missions need a military support and the military missions often change into civilian missions o r into programmes of assistance and development handled by the European Commission. The European Union is therefore unique in its ability to combine and coordinate both civilian and military instruments through a synergic and all-inclusive response. A clear example of what we are saying is Bosnia, where t here are as many as four efforts coordinated by the EU: • The European Union Force (EUFOR) "Althea" military mission; • T he European Union Police Mission (EUPM) civilian miss ion; • The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM); • The programmes of the European Commission (European Commission Programs) relevant to the Stabilization and Association Agreements. The prerequisite for this dream to become reality is that NATO and EU revive their interaction at every level, focusing their discussion on future contingencies and joint responses, working out common strategic scenarios in relation to the main security problems, finding basic standards aimed at encouraging synergic approaches with sharing of efforts and burdens.
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
democracy and welfare of which t hey believe they If the present mechanism of consultation North have sacrificed themselves, and have actually paid Atlantic Committee (NAC)/Political and Security a heavy price i n blood and money during the Committee (PSC) and NATO Military Committee twentieth century) may go adrift taking uni lateral, (NATO MC)/European Union Military Committee possibly irreve rsible initiatives, which could be (EUMC) is considered restrictive or ineffectual, one dangerous for it and for t he Western world in genshould consider new or .additional forums of eral. meeting and discussion. In any case, it is considOnce the relatio nsh ip between Europe and ered necessary to envisage, with immediate effect, United States is stabilized and an agenda with consistent perionormalized, both partners dicity of direct meetings between ' ' In fact, OSCE represents a could proceed by common the NATO and EU General Secretaries, so that the most vital forum for the European consent also towards goals urgent problems are dealt with Union's foreign policy and beyond the security-defence sphere: I refer to climatic personally by those responsib le constitutes the first and un changes and other internafor the institutional summit of the deniable EU interlocutor in tional problems, which, if two Organizations. One should not miss the oppor- the wider range of human faced, discussed and solved at transatlantic forum level, tunity to confront together and rights , , could constitute the foundamore effectively the common tion of realistic, concrete and threats of the future, keeping in mind that a futu re operation will require a variety global solutions . The detente and normalization of relations of civilian and military capabilities that range from between NATO and EU could moreover constitute war to reconstruction. a premise for relaunching the UN and OSCE. In short, the moment has come to go beyond The definition of common objectives in the wider Berlin Plus and intensify the NATO-EU cooperatransatlantic framework could p lay in favour of the tion. renewed and long - awaited effort to renew the UN, The importance and the necessity of a strong aimed at improving its efficiency and credibility. If partnership have been repeatedly proclaimed in we really want justice to prevail over force (this is numerous summits, the last of which in Bucharest, after all the United Nations' mandate) a reform of whose final communique clearly refers to it: "We the UN becomes undelayable, and attainable only will strive for improvements in the NATO-EU after having reached a joint vision of NATO and EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organon its modalities, proced ures and purposes. izat ions, to achieve closer cooperation and greater As far as OSCE is concerned, there is no doubt efficiency, and avoid unnecessary dup lications, in that t he present Organization, when one considers a spirit of transparency and respecting the auton the success achieved during the Cold War and at omy of the two organizations". the beginning of t he nineties, in the European It would certainly be absurd to see NATO and the institutional scenario it constitutes a reference EU expand their respective g lobal role in an uncopoint less visible and less significant than it was in ordinated manner: one can therefore recognize its "golden times": It is moreover believed by many the undelayable urgency of an effective reciprocal that OSCE is going through a crisis. exchange of information, integrated by concrete But the organization is and remain s an important activities that can transform political theory into actor on t he stage of European securitY.-, despite military practice. having delegated to the EU some of its prerogaWithin this framework, a key function is t hat tives in the specific sector. In fact, OSCE repreaccomplished by DSACEUR, owing to its unique sents a vital forum for the Europ.ean Union's forand central role in the relations between NATO eign policy and constitutes the first and undeniand EU. Both his all- inclusive vision as Operational able EU interlocuto r in the wider range of human Commander and his assessments as Strategic rights. It is NATO's and EU's interest to revitalize Coordinator in NATO- EU relations, are considered and support, through a joint and agreed approach , of absol ute importance as regards potential secthis international actor, allowing it to prevent or, if tors where the cooperation between the two necessary, to soften and manage crisis situations, organ izatio ns could be developed or strengthmaking it credible, capable and performing. ened. The more effective their cooperation, the more Giorgio Spagnol dialectical will resu lt the relations between the two Brigadier General, partners, ind ispensab le to each other, Europe and Deputy Director and Commandant of the Courses, the United States, avoiding that the latter, feeling Post Conflict Operations (PCO) Study Centre abandoned or even betrayed by Europe (for the
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THE EU ROPE OF DEFENCE Problems and Prospects A topical and fascinating analysis of the latest developments of the European Security and Defence policy, made by one of the most distinguished strategy.
A paradox dominates the discussion on PESD (European Policy of Security and Defence). All opinion polls confirm that the majority of Europeans would want Europe to become a geopolitical actor, at least a regional one. Europe should become a "pole" of the new multipolar world order, i.e. it should have its own strategic dimension and its own Armed Forces. Many go as far as wishing a "European" defence of Europe that should replace NATO, and a European Army of the type t hat, in the fifties, it was considered to constitute with CED.
But the Europeans , paradoxically, are indifferent or dis interested to what is being decided and done for PESD. For example, the media have almost totally ignored t he important decision s made on the subject during the last meeting of the European Council, held in Brussels on t he 11 th12th of last December. Of course the enthus iasms for a greater European autonomy from the US have diminished with Russia's geopolitical return, with a widespread Euro-scepticism, with t he runn ing out of the spur t owards new enlargements towards East and South, and with the failure of the institu tional reforms of t he Un ion. Nobody t hinks anymore that the Union could be transformed into a great State or a great Power. On the contrary, the Nat io n-Stat es are reinforcing themselves. The evolution occurred in Germany after its unification has been determinant, for it is rediscovering the historical roots of German nationalism - from Tauroggen, to Bismarck, to Rapallo - and trying to find a strateg ic entente with Russia. T here are various causes of this differe nce betwee n declared ambitions and reality: ¡ cultural deficiencies on the changes occurred in t he systems and in the security concept itself with the geopolitical earthquakes derived from the disappearance of the USSR, from t he Balkan wars and the attacks of September 11, 2001. T hey are still in progress, for Moscow's "return" to a policy of power. Although its eastern front iers are still protected by NATO, the EU finds itself competing with Russia, w hose priorities have changed . They have ceased to be Europeanization and integration into the West,
Left . Major General Stefano Castagnotto, /TA, Commander of EUFOR.
present
Title pages. A Swiss "Super Puma" helicopter in service with EUFOR.
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now t he aim is to reconstitute the "vertical of armoured ve hicles are being developed in power" and win back a fraction of t he lost power. Europe. But some regions of the forme r Empire are now • non-reorganization of the Europea n Armed part of the Union, wh ich has precise duties of forces . Only 3- 5% of the two m illi on European solidarity towards them. Other former Soviet ·soldiers are deployab le for long pe riods abroad . States are invo lved in the Union's Moreover, PESO lacks some essential capabi li "Neighbourhood Policy" even if Moscow is trying ties . For its intervention in Chad it had to rent exercise an exclusive influence on t hem . Also in helicopter from Russia. The strategic transports their regard Europe cannot "draw back" . It canare partly carried out with Ukrainian airp lanes . not fail to meet t heir expect ations. The dialogue Europe's strategic autonomy is perhaps only a for a "strateg ic partnership" between EU and wis h, not an interest shared by Europeans, nor an Russia started in January. On the tab le there are ambition, except for France, which believes to President Medvedev's proposals for a new ecoincrease its international weight through it. The nomic strategic "Pan-European order". PESC European masses are only hoping to continue to (Policy of Common Security) and PESO will cerscrounge peacefully a living under American protainly be much influenced by them. T hey w ill tection. But they also expect to be listened t o and have to be adapted to the arrangements t hat w ill taken seriously by the US, in the name of a multibe made, b ut tens ions are lateralism, which in Eu rope is foreseeable between the "old" understood as ideo logy and and the "new" Europe. The first ' ' Europe's strategic au end in itse lf, not as a simple is go ing to pu rsue an agree- tonomy is perhaps only a method. T he "Obamamania" is ment with Moscow, the second wish, not an interest an expression of th is ambig uity is going to rely on the US for shared by Europeans, nor hope to become more its security. The EU r isks to important than the US, but an ambition, except for witho ut making any effort. divide itself , as was the case in France, which believes to 2003 fo r the Iraqi war; With g lobalization , security · unwi lli ngness of the European increase its international has become indivis ib le. War States not on ly to transfer weight through it ,, has returned also in Europe's their polit ical and strategic suburbs . Europe cannot con sovereignty to the EU, but also tinue to live under the ill usio n to coordinate their foreign and secu rity po li cy, as that it wi ll be able to remain a "post modern" civil well as to increase their military budget , in order ian power, whose instruments are not force, but to contribute to the commo n security equitably. conciliation, d ialogue, mediation. It offers it sys As regards this last issue, it shou ld be undertematically - often pathetically - when conflicts li ned that the problem of PESO is not financial , break out, as in the Midd le East, for examp le. Its but rather po lit ical: t he m ili tary expenditure of pretension of being a model for the new g lobal the EU Count ries amounts to 20% of the world order is becoming r id iculous . The world is more total. It is t he second in t he world, lower on ly to and more d iv ided among democratic- capitalist that of the US; St at es and the aut hor itarian- capital ist ones . • scepticism about the EU capac ity to express i nciFurther EU enlargements towards the East have sive and timely common policies. PESO - like stopped when Moscow's priority has ceased to be PESC - are intergovernmental, not Commun ity. - as in the nineties - the Europeanization of They would have been the same, even if the Russ ia, but the reinforcement of its "sovereign European Constitutional Treaty and the mini democracy" and "vertical of power". T he -European t reaty of Li sbon had not been approved. The Council of December has acknowledged this. Proof decis ions t hat concern them are taken unaniis the fact that, in its final document, the "democmously. The increase in number and especially in racy" term has been used on ly once. The more lack of homogeneity among the EU member ambiguous one "safeguard of human rights" has states due to the en largements, make all choices replaced it. There are not going t o be "co loured difficult. What is lacki ng is a European people revo lutions" anymore. and a European identity. Nobody is w ill ing to die In this artic le we are going to recall, in a first for Europe; part, how and why PESO was born; secondly, what • the non - existence for PESO - desp ite Solana's its reali zations have been and its present situation efforts - of an efficient support by the media, in is, with its lights and shadows . Finally, we are competition w ith NATO's. Most Europeans ignore going to analyse the "European Security Strategy" what it is and what it is for; (ESS), wh ich the basic document of PESO, approved · interests in maintaining "national champions" of in 2003 and updated in the European Council of the armaments industry: as ma ny as 12 December.
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THE BIRTH OF PESO: THE FRENCH-BRITISH COMPROMISE AT SAINT MALO
According to Blair, PESO was supposed to be not only compatible with NATO but also strengthen it. It had to meet the security requirements that the Like the other great initiatives regarding United States was unwilling to "cover". Its aim was European common defense and security - starting also to convince the Europeans to increase their from the Brussels Treaty of 1948 - PESO had in military capabilities, so as to become, if not indisfact its origin from a French - British summit held pensable, at least very interesting partners for the in December 1998 at Saint Malo. A compromise US. In order to achieve this, Blair abandoned the was reached between the two opposing visions on t rad itional British opposition to European defence, the meaning of Europe's strategic dimension and, springing from fear that it would weaken NATO. above all, on its relations with NATO. Such visions The greater military capabilities would not only still subsist. For France it was a matter of reducing strengthen the European "weight" on the American the dependence on the US. Great Britain wanted to policy and Washington's engagement in Europe; reinforce the Atlantic Alliance. However, the they were also corresponding to the British natio ngeopolitical changes, outside and inside the al interests. T he United Kingdom's possibility of Union, occurred along the past ten years, have speaking in the name of Europe and of going to modified them. Washington with the offer of a substantial "packAt Saint Malo, Chirac and Blair were worried age" of capabilities would strengthen the "special about the disaster suffered by Europe in the bonds" existing between the two Countries. For Balkans, especially in Bosnia, and about the scarce the United Kingdom, therefore, the priority was to European military capabilities, which had dramatbe given to the creation of greater military capaically surfaced in the preparation of the war in bilities. Kosovo. They were also worried about the risk of a The objectives and vision of the French President progressive disengagement by the US in Europe, Jacq ues Chirac were different. According to the with t he ensuing creation of a traditional French ambitions, "hole" in the global European PESO should have laid the security system, which up to ''PESD had in fact its ori foundations of a real European then had been ensured 1 00% by gins from a Franco- British defence, tendentially indethe United States. Although summit held in December pendent of the Atlantic being conscious that the policy Alliance. Paris could have 1 998 at Saint Malo. Then a of defence is not a policy but exerted a considerable influ rather the defence of / a policy, compromise was reached ence on it, but had never been the two leaders were aware that between the two opposing able to carry out its plans owing such common poHcy did not visions on the meaning to the other Countries' suspiexist, as there was neither a of Europe's strategic di- cion that France had in mind to common vision on the future of mension... dim inish the US weight in ,, the EU, nor an agreement on its Europe and increase France's. eastern and southern borders . Th e European defence - which But PESO could be created from the technical perreplaced the European Security and Defence spective of military and institutional capabilities, Identity (ESDI) in the NATO ambit - was to allow for managing crises and inte rventions carried out Europe to become a geopolitical global actor. In in order to implement t he so- called "Petersberg order to ac hi eve this result, France renounced to mission". Anyway Europe's defence continued to oppose t he linking of PESO with NATO. During t he be guaranteed by NATO. Cold War, France had taken advantage of the Therefore, PESO continued to be "dangling in strategic protection against the Soviet threat space". It was conceived as a technical and not a offered by the advanced NATO defence on the political fact. In this way, "the marvellous astuteinter-German border. After the end of the bipolar ness of the EU", as defined by Jacques Delors, of world, having to intervene abroad, it had returned implementing common programmes without on the front line. It needed Europe, and its flag specifying their final purposes, was extended to exhibited to the world. Paris' priorities were the the field of security. A certain measure of ambigu institutes and the interventions of the EU, not its ity was inevitable. The compromise between military capabilities . Chirac and Blair co nsisted in ignoring the differences between their visions on Europe's future and the relations with the US and with NATO. They THE DEVELOPMENTS OF PESO were to explode in 2003, when the Americans attacked Iraq, and caused the division and marginThe European Council in Cologne in st itutionalization of Europe. alised PESO in 1999. During the following ten
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Rivista Militare English Edition n . 112010
years its developments were extremely rapid and the French line prevailed over the British one. Between 1999 and 2003 were constituted the institutions necessary to manage PESD within a complex and juridically rigid entity like the EU. The EU is structurally very different from NATO, imbued by Anglo-Saxon pragmatism, so much so that its institut ive Treaty consists of only two pages. In particular, there was t he constitution of
a: • Secretary General / High Representative charged with implement ing the decisions of the European Council for what concerns PESC and PESD; • Secu rity and Political Committee (COPS), responsible for the political control and strategic con duct of the crisis management operations ; • Military Committee, charged with giving recom mendations and advice; • European Staff, which is part of the Council Secretariat; • Situation Centre. The European Agency of Defence (AED) - envisaged by the European Constitutional Treaty - was establ ish ed separately in 2004 and charged with encouraging the creation of military capabilities, especially in the sectors where there are more European insufficiencies. It was meant to be an agency of the capabilities, listed in a catalogue that has tu rned out to be a "book of dreams". Of the 64 sectors then identified as lacking, 52 have not yet seen any significant improvement. They shou ld be implemented during the coming years, but the experiences of the European military engagement do not lead to be optimistic in th is regard. Meanwhile, there was the conclus ion of agreements with NATO, in conformity with the formula
A lesson in a school in Zenica, Bosnia.
called "Berlin Plus", acco rding to which the EU can avai l itself for its interventions of the capabilities of the strategic- operational Command of the All iance. When it does not make use of the NATO military chain of command, the EU employs the so- ca lled nation - led system . A leader Nation places at the European Union's disposal one of its ope rational strategic commands. In Europe t here are fou r : in Italy, France, Great Britain and Germany. The constitution of an autonomous Eu ropean operational Command is sti ll controversial because, according to those who criticise it especially on the British side - it would uselessly duplicate the capabilities supplied to Eu rope by NATO. President Sarkozy's promise to reintegrate the French forces into the NATO military structure has not modified the British opposition to a European Command. Since 2003, having completed th e nucleus of its institutional structure, the European Union has started to multiply its interventions. Up to now, t here have been 23 of them. The most important are: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia, with up to 7000 men engaged (2500 today); EUFOR Chad, with 3700 men; EULEX Kosovo, with 1900 eleme nts betwee n policemen and civilians; EUROMARFOR Somal ia, with 1200 seamen, embarked with anti-piracy functions. There were of course accords and promises regarding the capabil ities, i.e. the preparation of the military and civilian forces destined to implement PESD. However they have been systematically disregarded, and the objectives deferred to sometime in t he f uture. There are big d ifferences
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Training of EUFOR servicemen.
between the European Countries. The defence budgets of France and United Kingdom add up to as much as 40% of the EU military expenditure. Only 4.7% of t hem' are earmarked for Research and Development, and barely 1 .3% for science and technology. An European defence industry has t rouble establis hing itself, especially in the land and naval fie lds.
THE DECISIONS ON THE "CAPABILITIES" T he European Council of 2001, held in Hels inki, approved force objectives called "Force Headline Goals", that were to be implemented w ith in 2003, but now postponed until 2010: 60,000 soldiers, 400 airplanes and 100 ships deployable with in 60 days. Their definition did not comp ly with any strategic evaluation on the scenarios of poss ib le interventions. It only took the Balkan experiences into account. Afterwards, in 2004, considering the rapidity of intervention necessary for preventing crises, it was decided to constitute a dozen Battle Groups with 1 500 effectives each, dep loyable with in a week. Next to the m il itary capabilities were also created civilian capabilities, which characterise the European approach to security, as compared to
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NATO's. There are four priorities that should be attained by 2010: • police forces, consisting of 5000 men, l 000 of which deployable within ten days; • forces for a "legal ly constituted State", i.e. judges, investigat ive police, prison officers; • experts in the adm inistrative fie ld, essential for reconstruction and peacebuilding; •forces for civi l protection, for a total of 2000 effectives. Military and civilian managements are integrated. Some problems exist due to the fact that PESC and PESO belong to the 2nd Pi ll ar of the European Union and are subor d inate to SG/HR, wh ile humanitarian aid, civil protection and antiterrorism are under the 3rd Pillar, managed by the Commission. Desp ite the wide range of institutions and accords, PESD remains strictly intergovernmental. Its capac ities of intervention depend on the incidental will of t he single States, expressed in the so- called "Force Generation", a negotiation where each State offers its contribution for a particular mission. Unlike NATO, the European Un ion has no forces ass igned permanently, neithe r common resources with which to finance a part of the interventions. Save for the advantage of being in a position to manage jointly the civilian and m ilitary aspects of crisis manageme nt and reconstruction. The involvedness of t he decision- making process is such that, taking into account the increase in
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
number and the lack of homogeneity of the mem ber States, the problem of structuri ng a Union's "head group" or "board of directors", that could implement PESD, becomes more and more realistic. Moreover, the EU lacks some essential capabil ities: satellites, strategic air transport, h ig h-autonomy protected helicopters, · RPVs, logistic support capabi lity, stock of precision weapons. Some progress has been made, for example in the sector of air-transport. While waiting for the Airbus A400M, twelve Countries have decided to buy three C- l 7s (Italy had to give up the programme, owing to the recent financial cuts). Other sectors where the capabil ities have been poo led are those of satellite intelligence.
· a dozen of missions of assistance to post- war reconstruction, one of them including 3000 experts and policemen. The implementation of this programme requires a.-serious commitment by the EU partners, particularly by the major ones. They supply the greatest part of the forces. Of course, their commitment would require an adequate recognition, not only in terms of prestige but also of political influence. And here again the problem crops up of a European "directory", obviously opposed by the States that will not participate in it.
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE DOCUMENT "ENSURING SECURITY IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD" OF DECEMBER 2008
THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF DECEMBER 2008
The "European Security Strategy" (ESS) - or "Solana" document - expresses the trends of the Union's security and defence policy. Presented In the programmes of the dynamic - if not during the European Council at Thessaloniki in hyperactive - Nicolas Sarkozy's Presidency, in the June 2003 and approved in Brussels the following second semester of 2008, PESD has been given a December, it proposed to define the European remarkable importance. In particular, an ambitious "grand strategy" of security, precisely in a period "Capability Development Plan" has when the Union was divided been drafted and approved by the following the American European Council last December. ' ' In the programmes of the attack on Iraq, and was It is not based on new grandiose dynamic - if not hy~eractive apparently going through an programmes, but tends to make - Nicolas Sarkozy s Presi- irreversible crisis. It was the most of the existing capabil i- dency of the EU, in the se- meant as a response to t he ties. After reaffirming the intenNational Security Strategy cond semester of 2008, (NSS), tion of implementing the Helsinky approved by President Headline Goals within 2010, the PESD has been given a re- Bus h in September 2002. markab I e importance ,, plan envisages: Irrespective of its intrinsic · a pool of air transport; validity, ESS has had the · air-naval interoperability; great merit of reopening the • speeding up helicopter acquisition: transatlantic dialogue, owing to which the rela· completion of the space programmes; tions between the United State and the European •to network the sea surveillance and speed up the Union on the one hand, and PESC /PESD and NATO construction of a drone special ized in this secon the other, assume vital importance. It has also tor; been a way for inducing the Europeans to think •to pool the sea demining capabilities; about their future, and the Americans to consider · a joint effort for increasing force protection; what connects them to the Europeans and what • strengthening and increasing the interoperabi lity divides them. The document might have had a of operational intelligence and telecommunicagreater concreteness had it been linked to a gention. eral plann ing in the various secto rs , and especialThe plan specifies also the operational capabili ly in the military field, with a document comparaties that the EU must have at its disposal by 2010. ble to the "Quadrennial Defense Review" of the They consist in the possibility of conducting: Pentagon. If nothing, else it would help making the · two operations of 10,000 men each, for a period Europeans more conscious that every politica l of two years; ambition has a cost, which can neither be replaced · one emergency evacuation operation of European by the enunciation of programmes nor by the citizens, lasting ten days; expression of good intentions. · one sea-and-air-surveillance and interdiction The document, prepared directly by t he SG/ HR mission; Solana, is divided in three parts: threats, goals, · one civil- military operation of humanitarian aid and lines of action for achieving the latter. As lasting ninety days; regards threats , it considers three of them: terror-
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ism, proliferation of arms of mass destruction and not only with the US, but with the various regional the internal collapse of the States (failing or failed "power" poles, with Russ ia in particular, in the States). They could become bases for terrorism future multipo lar order, so much liked by France, and organized crime. In substance, they are the from De Gaulle to Chirac. The situation has signifsame threats listed in Bush's NSS, with the addition icantly changed with the "post-Gaullist" President of piracy, considered a crime by the Europeans, Sarkozy. Politics often feeds on utopias and selfand not a military threat as in the US. deception. The ambiguities of ESS were necessary The ESS also indicates three objectives: creation for the document to be approved. All are con of a security zone in Europe and in its immediate scious that Europe needs the US for its security. peripheries; "effective multilateralism", imp leNot only against, but also without the US, the EU mented both through the subordination of the sp lits and ceases to be a geopolitical actor. Not European interventions to the Security Council of even Russia takes it seriously. Moscow wants the United Nations and a mo re structured and bilateral accords with the single European States, institutionalised cooperation with the United especially wit h the major ones, precisely in order States; prevention of conflicts. The term "prevento neutralize the European Union. T his was pertion", which recalls Bush's pre- emptive defense, ceived also when Sarkozy - chairman pro tempore raised polemics and protests at the beginning . Its of the EU - went to the Kremlin, to confer with official interpretation has therefore been reasonDmitry Medvedev about the settlement of the ably modified and "sweetened", although it is quite Georgia conflict. On that occasion, the Russians clear t hat Solana did not refe r to preventive interrefused to place the EU flag next to the Russian ventions of diplomats and Samaritans , but also to one. They hoisted the French flag! the preventive use of military force, whose validity The Solana document of 2003 reflected, at least has recently been confirmed by in its form, France's positions. the new President of the Un ited According to Chirac's view'Europe - due to its econo States. po int, the West should have Finall y , three are also the my, history and culture been divided into an American guidelines of the provisions that cannot renounce being a and a European one. The the EU should have adopted in global actor. It has interests Atlantic Alliance was to be order to make PESO credible and transformed into a cooperative o defend and promote ir security effective: Coherence among syst em and in a forum Europeans, totally lacking in the the entire world. But is not of po li tical consultation Iraqi crisis. Capabi l ities, also 1 super state or a super- between Europe and the United mil itary ones, among which, .)ower and never will be , , States. As suggested by strangely enough, the "Berlin Dominique Moisi, on the two Plus" agreements are not menshores of the At lantic two tioned ; precisely the accords that allow the Union potentially conflictual "Monroe doctrines" would to avail itself of the operational and logistic capaimpose themselves. bilities possessed only by NATO, i.e. by the United Today the antiamericanisme primaire is decreasStates. Partnersh ip, not only with the United States ing. Moreover there are worries about Russia's but also with the other power "poles" of the multi"geopo litical comeback". In any case the Solana polar world, cherished by France: Russia, China, document is necessary. It has given PESC and PESO India. It is a decided ly poetic "variation", a nota certain political coherence. It has contributed to unaware tribute to the anti - Americanism then the abandonment of the myths and nonsense of p revailing in Paris and Berlin. Now the situation Europe "civilian power". T hat formula was simply a has been overcome with the new German and "fig leaf" that hid Europe's indecisions, divisions French summits - Merkel and Sarkozy are decidand w eaknesses. It was the "sunset boulevard" edly pro- Atlantic - as wel l as with Bush's w ithchoice, of ex it from history. The political uncerdrawal from the political arena (Bush was unfairly tainties wou ld be added to the reduced economic held responsib le for all wrongdoings) and the growth and th e demographic decline. widespread enthusiasm for Barack Obama. The new document - approved by the European Hopefully, the enthusiasm will last a long time. But Council last December - "Guaranteeing security in perhaps, in a few years, the Europeans wi ll end up full d evelopment" it should have updated ESS to regretting President Bush. If noth ing else, the the political changes inside and outside the Union. scepticism he felt towards them had led the In fact, it only modifies, formally and in a f ew President to avoid asking greater efforts of the EU. points, the document of 2003, reaffi rming its In short, with ESS, the Union made clear th at it validity. Among the various requirements it adds wanted to play an autonomous role as a regional network security and de- emphasizes the expanactor and, at g loba l level, to be a credible partner sion of democracy. It is in substance a report on
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Rivista Mi/itare English Edition n. 1/2010
EUFOR personnel on training.
what has been done or has occurred in t he last five years. It is influenced by the uncertainty caused by the war in Georgia and the change of the Ame rican Presidency. It is extremely cautious when it deals with the new Pan-European strategic order proposed by Medvedev, and the new strategic concept that NATO is going to approve in 2010. A positive aspect is the emphasis on NATO's importance, not mention ed in the document of 2003, and the fact that multilateralism will be effective only if firmly rooted in a transatlantic entente.
CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS: PESC AND PESO NEED A DIRECTORY I.E. A "CONCERT" OF THE EUROPEAN MAJOR POWERS Europe - due to its economy, history and culture - cannot renounce be ing a global actor. It has interests to defend and promote in the entire world. But is not a super- state or a superpower, and never will be. During t he nineties , when Russia's priority was integration and the EU had not yet been enlarged, the Un ion could have strengthened its communitarian dimens ion. The disaster in Yugoslavia, the German unification and the resurrection of the European Nation- States had stopped any significant reform. Today it has become imposs ible. This must be admitted . After the conflict in Georg ia, and the heavy pressures put by Moscow on Ukraine, many States are re considering the priorities of the ir secu rity and reappraising the importance of the ir territorial defence. The outcome of the present confrontation betwee n West and Russi a in Ukraine will determine the future of PESC and PESO. With the present EU w ith 27 partne rs, they can-
not achieve a decorous level of efficacy - nor of effectiveness. This could be possible only with a st rategic agreement among the European major powers (four: France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom - or six, also with Spain and Poland), which could honour the comm itments concerning the force objectives that co ul d be placed at the Union's disposal. In substance, it would be a matter of creating a structured cooperation , envisaged by the European Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon's Mini-Treaty. Therefore, another paradox should be added to the ones we have just mentioned : in order to be united, the Union must be divided, constituting a head group, sufficiently homogeneous so as to be in a position to make well-ti med and incisive deci sions. It would be a "concert of powers". It could improve the Union's decision-making deficiencies. It could constitute its heart and driving element, catalyser of subsequent integrations of smaller States which would accept its log ics, burdens and responsibi lities. The military dimension - marginalized up to this moment by the dynamics of the European integration process in favour of the econom ic dimension - cou ld become its essential component. The French-German axis could be replaced by a French-British one. Italy, for its part, will be able to participate in the "head group" on ly by equipping itse lf with adequate military capabilities. Its relative positions are deterio rating, due to the conti nuous cuts in the defence budget. This should be taken into account, considering the long t imes necessary fo r the reconstitution of any type of mil itary capability.
Carlo Jean Lieutenant General (ret.) Lecturer of Strategic Studies L. U. /.S.S. University
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LAND WARFARE: WHAT IS THE FUTURE? General Sir David Richards, designate Chief of the General Staff, outlined his vision of the future character of warfare for which the British Army should prepare. Training and equipping for conventional or unconventional warfare need no longer be distinct, for even state actors will increasingly seek more irregular means to prosecute war. Future war will continue to be a battle for tile hearts and minds of the people, but the revolution in communications will transform the way this is fought.
Above. General Sir David Richards.
Title pages. MBT ÂŤChallengerÂť.
