JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 2002 N.1 "RIVISTA MILITARE" by Biblioteca Militare

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, PARTICULARLY WITH NATO AND EU Lecture by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army at the Institute for High Defence Studies (Rome, October 12, 2001) The purp ose of my presentat i on is to clarify t h e r easons that led to t h e organization o f the Italia n Army jn c onnection w ith the internation a l c ommit m e n ts . Never b efor e considering th e events involving - side by side with th e US - su ch a large p art of the in ternati ona l c ommunity, h as t his subj ect b een so cruci al , a ls o in the light of t h e recent d evelopme n ts, whose parti cula r asp ect s will b e ful1 y a nalized. In p artic ular, a fter a sh or t account of the r e asons suppor ting ou r d ecision s jn this sector, I sh a ll d escribe the organ ization re a lized b y the S e rvice in order to m ee t the requirements connect e d with t h e multtinational nature of the la nd ins trum ent a nd point out the m ajor interna tiona l en gagemen ts of the Ita lia n Army: NATO, Eur ope and the minor organizations , in t hat order.

THE REASONS OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL FORMATIONS About t h e r easons of our p a rticipa ti on in multina tional form a tions , I w ant to say right away th a t we now p la y a n active r ole on the politico -milit a ry scen e of our contine nt, al a level a t long-las t c ompar able to tha l d eriving from other sect or s w hic h charact eri ze our Country. It i s th e r e fore i nevi t able to illustr a t e in short th e n e w inte rnational 1

scenario, in which Italy is a leading actor, both within NATO and in the E urop ean Union . Also owing to the crisis in Kosovo, the picture has undergone a sharp conceptual change. As a matter of fact, there was a transition from a generic participation in missions of p ea ce support (PSO), usually under UN aegis, to the planning and conduct of operations for crisis management (CRO). The latter envisage the devel opment of plans based on employment options related to possible risks, have a faste r and more active development than PSOs, and can be deployed much more rapidly. In short, the organizational decisions were based on the directives issued by the Minister of Defence an d the Defence Chief of Staff, consistently with the development of the new strategic concept of the Alliance and with the evolution of an autonomous capability in crisis management in a European framework , following t\,VO principles: â€˘ "active prevention", meant as participation of the military instrument in the national security policy, both in the various phases of prevention/control/management of crises, developed through a "remote control of conflicts", and in the national interests, independence and sovereignty; â€˘ "defensive sufficiency", i.e. the upkeep of the minim um quantity of force for deterrence or, failing this, for defence. This principle is obviously applied with reference to the Alliance system to which Italy belongs, and not from a purely national viewpoint. These are well- rooted principles, which were confirmed also by the deep cns1s experienced by the international community following the attack launched against the economic, political and milita ry heart of the United States on Septe mber 11. If anything, this new situation has further enlarged the already wide horizons of the possible military interventions in support of the institutional decisions. In short, far are the years when Italy's security policy consisted only in the convinced and loyal adhesion to the Atlantic Alliance, but it is equally true that, together with Europ e, NATO obviously continues to be the Pole star of our defence policy. Our Country is bound to the Alliance through its constitutive Charter, which envisages the well -known obligations in case of attack against one of the participants, leading to operations usually identified as "Article 5". These operations were inexorably evoked precisely by the suicidal attack against the US, an event \.vhich entails not only the revision of the typical mechanism of the cold war, but, above all, a new elaboration of the very concept of "common defence" . In practice, the end of the bipolar confrontation and the impact caused by the conflict of the early '90s have clearly shown the limits of the world's security systems, starting from the supernational one, managed by the UN, and have stimulated synergies and distribution of functions and responsibilit ies with regional organizations or coalitions capable of carrying out more complex missions and of tackling risky and highly operational situations. As a matter of fact, the regional organizations and coalitions can rely an appropriate military instruments, and are urged and supported in their efforts by the necessity to act against any threat to the interests o f their members. This is the scenario in which both the evolution of the strategic concept and the definition of the new tasks of NATO have taken place. Tasks which were formalized with the strategic concepti approved in 1999, but already implemented in practice during the operations in the Balkans, and very topical today. At the Washington summit of 1999, at the height of the Balkan crisis, some very important decisions were made, II

which, in the coming years, ;-5 . will greatly influence: • the new strategic concept, with the possjbility of operating preventively i.n order to manage the crises at their onset, without waiting for the interests of the members of the Alliance to be affected; • the creation of a European capability of crisis management, through diplomatic means and CREATION OF the support of a military EUROPEAN CAPABILITY instrument; OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND INTERVENTION • the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), i.e. the coordinate development of the military capabilities of the European NATO members aiming at force goals and equipment on the basis of what is realized by the United States. In particular, as regards the crisis management capability, the question is to be able to cope with two major PSO operations (of the Balkan type) in separate Theatres, together with a minor "Article 5" crisis. All this has involved a deep revision of th e Alliance's organizational criteria, emphasizing the projection capabilities and Command-and-Control structures, \,v ith the additional burden deriving from the considerable duration of the operations and the necessary continuous rotation of Units and Headquarters . The second pillar of the "multinational" reorganization of the land instrument is the implementation of the concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which, in stages,led to the creation of the "European Forces". ESDI is also an instrument which strengthens the cohesion, the efficiency and flexibility of NATO, through a better sharing of responsibilities and burdens among the European and North American allies. The formal act of the EU members' contributions to the European military instrume nt , which took place in November 2000, is a fundamental step along the process aimed at establishing an autonomous capability of crisis management, i.e. the goal fixed in H elsinki. The objective is to create adequate European military capabilities, avoiding the duplication of command structures, planning staffs, organizations and military capabilities already existing within NATO. But, beyond these decisions, which by now could be defined as "historical", owing to the rapid evolution of events, the best r eference element for defining the organization of the land instrument best suited to compete in the international arena, is an assessment of the future scenario, constantly updated on the basis of the numerous inputs deriving from the interaction with the main politico-military national and international organizations . The three characterizing elements are: • the geostrategic aspects and the consequent alliances within which we are going to operate; • the causes of instability, which allow us to define the types of intervention; III

• last, the foreseeable nature of the battlefield, for what concerns the pure ly technicalmilitary aspects. Let's examine, therefore, the geostrategic scenario, i.n order to see how it could influence the requirements of the military instrument. In the medium/long term, the possibilities that an international "actor" could threaten nationa l or allied vita] interests employing traditional m ethods are very low. Nevertheless, today's events show that future scenarios are marked by a great variety of risks, different as regards type, dimension and target. The first consequence of today's instability will be the growing fluidity of the political situations and, therefore, of the framework of alliances and coalitions wi thin which a military instrument will have to operate. Thus, from a t echnical and military point of view, and considering the land military instrument, we must und erline that, very probably, our potential enemies will profit by the .lesson learned from recent conflicts, perfecting a number of strategies capable of preventing modern Armed Forces to exert their technologial and professional preponderance. Their action will very likely consist in the asymmetric application of a number of strategies and tactics, both conventional and unconventional, capable of minimizing the technological and organizational gap, of hampering the access and the effectiveness of the instrument in the operational theatre, exploi ting our, or our Allies', political, social or military vulnerabilities . The main causes of instability that could produce critical situations are well known . .The end of the confrontation and the expansion of free markets have marked a time of ' epochal transformations. The most important consequences, at macrosystemic level, , are a considerable political fragmentation and a growing globalization, which are going to be the main elements of instability in a multipolar system . From the viewpoint of the instrument's general planning, these risky situations give shape, to a complex technical/military scenario. In very general terms, we can say that the operational environment where the Italian Army might have to operate will be ! characterized by four elements: • intricate information-architecture, including civilian, private and military systems, , · destined to influence the conduct of the operation more and more; • a complex morphology o f the operations area, a greater urbanization, high compartmentalization and the presence of civilians are among the conditions that will be exploited by the potential enemies in order to overcome our technologic advantage; • coexistence within the same operation of highly conflictive situations comprised within more widespread minor tensions; • a new role for the land instrument, called to carry out a wide range of missions, according to the evolution of the crises: prevention and deterrrence in the initial . phases, coercion and restraint in the successive ones. 1

This said, we can affirm that the technological progress enables us to express greater strategic and tactical mobility. This will give a practical foundation to some emerging concepts such as "active prevention" through the deployment of for ces from the very : beginning of a cri s is . Somehow, these are concepts already included in NATO's · Strategic Concept. The implementation of the concept of active prevention and the effectiveness of the instru ment within the abovementioned operational context, require milit ary forces capable of meeting several criteria: projectability, interoperability, mobility, versatility, survivability, ' lethality, precision and integration of the command, control and commmunications

systems with the sensors spread all over ~he conflict area. In short, as conce1Âˇns the land forces, these are the convergency criteria upon which the DCI is founded with the intent of providing Europe with military capabilities comparable ,vith the US ones, as a prerequisite for a more autonomous role of the European forces within ESDI. At the origin of this initiative there is the awareness - well known to the experts and pitilessly shown to public opinion by the Kosovo operations - that it is impossible for the European Nations to autonomously manage peace enforcing operations, as envisaged by the new strategic concept of the Alliance. It is a simple truth, but it will affect the future decisions of all the European Nations, cutting down to size the hegemonic aspirations of some nuclear-capable Countries, raising the expenses for modernization and renewal of materials, and increasingly promoting the integration of the military instruments, through the manifold forms of collaboration that I shall describe later on. On the other hand even the US, whose resources are greater than the whole of Europe's, is pursuing multinationality, both at organic level and - above all - during the operations, owing to the great advantages, in terms of lawfulness and impartiality before public opinion and, last but not least, in view of a possible approval by the UN.

OUR ORGANIZATION FOR PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL FORCES Let us see now hO\v our land instn1ment is organized for these tasks. The absence of a welldefined and quantifiable threat requires a flexible operational instrument, capable of adapting the Command-and-Control structures and the composition of the forces to the various possible requirements. Therefore, the Army has taken the form of a producer of forces, ready and constantly capable of meeting, in terms of efficiency/effectiveness, different requirements, less envisageable than in the past, in distinctly joint and mainly multinational contexts. The restructming process has been developed according to these considerations and to the criterion of sustainability, upon ,vhich we shall dwell later on, during our examination of CROs. The conceptual synthesis of this process is represented by the principle of modularity, which could also be defined as "task oriented". The r eference bases of the concept are the main missions assigned to the Armed Forces. Active prevention, the reference concept I mentioned before, consists of a qualified, active and reassuring presence on the national territory in order to conduct a constant vigilance and contribute with contjnui.ty to the collective security and well-being, of the participation in the common defence within the Atlantic Alliancee and the projections of forces to crisis areas in order to contribute, in multinational contexts, to the prevention of conflicts (crisismanagement operations and humanitarian missions in a broad sense). V

These activities can be developed inside a wide spectrum of scenarios deriving from the cornbi nation of several parameters among which we can list: the type of operations that range from the traditional to the humanitarian ones; the operational theatre, which could be outside the normal NATO area; the operational context, which increasingly envisages joint and multinational arrangements; .intensity of the engagements, which in crisis management will be very likely essentia]y asymmetric, but with possible local higher-intensity areas. This high degree of indeterminacy requires of the manoeuvring forces great flexibility, in order to face a possible rise in the intensity of the operation. The instrument that can guarantee this flexibility is precisely the new structure of our Service, which separates the command responsibilities (aimed at preparing the instrument for the operational ernploynient and managed by the chain of command going back to the Army Staff) from the truly operational ones, directed by the CHOD :j;i ORGAGNIZATIONAL METHODOLOGY through the Joint Operational , _.___ _ _ _ __ ___ iiiiiiii Command. In practice, the HQs operational Commands and forces have been conceptual I y grouped in "basins" corresponding to the operational functions that must C2 MOBILITY be carried out: C4, Manoeuvre, C41 Fire, RSTA. Similarly, some Commands are ( or will be very soon) assigned only operational / activities, freeing them from the respo,nsi bility for the forces TASK FORCE preparation. As the need arises, and according to the mission they have to carry out, the Commands are assigned the forces required for the performance of the operational tasks, taking from the various basins the necessary modules and aggregating them into appropriate "task forces". The reference picture described above is at the basis of the Army's operational Concept which fixes: the operational activities and relevant forces required; the force categories and priorities for their preparation and, finally the maximum endurable effort for each envisaged task. The rationale for this configuration is explained in the "Ministerial Directive" (1999) and in the "CHOD Strategic Concept" (2000). In particular, the Armed Forces are called to: • strengthen and increase their presence \.vithin the military structures of the Atlantic Alliance and participate in the construction of the European pillar of defence and security; • acquire technical and organizational capabilities enabling them to face the entire spectrum of possible conflict situations. This latter aspect could entail: • situations of low/medium intensity. They fall within the category of CROs (humanitarian aid, peacekeeping); • high-intensity situations. They concern both CROs (peace enforcing) and declared conflicts (collective defence - Art.5).

In short the reference operational problem, whis:;h is at the basis of the definition of the bulk of forces necessary to reconfigure the Armed Forces into a professional instrument, is centred on the capability of participating in joint missions, ensuring the evailability of C2 structures permitting to assume the direction of a CRO (LCC) and the responsibility of an AoR, both in case of a CRO and of an "Art.5" (Corps and Division). As regards the requirement of forces, we shall need Brigades and supports (CS and CSS) enabling us to participate, in case of CROs, in two long operations (one Brigade in each Theatre) and in a third operation, either limited or within the framev,iork of multinational agreements. These forces \Vil! have to be able to contribute significantly to two of the new projectable HQs of the Alliance, which were established in accordance with the new strategic concept. This body of forces, \,v hen not engaged in other missions, could be employed in activities of public interest on the national territory. Summing up, the operational concept fixes the following levels of engagement for our forces: • the Service as a whole in activities for the defence of our territory and the national external interests; • in activities for the participation in the coJective defence of the Alliance, the forces will be divided into packages, based on the plans for the performance of the agreed-upon tasks within NATO; • in case of long operations in response to crises (CROs), the Army has decided to subdivide the operational cycle into 4 four-month periods, in order to have, once achieved the full availability of projectable professional units, a period of twelve months b etween two successive engagements to be spent for reconditioning, training, evaluations within the preparations for the usual ,...,_=-r-, -- - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - ---.-=-, operational activities and, just :...._... l l) OPERATIONAL CONCEPT t&}, before the employment, for ~ . . . . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' - ~ special training cycles in view of the specific mission. CRISES MANAGEMENT ,I..............

···~

'--- - - - -- -~ - - - -~..-.-----''

To define the bulk of forces necessary for the tasks requires a remarkable effort. In fact, in order to keep in the Theatre the levels of forces and the number of Commands envisaged by the operational concept, we must have a sizab]e reserve, without which we shall not be able to carry out the mandate assigned b y the political authorities.

......

---- - :: ..

17-xx.. : :: XC] ;<LJ :

IN THEATRE (UP TO 3)

::.. D

IN MOTHER COUNTRY BY ROTATION

3•• THEATRE REGT LEVEL

2"" THEATRE BDE LEVEL

..·.

THE CONTRIBUTION TO NATO Let us examine more in detail the relations between the multinational commitments and the national land instrument. The most historically important commitment is obviously the one with the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, I shall examine it first. With the adoption of the "contingency" planning for employment, which has taken root VII

along with the progressive reduction of the threat from the East and the simultaneous focalization of areas more risky for the security of the borders of the Alliance, in the last few years the NATO forces have been "catego1ized" into three main groups, according to the time necessary for their preparation and their modalities of employment. • Reaction Fo rces, already assigned to NATO Commands since the early phases of the operations. In their turn, they are divided into Immediate Reaction Forces, such as the airborne multinational force (AMF(L), and Rapid Reaction, i.e. the Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC); • Main Defence Forces: national units, in different stages of readiness, with different levels of commitment, based on the priorities agreed upon within the Alliance; • Mobilization Forces, present in different sizes in the various Nations. One of the measures established following the approval of the new NATO strategic concept is the revision of the system of NATO Headquarters, mostly static and still oriented towards the management of defensive operations typical of the Cold War. The static HQs are now flanked by nine projectable land HQs, capable of managing Corps-level operations or, when appropriately completed, of directing the land component of the Thea tre HQ (Land Component Command), and even assuming the responsibility for the entire Theatre in case of minor operations. Italy, which was already present in the Reaction Forces with the "Cuneense" contingent MAIN AUGMENTATION of the AMF(L) and, above all, DEFENCE FORCES with a Division HQ, 5 Brigades FORCES and tacti~al/logistic supports, for a total of about 30,000 men in the ARRC, has decided to contibute to NFSR by offering a HRF(L) HQ and a complex of Forces and supports (approx 30,000 men). The offe1~ made in July 2000, Rapid envisaged the reconfiguration, Reaction Forces no later than November 2002, of ARRC the Milan's Projection Forces HQ into a Rapid Reaction Corps HQ for NATO, which can play leading roles at tactical (Corps), operational (Land Component Command) and operational/strategic (Operational Theatre Command - JHQ Land Heavy) level. The project's essential features are: • multinationality of the HQ, for ,.vhich important contacts are b eing established with several NATO Nations (US in primis); • construction of new installations for HQs, suppport units and dependents; • full operativeness by the end of 2002. The establishment of the HQ is now proceeding at full speed. It is a matter or reorganizing Milan's Operational Projection Forces Command at the new base of Solbiate Olona, providing it with all the material, human and organizational resources necessary to plan and conduct VIII

operations of the level mentioned b efore. We:. should not forget that the pre-existent Command's capabilities could have met only a small percentage of the new requirements. To this we must add th'a t the multinationality of the new HQ, in which dozens of Officers from other NATO Nations will serve, opens new horizons in terms of personnel preparation (suffice it to think of languages and procedures) and validation of organizational structures. Furthermore, the new HQ must be capable of operating aboard ships, \Vith the consequent activation of joint studies and analyses conducted with the Navy General Staff. We are determined protagonists in the projects of revision of the NATO structure and forces, also taking into account our geostrategic position and the need to revitalize the Southern Region, \Vhich must be enabled to effectively project stability to the Balkans and the Mediterranean at large. With a vie,,._, to this, our commitment towards NATO consists of: • two Regiment-level task forces for the two immediate reaction land forces now in existence, i. e. AMF(L), capable of operating wherever necessary, and the NATO Composite Force, earmarked for operations in Norway; • one HRF(L) Command, with a force package centred on a Division HQ and four Brigades, plus tactical and logistic supports; • one force package for the ARRC HQ, also reconfigured into an HRF(L), consisting of a Division HQ and four Brigades, plus tactical and logistic supports. SOLBIATE OLONA It is a considerable effort, which in some cases be sustained through the time, while in others - as for the Corps HQ - rotations are impossible, because of the lack of resources. This concerns also the airborne Brigades, highly valued but very expensive assets, of which no European Nation has more than one.

OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

More recent, but no less important, is our commitment for the Reaction Forces of the European Union. The member Nations have clearly shown their determination to acquire an autonomous military capability in support of the European Policy of Security and Defence (PECSD) as a development of the concept of European Identity of Security and Defence, with the aim of enabling the European Union to play in full its role on the international scene. With a view to this, the EU plans to acqujre, by 2003, the resources needed for setting up a force of 60,000 men, with a sustainability of at least one year in any operations Theatre. Unfortunately the Union at present is unable to deploy this force within 60 days, as envisaged IX

in Helsinki and neither, as was proved in the Balkans, does it have the operational instruments capable of meeting critical situations involving not only peacekeeping missions, but peace enforcing as well. I refer, in particular, to Command and Control, strategic transport, intelligence and precision weapons, which are necessary elements for the full effectiveness of the forces's actions and operations. The 2003 development target, imposed by the political authorities of the Union, will put at the EU disposal a well tested mechanism that can support its military-policy and security decisions. We must continue along this road, keeping in mind that the US continues to be an indispensable partner both for regional and global security. Europe must increase its defence capabilities, in order to better integrate with the American ally, also considering that the bonds between the two shores of the Atlantic are not based on transitory interests, but on common values of freedom and democracy. The formal act signed by the Ministers of Defence of the fifteen Nations of the Union is a fundamental step in the process of constituting an autonomous capability for crisis management, which was the target fixed in Helsinki. This process, commonly called "Helsinki Headline Goal" has developed, starting in January, through the planning of the forces necessary to conduct operations in international crises. The result (approx 115,000 men) is much higher than 60,000, \.vhich is the maximum number that can be simultaneously employed, according to the political decisions made in Helsinki. It is easy to understand that the possible operations could be very different from each other, and therefore require different "instruments". The whole contribution of the Army to the pool of EU forces consists of a package which includes: • one Corps HQ or, as an alternative, a Division HQ; • the necessary tactical and logistic supports represented by Regiment-level units (signal, engineers, artillery, logistics, medical service); • manoeuvre forces including four Brigades, two of which mechanized, one Alpine and one airborne. Two of these Brigades can be employed simultaneously in long operations. These forces, which amount to approx 20,000 men, from which the necessary assets must be drawn in order to carry any "Petersberg" mission, would not be employed simultaneously, but would give 11 the Army the necessary THE ITALIAN ARMY FOR EUROPE flexibility for gauging its !=--============= ·· = = == == = = ====i-=-i engagement which, as a whole, • One high-readiness could reach the maximum package (ea 20,000 men), from which the immediate contribution can be drawn sustainable number of 13,000. (c~ 13,000 men). In other words, according to +CS the type of operation and the +CSS characteristics of the ....................................................................... ············································· XXX environment, it composition will • Other available Forces HQ vary, both as concerns quantity subject to NATO assent. and type of the tactical and logistic supports and as regards • One package to guarantee the manoeuvre forces. The sustainability of long ops. latter, in particular, could include two mechanized Brigades or, as an alternative,

;! ,

~Ix g I

one mechanized and one Alpine (light). Furthenpore, in the initial phases of the operation, the employment of different forces, airborne in particular, could be required, in the capacity of "Entry Force". hi this case, the effort could reach a peak of 14,000 men, for a variable period of time which, in any case, \.vill not be longer than four months. The Corps HQ, being a NATO asset, can be employed, as any other resource of the Alliance, exclusively after its release by the Atlantic Council (NAC) .

THE OTHER MULTINATIONAL COMMITMENTS Finally, let us go into the commitments which are often defined as "minor", from the viewpoint of the forces engaged, but which are equal to the others if we consider their politico-military characteristics and the accords on which they are based. The Army participates in four formations \Vith "on-call" units, either for operations or for training events, giving a permanent contribution of personnel to the Headquarters. In short, they are: • EUROFOR. A Major Unit at Division/Brigade level, oriented towards "Petersberg missions" . It was installed iri Florence in 1996, with the participation of Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. The HQ is outright multinational,and the main jobs are assumed by a rotation of nationalities. It might develop into an immediate-reaction force for the EU; • Multinational Land Force (MLF). A Brigade-level Major Unit established within the PfP and oriented towards "Petersberg missions". Its members are Italy, Hungary and Slovenia. The Headquarters is "Italian framework" , based on the "Julia" Brigade HQ, where Magyar and Slovenian representatives are permanently posted. The trilateral agreement on the organization of the MLF was signed on July 12, 2001; • South East Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). A Brigade-level Major Unit, born of a Turkish initiative in 1996, established within the PfP, is constituted by seven Nations (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria and FYROM) and oriented towards interventions in the Balkan area for "peacekeeping only" missions. The US and Slovenia participate as observers; • Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). A Brigade-level Major Unit earmarked for peacekeeping operations under the UN aegis, with t he participation of numerous Countries. It stems from a Danish initiative of 1996, and at present is engaged in the UNMEE operation in Eritrea.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS Owing to the high variability of the operational situations and the need to prepare a basic instrument in any possible way, (since it is impossible to envisage different packages of Commands and forces for each requirement), we have to consider different operational subordinations. Therefore, the administrative subordination of the units follows the principle of maximum simplification by the adoption of a geographic criterion. Besides, in order to make the Division HQs fully projectable, freeing them from administrative responsibilities, the Brigades are normally placed under the authority of permanent Commands, directed towards activities of preparation and management (1 st and 2 nd Defence Forces Commands, Alpine Troops Command). XI

II I

The Command-and-Control structure of the Service takes on different configurations according to the reference situations (I shall be more precise later on). The administrative structure envisages three Intermediate Operational Commands, subordinate to the Land Forces Operational Command. Each of them is: • responsible for the preparation of a variable number of Brigades; • "parent" of a Division-level projectable command structure, associated, in two different cases, to the Rapid Reaction Corps Command (soon to be established at Solbi ate Olona) ( 1st FOD) and to the British Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (2nd FOD). The units assigned to the NATO Immediate Reaction Forces are: • the "Taurinense" alpine Brigade, responsible for the projection of the "Cuneense" contingent for the AMF(L), consisting of an infantry Regiment reinforced by "combat support" and "combat service support" units. This formation can be transported by air, since the AMF(L) must be capable of operating from the very early phases of the operations planned by NATO; • the "Julia" alpine Brigade, which detaches a similar unit to the "NATO Com posite Force" (NCF), destined for operations in Non,vay. The units assigned to the ... Rapid Reaction Corps ~ MAJOR UNITS IN THE PROFESSIONALE MODEL :_; Command of Solbiate Olona , are: • one Division HQ (resulting from the prese nt 1st Operadonal Defence Forces Command); • four Brigades (" Aosta", "S assan , "Ju 1·ia" ancl "Fnu · I 1'") . The latter conducts operations from and in the 3rd dimens.ion; • specialistic, tactical and logistic supports. •J)

Th e elements assigned to the ARRCHQare:

• one Division HQ (centred on the present 2nd Operational Defence Forces Command); • four Br igades ("Garibaldi", "Pinerolo", "Ariete" and "Pozzuolo del Friuli"); • specialistic, tactical and logist ic supports. Finally the pool of forc es available to the European Union includes: • one Army Corps HQ or, as an alternative, a Division HQ; • manoeuvre forces including four B'rigades ("Aos ta", "Sassari", "Julia" and "Friuli" airmobile Brigade as "Entry Force") . Two of them can b e employed simultaneously in long-term operations; · • the necessary tactical and logistic supports, represented by Regim ent-level units (signal, engineers , artillery, logistics and medical units).

XII

In addition, we have the "Folgore" paratroop Brigade, which has ahvays been the Army reserve capable Gf facing sudden, unforeseeable ai1d unplanned situations. It must be noted that this organization is not yet complete. The transformation activities are proceeding, and the entire Service is engaged in expressing the force levels employed in unprecedented operations abroad. The analysis conducted so far allO\vs us to express some conclusive remarks . The evolution of the geostrategic picture, and the progressive reduction of the resources available to the military instrument, not only in purely financial terms but a lso in connection with personnel - better in quality, but reduced in quantity - have forced Italy and the other most important Nations to proceed in a distinctly international sense. This implies the need to organize multinational formations, which allow each Nation to face the problems of defence and security in a direct manner while taking into due consideration the rationalization of the expenses, thanks to the scalar economy intrinsic in the multinational dimension of the actually operational contingents. Let us not forget, on the other hand, that this type of economy implies a reduced decision-making autonomy, since nowadays all decisions mut be mediated and agreed upon, in order not to conflict with the politico-military decisions of the individual participating Nations, which are often less integrated than the operational instruments subordinate to them. Thus, we see a ne,v role of mediation and agglomeration of the politico-military intents, which today is assigned to the multinational units, now destined to assume the complex role of a policy instrument concerning both the Country and the coalitions with which they interact. One could ask ,vhether, in the future, once the validity of this approach is ascertained, it would not be useful and profitable to participate in multinational formations with all the forces available, entrusting them with our security. This question can be answered through a close analysis of the politico-military aspects ,vhich characterize the multinational forces . As we said, they ,.vere established in order to meet the requirements related to the following problems: • collective security and defence; • rationalization/reduction of military instruments and expenses. Their employment, therefore, must answer the need to reduce the risks deriving from: • the possible redundancy of the instruments, out of place in the present context of reduction of resources; on the other hand the reduction was recently r~vievved, in the light of the events in the US; • the dispersion of efforts, which imposes a constant analysis of the opportunities offered by · the "market" of international formations, with the intent of participating exclusively in those which directly meet the politico-military requirements of the Nation avoiding, as much as possible, the commitments that cannot be met when the operational requirement occurs; • the rapid obsolescence of the instrument's rules of employment, which imposes a continuous regeneration of procedures, operational concepts and - at the same time weapon systems, in a growing spiral incompatible, in terms of costs and efforts, with the restraints mentioned above. The efficiency and the effectiveness of these formations, furthermore, depend on: • unity of intents of the participating Nations, to ensure that they will hold on as the events progress. This must go together with the clarity of the mandate assigned to the Force, as well as of the level of authority entrusted to each element of the chain of command; XIII

• consent of the participating Nations to the mission, in order to avoid reshufflings within the coalition during the operation, as happened in several cases; • determination in pursuing definite objectives, to be defined in the form of indisputable "end states" \Vi thin a joint planning process at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical); • sustainability in terms of resources, in parUcular as regards long-term missions and possible sudden changes in pace, not always foreseeable \Vhen planning. In substance, the efficiency and effectiveness of the forces derive from the: • rationalization of available resources; • standardization of employment procedures and modalities; • interoperability of the components.

Finally, we must list the determining factors of a multinational formation, in terms of organization, assets and personnel. These are obviously macrofactors, and each of them imposes - in relation to the objectives fixed thanks to multinational processes of convergence, such as the NATO planning cycle and the "Defence Capabilities Initiative" - a variety of decisions covering the entire range of the training and qualification activities of the units. In conclusion, the Army is well on its way on the road imposed by the multinationaiization of the instrument. Much has b een done, but the final objective,albeit defined in all details, is still far away, since the available r esources demand extremely Jong times. The achievement of the objectives, fundamental for the functionality of a land instrument in line with the defence objectives and the aspirations of the whole Nation, is closely connected with the allocation of material, human and budgetary resources that the latest events on the international stage have contributed to highlight. /

D Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale

XIV

CONTE_NTS

Number One 2002 January - February March - A1>ril

Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational t raining of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating t he military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

The Italian Armed Forces Are striving, together with the Allies,_ to contr~st international terronsm, m protec1on of peace and international security.

I The Organizazion of the Italian Anny in Connection With the International Commitments, Particulary With NATO and EU ( Roherto Speciale)

Politics, Economics FOUR-MONTHLY Supplement to num bers 1 a nd 2 of Rivista Militare Italian Ed ition

and Strategy

2 The Europe of Securitv and Development " lntenicw With Professor Romano Prodi (Ornella Rotaj 6 New Threats, New Strategies

Editor in Chief: Giovanni CERBO Management and Editoria l Office 8, Via di S. Marco 00186 Rome Phone 0039-06-47357373 Advertising Care of the Secretariat of Rivista Militare Phone 0039-06-6795027 Printer GRAFICART Formia (LT), Italy Photoprocessing Studio Lodoli Phone 0039-06-5898780 Subscription and forwarding By mail Law 662/96, art. 2, para 20/c Conditions for 2002: One number. Euro 2.07 One back number. Euro 4.14 Subscription rates: Italy: Euro 11.36 a year Abroad: Euro 11.49 a year Payment must be made on postal account No. 22521009 - SME Centro pubblicistica dell'Esercito 123/A Via XX Settembre - Rome Residents abroad may remit payment through bank cheque or international postal order.

Authorized by the Court of Rome u nd er No. 944 of the Reg istry by decree 7-6-1949

2002 © Copyright by Rivista Militare ASSOCIATED TO USP! UNIONE STAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA The production of this magazine has been supervised by Omero Rampa

(Mauriz.io Coccia)

18 Strategic Asvmmetries (Ferruccio Botti) 30 South East Asia Looks to Europe (Giovanni Semprini)

40 Evolution of the Scenario and Planning of the Land Instrument (Salvatore Farinaj

52 The Italian Corps for N~TO . (Rocco VaslOla and Fabnz.w Santillo) 66 Lithuania. The New Armed Forces Interview With the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Enrico Magnani)

72 Lahia. The New Armed Forces Interview With the Commander of the Armed Forces (Enrico /vlagnani)

78 The Caribbean Region (Orne/la Rota)

Science, Technology and Training 84 Completion.Forces . . . (Francesco Die/la and Giuseppe Bongwvanru)

History 93 Guido Romanelli. An Italian Officer in the Historv of Hungary (Piero La Parra) 105 Roman Legionaries in China ( Flavio Russo)

111

Sommaire - Inhalt - Resumen

Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee the highest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves contributors ample freedom, though it does not necessarily share their opinions. The Author is thus solely responsible for the articles which, published unedited and without editorial ties, exclusively reflect his personal ideas. Articles must be original in thought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (European Military Press Association) periodicals. Articles should be accompanied by suitable photographs, illust rat ions, explanatory tables, together with a photograph of the Author, a brief «curriculum vitae» and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves the right to change the title of articles and choose the typeface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging. In order to make the production of the articles more expeditious, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides the text on paper, also the diskette with the text files of the article. Any system and type of computer can be used.

by Ornella Rota -::

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States have changed the politico-strategic international scene. Could the new worldsituation, made worse by the conflict in Afghanistan and by the aggravation of the conflict in the Near and Middle East, affect - and how - the process of enlargement and extension of the European Union? 2

I don't see any reason Âˇwhy the commitment to fight against terrorism should have negative or slowing effects on the process of enlargement of the Union . If anything, but I don't see any proof or connection with this, there could have been an accelerating effect. The enlargement is the first occasion in history that unites the Continent and, for the very first time, this takes p l ace

with peaceful means. Such an impo rt ant opportunity must be a bsolutely seized and accompanied by a parallel and simultaneous process of reforms, so that the enlargemen t should not entail a dilution of the Union's operational capabilities, with the risk of a pa ralysis. In consideration of the evolution of the present international crisis, Europe should have the capability

of conducting effective and timely actions. We must respect this obligation, and the results of the Laekcn European Council go in that direction. Do you think that all this could strengthen, or weaken, the project for a European military instrument?

