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1/2006
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~ u;Jffi IOUMAl Of TBI ITAUAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856
CONTENTS
January-February March-April
Rivista Militare a im s at broadening and u pd ati ng t he te chnical a nd v ocational tra ining of Army personneL It is thus a means of propagating the military way of think ing and a forum of study and debate_ Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare a lso aims at informing the general public on the A rmy and on military issues_
The American Antimissile System
A regional power which is finding it hard to take off p. 2
A. p a tro l of th e 66-, "Trieste " o irmobile
n fo ntry Reg im e nt on training. :::ompetence, pro fessiona lism, dedication, o yolty and e sprit de corps o re the esse ntici ::iuolilies which oJow ed our Nmy to earn the trust and c onsent of the o 'lies a nd . even more i'nporta nt. o f the lto ion people .
Three good reasons for avoiding a military intervention p. 14
The strategic and tecnological evolut ion
p . 82
The Land Robots Where to use them and wit h what object iv es .
p.96
FOUR-MO~THLY Supplemen t Lo n umbers I an d 2 o f R h ·ist.a
Mi1ita1·e Italian Edition
Editor in Chid: Marco CENTRITIO
Europe and the Mediterranean
Management a nd E ditorial Office S. Via d i S . J\farco - 00 I 86 Rome Phone 0039-06-47357373
Ten years after tile Barcelona Declaration
p. 26
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Printer ll'v1,\GO MEDIA 8 10 10 Dragon i (CE) 1el. 0039-0823-8667 10
NATO in the 21 st Century p,38 Ethiopia and Eritrea
\V\\'\v.irnagomedia.it
On the brink of the abyss
C onditions for 2006: One num ber: Euro 2,10 One ba <.:k number: Euro 4 .20
p.50
The Century of Black Gold p, 56
Subscription rates:
Italy: Euro t 1.40 ;, ,-ca r Ah ioad: E uro 15.50 a yea r P ayment musi he made on postal accoun LNo.22521009 - S ME Centro Pubblicislica d ell'Ese,-eilo 123/A~ Via XX Sctten1bre - R o rnc
Honour. bravery and warlike spirit p. 118
Au 1horized by Ilic Coun of Rom e under Ko . 994 of the Regisl~ by Decree 7-6-1949.
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I USPI L_
2006 Ri, ~sta Milirare -
The ARMIR's Epic Deeds
7
The Italians on the Eastern Front p, 128
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ASSOCL\TE D TO USPI UNION£ STAM PA PERIODICA ITALIANA
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Tlx.· produc Lion of this m agazine has been supervised by O rm.-ro Rmnr,a..
The Army's message through the covers of the old magazine p. 104
The Foreign Legion
Residen ts a b ro a d may ren1i t pa ,y n1ct th rough bank d1eq uc or imematioria l postal o rder
© Copyrigh1 by
"Rivista Militare" is 150 Years Old
lnfanhy is Still Queen of Battles p. 66
The "Friuli" Brigade in Jordan Exercise "Eastern Desert 2005" p. 74
Summary in Various Languages p . 138
THE IRANIAN DILEMMA An economic power which is finding it hard to take off Iran, a country renowned for its huge material and human wealth, is putting itself forward as a world power. But the controversies caused by their nuclear ambitions, the relationship with Israel and the aspiration to oppose American economic policy compromise the already precarious international equilibrium.
Since the revolution of 1979 the Supreme Guide, the rahbar, has been chosen by an assembly of religious representatives, based on the curriculum and the degree of esteem from the popu lation. The Supreme Guide must choose the Council of the Keepers, composed of 12 members, who then must perform the task to approve t he cand idatures to the Presidency of the Republic and certify the authority of Parl iament and the highest judges. The Supreme Guide is also t he Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces. To guide the state there is the President of the Republic, elected by absolute public majority (universal suffrage). His mandate lasts for four years. He appoints and chairs the ministers' Council, coordinates the government action and selects the decisions to be submitted to Parliament. The Majils, the Iranian unicameral parliament, Islamic Consultative Assembly, is composed of 290 members elected by a direct and secret vote, also with a four year mandate. Since the beginning all the legislation has been scrutinized by the Council of the Keepers, based on the principles of the socalled velayet-i-faqih, t he "guardians of Islamic law", to check that the laws do not conflict with the Koran and with the Islamic doctrine in its 1 2th Century Shiism context. The six layman members of the Council , jurists named by Parliament, judge only on the laws' constitutionality, while the six religious members examine the conformity of the laws to the Islamic dictates (sha'ria). The seat sharing in the current Parliament, elected in 2004, is t he following : conservatives/Islamic 190 seats, reformers 50, independents 43, reli gious minorities 5, 2 not assigned.
FROM THE SECOND WORLD CONFLICT TO 1979
When the Second World War broke out, Iran (the ancient name of Persia was changed only in l 93 5) declared its neutra lity. Shah Reza Pah levi ,
OIKOS - 4
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Preceding pages. Mahmud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and George W. Bush, President of lhe Uniled
States of America.
Above. The Iranian national flag.
who had been ab le to neutralize the Russian and British i nterferences in Iran's internal affairs , had stipulated impo rtant commercial agreements with Germany, which initial ly seemed destined to trium ph in the conflict , but in general he had kept a good rapport w ith all the big powers. From one side or the other the invasion of Iran seemed inevitab le. The Russ ians and British wanted to secure the pipeline from the Pe rsian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, while the Germans wanted to occupy the territory after crossing the Caucasus so as to join Rommel's troops coming from t he east, thus threateni ng all the strategic routes in the region . Furthermore, whichever aggressive force conquered the o il wells of Iran and ne ig hbouring Iraq would be assured of having access to the world's largest oil suppl ies after those of the US .. Cutting across this st rategic corridor of Iran , the American and British , supplied with armaments the USSR which had been invaded by the Nazis with Operation Barbarossa in 1943. On December l" of t he same year, Teheran host ed an important summ it of t he Allied Heads of
Rivista Mili/are English Edition n. 112006
State; Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt .. The agreed document, divided into three fundamen tal parts, also agreed that Iran, in reward for its precious assistance to the Soviet Union would receive economic assistance for its reco nst r uction, just compensation for the military demands placed on the territory. At the end of the war the Red Army initial ly refused to withdraw from Iran's nort hern territories, th us creating the satell ite states of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. In 1946, after having obtained the guarantee that it cou ld take part in the exploitation of the Iranian oilfields, the Soviet Union agreed to implement a steady withdrawal of its sold iers. During this process however, the USSR, and in particular its secret services, deployed its largest settlement at such a long distance from its borders. From 1949 the Country, with increasing fervor, wanted to nationa lize its natural energy resources- that for the most part were controlled by the British Anglo-I ranian Oil Company - which wou ld supply the necessary resources to carry out its important agricultural and industrial development projects. In 1951 Mohammed
Mossadeq was appointed Prime Minister, a leading lig ht for the pro-communist party Tudeh, who subsequently opted for the natio nalization of the country's oil. This decision resulted in the ,¡Abadan Crisis', the name coming from the refinery that had become the worlds largest in 1950: as a result the main foreign powers stopped buying Iranian oil. It was at this point that United States started to put a massive focus on Tehran's po licy, making it one of its strateg ic priorities in the region. In 1953 the CIA and the SIS jointly o rganized AJAX, an operation that aimed at ousting Mossadeq, strengthening the Monarchy of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi. Undoubtedly this was due to the American fear of the communist tendencies of the Tudeh party, considering also Iran's natura l frontiers with the Soviet Union .
THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE WAR AGAINST IRAQ The re ig n of the Iran ian Monarchy and the use of its power revea led a "particular attention " to
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN Area: 1,636,000 km 2 Boundaries: total border length: 5,400 km. Countries bordered; Afghanistan 936km, Armenia 35km, Azerbaijan 432km, Azerbaijan-enclave Nakhichevan 179km, Iraq 1,458, Pakistan 909km, Turkey 499km, Turkmenistan 992km. Climate: generally arid or semi- arid, sub-tropical along the Caspian Sea coast Territory: Rough and with chains of high mountain. A central desert with mountainous basin. Occasional plains along the coasts. The highest point is kuh-e-Damavan (5,671 m)
Natural Resources: Petroleum, natural gas, carbon, chrome, copper, iron minerals, manganese, zinc, sulphur Land use: Cultivable land 8.72%, Actually cultivated 1.39% Population: About 68,000,000 Uuly 2005) 0-14 years: 27.1%; l 5- 64 years: 68%; 65 + years: 4.9% Average age 24 years Population growth rate: 0.86% (2005) Life expectancy 69.96 years (men 68.58, women 71.4)
Ethnic groups:
Persian 51 %, Azerbaijani 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurds 7%, Arabs 3%, Lur 2%, Ba loch 2%,
Turkmen 2%, Other l %
Religion: Shiite 89%, Sunnite 9%, Zoastrian, Jewish, Christian and Baha'I 2% Languages: Persian (Farsi) and its dialects 58%, Turkic and its dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Bloch l %, Arabic l % Turkish l %, other l % Form of Government: Theocratic Republic Capital: Tehran Administrative Areas: 30 Provinces (ostanha) ,Ardabil. ... (ecc) Independence: April l st 1979 (Date of the proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Islam Universal suffrage: l 5 years of age
5 - OIKOS
the interests of America. The Shah put in place a "White Revolution" to westernize the country; with the United States strengthening its economic and military aid, having seen that the key to ensuring access to the oil in the Persian Gulf was its partnership with Tehe ran and Saudi Arabia. At the same time the Soviet Union saw that its key ally in the zone was Iran's neighbour, Iraq . Between 1965 and 1977, the period of the Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the situation within Iran was one of ever more bitter and ins istent public protests, not only from the liberal classes and students but also strongly intertwined in these ill-feelings was the historical context of the situation of the Shi'ites - the majority Islam ic denomination in Iran. The Leader of the opposition from l 960 was the ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who on orders from the Shah was arrested in 1963 and exiled to Iraq, in Najaf, from where in l 978 he was expelled to Neauphle-le-Chateau, in France. From t he time of his exile the ayatollah kept sending recordings into Iran of his speeches against and h is verbal attacks on the Shah's reign. Many of his followers kept stress ing how many supporters, how much power, how much consensus this ayatollah would receive if he were in the country h imself. The protesting public - with feelings heightened by the economic crisis, the continually ris ing prices, the almost daily black-out in the capital, the ever increasing wealth of the sovereign and lim ited size of the ruling elite - first forced t he resignation of Hoveyda and then on the 31 st December 1978 the abdication of the Shah. Just a few weeks later, in February l 979, to the
acclaim of millions of faithful fol lowers the ayatollah ('sign of God') Khomeini returned from France. Perhaps nobody truly imagined that this was the beginning of the country becoming an Islamic Republic, but such an Iran began on April l st 1979. The political manifesto of th e Khomeini, announced in a publication from his time i n exile in Paris, the 've!ayet-i - faqih' (Guardians of Islamic Law), foresaw that in order to gu ide the Republic a faqih (a guardian of Islamic law) was req uired. To be nom inated by a rel ig ious group, the Council of the Keepers, all voted from the same citizens who had elected the President. The relationsh ip with the western powers and in particular with the USA became more compl icated. On November 4th 1979 63 US citizens were taken hostage in the American Embassy in Tehran by a group of students, 52 of them were held for 444 days before being released - after the Carter administration had to a plan of liberat ion fail near Tabas, in the Iranian, desert due to mechanical and weather difficulties. Apart from such happen i ngs the spiritual implications of the new powe r in Tehran brought a new equilibrium to all of the Middle East reg ion, influencing many i nterna l political decisions of other count r ies, both Arab and other powers - specially the United States of America. To rnalize. how this change took place in Iran one must undoubted ly acknowledge the success t he regime had in bein g able to penetrate deep into soc iety and fight the foundations of al l it needed to change. This was thanks to an ideo logy that could put a lot of pressure on the populace, a reg ime that could meet any problem head on and cut across
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OIKOS - 6
Rivista Militare Englis/1 Edition n. 112006
THE ARMED FORCES They number a good 350,000 men. The foreign influence on the army was strong and cont roversial. From 1955, Iran became part of CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) t'ci'gether w ith Pakistan, Tu rkey and Great Britain. The United States had heavily 4ss isted mil itary supplies until 1 960. After the breaking of diplomatic relations between Tehran and Washington in 1980 t he role of the United Stat es was replaced by the Soviet Union. And in turn Russia, then China, then North Korea. Even after the Islam ic revolution in 1979 the sale of arms to Iran from the US continued, above all through Israel, and went on irrespective of the international embargo against Iran. According to the article 110 of the Constitution of The Islamic Republ ic of Iran, dating from 1979, the Commanderin- Chief of the armed forces is the same faqih, that we remember today as the ayatollah Khamenei. He has the power to dismiss the Ch ief- of- Staff as wel l as some other posts, the Chi ef of the Pasdaran, the two advisors to the Supreme Council of Defence, and the commanders- in-chief to the army, navy and air force. Al l on the recommendat ion of his advice. The President directs the Supreme Council of National Security, but has no ro le within the armed forces . The Minister of the Interior is the Commander in Chief of the Police and reports directly to t he Su preme Guide. The most interesting part w ith regard to the Iranian army are the parts relat ed to the parami litary corps Pasdaran and Basij . The Pasdaran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, number over 120,000. Their structure is quite compli cated with t heir role somewhere between military and political. The troops come any of the army, navy or air force. The Basij in all like lihood are under the same commander as the Pasdaran, and hence to the Supreme Gu ide of the Islamic Revolution . The intelligence component, who busy themselves with non - conventional warfare, are in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and are about 5,000 in number and very we ll armed and equ ipped . In particular, the so- called Forze al- Quds have an important role in ope rations outside of the territory. Taking part in a series of training maneuvers in Libyan and Sudan fo r exampl e. This force is actual ly commanded by General Ahmed Wahidi, already the head of the Revolutionary Guard that had successfully completed the revoluti on against the Shah. Finally Bas ij, or rathe r the People's Mobile Army, is composed of about 90,000 men, with about 300,000 reserves and in total about 1,000,000 when fu lly mobilized. There are 740 regional battalions, each one about 300- 500 unit s, in 3 companies . T he Basij are generally young and have completed m ilitary service or retired servicemen with a low level of military competence. Under the control of the Min ister of Int erior are the Police and thP Rorder Guard , adding an extra 45,000 - 50,000 to the total. Milit ary assets and strategies are under the control of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution . Under their direction they have started, in 2003 , the deployment and testing of Shahab 3 Missiles (range 1,000- 1,300 km). There is a programme for the production of twenty new missi les a year and they developing a missile with a greater range, 3,000-5,000km.
strong re lig ious creeds - and by refusing any foreign interfere nce , deeming it the bearer of corruptio n and m ora l degeneration. It was firstly t he extraordi nary ri ches of Iran, in te rms of it s oil and gas reserves, not forgett ing its strategic position, that forged its history in the begi nning of the twent ieth century and sti ll was influenc i ng it 80 years later. Immediately after the accession to power by the ayatolla h, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein started to try to take advantage of the chaotic situation following the abd ication of t he Shah and laid claim to certa in Iranian oi l regions in order to also gain direct access to the Gu lf at Shatt al-Arab . The Iraq i invasio n of Iran was also aimed at t rying to take cont ro l of its wea lth ier neighbou r and t o stop any potent ial simi lar political revol ut ion spread ing to Iraq - where the majorit y Shiite pop ulation were under the con trol of the Baath Sun nite party. T he war wh ich fol lowed, 'The First Gulf War', was offic ial ly
declared 24th September 1980 . The concrete he lp t hat the west gave to Saddam Husse in, in terms of arms and money, left no do ubt that the war was for the contro l of Iran ian oil. (The strikes aga inst o ilf ields themse lves were particularly strong in l 983 and l 984). But, thanks mainly to the m il itary inept itude of Saddam Husse in, as wel l as the skil ls and strength of the Iranian armed forces and the Iran ian peop le, a war that the Iraqi pres ident undoubtedly imag ined would be sho rt, swift and victorious became an extremely protracted near l 0 year confl ict. At the end no one cou ld be sa id to have won and the end of the war was announced on 3 th August 1988 after Iran had agreed, w ithout adding cond itions but refusing precedent, a Un ited Natio ns resolution to make peace w ith Iraq . Iran immed iately bega n the reconstruction of the economy, especial ly its o il sector which was heavily affected by the conflict, and at the same t ime the genera l situation improved at the end of
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PRINCIPAL PETROLEUM DEPOSITS (barrels estimated in barrels per day, from 2005) ONSHORE
OFFSHORE
Agha Jari (200 000)
Abuzar (1 2 5 000)
Ahwaz-Asmari (700 000)
Dorud (130 000)
Bangestan (circa 245 000)
Salman (130 000)
Bibi Hakimeh (1 30 000)
Sirri A&E (95 000)
Gachsaran (560 000)
Soruch/Nowruz (60 000)
Karanj-Parsi (200 000) Marun (520 000) Pazanan (70 000) Rag-e-Safid (180 000)
the Soviet-Afghan War as more than 3 mill ion Afghan refugees returned to the ir homeland. When Iraq invaded Kuwait ('The Second Gulf War') Iran agreed with the international sanctions against Baghdad, but condemned the subsequent military attacks and gave permission to Saddam Hussain to land in Iranian territory. In 1993 Hashemi Rafsanjani became elected for a second mandate as President of the Republic, and so a new era was anticipated by a country ready to become more moderate, especially after the death of the historically important revo lutionary figurehead the ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, and then again following the election of the new spiritual leader Ali Hussein Khamenei.
IRAN TODAY
The Iranian economy is predominantly based on crude oil exports which constitutes about 80% of total exports (if only refined petroleum is counted the figure falls to 20%), and 40 -50% of Gross National Product. The oil price rises in the last few years has had a positive effect on the Iranian economy, which in 2004-2005 increased by about 4 - 5%, even if the leve l of inflation is constantly high at about l 5%. Ira nian oil reserves is about 125.8 bi llio n barrels, rough ly l 0% of the total world stock. The national petroleum company, the National Iranian Oil Company, controls the production of crude oi l. It's also important to st ress that Iran has larg e amounts of gas reserves, 62% of it currently unused, but that would make it the world's second largest producer after Russia. The majority of the fields are found in South Pars, North Pars, Kangan, Nar and Khang iran. Iran's public deficit remains hig h, also because
Fonte: Energy Information Administration (Country Analysis Briefs}
of the w idespread expenditure on public services, but above all because of the spend ing on its oi l pipe lines and the price of fuel ; while Iran is a big exporter of crude oi l it is forced to import useable fuel because of the lack of infrastructure and i nability to process its own crude oi l. And combined with a desire to decrease the dependence of the economy on the fluctuating oil market the Iranian Leadership have tried to develop other types of industry. But the lac k of a good level of technology heavily pena lizes the allround growth of the country. Basing their plan on the Norwegian Petroleum Fund model, at the end of the l 990's, the Oi l Surplus Fund (OSF) also k nown as the Oil Stabilization Fund - was designed to manage the enormo us inequalities that derived from the sel ling of crude oil, and directing resources to the economic sectors most in need of rapid imp rovement. The fund became a useful deve lopment instrument, but also a source of much po litical controve r sy, top leve l bickering and appears too unregulated to act as a stabi lizer for economy strength. One of the biggest problems the Iranian government st ill has to face is unemployment, especial ly amongst the youth (around 1 5%). Neve rtheless , all this enormous wealth in terms of 'labou r force' has forced the government to loo k into the long-t erm future : Iran wants to utilize its own resources to make it the number one power in the Persian Gulf, including level of technology. In particu lar its gas reserves will become one of the key in struments to achieve this plan. Gas should gradually subst itute oi l as the primary choice of nat ion al fuel consumpt ion and could be the dec id ing facto r in ac hieving pos itive diplomatic relations within the region as a whole. The opportun ities to export are numerous and Iran is extreme ly we ll positioned
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 112006
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geographical ly to take advantage of them. The main gas pipeline connects Iran to Turkey and Turkmenistan - b ut others are being built; to Armenia, to the autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan (an enclave of Azerbaijan) and to the UAE. The most ambitious project remains the Iran -India-China pipeline, what would soften the Chinese position on the so - called Indian
project 'The Energy Highway' - a gas pipeline through Russia, China and India cutting t hrough Turkmenistan , Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Chinese Xinjiang before entering India v ia Ladakh then crossing the Siachen glaciers and the mi litarized strip of the Sino-lndiano control line before going on to supply Southern India with gas. Clever political management of Iranian resources of hydrocarbon woulcl allow Iran to attract and then create a supply system to all countries inte rested in its nat ura l deposits of oil and gas. Requiring a true level of energy cooperation. Worried about the development of nuc lear arms the United States and the European Union are exerc ising increas ing pressure on Teh ran, and Iran has to find a way to turn eastwards and look towards other markets, especial ly India and China. Iran is lookin g to diversify its economy, above all its petrochemical and technology sector, but it also must take note that its efforts are colliding with its interna l politics - especially with the delicate balance between the reformists and t he conservatives. Foreiyri irivesLrnent has also failed to take off because the future of Iran loo ks unstab le, especia lly considering the im plications of the management of the nuclear research programme, which Iran is carrying out for civi l purposes . It's clear that this explanat ion convinces only a few and that the re is on ly a faint distinct ion between civil use and mili tary use. Last year t he state approved, with the ult imate sanctioning from the Supreme Gu ide, a document for a twenty-year plan that intends to free the country from it s economic growth dependence on oi l, its ne ed to play gee - st rat egic card games and on the issue of investment in human resources . The Pres ident Mahmud Ahmadinejad, elected in the summe r of 2005, gained the popu lar vote on a manifesto against poverty, socia l inequ al ity, w idespread corruption and pledging job creation. Since h is election many senior public servants have been replaced, but he doesn't need reminding that on three consecutive occasions his proposed candidate for the powerful pos iti on of Oi l Minister were turned down by the Maj/is (the Iran ian parliament), all this regardless of the majority he has .
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Only at the begin ning of December 2005 did the Maj/is express favour at the designatio n of Kazem Vaziri, but what happe ned is symptomatic of the d ifficulties facing t he President in del icate matters. We must remembe r that Iran contin ues to be subject to an econom ic embargo from the United States. The in itial sanct io ns im posed in 1995 by Bill Clinton were restated by Bush in March 2004 , all in consideratio n of the threat th at Iran const itutes to t he current geopolitical intern ation al equi librium and of t he lack of transparency w ith in the reg im es in Tehran. T he in terna l political situation, which has already been sketched o ut , had worsened in the last two years because of the d isappointi ng performance of the reforms of President Khatami, w ho was unab le to give t he country the level of freedom that soc iety, especially the young, wanted to be given. Th e cause of so much that has happened must be looked for amo ng st the constant obstruction from the Counci l of the Keepers , t hat organization composed of 12 religious personnel that i n Iran have the aut hority to block every piece of legi slat ion and opposes all moves to modernize the country even if the popu lace are hugely in favo ur of it, the closure of som e daily newspapers and the refusal to approve a great number of the reformist candidates that were intended to stand at the last Preside ntial elections (a good 2,500, of which a large n um be r had already secured dece nt majo rities in the 2000 electio ns). T he conservatives t oo k advantage of the strict vig il ance of the Sh iite cleri cs, but also of the w idespread d isil lu sionment of the electorate, in Feb ruary 2004 when the Parliament was reope ned and in June 2005 when Ahmadinejad was elected. The mod erates were left punished by having only a mod icum of powe r, in comparison to the amount needed to change Iran into a modern country , and the question of a secular state remai ns a dream. Unfortunately the po litics of Bush and th e neo-conse rvative Americans, who following the terrorist attacks in 200 1, placed Iran in the ' Axis of Evil' strengthened t he posit ion of the Iran ian conservatives w ith in t he governing of Iran . It could at le ast be hoped that the expu lsion from direct powe r of t he reformers w ill reig nite in society the fierce debate of social refo r m and poss ibly hasten t he process of democrat ization. The limited opposition from the last few years could th en soon widen and hence go on to weaken the conservative powe r, as was seen in th e election of t he Oi l Minister. Ahmadinejad's campai gn for the improvement of the country for al l wi ll undo ubted ly struggle against the difficu lty to imp rove t he eco nomy at the same time as
OIKOS - 10
havi ng to risk co nfronting the west's econ om ic sanctions, all at a time when job creation and t he foreign investments appear as much as ever necessary. Unfo rt unate ly Mahmud Ahmadinejad seemed excess ively expo sed to the influences of th e most extreme clerics, including t he ultraconservative ayatollah Mesbah Yazd i, who could be described as the 's piritua l gu id e' of the newly elected President. In the l ight of the influence that Yazdi exercises on t he President it beg ins to be poss ible to u nd ersta nd some of t he actions and declarat ion s of the Pres ident, in particular against Israe l, and also the line taken about the nuclear research dossier wh ich has so dominate d the med ia and the international pol itica l world in the last few mon th s. In this sense it is abso lute ly fundamental to envisage t he role that Iran in t ends to play in the reg io n and what its desires are for se lfprotectio n aga inst forces outside the Middl e Eas t , nor with rega rd to it as a world energy power.
IRAN: A NUCLEAR THREAT OR A PARTNER FOR FUTURE PEACE? Iran is an important world power. It wants to become a key player at the top leve l of geostrategic internaliunal relations and wants to oppose t he presence of the United States at the economic level and its privil eged pa rt nership w ith Iran's neigh bour Is rae l. Iran, just as Americans and international organs f ear (in primis the International Agency for Atomic Energy, {A IEA}), co u ld be continuing its research into nuc lear weapons for mi l it ary purposes and not civil purposes. T his would put i nto jeopa rdy the who le planet's inte rn ational political equ ili brium. Iran ratified the No n-Proliferation Treaties of l 970 and 1992 so giving the AIEA pe r miss ion to inspect its nuclear power p lants. T he first sign s of Iranian treaty violatio n emerged in 2003. After the en d of the l 980 ' s, specifically l 994 and 1996 according t o the father of the Pakistani nuclear programme, Abdul Qader Khan, Iran had acqu ired plans for nuclear test ing and then subsequen t ly p lan s for the building of an advanced centrifuge system fo r uran ium enrichment. Iran had shown a copy of this document to the AIEA claiming how a 'foreign inte rmed iary' had offered Iran parts and desig ns for the construction of a centrifuge, b ut these documents stayed in Iranian hands until 2003. T he contact with th is intermediary could have cont inued through the 90's but Iran main tains that it never took the in itiat ive and always gave account s of material in
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its possession to the UN. According to t he CIA however, Iran had frequently paid for foreign help to do with the nuc lear industry, and was continuing to enrich Uranium in quantit ies far larger than what it was declaring. After an appeal in 2004 from the AIEA for collaborat ion from the reticent Iran ian authorities, in 2005 an agency of the UN was given access to a plan t in Parchin and Arak where there were only nuclear installations for civi l purposes. Meanwh ile the AIEA were checking their contro ls to ascertain that, in particular the period 1995 - 2002, Iran had not been following its research programme, on the 9 th Jan uary Tehran took the decision to break the AIEA seals at the Natanz site and so setting off an internat ional crisis. Iran seemed not to have the plants nor the technology available , nor the need to produce nuclear energy for civil purposes and so it seemed the uran ium enrichment that they were doing was for military purposes. And above all the plant at Bushehr, bu ilt thanks to the expertise of the Russ ia in 1 995 was the biggest concern. Namely because the amount of combustible energy it was consuming was out of place for its activities, unless of course it was
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being used to conduct experiments on enriching uranium. And the required step via uranium enrichment from civil use to military use is truly short. Russia had offered a poss ib le solution to the crisis guaranteeing that the process of uranium enrichment wou ld take place on its own territories, under the full control of the international authorities. Iran has refused until today this offer because it be lieves the tests and research are completely legitimate and all is legal and completely satisfactory with the concept of the rights of a sovereign state. T he only nuclear power stat ion currently in use is that one of Bushehr - wh ile in construct ion is the plant at Ahwaz , and the nuclear installations for the enrichment of uranium in Karaj, Arak, Natanz and lsfahan. The uranium t hat is to be used for the process is to come from Savand and Yazd. The continual attitude of President Ahmadinejad in h is 'face - to - face' meetings w ith the AIEA, and especially the United States, has not been confrontational. Even in front of the UN and its economic sanctions , it hasn't been enough to make the radical leader to follow a
11 - OIKOS
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more milder line. For Iran it seems to have become an issue of in ternationa l kudos to be able to follow its own nuclear regime. The AIEA, meeting at the beginning of February at his general headquarters in Vienna, said that the possibility of negotiations has been kept open and that the situation is not irrecoverab le, but the stance taken remains fundamental if the situation is not to become further complicated. The ex - pres)dent of Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, has denounced the Ahmadinejad's attitude, publicly declaring the necessity of greater time for reflect ion, this from one of . the wisest men involved in the handli ng of t his nuclear dossier. Even in Iran, however, disregarding the hard -line position of the USA, Europe, Russia and China, the virulent words of the current President doesn't represent the best way to escape from this crisis.
CONCLUSION
We will try and concentrate our conclusions on the geo- political choices of Iran : the sense of encirclement which makes Tehran fee l the victim is reinforced by various objective facts, firstly the unstable situation all around its borders, together with the threatening American presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and Washington's influence on Pakistani politics. Israel for one feels the 'nuclear' threat of Iran, especially after an i ntelligence operation which resulted in it being classified as Top Priority in 2005. A series of sites unheard of by the international authorities, and where any possible uranium enrichment might well be happening, have been targeted by the Israel i Army, just as they did to the Iranian nuclear reactor Osirak in 198 1. Its Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, has commented on the rece nt speech by President Ahmedinejad against Israel, unde r l i ning the danger of an Iran with a nuclear arsenal but appealing at th e same t ime to the Iranian busi ness world about the way the conservative
extremists are floating in from the fringes and into real political power (6th Herzliya Conference, January 2006). If the United States and the allies of Israe l f eel threate ned by the Islamic state, they should remember that firstly in this delicate question there are two other big players; Russia and China. The challenges and the opportunities that the growing economic and military power of Iran poses, are r ising, and the UN forces, in a different mode in respect to the sanctions, are following any potential AIEA infringements by their nuc lea r programme. China and Russia have the power to veto from within the UN Security Council and are very inte rested in the diplomatic connect ions within the region. The Chinese government has invested millions of dollars to ensure receiving Iranian gas, in particular from Yadavaran. In 2004 Chinese businesses i mported a large amount of Iranian gas, contravening the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act t hat penalized any fo reign company that i nvested more than 20 million doll ars in the country. Additionally, China and Russia have sold arms and technology to Iran and this trend is surely set to grow. Also not forgett ing that the entire Shiite world is always watching Iran as a point of reference. And Iranians are agitated by the American p res ence in Iraq, for the sheer numbers and the current situation. Tehran can perceive the poss ible split in the Shiite unity. Even the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shiite gro up active in Syria and Iraq, the Sunnites of the Palestinian Ji had and the Hamas Party are following attentively what is happening in Tehran. After t he electoral victory de livered by Hamas on January 25, now and the months th at follow could bring either positve or negative effects to t he Israel -Arab peace process and the Iranian situation. A lot depends on the far-sightedness of their po lit ical leaders and on the capacity of mediation that they demonstrate to the principal international organizations. It wi ll be above all the economic envi ronment where the best cards could be played. The soft-
Missile systems Denomination
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OIKOS-12
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er positions taken up t il l now by t he EU against Iran are primarily in consideration t o the large dependence th at coun tries like Germany, Fra nce and Great TURKMENISTAN Britain have on Iran ian •energy supplies and o n the large amount of fina ncial invo lvement they have in many di fferent Irania n economic sectors. Iran is the main commercial partner from the Islamic republics to the EU. In 2002 alone Italy had an inc rease of 53% to their Iran ian exports fro m the previou s year . Companies that operate in Iran f) • include; Eni , Ansaldo Ene rgia, 1 Oeztol • Dan ie l i , Tec hn ipet rol, Snam Proget t i , Technip Italia, Sandel, Alstom Power Italia, the con sortium Sms Dasmag, Ed ison, Nuovo Pignone and Fata Engineering. At a European leve l, created during the period of the Khatami presidency, the High - Level Working Group on Trade and Investment created the Tra de and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) i n wh ich negotiations started i n 2002. The success of the conservatives in the 2004 elections has ARAB I A stal led negot iat io ns, not helped by the Ahmadinejad speech against Israel and the renewal of nuclear testing . Currently the tages, geo- political posit io n and its natural EU is the n um ber one import source into Iran resources, are at its disposal and uti lized t o gain (44% of total) followed by China (7 .8%), Un ited unden iab le benefits. Otherwise its prio rities are Arab Em irates (6.4%) and South Korea (6 .3%) . Its li bera lizat ion and democrati zation of society. unlu cky that their would eve r be an emba rgo on The strug g le for human rights and the safeIranian oi l by the UN because it is so impo rtant guardi ng of l iberty - freque nt ly trampled on d urto t he we stern markets b ut rather a focus in g on ing the reig n of the Ayatollah (for exam pl e; free t he trade in electron ic equipment, techno logy dom of the press, of expression , of political disand arm s. Iran has a desperate need for sension) - and above all the battle for the increased foreign investment and mustn't lose improve ment of t he economy and the inte rnal any type of advantage that could be gai ned by redistribution of wealth. moving away from po litica l isolation is m would b ri ng. The United States and the European Unio n must in a way t hat doesn't abandon th e prog resTehran has a clear need to sort out its polit ical sive forces and the reforming push t hat exists in alliances, in terms of friends or foes, and of Iran, make Iran a reliable partner in their ecocourse express its true internat ional wi ll. In thi s nomi c and po litical plan, and he lp o rgani ze a regard it's clear that its interests strongly cl ash more re laxed environment in all the middle-east wit h those of America, t he super- power, and in particu lar with the Greater Middle East. It's and Asia Central. important t hat Tehran conducts its po litics in a Andrea Margelletti wise and balan ced way, so as to not isolate itself and t o do it in such a way that its key advan Presiden t, Centre of International Studies
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13 - OIKOS
THE IRANIAN DILEMMA Three good reasons for avoiding a military intervention The American political expert, Edward N. Luttwak, explains the reasons why. We propose his point of view to our readers with the certainty that the renowned political scientist, the eminent scholar of military problems, the famous writer and, above all, the Advisor to the State and Defence Departments of the United States may offer a valid contribution for understanding what is happening and what could happen in those faraway latitudes.
The last time the use of force in Iran was seriously considered in the Pentagon, much larger operations were envisaged than the bombing of a few uranium-enrichment installations. The mission was so demanding that a complete light-infantry division would only suffice as an advance guard to screen the build - up of the main forces, and that too only because the mountainous terrain so greatly favoured the defense. The total number of troops in action wou ld easily exceed the max i mum total fielded by the United States and its allies in Iraq si nce 2003. Most would be Iranian, un its of t he US equipped, US-trained army, because the mission was to defend the country from a Soviet invasion thrust to the Persian Gulf, in which motor-rifle divisions would descend from t he Armenian and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics to link up with airborne divisions sent ahead to seize the oil ports. Although that bit of 1978 contingency planning reflected good Intelligence on the transformation of the Soviet Army from ponderous battering ram to fast- paced maneuver force, it was Afghan istan rather than Iran that was the target-and with good reason. In facing the advent u rism of the exceedingly well - armed Soviet Union i n its final stage of m i litarist decl i ne, the government of I ran could rely on the protection of the American alliance in place ever since 1946, when the Truman Administration blocked Stalin's attempt to partition the country. From then onwards, and even in the perilo us circumstances envisaged in 1978, the United States stood ready to risk the lives of American troops to defend I ran - it was that important in American strategy . The reason was not just the o il, although it had counted for much more in 1946 tha n it does now, because there was as yet no oi l pro duction to speak of in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or
OIKOS - 14
Abu Dhabi, and Iraq was t he only other oil exporter in the region . Actual ly the geography of Iran was and is even more significant than its geology. During the Cold War, it was its north ern border on either side of the Caspia n sea and across its waters that was of greater consequence an essentia l segment of the Cold War perimeter of containment. Now it is mostly Iran's very long souther n coastline t hat is of strategic importance. It dominates the entire Persian Gulf from the narrow entrance between Oman and Iran at t he straits of Hormuz, to the thin wedge of Iraqi territory at its head .All the offshore o i l and gas production platforms in the Persian Gulf, all the t raffi c of oil and gas tankers that originates from the loading jet ties of the Arabian peninsula and Iraq are within easy reach of the Iranian coast. Unchanging geographic realities thus favor a strategic alliance between the United States and Iran with major be nefits fo r each side. Only the strategic reach of the distant United States can secure Iran from the power of the Russians nearby -not even now in abeyance as recent nuclear diplomacy shows, and much more likely to revive in the future than to decline. On ly a friendly Iran ca n keep troublemakers away from the oil installations on the Arab side of the Gulf, where there are only weak and corrupted desert dynasties to protect them. The vehement rejection of the American alliance by the religious extremists w ho have ruled Iran ever since the fall of the Shah in 1979, therefore violates the natu ra l order of things, at a cumulatively huge cost for their subj ects, starting with the 600,000 dead and uncounted invalids of the 1980- 1988 Iraq war that American protection would cert ainly have averted, and cont inuing till now wit h the costs and inconven ien ces of the American embargo. T hat of course is on ly one of the ways i n
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
which the rul ing extremis t s oppose the natural order of things, thereby being forced into fanatical posturing not to advance any revolu-
langu ages, a deprivation hardly felt when i l literacy was st ill the norm, but now bitter ly resented by ever growing numbers.
tionary agenda, but merely to maintain them-
The Kurds account for some 9% of Iran's pop-
selves in power. This most paradoxical radical ism, that seeks to conserve rather than change anything at all , cannot endure i n the long run, for the inhabitants of Iran are bipeds of middling sensual ity just like the rest of us , and extremist norms can only be imposed on them by brute force. The most obvious evidence of Iranian opinion about the regime is the impulse to emigrate which has formed a vast and still growing diaspora, composed of a handful of polit ical exiles and millions of ordinary people who could have prospered in Iran and made Iran prosperous, but for their refusal to live under t he rule of rel ig ious fanatics. It is even more t han human nature that the regime must resist every day, for it also collides with the cultures of Iran. Almost half the popu lation is not Pers ian, yet under an official Persian nationalism that dates back to the 1920s -it is the only remnant of the Shah's imperial regime that Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors have left entirely untouched- all other nationalities are suppressed, educationally first of all because only Persia n-languag e teaching is al lowed , except for ArmenianChristian and Jewish re lig ious instruction. T his linguistic imperialism condemns al l the other non-Persians of Iran to illiteracy in their own
ulation, and the i r national sentiments have certain ly been strengthened by the example of virtu al Kurd ish independence in Iraq next doo r . As their demands for cultu ral autonomy become more forceful, something of an insu rgency seems to have started in the Ku rdish-inhabited parts of north-west Iran. Smalle r nationalities that are known to be disaffected because of recent acts of violent resistance, include the Arabs at 3% of Iran's population and the Baluch of the sout h-east at 2%. Little is known of the intensity of the national sentiments of the Turkmen and Lurs, each of wh ich accounts for some 2% of Iran ' s populat ion, whi le the Gilaki and Mazandarani, who are four times as numerous, may be cultura l ly and political ly ass i m ilated, if only because their languages are Persian dialects. Along wit h the Kurds, all the sma ller nat iona l ities, whether in revolt or not, amount to only a quarter of Iran's population, but the Turkish-speaking Azeris add another quarter at least all by themselves. Many Azeri famil ie s, i n Tehran especially, are thought to be thoroughly assimilated, with only a folkloric interest in the ir origins if that , but many more Azeris increasingly affirm their Turkic national ident ity, and groups calling for cultural autonomy or even separation have become increas-
15 - OIKOS
A 8-2 "Spirit" U.S. bomber.
ingly active among them. Since Azerbaijan just across the border gained its independence from the Soviet Union, the Azeris have had a nation al home of their own, and it is not Iran .. The religious extremism of Iran's rulers has further fractu red the cou ntry's unity. The ir discrimi natory practices arouse the resentment not only of t he non - Muslim Baha is , Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians who conjointly amount to less than 2% of the population, but also of the Sunnis who form at least 9%. In Teh ran, where more than a million of them l ive, the Sunnis are not allowed to have their own mosque -as they have in both Rome and Tel Aviv, as well as i n Washington.DC. The last attempt to build one was blocked by the former mayor of Tehran and current President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose advent marks a definite shift from the institutionalized extremism i n place since the fall of the Shah in 1 979, to a more strident ultra-extremism that frightens many in Iran , while inspiring hope in others for it denotes a degenerat ing reg ime. T rue , under Iran's theocratic and most undemocratic constitution the elected Pres ident must obey the unelected "Leader", a cleric of Ayatollah rank at least, just as the elected Maj l is parliament is subordinated to the une lected "Cou ncil of Guardians". Hence the views of the previous Presi dent , the elegant, learned and utterly ineffectual Seyyed Mohammad Khatami mat-
OIKOS - 16
tered not at all (though fools still quote his impecca b ly l ibe ral inter-faith pronouncements), as all the Western officials who wasted the i r time in negotiating with him soon discovered. But Khatami was powerless because he was out of step with a regime that is reacting to its ever i ncreasing unpopularity by becoming even more extreme. Ahmedinejad by contrast exemplifies that very trend. Although the world now knows him for his pers istent denial of the ho loca ust and his daily r ants against Israe l and Zionism -b lamed for absolutely everything he dislikes from Danish cartoons to terrorism in Iraq - Ahmadinejad is not known to have acted in any way agai nst the Jews of Tehran while he was mayor, nor has he acted against the Jews of Iran as a whole since becoming Pres ident, adding nothing to previous impositions and restrictions. Nor did he respond to the letter that Haroun Yashayaei, head of Iran's Jewish community, f elt free to circulate to the press denouncing his statements on the holocaust. By contrast, Ahmedinejad has been active ly hostile to Iran's Sunnis, and the re ligious dimension of his ultra-extremism is now antagonizing even many of his fellow Shi'is, because he is an enthusiastic follower of both Ayato l lah Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, for whom al l current prohib itions are insufficient and who would impose an even stricte r puri -
Rivista Militare English Edition
tanism, and of the messianic, end-of-days, Mahdivat cult centered on the Jamkaran mosque outside Qum. More traditional believers are alarmed by the hysterical calls of the Jam karan pilgrims for the return of the hidden 12th Imam-they fee l that as the Mahdi, the Shi'i messiah, he should have the prerogative of set ting the date of his own return- and more urgently they also fear that Ahmedinejad may try to "force" the return of th e 12 th Imam, by deliberately provoking a catastrophic attack on Iran that he would have to avert. The shift from everyday extrem ism to a more active ultra-extremism is also manifest in the persecution of heterodox Shi'is, both the Ahl-el Haqq of Western Iran, and the far more numerous Sufi brotherhoods, who were previously left alone even by the rigorously fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini (who himself wrote his final test ament in the form of a typically Sufi allegory). Now by contrast, Sufi gathering places are forcibly closed or attacked, and a major center in the theological capital of Qum was demolished, with hundreds of protesti ng Sufi dervishes arrested in the process. The persecuted re ligions and sects cannot be added to the oppressed nat iona lities without much double counting (most of the Sunnis are also Kurds), and i n any case the regime is opposed to the Persian majority cultL1re as well,
because it relent lessly Favors an essential ly Arab Islam ic culture i nstead. It therefore C!:>ndemns universally beloved pre-Islamic customs such as the fire-jumping that precedes the Nowruz celebrations of the Zoroastrian new year each spring, and more genera l ly it elevates narrow religion above one of the major cu ltures of the world, widely influent ial from the Balkans to Bengal. Well known in the West since the nineteenth century , Persian epic poetry and love songs are widely echoed in the literature and music of T urkey, all of central Asia and much of the Ind ia n sub - continent, and whi le the specifically Persian arts of the miniature and the woven carpet are consciously imitated , few Arabs , Turks, Pakistanis or northern Indians know how much of their material cu l ture is actually Persian , including many of the best dishes of their cuis ines: the now ubi qu itous tandoor for example, is simply the Persian (and Hebrew) word for fire-oven. This cultural dimension is highly significant for the Persians of the Iranian d iaspora, for it gives them a stro ng sense of identity i n good working order, quite independently of Islam. Only a few have converted to Christianity or are seriously engaged i n the Zoroas t rian revival promoted by some exiles , but most have react-
11.