We all know of the apocryphal tale of armies historically preparing to fight the last war rather than the next. Successful armed forces adapt and transform at a pace faster then thei r potential adversaries. Cromwell, for example, unlocked the synergy of discipline, training, new equipment and new t act ics iii a manner that left the Royalists looking like barely gilled amateurs. This process can be found throughout history although rarely is it accelerated with t he vision and drive demonstrated by Cromwell. Indeed in the 1920s, as an example, Basil Liddell Hart and 'Boney' Fuller
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struggled to persuade soldiers everywhere that the era of the horse had been replaced by that of the tank and aircraft, even though both had been in service for a number of years. It was during this period, as CGS remi nded us recently, that Liddell Hart noted ruef ully that 'there is only one hung harder then getting a new idea into the military's mind and that is getting an old one o ut'! We must be determined that we do not fall into that t rap. The British armed forces are adapting to the challenges of war in Afghanistan. Se lf critically however, this 'transformation in contact' is still localized and small in scale. We have yet to import the population focused , often subtle and certainly hi-tech ways of fighting that we now take for granted in places like Helmand into the core of the Armed Forces, as we train and equip for generic operations. US forces are doing better in my judgment. Having only six years ago abjured nationbuilding and Counter Insurgency as things recall armies did not sloop to do, they now give stabilizat io n operations the same doctrinal weighting as those re lated to conventional offensive and defensive operations. Evidently, although not yet culturally internalized, there has been a radical change in the way wars ale fought. Morally and importantly legally we cannot go back to operating as we might have done even t en years ago when it was still tanks, fast jets and fleet escorts that dominated the doctrine of our three services. The lexicon of today is non-kinetic effects teams, precision attack teams, Counter-lED, combat logistic patrols, informat ion dominance, counter- piracy, and cyber attack and defense. Our people are used to operating in a complex combat, joint, interagency and multinat io nal environment in which success is measured in terms of securing people's confidence instead of how many tan ks, ships or aircraft are destroyed.
Rivista Mililare Englis/J Edition n. 1/2010
The pace of technological change is bewildering. It has left every nations mainstream procurement process struggling to deliver equipment that will remain relevant against more agile opponents satisfied with cheap and ever-evolving eighty PCI cent solutions. Too often, we still strive for hugely expensive 1 00 per cent solutions - 'exquisite solutions' as Secretary Gates calls them - relevant only in a hi-tech state on state war but that risk being out of date before they are brought into service. Tactical, operational and strategic leve l success in today's environment is beyond that of a military that draws its inspiration from visions of t radit ional state on state war, however hi-tech in nature. But what of the next era, assuming success in Afghanistan gives us the confidence and moral authority to get t here? And be quite clear that success in Afghanistan - redefined on less ambitious aims, certainly - is t ruly a grand strategic issue for our nation. Why7 Firstly, as our Secretary of State Bob Ainsworth has argued persuasively, it is vital to our domestic security that we do not allow Afghanistan to once again become an exporter of Al- Qaeda inspired terrorism or give such people a 'victory' that could inspire a much bigger threat sti 11. An hypothetical defeat of the USA and NATO, the most powerful alliance in the history of the world, would produce hugely intoxicating effects on Muslim extremists' world - wide. Anything might then be possible in their eyes and that's what we should expect. Nor, in a very unce rtain world, A soldier of the Z 15r Air Artillery Defense Battery about should we be content for NATO to be seen to fail to hoist the Union Jack at a base in Helmand, on its first ground combat operation7 If we do not Afghanistan. succeed conspicuously in Afghanistan, and vitally by extension in and with Pakistan, then we risk failing in this objective too. And t he reputation of it very clear that Afghanistan is to be our top priour armed forces is in itself a grand strategic ority. Yet a natural caution sometimes constrains issue. For many year's. they have given the UK influence int ernationally, defeated our nation's excellent people from full-bloodedly seeking to meet clear strateg ic intent. enemies while deterring others Why? and been an institution of which In order to shed light on this the British people are proud. ' ' Tactical, operational and And we would lose th is at our strategical level success in conundrum, we have to cons idt he broader issue of generic peril. today's environment is er f utu re conflict. There is a colOur Foreign Secretary David Miliband recently summarized beyond that of a military that lective belief that historically his views on Afghanistan with draws its ispiration from most war's have been primarily these words; 'What we are doing visions of traditional state on inter-state in natu re. Driven by in Afghanistan is incredibly state war, however hi- tech in national interests, success was often easy to define, normally important. For the next three to nature ,, by overwhelming your oppofive years it will dominate our nent militarily in order to force foreign policy. It will be the defining issue for t he next government. It is the a political outcome on your' terms. Clear- cut victory was feasible and indeed frequently archieved. laboratory of so much that we will be doing in the It is this thinking that dominated the development future'. For this reason amongst others the Prime of our armed forces. Many area analysts argue Minister and our Chief of Defense Staff have made
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A patrol mounted on ÂŤDefenderÂť.
the likelihood of confl ict with non- state or failed state actors. In today's environment, given the risks associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the potential effects of economic co llapse, climate change, and international crime , this is something that responsible countries have to confront more convincing ly: both once engaged in such conflict but also in much more assiduously seeking to prevent them from occurring in the first place given the implicit threat to our nat ional security. So, even t hough they are not bad at it, our armed convincingly that the approach being taken to forces need to become bette r still at this type of future conflict today by many countries has still warfare. It is important to emphasize that to sucnot substantially changed . ceed this is Joint/Inter- Agency / Whole of These countries m ay not be so wrong, in princiGovernment business . Today it's a land- based ple, if one believes that traditional state on state affair in Afghanistan . Tomorrow it will be in or ju st warfare is what it is all about and that the type of off the coast of a rogue state . operat ions we are conductin g in Maritime and amphibious Af ghan istan are aberrant. In fact, forces will play the dominant even a cursory examination of ''First of all, whilst globahistory suggests that such wars lization has reduced the role. Or it could be in a central arc the norm: whilst hugely likelihood of inter-state Africa state in which well trained indigenous forces are important when they occur, state warfare it has increased the dependent for success on air on state conflict is far less frequent. In any case, I believe that likelihood of conflict with support from other nations. our generation is in the midst of non- state or failed state But regardless of these scenarios, how we deal with the a paradigm shift, is facing its actors ,, growing dis ill us ionment of 1.2 own 'horse and tank" moment if billion Muslims, most, living in you like, born in o ur case chiefly dangerously radicalized states, will be an issue but not exclusively of the global revolution in that w il l dom inate o ur professional lives. And communications and associated t echno logy. Th e while succeeding in that, we must concurrently result is that the way even state on state warfare and actively exp lo it the precepts underpinning the will manifest itself has changed Fundamentally. Comprehensive Approach to prevent copycat conThose charged with the design and equipping of flicts arising out of' cultural and economic alien our armed forces need to do three th ings. Firstly, they have to decide whether they believe conflicts with dissatisfied and violent non- state actors are here for the long term or are an historical aberration . Secondly they have to decide whether they believe that, despite g lobalization and greate r mutual inter- dependence, state on state warfare remains something for which they must prepare. And thirdly, if it is decided that our aimed forces need to he capable of succeeding in both, would not the two types of conflict look surprisingly sim ilar i n practice, at least to those actually charged with cond ucting them at the tactical level'? If they were, and there is a good case for th inking they might he, it wou ld make the issue of preparing our forces much easier to agree on . First of all, whilst globalization has reduced the likelihood of inter- state warfare it has increased Dogs during training.
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ation in large parts of the world. Some are sceptical about the risks of such conflict developing and whether they will actually affect us. They are already occurring:to give an example, the bloody Naxolist insurgency spreading across parts of India. This is an insurgency that has a sense of hopelessness and economic envy at its core, powerful instincts that today can be inflamed and communicated to other similarly dispossessed groups across the world at the touch of' a button. It is this that makes the importance of winning the battle of ideo logy, of hearts and minds, so important . Only genuine improvements in the Jot of the d ispossessed and viscerally envious, an upward trajectory of progress as I used to call it when serving in Afghanistan , will prevent such conflicts eventually affecting our own lives. And substance not spin is key to Winning this vital information
Identification of a patrol at a sentry post in a base in the desert.
operation. To achieve this, while placing much more emphasis on prevention in the design of our armed forces, non-military activities must be given much gloater weight. But they must be reengineered as security instruments and properly integrated into strategy, not viewed a internation al versions of domestic welfare programmers. Marriage allowances could be a more effective means of turning young Muslim males away from violence than bullets. Jobs would prevent dispossessed African communities, with their Diasporas already reach ing i nto the heart of our own soci -
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eties, from respond ing to violent agitators and the attractions of international crime. And given the reach of dispossessed extremists, it is no good today a nation developing what has been referred to as a 'defensive crouch' to deter or contain violence in other nations from affecting one's own . The case in principle for engagement and preemption is stronger today than ever it has been and actually accords with most politicians natural tendency to 'make a difference' on the ir watch. Our statesmen need credible choices, both in preempting and in winning inevitable conflicts in the future. But, if I am right and non-state opponents should be our principal defense and security focus, inconveniently we cannot dismiss the possibility of state on state warfare either. What would such warfare actually look like7 Would it really be a hot version of what people like me spent much of our lives training for? Why would China or Russia for example, despite t il e often ill-informed debate after the invasion of Georgia by Russia last year, risk everything they have achieved to confront us conventionally? The social and economic costs of creating tile scale of military capability required p lausibly to succeed, even assum ing we do not start to respond in like manner, are enormous. The presence of nuclear weapons reinforces a likely caution. If countries like Russia or China really want to cause us major problems surely they will employ other levers of state1 power: economic and information effects, for example? They have seen the Ho ly Grail. Attack's are likely to be delivered semianonymous ly through cyberspace or the use of guerrillas or proxies like Hezbollah. After all, it was that Chinaman Sun Tzu who famously reminds us that 'the acme of military skill is to defeat one's enemy without firing a shot'. In other words, there is a good case for believing that even state on state warfare will be similar to that we wil l be conducting against non-state groupings. So if this thesis is right, tile golden lining to all this is that our armed forces can focus, not exc lusively hut focus, on a single version of conflict. Whether one is fighting non - state actors in Afghanistan or prox ies sponsored by a disgruntled major power there or somewhere else, the skill sets and weapon systems required will look usefully similar: a virtuous congruence, if you like, between non- state and inter-state war. Some will respond by arguing t hat we cannot afford the ultimate risk of a return to traditional state on state conflict; that our capability and mil itary culture should he primarily based on such a possibility, remaining firmly and conspicuous ly in the 'big boys' league, while seeking to build a capability in new areas too. There are a number of
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flaws to this approach. Firstly, it seeks to bury the fact that we have to f ind the courage to accept risk in tile way we prepare for future conflict for one obvious reason: it is simply not affordable to do otherwise. In trying to do a bit of everyth ing, we risk future failure across ti le board because, on the day, we will have insufficient of what is needed. Secondly, those focused on hi- tech but tradi tional inter- stale conflict often confuse their case by asserting the need to be seen for power projection reasons to possess traditional combat power, large air and tank fleets for example, failing to appreciate t hat an intelligent opponent will not be impressed by capabilities which can readily be made irrelevant through tile adoption of asym metric tactics or technology. This is an approach that we must understand better and invest in more, if we are either to thwart such aims or succeed in achieving our own foreign policy goals in a
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highly complex internation al environment. One which to me and others cries out for new diplomatic and trad ing mechanisms with which to bind into a co- operative process states that, quite naturally, will compete for raw materials and other scarce assets . Why, for example, is competition within the EU or with the USA healthy yet that same competition from Chin a or Russia automatically seen as hostile? Market and diplomatic mechanisms should be trusted much mole to regulate what should be viewed as normal and healthy rather than provocative and bell igerent. T hose who seek to continue investment in traditional forms of conflict at the expense of the new fail to understand the degree to which i nter-state dynamics have changed since the Cold War era. Whilst reluctant to acknowledge the huge pressure on belligerent states to find cheaper and less risky routes to ach ieving their goals, and the concomi-
A «Scimitar» and a «Spartan» on reconnaissance in the desert.
tant ab ility of new technology to help deliver this, perhaps they will at least be persuaded that count r ies like the UK need only possess a deterrent scale of traditional war- fighting capability; one that reflects our stated policy of only go ing to war as pail of the NATO alliance or, in a regional con text, with the USA. The aim of this art icle is not to advocate the scrapping of all our aircraft and tanks to t he point that traditional mass armored operations, for example, become an attractive asymmetric option to a potential enemy. On the contrary, with our alli es, we need to retain sufficient conventional air, land and maritime forces to ensure tactical level dom inance in regional intervention operation s or
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British and American personnel near a Patrol Base in Afghanistan. /
enduring stabilization operations. But, the key p,oint here is that the scale of employment and the context in which conventional weapons systems may be used in the future will be quite different to what may have been the case in the twentieth century. Should traditional interstate conflict again become a serious possibility, we do not need to plan on winning these things by ourselves. Our contribution can prudently reflect better what our allies will bring to the party. For now, des igning our forces on the requirement to deter potential state adversaries will result in what some analysts icier to as a 'deterrence dividend'. If we ruthlessly apply our own policy that we will only undertake traditional state on state war with powerful allies, we can achieve savings in t his hugely expensive area that will free up the resources needed for investment in other more likely forms of conflict. And because many of the skills are transferable, it will also go a long way to finding the money needed to allow our armed forces to contribute to important stabilizing activity in fragile and failed states as well as to that Cinderella activity to which President Obama has drawn our attention recently, that of peace- keeping. Briefly, it could be usefu l to refer to the concept
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of 'mass'. In people focused conflict, whether in Afghanistan or protecting vital sea lanes , delivering success will often need mass, whether it is the right number of troops and support helicopters, sufficient UAVs or sufficient small ships. While we are changing slowly, our forces are still designed primarily to conduct short duration conventional war fighting operations. In these, one compensates absolutely correctly for what historically would be viewed as a shortage of troops with huge firepower, hence the bias of the equipment programmer towards these capabilities over the last sixty years. But in wars amongst the people, if you are using a lot of firepower - often delivered from the air in extremis as a resu lt of insufficient manpower - you are almost certainly losing. One must have enough troops firstly to retain the tactical initiative and, secondly, to provide the enduring routine security without which the population will not have the conf idence to reject the insurgent or spoiler. They can, and ideally should, be indigenous forces, but you also need sufficient people to train them quickly and e efficiently in the first place. So are our armed Forces geared up properly for future conflict? The essence of a good navy, army or air force is that they have fighting spirit, and can impose their will on a skilled, cunning and violent enemy. Armed forces of this quality, with the agile and innovative leaders they breed naturally,
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A Gurkha of t he British army in Afghanistan.
can with good traini ng turn their hand to any type of conflict relatively quickly. And there is no doubt that our navy, army and air force is very firmly in this league. If you do not ¡ possess such fighting spirit, however good or hi -tech you r equipment, you will not win against opponent s who do, whether they arc part of another states' army or Taliban style insurgents, and however shoddy or out of date their equipment. So, from one key perspect ive, our fight in Afghan istan is the best possible preparation for any future conflict, whatever its nature. It is on this basis that, as General Martin Dempsey has written recently, armies will 'build leaders competent and confident in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment' too. In conclusion , a fundame ntal re-think of the way we prepare and equip our armed forces for the twenty-first century is necessary. Certaintly, we have much to do but I believe it is doable; and al l three services have a vital role to play in it. We firstly need to agree t he essential character of our stated policy of on ly going to war as part of future conflict. The re are some synergies to be had here. We cannot rule out major inter- state warfare the NATO alliance or, within a smaller regional entirely. But even if th is does materialize, and I context, with an overwhelmingly powerfu l USA. thin k t hat the probability of it doing so is low, the Th is scale of capability wou ld be sufficient to avoid aggressor is unlikely to use massed armored, air t raditional military options becoming an asymmetric att raction to a potential o r naval Formations in some live re-run of t he Cold War. Very few enemy, as well as ensure tacnations have the capacity and ' ' While we are changing t ical level dominance in reg ion al intervention o r stabicapability to wage this type of slowly, our forces are lization operations. warfare and the costs and risks of Importantly w e sti ll need to developing it, let alone us ing it, still designed primarily are enormous. More likely, such to conduct short duration be able to fight hard, but nat ions will seek to exploit other conventional war fighting cleverly so, within the co ntext of a Comprehensive Approach levers, such as economic power. operation ,, whose constituent elements If shooting does start, it is likely are viewed and resourced as to be through prox ies, guerrillas and terrorists o r through cyber at tack. The battle the security instruments they shou ld be. Crucially, we need to f ully understand and exploit the tools for people's minds will , as ever, be central albeit of info rmation super iority. And when -procuring the commun ications revo lution w ill transform the new equipment, we should exploit the agility and way t his is fought. timeliness of t he Urg ent Operat ional Requirement Much of what we need for the future is in today's inventory, but the scale and context in wh ich it (UOR) process. If this, arguably at least our generation's horse may he required must be rigorously examined . If and tank moment, is not gripped our armed forces technology and globalizat ion has materially will try, with inadequate resources, to be all things altered th e way inter- state and non-state w ars will to al l conflicts and perhaps fail to succeed properbe fought, we need to change ou r historical priorities especially if we are also to afford vital prevenly in any. The risks of such an approach are too serious for th is any longer to be an acceptable tive stratagems. We are not suggesting t hat the UK should get rid of all its more traditional military course, if ever it has been . capability. Far from it, but its scale should reflect Sir David Richards the context in which it might be used or have General, value. We need to possess a deterrent scale of traChief of the British Army Staff ditional war- fighting capabi lity; one that reflects
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REGIONAL COMMAND WEST: ACCOUNT OF AN EXPERIENCE The recent employment of t he "Friuli" Brigade in Afghanistan has allowed this Major Unit not only to contribute to the achievement of the ISAF objectives but also to enhance and improve its operational capab ility.
At the end of December 2007 the "Friuli" airmobile Brig ade was entrusted the task to constitute the framework of the "Regional Command West (RC-W) of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a mu lt inationa l Command led by Italy with the contribution of Spain, Slovenia and Lithuania. Up to that moment personne l not belonging to any organi sed unit had carried out the task and autonomously se lected personne l had filled the various pos itions. The development of the situation and the increase of the threat have led to decide to employ a full Brigade Command , characterized by the best amalgamation of the sing le components . The choice fell upon to/ th is Brigade, which in January 2008 was concluding its NATO eng agement as Brigade Command NRF- 9, having passed the national and NATO trai ni ng and evaluation cycles.
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THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT The Area of Responsibility (AoR) assigned to the RC- W consists of an area of about 160,000 square km and inc ludes the provinces of Herat, Farah, Badgh is and Ghor. Within the "Shamshir" framework operation, conducted from March 1 to October 31, the ISAF Command in Kabul has tasked t he "Friuli" airmobile Brigade to increase the security conditions , to ensure freedom of moveme nt along the main communication lines and to support the FDD (Focus District Development) programme, which envisages t he installation and development of police units in some districts considered crucial. Within the scope of this miss ion, be sides the normal patrolling activities and convoy escorts, two main operations have been conceived and carri ed out in the critical areas of the AoR: operation "Bazaar", in the southern province of Farah and operation "Kohra", in the northern province of Badghis. For the implementation of its mission, the RC- W could count on an ltalo- Spanish manoeuvre battalion, consisting of four companies: four Italian and one Spanish; one Joint Air Task Force w ith national air assets of the three Services : Task Group (TG) "Fenice" with the A-129s "Mangusta" and CH - 47s of the Army: TG "Ancora" w it h the SH-3 Ds of the Navy; TG "Astore" with the "Predators" and TG ''Tigre" with t he AB- 212s of the Air Force . Besides these national air assets , RC-W incl udes two more units supp li ed by Spain: TG "Asphuel" w ith t hree CH47s and TG "Hel isaf" with two "Super Pumas" with MEDEVAC function .
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t hat included a mission, an intent and an End State approved and signed by all the Commanders: the Joint OPORD. An element that emerged at once was the importarice of conducting the operations in close coordination between the various allies, in order to maximise the wanted effects. Such situation has compelled the various actors playing in the same area to carry out joint operations in the same OPBOX, avoiding actions of "friendly fire". The idea of "Boxing - Packaging - Bubbling" is connected with this principle. The concept was adopted to supply the various forces operating on the ground with a clear and unmistakable system to "deconflict", but at the same time to harmonise, the reciprocal operations. The first step, "Boxing", permits to create the so-called OPBOX, portions of areas inside which t he operations are carried out. The second step is "Packaging", which envisions the creation of packages of forces realized with the contribution of all the actors. The third step is "Bubbling" and consists in creating "bubbles" activated from time to time, in order to act in a targeted and incisive manner without superimpositions in time and space.
A phase ofJoint planning.
JOINT PLANNING
The approach adopted was to involve the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in all the operational activities, starting from the planning phase, in order to show, according to the directions given by the ISAF Command, the "Afghan face". The "JOINT Operational Planning OPERATION "BAZAAR" Group" was constituted together with the planning Operation "Bazaar", conceived and of the "Bazaar" operation. An element that emerged The Group met 2 or 3 times at once was the importance carried out by RC-W in support of a week, and the meetings of conducting the operations the Af ghan security forces within the "Shamshir" operation, was aimed at were attended mainly by close coordination creating the conditions for restoring RC-W and ANA representa- in tives; in particular, the between the various allies, in the governance in the Bakwa dismaximise the trict, where there had been no members of the J2, J3, JS order to Afghan state authorities for months, branches discussed on how wanted effects , , and pol ice forces least of all. to solve the military probThe operat ion witnessed the lem deriving from the misengagement of all the manoeuvre forces and the sion assigned to them by the higher Commands, above-mentioned RC-W air assets. making use of the Military Decis ion-Making Process. The JOPG included also representatives of the ANP, of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), a unit organized within the RC- W and tasked with mentorin g the ANA and ANP. This approach, despite the difficulties deriving from the employment of interpreters to translate from English into Dari, which somehow constitute a "filter", has permitted to tackle together problems of various kinds, achieving a reciprocal sharing of information, the joint solution of log istic problems and the integration of the respective Tactics and Procedures. This new "modus operandi", which proved immediately productive, has resulted in the realization of a single document
''
A meeting of the Joint Operational Planning Croup.
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The signing of the Joint OPORD.
The Afghan Forces there were 2 kandaks (battalions) of the 207th ANA Corps, ANP u nits (Afghan Police), both with their mentors, and a company of the 2nd/7th US Marines. The operation envisaged the encirclement of the Bakwa built-up area and subsequently the ANA, with Italian mentors (OMT of RC- W) and Marines, occupied the village and the police station, which had been idle for about a year. On the enemy side, the information activity had anticipated the employment of improvised explosive devices (IED); for fear of a direct engagement they had concentrated with very quick fire actions,
Troops on foot looking for IEDs before the passage of vehicles.
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of the ambush kind. During the deployment of the instrument for the encirclement of the target zone, until the day preceding the entrance into Bakwa the Afghan security forces and the American Special Forces endured several TICS (Troop in Contact) in the zone of Shewan, the insurgents' stronghold, and often the disengagement occurred thanks to close air support. The forces engaged operated within a remarkable security framework, made possible by the continuous employment of the "Mangusta" A-129 helicopters, which produced a psycho logical effect, essential for the development of the manoeuvre, which was developed along three different facilitation roads, g iving the enemy a demonstration of force and coordination. In order to defy the IED threat, long stretches were covered by infantry units on foot. Thanks to this techn ique, our soldiers found and neutralized several devices: nevertheless the day of the entry into Bakwa, despite the precautions adopted, an IED seriously damaged an ANA vehicle, wounding some Afghan soldiers.
OPERATION "KOHRA" Like the preceding one, also th is operation was planned in coordination with our partners (ANA, ANP and ARSIC- W). The task was to assist, with the contribution of ARSIC W, the 207th ANA Corps and ANP in expanding security and freedom of move-
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ment in the district of Bala Morghab, in order to Italian and ANA units in operation "BAZAAR". allow the development of the FDD programme. Following the analysis of ground, road conditions, and the travelling and flight times existing Golo Jirak, Mangan, Doursori and Akazai. As a between Camp Arena and Bala Morghab, in the matter of fact, starting from the reconnaissance of planning phase it turned out that it was necessary Bala Morghab, carried out in the month of June, to have a greater adherence of the fire support the insurgents have twice attacked our convoy, supplied by the "Mangusta" consisting of platoons from t he helicopters and by the log istic "Aquila" TF, in the area between support. It was therefore envis- ' ' For the insurgents our Mangan and Gola Jirak. Our aged to establish a "Forward presence in the area has men, immediately af ter the Arming and Refuelling Point" made with mortars, RPG represented, and repre- attack (FARP) at Qala and Naw for the and small arms, answered the redeployment of the he licopters sents, a threat and a fire, supported also by the A and a Patro l Base (PB) at hindrance to their free l 20s "Mangusta", confirming Mangan, in order to allow the dom of movement,, the need to have t he combat un its to make t he movements helicopters redeployed at Qala from Qala and Naw to Bala and Naw. The Ill phase of the Morghab in two stretches. "l(ohra" operation has started on August 4, with T he month of July witnessed RC- W engaged in the redeployment of TF "Aqui la" in t he FOB of Bala the construction of the abovementioned strucMorghab. For the insu rgents our presence in the tu res, be lieved to be decisive points for proceed area has represented, and represents, a t ~reat and ing with the next phase. Th is represented more a logistic than an operational effort: t he FARP of Qala and Naw was estab lished within Ju ly and by August the PB of Mangan was also completed. The decisive phase of operation "Kohra" started at t his point: to arrive at Bala Morghab, occupy the FOB, keep control of the area with patrols and checkpoints. From He rat to Qala and Naw the road of the Alfa axis did not pose particular problems, o n t he contrary, the t hreat increased whenever we reached
The "Aquila" Company takes possession of the FOB structure.
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a hindrance to their freedom of movement: this is confirmed also by the fact that the FOB and the following convoys headed for Bala Morghab have been t he target of attacks with small arms, mortars and RPGs . The IED threat has manifested itself non- stop all along the route emp loyed to reach the FOB, providing qu ite a number of difficulties to
Observation Posts, in order to seize ground from t he enemy control, thus securing the freedom of movement necessary for ach ieving the pre-establi shed "Kohra" End State: FOB of Bala Morghab bu ilt, bridge on the Morghan river positioned . At the same t ime we have worked on another front : intense "Info Ops" activity through talks with the local elders in order to convince them of the reasons of our presence; PSYOPS activity, Med ical Civi l Affairs Patrols , handing out of human itarian aid.
THE TACTICAL COORDINATION CENTRE The greatest effort that had been foreseen in the planning phase is that of having availability of a Command and Control (C2) system suitable for managing an operation that concerned all the forces involved.
Above. The FOB of Bala Morghab. Right. Servicemen of the "Aquila" company in an observation post on the hills west of the FOB of Bala Morghab.
Below. A CH-47 of the Italian Army approaching the Dela ram Patrol Base. /
the logistic supplying . Such situation (two IEDs had ki ll ed an American and two Afghan soldiers) has compelled to choose the supplying by helicopter (CH- 47 and Ml - 8) and by C- 130 aircraft. During the whole month of August, the "Aqui la" T F, in accordance with the ANA and ANP forces with their mentors (RC- W OMLT and ARSIC- W), have carried out patro ls, put up Check Points, occupied
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This d ifficu lty was overcome with a ''Tactical Coordinat ion Centre" (TCC) to manage the activi ties, coordinate their imp lementation and, if necessary, to deconflict them. The necess ity to have this instrument is felt for the first time wh i le planning "Bazaar", the first large operation conducted jointly in t he AoR of RC- W. The system found consisted in creating a coordination centre whe re the information gathered by each ally was made to converge : the pieces of information were jointly worked out in order to draw the appropriate deductions and conclusions to be passed on to the respective Commands. Similar ly, the orders coming from the Commands, appropriately deconflicted, were sent down to the subordinate units. The results have been very good . The capacity to combine, confront and integrate the information supplied by each partner, outli ni ng a clear and complete picture of the situation in real time , has certainly supplied a high added value, giving the poss ibility to intervene promptly in case of need .
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INFO OPS
The units at Bala Morghab receiving supplies by air.
The activity of influence on the authorized "Target Aud ience" has been fundamental for the tions . success of the operational activit ies . The "Key Of fundamental importance are also approach Leader Engagement" (KLE) and "Face to Face" (F2F) and presence . The "show of force/presence" is an act ivities have turned out to be probably the element of deterrence for the enemy's capability essential component for the new way of conductand has proved important in iso lating the insuring military operations . If well gents from the local populacoordinated, it can influence the tion. fundamental ganglia of society, ' ' These activities repreconstituted by government per- sent a "non kinetic" in sonnel and their leaders. These strument, a multiplier of HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT activities represent a "non kinetic" instrument, a multiplier effects, employed against The helicopter, an important of effects, employed against the the targets to support instrument for carrying out land targets , to support the the manoeuvre ,, operations, has proved fundamanoeuvre. mental in this environment. The Therefore tactical CIMIC activsize of the AoR and the precarities, d istribution of humanitarian aid and MEDious roads make Afghanistan, and especially the CAP, integrated within the so-called "Qu ick Impact western region, of our responsibility, a difficult Projects", have proved essential during the operaground . In this particu lar situation and type of ter-
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rain, sending a mechanic to Bala Morghab, the logistic supply of a unit at Delaram, transporting the ''Tuscania" Carabinieri to Adraskan and the Commander's visit to a unit, just to mention a few examples, are operational problem that can be tackled and solved only with the employment of helicopters. Besides the missions of this type, the employment of the A-1 29 "Mangusta" has proved enormously important as support to the activities conducted by the manoeuvre units. This helicopter has in fact accomplished deterrence tasks during critical movements on ground and has been employed as "Close In Fire Support" (CIFS), for reconnaissance and to escort transport helicopters in areas marked by a high level of threat, such as,
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A "Mangusta" A-129 on an escort mission.
for example, Bala Morghab during operation "Kohra". T he results have been excellent. By just flying over, our manoeuvre units showed such an impressiveness and force that dissuaded the Insurgents from taking any action against us.