Naturally, it strengthens our project . It was evident to everybody that the Union reacted timely and effectively \Vithin the sectors where the Com.m ission is responsible and can act (money laundering, int.eJ I igence cooperation, European wa1rant of arrest), while iL has Lo rely on the collaboration among the member Nations when the Commission is

Left. Ita lian pa ratrnoper du ring the m ission in East Timar. Facing page. Paratroop patrol o n a VCC-1 .

"Pax europea" in the Balkans depends on the success of the "Pact of Stability ". It is necessary t o E uropeanize the Balkans without "balkanizing" Europe. The role of the EU is very weighty both in the various sectors of intervention (from diplomacy to economic policy and security) and in developing economic and politic relations among the Nations of the region. Could you tell us w hat are the measures under study to favour the democratic evolution and the economic and social development of the Nations of the Former Yugoslavia?

not qualified to act directly, as is the case with PESC. But I a m sure that yo u know belter than I do that the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force, already decided and now under way~ needs a period of time which cannot be reduced in any way. But, as I said, the decision has been made and there are no seco nd thoughts. The beginning of the negotiations for opening to other nations and, above all, the actual start of a military policy can, once the risks of fragmentation of the national policies are overcome, could give rise to a new Europe, very different from that of connnerce and conunon 4

currency. Is the time ripe for the EU to actually play its role, which has been virtual up to now, as a regional power?

The euro was not born in a day; t h e debates on a common c u rrency lasted over 4 0 years. Onc e th e de ci sio n Âˇwas take n, things went on quickly. I am n ot s aying th at an ot her hal f century will be necessary to a ch ieve form s of better integration in the sector of foreign p o licy a nd se curity but it is e vident that this kind of steps forward can be m ade only when the public opinion of the member Countrie s are ma tu re and w illin g to proce ed. To for ce things too soon w ould on ly be over-a mbitions.

I don't think that the Balkan s cou ld produce a force o f a tt ract io n so po werful as to "ba lkan ize" Europe. O n t he contrary, in th ose Countries there is a strong de ma nd for association \vith E urope. The m easures bei ng st ud ied no w are well kno\,vn: respect of human rights and civil liberties; political and economic assistance; support to th e modern izat ion process and t o infr astru ctural investme nts ; supp ort to th e streng thening of democracy; s c rutiny of t he req ue st s for association ; o p ening of partner ship , negotiatio ns, as was done in the case of Albania. To put it more specifically : the multisector programme of the EU for the reconstruction and development of the Balkan region, better known as "Pact of Stability for Southeastern Europe", concerns three sectors: democratization and human rights; economic

of a highly tec hnological and research-o riented Europe? This is the e fforl \,ve are rna king within our globa l actio n plan of reforms . One o[ t.h.e key points, as wa s a lrea dy unde rline d a t the European Council in Stockhol m, is t h e p r o m ot io n o f a st r ong commitm e nt to research , b o th scientific and technological. This is a secto r w hich, as lo ng a s a co nt in en tal di mens ion i s n ol adopted, will grea tly su ffer from lhe internaLionaJ, and parLicuJary American, competitio n. If we don'L w.:Ull to miss lhe train of the developent of the so-called new-fron L.i er technologies,we m ust assemble the efforts of all member Nations in o rde r lo p rov ide the scie nt ific and tec hnolog ical r ese arc h wi t h th e ne c ess,Hy strength, in order to obtain a real and con1pelitive successes. :_J

Âˇ '--Jou rnalist,

Contributor to ;rLa S tarn.pa"

reconstruction; cooperation security and defence. What are your expectations about the developm e nt of these three sectors in this rather difficult moment? I see t ha t th e proce ss is proceeding according to schedule wi thout the d e lavs or the difficultie s c aus e~\ by th e consequences of the fight a gaist terror or by the worsening of the Middle East crisis. I a m optimist on th e rapid process of normalization of the Balkan area. On th e othe r hand, times will not be very short. Along the way to a not-only economic and monetary Europe, an agreeemnt which characterizes it also in a military sense has at last been reached. Based on the experience you have made, also in the industrial world, in what way do you think it will be possible to start the promotion

Romano Prodi was born in Scandiano, near Reggio Emilia, in 1939 . H e graduated in Law at Milan "Universita Cattolica", specialized at the London School of E conomics and was a professor of political and industrial economy at several Italian and foreign Universities, among which Trento Free University. Professor Prodi is considered a precursor in the fie ld of research on the development of small and medium enterprises, industrial districts and antitrust policy. He is the author of various publications which have become classics in the study of industrial economy, relations between State and market,Âˇ denationalization policies and the essential role played by the school system for the promotion of economic development and social cohesion, the process of European integration and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dynamics of the different models of capitalism. From 1974 to 1978 he was president of "II Mulino" publishing firm and in 1981 founded "Nomisma", an institute for economic studies. From 1978 to 1979, Professor Prodi has been Minister of Industry and, from 1982 to 1989, President of the Institute for the Reconstruction of Industry (IRI). In 1993 he w as appointed again to the same office. In 1995 he was one of the founders of the "Olive Tree" political coalition, leading it to success in the general election of 1996. Prime Minister until 1998, he has led Italy into the head group of the Nations which adopted the Euro. Professor Romano Prodi is now the President of the E uropean Commission.

Faced with unpredictable and indiscriminate attacks, like those against the US and world democracy, a mobilisation of the available security resources is now under way, also through a careful monitoring and interpretation of the events, in order to find prudent strategic choices, farsighted and adherent to the new scenarios. From here the interest to appraise the substance of the new threat taking shape, in order to verify what are the possibilities of success against a challenge to civilisation and civil progress. 6

by Maurizio Coccia-:~

errorism in general, diversified as a whole, is grown up to become the most serious threat the values, the .liberty, to the territory and to life. Terrorism isn't referable to a single Country, to a government, to a single leader, but to a tenacious opposition, ~hat in the post-bipolar scenery 1s reinvigorated.

It's a wide oppositi'on, because the contradictions of a very defective world arc many, so it is possible and it can be imagined that in case of not satisfactory development of the effe cted countermeasures, the activists, already numerous, can be destined to grow, as the mandators. In this perspective, the realised series of terrorist events constitutes the point - visible at the moment - of an iceberg of much greater dimensions and on vvhich it is necessary to intervene in a wide field of actions, if we want to exorcise the collective fear and reconstruct a climate of trust and liberty.

make mankind regress to levels judged unacceptable. The answer is war. War on terrorism, beyond measure obsolete, difficult t;p to graze the impossible, but also a lw ays made of actions and reactions, of forces comparison, means and strategies in which the most innovative, the most lasting, the .m ore felt and sustained wins.

The suffered aggression fades the terrorism of the past, also recent, into the background because, in com parison Lo that, it is characterised by the ideological and religious optimal combination of the components with the application, without hesitations, of the most sophisticated technologies; for the search of effects of global scope, without pre-set limits, to maxi.mum relapse in every sector of internal and international relations, according to a direction that has already shown to know how to draw the maximum profit from the least effort, resulting in an initial shock without precedents, Lo the limit of the imaginable. Instigating so a chain reaction whose effects are diffused and are made to be felt in time.

It's clear that every human being, everywhere and despi te own merits , is the principa l objective of the present te1rorism. His individual safety is openly jeopardised, such as the freedom which he has enjoyed in past or he would have liked to enjoy in the future, because of the control established by every Country and that seems destined to increase. The involvement is made total. Each feels in first line and has good motives t o speak out . Taken by anguish and by fear, they have the tendency to react by instinct radicalising divergences, incongruities and contradictions. Facilitating the plan of terrorists, that great trust attach to every decomposed reaction and on its negative effects.

What is the model of relations wanted by terrorists and by their mandators it is sti ll to be determined, but the range of possible motivations and claims allows to glimpse the ghost of the amplest and destructive anarchy.

It would be a serious error. The lessons learned from t he long cohabitation with this sore of modern times put u s in watch from a series of dangers of formulation. The first direct danger that an institution, national or international, runs in facing the terroristic phenomenon is implicit in an uneven struggle that instigates the terrorist to apply violence where there is not predictable

As the American President has specified since the first reactions to the treacherous attacks, the exploitation by terrorism of the vulnerabilities of democracy could

lt preliminarily owes to us to intend as war, more than to terrorism is a form of fight, is turned and with every mean to the social, political and economic presuppositions that favour it, to the craftsmen and to the mandators.

-~ 路.;

// /

contrast revolving Lhe measures of defe nce and sa fety a pplied. Against su ch a danger every classical defence is r evealed till now insuffic ienL , while the analysis of the facts, the ability of forecast and t he inLuitio n of the em ployees can make miracles. It fo llows th e clan ge r of the recogn ition as the parties to the cas e, t hat co incides wi th his leg it im isati on and it allows his promoters the ethical jump frorn crimi nal lo fighter. Starting a real c areer of the opcrato1路s that, in case of positiv e result of th e a ctio n, ant ic ipates rais ing to hero of li berty. Fina lly, the danger to reg ress to th e sa m e level to reduce the o perational discrepan cy or for路 1路e acli on in cas e of serious loss of image, fe edi ng a spi ral of vi olen c e w itl1out end. Te rror ism is always also the sy mp to m of an illness that cannot he taken care of only w ith a moral sen ten ce and or 8

-._.., ,. . , .- ~ ';..'r.

__,,,

principle, a sy rn ptom that can be taken Lo champion of the level o f confrontation of the system , as it re p rese nts the mo st rad ic al demonstration . ln such sense, it is necessary Lo consider that the fu Lure reserves us every o ther type of struggle already experimen ted, unless we reduce the levels of confrontation and injustice in the wo rld thro ug h a mo b il isa tion even more arduous and longer of that declared against terrorism. To int rod uce terrorism is not easy. In the com mon meaning, under such generic expression, it is intended a strategy that resorts to forms of struggle and activity c haracterized by violence and by illegality, finalized to shoot down a r egime or a Govern ment or in any case finali zed to cre at e tension, mistrust and insecurity. The fu ndamental parameters of the action arc th e co nceptual opposit ion and the consequent recourse to violence in deceitful

Above and facing page. Tialian soldiers on pat,o/ in Easl Tinzor.

a nd hidden forn1, the app lication of s poradi c violence (selective or indi scriminate), the maintenance of the liberty o r action, the appeal to the amplest illegality, the choice of tall rep resent ative content objectives, with particu.lar respect to those that are magnified by the s urprise effec t and from the reaction with the conscience and ll1e culture of the invo lved people or peoples. M ode rn terrorism has accompan ied the inside rela tio nshi ps among Sta te s beginni ng fro m t he ind ustrial revo lut ion of Lhe X IX cent ury and h~ had a meaningful role in the ,.vars of liberation and in the movements o f in depen den ce. Sin ce then the social clas s es

evolved in an aware society, legitimist, that doesn' t accept anymore the Mac hiavellian concept of the goal that justifies the means that has served as conductor thread to all the modern demonstrations of terrorism and the consequent repression. Seeing that, in time, the results have never been equal to the expectations, today there is the tendency to preliminarily appraise the goal and the means to reach it. The p ublic opinions and the single citizens demand guarantees so that, at the end of the run, the individual can improve himself, rather than sacrifice himself for a vague and uncertain ideal, however situated in a future all to be defined. Consequently, the myths collapse, the awareness grows while the possibilities [or terrorism to realise the "ethical" goal native to lift the masses wi Lh the example become inconsistent. At the same time, lo the reduction of the material poverty in the world corresponds th e increase of the moral poverty of the motivations, and this can originate an equal indi vidual rebellion. Democracy and its choices overcome for amplitude of involvement and consent everv logic of ten-orism. They are set a: the best medicine ~l"~tinsl every b type of violence. The process is in progress and far from finished; this is so true that when politics is not able, to make itself adequately understood, appreciate, also in the most emancipated Countries again violence reappears. It is necessary, therefore, to involve in the democratic process the whole world and the individuals, but in the meantime it is necessary to protect both. The globalization seemed a good answer, in that it is potent ially able to level th e comfort, reducing the injustice on which terrorism gro\,VS and flourishes;

bu t also this is glo b alized , choosing forms of struggle typical of an ··o p en and communicating society. NEW THREATS The threats to the co ll ective security changed at the change of the equ ilibriurn related to the relationships among States. We passed, in fact, from the cold war of bipolarism to a kind of planetary 1·egency of the USA, still managed in a national key. Consequently, the compromise is grown in every part to trying to involve the rest of the world and

to cohabit with the American values. The lack of alternatives has made the tension grO\v. Also because the European and American way are progr·essively approaching, until they almost coincide. The radicalisation of the refusal is accented. This way, while on one side the progress of the democratisation and the international co-operation has occurred under the aegis of US, Europe, UN, OSCE, NATO and every other international organization devo ted lo lhe

collective recognition and help to the development. On the other band, ep isodes of rebellion are occuffed by States that have tried to oppose the rules of the general development in the intent to preserve and, if possible, to expand their own relative power: the Gulf war and Irak, the inside struggle in Somalia, the de spotism of Milosevic in the Balkans, up to the .recrudescence of the conflict between Israel and Palestinians , visibly gone out of the schemes of compromise and tolerance LhaL in the last years had succeeded in containing violence in the sad cohabitation between the two peoples.

The opposition of the past, an unusual liberty at every level and above all the opening o( coffirnun ications and information, have amplified the terrorisrn of p er iod and have originated another, making to meet the different matrixes in a communicating system . T he native roots generally recognized are al leasL seven: • dynamics of the cold war. Plan of destabilisation of the world order fomented by the URSS to put in crisis the model of the capitalist society, making its 9

Italian checkpoint in East Timar.

contradictions explode. Realised through the fi nancing a nd suppori of the anti-imperialists movements in every p art of the \.vorld (Latin America, Middle East, Africa, S pai n, Italy, Germany, Ireland, etc.) ; • imi tative process by groups and individ uals att racte d by t he spectacular effect of the action of protest a nd rebellion; • am bigu ity bet ween o ffic ial positions of the States and lheir con tra ry behavio u rs in s u rrep ti tious form , in t he p icture of the hidden opposition to the American leadership and the western values or, simply, to reach contingent objectives in national or faction key; • con spirac y among S tat es sponsor of terrorism (accordi ng to the America n Nation al Commision on terrorism of the year 2000: I ran, Ira q, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Sudan, 10

bu t the re ad ing of t h e newspapers allows to widen the sp ectrum in much ampler form) and organised cri me for conquer ing w orld power a nd 1·ealize immense earnings; • in ternati ona l isola t ion of charisma tic leaders (Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, etc.); • support to the Palesti ne's cause and to the des truction of the Jewish State by Arabic islaniic Co untr ies an d m ove ments present nearly anywhere in the ,.vorld; • ex pansi on of the Is lam ic fun da me ntal ism, in form of po pular move me nt (Ira n , Algeri a, Egypt , Afghanista n , Pakistan, Sudan, others) . The worst case is the coalition of manifold forces united by the an ti -American and anti-Western ideology. A predictable behavi ou r may be foun d ed up on breaki n g attacks di stribut ed in tim e , w ho se e ffect s would be s tre ngthened by the more and more radical 1·ecriminations \-\.'ithin t he coalition a nd from reactions,

also radical and violent, that would reduce the consent, also increasing the fronts of struggle and contrast up to the exhaustion o[ Lhe notable ab il ities of ans,.ve1·. Wh ere the answer of the coalition w a s, instead, calibra ted in ti me and proportion al to t he attack, the tensi on could be prolonged endlessy, w ith i denti cal repercussions on the vulnerabilities of the democracy, 'with particular reference to the fall of economy a nd liberty. To ma n y peopl e i t can seem t ha t th is threat , ,.v id e and breaking, appeared from nothing a nd succeeded in avoidi ng the safety measures erected from si n g le Sta tes an d from the internation al community as a whole. It is not this way. l n the last ten years world strategic analysis has not remained \Vith its hands in hand. Aggressive initiatives had been planned also on a wide scale, by Countries endowed with values d ifferent from the western ones and of significant military ability as well as by t ransnational grou ps. Under the headi n g

"indeterminateness of the threa(', it was understood that the lack of suitable control in the diffusion of information, once reserved, and of advanced technology, could increase the number and the typology of critical situations and potential actors: n u clear, bioJogical and chemical ,mnaments, offence (computer science or conventional) invisible to the means of identification, employment of space against our security, wide terrorism, expansion of organised crime and, particularly, of that devoted to the commerce of drug traffiking and the clandestine migratory flows. All this had been examined case by case, even if it had not been contemp lated as feasible the realisation of such events in system and the probability of their happening had not been considered. Besides, we kept on counting, perhaps over measure, on the ability of the single States to individuali se, monitor and oppose the destruction in all its aspects. Finally, and on the base of the past experiences, an ability of discernment was attributed io terrorists in the application of the violence . This resulted restrictive and represents, perhaps, the aspect of the greatest strategic surprise.

stronger or where stronger is the authoritarianism of the regime. In the international fr:ame, when a flag subsists, a common element of recognition among populations, public opinions or single individuals. The appeal to the Holy ,.var tends really to this preventive recognition, turning lo the Islamic world and specifically Lo the Arab people. Elsewhere, povert)~ marginalization and alienat ion make the individual rebellion meet the organised crime. Also this has become global and with much more incis ive effects than those reached by the States, up to become a p lanetary network. An invisible State of remarkable economic we ight, w ich intercommunicates with te1T01ism o r whateverÂˇ matrix, because of the simi lari ties and of the mutual demands tied to the inv is ibility, conspiracy of silence and illegality, able to exert remarkable multidirectional pressures on the single Countr'ies and on the international context. The reason for the effervescence of period and the actual amplification in the formalities and in the tools, can be connected to the most negative effects of the global economic interaction, but also to an action of conceitedness of the enemy. Crime has a lready

tried to underline itself at the level of State ("narconation") and perhaps feels enough or it judges us weak enough for a further jump of visibil ity. The fall of the collective security is a lso attrib u table to the discrepancy of attention among the 1Âˇeached economic and social development and the quantitative and qualitative modesty of the strategies of defence, that should have protected the yet and, instead, they have not succeeded 1n changing to safety strategies, really for the low our action level of interest and involvement of the people. This vu lnerabi lity has immediately been individual ised and stricken. An assertion is constantly dramatically repeated by the security operators and that is to say that a primary good of such magnitude cannot be delegated to a minority. The safety of wh ich it is spoken must not be confused with the militarist attitude . For security we mean the growth of awareness, participation and integrated co-operation of every community, toward the predictable or unexpected threats, knowing the enemy up to knowing hovv to recognise its activity and intentions, acting with every means for the

After the first terrnrist initiatives it seems reasonable to believe that the .ethica l, cultural and religious opposition bet,.veen Israel and the Palest ine's people, international since the origins, is now globalised, pushing the opponents of democracy toward a violent radicalism that meets in terrorism. In the national frame, where the opposition of values is

Italian paratrooper in activity of vigilance in Bosnia.

lLalian paratroopers during an exercise.

main ten anc e of the collective good of security. The example of heroic citizenship, realised by the passengers of the aeroplane fallen in Pittsburgh, on the tragic day of 11 September of last year, points ou t the values that we intend to defend and delinea tes the level of th e commitm en t to w hich we could be called.