1/2006
ed to the relentlessly fanatical Islam of Iran's present ru lers by becoming post- Islamic, that is essentially secular but for a sentimental attachment to certain prayers and rituals. In t"his, the exiles are presaging the future of Iran itself. In contemplating mi I ita ry action against I ran, it is important to re call these fundamenta l realities that are now submerged but wh ich will certainly reasse rt themselves, as f undamentals always do. The perfectly valid analogy is w ith the collapse of Communism in eastern Europe and Russia, and the retreat of Chinese communism to the political realm alone. In both cases, for all the vast prete ns ions, depredations, massacres and destructions of Communist rule, local cultures and histo r ic identities re emerged essentially unchanged-except of course for a very principled and uncompromising refusal of political oppression . It will be just the same in Iran, when the fanatics who now oppress the non -fanati cal majority lose power, as they inevitably will. Along with the re-emergence of the country's suppressed Westernization, and the restoration of its own secular Persian culture which the clerics have tried and fai led to Arabize, the United States will certainly return on the scene as Iran's ally, as will Israel no doubt. Bu t not everything will be th e same as before, for thP long and bitter yea r s of religious oppress ion will have engendered the wor ld's first postIslamic society, with widespread disaffiliation, many conversions to more tolerant variants of Islam or to other and milder religions, but in any case with all clerics confined to apol itical liturg ies, and stripped of any political o r ju d icial power. T he lo ng - te r m co nsequences of any American military action cannot t herefo re be disrega rded. Iranians at large - our once and future allies - do not view themselves as enemies of the United States but rather as the exact opposite , and must not be made to feel that they were attacked by the very country they most admire, where so many of their friends and relatives have so greatly prospe red. That is one exce llent reason not to bomb Iran ' s nuclear instal lations, even though the essentia l bui ldings could be destroyed in a sin gle n ight by les s than four hundred precision weapons, w ithout i nflicting civilian casualt ie s, ba r ring the gross mechanical errors that rarely occur these days . In the meantime, while waiting for the emergence of the future post - Islam ic Iran, the United States must contend with the regime in power, which started off in 1979 with t he
17 - OIKOS
A view of the square of lsfahan.
immense moral authority of Ayato l lah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially the consensua l and most latitudinar ian leader of absolutely everyone in Iran except for the Shah ' s int imates old - line Tudeh Communists, assorted vio lent radicals, Western izing liberals, traditional bazaar merchants, modernizing middle classes , the urban poor, rura l land lords, and Muslim bel ievers of all kinds, from the moderately devout and qu iet i st to the fanatica l c ler ics of the more extreme theo logica l schools . Except for the latter, al l the members of this broad coalition of the de luded were excluded one by one from any share of power, and then various ly outlawed, i mpr isoned, executed, oppressed or at least marginalized and ignored, leaving the more fanatica l cler ics in fu ll co ntro l. In it ially they st il l had Khome i ni's prestige to justify their power, and still enjoyed the traditional respect that many Iranians used to fee l for the clerics of Shi'i Is la m . That is al most ent ire ly gone now, replaced by resentment and contempt . Too many c ler ics have used their official government positions, or their co ntrol of confiscated property placed in Is lamic trusts, to
O IKOS - 18
enrich themselves and their families. T oo many have operated scams of all kinds to d ivert o i l revenues or to over- charge the government, not only to fund the hugely swo l len theo log ica l schoo ls whose hordes of pious id lers must be fed and c lothed, but also for their persona l be nefit. The most notorious of all of them, A li Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjan i, low-ranking cleric by trade , twice Pres ident of the Is lam ic republic from 1989 to 1997, perennial candidate for anot he r te r m , chairman of the une lected but powerfu l "Expediency Discernment Council" and a top adv isor to the Leader Ayatollah SeyyedAl i Khamenei , is widely believed t o have become Iran's richest man. Born Hashem i Bahraman i he renamed hims el f Rafsanjani, i. e . of the prov i nce of Rafsanjan , wh ich is on ly fair because he now owns so many of its famous p istachio orchards . Under the Shah , the notor ious corruption of government contracting added some l 5% to the cost of everyth ing that was bought, from fert ilizers for the Min istry of Ag r icu lture t o helicopters . Now the graft it is more l i ke 30%, and it turns out that the fam ily a nd cronies of the
Rivis!a Militare English Edition n. 112006
shah were paragons of self- restraint compared to the clerics, whether ayato llah ozmas o r ' grand ayatol lah's, plain ayato ll ahs , hojj at ul islams (Rafsanjani's rank), o r humbler t haqqat ul !s lams. T hey form an entire class of clerical exploiters w hi ch does not even have the authority of anc ien t orig ins: the Persian s were only converted to Shi'ism in the sixt eenth cen tu ry -mostly by brutal compulsion - but the Sh i'i hierarchy and its ranks are far more recent , not even a centu ry old. So t here is no deeply ingraine d acceptance of cle r ica l rank and c leri ca l luxu ry as t here is in Catholicism, whose bishops live in buildings officially designated as palaces, w hose cardina ls are expected to enjoy an aristocrat ic standard of l iv in g, a nd which has dist i nct mend icant orders for those who prefer more austere versions of t he faith. A bit t er anti -cl eri ca lis m is now widespread in Iran, as it never was before. Th e tai lor shop s of Qu m, which specialize in turning the best Italian worsted wool c loths into the flow in g robes of Hojatol las an d hi gher ranks, now do a brisk business i n ordinary business suits, because clerics go ing i nto T ehran in t he ir trad itiona l headgear and robes are i nsulted by total strangers, pushed into the gutter by uns een hands , p umme led i n crowds, and often left standing when trying to hai l a taxi - ma ny o f the driver s have now rdirieu Lhe Led1n i 4ue , first slowin g dow n as if to pick up the cleric, then speed in g away. Having lost all of its mo ral authority, the reg im e must survive on its direct power of coercio n alone, derived from the brutish part-time Basij militia of poor il lite rates, who really need the modest hando uts they receive, and from the f ull-ti me Pasdaran lnqil ab (" revolut io na ry guards") forces which in clude heavi ly armed ground, air and naval units, but w hose men can sti ll be used as enforcers against protesting civi lian s. It is one more symptom of t he reg ime's degeneration that although the Pasd aran are well paid by local standards, many of them complement their salaries with the inco me of a variety of legal and illegal bus inesses, from l ig ht manufacturing to contraband across the Persian Gu lf. The Pasdaran's naval arm operates fast patrol boats from seve n Iranian ports and the Halul o il platform, and they are often used to smuggle in products from th e port of Dubai(!), both embargoes items for national purposes, and also perfu mes and other lux ury products for th ei r p r ivate money-mak ing . With t he rise of A hmad inejad, the f irst non cleric to win Iran' s pres id ency and h imse lf a former engineering officer i n its ranks, t he Pasdaran have become an im porta nt po l it ica l
factio n as we ll as a m ilitary force, a po litical ge nd armerie , and a bus iness conglomerate. Ahmadinejad is untroub le d by t hat confusion of i:oles - itself evidence of a r eg im e in accelerated decadence-and goes ou t of h is way to procla im his continuing Pasdaran all eg ianc e, evi dently his powe r base. In fac t Ahmadi nejad's unkempt appearance is not merely th e result of boorish if not outrightly u nhyg ie nic groom i ng, for it is in the approved Pasdaran sty le - the simu late d j ust- off- the-battlefield look of men who have not been in combat since the IranIraq wa r than ended in 1 988. With th is we come to the second good reason not to bomb Iran's nuclear i nst al lat ions, or even to make a large f uss about them. In essence we should not bomb Iran because the worst of its leaders posit ively want t o be bombed - and are doing thei r level best to bring that about. When a once broad ly popu la r reg i me i s reduced to t he final extremity of relying on rep ressi on alone , when its leade rshi p degenerat es from an ico ni c Khome ini all the way down to a n Ahmadinejad , it can on ly benefit from bein g e ngage d or eve n t hreate ne d by the great powers of the world - a co ntemptuous in d iff erence would be far more damaging to it. H is own and the regime 's frant ic extremism reflects a fu lly ju st ifi ed sense of insecu rity, given th e host ility and disgust of th e popu lat io n at large . In a po l it ical maneuver that should be more tra nsparent t han it appare ntl y is for many peo ple , Ahmadin ejad ke eps trying t o evoke nation al ist support at home by provoking hostile react ions abroad, through ever more outra geous threats , incl udi ng his repe ated declarat ions that Iran is about to repudiate the Non Proliferation Treaty it rat if ied i n 1970, his cal ls for the destruct io n of Is rael, and h is especially clumsy vers ion of holocaust de n ial , which is pla i nly an embarrassment even to ot her reg i me extremists. That is how Iran's presen t at ion of its nuclear program should also be interpreted -a s a deliberate attempt to arouse fo reign opposi tion, in order to ga i n sup port at home. Its aim is to in duce an urgent sense of cr isi s over very slow and repeatedly interrupted efforts that start ed more than thirty years ago, and wh ich are stil l years away from producin g a bomb . It w as as far back as August 1 974 , when the overn ight t ripl i ng of Iran' s o il reven ues seeme d to offer bound less oppo rtunit ies, t hat the Sha h pub l ic ly announced h is intention t o fund the building of 23 nuclear reactors with an electr icity- prod uci ng capacity of 1,000 megawatts each - - a huge total, enough to supply Iran's
A typical Persian village.
entire demand. His declared aim was to p rese rve the "nob le " commodity of oil for t he more valuable extract ion of petrochemicals, instead of burning it as furnace fuel - and that almost made econom ic sense at the time. Many sus pected that the Shah's real aim was to acq uire nuclear weapons and they were right as we now
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know, because he was seeking to buy ballistic missiles as well , but he d id at le ast have a plausible explanation because the full extent of Iran's nat ural gas potential was not yet known. But t he Shah's 1974 cover-story cannot dece ive anyone at al l in 2006, because w ith its 812 tril l ion cubic feet of fully proven reserves, l 5% of the wor ld ' s total and seco nd only to Russia's - proportionately much more than Iran's oil reserves that are sma l ler t han t hose of Ir aq , Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or even Abu Dhabi- Iran
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the Shah but in Ju ly 1979, after the expenditure of some two and a half billion dollars, the Germans abandoned Bushehr because the new revo lutio nary rulers refused to make a 450 mil.iion dollar prog ress payment that was overdue. It seems that Ayatollah Khomeini opposed nuc lear devilry - it is certainly unmentioned in the Koran - and besides, anything done by the Shah was viewed with great suspicion. At that point, one reactor (Bushehr I) was dec lared by the Germans to be 85% completed and the other (Bushehr 11) 50% complete, but both we re damaged by Iraq i bombing during the war that lasted until l 988 (especially a series of March 1984 air strikes almost certa inly flown by seconded French Navy pilots), and when Siemens was aske d to come back to complete the work, it refused knowing that the Ge r man Government would never allow the contract to proceed. Negotiations with the Russians soon sta rted but because of quarre ling within Iran and very protracted hagg li ng with the Atomic Energy Ministry Minatom , headed by Evge ny Adamov (who would be arrested in 2005 on fraud charges in Bern, Switze r land) and not only in the inte rest of the respective governments it seems, because negotiators on each side had u rg ent personal expenses to cover as well, no agree ment was reached until 1995 , when the t hen President
can cheaply generate all the electricity it wants with turbines. The Shah contracted in 1975 with t he French for the enriched uran ium with a billion-dollar down payment, and with the Kraftwerk Union consortium of Siemens and A.E.G. Telefunken, as well as with T hyssenKrupp AG to build the first two pressurized light-water reactors and their generating units near Iran's major port city of Bushehr, for a total of more than four billion dollars. Work progressed rapidly unti l the fal l of
of
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American objections to approve t he delivery of a VVER- l 000 pressurized I ig ht wate r reactor powered by slight ly enriched uran ium rods. Delivered as a single if la rge module (VVERs power submarines), the reactor was to be fitted into the Bus hehr I building which was to be quickly repaired, adapted and completed by Iranian as well as Russian civil engineering con t racto rs supervised by Minatom . But there were problems, more or less the same o nes that may be encountered in remodeling a suburban kitc hen, though on a somewhat larger scale of course: as of th is writing, some eleven years from the signature of the contract to complete an 85% completed build ing and install a readymade reactor module, some 2,500 Russian technicians are still hard at work in famously hot Bushehr, but the reactor is sti ll not quite ready. The United States had originally opposed the Minatom contract, but now accepts that all is proceed in g under strict safeguards - the Russ ians alone are to process the uranium rods - and besides, Minatom's honesty, efficiency an d rapidity as a contractor is someth ing of a safeguard in itse lf. Much more is known of the Bushehr reactors than of Iran's secret program to produce weapon - grade uranium by the centrifuge
21 - OIKOS
The Shah Safi mausoleum near Ardabil.
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process, but there is absol ute ly no reason to believe that it is an entirely different set of Iranians who are in charge, each and all incorruptible and high ly expert monsters of efficiency. One thing that is k nown with certainty is that in 1995 the supposedly¡ eminent Pakistani scientific wizard Abdul Qadeer Khan, after whom hospitals and schools are named, a metallurgist by t rade and more precisely a thief and smug gler who has never invented or developed anything at all, agreed to sell to Iran the complete centrifuge technology package he had stolen from the European URENCO consortium while working in a modest capacity for one of its Dutch sub-contractors, samples of Pakistan imade centrifuges, full-scale plans for a heavy water and pluton ium reactor and separation plant, and also the drawings and calculations for a cannon-type uranium bomb that Pakistan had originally received from China. Khan did not apparently sell the two first stages of the entire separation process, the straightforward crushing and leachi ng needed to extract concentrated natu ral uranium or "yel lowcake " from uranium ore, and t he less simple but not all that sophist icated chemical plant needed to convert yellowcake into the gas uranium hexafluoride which is fed i nto centrifuges - but China did that in 1996, selling the detai led and complele pldri!:> arid bluepririL:, when Lhe United States successfully objected to the sale of the plant itse lf. It is now completed and installed as big as lif e near lsp hahan, ready for use and already tested apparently, and which could be just as readily be incapacitated with less than twelve 1,000-pound bombs judging by the photographs, though of course that sort of target would have to be revisited periodically, because chemical plants are easily repaired even after t he ir spectacular destruction. But the core technology in the package was that of the centrifuges themselves, not the ultra- fast, highly efficient carbon - fiber units that URENCO uses now, but two ea rly 1970s models, one built out of dense aluminum that is easier to manufacture with the right machinery which its German producer will sell to anyone at all, it seems (" how can we possibly know ... etc. etc), and a more efficient maraging steel model that is a good harder to manufacture - both themselves derived from a 1957 German des ign which was actually an improved version of the original alum inum centrifuges developed in the Soviet Union by the usual team of captured German scientists - its Von Braun was Gernot Zippe, who emigrated to the University of Virginia when re leased, before return in g to Germany to produce his devices indu strially.
Because the needed U-235 isotope of ura niu m with which bombs are made in high proportions and reactors are fueled in low proportions, is only 1.26% li ghter than the mass of U-2 38 that makes up 99.3% of natural u ranium, only very fast centrifuges are of any practical use, turning at the rate of at least l ,500 revol utions per second, a hundred times as fast as a domestic washing machine. Things that turn that fast easily break apart, and the detailed design is also far from simple : to reduce fr iction that would otherwise generate enough heat to melt the whole th ing, the electrically- powered rotor must spin in a vacuum, with a magnetic bear ing. The Japa nese , who are generally be lieved to be somewhat more advanced than the Iranians in such matters, encountered considerable difficulties in manufacturing their centrifuges. Nor could Khan possibly sell enough centrifuges to Iran: to separate U-235 for a bomb in less than many years, many centrifuges must be set to work at once , connected by piping to form a so -called "cascade" , and with the centrif uge des ign t hat Iran has it would take at least l ,000 centrifuges working round the clock for at least a year to produce enough U- 2 3 5 for a single cannon - type uran ium bomb. But first those l ,000 centrifuges must be manufactured and connected into cascades- and they must noL break down as poorly-made centrifuges will: of t he 164 centrifuges t hat Iran already had in motion when the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Authority shut down t he cascade in November 2003, one third crashed when the elect ricity was turned off Nor is it easy to keep the cascade run ning co rrectly: because u ranium hexafluoride becomes h ighly corrosive and can easily perforate imperf ect tubes - and any leaks would promptly damage more of the p lant. But there was one potential obstac le to Iran' s quest for U-235 that proved to be entirely insig nificant: European firms , mostly German and Swiss, not only eagerly sold the highstrengt h aluminum , special maraging steel, electron-beam welders, balanc i ng machines, vacuum pumps, n ume r ical ly- controlled machine too ls, and very specialized flow-forming machines for both aluminum and maraging steel, but also trained Iranians in the use of a ll this equipment, and -remarkably, or perhaps not, they were also willing to trai n Iranians in the processes specifically needed to manufacture centrifuges whose only possible purpose is to enrich uranium U- 235. When the insp ectors of the International Atomic Ene rgy Authority came ro und, they were ab le to read and photograph the labels on all t he equipment, which
2
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neither the manufacturers nor the Iranians had bothered to remove. It remains to be seen if any consequences will ensue. Yet, in spite of al l the industria l assist ance so willingly so ld to th em , it is not clear that the Iranian nuc le ar organi zat ion can manufacture ce ntrifuge cascades of sufficient m ag nitude, efficien cy and rel iabi l ity. The re are a great many talent ed engineers among t he Iran ian exiles in the Un it ed States and els ewhe re in the world, but perhaps not that ma ny in Iran itse lf; besides, d emanding techno logical effo rts require we ll- organ ized labo rato r ies and industrial facilities , and not just individua l talents. Organization is indeed Iran's weakness point, with weighty consequences : after a century of oil dril lin g in Iran, the state o il company cannot drill explo ratory wells without foreign assis tance - lately from a Roma ni an ri g at one lo cation - and Romania is scarcely at the leadin g edge in oil drilling ; even thoug h t he US embargo was imposed almost twenty-five years ago, local indus t ry still cannot reverse engineer and manufactu r e replacem ent parts of adequate qua lity for US-made aircraft, wh ich must therefore rem ain grou nd ed or fly at great peril there have bee n many air crashes. In Israel by contrast, within five years of t he 1967 French embargo on t he sale of Mirage V f ight ers, locally produced copies we1¡e already in full ope rational service. Likewise, after more than sixty years of experience with o il refining at Abadan, existi ng capacity cannot be i ncreased w ithout foreign engineering contractors, while the building of new re fi neries with local talent alone is deemed quite imposs ib le , so that Iran must import o ne t h i rd of its gasoline consumption that it cannot refine at home. T hat is the thi rd reason not to bomb Iran's nuclear instal lations at this time : th ey certainly cannot produce n uclear weapons in less t han th ree years, and may not be able to do so even then, becau se of the many technical difficulties not yet overcome. How can peop le unab le to cut metal for replaceme nt parts for US- buil t aircraft w it h enough precision to keep them flying , man ufacture effective centrifuges by t he hundreds, and assemb le them in functioning cas cades7 True, the nuclear p rogram might be different because it clearly has priority over everything else, an d r eceives fund i ng in huge amounts in a cou ntry filled with poverty in spite of vastly inc reased oil revenues of late: with a pop ul ation of almost seventy million, oil revenues even now u nd er forty bi ll ion come to less than$ 6,000 per head , whi le the non - oil econ omy is miserably unproductive and ad d less than$ 2 ,00 0 at mo st.
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T here are no reliable expenditure numbers for the nuc lear p rogram but there is no need of numbe rs to establish its sheer magnitude. When the instal lations and activit ies of Iran's secret program were ad ded i n August 2002 to t hose already pub licly k nown, t he total i nclud ed the Saghand ore proces sin g p lant at the ura nium mine , the Tehran Nuclear Research Center with its very old US- supplied 5-m egawatt research reactor, the Nuclear Techno logy Center at lsfahan with four sma ll resea rc h reactors , the lsp hahan Zircon ium production plant, the Bonab Atomic Energy Resea rch Center, the Anarak nuc lear waste storage site near Yazd, the Ardekan n uclear fuel plant, the shu t - down L'ashkar Ab'ad laser isotope separation pla nt, the less define d Parc hi m, Lavizan II and Chalous faci lities and the Yazd Radiation Process ing Ce nter, as well as the more impo rtant ins t allations already mentioned , t he Bus heh r reactor, t he lsphahan uran i um hexafl uor id e conversion plant, t he heavy water and plutonium reacto r and separation plant at Arak near th e Kara-Chai r iver some 1 50 miles so uth of Te hran, and t he huge Natanz centrifuge complex between lsphahan and Kashan (at 33?43 '24.43 " N, 5174 3' 37.SS"E, in case any friendly p ilot should ask). It contains more than two dozen separate build ings within a perimet er of no less than 4.7 mi les , tJuL of greatest interest are the two huge underground halls of 250 ,000 squ are f eet each. Bu il t with wa lls six f eet thick and protected by two concrete roofs wit h sand and rocks i n between and ove rcast on top - impressive to contemplate bu t no d ice against today's pe netrat i ng munitions these ha lls are l ar ge enough to hold as many ce ntrif uges as t he Iranians could possibly want to make any number of ura nium bombs, or to fuel many reactors - always ass um ing of course that they can successfully manufactu re, assemble and ope rate the centrifuge cascades . T hat is what Iranian spokesmen themse lves now claim, and none more emphatically t han President Ahmadi nejad, who insi sts that they have already mastere d all the requ ired processes and techniques, implyi ng the ab il ity to rap id ly p roduce highly enriched u ranium for bombs. Ahmadinejad's v iews, wh ich contradict the more optim istic view here endorsed, must of cou rs e be t aken very, very seriously, especially given h is own engineering PhD, though of cou rse that was a docto rate won i n a special program for Pasdaran veterans, and in the subject of urban t raffic management rather th an nu clear engineering. But what u ndermines confidence in Ahmadinejad's op ini on is his rath er expansive way w ith the facts. Most notably, he keeps
Rivis!a Militare English EdiliOIJ n. 1/2006
claiming that the centrifuge t echnology was actually developed by Iranians in Iran , that it is "the proud achievement of the Iranian nation", somehow overlooking the 99 . 99% of it that was purchased from the ¡ Pak istan i thief and smuggler . He also makes even larger claims, most recently for example on Ma rch 14 of this year , in a public speech in the beautiful mountain city of Gargan i n Golestan province , where after again describing the enrichmen t technology as Iran's very own scientific achievement, he added according to the offic ial translation: "Iranians have played a leading role throughout history ... with the lion's sha re in all the medical sciences, mathematics, astrology, arts, literature and engineering" . One presumes that t he translator confused astro logy with its near namesake i n whic h Iran was i ndeed the unchallenged leader, till the end of the fou rteenth century. Even casual observers cannot be unaware of t he exceptional detail of the world's knowledge of Iran's on ce secret nuclear program, as compared to what is known of North Korea's, and what was known of Iraq's at any point in time. Only a fract ion of what is known about Iran ' s i nstallations and processes at Arak, lsphahan, Natanz and all othe r places was uncovered by the much -advertised inspections of the International Atomic Energy Au t hority, whose recent Nobe l Prize must have been a rewar d fo r effurL rather than achievement. Satell ite photography is only part of the story because one needs to know where to look before it is usef ul. The co nclusion is inescapable that among the scientists, eng ineers and managers engag ed in Iran's nuclear program- most of whom no doubt hold the same opin ion of their ru lers as almost al l educated Iranians- there are some who feel and act on a higher loyalty to humanity than to the nationalism which the regime has discredited, thereby providing a continuing flow of detailed information. Iran's regime is ext remist but not totalitarian, and cannot control the movement of people and commun ications in and out of t he co untry, as No rth Korea does almost complet ely and Iraq did in lesser degree .. Becau se of t hi s co nt inuing flow of detailed and t i mely info r mation, it is both poss ible to target ai r stri kes accurately enough to seriously delay Iran's manufacture of nuclear weapons in a single night of operations - especia lly if new imports from Western Eu rope can be impeded and at the same time, there is no reason to do so premature ly , because t here will be ample time to act before it is too late, before enough fissi le material i s produced , that is. What gives great significance to the factor of time is of course the advanced stage of degenerat ion of
the reg ime wi t h its quarre llin g m ob of corrupt clerics, Pasdar an careerist s and fanat ical ult raextremists , whose antics presage t he inevitable ~nd. But h ig h oil p laces and the hand-outs are susta in ing t he regime j ust now, and it m ight last even without t hem simply because of the inertia of any dictatorship un defeated in wa r . There is certain ly no evidence to justify the ho pe that t he regime will fal l before it acqui r es nuclear weapons - but because t here is st ill t i me, it is not irresponsib le to ho pe just t hat. By the same token, none of t he argum ents advanced to j ustify coexistence wit h a future nuc lear- armed Iran are persuasive even as purely academic exerci ses: how could deterrence work agai nst beli evers in the ret urn of t he 12th Iman as the Mahdi , w ho addit ionally be lieve t hat this redeemer can be forced t o reveal himself by provoki ng a nuclear catast rophe? But th ere is not even need t o raise this que st ion in order to reject a nuclear coexiste nce with Iran u nder its present regime, given w hat may be observed of its conduct on a d aily bas is: as of now in 2006, wit h Ame ri ca n and some all ied ground and air fo rces de pl oyed on both sides of it i n Afghanistan and Iraq, w it h powerfu l US naval forces at sea to its south, with Iran's own arm ed forces in shamb les and of course no nuclear weapons in hand, the rulers of Iran are very open ly fi nancing, arming , t raining and inciting anti-American terro r ist or_ganiz at ions and militias at large, as we ll as doi ng the same th ing under very t hi n cover wit hin Iraq, where they pursue a logic of t hei r own in he lping Sun ni in surgents who kill Shi'is, as well as r ival Shi'i militias that fight one anoth er. T his is what Iran's extremist r u lers are doing now, even witho ut the shiel d of nuclear weapons to protect t hem. What t hen would they do if they had it? Even more agg r essio n is the only reasonable answer, beg in ning with the subversio n of their neighbors , wh ich conven iently enough have large Shi'i po pulat io ns they vari o usly oppress. Th ose then are the clear boun daries of prude nt act ion in r espo nse t o Iran's vast, costly and most dan g erous nuclear prog ram . No premature and t herefo re unnecessary attack is warranted while there is still ample time measured in years to wait in assured safety for a better solution, b ut, also and equally, Iran under it s prese nt fanatical rulers can not be all owed t o f in ally acqu i re nuclear weapons , fo r they would not inaugurate a coexis t ence of mut ual deterrence, but i nstead threaten uncontrolla bl e peri ls. END
Edward N. Luttwak
Political s cientist
25 - OIKOS
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UROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN Ten years after the Barcelona Declaration Heads of State and Governm_ent of a Europe that has now been broadened to twenty-five members gathered in the Catalan city in order to relaunch the process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.
After all , it is fair to have chosen Spain as the venue for starting and relaunching the process of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. It was November 1995 when the fifteen Countries of the European Union and twelve non-member Countries situated on the southern side of the Mediterranean signed the historical "Barcelona Declaration", a document that set up numerous co- operative initiatives and , ten years later, during the period 26- 28 November 2005, still in Barcelona, was celebrated by the Heads of State and Government of a European Community that has now been enlarged to twen ty- five members ( table l ).
A FEW PRECEDENTS Spain, together w ith Portugal, became a member of the European Community in 1985, after having restored a form of internal democracy; and just then the Mediterranean Integrated Programmes were launched in order to help the southern regions of the Commun ity to face the d ifficulties inherent in the enlargement. This provides an important precedent which clearly shows how the Community has turned full attention to the complex real ity of southern Europe . This attitude has also an enormous political significance, as lots of influential commentators have often pointed out, mainly because it prevents Europe from excessively projecting itself to the North and the or East, threatening to upset the whole balance. It was not simply by chance that Felipe Gonzales made this remark when he was still Spanish Premier: «Spain has conveyed the idea of centuries of history and culture shared with the Latin-American world through the centuries, and the Mediterranean dimension, with a look towards the Maghreb (from «Project», no. 250,1997)». Nevertheless, the choice of Spain, as venue for the start of the Euro-Mediterranean process, could well mean a special historical recognition,
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perhaps accorded unwittingly. As a matter of fact, history is always able to surprise us by rectifying situations and with recognitions to whic h only a few people had paid attent ion. To be p recise, at the time of Charlemagne, it was a repo rt writer who coi ned the term «Euro peans» for the firs t time . His name was Isidoro Pacensis. In describing the opposing armies in the batt le of Poiter in 723, which Carlo Marte llo was able to win, stopping in th is way the Arabian advance towards Europe, he cal led «Europeans» the so ldiers of the formation led by t he Franks: «at dawn, the Europeans went out of the gorge and the tidy t ents of the Arabs loomed before them ... Actually, the Europeans were worried that they would not be well hidden from their enemy on the path, and built some shelters ... (from «Chronicon», 796). The Army of the Franks was made of soldiers who came from different popu laces and it was just in reference to this complex reality that the Spanish writer for the first t ime called them «Europeenses», that is to say, Europeans; and this was the baptism of the citizens of the Old Continent.
BARCELONA 1995: THE NEW EURO- MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY In 1995, the European Union m ade an attempt, in Barcelona, to create a b r idge between the Countries situated on t he southern side of the Mediterranean. in order to foster understanding, co llaboration and cooperation. On one side, t he member Countries of the EU and, on the other, the non-member Countries of t he area: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Malta, Cyp r us, Israel, Pa lestinian Aut hority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey. In Barcelo na, not only did they strike an econom ic and financial pact; not only did t hey ente r into an agreement on an assoc iation between the EU
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2006
THE STAGES OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS Ministerial Conferences: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
Barcelona Malta Stuttgart Marseille Valencia Naples Luxembourg-Kiem Barcelona
November April 1997 April 1999 November 2000 April 2002 December 2003 May 2005 November 2005
1995 Declaration -- Working Programme
Action Plan
10thAnniversary - Conference of Heads of State and Government
"Interim" Ministerial Meetings: 1St 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Palermo Lisbon Brussels Crete Dublin The Hague
June 1998 May 2000 November 2001 May 2003 May 2004 November 2004
and the State s of the other shore ( am! Lhi:, policy had just been adopted for some of them al ready with positive results); not on ly d id they reach a new important political international agreement which committed the governme nts of 27 Countries to following a series of numerous and fundamen t al principles . The bas ic idea of the new Euro- Mediterranean strategy was to start establish ing , together with the non- member Countries of the Mediterranean, good relations among all peop le of this complex area. But its originality lies in setting out the exact nature of the relations wh ich should have a political-institutional significance, as well as being based on economic and financ ial exchanges, with refer.ence to security, rights and the role of civ il society, and shou ld have a spiritual significance, that is to say cultural , educational and informative, i.e. an effective mutual friendship and understanding. In short, a far- reaching process in favour of peace, stability and development of the entire region started in 1995 and made it possible to plan a series of actions close ly related to each other in order to rep lace suspic ion and preconceived hostility; in order that this strategy could have success all its parts had to influence and support each other, j ust because the partnership drew inspiration from the clever and valuab le idea
Medium Term Conference Medium Term Conference of Foreign Ministers Conclusions of EU Presidency
of a gradual and harmon ious deve lopment of ec1c h aspect of the relations among the States and even the popu lations .. According to this view, the programmes con cerning the three types of Euro- Medite rranean partnership should have been established and implemented at the same time, integrating all their components with each other, or else the whole action would lose its effect iveness .
TH E TH REE SIDES TO THE PARTNERSHIP: POLICY AND SECURITY, ECONOM IC, AND SOCIOCULTURAL The partnersh ips started with the Barcelona Conference in 1995, dealt with three specific subj ects: policy and security, economy and finance, the social and cu ltural situation. To be precise: « Po li cy and security partnersh ip: to build a common peaceful and stab le area»; «Economic and financial partnership: to create an area with general prosperity»; «Social , cultural and h uman partnership : to develop human resources and promote understanding and exchanges among diffe rent cultures and civil soc ieties». With reference to every sing le te rm of the part-
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nershi p, the Barcelona Dec larat io n hig hl ighted th e following main aspects : with regard t o the policy and sec uri ty partn ership, the primary goals were t o promote the regional secu r ity «throu gh the non- proliferatio n of nuclear, chemi cal and bio log ical weapons, according to int ernational agreements concerning the policy of armaments control an d d isar mament, "to res pect the equal r ight s of all popu lations and self- determ ination", to act in "acco rda nce wit h the pu rpose s an d pri nciples of the United Nati ons Charter» . In parti cular, in ref erence with the Middle East, the Barce lona Declarati on be gan wit h t he firm commitment to make that area a peaceful place w here each part will refrain from d eveloping a m ilitary power which goes beyond their rightful needs for defence ... it will foster the establishment of good and mutual relations... and develop the constitutional state in their political systems; as regards t he eco nom ic and financial partnersh ip, the main purpose was to create a free - t rade zon e in t he wh o le Med iterranea n basin by 2010. A special fund amounting t o 4685 millio n ECU du r ing th e peri od 199 51999 ( almost 6 bill ion do ll ars) and a syste m of c red its, granted by t he European Inves tm ent Ban k, (BEi) were approved i n o rd er t o ease the p rocess of adju~tment and l iberalization and the creation of new infrastru ct ure s i n t he non - mem ber Countries of t he Mediterranean ; as fo r the socio- cult ura l partners hip, the mai n pu r pose was to take a series of measures for improving the fri endshi p and understand ing amon g t he di ffe re nt Cou ntries, promot ing exchanges and mutual contacts especially amo ng peo ple «wh o are respo nsible for politi cal and civil soc iety, the cultural and relig ious world, univers ities, researchers, mas s media, associat ion s, t he trade uni o ns, and amon g public and private companies». T he representatives of the Gove rn me nt s und ertoo k, in parti cul ar, to curb and handl e the migrat ion flows ( we can point out some initiatives ranging fro m profes sio na l t raining t o t he fig ht agai nst unemployment). The "Working Plan», enclosed w ith th e docu me nt of t he «Declaratio n», g ives so me indi catio ns relatin g to the first t asks to develop. Th is Plan, detailed at poi nt V, envisaged the promotion of instituti on al co ntacts wit h t he involvement of t he Parliaments (EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Di alogue) and t he Euro pean Co mmu ni ty Soci o- Econo mi c Committee. Un fortunately, j ust what was feared happened in part , and t he new Conf erence of the Heads of State
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and Government, in Nove mbe r 2005, ten years after the Barcelona Declaration, on the one ha nd resu lted in an evident fail ure, and o n the other relaunc hed a new form of cooperation. At any rat e, the initiative has kept, as well as the essential spirit, t he orig inality of its plann ing; i.e. t o work on the three sides of the intervention at the same time.
POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES: THE MALTA CONFERENCE, 1997 AND THE PALERMO CONFERENCE, l 998 The Barcelona Process got off to a good start. Ministe rs , gove rnment offici als and experts had already attended meetings, called at regular intervals and provided for by paragraph Ill of the «Workin g Programme», enc losed with th e Barcelona Declaration. Considerable steps were take n towards econom ic cooperation (en ergy, transport, tourism, telecommunications, industry and environment), social coope ratio n (devel opment of human resou rces), cultu ral cooperation (meetings and agreements among European and Arab univers ities, initiatives t ake n by t he Mini st ers of Culture to enhance the cu ltural heritage of the Mediterranean). The financial re sources, provided by th e European Un ion , howeve r li mited , made it poss ible to introduce meausur~!> c1.imed at carrying t hrough t he reforms of the econo mic an d soci al structures envisaged by the specific "M EDA" prog ramme. But t he po licy and sec urity partn ershi p, t hat is the first and most important of t he three corner sto nes o n wh ich the Barce lon a Process of 1995 is founded , enco untered the major o bstacl es in th e course of the enti re project. Its aim i s to «keep peace and sta b ili t y» in t he Med iterranean, an d it in fl uences the develo pment of the other partnersh ips . At once, the crisis in the peace p rocess in t he Midd le East st ro ng ly influe nced the start of th i s kind of partnersh ip and put a brake o n it, affect ing the whole proce ss in a neg ative way. T he situat ion became worse in the followi ng years, in conseque nce of the crises i n Alban ia and Kos ovo, th e o utbrea k of th e su b-Saharian and Iraqi wars and, above all, the spread of terrori sm. T he Euro - Mediterranean conference, atte nded by Foreign Ministers, took place in Malta (A pril l 99 7). On t hat occasi on, th e so - called «reg ul ar reinforced po litical dialogue», o pened i n Barcelo na, came to a su dd en standst ill and t he importa nt meeting risked failure. For instance, t he European Autho rities had to assert again and exp licity the cl ear- cut disti nction betwee n the Euro- Med iterranean Partnership and the peace
Rivista Militare English Edition
process in the Midd le East, a basis for the negotiation which had led to the Barcelona Declaration. T he purpose was to prevent Syria and Israel from fai li ng to attend the Conference because of the renewed tensions between Arabs and lsrae lian s. T he European Union had to recognize again that it did not have enough political and military force, because of its limited fore ign and security policy, to play a decisive role in favour of peace and stab ility in this area, a crucial point for the whole Med iterranean (tab le2 ).
n.
1/2006
However, the purpose of keeping the talks open among people from different and opposing cul tures led the participants in the conference of Ma lta to report (in the hard - won «Conclusions», which were signed and pub lished a month af ter the session!) on the one hand the obstacles to the peace process in the Middle East, and on the other the first positive results of the «Working Programme», established in Barcelona, as far as the economic and socio- cultural cooperation was concerned.
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The approval of a «Charter for peace and security», that was an institutional basis for the political partnership, was postponed until the situation improved. It is really interesting to note that the approval of a new policy in it iat ive by the European Parliament, aimed at taking the parliamentary assemblies of twelve mediterranean non-member Countries into the policy and security partne rsh ip , was regarded as one of the few positive aspects. It led all the observers to ag ree that the Malta Conference had not resulted in a fai lure at all. The creation of a permanent parliamentary Forum, able to institutionalize the dialogue, appeared to be the best way to lay the foundations of the pol itical partnership. There is no doubt about this: the relative failure of the Malta Conference in 1997 made it clear that the method, adopted successfully in order to bu ild t he European Community, following the Treaty of Rome in 195 7, would not have the same good effects on the Euro- Medi t erranean partnership. That m ethod had already promoted the economic cooperation among the founder States (Common Market etc.) and had made it poss ib le to reach widespread politica l inst itutional agreements, thanks to the impress ive results obtained in the economy. But in t his case , it would not have worked. There
is a
point t hat the
VALENCIA 2002: A «NEW PLAN OF ACTION))
The Vale ncia conference in 2002 constituted a co nsiderable step forward in acce lerat ing the
Barcelona
Barcelona Process. On t his occasion , a precise
Process raised immediate ly. To make the partnership work, the three «corne rstones» of the partnership must be developed at the same time. If th is d id not happen, the entire bu ilding would collapse. To take a good example , an inter-governmental conference about industrial cooperation was called off in 1997, because the government of Morocco, which was the venue for the conference, d id not want to host the Israe li delegation at that time. Moreover, in the ministerial «ad in terim» con ference, which took place in Pa le rmo (1998) and was the first in a series of intermediary conferences, planned among other big events, the Itali an Government was able to avoid a failure by adopting a makeshift sol utio n : that conference would not have an official character. On this occasion, the represe ntatives of the eight Arab governments took a po litical position. From their viewpoint, the peace process in the Middle East did not have to be regarded as a marg inal issue ; on the contra ry, it had to serve as a useful reference point in the project of economic cooperation . Af ter difficult negotiations, t he participants recognized that the Euro-Arab dialogue d id not constitute a solid bas is for the development of the peace process. Nevertheless, «the partnership must not be broken» because it represents
«Plan of Action» was defined in order to make further progress in the initiative . In pol iti cal terms, the significance of this choice was li nked w ith the expansion of th e European Community, wh ich had already bee n started , especially in Eastern Europe. There was a growing fear that the expansion cou ld mean a reduction in attention on Mediterranean matters but it was dispelled by the renewed and concrete commitment made in Valencia. The document stat ed rea li stically that, de spite some good part ial results, they were st ill far from the goals which had been set in the Barcelona Decla ration i n 1995. The refore, it was necessary to draw up t he whole strategy again and undertake a series of tasks , co nsidering that the States and the signatory powers had become fully aware of being the real acto rs behind the process and, at the same time, the «receivers» who really benefited from it . T he Plan of Actio n involved a d iv ision of t he in iti atives into t hree different actions : re g ional, sub- regiona l and multilateral. It defined itself as «complementary» to the agreements on bilateral cooperation whic h are prese nt, fo r example, in t he Agreements of Association between the EU and the Mediterranean partners and even in the specific Agreements between the same partne rs. As far as the policy and security partnership is
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basic
the on ly forum of discussion, prospective agreemen ts and fruitfu l cooperation invo lving al l Med it erranean Countries. «We remain steadfast in our belief that - we can read in the final declaratio ns - the Euro- Med iterrane an cooperatio n cannot fully develop in the context of a continu ing conflict with Israel , but anyway we pledge t o maintain it». And this pledge was see n as a pos itive signa l. T he Palermo Conference adopted th e so- called method of «channel ling» , that mean s continuing th e talks and analyses on each of th e t hree co r nerstones in order to exami ne variou s common projects by concentrating on a smal l number of them and in conform ity w ith a precis e g lobal programme so as to assure its financin g and its completion. T his concerned both th e programme «MEDA», in the econom ic cooperatio n, and other different courses of actions in the socio-cultural context. The European enthusi asm extolled th is little progress: from Palermo , Cock, the President of the European Parliame nt took the r isk of saying: «a new spirit sta rts blowing on the Barce lona Process ».