RESULTS ACHIEVED The six months of intense activity conducted in the area have allowed RC- W to act i n all the Operational Lines that constitute its mission:
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In the sphere of the third line of the R&D operaSecurity, Governance, Reconstruction and tions, the RC-W was divided following three main Development (R&D). lines: The "Bazaar" and "Kohra" operations, besides supporting the FDD programme, have allowed the · the CIMIC activities developed in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the operations conducted by the Battle Group, with ISAF forces to take control of the districts that up particular reference to medical assistance to that moment had never seen an Afghan govern(MEDCAPs) and distribution of humanitarian aid ment presence, let alone the presence of NATO. (HA), in order to promote the consent of the local population, improve the security conditions of The success of these operations has permitted to our AoR and ensure freedom of action/freedom set up a post of the Afghan National Police (ANP) of movement (FOA/FOM) to the manoeuvre in the village of Bakwa, while a FOB was realized at forces; Bala Morghab, destined to house RC-W, ANA and • t he activities of reconstruction and development ANP troops, ensuring a permanent presence, and a and Governance support carried out by the PRTs, new bridge on the river of the same name: a projwith particular reference to that of Herat, for the ect that COMISAF believed of strategic importance. development of the projects agreed upon with For the first time in the RC-W, the AoR portion, the local authorities; marked by a stable and permanent presence of · the supply medical aid through the ROLE l and ANSF/ISAF forces, has been decisively increment2 of Camp Arena and t he PRTs of Herat, Farah, ed in terms of ground control and security. Chaghcharan and Qala-1-Naw; this activity has The larger presence on the territory has permitted and favoured a better control of the area and, permitted to assist more than 17,500 people. at the same time, a greater control of t he roads, increasi ng the freedom of movement of ISAF and CONCLUSIONS ANSF and, consequently, also of the civilian con voys. Both in t he planning phase as well as in the conManoeuvre units and those operating in the third dimension were engaged in these tasks without a duct phase our units have operated together with break in the entire AoR of RC-W. the Afghan security forces. The threats present in t he area have once more In particular, in the conduct phase it was neceshighlighted the importance and peculiarity of sary and risolutive the uti lization of accurate and some assets t hat are fundamen detailed coordination procetal in order to be able to operate dures; thus it was possible to , , achieve the wanted resu lt, Both in the planning in that context: the Joint Tactical according to the COMISAF phase as well as in the con- Air Controllers UTAC), the Explosive Ordnance directions: show the "Afghan duct phase our units have Teams Device and the Improvised Face" in every circumstance, in together with Explosive Device Disposal order to facilitate the Afghan ope rated Afghan security (EOD/IEDD). Government in assuming con- the forces ,, Also the role played by helitrol of the territory. copters in this operation has Also in the Governance ambit proved of remarkable imporwe carried out various activi tance. The AoR dimensions and the nature of the ties. The education and train ing act1v1t1es of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) were conducted by the ground, in fact, recommend t he employment of "Grifo" TF (a unit consisting of men from the the helicopter in order to offset the bad r-oad conditions and ensure t he necessary logistic and fire "Guardia di Finanza" (Revenue Guard Corps), and support to the ground units. the mentoring activity that OMLT continued to This operation has represented for the airborne carry out with ANA, giving a great contribution for brigade an experience unique of its kind. The sinthe success of the operations. gle activities carried out, besides having permitted A precious result was achieved within this operthe f ull achievement of the objectives fixed by the ational line with the population's approval. The ISAF Command, have offered to the Major Unit a "Shura" instrument, much used during our manrange of experiences and occasions, with an date, contributed to reconcile the local authority, unquestioned growth in terms of operational represented by the "elders", with the legitimate capability. authority. Moreover, it permitted to draw attention to the real problems of the population so as to tarMarco Poddi get our humanitar ian aid as best as possible. In Major, this regard, the Info Ops activities conducted Headquarters, "Friuli" Airborne Brigade proved decisive.
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I
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KOSOVO: A CONSTANT COMMITMENT TO PEACE Ten years have elapsed since the NATO troops entered Kosovo to guarantee security and assistance to the population. The situation of the Country has definitely improved, but there is still a lot to do on the internal level and in the field of international diplomacy. In view of this, our soldiers are continuing to carry out their mission with competence and spirit of adaptability to the new operational scenarios, winning unanimous approbation both locally and on the international plane.
tion of the conditions necessary for the social and The 12th of June 2009 is the 10th anniversary of economic development of the region. the NATO troops' entry into l<osovo. With the improvement of the security conditions The KFOR mission, in accordance with in the region , the KFOR mission in 2002 was Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the reduced to 39,000 soldiers and to 27,500 in 2003. United Nations consisted of 50,000 soldiers under The military presence was increased again in the orders of the British General Jackson. They March 2004, owing to an unexwere deployed in the Serbian pected resurgence of ethnic province of Kosovo and were to violence. witness the concomitant with- ' ' The military presence Until 2007 the situation drawal of the Serbian forces. was increased again in remained substantially The objective of operation March 2004, owing to an unchanged. "Joint Guardian", as was origiresurgence In that year, a Comprehensive nally called,, was / defined by unexpected of ethnic violence,, Plan on the status of Kosovo, Resolution l 244 itself and worked out by the Special envisaged: immediate cessation Envoy of the Secretary General of all violence and hostilities; complete withdrawal of the military, paramilitary of the United Nations, Martii Ahtisaari, was published and immediately accepted by Pristina and and police forces of the Federal Republic of Serbia; categorically rejected by Belgrade. presence of a NATO security force; establishment of an ad - interim administration (UNMIK); free and On August l, 2007, lacking a Resolution of the Security Council, the Secretary General of the safe return of the refugees; complete demilitarisaUn ited Nations decided to reach an agreement tion of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); restorathrough the contact Group of negotiation, but no accord was reached between the two sides on the status of Kosovo. In December 2007, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO Countries decided to confi rm the presence of KFOR on the basis of Resolution 1244 until the UN adopted a new Resolution. Thus we reach 2008, the crucial year of the evolution of the crisis. Left. Brigadier General Giovanni Armentani, Commander of the "Granatieri di Sardegna" mechanized Brigade, present Commander of the Multinational Task Force West in Kosovo.
Title pages. Flags Square at "Villaggio Italia" in Peje.
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On the 4th of February, on the basis of a "Joint Action Plan" the European Union endorses the const itution of EULEX (European Union Ru le of Law Mission in Kosovo) destined to replace UNMIK. On February 17, the Kosovo Institutions issue a unilateral declaration of independence, openly supported by the Un ited States and determined to obtain a common acknowledgement by the European Union. On June l 5, the first Constitution of the new State came into force. Declaration and Constitution clearly refer to the Ahtisaari plan and its implementation. Up to now, 55 Countries have officially recog nized Kosovo. Some important European Countries are not among them : Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus, which have recently reaffirmed their refusal to acknowledge Kosovo. Meanwhi le, on October 8, t he UN General Assembly voted in favour of Serbia's request to ask the International Court of Justice to issue a ruling about the legitimacy of the declaration of independence. On November 26, the Security Council, following a suggestion made by the Secretary General, has put EULEX under the aeg is of Resolution 1244, and allowed its deployment, which started on December 8 . T he year of the l 0th ann iversary opened with a further event that is going to affect the crisis'
A moment of the ''Transfer of Authority" of the Multinational Task Force West.
development. On the January 20, the actIvIty of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) came to an end, although not officially, waiting for the offic ial closing, envisaged for June. The 20th has been declared "Announcement Day", with the delivery to the KPC members of the admission or exclus ion letters to the new Kosovo security force. The activities of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), the new structure of civi l protection, started on the 21 st. These last events are causing a heated debate that is picked up every day by the local and international media. The usual interlocutors, belonging to the Serbian political authorities and to the Kosovo and international Institutions, have been joined by others who, for various reasons, express thei r point of view or their protest against the last initiatives (EULEX and KSF). The outcome is a ris ing of tension, which sometimes results in sudden and unforeseeable acts of intimidation or protest, mostly peaceful. The l 0th year of the KFOR and of the Italian troops' permanence in Kosovo has started in this atmosphere . In this article, we shall try to provide an updated report on the MNTF- W activity.
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Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, led to a mass ive NATO intervention in t he Balkans, on a UN mandate (Resolution 1244 of June 10 1999). THE NEW SCENARIO The KFOR (KosovoFORce) activity o n the territory, starts early on the 12th of June 1999, when the The Yugos lav Federation - formed by six NATO contingents (the Italian one among the first) p reviously deployed under ARRC (ACE Rapid Federated Republics : Serbia, Montenegro , Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Reaction Corps) Command , Bos nia-Herzegovi na - broke entered Kosovo hot on t he heels 1 up in 1991, aft er 4 5 years of ' ' Marshal Tito s death and of th e Serbian troo ps , al ready appare nt harmony since its the progressive decline of tried by 78 days of contin uous foundation, causing bloody at tacks by the air forces of the the remaining Communist Atlantic ethnic confl icts. Alliance . Marshal T ito's death (1 980) regimes in Eastern Europe At the end of 2004, the NATO and t he progressive decline encouraged an increasing Authorities decided to unify all of the remaining Communist claim for democracy ana operations carried o ut on the regimes in Eastern Europe autonomy by the local Balkan territory i n a single operaencouraged an increasing populations ,, t ion al framework, th e "Joint claim for democracy and Operation Area" , g iving b irth, on autonomy from the local April 5, 2005 , to Ope rat ion "Joint populat ions. Ente rprise", which includes all the Contin gents of Kosovo, a Serb ian province where the majority of the Alliance deployed in the various theatres . the population belong s t o the Albanian ethnic Today, KFOR is present in Kosovo with more than group , was one of the f irst to claim it s inde 16,000 men and women be lo ngin g to 34 Nat ions, pendence from the Yugoslav Federation , causing a organized in five MNTFs (Mu ltinat ional Task react ion from Serbia, which imposed a violently Force), major units at Brigade level named after rep ressive regime on t he territory. their geograph ic position on the t erritory: T he following declarations of inde pendence from MNTF - C (Centre) based at Liplijan; the Federation, which were peaceful for Slovenia MNTF - N (North) based at Novo Selo ; and Macedonia, but gave ri se to violent conflicts in MNTF - S (South) based at Prizren ; A "CRC - Crowd Riot Control" operation.
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MNTF - E (East) based at Urosevac; MANT - W (West) based at Pec-Peja ("Villaggio Italia" Compound). The main objective of the mission, after ten years from its beginning, remains the initial one, stated by UN Resolution 1244, i.e. to ensure secu rity and freedom of movement to the local population, with no ethnic or religious distinctions, but the situation in which this task is carried out has deeply changed. In fact, and as we already mentioned, on February 17, 2008 the Prem ie r of the Democratic Party (PdK) Hashim Thaci, winner of t he elections of 2007, announced to the world that Kosovo was at last "A proud, independent and free State". The declaration of independence, voted by the Pristina Parliament assembled in an extraordinary session, had a unilateral character and its only precedent has been that of East Timar. The first immediate recognitions of the new State arrived from the United States, Albania and Costa Rica. At present, Kosovo has been recognised by 5 5 Nations of the world. The European Union, in a meeting in Strasbourg, gave its member States freedom of choice as regards the recognition of the secessionist province. On February 21, 2008 the Italian Government officially acknowledged the independence of Kosovo and established diplomatic relations with the new State. Serbia, only ten minutes after three p.m. of
Patrolling a rugged mountain area.
February l 7, 2008, time of the declaration of independence, defined such pronouncement illegitimate and illegal. Outside Europe, China and Russia remain strong ly against it, and both nations have veto power in the UN Security Council; the latter has not expressed itself in favour of independence, reaffirming that t he only reliable document of reference remains its Resol ution 1244.
THE AOR OF THE MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE WEST (MNTF-W)
The MNTF- W, within which the majority of the national contingent is organized, since November 6, 2008 has been based on the Command of the "Granatieri di Sardegna" mechanized Brigade and operates inside its area of responsibility (AoR). Th e AoR of t he MNTF-W covers about 2500 sq. kilometres in t he western part of Kosovo and includes 6 municipalities: Pee, Decane, Djacovika, lstok, Klina and the recently constituted Junik Uune 2008) for a total of 6 cities and 4 1 l villages. The area borders with Albania on the southwest, Montenegro on the northwest and Serbia on the north. Along these borders there are numerous passes, among these three official Border-Crossing Points (BXP) (2 with Albania and 1 with Montenegro) and l O non-official ones (4 with Albania, l with Montenegro and 5 with Serbia along the Administration Boundary Line). In winter, due to snow, their crossing is difficult or even impossible for most vehicles. The population in the region adds up to about 400,000 inhabitants and 90% consists of Kosovars of the Albanian ethn ic group (KoA) and the
Medical prevention at Klina orphanage.
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remaining percentage is divided among Serbian Kosovars (KoS) spread in the municipalities of Pee, lstok and Klina, and representatives of other ethnic groups (Romany, Egyptian, Assal and Bosn ian). The MNTF-W Area of Res ponsibility includes 2 enclaves and l 7 resettlements in smaller villages. The two enclaves are Goradzevac, which with its 800 residents is the largest of the region, and Osojan e, which is inhabited by about 450 KoS. Of fundamental importance are also the socalled "Properties With Designated Special Status" (PrDSS) i. e. places or monuments of outstanding historical, patrimonial and religious value, which have a role t hat is considered strategic for the impleme ntation of the mission.
A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE MISSION On June 12, 1999, t he NATO forces t hat entered Kosovo were called to put an end to a situation of armed confrontation. The activities carried out by this Force had a typically military connotation, with particular attention to the needs of the civilian population, which was hard tried by the conflict and by the horrors of ethnic cleansing. Ten years of continuous commitment by KFOR, in order to ensure security and freedom of move-
ing and disturbing element in the process of integration, necessary for reestablishing the rules of a life in common. On a future of stability of this region, weighs in a determinant way the precarious financial situation of the Country. The world economic crisis, an abnormal rate of unemployment, which in some areas reaches 70%, and the low salaries, most of which have not increased since 1999, contribute to the diffusion of phenomena of corruption and to the development of illegal activities. In such a scenario, it is indispensable to maintain a strict monitoring activity on the territory because, if the general situation can be defined essentially calm, there are nevertheless important elements of unpredictability. A last important point, in chronological order, is the breakup of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and the formation of t he Kosovo Security Force
l.
Above. A donation presented by CIMIC.
Left.
A heavy power shovel of the Engineers of the "Astro" Task Force, used to repair the road system.
Below. A visit to a Romany camp.
ment on the territory and assistance to the population have significantly improved the situation of the Country, which, nevertheless, still presents remarkable problems of social instability. The continuous threat of a will of territorial separation, shown by the motivated Serbian community that lives in t he northern part of Kosovo, on the borders with Serbia, is a source of tensions that have sometimes resu lted in incidents. T he creation of parallel structures inside the main ethnic enclaves constitutes in fact a slacken-
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(KSF) . The KPC was an organ ization born to carry out tasks of civil protection, consisting mostly of Albanian personnel that had belonged to the Usshtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK). The KSF (Kosovo Security Force) is an organization also born to carry out tasks of civil protection, but with recruiting and training standards based on western principles and a special stress on mu ltiethnic participation. It originates from the wil l to provide the Country with a modern, effectual and efficient force, in line with the foreseeable needs of civil protection of a western Country . The d isbanding of the KPC has caused the loss of
Right and below. The historical Monastery of Oecane.
a job for some of its former members, who have not found a new position in the new structure. These have immediately organized themselves in order to develop forms of protest against Kosovo's institutions and KFOR, which supports the new organization. In orde r to keep under control and try to solve as best as possible the social problems deriving from these issues, it has been necessary to find a total ly different approach to the miss ion . Therefore, an actual new "philosophy" of fo rce employment has been developed, based mainly on the concept of "Effects Based Approach Operations (EBAO)". The EBAOs represent a whole of activities, which, starting from the detection of the precise objec-
tives that one wants to achieve and find ing the effects necessary to reach them, permit to assess and p lan the actions that can be carried out in order to obtain the wanted result. The activities concerning this new concept are carried out, first of all, through a work of diffusion of information and messages to the population. T he messages are mostly intended for improving the perception of KFOR by the political leaders and the citizens them selves. The planning of the EBAOs at MNTF- W HQ level is entrusted to TEC, (Tactical Effect Centre), a new Staff Cell constituted wi t hin MNTF- W. T o develop its activities this Cell makes use of CIMIC, PSYOPS, LMT and other assets . The TEC constantly coordinates, deconflictualises and synchronises t he EBAOs in the AoR, with a continuous interaction w ith the kin etic and nonkinetic activ it ies carried out on the ground.
KINETIC AND NON- KINETIC ACTIVITIES
These represent the whole range (Fu ll Spectrum) of the mi litary activities that can be conducted during an ope ration . With the te rm "kinetic" one wants to in dicate the body of activities that employ means that interact with the physical domain of the adversary, wh ile "non-kinetic" are the m il itary activities that intend to achieve military obj ectives by employing means
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MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE WEST (MNTF - W) - FIVE NATIONS, ONE TEAM -
\
Leader Nation Italy Member Nations Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Spain Brigadier General Giovanni Armentani has been its Commander since November 6th, 2008. On the national territory he is the Commander of the "Granatieri di Sardegna" Mechanized Brigade, based in Rome. There are three operational task forces, stationed on the western part of Kosovo, in the municipalities of Pec/Peje; Klina/Kline; Decani/Decan; Djakovica/Gjakove; Junik/Junik. Multi nationality is the key characteristic of the Task Force. "Five Nations are working together, in synergy of intents in order to maintain a safe environment where the provisions of Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the United Nations are fully applied". / The tasks of MNTF-W are: • Keep a safe environment for the entire population in the area of responsibility of the Task Force, working in close cooperation with all the international and local institutions; • Allow freedom of movement without distinction of ethnic groups and religion; • Contribute to monitor the borders with FYROM and Albania; • upport EULEX in maintaining the rule of law. • Continue to cooperate with all the organizations on the territory in order to promote the full recovery of the administrative, economic and social structures of the region. • The manoeuvre forces of MNTF-W, at regiment/ battalion level are: • Task Force Aquila in Pec/Peje (Italy); · Task Force Tizona in lstok/lstog (Spain); · Task Force Nimrod in Pec/Peje (Hungary). Other units: • Task Force Astro: multinational unit of engineers in Pec/Peje (Italy); • Task Force Ercole: helicopter unit in Djakovica/Gjakove (Italy); • Task Force C4: signal unit in charge of radio and telephone links in the operation theatre in Pec/Peje (Italy); · T - CSS Unit for the logistic support of the forces in the operational theatre in Pec/Peje (Italy).
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that interact with t he psychological domain of the adversary. T he abovementioned different approach fosters the creation of the preconditions for the subsequent phase of deterrence, characterised by a new configuration of the assets of the manoeuvre and an increase in the manoeuvring spaces. The necessary reduction in the assets of the manoeuvre must be compensated by an increase in the assets necessary to warrant the domination of informat io n, guaranteeing t he preservation of the situat ion awareness (SA); among them, the liaison teams with the municipalities (LMT) and the PSYOPS assets. As regards the present conduct of the Kinetic Operations, "Focused Operations" have replaced the previous "Framework" Operations, which were aimed especially at realizing a large and militarily very intense presence on the territory (Show the Presence) . The operations of the "Focused" kind represent a new "modus operandi", no more hinged on a generalised presence of KFOR on the territory, but positioned where the i nformation picture requ ires it and according to t he principles of "High Visibility" and "Low Profi le". This kind of operations is conducted on a daily basis and with a minimum impact on the social life of the civilian population. Within the sphere of t hese operations, there are activities of Foot Patrols (FP), Vehicle Patrols (VP), Observation Posts (OP). The Kinetic activities do not inc lude only the military activities in the proper sense, but also all t hose activities that in normal times are conducted by police forces but, in peace support operat ions, are carried out with methods and purposes suited to the mission of the military forces. As regards the "non military tasks", t he main
A detail of the interior of the Patriarchate of Peje.
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operations conducted by the MNTF- W essentially An area reconstructed as part of the C/M/C activities. consist in the control of sensitive areas, such as enclaves, border points (BXP), places of historical, relig ious, cultural and strategic sign ificance and international Organizations . (PrDSS) . It is a matter of guaranteeing decent living conMoreover, t he MNTF-W conducts operational ditions by restori ng the essential services (aqueactivities, such as patrols in support to the Kosovo Police (KP) and to t he Kosovo Border Police (KBP) , ducts, power lines, etc) , staple commodities , synchronized patro ls in collaboration with the Serb reconstruction of important infrastructure such as Armed Forces behind the Adm inistration Bou nd ary hospitals, schoo ls and roads. Line (ABL) and, finally, escorts Moreover, t he civil - m ilitary cooperation int ends to create to personnel under protection. t he best conditions of cooperForm t he viewpoint of the ' ' The main objective is the ation with the many non - govnon- Ki net ic activit ies, of great reconstruction of the socio- ern me ntal o rgan izations importance is also the coopereconomic fabric, so as to (NGOs) and w it h the internaation betwee n t he milit ary re-establish, as soon as postional organ izations (10) and component in t he t heatre and agencies present on the territhe civi lian sphere, realized by sible, the confidence in the CIM IC (C iv ilian - Milit ary institutions and international tory, in order to achi eve a rap id hand ing over of power and Coope ration) team. Organizations ,, responsibilities to t he local civil aut horities. THE CIMIC ACTIVITIES A Health CIMIC Center has been operating for a long t ime w ith in the CI MIC branch of MNTF- W. The Center provides the papers for t he admission to The CIM IC act ivities of MNTF-W are impleme nted through the realization of the so- called Qu ick Italian hosp itals of ch ildren suffering from severe pathologies that can not be treated in Kosovo. Impact Projects, which propose find ing immed iate The medical support does not entail any financial consent among t he population. The main objective is t he reconstruction of the contri bution from the families of the litt le patients because, in addition to the helpfu lness of the hossocio- econom ic fabric, so as to re- est ablis h, as pitals, the Health CIMIC Center fi nds the necessary soon as possible, t he confidence in the institutions
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financial covering from the Italian regional administrations. Also free is the logistic support connected with the transport from Kosovo to Italy (the transfer is made with military flights scheduled by COi) and from the airport to the hospital and the board and lodging of an accompanying parent, because everythi ng is supplied by the numerous and active Italian charitable and/or relig ious associations. Since the beginning of its activity, over 5000 Kosovar children have passed through the Health CIMIC Center. 265 of them have been sent to Italy since 2006 and at present there are 50 in Italian hospitals.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS) INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS (INFOOPS)
AND
A PSYOPS unit operates ins ide the MNTF-W. Following l<FOR guidelines, this unit has realized a campaign on the image of KFOR, aimed at creating a better perception of the presence of the NATO troops on the territory in terms of: • interethnic tolerance, in order to reduce the t ensions among t he various ethnic groups; • observance of the rules of law; But also campaigns of social and educational importance, such as: • campaign against environmental deterioration;
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
A control post manned by personnel of the 7st "Cranatieri di Sardegna" Regiment.
• i.Aterviews and surveys on the Target Audience, conducted by the PSYOPS unit s, in order to veri fy the effectiveness of the campaign. The product s have been realized in "print" (bill board and handbill), "video" (spots), and "radio" Qingles), and spread all over the AoR of the MNTF-
W. In this phase of the operations in Kosovo, the contribution of the INFO Campaigns is to be con sidered fundamental for the ach ievement of t he obj ectives of the mission .
LIAISON AND MONITORING TEAMS
· campaign to awaken t o the observance of traffic reg ulations; · campaign against the dangers re presented by mines and unexp loded devices. The INFOOPS campaigns are carried out t hrough th e d iffusion, among a given t arget audience, of Key Messages specific to every campaign, and are conducted and assessed through a coordinated sequence of activities, such as: · contact pat ro ls; · audio and video materials diffused through the local media; · meetings w ith local leaders; · diffusion of leaflet s and informative posters ;
Finally, among the non- Kinetic activities, let us mention t he activities in contact with the Munic ipalit ies and t hose with the Villages, carried out by the Liaison and Monitoring Teams (LMT), in contact with the populat ion and spread all over the AoR territory. They constantly monitor the political and social situation, the attitude and expectations of the population and the interethnic relatio ns among the re presentatives of t he different com munities. In practise, the action of the LMTs is aimed at maintaining a constant lin k with t he polit ical and re ligious leaders , the GOs and t he NGOs, the l<osovo Police and al l the international organizations on the territory, through a constant presence at weekly meet ings at the various municipalities, participating in all municipal assemblies, making t he coord ination with the CIMIC assets, taking part in political, religious and social events. The LMTs are perform ing a very incisive and effective action, especially t hanks to the liaison offices (Field Offices), located in al l t he Municipal ities in the AoR and open to the public. The LMTs are decisive for implementing t he Situat ional Awareness and are destined t o be even mo re fun damental in the following period, after the future cutback in the manoeuvre forces, to "feel the pu lse of the situation".
HAND OVER TAKE OVER UNMIK EULEX Together with the implementation of t he m en tioned Ahtisaari plan, the European Union has given the green light to the typically techn ical mission EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in l<osovo), which consists in sending to Kosovo about 20 00 representat ives, tasked with Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising the budding
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Above and facing page. A "Centauro" heavy armoured car on a "Quick Reaction Force" activity.
institutions of Kosovo, in the fields, defined as "pillars", of Police, Justice and Customs. The mission is headed by Mr Yves de Kermabon, former General in the French Army and also Commander of the NATO KFOR in Kosovo. The mission, after a series of delays due to Serbia's opposition to the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, received the official "go-ahead" on December 9, 2008. The diplomatic opposition made by Serbia, and supported by Russia, is based on the sole recognition of the UN Resolution 1244 (of 1999) and on the appeal, to the International Court of International Justice of t he Hague, to assess the legitimacy of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. In an attempt to overcome the impasse that had been created, the UN Secretary General, Ban KiMoon, at the end of June 2008, acting as a mediator, tried to obtain the Serbian support on the retrenchment of UNMIK and the deployment of EULEX. Th is action of diplomatic intermediation has led to what is now defined as "the plan of the six points". The agreement envisages that in the zone of the Serb enclaves and in the North of Kosovo where there is a Serb majority, resolution 1244 be kept valid , especially in the sectors connected with Customs, Police, Justice, Transports, Te lecommun icat io ns and cultural and religious Heritage.
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In substance, this agreement, especially in the specific areas where the Serbs are a majority, puts the EULEX mission under the "umbre lla" of Resolution l 244 and, consequently, of the United Nations. It should be underlined that the Pristina authorities have never part icipated in these negotiations. Actually, the official acceptance of the "six-point plan" would undermine the very sovereignty on these areas , consequently the "Ahtisaari Plan" as a whole, therefore independence itse lf. In the confusion of the current dip lomatic actions, this situation has actually generated a dual chain of Command for the EULEX mission. According to the Joint Action Plan, the Head of the EULEX mission is directly under the EU-PSC (EU Committee for Policy and Security) and Javier Solana (Secretary General of the Council of the European Union); while in the UN and Belgrade's opinion, the miss ion continues to operate under the UN mandate and with the "hat" of Resolution 1244. The outcome is that, at present, the mission operates under mandate of the Council of the European Union, which therefore applies the "Ahtisaari Plan" (even if some of the member Countries have not recognised the Kosovar independence yet, mainly for questions connected with reasons of internal policy), but with reference to the UN Resolution 1244 (which, on the contrary does not define the status of Kosovo and does not envisage the implementation of the abovementioned plan). According to some columnists, the transfer of a fu ll mandate to the EULEX mission, with the subsequent withdrawal of UNMIK, which would entail clarity in the relations of Command and in the norms of reference, depends essentially on the forthcoming decisions of the Belgrade authorities.
THE KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE (KSF) The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was officially instituted on January 21, 2009. This occurred bearing in mind the "Ahtisaari Plan", according to NATO princ iples and on the basis of the Constitution of Kosovo, respecting the multi-ethnicity of the new Balkan State, which had become independent on February 17, 2008. This force w ill have 2500 members, and it is envisaged that l 0% of them will belong to the ethnic minorities, plus 800 reservists. Moreover, as
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will have to be 25 to 30 years old and have a un iversity degree, while the other ranks will have to be l 8 to 30 and have concluded the advanced school. The primary mission of KS F will be that of participating in the anti - crisis operations in l<osovo, especially in the sectors of civil protection and in support of the local authorities , in case of natural disasters or other emergencies. The Force w ill achieve its initial operational capabil ities in September 2009, at the end of the first cycle of training, coordinated and overseen by the NATO forces of KFOR. Its complete implementation is envisaged in a few years.
CONCLUSIONS The tenth year of the Italian soldiers' stay in Kosovo is showing itself to be full of events, wh ich, taken together, would lead to surm ise the advent many as 1300 mem bers of the old Kosovo of important changes in the cris is of this Country. Protection Corps, in part forme r elements of the In the year just gone by and in the year that has Kosovo Li beratio n Army (UCK) have been admitted just begun , the international Community has proto KSF by r ight. duced a d iplomatic effort that has never been The transitio n from KPC to KSF occurred after a equalled in the past, aimed at achieving a solution psycho- physical se lection, concluded on January of the crisis, peacefully shared by t he differe nt 20, with what has been defined as "Announcement sides. Day", i.e. the official communication, by letter, that In this atmosphere of frenetic polit ical mediathe selection was passed . t ion, continuous tension and media attention that The former members of sometimes results in sudden and KPC who were not transunforeseeable episodes of protest, ferred to the new institution ''The Kosovo Security Force, the Italian soldiers continue to are going to benefit from carry o ut their m ission, showing some compensations (pen - according to the law drafted the capacity to adapt instrument, sions or work with other following the projects of the procedures and techniques to the administrat i ons), as Ahtisaari Plan, will be con new scenario. acknowledgement of their structed and founded on NAPrecisely t his adaptab il ity, service . together with the consent and TO parameters , , General Sulejman Salimi, gratitude of t he local populations, former Commander of UCK regardless of their ethnic groups, and Commander of t he former KPC, has been con is the key of the Italian Contingent's success, firmed at t he head of KSF. wh ich has been lasting along the past l O years and The remain ing members that will complete the has been unanimously acknowledged by the other organization of KSF w ill be recruited during the international actors. coming years, through t he mu lt iethnic society and a recru iting process, which will invo lve also the Giovanni Armentan i NATO and KFOR forces. T he first period of the Brigadier General, recruitment is schedu led from January 21 to Commander, Multinational Task Force West February 14. T he Kosovo Security Force, according to the law Pietro Piccirilli drafted following the projects of the "Ahtisaari Major, Public Affairs Officer, Plan", will be constructed and founded o n NATO Multinational Task Force West parameters, i. e. all the citizens of Kosovo, regard less of nationality, re ligion or sex, will have the Matteo Pergetti right to participate in the recruitment, in view of First Lieutenant, j oining the Force. Chief of Staff's Military Assistan t, Those wanting to be commissioned as officers Multinational Task Force West
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THE "ACQUI" DIVISION: AN OPERATIONAL COMMAND FOR EUROPE ITAJTF/EU FHQ ITA is going to constitute a precious asset destined to enhance the operational capabilities that can be expressed by the national military instrument and, therefore, to increase the political weight of our Country within the European Union.