News strategies

the am p l itu de [ac t, of the phenomenon and the reduction of the reacti on to a sinngle fact li mi t ing the attenti on to th e visible part of the iceberg . Also com mon is the excess of reaction, repression, seeking an equal or superior result to that achieved by the terrorists. Very similar is , w ithout doubt, the error to bask in the demoralisat io n tha t the m isse d allainment of s uch an o bjective involves. To adeq u ately react, o ne ca n depart fro m the ver-iricalion that the surprise tactic is inevita ble, because it is realised w ith the attack , \,vhil e th e stra t egi c surprise can be opposed up to ma ke it decay. And how? Ana lys ing the parame ters of reference of the terr-orist strategy a n d through fitting and timely countermeasures.

The security~ that is compulsory to bu ild , must be constructed by integration and co -opera tio n b e t,veen the Countries and the peoples, ,,vi thout being condi tioned by fear and egoism, but in the belief thal only with the magn itude of the commitment the reached d evelopmen t can b e consolidated and the premises for further finishes established . l t is a question of giving depth lo every aspect of l he evol.u lion The e nemy is shaped vvith a and not to return to the dawn of certain number of connotatio ns: coexistence, to the Middle Ages, • in this scenery of war; the terrorist to the towers and the strengthened organ isations become walls. transnational, part of a global net, even if they historically ,,i ndicate The reaction to terrorism has motives and national objectives. always ex isted. The most common The bond is made consistent ,vith en·ors are the unde rvaluatio n of organised crime; 12

• the first objective is the capitulation of the will because of rear and intimidation. One tends, therefore, to the employment of weapons of mass destruction of every type , to seek epochal slaughters. The hypothesis to anive to an apocalyptic future is not excluded; • grows the number o( terrorist organisations that individualise in the US th e obj ective to strik e . Of these, Al Qaed a, created by B in Laden, is only the more sadly known; • the fall of the ideological motive and the revolution of th e masses as las t a i m, doesn 't mak e a b ehaviou ral log ic necessa ry because it could be indivi d ualised, monitored and st ricken, and no t e ven a h ierarc hi cal organisation that acts as the embryo of the new insti tutio ns, once taken pO\.ver and tha t grant a mi nim um of visibility lo the investigators; • to t he in vis ibi l ity o[ the viole nce serves as contrast a good visibility of the financing and the resources. The param eters of the strategy of Osama Bin Laden are dra wn from the objectives listed in his pr-oclam ations and from the perpetrated actions : • America, crusaders tha t then become the Jewish-Christian a lliance, the Saudi real family, oil and the Palestinian cause; • th e strategy of the terro r applied turns around oil; • the formula of the sp ect acu la rity is a dopted , li fting the so ugh t le vel of destruction and resorting to the kamikaze tec hnique a nd to advanced technology; • the declared wish to ra ise a Holy wa r- is not original. It has a lready been proposed rnany times and has punctually failed.

From Nasser In the 50s to Gaddafi in the 70s, to Khomeini in t.li e 80s, to Saddam in the 90s, the appeal to the "Islami c nation" h as never gotten more than a bland consent of pr-incip le . The motives for so much Lepi dity find t heir origin both in Natjonal interest and in global involvement and, the refore, they seem destined lo last in time; • the nuclear weapon is certainly access ib le and s u rely the method s have been fo und for bringing it up to the objective in hidden form. And it is not even the case to discuss the pros and cons of such a c hoice, in the sense that has been done already and its employment is fo1-esecn. As much can be affirmed for possible biological and chemical attacks of great dimensions; • since it is be.lieved that so much terrorist engagement can meel only in marginal, local tactical successes, we can prefigure the

conceptual lirniL of the movement, that is destined to regress for lack o[ support in Lime. ·· In the meantime, w hat can be opposed to these connotations of U1e threat, Lo reduce its value and to facilitate its decline? Preliminarily, th e avvareness that terrorism is as an epid ernic illness, that first of all must be iso lated and then needs an intensive th erapy, because the roots are ample and surprisingly branched. The conceptual aspect of base is given really from the opening of the confrontation. Th e react ion, institutional and of the democratic collectivities, mus l be amp le, clear and involved respect to the paraded claim, reducing iL w ith o u t truce in the mediatic confront at ion an d in the operational strategy of reaction. The a m b ig u o u s, transversa l and fleeing threat must be opposed directly a nd in its perverse effects w it h a

progressive approach and within a convinced operationa l r·eciprocity. Only an aware coo p erat ion, founded on the determination and on the exaltation of globa l interests of securi ty and develop ment, can make the collective strength of the opposition grow. In this case it w ill be more probable that to the ne,v risks and [ears can correspond , as in the past, new possibilities and opport unit ies, new s uccesses for the progress of humanity. Between distrust and barriers (West and Islam , them and us, etc .. ) it is better to isolate the facts. If we wanL a better world, we must not doubt and mortgage what we have a lready reach ed togeth e r. It's b e tter to valorise,

TLalian para1roopers at a checkpoint in Somalia during operation uReswre Hope".

I!\

')'

American unit patrolling a roadway in Kosovo.

w hy n ot to red isc over the com mon a ff iliation to human kind, t he monotheist rel igio us c ommunio n a mong Islam, Juda is m and Catholi ci sm, th e r ecognition of a n integra ted culture that has on European and Mediterranean ma trix , the improvement of the concept of justice going back to universal principles. This \Vay the damage is limited, non necessary clashes are avoided, however dram atic, folly is kept to whom wants even in go o d fai th a better wo rld, when t he whol e h is tory points out tha t terrorism ma ke s to regress the development and the collective r ecognition. Fo r whoever has to heart peace and devel o pment, "not to r egress" should be the wo rd of order. In a sc enery as the one delineated, the most meaningful result to be reached is the world awareness of every individual to have overc om e, toward t erro r ism, the lim its of every accep t able co mp ro mise. An epoch is e nded an d an ot her starts, also it is an epoch of wai~ in which all human beings are called to the first I ine, otherv, ise \,Ve recede . 1

The first objective of this war will have to be the demolition 01-, at least, the ampl e and visible regress of compromise, followed by analogous action towards the ambiguity, of the politica l contemporary custo m, to hold the feet in two or more stirrups, at every level, to safeguard partic ular interests . Terrorism strikes by now everybody, inside and ou t o f its own ci rcle o f National affairs. The vict ory, arduous an d at present very distant, ,viii be given by a new type of relationships arnong pe ople fre e d fr om the fa lse probl ems o f coexist ence , originated from the Nat ional perspectives. The real isatio n o f th ese objectives e ntai ls ma nifo ld choices and activities: • to overcome the passive p hase of absorption of the damages bro u ght by so m a n y par ts , assuming th e j nitiative of a global campaign for the use of the available tools, drawing up all the National and international se curit y res ources. In such se nse, the elem e nt o f great meaning is given by the answer of the Islamic communities in

the world. Their definite position towards the m ethods and the objectives applied by terrorism would ma ke to d ecay the intens ity and amplitude of the potential ideological , cu ltural and ethical confrontation. • to seek maximum effectiveness witho u t de na turalising th e democratic ch aracteristics and vvitho ut lo s i ng s igh t of t he objective of th e w ante d development and the consent th at can gather. Farsighted, jn su ch se nse , is the s t rategy solicited by the President of the European Commission: support to America, integratio n no Lo the war of civilisations, affinities prevail on differen ce s, reciprocity and solidarity; • to so lve insid e th e US and inside the coalitio n Countries, the probl ems of the resources ass igned to the sec urity o rgan is ms, of co-ord inat ion and of operational co-operation between · the different branches and components; • to exte nd the operational coop era tion at gl oba l level checking the devotion, ab il ity and r eliability of every other Co u ntry in the c om mon struggle; • to extend in capillary form the ac tivities of co nt .-oI - t oday they are limited essentially to the frontier s and to objectives co nsi dered sen s itive in th e institutional optics - without paralysing activities; on th e contrary, stimulat ing them to progress in how much feas ible in a scenery of greater security than in the past; • Lo r igorously is ola te sponsor States; • to neutralise with accords or if ne cess ary -.,vith forc e th e weapons of mass destruction within a planetary campaign of a wareness, co -ope ration and rigour;

Raider in training.

• don't make concessions and don't go down Lo compromises with terrorists. When captured, bring them to Lhe democratic justice; • to remember Lhat also terrorism has its heel of Achilles, a structural vulnerability that can be activated by adherent and intelligent countermeasures. It is the s timulant chain that bomis from Lhe demoralisation, to become dissociation, repentance and collaboration; • to strike Bin Laden as negative symbol for excellence. As you can see, the threat is serious for how iL is realised and for the future risk. It requires an answer just as serious that could redraw the map of the international relaLionships and behaviours. Globalisation was associated to peace and now is seen under conditions of war. This shows the lack of terriloriality and the demand to compensate new

vulnerabilities with mutual trust, fixing new rules, avoiding and overcoming naLionalistic closures, inside ·wich it is possible to make ideas and terror ist activities grow. The evoluLionarv lines, allow to think about a· new diffused interventionism from many Countries and the convergence toward behaviours judged positive in this type of global comrnitmenl, like: the control of the production and sale of \.Veapons of mass destruction; the widened informative collaboration; the redefinition of Lhe vulnerabilities and the extension of security; the operational collaboration between military forces of defence and police forces; institutions; society and economy. The Schemes of the alliances have jumped and this means a new potentiality of globalization. In the picture of word common effort for security, Russia, China and Islamic community in the world can say their word and do a good job, regaining positions of credibility and connection in the international field, first temporally blocked in name of a

recent past, but conceptually far. The same is true for their "near abroad", for their alliances and proximities. A new international osmosis is around the corner with an America amalgamated in a more mu ltipolar context. America rediscovers America and its needs, and the world rediscovers the humanity of it. This increases the relative proximity and the desire to collaborate. The Europe of the nations follows, even if the terrorist events of the last period have not exalted it or accented the push to integration. In the US as in the European Countries and elsewhere, good and bad news cross in this first phase of adaptation. There is an increasing series of initiatives to raise security. Their brake to the free operation is already bringing to new behaviours that don't facilitale the development programmed. In the process of general revision, the finality of survival and security has the tendency to take upper hand on every other need. International co-operation in the field of information and 15

human and mate rial resources spent wi th so m uch prodigality and with so modest returns a re dried up. In th is perspec tive, for example, among the construclion of new systems of spat ial defence a l I to he experimente d a posteriori" and the reduction of the strategic and tactical nuclear arma ment, in th e austerity and abo ve all in lhe un usu al convergence of the moment, the second solution seems the on ly practicable one.

Italian paratroopers rake up a,1 inhabited centre in East Timar.

security is still in good measure lo b e ex perim en ted, with it s potential risks and wit h its potentialities to reduce attritions a nd preconceived hostility. The fervo ur and go od will arc ex tended and vis ible and th e particular period pushes to take ini ti atives that up to yesterday were j udged unscru pulous . To isol ate ter roris m it is necessary to make democracy gow in the depressed Countries and integra ti on in th ose with differcn t eth nic grou ps and 16

re! igi ons . For these goals new strategies and tool s in t he international field are needed . Wit hin the coaliti on of th e w is hes that refers to ll1 e emancipated west, the tools at our disposal to contrast the threat are only a part of those ju dged necessary by the Na tions more deve lope d and by th e international Organisations . The whole d iplo matic and military Com mitment is so intense to fear for the consumption withou t return of these two essential tools of poli tics. The eco nomy in recessive ph ase underlines the onerousness and the rnodesty of the strategic choices till now operated. 1l is necessary lo quickly move toward a compatible form of global solidarity, before th e

To realise so radical changes, the un ity of in tents mus t be mai ntained firm in time. This is quite di fficul t , because around terrorism an ind uced co nsent that can produce other violence grows and it find s origin in the e mulatio n, in the tendency to aggregation and in misinformalion, in easy beliefs of, in the lack of a historica l culture and in the exponential growth of the people directly involved in politics and in the management of povvcr w it hout having a complete and correct informative picture. The ipstitutional opposition has to remove s trategic space fro m tcrcorism, with an inform ative offensive able to re-establish and extend lhe grip of our point of view. Toward the Islamic communities to which Bin Laden turnes, but also toward those, much more careless, in our own house. N ot only dec lar ing and testifying that a wa r of civilisation is not in p rogress, bu t reviexing th e mechan isms and the co n tents of th e communicat ions again, so that lhe information is given in a way to be und erstood by the recipients and doesn't serve only to capture the allention dictated by selling [ear, a great number of copi es . I t is a qu estio n of prog ress ing, ove rco ming th e logic of the scoop and the effect t itle nol su ppo rted by th e contents that have originated it, wi th wh ich a large part of the

communication is developed in the US and in our Countries. The service must ,be delivered at home, therefore opporlunely diversified, as it is proper in a real mediale war. Where for media war we intend much more than the propaganda of war, o[ informative \Nar and intelligence. Its operational purpose lends to isolate the terrorists because public opinions judge them nonbelievable actors not entitled to raise objections, to v indicate justice, to seek attention. A war of these proportions has not even been imagined before, and the times seem mature to give a deadly hit to the declared enemy that, more wrongly than nightly, afler '68 and after the terrorism of European-American matrix, is broad ly spread in the fabrics of modern societies, and countinues to flourish in the developing ones. The resistance of a wide coalition of wills is already deai~ In this situation it is predictable to see a hvsteric future of tears for the t;rrorism of the XXI century. Bul not less dangerous and hard to fight and to destroy. But at leasl, we can objectively think that its interests are on this earth, so Lhe destiny of the modern world is not stake. The state of siege of these days a nd of the predictable future, even if it does not continue, authorises to think that is being developed a new sensibility and will of intervention toward the critical areas where terrorism is fed. We can imagine that, from every part, Lhere will be he tendencv to reduce the economic discrep;ncy, Lhe social injustice and the authoritarianism on a National basis. Also because we are really involved and the appeal to definite and onerous choices in name of a common interest that is first of all of survival, of mutual support, therefore of continuity. The nm won't be vir1uous only.

Reduction of the growlh, wide controls and revaluation of the frontiers, stiffening of Lhe security measures., probable protectionism to make revert abroad Lhe costs of the new security, reduction of the exchanges and anaemia of certain types of products and services, reciprocity of the commercial accords. Yet problems and themes as agriculture, the environmenl and the amplitude of the subject rea lted to commerce demand global approaches. To avoid a heap of negative effects would be necessary to relaunch the open markets and the libernlisalion of products, continuing in the reform o_f the rules that are app li ed lo global commerce. The economic resumption thei-e will be, bu t iL won't bring everything as it was before. New technologies will h.auJ because so wants the law of it evolution and progress. Already lelernatics have filled the void of the aerial land and nava l communication, dug by fear. vVe will go tovvard a phase of new risks and great costs in which the public investment will frevail on the private one, everything in the circle of commpatihle a rÂˇeas and

Russian soldiers on paLrol in Chechnya.

regions therefore less global. Economy, politics and strategy will become even more united and synergetic. The economic globalisation has paved the way bu t, as for the historical courses and recurrences, we start a new commitment in which the integrated opening, politic, economic and of security begins among a group of similar Countries, crealing prolected areas of reference that will progressively be widened, resulting in a new globalisation, much more complex and complete than before. However iL is prec ise ly in lhe impossibility to proceed straight Loward lhe collective recogniLion of the whole human society and in Lhis spirnl trace lefL in his Lory LhaL our destiny is \vritten.