The President of the Eurupedn Cummi~sion, Jose Manuel
Barroso, together with a representative of the Countries which took part in the extraordinary session convened in Rabat, Morocco, during the period 20- 21 November 2005.
concerned, the Plan of Action ca lled for prec ise tasks and act io ns in the fig ht against terro rism , in the defence of human rights , in the preve ntion of conflicts. In regard with eco nomic and finan cial partners hip , the Plan aimed agai n to create a free-trad e zo ne across the Mediterranean by 207 o ;· it i ntrod uce d actions in support of the agreement on commercial integration among the . partners of the southern area - th e so-called South-South agreements - l ike the acco r d sig ned , in Agadir, by Morocco, Tunis ia, Egypt and Jordan to create a common free-trade zone ; it set out the princi ples and guidelines for invest ment policies and made a commitment to control t he effects of libe ral ization process ; it faced , in a definite way, the matter of the free - trade i n service s and, above all, the trade libe ralization in agricultural products ; it ai med to promote the const itution of a special « Euro- Mediterranean Bank» required urgently by no n-m embers partners. Other im po rtant issues co nce rned , for example, the sem pl ification of adm i nistrative tasks t o support investment pol ic ies and the constitution of a Un ion of Industrial
Confede rations of the Med iterranean. In regard w ith the socio- cultu ra l part nership , the Plan of Act io n focused on t he dramati c matters of migrat ion flows and called for a special Euromed iterranean Fou ndation t o open a closer dialogu e among diffe rent cu ltures. Other projects aim ed to promote youth exchanges among dif feren t Cou ntries, and to monitor, through the co nstitution of a special Observatory , professional training and occ upationa l plans and to create a Euro - Mediterranean Parliament ary Assembly, seen as a t op venue fo r discussion and political - inst itut io nal talks . In view of important changes to face, all the partners - as th e document co ncludes - wi ll be enlisted to prepare p lans and actio ns, w ith specif ic direct respons ability.
PROPOSALS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DURING THE PERIOD 2005-2010 In view of the tenth Ann iversa ry of the Barce lona Dec laration, in a «Statement» (2005) to t he Council and European Parliament, the Commiss ion put forward «a work programme» t o face the challe nge s in t he next five years, w it h a dead lin e of 2010 . It is about a real agenda, with key points to
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discuss, which represented an important reference point for the summit of the Heads of State and Government gathered in Barcelona during the period 26-28 November 2005. It is important to point out that, in the Statement of the European Committee, the initiative set up in Barcelona in 1995 is defined as a real «turning point» in the framework of relations between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours. Moreover, the planned partnership has an «all embracing character, because it covers vast geographic areas and encompasses a range of specific sectors and leans towards political, economic and social goals». The document says Europe is the main partner of the Mediterranean Countries in the market sector. More than 50 per cent of their global trade is represented by the EU ( in some of these Countries the export quota r ises to 70 per cent). Europe is the major investor in this context (it holds about 55 per cent of the tota l number of the in ternational investments) and is the biggest supplier of financial support (in total 3 billion Euros)· Finally, Europe is the most important resource for all Countries that surround the Mediterranean Sea and also the main destination of the migration flows. As the document adds, all the Mediterranean non-member Countries, which signed the Barcelona Dec laration, negotiated Agreements of Association with the FU and intens ified sharply bilateral exchanges. The regional character of the partnership has considerably been reinforced. However, in the document the Committee recognizes that the progress, which has been made, is much slower than expected, mainly because of political reasons relating to continuing conflicts and tensions which struck the area. T he Committee also indicates the three main crucial points that could compromise the system of Euro- Mediterranean relations: • human rights and democracy that is barely able to put into effect the real participation of the people. · the economic growth that is very slow and prevents the Med iterranean Countries from grasping the opportunities given by the globalization; the Mediterranean partners would need to create at least five millions of new jobs each year in order to meet the needs of people who are unemployed; • better educational opportunities which represent a fundamental shift towards human and soc ial development.
THE WORKING PROGRAMME 2005-2010
2005 The Euro-Med iterranean partners should: reach an agreement on a road- map in order t o liberalize the agriculture. The Commission is submitting some guide lines to the Council for approval to start the negotiations with the partners; set a time for the agreements on bilateral economic integration, in reference to investment s and se rvices; organize a seminar on weapons of mas s destruction before the year' s out; organ ize a Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference concerning the problem of transport, with the European Investment Bank, before the year' s out, to discuss projects for infrastructure linking the Euro-Mediterranean partners to each other.
2006 Sub- reg ional Conferences concerning human rights, in the presence of t he representatives from Governments and civil society; Euro-Mediterranean Conf erence concerning sexual equality. The Conference should compare specifically the best experiences with each other in order to promote the role of women in society; Adoption of a clear agenda to take practical measures for depolluting the Mediterranean Sea by 2020; Explore the possibility of setting up the Euro Med iterranea n development Bank within the year. Design a Scheme providing scholarships for uni versity students.
2007 the Euro- Mediterranean partners should reach an agreement on a common code of conduct to take measures against te rroris m; conference of the Ministers of Interior and Ministers of Justi ce, togethe r with representati ves from local Autho rities, about how to handle migration flows and social integration ; adoption of a regional programme aimed at supporting rural development and raising the quality of agricultural productions; after wide consultation with the partners, t he percentage of financial resources for the cooperation in the education sector should be increased by 50 per cent in reference to national and regional programmes.
2010 In order to sort out these serious matters, the Committee proposed they shou ld follow, as mentioned above, a clear agenda.
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All the free - trade South - South agreement s should be concluded before the year's out, also
Barcelona Conference, 2 7-28 November 2005. From left, the President of the Palestinian Authority Abu Mazen, the British Premier Tony Blair and the President of the European Committe Jose Manuel Barroso.
with reference to the service sector, taking into consideration the Ag1·eement of Agadir and the first Pan Euro-Mediterranean Protocol so that the agreements can be compatible and, at the end of their transitory periods, the free - trade zone can become fully operative .
BARCELONA 2005: CELEBRATIONS OF THE l oth ANNIVERSARY OF THE «DECLARATION» As it had already happened most of time in the past, even in the conference of the Heads of State and Government gathered in Barcelona during the period 26- 28 November 2005, political matters suddenly assumed importance and strongly influenced the outcome of the work. One of the most significant conflicts which led the Arab Countries, except for the Palestinian Authority, and Israel to send de legations without Heads of State and Government (this Summit was snubbed by the protagonists of the Mediterranean , as lots of newspapers articles have remarked) concerns the different approaches to the Middle East problem and the defin ition of a «common Code of conduct» in the fight against terrorism. Accord ing to lots of Arab Countries, fi ghting against foreign forces that occupy your territory does not mean terrorism; in contrast, European people fi nd these distinctions
unacceptable. The Code of Co nduct about te rro rism is a document by which all th e EuroMediterranean Countries, as wel l as Israel and its closer Arab Countries, issued a firm condemnation of this phenomenon. Some Arab Countries insist on drawing a sharp d istinction between terrorists and f ighters who take this kin ds of actions as «acts of defence and nat io nal li beration against an occupation force» . Th is att itude has led to a ser ious confl ict. The compromise, reached in Barcelona at the last moment, made it possible t he approval of the Code, in particular the part about the condemnat ion of terrorism, but the juridi cal and leg al definition of this phenomenon was referred to the United Nation s General Assembly. In this way, at the end of the Conference, a Declaration of the Presidency, but not a common document, passed with a majority of votes, was approved. As Italian Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini has pointed out, it was just a comprom ise «to let t he whole world see a failure». The agreements reached on the other two forms of partnership appear to be more posit ive, even though everyone realizes that the missed ag ree ments and sharp d ifferences of opinion o n how to develop the political partnersh ip wi ll badly affect the Barce lona Process. In any case , what is beyond doubt is that t he Wor k Programme 2005-2010, drawn up by the Commission, was approved togethe r w ith farreac hing agreements on dealing with m ig ration flows. Th e point under discussion is quite interesting . The purposes of the programme are really ambitious, especially the main goal of creating
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Italian Foreign Minister Cianfranco Fini greets Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem during a meeting.
a ful ly operative free-trade area covering the Mediterranean by 2010. However, there have been negative comments also on this decision. Even at the Barcelona Conference, it was realistically realized that there were still lots of difficulties to overcome. In political terms, the Mediterranean democracies have not made any progress in the last ten years; in economic terms, the results have not been better. The EU has invested 20 million dol lars in the Barcelona Process up to now, but this large sum of money has not al low the southern Countries of the Mediterranean to take off In 2002, Romano Prodi, Pre s ident of Commiss ion, still had to recognize that the problem of poverty was dramatic in the whole area. In fact, even t hough curre nt ly there are signs of improvement, it is u nacceptable that almost 30 per cent of the popu lation of the Middle East and North Africa lives below t he poverty line (less than 2 Euros a day). In addition, in reference to education: «just think ... , only 0,6 per cent of the population uses In ternet and only l ,2 per cent has got a computer ... - And yet - knowledge and culture re present the cornerstone of t he development; education and traini ng are the key instruments for encouraging an active partecipation i n poli tics and democracy" (Catho l ic Universi ty of Lovanio , November 2002). Even British Premier Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Zapatero have remarked t hat the relations between Europe and the Mediterranean have not improved at all in the last ten years. As t hey wrote on the occasion of the summit: ... the migration flows stem from the great inequalities in wealth and opportunities, lack of security, democracy, and civil rights ... The gap between the rich and the poor, that is between the EU and the southern Mediterranean Countries, has
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not narrowed, on the contrary it has widened, fuelling a sense of frustration and a massive emigration. In view of this, there is a need to create twelve million of new jobs in the next twenty years, in order to provide for a decent future the young people who live in the Mediterranean area. Then t hey added: As a real form of partnership, the «Barcelona Process» sets out conditions and expects everyone to observe them: it is essential to go ahead after reaching an agreement. Th e future generations will not be able to forgive us if our attempts to provide them with greater security, investments, prosperity, commercial trade, and educational opportunities should result in failure. («La Repubblica», 28 Novembe r 2005). Further influential remarks enable us to have an idea even about the atmosphe re of t ens ion and co nfl icts pervading the Barcelona Conference. As Magdi Allam writes for «II Corriere de lla Sera» , however hard we try to appear diplomatic, we must admit that substantially the Euro-Mediterranean partnership failed for two obvious reasons. First of all, the Arab regimes, whose leaders all together boycotted the Summit of Barcelona, and cannot be reformed motu proprio from the inside. Secondly, the EU, more and more discredited as political actor, has not been able to set in motion a genuine democratic process in the South and in the East of the Mediterranean, taking advantage of economic help. The hard words uttered by Algerian Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem seem to sum up the failure of the event: They told us: «first you carry out the reforms, then we will give you money». Let them keep their money! We never asked them to undertake reforms. Consequently, they must not ask us to introduce them. («II Corriere della Sera», 29 November 2005).
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS What conditions influence the f uture success or failure of the Euro-Mediterranean part nership7 The politica l conditions of democracy have not take root yet in this area, and the secu r ity apparatus must be set up in regions shaken by co nfli cts and tensions. We should omit from our remarks any empty rhetoric of coope rat ion among populaces , in terms of peace and development, and ask ourse lves whether Europe really has the great pol itical power needed to spread progress and im provements over this field. This point raises legitimate doubts because the European Union itself is going t hrough a severe political cri sis after the negative resu lt of the referendum on the constitu tional project and the consequent uncerta inty. In addition, t he EU does not appear to be ab le to
relate the econom ic and financial support g iven to the Mediterranean Coun t ries to a specific polit ical influence on human ri ghts an d pol itical liberalizat io n. T his situation upsets the balance of the three sectors ·of the partnership and puts the significance of the · Barcelon a Process in to perspective with regard to its economic potent ial as well, just as the growing gap between European and Mediterranean Countries shows. In such a situation, the goal of creating a fu lly operat ive free-trade zone by 201 0 appears to be elu sive, because there are still a lot of proble ms that must be solved. In particular, t he liberalization of the agricultural sector, which was strongly supported by the Mediterranean Countries but obstructed by the EU members. Moreover, up to now the socio-cu ltu ral partnership has experienced nothing but deficiencies and delays from t he EU . We are far from producing a large flow of youth exchanges, that is t o say succes sfu l initiatives for a mutual understanding among people. In th e last years, media attention has been focused on unli kely confl icts among different cu ltural gro ups rather than cul tural exchanges. The scenario pa i nted in Barce lona is very different from this one . Maybe less rhetoric and a strong determi nat ion to monitor ca refu lly t he real usefulness of certa in initiatives and in stitutio ns would lead us to und ersta nd what corre ct ions are needed in order to build a more effective partnership. Even though Europe is not able to untie t he knots in the political project that should lead its whole action, it persists in havi ng fait h in its mode l of democ racy, wh ich is an incomplete model at Euro pean leve l, and in the value of free trade. In view of this, on the other side of the Mediterranean the political, economic and socio-cultura l approach es should consid er most the significan ce of differences and needs of t hose po pulaces. Fo r istance , a great er read iness to bring themselves into quest ions and put the ir sk ills to the t est by making a comparison with the othe rs could open th e door to more effect ive collaboration. Rather than prov id in g training for companies in a precar ious state and for people who act as manage rs, even tho ugh they do not possess any entrepreneurial skills , a lot of more social support in t hos e areas cou ld give positive, eve n surprising res ul ts. As Prem iers Blair and Zapatero say, t he Barce lo na Process sho ul d have given rise to a re al partnership in which everyone should fu lf il the commitments taken on. However, the results have been disappointing and the d isparit ies have been g rowing up to now. In view of t his situation , when they go back to their own Countries, they have to face the internal si tuat ion and their
Spanish Prrme Minister Jose Luis Zapatero.
behaviour appears to be rad ically different from that es t ablished official ly. Nevertheless, t he Barcelona Process does not have any alternatives an d its orig inal and comp lex planning, w ith its triple form of partne rship, involves re liab il ity, rat ionality, valid ity. There is no doubt about this : everyone ai ms to promote the gradual deve lopme nt of Europe. But if Eu rope devotes excessive atten t ion to the North and t he East, this wi l l cause new tens ions and worsen furt her t he crises of t he Union . Italy i s really int erested in reinforcing the Euro Mediterranean cooperation, which is an important element of the development of our Country; exactly like the tot al commitment of Europe to t he South. At least as far as Ita ly is conce rn ed, it is enormously im porta nt to be abl e to grasp the opportun itie s offered by the process wh ich still needs to be corrected thoroughly, but anyway it has al ready been started.
Marco Ricceri , Professor of History of European Integration, at the «Link Campus University of Malta», Eurispes Secretary General.
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NATO IN THE 21 5T CENTURY Fifty-seven years after its constitution, NATO today is not only a bulwark of democratic principles, freedom and legality, but must also meet the challenges of the new century, which entail a rev ision of its role and responsibilities, in order to achieve three fundamental objectives: new capabilit ies, new member Countries, new relations and overtures to the East.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) represents the po litico- mi litary bond that ties Europe and North America in a single alli ance, aimed at guaranteeing the co llective defence of the territory and constitutes an effective forum of consultation for the prob lems related to security. In fact, even if it does not have its "own" Army, it has con t ributed, for 57 years , to the stability and security of the transatlantic area, upholding its principles of democracy, legality and individual freedom consecrated by the Wash in gton T reaty. Today the All iance is an institution much different from the one defined by the No rth Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which has represented the stronghold of the territorial integrity of its partners for the entire period of the Cold War until the end of the eighties. It is also different from the structure that has watched over the delicate period of transition of the post- bipolarism. The new international horizon, opened with the terrorist attack of September 11 , 2001 against the United States, has made us understand how the geo-po lit ical context of reference has changed after the end of the Cold War, and the vulnerab ili ty of present-day society vis-a-vis the new threats to security, actually speed ing up the process of transformation ratified during the Washington summ it of 1999 with the new Strategic Concept. In th is sense, the Organization has taken a series of initiatives aimed at improving the military capabilit ies and strengthen ing the cooperation among the member States and the partner States. The un idirectional organization has turned into a "multidirectional" structure, capable of project ing its forces also outside its borders . In this scenario, NATO has started a process of transformation of its ro le and responsibilities, starting a series of politico-structural revisions with the intention of achieving three fundamental objectives , wh ich can be synthesized in the "three news": new capabilities, new member Countries, new relations and openings to the East.
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THE EVOLUTION The origins of the North Atlantic Treaty date back to the post- war period, with the proposal advanced by some West-European Countries (l) to strengthen the mutual bonds in orde r t o define a common defence system against the ideological, political and military risks that were then present in Europe. The accord was formalized with the ratification of the Brussels Treaty that, in l 948, gave birth to a pact of co llective self-defence among t he contracting States, alt hough the constitution of an internationa l organization was not yet envisaged . Along the months, the signatory States found the necessity to w iden this form of "embryonic" Alliance and started the negotiations with the United States and Canada with the intention of creating a "North Atlantic" Alliance between Europe and Ame rica. An Alliance founded on guarantees of secu rity and reciprocal commitments of protection . Denmark, Ice land , Italy, Norway and Portugal were subsequently invited by the signat ory Powers to participate in t his process . The negotiatio ns ended in April 1949, w ith the signature of the Washington Treaty, which sanctioned the birth of a system of co llective defence between the twelve Countries. The ratification of the Treaty by all the members gave birth to the North At lant ic T reaty Organization (NATO). The member Countries pledged to share the risks, responsibi lities and advantages of common security, affirming , consist ently wit h artic le 51 of the U.N. Charter, the princip le of the "natural right" of the States to individual and co llective legitimate defence. In order to secure itself such r ight, the Alliance has thus provi ded itse lf w ith a po liti cal structure and a military organizatio n, which, for the whole post-war period , have represented the main form of deterrence in the East- West bipolar confrontation. In order to imp lement a security pol icy, NATO has equ ipped itself with a credible
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and effective military structure for crisis management, adopting, at the same time , a pro- dialogue pol icy. The stabi lity ensured by NATO during this peri od has allowed Western Europe to concentrate its energies on reconstructioo and development after the destructions caused by WWII. Today NATO is a well - established real ity, fu lly developed and deep ly transformed. Twenty- six Countries belong to it: Italy, Belgium , Canada, Czech Rep ubl ic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg , Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom , Turkey, United States and, since Apri l 2, 2004, also Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovenia and Slovakia. The Alliance has continually changed, also due to the radical transformations of the world strategic environment. The first important changes date back to the six ties and seventies, when some pol itical initiatives deep ly i nfluenced the East-West relations: Fi rst of all , the adoption of the Harme l Report (1967), which pointed out an innovative road , asserting that NATO should pursue a doub le objective: increase its defensive capab ili t ies and adopt a detente policy towards the Cou ntries it considered enem ies . Germany's open ing to "Ostpolitik" (2) in 1969.
economic weakness of the new internat ional act ors. T he new Strateg ic Concept, aimed at reaffirm ing t he centrality of the collective defence of _the Alliance, is complemented by the role of "active defence" also outside NATO's traditional area of responsibility (i.e. "out of ACE area") (5), widening the prerogatives of both the tasks and the exped itionary nature of the military instrument. The Washington Summit can be considered the finishing point of t he delicate process of adaptation that fo llowed t he breakup of the b ipo lar confrontation and the beginning of a deep process of t ransformation of the Alliance, as regards the effectiveness of its military instrument. The main stays of the "NAT O system" are now the enlargement and the ass istance to the new members in the fields of politics and economy; armed forces and defence, resources and secu rity. With these assumptions, the concept of security is now understood in more g lobal terms than in the past, for it includes in its elaboration risks of different natu re such as, for example, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ir carriers , the inte rruption of the flow of vital resources, terrorist and sabotage actions. Two more prerogatives of t he Alliance are int roduced together with the new security concept: the management of international crises, to be carried out "case by case with the co nsent of the single
Ratification of the Final Act of the Conference
nations", and
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later turned into Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (3), which , in 1990, started to make substantial cuts in the conventional forces in Europe (4).
Countries of the Euro-Atlantic area (partnersh ip) . The provisions of reorganizat ion that are leading NATO towards a full adaptation to the geo- politi cal conditions of the 21 st Century stem from the Wash ington Summit of 1999. The events occurred on September 11 , 2001 , in fact, have only accelerated the t imes for the transformation of t he military instruments, in quantitative and qualitative terms, through the defin ition of the "Defence Capabilities Initiative" (DCI) (6), aimed at improving and increasing the m ilitary capabilities of the Alliance . The unce rtainty of the new threats has spurred the pol it ico- military lead ership to accelerate the process of transformation, as sanctioned by the Prague Summit of November 2002 . The creation of the "NATO Response Force" (a force of rapid intervention consisting of 20.000 men employable in any part of the world), t he adopt ion of a new projectab le Command structure, the development and acquisition of the capabi lities for the new forms of conflict (Prague Capabilities Commitment - PCC, as prosecution of the DCI , which entails the allotment of specific resources to the Member States) , the spur towards a wider enlargement (open - door policy) and the fight against international terrorism, rep resent some of the mi lestones set down during the Prag ue Summit.
As a consequence of such initiative, the Brusse ls Summ it of 1994 outlined the new objectives and principles that were to gu ide the Alliance in the immediate future, as well as the new guide li nes concerning armament control and disarmament. The events, wh ich in the past years have rad ically changed the o rder that had become establ ished du ring the last 50 years, have diffused within the Alliance a willingness to st art a revision of the thought and structure of the organization . Within this framework, the most significant response of the Alliance to the changes occurred in the EuroAtlantic scenario has been the definition of a new Strategic Concept, approved by the Wash ington Summit of 1999 (evolution of the military instruments, cooperation and enlargement are its main themes). The security of the member Countries is no more put at risk by the danger of a generalized conflict between regu lar formations or symmetric conflicts , but the risk comes from more evanescent, but equally dangerous threats, such as terrorism , which pro liferate owing to the politico-
the
coope r ation
with
the other
41 - OIKOS
CHRONOLOGY ISTANBUL, 28-29 June 2004: strengthening of the contributions to NATO in the fight against terrorism; support to the process of stabilization in the Balkans; increase of the capabilities and employability of the forces and of the response capabilities for carrying out the new missions of the Alliance, strengthening of the cooperation with the partners inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. PRAGUE, 21-22 November 2002: participation of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovakia and Slovenia in the preparatory talks for adm ission to the Alliance; reaffirmation of the "open door policy", definition of the increase of the Alliance's capabilities (Prague Capabilities Commitment); creation of the NATO Response Force; redefinition of NATO Forces and Command Structures; adoption of the concept of fight against terrorism; support to the member Countries for participation in the operations in Afghanistan. ROME, 28 May 2002: creation of the NATO- RUSSIA Council. WASHINGTON DC, 23-24 April 1999: commemoration of the 50th anniversary; adoption of the New Strategic Concept; qualitative and quantitative development of new capabilities (Defence Capabilities lnitiative);development of t he European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance; reinforcement of the operational dimension of PfP, as well as consultations and cooperation within EAPC; pursuit of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue; aid to t he Countries that wish to become NATO members through a Membership Action Plan (MAP); willingness to exercise an adequate politico- military pressure for the settlement of the disputes in former Yugoslavia (Kosovo); enhancement of Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Mediterranean Dialogue. MADRID, 8- 9 July 1997: participation of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the preparatory talks for t he adm ission to the Alliance; reaffirmation of the "open door policy"; official signing of an agreement for a specific partnership between NATO and Ukraine; special pronouncement on Bosnia- Herzegovina, reaffirm ing their commitment for a full implementation of the Peace Accord and creat ion of Bosnia Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multiethnic State; meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government and the cooperation partners, under the aegis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The meeting is focused on how the EAPC could be more effectively employed for contributing to security and stability. PARIS, 2 7 May 1997: NATO-Russia summit meeting for signing the insti tutive act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation. BRUSSELS, l 0-1 l January 1994: inauguration of Partnership for Peace (PfP). The NACC members and other CSCE Countries that can and want to contribute to this programme are invited to participate in the works; issue of the PfP framework document; approval of the CJTF concept; approval of the measures for supporting the development of a European security and defence identity; manifestation of NATO's willingness to carry out air attacks to avoid the strangling of Sarajevo and of other security areas acknowledged by the U.N. in Bosnia Herze¡g ovina. ROME, 7-8 November 1991: the Heads of State and Government issue t he new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, as well as the Rome Declaration on peace and cooperation and the developments in the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. LONDON, 5-6 July 1990: publication of the London Declaration with proposals aimed at developing the cooperation with the Countries of East and Central Europe. BRUSSELS, 4 December l 989: the Leaders of the Warsaw Pact Countries, in conjunction with the meeting of the Atlantic Council, issue a common declaration that denounces the invasion of Czechoslovakia in l 968 by the forces of the Warsaw Pact and reject the Brezhnev doctrine on limited sovereignty. BRUSSELS, 29-30 May 1989: the Amcrico.n President announces new important initiatives for reciuciny Lht:! conventional forces in Europe; approval of the global Concept for armaments control and disarmament and publication of a statement issued by the Summit. / BRUSSELS, 2- 3 March 1988 (Atlantic Council): it underlines the unity of the Al lies and reaffirms their common objectives and ideals, as well cJS the lasting validity of the Alliance ; it asks what significant measures are taken to eliminate the disparities between the conventional forces. BRUSSELS, 2 J- November 1985: consultation between US President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbatchev on the US-USSR agreements on the reduction of the medium- range and nuclear strategic forces.
One should think that the initiative for the acquisit ion of capabilities (PCC) is no more a "suggestion" but a formal commitment by the member Countries to develop common capabilities in more than 400 sectors (7). In order to sustain the objectives outlined by the new model, NATO is equipping itself with an expeditionary- type military instrument (8), technologically advanced, flexible and interoperable, which cou ld be rapidly projected in the land, sea, and air dimension, and able to operate in a wide range of missions (from crisis management to fight against terrorism).
THE ADAPTATION OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE
With the evolution of t he reference operational environment t here has also been the development of a process of "internal adaptation" (9) aimed at making the Alliance more flexible and effective vis - a-vis the new types of threat.
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New operational instrume nts have been developed , in order to accomplish with effectiveness and cred ibility both the traditional missions in defence of t he member Countries (a rt.5 operations) and the new tasks, with particular reference to "non - art.5" missions. At the same time, number, type, mission, location of the Commands of the military structure of the organization have also been redefined. Thus NATO has started the revisio n of the Command structure, aimed both at reduc ing the number of Commands and static bodies, especial ly at intermed iate leve l, and at creating a new structure of the Forces, according to the decisions made during the Washington Summit of 1999. Command Structure
In the light of the new security context and to develop the Prague provisions according to an
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Allied Command Transformation
approach based on the "functionality", NATO has proceeded with a revis ion of the Command organization , which retains its strategic goal , especially focussed on the exercise of Command and Control of the joint operations of the Alliance. A new structure based on parameters -of greater flexibility and capabi lity has been approved by the Ministers of Defence at the meeting of 12-1 3 June 2003.The two strategic commands - SACEUR (l 0) and SACLANT (l l) - have been reorganized with different functions . The NATO operational d irection is concen trated in a single strategic Command - Allied Command Operations (ACO) (12) located near Mons (Belgium) - , wh ich covers the whole NATO area of responsibility. This strategic Command has been flanked by a "functional" Command, called Al li ed Command Transformation (ACT) (13), located in Norfolk (USA), wh ich substantially performs a guiding role for the activities connected with the transformation of the mi litary capabilities of the Alliance. The capabilities of both strategic Commands are integrated and intrinsically independent. From the results of this transformation emerges both a more rational distribution of the tasks between and inside the strategic Commands and a more stream li ned and integrated organization .
ACT commands, bes ides the General Headquarters, t._he Bodies and Cent res tasked with transformation: Joint Warfare Centre UWC) (Stavanger - Norway) supports the activ it ies of experimentation, analys is and deve lopment of the doctrine at operational leve l, in order to optimise the process of transformation , inc rement the interoperability and the capabilities of the All iance and provide the training of the staffs. Joint Force Training Centre UFTC) (Bydgoszcz Poland) assists the ACT and ACO Commands in promot ing the NATO doctrine at tactica l level with in t he Countries of the Alliance and in training the Staffs. Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre UALLC) (Monsanto - Portugal) ensures t he collection , analys is and d istribution of the lessons (identified and learned) of the operations conducted by the NATO forces in the Operations Theatres . Centres of Exce llence (CoE) perm it to deve lop, verify and implement the doctrinal concepts through trainl ng and experimentation , to t he advantage of the units and personne l of the member Countries in sectors of particular interest.
NATO Command Structure North Atlantic Council Military Cornrittee
ACO
ACT
cc
cc
NAV
AIR
,JHQUsboa
JFC Napol l
JFC Bl"tlmssum
cc
c.c
cc
cc
LAND
A IR
IN AV
LAJND
J FCHQ
Bruns-sum CCAIR HQ Ramstem
HQAC r Norfolk
ACO Shape Mons
c:::.~~ - - -lcc LAND HQ Heidelberg
JOIN T HQ
Lisboa
CC L A.ND HQ
CC NAV H Q
Madrid
Napoli
JFC H Q N9p0Ji
CC AIR HQ lzmir
43 - O IKOS
Allied Command Transformation
d I
HQ SACT SACT Representation NATO HO
USJFCOM
Norfolk, USA
•~======~ ----------, Strategic Concepts. Policy & Requirements Identification
Joint Concept Development
ACT Staff Element
_..., : r - - - - - - - - - . ································ .. ..
Joint Warfare Center
Mons, BE
Stavanger. NO
Future Capabilities Research & Technology
·
Education & Training
·
' ''L'
NATO Defence College Rome, IT
Undersea Research Centre La Spezia' IT
.:
'f-
NATO Agencies/ Bodies Multi/National Centres of Excellence
,-----------------------7
i Capabilities Planning & i i
Implementation
I
NATO School Oberammergau,GE
Joint Force Training Centre Bydgoszcz. PL
L_____ --------------.---
NATO Communication and Information Systems School Latina. IT
Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre Monsanto. PO
.
.
······························· NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre Souda Bay, GR :
NATO Schools aimed at forming the Commands at various levels in a "NATO perspective". They in clude the NATO Defense College - NDC (Rome), the NATO Communications and Information Systems School - NCISS (Latina, Italy) and the NATO School - NS (Oberammergau, Germany) . NATO Undersea Research Centre - NURC (La Spezia, Italy) tasked with research and deve lopment of t he Alli ance's capabilities in an underwater environment. T he growing importance that ACT is going to acquire in the f uture is due to t he fact that the Command for transformation is going to influence the decisions of the member Cou ntries concerning mi litary pol icy, with ve ry important repercussions in the sectors of doctrin e, train ing and procurement of materials . Allied Command Operations T he Allied Command for Operations (ACO) has its HQ (SHAPE) (14) at Mons (Belgium), and is com manded by SACEUR (Supreme All ied Commander Europe) (15), a "doub le hat" Commander of the American forces in Europe (USEUCOM) (16) . The Command ' s complet e reorgan ization comes up to its new and wider geographic responsib ili t ies. The ACO Comm ander (SACEUR) performs
O IKOS - 44
............................. •.
command act1v1t 1es on Lhe Lhr ee new operational HQs at second level of command, which become responsib le for the d irection of t he operat ions of t he Al liance from the ir HQs, or constitute a CJTF (l 7) . There are two j o int Commands located respectively in Brunsum , T he Netherlands) - JFC (18) Brun sum , and in Naples, Ita ly - JFC Naples, for the constitu t ion of a land - based CJ FT, and a Command located in Lisbon (Port ugal) - JHQ Lisbon, which is focussed on the Command of a CJTF from a naval pl atfo rm (sea- based CJTF) . Every jo int Command must als o be able to const itute, by turns, a DJTF HQ (19) within the NATO Response Fo rce - NRF. As concerns the operatio ns unde r way, JFC Bruns um exercises Command an d Control of the ISAF m iss ion (20) in Afghan istan and JFC Naples commands the NATO operations in the Balkan s. The princ iple of funct ionality is moreove r extended to six "Compo nent Commands" of ACO which are on t he third leve l of Command , two each for air, land and naval forces, respectively in lzmir (Turkey), Ramstein (Germany), Madrid (Spai n), Heidelberg (Germ any), Naples (Italy) and Northwood (U.1<.). These Commands supply a flexible comm and capab ility, in a pos ition t o operate in many different operational environments.
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2006
Allied Command Operations SHAPE
Strategic:
Mons, Belgium Operational:
JFC HQ Brunssum
Joint HQ Lisbon
JFC HQ Naples
The Netherlands
Portugal
Italy
Component: CC-Air HO Ramstein Germany
CC-Mar HO Northwood United Kingdcrll
C-Lan<1 HO Heidelber Gemiany
CAOCUedem
Gem'8/ly OCAOCUedem Germany CAOC finderup Denn,arl<
Forces Structure In July 2001 the NAT O Authorities defined t he parameters and principles of a new structure of the forces (NATO Force Structure - NFS) aimed at acquiring multinational forces with the ir respective Co111111ands. In view of this, NATO decided to abandon the traditional "miss ion oriented" structure in favour of a "capability oriented" instrument, made up of capability packages of flexible, modular, highly projectable forces that could perfectly integrate in a joint and multinational enviro nment. The NFS has a goal at tactical - leve l and allows NATO to equip itself with additional component Command and Contro l capabilities for missions also outs ide the territory of the Alliance, on the grounds of the experiences made by ARCC (21) in Kosovo in 1999. The revis ion of the structure has led to establ ish a series of "national framework" Commands of graduated readiness, i.e. the Graduated Readiness Force HQs (GRF HQ) permanently assigned to NATO: · Six NATO High Readiness Force (HRF) (Land) HQ, with readiness betwee n O and 90 days, at Corps level , called NATO Rapid Deployable Corps HQ, among which the NRDC-ITA of Solbiate Olona. · One Corps HQ (Force d'Action Terrestre) offered to NATO by France and at the same level of a NATO HRF (L). · Three Forces at Lower Readiness HQs (FLR (L) HQ), with readiness between 91 and 180 days, at Corps level. · Three High Readiness Naval Forces - HRF (M) HQ, in charge of naval operations, one of which offered by Italy.
CC~Air HQ lZrnir Turl<ey
CC-Lan<1 HO M adrid Spain
CC.Mor HQ Na~es Italy
CAOC p Reoatico Italy DCAOC P.Renatico Italy
CAOC Larissa
Greece
The structure of the forces is moreover comp lemented by an integrated component consisting of six "Combined Ai r Operation Centers - CAOC, 2 of which projectab le DCAOCs, in charge of air operations, one of which offered by Italy. NATO Response Force (NRF)
Besides the reorganization of the Commands at various levels , the revision of the structure of the NATO forces includes also the constitution of the NRF. It is a high-readiness force, equipped with technologically advanced means, consisting of land, air and naval components and of special forces made available, by turns, by the Arm ies of the member Countries. Once it ach ieves its Full Operational Capability (FOC) during 2006, the NRF will consist of about
HIGH READINESS FORCES
_
Farces Availiible 6 HRFIL) HQs. 3 HRFIMl HQs Deplayiible CAO Cs.
FORCES OF LCWi/ER READINESS
LONGTERM8UILD·UP FORCES
- OIKOS
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949 The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire t o live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the p rinciples of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well- being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agre e to this North Atlantic Treaty. Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which t hey may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the t hreat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institution s, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which thes e institutions are founded , and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their internat ional economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of th em. Article 3 In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self- help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop t heir individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Article 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them , t he territorial integrity, polit ical independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. Article 5The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them , in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist t he Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwit h, individually and in concert with th e other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security . Article 6 (27) For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: • on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2 8), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the Nort h Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. Article 7 This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary respons ibility of the Security Council for t he maintenance of international peace and security. Article 8 Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this I reaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Tr,eaty. Article 9 The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consi der matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organi sed as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particu lar it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recom mend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. Article 10 the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further t he principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of t he United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession. Article 11 This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signat ories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect wi t h respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (29) Article 12 After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests , consult together for th e purpose of rev iewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in th e North Atlantic area, including the development of u niversal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of t he United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 13 After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of d enunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation. Article 14 This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to th e Governments of other signatories.
25,000 men and be able to start its deployme nt five days after the order and will be able to keep up the operations for thirty days, with the poss ibility of extending the durat ion with adequate log istic supplies. The NRF represents NATO's main , read ily employable instrument for facing possible crises in any area of the globe, and has been studied also as pilot proj -
OIKOS - 46
ect that will have to lead the future process of transformation of the Alliance's military instru ment.
THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS The transformat ion of NATO is impleme nted, coordinated and harmonized by the Allied
Rivista Militare Englis/J Edition n. 112006
com mand T ransformatio n through a continuous and pro-active process of development and inte gration of the innovative concept s, doctri nes and capabi lities aimed at incrementing t he interope rability and effect ive ness of the forces at NATO's disposal. The main com:epts under study are directed at ensurin g the Alliance t he capabi lity of meeting the new t hreats on t he whole range of operations w ith speed, ag ility, preci sion and flexibility, and refer chiefly to t he development of the capabilities of the "Effect Based Approach to Operatio ns (EBAO)" . In practice NATO refers, w it h an innovative character, to the "Broad Approach to Security" envisaged by the St rateg ic Concept and reaffirmed both on the occasion of the Prag ue Summit and at the Istanbul Summ it (2004) . The co ncept affirms the necessity of car ry ing out a series of actio ns, coordinated and performed by various acto rs (also non- military), meant to influence t he will of the adversary. The appl icat ion of this concept and of the ensuing capabil ities favo urs the interservice integ ration through a system of planning , according to the NATO princ iple "Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) (22). The transformat ion of t he military organization of the Alliance wi ll have to meet many chal lenges before it becomes effect ive, espec ially fo r what concerns t he sufficiency of t he reso urces and t he cultural approach to the mentioned prin ciples . T he ACT , withi n the "Force Planning Process" , has already started t o involve the Co untr ies in this process, emp loying t he NFR as catalyst of the Transformation .
THE NATO- EU RELATIONS The fall of t he Soviet Bloc had undermined t he raison d' 1 tre of t he Alliance , increasing at th e same t ime Europe ' s aware ness of the necessity to eq ui p itself with its own security and defence capabil ity. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and its military inst rument, NATO has rema ined a point of reference for t he defence of the European borde rs, sanctioned by art.5 of th e North At lant ic T reaty, but has also sustained the deve lopmen t of a Europe an Securit y and Defence Ident ity (ESDI) (2 3). Aft er sig nin g the T reaty of Maastricht i n 1992 , the European Union has decided to deve lop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and plan the possib le deve lopment of a common defe nce capability. The fundamental stage wh ich sanctions t he beg inning of mutual collaboration and the full support of the Alliance to a Eu ropean Security and Defence Identit y is represented by the decisio ns taken by t he At lantic Counc il of Berli n in 1996 . T he acco rd has endo rsed t he constitut ion of a
European pillar with in NATO, adopt ing the princi ple of common m il itary capabilit ies "separable but not separate", employab le in EU- led operations <!nd in the who le range of t he possible m issio ns of t he European Un ion (Pet ersbe rg mi ssions) (24). Neverthe less , t he deve lopmen t of the internat ional sit uation has entail ed that NATO and the European Un ion make a revision of t he agreem ents reached in Be r l in in 7 996 (Berli n p lus Arrangements). In particular , t he European Union has acquired it s own permanent po lit ico- military structure aimed at ensuring the po lit ical control and the st rat eg ic management of the crises and , at the same t ime, has laid t he found at ions for t he revis io n of the NATO defence plann ing process , acco rd ing t o t he new requi rements of the Union . With respect for t he operational req uirement s of NATO and its command structure t he Un ion has adopted a package of provi sions aimed at: Guaranteeing t he access of t he European Unio n to t he NATO planning capabi lities , fo r p lann ing EU-led operat ions . Pre - designating packages of NATO fo rces, to be emp loyed in EU-led operat ions. Findi ng t he EU Comm and options fo r t he abovesaid operatio ns. T hanks to t he abovesaid agree m ent t he Union can have access t o the log istic and plann i ng resources of the At lantic J\lliance, also for what concerns military information . Moreover, in o rder to warrant fu ll reciprocity and t rans parency of t he flow s of informat ion between the two organizations, a NATO liai son cell has bee n activated within the EU Military Staff, a group of t he EU (EUSG - EU Staff Group) at SHAPE. T oday we have achieved the stage of j oint planni ng of t he NATO predetermined assets t hat th e EU can employ in its operations, the NATO- EU relations have shown their effectiveness on t he occas ion of t he m iss ion s carried out in FYROM (2 5) with Operat ion Conco rdi a and , at present , in Bosn ia with Ope rat ion Althea, to wh ich also Italy has given its contr ibut ion. In particu lar, for t he mentioned ope rat ions , it shou ld be underlined t hat, accord ing to the "Be rli n Plu s" agree ments , t he "NATO Deputy Supreme Alli ed Commander Europe (DSAC EUR) holds the offi ce of Ope ration's Commander.