"Europe's only choice is to become a global actor. This means, concretely, as regards crisis management, that it must continue to develop its military and civilian instruments, as well as its structures of planning and conduct of operations. And this, in order to improve the work with its partners in Washington, in New York and certainly with NATO". These were the words with which Javier Solana (High Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy) has expressed himself, in his opening speech at the seminar on the relations between th e European Union and NATO (Paris, July 7, 2008). These words imply the need to continue to give and, possibly, increase, the contribution of the European Countries to the pillars on which the Union is based: European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy (PESC), Justice and Internal Affairs (Fig. l ). And it is precisely inside the second pillar that the emp loyment of the military instrument is envisaged for the implementation of the so- called Petersberg missions. These missions were constituted at the
- - - EUROPEAN UNION :.,I -
-.
t'
EUROPEAN UNION
Fig. 1
.-.i
end of the cabinet meeting of the EU in June 1992 and today, in line with art. 17 of the Treaty on the Union, they provide for wide-range military interventions, which go from humanitarian assistance to operations of evacuation, stabilization, recon struction and military advice to th ird parties, to operations of conflict prevention, as well to operations to separate warring parties by force. In order to be able to assume its responsibilities in cris is management, the European Union (European Counci l in Nice in 2000 and the following meetings of Heads of State and Government) decided to acquire permanent military structures (Political Security Committee, European Union Military Committee, European Union Staff and Headquarters for this purpose (Operations Headquarters-OHQ - EU Force Headquarters - EU FHQ, EU battlegroup). Within this framework, Italy has decided to give its contribution for the constitution of these structures at all organizational levels. Such decision is emphasised also in the strategic concept of the Chief of Staff of Defence, where it states that the missions assigned to the Armed Forces must be seen from an integrated perspective, with a Unitarian vision aimed at defining a flexible military instrument able to intervene efficiently and rapidly, also very far from home, to meet the national needs and honour the commitments undertaken in the international arena. lnterforces integrat ion , knowledge of the NATO and EU procedures, together with the knowledge of the English language, are the passe-partout that enable the Armed Forces to ach ieve a cornTitle pages. The /TA JTF HQ Command Post deployed at Capo Teu/ada during Exercises "Arrcade Fusion 08" and "Evropi 08".
LOGOS - 56
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Fig. 2
[___ E_M_P_L_O _Y _ M_E_N_T_ O_U_7r_lL_6N _ E_S~ ] ITA JTF HQ FOR MEDIUM SCALE OPS
EU FHQ ITA
NAtlONAt,OPERATilON (ITI Jlfr~HQ) ***
EU OPERA1ilON (EU FHQ liFA) *** *** ,
sea Forces Command - COMITMARFOR) if prevailingly naval and Air Force framework (Air Forces Command - JFACC) if mainly "air". The first Joint Task Force Headquarters / EU Force Headquarters (ITA JTF HQ/ EU FHQ ITA),ltalian, will be constituted on the framework of the "Acqui" Division of the Italian Army. In short, this Headquarters must be in a position to achieve the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) , i.e. to start THE ITA JTF HQ/EU FHQ ITA ON THE "ACQUI" plann ing an operation within 3 to 5 days from its DIVISION FRAMEWORK activation (respectively as ITA JTF HQ or as EU FHQ ITA); reach its full operational capability (FOC) The ITA JTF HQ/EU FHQ ITA is a Command conw ithin 60 days. (i.e. to be able stituted for achieving two topto implement the mission priority goals (Fig. 2): attainassigned. with t he HQ already ment of a national joint Command-and - Control ''The first Joint Task Force located in the area of the operEU Force ations) ; manage forces up to a Capability (C2) for carrying out Headquarters / a "medium scale operation", Headquarters (ITAJTF HQ/EU maximum of Brigade Hq and / or through the real ization of an FHQ ITA), Italian, will be con- a naval force consisting of Italian Joint Task Force (ITA- JTF stituted on the framework of about l 0/l 5 major combat 11 11 units and / or of some other HQ) ; establishment of a the Acqui Division of the type, plus 50 / 60 ai rplanes and European Force Headquarters ltal ian Army , , helicopters in support of t he (EU-FHQ) on national frame operation. work, based on current EU The dead lines for the minidirectives on this matter, which mum mi litary requ irements (MMR), defined by t he could be imp lemented t hrough the "reconfiguraJoint Operational Command (COi), are : 20 11 for tion of the mentioned ITA-JTF HQ. The above menthe Initial Ope rational Capability and 2014 for t he tioned HQs, constituted as required by the possiFul l Operation al Capabi lity (t he verification will be ble scenarios of employment, on an Army framem ade during two distinct exercises, respectively in work ("Acqui" or "Mantova" Division) if they are ITAJTF HQ and EU FHQ ITA configuration). prevailingly "land", or on a Navy framewo rk (Hig hplete multinational integration. Within this framework takes its place the decision of the Defence to equip the military instrument with a joint Command at division level, which wou ld assume the role of Force Headquarters (FHQ) in the Operational Theatre.
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In order to better understand the situation conPOLITICO-MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE cerning the miss ion to be carried out (i.e. the EUROPEAN UNION organization of a ITAJTF HQ/EU FHQ ITA based on the "Acqui" Divis ion HQ), it is appropriate to Like NATO, the European Union, in order to be remember some notions related to the levels of able to manage and solve possi ble crisis situarespons ibility in the conduct of operations and to tions, also by employing the military instrument, the military structure pertaining to the Chain of has set up permanent military structures (Fig.3) , Command and Control of the European Union, as such as the Political and Security Committee, the well as the procedures of activatio n of the headMilit ary Committee of the European Union (Fig.4), quarters for t he conduct of a Union - led operation. the Staff of t he European Union. The operations are conceived, organized and Moreover, it avails itself of the Committee for carried out at different levels. 'They identify, from Civilian Planning and Conduct Capabilities (CPCC), a doctrinal point of view, the p lace of the objeca body that be longs to the Secretariat of the tives and responsibilities , as well as the mutual Council, and is the permanent structure responsi relations that link the objectives to the activities ble for planning and conduct civilian operations of aimed at their achievement". ("La Dottrina crisis management within the European Policy of dell'Esercito Italiano" - Ed. 2002, chapter Ill, Security and Defence. par.2). The politico-strategic leve l is responsible As regards the Command and force structure, for the political d irection of the t he European Union has no peroperation; it defines the "end manent instruments through state", i.e. the final situation to which it can exert Command and be reached with the conduct of '~.. the European Union has Control, but uses Commands the operation, and establishes no permanent instruments already existing, suitably reinwhen it has been achieved. Th e through which it can exert forced (1) Actually, for the strategic-military level is Command and Control, autonomous management of immediately subordinated to it, the European Union, but uses Commands crises, and is responsible for translatalong the time, has acqu ired existing, suitably Commands and forces capable ing into military objectives the already reinforced ,, goals fixed by the politicoof planning and carrying out strategic level. It fixes the act ions at th e various leve ls: strategic - military goal and strategic, operational and tactiassigns one or more objectives to the operational cal. At strategic level, the solution consists in level. establishing a suitable Headquarters for The latter represents the link between the tactiOperations (Operations Headquarters (OHQ) , cal employment of the forces and the strategic deriving from an already existing HQ, reinforced goals. It plans and conducts campaigns or major with m ultin ational personnel, in order to plan and operations in order to achieve one or more strateconduct autonomous operations of the European gic objectives and chooses the operational objecUnion. At present, five partners have confirmed tives, allocating them to the tactical level. Finally, their willingness to provide t he OHQ (France, the tactical level is responsible for the conception, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom) organization and conduct of the operations at that (2). leve l, aimed at achieving the objectives assigned There is mo reover an Operational Ce ntre, to be by the operational level. activated when necessary, capable of planning and conducting a particular operation (3) (roughly THE PERMANENT MILITARY'•'STRUCTURE OF PESD involving no more than 2000 persons), if a joint -C-i#' civil /m ilitary force happened to be necessary, and ·~ .······•.·.-,"~ ,, •L it were impossible to identify a "parent" national .J6/!' ~ !7 .R' 4 ~ Headquarters. At operational level, the European PCS: POLICY &SECU ITV COMMITTEE, made up of Union has decided to acquire HQs that can conpermanent rej fsentativesJ'' Ambassad~ ank duct an operation, with a projectable command EU MC: EU M.!..~ITARY COMMITTEE, made up of the capable of starting planning within 5 days from Chiefs ofs'raff of Defence/ represented.~ b . their the decision of the Co uncil of the European Union, permanent delegates ,,,. ~ and of being deployed in the crisis theatre, impleEUMS: EU MILi~ STAFF, made up of ..,_11.),iiitary and menting the mission within 60 days (Command civilian experts, responsible for warnin g, situation Post set up and functioning). This Command has evaluation and s_~ egic planning ~ been called EU Force Headquarters (EU FHQ). It is a joint multinational Headquarters on a NationFig. 3 leader framework, and has an organ ization
~~
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Fig. 4
Political-strategic
PSC
Leve l
C EU MC Possible Links Military.Strategic Level
OpCdr (OHQ)
EU-Bodies I Repret;entatives Governmen(s) I Authorities Crisis A rea I Member States and non EU TCNs " " " • • "• • • • • • • • • • • • ,._)_ _ _ .J.;; /1/n"-"t=er)"--Nc.c:; a:.;.; tio'-"n""al""H'-=Qc=.s_ _ ---1 International Oraanisations ; Non Governmental Oraanisations
i
---- ---- -- -------------------- --------O perational Level
FCdr
(FHQ)
T actical ,__ __.__ ---, Leve l CC L and
EU-Bodies I Rcoresentatives Governmen(s) I Authorities Crisis Area _ , ••• ,. •• , •••• •• ... , ••• J Member States and non EU TCNs l //nterlNational HQs ! International Organisations Non Governmental Oraanlsotfons :
r--....,__.__-_ - ..,- - - - I
OtherCC -,1 .... C Maritim ... (i.e. socc, ' ... POCC)
:I
,...-- '' -- .... ., I_ ·····cct-cc,..:.=.iJ
Forces •••• ••
Forces ......
defined a priori, but adaptable accord ing to the situation, as deemed appropriate by the Force Commander. At the moment, four Nations (France, Germany, Italy and th e United Kin gd om) have put themselves up for organising the structure of the EU FHQ. They would have Component Commands (CC) u nd er them , or t he forces directly, but not necessarily a battlegroup (EU BG). Finally, at tactical level, the European Uni on has set up readily deployable forces , which can answer promptly as soon as a crisi s material izes. Namely, the European battlegro ups (EU BG) (4).
TH E DECISION- MAKING PROCESS IN THE EU ROPEAN UNION As a ru le, there are four sit uations where the European Union decides to launch an operation (in case of employment of the military instrument) or a mission (non military) within the Eu ropean Policy of Security and Defence: on p roposal of the Ch airman ; on proposal of the Secretary General / High Representative ; on proposal of a mem ber State or at the request of an international organization, such as, for example, the United Nations. The decis ion - making process defined by the Committee of Policy and Security of the EU, for the
For ces
i . , - ·- ·- ·· ·· _i
EU-Bodies / Representatives Authorities Cris is Area International l Oraanisations Non Governmental Oraanisations
.
management and solution of crisis situations, is divided into six phases (Fig. 5): l) routi ne; 2) start and development of a crisis; 3) approval of the concept of cri sis manag ement; 4) formal decision to intervene; 5) imp lementation of t he decis io n; 6) reexam ination of the mission / end of the operat io n. In t he "routine" phase, the internatio nal situation is constantly monit o red by the EU Situat ion Centre (a body under the General Secret ariat of the Counci l, which performs this f unction). When a cri sis occu rs (p hase 2) , a po lit ical interest to i nte rvene could develop within the Union and, as a consequence, the process of crisis management starts (phase 3) . Among its first formal steps, the process envisages the elaboration of the Crisis Management Co ncept (CMC), approved by the Council on proposal of the Poli tical Security Committee (PSC). Already in this phase, in connection w it h the national interests involved and the preliminary d iscussi ons w ith in of t he Eu ropean Unio n, some Nations could make avai lab le their OHQ (Operation HQ), and others their FHQ (Force HQ). In this phase, the Nations concerned could therefore decide to start the pre- activation phase (Fig.5). When and if the Union Council decides to intervene active ly (phase 4), the Initiating Military
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Directive appoints the OHQ and the Operation THE ACTION PLAN FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF Commander, as well as the FHQ and the Force THE ITAJTF HQ/ EU FHQ ITA Commander. Then, the two parallel procedures of activation and planning can start. By the light of what has been written up to now, The first task that the OHQ must implement in order to constitute at operational level the ITA (generally in parallel planning with the FHQ) is the JTF HQ and EU FHQ ITA Commands, Italy has is sue of the Operational Concept of the Operation undertake n all the actions necessary to achieve t he (CONOPS) (5), which will be approved by the Union. initial operational capabi lity by 201 l and the full The second is the preparation of the plan of the operational capability by 201 4. It is a complex operati on (OPLAN) (6). With the approval of the problem and its soluti on is not easy. The re are OPLAN , there shou ld be the dead li nes to be met and t he contextual start of the operation complexity its elf, which by means of the Executive ,,... the Defence Chief of Staff requires the synergic intervenOrder, starting the process of has entrusted the COi with tion of different "actors": the conduct of the operation (phase the responsibility of the Defence Chief of Staff, respon5) . sib le for procuring the necesThe time necessary, from the project and, on proposal of sary resources; the Joint formal decision to intervene till the latter, in January 2008 Operational Command (COi), the start of the operation , has appointed the Com - which directs and monitors the should consist of the famous 60 mander of the "Acqui" Divi development of the project at days of the Helsinki Headline sion as project officer ... , , strategic level; the General Goal (7). To be precise, the EU Directorates, for the execution envisages a sixth phase of rediof the works of adaptat ion of rection of the action , once the first returns of the the infrastructure and the acquisition of weapons, operation in progress are availabl e (similarly to vehicles and materials; the four Services , which what is occurring in NATO with t he periodic revi have to su pply the personnel for a joint Com man d. sio n of the miss ion - Period ic Mission Review). If Moreover, there is also to consider the not easy the situation makes it necessary and the Operati on finding of resources (hu man, material and f inanCom mande r (Op. Cdr) is appointed before the forcial) to be destined to the project, at a particular mal decis ion of t he EU to intervene (betwee n ph ase moment characterised by a high degree of eco2 and 3), they can both activate their own com nomic and social instability (world crisis, and need mand s, in order to contribute to the setting up of to ensure the presence of the State on the territothe Military Strateg ic Option (MSO) and th e ry), the consequences of which are a matter of Initiating Military Directive (IMD). dai ly discussions. The problem has been tackled With in t he nation, three possible phases can be with a holist ic approach , using the concept s typiidentifi ed for the necessary coordination with the cal of the solution of the military problems, using abovementioned activities: the routine phase, th e instruments of management control, in order to pre- activation phase and the activation phase (Fig. 5). rationalize every available resource.
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ···················1
Fig.
s
1·····················································································································
EU
E U U EC I S l<>:-1 -M A Kl'-G PROC ESS
Phase 1 : Routine
= =--- --=--
Phas e L Cris is Development
Pha s e L Appr CGC
t
Formal D ecision by C ouncil
Phase L Implementation
...___ _ N_A~T_ l_O_ N _ AL _ _
HQ ROUTINE
EU A cl v ancc Planning EU Tn1ining EU C once pts , C I C •••
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EU HQ PR E -ACTIVATION Activati o n Tc;un s - C PT, CTS, ACT Pre-A lert Na t.A u g m .
C r is is Monitorin g
ACTI VATION & AUG M P LANN I G MA NAGEM EN T
l Phase~ Readdress / e nd
__,I···...................
---
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"Eagle Resolve 08": the map of the exercise at the !TA JTF HQ Command Post.
In order to defi ne the problem as cor rectly as possible at once, the Defe nce Ch ief of Staff has entrusted t he CO i with t he respo nsib il ity of the project and, on proposal of the latter, in January 2008 has appointed the Commander of the "Acqui" Division as project officer (and president of a joint working group, with 6 subordinate subgroups), responsib le for the supervision of all the organ izational, executive and training activities connect ed with the constitution of the ITA JTF HQ/EU- FHQ ITA on the framework of the "Acqui" Division Headq uarters. Avai li ng himself of his own Staff, the project officer has started the activities for finding the solution of t he problem . As a first step, he examined t he miss ion assigned, i.e. to acquire f ull initial operational capability, to be achieved by 2014, w ith the initial operational capability to be attained within 201 l . At the same time, all the relevant
documents were fou nd and examined in t he national and European ambit; then the Group analysed the congruence bet ween the operational capabilities to be achieved and the avail able ones (comparison between needs and poss ibil it ies); wit hin t his framework, the Group has exam ined the m ini mum m ilitary requisites that this type of command must possess. By examining these req uisites, according to the principle of breaking down a complex prob lem into simp le ones, the Group proceeded to divide the requisites by areas of responsibility, and defined the li nes of actions along which to operate (8) . For each of them, the Group has detected the actions that shou ld be undertaken and, among these, those representing the decis ive points (i. e. the events t hat shou ld take place in order to be ab le to achieve the fixed goal); subsequently, these actions have been systematized through a logic- deductive process, so as to identify the order of priority in which they must be carried out and conc luded, t oget her with the relevant deadlines.
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•
/
The ARCC Commander, Lt. Gen. Shirref, visiting the /TA JTF HQ Command Post.
Hence, the Group has detected the course and the critical activities, i.e. t hose wh ich, if not carried out within the set times, would certain ly de lay the enti re proj ect. The synthesis of what we have described has been represented w ith the PERT /CPM and GANTT diagrams (project manageme nt instruments), which permit to quic kly visualize the project's . progress and to evaluate its expect ed completion. The whole material has been introduced in a document (Plan of action for the achievement of FOC by the /TA JTF HQ/ EU FHQ /TA based o n the "Acqui" Division HQ, w hich rep resents the guideline for the realization of the said project. Also included are the tasks assigned to the project officer, the m iss ions of the /TA JTF HQ and EU FHQ /TA Commands and t he re lation s of Command and Control (Fig .6) in operationa l standstills, t raining and operations. Moreover, the document po ints out, for each operational line, the criticalit ies that can endanger the success of t he project. Going a littl e more into detai l, we are going to
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explain the most interesti ng aspects connected with t he operatio nal lines just pointed out. As for personne l, the organization chart of the EU FHQ has been considered valid also for the ITA JTF HQ, in order to permit the passage from one command to the other, reducing as m uch as possible the hysteresis connected with the numerical adaptation ; the four Services have been requested to find out personnel w ith specific technical-profess ion al knowledge Qob description) that can guarant ee continuity for at least 2 -3 years, in order to ensu re the necessary training prog ress for the achievement of the FOC. From t his point of view, the criticality consists in a wise choice of the person nel to be designed as "augmentees" for t he ITA -JTF HQ (this is t he heaviest case) for such a long period and make t hem available for the periods of j oint training . In the specific case, ("Acqui" or "Ma ntova" Division framework), the greatest efforts concern the Army that supplies most personnel. As far as t raini ng is concerned, it has been divid ed into two phases: individual and joint. T he first pertains to the Service the person belongs to (as wel l as the q ualification for being employed ab road). Th e joint training is structured in interservice modules, where the personnel of the
Rivista Militare Englis/J Edition n. 1/2010
test- bed for verifying the implementation of the "Acqui" Division HQ participate in training activi working procedures of the European Union. It is in ties of the Navy (for example, for 2008, exercise fact an exercise carried out within the European "Mare Aperto" (Open Sea) and the Air Force (for Union, where the EU FHQ ITA, (although consisting 2008, exercise "Spring Flag"), in order to be of .national personnel on ly), is subordinate to a acquainted with their modus operandi. Greek OHQ, with in a scenario of stabilisation and Vice versa, the personnel of the other Services reconstruction (l 0), in support of a village are called to participate in the training activities of (Kleonia, located on an im aginary island in the the Army ; furthermore, the Highest Joint Atlantic Ocean - Milenia - west of the African Operational Command has held seminars concoast), which is asking the international communicerning concepts and functioning procedures of ty for help. This scenario envisages also the subthe European Union. Finally, as moments of syn stantial employment of the navy component thesis and verification, t he re have been training (Maritime Component Command), tasked with activities and exercises of different types. In parestablishing an embargo on one of the Countries ticular, there has been exercise "Sharp Endeavour adjoining Kleonia (Desponia), responsible for sup08" in June 2008, and exercises "Arcade Fusion porting and help ing the destabilizing activities of 08" and Evropi 08" in November of the same year. an ethnic group that operates in the north of the "Sharp Endeavour 08" was the first moment of Country. amalgamation of interservice prsonnel since the The European Union, following a UN resolution, launch ing of t he project (9). The second, t he examines the possibility of intervening and starts (NATO) exercise "Arcade Fusion 08" constituted the planning process of the operation. Therefore, the land training module for the personnel of the it is a planning operation (and not a conduct one), other three Services. This exercise most significant where the Greek OHQ and the Italian EU FHQ carry annual commitment of the ARRC NATO out a parallel plann ing, achieving a draft of an Headquarters. operations concept (CONOPS) and the forces necThe "Acqui" Division, affiliated to the ARRC HQ essary for conducting a possib le military operation within NATO, has been participating regularly in (wit hin the abovesaid phase 4 of the decisionthe "Arrcade Fusion" exercises since 2003;this has making plann ing process). A similar scenario will been an opportunity for involving the personnel of be played in exercise "Milex 09 the other Services in this activUune 2009), where the Greek ity, so as to acquaint them with ''As for personnel, the orgaOHQ will have a EU FHQ ITA the conduct of land operations. under its orders (this time com With this exercise, the Division nization chart of the EU FHQ pleted with multinational eleHQ has been able to confront a has been considered valid scenario unlike the traditional also for the ITA JTF HQ, in ments). For what concerns log istics, ones (counter insurgency), order to permit the passage there is a need to adjust the where the asymmetry of the from one command to the home base capabi lity of the threat is constantly present Division HQ, i.e. to enable the other, reducing as much as and where, as a consequence, personnel of the HQ's core staff the need to coordinate as possible the hysteresis con to carry out the operational much as possible the activity nected with the numerical planning, making use of working of all branches is emphasised adaptation , , posts, means of communication, to the utmost, as a multiplier also classified ones (data, voice, of resources, in order to maxVTC, etc.) with t he higher Headquarters - and the imise their effects (Influence Operations). subord inate Component Commands . In order to An excellent test of force integration has also adapt the capabilities of the Cavalieri Barracks at been constituted, which has permitted to profit by San Giorgio a Cremano (Nap les), home of the HQ the expertise of the personnel of the other 2nd FOD and "Acqui" Division, evaluations have Services in the operational and logistic sectors. been made about the necessary infrastructural Finally, it was also possib le to test the personnel's modifications, which in short consist in completcapacity to implement the procedures ing an area of the Command, where the planning (NATO/ARRC), the employment of the communi is going to be carried out, and adapting the struccation systems (in particular, by utilising a chat tures destined to the reception and quarters of the line, the personnel exchanged information about personnel t hat will constitute the ITA JTF HQ/EU what was happening in the area of the operations) FHQ ITA Command. For this, it will be necessary to and also the use of the English lang uage as lingua proceed to some infrastructural interventions and franca (also the internal meetings were held in this to the acquisition of furnishings. language). It is moreover necessary to adequate the The third exe rcise, "Evropi 08", has constituted a
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... encamping capabilities of the ITA JTF HQ/EU FHQ In any case the work is not exogenous to the !TA Command (i.e. to be able to dep loy and funcCommand itse lf. Inside it there are activities bein g tion also in extreme weather conditions and in an carried out, such as, for example, the revision of adverse operational environment) in order to make the standardized internal procedures for the actiit projectable within the time foreseen. Within this vation and function ing of the !TA JTF HQ/EU FHQ framework, there are also the communications and !TA. They consist of instructions that define and the Command and Control capabilities, both in standardize in detail determinate activities , both in home base and with the Command Post deployed. operational standstill and in activation/operation (11). The "Acqui" Division HQ is already quite far In conclusion, the project is certainly ambitious ahead, thanks to the employment of SIACCON but, at the same time, has a strong impact. As a (Automated System of matter of fact, with its impleCommand and Control) as mentation the Defence System regards the land component. A ' ' The optimisation of the will be able to make a further problem that is still to be employment of the available step towards the improvement of solved is t hat related to the the capabilities of the military other two components and to forces .. .is obviously the fo- instrument, the increase of its the connecting capability with cal point for the whole prointerforces interoperabil ity, the higher levels, with the ject to be successful , , thanks to the innovation of the home base above all. To this joint concept and t he developend, COi has constituted a working group. In ment of a greater number of joint activities short,as regards the financial aspects, all that has between the different Services, integrated within been said until now materializes in costs to be the multinational ambit, maximising the training borne. Also in this field, the rationalization of the returns of the international activities carried out. employment of the resources available is achieved Once the full operational capability is achieved, by coordinating all the activities that have to be the !TA JTF HQ/EU FHQ !TA HQ is going to consticarried out, through t he utilization of the mentute a valuable asset that will increase the operationed instruments of the project management. tional capabilities expressible by the national military instrument and, as a consequence, its politiFINAL CONSIDERATIONS cal weight within the European Union: because t here are only four Nations that can express such Within the p icture just outlined, one understands capability. The undertaking, which is certainly that the project's main difficulty is not so much the important, will permit to have one more instru implementation of the single activity, but the ment for ens uring stability in the areas of nationcoordination necessary for addressing the efforts al and European strategic interest and, if neces in the right direction. The variances must be found sary, for opposing the symmetrical or asymmetriin real time, so that they may be rectified as soon cal t hreats to the national and inte rnational secuas possible, to avoid or reduce or, in any case, be rity, within t he framework of our commitments. able to manage any delay in the various phases of implementation of the action plan. Stefano Chille A situation report (SITREP), written for th is purLieutenant Colonel pose, briefs the parties concerned about the Head, Operations Office (G3), advancement of the project and points out the "Acqui" Division Headquarters likely criticalities that may jeopard ize it, proposing at the same time feasible solutions. A meeting of all parties concerned is held periodically by COi, NOTES on the basis of the situation report, in order to (1) The European Council of Nice (2000) and the discuss the criticalities emerged and find the best following meetings of the Heads of State and solution to the problem. Government, sanctioned that the European Union The optimization of the employment of the was to be able to conduct operations of crisis available resources connected with the activities to management, both au tonomo us ly and with be carried out, with the materials, the capabilities recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, falling to be acquired and the infrastructural work to be on the Berlin-plus acco rds (within the framework carried out, is obviously the focal point for the of the development of forces "separable but not whole project to be successful. The managerial separate", vis-a-vis those of the Atlantic Alliance, and coordination capabilities of the project officons idering that various Countries belong to both cers and of COi (together with the excellent colorganizations). laboration of the Armed Forces) unquestionably (2) The two military operations of the Eu ropean represent t he strong point of the action plan. Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo have
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Jn case of operation conducted urt e EU a~gis, the A-t-QUI Div. Commander and the EU FHQ /TA ( realized with the "reconfigµJ.._ation" 'l he /TA JTF HQ, established in its turn on ACQUI Div. fram_) work), wm be subject to: • OPCOM, exercised by Chief, DGS as CINC; • OPCON exercised by OP.CDR (appointed by EU for the _nee_d ). been managed precisely through a "parent" Command strengthened by multinational elements (Paris for operation "Artemis" in 2003 and Potsdam for operation "EUFOR DRC" in 2006), while operation "Althea in Bosnia- Herzegovina, still under way, is conducted having recourse to the NATO Command structure. (3) Exercise "M ilex 2007" was carried out with this structure, with the EU FHQ provided by Sweden. (4) Units at tactical group level, which rep resent the minimum credible force, rapidly deployable, effective, capable of conducting isolate operations or as initial part (entry force) of wider- range operations. In January l, 200 7, th e "battlegroup" concept reached its full operational capability. This means that the EU has at its disposal, permanently, two battlegroups in stand-by, ready to launch two separate operations, also at very short intervals between them and in different places. (5) It consists in defining how the Commander intends to carry out the mission. (6) It divides into phases, and specifies in detail, the operational concept. (7) In 1999 there was the first concrete act (within PESO) aimed at implementing the military capabilities of the EU. The member States defined a num-
ber of objectives to be pursued within 2003 at first, and by 201 0 later, among which also a catalogue of military forces, called the "Helsinki ForceCatalogue", which could accomplish the so-called "Petersberg missions". (8) These li nes of action state the interrelation connecting the activities to be carried out in due time, which are in short: personnel, training, log istics and infrastructure, CIS. (9) During this activity, it has been possible to study the EU procedures, write a first draft of the documents for the activation and functioning of the Command, carry out a training activity for maintaining the operativeness, verify the logisticadministrative procedures and to hold many conferences regarding the structure and peculiarities of the th ree Services, in order to increase the ir mutual knowledge, and therefore the integratio n in a joint sense. (l O) It is one of the 5 Peters berg missions. (l l) These procedures must be tested during the training activities and corrected, if necessary, in a continuous cycle of verification, which could consider also the real operational activities carried out directly of by other units (according to t he process of the lessons identified/learned).
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THE ITALIAN OFFICERS IN KASHMIR Since 1961 italian Officers have been operating as UN Observers in the UNMOGIP Mission (United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan) in the indian and Pakistani Kashmir. Over the last years, the devastating series of strikes and battles between the Taliban extremist fractions - connected with the nationalists - and the two armies have highlighted a close connection with the Afghan "world".
The first impression the Italian Officer has, outside the international airport of Islamabad (p laced in Rawalpindi), is to be in a developed and classically chaotic Country, with a developed road network (three lanes highways, tunnels and viaducts) and typical buildings of a modern city. On the streets you can see hundreds of multicolor buses and vans, w ith left-hand drive, typical of an ex
LOGOS - 68
Title pages. Hotel Marriott's fa<;ade, in Islamabad after th e bomb attack of 20 September 2008.
Below. Bhimber Fi eld Station, one of t h e base camps i n Pakistani Kashmir.