D ''Major General (rel.) 17

by Ferruccio Botti~Â·:

efore September 1.1, 2001 (it is no use to repeat here what happened on that day, tragic for all us and not for the US only), if one asked what changes had taken place in the military world after the Cold War, the "politically and milita1ily correct" answer, particularly in Italy, would have been as follows: before 1989 the armed forces were preparing for war and defence of the borders

whereas today their task is mainly to carry out "peace missions" overseas and/or abroad. This was a new (or supposedly so) role for the military force, which was very suggestive for public opinion and could be summed up in the well-known "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcing" missions. Having observed that this type of missions implies, in practice, the

recourse to arms, albeit on a reduced scale, and that also in peacekeeping missions unfortunately a price in human lives has been paid by our military, a question comes to our mind: what has really changed after 1989? And in what measure does the recent bloody terrorist attack on the economic and military sanctuaries of the Superpower contribute to make us understand, or change the strategic parameters? It must be said right away that the strategic problem that we have to face, not only today, but which existed already in the last decade of the 20 th Century, is extremely complex, since it contains such a number of threats and ris.ks, lights and shades and contradictory signals, to put to a severe test any politico -military leadership, discouraging any attempt of summing up the issues in a few formulas and concepts, or in more or less pleasing, rhetoric and approximate phrases for the benefit of the media. Strategy has never accepted sure recipes, and this is even more true today. It cannot let itself be too influenced by the past (as happened only too often) and neither can it refuse 19

the wh ole historica l expe rie nce a nd r efer only to the increased performance of th e new tec hno logies, even by a ttributing them thaumaturgic vir tues they don't have and never had. The least that can be said today is that the "peace missions" have behind them a long histo ry going hack to the 19 th Century (1). Even terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Two of the facts that occurred on September 11, on the contrary, are new: the capability of striking in a massive way, for the

1. ln a book always ignored by historians, a certain Mr. Vi ncenzo 1\IIolinar i, in 187 1, represented the still chivalrous conduct of the w ar·s of hi s t i m e thus : vile treache ries rnust be dispensed with, all m ilita1y actions m.usf be fair and generous. Prisoners must be respected, if they behave according to their state: officers can keep their sword, as a token of honow~ they can even be set fi-ee on their word. Generals musl be kind to each other. If they are found on reconnaissance, it is a

na tions wo ul d be less and less nu rn erous, with a return to local disputes and internal conClicts, so rn u ch so that Nations will find within the,nselves the reasons for wa r 'W hich they cannot find anvm.ore with others. And even if solutions through force were to become exceptions, it is impossible to envisage the complete disappearance of morbid passions. Therefore, peace would never be perpetual. On the o ther hand, an excessive attenuation of the destructive character of war would deny its essence and at the sam e tirn.e would increase the hardsh ips o f society, since it would prevent crises (i-0111 heing resolutmy (3). 3. In 1898, Co l. Enrico Barone, a distinguished socio logist, historian an d economist , maintained tha t , considering things in broad ou t line , ce rtain salient politico-s ocial characteristics correspond to some prominent military qualities; that is to say that the reasons for ·which war is waged, the rn.an.ner in which the instrument, i.e. the Army, is forged and employed, i.e. the conduct of ·ww-; are nothing but simple superstructures o{ the political and social conditions, and follow their variations. Thus, in order to understand the succession of m.ilitary events, it is necessa,y to refer lo the succession of the social phenomena.

fi rst time, the ten· ito r--y of the S uperpo'vver, and the psychological significance of t he targets, unpreced ented a lso thanks to the unconscio usly se lf-in ju ring amplifications of the mass-media. We are not inclined to see m il itary revolu tions everywhere, and a lso for this reason we believe that, to app r·oach in a co rrect \Vay the present reality, some theoret ical examp les of 19 th Century classic strategy wo ul d be usefu l. T he refo r·e, we summar ize them here as terms of comparison and/or in terpre ta tive keys for today's events.

A "Bersaglieri" checkpoi11l wiih a "Camillirw" \ICC- I.

good cuslOl1l Lo shoot into the air to warn them . And thei r los t luggage or field glass will be returned to them (2) . 2. In 1875, Gen . Nico la Ma r·se ll i foresaw that the often violent revolts for the formation of nationalities and the freq uent international conflicts which had characteri1.ed the 19 th Centu rv would be fo llow ed by a period in wh ich th e grea t wars among .

Dealing with the characteristie's of the "cabinet wars" of the l 8 th Centu ry, Co l. Barone a d ded : at that tim e, Lhe constitution of Lhe Armies and the conduct of wars were so close ly related to th e politico -s ocial conditions prevailing al the time that only "that" constitution and "that" conduct of wa r vvere possible . According to Barone, therefore, one should not be m isled by very cons p icuo u s changes, s u c h as those concerning wea pons : the art of war is mainly infl uenced by politico-social factors, because if

weapons and mater ia ls change, the nature of man, wit h his instincts and his pass ions does not change and, even less, docs the psychology of the masses (4 ). 4. The classic strategic thoughl - starting from Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Marse ll i, Bonamico, etc. refers essentia ll y to \Vars belween regular armed f'orces of highly developed Nations, and is mostly influenced by the Napoleonic wars, both on land (Napo leon's offensive, rapid and decisive war) and on the sea (Ne lson at Trafalgar). Nevertheless, already during the first part of th e 19 th Century, the idea of waging ,var also against the c iv i li an popu lat ion slarted to gain ground, considering that it would lower the morale and deprive the fighting armies of moral and materia l s u pport. During the American Civil ·war, General Sherman, comrnander of the Federal forces, did someth ing or that kind . In .1 8 8 0 the French .Jeune Ecole Navale maintained that the Ita li an coastal cities should be bombed from the sea, counting on Lh e psychological fragility and scarce nat iona l spirit of our people, who would then rise against the Government, Corcing it to seek peace (5). In the twenti es, our Giulio Douhet, like the Jeune Ecole, theorized on th e usefulness oC striking the inhabited centres from tT~e a ir, since he considered them the most vulnerable and defence less part of the enemy Nation. Their destruction would take th e fighting 'Will and the sources of support away from the armed forces . From 1943 to 1945, the heavy Anglo-American air raids hit very hard t he German and !,apanese cities . After 194:i, the Mutua.l Destruction" assured bv the intercontinen tal nuc lea·;. missiles subjected the entire territory of the opposing blocs to a deadly threat; it rnust be added

that the n uclear, biological and m iss il e lechnologie~ lrn ve been available, for· quiLe cl time, even to the less developed counlxies. The barbarizat ion or war in the 20 th Century and the d irecl involvement or civi lian popu lations have long been facts that, albeit dcprecable, m ust be taken into account. What is even more d isquieting tod ay, is the vu lnerabi lity of the computerized systems and the growing availab ility or the technologies r·elated to nuclear and chemical

An Italian checkpoint ·w ith a "Leopa rd" I-AS lank.

warfare, that could be exp loited precisely by the terrorists. 5. Napoleon used to say that one should never do whaL l.b e enemy wan t or expect for the very reson that rhey want or expect it; nor one should go into battle, for the same reson, on a terrain or at a n,oment that suit the enemy. Furthermo r·e, one should never be taken by

surprise: the commander shou ld a lways know what to do in case of a sudden enemy attack; if he is doubtful, then he is in a bad position a11.J. outside the rules, and must f1.nd a remedv very quickly. In the light of these historica l references, it becomes easier to say what has actua ll y c hanged after the fal l ol the Berlin Wall, and what has changed again after the fateful date of 11 September 2001, which was defined by the media as an epochal change, the

beginning of a new era, the third world war etc.etc. Some a lso wondered whether it was a clash of religions or civil izations, i.e. a new war· threatening to continue for a long time . This debate bewi lders and alarms the man in the street, witho u t letting him unders tand anything, and without adding anything actually new to the strategic real ity. Everybody ta lks about wa r, if anyth ing Lo de.ny or exorcise it: but one shou ld be very clear abo u t today's conce pt of war, from which that of strategy is clcr·ived (6). Certainly war is not 21

declared anyrnore; certainly it is no more a conflict betvveen Nations - as was the case at least up to 1945 - which, uncapable of so lving a serious cl ispu Le i n a peace[ul way, had recourse to arms, conforming to the rules of international law. Certainly there is no more a cl ichoto1ny - as was proved in the cold war - or a clear fracture betwee n war and peace . Beside the continuous tension between the two blocs from 1945 to 1989, during tb is period of - at least European "peace", many Nations (mainly France and the US, but also the UK, Belgium, Holland .. . ) have been fighting exacting oversea

degree of organization on both fronts, another scholar (Luarcl) bel ieves that war must b e characterized by a significant n u mber of act ions for a significant length of time, and this is also true. F inally, one should remember that, according to Clausewitz in wa1; actions are never conducted against 1n.atter alone but also,. simultaneously, against the rnoral forces that anirn.ate it; and it is impossible lo differentiate them.. Marshal

Army rangers armed with "Heckler uncl Koch" lv1P5 during an exercise.

today, must have a dua l character, i.e . it must refer not only to those \.vho formulate it, but to the probable or possible enemy, to their methods and their weapons. ln a word, i t should not be "Europocentric" or; to put it better, it should not be valid for the developed West only. So, even after September 11, we believe that, on the whole, ou r definition of 1998 is still realistic: war is a s tate of hostility and struggle deriving from a conflict of great interests or from a crisis (between Stares or coalitions of States, between States or organized internal or externa l groups, or between States and organized groups) reaching such a level thaL for both opponents it becomes necessary and inevitable to have recourse to the potential or actual use of armed force (not or ''the Armed Forces") on a considerable scale, in order to achieve their political objectives (8) .

wars, often with trauma t ic outcomes , as was the case in Indochina, Algeria and Vietnam . And what should we say about the Gulf vJa r- and the confl icts in Lhe former Yugoslavia? No doubt, today war is an armed and bloody struggle between organized groups (Bouthou l); but iL must also be kept in mind that for a long time, since the Arnerican Civil War (1861 - 1865) it has not been conducted only with weapons , but enters more and nore the economic, industrial and soc ial internal tissue of the Nations . Besides implying a certain

Montgomery (1968) gives us a definition which is still interesting today. He does not consider only the employment of m i Ii Lary means or the leading role of the States: war is the continuation 1,v ith i,veapons of any conflict between rival political groups. fl includes insurrections and civil wars, and excludes riots and indiv idual acts of violence (7).

These scattered elemen ts are undoubLedly valuable , b u t we wou ld like to acid that a de[i ni lion o f war, particu larly

Today, we rnusl only observe that in this definition there is no reference Lo the time parameter: as Luard says, in order to be considered a war, a struggle must last for a significant period of time (bul how long? Up to, and including, the very recent war in Kosovo, short wars have always been the primary objective of po! i tico -rnilitary leaders) . However a war must have an end: if il is "infinite", it cannot be a war in the full sense of Lhe term. By applying these theoretical princ ip les Lo the reality of today, we note that on September 11 there was certainly a recourse to force on a co n siderab le scale by an organized criminal group, against which a legitimate reaction was directed - on a remarkable scale as well, and noL only by military means - by the US and the \:\lest: but what will the sequel of the fight against terrorism be? Wi ll it be, also in the future, studded with actions of vio lence organ ized on a

remarkable scale by both sides, or will terrorism become a chronic disease with ,vhi.ch we shall have to live, fighting it when it strikes, with the means required by the situation? In other words, will there be such an escalation that the word "war" could be justified? Only history will give a final and irrefutable answer, proved by facts. Meanwhile, it is important to find the best way not on ly to fight terrorism, but also to counter the numerous threats to the well-being and security of the western societies; threats that must not be forgotten, as a consequence or the enormous resonance of the terrorist attack against the United States (this would be indeed a remarkable result for the terrorists). Certainly terrorism is not the only challenge (or the West . lf anything, it is closely connected with success i n othe rÂˇ and perhaps more important challenges. After al l, if the fight against terrorism can be called war is a secondary and debatable question. Before Bin Laden, the "holy war" was proclaimed a lso by Saddam Hussein. We must beware of the propaganda's and the media's exasperations. In this respect, at least for the European mentality and sensitivity, the less we ta.Uc about war, the better it is. For the moment, suffice it to note that there .is a developed Western world with its o\vn culture, history and mentality and a religious inspiration which is more Chrislian-Calvinislic than Catholic-Orthodox. But there is also an anti -West and extremist culture, a tradition, a religious philosophy which, refer-ring to Islamic traditions, conducts an all-out struggle against the West. In the Islamic ,vorld there is also a group of moderate Countries which do not consider the West an enemy to fight without quarter, but rather a partner with which it is convenient to cooperate, albeit without

accepting in tolO .i Ls economic, social and political patterns, which often rema ir1Âˇ divergent. Another fact is that those who live in indigence and underdevelopment consider the consumer's society a pi-ovocation and is thus relatively easy to convince them that the West is the den of all evils, etcetera. As Col. Barone wrote, the purely military and strategic dimensions of the present rÂˇeal ity are closely connected with the politico-social situation where old

''Bersaglieri" co11.Lrolling a vehicle near a chec/cpoinl.

To fight terrorism, the experience of the two great wars of the 20 th Century is useless. After all, they were won by those w})O were better anned , better equipped and richer, even pr'.escinding from the quality of the strategic conduct and other factors that we do not \,v ish to consider here. On the contrary, this heritage could even be misleading, if its results were to be the overestimation of the role and quality of ,,veapons and materials and the underrating of the human factor in general. Leaving aside, for the rnornent, the purely military considerations,

and new emerging confrontations directly influence the different military modalities of the recourse to organized violence. From this point of view, terrorism is a phenomenon with a clear and growing strategic value, and this confirms what we wrote in 1998: "it tends lo strike lhe enemy vulnerabilities and, as shown by the events of the recenl years, is a very effective antiWestern and antiAmerican weapon, probably even superior to guerrilla warfare, since il requires less men, less equipment and not ve1y protracted and inlense efforls{9).

we can say rig.lit away that the Western way of life makes the recourse to terrorism very attractive for its enemies , as much as 1J1e Superpower's force and technological superiority - in the annarnents' sector~ but not only induce the West's adversaries to avoid challenges on the plane of the classic art of war and of war technologies, because they would certainly lose: t.he last to make this mistake was Saddam Hussein in 19901991, and he ,vas also at a disadvantage on account of the desert land, which offered

Crew mernbers of a sel(-propelled _gun.