CONCLUSIONS Fi fty- seve n years after its constitution , NATO represents more than a def ens ive alli ance, found ed on the principles of democ racy, ind ividu al freedom and leg ality envisaged by the North Atlantic T reaty. T he tak ing on of new tasks, t he
47 - OIKOS
HIGH READ/NE..~..~ FORCE..~ (LAND) HQs I'vflJNSTER -GE/NL HRF (L)-HQ
RIIEINDALEN - l_TK HRF (L)-HQ STRASBOURG - EC HRF (L)-HQ
BETERA - SP HRF (L)-HQ
SOLBIATE - IT HRF(L)-HQ
"Transparent Partnership" with the EU, the process of enlargement to the new Countries and the internal adaptation cont inue to guarantee the security of the Euro- Atlantic area. With in t he Alliance of 26 Countries, consent and cooperation are still the keystones sanctioned by the Washington Treaty. The constant balancing process between the European and the North American interest s and, more in general, the interests of all member Countries, makes NATO an organization able to evolve and adjust to the st rategic changes. The adversaries of t he Co ld War period are now partners in the NATO-Russi a Council (NCR) for the struggle against terrorism, confi rm ing the valid ity of the ag reements reached in Rome in 2002. The new threats have shattered the old concepts of secu rity. Unlike the Co ld War, which required the preparation of contingency plans for the defence of the territory defined by art. 4 of t he T reaty, t he defence against the terrorist org anizations takes on a wider dimension that, as matter of fact, imp lies the inadequacy of the "In and Out of Area" border line. During the last summit of the NATO Foreign Ministers (December 8, 2005), the Secretary Genera l himself has highl ighted the g lobal dimension of t he accomplishments of the organ ization , which, through the "Mediterranean Dialogue", are now extending from the North
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ISTANBUL- TU HRF (L)-HQ African Co untries as far as Pakistan , with th e employment of the NRF in human itarian miss ion s that assist t he populations hit by the earthquake (26); or th e training of the military in Iraq, as w ell as t he logistic support of the African Union mission in Sudan. Moreove r, t here is also been the decis ion to extend the mission in Afghanistan t o the southern part of the Country, increasing the nu m ber of personnel prese ntly engaged there. The current year will be fundamental for the NATO process of politico-military transfo rmation. During the summit that w ill take place in Riga (Latvia) on the com ing 28- 29 November, the Heads of State and Governmen t of t he All iance wil l decide the objectives that wi ll have to be ach ieved wit hin the year 2008, as regards the new ro le, a new Command structure and a new process of enlargement. Are we approaching the politicomilitary results reached in Washingto n in 1999 or in Prague in 20027 NATO's success is the sum of the will and capability of each Country to make t he necessary changes and all ocate adequate resources in orde r to give effectiveness to the current process of transformation . In this regard, the Ital ian Army continues to grant concreteness to t he Atlant ic Alliance, in accordance with the strategic concept of t he Defence Chief of Staff, offering an adequate number of Commands and units to force planning,
R1'itista Miliiare English Edition n. 112006
operational missions and to the NRF, indi spen sable inst rument t hat acts as catalyst for focussing and promoti ng the capabilit y cha nges of th e organization. The NRDC- ITA Command at Solbiate Olo na, is an example of the comm itment that o ur Army has t aken in the Alliance and for the Alliance . From t he aspiration of the ear ly 2000s, the Army has moved forward t o t he concrete ness of the commitments ho noured by t he Corps Command, protagonist in 2004 as head of the land component of NRF 3, and in 2005 as HQ of Operatio n ISAF VIII, comm itments that place Italy amo ng the mai n fo rce contributors of NATO.
Pietro Serino Colonel, Chief, Plans Office, Army General Staff Stefano Del Col Lieutenant Colonel, Plans Office, Army General Staff
NOTES (1) Belgiu m, France, Luxembourg, the Netherland_s and
the Un ited Kingdom. (2) In order to create a climate of detente with the Countries ur Eastern Europe and t he Soviet bloc, throug h t he adoption of a series of measures aimed at a more preci se defin ition o f the borders and t he complex situation of Berl in. (3) The Conference on Securit y and Coope ration in Europe sanctioned some new norm s on human rights , frontiers inviolabi lity, peaceful settlement of d isput es and cooperation among Stat es. (4) The Treaty on Conve ntional Forces in Europe (CFF) was signed in Paris in 1990 and came into forc e in 1992. It is a j uridical agreement that was negotiated o n t he basis of t he purpose s and aims of CSCE. It was stipulated by 30 European Countries, t he U.S. and Canada, and envisaged a subst antial red uction i n offensive air- land armaments and the mutual verificatio n of the retrench ments t hrough inspections and co ntrols. T he area of applicat ion of the Treat y is the European Continent from t he Atlantic to the Urals, and includes the neighbouring islands belonging to the various States , as we ll as a large area of Asian Turkey. (5) ACE: Al lied Command Eu rope. (6) DCI was adopted on the occas io n of the Washingto n Summit of 1999 . It is an initiative aimed at strengt hening the "European pi llar" of t he A ll iance w ith t he modern ization of its o perational capabi lities t hrough the improveme nt /increase of its capal;il ities in t he sectors of mobi lit y and projectabil ity, logistic sustai nabi lity, engagement capabi lity, survivabil ity of forces and infrastructure, Command and Cont rol.
(7) The most important are: nuc lear, chemical, rad iological and bacteriolog ical defe nce , intell igence, surveillance and target acqu isition, C3 (Command, Control and Commun ication), strateg ic t ransport, complete proj ectabil ity and sustainabilit y of the force packages. (8) T he term "expeditionary'' synthes izes the capabi lity t hat th e mil itary inst ruments have to be projected also at g reat di stances from thei r permanent q uarte rs for conducting long- term operations . (9) Wh ite Book 2002 - Ministry of Defence. Part I, chap . l , parag raph l , su bparag raph 3. (l 0) SACEUR: Supreme Al lied Commander Europe. (l l) SAC LANT Supreme All ied Commande r Atlantic. (12) ACO: Al lied Com mand Operation. (13) ACT All ied Command Transformati on. (14) SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters A lli ed Powers Europe . ( l 5) SACEUR: Supreme A llied Com mander Europe. (16) USEUCOM: United States European Commander. (l 7) The CJTF (Combined Joint Tas k Force) concept has been acknowledged by NATO during the Brus sels Summit Uanuary 1994). It is a mu ltinat ional j oint Tas k Force HQ (generated by a parent standing HQ) organ ized for a specific mission . The concept has been experimented during Exercise "Allied Effort 1997" and "Strong Resolve" in 1998 . It has reached its complete implementat ion in l 999. The fol lowing process of acqu isition of the specific CIS and control capabilit ies for t he exercise of Command and Control has been validated at the end of 2004. ( 1 8) JFC: Join t Force Com m and.
(19) DJT F HQ: Deployab le Joint Task Force Headquarters. (20) ISAF: Intern ational Security Ass istance Force. (2 1) All ied Rapid Reaction Corps. (22) These concept s w il l be descri bed in detail i n a comi ng article. (23) ESDI European Security and Defence Identity. (24) The Pete rsberg missions have been established in June 1992 during the counci l of m inist ers of t he Western European Union (WEU). Bes ides the con t ri bution to collecti ve defence , implementing art . 5 of t he Washington Treaty and art.5 (mod ifie d) of the Brusse ls Treat y , the mi litary units of the WEU m ember States can be emp loyed i n human itar ian or evac uation m iss ions, peacekeeping mi ssions, combat miss ion for cr isis m anagement, i nclud ing peace enforcing missions . (25) FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (26) The It alian Army has contri buted to th is m ission by sendi ng a t ask force taken from the Eng inee r Brigad e. (27) Mod if ied by art.2 of the Protoco l of participation of Greece and Turkey i n the North Atlantic T reaty (October 22, 195 1). (28) On January 16, 1963 the Atlantic Council acknowl edged t hat all t he provisions of the North Atlantic T reaty concerni ng the former French Departments of Algeria were no more i n force as from July 3, 1962 . (29) The T reaty came into force on August 24, 1949, after the signatory States had depos ited t heir ratificatio n instruments .
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ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA On the brink of the abyss The region has been blighted for more than seven years by a bloody civil war that caused the death of hun dreds of thousands of people. In the last months, the tension has increased so much that there is a wellfounded fear that an armed clash can spread like wildfire involving other Countries. The negotiations started by the United Nations the and African Union and the intervention of a multinational Contingent have come to nothing. Because of continuous obstacles to its mandate, the UN has decided to withdraw.
The demarcation of borders is a source of great contention and the root cause of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia broken out in May 1998. The UN offered its help for a pacific resolution of the controversy. In particular, Kofi Annan asked Algerian ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, his special envoy in Africa, to support the action of mediation of the African Union (OAU). It was in A lg iers, in July l 999, on the occasion of one of the numerous summits arranged by this organization, that a first step was taken towards normalization. The two Countries signed a document, denominated «Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement», with which Eritrea made a commitment «to reorganize the positioning of its troops outside the territories it had occupied after May 5th 1998». Ethiopia, in the same way, promised «to reorganize its forces» according to the agreements reached before the situation had come to a head. Subsequently, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a new document «Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities», which provided for the institution of a neutral Committee in order to define exactly the borders between the two Countries and form a group of military observers who had to control the withdrawal of the Forces. In addition , the document also provided for the demilitarization of the border. While Eritrea accepted the document, Ethiopia expressed some reservations. The tension along the border was rather high despite international mediations. The major risk was the renewal of hostilities and the involvement of the civil population. Fighting broke out again in May 2000. On the
same day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1297, which expressed «concern of the renewal of hostilities», highlighting the serious consequences that would follow especially for the civil population and inviting both sides «to urgently reach a ceasefi re agreement» and take again the road to negotiation. Another resolution (7 298) was adopted on May 17th and imposed sanctions in order to prevent the two Countries from receiving arm supplies. As we can read in the text of the reso lution - al l the States had to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea from Title pages. A moment of everyday life in an Eritrean village. Below Eritrea and its borders.
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Rivisla Mililare English Edition n . 1/2006
being provided with weapons, munitions, mi litary vehicles, equipment and any technical help relating to the manufacture and use of weapons. The conflict and tension among the two countries caused devastating consequences. In March 2000, just two years after the tension had increased , the total death count was more than 370 thousand Eritreans, and more than 350 thousand Ethiopians. In some reg ions of Ethi op ia, the situation became complicated also because of a severe drought that affected the Country ki lling more than 8 mi llion people . Immediately, the UN General Secretary took appropriate measures and announced a task force would be dispatched to deal with the food shortage. The FAO was entrusted with handling the situation, in particular providing drinkable water, food and basic medicine.
THE SIGNATURE OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT After two years of violent armed clashes, finally the two States signed a peace agreement in June 2000. Thanks to the negotiations conducted by Algeria and the African Union Organization, the document called for a ceasefire. It was an important political and diplomatic step towards normalization. Furthermore, the Algiers peace agreement provided for the creation of a «neutral committee», which had to watch over the border, and for t he establishment of «a neutral committee to oversee the disputed te r ritories», which had to make a decision about the claims from the two sides. In Ju ne 2000, with Reso lu tion 1312, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) composed of 1 00 mil itary observers and a civil staff in support, which would be inc reased in the following years. The peace progress has made a lot of progress here, but we cannot talk about a completely stable region yet.
THE CURRENT SITUATION The tension has become worse si nce last October. The internal situation of Ethio p ia has increased the level of alarm. There have been indiscriminate arrests, soldiers who shoot on sight, night round - ups and summary executions for a long time. Currently, t he tension is high. An internal social protest has caused lots of difficulties for the Government. In addition, new tensions with Eritrea have risen. T he two States have entered the difficult phase of troop
movements. But these movements, accord ing to the African Union, «cou ld degenerate into a military conflict with possible wider impl ica.tions which could hit not only the two Count ries but the whole region». Th is is a pessim istic scenario and a difficult situation to cope with, even for the in ternational community. For this reason, the pan - African organization asked the two governments to «exerc ise a total control in orde r to avoid any action that can have negative effects or exacerbate the current situ ation». There is a real fear that the bloody war of th e period 1998-2000 will erupt again. In Ethiopia, the internal crisis has been dragging on since last spring and it has become worse after the legislative elections of May when the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) confirmed its position as leader surpassing the CUD (Coalition for Un ity and Democracy). Because of electoral fraud, the election has been defined by the European Unio n as «not conform to in ternationa l st andards and marked by a lot of human rights abuses». Recently, the spec ial envoy of the United Nations Security, the Japanese Kenzo Oshima, has been entrusted with assessing renewed tensions over the border. Last December was a crucial mo nt h. Eritrea increased the number of troops garrisoned in the border, adding other two Divisions (about 12 thousand soldiers) to the five Divis ions already present at the frontier. However, the dec ision to expel American, Russian, Canadian and European peacekeepers from the territory had major repercuss ions. Kofi Annan accused the Asmara Government to contravene, i n th is way, t he principle sanctioned by the institutive Charter according to which the UN workers had to be considered as generic «internationa l subjects)) and not as workers coming from specific States. Therefore, the UN Secreta ry General invited Asmara to withdraw t he ultimatum concerning the expu lsion immediately.On the 29th, the Court of The Hague passed judgem ent on the suit b rought by Addis Ababa, accusing them of being responsible for the outbreak of the 1 998 - 2000 war. The Court supported the thesis and declared Eritrea «responsible for the abuse, injury and k illi ng of innocent civilians, as we ll as for the destruction of lots of property ins ide the occupied te rritories and for huge economic losses». The government of Addis Ababa was also found guilty of contravening t he Convention for the treatment of agents and diplomatic seats (it was held responsible for gross violations of territorial immunities entering by force the embassies
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and requisitioning documents, for the destruction of the personnel's houses and for the expuls ion of the Delegation in 1998).
THE UNMEE MISSION
It was a peacekeeping missio n aimed at checking the realization of the peace agreement signed in Algiers in June 2000. With Resolut ion 1320 of Sept ember l 5th 2000 t he maximum executive o rgan in New York decided to rais e the numbe r of t he components of the mi ss ion to 4200 soldiers, divided into t hree infantry battalions. At first, the UNMEE was expected to be rel ative ly brief because it had to fin ish, except for possible ext ensions, by March 3 1 st 2001. Josep h Legwaila of Botswa na was placed in command of t he mission, while a Dutch man, Major Gene ral Patrick C. Cammaert was placed in com mand of t he Forces . Troops, civilian and medical personnel and t ec hnicians were recruited in: Alg eria, Arge ntin a, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Ch ina, Denmark, Finland , Ghana, In d ia, Italy, Jordan, Ke nya, Malays ia, Nepal, Ho lland , Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland , Rumania,
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Russia, Spai n, Sweden, Switzerland, T unis ia, Turkey, Ukraine, Tanzan ia, Uruguay and Zambia. The mission was divided into three phases. Initially, 2 officers had to be sent to Addis Ababa and 2 to Asmara to assess t he f easibility of t he miss ion; subseque ntly, military observers had t o swing into action to clear the ground from m ine s, activate com mu nications and coordinate the act ivities of the organizat ion , preparin g the third phase with the arrival of 4200 so ldiers, among w hi ch there were 200 observers. Th e first rep rese ntative mission of the UN an d OAU start ed on July 4th and, in a couple of weeks , completed its assignment. Th e talks with th e Countries who are at war with each other turned out t o be positive and the United Nat ions decided to st art the second phase.
THE MANDATE
The mission aimed at checking the observance of the ceasefire and the demarcation of t he borA typical village of the region.
Rivista Mi/itare English Edition n. 112006
ders between Ethiopia and Eritrea to maintain a link between the Countries in conflict with each other; to visit the commands and military sites in the whole area of operation, as req uired by the General Secretary; to estab lish and follow the procedure for the verification of the ceasefire; to establish the Military Coordination Commission provided for by the peace agreement. Anothe r assignment was to provide assistance during the long process of normalization. In the meantime, Eritrea and Ethiopia co ntinued the negotiations to reach a solid peace. They signed a new document, the «Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea», which had been stipulated in December 2000. The military contingent of the UNM EE operates within the UN mission, in observance of the rules of engagement estab lished by t he United Nations, as provided for by Chapter VII of the Charter that authorizes, if necessary, the use of force in self defence. Particularly, as far as the UNMEE is concerned, the use of force is allowed to assure the respect of the peace agreements and guarantee the security conditions and freedom of manoeuvre of the Contingent.
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS The Asmara Government put ins istent pressure on the UNMEE mission in the last months and this created lots of prob lems. The UN Security Council decided to «station temporaly» the western personnel of the mission in Addis Ababa. T he peacekeepers final ly retreated from the territory on December 14th 2005 . Actually, difficulties had already arise n when Asmara decided to put a ban on he licopter flights over the buffer zone . For this reason during the peacekeeping operation the military capacity was reduced by 60%. In fact, Kofi Annan had announced that there would be difficulties: «The UN helicopters are forbidde n to fly ove r the territory and this provision stops the military operations. Unless the situation improves, we wil l have to take a crucial decision since it is po intless to stay there if we can not operate». Without any helicopters, in fact, not only the security conditions, but also the possibilities of providing he lp, were substantially reduced to the min imum. Because of the ban on helicopter flights, the United Nations had already decided to close 18 out of 40 check-points within t he buffer zone and to suspend t he mine clearance along t he border. The difficult situation worsened even further because of big obstacles posed by the Asmara Government. According to the United Nations it
was practically imposs ible for t he peacekeepers to perform their tasks along the border. Aft er a while, the withdrawal was the inevitable consequence of th is situation.
THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT IN ERITREA
The italian m ilitary forces were deployed in Eritrea in November 2000 . It was the start of the third phase of the mission. At first, t he Contingent consisted of a unit of t he Air Fo rce, whose base was in Asmara, and a unit of the Carab inieri, helped by military observers. In t otal , t he Air Force deployed about 160 men who had to assure the air trans port of personnel and supplies, air reconnaissance along the border, photographic monitori ng , needed for the demarcation of the borders, and emergency aeromedical evacuation. The Carab inieri of the 1st ''Tuscania" Paratroop Regiment performed tasks of military police . Since December 2002, the Italian contingent had been reduced at first to the department of the Carab inieri, then, in July 2005, to just 25 men. Currently, exactly like the who le United Nations mission, also our soldiers have been forced to w ithdraw.
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CARABINIERI
Our soldiers came home a few months ago. They returned to Italy before t he UNMEE m ission had been completed, because they were work ing in conditions of extreme danger. However, the Carabinieri had performed their tasks in a very satisfactory way. In a peacekeeping operation it is easy to run into difficulties. T hese kinds of ope rations are defined as «peace operations», but anyway t hey are always carried out in areas of confl ict . T he activities which are related to the peace keeping are not considered as military activities any more. They cover a wide range of civil activities , from the human itarian assistance to the distribution of groceries, from the safeguard of huma n rights to the restoration of administrative structures and institutional activities. However, this happens in a theatre of constant unreso lved conflict. This is t he reason why t he m ili tary contingent should have the opportunity to undertake also, and above all , m ilitary operations.
Serena Sartini
Journalist
THE CENTURY OF BLACK GOLD It entered history in 1859, and progressively became the undisputed protagonist of the l 900's. Its low cost and reliability of use and transportation made petroleum the key factor of world wide economic develop ment in the last century. It is also a dangerous focal point of political and military tension and turbulence.
Whether a primary, indispensable materia l for industry, a gamble for t he superpowers, or an instrument of pressure, precious Black Gold has le ft its imprinting on the twentieth century. Petroleum (1 )and its natural derivatives (tar, diesel oil, asphalt) (2)known also in antiqu ity, became useful for many different purposes. The Greek geographe r Stradone, living during the early Christian era, recalled that the Babylonians had the ha bit of burning liquid asphalt in their lamps to produce light. The Assyrians u sed it to l ight their torches. In Egypt ta r was used for embalming . In Rome, on the other hand , it was attributed with miraculous therapeutic virtues. In fact, as affirmed by Pliny the Elder, in the first ce ntury after Christ, th is product was particularly well ad apted at curing rheumatism, asthma and epilepsy. Later on, diesel oil was used in the composit ion Greek Fire, whose composition remained a secret fo r many centuries and is said to have saved Byzantium from barbarian assaults . That wh ich would late r become Black Gold no longer had a u niversal purpose. People were unaware that it could be found in the depths of the earth in enormous deposits both in liquid and gas forms. Therefore , only that available in superficial stratum was util ized. Not until the second half of the l sth century did a naturalist observe t hat drilling caused the leakage of a flammab le substance and the flame became live lier the deeper you drilled.
1859- 1901, THE DISCOVERY OF A MIRACU LOUS PRODUCT
Petrole um t ru ly entered history a century later on August 27th , 1859, when the prec ious l iquid emerged in T itusville, a small city in the south of Pennsylvania. The discoverers were: George Bissel, a jurist from New York, James Townsend, a banker from New Haven, Benjamin Sillman, a professor from Yale , and Edward Drake , called Colonel Drake, an advent urer
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originally from Vermont, who was the drivi ng eleme nt and "do all" of the business. All fou r were convinced t hat the mysteriou s fuel t hat came to the surface and was craft ily collected would be usefu l for illumination if enough of it was produced. With Rock Oi l Company's fi rst drilling, industrial utilization of petroleum became a reality. From that mom ent on , oil lamp s substituted wax candles before eventually being beat out by electric lights in their time. For thirty years or so the oil boom was base d essentially on prod uction for lighting . A speculative fever, accompan ied by a race for produc-
Title pages.
A plant for oil refining. Below. An oil platform.
Rivista Mili/are Englisli Edition n. 112006
tion as well as transportation, swept across the United States . In the l 870's , just 1 1 years after the drilling of the well in Titusvi lle, Standard Oil company was founded by John D. Rockefeller. In 1882, after diffirnlt battles waged against its competitors and the ¡large rai lway companies, Standard Oil was organized into a T rust: a cartel with firms invo lved in ali sectors. This Trust dominated the entire American oil busi ness thanks to its transportation companies and its 39 oil refineries. It was not until 197 S, afte r an initial decision in 1911 , that the Supreme Court, applying the Sherman Antitrust Law of 1890 regarding liberal business competition, would establish a fragmentation of the Rockefeller Emp ire into about 30 subsidiaries. Between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of t he 20 th , adjustments to the combustion engine (3) caused a decisive acceleration in the development of the oil industry. The automobile industry began its dizzying growth and soon the diesel (4) engine would permit t he propulsion of heavy transport and shipping. In th is way, the hydrocarbon market witnessed an incredible expa nsion and not only in North America. At that time, the Americans were no longer the only competitors in this grand affa i r. Certainly the United States had advantages at thei r d isposal which the others did not: the vastness of the country, strong demographic growth fed by continuous immigration bringing a fresh and docile work force, and the flexibili ty and dynamism of American capitalism . The United States also had huge rese rves at their disposal that were easily extractable and dispersed over a vast portion of the country. We have already noted the reserves that came from Pennsylvania. Others came from Ohio, Oklahoma, Tenn essee, Louisiana, Indiana, and even California. It would not be until 1961 that the gigantic reserves in Texas would be added to the l ist.
1901-1918, A STRATEGIC BET
During the 10 or 11 years preced i ng the Fi rst World War, the Eu ropean powers began to seriously in terest themselves in this prec ious fuel. The Rothschilds (British)were in competition with t he Nobels (Swedish()for control of the rich rese rves in Daku, Azerbaijan, in Russia. Marcus Samuel's British She ll and Deterding's Royal Dutch became direct rivals to Standard Oil focusing the ir activities towards southeast Asia (Borneo, Sumatra) and towards the Far East,
before t he ir merger in 7 907. The Armenian bus i nessma n, Caluste Sarkis Gulbenkian, who became a British subject in 7 902, int erested h_imself in the exploitation of the reserves in the reg ion of Mossul i n Iraqi Ku rdista n. World oil production, which in 7 867 was represented exclusively by that in Pennsylvania, passed from 1 00 thousand tons in 1862, to 4 million tons in 1880, to 2 1 mi l lion tons in 1900, to 44 million tons in 19 7 0, and final ly reaching SO million tons in 19 13 . At that time Th e United States produced about two thirds of the total amount, followed by Russia (7 0 mi ll io n tons in 7 900) Mexico, Venezuela, Romania, India, Argentina, and Peru. Persia fol lowed far beh i nd. Meanwhile, the yearnings of the powerfu l were focused on the easte rn provinces of th e Ottoman Empire where geologists and speculators had already foreseen the enormous energy potential hidden in the subsoil. Except for The United States, the number one producer and consumer of oil, other industrialized nat ions were restricted to resorting on foreign refineries to confront t heir needs. Therefore, coal consumption continued to clearly ma i ntain first place. The acquisition of oil grew to an equal level with the extraordinary development of the automobile industry, aviation, maritime navigation, domestic heat ing , and beginning in 1920, the petrochemical in dustry. In this way, the 20th century was initiated with the struggle by the superpowers to access petroleum reserves. Governments entered the scene behind in vestment groups and large corporations. The British, French, and Germans sought to organize themselves in the Middle East in view of the future exploitation of the mineral wealth of Ottoman Mesopotamia. In 1903, the co ncession to a German compa ny of a construction p roject to bui ld a rail line from Constanti nople to Baghdad (called BBB Line: Berlin, Byzantium, Baghdad (was accom panied by the 80 year rights of exploitat ion of Iraqi soil for a distance of 20 k ilometers on either side of the rai l). In 1 914 , the railway also connected Mossul. Meanwhile, t he British had for some t ime begun their counter measu res. In 1909, The Anglo- Pers ian Oi l Company gained control of Iranian crude oil an d three yea rs later the government had to accept the sublime way under pressure from the Foreign Office. This inve stment dea l assured the British con trol of 75 percent of the capita l of the Turkish Petroleum Company. In this way the Br itish were able to ne utralize not only t he Germans, but the Americans as well, who had , by means of
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Standard Oil, proposed to the Ottoman s a loan and participation in t he benefits in exchange for exclusive r ights to the expl o itation of the empire's oil. The First World War produced an increased ne ed for oil. Gas and diese l engines had, by now, demonstrated their superiority as means of traction. Th e new armies, nava l flee ts and air forces became the grand consumers of gas, diesel and kerosene and t he needs grew with t he increased losses. The first ta nks, the Marki, used by t he British i n 19 16 at Somme, were t he tangible example of the beginning of the mechanization and modernization of war. Nonetheless, it came to be pa id for with an enormous cost in hum an life. In the same way, on the seas, where in 19 1 7 the Germans provoked all out subm arine war, the 185 u-boats sunk, the 800 thousand tons of naval ships to rpedoed and the l O million to ns of mercantile shippi ng sunk to t he bottom in a few months tim e represente d yet another po nderous t ribute to m odern ity. In every weapons sector, even in the skies with the impressive development of military aviation, oil i mposed its law. From a few dozen aircraft at the beginning of the war, the air flee t of the Allies reached 7 m i ll ion u ni ts in November of 191 8. Even politicians of thP era began to comprehe nd the importance of black gold in so mu ch as Clemenceau wrote to President Woodrow Wilson that" gas will be important as the blood of war to morrow. " WWI demo nstrated that petroleum was already an element of strategic i mportance and that controlling the p r oduction zon es of black gold was as important of contro ll i ng coal rese rves, especially for the powe rs wh ich di d not possess their own reserves. He pole position becomes even more imp ortant the moment we realize t hat post war con su mpt ion not only did not st abil ize b ut u nde r went a robust, new upturn due to in d ustrial develop ment, especially in the automobile, aeronautica l, and petrochemical ind ustries. In the end, one d iscovers a grand tru ism of modem economies, which is that, petr oleum equals d evel op me nt.
1918-1945, THE MOMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN
Among the many conseq uen ces of W WI was t hat of putting three princi pal Eu ropean powers out of play: Germany and Russia temporarily, and Austria- Hungary in a defini t ive way. After the war in Euro pe the chess game for control of
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Middle Eastern refinery wealth was p layed p ri marily between Britain and France. In March, 1916, t he Anglo - Fre nc h T r eaty Sykes - Pi cot provided for t he partit io n of a part of the spo il s from t he Ottoman Emp ire, that is, a ll of t he area which extends north of the Sinai-Persia n Gulf alignment to the south of Anatolia . Based o n t hi s agreement. Mossul went to the French. T he province was rich in oil but at that time t he French did not rea liz e the true potential. T he British however, perhap s better reali zing t he extent of the resou rces hidde n in t he soi l, in l 918 convi nced th e French to exchan ge t he prov ince of Mossul for the Syr ian mandate. In th is way the British gained contro l of al l of Iraq inc lu di ng all of its petroleum. T hanks to the participation of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Royal D utch She ll in t he Turkish Petro le um Company, London controll ed the entire area and to pol it ica lly consolidate it s positio n, Britain offered one quarter of its ca pital t o Amer ican and Fre nc h companies. Godfathers of the game in Ir aq and Pers ia, t he British were forced to align themselves with t he Amer ica ns. Standa rd Oil of California, Gulf Oil Corporation (Me llon Group), Texas Oi l and ot hers laun ched t he mselves headlong i n t he regio n to enlarge their market. Begin ni ng i n 1920, th e Americans adapted a pol icy of co ncess ion hu nting fo r refineries in Saudi Arabia and the Gu lf Emirates. Th e economic risk was h uge and the worry was testified to w ith t he words of th e Presiden t of Standard Oil, " that which we are acqui r i ng is an enormous mass of sand, heat, mosques an d ... ho pe, but history will show t hat t he endeavor will be crowned a success." On t he eve of the Second World War, Th e United States was by far the num be r one oi l power of the world. With a consumption of mo re than 160 million tons, they still controlled 60 percent of world production, to which an additio nal l 2 percent extracted by American com panies around the world shou ld be added. The most important, Standard Oil of New Jersey, t he principle inhe ritor of t he diss olved trust, produced 41 million ton s alone, said to value l 5 perce nt of t otal world -product ion. It refined l 50 mil lion tons of crude oil daily, posses sed 8 t housand kilometers of oil pipeline and a fleet of 200 tankers . Opposite this g iant was Royal Dutch Shell , which was stili flying t he flag of o ld, Europe and was the only rival to the powe rful Am erican companies. Royal Durch Shell had a production of 30 million tons and a fleet of 300 ships. Within this multinational, direct ed by Deterding and Gulbenkian, Great Britain had about 30 companies. At t he moment of the exp losion of the
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second World War, petroleum had become an important source of energy and a primary material. By that time, 45 million cars were in circulation, more than half of the entire mercantile fleet that rnoved with combu stible oil or diesel engines. consumption of the combu'stible liqui d was rapidly growing. Meanwhile, t he petrochemical industry was producing co loring, plastics , rubber, synthetics and clothing on a large scale. The Spanish Civi l War demonstrated t he ro le of armored vehic les and aviation in combat, conditiona l of course, on the possession of sufficient reserves of fuel. In the new context of world war, which began in l 939 , Germany, Japan, and Italy were the most disfavored. To confront their shortage of fue l, the Thi rd Re ich, which had bu ilt modest reserves of fuel during the last years of peace, had no other way than to apply the technique of Lightning War. Th is system was designed to rapid ly obtain success or control of product ion zones (looking towards Romania and successively the fai led attempt for the Caucasus)ln a few words, petroleum and its avai lab i lity dete rm ined the adopted strategy. In Po land , France and the Balkans , Blitzkrieg a llowe d the Germans to obta i n important successes and to take possession of the important reserves at Ploesti, Romania. T his al lowed them to maintain the conflict for some time. The next objective would be the Caucasus , but against Russia they did not have the same success. Actually, within the Russian offensive, the assault by German armored divi sions encountered their special-time limits. These limits were re - supp lyin g fuel and the cl imate (at - 30 degrees gas freezes in the tank). The change i n the German strateg ic obj ective from Moscow to Caucasus, to arrive from the north to the im mense petro leum reserves of the Caspian, and therefore the Middle East, wou ld be a vain hope definitively faded with the surrender of Von Paulus at Stalingrad. The Axis troops re lived the same tribulations in Nort h Africa where Romme l had to halt his advance towards Alexandria because of t he chronic shortage of fuel, among other things. In the resu lt i ng retreat, followed by Montgomerys assau lt of 1942, many motorized vehicles were ini t ial ly capable of conducting simp le tactica l maneuvers before being completely blocked i n the desert. The Allies evidently did not suffer the same pro bl ems but, all the same, had to maintain the flow of fuel to where it was needed. On the seas it recurred , as in WW! , a conflict between naval escorts and the German submarine wolf packs. Also in this confl ict, the Allies would have the last word but with considerable losses.
1946-1 960, THE COLD WAR AND THE MIDDLE EAST
WWII was certa i nly not, like WW!, a war for oil . It . d id , however accentuate that b lack go ld had strong ly conditioned the results of t he conflict. It is certainly no surprise that during the conflict in the period after 1946 T he Un ited States and the Soviet Union (the primary producers and consumers of oil)positioned themse lves for control of principle production zones. In Iran (third largest producer si nce the end of l 940)the Bri t ish he ld, since the beg i nning of the century, a near monopoly on the explo itation of oil. During the war the Russians, who had entered the northern provinces, imposed on Teheran in April, 1946, t he creation of a combined petro leum company of which the Russians had 51 percent control. T he Iranians, with American and Br it ish he lp, fomented revolts and , in the end, achieved an annu lment of the agreement. In l 951 , the government of Docto r Mossadek, head of the Nationalist Front, with a unanimous parl iamentary vote, nationalized the property of A ngl o -I ran ian Oil Company. But the British reacted by going to the United Nations Securi t y Council and Churchh i ll threatening d irect mi lita ry intervention . Then the t ension seemed to decrease. In fact a popu lar revolt, well prepared and conducted by the CIA in 1953 , collapsed Mossadek's government. Mossadek was i mprisoned and hanged. In this way the Westerners val id ated their own rights, at an actua l price, of a compromise that ended, in every case , the monopoly of the British com panies . The National Petroleum Company of Iran found itself ceding its property of reserves and refineries over to an international consort ium. This consortium was granted 25-year rig hts of exploitation and refinement of crude oil . With in the consortium, the Americans, with Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf , and Texaco, obtained 40 percent . In Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates (where the first prospective wells were d r illed in 1930) American influence was deve loped in a subtler manner in comparison to the European companies, especially the British. In th is zone the Trojan horse was ca lled Aramco (Arab American Oi l Company) an d con tai ned in its inna rds the cream of the American oil-producing galaxy (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, T exaco and Socony). These companies presented an immense challenge to the prospect in g and explo itation of t he Arab world's oil rese rves . Thousands of kilometers of oil-pipe lines we re
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built and ports were co nstru cted to be utilized by gigantic tankers. The results material ized in an ex plosion of t he Arab Midd le East's oil production (53 million tons in 195 0 , 500 m i llion in l 970). In 1956 the Suez Crisis, other than the direct effects on the o il mark et cau se d by attack s on the oil pi pel i nes of Iraq Petrol eu m and the closing of the canal , c larified the decline of European influ ence in the Middle East. Fran ce and Great Britai n had both ceased to play t he game i n th e region to t he benefi t of t he world's two supe rpowe rs, in parti c ular The United States. Moreover, the b rief shortage of oi l i n Eu ro pe provo ked a ch o ice in the trans portati on system, orientin g the specifi cation s of the ship bu i ld ing industry to the production of super oi l tankers with a ca pacity of more than l 00 thou sand to ns. Thi s was to chang e the ro ute of traffic, ad equ ately from a n economic po i nt of view, t oward s the Cape of Good Hope . T h e industriali z ed, petro le um-im po rtin g nations had, for a lo ng time , based t heir growth, an d th erefo re t he ir wealth, on the staA fully operational refin ery.
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bility an d low prices of o il, imposed by the large compan ies of producing coun t ries: S l .20 per barrel of crude o il (about l 59 l iters) in 190 0 , $1 .10 in 1914, betwee n $1 .20 and $ 1.70 d ur ing t he acute phase of t he Cold War, and less than $2.00 a barre l at th e beginning of t he l 96 0's. In t his period, the o il market came to be contro lled by 7 la rge companie s (Majo rs) (l 0), t he famo us "Seven Si sters." These seven, l 0 years later, with a bu si nes s volume of $67 .5 b ill ion and a production of abou t 1,200 million tons of oi l, would sti ll contro l 60 percent of the market of refi ned o il. Th es e proportions were suffic ien t to lay down the law for ex port in g nation s. What is more is that these nations did not receive even a mod est portion of the overa ll revenues. To keep oil prices at a r elat ively low leve l was doubly favorabl e to wes tern econ omi e i nte rests. It al lowed, esp ec ially in Europe , the ca rryin g o ut of a con siderab le fiscal gai n from the growi ng use of hydrocarbons and to, contem porarily, finan ce at a low cost a part of the ex pen ses of the dis trib ution chai n. Above al l, the u se of cheap energy facilitated a dizzying growth of th e north of th e world ; reinvigoratin g the ir te x-
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tiles industry, favoring the rea lization of new technologies, and new business activities. This favorable situation allowed, especially in those more deve loped societies with great er income distribution and the myth of the automobi le, an exceptional capacity of ¡ integration and to a lesser degree, "pol it ic iz ation" of the masses . Basically, the west underwent an econom ie expansion, wh ich, unti l the end of the l 960's , seemed limitless . The phenomenon would occur at a cost of a huge squandering of wealth and perhaps a true and real "bleeding" of th e produci ng countries. In so doing, the i ndustrialized world did not know nor want to understand that , by investing everything on hydrocarbons (in 1970 o i l represented 71 % of the primary energy consumed versus 30% 20 years ear lier) it was tying its hands and, above all, building its future and its prosperity on a fragile base. As long as the re lations between co nsuming nations and exporting nations remained within the context of northern domination of the south, the question of oil dependency did not truly present a prob lem. On the other hand, it is a po litical axiom t hat one is unab le to not depend on that wh ich one controls and on that which is controlled by the hegemon ic power of the camp to which you belong. Undoubtedly, Great Bri ta in and France discovered during the Suez Crisis that they no longer had the means to cont i nue the practice of "big gun politics. " Nevert heless , western v ital interests we re no longer a matte r of d iscussion , so it was sufficient that t he United States show the i r authority so that the eventual contestants of the estab lished order would get back, more or less quiet ly, in line. Mossadek in Iran in 1953 , and both Egypt and Syria with the events in Lebanon in 19 58 , would see that you cou ld not get away with challeng i ng American m ight Ten thousand me n landed in Beriut under the protection of a f leet armed w ith tactical nuclear weapons. It was more than sufficient for t he west to continue to not question the future of petro le um supplies. T he overwhe l ming strategic superiority of the United Sates on t he international scene and this undeniable position of force seemed to offer no serious doubts for long. It was during this period, however, that the contestants in the world economic order of petroleum began to organize themselves, inst ituted by t he supp li ers and embodied by agent s of t he "Seven Sisters, " they we re suppo rted even by the ideological penet rat io n in t he A rab world on the part of the communists. Following t he decision of the "Seven Sisters " to u ni lateral ly reduce the price of crude o il,
which had been practically u nto uched for half a century, OPEC, T he Organization of Oil Exporting Count r ies, was 0orn in Baghdad i n September, 1960. Its members at that t ime were Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait. Later j o in ing them wou ld be Qatar, Libya, A lge r ia, Abu Dhabi, Ecuador, Indones ia, Nige ri a, and Gabon, for a tota l of 1 3 states who , from 1 970, contro lled 85% of t he wor ld's crude oil exports.