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
KASHMIR The legacies of the colonial past keep characterizing the current political and strategical situation in some extremely sensitive scenarios for the present security and, esp_ecially, the fight against terrorism in the lndoPakistani area. In order to understand such tegacy, it's necessary to summarize to the reader the succession of events since the end of World War 11, in order to clear up the existing problems in those two Countries and why it's hard to fairly solve a conflict began in 1947. During that year, Great Britain decided to divide Pakistan from India, divided on the east and west India, due to the ethnic and rel igious difference. The borderlines, meant to be temporary, cut in two the indian regions. But as soon as Maharaja Hari Singh, who governs the Jammu region and Kashmir, decided to merge into the Indian Country, t he Pakistani troops crossed the borde r in o rder to annex the territory to the newborn Pakistani country. India, ready to react, sent, in turn, its Army, and the first Inda- Pakistani war broke out over Kashmir's territory sovranity. The ceasefire imposed by UN Resolution in 1948, obtained the temporary end of the conflict (which broke out again in 1965 and in 2002) and the definition of the so called "Line of Control" (Loe) as a double result. In Resolution 47, the UN Security Council ordered that the invading Pakistani army retreat from the occu pied zones and ordered India to call a referendum on self- determination. On the contrary, Pakistan did not retreat and set up a defined area "Azad Kashmir" (free Kashm ir), mainly populated by muslims and, accordingly, India did not call the plebiscite. In 1951 UN established Mission UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan) i n order to observe and report violations of ceasefire along the Li ne of control. In 1972, India argued that the mandate of UNMOGIP lapsed but, since Pakistan disagreed, the Secretary General of the United Nations maintained that the UNMOGIP should have continued to function until the approval of a Security Council Resolution. Since then and in the following years, t he situation got worse due to the afghan groups' integral ism that tried to create a corridor between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir, along which they could move and operate. In fact, in the border areas between Afg hanistan and Pakistan, out of Islamabad authorities' con trol, t here are the taliban gue rrilla' s "logistic bases" from where attacks to the western coalition start and where, lately, in the Swat valley, due to the weakness of the Pakistani army, a ceasefire has been reached in exchange of the acceptance of the Islamic religious law "sharia", which imposes the muslim religion rules in the most fundamentalist way, alarm ing all the allies and Islamabad 's neighbors, from the US to t he European countries, from India to neighbour Afganistan.
team come from different nations and therefore British colony, and bill boards advertising western products. All of this suggests a different reality they have different hab its, easy to imagine and so metimes hard to accept). We daily cover hunfrom what TV reports often show about this Country. As soon as you leave the capital and dreds of kilometers across plains that gradually move towards Kashmir's area, you run into a cul turn into valleys, some desolate and mountainous, tural and socio- economic environment strongly in other with sceneries that remind us our Alps, and decline, typical of a Country with few resources months go by in missions t hat may last one day or develop i n the space of severand that fights against a strong cultural conservatism, within the ' ' ... the Italian Officer is al days. It's simple, therefore, Islamic law: a multitude of assigned to a training field to imagine the differences of mosques and minaret, hou ses mentality and daily life with station and starts a pro - personnel coming from bui lt wih no plann in g rules, with fessional activity com bricks still baked in wood kilns Northern Europe, from the Far different from East and from South America. and without plaster, an economy pletely based on sheep farming and other Service Missions ... ,, As a matter of fact, every two agricolture. months, based on a duty roster, you change station and After the first week spent in Islamabad at UNMOGIP Mi ssion' s Headquarters for you find yourself living with new people, new culthe usual "in briefing", the Italian Officer is tures, different skills and background that clash against the Italian Office r training. Many foreign assigned to a training f ield station and starts a professional activity complete ly different from Observers, coming from the riserve, in the ir civil life have completely different jobs far from the other Armed Force Missions (the Officers of each
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UNMOGIP'S FRAMEWORK UNMOGIP includes 42 Observers coming from various Countries (currently: Italy, Sweden , Finlan d , Denmark, Croatia, South Korea, Uruguay and Chile), with an annual$ 17 million ,and within thi s little contingent seven Italian Officers are annually on duty mostly employed in the eleven Fiel d Station located in Kashmir (G ilgit, Skardu, Darnel, Rawalakot, Kotli, Bhimber and Sialkot in the Pakistani part ; Poonch, Rajouri and Jammu in the indian part), bes ided the dislocation of the Headquarters, durin g the winter in Islam abad and in Srinagar during the summer (in the Indian part another statio n - Baramulla - is available, waiting to be used again and in New Delhi there is another Rear HQ) . The Italian personnel is selected among Officers with the rank of Captain/Major, with long an d previous experience in the operational sector, with the ability to work individually or in smal l units, able to recogn ize weapons/artillery, air vehicles, and able to read a topographic map. Another requirement is having an excellent knowledge of English, in terms of conversation, read ing and composition. The number of components of the International teams, present in each Field Station , may change from one to five, and must be of different nationalities in order to guarantee the impartia lity while drafting the reports. After the 1972 i ndian declaration, in the indian side of Kashmir, is not possible anymore to carry out reconnaisance, military units' inspections and border control, which is, on the other hand , da ily carried out in the Pakistani side; these tasks are the Road Reece (RR), Field Tr i ps (FT), Investigations, Observation Post (OP), Field Visit (FV) , that is patrols over the main axes of the territory, inspections at pakistani military units, invest igations on possible violations of ceasefire, observations of the border and t he teams' meetings in the mission's bases. In 2008, the main effort was focused on the "vis its " to military units and on the control of the defensive lines along the Loe, because reports of ceasefire violations increased, but fortunately, as th e charts att ached show, the number of victims decreased. The decision of the indian government, consequently, has limited the task and success of UNMOGIP, even though its mission in Pakist an keeps t he situation under control.
military world. And s'ome of t hem get promoted to a higher rank in order to allow them to be part of the Mission. The re are only few "soldiers on duty" and, for t his reason, you find yourself teaching them the specif ic military notions and rules. Eve n here the figure and expertise of the ital ian soldier stands out, who is often the station's Officer in Charge (OIC), also for the positive image acquired over the years among other contingents' Officers; it is sometimes difficult to rub in and obtain from other people a profile and behavior similar to our mentality and performance on duty. T he OIC is totally responsible for the field station, from the administrative area, to the logistic and operational area. He draws up a fortnight action plan and submits it to the Headquarters (FTF - fortnight t as k format) based on the guidelin es received from HQ itself and divides at best t he tasks among the Team Officers, obviously based on the ir qualities, and creating Teams where the most efficient and senior mission elements work together the less experts and the younger ones. Each component must acquire and assess the information collected from the local people, must gain the confidence of pakistani and ind ian Officers and have a contact and a constructive dia-
LOGOS - 70
logue with various liaison Officers in the different areas (Pakistan Army Liaison Officer e Indian Army Liaison Officer called PALO and IALO), in order to always have freedom of movement and to be able to visit the units posted close to the Line of Control "Loe" (only in Pakistan). All th is with the utmost diplomacy and always without coming into friction with religious rules dictates, even when you get urged to express your opinion, especially during meetings with mi litary personalities in their visits to the units, always replying with a smile when somone else's opinion is rather provocative and litt le objective about the western world. What stands out is t he need of infrastructu res, hospi tals, drugs, drinking water, schoo ls. Unfortunately, t he International organizations can't easily work in these areas, especially because of the unpractical ity of the roads that make the places inaccessible. This data collection, carried out on t he field and
Top right. Indian and Pakistani l<ashmir's map. Below right. The location of UNMOGIP Field Stations in India and Pakistan.
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
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through t he direct vision of t he situat io n, is sum marized and forwarded with proper reports to t he Head Quarters. Every day is marked by scheduled procedures and activit ies, starting with t he Morning schedule which is broadcast every morning to the HQ, in tu rns among the Field Station's personnel. T hen off, you get in the jeep and start driving for hours on paved roads almost reaching the border, on hilltops where the observation post and Pakistan i military companies are stationed. In front of the difficulties due to an insufficient road network and its maintenance, we have to consider- especially during the monsoon season t he continuous danger of lands li des and floodings t hat sometimes prevent the continuation of the
Above. Statistics of the tasks accomplished by UNMOCIP t hroughout the years 2006-2008.
Left. Officers of different nationalities during a Field Visit.
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Rivisla Mi/itare English Edition n. 1/2010
often happen that an italian Officer can not meet mission. Ofte n yo u can't get back due to narrow one of his compat riots for months, because t hey roads, with sheer waysides, with no guardrails or are all individually on duty in different bases, and other protections . • the on ly occasions t o meet is the UN Conferences, Sometimes , you have to wait until a caterpillar a.-meeting for all t he Observers of the Mission, arrives in order to go on and spend the day waitarranged in Islamabad every six months. It freing. quently happens t hat you get to know another You have the best satisfactions when you stop in italian Officer only by telephone and t hat, except the isolated vi llages. The peop le show their apprefor the Conferences or at Italian House (the accociation for our job and they convey their preoccumodation in Is lamabad where the italian Officers pation for their life conditions, even though the st ay overnight when they are on leave) you never civil population involvement in the pakistan i and see him again . ind ian mi litary confrontations is rare. They show It's hard to express what you find yourse lf seetheir hospitality by offering us tea (chai tea) in i ng and feeling everyday in a world where religion poor hygiene, but wh ich you can't refuse for obvi beats the day' s time and the daily life, where ous courtesy reasons . Alternatively to this patro l everything, starting from food, must be done activity, you observe the d islocation of bunkers, of according to its rules . For examp le, it is impossifort ification works, of minefield along the border, ble to speak or simply shake hands with a woman, after espos ing a white flag and a UN flag, in order it's dangerous to wear clothes that cou ld irritate to not being involved in risk situations. these populations ' sensibi lity: the UN Observer Sometimes, to reach the border, it is impossible to must always respect and have this kind of be havuse the vehicles and , so, you walk with your backiou r, in order to avoid to harm the relationship pack, under a hot sun and high humidity. Despite between the Mission Command and the civil and these difficu lties, when you arrive to destination mi litary authorities . you get rewarded by these wonderful unspoilt During their dai ly missions, the Officers cope landscapes with a fauna almost impossible to find , with , starting from the log istic situations, issues elsewhere, and it is sometimes difficult to underthat you can solve only if you are strong ly adaptstand that, theoretically, you lie between two firing able: the rotten situation of t he road network, the lines and the only protection you have is these two adverse weather conditions especially during the flags. monsoons season, the poor sanitation and someThe other assigned tasks , for which a previous times the poor communication, submit everyone experience is fundamental, are the so call ed Field to real endurance tests which you can pass on ly Trips, the Command inspections, to military units w ith persistence and capacity. Often , there is not and separated companies, where you have to be in food supply, spare parts, drinking water, hot tune with the Officers on duty, for example asking water. After the bomb attacks questions without an inquisitoroccured especially in the capiial attitude . Units are often ''sometimes, to reach tal, security and safety have located far from towns or com the border, it is impossicompletely changed the operamunication lines and sometimes tional stage of the teams, to ble to use the vehicles they remain isolated for the whom it is prohibited to get out who le winter season due to and, so, you walk with of the base camps. Moreover, snow or the roads that turn into your backpack ... ,, you are not authorized to move rivers . from and towards Islamabad . In Sometimes, the personnel on the last years, the hardest peri duty "celebrates" the arrival of ods occured in December 2007, with the murder UN Observers, because they haven't seen a of Benazir Bhutto and with the attack at Hotel "stranger" fo r months. When you realize the con Marriott, on 20 September 2008. d itions they work in, the billets they stay in, their But eve ryth ing gets rewarded by a cultural and log istics precariousness, it's easy to deduce the professional enrichment, thanks to the contact temper and the endurance of these soldiers and w ith the Armed Forces of other Contingents, to the how they have been facing their archenemy for possibi lity to live in a society with parameters and sixty years - the Ind ians - without demoting one a life philosophy completely unknown to m any position . Since these tasks can last even a few people, and in contact with UN soldiers of other days, it causes their separation from UN bases . countries, with whom you long periods of activity. Therefore, they spend the night in the pakistani un its guest quarters. In th is reality, due the comMarco MORELLI munication difficulties with Italy, you are happy Major, just to get in contact and talk to the italian Army General Staff Officers, displaced in other areas . In fact, it could
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THE ITALIAN CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN New elements, such as the future evolution of PRTs, the reinforcement of the italian presence in the West Area of the Country and the concept of an organic Brigade, lead to consider a gradual passage of responsibility for the civilian component in the reconstruction-development activity, in order to outline the connection in terms of civilian-military cooperation.
The persistent fluidity of the security conditions highlighting the operational effectiveness of the in Afghanistan requires a constant assessment of National land component committed in th is scethe features and structure of the peacekeepers nario. operating in the area. At this stage, in particular, • until april 2008 the supply of the Italian composome specific circumstances offer an opportunity nent of the Regional Command West in terms of to qualify and make more effective the Italian milCommand, operational arrangements and aids, itary commitment with particular reference to the in fact, came t hrough the use of personnel comcivilian- military cooperation i n the west region of ing from Commands and different units. In brief, Afghanistan. Among the most remarkable changes only Herat's PRT represented an homogeneous we can mention the following: division supplied by the •the appointment of / AmbasRegiment 's staff while the Battl e ' ' In order to remedy this sador Fernando Genti lini as Group's Company, the National problem, the lnterforces NATO SCR (S-e nior Civil pport Element (NSE) named Operational Command (COi) Su Representative) in Kabu l (l) ITALFOR, the National positions in 2007 the ins ide the NATO Regional and of the Ambassador developed Etto re Francesco Sequi as concept of organic Brigade Command and t he Commander Senior Representative of the aimed at supplying the itaof RC-W came from different European Un ion for lian national land component divisions. That negat ively Afghanistan, in recognition reflected on the Commander's of RC-W with staff and diviof the preeminent role percapacity of Command and be Iong in g to the Control, formed by Italy over the area; sions who had to operate in • the appointment to the NATO units itself,, theatre with staff and divisions SCR of new tasks and not usually under him. In order responsibilities, in particu lar concerning the to remedy this problem, in 2007 the lnterforces reinforcement of coordination with UN Mission in Operational Comm and (COi) developed the con Afghanistan (UNAMA) (2) and w ith member cept of organic Brigade aimed to supply t he Countries of t he International Security Italian national land component of RC- W with Assistance Force (ISAF), in order to harmonize staff and d ivisions belong ing to the Brigade and synchron ize the action of t he Provincial itself; Reconstruction Teams (PRT); •the possib le relocation of Herat's PRTs in a new •the introd uction of the organic Brigade concept head office at the "Arena" Camp base that is for t he supply and replacement of the Italian already lodging the Regional Command West; Nationa l land component within the ISAF • the ongo ing consideration regarding ISAF possi Regional Command West (RC- W) (3), that has bi lity of changing PRTs' tasks and structure six co ns id erably improved the Command and years after their introd uction ; Control capacities of the Commander and has · the en hanceme nt of the Italian presence in the increased the contigents integ ration ability, West region, made possible by the reduction of
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Rivista Milltare English Edition n. 1/2010
RC W J9 BRANCH Above. The RC- W ISAF logo.
Title pages. Humanitarian aid being delivered to a village.
the area, in respect of t he national interest and the targets achieved in the mission itself. In particular, w ithin a desi rable prospective of a gradual and prog res sive shift of res po nsabi lit y to the civil ian component in reconstruction and development and in order to outline the whole situat ion of ou r commitment in te rms of civi li an- m ilit ary cooperation at all level s.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RECONSTRUCTIO N TEAM
PROVINCIAL
In 2002, when PRTs we re established, t he main necessity was to increase the ISAF presence from
the city of Kabul to the whole Country, in view of a gradual shift of the security maint aining to the Afg han Security Forces and of the tasks concern ing reconstruction, development and Governance, local authorit ies and civil organizations at all levels (International Governmental and non Governmental Organization). Such mode l therefore represented the attempt of giving an operational answer to the diversified demands through t he deve lo pment of a dou ble- ident ity syste m t hat mixes so ldiers and civilians toget her on the f ield in order to achieve at least three main object ives at t he same time: to ext end and conso lidate the mi litary prese nce all over t he Afghan territory (garri son function), to promote the local administrations' abi lity of governance and to develop reconstruct ion projects focused on the re- introduction of the main infrastructures and essential services. Six years after the first PRT's introduction it is now poss ibl e to t ake stock of we've do ne, in o rder to detect st rengths and weaknesses of a mode l
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HUMANITARIAN AID
QUANTITIES
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150 Tons
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1 Ton
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3 containers
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that at this point could need some accurate con ceptual and struct ural adjustments, in relation to the changed refe rence situation . Among the positive aspects, we absolutely have to give credit for having ensured a steady and capillary ISAF pres ence on the territory, strong ly promoting the afghan government authority' s extens ion to a good part of t he Country. Having ascribed, during the emergency phase, to t he mi litary component a strong responsability in the reconstruction process allowed a fast, effective and efficient use of the financial sources availab le, as well as making the reinstatement of infrastructures and services possible even in high - instability areas . Among the most re levant li mits so far highlighted, we must po int out a certain chronic difficulty, coming from the force Command, of coordinating the sing le PRTs' activitities and, consequently, of centrally maintaining the des irable coherence of their action. Each PRT Leader Cou ntry has in fact d ifferently interpreted the assigned task, favouring , accord ing to the different sens ibilities, some aspects and marginalizing other ones (in most cases the "reconstruction" aspect has become prevalent or even sole to the detriment of governance task and, most of all, of security, representing ISAF' s main task .) In addition , they are financed with National funds, which are often a result of the availability of different Countries to committ in Afghanistan more than of the real
LOGOS - 78
demands of the area w here they are channelled into. T he capacity of integration , cooperation and coordinat ion between the civil ian and military component noticeably varies from one reality to another also in relation to the Nations' cu ltural background showed by the PRTs and turning , in a few cases, into exemp lary mode ls of synerget ic effort at the service of a Country- system and, in some other cases, into much less integrated models. Finally, if having credited to the so ldiers an important ro le in the reconstruction process during the emergency phase soon brought to sat isfying results , it is also true that what often created a significant discord with the civilian component that keeps perceiving the military one as a "com petito r" and has many times reported t he assumed " humanitarian space erosion" caused by the admixture between civil ians and soldiers in humanitarian and reconstruction activities .
HERAT'S PRT On 31 March 2005 Italy took command of Herat's PRT i n place of the United States. T he team , who was initially composed of other nation alities' members, is currently complete ly Italian and can number a staff of more or less 200 people, so ld iers and civi lians (on ly one at the moment). They are under the ISAF Regional
Rivista Militarc English Edition n. 1/2010
Command West, as well as the Lit huanian PRT in Board chaired by, besides PRT's representatives , the province of Ghor, the Spanish PRT in the all local authorities, both elective and representaprovin ce of Badghis and the American PRT in tive of t he different social realities of the province (Provincial Cou nci l, HoDs , Governor Ge neral 's Farah. Herat 's PRT mai nly performs reconstruction and Office). It's about a complex and st andard negotigovernance support of the local institutions. It is ation mechanism that appeals to the authorities composed of a Regimen t level military co mponent and communi ties consent and t hat manifests itself and of a civi li an component rep resented by a foras t he CIMIC Executive Plan which lists the projects eig n service officer. Th e m ilit ary compon ent to be carri ed out accord ing t o the priorities po introtates with shifts of about 5- 6 months, while the ed out by the local Authorities considering already planned programs by the Afghan Government civi lians re main there from six months to one year. w ithin its Provincial Development Plan. All planned The two compon ents are se lf-suffi cient from a logi stic and secu rity po int of view. works are, at last, d iscu ssed by the elders of the villages in order to also involve the local comm uThe civilian-military double soul, besides bei ng t he core of the PRT concept, allows to maximize nities du ring the reconstruction process to have the d ial ogue and collaboration ability with the off their su pport and t o prom ote thei r consent at any base people. The head of t he civ ili an component leve l. can establis h relationships with the local and Throughout 2008 47 reconstruction projects international community that prefer not to directwere developed : the dig of 180 wells in rural areas ly int eract with soldiers (in particu lar so me NGOs) i n ord er to imp rove the wate r su pply and The Commander of t he military com ponent, on the hygie ne / health conditions of the local population; the bui lding of many group practices and of at other hand, apart from bei ng in a constant and conti nuous l iaison with the local author ities least two schools for each of the l 5 province's disctricts; a bridg e bui lding named "Karta Bridge" (Governance) and re presentatives of In te rnati onal wh ich has co nside rab ly Organizatio ns, Governmental an d not prese nt in the area, plan s, March 3 l , 2 00 5 improved He rat' s downtown ' s road network and the coordinates and conducts all the ' ' On Italy took command of construction of the Juvenile reconstructio n activit ies f inanced by resources of the Mini st ry of Herat PRT in place of the Co rrection al Centre aiming is at to ease the prison overDefense (Reconstruct ion an d US. The team Development) and the initiatives present completely Ita- crowding and the sexual su pporting t he ANSF (Afg han lian and can rely on a blend between adult an d ile prisoners. T he National Securi t y Forces) (SS R) . staff of about 200 mili- juven impact of the t hese project Under him th ere is the PRT'S mi litary and civilians ,, on the local economy develtary compone nt whose priority is to opment is t angible even defen d t he infrast ructu res, the because t he PRT avail s itself of operations and personnel's safety, and to conduct CIMIC's activities (civil-military co - operation). All projects local labor in order to introd uce resources in t he local economic system, to moderat e t he unemdeveloped both by the civilian and the military ployment issue and to promote both the entreprecomponent are for the local com munity with no neu rial capabil ity and t he level of t ech nical- prore ligiou s, ethn ic or t ribal di stinction and they are fess ional qualificat ion of t he Afg han workers . shaped in accordance w ith the greater possible respect of traditio ns, r eligion and afghan cultures. CIMIC activity, besides reconstruction initiatives, also provides health care at t he PRT's infirmary. Starting from 2005, the PRT military compo nent Just to give an example, it could be helpful t o has invested t he average of abo ut 5 million euros remem ber t hat abo ut 4,000 patients made use of pe r year in reconstruction project s developed by this service during 2008 contributing to strenghtthe CIMIC unit composed of personnel coming fro m t he CIMIC Group South Regiment (4) and en the consent and, consequ ently, the secu rity in behalf of PRT. The military com ponent also se rves from th e Se lected Reserve. The projects co nce rn as liai so n for t he aids com ing from Italy t hat many sectors: education, health, security, agricol involve a consid erable effort logistically speaking ture. They are d etected through a process that and that fully contribute to the reconstruction emphasizes t he "ownership" (planning and priori work carried forward all over t he Provi nce (e.g. tization) of the local aut horities an d that is, con sehospital kits donation, reli ef goods and aid packq uently, an effective governance su ppo rt mechanism. Specifically, the mechanism is based on the ages). For what concerns the role played by the civilian development of a master plan that all ocates by co mpo nent in t he reconstructio n act ivity, besides area the fu nd ing ann ually allotted by the Mi nistry facilitat ing the d ialog ue between PRT and t he of Defense and t hat is d iscussed by a Provincial
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THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM According to ISAF PRT handbook's definition, PRTs are civil-military structures operating in provinces. Their mission is to "support the afghan government in order to empower its authority to facilitate the development of a stable and secu re environment in the specific area of responsability and to support the security sector reform (SSR) and the reconstructi on efforts". Following the Bucharest's summit, the Heads of States and Government of the ISAF partecipating nations are engaged to support PRTs' mission and the unity of purpose, to empower the civilian component and into a future prospective to adjust the development stratey with the real afghan government priorities, until the National institutions are not strong enough to make their presence unecessary.
interested party, MAE's representative is responsible for the coordination of the projects financed by reconstru ction international programs (e.g. European Commission Support to Governance Program or Grant Assistance for Grassroot Projects Program financed by the japanese government) Specifically, the civilian component is taking care of three projects, one of which is already under construction and the other two are still under study, worth 500 000 euros each. We would also like to explain that the already started project concerns the construction of a new Women Correctional Centre in Herat that is involving t he civilian component (project coordination and relat ionships with the International organizations and local authorities), the military component (plan ning and contract by CIMIC), and the non-governamental afghan organization "Voice of Women" (providing professional training courses, capacity building and psycholbgical assistance to prisoners in order to make easier their reintegration into society at the end of their detention).
occasion to take stock of the work done so far by the Italian PRT and to assess the future prospectives. Today we can say that it has largely and successfully perfomed its role according to the cu rrent conditions and that it can unde rtake t he "transition" process desired by the ISAF PRT Handbook which provides for PRT's transformat ion into a Provincial Stability Team (PST) with a stronger civilian connotation. With reference to the province of Herat the conditions to shift the emphasis on the civilians' role and to invest more on local administration capacity building and on development assistance in a medium-long term are maybe mature.About PRT's future we can, in particular, propose a few considerations. A hypoth etical displacement at the airpo rt (already base of the Regional Command West), even though it might be a considerable challenge logistically speaking and even though it might involve a removal from the local community, it would allow a personnel saving that could be put to use as other roles within the total Italian commitment in the area. Moreover, perhaps the time is ripe to think of a THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRT MODEL AND THE transition stage where PRT could mainly rely on FUTURE OF HERAT'S ITALIAN PRT t he civilian component and on the local people and, only rare ly, on soldiers. In brief, the military In July 2008 the DCOMISAF (Deputy Commander component could restrict itself to security sector ISAF) proposed a PRT 's task and structure review, support (providing equipment and named "PRT review" (5), currently under ISAF construction/renovation of the infrastructures Country members consideration and item of disused by ANSFs) and to reconstruction activity in cussion during the last PRT those areas where civilians Conference held in Kabul last can't act due to the persistent september. Aim of the document ' ' In July 2008 the Deputy instabi lity conditio ns. We must is to assess whether and how Commander ISAF propoesed also consider that the PRTs are complying with the to review the PRTs' task and advanced level of Herat's duties assigned and to understructure... the proposal is economy development would stand whether and to which currently being assessed by consist of shifting PRT's atten extent there is t he necessity to the ISAF member countries... , , tion from reconstruction activreassess the current PRT model ities to development cooperain th e light of the tactically tion activities. Specifically, in changed situation and of the new responsibi lities fact, the necessity of a reconstruction work does assigned by the Bucharest's Summit to the NATO not refer to the damages caused by 2001 allied Senior Civil Representative concerning the harmomilitary action (Operation Enduring Freedom) but nization and synchronization of PRTs' action. to those ones caused by thirty years of internaThe publication of this document offered the tional and civil war that have made the basic infra-
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struct ures and services unusable. Regarding Herat's Province, th is process can however be con sidered virtually over and it is now time to move up from the reconstruction to the development stage. In this new scenario, civilians and soldiers could work in separate fields and minimizing the civil military admixture and the unce rtainty regard ing their roles. Specifically, the m ilitary component could bea r the reconst r uct ion works in still strongly unstable areas and the construction of basic infrastructu res considered to be pre lim inary to the development stage (road and bridge construction) . The poss ible PRT's relocation at Camp "Arena" would also consist of creating a logistic distinction, w ith a civil office in town and a mi litary one (CIMIC cell) at the RC- W' s office, a solution that cou ld allow a greater involvement of those NGOs less w ill ing to cooperate w ith sold iers . However, hopefully civilian and m il itary components w ill continue to work in close cooperation and coordination (CIM IC) in order to pursue the aim of the definitive stabilization of the area according to the "comprehensive approach" prin ciple stated in Bucharest. PRT's activity shou ld be based on a sole program strictly coordinated to
avoid unnecessary overlaps and duplications and to guarantee the jo int efforts of the military and civi lian components . The redefinition of roles and respo nsabilities with i n PRT should be granted with satisfaction due to the good work done so far and t he necessity to evolve towards an organizational mode l in order to en sure the end st ate achievement that would make a PRT' s presence in the area unecessary.
THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE ITALIAN MILITARY INSTRUMENT IN THE WEST REGION The divestiture of commitments linked to the Regional Command - Cap ital (RC- C) has made theoretically possible new redep loyment of contingents previous ly employed in Kabul and the ir reemployment in the West area of Afghanistan . Th is allowed the creation and the fol lowing deployment of the new Battle Group i n t he province of Farah . Whi le the reinforcement of the Italian military presence in the West Reg ion through the new Battle Group deployment repre sents a positive evolution, on the other hand, it could produce risks of a further comp lexity of the sce nario, increasing the number of active people with different tasks in the area of responsability. In the province of Farah, an american PRT is already
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employed in the reconstruction and local authori ties governance support. The deployment of a force previously employed in performing operations connected with the improvement of security conditions in the area but that, most likely, also conducts CIMIC's activities, necessarily req uires a coordination activity aimed to avoid overlaps and duplications. The elements to focus the attention on, are the following: • providing the Battle Group with a CIMIC unit properly sized for t he task; • supplying this unit mostly (even if not exclusive ly) with personnel coming from the CIMIC Group South Regiment in order to ensure minimum operating standards and to facilitate the coordination with PRTs and Cell J9 of RC-W (supplied by the same division); • the CIMIC act ivity performed by the Battle Group is first of all understood as force multiplier in support of the operations and as being oriented to the consensus building towards ISAF; • precisely because "in support of operations", the function of CIMIC is performed strictly combined with patrol activities conducted by the Battle
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Group and must be realized mostly in the distri bution of humanitarian aids and in providing health care to the local population (Medical Patrols/MEDCAPs) besides acting as liaison with the local leaders (Key Leaders Engagement/KLE); • at last, the CIMIC activity must be developed in close collaboration and coordination with PSYOPS activity performed by TPT (Tactical Psyops Team) currently under RC-W's Commander for maximazing their effects.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS The new articulation of the military disposition in the West Region, the presence of Italian personnel in key positions to the highest degree and the hypothesis of Herat's PRT relocation give t he opportunity to develop an overall strategy that could harmonize all the Italian institut ional figures operating within the civil-military Cooperation in the widest sense of the term . T his strategy could pivot on tre main aspects: First of all, tactical ly reach ing an even more pre-
• Rivista Militare English Edition n. 112010
It was established on 28 March 2002 by UN Security Council resolution 1401. It's original mandate was support the Bonn Agreement, that provided for, after the fall of the taliban regime, the . establishment of a transitional government that could draft a Constitution and lead to political elections. The coordination of the international efforts in humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, development and governance, is also under UNAMA. Finally, UNAMA is employed to politically and strategically assist the Afghan Government, and to promote the presence of the international community in this Country. Its mandate was extended by Resolutions 1662 (2006) and 1746 (2007) that have directed the efforts of the mission and of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Afghanistan to establish a closer collaboration with ISAF. (3) The Regional Command West (RC- W) is an lnterforce Multinational Brigade Command currently placed in Herat at Camp "Arena" base. The base also hosts the city's International airport which is under RC- W's responsibility ( the part concerning military air traffic and security issues). The Command, led by Italy, groups 12 nations's contingent together (Italy, Spain, United States, Manuel Solastri Slovenia, Lithuania, Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ukraine, Georgia) for a total of a little Captain, less than three thousand men, to which Italy conNA TO C/MIC CROUP tributes 50% of the total force (followed by Spain Motta di Livenza that contributes with 25%). The RC-W mission is mainly to contribute to the security reinforcement in the West Region of Afghanistan supporting and NOTES in close collaboration with the Afghan National Security Forces, ANSF) deployed in t he area. Then, The NATO Senior Civilian Representative role in RC- W's aim is to pursue secuAfghanistan is articulated and rity even ind irect ly, supporting diversified. It incluedes the NATO action coordination with the ' ' The new articulation of the the local authorities' legitimaaction of the other International military instrument in the tion through support interOrganizations and, in particular, West Region, the presence of ventions in favor of the subwith the United Nations Italian personnel in key posi- national governance and prothe postwar reconAssistance Mission (UNAMA) and tions at the highest level and moting struction and development the European Union, besides the the hypothesis of Herat's PRT process (R&D) . dialogue faci litation with the Afghan Government that, relocation give the opportu- (4) T he CIMIC Group South through the NATO SCR, may nity to develop an overall (CGS) placed at Motta di Livenza (Treviso, Italy), is the count on a direct communication strategy... , , only existing NATO's multinachannel with the NATO's headtional unit for CIMIC's activi quarters in Brussels. The aim of ties. The CIMIC Group South was established on 1 its mission is mainly offering to the Atlantic January 2002, with the participation of Greece, Council a qualified contribution for the NATO's Italy, Portugal, Romania and Hungary. Bulgaria, strategy definition in the central asian Country, in Slovenia and United States are supposed to com a crucially important moment for Afghanistan and plete their membership this year. The personnel is for t he evolution of the International presence in currently also employed, besides Afghanistan, in the area, as proved by the decisions t aken by the the UN mission theatre in Lebanon, in Kosovo and, NATO Summit of Bucharest (2-4 April 2008). with a limited presence, in the EUMM in Georgia. (2) UNAMA: the United Nation s Assistance Mission (5) HQ ISAF PRT Review Uuly 2008). in Afghanistan is the UN's mission in Afghanistan.
cise difinition of the responsabilities, conditions and structure of CIMIC component within Battle Groups, in order to give an efficient unity of purposes and to avoid overlaps and duplication with PRTs. Then, in relation to reconstruction and development (R&D), hopefu lly we will go on moving from the current PRT model to an organization more conforming to t he local necessities and ISAF targets emphasizing the civilian component's role and focus ing mainly on the development assistance and on t he governance support, rather than the simple reconstruction activity. At last, it would be necessary to capitalize t he Italian presence in key positions in order to create a consultation forum attended by: the NATO SCR, the Italian embassador in Kabul, the Italian Senior National Representative (ITA SNR), the RC-W Commander and the heads of t he PRT military and civilian component. The task of this forum is to ensure the coordination and the unity of all ital ian institutional figures' efforts, both military and civilian, operating at all levels in the area of responsability in view of a mission approach based on the concept of country system.