excellent targe Ls lo Lh e Weslern a i ,路 forces. The so undn ess o f Barone's teach ings is also proved by the almost co mpul s ive m ilit ary repercussions of the 路w estern socio -p o litica l sys Lem . Il s advantages are evident: a welfare level, never achieved before, for la rge masses o f citizens and d emocrat ic libenies. But, in o rder Lo achieve and keep these excellent o bjecti ves, th e sys te m must be based on the individual, 24

on his initiative that must be left as free a s poss i ble, a nd on the cull of results, efficiency, prnfil and growth, even to the cl elriment of o ther ne eds. Th e negati ve i mpl ica Lions are also evident: a dangerous tendency to set aside the moral values, which can produce dangerous even i[ re duced seclors of social d iscornfort t ha t can breed internal v io le nce an d even inlernational terrorism; th e creation in the res t of the world of hostilities, tens ions , env ies, accusations o f inju stice and ec onomic exploitation . l n particular, the system., precisely

because i L is bas e d on technologies direc ted on ly lo p rof it, p resents growin g vu ln erabil ities, which can be reduced but not easily elirninated. Therefore, for the enemy, they are a practically unlim.iled nurnber or "paying targets" which can be hit w ith nol very sophistic ated weapons, or even without arms. Suffice it to think of skilled acts of' sabotage against therrnonuclear centrals, aqueducts, pipelines, etc.), In short, it is an efficient and organized sysLem, but 路with several delicate mechanisms which rn.ake it insecure, also in the minds of its citizens. The evi dent consequence is that this sys lem must n ecess aril y p ro d u ce highly tec hnolo gical m il itary instruments which, in turn - and this is a lso a Jirnitation - g ive the utmost importance to pe rfo rmance, i.e . d estructi ve powe r; Lo the detriment of other requirements . 1n r:ni.lilary organ i,,ations, as in industries, the number of m ac hines increases, and p erso nnel dimini s hes . A few rnen c a n express a terrifying power: but also in this case, an exaggerated cult or power can open importan t "win dO\.vs" to vulnerabilily. Still v uln erab le , despite everything, are the armies' rear lines, airports, logis tic infrastructure, elc. Relatively vulnerab le ar e also ultrapower{ul, very expensive and very sophisticated weapon systems, such as tanks, airplanes and helicopters, thaL can b e d es troy ed by not highly sophisticated and very cornmon arms, such as surfaceiair or antitank portable m issi les, whose main requisite is the fig hter's guts. To a ll Lhis, we must add that the modern w eapon systern s were des igned, constructed and optimized for the wa,路 or armies and flee ts , w hich finis h e d in 1989. S econdly, they have an absolute need of paying and welldeterm.ined targets w h ich, in lhe p re senl r ea lity, only a very

clumsy enemy would offer them (also in the Kosovo war, the Serbian Army suffered very modest losses). Let us not delude ourse lves : these limitations cannot be easi ly removed, also because the West is practically condemned to conduct a war of machines, \vhich not only tend to rep.l ace men, hut a lso to avoid losses. During the recent limited wars, the Superpower was the first to impose extremely severe restrictions to its milita ry strategy: first of all lo avoid losses of personnel or ai rcraft, because pu b.lic opinion wou ld not tolerate them . But this is not a new strategic position: it. emerged already in the conduct of the Anglo-American \var War in .1939-1945, especially in North Africa and Italy. Land borders appropriately defended by fo rtifications and mobilization mechanism ready to spr ing up are anachronisms. It is a fact that after 1989 they still exist, part icularly in the sea a nd air sectors, even if they arc not always drawn on maps. Their existence is proved by the preparation of a space shield, that the US has been considering for twenty years and sooner or later will be made: the qucst'ion is only when it will start to operate. Another proof of their existence is, above all, the deep fracture across the Medi ter-ranean , invisible on the maps, but very visible every clay, when hu ndreds of desperate people land on our coasts. \Ve refer to the border between welfare-society and the large too large underdeveloped world wh~re, for various reasons, Is lamic extremism enjoys the simpathy of many, and the anti - West propaganda, as 'Nell as the call to the strictest Islamic traditions, find fertile ground. Together \vith the enormous uncontrol led mass of dirtv rnonev movinu a round the wo;ld (tha~ks to the'Â°'rinancial instruments typical of the advanced soc ieties) and the

profitable traffic king in drugs and illegal inHnigrar;tts, this is a good ct;lture me~liu~1, not only, or not so much, for t.erroristic undertakings, but for any activity aimed at endangering in different ways the well -being and the stab ili ty or \:Vestern societies . Unfortunately, therefore, granaries must be clefended also by arsenals. For a l] these rÂˇeasons the underdeveloped societies, and particularly those of the Middle East and the northern coast of Africa, permit terl"Orism and

2000s, symbolized by the fact that, also in t he military field, one s ide lends to safeguard the individual and his i-ights to the utrnost, Lo the point of asking him to fight as little as possible and to sacrifice himself for the common cause only by exploiting evffy resource of technology; the other side, on the contrary, continues to oppose armed masses -- whose life is not greatly va lued and the individual is asked the supreme sacrifice in the name of hatred and celestial j oy, to a small number of

other forms of illegal activities to recr u it large numbe r s of "labourers" ready for anything, to the point of sacrificing the ir lives for the cause. At the same time, particu larly tanks lo Lhe oi l profits - which did not translate into what, al least for t.J1 e Âˇwestern mind, is an economic, social and cu ltt.m,I deve lopment those societies also provide large amounts of rnoney to \vhorn ever \vants to fight the loathed American enerny and the WesLern model in general. In the f'inal anaZ,vsis, this creates a strategic asyrnmetrv, which is the main characteristic of the early

radio operator o{ the i\nny Ranl',ers during the TNTERFET mission in Easl Timor.

superequipped, superfed and superprotectecl men. Thus the Kamikaze has become a p,,.irnary strategic resource that can annul the tec hn o log ical gap t hat separates the most advanced arm ies. But we can say eve n more: in the present reality, the Kamikaze has hecom e the best weapon of our enemies, for the sirnple reson the he can exp loit the West's niches of vulnerability" w hile against this th reat, terrible 25

and indeed inconce ivable for our rnenta lily, there is not a really valid defenc e . ll is therefore an asymmetry which plays against the US and Lhe ·west for two essential reasons : it would be very cl i Uicu I L Lo remove it with further refinements of the rnil i ta r·y, informative and social/territorial control-technologies; al the same time, the asymmetry increases p r·ecisely with the well -known faults of the advanced induslria.l societies. The latter, in their turn, are not easily disposed of, (or the simple reason that their removal could impose changes in living standards, and even more in mentality and customs, which the Western peoples are not prepared for, and cannol accept. Nevertheless, this asymmetry can and must be reduced. It might seem like a paradox, but it can be done using criteria and means we do not hesitate to define as traditional and, as such, are rather easy to state but very difficult to apply. Reason ing coldly, we must note that after all, the 18 Kamikaze armed only with millenarian weapons such as knives, on September 11 achieved the opti1num of classic strategy: maximum result with minimum effort, obtained by

applying the \Nell-known ancient principles: concentration of forces on the weakest and most profitable po,int of the enemy [ront, surprise and economy of forces. Second ly, Loday, in order Lo counter the schemes against our society - not only terro r· ism - one should use a perfect mix of ingredients, involv i ng the economic, financial, social diplomatic, informative, psychological and military sectors. Also this, after all, is an old practice followed for centuries by yesterday's Superpower~ Great Britain, which managed to defeat its powerful enemies , and develop its wellbeing through a h igh ly technological instrument (the Royal Navy) and a small volunteer army, accompanied by a foreign policy, a diplomacy and a proverbially efficient intelligence which were capable of combin ing Lhe employment of the military instrument with all the other possib.le extramilitary and paramilitary means, multiplying their effectiveness. In this way the great powers or the continent (France first, then Germany), which counted mainly on the ma1iy divisions of their armies, were defeated. Th.is does not alter the fact that in the wake

of Sor·e] and Blanqui's theories, violence, be it more or .less organi.zed, continues to be, as always, the protagonist and the mould of history, even if it is limited to small minorities. In Lhis situation, the sterile appeals of the self-styled pacifist movements are pathetic in face of facts which, as Spinoza used to say, are not touched by our wrath. In concrete, the question today is to continue and perfect the o ld Brit ish way, making the military instrument not the only means but rather one of the means to be employed very selectively, and only when targets and possible results are very clear. Terror and its supporters must be hit with different means, taking into account - and this is the difficult part - the repercussions of our actions, first of all in the Arab vvurld, where it is necessary to reduce - and not lo increase - the area of assent around terrorism.. Secondly - and we underline it, only second ly our vulnerabi.l ities must be reduced, starting with the psychological ones, which have already heavily affected the economic and financial activities, touching upon the interests and living standard of the average American and European citizen, without distinction. Those who want peace should know that war has already been declared on them, and act accordingly. The asymmetry starts precisely from the way events are perceived. In Italy and in the West in general, unfortunate ly th is is an advantage for the subversive forces . Everyone th inks as he pleases and there are, without too much of a scandal, different recipes and different sensitivities, even among European nations and between Europe and the US. Nothing of the kind exisls within

Italian emplacernenL control in Kosovo,

/c)r

territorial

Tank leader and radio operator aboard a "Leopard" 1 A.5 of the Garibaldi Brigade.

the area consenting to terrorim, where the religious authorities, who hate the West, give polilical teachings, which are listened to by many and which incite to holy war, thinking on behalf of all. The only advantage we have al presenl is thal L}1e justified horror caused hy September 11 objectively reunited the Western lineup, taking space and consent away from the pseudopacifists. But this horror should not turn into a pure and simple yearning for revenge (this is a fault o( democracy) or into short-lived and irrational impulses of public opinion, which governments could be tempted to second, in order lo achieve consent. Il is relatively easy to unleash the destructive power of armaments. but it could be counterprocluctive; on the contrary it is extremely difficult,

for the reasons mentioned before - to strike at the right time what must be struck. The information on the enemy is essential in the present context, and must still rely mainly on man rat.her than on mythical technological devices for global listening. The A.ir Force, providing that good targets are found, can hit lhe Countries which support the terrorists, but not the terrorists Lh emse lves, who can easily escape an offence from the sky. We shou}d only ask of technologies Âˇwha t they can give ; on the interna} plane it would be good to follow the example, rightly reca.lled in these clays, of the Englishman who in 1940 or 1941 affixed on the debris caused by the Luftwaffe a "business as usual'' sign. This is an effective way of defending ourselves against terror fighting it, first of all, by learning to live \.vith it, exactly as we do with the many evils of our time, which also cause victims.

Public opinion should become aware of the fact that security measures are necessary but not always sufficient, and that terrorism is just a very impressive expression of the manifold threats to lhe welfare society. They can be faced only by recovering our moral values and wiLb a policy which must not confuse the d eman ds of econom ic development (and the deriving globalization) with an anachn)nistic homogenization which does not consider enough the .many diverse histories, cultures , religions, characters, tradiLions and economic situations of the various peoples, be they developed or not. \,Vithin this framework it must be strongly stressed that the fundamental rnission of the Armed Forces is still the same: lo safegard national security and territorial integrity, on the basis of the directives issued hy the legilirnate political authorilies and in the ways a.nd forms - very

Engineer NCOs in a mine-clearin_g operation.

the threats of tomorrow using arms conceived against yesterday's en.em.ies, we musl rethink our security (Lord George Robertson, NATO Secretary General - September 14);

• once the aircraft have taken wing we must decide what to do, the specific threat which ·we have lo attack must be identified. We are very efficient in counlering external attacks, less so againsl the internal ones. (Gen. Richard Myers, USAF, fu l ure Chief of Staff September 15, 200 1).

different from the past ones requ ired by the present and by the foreseeable future situaLion. In th is sense, the fateful elate of September 11 does not sound so much as the beginning of a new era but rat her as a strong spur not to indulge in illusions 0 1· fashions, demancli ng of the military and of the government what, beyond appearances, has always be e n lheir primary m ission, particulady a[Ler the Cold \.Var. To he even cleare r·: as we have been saying since 1998 (10), defence, security and national integrity must keep, or

retake, the first p lace. In th e preparation of the mil itary instrument, some radica.l changes are nevertheless necessary. This is acknowledged, (or example, by three acceptable aut horitative statements, w hich should be carefully cons idered: • our classic armies are obsolete vis-a.-vis faceless enernies who do not wear uniforms, have nu name and fly easily across the most. forrified borders (Shimon Peres, Israel's Fore ign .Minister· - September 12, 2001); • we crossed the Rubicon., we cannot defend ourselves from.

If this is the situation, what arc we going to do? Jn order to meet the very hard challenges of the fut ure, it would be wrong Lo tailor the security instrument only for the fi ght against terrorism. Technologies and mil i tary instruments must instead be oriented to Lhe best de velo pmen t of two primary objectives: capability o f carrying out comprehe nsive, rapid and selective in Lerventions (against any th reat and naturally, where necessary, also in peace missions), and red u ced vulnerability which must be pursued through changes in the organizat ion and particularly in the ·weapon systems, ,.vhich so far have given the highest priority to povver (in the maritime sector, Lhe attack to the USS Cole can teach us many things) . Great atten tion must be g iven also to the precision o f the ,.veapons and of th e target -acquisition equ i pment; it goes without saying 1.J1at the collateral damages, even when limited, are as many psychological weapons offered to the enemy propaganda. Fina ll y, the most diffic ult c ha ll enge : we must establ ish a mainly humanistic cul tural and professiona l training for the

"Mangus ta" A 12 9 combat helicopter arrned with AIT missiles.

Cadres, Leaching them Lo give due importance to man, giving technology only Lhe role it deserves, without excessive enthusiasm. Everybody - and not only the military - should understand that Lhe war between regular armed forces did not finish on September 1 1 b u t rathe1~ as we said, Âˇwith the fall of the Berlin Wall. This causes a sharp change in the concept of security which, besides pulting to the test the politico -military leaders, requires the harmo nious coordina t ion of all efforts and componen ls to ach ieve the common objectives. Non affiliation, Âˇ corporativism, separation and exclusivisrn, so common in our rn ili tary history, are not admitted anymore. From

the global, industrial, technological, rnassive war lo the invisible war of today, the leap is long and difficult, but necessary. To have success, the transition must be made w ill, un ity of intents and objectives, not only by the entire security system of the Country, but by all citizens. And soon. Only in Lh. is way \Ve shall be able to concentrate all our forces on the enemy's decisive and weakest point. The real revoluliun in 1nilit.ary affairs starts precisely from this. (October 200 l )

D "'C'olonel (ret.)

NOTES ( l)See, for ex amp le : Various Authors, "The missions abroad or the Italian Army" (edited by Enrico 1\ilagnani). Rorne, i\rrny Staff Ed. 1992. (2) Vincen7.o Mol inari, "The art of

war" - six volurnes, Parma, Grazioli Ed. 1871, p .234. (3) Nicola Marselli, ''War and its history", Rome, Voghera 1875, Vol. l, p. 104 and 136-139. (4) Enrico Barone, "Mi litary instit utio ns and politico-social condilions", Tu r in, Roux & FrassaLi 1898, pp .VII, xvm and x1x. (5 ) See "Th e war against Italy", Rome, Quadrivio 'Ed . 1940 (abstract from ;,Les Guerres navales de d cmain" - 1891, b y Commandant Z. & H. l'v1ontechant; foreword by Maj. An tonino Tri,.,.i no, TTN. (6j On Lhe changed nature of the ,var i11 our tirne see "Encyclopedi"i of Social Sciences", Rome, IsLiLuto Encic lopedia ltaliana l 894, Vol. IV pp 465 -467 an d Ferruccio Botti, "The art or war in 2000 m e n and sLrateg ies between t he 19 t h and the 2orfi' Centu ry", Rome, R ivisl.a Mi litare Eel. 1998, c hapter TV. (7) Marsha l Bernard Law Montgomery, "History o[ wars", Milan, Rizzoli Ed. 1970, p. 10. (8) F. Botti, "The an or war in 2000 - men and strateg ies", p.305 . (9) Ibid, p .358 . (1 0) Ibid, pp.630-632.

by Francesco Semprini

Âˇk

Most ASEAN countries, after the devastating crisis of 1997, start to show the intention to open themselves to the free market and to international cooperation. This explains _the interest of the Western operators towards this area and in particular towards Thailand. A Country that stands out for its economic dynamism, its efficient military instrument, employed in a wide range of UN peace missions, and for its manifest preference for the culture, art and products made in Italy. 30

he Asian continent, ou Lstanding for its tenitorial and demographic dimensions (about 3 billion people) is charact erized by noticeable economic, commercial and sociopolitic diversities, despite the developm ent, for decades, of a multi lateral process of regional accords among its sovereign States. ASEAN (Association of SouthEast Asian Nations) ist the first organizaLion derived fron1 this process. It was born in 196 7, from

i\far Cinese Orientale

SUD-EST ASl.1.L\TICO 1vJar

delle

FiUpp in e

.., • •Luzon I

.j1 ANILA

FILIPPINE Palawan Mindanao Penisola Malese

~ ~

BRUNEI . -.. Y..- -MALAYSIA !*.BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 9 KUALA LUMPUR..c \J Jl't. SINGAPORE I . ..

l':1~«g/j1;1NGAPOR E

r--

orn:eo '

Celebes Sumatra

Grandi I sole della Sonda

INDONESIA

GIACARTA*

Oceano In diano

Oceano Pacifico

Giava

PAPUA-NU OVA GUINEA 4

Nuo,!a Guinea ~1are degli Arafura AUSTRALIA

a pact among Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phtlippi nes, Singapore, Thailand, and enlarged witb the joining of Brunei, Laos, Myanmar~ Vietnam and Cambodia. Papua New Guinea and South Korea are admitted as observers. ASEAN's decision-making centre resides in the Conference of the fore ign ministers, but the important decisions are made during the rare occasions of the summits of the Heads of State and Government. . The curTent business is handled by a permanent ad hoe commiU.ee of specialists and officials and by a coordination committee in Jakaiia. In the past, in ASEAN has prevailed the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of the partner countries and pursuit of consent devoid of

unpleasant deep examinations. As a matter of fact, it seems unapt to give adequate answers to the multilateral political and social crises occurred in the area and even less to the financial crises . It has only been able to overcome the problem of Marcos' succession in the Philippines, to freeze Cambodia's participation, after the bloody events occurred in the Country, and to stimulate Vietnam's transition from statecentred Communism to a free market economy. In face of the financial crisis of the late nineties, ASEAN should express some decision-making capability, proving itself willing to rise the levels of cooperation among the partner Countries and create the conditions that can set in motion a cycle of commercial integration.

Only at the end of 1998 did the Partners decide to: institute a special area of investment aimed at reducing the barriers against the flow of direct investments and to achieve, by 2010, the optimal objective of liberalizing trade and investments by doing avvay with duties and customs barriers; promote a further regional cooperation for indus trial development and implementing a plan of coordination among the central banks and of regional surveillance \.vith reciprocal information on the economic data. Having set aside the principle of multilateral non -interference, ASEAN opts for a par control of the reciprocal behaviours so as to exert pressures on the Countries that adopt risky policies. In substance, it wants to 31

create a system of n1acrostability, possibly supported by a kind of Asian monetai-y fund, up to now favoured only by Japan. A second phenomenon of advance d Asian regionalism appears in 1989, with the institution of APEC, follov.1ing a proposal made by Australia. The organization, which has its seat in Singapore , includes the ASEAN Countries washed by the Pacific Ocean: China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada, Russia, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, Chile, Mexico and Peru. APEC, albeit it includes many non-Asian countries, has a particular sign ificance within the Asian region washed by the Pacific . However, up to now, it has not been able to promote any formal accord - not even in the commercial sector - acting only as reference forum for the economic-strategic decisions of the individual States, hoping for the liberalization of trade and investments, with long-term goals (2010-2020). The partnership gels an unexpected notoriety in

A market at Hai Han, \/ietnarn.