1 960-1 979, OPEC'S STRUGGLE
From the start it was considered essent ial to coordinate and unify the pet roleum po liti cs of t he member states in order to ensu re the stabilization of- prices and t o supply a constant income for the producing countr ie s. These were, in any case, the apparent aims of the organization whose treaty was registered with the Un ited Nations in 1962 . In the first ten years of its l ife, OPEC conducted a true and incessant struggle against the companies. T hey were able, w it h growing contro l of reserves and the direct ex ploitat io n of oi l on the part of prod uci ng nations, to not only stabi li ze t he price of crude oi l but also to sensibly modify the revenue t ax . The turning point took piace at t he beg inning of 1970 wit h the 2 1 st Meet ing of Caracas. OPEC decided to fix the sa les t ax on revenues at 5 5% for agent companies . Desp ite fierce res ist ance, t he compan ies were compe l led to accept, w it h t he agreements of Teheran in February 197 1 and Tripol i in Aprii of the same year, a substa ntia l increase in prices . These automat ic rev isions set in mot ion i nternat io nal inflat ion. T he offe nsive on the r u les of rent and o n the prices of crude oi l were accompanied w ith a n action intendi ng to assert fu ll sovereignty over their o il reserves . In l 977, t he examp le came from A lg eria where Houa r i Boumedienne decided un i late rally that t he country had to rearrange the majori ty of the French compan ies operating on their so il and that the oil pipe lin es and reserves had to begin work ing for the good of the state . In the fo llowin g year, 1972, the government of Baghdad nationa lized t he powerful Iraqi Petro le u m Company a nd then in September, 197 3 Co lone l Gheddafi an nounced t hat Libya wou ld become the owners of 51 % of the compan ies operat i ng on t heir soil. Elsewhe re, the "Seven Sisters" were ab le to maintain their control of prod uct ion , t ransportation and refining of crude oil even if their contracts were amended or replace w ith new types of contracts. Joint Venture contracts st ill ex isted which entruste d the ex p lo itation of
ex1st1ng reserves to f i na ncial ly mixed companies on a general ly even bas is. With the Kippur War of 1973 , this onslaug ht of petro leum decolonization assumed a comp let e- . ly particular dimension . Thi s conflict was accompa nied by a decision of remarkable importance for th e economic future of t he w o r ld . On l 7 October, l 973, wh ile the outcomes of t he war were sti li un clear, t he ministers of six Persian Gulf nat io ns Saud i Arabia, Kuwait, lrag, Iran , Abu Dhabi, and Qata r , meeting in Kuwa it City, decided u ni laterally to increase the pr ice of crud e oi l by 70%. T his was the first step in a race of price increas ing that in th e next two months would quadrup le the price per barre l from $3 to $11.65. Th e day after t his decision, with the exception of Iran, but the support of other Arab nations, OPEC decided to us e Black Go ld as a weapon of war, i nitiat ing a reduct ion in production of 5% for months or unt i l t he i nternat ional comm unity forced Israel to abandon al l territories occu pied in 1967 and the r ights of the Palestinians we re reinstated. On t he 28 th of October, as soon as th e cease fi re came into ex iste nce , OPEC declared an embargo against the United States, "the protectors of the Jews, " and in th e following days the same embargo was declared again st Hol land , Portugal, Rhodesia, a nd South Africa. The Kippur War therefore offered Arab exporting nations t he occasio n to stress the energy debate and to obtain, with a sing le b low, considerable results . Th is decision played a f undam en tal role in the process of price i ncreases and i n a reversa l i n the strength of re lations between exporting cou ntries and the concess ionary companies. These relations were already being discussed for some years. On the other side, if the signals of economie crisis were perceptible from the start of the decade, the d ec isive measures of Kuwa it City sudd en ly engraved t he scale and the gravity of t he eco nomie situation t hat wou ld show its pernicious effects on every state of the p lanet. These crises appeared to be a corollary to the deterioration of international relat ions and a re tu rn to the Cold War with the developmen t of peripheral conflicts in Asia, Afghanistan, in East and Central Africa, and even in Central America. On the whole, even if directly attacked by the oil embarg o , which cam e to an end in March 1974 , the Un ited States was practica l ly untouched. It was extremely d ifficu lt for an expo rt ing country, eve n if it wanted to, to con trol t he fina l destination of its product. In the
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weste rn world the United States was, above al l, the least vu lnerable to t he weapon of oil, taki ng into account t hat , at that time , on ly 5 - 6% of th e oil imported by the Americans came from th e Gulf region. The embargo, d ur in g its in it ial phase of price i ncreases, b ro ught more advantages tha n inconveniences to America. In real ity, t he event had contrib uted to rein forcing t he pos ition of the Un ited States with i n t he capita lis t world, dim i nis h ing the competi tiveness of the ir European and Japanese com petitors and causing thei r A llies to be confronted with the scarc ity of t he margin of rema in ing maneuvers . At the sa m e time, th e new situation had eve n con t ribute d to a consolidation of American influence in the region . Th i s was becaus e th e primary beneficia ri es of the operation were th e "moderate nat ion s," tightly connected to the Majors a nd therefore to the pol iti cs of th e Un ite d States . From an economic point of view t he pric e increases reinvigorated the int ernal product io n of the Un ited States , wh ic h by t h is time had been slowed by the cost of extraction (Alaska) some 1 0-20 times more expe nsive than that of the Middle East. It a lso perm itted research and exploitation of substitute energy so urces in a new way: coal , nuclear ene rgy, and sand and ui l sha le. On an internat ional level, the first oi l cri sis and than the second, wh ich came in 19 79-80 , fol low i ng th e Irania n Revo l ution and the Iraq / Iran War, had the effect of pushing oil companies and governments to search for so lutions to stab il ize prices and slow the exhau st ion of the wo r ld's petro le um reserves. T he two crises, especial ly the f irst of 1 973 74, but al so t he second of 1979- 80, were need ed because as a result t he consum i ng nations adopted economic measures and , above al l, developed alt ernative energies .(l 3) The explo itation of new resou rces (North Atlantic, Mexico, Ango la , Alaska), the excoriat ion of OP EC, and the po litics of "to each h is own," adopted by many produc ing nat ions start ing in 1 98 5 , did t he r est.
1980-200 3, THE AMERICAN TRIUMPH
The turbu lence of the last quarte r of the ce ntury contributed to accentu ati ng the abso lute, central ro le o il assumed in t he li fe of t he world and the evo lu t ion of internat ional relations . In 1975 Soviet intervent io n in Mozambique, Eth io pia, Soma lia, South Yemen, a nd
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ture of what remained of the Soviet Union. Victorious without havi ng to wage a single battle in the field, the Americans found themselves after 1 990 in a hegemon ic pos it ion without a coun t er - ba l ance who could play ; a Russia wi t h its superpower prerogatives reo rganized o r a China just coming out from an underdeveloped economic position.
Massimo lacopi Major General (ret.)
NOTES:
An oil well.
(l) Norm ally present in sof t , poro us rocks wh ich ma intai n in t heir interior a natu ral , comb u sti ble, min era l oi l composed mainly of hydrocarbons . (2) Diesel, tar/pi tch - a clear, yel low liquid produced from the distil lation of oil u sed as fuel and combustibl e; bit um en- natural, organic material or coming from the d istillation of oil, used in publ ic works and construction; as phalt- a blackish mixture of sediment and bitumen, used for paving roads. (3) Gas engine in which the combustion of gas provides the movin g forc e.
Afghanistan aimed to exert pressure on petroleum shipping routes and therefore on the primary arteries of western supplies. This situation, if successfu l , wou ld have assu red the Soviets, with addition of a high ly developed navy, an important winning ca rd in case of an explosion of regional conflicts, but als o in the eventuality of a direct conflict w it h th e west. Th e US.S.R. never had the pleasure of enjoying the benefits of its presence in Persian ports and along the "arc of world crisis," wel l descr ibed in geopo li t ical texts as; a zone whi ch goes from Indochina to the Cape of Good Hope, across the Horn of Africa and whose control would permit the entangleme nt of west ern energy resources from t he south . The Cold War disappeared practically at the same time as commun ist power. The U.S.S.R. , one of the principal producing nations at the start of 1 980, with the disso lving of its empire, watched its production fal l nearly 50% (from 600 - 3 50 million tons). Th is happened not with out a connection to the beh avior ass u med by Russia in the recent Iraq Cris is and explained by thei r politics i n Chechnya (I n Fact there are larger po l itical reasons connected to the cohesion and th e subsequen t survival of the struc-
(4) The German Rudo lf Dei sel invented the diesel engine in 1893. A combustion engine wh ich f unct io ns w it h auto-i gnitio n of the fuel inj ected into an air chamber and compressed at 800 degrees. (5) Founder i n l 91 1 of the Turkish Petro leu m Company, also ca ll ed Mr. 5%. (6) 50% of the cap ita l w ent to the Anglo- Iran ia n Petroleum Company, later Anglolranian Company, and the n British Petrol eum . (7) Liq u id derivative of oil , obtain ed from distil lation of crude an d used as aviation f uel. (8) In l 929 will become Iraqi Petro leum Company. (9), Du tch bu sinessman , patron of She ll, late r became a suppo rte r of Naz iGermany. (10) The ''Seven Sisters": St andard Oil of New Jersey, American; Royal Dutch Shell , British / Dutch ; Mobil Oil, American ; Texaco, American; Gu lf Oil, A meri can; British Petroleum, Britis h; St andard Oil, Ame rican . (11) Fee s paid by an oil company to the country of which t he product is expl oited or a country cr ossed by a pipel i ne. (12) Iraq i t roops attacked Iran in September l 980; the conflict lasted unti l 1988. (1 3) While France ai med towards nuclear, Ita ly decided, under pressure fro m emotional and political factors, unrelated to rat iona li ty or national inte rests , to renounce the only way out that t he present offers to th ose who do not have o i l.
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INFANTRY IS STILL QUEEN OF BATTLES The ancient "Queen of Battles" is still the spearhead of today's strategic and tactical context. But more than in the past, its "head" must be sharp, technologically advanced and polyvalent, and its "spear" and "shaft" much stronger, in order to ensure the highest performance.
An old infantry Officer in the reserve, who served as 2nd Lieutenant at t he height of the Cold War, told me that he was particularly imp ressed, and very proud, when read ing a sentence written very visibly on a wall near the entrance of the Infantry School at Cesano: "This is the School of the Infantry, Queen of Battles". Th e truth of t his sentence has never. been questioned since the past centuries. Useless to mention th e Infantry's role in WWI: the Branch always paid heavily with blood and sacrifices and is the only one deservedly decorated with the Military Order of Savoy. Also at the beginning of WWII, one of t he best "naval" (or, better, "navalist") (l) writers of the XX Century, Adm. Giuseppe Fioravanzo, concluded his strategic considerations on the war, then under way, with these words: "the infantryman, as usual, will have the last word, asserting unequivocally, with his foot on the enemy soil, every definitive conquest: but his action, directly or indirectly made easier by the air and naval power, will be to the advantage of the air
Italian infantrymen in Iraq.
Title pages A squad of Alpine paratroopers in the Afghan desert.
force's and navy's operational possibilities, broadening their action over wider horizons". In order to complete t he histo rical reference picture, it is also useful to remember that Since WWI included, t he Infantry has constantly increased its f ire and transportation means , as well as logistic means; all this in addition to the growing firepower of the Artillery. Until recent times the importance of the Infantry, in princi ple acknowledged by all, has never been accompanied by an appropriate selection of personnel. For in stance, in 1908, the future Marshal Pi etro Badoglio, then a Captain in the General Staff Corps, altho ug h originally an arti llery- man, dep lored with unu sual frankness the excessive and often unne-
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cessary impoverishment of the Infantry in favour of the so- ca ll ed "specia list Arms", (Artille ry and Engineers) whic h was made even worse by an add itional cons iderab le skimm ing of the line infantry in favour of the "special infantries" (Grenad iers ; Bersaglieri, Alpini). Granted that today, by "Infantry" we mean by and large the whole infantry and its traditional branches, whose number has notab ly increased af ter WWII (Grenadiers, "Bersaglieri" and "Alpini" were j oined by Tankers, Paratroopers and "Lagunari") it is natural to ask: what is the ro le of the In fantry in the comp lex and difficult context of the post-Col d War pe riod and in re lation with the new technologies? A series of high -quality stud ies exempt us from making minute and detailed descriptions, very abundant in military literature in general. Obviously, opi nions are not always i n agreement; for example, an article pub lished in June 2003, wh ich with an emblematic and categorical t itle stated that 'The Queen of the Battle will be the revolutionary central computer network", is the cause many reflections . Another art icle of the same month asserted that in the year 2003, when we celebrate the centennial of the first human flight, the air power (but perhaps it would be better to start to call it air-space power) asserts itself once more as the winning Arm, the solver of conflicts and, after affirming, without naming t he "normal" infantry, that we Italians are proud of our "Bersaglieri" and "Alpini"(. . .) engaged in peace missions (.. .) asks whether with in the context of our alli ances we will be providers of high technology or only suppliers of men, albeit professionally and spiritually well prepared. From these interventions one may ass ume that the most advanced techno log ies have acqu ired a greater - perhaps excessive - importance , not on ly in terms of effect ive ness but also in order to spare human lives, which, as everyone knows, is a great concern of the Western politico- social system . This has induced to emp loy with great prudence the piloted aircraft (which are besides very expen sive) replacing them with pilotless airplanes and / or with long - range missi les of the ''Tomahawk" type . On t he other hand, desp ite the continuous - and sometimes spectacular progress, technolog ies have never been ab le to replace man and never will. The Army Chief of Staff of t he time had already underli ned it in 2003 commenting on the subject se lected for the Army's Communication Plan of that year (an eloquent subject : "From sat ellite to man ") (2), rightly pointin g out that after the Gulf War (1991) and in view of the most recent events , the illusion of achieving a "zero- dead war" through technology had vanished.
.. Italian servicem en on patrol.
Therefore the Army cannot be red uced to a mere ly subaltern role, since it carries out indis pensable activities, at home and abroad, when it is a matter of providing complete operational capabilities ... , to which one should add that of reconstruction. As a matter of fact, the proliferation of unconventional forms of fight, the absence of any restraint in recurring to indiscriminate violence (. . .) lead to a further revaluation of the human factor, owing to which the physical, moral, cult ural and professional qualities of the personnel of every category must be developed and increased with constant determination. Of course, this does not mean closing the door to progress and go back to the past, but only finding the right balance between the human and technological component, compatibly with the resources available. The same concepts were confi rmed and item ized by the Chief of Staff in June 2003, when the first phase of the war in Iraq was concluded, w ith the conq uest of Baghdad and the fall of Saddam's regime. These events marked t he revaluatio n of the fighter's role since, in order to turn a mi li tary victory int o a po litical success, it is necessary, as our Anglo- Saxon friends say, to have "the boots on the ground". For t he sake of brevity we omit other convincing remarks made at the same ti me or later, which widen and insist on the same concept, keeping in mind also the de licate and more difficult phase of the Iraqi war, common ly call ed
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"post co nflict" . One thing is certain: the war in Iraq, not yet concluded, provides lots of technical and mi I itary lessons that can sig nificantly influence not on ly the future m ilitary organizations, but also, and even more, the study, preparation and selection of new materials, w ith the largest use of the available technologies which , on the other hand , must be reso lutely steered towards the new requ irements and measured - after exhaustive studies - against t he technical and financial possibilities. First of all, some preliminary remarks are necessary: the application of advanced technologies regards the Western forces and almost not at all those, which at present are oppos ing them in Iraq. Faced by the initial "bl itzkrieg" conducted by the American and British forces , the regular Iraqi Army has rapidly dissolved, w ith a performance far inferior to that objectively assumed u ntil that moment. This high lights once mo re an elementary and notnew truth, which unfortunately favo urs the recourse to terrorism and guerrilla warfare: it is unprofitable for t he enemies of t he West to engage technologically advanced air- land forces with a "class ic" strategy conducted by regu lar forces , since thei r opponents could employ their own fire and manoeuvre superiority. The second p hase of the Iraq i war has shown, in fact, the excellent performance of very simple, and almost archaic, modalities of action and weapons: lorries loaded with explosive and driven by "kamikaze", mines, mortars and aut omatic weapons. Against these arms - thoroughly exp lo ited with the application of procedures based on surprise and disregard of human life, a thing unacceptable to the West - the most advanced technolog ies and the most modern fire sources have been unable to fully exploit their capabilit ies. It is also well known that the American and English losses in the second phase of the war have been much greater than those suffered in the first phase . Even considering that the first phase consisted not so much in hard fights but rathe r in daring offensive raids with almost exc lusive ly logistic difficulties, it still conf irmed the old theory that one needs a large num ber of men - or, to be more precise, many un its of Infantry - to fu lly control a territory not complete ly safe, w ith populations partly or potentially hostile . This is because the air force can intervene only against targets with a minim um of consistence and persistence, while t he support of the even most powerful fire sources on the ground cannot always be well timed, adherent and effective . Th is confirms that the West needs a sufficient number of real fighters, motivated, trained, wel l armed and appropriately equipped, as it should have been, and not always was, espec ially in our case, also for the wars of the XX Century. Only that
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this t ime either the fighter, who is destined to "look the enemy into the eyes" (as the young infantry officers were told many years ago) has at his disposal all the moral and material too ls of hi s trade or he is simp ly unable to operate wel l, because nothing (fire means , technology, etc.) can offset his bas ic moral or training shortcomings. It is for all these reasons that, precisely at the begi n-n i ng of t he second phase of the war i n Iraq, it has become necessary to reinforce the already cons iderable Western forces already present there: a fact that shou ld be considered carefully. Are therefore the new technologies of no use at all or less useful? Or, are they, at least in this phase, of secondary importance? Taking for granted that al so in the f uture it is unlikely t hat they will be able to prevent or neutralize terrorist actions or guerrilla warfare, the present situation is such that the new technolog ies should be whipped along , requiri ng that t hey suggest new and difficult paths of research, which for the first time in history shou ld no more be aimed at increasing the weapons' power but at improving the security in general. It is a fact that the needs of personnel protection, both at ind i vidual and col lective leve l, are today in the forefront (we refer to personnel of all Branches of the Army, including helicopters and logistic assets). One should also point out that - as was confirmed by recent events reported by the press - this protection has had important reper¡cussions uri Lhe fighters' morale and on their confidence in their weapon s, equ ipment and organization . It ensues that, at ind ividual level, armament and protection (bu llet- proof jackets, helmets), wh ich are already carefully stud ied , should make further steps forward, g iving t he individual, and in particular to the infantryman, th e possibility of seeing - and intervening very quickly with his individual weapon - as much as possible also behind himself and on his flanks . At collective level, in every case and sit uation, priority must be given to protection and security against the wide range of all poss ible offences, starting from m ines and bomb- vehicles . It is actua lly a matter of deduci ng the conse quences from the fact that there are no more front lines and rear li nes, as was the case un ti l the Cold War inc luded. Researches and studie s should therefore preferab ly be directed toward s the protect ion of the following sectors of collective interest: Installations (commands, troops and logistic units), to be protected also from rockets and mortars (whose emplacements shou ld be located immediate ly) and also from ai r attacks from light and ultra- light aircraft, wh ich cannot be ruled out. Fixed and mobil e logistic means. Studies are under way - and sometimes have already been
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concluded - for protecting also the crews of the log istic veh icles. Such protection must now be extended also to the loads, ammun ition and fuel in particular. Combat systems (tanks , APCs, he licopters , guns). Tanks have often become moving fortresses and the differences from APCs have diminished. Therefore in the new context the protection of these systems should be privi leged, even to the detriment of the armament, while the light and medium artil lery pieces should adhere as much as possible to the formula "self- propelled with reinfo rced protection" (the gun - tractor unit is of course more vulnerable). An armoured vehicle shou ld be ab le to detect, rap id ly and t ime ly, the surroun ding threats (m ines, kamikaze, automatic weapons) and to intervene without having to det ach a man outside (albeit partia lly protected) near the mach ine gun . In other words, the space surrounding the vehic le should be easy to con trol and be stricken also from t he inside. In short, techno logy must be conceived f ist of all in the service of the security of man, who should thus be put in t he best co ndition to fil l With his actions the gaps inevitab ly left open by
Infantrymen of the 66th "Trieste" Airmobile Regiment in Iraq.
technology. If one says "man", it means f irst of all "infantryman", an infantryman who has never been, and cannot be , left alo ne, because the effectiveness of his act ion and his material and moral cond itions depend on what the ent ire m ilitary organization - including of co urse the other Services - does before him , with him and behind him, in the sky above him and on the sea that is perhaps very far from the fie ld of his action. T o insist that we need a joint organization of the national def ence and security - sanctioned by a special law in 1997 - is by now a pleonasm, considering that all mi litary leaders are convinced and cont inuous ly underline th is necessity. What counts is that the infantryman needs everybody more than ever, just as everybody - as always needs the infantryman. Battles - or, i n wider sense , operations - are won, lost and brought to an end by all together. Therefore it does not seem necessa ry t o use categorical terms such as the adjective "decisive" or "determinant" refe r red to this or that Service , t his or that Branch . T he boundaries between Services
7
_ 1 nr:n,
and/or Branches little by little are dest ined to shrink and dissolve. Each component has an irreplaceable role. By ins isti ng on certain subjects, one runs the risk of becoming entangled in inconclusive de bates, suc h as t he d iscussion that over a hundred years ago took place in Britain, where the argument was if in t he frequent exped itions overseas the Royal Navy (th e gu n) was more important than the Army (the projectile). Obviously both of t hem were important: to achieve the goal of the m ission, the former could not do without the latter. Going back to th e present geo- strategic reality, we see t hat each miss io n req uires a careful assessment of its characte ristics, w hich must log ically lead to an appropriate dosage of t he forces, different f room case to case. A centuries-old historical dat um counts today more than ever: t he regu lar armies are in a plight when they have to face guerri lla warfare and terrorist attacks (for example, just t hi nk of the debacle of the until t hen undef eated Napoleonic armies in Spain, in the war 1808- 1813), also because in many cases the solution of the problems can not be obtained thro ugh mi litary means on ly. In any case the latter are necessary, fi rst of all in order to carry out t he activities in favour of t he civil ian population in a frame of security. Activities that require well o rganized land forces.
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A 6x6 "Puma" armoured car on a reconnaissance mis sion in Iraq.
Secondly, the human factor - i.e., practically, the infantryman - cannot certainly take second place vis - a- vis technology. Significantly, the futu re demanding and costly technolog ies are st udied mainly for man: but it is certainly not easy to motivate a Westerner, inspiring him w it h confidence in his mission, his weapons, his equipment and leadership, to train him , command and provide him with the necessary supp lies and rise him t o a high level of conscious discipline. It is a fact that the recent conflicts have been characte rized by a "hunger for men" precisely from the strongest , richest and most t echnological ly advanced Army, such as is, by far, that of the United States. The reason is t hat technology has , and w ill always have, insuperable lim its and, as always, t he terrain w ill affect the ope rations and when t he environment is difficult - as was rece nt ly the case in Afghanistan - it will favour guerril la w arfare, wh ich, as always, can be effectively fought only by large units of lig ht infantry, w hich must adopt as much as possible their proced ures . On the othe r hand, if technologies <!annot replace man, the contrary is also t rue: masses of m en can not take the place of technology; therefore we need
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a sufficient number of men, accurately se lected and prepared. T he old concept of Infantry as "Mass Arm", which was already obso lete in WWII and even more during the Cold War, is by now "money no longer in circulation". 'A nd the same is true also for a Navy based on a group bf large ships and escort vessels and for an Air Force made of large and very expensive bombers and/or aircraft conceived mostly for "strateg ic" interventions. Also in these cases the pursuit of protect ion must become a top priority, within an operational framework, which - by indirectly acknowledg ing the ir importance - more than in the past makes necessary both the intervent ions on the ground, also very close to the fighting forces, and the direct protection of the hulls of the individual ships, as we ll as the close escort of convoys. It must be unde rl ined that protection and security are topics not totally new. As regards the land force, "Rivist a Militare", already at the end of the l 9th Century, published a number of debates on the need to protect the infantry from the increasing effectiveness of the repeating firearms , both at individual leve l (cu irasses and shie lds) and at col lective level (armoured vehicles w ith internalcombust ion engines, derived from the British armed trains employed in the Ang lo- Boer war 18991902). As a never belied truth proves, also in this case by turning to the past one creates the ind ispensable starting base for meeting the challenges of the future. In conclusion , in today's strateg ic and tactical context, Infantry is actually the spearhead; but more than in the past th is head must be sharp, technologically advanced and po lyvalent, and its spear and shaft much stronger, in order t o ensure the highest performance . One shou ld not overlook the fact that also in purely human it arian emp loyments of assistance to the populations, the Infantry has always been widely employed in the front line. T he old infantry Officer that we mentioned at the beginning can therefore be reassured. Infantry is as always t he basic Arm that dominates combats ( the decis ive great battles between regular armies of the past cent uries have become obsolete) but, like the other Western military forces , espec ially in "combat" missions, Infantry asks much mo re than in the past and meet s greater difficulties. In short, it is a constitut ional Quee n who cannot r ul e by herself, and more than advanced techno logies and various kinds of backings, starting from air support, she needs Information and Command-andControl systems that ensure a maximum performance with minimum possib le harm to the security of the ind ividuals: certain ly these are no easy objectives for the Staffs. Ferruccio Botti,
Colonel (ret.)
NOTES (l) "Navalism" is a school of t hought ai med at demonstrating - with frequent quot ations of t h e works written by Admiral Alfred Thaye r Mahan at the end of the 19th Centu ry - the pre-eminence and the decisive role of the nava l forces and, therefore, the need to give the highest pri ority to shipbui ld i ng . At the beg i nning of the 20"' Century t hi s theory was also cal led "marit imism". (2) Reflections of the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, "Rivista Militare" no 2 /2 003 and The role of the land forces in modern scenarios - Lecture by the Army Chief of Staff (Rome, June 19, 2003), publ ished on ''Rivista Mi l itare" no 4/2003.
THE <<FRIULI>> BRIGADE IN JORDAN Exercise ÂŤEastern Desert 2005Âť The infantrymen, airmen and cavalrymen of the only airmobile Major Unit of our Army, after the exercises in Poland and despite their commitment in Iraq, have been welcomed by the desert of the historical land of t he Moabites, where they have been engaged, side by side with the Jordanian soldiers, in exercise "Eastern Desert 2005".
THE EXERCISE
The name comes from a previous occasion of bilate ral planning with the Armed Forces of the Jordanian Kingdom when, in March 2003, the process of bilateral negotiation for the use of the training area of Al Qatrana, wh ich had reached by then the conclusive stage, had to be suspended because of the rapid deterioration of t he international situation in the Middle East. It was therefore inevitable to adopt the name chosen in the preceding occasion : "Eastern Desert".
Actually also this edition, which t ook place i n September 2005 , risked to suffer the cons equences of a terrorist action soon after th e departure from Italy of the fi rst ma r ine carrie r. Luckily, the te r rorist attack against so m e American military ships docked in the port of Aqaba was unsuccessful. The immediate assess ment of t he situation , sus t ained by the w ill t o continue to maintain the same relations with the Jorda nian counterpart, induced the chiefs of th e Army to proceed on the path they had started on, taking some precaut ion ary meas ure such as , for example, that of employing the night t ime fo r conditioning materials and mean s for the subse-
Title pages. King Abdullah II of Jordan and the Italian Army Chief of Staff, General Filiberto Cecchi, attend th e exercise.
Below. A Jordanian AH- / "Cobra " (in the background) and an A 129 "Mangusta" (launching a volley of 81 - mm rockets) in Joint training.
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quent transport. The decision to continue the exercise, despite the revivi ng of the atmosphere of restlessness t hat characterizes t he area of the Middle East, turned out to be quite appropriate, and the resu lts achieved are an ample reward for t he worries that pervaded the initial phases.
Rivista Militare Englis/J Edition 11. 1/2006
AB- 205 Helicopters and airmobi/e infantrymen carry out ;,n attar:k, supported by an A - 129 (in the foreground).
THE TRAINING AREA Located at about 120 km south east of Amman, in the vicinity of the important road that links the capital with the only Jordanian coastal outlet, wonderfu l Aqaba is a meeting point of Countries with very d ifferent political, social, economic and, last but not least, religious features: Egypt, Israel , Saudi Arabia and Jordan itse lf . The morpholog ic characteristics of the range of Al Qatrana are similar to those that were in the background of the leg endary adventures of Lawrence of Arab ia, the fascinating ch ief of the Bedouin tribes. These places, which have been t he setting of the sci-fi due ls of the knights of the star wars, remind, although at a distance of some meridians, the African military campaigns of WWII, ideal stage for the tactical genius of indomitab le and imaginative leaders. The weather conditions that characterized the period of permanence at Al Qatrana of the "Friuli" Brigade were a temperature that in the middle of the
day reached 34- 35 deg rees centig rade and at night l 2- 1 3 degrees . The almo:,L constant nort hwesterly wind represented the leitmotiv of the exercise and with its afternoon in sistence it weakened even the most pe rsevering spirits . The peaks exceeding 1 0 knots, in fact, caused blasts of dust so dense that it was impossible to see even at a d istance of a few
....
-.. i
"Centauro" armoured cars in action.
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I
.:,,
120mm rifled mortars transported by AB-205 helicopters with barycentric hooks.
met res and t his ind uced t he western guests to fol low the Bedouin hab it of wrapping more or less improvised turbans around their heads.
LOGISTICS The figures referr ing t o the participat ion of me n, materials and vehicles of the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade make clear the significance (especially logist ic) of th is t ra ini ng event . It is the refore correct to ass ign the place of hono ur to the pla nning and logistic conduct, as well as the praise for having been able to face, and overcome, t he difficul t ies of a dista nt and almost un known land. Talking about logistics, clearly the reference concerns all its distinctive activities that go from t ranspo rts, both international (with naval and air carriers) and inside Jordan , to normal provi sions (making ample recourse to local resou rces) and urgent supplies from home, to the medical activities, a syner-
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g ic fru it of the f usion of the resources of the Army itself with the high ly profess ional ones provided by the Mil itary Corps and the Corps of the Voluntary Nurses of the Italian Red Cross, and to maintenance, which has forced the technic ians to adopt special devices in order to control the effects of an unusual and sometimes hostile environme nt . The circumstances in which the units had t o operate have shown, on the one hand , the need t o adjust some materials to the particular environmental conditions, whi le on t he other have proved how some nom in al limit s of emp loyment of some resources can be overcome to the advantage of totally unexpected performances . The 36 helicopt ers lined up on the Al Qat rana airstrip, be lo ngi ng to all types of aircraft of the Brigade (t here we re also four he li copters AB- 20 5 and AB-212 from th e AVES Brigade, precise ly from the 2nd Regiment "Si ri o" from Lamez ia Terme and the 21 st Squadro n "O rsa Maggiore" from Cagliari) have confirmed the great flex ibi lity of employment of the Army aircraft and the ext rao rdinary sp irit of adaptability of th e technic ians and pilots, wh ich has created the conditio ns fo r making almost seven hundred hours of fl ight accord ing to all the envisaged training and operational aspects. T he unl oading and co ndition in g at the port of Aqaba of 36 he licopters from th e RO- RO Ship "Skamderborg", and their successive flying transfer to t he Al Qatrana area, represe nt an unprecede nted, extraordinary success of organizat ional effic iency, and are moreover an expression of t he human and profess ional capabilities of th e person nel of t he 'Tuo no" Task Force . No le ss remarkable was the movement of over 300 vehicles, among w hich 14 "Centauro " armoured cars of the "Savo ia" Cava lry Regiment and of about 200 co ntain ers, whic h t ranspo rted t he materials necessary for starting from scratch a field organization capable of meeting the life and worki ng needs of almost l 000 peop le. T he recourse t he local resources concerned the supp ly of some se rvices , such as victuals, electrical ene rgy, as regards both sup ply and macro- d istr ibutio n, san itatio n, disposal of normal and special waste- mat erial, transport of heavy equ ipment and containers form the entry points to the trainin g area. The "F riuli" Command and Tactical Support branch , employed as logist ic unit respons ible for the only large service zone of the Brigade, has known how to amply benefit from services outsourced in loco, complementing the ir quality with it s own resources and pe rsonnel.
COOPERATION AND TRAINING The re lationship w ith t he coope rating Jordan ian unit represented, after t he pecu liarity
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A 120mm mortar in action.
of the logist ic organization, the cause of greatest interest of "Eastern Desert 2005". The exercise, born essentia lly as a national activity for the util izat ion of a fore ign tra ini ng area, already since the planning phase has become a real bilateral exercise that invo lved , besides the "Friuli", the "First Royal Gua rd Mechanized Brigade" of t he Jordan ian Army and some assets (4 "UH - 1 Huey" mu ltiro le he licopters and 4 "AH 1 Cobra" attack helicopters) from the Air Force of the host country. Our Jordan ian col leagues rece ived t he Italia n so ld iers with a strong sense of hospita lity and repeatedly expressed their appreciation for a Nation t hat t hey fee l as friendly and in many aspects close to the cultural character of their peop le. It is a consideration of great impo rtance that should lead to some reflect ions, and not on ly of a technica l nature the Ital ian sold iers, who can express a profes sio nalism unq uestionab ly appreciated everywhere, enrich the ir behav iour w ith an extraord inary sense of huma nity, which is open to dialogue, irrespective of cu lture or rel ig ion. T he training activities were deve loped in three phases: unil atera l, bil atera l, j o int. Th e first activ ity envisaged training actions carried o ut unilate rally by Italian and Jordan ian units, after the jo int use of t he Al Qatrana range. In the second phase , defined bilateral or "cross training", there were exchange activ ities between both the land unit s and between the helicopter
units be longing to the two Nations. The conc lus ive phase, def ined "comb ine d ", proposed j oint exercises at d ifferent leve ls, until their conclusion, on t he occasion of the "D ist ingu ished Visitors Day", wit h a Brigade exercise ctnd the implementation of a Command Post of a JOR-ITA Maj or Mu ltinationa l Unit, charg ed w ith p lanning and conducting CRO (Cr isis Response Operat ions) and Warf ighting Operations . In the bilate ral phase, the most int eresting act ivit ies were those concern ing ant iterrorism , survival in a desert environment an d the so - cal led cultural awareness on Arab culture , subjects treated by the Jordanian units fo r the benefit of the Italian sold iers and, among th ese , i n particular the sold iers of the 66th airmobile Infantry Reg iment "Trieste" and the cavalrymen of t he "Savo ia" Regiment, who have profited by the knowledge of the special t echniques of combat and adaptation to the environment suggested by the ir Jordanian col leagues. On the other had, t he item most requested in exchange by the Jordan ian counterpart was airmob ility training; therefore a platoon of the "F irst Royal Guard Mechanized Brigade" attended the course for first- level airmob ile q ualification, while 1 50 sol d iers conducted activi t ies of night- and dayembarkation and d isembarkation with he licopters AB- 412, fo r obtain ing the certification of tactica l he li-transport. An eq uall y i nten se exchange activity occurred between the ''Tuono" Task Force and t he Jo rd anian Air Force, that con sisted ma inly in flights with jo int format ions, the developmen t of pi lot exchanges on "A- 1 2 9
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Mang usta" and "AH- 1 Cobra" helicopters and in joi nt fire activities carried out wit h combat helicopters. Th e fin al exerci se, which took place on t he occasion of the "D isting uished Visit o rs Day", perm itted t o pu t into the field all the available assets of both partici pat ing nations. In particu lar, it tack led some techn ical - tactical su bjects regarding Cri sis Re sponse Operations (reaction to a land att ack ca rri ed out against a motor colu mn, p urs uit and capture of some hosti le elemen t s, no n com batan t evacuatio n), as we ll as an important conclu sive event, assum ed in a so- cal led "w ar" env iro nm ent, were it was pos sib le to appraise the emp loyment of all th e avai lab le weapon systems and verify th e Command and Control capabil it y of the Main Co mmand Post of t he "Fri ul i" Airmob ile Brigad e. Right. The Defence Chief of Staff, Adm iral Giampaolo Di Paola, on board an A - I 2 9. Below. Helicopters deployed on the Al Qatrana airstrip.
A Combined Coordination and Control Struct ure (CCCS) disciplined al l training activities from the beginning, with particular attention to live- fi re activities. The range, about 500 sq km wide, approx imat ely seven t imes the Capo Teulada training range, was divided into five areas where "Centauro" armoured cars, light and mechanized infan try, tanks, helicopters, artillery and mortars operated, also simu ltane-
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ously. A common radio- room, heart of the joint structure, monitored all t he activities making use of Jordan ian Army and Air Fo rce liaison Officers.
COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES The exercise offered also the opportunity to visit places of historical and artistic inte rest in Jordan .
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King Abdullah
If
of Jordan wit h the CommiJ.ndcr of the
"Friuli" Brigade.
Such as, for example, famous Petra, with its rosy architectures dating back to the VI Century B.C. Another very interesting location was Mount Nebo, where the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Filiberto Cecchi , attended a ceremony for the donation of two ornamental tiles that now adorn the floor in front of the edifice realized as memento of the visit of Pope John Paul II.
THE VISIT OF THE KING King Abdul lah II, the reigning Sovereign of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, visited the personnel of the "Friuli" to convey h is personal salute. Successively he attended the final phase of the exercise and, on his express wish , he set himself at the controls of a A-1 29 "Mangusta" . The contingent received also the visit of the Defence Chief of Staff, Admiral Giampao lo D i Paola , the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Filiberto Cecchi , and the Ita l ian Ambassador in Jordan , His Excel le ncy Gianfranco Giorgolo.
CONCLUSIONS The train ing carried out in an environment that was unusual, difficult, and somet imes even hosti le, has improved t he knowledge of the Italian soldiers as regards operational situations that occu r more and mo re frequently. The logistic activities have once more shown the extraordinary national g ift for adapting materials and working t ec hniques to the environmental co nd itions, so as to ensure the performance of the task in any situation. The professiona l experience of the personne l, who worked to assure the efficiency of the means, offered an invaluab le performance vis- a- vi s the costs borne . The level of cooperatio n ach ieved with the Jordanian units makes us hope fo r a better future, in view of an integration that proved possible and profitab le. The objectives of "Eastern Desert 2005" in the fields of training, logistics and internat iona l cooperation have been achieved thei r value strengthens the identity of the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade and increases the importance in the world of the Italian Army and the Italia n Armed Fo rces. Antonio Bettelli Colonel, Commander, 66th "Trieste" Airmobile Infantry Regt
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THE AMERICAN ANTIMISSILE SYSTEM The strategic and technological evolution While the first Ground based Interceptors of the American anti/ballistic missile system are being installed in their sites at Fort Greeley, Alaska and Vandenberg, California, it is useful to review the history and the doctrines regarding the operational formation of these systems, studied and developed to achieve strategie objectives of the utmost importance.
If one were to ana lyze the events which have characterized the attempts of the United States to formulate an anti-missile defense system one would find that the re exists an evident red line which ties everything together; from the motivat ion s advanced to justify the considerable indus trial , scientific, managerial and organizational resources dedicated to the realization, to the costs of research and development in relation to the effective ly achieved results In reality, considering the predictions of a probable future missile threat, one cannot help but notice how these have been based on assessments of a worsL case :,cendriu, which t1c1.ve uflen been shown, over time, as less credible than proclaimed. If we could exam ine the results , it is correct to assert that the history of these systems in terms of the cost/effectiveness relationship must be valued above all as a ful l strategic-technologi cal advantage.
HISTORY AND PROSPECTS The desire to substitute or add a defense system against inter- continental missiles to the strategy of retal iation has been present since t he l 970's. In S.eptembe r, 1967 the United States announced the ir decision to build a "light" system called Sentinel to protect the entire nation against an unsophisticated threat li ke that of the Chinese. It was based upon radar warning and anti - missile missiles armed with nuclear warheads that could intercept incoming missiles and explode them outside of our atmosphere and far from urban territories. The projected system lent itself to important objections, such as, at those heights it is difficult to distinguish between missiles and other objects such as air balloons of an opportune shape. T his shape is only possible during the phase of atmospheric breaking due to their high ratio of area over mass.
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The syst em would actually not be suffic ient against a Soviet threat. On the other hand, durin g re- entry in the atmosphere by means of a nuclear explosion is not the appropriate solution to defend cities that would pay severely for the cataclysm produced over thei r heads. An inert ial flight of an ICBM (Inter-continental Ballist ic Missile) would have an orbital speed of approximately 29,000 km/h r which means a flight time of approximately 20 minutes for a target l 0,000 km away. The t ime of launch and the altitude reached depend upon the requested he ight of orbit, the power of the com bustible, and other factors as well. In both America c1.nd the Soviet Union, rockets have been designed with a "boost phase" of less than one minute. The Soviet Union, aware of the problem, began to simultaneous ly deve lop a similar system around Moscow. The interceptor Ga losh of 2-3 MT was introduced in th e 1980's and later substituted w ith t he SH- 11 Gorgon as the front line of defense against attacking missiles, and with Gazelle aimed directly at its target by means of the comman d radar Flat Twin. Terminal phase guidance, however, could be carried out with an infrared syst em. For this reason, and also because of the commissioning of new inter- continental rockets (in particular the SS9 Scarp) the United Stat es transformed the Sentine l project into the Safeguard project. The primary objective of this last project was to defend two miss ile sites. T he system used was simi lar but also to be employed were shorter range anti - mis sile miss iles ready to intercept incoming missiles w ith a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere. The two vehicles employed, w ith their respective statistics, were the Spartan which carried a W71 5 megaton warhead and would impact at 480 km in space and the smaller, two-stage Sprint which had a very short range , rapid interception and was armed with W66, I OKT warhead. The Sprint could reach live enemy explos ives in the range of 1 30-180 km. T his took care of local defense dedicated to better insuring survival from the forces of attack and
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retaliation. Both of these systems req uired th e. use of large radar inst allations which were extremely vulnerable. Added to the protests of a possible nuclear explosion over national territory were doubts regarding the system's rel iability and con cerns about t he chain reaction within a global strategy. The Soviet Union, which was initially opposes to any limits on defense systems, changed their attitude; which is to say they sought a treaty and signed the Anti-Ball istic Missile Treaty in 1972. The ABM allowed t he two signatory superpowers to develop only two systems for local defense. T he treaty was amended in 1974 w ith a protocal in which the number was red uced to one system . Whi le the Soviet Union decided to maintain their
Launching of a "Patriot" missile in the PAC 3 version.
Title pages A sea platform equipped with X- band rada r for the direction of missile fire.
defense system of Moscow, the United States installed their missiles to defend the t he ICBM si los in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Seventy Sprint and thirty Spartan missiles stood guard in protected, underground silos; already operation al in 197 5. Washington, however, in February 1976, a few months after install ation of their missiles and realizing the high cost of a limited local defense,
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abandoned the "Safeguard" and the base was dismantled. The missiles were retired and finally destroyed in 1983. From that point on the project of "traditional" defense was a shelved matter.