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FORCE PROTECTION AND THE RESPONSE TO IEDs The threat represented mines and by explosive devices has entailed the study and adoption of sophisticated measures for protecting men and vehicles in the operational theatres. Today, Italy - with IVECO and OTO MELARA - can be considered itself in the forefront of armour plating.
The concept of "Force Protection" is very extensive and includes different operational sectors that go from individual protection of personnel and equipment to information, surveillance, communication and information dominance. The reference regulations in this sector are by now well-established, both in the NATO and national environments by the "Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection", the "Allied Command for Operation", the "Directive 80-25", the "SMDPID/O-3.14", the "lnterforces National Doctrine for Force Protection" and the "Ital ian Chief of Staffs Strategic Concept". In the national ambit, "Force Protection" is defined as the "body of measures and means for reducing to a minimum the vulnerability of personnel, installations, equipment and information, in any type of threat or circumstance, in order to safeguard the freedom of action and the operational efficiency of the forces". The application of this concept is of particular interest for what concerns the protection of personnel aboard vehicles. This need has appeared more pressing, in particular. du ring the past l 5 years, following the exponential growth of the threats deriving from mines and IEDS (Improvised Explosive Devices). These devices, made by mixing deadly cocktails of dozens of kilos of explosives, sometimes more than one hundred kilos, are the most common threat in the present operational scenarios. At the moment there is no acknowledged standard of protection for vehicles, but many companies are trying to implement in their offers what has been learned from in - theatre experience, developing more and more protected vehicles, thus anticipating the doctrinal evolution. Italy, with lveco and Oto Melara, is in the vanguard in the field of vehicle protection. In the "IFV" sector, the "VBM" has been designed for reaching a maximum level of ballistic protection (5) and 3A
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Above. A line of "MaxxPros". Title pages. An "RC-33".
level of anti-mine protection. Such vehicles can moreover be equipped with anti- lED side armour-plating and the adaptation of the same protections is envisaged also for the underside of the hull. As regards the lighter vehicles, the trend appears to be that of planning the production of security cells for the crew, often hanging from the chassis, and the concentration of all the mechanical units outside them, so that the pressure wave of the explosion will not generate splinters potentially lethal for the occupiers. T he caissons, separate from the cell, are easily ejectable, which gives more vent to a possible explosion, while the seats, made of anti-shock materials, are overhanging the bottom of the cell on special elastic structures. In this way, the vehicle may be destroyed by an
Rivista Militare Englisll Edition n. 1/2010
explosion, but the cell must remain unharmed and A "Cougar" damaged by a mine. suffer as little damage as possible. lveco, with its "LMV", can rightly say to be the STANAG, both as regards ballistics and m ines. best in this sector. In the anti - mine protection sector, Italy has This vehicle has a level- 3 ballistic protection and recently acquired six "MRAP" (Mines Resistant a leve l- 2A anti- mine protection, which envisages Ambush Protected) vehicles in a "Cougar" transunder-wheel resistance to explosions caused by port version and four "Buffalo" mines made with 6kg of exploit inerary clearing vehicles . sive, and has been employed for ' ' ... Force Protection is the The "Cougar" weighs 17.7 over one year in Lebanon and body of measures and tons and is equipped w ith a C7 Afghanistan. means for reducing to a mi- Caterpillar engine, adjusted for In this latter operational theatre the "Lince" endured explo- nimum the vulnerability of 330 hp to 2400 r .p.m . The sions but, despite the damages personnel, installations, "Buffalo", instead, is even heavier suffered by the vehic le, the equipment and information, (from 20.4 to 36 .3 tons) and has been des ig ned to be crews were only slightly woundas regards any type of thre- repaired directly also on the ed and the survival cell came out at and circumstance ... ,, battlefield. almost intact. The abovementioned vehicles During the "Force Protection" deserve a through analysis, convention held at La Spezia on precisely because they are cons idered a possible May 23, 2008, IVECO announced the development concrete answer to IEDS. of a new version of "VTLM" called "VTM - x" for the T he news regarding this order dates back to last Italian Army, and "MPV" for the commercial verMarch, when the American Department of Defense sion. officially informed that it had started the proceIt is going to be a 4x4 super- protected vehicle, dures for awarding to the "Force Protection based on an lveco Cava Cantiere commercial chasIn dustry Inc." of Ladson the supply of l O anti- mine sis with a Krauss Maffei Wegman security module vehicles to the Italian Ministry of Defence. hinged on it . T he protection will be level 3
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capability, but to the det riment of a passive protection of the veh icles . In order to make up for th is lack of vehicle protection, the US forces started to use a se ries of rud imentary solutions consisting of discarded material, plywood and metal plates. But these improvised solutions did not succeed in increasing the levels of security of the persons on the vehicles; on the contrary they have made the latter less mobi le and flex ible , for they strained the suspensions and the driv ing wheels . In add ition, there was the increased dange r deriving from improvised protection kits that augmented the probabil ity of splinters in case of !ED attacks . As a consequence of this, the Pentagon decided to step up the "MRAP" programme, going from the initial l 022 to 3700 orders . Therefore a large part of these vehicles w il l have to be deployed in Iraq, THE "MRAP" VEH ICLES: HISTORY AND DELAYS to rep lace the "Humvees" for utility and scouting tasks. In the war theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq most Various firms are participating in this provictims among the Coalit ion fo rces are caused by gramme, but the most important are BAE Systems, IEDS, devices made by emp loying the most d isForce Dynamics and Force Protection . parate elements, such as artillery shells and Franz J. Gayl , a former Marine officer who spent homemade explosive materials. six months in Iraq , in 2006 and 2007, has made a Often t heir power exceeds that of industrially research on this subject deno uncing the de lay in produced mines, while concealment and priming the "MRAP" entry into service . become more and more According to the research, the sophisticated . This makes the '' ... The MRAP systems are cost of the veh icle was suppos preventive discovery of these characterized by an edly one of the main factors that devices very difficult, because armoured cell with a V influenced the decision of not they are hidden along roads conc luding the purchase . In travel led by the convoys of the hull that can deflect a fact, it was feared that these allied forces. large part of the energy vehicles, that cost a million Thi s fact has determined a generated by an explo dollars each , wou ld interfere greater attention towards syssion, thus ensuring the with the financial programmes tems that can provide a greater integrity of the cockpit,, for lighter vehicles. protection of personne l. It was secretary Robert Gates At the beginning, t he who, in May 2007 , ind icated the research was based on the MRAPs as a "priority one" programme in the developme nt and employment of detection and/or Pentagon's list of acquisitions and provided that neutralization systems, which, although obtaining such vehicles be transported to Iraq. appreciable results, were not up to the increasing Moreover, Gayl lists the four factors that probaly refined techniques of IEDS' product ion and bly determined the wrong decisions until the employment. moment of Rumsfeld's replacement in 2006 . Thus, the conclusion was reached that, at least in To beg i n with , as we have already mentioned, the short time, it would be difficult to ward off the wrong evaluation of the possible improvethese lethal attacks and, therefore, the attention ments deriving from the rudimentary patch-ups of has rapidly turned on the reduction of human the "Humvees". There was, in addition, a fear for losses by having recourse to vehicles des igned to the excessive costs t hat the new vehicle could protect the crew. have on the chain of support and logistic mainteThe experience in Iraq and Afghanistan was in nance of the Mari nes, rather than the observation fact showing the dec li ne of the Rumsfeld doctrine, that the troops wou ld be transported on a vehicle marked by high techno logical contents scarcely that could save thei r life in case of IEDS explosions supported by adequately protected means of ( 1) . transport. In this sense, the "Stryker" was a symbol Then there was also a lack of information about of this way of thinking: high mobility and prothe state of urgency of the requests for "MRAPs", jectability together w ith information dominance
The contract falls within t he Pentagon's programme of foreign military sales and amounts to about 8,353,715 dollars. It includes, besides the l O veh icles, also the supply of services of technical support and the spare parts for their maintenance in working order. The logistic support wi ll be ensured by the Force Protection, through the Marine Corps System Command in Quantico, unti l the middle of 2009 . The construction of the vehicles for Italy should be completed by the end of July and t he de livery should take place by the end of summer. At the moment we don't know if this is only a first consignment, possib ly followed by a second delivery, numerically more significant.
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Rlviste Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
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Front view of a MaxxPro.
THE MODELS
toget her with some kind of mistrust regarding t his vehicle, considered hard ly suitab le for a force employable in rapid - reaction military operations. It has instead scarce credibi lity the justification that there would be few American firms capable of producing such vehicles, while somehow more credible appear the problems that these vehicles could have in particu lar sit uations, such as pursu it in the narrow streets of inhabited centres or crossing little bridges.
A part from the model , the "MRAP" systems are characterized by an armoured cell with a V- shaped hull that can deflect a large part of the ene rgy gen erated by the explosion, thus ensuring the integ rity of the cockpit. Th is particular form different iates the m from other armoured vehicles . In fact, despite t heir p rotection, vehicl es w ith a flat hull expose too ample a surface to the im pact and tend to break under the pressure of the shock wave . Besides, also when they withstand the explosion and the splinters, the energy transferred
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Due to their dimensions, MRAPs can be cumbersome and not very manoeuvrable, but they are very effective for personnel protection. /
ins ide the cockpit can often cause serious damages to the men, especially to their lower limbs. According to General T. Conway, Commander of the US Marine Corps, the possibilities that WRAP personnel may survive a IED could be three- hundred t imes higher than those offe red by a "Humvee Up Armored". T he "MRAPs" employ chassis from heavy vehicles (generally of commercial origin) and mount wheel with high tyres, so as to increase the distance from t he ground as much as possible, to help disperse the energy of the explosion. Moreover, almost all the whole equipment and systems are placed in appropriate spaces outside the protected cell, so that they may offer a supplementary level of protection. These vehicles were divided by the Pentagon into three categories. Th e first includes the vehicles of more reduced dimensions, destined to patrol, reconnaissance and Command and Control operations. They can carry six or more persons and are mostly suitable for operations in urban environments, where bulky vehicles of a higher category could find manoeuvring difficulties. To the second category belong vehicles that can transport l O or more persons and are mostly destined to escort-
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ing convoys, transporting troops and conducting medical evacuations. Finally, the th ird category consists of vehicles equipped for clearing communication routes from mines, IEDs and UXOs (unexploded ordnance). These vehicles are not exactly demining systems, for they cannot rapidly clear wide areas; however, t hey can remove devices piece by piece.
PROGRAMME NUMBERS AND SUPPLIES In order to understand how such vehicles are gaining ground, one should analyse the role of the American military planning, which is gaining more and more attention from the Defence Administration and the American Cong ress. Initially the supply requ ireme nt fixed a number of 2 500 vehicles, but after budget and Congress adjustments the numbers were reconsidered until they totalled 17,000 vehicles. In a memorandum of May 1 5, 2007, Pete Geren, ad - interim Secretary of the US Army, stated that the US Forces needed as many as 17,700 vehicles, and several officials of t he US Army had asked the Department of Defence to approve a financing of 20 billion dol lars for the following two years, to redeploy the vehicles in the theatre by t he end of 2009. The US Defence Secretary himself in many occasions has described "MRAP" as a priority pro-
Rivista Mili/are English Edition n. 1/2010
gramme, fundamental for guaranteeing a greater MRAP can remarkab ly reduce the number of IED security to the land units deployed in Iraq and casualties, it is still impossible to consider it a tool Afghanistan. capable of giving a definitive answer to the reacAlthough there had been talks about this vehicle tio n capabilities of guerrilla warfare . at least since 2003, the first substantial joint In fact, the main threat at the moment is reprerequ irement for 4060 units was issued only in sented by the diffusion of IEDs of the EFP type 2006 (2500 for the US Arm'(, 538 for the US Navy (Explosively Formed Projectile), i.e. hollow charge and l 022 for the US Marine Corps) , soon risen to devices that can penetrate also the hull of MRAPs. a number of 7774 and 23 ,000 These lethal IEDs are generally orders until 2010. made by employing a shaft or a 't.even if MRAPs can re "MRAP" is therefore a "Joint" markably reduce the num- pipe filled with explosive and prog ram me, whose managea hollow form in correber of IED casualties, it is given ment, nevertheless, is spondence to the openin g to be assigned to the Marine Corps. still impossible to consider directed towards the target. The Besides Italy, many other it a tool capable of giving a tube is then shut with a copper or Cou ntries are decidedly relying definitive answer to the re- steel "concave li d" wel l inserted on them for increasing the action capabilities of guerinto t he ex p losive. With the security of t hei r per sonnel rilla warfare , , explosion , the "l id" turns into a deployed in Iraq and dart of melted metal that can Afghan istan . pierce even armour of remarkLikewi se, also the British Ministry of Defence has able th ickness. initialled a contract for the supply of l 74 "MRAP" To make MRAP vehicles capable of surviving also vehicles in the 6x6 "Cougar Mastiff' version (the the EPFs, the Pentagon has launched a programme British model of the veh icle), for a disbursement of of acq uisition of additional armour, the "Frag Kit 6". 115 million dollars. Altogether the United Kingdom has an order fo r This implies an inevitable reduction of the vehi supplying 330 Cougars in the 6x6 version and 500 cles' mobility, due to a notable increase in weight 4x4, for a total of l 050 pieces. and bulk. Australia has bought from Thales-ADI as many Together with this programm e aimed at strengtheni ng the vehicles, the Marine Corps as 668 "Bushmaster", wh ile Holland has bought 2 5 of them. Systems Command has urged the firms to develop The German model "Dingo 2" of "Krauss-Maffei a new generation of MRAP vehicles , which could Wegman" has received orders for 204 pieces from provide a higher protection while guaranteeing Germany,(that have been added to 147 "Dingo 1"), sufficient mobility. from Belgium for 220, from Luxembourg for 48 and from the Czech Republ ic for 4. Matteo Bressan From these numbers one can infer that soon the Analyst and Researcher "MRAPs" will be the standard means of transport for the Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. NOTES (1) An urgent request for 1169 MRAPs signed by Brigadier General Denn is Hejlik in February 2005, had landed on the desk of some civilian official THE CRITICAL FACTORS IN THE MRAP PROGRAMME who certainly had a scarce knowledge of military The need to have a greater quantity of "MRAPs" vehicles. (2) Cfr. Italy bought anti - mine vehicles "Cougar" and available in the shortest tim e poss ible has determined the choice to address various manufactur"Buffalo" in "Rivista ltaliana Difesa", n.4, April 2008. ing industries. (3) Cfr. L. Pozzi, After Rumsfeld, "Panorama Difesa", This choice could generate considerable logisti c n.253, May 2007. problems, sin ce there would be as many as 11 ver(4) An urgent application of l l 69 "MRAP", which was signed by Brigadier General De nnios Hejlik, in February sions of such vehicles on the market. The Pentagon has explained that the wide 2005 , was found on the desk of a civil servant, who had em ployment of commercial components, common definitely a superficial knowledge of military vehicles. (5) R. Lardner, "The Associated Press", which has been to all vehicles, should limit the risk of bad com pletranslated in "Pagine di Difesa", 27th February 2008. mentarity of the pieces. 6 R. Ferretti, "MRAP" vehicles, "Panorama Difesa", n. 264, In addition to this problem, there is also the difficulty of transporting MRAPs with any type of carMay 2008. (7) Cfr. "MRAP" a programme that is growing, "Panorama rier, either naval or aircraft. From a practical point of view, instead, even if Difesa", July 2007.
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THE NEW TRENDS IN THE FIELD OF THE WESTERN MBTs With the end of the Cold War and Operation "Desert Storm" it was believed that the battle tank (MBD had had its day. Nevertheless, today, in the light of the Israeli experiences against the Palestinian terrorist organizations, thanks to the installation of more and more advanced electronic sensors, the development of protections, the concept of deterrence applied to it and to the asymmetry of the new conflicts, it has apparently been reborn to a new life and is now employed as mobile fire base in support of the infantry. This latter need being the reason of its birth during the First World War.
After the end of the Cold War it was be lieved that the Main Battle Tank (MBT) wo uld be destined to early retirement. The scenario of great clashes among armoured u nits was considered definitely over, as, on the other hand, the other high - sym met ry and conventionality scenarios planned duri ng t he fifty-year-old conflict with the Soviet Union. Operation "Desert Storm", w here o ne actu ally witnessed big clashes of tanks in t he desert, was considered the ending of a story destined to be replaced by conflicts of a different kind. In the new asymm~tric scenarios t he tan k was going to play a marginal role to the advantage of new protagonists: new high-mobil ity wheeled vehicles , speciai forces with revolutio nary equipment and, above all , drones and aircraft (the latter better if "invisible"). Especially in urban environ ments. For obvious reasons i n an urban clash there are no manoeuvri ng spaces that permit to operate w ith tanks, and the tank itse lf cannot develop in full its most distinctive characteristic, i.e. fire power. The l 20mm gun, which has been equipping most Western tanks since the nineties, is a weapon hardly su itable for employment in inhab-
Above. At the end of the Cold War it was generally believed that the battle tank was destined to an early retirement. Below left. In many Western Armies the dominant trend is to employ tanks in the innermost part of a town, as platforms suitable for "non-legacy" tasks. Th e picture shows "Abrams" tanks patrolling the Iraqi town/et of Tai Afar.
Title pages.
Operation "Desert Storm", where heavy fights among tanks actually took place in the desert, was considered the epilogue of a story destined to give way to different types of conflicts.
ited centres: In fact, the targets are mostly "soft" vehic les, houses, machinegun nests; therefore, for t his reason, they can be "worked" best with the 25mm light gun of an armou red car or even w ith the 40mm grenade thrower - and the probabi lity of collateral damage is very high. Yet, the experience made from the second half of the nineties by the Israeli Army in fighting the
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Palestinian organizations, which entailed a massive employment of tanks also in urban scenarios, has started to change the convictions that had been wel l- established soon after the end of the Cold War. The tank has shown that it is not fin ished as main army instrument of combat. Not in the least. Let's try to understand why.
The experience gained since the second half of the '90s by the Israeli Army in their fight against the Palestinian organizations, began to change the convictions that had become established soon after the end of the Cold War. The picture shows "Merkava" tanks ready to enter the Caza strip during operation "Molten Lead".
the mac hi neg uns, it is possible to hit soft targets accurately - parti cularly sn ipers posted on roofs or THE MBT TODAY: A FLEXIBLE INSTRUMENT shooting from windows - without having to resort to the main gun, thus jeopardizi ng the presence of A battle tank is not on ly its gu n. Certainly the possi bly adj ace nt civi lian targets. gun is the main weapon, but next to thi s, a tank is There are moreover two more very important fitted out wit h a whole range of systems that make aspects that extol the employment of tanks also in it an extraord inarily fle x i ble an urban environmen t. The instrument, capable of adapting fi rst is protection , the seco nd to lots of scenarios. Observation ,, .. .today the battle tank is deterrence . As regards the systems, panoram ic systems, and fitted out with a whole first aspect, as compared to machineguns offer vario us range of systems that make an armoured vehicle o r, options and allow a tank to operit an extraordinarily flexi - worse, to a ve hicle like the ate at its best also in difficult "Humvee", t he MBT has an ble instrument, capable of incomparably higher protecenvironmen t s, like t he urban o nes. The o bservation and vision adapting to lots of scenar- tion. Many tanks can resist in various points to RPG shots too ls, especiall y thanks to the ios ... ,, availabil ity of the thermal chanfired at short range. Not to nel, remarkably improve the situmention its capabi lity to bear ation awareness around t he vehicle and have the heavy machineguns or big anti - vehicle rifles. The advantage of being passive (therefore, making no Israelis, who have always paid the greatest atten tion to the survival of personnel, have been the emissions, t hey cannot poss ibly be discovered). As we shall see later on, these devices have been first to fully understand the advantage that a tank improved a good deal in t he past years by increcan offer in such terms and insisted on t he menting their resolution, ranges and ab il ity to di s"armoured tax i" concept, i. e. the MBT platform as criminate objects more accurately. In stead, with an armoured bus capable of carrying, like the
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• and are protect ed in their turn by the infantrymen against possible amb ushes or short- range threat s. Th us, from mass- employment, based on t he manoeuvre of big independent armoured units, we have proceeded to an employment more and mo re "flattened" at tactical level , where the typical formation is the platoon or even a coup le of tanks. Coming to the second aspect, deterrence, t here is no other vehicle capab le of meeting th is requirement better than the tank. In fact, its presence and bulk suffice to deter possible hostil e ini tiatives and attacks, and the clatter of its tracks is enough to produce the same effect, arous ing fear and making possib ly evi l- minded individuals t o see reason . Thus tanks are regularly employed in peace /stabilisation operations . Many contingent s employed abroad are actual ly reinforced by squadrons of tanks that se ldom go out of t hei r bases, or they do it only in particular circum stances and only to go "clattering" on the roads of the "hottest" areas, or to protect checkpoints, in stand ing positions of observation and control. Techn ically, the operational trends just analysed have translated into a series of measures that have more or less invo lved the MBTs of every major Western army. Thus there has been a sprouting of proposals of urbanization kits, more and more performing observation apparatus have been introduced, together with contrivances that can transform also t he tank into one of the many knots of the tactical network.
URBANIZATION Section view of a "Merkava" Mark 3 Baz. In particular, note the add- on armour tiles for urban combat.
Israeli "Merkava" tank, an infantry sq uad, offering them the maximum possib le protection . Certainly the Israe li have pushed this concept to the limit, but also other Western armies are inclined to emp loy tanks at the heart of the urban environ ment as platforms suitab le for carrying out "non legacy" tasks, such as observation or fire support for the infantry. Precisely this latter aspect deserves a further consideration. With the present asymmetrical scenarios , because of its spec ific characteristics, the employment of the tan k has paradoxically returned to its origins , i.e. to the t ime when in 1916 the "big tracked tin cans" appeared on the battlefields as vehicles in support of the infantry. We ll , also in today's scenarios and not only in th e asymmetrical ones - tanks are employed mostly in support of infantry squads, ensuring protection, fire and information support,
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In the last four or five years, various solutions have been suggested for urbanizing tanks . Some of these have been selected by the Armed Forces , wh ile others sti ll remain at prototype leve l. Among the various proposals, we mention the 'TUSK" kit for the "Abrams" tanks , the "PSO" for the "Leopard 2" or the "AZUR" for the "Leclerc" of the French Army. The TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) has been
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fl
Remote weapons sration
Loader's thermal sight
tank/infantry telephone
'
11,crmal sight goggles
l
,.j.'
-.~. -
,_:"
Rear protcc1in\ unit slat am1or
-
-•\M-- •
T hem1al sight coInponen1s
-
Abrams Reactive Annor Tiles
Above, below left and right. In the order listed above the various urbanization kits proposed in the past years: "Abrams TUSK", "Leclerc AZUR", and "Leopard 2 PSO".
especia lly designed to protect the "Abrams" employed in the Iraqi cities and villages, and more than 500 kits have been mounted on as many t an ks emp loyed in the Mesopotamian theatre. It is an adaptable kit that includes additional passivetype armour plating on the sides, a remote-con trolled turret installed on the tank's turret according to the ''TOT' (Turret on T urret) concept - armed with a 12.7mm machinegun, a shie ld for the machinegunner, a rear cage for protection against firebombs and RPGs ., a camera installed on the back of the turret, an im proved snooperscope for the driver and an interphone to communicate with t he squ ad on foot. Anot her very interesting element is "CSAMM" (Counter Sniper/AntiMateriel Mount), a small appliance installed coaxially on the high part of the barrel, armed with a 12.7mm machineg un. This system was introduced on purpose, for anti- sniper and anti- vehicle fire. The same concepts inspire also t he "PSO" for t he "Leopard 2" of the German army or t he "AZUR" for the "Lecle rc" of the "Armee de Terre"; both kits include more or less t he elements already men-
t ioned for t he "T USK". But the "Leopard 2 PSO" has something more. Its kit, in fact, envisages t he installation of a bulldozer shovel on the front sect ion of the tank, for removing obstacles and barri cades. A contrivance that literally revol ution ises the physiognomy of the "Leopard 2", transform ing it into a really polyvalent platform. This year the German army had intend ed to order a prototype of t he PSO fo r a first appraisal. The Israelis and the British have also moved on the same path. The British have equipped their "Challe ngers 2" w ith pass ive armour on the tu rret and with a cag e for the protection of t he rear sec-
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Another trend that became established during the past years in the field of armoured vehicles is digitisation, which led to the installation of "BMS" modules.
tion. Moreover, fo llowing an "urgent requirement", they have acquired and installed on the turret's sky t he new "Enforcer" remote- control led system, armed wit h a 7.62mm machinegun. The Israelis, as we said the best theorisers of the employment of tanks in urban confl icts , have updated both the "Merkava" Mark 3 and Mark 4, to acknowledge t he new requirements . The Mark 3 has undergo ne a series of adjustments, wh ich include the strengthen ing of the platform, in order to increase the protection against improved IEDs, the connection of the 12 . 7 weapon, installed on the turret sky, with the fire-control system, so as to enab le the tank commander to fire from inside the tank, and a slit on the hatchback, whic h all ows the members of the team to fire from inside on the areas surrounding the back of the tank. T he Mark 4 has undergone even better improvements. A te lescopic mast has been mounted on the turret sky, a hunter- killer sight, which permits a better situational awareness to the tank commander, a "Vectrop Tank Sight System" which includes four protected cameras, to increase the view of t he conductor on every side of the tank, a remote control turret, a battering ram on the front of the tank to remove barr icades and obstacles, and the new "Trophy" kit for active protectio n. T hus, also with the "Merkava" Mk4 we have another example, in th is case taken to extremes, of a tank as highly flex ible and versati le combat platform .
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: PANORAM IC SYS T EMS
A I MING
AND
To forestall a threat and neutralize it before it shows itself is always better than taking the blow. Especially when one operates in limited environments, with reaction times reduced to a minimum. For th is reason, during the past years almost all the major MBTs have been involved in updating programmes, in order to improve t heir sight and observation capabilities. In some cases independent panoramic systems have been install ed on the turret's sky, so as to achieve a 360° sight capability and allow the tank commander both to go on with the observation and reconnaissance operatio ns while the gunner contin ues to busy himself only with the fire manoeuvre - and bring the tank's aiming line on the target, enabli ng him to take over the d irection of the fire, excluding the gunner from t he operation. This entail s that the respective optical systems ought to be unconnected and independent in their movement. In any case, also
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when the choice has been made not to install t he panoram ic system, the sights and the thermal cameras of the laying system have been updated. On the other ha nd, the huge technolog ical advances made in the materials used to make the detect ors for the thermal cameras have permitted to obtain more and more performing equipment w ith ever increasing range and resolution .