October 2001, when the US seizes the opporlu n.ity of Llie A PEC summit in Shangai to negotiate with Russ ia and China an al liance against international terrorism. Much more inte rÂˇest ing is th e bridge throvvn between Europe and Asia in 1994 with ASEM (proposed by Singapore), an association based on an agreement of economic cooperation between EU, ASEAN Countries (excluding Laos and .M yanmar), China, Japan and South Korea. Through ASE.M, the ASEAN Countries want to counterbalance the American weight within APEC and strengthen their identity outside the Asian-Pacific area. In economic, political and security terms, they tend to establish bonds with Europe that should go beyond the mere bilateral relations. ASEM is a lso a significant accord for the Asian Countries that were former European colonies, since it allows them to treat on a par the representatives of States that ruled them in the past. The first ASE.M forum, held in Bangkok in 1996 with the parlicipalion of the Heads of State and Prime Ministers of the 15 European Countries and of the Âˇ

10 Asian Countries, marks th e beginning of a cooperation and a dialogue that encourage, until the n1id cl le of 1997, a s p iraHing growth of the exchanges between Lhe Lwo continents. Considering the large demand of consumer goods, app liances , financing and infrastructure expressed by the Asian Counlries, we can foresee that by th e beginning of 2000, the exchange!:i between Europe and Asia will exceed by 50% the current trade between Europe and North Arnerica. These rosy prospects are watered clown by the economicfinancial crisis that in 1997 hit Eastern Asia, forcing ASEM to reconsider data and estimates about the process started in view of intensifying the relat ions between the tvvo continents. The collapse of the Asian tigers causes a reduction of the European exports towards South East Asia, w ith a damage only in part offset by the decline of the costs of Asian rnw goods exported in the opposite direction. Therefore, the West must lead the ASEAN Countries out of their cri sis, not only by winning back the confidence of the economy managers and of the financial markets, but also dissuading them from turning to protectionist measures . .ln view of this, the second summit of ASEM of 1998 decided to create, for the As ian Countries, a Trust Fund (within the World Bank) and a network of experts capable of guiding the financial restructur ing of the s ingl e Countries. These problems are interm ingled with the strategic interests of some European Countries wh ich sell anns and train military fonnations of various Counti-ies of the Region. For example, France and Great B1-ita i n supp ly 20% of the armaments. Undoubt e d ly, if ASEM and APEC were in a position to express appropriate ly coordinated

and significant decisions , it would be easier to find structural solutions for the sys.temic crises of the Asian Countries, of course through institutional organizations such as WTO and IMF.

WARNING SIGNS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997 Until .1997 the Asian area records a high growth of its GDP, together with deep structural transformalions in the production systems and remarkable chariges in its institutional organ ization. The mar·ket share of the area, as compared 'With the world trade, quadruplicates in a time-span of 25 years (from 5 to 25%). In the face of the success o[ the Asian Countries' economic policies, the World Bank abstains from admonishing tbern w hen they depart from the traditional prescriptions of the economic policy which, as a rule, tend to leave free space to the market, liberalize the exc han ges, avo id subsidies to the industry, etc. The WB considers these policies market -oriented and not conflicting with the principles of free trade it champions together with the IMF. The trade exchange in the Region is characte rize d b y a marked increment of direct investments (the manufacturing industry is privileged), ,vh ich in 1995 reach a yearly amount or 90 billion dollars . While the trade exchange of almost all Western Countries records a 50% inc rease in 5 years, the Italian trade remains in a marginal position. Among the numerous sectors involved by this growth there are those concerning ve hicles, electricity, textiles and clothing, agricul.Lure, farm-industry and electrnnics, which assu~r1 e a particu lar importance. The economic- ri nancia l crisis

of 1997 hits South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Ma lay s ia and Thailand in a more severe way, causing a slump not easily remedied. The crisis starts in Thailand and spreads rapidly throug hout U1 e other Asian nations as a consequence of the so-called contaminating effect. The warning signs of Thailand's crisis can be detected in a series of negat ive circumstances: d eficit of current expense reaching 1.8% of the GDP, rate of exc hange anchored to lhe American do] la r and high foreign debt. The considerable devaluation of the local currency (the baht), caused by the repeated speculative attacks of the international investment funds (the so -cal led edge funds), marks the real beginning of Lhe cr-isis . Although of rather limited dimension, the devaluation of the baht spreads through th e other Countries witl1 such a speed that it provokes the ruinous effect of chain devalual ions and collapse of Stock Exchanges. The considerable depreciat ion of the baht badly a rfccts the currency or Malaysia, the Philipp ines and Indonesia and, in lesser vvay, that of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiv"° an, South

A rice-paddy in Myannw.r.

Korea and China. After alternate phases of fluctua lions, the cun-encies of Indonesia and the Philippi nes, at the beg inning of 1998, reach a devaluation of 3040% against the dollar. .According to the theories of some analysts, the contamination among the various econom ies occurs when the economic operators observe significant resemb lances b etween two eco nomies, or a remarkab le amounl or commercial 1·clations. The ctuTency crises automatically nigger off financial crises, because in the preceding years the rate of insolvency of the great national a nd internalional banks (i.e. the amount of the banks' bad debts) }1as gone up. Jn the banks or South East .Asia, the pe r·centage or dishonoured credits reaches the 10-20%, compared to 1% in the US banks. In Thailand, 58 financia l companies that have a la rge number of bad d ebts were suspended at the start of the crisis. In Indones ia, the economic crisis is added lo the politica l crisis determined b y Suharto's resignation and degenerates into i nteret hnic tensions, 33

Fig. 1 9':NGAGEMENTS OF IMF ANO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS (in billion US$)

CO\JNTRIES

IMF"

l\.fultil.uh.irul \V,, rld 8lrnk

Bllukrllt F1'01n sovt:-;

TOT Ai,

9 ,9

8,0

1$.7

36,6

3,0

$(1uth l<.orc:n

:!.0,9

14,0

23,3

58,2

15,1

Thl.Wand

3,9

2.,,

10.5

17 . l

2,7

34,7

24,7

52 .5

l l l .?

TOTAL

dangerous for the regional balances. Tensions that are nol completely appeased yet. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE ASIAN CRISIS The interven Lions to rescue East Asia from its monetary and financial crisis are of such a size that, for the first time, they pose questions about the adequacy of the resources of the IMF, and of the international community at large, vis-a-vis the exceptionality of these events (fig. l). In August 1998 the I.MF 01·ganizes packages of intervention and programmes of reforms aimed at putting in order the economies of South East Asia by keeping in activiLy the financial channels between the economies hit by tl1 e cns1s and the international markets, without freezing funds. According to the Bank of International Regulations in Basel, the bank foreign debt of the Asian Countries amounts to 357 billion cloUars; Europe holds 39% of the credits (approx. 140 billion dollars); Japan 33% and the US only 1,8%. The IMF intervenes with the redressing measures typical of the eighties, such as, for example, 34

f'lQ•ml"1\1 h)' JMl:-

FrMn Al)l'il 1?98 \11, l>illiu.. U SS)

and A s ian developmcm Bank

20):1

by closing down lhe financia l companies in trouble, fis cal restrictions and cu Ls in current expenditur·es and rising inlerest rates. As a whole they are aimed at containing inflation, ensuring fl exibility to exchange rates and to the labour market, as \,vell as liberalizing foreign capitals, in part icular in the financial and credit sector. The deflationa i-y impact o[ credit cuts , fiscal squeezes in the social field and the further risks of insolvency are underestimated. In fact, in order to be able to fol low the developments of lhe crisis, the IMF is forced to carry out continuous and frequent revisions of the estimates. Concretely, in the A SEAN Countries the crisis causes reductions in GDP, internal demands (up to 10%) and imports.The measures adopted to offset i l lead to a rapid improvement in the balances o[ payments and in foreign accounts, and to the relaunching of exports; on the other hand, the unemployment rate grows. Since th ese Countries have scarce social protection , the increase in unemployment inevitably gives r ise to serious tensions. Malaysia and Thailand, Countries with a share of irnmigrant labour,

consider the possibility o f proceeding to forced repatriations. According to the IMF, th e Asian crisis may have reduced by 1% the gro,vth-rate of th e world GDP; obviousl v, Countries like NevJ Zeala 1{cl and Auslralia, more involved in the commercial exchange wi th South East Asia, may hav e suffered a greater reduction . MACROECONOMI C EVALUATION OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AT THE END OF THE NINETIES The ten ASEAN Countrie s represent 7% of the socio economic power or lhe planet, considering (empirically) lha t they include 9% of the population and 6% of the economic spaces (3% of the emersed land and 8% of the sea areas). However; in order to outline the great contrasts existing in th e region, we must relate the GDP of the various nations wit.h the respective indexes of the per:..capita GDP. From lhis relation, we can observe that four models emerge in an increasing order of wea.llh. Th e 1st model represents tl1 c poor Countries, underdeveloped and economically closed, with a per-capita GDP of aboul 400 dollars per year; a per-capita surplus of 70 dollars per year corresponds (in a broad sense) to this datum, a surplus that can exist only by drawing crumbs from the monetary Hows that graze il. It is defined also "survival surplus", because it admits charitable and/or mafia interventions. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam can be included in this model. The firsl tvvo Countries have a small population (3% of the region) and are in serious conditions of poverty (per-capita GDP of 310 dollars per year) . Their economic weight is insignificant (below I% of the regional activity). Since they do not have an instrument of

capitalization, they are unable to develop an industrial production and, therefore, are .compelled to import, at the cost of.a heavy commercial deficit (equivalent to 40% of their GDP). In order to survive and try to emerge from their w1derdevelopment, Cambodia and Laos must accept, without conditions, more or less floating foreign capitals (fig.2). Myanmar and Vietnam have instead a significant demographic weight (25% of the region) and are less poor ( 400 dollars percapita GDP per year). They are in a position to realize a modest socioeconomic infrastructure and a minimum industrialization, even if supported by some protectionist expedients. Foreign investments are still limited in both Countries, owing to internal malfunctions as well as to the opacity of the regimes in power, whose intentions are not easily understood. The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia be long to the 2nd model and are marked by a limited poverty ( 1500 dollars percapi ta GDP per year) and by a minimum of economic r·esources (at Rumenia's level). Their consumption takes up less than 60% of the GDP, leaving a surplus of 600 dollars per capita per year; enough to develop a reasonable industrial capability. Thanks to this surplus, they are able to realize a minimum of socio-economic infrastructure and obtain an industrial production of aboul 400 dollars per capita per year: Their foreign celat ions are important ( 40% of the region) and amount to 500 dollars of the investments per capita per year. The three Countr ies are the substantial component of the region, if considered in terms of foreign relations, productive activities, population and consumption (2/3 of the ASEAN area). The Philipp ines retain some typicality of the 1st model. Thailand , a lthough it has the highest per-capita GDP (2700

Fig. 2

South East Asia in 1997

.:.

Corn,lotlon b<twr.n GDP 1U1d p,,r ca1>ilu GDP In US$ Logarith.,u.ic. sc::ik l'<r C:tpi1a

GOP i1) ck\ ll!U"$

.51ngapore

"'""

Brunei

10000

"°'

Malaysia

Thailand

'2,000

The Philippines

Indonesia

HOO !llO

!"Yanmar

LfOS Cam~odia

"'°

.Vietnam

100

"'°

Pil in tiilli,on S

Corrclaliou between Jnduslrlal pn>duclion (%) and n-gional imports(%) Logaritmic scale !I)

Rcgionol

l~onesip Thailand

industrial

pn:><luc1ion

(%)

• • Ma;aysliingapore The Philippines

s Vietnam 2

MY, mar

C\S

Cam,bod a C\2

B_nmei

Laps

C\I 0,2 O,.l Regional impons (%)

0,1

dollars per year) holds an intermediate position in lhe group , because of the modest presence of foreign investmenls within iLs economic system. Indonesia approaches the 3rd model, buL is too pervaded by internal disturbances portending uncertainties. The 3rd model includes lhe weal thy Countries (8000 dollars GDP per capita per year), i.e. Malaysia and Singapore. In both cases, the private consurnplion absorbs less than half of the production, providing a surplus which permits to create a modern socio -economic

100

infrastructure, a high level of industrialization, attracting remarkable foreign investments and maintain a high volume of imports (approx l O,000 dollars per capita per year) . The population of the two Countries is less than 5% of the whole region, whi le the productivity level reaches 27%. The 4th model is represented only by Lhe exlrernely rich Brunei (GDP per capita per year of 13,000 dollars) whicb can count on surplus of 55% of its GNP. The industrial capability of this Country is of secondary importance as compared lo what

A street in Singapore.

it obtains from its oil resou rÂˇces. Thanks to these resources, it can import the equivalent of 7,200 dollars per capita per year. Brunei is a great exporter of capitals and, therefore, the foreign investments in its economy are very limited. For its geographic (the same as Liguria's) and demographic (300,000 inhabitants) dimensions and for its productive structure dominated by oil and the Royal family - Brunei is a state reality very sim ilar to the Emirates of the Persian Gulf.

ITALY'S PROJECTION INTO SOUTH EAST ASIA The main lin es of Italy's economic-commercial po licy towards South East Asia, after the Asian crisis of 1997, seem to be still rather uncertain. It should be stated in advance that Italy's economic presence in the ASEAN Countries was little affected by the crisis of 36

1997, b eing a reality rather different from the similar ones of other EU Countries. Italy's policy has asserted itself in relatively recent times, has a dispersive and occasional character and reflects the nationa l economic system. The model is based on the prevalence of small and m iddlesize concerns, verÂˇy much inclined to exports and rather unwilling to stabilize thernselves on the fore ign markets \Vith forms of investments different from the us ual purchase of shares. This presence in the past was encouraged by continge nt and short-term facto rÂˇs, .i.e. by the heavy devaluation of the Li rn in 1992/1993, the expansion of the Asian internal demand especially in the machinery sector and the Asian governments' will to acquire a diversified productive organization . The performance of our exports is also favoured by two political reasons : Italy's extraneousness to the colonialisms rorrnerly ruling in the region and its noninterference in the internal

affairs of the Asian Countries. The exchange between Italy and the ASEAN Countries, unti l 1996, equals 23% of that in progress with the rest of th e 'vvorld and guarantees l /3 of the global commercial assets. Despite the many uncertainties inherent to 1.l1e present worl d economic situation, a relaunch of Italy's econom ic presence in the region, according to new schemes, appears extremel y favourable. As a precondition, it should be ascertained that each country is ready to cornp.ly witb the princ i ples of lawfu lnes's , openness to the market, liberalization of foreign investments; other factors should also be well considered, such as the structure of the internal demand, the historical level of family savings, etc ... The e lemen ts emerging from these evaluations evidenc e immediately that the economically nwre dynamic Countries of the region a r-e Thai.land, Malaysia and Tndonesia . It follows that it is convenient lo vviden the network of bilateral accords with these

Countries (especially as regards investments), r·eviving Lhe exisling mixed Commis s ions and establishing offices and sensors aimed at improving the efficiency of our Institute for Foreign Trade. .Moreover, our businessmen should be directly involved in the dialogue with the ASEAN Countries and there shoul d be an a dequate support to the initiatives of any other· componen t of the Italian society (regions, universities, commercial and consultant socielies, etc) wishing to establish themselves in As ia. One should try lo strengthen bilateral relations with the most reliable Countries of l.be area, because ASEM finds it difficult to take root as an or·ganiza tion capable of making operational decis ions. This conlexl prod u ces a synergic whole of econom ic, commercia l and geo-strategic factors which attract t he attention to Thailand. Unlike other ASEAN Cou ntr ies of the 2nd model, Thailand has never been under co lonial rul e and therefore is more inclined to share the Western po ints of view on the main issues of world policy. lt has j oined t he most imporlant international agreements (ASEM etc.) and has participated together with Italy in the peace operat ions in East Timor. Besides, apparently the Ital ian and T h ai comm u n it ies have affinities as regards artistic and cultural preferences. While Indonesia and the Philippines spread over vast archipelagos , Thai land has a unitary and central geograph ic configurat ion within the IndoChinese peninsula. lt constitules tl1erefore the easiest access to a ll the Countries of Indochina and a crucial cl earing and transi t crossroads for manv international air- and sea-routes. Bangkok is the terminal of most of the a ir and sea traffic that from Europe branches off to the Far East and .Austrnlia. Tha Thai nation is surrounded by Countries that are poor but

have an e normous potential of economic developmen_t. Myanmar and Vietnam, are thickly peopled and have an emerging economic activity w hi ch, in lhe near future, is going to need a large infrastr uc ture. Laos and Cambodia, at present o f litLle demogrnph ic and economic importance, are nevertheless in an env i ron men.Lal p osition suscepti b le of a d ivers ified development o[ economic aelivi.Lies. Suffice it to think of the large project of economic cooperation in the Mekong basin, sponsored by ASEM , which is partnered hy the Countries bo ,·d e ri ng on the Mekong river, including Chi na. The p lan envisages the conslruction of large hydroelectric power plants, the exploitation of huge n1ineral resources (especially in Laos) a nd agricultura l improvements in vast areas. The poor countries of Lhe IndaChi nese peninsula , despite t he ir

be ing governmentalist an d not very democrat ic, maintain strong comrn.ercial bonds with Thailand, endeavour to prnmo te the flow of fore ign investments for the deve lopment of Lhe respective industries a nd are eager to enter as soon as possible in to Lhe fr eema rke t play. In Asia, ideologies do not have an absolute value: they count inside the Country b u t hi nde r business re lat ions wilh Countries thal have o pp osite po! i t ica l o utlooks. After the crisis of 1997, Thaila nd was the first nation to show concrete signs of recovery by rernovi ng Lhe factors or ils structural weakness and by adjusting its econom ic system to the nevv situation. Now Thailand h as its papers in or·der and can reactivate its deve lopment, considering that the change bathdolJar is calm, inflation is at its lowest level, the encepha lograrn consumption shows s ig ns of

STRUCTURE OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC-EUROPE COOPERATION PARTNER COUNTRIES

Bruri

ldowsia

Malaysia The Philippines

Sut:qore Tkailuoi

y-,.- .