THE AIMS The motivations which led to the sign ing of the ABM Treaty are complex. First of all, one must remember that the nuclear equilibrium was based upon the threat of retaliation with which one could inflict unacceptable losses upon the attacker using even a smal l portion of the strategic arsenal at hand. Therefore, retaliation has as its primary targets combined urban and industri al centers. In this respect every attempt to neu tralize or diminish the effect was perceived as offensive in as much as it jeopardized the only possible defense> this in particular applied to systems of interception of incoming missiles against civilian targets. Th is paradox, the offensive characteristics of certain defensive measures is typical of the nuclear situation which brought to light the truly "revolutionary" aspect of the foundation of MAD(Mutual Asured Destruction) ; it is not the weapons in and of themselves, but the capacity of a "second strike" in which either of the two superpowers were in apposition to
Initiative" of 23 March, 1983, the debate about it s defense systems against missiles resumed in th e United States in terms of new technologies, above all with regards to space activities. Despite everything we must consider som e not so radically innovative developments suc h as the precise systems of maneuvering space vehicles. One such deve lopment was heat seek ing bands which were widely used in tele observat ion s and sophisticated, i 11 um i nate d electronics. These are able to control and modify the orbi t of a space craft in an autonomous manner; all of which allowed planning and experimenting wit h weapons based on a simple collision wh ich, considering orbital elevation and speed , is generally lethal. Even operations of an approach followed by a conventional explosion were mad e possible. The principal counter-measures against thes e anti-missi le systems were armor and frequen t maneuvering which is relatively and easily real ized regarding satellites, espec ially those in a low orb it. As far as the ir orbit is concerned, satell ites are equivalent to targets in space. In the case of missi le s however, the brief time available and the lack of knowledge regarding the force of atmospheric breaking during both launch and
inflict upon the other unacceptable losses and
re-entry makes th i s type of attack much more
damage (2 5% of the population and 50% of industrial capacity) after having absorbed an adversarial "first strike." Defense of the missile bases, however, as a primary aim of diminishing the interest of an adversary to strike first, has a stabilizing role. In general, every measure which diversifies, protects, and rende rs the powe r of a nuclear response less vulnerable is positive. If global security is so secured, the terror of a preventive attack is eliminated or diminished and in the sphere of a more relaxed international situation, one can proceed with a progressive and controlled reduction of nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, we must also keep in mind the inevitable chain reaction that every new system of defense against missile defense systems generates; the construction of a similar system by the adversary, the counter-measures and the ways to nullify it. Regarding the "ABM Treaty," one must consider that these negative aspects and the cost of the operation did not make up for the margin of growth in the stability of a deterrent.
difficult. Diffe rent methods of acceleration for projectiles were thought of based upon the combined effects of electrical fields and magnetic intersections. An electrically conducted projectile running a track of some dozens of meters will ach ieve a speed of 2030 km a second. These systems must be based in space (to p revent the destruction of the projectile by atmospheric friction) and require an eno rmous amount of energy on board the base station. The development of powerful lasers and their systems of focusing allow the damaging of an incoming missile or an orbiting satellite by hiiting their surface with an adequate quantity of luminous energy and si nce light trave ls at a speed of 300,00 km/second, this can be achieved in an instantaneous manner. Certainly the mirror which directs the laser must be in orbit in o rder to control a vast area. The laser, however, needs to be installed on land which greatly increases the energy necessary which is equal to four times the distance. T his is why the hypothesis of a fleet of space stations in an orbit of some thousands of kilometers is favored. This hypothesis immediately brings forth the problem of the extreme vulnerability of such delicate systems.
NEW PROSPECTS In the 1980's, even before President Ronald Reagan's discussion of a " Strategic Defense
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...
THE CONSEQUENCES
An ÂŤAster 30Âť missile.
President Ronal Reagan's program of an impenetrable umbre lla of protection covering the entire Un ited States of America was ended in 1993, again because of t he awareness of the immaturity of the necessary technology; above all regarding the space stations as confirmed in April, 1987 by the "American Physics Society, " and by the prohibitive cost of development. Until 7 993, more than 55 bi ll ion dollars had been spent. With the break up oif t he Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the primary motive, that of defending the United States from a Soviet missi le attack collapsed. Nevertheless, by the end of 1987, the Strategic Defense Init iative Organization, or SDIO, developed the concept of Strategic Defense System Phase I Architecture, consisting of a system of interception based in space together with two sensors and a
system of interception based on land usi ng the same sensors and a system of Battle Management. Even if the system never became operative, the enormous force of research and development produced results: in particular i n the fie ld of Hit to Ki ll technology adapted for all new i ntercept io n systems, X-Band Radar technology in lase r tech nology, part icularly in the D irected Energy Weapons- DEW whose deformable mirro rs are today used in astronomy and whose outer coverings no lo nger needed heavy coo ling systems, and in the miniaturization of various components an d sub- systems. The resu lt was to develo p smal l missile engines weighing approximate ly 12 pounds and able to develop a force of more than 10,000 pounds.
THE l 990's In early 1991, President George W.H. Bush replaced the Strategic Defe ns e System Phase I Architecture with Globa l Protection Against Limit ed Strikes . It 's responsibility was to protect the nation against limi t ed missile attacks and to defend American fo r ces ab road fro m attacks by short range ball istic m issiles. GPALS uti lizes a defen sive mode l based on three ele ments: an intercept ion system based i n space called Brilliant Pebbles, a theater of o perat io ns defense based in part on land and i n part at sea, and a li mited national defense system based on la nd . As previously mentioned, the red lin e, both mi litarily and technolog ically, w hich ties all t hese systems together is evident. Nevertheless, if we consider not on ly the motivations connect ed to a threat , whether actual or future , but also those motivat ions less exp li citly attributed to the need of t he United State s to
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finance incessant technolog ical progress, eve rything becomes clearer. T he decision is mo re comprehensib le in li ght of t he strategic philosophy wh ic h exp li cit ly became part of t he Bush Administration's new Natio nal Security Strategy, adopted in September, 2002 in wh ic h they confirm, "Ou r forces will be strong enough to dissuade potent ial adversarie s from pursuing a m ilitary build up in hopes of surpassing or equat ing the power of the United States." This objective can be fo llowed only if the United States conti nues t o ma intain their technolog ical edge in t he mi li tary arena with a financ ing of research and deve lopment that does not b r ing to rea lizat ion only new weapo ns systems but also has a benef it in th e civi lian world . This can , in t ime , lead to the deve lopment of further tech nologies which can have mi lita ry applications, so creating a process of osmosis and interaction r ich in results. In this sense, t he best applicat io n in the field of research and development is t hat related to
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Right. A «Spartan» missile.
Left.
A «Sprint» missile.
anti - missile defense systems. T hese systems contain a remarkable series of components(missiles, sensors, radar, lasers , aerial platforms, command and control systems, and communications, "intelligence," reconnaissance, elaborate electronics) capab le of providing, in perspective, a notable technological fal lout, above all a series of connected and collateral military sites.
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THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE The Clinton Administration did not support the GPALS and in 1993, together with the abandonment of SD I and the transformation of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization into the Ballistic Missi le Defense Organization, adopted a new series of priorities. With the publication of the Bottom up Review in Autumn of the same year, the anti-missile system was reoriented in three diverse components with differentiated financing accord ing to priority. The most important was missile defense of the theater of operations which would receive l 2 billion dollars over 5 years. There were three programs: technological perfection of the Patriot missile with development of an advanced capacity system, the Patriot Advanced CapabilityPAC3, modification of the Navy's air defense sys tem Aegis (from the mythical shield of Minerva,"Egida") giving the Navy the capability to intercept even bal listic missiles and designated Navy Area Defense, and thirdly, a new missile for the Army called Theater High Altitude DefenseTHAAD. The second priority considered National Missile Defense with financing of 3 b il lion dollars over 5 years. In reality it dealt with a program of "technology readiness" which would decrease the t ime for system alignment if a new missile threat against the Un ited States materialized. The third priority, with financing of more than 3 billion dollars over 5 years, was given to a research and development program to develop new tech nologies improving the efficiency of missile defense both for theater of operations and the nation .
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FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS An additional two programs were successfully added: that of Navy Theater WideNTW and that of Medium Extended Air Defense Systems- MEADS, which until now was based upon American and European defense ind ustry cooperation. It was a trinational program (Germany, Italy, and the United States) that availed t he complex of a lig ht launching armed with t he extremely mobile Patriot- PAC3 in participation with the U.S. Air Force.
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The new direction of anti-miss ile defense capacity research und ertaken by th e Clinton Administration, with a major em phasi s on defen se of a theater of operations rather than defense of national territory was a direct conseq uence of the radical tran sform at ion of the threat. Thi s was t he res ult of the collapse of th e Soviet Union, the new relat ionship betwee n Washington and Moscow, and Saddam Hussein' s use of SCUD missiles during the Gulf War. However, the weight of internal poli t ics and the im pact of international events after the first half of the 90's required a different choice . . In 1994, the control of Co ngress returned to t he Repu blicans who always favored a Nationa l Missile Defense System. In February 1996, i n part due to political pressure and in part du e to predi ctio ns of a threat by "intelli gence services," th e Pentagon decided to transform th e Natio na l Missi le Defense Prog r am from a technology read iness program to a d eployme nt readine ss prog ram . The progra m was also known as T hreeplu sThree , which is that the program would be completed in t h rees yea rs ti me and ready for an integrated testi ng by 1999. Based upon which , the Uni ted States predicted they would be ready to put th e NMD in place in t h ree years if the need arose . If on thf' other hand, the NMD formation was not needed, the BMDO would cont inue to improve and refine t he programmed operative compo nents to align the program within three years of any decision of need. 1998 was a particular year not only for the Rumsfeld Report, which served to accentuate t he missile threat against the United States, but also for the ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea and Iran, the technological espionage of China, and the mounting Republican pres sure on the White House for a new approach to t he problem of anti- ballistic missile defense. In January 1999, Secretary of Defen se, Wi lliam Cohen, announced an additional 6.6 billion dollars for the NMD Program to ensure t hat the United Stat es could, if necessary, fix t he date of formation before June 2000 with a fully operative system between 2003 and 2005.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NMD
The NMD would consist of twenty land- based interceptor missiles, a new BandXradar, modern ization of alert radars already in use, space sensors, and Comm and and Control System. Additional interceptor missiles wou ld be added after two years togethe r with other eventual
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improvements resu lting from technological developments . The system's purpose is to intercept a very limi_ted number of bal listic missiles " acc identally launched or launched w ithout authorization by a nuclear country, or de liberate ly launched by a Rogue Nation," according to the definition of the NMD Act approved by the American Senate on l 7 March, 1999 with 97 votes in favor and 3 opposed . The app rova l of the NMD Act with such a large majority (w ith the obvious support of Democrats) to put the system in p lace as soon as techno logica lly feasible would have been unthinkab le only a few months before. It is interesting to note that the format ion decision is no longer based on threat but the time of t ech nological development. T he Clinton Adm inistrat ion's decis ion to no longer oppose an ABM System (the Pres ident signed the NMD Act) carne from the visib le growing support for such a system from American public opinion and, at the same time, form the Wh ite House's need to avo id the accusation of not sufficiently considering the defense of the United States during the upcoming 2000 Presidential Election . The development of an anti - missi le system would be one point of t he Repub lican's election platform . The democrats voted in favor because they rea li zed that they could not al low t he Party to be considered soft on defense. The Democratic sen ators reaffirmed , however, that their approval was a qualified approval: the system could be aligned if t he threat was real, if the technology was efficienfy secure, if the cost was acceptable, and if the international impl icat ions were man ageable. President Cl inton emphasized his persona l satisfaction for two amendments added to the law because he was opposed to the init ial draft. The first amendment spec if ied that the formation of an NMD system would be subject to a normal process of authorization and approva l wh ich was sign ifican t because no decision for formation of the system had yet been approved. The second amendment reaffirmed that the Senate would con tinue to support a negotiated reduction in nuclear arms and emphasized that the politics connected to the eventual formation of NMD would have to take into account the para ll el objectives of Arms Control.
Launch of a Ground Based Interceptor missile.
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Clinton promised to continue, with Russia, the direction initiated with the work of Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit of March 1997 to arrive at a " START Ill" treaty. This treaty wou ld reduce by 80% the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers during t he Cold war and would also maintain t he ABM Treaty as a basis for reciprocal, strategic security. Finally, on Septembe r 1 St, 2000, in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, Clinton annou nced his decision not to authorize the formation of a NMD system. He cited the lack of trust in the maturity of technology, Russian opposition to any modification of the ABM Treaty, and persistent international opposition even from Allies.
THE ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM OF PRESIDENT BUSH During the electoral campaign, the Republican candidate for President, George W. Bush, confirmed his desire to ach ieve an effective anti - missile defense based on the best available options at the earliest possible date. Therefore, with his victory, the program became a priority of defense politics and the fact that Bush chose Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, the author of the "Mi ssile Threat Report" of l 998, clearly indicated the direction.
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A Boeing 747 Airborne laser.
The new program of defense politics planned a new approach to deterrence which would have reduced th e dependence of the United States on nuclear weapons. Regarding t he question of th e eventual use of their nuclear weapons, the " Nuclear Posture Review" and the "Nationa l Security Strategy" expressed respectively t he reexami nation of the nuclear position and the National security strategy of the Bush Administration (complete with the capacity for defense against precise attacks with conventional weapons). A consistent component of the new nuclear arsenal should be a modernization to make it capab le of destroying bunkered weapons depots and to "burn" chemical and bio logical weapons without dispersing them into the atmosphere. Until now, this preventive actio n could not be conducted by any other means. The Strategy of Decap itation would thus be possible. In the scheme of these strategies some involve d were already calling t his new strategy Fourth Generation War or Dissuasion of Fo rce to the Insane. This is reminiscent of the French concepts, structures and doctrines of " From Weakness to Strength" during the Cold War which , from a speculative point of view, fo resaw a situation in
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An "Aster 30" immediately after launching.
which the Soviets co uld find themse lves in similar difficu lties as those confronting the United States . Regard in g these capacities, the United States intended to deve lop a m issile defense capable of intervening w it h all types of balisstic missiles inte rcontinental, medium range, and short range, as well as interven ing in all 3 phases of a launch boost phase, m id- course phase, and t he term inal phase. The system was considered much more urgent after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 as a defense of the American territory against a threat from Rogue Nations. l l September had at least 4 specific effects on the Ameri can Adm inistration: it conso li dated the emphasis that Bush had from the start of def ense as a primary means of confronting the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD), less priority to the too ls of d iplomacy, control of exports, means of verifying treaties, and arms contro l, pushing a dramatic urgency to empower Homeland Defense, changing the ir initially skeptical attitude t owards programs of Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia, and adopting a much harder position against Rogue Nations, some of which, accord ing to Bush , constitute an Axis of Evil. The accelerated work on a miss ile defense program pushed the Amer ican President to announce on 12 December, 2001 a part from uni lateral reductions of nuclear missi les from the strategic forces to a level of between l ,7002 ,200 by 2010 (a position presented to Putin on 14 November during the American/Russian summit in Wash ington and finalized with the signing of the "The St rategic Offensive Reductio ns Treaty" in May, 2002), a retreat from the ABM Treaty to allow a continuation of testing (there would be two tests on 14 July and 5 December, both crowned successes) and to begin work in Alaska on the interceptor missile silos and the Defense Command Center at Fort Greeley. By 2004 - 2006 the objectives of the Missile Defense Agency wh ich by now aimed for a global cover were the following : interception capacity at mid - course achieved with missi les based on land in Alaska, interception capacity provided by Navy Standard Missile-3 mounted onboard 3 Ticonderoga class cruisers and all equ ipped with Aegis, l 5 others equipped with Radar Spy- l systems modified to support the functions , an airplane based prototype laser system, a follow through of the technological development and
p lacement of Patriot- PAC3 miss iles, and an initial operation of THAAD .
CONCLUSIONS The actual systems in the development phase consist of sate llites equipped with IR sensors to locate launch sites, EW land-based radar and XBand radar for tracking which are on board naval
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ships and at least 8 different ki netic energy sys tems( missile interception) and direct energy systems (Lasers). The Ground- Based-mid - Course-Defense system, even if characterized by a limited capac ity, is actually placed in 9 underground launch silos each containing a sing le interception missile. Seven of these are installed at Fort Gree ley, Alaska, the last of which was installed 18 September, and two are installed at Vandenberg Air base, California. In the coming years more sil os wil l be built. The inter-
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ceptors are capable of guaranteeing only partial protection to the west coast of the United States in confrontation with attacks coming from Asia and appearing over the Pacific Ocean. Th e Bush Administration is, however, evaluating the possi bility of expanding the existing system as a missile defense from Eastern Europe and as a protection in a confrontation that may come from the Middle east. Finally, according to the long term program, by 2020 the anti-missile defense of the Unites States
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Right. Placing the first GMO in its silo at Fort Greely, Alaska. Facing page. A laser employed in th e antimissile-defence project.
should consist of other land-based missiles an d others on naval ships, a constellation of alert and tracking satell ites: from 24-40 satellites equipped with laser syst ems capable of striking a target as far as 4 ,000 km away, as well as a group of 7 Boeing 7 4 7s armed wit h lase r cannons. Five of the planes could be employed in a theater of operations with two aircraft on continuous patrol at an altitude of 12,000-13,000 meters and hundreds of kilom eters from the border of an enemy nation, ready to attack ballistic miss iles in their acce leration phase. Such a system would allow for the interception of ball istic missiles in ali three phases of their traj ectory and in any part of the world where they may be launched. It seems clear t hat space will be the next technological fron ti er of the United St at es . It is reason able to suppose t hat ali of the experience gathered during the development of various def ense programs, above ali SDI , w ill fi nd other outlet s not only as t h ose anti-m i ssile compone n ts already
highlighted, but as offensive weapons as well. It is very likely that in the near future the q uestion of "killer" satell ites will return to front stage. On t he other hand, it is significanfy clear that the United States, w ith the complete Command Restructuring carried out in 1992, have f used the Space Command and the Strategic Command into a single command called Stratcom (with headq uart ers at Offutt Air Base . Nebras ka). Today many countries are capable of bui ld ing an atomic bomb and even one wou ld confer an enormous st rategic advantage t o the possessor. Let us not forget that even one is infi nitely more powerfu l than none. There is the danger that the most dangerous weapons could end up in t he hands of t he worst. The anti-missile defense represents a potentially good and valid idea if it is a continuat ion of new discoveries. In conclusion, it seems credible to th ink that the Aristotelian principle of reve nge should be abandoned because it is morally unacceptable as a military strategy. It is usefu l to follow the pat h of research we are att endi ng to and to t he Kantian principle of re spect for Nations according to moral pri nciples of universal validity. Antonio Ciabattini Leonardi Expert in Strategic Sciences
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THE LAND ROBOTS Where should they be employed and with what objectives? The Armed Forces and the Defence Industry are working full speed on the design of complex systems not necessarily destined to replace man, but rather to integrate and increase his combat capabilities.
The he licopter lands wit hout wobbling an d with in a few seconds a wheeled vehicle rolls down the ramp and leaves immed iately t he aircraft, which then takes off and continues its flight. Some hours later the same scene takes place the other way around on another site: the whee led vehicle arrives on the envisaged spot of its retrieval, the he licopter lands, embarks it and t hey fly together towards t he base of departu re . A scene of th is type could see m an o rdinary helitransport ope ration, but the substantial differ ence is that during th e loadin g / unloading phases of t he vehicle, no man has been seen controlling t he activities of the veh icle during its descent and ascent phases ; actually no man has been seen driving t he vehicle and, co ming to think of it , there was no pilot on board of the heli copter 1 Scie nce fiction? Not exact-
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Title pages. An Oshkosh truck on its arrival at the DARPA Grand Challenge 2005.
Above. PACBOT vehicle equipped with a camera mounted on an extensible support, remote-controlled by an operator.
ly, cons idering t hat last autumn a non-piloted helicopter has put on the ground a robotic veh icle, which, after travelling so me distance, has been retrieved and carried to the point of departure. It is by now an established fact that robotics is about to "invade" the field of military ope rations: t he American programme "Future Combat System s'' envis ages autonomous air and land systems,
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although the time for their realization depends mainly on the level of autonomy required. A milestone in the field of land robots was set, still last autumn, with the "Grand Challenge" competition, organized by the US DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) which witnessed five competitors complete the 132-mile itinerary (over 210km) entirely on a off- road vehicle. Meanwhile, at a lower technological leve l, other smaller robots are operating in Iraq and Afghanistan in the hands of t he US military. How and where should the land robot syst ems be employed in the present scenarios? And what are the aims that the Armies intend to achieve with the employment of these systems? The answer to the latter question is simple enough : the non - pi loted vehicles are emp loyed first of al l to reduce the risks for the personnel. The robotic systems therefore enter into play in potentially dangerous situations, not necessarily to replace man but at least to warn him in good time about an impending danger. If one considers the UAVs as robotic flying syste ms, as they in fact are, clearly they allow the soldier on the ground to "see" much more than what Mother Nature permits him, and to prepare himself to face or avo id dangerous situations. The same warning can be given by a land robotic system that in some cases can also intervene to remove the threat: it is the case of the Talo n robots (employed by the explosive ordnance disposal units), SWORDS (Special Weapon Observation Reconnaissance Detection System - a Talon armed with a light machine gun) and Pacbots deployed by the US Army and the US Marine Corps in Iraq, employed mainly for t he reconnaissance of zones potentially infested with improvised explosive devices. If UAVs are free to move in the air acco rding to pre- established routes or following corrections imposed to them t hrough rad io commands by an operator on the ground, and t hose sensors can be directed on a target and then follow it automati cally, today's land robots are essential ly rad io-controlled vehi cles that follow the directions coming from the console for what concerns movement, orientation of the visual sensors and the possible attacke rs'. This limits the ir range and applicat io ns considerably. The technolog ical level of a robot can be lin ked to t he level of independence from t he operator that the vehicle can maintain during t he conduct of a complex operation. Robots that necessitate a man to operate them carry advantages only for what regards the safety of the operator; if t his is a short-term important objective ; at medium- longterm t he Armies intend to entrust robotized systems with re lative ly sim ple tasks, which im ply not only a reduction of risk but also a cut in t he necessary manpower and increase the systems ' effec-
A SWORDS vehicle armed with a light machine gun.
t iveness. Just think of a motor column of supp li es consisting only of robots: the risk of human losses would be nil, and consequently it wou ld be possible to spare conside rably on armourin g, increasing the payload (excepting particularly sens itive materials). What wou ld happen in case of enemy attack? Would it be conve nient to leave the co lumn to its fate , maybe equipp ing it with se lf- destruction systems in order not t o let t he supp li es fall in t he hands of t he enemy, or would it be better to equip t he vehicles with self-d efence systems? What would happen if th e ro botized guidance syst em were unable to understand if an obstacle along t he road is really insurmountable? Would the vehicle autonomously be able to fi nd an alternative road or to make the decision to retrace its ste ps? Shou ld all t his be don e by the ve hicle in total autonomy or it would be better to keep a remote link with a control station, from where an operato r could intervene , deciding on t he bas is of t he panoram ic i mages sent by additional sensors
The vehicles especially designed for clearing explosive devices reduce the risk of human losses in operation theatres.
placed on the means of t ransport (different from those employed for gu iding the vehicles) or by sending there a drone, which observing the scene from above would amplify the field of vision and facilitate even more motivated decisions? After all, already now the conductors of the logistic columns in Iraq avail themselves of images from above to have a fu ll knowledge of t he situation on the sector, and the same conductors maintain a co ntinuous radio link with the bases of departure, arrival and pos-sible transit; why should a robotized truck be able to do it all on its own7 All these and other considerations are being examined by the Armed Forces and by the Industry, which have also identified intermed iate solutions. Next to the abovementioned emp loyments concern ing the detection of improvised explosive devices in zone of limited extent and usually under man's control , robotic veh icles are now be ing planned which are aimed at incrementing the scouting capabilities of means such as , for
examp le, the Fennek, adopted be the Dutch and German Armies: the Bundesweh r in facts intends to equip some of its Fenneks with scout robots , and some German firms are working on radiocontrolled light systems, which will allow the mother-vehicle to observe hard- to- reach zones or avoid to expose oneself to unnecessary risks. In the fami ly of the US Future Combat Systems there are three land robots (in addition to as many as four classes of UAVs). ARV, or Armed Robotic Vehic le, a five-ton vehic le on a wheeled hull 6x6 , in an assau lt version and a reconnaissance, survey and target acquisition (RSTA) vers ion, both transportable by CH - 47 helicopters. SUGV (Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle), conceived like the small tracked Pacbot, now employed in Iraq, des tined to reconnaissance, especially in urban envi ronments and in zones difficult to enter, such as tunnels, sewer systems and caverns ; it is equipped with modular sensors of various types (optical, chemical). Finally, the MULE (Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment vehicle), a 2,5ton, wheeled (or tracked) 6x6 robot, highly mobil e thanks to a system of articulated suspensions, equipped with the same Autonomous Navigation System (ANS) of the ARV and of three different mission packages: transport, demining and light attack. The MULE will operate in direct support of the teams , transporting their load (up to more than a ton), ensuring the function of mine detection, signalling and neutralization, as well as supp lying support fire and reconna issance. The autonomous navigation system of the MULE and the ARV will allow the vehicles to move w ith full autonomy but also to be operated by remote control, while the SUGV will function on ly by remote control, starting from a portable console. On board the MGV (Manned Ground Veh icle), the piloted vehicle that will be produced in numerous versions, there will also be the ANS, whose data supplied to the robotic vehicles will provide the connection between the column leader and the follower when required. The FCS (Futu re Combat System) developing team wo rks in close connection with the DARPA, and therefore the results of the Grand Challenge, held in October 2005, will certainly have an influence also on the future robots of the US Army. The second competition among robotic vehicles - the first had witnessed the fai lure of all the prototypes presented , also due to the lim ited time allowed to fine-tune the systems - had a remarkable success of participants. More t han 23 participated in the f inal out of 1 95 that had presented themselves for the qualifying round. Many compared the results to the f irst flight of the Wright brothers, wh ich took p lace a litt le over a hundred years ago. The race course,
Rivista Militare English Edition
entirely off-road, was marked by numerous waypoints , more or less numerous acco rd ing to the orography of the zone crossed : In the end only five vehicles were able to go a ll the way ; they were most ly mod ified off-road vehicles, the first of w hi ch , baptized "Stanley" and real ized by the Stanford University, on the whole employed 6 hours , 53 minutes and 58 seconds, at an average of 30 km per hour, followed by th r ee others. The fift h vehicle arrived beyond the time limits of 10 hou rs, having cove red the distance in 12 hours and 5 1 minutes, but it was also the heaviest and bulkies t of them al l , for it was a 16-ton Oshkosh t ru ck. One of the vital elements of the system of automatic nav igation of this vehicle was of part icular i nterest for Italy. The system cal led Te r raMax, the art ificial vision system , came from our Cou ntry and precisely from t he Artificial Vision and Intelligent Systems Lab of the Department of Information Engineeri ng of the Unive r sity of Parma. Based on daylight cameras , the system was entirely pass ive, an essential thing in view of possible
11.
1/2006
Some versions o f MULE.
milit ary develop m ents, and was based on three sensors on the front of t he vehicle; i n orde r to exploit the st ereo scop ic effect it is necessary to emp loy two cameras sim u ltaneously, and t he t r iangulation capabili t y m ust be gauged on t he distance. Hence the need to have a base more or less wide according to the speed and dis tance of the obstacles, t herefore the spaces between the cam eras were diffe rent, provid ing spacing respectively of 0.5, 1.0 and 1.5 met res. At m i nimum speeds , under 1 5 km /h, t he closest cameras were emp loyed, between 1 5 and 30 km / h, t hose at a d ist ance of one metre, and over 30 km / h, the most distant ones. Besides the came ras , the T erraMax car ried a four-pla ne laser-sca nner i n front, and two si mpler laserscann ers o n the sides, in orde r to fol low the roadside. The front laser-scanner and the cam er as completed each other in detect ing the
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the far infrared and two cameras in the visible spectrum, which create two separate system s whose data are then fused in order to ensure an all-weather navigation. According to the engineers of the Parma University the research is rather advanced, and the vision aspect can now be solved at very low cost, owing to the price of came ras and the calculation power of norma l computers; the critical element rema ins the development of the algorithm, but also here t he researches launched already several years ago have produced their fruits and the experience
Left. A vehicle employed for clearing explosive devices.
Below. A 6x6 MULE vehicle equipped with its autonomous navigation system.
obstacles, since the former could not "see" some of them, while the optical system, being of a daylight type, could not steer the vehicle inside tunnels. The only critical situat,ion occurred during a windstorm on the initial flatland, on the bottom of a lake, where the storming sand and dust almost blinded the system, which also here proved to be very similar to a human being. A GPS system was obvious ly also present, to enable the vehicle to head for the following waypoint. The speed was regulated automat ica l ly accord ing to the narrowing of the spaces and the presence of obstacles. The main reason that made the Oshkosh truck overrun the time limit is apparently connected with its d imensions; considering that among the obstacles that had to be overcome there were very narrow passages among shrubs, underpasses and a mountain pass with a winding road, it is easy to guess that cars had the edge on the truck. Nevertheless, from the experimental viewpo i nt the TerraMax' results have been perhaps more complete: just th i nk that in some underpasses the truck was forced to stop, had to manoeuvre in order to align itself perfectly and then passed leaving on its right and left a space of only 12 cm. The same can be said for the mountain stretch of the road , where on several occasions the truck was forced to manoeuvre in order to overcome the hairpin bends. The laboratory of the Par ma University is now deve loping a navigation system w ith two sensors i n
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gathered until now perm its to look confident ly to concrete developments in the near future. Certainly, before ach ieving a full autonomy there are st ill many problems to be solved, first of all the knowledge of the type of obstac le in front of us; but, as we said before, the autono my of the vehicle does not preclude the possi bility of help from outside, and if during the action a close collaboration between piloted and non-piloted systems is probab le, the complete autonomy could be used, for example, to lead the robotic system back to the friendly lines in case of interruption of the connection. The "man in the loop" principle will probably continue to be valid for a long time for what con cerns the weapon component; in fact it is hardly conceivable that, especially as regards lethal
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/2006
Right.
A MULE in action.
Below. A tracked vehicle employed in reconnaissance activities, surveillance of the battlefie ld and target acquisition.
weapons, it could be possible to entrust to entirely automated systems t he acquisition - ide ntification-targeting - fi ring cycle , especial ly in a land enviro nment, where sometimes, as in case of other-than-war operations, it is not sufficient to identify the target as "unfriend ly" (this in the f uture will be simplified by the presence of IFF systems on t he battlefield) but one must evaluate its more or less hostile attitude and proportion the response acco rdingly. But to do this one should be ab le to replicate human intelligence and nourish it with the experience and t he notions that a human be ing acquires all along his life, but this is not possible yet. Having spoken abou t robot ics app lied to vehi cles, t here is another t ype of system that interests the Armed Forces: it i s the exoske leto n, a biomechanical system that permits to util ize a mec hanical system as man's "fo rce amplifier", giving him a speed, force and resista nce greater th an he norn1al ly has . If an i nfantryrnan (for example one of t he Special Forces) could carry a heavie r weight, he could atta in a greater auton -: omy or firepower on the ground, w hile , if necessa ry, he cou ld reach a speed suffic ient to dis engage from an enemy, or could generate a force in his upper l imbs sufficient to solve cr isis situations. For example, the same force given to a sapper would enabl e him to put up a bridge without t he em p loymen t of a cran e, with movements much more prec is e because they would be di r ect ly pantographed from those on his arm. Sci-fi? Probably not really that much: also in Italy a resea rch prog ra mme laun c hed in 2003 by the General Secretariat of Defence , called "Advanced applications i n the mi l itary fiel d of robotic tec hnologie s of teleoperation ", with the active collaboration of the Scuola Su periore di Studi Universitari e di Perfez ionamento "S. Anna" of Pisa and the "S igno Motus" co mpany of Messina. Init ia lly the ide a was to equ ip t he operator of an engineer tank with a system including only t he up pe r limbs, but now t he system is apparen t ly evolving towards a com pl ete exos ke leton inc lud ing also the lower limbs . In this case one of t he mai n problems is not so much th at of transm itting force, but rather th at of grad i ng it: an excessive grip on a relatively fragile object
could damage it an d it is therefo re necessary for t he mechanical "hand" to have sensors that t ran smit to t he operator's hand the sensations t hat usua lly one feels in getting ho ld of an object. The same is true for speed, which in case of systems dest ined to assemb le part icula r parts must be lim ited, so as to make a prec ision j ob possible without necessitat ing micrometric movements from the operator. Here also the applications are manifold and the t echnologies are now reaching a level of matu rity sufficient to approach to the real world what until a few years ago was conce ivable on ly in fantasy tales. Vis - a-vi s such in novative syst ems, an accurate analysis of the requisites will be of great importance, in order t o concentrate the scarce resources on t he systems t hat may represent t he real force multipl iers in the military enviro nment.
Paolo Valpolini Journalist
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<<RIVISTA MILITARE>> IS 150 YEARS OLD The message of the Army through the covers of this ancient magazine "Rivista Militare" can be considered a pris m t hat reflects and synthesizes on it s covers separate sto ries that travel side by side: the civil and social evolution of the Country, the changes in the international scenarios and, therefore, in the concept of defence, the transformations of the military institution and its capability of communicat ion following the progress of t echnology.
The periodical press is a power. It is actually the only power of modern times. It is that because of the means at its disposal and for the very nature of its apostolate, because it speaks and insists; it links the virtues of strong convictions with those of long- lasting customs; it speaks to all and everyone, to the multitudes as well as the individual; it strikes all the notes that vibrate in the human soul; it travels rapidly and at a set hour through the entire Country to which its word is destined; it [Jlnughs through it, penetrates it, so to speak; it meddles with everything; it employs every faculty; it doubles all force s; it is for the intellect what steam is for the industry. It is with the passion of these word s that in 183 6 Giuseppe Mazzin i was explainin g the irreplaceable function that info rmat io n performs in society . One could add , borrowing an expression from Arthur Miller, that t he press is a nation that speaks to itself, meanin g for this lat te r t he link, strong and el usive at t he same t im e, t hat dist inguishes a people t hat is conscious of being the custodian of common patrimonies and destinies. The sp irit of this reasoning t urns out to be useful for introd ucing a reflection on a historical magazine such as "Rivista Militare", which, born in the time of the Risorg imento, has accom panied t he life of o ur Country ti ll t he present. Leafing t hro ugh t he issues of the review alo ng t he many years of its exi stence assumes a twofold value: o n the one side it permits t o go back over t he most im portant stages of the life of our Army and of our society, of wh ich t he m ilit ary inst itution is an express ion . On t he othe r, it is like to witness the it inerary of an institution, which has taken shape and evolved along the t imes while always abidi ng by its principles. In short, one co ul d say that by te ll ing t he sto ry of t his review one te lls the story of an idea. The idea that in 1856 two Officers of the Bourbon
ANTHROPOS - 106
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The firs t issue of «Rivista Mil itare».
army, w ho had settled in Piedmont, brought forth driven by t he need t o create a free arena of o pin ions, open to study and di scuss ion on military issues. It was t herefore an instrument dest ined not on ly t o record t he events, the developm ents, the aspirations an d t he t urning points of t he Army, but also a real f ield of cultural batt les aimed at catalysing the debate and the innovative sugges -
Rivista Mili/are English Edition n. 112006
tions of a dialectic spirit, aware that, in agreement with Plato's teaching, when two or more stones clash, the f ire of knowledge is born. In this sense "Rivista Militare" along the years has, so to speak, worn a double attire: that of means of diffusion of the military t houg ht and, at the same time, that of formation of an analogous culture. Having being conceived as a modern instrume nt of participation of the military base to the choices of t he summit, the magazine has eventually revealed its potentialities becom ing a means of inform ation for t he technical-professional updating of the personnel, but also a way of making civil society aware of t he problems of defence. Here we propose to sketch out an analysis of this history t hat runs through two centuries of Italian life. An analysis which, in its at tempt at being original, limits its scope to a particular field of vision: that of the covers of the magazine, convinced that, living in a society more and more dominated by images, where the new technologies are transforming at an inconceivable speed the ways of producing information , this choice may represent a thought- provoking key of interpretation. Today, in fact, any jo urnalistic product tries to define its own specific identity so as to make it recognizab le by the public among the competing news papers . Therefore, the periodical press, particularly when specialized, at present does not just transmit defined information contents, but tends also to construct and project its own image. In this sense the cover performs a strate gic function, because it represents not only a showcase of the contents proposed by the review but is, above all, the "face" of the magazine. As acutely suggested by Mario Garvia, one of the main scholars of "media" and "desig n" of the American newspapers, readers do not devote more than ten seconds to the first page. It is not the object of study but rathe r a stimulus to which one reacts. In the light of these considerations, one understands that what assumes significance is not only the fact that a cover carries certain news rathe r tha n others, but also the way the news are placed and their graphics are elements that can carry a specific meaning. At present a cover, in order to win away a reader from the competition , usually tries to create a strong visual impact, which often relies on the employment of a good photograph: the cover is in fact the portion of the editorial product where the visual element is exasperated. The analysi s that we propose here aims at studying the organization of the expressive plan of the cover of "Rivista Militare" (i.e. its format, paging, graphics, plastic analysis and chromatisms of the pictures) trying to understand the function performed for the reader,
as well as the relation t hat does, or does not , create with the organization of its contents. Today the jou rnalistic text, in fact, takes the shape not orily of a syncretic text t hat employs two codes (verbal and visual), sometimes in a complementary and sometimes in a parallel way but, as analysts Calabrese and Violi explain, is above all a relation al text, i.e. a kind of mosaic where not only the single elements are significant, but also the ir relations. If, as Susan Sontag points out, memory resorts to "freeze-frame"; in an era overflowing with information , covers, exactly like photographs can supply a rapid way of learning and fixing in our mem ory a particular historical event, a personage, an epoch. In this sense the Review can be cons idered a kind of prism that on its cover reflects and synthesises at the same time separate stories that travel side by side: the Country's civi l and social evolution, the changes in the international scenarios and therefore in the concept of defence; the transformations of the military institution and its ways of communication following the progresses of technology.
FROM THE «RISORGIMENTO» TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR T he choice of employing the covers of th e Review as a basis of the analysis proposed here actually restricts our field essentia lly to its most recent editions. As a matte r of fact, until 1974 the magazine has appeared in a rather anonymous and simple format. Its cover, with no images, fo r a long time carried only the name of the magazine on coloured card, which had a protective and presentation function rather than a promotional one. This l im its, however, does not exclude the possibility of expressing a reflect ion also as regards the most ancient numbers of the magaz i ne, starting from the epoch of the Risorg imento. T he Review was founded in Turin , in March 185 6 by Luigi and Carlo Mezzacapo, and was first published by t he Barera printers in quarterly volumes, each of which grouped three monthly papers. The examination of t he format of these first numbers , • proves the economic difficulties that probab ly marked the first appearance of the periodical. The • medium-small format, typical of a book, (l 3x2 l cm), the modest paper, the black print, the small and close type, the plates covered by a sim- • pie paper lining, are the external mark of a second - class typography, as was moreover stated by the word "Economic" printed on the frontispiece of the first volume.
107 - ANTHROPOS
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In 1974 the format changes.
The originality of the Review emerges therefore especially from the analys is of its contents. In this regard , it is usef ul to consider the first pages of this periodical in the bud, devoted to what we could call "programmatic intentions", where the Mezzacapo brothers, complaining about Piedmont' s delay in possessing newspapers that dealt with weapons and military sc ience, asserting the inevitable necess ity for an Army to have a periodical publ ication, so that the Officers would not be distracted from the movements of studies and ideas, invited the Officers of all arms and the persons learned in military matters to give thei r con t ribution for present i ng experiences and suggestions for so lving military problems, with the on ly limit of political questions, useless polemics and perso nal discuss io ns. It was actual ly t his pluralist and modern formu lation that determined the originality of the Review and, at the same time, its longevity. In fact the innovative drive of the founders' id ea can be traced to the anticonfo r mism with which the Mezzacapo brothers wanted to address the Italian military thought, which in their opinion was to be intended not re stricted to a lim ited circ le of Officers who interpreted the ideology of the summit, but it shou ld rather be expanded to every Army corn -
ANTHROPOS - 108
ponent, as a fruit of study and research . T he se were acti vities p ractically un k now n by th e Armies of those times, where the stress was lai d more on pract ice than on cu lture. Another sign of t he modernity of the "Rivist a" can be found in t he close examination of the index placed at the end of t he first volume, characterized by a multiplicity of subj ects, subdivided in surveys well proportioned among military, scientific and humanistic sciences . Next to the traditional sub jects of tech nical-prof essional updating there were avant-garde columns, such as military ethics, contemporary and past history, military apho ri sm s and retrospective and contempo rary criticis m . These themes, since then, have given the Review its configuration of an instrument intended not only to answer t he needs of technical and scientif ic preparation but also, in a st rictly conservative environment, to spur public criticism on the most inte rest ing military questions. Another l ine, in d icated in the programme of th e Mezzacapo brothers and destined t o survive th e passing of time , was the attention given to th e military experiences abroad and the topical pre sentation of the Magazine: every study and proposal should have been linked to the military reality of the moment and precisely for this reason the "Rivista" predisposed the "Mil ita ry Chronicle" section, thus unde r lining even more the need to have a real contact wit h t he current events. After the first year the magazine was forced t o inte rrupt the publications for four month s because of financial difficulties: only a hundred subscriptions had been made, wh ile there shoul d have been at least th ree hu nd red in orde r t o meet just the printing expenses. But it was only a short interruption: in 185 7, in fact, the periodical resumed its publ ications thanks to the support of young editor Carlo Voghe ra. The most evident nove lty of this second ed ition, from t he purely formal po int of view, consists in t he indi cation of the new printer, "G. Cassone", spec ial ized in military pub lications, and therefore more suited to sponsor t he effort of the Mezzacapo brothers. Anyway, until the eve of the First World War, th e graphic analysis of t he covers of the magazine does not suggest evident innovations, excludi ng the edition of 1859 w hen the review, by becom ing the "Rivista Militare ltaliana", took an adj ectivation, which on the one side represented a good omen and , on the other emphasized t he national vision through which , already from the first iss ues, the national mi litary prob lems were considered . In 1869, the periodi cal, while remaining in the han ds of t he Voghera publish er, passed under the control of the War Ministry: this fact, while from
Rivista Militare Englis/1 Edition n . 1/2006
the one side assured t he means necessary for its edition and diffusion, at the same time it gave it a greater authority, at least unti l the issue of December 19 18 when, because of the war events, the Publisher was forced to suspend the publications . In 1927, the publications started again following the decision of the War Ministry and were entrusted to the General Staff Corps, whic h in the beginning assumed the ed ition and the t echnical- military direction of the Review and subsequently acquired its publ ishing property and ent ru sted its printing to the "Tipografia Regionale" in Rome. The format of the reborn Review was simple: medium size (22xl 6cm), Badoni type, modest paper, the colour of the cover was grey-green (like the uniforms of the time), the print was black, with the exception of t he headline that was imp ressed in red. It was however a brief experience that lasted only seven years . The frequent rotation of its directors represents, from the fo rmal point of view, the most evident sign of the moral and intel lectual difficulties that hit the periodical in those years. The end of the Second World War reawakened the stimu lus t o discuss the problems of the Ar my with a new vigour. This is proved by the numerous changes in t he g raphics of its cover that the magazine experimented in those years. T he tradition ally protective function of the cover was flanked by that of presentation page of the magaz ine's contents.