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On the SEP version of the Ml A2 "Abrams" an independent panoramic system is available, w ith a second - gene ration FLI R (Forward Looking Infra Red) for t he tank commander, and an aiming system, also w ith a second - generation FLIR for the gunner. The second- generation FUR offers a 30% gain in range and 70% in discrim ination, compared to the FURS of the first generation emp loyed by
the "Abrams" during the First Gulf War. On the German "Leopard 2", starting from the AS version , a new "PERI R l 7 A2" panoramic system has been introduced, which offers a 360° cover of the batt lespace, is equipped with an independent thermic camera, whose images are t ransm itted on a display placed in the commander's post (he can also receive the images com ing from the thermal sight
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... Commander's Display I.Jnit (CDU}
DIGITISATION: TANK"
THE
"NO D E
Another trend that has assert ed itself during the last years in t he cnv Electrorllc field of armoured vehicles is d igit iUnit Assembly sation . Owing to which, the MBT s, as we ll as the other army vehicles and the infantry so ld ier himself, are undergoing a progressive t ransformation into nodes of the tactical netwo rk deployed on the battlefield , in comp liance with the NCW (Network Centric Warfare) or the 9 NEC (Network Enabled Capabilitie s) 0~ unit/SGCEUJ requirements . Thus, also a tank wi ll 2nd Gen FI.IR Sloc-ular 12 Ptaces) be able to share information with Image Control 1,Jnlt (S081CIJJ, the other operational elements o n the ground and with all the other Section view of an "Abrams" that highlights the added levels of the chain of command. In view of this, the vetronic package with the SEP standard. major western MBTs have been equipped w ith d igitised Command - and-Contro l modu les, which can integrate sensors, communicat ion and weapon of the gunner), and is comp letely stabilized and systems and provide the tank with a range of funcinterlocked with the fire- control system . tionalities , such as the possibil ity of d isp laying T he aiming system is instead the "EMES-1 5" one's position on specia l digitised mapp ing which consists of a doub le- magn ification stabiscreens, t ogether with that of the other "friendly" lized apparatus , equipped with an integrated and "enemy" elements ; to exchange with all the "Zeiss Optronik CE628" laser rangefinder and a othe r users, through more and more modern radio "Zeiss Optronic WBG-X" thermic sight (with an IR sets, photographic, video and voice data, to send detection unit cooled by a closed-circuit Stirling messages, both pre-formatted o r free t ext, to p lan engine), both interfaced with the director computroute and mission, to monitor one's own logistic er. The "Zeiss Optronik CE628" transmits the data status or control the alarms . These are precious on the target's distance (wh ich can be read d irectdat a that before were tactical ly scat tered , but ly on the gunner's display) to the fire-control comwhich are now merged in a sing le operational leve l puter, which processes them t o calculate t he firing and permit to obtain a sing le representat ion of the algorithms and has a maximum range of about battlespace for all the operators who at that 10,000 metres, with a 20- metre accuracy. moment are ,as they say,"plug- and - play" . Of Also in t he vanguard is the situational awareness course not all the BMS (Battle Management system of the "Ariete" tanks of the Italian Army T he Systems) introduced in the last years have the tank commander can count on a panoramic appasame sophistication . Some Armed Forces, the ratus st abilized on two "SFIM- SP-T- 694" axles. The system turns, so as to be independent from the position of the turret, and is equ ipped with a first- generation thermic camera. The last 55 t anks delivered mount a camera of the second generation, whose performance is increased by 40% compared to the previou s one . The gunner has his aiming system wh ich includes another thermal came ra that reproduces the image on the screen of the tank com mander (toget her with the ball istic data) and on the emitter/receiver of the laser telemeter.
co!r;: ~:c;:.~nlc
The CSAMM (Counter Sniper/ Anti- Materiel Mount) is a small complex mounted coaxially on the upper part of the gun of t he "Abrams" tanks equipped with a "TUSK" kit.
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Profile of an ''Abrams" tank. Note the CSAMM mounted on British for example, with their "Bowman" have the barrel. started with a package of bas ic capab il ities, which includes essentially the integration of radio sets with the "blue force tracking" capability, and then (although the Commander can always send freehave gradually tried to add new functional ities . text messages). However, what makes "SICCONA" Certain ly one of the most sophisticated systems a system much more advanced than others of the in the BMS field is t he Italian "SICCONA" system, same category, is the integ ration with t he tank's also installed on the "Ariete" tanks. T he system firing system . More precise ly, "SICCONA" offers, which, having started later is, among those avai lbesides the typical functionalities of the BMS, three able, the o ne that has benefited from the greatest further interfaces: the logistic technolog ical advances - is one, the "warnings interface" based essentially on three corn- , , Certainly the SICCONA and the combat one. T he logis ponents: turret, hull and C2D. The turret component ("SIV" system, also installed on the tic interface permits to have, at turret) controls weapons, sen - Ariete tanks, is one of the any moment, the actual operasors, warnings and al l the most sophisticated systems tional state of the veh icle - data on fuel consumption, breakammunition logistics. The hu ll available, because, having downs, etc. - and share this component ("SIV" hu ll) monitors the state of the propulsion with started later, has benefited information with the entire the relevant logistics, naviga- from the greatest techno- chain of Command and-Control. The "combat interface" enables t ion and route . As regards navlogical advances ... ,, the system t o aim automat icaligation, the "SIV" hull is interly, w itho ut operator's intervenfaced with an ine rtial platform, tion, and, potentially, also to fire (Obviously in a GPS and an odometer. Finally, the third compocombat the abovesaid sequence is validated by t he nent, the "C2D", i.e. the act ual BMS (Batt le tank commander) . Finally, the "warnings interManagement System), provides the opening of the face", which tanks to the integratio n with the "laser SICCONA towards the "SIACCON" above. It offers warning receiver'', permits to receive the laser also a graph ic representation of the situation on warning not only by the veh icle attained and object the batt lefield - the position of the vehicl e, of the threat but also by the others, so that the together with that of the other elements, the poswhole unit on the field can act accordingly. sible presence of minefields, obstructions, bridges, etc. - and the poss ibility of updating it Pietro Batacchi continuous ly, t hro ug h preformatted messages, Journalist which are sent automatically at regular intervals
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STRATEGIC PROJECTION OF THE CH-47 OF AVES The new NATO strategic concepts, the development of the operational scenarios, the typology of the missions and the extreme weather and environmental conditions where they are called to operate, especially in Afghanistan, entail an increased employment of combat and transport helicopters. Here is how AVES has answered to the "Expeditionary" concept required by NATO.
Recently NATO has fixed the Expedit ionary capability, the Effect Based Operations and the Network Enabled Capability of its forces, as the fundamental concepts for its future organization al assets. For a military ins tr umen t, to possess Expedit ionary capabilities means to be able to redeploy itself in very far operation zones and be fed through a turnover system for what regards men, vehicles and materials, so that its operational capabilities remain always unchanged. The possibility to intervene at the right time has always been a capability pursued by the Atlantic Alliance, even though, in the last years, th is tactical-strategic approach has undergone radical modifications. During the eighties, the AMF (1) has represented the force of immediate response in Above. case of Soviet attack to a NATO Country. It conItalian troops disembarking from a CH-47. sisted essentially of highly-mobile light forces, which could be deployed for managing the crisis Title pages. before the arrival of the heavier conventional AVES CH- 4 7 assembled at Fiumicino airport in view of their shipping to an Operational Theatre. forces . With the end of the bipolar confrontation, the threats that the part ners of the Alliance have had to confront have not occurred inside the geothe Balkans. graphic borders of NATO, but outside it, main ly in Bes ides the quality gap, one should also considthe form of operations of power projection aimed er the t ime that elapses between the deployment at Peace Keeping and Peace of the light forces and the arrival of Enforcing. the heavy forces, which can be The military interventions ' ' The CH47 stands out quantified in about one month. like those conducted in Iraq among the aircraft Since the strategic concept of (1991 ), Soma li a (1992 employed by the "Rapid Effect", i.e. preventive and 1994), Bosnia and Kosovo Coalition in Afghanistan rapid effect, has by now become have been carried out by established within the and is indispensable for well deploying first the highlyAlliance, lig hter and readi ly redemobile light forces, subse- mass handling men and ployable forces have become necquently projecting also materials ... ,, essary. armoured units and se lfThe "Expeditionary" concept has propelled artil lery, as in contributed to speed up the ereoperation "Desert Shield" or in the intervention in ation of the Medium Forces (well represented by
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the Operat io nal Theatres (O .T .) in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted a new type of confl ict, t he "three- block war" where, ins ide a sing le Theatre, can ex ist operations of the CIMIC type, law enforcement/peacekeeping actions and actual combat actions. At present, the units that best meet this operational concept are precise ly the Medium Forces, w ithin which mob ility and firepower are of primary importance.
THE OPERATIONAL REQU IREMENT
The base of the rear pylon of a CH- 47 shows the cables and connections to the upper part that has been removed.
the "Medium" Brigades in the prese nt organization of the It alian Army) . These forces' manoeuvre ele ments are equipped with wheeled armoured units and self- propelled or hauled artille ry, capable of operat ing as peacekeepers, but also against organ ized convent ional forces . As a matter of fact,
During the last years, AVES (Aviazione de ll'Ese rcito - Army Aviation) has had to support flight units in very sens itive O.Ts, both from the mi litary- operational and the weather- environ mental viewpoint. In particular, the Afghan O.T. has proved especially difficu lt to manage for different reasons: first of all, the ruggedness of the territory and the scattering of the units on the ground called fo r a large emp loyment of helicopters; secondly, t he elevated altitude of the bases and the high temperatures of the summer period have caused big problems to the aircraft deployed there. The CH47 stands out among the aircraft
A CH-4 7 ready to embark on an "Antonov" An-124.
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Left. A CH-41 during a launch of flares on the Saito di Quirra range. Flares and ballistic shields provide t he CH- 4 ls' self- protection. Be low.
During the employment on the Iraqi Theatre, the CH4 ls were sent by sea, exploiting the receptivity of t he Iraqi port facilities .
Facing page. An "Antonov "An-1 24. Note the huge dimensions of the loading compartment.
emp loyed by the Coalition in Afghanistan. It is a transport helicopter assigned to various contingents, in various versions and confi gurations. In fact, since most multiple-role helicopters now in service with t he NATO Countries , conceived to operate in the central European zone, are very much affected by the limitations due to having to operate at high altitudes and elevated temperaI
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.... Rivisia lvlilitare Englis/1 Edition n. 1/2010
I-.
tures, the greatest part of the job has been concentrated on the more powerful mach ines, such as CH-47, CH - 53, CH-46, SH - 3D and "Super Puma" . Actually, the CH-47, which can lift about l O tons even in its oldest versions, has a remarkable superabundance of power, and is an indispensable element for mass - hand lin g men and materials, w ithout the limitations of the O.T. nu llifying its manoeuvre. AVES has dep loyed in Afghanistan a Task Force consisting of six helicopters A-129 and four CH-47s with the relevant support, among which a l st and 2nd technical - level maintenance team . Among t he tasks entrusted to the men of the teams of the 2nd technical leve l, the re is also the packaging for its transport by air in case of turnover. In fact, the C- 47s have been airlifted to the O.T. with "Antonov" An- l 24 airplanes, wh ich can stow up to three m achines at the same t ime . The most important parts of this operation of strategic projection are the disassembly and reassembly phases of some sensitive components of the he li copters . Such operations are entirely carried out by military personnel in service with the "Scorpione" 4th Support regiment, a unit that usually takes care of the maintenance of the C- 47s of the 1 st "Antares" AVES Regiment" . The effort that AVES has had to confront in order to so lve the prob lems of the helicopters' strateg ic projection, has not concerned on ly the transport of the aircraft , but also the adaptation of t he se lf protection devices and the logistic chain . The se lf - protection has been impleme nted through the installation of flares, in order to face up to the th reat of MANPADS, and of ballistic slates to protect the crew and the v ital parts from t he fire of light weapons.
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The logistic problems concerned the protection THE TECHNICAL OPERATIONS OF PACKAGING of the machi nes in particular environments, aimed at minimising the degenerative action of atmos Despite the American skill in handling means pheric agents; the alu minium parts are eas ily and materials to be sent by air, the CH- 47 was not damaged by corrosion, while the conce ived to be embarked composite parts may bend when inside transport plan es with a landing on rough surfaces . Other ''Packaging the CH -47 for simple field-preparation. At parts may suffer small damages transport requires first the present, des pite the An-1 24 caused by the frequent employdisassembly of its rotor d imensions, to embark a CH ment of the he licopter in particu blades and subsequently 47 one must disassemble its lar environments, as is the caseparticularly fragile parts, that of the pylons ... ,, w ith landing gear and wiring. such as the rotor b lades and All these problems must be the pylons where the transtackled in the O.T. by specialised mission gears are lodged. personnel of the support units who have dis The aircraft packag ing operations in Italy are mountable modular hangars at their disposal, so carried out at the Fiumicino airport, where the as to ensure a safe environment from the mainterotor blades of the helicopters flown in from nance point of view. Vite rbo, are taken apart by using cranes and, last-
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A CH- 47 hooking a German "Wiesel" armoured vehicle; its capability of handling cargoes despite high altitudes and elevated temperatures makes the CH- 47 indispensable for the Afghan Theatre.
and therefore they must packaged with methods especially studied for this necess ity. Once embarked and flown to Afghanistan, the CH - 47 must be re-assemb led . For this reason, at the Kabul airport there is a team ready to rece ive them, unpack and de liver them to the Task Force that works in the Ope rational Theat re. After this operation, the teams see to the packagi ng of the he licopters to be sent home. T he packag i ng procedure, and t he related d ispatch by air, is made also for the A - 129 hel icopters, although, due to their reduced dimensio ns, the operat ion is less demand ing from the logist ic viewpoint. In fact, the A - 1 20 can be carried also by the C-1 30J of the Italian Air Force . The strategic projection of the he licopters and the relevant technical supports enab le AVES to operate and maintain two he licopter li nes, ensuring a high efficiency rate also in a difficult O.T. like the Afg han one, and corresponds to the Expeditionary concept requ ired by NATO.
Andrea Lopreiato Captain, Army Aviation Command
NOTE (l) AMF: All ied Command in Eu rope (ACE) Mobile Force, highly mobile , under the NATO Commander, read ily employab le without previous national consent. ly, the pylons are disassemb led . These components are nonstructured so that they can be easily taken apart. Besides, some parts of the electric and hydraulic circu its have not been designed to remain unconnected for a long time - as the entire transport operation requires The disassembly of the blades of the rotor is helped by a crane.
k::;;ii
a
w-b
I ~
-
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,.. ..l
THE UAV PLAN ET: MARKET, ACTORS AND MACHINES One decade has passed by since the first systemat ic use of UAV on t he battlefield. T he article analyzes systems and com panies, w it h prospectives of market and technological skills. Besides United States and Israel, there are at least 38 Countries employed in t he development of various classes of drones. In Italy, Alenia and Galileo are conceiving excellent projects, supported by PM ls and university laboratories.
Globally speaking , the market of UAV, UCAV, speed of 0 .8 MACH and ho lds a potential for m ini- RPV knows no crisis . There are at least 32 unlim ited flig hts of thousands of kilometers. UAV countries busy in engineering more than 250 remot e sensing funct ions include radar sensors, models; 38 are the users. In the near f utu re, we electro-optical (EO), i nfrared (IR) and SIGINT will hear about cargo UCTAV (Umanned Cargo (SIGnal INTel ligence) wh ich can provide decisive Transport Aerial Vehicle) and, in a more distant information regarding t he movement of rebe ls or future, about UAV systems for enemy troops, revealing the ir passenger transportation ( l ). operational plans . The demand, increasing any- ' ' Remotely Piloted Vehicles The only disadvantage is the where, w ill absorb 9000 models are robotic protean aircraft, cost: in 1994, updating a in the next decade, worth 40 able to spot aerial and Global Hawk's imaging systems billion dol lars. From the 90s to ground targets, to provide or FLIR (Forward Looking Infra the present, t he sectors investRed) cost l O million do llars, ments of the United States only, battlefield intelligence and today 28 .2 , almost three t imes more t han tripled , j umping from act as multi-role airframe as much . Who wants to buy the 4 to 14 billion dollars. Remote ly platforms (AA or AS),, who le package, i nclusive of Piloted Vehicles are robotic proUCAV, Ground Control St ations, tean aircrafts, able to spot aeri log istical support and sensors al and ground targets, to provide battlefield intelmust pay out not less than l 30 m illi on doll ars . ligence and act as multi - ro le airframe platforms (AA or AS). UAVs come in various sizes, from a few centimeters to more than 30 meters of length, MATERIALS AND INDUST RIES from a few hundred grams to tons of weight (chart l ). Some of them can fly 20 km altitude, reach a Behind a "Global Hawk" there is the excellent US Air Force expertise : From Northrop Grumman to Raytheon Systems (sensors), from Roll s- Royce (propuls ion - UK) to Vought (fiber wings) , to L3 (comm unicatio n systems) . Northrop is a giant indust ry w ithout parallel and it's about to provide to t he US NAVY a set of UCAV STOVL: the "Fi rescout", for coastal warships support. The archetype of all STOVL systems is probably
Left. The "Hawk" UAV demonstrator MALE class, was awarded by the consultancy Frost & Sullivan (2006). Galileo Avionica could mix MALES' peculiarities and tactical UAVs' advantages.
Tit le pages. A "Predator" (General Atomics) landing.
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Above. The "Sky- Y" (Alenia) is the first European demons t rator MALE class to integrate EO sensors manufactured in the Old Continent, to tran smitt data via satellite and to operate in any weather condition. Right. The "Sky-X" (Alenia) is a new generation demonstrator, studied for reconnaissance and air defense.
Fi- 1 56 "Storch": t he famous Stork, liaison aircraf t bui lt by Ger mans starting from 19 35 . The C- 1 model had been conceived especially for li aison, the C- 2 fo r photographic reconnaissance, the D for air rescue and the E for operations in unprepared lands. 2900 mode ls came out, employed at all st ages . They were excellent for counter- insu rgency, due to their robustness, to their reduced stall speed (50 km / h) and take- off spaces (65 m) and landing (20 m) . Speaking about the United St ates we can see t hat the Pentagon is the leader in ter ms of strategical needs , program s and research approp riations. T he J- UCAS Uoi nt Unman ned Combat Air System) X4 7B "Pegasus" by Northrop Gru mm an synt het is izes previo us DARPA' s and USAF' s prog ram s. It simu lates combat trainings. It can fly for over 50 hours and load 2 bombs JDAM of 2 000 pounds. It's got a wider range than the F-35C, naval var iant of the
Table 1
UAV CLASSES Class M AV1
Length
Weight Endurance
Range 10 km
< 15 cm
50 g
J\!finiclrones
50 cm-Im
10 kg
l h
10 km
Short ninge
-Im
300 kg
Sh
100/200 km
MALE'
8 m
11
35 h
5.000 km
HAL E'
15 111
10 I
-18 h
25.000 km
1
Micro Al.!rial Vch.idc (micro/mmo-t.lroni)
1
Ml..-dllun Altituc.lt.!, Long Enduram:.i.:
20 1tninutcs
Source: Dtifemw .\'mio,wh•
' High Allitudc. Long Endurance
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JSF. In July 200 7, the USN chose it over t he archrival Boeing's X-45C. Since aereospace engineering introduced carbon fibers, vehicles' payload has enourmously increased and consumptions have decreased by 20%: comparing the length and weight, a stee l or aluminum fiber bears a load l O times lower and it's much less refractory.
COMPARISON OF GIANTS Eventually, "Predators" by General Atomics have become the epitome of remotely piloted vehicles. Able to fly nonstop for about twenty hours, they reach the speed of 135-160 km/h and a ceiling of 7,8 km (chart 2). Thanks to the electro-optical and infra red sensors, they disregard brightness conditions. Within a 200 km radius, they can be piloted by a land operator (LOS), over 200 km they use satellites (BLOS) History tells t he first ones to employ UAVs in theatre were the Israe li, except for the famous rad io-target modified by the americans in Vietnam. In 1982, Te l Aviv used them in Lebano in order to pilot the fighter-bombers over the enemy's missile batteries. It was the answer to the estab lishment of syrian bases in the Beqaa Valley, equipped with Soviet carriers and warhead. In the same conflict, the Tu- 143 "Reys" received t he baptism of fire, a tactical UAV that the Soviets proThe "Nibbio" (Galileo Avionica) is a concentration of the best UA V technologies, very useful for tactical penetrations at very high speed.
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TECHNICAL CARD Table 2 «PREDATOR» AND «GLOBAL HAWK» RQ-IA. Prc,lutor (MALE)
(,'/ohu/ Hawk (IIALF:)
1-U <m
19.9 m
l Leng th
8.2 111
I-J.5 m
Height
IJU ,n
,l_7
Cruising s1x.-ed
,Wingspan
Tech. char.
Ill
135-l<•t km/l,
7-l<l km/h
Op. tangency
7 i:(IHJ Ill
I IJ. XOO m
Endurance.
2.t. h
24-.15 h
Range
926 kn1
22. 7R(I km
)52 l g
IH~lOk~
Propulsion
Ro(ax M owr ~ 12 a 4 di.
Rolls-Royce Allison
Useful load
204 k~
1..160lg
Sensors
EOIIR/SAR
ttl('m
Cl link
UHF/Ku/LOS/l111111arsa1
ukm
t lobilil)'
C-\JO 15). C-17 (I)
C-5/ 17( 1)
l~flicieuc y
~lax Wcght
4
The "Neptune" made by the Italian American DRS (Fin meccanica) is a tactical UA V able to operate from the sea.
duced (950 models, 1976- 1989), soon employed in Syria, Romania, Czechoslovakia and GDR (2). At that time, the soviets had no rivals: TBR- 1 (1958) used to cover an area 200 km far from the launching point, taking pictures or recording video images. Among the strategical UAVs, the Tu-123 DBR-1 was better than the western counterparts . The cruising speed and the ceil i ng of the 52 mod els produced between 1964 and 1972, stood out. Moving from the Lithuan ian and Ukrainian bases, the Tus could penetrate the western airspace for 3,200 km and take pictures of 56-100,000 km2 land s. Besides IMINT missions, they picked up electromagnetic signals up to 390 km far (ELINT). The co llapse of USSR irreparably bore on the National capacities. During the last war in Ossetia (2008), the Russian Com mands com plain ed about the lack of drones. The Yakovlev DPLA- 60 had been conceived for a regiment distribution, but the budget cuts allowed to buy only 3 of them, each one equipped with 10 RPVs. Even though planned,
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and synthetic aperture radars . Whi le t he Georgians inexpertly used it in the ossetian and abkhaz i skies , the americans made the mexican border's guardian out of it: speed (95 knots), ce ilin g (18 ,000 feet) and autonomy (more than 20 hours) make of it an exce llent "air tracker".
WHAT'S EUROPE ANSWER?
During the war in Iraq, the UCAV "Global Hawk" (Northrop Grumman) flew non- stop, from California to Australia, thanks to an endurance of 35 h.
the all - time and electronic warfare version is not yet in service . Nevertheless, t he few DP LAs employed in Chechnya had done a great job: during the battles, about ten hours of overflight allowed to spot l 3 enemy stations and 20 ammu nition depots, destroyed w ithin 3 minutes by mul tiple rocket launchers (3). The Ministry of Defence, in Moscow, on t he other hand, ordered tens of ''Tipchak", reconnaissance UAVs with EO cameras, IR sensors and possib ility of data transmission in real time. The first UCAV is st ill a distant horizon: Sukhoi had conceived a prototype since 1982. T he contract had been awarded to Tupolev instead, but the Tu - 300 "Korshoon" never saw the light, overwhelmed by the l 989 collapse and the following budjet cuts. It has been taken up only recently, with increased range and speed (950 km / h). While the Russian slacked off, the Israe lis have reached the apogee in the sector: forced to often fight in cities, they busily work on micro- drones. The Mosquito I, equipped with a mini camera, weighs 200 g and can fly for about forty minutes. The RPVs developed by the national industry constantly mon itor the borders and are often emp loyed as retransmiss ion platforms, in order to provide for the difficulties during radio commun ications. When Elbit produced the "Her mes 450", they would have never thought to se ll it almost everywhere: from China to UK, where inspired the Watchkeeper (4). 6. 1 meter long by l 0 .5, the "Hermes" is a medium UAV in terms of size. It weighs 450 kg and can carry up to l 50 kg, mostly optoelectron ic devices
A «Predator» of the IAF.
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Many industries in the Old Country are working on UCAV and USAV demonstrators. Italy, France, Sweden are the most operative. Gal ileo Avionica and Alenia Aeronautica, supervised by Finmeccanica, are focusing t heir experience on the sector: the first one is specialized in mini-drones and tactical UAVs, the second one works on MALEs and UCAVs, a·nd we can't forget Selex's expertise on systems and avionics . Anyway, they all manufacture excellent products. The Galileo's "Mirach l 00 / 5" is a multi - role drone able to simu late the most advanced fighter bombers' attack maneuvers, to fly in formation and to act as an interactive target . It s versatility has turned it into an alluring product on the market, as to be purchased even by the British , French and Spanish Armed Forces. Reason it allows to test the air defense' s promptness, reducing the operating costs and the environmental impact. Many ranges are using it: from NATO's one in Crete to the sardinian one in Quirra, ho ly of holies of the italian war testing . The "Nibbio" is the UAV' s variant, very useful for penetration and subsonic tactical reconnaissance (380 Km / h). What about "Falco" , monitoring and identification system of the lat est generation. It weighs less t han 500 kg and is capable of 14 hours continuous fl ight time, and it' s able to load 70 kg of sensors . from the Eost 45, electo- optical system wh ich penetrates both darkness and light, to Sim - Ga, an hyperspectral camera already employed in miss ions for national security and civil protection, able to spot hidden objects,
Rivista Milifa re Englis/1 Edition n. 112010
The «HALE Molynx» (Alenia) is a dron e for surveillance, un derwater dangers and chemical po llutants. civil and environmental protection and archaeological The re are also synthetic aperture radars, and NBC prospection. The «Blacklynx» is its military alter ego. systems, esse ntial both in t heatre and at home. T he first flight from pneumatic ramp confirmed the system's pote ntial (December 2008). aircraft, "Rafale'" s successor. Nothing is more important than Alenia However, it would be wrong to expect a structurAeronautica's techno logical demonstrator: develal collaboration . In this as in ot her fie lds, the eurooped in less than two years (2005), "Sky- X" is a pean industrialists pursue the national interest new low radar signature aircraft, conce ived for more than the common good. Eac h one has an reconnaissance and air defense tasks. It's 7 meters autarkic project, through wh ich he aims to co ll ect by 6 meters long , it can fly beyond the range of the the hig hest numbe r of access io ns, in o rder to portable anti - aircraft miss iles (2 5,000 feet) and reduce costs and t o wrap it up reach speeds of 650 km/h . At with a european semblance (6). the same t ime, "Sky- X" is an expertise laboratory, t hat ' ' Many industries in Europe T he "EuroMALE" d ied before enriches Ale ni a' s ab ilities in a are working on UCAVs and birth because , apart fro m USAVs. Italy, France and EDA' s frag ility, the National crucial mome nt: the participatio n in t he "Neuron" program , Sweden are the most active , , Governments put programs about the needs of t heir Armed "eu r opean" UCAV that will fly for Fo rces before the commun ity t he first time in 2011 . Led by the view. Unfortunately the acqu isition strateg ies con french Dassau lt (50%), the project includes other 4 t inue to be poorly coordinated. european industries, apart from ours (22%): the On l O November 2007, fo r example, the DGA spani sh Eads- Casa, the greek Hai, the swiss Ruag notified three stud ies for the defin it ion of a drones and t he swed ish Saab. It will not und ertake mi litary vertical takeoff and land ing: 4 bi ll ion of euros devmissions, but w ill be necessary to demonstrate the ided between Vert ivisoin (s hared with EADS maturity of integrated technologies, especially Defence Systems), Thales and Sagem Defence regard ing stealth radars, a sector where americans Secu r ite. Everything is homemade and according are still the leaders (B- 2, F- 117, F- 22) . Hopefu lly to Armee de Terre and Marine Nationale requ ireto lay the fou ndations for the industrial developments. ment of a combat fu t ure dro ne, exactly like the T hat' s not it: if successfu l, the british partici paoverseas J- UCAS Uoint Unmanned Combat Aerial tion in the J- UCAS program would have struck a System) . We're talking of a 5 ton aircraft, w ith 12 heavy blow to t he current combat drones' eurom wingspan and l O m long. Dassau lt aims to cappean system . Li ke what happened with t he JSF italize on resu lts in view of a future piloted fig hte r
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AN UNDISPUTED LEADERSHIP The american DARPA's budget constraint has no equal. · Among the most rece nt p rojects "Cormorant" stands out, which is a UAV's prototype able to take off from under water or sea surface. Th e first test occured during t he ope ration "Giant Shadow" (200 3), but the USN will be able t o have it at t heir d isposal after 2010. The american lead ersh ip in the micro- drones field is also undisputed: Pr ioria's "Maveric" is a
Above. Certificated b y 65,000 hours of flight, the «Hermes 450» by made the israeli Elbit can carry up to 150 kg, mostly optoelectronic equipment and SAR radar, essential for !STAR and SIC/NT flights. Besides t he Israeli Armed Forces, th e United States also uses it for monitoring the mexican border. Right. Controllers at a m onitoring station (GCS).
Below. The launch of a «Firebee» (Ryan Aeronautical Company) of the American Air Force. The «RPV» was used in Vietnam. After being shot down, ended up in the hands of the Chinese, who understood its secrets and integrated them i n the «CH- I».
60,000 dollar hypertechnological jewel, entirely made of car bonfi ber and so compact that fits in a briefcase. T he "Black Wid ow" is not more than l 5 cm : it can twirl for about t hirty minutes, transmit ting live video recordings. Al so Italy holds its own: Alp i Aviation's UAS "St rix" in cludes three aircrafts , GCS and logistical su pports. It' s got electric m oto r, invisibility to rad ar and possibilit y of GPS o r li ne of sight (12, 5 km). Like al l micro UAVs the size is so reduced that it stands out withi n a urban environment. Mi ni UAVs of "Pointer/ Rave n"'s class already supplied the 41 st Army Reconnaissance Reg iment, prov iding a we ll- ti med sup port for forces' protectio n.
UUVS' ERA
Uoi nt Strike Fig hter) (7), it would have waisted the poor european resou rces, promoting th e U.S. trade monopoly.
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Re mote ly piloted tech nologies rep rese nt a power m u ltipl ier even for the maritime and unde rwater forces. Unmanned means w ere deployed in t he "Crossroads" operation (l 946) . T hey took sampl es of rad ioactive water off shore the Marshall island s, where the Pe ntagon had carried out atom ic experiments; others demined the coast in the south of Saig on ; some others have recently cruised on th e
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2010
A US Navy's X- 478 ÂŤPegasusÂť (NG), during a landing.
DUAL USE TECHNOLOGIES
Persian Gu lf's waters. The Unmanned Surface / Underwater Vehicle represent the result of researches and experiments that date back to the second postwar. They allow to coll ect information from otherwise impenetrable or high risk areas, such as an enemy port. Whoever got completely hooked on the purchase of DRS (3,4 billion euros), could never forget that Finmeccanica has been stand ing out in the field for a long time The USV "Sea Owl" is a half ton hull, 3 meters long and 1.65 wide. Autonomous for 30 hours, it can reach a speed of 30 knots. Full of sensors and very advanced techno logies, it infil trates ports and the most narrow inlets, coll ecting and transmitting data in real time, picked up with thermographic cameras, sonars and radars . And what's more, DRS also produces "Neptune", tacti cal UAV conceived to operate from t he sea.
Over the last years, manufacturers have started to place themse lve s on the civil market as well. UAVs burn less gas and cut the operating and maine nance costs . Demand is high. Only in EU, 2 bill ion euros for the next two year. UK and Italy are th inking to em pl oy them in police services, fire servi ces, and in the study of climate changes. The potential in agricolture is also important: the Welsh "U- MAP" offers a monitoring of cereal crops, al lowi ng to spot the fertilizing areas. The italian "HelPlat" (ASI-Politecnico Tu ri n) offers as much versatility: powered by the sun, it will be ab le to remain at 17- 20 km altit ude for 4-6 months. Financed by ASI and t he European Commission (Helinet), it has synthetic aperture radars, optical sensors, infra reds and hyperspectral cameras. Seven or eight aircraft would be enough to cover the mediterranean basin, to mon -
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itor coastlines and illegal landings, environmental age assessment (BDA) . Equipped with intelligent systems ("Loce" or "Centrix") UAVs have been po ll ution and natural d isasters (9). Alenia has a "civil project'' as we ll. Analysing the wide ly employed even in Afghan istan , Iraq and the "Sky- Y", its engineers fo llowing conflicts. designed a real experimental "Pointer" and "Predator" have platform , that will be used by ' ' A decade has passed by reinforced !STAR capacities of the the "HALE Molynx", a drone since the first systematic italian Contingents employed out for surveil lance, civi l and use of UAVs on the battle- of area. During t he ope rat ion environmental protection, field (Kosovo) ... Equipped "Anti ea Bab ilon ia" (Anc ient and archaeolog ical prospec- with intelligent svstems Babylo n) the second ones tion (l 0). The "Blacklynx" is patrolled urban areas, monitored ("Loce" or "Centrixif) UAVs te r r itoria l boundaries, p ublic the military vers ion . Though have been widely employed demonstrat ions and suspected tracing t he civil one, the mil also in Afghanistan, Iraq te r roristic actIvItIes . Holding itary version empowers it. The w ingspan increased from and the following conflicts , , secrete ly on the targets, they cov25 to 28 m; the takeoff ered a very wide area inaccess ible we ight from 3 to 3.5 t and to vehicles, due to sandstorms and t he payload from 600 to 800 kg. More capacious the abundant rains. Employed in both line of sight, tanks increase the autonomy from 30 to 36 hours, and with the use of satellite channels, t he aircrafts loading 200 more liters of fuel. distributed the images to t he IT-JTF, to their coun try and to the Coalition . One of the main lessons is that the systems need LEARNED LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS to be improved : they suffer so much the weather cond itions that it's sometimes necessary to sus Since the investment is huge, the technologies pend the m ission . Breakdowns and various probdemonstrators' project are often a prerogative of lems caused the loss of over 30 US Predators . The big industrial groups. It would be appropriate to informatio n flow has not always been sufficient. extend greater cooperation to PMls and to univerAnother warning is that, against asymmetrical sity research, supervising that the prime contracand underdeveloped enemies, nothing is more tors do not favour the subsidiaries (l l ). important than plenty of forces accustomed to the One decade has passed by since the first syscounterinsurgency and to HUMINT. tematic use of UAVs on t he battlefield. During the operation "Allied Force" (Kosovo), the video images Francesco Palmas transmitted by the' "Predators" would get to Italy International Relations Analyst through ad hoe connections: on board of their Al O or F- 16, the Forward Air Controllers (FAC) NOTES would receive in real time the grid reference of the targets to be bombed. Furthermore : they had a (l) Giovann i Berto lone, "Dag Ii aerei senza pilota un photograph and an almost immed iate battle dammercato d i opportun ita", in "Nova 24", addendum of "Sole 24 Ore", of 8 February 2007, pag. 7. (2) In that period, also the chinese long - range UCAV demonstrator ÂŤNeuronÂť, project on which drone flew for the first time: the "CH- 1", copy of Dessault, Alenia, EADS- Casa, Hai, Ruag and Saab are working together. the american "Firebee", put down in the Vietnamese skies. Beijing today has several shor and med ium- range drones , for monitoring, intel ligence and electron ic war (ASN - 206/207). Researches are st ill on going for st rategical UCAVs development. (3) Davide Mori, Past and Present of ex soviet and russian UAVs, in "RID", n. 6/2003 , pag . 49 . (4) The "Eag le l" (EADS) comes from the "Heron" (IAI) .
(5) Yves Robin, Neuron le demonstrateur europeen d'UCAV, in "Defense Nationale",n. 6/2005, pag. 91. (6) For an opposite interpretation see Martin Aguera, More UAV Partnerships Foreseen in Europe , in "C4 ISR", T he Journal of Net- Centric
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War f are ", 5 August 2 00 4, http: //www. isrjournal.com/ story.p hp? F=3 2 8005 (7) He len Masson , "Participation de pays europeen au projet d'avion de combat JSF et con sequences pour l'Eu rope de l' armeme nt". 1 1 . (8) A lain de Neve, L'evolution des prog rammes de dron es de combat aux Etats- Unis l'aun e de l'UAS Roadmap: q ue lle co nseq uences doctrinales et ind ustriel les l' eche lle t ransatlant ique7, i n "Cahie rs du RMES", n. 2 / 2005, pag. 64. (9) Gi ulio Romeo, HeliPlat: l' UAV del futuro parla it al -
a
a
A UA V reconna issance over Kosovo.
iano, in "Rivista Aeronautica", no. 3/2008, pag. 96. (10) Sensoristics w il l be deve loped by Selex Gal ileo. (11) In Italy, two civil researches projects will involve the Polytechnic of T urin, the lead ing industries an d several Pmi, ab le to provide excel lent contrib ution s. T he Country Syste m should always work like this.
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AMEDEO GUILLET: A MODEL FOR YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW Res mundi transeunt, spiritus autem permanet Worldly things come to an end but the spirit lives on. The deeds of General, Ambassador, Baron Amedeo Guillet wil l most certain ly be passed down for many years to come and conserved in the temples of Knowledge, but the spirit t hat moved them w ill never fade away.
A century has elapsed since hi s birth, but had it been fo r him, he wouldn't have regarded it as an event to be celebrated in a particular fashion . However, he recent ly found him self at t he centre of a great display of affection paid to him in the throne room of the Barberini Palace, which is reserved for g reat events of the Min istry of
Above. Professor Vittorio Dan Segre.
Left. A medeo Guillet.
Title pages. Amedeo Guillet and his Amharas.
Defence, under the aeg is of t he Officers Circ le of t he Armed Forces of Italy. In the hal l full of guests, t he Army Chief of Staff, Fabrizio Castagnetti, addressed Amedeo Guillet w ith kind and t hankful words, in the name of the Italian Army. As guests of honour there were no less than six am bassadors accredited to th e Quirinal: Erit rea, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, India and Ireland. Besides these, there were the H.R.H., Duke Amedeo Savoia Aosta, t he Italian Defence ind ustry leaders, OTO Melara and IVECO, and many more
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Th e Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Fabrizio Castagnetti with Amedeo Guillet.
friends from overseas and from Ireland. Professor Vittorio Dan Segre gave a wonderful speech on Amedeo Guillet. During the second world war he was his opponent, but now he is his dear friend as well as excellent biographer. His words moulded Amedeo Guil let's image like a sculptor who moulds his clay figu re but leaves the choice of colours to the peop le present. A toast between former soldier Amedeo Guillet and a young Major of the US Marine Corps and Helicopter pilot, Edward L. Jeep, was both unex pected and touch ing. The toast was to symbolize not only an unbound ed soldiering brothe rhood but, moreover, a continuous bond to the principles which come naturally to verbalize on these pages. We may wonder why there is still such an interest in the figure of Amedeo Guillet today. The answer lies simply in the re levance of the values t hat motivated his deeds. Values which, to be fair, are available for each and every one of us: valid yesterday, today and tomorrow. Let's recollect t hem: courage, loyalty, moral integrity, sense of duty and honour. Amedeo Guillet stuck to these virtues each time he had to make any important decision in his life. T his is the keystone to his charisma. This is the strength which vibrates the strings which have always answered the call of the beautifu l, fair, daring and - why not? - also the adventurous, unde rstood as an exciting and fair challenge, such as that of the mountaineer who aims at reach ing the peak after a difficult climb. It is no wonder, therefore, t hat the mere pres ence, either physical or throug h the media, of Amedeo Guillet at inst itutes, military and civilian
schoo ls , circles of every kind , has always, up to the present day, caused enthusiastic expressions of adm iration w hich often unde rpin a plan of emulat ion. The who le of Amedeo Guillet's life has the im print of those values and, for t he benefit of those who, for the first time, are looking through the window that covers the century of our timeless gentleman's life, to recall just a few, self- explain ing moments will be enough. Courage: it would take at least a ream of paper to narrate t he events that demonstrate it. A courage which , in its essence , is an awareness of dangers combined with a well t hought- out will to overcome obstacles. A few examples will be sufficient. Eritrea, 1941: in Cheru he orders t he last cavalry charge in Africa with his seven hundreds native cavalrymen again st an enemy endowed with tanks and artillery. From April l 941 to the following October, he carried out by himself, lead ing about a hundred of his Ascari, a hard guerrilla warfare which cost dear to the British, who had set a thousand golden pounds reward on his head. Some compared him to Lawrence of Arabia. Nothing can be more inappropriate. The English Officer was supported by an Empire that hand somely financed and protected him. He was equipped with every possible means to fight. Amedeo Guillet had no ne of this. The Italian Armyhad lost his trail and probably t hought he was missing in action, wh ile he was actually using weapons and munitions he had previo usly, very wisely, concealed . He never once took possession of a single grain of wheat from Eritrean peasants.
The encounter of Amedeo Guillet with Major Edward L. Jeep.
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He always paid for his supplies out of his own pocket or it was the peasants themselves w ho, since t hey knew and respected the "Cummuntar As Sciaetan", the Devil Commander, placed w hat little they had at his disposal. He was never b etrayed. There never w as a single deserter. Yea rs later, even though the war had come to an en d since quite a w hile , he found himse lf f ighting once again, aga inst his w ill. In 1 971 , while he w as an A m bassad o r in Morocco, d u r ing a reception in Rabat, he was d ragged into a shoot-out sprung from an attempt at coup d ' etat. T han ks to his ex perience as a combatant, he managed to rescue many of h is d i plomat co lleagues who had been unde r fire . Sense of duty: in 1935, Lieutenant Gu ill et, d ue to his excellent equestria n abi lities, was i ncluded in t he Ita lian Olympic t eam which was to take part in th e l 936 Games in Be rl in. He was a prom is ing sports r ider and a likely winner. But he never w ent to Be r lin. The Aby ssinia cam paign had started and Lieutenant Gu illet had no hesitat ion in mak ing a choice . As he h imself r ecalls: "My fi rst duty was to Right. Amedeo Cui/let's entrance into the Throne Room of t he Barberini Palace.
Below. The sp eech of t he Army Ch ief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Fabrizio Castagnetti.
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serve my Home land and the war campaign too k priority over the Olympics". Loyalty: Amedeo Guillet would have liked to marry in 1938, but the rules of t he t ime d isadvan taged the career of unmarried State employees. His marriage might have been seen as a move for facilitating promotion. With gentle care towards hi s fiancee, he chose to put his wedding off. Amedeo was later promoted on merit of war and the wedding was celebrated at the end of the con flict. Sense of honour and moral integrity: when, in 1946, the Monarchy/ Republic Referendum was won, by a narrow margin, by the latter, Amedeo Guillet, who had sworn allegiance to the king as a soldier, resig ned from the army, althou gh he had excellent prospects in t he military career. Since he w ished to kee p on serving his country anyway, he chose a diplomatic career. We must remember t hat in the postwar period there was a regulation which made it pos sible to enrol in the
Above. Amedeo Guillet, Ambassador to Morocco, with his wife, Beatrice Gandolfo.
Left. Amedeo Cui/let training for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games.
.._ diplomatic career without a competitive examination, i.e. through direct appointment , in particul ar cases. Amedeo Guillet's was such, but he didn ' t want to have recou rse to this regulation. He chose t he way of the state competitive exami nation, regarding it as being more in keeping with his conscience principles. Amedeo Guillet has known victories and defeats. The prize for his vi cto ries was awareness of having accomplis hed his duty. The prize for his
defeats was his safeguarding his honour. Many pe ople wonder whether it is possib le to combine in a synthes is t he figure of Amedeo Guillet. Maybe the answer can be found paraphrasing the words of Miguel de Unamuno, a great exegete of Don Quixhote's, when he described his Gentleman of La Mancha: "Amedeo Guillet has never been, and is not, either a dreamer or an idealist. Amedeo Guillet's cannot be said, strictly speaking , to be ideali sm; he did not fight for ideas. It was spiritualism. He fought for the Spirit" .
Mario Mongelli Colonel (re t.)
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THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES ON THE WAY TO THE <<RISORGIMENTO>> This is a brief but intense account of the evolution of the liberal spirit of the Bourbon reign up to the fusion with the raising and definitive unitary state.
The nineteenth century was decis ive for t he history of the south of Italy, because it w as t hen that the reign, w hich had been fou nded by Ruggero II t he Nor man in 11 30 in Palermo, ceased to be an autonom ous political entity aft er about 700 years to become an i ntegral part of the Kingdom of Italy . Naples w as not the capital anym ore and so became just a city, although one of t he most rep resentat ive cit ies of the newborn nation. That ancient dream, which had been cherished for so long by all the great m in ds of t he Peninsu la, fin ally cam e true. It was a romantic dream of a united and free Italy with a constit utional government. T he fus io n of all st ates into o nly one political o rganism is commo nly called "Risorgimento". Despite the past and current criti cis m, it was a great hi storical event w ith p rofou nd emotional, spiritual and material effects .
After centu ries of politi cal d ivisions, foreign dominati o ns and non- nati o nal dy nasties, the un it ary representat ive and autono m ous state was the result of a process of evolution which had gone t hrough different stages . A series of ev ents in spired t his feeling across Italy and instilled it in t he mass consciousness , even though it was experienced d iffere ntly accord ing to culture, education and view s of lif e. In the Ki ngdom of Two Sicilies t his political evolut ion , even t hough it was limit ed to the pop ular parti cipation in p ublic life of the st ate, had started in 1 799 w ith the Neapolitan Repu b lic. At that t i me only the intellectuals adh ered to it, wh ereas the peo ple and farmers had sup ported the Bourbons. With in t he space of little more t han a half century, this fee li ng changed rad ically. In fact, in 1 860 with the arrival of Garibal di's troops, no one too k up arms any more t o defend their King . In fact, in the previous sixty years not o nly had the const itutionali st des ire become stronge r but also the rift between t he Crown and the cou ntry had devel oped . T hi s rif t was caused by a despotic an d tyran nical reg i me, w hich adopted reactionary met hods and cancelled su per ior ideals, at a pol itical, social and cu ltu ral level. This arti cle chronicles the evo lution of the li beral spirit in the Kingdom. The Bourbo n dynasty started in 1734 with the arrival of King Charles. The latter gave auto nomy to t he So uth of Italy, after 230 years of viceroyal hum i liating ru le, and solved the most urg ent and se rio us proble m s. He created a new modern and efficient adm inistrative
Title pages. The retreat of the Neapolita n troops from Salento after the surrender .
Left. Portrait of Ferdinand II.
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actively and created the so-called "italic party", which aimed to achieve nation al unity. Despite the Restauration, their dream survived and was the linchpin of the future patriotic movement. structure, reduced the baronial power and preWhen the Bourbons came back (1816), the politvented interfere nce by the Holy See into his ical situation turned out to be unchanged: it was dom inion. When he left to go to Spain, it was a deeply conservative and relied on t he resignation sol id and efficient state and a strengthened of the lowest classes. The rampant poverty and dynasty. corruption highlighted the difference with the preFerdinand, who was the designate heir, was not vious period. This general dissatisfaction facilitatable to continue the sensible to lerant policy of his ed the spread of secret soci father and imposed a setback eties , among which the most to t he reformist course that ' ' A new positive phase of important was the "Carboneria", had been embarked upon. the liberal process started whose thought showed differThe Revolution started in when Ferdinand II ascend ences in the ins ular and contiParis and the n it spread across nental zone. In fact, whereas the Europe. In l 799 the revolu- ed the trone ,, Sicilian followers aimed mostly tionary wind led the Kingdom at autonomy, t he Neapolitan ones aimed mainly at of Naples to change itself into a Republic, accorda less abso lut ist and po lice government. T hese ing to t he French principle s of equality and libe rconspiracies led to the socalled risings of 1820ty. Its tragic end, after a short lapse of t ime , was 21, by which the Ki ng was asked to re- estab lis h the self- evident sign that the Realm no longer the constitutional system . T he movement, in which reached the stage to transform society radically the ex-Murattians took part unanimously assum - • and follow a different policy. ing in a short time the leadership in place of the T he French- Murattian rule (l 806-181 5) was a Ca rb onari, was unsuccessful because of the further step towards the liberal revolution. Among Austrian intervention. The des ire of a representa- • ot her things, the bourgeois ie, whose precursors tive regime was not repressed by the bayonets of had been opposed by the previous dynast y, conthe Hapsburgs and survived, whereas the solidated their position as a class. Thi s soc ial Monarchy, especial ly after King Ferdinand's pe rclass , which was the most well- educated part of j ury in Ljubljana, was brought into disrepute and the Kingdom, participated in the government The Royal Palace of Caserta.
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continued to lose its supporters. The movement was the first real example of autonomous actions that were performed by the Neapolitan patriots. In fact, whereas in 1799 the Revolution had broken out only after the arrival of a French army, in this case the movement was spontaneous and could not count on any extern al support; this meant that the liberal ideal spread across the population w idely. But this ideal had a great enemy that had to be defeated: the Aust rian Empire, which was a canny guarantor and enemy of any Constitution. Not only in the Kingdom of Two Sici lies, but also in all Italian t erritory, in o rder to obt ain the political representat ion, the popular participation in the government and finally the national unity, it was necessary to gain independence from Au stri a. A new positive phase of the liberal process started when Ferdinand II (1830- 1859) ascended the t hrone , after the short interval of Francis I (l 82 5l 830). As soon as he came to the throne, he
A view of Naples.
adopted appropriate measures and reorganized the adm in istration, abolished some unpopu lar taxes an d did justice to the ex- fo llowers of M urat Officers all owing them to wear the uniform of the Neapolitan army again . Th is willingness and the constant interest in the po litical prob lems and in the subjects' needs boosted hopes among the intellectuals that the re ign could show a positive attitude towards a change of the absolute monarchy into a constitutional one. But this hope faded very soon . In fact the King became aware of the m isunderstanding and hastened to d ispel it. His behaviour suggested that the absolutism re mained a theorem of government for him and his on ly aim was to improve the general conditions of the Realm without betraying the fundam ental principle of the
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King, who was so according to God's wil l. As l 848 approached and he became aware of the const itutional ferments th at roused Europe and even the Kingdom of two Sicil ies, Ferdinand II strengthened the polit ical po lice considerab ly. Nevertheless, the ideal of liberty proselytised lots of people anyway, thanks to an enlight ened bou rgeoisie that ident ified itself with the liberals. Even though it had a short life, the new constitutional government, which had been imposed on the Crown by an actio in of force that had been t aken by the lower classes again, can be regarded as a new chapter of a process of m aturation and evolut ion of t he sout he rn population towards the unitary ideal of the "Risorgimento". The dramatic fai lure ended participation in publ ic l ife . Therefore, very few Neapolitan patriots, who were abroad, made their presence fe lt i n the south of Italy. In the meantime, a consc ious awareness that in the f uture the triumph of liberal ideals would depend on a different internal po li cy of the great national and foreign States was increasing. In fact, on ly if they took a d ifferent direction, would the repressive mechan ism of the Sainrt Alliance be eliminated . After having assumed power again, in order to defend t hose pri nciples of absolutism and patriarchal dom inion, in w h ic h he be! ieved firmly, Ferd inand II conducted a fierce campaign against a ll the intellectuals and anyone who was bold enough to express criticism, even though moderate, of his actions . Luigi Settembrini was one of the i nte llect uals who struggled against his tyranny. He was a lite rary man and a pat riot as well as be ing author of a memorable pamph let: "Protest of the population of the two Sicilies". Because of this indictment, he was sent into exile and to prison . H is personage is a perfect example of virtue and value and is considered as one of th-e most representative men of our "Risorgimento" because he pursued with a strong commitment the nob le ideal, showed moral r ightness and endured persecution with dignity and courage. At the end of the twenty- year period of Ferdinand II the situation of the Realm was clear and well - def ined . T he rep ressive policy of the sovereign had sent the best minds away definitive ly and prevented the formation of spiritual and cu ltural support for the dynasty. In add ition , th is tyrann ical and reactio nary behaviour had also made those constit utional principles much mor e popular, together with a strong desire for liberty and national un ity. Those principles, which had always been the characteristic expression of t h e bourgeois ie , had spread even across the lowest and poorest classes . The epilog ue was b rief! In 1860, when Garibal d i landed in Sicily, Francis II, who in the meantime
Rivista Mililare Englis/J Edition n. 112010
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. . .... faith anymore in the dynasty, which had been founded by Charles Ill and which had now been brought into d isrep ute, and embraced unan ihad succeeded his father as King, co ul d not count mous ly the unitary solution of Cavou r. They saw on the strong support of his state . He did not the Piedmontese army, wh ich was supporting the receive t he help of his people, who had been morfollowers of Garibald i, as a guarantee of status quo tified and brutalized by decades of misrule, and of and of their privileges. T herefore , although t hey a valuable political and military class . In fact, as acted for differe nt reasons, they themselves conme ntioned above, his predecessors had taken tributed to our "Risorgimento". T he end of these acti on to preve nt t he format ion epic deeds was a plebiscite of this class because they had , , which sanctioned the f usion of been afraid of its judgement that plebiscite ... sanc- the Kingdom of Naples and t he and superiority. T herefore, t he tioned the fusion of the new nat ion al political reality with advance of the followers of Kingdom of Naples within the foll owing words: "The people Garibaldi was greeted by the want Italy to be one ind ivisible people, who lived in the South the new national political nation with Victor Emanuel as and w ho, in some cases, had reality ,, constitutional King and with his already revo lted against the legitimate descendants". T his power, with cries of joy. In 1799 t he Gangs of t he sealed the birth of Italy as a free , independent and constitutional state where t he po lit ical confl icts • Holy See had reached Naples by crossing Calab ria and since t hen history has come a long way! With could occur in the Parliament, free from the forregard to th is, it is remarkab le t hat when the daneign influence, and no more on the fratricidal batger was impendi ng the Bourbons were abandoned t lefields. even by the rich class of landowners, who were commo nly known as "Honourab le men". The latter Vincenzo Cuomo Journalist, feared that the arrival of one thousand me n co ul d result in a democratic social revo lution and had no Member of the Italian Society of Military History The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
JULIUS-CAESAR THE MAN, HIS FEATS, THE MYTH In Rome an interesting exhibition brings to the fore the most glorious and incredible heroic deeds. The Ides of March of 44 B.C. closed Caesar's human history with the best script history has ever written and highlighted the frailty of life. His existence was great, though.
A prestigious place was chosen for the absolute p rotagonist of Roman history: Julius Caesar. The Cloister of Bramante is an imp ressive place and played host to an exh ibition on this great leader, who has become a myth , from ~ 24th Octobe r 2008 to 3rd May 2009. It was an u nprecedented ~ ¡ event because it was t he first -..::: exhibition on Caesar in the world. It was completed shrouded in a trick of the light and shadow where the only protagonist was the exhibited work. The first part was ded icated to the personage "Caesar" in a polit ical and cu ltural context. It shows Caesar as a ris ing star, his re latio nships with all ies and enemies (Pompey, Crassus, Cicero), his m ilitary cam paigns, the Egyptian period t hat was marked by his meeting w ith Cleopatra and his tragic en di ng, the Ides of March in 44 B.C., wh ich strengthened the myth of the first permanent dictator of the Res Publica Romana. He was Caius Caesar Octavianus' father, who would come into power as Augustus . The magic of this person age has been unchanged with the passing of time. Maybe it has even been heightened by the most famous mu rder in history. Even though he was never conferred the title of Emperor, he was actually the first Emperor of Rome since he laid the foundations of the construction of the empire. He was a ve rsatile man, won victories and suffered
1J
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defeats, he was a brave Commander of the Roman Army and the glory often smiled on him in the battlefields. His genius, his intellectual qualities and his clemency fascinate us but he disti ngu ished himself also by takin g tyranni cal and crue l actions. Despite the conflicting aspects of his politi cal and mil itary life, it is unquestionab le that Caesar opened a fu ndamental chapter in the Italian and world history. The exh ibited works w ere approximately 200. They came from the most important Italian and European museums, suc h as the "Vatican Museums", the "Louvre Museum", the "Cap itol i ne Museums ", the "British Museum", the "Arch aeo logical Museum" of Naples, the "Staatliche Mu seum zu Berlin", the "Kunsth itorishes Museum" of Vienna. Th is cu ltural heritage inc lu ded archaeolog ical finds (scul ptures, mosaics, frescos, gems and coins), depictions, scale models of Rome that had been built for this occasion and that represented the personage and his deeds pe rfectly in the ir histo rical dimension. The myth of Caesar has also made its mark on cine ma, from the sile nt screen to multiscreens. Lots of images, which had been selected from some / movies, were displayed, such as th e famous Hol lywood movie "Cleopatra" , starring the glamorous Elizabeth Taylor, Richard Bu rton and Rex Harrison, whose stage clothes were displayed. T he exhibition was opened by two objects which
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tion also displayed important finds coming from the siege of Alesia, javelin points and arrowheads, swords, daggers, helmets, a Gallic silver harness for mounting and a catapult plate of the 5th Macedonian Legion. There was also a slab of slingers dating back to the siege of Ascoli in 89 B.C., from which one can infer the intensive use of acorn-missiles, which were found in abundance
Statue of Aphrodite, 2 nd century A.O., Louvre Museum, Paris.
Title pages. Vincenzo Camuccini: "Caesar's death", 7800, Naples.
Above. A Gallic warrior, Avignon.
7st century B.C., Musee Calvert,
distinguished themselves by their originality and evocative power: "Caesar's portrait" (the so-called "Cesare Chiaramonti"), which had been chosen by the organizers as the logo of the exhibition, and the enigmatic globe coming from the Egyptian obelisk, which currently towers above Saint Peter's Square. According to the Caesarean legend, t he latter contains the ashes of the famous leader. It is an evocative piece of work on which it is possible to see the marks that were left by the Lanzquenets during the sacking of Rome in 1 527. The exhibi-
below the city walls, and "Gianon's hobble", which was used to bind prisoners of war in pairs. The exh ibition also displayed a unique piece coming from the Gallic war which was a hub of attraction for visitors: the gallic armed warrior. It is impossible to describe all the exh ibited works, but the famous "green Caesar", which is a sculpture • Alexandre Abel de Pujol.¡ "Caesar's clemency", 7 808, Musee des Beaux Arts, Valenciennes.
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background and light in g cuts, which stress Caesar's horror. In addition to Rubens and his pupil Erasmo Quel lin us' works , other maste rpieces depicting t he great personage come from the French eighteenth- century and nineteenth-centu ry paintings. The exhibition displayed a magnificent silver chalice, which was discovered by Napoleon Ill to whom we owe t he diffusion of Caesar' s myth also thanks to the celebration of other great protagonists: for example, Hermann and Motte's paintings of Vercingetorige. However, we can infer the deep admiration of the great
Adolphe Yvon: "Caesar's triumph" (a detail), Musee des Beaux Arts, Arras.
1875,
from the Egyptian oriental desert, cannot be left untold. Exactly like the famous "Venere Genitrice", a Roman piecework that is held in t he Louvre Museum. It is a valuable copy of the goddess' simulacrum, which was placed in the temple that had been erected by Caesar in honour of Aeneas and Gens lulia's progenitor, to whom Caesar himself linked his origins. The show was closed by an exceptional roundup of neoclassical, baroque and Flemish paintings. Rubens, Reni, T iepolo, Hayez, Rixen depicted Caesar's triumphs, t he tragic end of Pompey and Cleopatra's death. It was also possib le to admire the gigantic painting that represents ''.Julia's fai nt ing at the sight of Pompey's mantle covered with blood" by Sienese Be rnardino Mei and "The head of Pom pey presented to Caesar", which is in two works made by P.P. Rubens and by Gian Batt ista Langetti. In particular, Rubens' work, which is in Italy for the first time, is typical of the great Flemish painter's style: the drama of this event is portrayed by the contrast between a dark
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Above. A relief of Mother Earth, I st century B.C., Louvre Museum, Paris.
Left. A silver phalera, I st century B.C., Saint Julia Museum, Brescia.
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Henry-Paul Motte: "Vercingetorix surrenders to Caesar", 7886, Mu see Crozatier, Le Puy-en- Ve lay.
which is kept in the "Pinacoteca Capitolina" i n Rome . The main subject of the final part of the exhibition is Caesar's murder, as well as being the recurring theme in the flourishing literary and artistic production about the great leader. The pictorical work that have been dedicated to t his subject are several. 'The Ides of Marc h" by Edward John is a touch ing painting. This subj ect was drawn by a Shakespearean tragedy, which depicts Calpu rnia in an attempt to save Caesar from the appointme nt with death and in t he background it is possible to see the passage of a comet, which has always been a presage of adversity. It is as if his destiny was written in the stars. His life was short but brilliant and was studded with triu mphs and conquests . It was t he emb lem of an exceptional spirit and his deeds earned hi m the t it le of
The cheekpiece helmet of a legionary of the Caesarean Age, Civic Museum, Trieste.
French Emperor for Caesar from the paintings that celebrate his deeds : "Caesar's clemency" by A. Abel de Pujol , "Caesar's triumph" by Adolphe Yvon and "The salutation to Caesar" by Picault. Even the personage of Cleopatra was given rel evant space : the marvel lous portrait by Miche langelo Buonarroti, which is kept in the caveau of Buonarroti's hou se in Florence, and the dep iction of the dying Cleopatra by Guido Reni,
hero and the immortal g lory. Today he is still th e most famous and be loved historical personage in • the world . His star has never stopped shining . Thi s is the reason why the exh ibition , the only one in the world , was a show that was a must, in • particular for the dedicated admirers of the father of the fu ture Roman Empire .
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