THE WHITE PERIOD BETWEEN INNOVATION AND TRADITION
Starting from 1974 "Rivista Mi litare" underwent such a deep transformation of its format that it represented almost a formal separatio n from the past. The change concerns first of all its format : the medium - small dimens ions of the preceding years, typical of the academic reviews, are replaced by larg er- size pages (2 8x2 l cm), typical of most period icals circulating in Italy in t hose years. The format perm itted not only to contain more information and place it in an orderly way, but also to easily include different elements (text and iconographic display). Already th is choice by itself contributes to create a sensatio n of a new and less traditional review, intended for a more modern and informal public. Also the type of pagination adopted reflects the wish to offer a more dynamic modality of fruition : the text is distributed in a more uniform manner, us ing sometimes two columns, besides the three and often five columns, accord ing to a not- always
vertical trend . This is a layout that not on ly gives rhythm t o reading, enlivening the rigidity of t he previous model , but at t he same time transmits an effect of composite se nse, w hi ch emphasizes the pluralist character of the conte nts of the "Rivista", which also v isual ly appears as the fruit of the con t rib ution of various enunciators . Another graph ic ele me nt that lets us reflect on the wish commo n t o the t ransform atio ns adopted during these years concerns the choices regarding the type , the so- called letteri ng. In fact, if on the one side one wants to modernize the Review by experimenting i nnovat ive and informal colours, st iles and types in the headl in es of the art icle s, on the other the wil l to project the image of an autho r itative and institutio nal Review emerges clearly from the choi ce to keep for the body of the text a smal l, classic format, which gives it an overall visua l effect of a dense and not much diffe rentiated whole, d ifficu lt for th e eye to penetrat e. All these typically graphic elements (format, number of columns, type style and dimension) thus contribute to define a new identity of t he magaz ine, w hich, while maintaining the character of a period ical of technical analysis , in lin e with its ancient and famous tradition, does not hi de its wish to be up to the times, as was moreover made clear by an edito rial in no. 6 of 1974 that expldi ned t o the readers the meaning of the new
format. Actually the ef fort common to all the changes introd uced in this pe riod seems to be that of making up a product that is in co nstant pursuit of a balance between innovation and trad ition. The most evident sign in th is se nse is offered by the numbering of the Review: the fi rst num ber of 1974 , in fact, bea rs the words "Anno XCVII " on the upper left side of the cover, un derli nin g the ideal continuity of the new se r ie s w ith th e Risorgimento spirit of the pe riodical. T he mes sage that such choice imp lies is evident: the intention is that of livening up the Review with out altering it. Anot her indication is t he cho ice of t he colou rs adopted for t he background of t he cover (wh ite) and for the name of the magazine, placed on the upper right, o n two lines, with rou nded type (black): also in t his case the choice privilege s neu t ral tones which reflect the wish to connote the magazin e with an overall character of sobriety, • respecting the absolute non-political position and moderat ion of tones that the Mezzacapo b rothers wh ished sin ce its fou ndation. Mo reover, for t he • first t ime, the initials of the magazi ne (RM) are placed befo re the name of th e period ical. In every number the initials are printed in a different colour, the same used for the frame of the photo-
9 - ANTHROPOS
graph printed on the cover as well as for the frame of the lower plate, where the initials are repeated and positioned at the centre. These simple graphic ornaments actually show the elegance of the periodical and the meditation with which the cover has been studied; moreover the preciosity and refinement of the Review emerges also from the glossy and thick quality of the paper employed for its pages and for t he cover itself. But the most evident novelty that marks the new format is doubtlessly the introduction of a colour photograph on the cover, which takes up about three fifths of the space. Also th is choice is clearly suggested by the wish to adapt "Rivista Militare" to the aesthetic innovatio ns of the other periodicals of the time. Beginning from the second postwar period, also in our Country photojournalism started to charact erize all the editorial production of the periodical press, following the pattern of American magazine "Life", which, particularly in Italy, created a school. The opening and greater flexibility of the pagination, together with the inevitable progress in photographic technology and transmission Uust think of the appearance of light and handy cameras such as the Leika, but also the employment of rotogravure, telex and t elephoto and the appearance of television) permitted to rethink the spaces and weight of t he image, giving it increasing importance. Thus iL t.H:!Ldme more and more evident the image's power to form public opin ion in a manner sometimes more incis ive than words, owing to some characteristics typical of the photographic medium, such as universality, immediacy and symbolic potentiality. At the same time a debate started in Italy on the photographic language, which developed within the wider ling uistic, semiologic problems, which, starting from the sixties, hit al so the image field. Init ially the discussion was centred on the mimetic conception of photography, i.e. on its capability of mechanical reproduction of t he reality produced by the images. But soon various scholars challenged the assumed innocence of the dark room and the photo's very objectivity: Roland Barthes, for example, although acknowledging the causal re lation that links a photograph to reality, deconstructed the referential illusion of the photograph, underlining how this nece ssari ly must operate a manipulation of its external point of reference. These brief cons iderations offer a valid support for understand ing the images proposed on the covers of "Rivista Militare" starting from 1974. The photographs normally refer to the third "banner" on t he cover, which refers to the internal column "Arms and Services" and concerns a Service or a Speciality of the Service (Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Eng ineers and Signal Corps).
ANTHROPOS -
Nevertheless the photos do not show a direct or evident link to the event with which they are connected: i.e. they are not news snapshots but images intentionally decontextualized with a marked artistic effect. Just consider the cover of number 3 of 1974, which shows a close-up of a detai l of a soldier's boot on a green meadow and an airplane gliding against a red sunset. Not on ly the unnatural colours but also t he grainy and blurred contours of the photograph produce an evident evocative effect rather than that of a pres ence. The link with the paratroops is explained by a caption on the frontisp iece which points out the wi ll and self-control that are necessary to parachute, the fami liarity with difficult situations, th e example of the Commanders, the deep harmony among the units and the indomitab le aggressiveness that are indispensable for conducting toug h land combat, in prosecution of dangerous ai r transfers. The written text, in th is case, has a double anc horing function vis-a-vis the photo, for it fixes the precise meaning t hat the picture must transmit and, at the same t ime, it determines th e sense-paths of the message. It should be noticed that also the caption, like the photo, does not have a really journalistic tone: it does not say where the photo was shot, who is its author and the name of the subject portrayed, but rather it describes in rhetoric and celebrating terms t he series of values of a military category. Referring to a typology recently proposed by Lorusso and Violi in a book devoted to the semiotics of j ournalism, one can place t hese photographs within the category of symbo l-images, whose aim is not to document but to carry out a function of interpretation and mythicization. One deals with images representing the Army's figurative universe that refer to the sphere of the ideals at stake in t his context. Besides the mentioned effect of distance from reality, one should point out how the photograp hs published on the cover of 1974 portray, always and only, mil itary subjects: an exped ient that defines the periodical as a sectorial review addressed to a specific public. This is also confirmed by t he quotation on t he frontispiece (which from now on we are going to adopt as qualifying element of our analysis) that presents the magazine: Rivista Militare's purpose is to expand and update the technical- professional preparation of Officers and NCOs of the Army. To this end it constitutes an organ of diffusion of the military thought and arena of study and debate on subjects concerning the Army's sphere of competence. It presents moreover a survey of the most qualified foreign press and develops topical technical and scientific subjects.
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 112006
i
I
It is therefore clear that the Review's intention is not to inform the Italian citizen about the military thought and the problems of security. Its aim is to be an instrument of scientific updat ing for the military personnel. The overall effect that o¡ne derives from these considerations on the covers on 1974 (in its visual and textual aspects) t ransmits on the whole the image of a military class wrapped up in itself, that somehow reflects the situation in which the Italian Army lived around the seventies vis-a-vis public opinion. Some authors trace the origin of the difficult relations between the Army and the Italian society back to the institutional and military collapse of 1943, and to the connected wish t o forget the defeat as soon as possible. Militarism became then a synonym of Fascism and the Armed Forces were associated to concepts li ke aggression, war and defeat. A diffuse antimilitarist sentiment was thus nourished which, on the other hand, ended by being functional to the bipolar confrontat ion, where the Army represented one of the few proofs of the Italian partnership in the Atlantic Alliance. This split between the Army and t he civil soc iety grew wider between the sixties and the seventies on the spur of the student protest and t he crisis of the traditional values. It was fed w ith news regard ing assumed deviations attributed to some Top Brass, which questioned the democratic spirit of the Armed Forces. Finally, between the end of the seventies and the beginn ing of the eighties, it was channelled into the wider process of delegitimization that hit all the State institutions. All these factors caused a deep split between the Army and pub lic opinion, which for a long time remained centred on the denial of the validity, usefulness and leg itimacy of the military institution, to the point that it fed an endemic refusal of mi litary service, which was sometimes endured as a true affliction. On the other hand, one must acknowledge that, as underlined by Leonardo Prizzi in a recent publication, on the military side there was no willingness to bring the truth to light: to a society presented as hosti le, the response was an equal and contrary prejud icial hostility. Actually an attempt at realizing an ample national debate on the problems of defence was made in 1975, together with the decision to implement a deep reorganization of the Armed Forces. Also "Rivista Militare" was involved in this debate, as witnessed by the covers of the biennium 1975-76, entirely devoted to the process of modernization and renewal of the Army. In this regard, the covers of 1975 deserve a special consideration; un like those of the preceding year they bear no photograph but only opticalstyle drawings: in this case it is the caption on the frontispiece that shows the reading paths of the
image and faci litates an immediate understanding. The choice of employing the geometric image s fashionable at the time, strongly characterized by colour and dynam ism, may perhaps be connected with the wish to communicate an unconscious sense of modern ity, novelty and evolution , in line with the progress experienced in those years by the military structure. Starting from the last number of 1975 the process of reorganization of the Army is again represented on the cover of the "Rivista" through symbolic images: in fact, photographs (grainy, and therefore highly evocative) of antiq ue toy-soldiers, cannons of the eighteenth century and military symbols such as war flags, are used all along 1976, almost to reassure that the changes underway were in any case inspired by and anchored to the respect of the past and the traditions . As there. is no evident link between the photographs and the event, it is again the caption that fixes the precise meaning that the image must transmit and whose function appears therefore essentially explanatory: referring to a historical and paradigmatic inventory of t he memory it offers the clue for read ing the info rmation. Close-ups of young officers are reproposed in the bienn ium 1977- 78: in this case the caption describes a particular military training school. The
The first number of 19 75. The optical style. ANNO :0.C'lllt NUt.11:RO V NO
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1
- ANTHR()
ns
novelty of these issues this t ime resides in the conn ectio n with the index: in these number, in fact, the photo on the cover not only refers to a header but points out to a subject that is analysed in depth with two or more articles. Number 3 of l 977deserves a particular comment: in this case it is a highly symbol ic photograph, inte ntio nally constructed to communicate a message thought to be of high importance. On the forefront, on the r ig ht, there is a coat-stand with mi litary caps of various foreign armies hang ing on it. On the left, t he cap of the Italian Army stands out on a desk, where there are different periodicals, among which "R ivista Militare" takes a prominent place. In the background , a beam of light enters through a large window. In this case the caption is decisive, for the photograph is neither connected with an easi ly identifiab le subject nor to an article of the Review. Instead, it concerns an event full of mean ings for the public of the peri odical: in fact, as is explained by the caption, the image wants to emphasize the first meeting of "Rivista Militare" that has taken place on the occasion of the anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. In 1979 the magazine makes the experiment of proposing on the cover an image that does not expressly recall an article ins ide, but wants to stress a link between events of topical interest: every edition of that year, in fact, bears on the cover a model of a particular weapon-system which, d::i exµldined by a caption on the frontispiece, has been recently adopted, or will soon be adopted, by t he Italian Army. In t his sense the cover has the function of emphasizing the specialist character of the periodical as means of technical-professional updating of the military personnel, as stressed also by the editorial appeared on the first num ber of 1980. In orde r to understand the sense of t hese covers we should briefly refer to the spirit of those years. The beginning of the eighties in Italy was characterized by a growing awareness of the vulnerability of the internal and international scenario: the persistence of a significant level of criminality and internal terrorist violence, the marked delegitimization of the institutions, together with an international scenario characte rized by a drop of confidence in the spirit of Helsin k i, and by the military expansionism of the Soviet army, caused a sharp decline in the general sense of security. Thus, while on the internal plane these years were characte rized by a rationalization of the battle against crime and terrorist subversion, at international level they were marked by the Italian Government's decision to deploy on the national territory the "C ruise" and "Pershing - II" NATO medium-rang e missiles, deemed necessary for rebalancing t he massive deployment of analogous missiles, the "SS- 20s", carried out by the Soviets.
ANTHROPOS - 1
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The third number of l 977. The EMPA Congress.
At the same t im e, there was a marked interest for the problems of t he foreign defence po licy. In this sense, the photographs on the covers of the first two numbers of "Rivista Militare" of 1980, which portray an Italian and a foreign sold ier in a friendly and cooperative attitude, are rather sig nificant . Also the numbers of 1982 have an o rigi nality of their own, being totally t aken up by the reproduction of paintings on the Risorgimento; also in th is case the right interpretation of their meaning is given by the caption, which explains that the Minister of Defence had consecrated the year 1982 to Giuseppe Garibaldi. "Rivista Militare" had seized the opportunity and published various articles on the Hero' s figure and deeds. But the true innovative covers, in a certain sense precursors of the immed iate futu re, are those of the last two num bers of 1981, one of which deals with the cooperation realized in those years between the Army and the State Railways, and the other with the anniversary of the earthquake that on the 23rd of November 1980 had hit Campania and Basilicata. For the fi rst time, in fact, the photos on the cove r, although not yet related to topi cality but with a distinct symbolic value, propose next to the traditional military stereotypes also civil ones. Similarly the caption for the first time extols the work for the community carried out by
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the Army. In fact t hose years marked a turning point in the difficult relations between Army and public opinion , brought about by a d iffuse appreciation within the national community for the reliabi lity and efficiency shown by the mi litary units in the numerous activities again st terrorisnis and of ass istance to the population. These activities find their prelim inaries in the law of 11 July 1978, n.382, whi ch contains the "N o rms of prin ciple on m ilitary discipline" which defined the institutional tasks of the Armed Forces and set side by side the traditional task of defending the Mother Country and t he contribution to the safeguard of the free institutions and t he welfare of t he national com mun ity in case of public disasters.
THE YELLOW PERIOD: THE DIALOGUE WITH SOCIETY Starting from 1983, "Rivista Militare" undergoes a new t ransformation in its format, wh ich i nvolves not only the graph ic layout of the cover, but also the selectio n and the whole set- up of its contents.
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Unlike that of 1974, the need t hat moves t his spirit of renewal can be id entified not so much in the wi sh Lo keep the periodical "abreast of the t imes",
as had happened in t he past, but rather t hat of inserting it "in the times". Starting from that period, all the chang es seem to have on ly o ne common denom inator: to conque r t he interest of a larg e publ ic , in lin e w it h the new "look" that t he Army had assumed in th e op inion of civil society. In fact there is in t hose years a ki nd of reversal of t he image of the Armed Fo rces, which set out on a path of wider open ing towards t he civil world, w ith the pu rpose of doing away with the preconceptions and the mutual mistrust that had ch aracterized the relations between the military p lanet and civil society. This intention is moreove r made clear by the heading of the magazine, placed on t he front ispiece, where the trad itional purpose of wid ening and updati ng the technical-profess ional preparat ion of Officers and NCOs is significantly complemented by the Review's wish to info rm pub lic opinion about t he Army and issues of military interest. Another typically graphic element that witnesses the wish of th e magazine, and th erefore of the military inst itution , to be open to the civil ian world • is undoubtedly offered by the in d ication of the price, which for the first time is printed on the cover of the magazine, as a sign that it is sold at newsstands and bookshops.
1
- ANTH ROPOS
Also the colour chosen for the background of the cover, which from a neutral white goes to a bright yellow, indicates the wish to present a captivating and immediately identifiable product. In this regard, it is also interesting to note the position of the name of the magazine on the cover: compared to the previous format, it is shifted from the upper right side to a still high but central position, which privileges the "Mi litare" term placed in a horizontal sense, vis-a-vis the "Rivista", which has avertical and therefore less evident position. On the other hand, the "trademark" of the magazine, which can define its identity without hesitation, in this edition assumes a discreet but unprecedented visibility: in fact, for the first time the logo of the Army is placed on the cover through a graphic expedient which positions it elegantly on an angle of t he central photograph. This spirit of renewal concerns also the g raphics of the contents, where one can observe an intervention aimed at making t he product more homogeneous: not only because the text is always set on three columns, but also because the type - size is made uniform and inc reased. These changes permit a readily available and effortless read ing. As regards this, it is also int erest ing to note that, starting from 1983, commercial advertising enters the magazine together with promotional pictures about the possibility of subscribing to the publication. In relation to the photographic arra ngement, one should underline how this assumes a more and more journalistic and news-related set-up, with the purpose of illustrating and completing the information of the articles. Also the photograph on the cover deserves a special comment, owing to the differences it shows in comparison with the previous format: first of all its position changes and privileges a vertical trend, visa-vis the preceding horizontal one; secondly, it is a vividly coloured photograph with precise contours, which in itself produces a greater "effect of presence". A sensation that grows when one considers the photos' subjects: until 1985, in fact, they are soldiers' close- ups, which tend to privilege their counte nance, their look, their expression. Resorting to the already-mentioned typology of Lorusso and Violi, the photographs can be set within the category of the emotion- images, whose aim is to transmit an emotional reaction by staging the passions of the protagonists of the events, i.e. hinting at the individual dimension that every incident presents . In this case the photograph produces vis-a-vis the event a substantial enhancement, where the signs of the photographic form are cancelled as far as doing away with captions, in order to increase the illusion of adherence to reality. But the aspect that more than any other distinguishes the photographs of the covers of these years
ANTHROPOS -
14
is that military subjects are represented together with elements linked to current events and civi l society. Just think of the cover of the fifth number of 1985 which portrays the t hen President of the Republic, Francesco Cossiga and the Minister of Defence, Giovanni Spadolini, during a vis it to the "Alpini" Corps; or the cover of no. 6 of l 986 that shows a moment of Pope John Paul !I's visit to the military school of the "Alpini" Remarkably, in this period many photographs regard female subjects, in line with the then topical debate about women's military service envisaged by the bill of September 1981. Moreover, starting from 1986, the covers show another novelty that once more reflects the need t o establish a dialogue with civil society that the Army felt in those years from that date, in fact, in the three banners set on the lower section of the cover (often parallel rather than complementary to the photograph) there are the names of the authors. These are prestigious names of the academic, political, literary and newspapers world of civil society, which witness not only the greater attention given to public opinion, but also the magazine's wish to represent a stim ulus for a conscious involvement of all citizens in the problems of the Army. The turning point of this restored and less controvers ial relationship between the Army and society can be undoubted ly be found in the consent that followed the Peace Support Operation in Lebano n (no.1 or 1984), which was the most significant Italian military engagement after the War of Liberation, to which, not by chance, "Rivista Militare" dedicated a cover. Eve n if the Armed Forces of the Republic had been employed in other occasions outside the nati onal territory, the Lebanese mission distinguished itself for the amount of forces and means employed and for the demanding the tasks ass igned . Above all, it was a brilliant success for our Army, acknowledged at home and abroad . After the Lebano n operation , our Armed Forces enter a new period marked by a greater conscious ness of the role that Italy can play on the internat ional stage, but also by an increased sense of se lf esteem of the Armed Forces and of the nat ional society. Actually t he covers of the last numbe rs of this period (1993-1994) are almost entirely dedicated to "Operation Ibis", coherently with the changed national and internationa l scenario. The peace - support operations in fact characterize the second half of the twentieth century, as a response of the international commun ity to the conflicts started after the fall of t he Berlin wall. Their development implies, on the one side a change in t he concept of defence and on the other a revision of the m ilitary strategy and of the units' attributions . Evolutions that go hand in hand wit h a new format of "Rivista Militare", starting from 1995 .
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1986. Right. The cover of the third number of 7993 is devoted to peacekeeping operations.
THE BLUE PERIOD: THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM In 1995 the magazine undergoes a new transformation of its format, which is destined to record epochal events, such as the beginning of a new mil lennium and the adoption of the Euro. From the formal point of view, the size, paging and paper are the same as those of the previous editions , only the g raph ics of the cover are different: the background is blue crossed by slanting lines, on which the name of the magazine stands out on the upper side printed on two li nes in thick red type. The headings are placed on the left, with type that alternates a yellow colour for the tit le and white for the author. T he intentions seem to be that of producing a strong visual impact through an emphasized use of colour. The attention to the news items that had characterized the layout of the previous numbers is kept and accentuated in the new edition through a proper column "Attua lita in breve" (News in sho rt),
which even precedes the index. Also the p hotographs on the cove r reflect th is intention: the images in fact portray so ld iers in action (almost always close-ups of men in battle dress), contextualized in a real and often identifiable environment. Nearly all t he photographs of these years refer to a particu lar miss ion of the Army, fro m Somalia to Yugoslavia, from Albania t o Sicily. With reference to the methodo logy adopted up to now. one can set t hese photographs w ithin a category across the "emotions" images and the "document" images, whose aim is to document a particu lar event giving the proof and substantiation of the facts reported . Actually, the covers of these years can be divid ed in two distinct categories : those devoted to the missions abroad and t o those on the national te rritory. Starting from t he nineties, in fact, t he impact on the concept of security produced by the r isks connected with clandestine immigration and o rgan ized crime becomes more and more evident, to the point of inducing the Government to confront it through the emp loyment of the Armed Forces, confirming the new legitimization of the military institution as a means to safeguard the national interest s. It is in this context that Operation "Pe llicano" in Albania and "Forza Paris" and "Vespri Sic il iani" on the national territory, take shape and, for the first time, the Army operat es in favo ur of the community outside situations of
Above. The second issue of 7995. The new graphic. Right.
The cover of the last number of 1999 introduces the theme of the new millennium.
national disasters. The consent acqu ired by t he Armed Forces in such operations persuaded t he Government to increase the employment of the Army against organized crime also in Ca labria, Campania and Pug lia. T he other category of covers is instead ded icated to the operations in support of peace, to which Italy increas ingly committed itself after the Le banese mission also in this case the photographs have a strong emotional impact which, by portraying mainly Italian so ldiers in informal and friendly attitudes with children or women of the local popu lation, tend to emphasize the humanitarian aspect of the mission , and therefore the legitimacy of the intervention (see for example the cover reproduced on the upper left). At the same time, these are symbolic photographs, for they tend to highlight details more or less imm ediately connectab le to the stereotypes of the peacekeeping operations and to the international bodies. One last observation concerns the most recent covers, which, while maintaining the structure men tioned before, show some innovations. In fact, starting from 2003 , although the covers exhibit
A t-..lTUDnonc-
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image s of a documental quality, they emphasize the illu sion of immediacy by choosing a photograph that occupies almost the entire cover, w ithout any kind of frame, almost cancelling the marks of its being set in a photographic form . Nevertheless, t hese are images that, although representing recognizable events, necessitate an explanatory title, which does not bring to li ght the objective evidence, but rather the intervent ion of the observer, who defines "reality" accord ing to one of his possible interpretative hypoth eses . Actual ly the aspect that both typo logies of covers have in common can be retraced t o the evolution that the concept of defence went through in the years after the fa ll of the Berl in wall with t he overcoming of the bipolar confrontation, in fact, the concept of "threat" is replaced by the mo re hazy and insidious concept of "risk", which becomes more and more g lobal because it can radiate its destabi lizing effects also outside any territoria l boundary. The covers of "Rivista Militare" therefore bear witness to a gradua l success in the Italian context of the new concept of defence, understood as prevention from any type of threat, with no limits of space and nationality, as opposition to any type of violence and, finally, as re inforcement of peace and internal security. In this sense, we find once more risolut ive the definition of the period ical quoted in the index, which, next to the review's traditional object of expanding and updating the technical-profession-
Rivista M1Jitare Engtis/1 Edition n . 1/2006
al training of the Cadres, adds that of informing public opinion on the themes of defence and secu rity. Its aim is to be an organ of diffusion and a field of study and debate. The new environments where the prevailingly joi nt and multinational operations are now carried out, have produced a reconsideration of the structure of the Army by emphasizing the function of the individual fighte r d irecting it towards a Force of professionals. "Rivista Militare" anticipates the debate about this evolution through a co nstant reference to the debate "Army. Project 2000", in the titles of its covers. On the other end, the events of September 11 have awakened the interest of public opinion for the defence and security issues, prompted by a threat that is felt as global. As a matter of fact, if at the end of the last century we had convinced ourselves that we could inaugu rate a third millennium of peace by foreseeing and managing in advance the crises in the various areas of the world, the attack on the Twin Towers has made entirely evident the hazard of those who, like Francis Fukuyama, after the fall of the Berlin Wall had hypothesized the end of history. The beginning of the new millennium has thus coincided with the opening of new areas of instability that have accentuated the multiform and volatile character of the new threat of internatio nal terrorism, whose particularly gratifying target is very often constituted by civil ians, who are the real objectives chosen in order to hit and divide pub lic opinion. The discontinu ity of such conflicts not o nly implies a transformation of the structures and assets of the Army and, more in general, of the military thought in a new perspective of synergy with the civilian society, but it also generates an increased attention from the citizens towards the problems of Defence. Evidence of the results and solidarity, facts but also dialogue and transparency: this is what the citizens, worried for the ir future, increas ingly ask of their Armed Forces, which are no more considered a distant and selfabsorbed institution, but a an integ rant part of society. The new format of "Rivista Mil itare", which starts from this issue, can be interpreted in the light of these considerations. It is a further effort to acknowledge the new requirements of t he public vis- a- vis an Army wh ich on the one hand is perceived as defence and development of state- ofthe-art technologies for the security of the citizen , and on the other appears more and more ready to open up to the outside world. The periodical , which has maintained the same format and pagination, it now divid ed into four new sections which, with their Greek denomination, rem ind of t he link with traditio n and, at t he same tim e,
The cover of the third number of 2003. The value of the photographic image prevails over graphics.
emphasize t he importance given to dialectics. But, once more, the most evident change can be found in the cover which, for t he first time, uses a f ull page image, highlighting the effect of "presence" of t he subjects portrayed. As regards the meaning of the photo chosen, one can im agine that it may enclose and synthes ize at the same time all the models of the typology used here (symbol-images ; document- images; emotio n- images ; interpretat ion - images) relying on an eminently evocative character. In other to avoid superimpositions with a specif ic terminology which employs term s such as icon, index, symbol with terms very precise but often not coincident with the common use, for these photographs it can be expedient to use "emb lem", as a figure that symbolizes a concept. In confirmation of this , one can notice t hat on the cover there is no expl icative title, as there was in the previous edition. The captions are hig hlighted, creating an effect of harmo nious balance between • image and contents. It is a further piece in the variegated mosaic that "Rivista Militare" has con tributed to assemb le in the Count ry d uring the long t ime of its existence . Sabrina Carreras
Journalist 17 - ANTHls>()P()~
THE LEGIONNAIRE'S CODE OF HONOUR Legionnaire: you are a volunteer serving France faithfully and with honour. Every Legionnaire is your brother-at- arms, irrespective of his nationality, race or creed. You will demonstrate this by an unwavering and straight forward solidarity which must always bind together members of the same family. • Respectful of the Legion's traditions, honouring your superiors, dis cipline and comradeship are your strength, courage and loyalty your virtues. Proud of your status as a legionnaire, you will display this pride, by your turnout, always impeccable, your behaviour, ever worthy, though modest, your living - quarters, always tidy. An elite soldier: you will train vigorously, you will maintain you weapons as if it were your most precious possession, you will keep your body in the peak of condition, always f it. • A mission once given to you becomes sacred to you, you will accom ---plish it to the end and at all costs. In combat: you will act without relish of your tasks , or hatred· ; you will respect the vanquished enemy and will never abandon neither Y, our wounded nor your dead, nor will you under any circumstar;i~ s surrender your arms. , / -,.
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THE FOREIGN LEGION Honour, bravery and warlike spirit In more than 1 50 years of history, the deeds of the Foreign Legion have created the myth of one of the most feared and admired military formations. This article will cover the history of this military institution, from its bloody and glorious page of Camerone, which made it the legend it is, until the present day.
On l 4'h july 1919, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rollet, at the head of his men and surrounded by the insignia of his Detachment, which were covered with decorations, had the honour to open the grand Victory parade along the Champs Elysees in Paris. While the band struck up ÂŤLe BoudinÂť, his contingent paraded proudly with swollen chests . Thei r unique marching cadence of 88 steps to the minute was superb and majestic: they strode with the step of Kings and Emperors (this was quite exceptional since all the regu lar Armies marched about 120 steps to the minute). The contingent carried the heavy burden of a conflicting tradition, that was a mixture of bravery, ind ifference to danger, and legendary deeds, but also a mixture of insubordinations, desertions, alcoholism, cut throats, and lungs pierced by the long regulation bayonets. Surrounded by an aura of mystic romanticism the contingent was parad ing: soon it would become one of the most feared Units in the military history of the whole world. There was a moment of respectful silence before the French people burst into so thunderous an applause t hat even the Authorities present at the ceremony had to stand up and dramatically pay tribute with an equal intensity to each nobleman, labourer and crim inal: Monsieur le Legionnaire was marching.
THE CONSTITUTION T he reactionary Charles X, succeeded as King of France (1824- 1830) after the death of his brother Louis XVIII - longing for military successes in foreign policy to divert attention from its anti-liberal policy - took advantage of a diplomatic incident to declare war on Turkey. After having occupied the coastal strip of Algeria, his troops entered Algiers triumphantly in July 1830. In fact, the French expe-
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ditionary force - composed of around 37 000 soldiers under General de Bourmont's orders - actually defeated the Turkish forces rapidly, but was not able to prevent a violent guerril la movement under the leadership of the dexterous Emir Abd el - Qader, who would create lots of problems for the contingent stationed in Algeria for about twenty years. It was the new Armee d'Afrique. The French troops , well trained and equipped according to the mi litary criteria prevai ling across Europe at that time, were not in fact capable of adapting to the warlike culture of North Africa and facing the risky unknown environment (after the Restoration, the European armies adopted again the military doctrines which had been established in the late l 8 11, century). Consequently, the new Commander, General Clauzel, took a series of im portant measures which would deeply mark the whole French military system. This represented the first important military intervention after the famous Napoleonic campaigns. So General Clauzel, and after him also General Bugeaud, succeeded in bringing mobility and flexibility to the French Army in accordance with the new operational needs. The French contingent was reduced to 10 000 men in order to avoid any logistical problems and, at the same time, two battalions and two mounted squadrons, composed of people coming from a local tri be (the Zouaouas, Zouaves) were founded on March 21 st 1 831, together with the first Regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, with indige nous and French personnel. In addition , t here were irregular units composed of mounted fighters and led by t he brave Algerian Yusuf Bey (the Spahis) - who would become soon one of the most effective means of contrast to the growing bloody guerrilla warfare. T here were also two battalions of lnfanterie Legere d'Afrique with mixed personnel. The aim was still to use the same m ilitary techniques which had been adopted by Abd el-Qader. The time was ripe for the arrival of the Foreign Legion. In the meantime, in Paris , Charles X made
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Rivista Militare English Edition n. 112006
Above Recruitment poster.
Title pages Patrolling a Bosnian village.
a co mm itment to supp ress any internal oppos it ion by staging what today we could call a «white coup d'etat»: he di sso lved the Chamber of Deputies and w ith the «Four Ordinances» of July 2 sth l 830, abolis hed the fu ndamental rights - such as the freedom of the press- and significantly reduced t he electo rate to oppose t he dangerous advance of t he libe rals. He was not able to fulfil his purpose but neve rt heless succeed in causing a popular upri sing w hich, after hard clashes with the King's t roops during the Trois Clorieuses (27 - 29 July 1831 ), put him to fl ight and then dismissed him. On Aug ust 9 of the same year, liberal Lou is Philippe d'Orleans came to the French throne (1830 - 1848) and accepted the Crown fo llowing the w ill of the Nation, not by divine right, without adopting the tradit ional title of l( ing of France. He beca m e Ki ng of t he French, and w it h his «Monarchy of July» the glorious t ricolour was re stored. It was the symbol of the Revol ut ion , of liberty and of the Napoleonic Age. International
prestige was of great concern to the new Sovere ign. It had been put through a hard test in Algeria, during t he raids conducted by t he elus ive Abd el-Quader against one of the most powerful European Armies, thus under mining Frenc h leadership in the Old Continent. In addition, a series of strugg les and internal pol itical intrigues were sources of worries for France during that tormented period. Lots of people and soldie rs were con sidered as awkward and dangerous for th e new Monarchy and even some Officers aroused susp icion because t hey had serious ly comprom ised themselves with the old reg ime . Finally, it was also important to assure the French co lonial expansion - like a real Emp ire and protect thousands of co lon ials w ho were pouring into the colonies as a privileged white elite in order to civ il ize the nomad ic tribes wh ich still lived "in the wild". Therefore on March gth 1931 Louis Phi li ppe d'Orleans did not have any hesitation in establish ing a new Regiment which would operate outside t he metropol itan territory, with voluntary service and without excess ive formalities in the enlistment. It would be open to foreigners, but always unde r the g lorious French fl ag: the Legion Etrangere Francaise. However, it must be kept in mind that the Foreign Leg ion cherished a trad ition wh ich had been maintained by the French Army since the Renaissance survived unti l shortly before the Revo lution , when Francis I recru ited Italian troops - besides the Swiss , trad itionally reg ard ed as mercenaries - and Henry Ill hired so ldiers coming from all t he European countries. Training methods were extremely strict because t here were not only good and experienced so ld iers , but also the dregs of society a r igorous regime, characterized by the brutality of the non- commissioned officers, and harsh corporal pun ishment. The main purpose was to gain a heroic reputation on the front line w here France had a colonial war to fig ht. The recruitment procedure , wh ich is st ill more or less the system used t oday, involved a prelim inary interview, gett ing through a test, a medica l examinatio n, physica l aptitude tests and an «interrogat ion» conducted by the Bureau des Statistiques de la Legion Etrangere at the Centre of Se lection of Aubagne (about 7 5 kilometres east of Marse ill e) , the Headq uarters of the Legion . Candidates, who were obviously all volunteers, • were not required to have any military experience or any knowledge of the French language (becau se «... it wil l be acquired during the service) . They had to be aged between l 7 and 40 and be phys ically fi t for military service. Personal particu lars and cu rricu lum vitae declared by t he candidate were certa inly arbitrary (h is past was often questionab le) .
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Reaching t he Office o f Recruitment in France represented t he fundamental step towards t his new career. Travel expenses were directly paid by t he candi date , with no contribution by the Leg ion. The Legion arranged for the transfer to Aubag ne for the selection tests . In case of failure, the Legion would provide t he candidate with a train ticket to reach the frontier zo ne nearer to their country of origin. Those who were capable of pass ing this stage signed a f ive-year contract (unconditional and irrevocable, with rare except ions). Acco rding to the agreement, t hey had to serve the French Fo reign Legion any tim e and anywhere, complying with the code of honour and pledging t heir loyalty to the Corps . During t he following four months of t raining at the 4 t h Regiment stationed in Castelnaudary (west of Marseille) t he real selection took place . Th e harsh discipline and physical violence towards t he new recruits (histo rical ly, 50% of them were not able to pass this course) has been only recently moderated by t he safeguard of human rig hts. The physical aggressiveness of the Officers and NonCommissioned Officers suppressed all poss ible insubordinatio n. Initially, the Foreign Legion consisted of a battalion of Polish exiles (who had already enlisted in the 5 7th Infantry Regiment) and other battalions divided by nationality: in the 7 st t here were the Swiss, in the 2nd and 3rd t he Germans, in the 4th the Spanish, in the 5th - the Italians and in the 5th the Dutch and Belgians, who were actually almost all Fre nc h. The bapt ism of fire took place in Maison-Cam~e in August 7 831 (in the operation zone of AlgiersOran-Bone, under the command of Colonel Stoffel). Thanks to t he brave ry shown during the first clash against Arab and Berber Algerian tribes, the Legion was awarded the Flag (Colone l Combe) and t he red epaulettes of the Grenadiers (a corps historical ly regarded as valiant) on t he j acket. Th e first uniform - with the red Ke pi (now white) covered with white cloth and equ ipped with the famous «nape-guard» - consisted of a dark blue tunic with a white lape l and highly-visible red trousers, symbol of vehemence (elan), which were designed to inflame the French soldiers during the offe nsive. However, this time the young and rich Islamic Em ir, Abd el-Quade r, who was 25 years old in l 831 and claimed to descend from Mohammed, was the principal enemy to defeat. He could rely on armed bands of 50 000 men, who used to employ guerri lla tactics. The Legion engaged them in an exhausting battle which would last, with mixed and b loody fortunes, more than one century.
ANTHROPOS - 122
The King of Spain died in 1833 , and this event would sudde nly affect the young Leg ion' s fate: the descendants of Ferdinand VII of Bou r bo n - on one side hi s brother Charles with his reactionary forces, on the other his wife Christ in a and his daughter Isabe l (the future Isabe l II, who was just th ree yea rs old at that time) with the suppo rt of t he constit utional li bera ls - competed for t he throne of Spain with a long and bloody civil war which ended only in 7 839 with the victo ry of t he constitutional forces . Eng land and France went t o t he he lp of the liberals. Engl and se nt a contingent of 12 000 men . It came as surprise t hat France ceded t he Foreign Leg ion t o Spain. Probab ly, France believed that t he operation would have a lower cost than expected. However, it paid a bitter price, losing al most 4 000 men and having second tho ught s later, in 1835, as we shall see.
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THE MYTH OF CAMERONE The firs t military campaigns acqui red thei r names from previo us battles: Costantina (1837), Dj idelli (1839), Milianah (1840), lscheriden (18 57), the Crimean War (Alba and Sebastopol) and the war of Italy (Magenta and So lferino where two Regiment Commanders, Colone ls Vienot and de Chabrieres lost t he ir lives). However, the myth became firmly estab lished in the popular conscious nes s in Mexico, in a secluded farm w hich still now is cal led Camerone. As time went by, it became (official ly in l 920) the bedroc k of the code of «honneur and fidelite» of the Legionnai re, in t oken of respect for t he fallen and of t he moral courage the Fore ign Legion had shown in ext reme adversity. In 186 l t he new Mexican Prime Minister, Be nito Pablo Juarez, decided to suspend t he payme nt of the international debts contracted by Mex ico, fi lling Napo leon Ill with anger. He had recently bo ught a large part of t he Mexican debt from a Swiss Bank. At t he beginning of 1862 , the first French ex ped it ionary Corps (about 3 000 men) arrived in Mexico, together wit h Eng lish and Spanish contingents, w it h the task of guaranteeing t he enthronement of Maximi lian of Hapsburg, the yo ungest brother of Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria and Hungary. Although the French infantry suffered heavy losses, Napoleo n Ill did not want to accept face such a great humiliation and sent an addit ional 40 ,000 soldiers during the year. He concentrated the troops in Puebla, laying siege to Mexico City. On 1 9th Janu ary 1863, the French Sovereign also ap proved t he d ispat ch to Mex ico the Foreign Leg ion, which had formally req uested to go to the
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Rivista Mililare English Edition n. 1/2006
defence of the French troops engaged outside the metropolitan territory. After a month, the «Foreigners' Regiment» of the Legion - around 1 500 men assigned to two infantry battalions and a Headquarters Company under Co lonel Jeanningros' orders - sailed from Oran and arrived in Vera Cruz on 28th March, about 200 kilometres from Pu ebla, where the Fre nch troops were just encountering serious difficu lties with the large and combative Mexican army. But the 48 Officers and 1432 Legionnaires just arrived in Mexico were ordered to guarantee only the security of the communications and logistical supplies, in a particularly unhealthy area stretching for 120 kilo metres of tropical swamps, wh ich badly impaired the contingent's health to the po int of conditio ning the dispatch of two Compan ies in defence of an important convoy bri nging material for siege , munitions, a cargo of gold , wh ic h had been sent t o General El ie Forey, Comm ander in Chief of the Fre nch army, barricaded in Puebla with his soldiers .. When the news arrived of a possible ambush to the convoy by the r egular Mexican troops , Jean ningros ordered t he 3rd Company of the l st battalion to intercept the enemy and warn the
Legionnaires in action.
escort of t he co nvoy, by giving it al l the usefu l information obtai ned during the patrol. Decimated by diseases (yellow feve r, typhoid and infectious diseases still un known) t he Company was reduced to just 62 men (at first they were 120) and did not include not even an Officer capable to command it. Captain Jean Danjou, Staff Office r of Commander Jeanningros, together with Second Lie utenant Vilain and Sergeant Maudet, vo lunteered to lead t he Company. On 30th April 1863 (an historic date) at 7 a.m., after an exhausting twenty-kilometre march, t he Legionnaires were intercepted by the Mex ican Cavalry and after a desperate «square» defence, which caused a t empo rary withd rawal of the enemy, Danjou and th e 48 survivors were able to take shelter in t he Hacienda of Camerone, an o ld • farm surrounded by a low stone wall that affo rded them som e protectio n. T he Mexican cavalrymen , taken aback by the • hard reaction of such a handfu l of men, asked t he infantry to intervene. The infantrymen were encamped an hour's march from t he place of the clash. Led by Colo nel Milan, they intervened with
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no less than three line batta lions , as the Legionnaires were still brave ly resisting the attacks of the Mex icans . At 9,30 a.m., a Mexican Lieutenant, Ramon Lai ne, offered Captain Danjou t he possib ility of an honourable surrender - explaining that mo re than two thousand sold ier s had already surrounded t he Hacienda and, consequently, t here wou ld be no hope of escape - and gave him the guarantee that they would be issued a safeconduct as prisoners of war. Danjou refused t he offe r with disdain . He asked his soldiers to swear the oath that he himself had taken (ÂŤF ight to the death'Âť). The Legion never broke that oath and fought valiantly and proudly even after the honourable death of their Commander, hit in the chest by a bullet. In the meantime, the situation was deteriorating rapid ly because of the oppressive heat, lack of water and food , shortage of mun it ions . T he fighting raged fo r nearly eight hours and the n the few Leg ionnaires who had survived and ki lled 280 Mex ican sold iers were subjected to the last brutal attack by the cavalry and infantry, after the barn had caught f ire . After f i r i ng the last bullet, the five Leg ionnaires who were st il l al ive went out and
ANTHROPOS - 124
Captain Danjou's wooden left hand.
attacked with bayonets . T hey were hit by a vol ley of shots: two of them d ied immediately. T he other three were surrounded by thousands of Mexicans because t hey were seriously injured. Corporal Maine sa id that they would ag ree to surrender only if they were rendered the mi li ta ry honour and t he most cr itical ly injured of them, who had fal len on to ground and was unable to walk, was given med ica l ass ist ance. Colonel Cambas ch ivalrously accepted the condit ions imposed and the lives of the three Legionnaires (Maine, Costantin and Wenze l)were spared. After a f ew days, when Commander Jeanningros reached the scene of the tragedy in order t o bury the fal len according to the stern trad it ion of the Legion, he found just human remains, devoured by vultures and torn to pieces by coyotes, but he did not not ice that the wooden left hand of Capta in Da njou had been spared . Some people say that he had lost his hand during mi l itary train ing with a r ifle . According to others, it was the resu lt of a seri -
Rivisla Militare English Edition
ous inju ry suffered during the Cri mean Campaign . His hand was found later by a local ranchero who seized t he opportunity of a good deal and sold it to the Legion for l 5 p iastres . The hand of the he roic ' Officer was taken to the Salle d'Honneur of the Legion Headquarters, which at the time was in Sid i Be lAbbes. Whe n he heard of this heroic deed, Napoleon Ill o rdered t hat the name of Camerone would be inscr ibed (to be remembered) not on ly on the reg i mental Colours but also on those of the future Un its - as if it had been a real vict ory and that the name of Danjou, Vi lain and Maudet be written in gold let ters on t he wa lls of t he Hotel des lnvalides in Pa r is. At t he scene of t he clash a monument was erected w ith the fol lowing inscription : Here less than sixty men clashed with an entire Army whose mass crushed them to death. Life, not bravery, deserted these French soldiers on 30 th April 7863. Passing by the monument, st il l now, t he regular Mexican Un its present arms. T oday the wooden hand of Captain Da nj ou is kept i n the Great Crypt of t he Museum of the Fo reign Legion, in the barracks of Aubagne , and is shown o nce a year during the most impo rtant celebration of t he Leg ion , on 30t h Apr il , which is the anniversary of the heroic batt le. On that occasion, in all the barracks of the Leg ion, as in t he m ilitary garriso ns and associations of ex - legionnaires, the fal len are paid homage stil l t oday, by te ll ing the story of t he batt le (Recit du Combat) and with celebrat ions i n the ir honour. ... I heard the story about the battle of Camerone for the first time as I stood at atten tion and presented arms in the parade ground of the Legion in Sidi Bel- Abbes, observing the wooden hand of Captain Danjou, which was found after the slaughter and wa s now carried w i th respect and care by a veteran adjutant of the Staff. I could not help noticing that tears were streaming down his face although he was wearing a black bandage covering the orbit where there had been an eye. By order of the superiors and at the request of the Legionnaires, on 30 th April the Recit du Combat is recited in front of all the men pres ent at the parade ground. After the ceremony the Legionnaires sit down for a banquet, fol lowed by a total relaxation of discipline and formalities . Each Legionnaire is a/lowed to celebrate the rest of the day as he likes. On this day, a Legionnaire is not likely to be accused of
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minor infrigements of the regulations and end up in jail if he is charged with an offence less serious than a murder[. . .]. Camerone is some thing more than a day of celebration, it is almost a faith for the Legionnaires and exLegionnaires . It is essential to understand the reason why this is the most celebrated day of the Legion. Why does a worthless battle fought in Mexico on 30 th April 7863, in an unknown place, mean such a great deal to the Legion, especially considering that it was a lost battle 7 The fact is that it is an exceptional example of the inner essence of the Legion - never surren der - and of what it will represent in the future. This is why it is still now celebrated with utmost respect. These words were uttered i n l 998 by Jim Worden , Secretary General of the British Association of the French Foreign Legion, one of the most re liab le official h istor ians of the Legion.
THE FIRST ORGANIZATION As we mentio ned before , on 6 t h Deeember 1 835 Lo uis Phil ippe d'Orlean s signed a new decree in order to create a «second» Fore ign Leg ion (according to some historians , this is the real ancestor of the present- day Legion) six months after the first batta lion had been seri L t o Spa i n. T he reasons were t he same as those already given in March 183 l , but w hat made the sit uation worse was t he heavy losses that A lgerian guerri l las were inflict ing o n the regular French troops. In 1 837 the Legion had 3000 so ldiers con stant ly engaged in a fi er ce strugg le against the men of Abd el - Qader . Not on ly did they con front the enemy with hand -to-hand fighti ng. Not only did they t ry to avoid the danger of ambushes. T hey took action to prevent the spread of Afr ican d iseases and had to face b itter accusat ions made by French publ ic op i nion after the slaught ers in the vil lages whe re the colonists lived . Three years later, T homas Bugeaud de la Piconnerie was appointed as Governor Genera l and the Leg ion was organized into two Reg i men t s: the first and second Regimen t Etranger, bet ter known as l st RE and 2 na RE. This new o r ganization had to pursue a clear • m il itary strategy formu lated by the new Governor:«fl yi ng columns of men», employed as the vang uard of the bu lk of the Army, would • penetrate deep into enemy territory mount ing a series of surprise attacks on vil lages and enemy sett lements . Nowadays, this strategy is could be defined as «dirty work», but what made it
worse were the exhausting forced ma rche s, on inh os p itab le ground and with a minimum of suppl ie s - stocked up on the spot - and with limited equ ip ment. In t he light of this, the Legion earned its reputation as being com posed of b rave sold iers who were able to endure any k ind of ex ertio n. One of the military bases which had been built as supp ly de pot for the «flying columns», is in Sidi - Bel-Abbes, about one hu ndred kilometres south of Oran. In 1845 it was a fortified town and became t he Headqu arte rs of the Legion. It was abandoned just after the in depende nce of Alge r ia in l 962, after eight years of war fought by the Front of Algeri an National Liberation against France. T he last Com mande r of the garrison, Colonel Vaillant, on l eavi ng the «Vienot»,barracks, declared: The Legion did not deserve to have to slip shamefully away. This represents a hard blow to the Legion. Nevertheless, the Legionnaires do not talk about politics and will obey orders. They are paid to figh t and they fight well. It was Algeria that gave birth to the first legends regard ing t he Foreign Legion, as well as the anci ent trad itions that still now survive . To give an exam p le, the monthly salary must be paid according to t he Legionn aire's custom: after the milit ary salute and declaration of the name, rank and record of service, t he pay is slipped into the kepi blanche with a single gesture . The white kepi made its first public appearance in Paris o n Ju ly 14 th 1939, together w it h the red and green epaulettes. They date back to 1866, di sappeared over t he years but sometimes were revived until this custom becam e defin itely established thanks to General Rollet, regarded as the father of t he Foreign Leg ion. T he b lue belt, in the past, w as worn under t he jacket in order to prevent intestinal diseases . T he gree n t ie originates fro m a large stoc k built for the «Yards of Yout h» during the period l 940 - l 944 and the n used by th e Le gio n . Eve ry fi ve years the Legionnaire earned a str ipe. T he st r i pes highlighted the time hon ourably spent in t he Foreign Legion . T he Legion was essentially a corps of Infantry. However, it is interesting to note that the firs t mounted com ponent was not instituted when the Corps was first formed - that is to say during t he figh ting in Africa where maybe it would have been much more useful because of the pecularities of the guerrilla warfare. Paradoxically, it was ado pted just when the other European Armies decided not to use any more t he trad itional Cavalry, just after the end of t he First World War. However, the creation of the first Infantry unit was also due to favourable circumstances: at the
end of the war, and after the Russian revo lut ion, the ranks of the Legion were swollen by Officers and Non-Comm issioned Officers w ho came from the Cavalry (almost eve ryone came from th e ex Czarist Army) and had g reat technical competence and profess ional skills . Over the years t he Legion Entrangere Franca ise has been represented by various nat io nalities. After the Russian revolution, the re was a large flow of Russians . Italians jo in ed the Leg io n especially during the campaigns of Napoleon Ill because of t he romant ic appeal of t he Italian Unity. Currently, lots of Slavs join the Legion both because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and as a consequence of the wars between the new Slav nations which have caused t he flight of militaries and refugees . On August 5th 1920 the French Parliament approved a proposal concerning the establishment of t h ree new Regiments of t he Fo reign Legion, among whic h t he fi rs t Cavalry Reg i ment. Fo u r sq uadrons were formed . They consisted most ly of Russian personnel, French Officers coming from other units of Cavalry and so ldiers of the 2nd REI. Sarcia, in Algeria, pro vided the venue for the constitu t io n and tra ining of the personnel. Once the training had been completed, the Reg iment was transfe r red to T uni sia u nder Colonel Perret and was called the l st REC, Regiment Etrange r de Cavallerie . The un iform and equipment aree extremely fascinating: the white kepi has a pi ece of kaki cloth which serves as a nape -g uard . A f ull garment is worn over the uniform (gan dourah) and fastened on the chest by a green ho r izonta l ba r (l st Class Leg io n na ire) and decorated with a kit of accountrements made of leather and containing a bayonet case, water bottle and two cartridge cas es for the munitions, beside s the cartridge belt aro und the hors e's neck, according to the tradition of t he Oriental Cava I ry. There were also the 8 cal. carabine, mode l 1892/16, with a magazine sto r in g five bullets , the sabre with a meta llic case covered with kak i cloth, acco rding to the custom of many mounted colonial uni ts. Long st iff bootlegs made of black le athe r comp leted the d istinctive uniform of the mou nted Leg ionna ire . In 1925 dur i ng the Druse u prisi ng in Syria the l " REC distinguished itself by the brave ry shown i n the ha rd and bloody fig ht i ng, i n spite of its rece nt co nstit utio n, and had the rare hon our of marching at the head of the legi o nary co lu mns (the Hymn of the Reg iment i s st i ll today «Une cofonne de fa Legion Etrangere») . The memo r ia l to the fa llen of the Legion, which had already erected i n Sidi-Bel Abbes,
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Legionnaires boarding a «Puma» transport helicopter.
was transferred to Aubagne i n 1962. It cons i sts of an enormous dark globe, wh i ch represents ou r planet, around which four bronze Leg ionnai res wearing the traditional uniform are rep rese nted. The regions which were witness to the fervour and bravery of the Legion are covered with golde n paint which stands out brill iant ly against the black backg r ound. «A nous, la Leg ion!», this is t he battle cry with which the Foreign Legion intervened in France in 1870 (this was the first time that the Legion w as called to intervene in a metropolitan area), in Indochina in 1883, in Dahomey in 1894, in the First and Second World Wars, again in Indochina during the dramatic events between l 945 and 1954, and during the Algerian rebellion during the period 1957-1962, in Gibuti in 1970 and in Za ire in 1978, in Lebanon and in Chad the following year, in French Guyana in 1987 and finally in the
Gulf War of 199 1 (in the spring of that year Lieutenant-Colo nel Terraso n, Head of the Histo ry Office, painted with gold the territ ories of the Arab ian Gulf, where the Leg ion excelled during Operation «Daguet») in Bosnia in 1 993 and in Congo in 1997. A lso more ecen t ly the Legionna ires di stinguished them selves duri ng the i nt ervention in the Ivory Coast. The political role played by the Legion i n Ab idjan as military instrument of neoco lonialism has provoked criticism, as the «Corr iere del la Sera» point ed out in November 8 t h 2004 w ith an article, ent itled «Paris sends the Foreign Legio n» , deal i ng with the se r ious risk of a civil war in this country. The current peacekeeping operations cannot be forgotte n al t hough they do not have a very • significant echo: the Legion continues t o perfo r m its duty wi t h « honour and fidelity», to th •e glo ry of the seve n-flame grenade. Daniele Cellamare Lecturer of International History at the Urbino University
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THE ARMIR'S EPIC DEEDS The Italians on the Eastern front The eastern front witnessed levels of ferocity and ruthlessness never reached before, with the opposing forces engaged in a war of extermination, with no regard for international conventions. In that environment, the behaviour of the Italian troops was decidedly d ifferent. To revisit those moments does justice to the Units and to those who heroically fell on the gelid Russian steppes.
The b ibl iography concerning the w ar o perat ions of th e Ital ian contin ge nt sent to fig ht in Russia during t he Second World War is v ery exten sive. There are many diari es an d memories of the sold i ers returned from t he fro nt and fro m im prisonment and , abov e all, books on t he ep ic retreat t hat invo lved tens of thousan d s of ARMIR (Armata ltal ian a in Russia - Ital ian Army in Russia) so ldie rs. On the contrary, the be haviou r of th e Ital ian soldiers towards the civilians is less k nown, because t hey had the role of an occu pying army, in co nform it y with the po litical orders wh ich impos e.d to wage wa r on th e Sovi et Union. Recent stud ies on the eastern front, translated in to Italian, have analysed thorough ly t he d ramatic involveme nt of the civi lian s in th e harsh confrontation between the two mos t dictatori al and sanguina ry re gimes in the history of Europe . T he combats betwe en Rus sians and Germans of l 94 l - l 945 reached peaks of ferocity and ru th less ness never achieved duri ng the Second World Wa r (1 ). The two bell ig erents foug ht a war of an ni hilation, with no re gard for i nte rnat ional co nventions on humanitarian law s, w hi ch di d not spare the civilian popu lations. It was a co nfli ct fought without quarter, a high ly ideolog ized confrontati on between two dict atorsh i ps, which played on the patriotic and national ist sentiment of the two peopl es, on the atavic hatred that separated them and, for w hat concerns th e Ge rman side, also on raci al convictions. Special un its of the secret pol ice were sent to the Russian fron t w ith the task of el iminati ng the socalled enemies of the race: Jews, Bo lsheviks and Slavs . A task that the Wehrmacht had t o suppo rt with a merciless war conduct. Already since the first p hases, t he mil itary operations have been marked by battles of g r eat intensity, where, to the superior training and
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manoeuvrin g capabil it ies of th e Germans , th e Rus sians tri ed t o oppose a val iant resistance in defence of th eir mothe r land . Even when surro un ded and isolated , the Russ ian troops general ly fought till the last cart ridg e, reg ardless of the h ig h losses i n h um an lives. After th e first defeats of the summe r and autum n 1941, and the follo wi ng ge neral retreat, the Soviets turned to th e technique of "scorched earth", syste matical ly destroyi ng duri ng the retreat every road in frastructu re, every artefact connected w ith industrial production, every source of food supply . This w orsened the Germans' logistic problems of provis ioning the ir un its , but also reduced the civilian populations to starvation , for t hey had to suffe r the m ass ex propriati ons and requ isitions of t he occupants , who tried to ex pl oit as much as th ey coul d, as war booty, the remaining economic resources of the i nvaded te rri tories. Already si nce the summer of 194 1 both advers arie s had been treat ing i n huma nely t he en emy that surrendered : t hey we nt fro m the imm ediat e elim ination on t he spot to a forced ex p loitat ion as la bour of the pri so ne rs of war, who were subjected to exhausting working t ime and terrible li fe cond itions. The Ru ssian government had not ratified the Geneva conventio ns of 1929 on t he treatm ent of the prisoners of war and in August 1929 went as far as declaring in privat e, t h rough diplomatic channels, th at it did not consider itself bou nd by the inte rnatio nal agreements concern ing the prohibition to use chemical weapons and the assistance d ue to the wou nded and illk of the other fighti ng arm ies. The German army, on paper, issued order s t hat com plied with the international treaties, but in practice neve r respected them. A bett er lot was reserved to the hu nd red s of t hou sands of volunteers and Russian prisoners that were sent to the t erritories of the Reich to con -
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Capture of Russian soldiers . Above. Celebration of the Holy Mass attended by Soviet prisoners .
of Stal in's troops t owards t he west was accompanied by t he mass flight of the civilians of German origin , who tried to find a way of escape from t he hordes of the Red Army. The massacre that was tak ing place o n the eastern fron t had become known to the Italian mil it ary leaders al ready in l 94 1, when the Ital ian Mil itary Mission in Ber l i n reported to t he Supreme Command about a confidenti al meeting with a high off ici al of the Germ an inte ll igence. The report info r med about the te r rible losses suffered unti l then by t he two adversaries wh ich tota lled to no less than 600,000 me n fo r the Germans (between dead, wou nded and m issin g) and 4 mill ion of Soviet so ldiers. "The fig ures of the Russ ian losses given by the O.K.W. (Hi gh Command of the Army) - 5 mi lli on - are sl ight ly higher than r eality , becau se they include many workers, but they are certain ly no less than 4 mil li on. Having ac kn owledged the in itial m istake , t he Russian prisoners are not sh ot anymore and th ey are more conveniently employed as labour". Other sou rces of the Italian Sup reme
Right. Distribution of food rations at an Italian concentration camp.
tribute to the German war economy, while those who remained to work behind the li nes lived in pitiful conditions, often to the limits of su rvival (2). In t he German concentrat ion camps, the Russ ian officers and the Russian so ld iers lived togethe r, w ith al most no medical assistance, insufficient food, and were subjected to continuous harassment s and hard work (3). On the o pposit e front, the Russ ian concentratio n camps were even worse than the Nazi ones, and t he re were several cases of anthropophagy among pr isone rs d rive n by hunger and deprivations (4). The Russians immediately started to wage partisan guer rilla warfare behi nd t he German lines, recruiting informers and saboteurs also among women and boys and infiltrat in g within the enemy li nes units of special troops in civilian dress to carry out attacks and organize the resistance. The Germans re plied to t hese systems of non - conventional and subvers ive warfare with brutal methods, with a large-scale retaliat ions ag ainst civilians and the indiscriminate capture of hostages. During th e cou nteroffens ive of 1943 - 1945 towards t he heart of Germany, the Ru ss ians repaid the Ger man army for the violence perpetrated against the civilian popu lation with an eq ually barbaric and vindictive behaviou r towards those that had supported the occupation of t he territori es of the Soviet Union, especially Uk raini an, Coss acks , Eston ians, Latvians and Lith uanians. T he advance
Command confirm t hat t he conflict foug ht in the east had assumed trag ic aspects with no regard fo r the war laws. The winter cam paign (1 941-1942) has confirmed and hi ghlighted even more t he characteristics of t h is war, that is not o nly total b ut al so a war of ann ih ilatio n. Germany and Russ ia fight for t he ir ex istence and t he refore have impressed on • t he struggle a character of destruction and ferocity, as for many centuries had not been happenin g i n the Eu ropean wars . The mass • killings of priso ners, the har sh measures t aken by bot h si d es again st t he populat ions, th e destructio ns, constitute a characteristic aspect of this str uggle, as pointed out in an artic le by
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the Swiss mil itary critic Co lonel Danicke r: " It is a real war of annihilation in the ancient sense, which concerns the ve ry substance of an entire people. In other campaigns it wa s ra ther like a gam e of chess. If one was surrounded, he surrendere d . Now it is war "to the kn ife". The
Summer l 942. Prison ers assembled at a camp for Soviet soldiers captured by the Axis for ces.
from snow (5 ). T he prisoners were given t he same rat ions an d number of cigarettes distributed to the
Russian strategy - where A sian conceptions nat-
Italian sold iers and a special w e ll- organized camp
urally emerge - puts into the field also wom en and adolescents, destroying everyth i ng during the retreat. It is, besides, a phenomenon that recurs every time there is a clash of two oppos ing ideologies, fanatically upheld b y the adversaries (. ..) the re is the manifestation of the same characters of fe rocity that occurred during the wa rs of religion of the pas t centuries. In view of the b rutality of these systems of fig hting, co ntrary to every norm of the war law, the be haviou r of the CSIR troops first, and of the ARMIR later, t owards the Ru ss ian pr isoners and the Russian civilians, di stinguis hed itself from that ad opted by the other be lli gerent armies. In the pe riod of the CSIR, between July 1941 and July of the following year, t he captured Ru ssian soldie rs, according to previous agreements between the Italian and German Governments , after a pe rfu nctory inte rrogation were sent to the concentration camps under¡ the surveillance of German unit s, where there was no interfering by the Italian Commands o r units, because the CSIR had always operated under ord ers of a German Army. Only late i n autumn d id the German Command allow the Italians to keep a few hundred prisoners w ho, in co llabo ration with Engineers and Log istics un its, we re occas ionally employed behind t he lines as labour for road works or for cleari ng the runways
was set up, where the Russian soldi ers found an acceptable accommodation. The treatment w as such that the prisoners spontaneous ly offer ed t hem selves for work, in order to avoid to be transferred to the camps run by t he Ge rman authorities . Many prisoners we re em ployed without any surveillance . Differen tly from the Nort h African fro nt, where the pri soners of the Commonwealth were sent to concentrat io n camps in Italy, CSIR and AR MI R never sent Ru ssia n prisoners to Italy. At the beginning of t he war the Sov iet Government had declar ed that , although it had not signed the Geneva Conve nti on , it wo uld al l the same respect its provi sio ns, o n cond itions of reci procity . Two months later, o n 21 st Au gu st 1941, the Ge rman Government declared in its turn that, in the face of the prove n atrocities perpetrated by the Russ ians against the German p r isoners, it would not cons ide r itsel f anymo re bound by the Geneva provisions. In the same circumstance , the German Co mm and issued a memoran dum to its own and to the al lied troops figh t ing o n the eastern front, j ust if y ing its decision by listing a series of terrible atrocities wh ich had su p posed ly been comm itted by the Russians, with a k ind of terrifying summary. T he Italian Gove rnment
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d id not join t he German declaration and the CSIR Command continued to comp ly w ith the norms fixed by the international conventions rat ified at The Hague in 1907 and in Geneva in 1929 . Only much later, on March 12, 1942, it informed the Red Cross International ¡committee that from that moment, owing to lack of rec iproc ity, it wou ld stop to communicate the lists of the Russ ian p r isoners. In the period from Ju ly 1942 and January 1943, the constitution of the ARMIR determined the organization of two prison camps at Stalino and Dniepropetrosch, with 835 soldiers. Later the number of camps increased to ten , with a total of about 5000 prisoners com ing mostly from German camps, from which t hey arrived in frightfu l condit ions. The Germans had iss ued detai led and humane instructions about the treatme nt of the prisoner s, but while in thei r camps they we re never enforced, in the Italian ones t he analogous norms given by the Italian commands were always duly applied . The sick, comp lete ly neglected by the Germans, were treated and then se nt to a convalescent home for prisoners , wh ich was bu ilt for t his purpose by the Italians at Rikovo. While in the German camps office rs and privates were quartered promiscuo usly, in those of the ARM IR they were suitably separat ed , as envisaged by t he int ernational conventions . The Italian behavio ur differed from that of the German ally also in the fie ld of victuals and clothing t hat should have been supplied by the German command also for the prisoners he ld by the Italians. While the German authorities had established d iffe rent rations for the men assigned to heavy work, for those w ith lig ht j obs, for the non employed and for the sick, the logistic Command of t he VIII Army, having observed the se rio us insufficiency of the rat ions envisaged by the lists, ordered that rations sim il ar t o those of the Italian soldiers should be d istributed to the sick in the infirmaries and to th e men underfed or in bad hea lth, and authorized the Commanders of t he camps to g ive the other men t he rations estab lished for those ass ig ned heavy jobs. As for cloth ing , since t he numerous requests add ressed to the Germans had neve r been granted, it was decided to dist ribute the used clothes collected from the Itali an troops that had received new ones. Some ep isodes are good examp les of the attitude of the It alian Commands towards the Russian prisoners. At Voroscilowgrad, in order to d istr ibute blankets t o the Soviet soldiers who had none, a blanket was temporari ly taken from each Italian sold ier of the garrison . On the 21 st of December 1942 , d uring t he retreat, a group of Italian sold ier s belong ing to a reinforcement battal ion coming from Kantemirowka arrived at
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Vorosci lowgrad; after co llecting their rations they shared it with the Russ ian pr isoners, who had voluntarily fol lowed them in the retreat, becoming their protectors and rescuers . At Rikovo, the German Command blamed the Commander of t he local camp for having al lowed the prisoners to ta ke a bath . The "Cuneense" Alpine D ivision too k over, from t he 294 th German Divis ion, about 600 Russ ian prisoners , emp loyed in works of field fortifications, who were in bad condit ions of nourishment and clot hing (most we re barefoot). At the beg in ning of November, an o rder from the German intendance fixed that the POWs were to be given a reduced rat ion of food. T he Division Commander, considering that t he few p ri soners in custody were work ing and were suffi cient ly efficient , o rdered that they be dist r ibuted almost the same rations given to the Italian soldiers and changed the uniforms of a company w ith new o nes in o rder to give the used cloth ing and shoes to the pr isoners. The re lations between the civi lian popu lation and the Italian troops were general ly marked by mutua l respect and somet imes even with affabi lity, especia lly in the Ukrain ian regions. Some sporad ic cases of v io lence and de linquency reported to the Italian Command were severe ly p un ished . Thus , for example at Ri kovo , a soldier that had k il leu d woman in a robbery was immediate ly tried by a specia l court sent on the spot and , after a publ ic hearing atte nded by many Russ ians, was sente nced to 26 years' imp r ison ment. Sti ll at Rikovo, an Italian Officer accused of having attempted rape on a woman was pun is hed with one month of fort ress arrest and immediately repatriated . The orders of the Higher Commands were catego ri cal: "ft is my precise intention that our units gain the confidence of the civilians, so as to make sure to obtain the ever more active cooperation of the population of the zone. I therefore ask to carry out an effective and vigorous effort to convince Officers and troops of the absolute n ecessity of the abovesaid. Behaviour towards the civilian population. it must be correct, dignified, energetic. Avoid soldiers going about with civilians, especially women. Thefts of livestock or of any other kind must be absolutely avoided. Repress with utmost energy and severity the unauthorized shots (liable to accusation). (. _) I shall • severely punish any abuse committed against the population. Considerable relief was given to the popu lation • with food and med ical ass ist ance: in winter 194 11942 , the Command of the "Torino" Division organ ized and operated the . local orphanage, distributing food and clothes t o approximately 400
1
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children, bearing the costs of the hired teaching staff; in the zone beh ind the frontline, ARMIR set up and ran 29 hospitals and 75 outpatients stations, with the cooperation of 71 doctors and 157 midwives; during the stops, in many cases our soldiers he lped the farmers with their work. T h is is the report of the Health Director of CSIR: On my order afl the Italian field- and reserve-hospitals set up free outpatients stations for the civilian population who greatly benefited from such aid, lacking, as they were, of any means of treatment and especially of medication materials (. . .) In accordance with my precise directions, good relations were established and maintained with the Russian medical staff, for a cooperation deemed indispensable for a hygienic protection of the troops, which could not disregard the civilian population's health, for which, as there were spreading endemics of diphtheria, typhus exanthematicus and dysentery, we provided prophylactic means and personnel for disinfestations and disinfections, medical material and food. In confirmation of the friend ly attitude of t he Russian population towards the Ital ian troops, t here is the fact that the Commands and units were rare ly the targets of raids and actions of sabotage by t he partisans and, in any case, t he losses caused by Russian snipers were notably lower than those suffered by the Germans. Also during the retreat from the river¡ Don, our units rnet no t1u::..l iliLie::.. buL often received help and comfort from the local civilians . In many cases the Russians, especially the women, turned to the Italian soldiers to be protected from the abuses and violence of t he German soldiers. Every time that, in the occupied territory, the Italian troops were rotated and replaced by the German ones, t he inhabitants were deeply worried that the situation would get worse. The Italians tried to keep the requisitions to a minimum , preferring a little reduction of their ration and, when the requis itions were made, they were regularly paid for. Food contributions from private citizens were avoided, while the requis itions of houses were limited exc lusive ly to public property, even if somet imes , for its location and housing qualities, it did not meet the requirements. A report by Marshal of Italy Giovanni Messe, Commander of CSIR and of the XXXV Corps, subordinate to ARMIR until October 1942, written in September 1945, says : (. . .) Also in operational phases that would have needed a maximum exploitation of local resources (due to supplying difficulties, authors' note), our troops weighed as little as possible on the population. When the mud of the tracks did not a/low the logistic columns to reach the most advanced units, nothing was requisitioned by violence and everything was regularly paid to the lawful owners. (. . .) By personal
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ascertainment I can say that I have seen terrifying devastations such as those made by the retreating Russian troops, only after scientific air bombings. Living aside any consideration of humanitarian character, I believe that the Italians, at least for the zones where they had to stop and live, had no interest in increasing the scene of desolation and dreariness already existing. (. . .) More than cordial relations were established between our troops and the civilian populations. The Italians had known how to conquer the heart of the Russians, of afl Russians, also of the partisans, whom we never realized were behind our lines. From this point of view, we had the impression that we were operating in a friendly country! Marshal Messe presented perhaps too an idyllic picture of the relationship between Ital ians and Russians, as evidenced in the account of the Commandant of the "Reali Carabin ieri" of CSI R on t he first s ix months of activity on t he Russian front, which re ports that 249 suspected enemy agents were handed over to the German secret police and 27 partisans were shot for "they were caught in flagrant crime" (6). However, t he orders iss ued by Messe between 194 l and 1942 on the attitude to be assumed towards the c ivilians were clear, and left no doubt about t he inte ntion to respect the population as much as possib le. With aim of eliminating presence of civilians near the line!> dnd permit greater liberty of troop movements and maximum control of transit through same lines for repression spying, I order afl population still dwefling in buildings across defensive positions be moved back. (. . .) Division Commanders organize departure so as to ensure evacuated populations safe refuge in buildings behind the lines with particular regard to women and children. Also General ltalo Garibaldi, who replaced Messe as highest Italian mil itary aut ho rity in Russia, followed t he line of h is predecessor, ordering that: it is economically necessary to ensure to the populations the respect of their properties and products. The populations should serenely and trustingly resume their occupations, especiafly in the rural areas, in order to increase production. Politically it is necessary to show the victor's great superiority in his respect of law, right and justice. Therefore the best propaganda is to demand and obtain correctness of behaviour, respect of property, justice, safeguard of life and possessions of our subordinates. Messe continues in his report: The stay of the Russian prisoners and deserters at our Commands was limited to 36-48 hours or a little more, after which they were taken - almost always by motor-vehicles - to the nearest concentration camp indicated by the German Commands. But soon news started to spread
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A column of Soviet prisoners escorted by an ARMIR "Carabiniere".
within the Italian Commands about the treatment that the Germans were giving to the Russian prisoners. An exceptionally harsh, and sometimes bestial, treatment. No pity for the weak and the ill; officers quartered with soldiers, the daily ration reduced to a single distribution of disgusting millet slops, without the vitamins necessary not so much for working but for simply sustaining a human life (. .. ). These facts could not but trouble the Italians and in fact our Commands ceased to indicate the precise number of the prisoners, taking advantage of the shortage of vehicles and impassability of the roads, and kept a certain number of prisoners, assigning them to auxiliary services. This was done to save as much as possible the prisoners from the sufferings that were inflicted to them in the German camps and put off the day of the handover, which at the end had necessarily to take place. (. . .) The location chosen for the concentration camp of Karjnskaja was a large kolkhoz, with spacious barns, well protected, divided with wood partitions, disinfected, provided with straw. Sanitary facilities (bath, disinfestation, infirmary) and general services (kitchen, latrine) were set up The guard personnel were constituted of about twenty soldiers paired by Ukrainian prisoners, who had volunteered for guard service. The Russian officers had premises for themselves, where they ate and slept isolated from the privates. They were never employed for work but only for organizing the prisoners who, as a matter of fact, were extreme ly well behaved. Mass was celebrated in the camp and the relatives of prisoners and civilians were allowed to go inside the camp to enquire about their kinsmen and bring presents. The news about the humane treatment that the Italians were giving to the prisoners soon spread also
through the enemy lines with the result that within 75 days (2 5 August - 70 September 7942) over 800 Russian deserters turned up at our lines on the Don. (. .. ) When in mid-February 7943 the retreat, momentarily interrupted, started again and the prisoners had to be handed over to the Germans, the news was received with g rief and tearful outbursts,¡ many prisoners took flight, helped by our soldiers on guard. They had in fact spontaneously followed the retreating Italian troops and did not want to end up in German hands (8). The Italians, during the period of adm i nistration of the territories occupied by ARMIR, reorganized the civil and social activities that had been temporari ly interrupted by the war. The offices of the Corps Headquarters fo r the operatio ns zone and the Direction of the Halt ing Places for t he area behind the lines arranged for a census of the population , the reopening of schools and churches, the administ ratio n of justice, th e f ixing of emergency sanitary services and th e maintenance of public order. T he population expressed th ei r gratitude to the Italian authori t ies for t he reopening of the churches (over 50), a provision that sat isfied the wishes of the great majority of t he people, deeply pervaded by a re ligious sentiment and practising the ChristianOrthodox rite. On the who le, 4 77 schools were reopened, attended by 28,000 student:, . T he health service was organized by repairing the damaged civilian hospitals, reope ni ng t he outpatients ' departments and restocking the chemists' shops as much as poss ible , in order to ensure a m ini m um of health assistance to t he inh abitants. When an immed iate opening of th e p re-existing san itary faci liti es was impossible , mil itary doctors were called in. All the Ital ian field- and reserve-hospitals set up free clin ics for the civilian popu lation, who widely benefit ed from such aid. The administration of j ustice was never a problem, because the population was peacefu l: th e most common offences were thefts and infri ngements of the provisions of t he local aut horit ies (blackouts , curfew). In order to finance the loca l administrations al l the inhab itants aged 18 to 65 had to pay a personal tax. The relations with civi lians remained good also during the second part of 1942, so much so th at the Command of the Alpine Corps in its "Monthly report on the sp ir it of the troops and of t he pop- • ulations of the occupied territories" of December 3 1 st , 7 942, specified that the relations between the troops and the civilian population have continued to be normal. No incident to be reported, because the relations with the population persist being corr ect and cordial. Earlier, the same Command had pointed out that the soldiers, dur-
1. - ANTHR()P()S.
ing the following transfer to the zone of operations, with their behaviour had won the liking of the populations of the occupied territories, and constantly received tokens of kindness from the inhabitants. (. ) With the populations the behaviour has always been dignified - with no excessive familiarity - characterized by the benevolent spirit that distinguishes our soldier in the face of spiritual and material destitution. Therefore the relations between the troops and the population have constantly been cordial - as a matter of fact the "Alpini'' have become more and more popular in the countries where they have been, The Ukrainian populations of Rikovo, at first, and then of Corlowka and Voroscilowgrad, where the units have been stationed, have generally shown open liking for our soldiers, Sporadic episodes of thefts of fruit, greens and livestock caused mainly by fortuitous circumstances connected with logistic necessities that could not be satisfied, owing to circumstances beyond their control, have not influenced the good opinion of the locals about the Italian soldier. Very few incidents, all of minor importance. The transfer from the zone of Voroscilowgrad to the banks of the Don has made the troops meet quite different populations. Unlike the Ukrainians, they are rather reserved and, although they show no open hostile attitude, we ought to be wary of them. In some, the proximity of the enemy rouses hopes of revenge of the Russian forces, bolstered by propagandistic acts carried out through leaflets and by the infiltration of a few elements dropped from airplanes. On the whole, the population in the fields shows no sign of impatience and starts to show some liking for our troops. The "Acco unt on the spirit of the troops and of the populat ions of the occupied territories in November 1942 ", issued by the Command of the II Cor ps, appeared less optimistic: It is still difficult to understand the ideas and the spirit of the populations of the occupied territories. The impression is, nevertheless, that our presence is hardly tolerated even by those who oppose the Soviet regim e. Perhaps the situation is influenced by the lack, very felt, of food and clothing. Everything advises to distrust everybody. In September 1 942, the ARMIR Command gave instructions for the constitution of grou ps of local militia for car rying out tasks of polici ng, publ ic order, exploitat ion of natural resources and partici pation in the anti-partisan struggle. ARMIR was joined by the "Vicenza" Infantry Divis ion , destined to control th e rear lines and fi g ht the gue r r illas. The Maj or Unit, wit h no artillery Regiment and re inforced by a battal ion of "Carabinieri" , operated on the second li nes of t he eastern front fo r about two months (October-Novembe r 1942), taking care of the
security of the communication rout es. During th ese operations, whe re more than half of the effectives were engaged di rectly under the orde rs of t he Germ an Command of the "B" Army Gro up, the clashes with the partisa ns were rat her limited and, at t he beginning of Decembe r , in anticipat ion of the Soviet offens ive, the "Vicenza" w as redep loyed in defence of t he rear positio ns of t he Alp ine Corps. Also the news arriving from t he "Cuneense" A lpi ne Divis ion, betwee n the summer and w inter of 1942, said that : The activity of the partisans in the zone of the Division, also in the most distant rear lines, was practically nil. Weak actions of popular reaction occurred only against
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A certificat e of gratitude issued by the Soviet prisoners interned at t he Karjnskaja camp.
the back units of the Division's column, the day when the latter started to retreat from the Don. In its conclusions, th e Messe report says that : The first contacts with the Ukrainians were soon established: the rigours of winter favoured them. The troops went into the houses fixing themselves up as best as they could in some rooms. The important was to find an endurable temperature and the stoves were already functioning, The women washed our underclothes and the soldiers offer ed in exchange part of their bread and
Rivista Militare English Edition n. 1/ 2006
rations; our doctors gave treatment disinterestedly and supplied also the medicines to the sick civil ians (. . .) As man sows, so shall he reap, and CSIR, which in Russia had lavished generosity and sym pathy, could not but be repaid with the same money. CSIR, without coerdon, could have at its disposal snow shovellers, rooms of all kinds, per sonnel for performances and concerts and for the most varied auxiliary work. During the Christmas battle, (2 5-29 December 194 1) the situation went through moments of r emarkable fluidity, owing to which villages were lost and reconquered, also after furious night fights and with a t emperature 35 degrees below zero. In these circumstances, several of our soldiers were saved by the generous intervention of Russian peasant women who, defying the punishment from the political Commissars, gave the m shelter, food and protection until the Russians were compelled to retreat by our counteroffensive. (. . .) Also during the sad da ys of our final retreat, all t he vetera ns agree in declaring t hat the civilian p opulation wept for emotion in seeing our soldiers dra gging themselves along in the snow, ragged, tired, hungry and often gave them cloth es, food and hospitality. This could certainly not have happened if the Italian soldiers had left a bad m emory to those populations. In conclu sion , the Italian soldiers ' behavio ur in Russia was inspired by a hu manitarian sp ir it and respect of the enemy and the civilians. T he Italian Co mmands did not oppress the popu lation w ith strict coercive measures, i n order to avoid weigh ing even mo re negatively on th e already precari ous life cond itions of the in habitants of the areas crossed by war, and especial ly to avoi d nou ris hing the partisan phe nomen on. T he Commander of the Exped ition ary Cor ps had to re buke the natural and i nstinctive propen sity of the Italian troops t o be too friend ly towards the civilians, wh ich risked encouraging both spying and th e activity of the Russian parti sans. The Italians we re co mpletely d ifferen t from t he Ge rmans, who were more i nclin ed to use hars h an d me rc iless manne rs. The treatment of the Ru ss ian pri soners of w ar comp li ed with th at im pos ed by the international conventions, even if th e enemy never reciprocated su ch attitude . Although th ere may have been sporadic acts of atrocity made by Italian co mbat ants or Officers , which are part of th e war conduct, t he orders issued by th e Hi gh Commands never included the re cou rse t o extreme measures for restori ng orde r in the rear lines or ensuring the securit y of t he troops in the encam pments and during transfers. The troops that from 1941 to 1943 marched against Stalin's Russia, within the expansionist w ar wanted by Mussoli ni' s government and coolly supported by the
Top Military who would have preferred to concentrate the war efforts on the Mediterranean theatre, fought with de.t ermination despite enormous supplying difficulties and often w ithout adeq uate weapons. The Italian sold ier did his duty ti ll the end and t he Commanders d id not have to use the extreme forms of virulent propaganda t hat had characterized the political indoctrination and the fighti ng spi rit of the Germans already since the initial phases of the conflict on the east . Pietro Quaro ni, Italian ambassador to Moscow, in a re port of May 1 945 stated: I have received information about the conduct of the Italian troops in Russia from three d i fferent sources : Italian Communists, foreign journalists that where there after the retreat of 1942, Soviet subjects on the spot. They wer e all agre ed in asserting that not only were the Italian soldiers never responsible of abuses on women but, on the contrary, in many cases the y defen ded the Russian women from German violence. Towards the local population they have behaved generally well, certainly much better than all the other occupiers. Giovanni Sargeri Colonel, Head, History Office, Army General Staff Filippo Cappellano Lieutenant Colonel, History Office, Army General Staff
NOTES (l) Al most half of the 55 m i llion people killed al l over the world during the conflict were Soviets , most of the m civilians . (2) In 1944 there w ere more than 7 m i llion civilians and prisoner s of war employed as laboure rs in t he Reich's economy. A great many of them we re from the USSR. (3) Al together 3,300,000 prisoners d ied, out of a total of 5,700 ,000, eq ual t o about 60%. (4) This abe rrant phenomenon occurred in at least four Russ ian camps w here al so Italian prison ers we re detai ned . (5) A report by the Priso ners' Office of the Ital ian Army, issued i n 1942, me ntioned the capture by CSIR of • 14,267 Russian servicemen. 12,472 were tu rned to t he Germans and others to the Rumanian authorities . Only 3 Russ ian soldiers w ere detained in concentration cam ps in Italy, the others were kept in Ukraine . (6) It m u st be rem embered that the i nternational war laws at the time d id not g rant t he qual ification of "regular fighters" to the partisans.
137 - ANTHRO POS