Laos My....ar

China

ASEAN

ARF

PMC

APEC

PECC

A SEM

A:sociation

ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAflPoslMimsteml

M a-Pecific

Confttehee

ColJl0!1'1.ion

Pacifl< EcoDOllUC Coope,.tiou

.. .. . • ... ... . . ... .

.. ... .

ofSo111b.-Easl MmNations

... .

.. ..

Japan Sooth Korea ADStralia Newz.alaod United Stat<d Canada

Russia E nn>pC10

Union(! )

Imm Cambodia

Mongolia l'llpu:aNew

Guinn

.. ..

.. ... .. ... . ... ... .

Taiwan

Hoag Kong SAK Chile Cobobia !l,1ma)

Peri Pacific Islands (2)

Eccmomi::

. .. .. .. .. ... .

Cow,;il

MaE=pe

... .. ..

... .. *

... .. ..

NOTES: (I) EU

-1xn..., ._.......,. iD AS~I oaly illclitidaally

{2) Thrf......... , ..-rit.... o(d,e f'a(iliureassoriakd--. ... Pt:cc

recovery and the Central Bank ensure, above aU, the security of desirable to do away with the relaxes its grip on the rates of the maritime traffic (95% of the useless restr-ictions imposed by the interest. impo rt-export of the Country European Community to the trade The Thai government obtains travels by ship) . with some Countries (c,mcellation this success thanks to a rigorous As regards our economic- of antidumping tax, extension of package of anti-crisis measures, commercial presence in the SPG benefits to Myanmar, etc.) launched in 1999, which ASEAN area, we cannot a vo id envisages tax reliefs, tariff saying that some Italian initiatives reductions, faci litations for loans have risked Lo fail because of CONCLUSIONS corning from abroad and , above negative factors which other all, a 7% VAT reduction. Countries, (European and non While the devastating effects of Since the middle of 2000. the European) have managed to the economic crisis of 1997 a re course of the Thai economy fading away, in all Countries like other A.SEAN Countries' of South Easlern Asia there - has suffered a deceleration GLOSSARY is an increasing will to set in caused by tl1e increased motion the development by ASEAN Free Trade Area costs o[ the energy AFTA opening to free market and products, by the cecessive APEC Asia-Pacif1c Economic Cooperation international cooperation . thrusts of US and Japan and Such will can be felt also in ARF ASEAN Regional Forum. the credit situation, Countrie s that have a remarkably improved since ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nation strong govern men ta) is I 1997 but not completely back organization. to normal. A(ter a massive ASEM Asia Europe Afeeting Most economies of th e reflux on the Bangkok Stock F.MI ASEAN Counlries have a Fondo Monetario Internazionale Exchange of capitals deposited stable and positive trend o f ICE Tstituto peril Commercio Estero by international investors, the grmvth rate (in 1999 it foreign observers h ave PECC fluctuated from 4.1 to 6.5%). Pacific Economic Cooperation Council confirmed t11eir confidence in The recovery concerns Prodotto Intemo Lordo a favourable evoluLion of the PIL especia lly the industri al Thai econorn.ic trend. sector, wh id) urges fo r PMC Post-Ministerial Conference This dynarn ism of the countinuous orders o f Piccole Meclie Imprese economic recovery has also PMI new machinery and/o r been fostered by Thailand's PML new technol ogies ; orders Prodotto .!\:1oncliale Lordo institutional soundness, its that are consi dere d rate of democracy (greater PNL Prodotto Nazionale Lordo extremely interesting by than that of the other the Italian manufacturers PVS Paesi in Via di Sviluppo ASEAN Countries) and by o( this sector. Th es e the m,u-1<.ed public spirit and SPG Sistema delle Preferenze Generalizzate positive signs go together industriousness innate in its with the reborn confidence Unione Europea people, especially those of UE of the local popu~tions in Thai ethnic o rÂˇigin. VAT the potentialities of th e Value Added Tax (come ]'TVA in Italia) One should also add that, economy, which is indicatiye World Trade Organization for its necessities of WTO of an increased revival o f security and prestige, the private consumption. Country can count on an The interest o[ the efficient military instrument, rernove long ago; for example, the economic operators for th e \.Vith a force of 330,000 men (one protection o[ the Italian macroeconomic realities of the of the most povverful of the investments in some Nations is region, today is focused on region) capable of carrying out a inadequate, also because they Indochina, \.Vith panicularÂˇ very wide range of missions, such have legal systems slow in regard for the Country which , as, for example, the participation deciding and inscrutable in today, more than any other in UN peacekeeping missions judging. This happens particularly Country, is in a position to offer and in Lhe in tern a tional in controversies between Italian conditio ns favourable to the campaign against the prncluction businessmen and local companies revival and relaunching o f and diffusion of drugs. Besides, and citi1.ens. It is absolutely economic-commercial iniLiaL.ives in the Army is engaged in the necessary to r-e medy such the entire peninsula, i.e. in Thailand. unhappily famous "golden inconveniences through suitable This Country is very interesting triangle", and the Navy must bilateral accords. IL is also for its economic dynamism

during the years of the crisis (1997-98) and for its clear sympathy for the Wesl. As r路egarcls Italy, this interest is corroborated by the preference that the Thai society expresses for the Italian culture, art and good taste. In military jargon Thailand could be described as a suitable launching base for the Italian economic-commercial initiatives in that area. Besides the immediate economic returns, it is profitable to expand our presence in Thai.land and to the neighbouring Countries through bilateral relations aimed at fi nding and evaluating the commercial and business opportunities of the area, as well as appraising the real values of the reality of each State. This polilical-econom ic option does not spring from a desire to compete with other UE or extraDE Countries, but only from the legitimate interest Lo路 allow our enterprises to express their best operational and lechnologic capabilities, to promote every form of tedmical -scientific cooperntion

and to introduce in the Asian commercial c ircuits the most appreciated national products. Lel us adm it tha t in this regard there mav be a surfacing ofuncertainlies' and conflicting signs. Suffice it to think, on the one hand, or the heavy deva luations of some local currencies, useful for incr路easing the exports of the Asian Countries and, on the other, the considerable drop in their industrial production and home demand, which leads to fear the beginning of a recessive phase that could last many years. We ought lo point out that the exports of Thailand and Indonesia are stagnant, i ( est imated in dollars, and shovv an increase, if measured in volume of exported goods. This means that the devaluation or the Cl.ltTency of the two Countries and the fall in prices on the internat iona l markets have reduced the beneficial effects of the respective exports and produced a slight deflationist impact on the Western economies.

Vietnamese drillin g pla1/or111 at Bach Ho, in 1he South China Sea .

Anyhow, the Asian South East continues to be very attractive, because the motivations particu larly favourable to the investments in the minor markets of the region (Thailand, Indonesia, th e Philippines) still exist. Obviously, one must try lo gravitale on those more reliable for thei r short- medium - term economic capacit ies and which have no politico-social or ethnicreligious disturbances. In a less -immediate future, hopefully, .ASEM is going to fulfill its Institutional role and constilute, for the UE Countries and for ASEAN a reliable point or reference and discussion, especia lly in the rnornen Ls of uncertainty of wodcl economy.

::J 路1:Graduate in Econorny and Commerce, specializing in Management Baruch University, New York.

What are the factors that have changed the international scenario, and what interventions are necessary in planning and defining the operational capabilities of the land Forces? The following article gives some precise answers to these questions, stressing the need that the emergencies appearing in the new politico-strategic picture be faced with an acceleration of the adjustment process, which is actually being fully developed in our Army and in those of many Western Countries. 40

he events of September 11 , if on the_ 011e hand have striken the feelings of all those who, all over the ,.vorld, share the same values of freedom , constit u tiona l state and respect for human life, on the other have added new parameters to the complex problem of security. It is a conceptual leap in a sector which, for more than a decade, has undergone a geostrategic evo lution , in which the Armed Forces of many Countries, and particularly the Western ones, have been engaged in a transformation process which has been rightly defined as "epochal". In this sense, one of the n10st important events is certainly the crisis in the Balkan area. This crisis accelerated the process of cohesion in the political and security sectors in Europe, prompting NATO to proceed to

a crilical review of its structures, in order to adapt them to the changed security requirements. As a consequence, alrn.ost all Nations of the EuroAtlantic area have been involved in the full development of important programmes of renewal, based on quantitative reductions and on the in crease of the operational ea pabili ties, at both national and multinationa l level. The scenario of reference, however, was antecedent to the terrorist attacks against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. It is therefore logical , today, lo ask ourselves what were the factors that produced substantial transformations in the scenario, and consequently what changes must be introduced in the definition of the forces and in the operational capabilities necessary to meet the new security needs.

EVOLUTION OF THE SCENARIO The general picture confirms the reduced possibility that, in the medium -long term, an international actor could d i rectly threa t en, in a "traditional" way, national and allied vita l interests, such as territorial integrity, with largescale military operations . Nevertheless, as was amply proved by the attack against the United States of America, the future scenarios will be characterized by a long series of risks , different in type and dimensions, with variable means and app lication points, which will also involve governmental and social structures. From a strict ly mil itary viewpoint, the potential enemies will very likely adopt techniques capab l e of neutralizing or decreasing Lhe technological advantage availa b le which seems to be destined to increase 41

of a capability of intervention, using power as a deterrent, but it could be necessary to actually deploy a projection comba t force, in order to achieve, if necessary, a real operational impact. The third consideration to bear in mind ensu es from th e ne,v structure of the NATO forces and from the consequences on th.eir categorization. It is a [a c t that the NATO decision to constitute a number of highreadiness Corps for both Ar t. 5 and CROs (Cdsis Response Operations) requ i res th e presence of Division/Brigadelevel formations capable of playing the role of readily dep lo yable "entry forces ", projectab le also to nonpermissive theatres, and able to create the secu rity framework necessary for the deployment of higher-level Major Units. ln this sense, this type of forces will have to meet requirements of high strategic mobility, and cornmand protection and comba t power helter than th e present immediate-reaction forces, in order to guarantee a high operational impact and an enduring survivability.

considerably in certain more and more frequent recourse sophisticated sectors. to the constitution of "Coal itions In general, at politico-milita,路y of the WiJling", underlines the level, it is necessary advance need that in future the forces will some observations on the have to be in a position to in novato r路y elements in the operate even with a lovv scenario of international interoperability. In view of this, it ,路elations. These innovaLions ,vill will be necessary to evaluate each affect the conduct of mi li tary time the degree of integration of operations, and are now as the military instruments, w ithout important as the strictly techno- accepting tout court the military elements. extension of the "taskThe first consideration derives organizalion" principle to the from the possible fluidity of the multinational sphere but, on the polit ico-mi lit ary coa litio ns in contrary, specifying the which the instrumen Ls will be minimum level below which THE OPERATIONAL called to operate. As a matter o[ "multinationalization" could ENVIRONMENT fact, the framework o[ alliances hamper effectiveness and thus and coalitions will evolve \Vitl1 a be unprofitable. The second The operational environment frequency never observed during consideration derives from the can be characterized bv several th e last fifty years. T his is anly sis of the political variables, fa lling witl1in two confirmed by the trend started institutions ex isting in the areas categories concerning, respectively, with Operation "ALBA", followed of foremost strategic interest, the physical and human sphere by SFOR, KFOR, East Tirnor and and indicates that, in case of and the eme,路ging threat. the international commitment in crisis in these reg ions , the The characteristics of the support o[ the US. application of diplomatic and pro bable future Operation Areas The different sensitivity about economic initiatives \,vould not will be different (Fig. I) from those crisis situations, and the be very successful. 0 n the where the traditional forces have potential diverging interests contrary, lhe enforcement of up to now planned their between partners in formal and diplomatic, economic and ern.ployrnent: greater urbanization, durnble alliances could lead to a informative measures together larger Operation Area s, decrease in the rythm of \,viLh others of lhe military kind, increased subdivision of the operations guided by joint would very likely turn out to be ten-ain, presence of civilians, will politico-military bodies and to a much more effective. characterize the future reduced integration of m ilitary In these areas , il will not be manoeuvring areas . Terrain, capabilit ies. On the contrary, the sufficient to give the impression enemy forces and ci\ilians are the 42

Italian squad at a checkpoint.

three inseparable components of the situation wbere all units wi ll have to operate. \Ve are going to examine each element, in order to determine their impact on the required capabilities. As regards the first classic factor, t;rrain, it is likely that in the future will occur again what happened in Soma lia: Kosovo, Chechnya and Afghanistan : the enemy wiLI rn.ove Lhe fighting to hi gh ly comparted and/or thickly urbanized areas, to counterbalance their vulnerabilitv in the sectors of intell igence and highly techno logica l ~Neapons, thus redressing the force balances. It is therefore possible to say that in planning the future military operations, the involvement in areas with a medium/high density of urbanization cannot be ru led out.

Therefore, in order to develop the type of forces to be employed in urbanized environments, it will be necessary to take into account the following characteristics: • tridimensionality of the space, including the subterranean level; • predominance of structures and buildings, \vhose dimensions will hamper observation, fire, movement and Command-and-Control; • increased indistinctness and protection of the enemy formations or of individual elements , thus making more difficult their acquisition and neutralization; • non -contiguity and large extension of the ba ttlefie.ld and, in particular, of the area of responsibility, in relation to the forces employed; • high physiological stress, due to the high level of atten tion required, the presence of risks on all sides and the impact of

close combat, which arc elements producing a high rate of atlenlion of the personnel. As regards the presence of civilians, it wi ll not be possible anymore to overlook the probable po lit ical implications connected with a military involvement of the centres of gravity located in a urbanized and media-influenced context. As a consequence , the units employed in this type of environment will have to possess a diverse and increased ability to gather and process information. In particular; a lso the lower-level Commanders must be capable of: • detecting the politico -social and psychological implications of the use of force; • confronting possible actions conducted by paramilitary units, such as irregular forces, terror ist organizations and networks, extremist political facLions , transnationa l crime organizations; 43

• acqu iring in re al time th e cl i ,·e ctives on the Ii nes of conduct and the rules of engagement. The presence of inte l'national, governmen Lal and nongovernmental organizations (IOs, GOs a nd NGOs) in the future int e rve ntion a reas wi 11 be an add i liona l cha ll enge for th e military instrument . Relations marked by not always converging .require ments a nd p rogran,mes could result in dyscrasias vvhich alfect the fulfilment of the mission. The c1itical aspects that are going lo impose a re view of the composition o f" the formations are:

• the multiplicity, many-sided nature and unpredictability of the operational options, owing to the possible presence, in th e s am e o perati ona l scenario o r di ve rse types o r conflicts with different levels of intensity ( conflict islands) which will impose a selective manageme nt o f milit a ry capabilities in the same al'ea of operations; • the reversibility and instability of the conflict levels, clue to the continuous "symmetricasymmetric" interaction; • the difficulty in force deployment i n t he areas of intervention ow ing to the

possible interdiction of" the main points of entry in theatl'e, ,,1,foch cou ld also cause a greate1 complexity in the activit ies o f deployment a nd expa nsion o f the formations; • the rapid wearing out of the forces, as a consequence of the strong tendency to d ispers e them, the inc rease of restraints and limitations deriving from public opinion and po li lical power, w ith referen ce to th e gro wing and prope r sens1t 1v1ly towards th e safeguard of human life and natural en vironmenl. The influence of the media on milita1-y operations is growing at th e sa me ral e as th e interest shown by public opinion, which is more and more emotionally invo lved. l n the so-called "global village", the c r ises a nd t he mililary operations for the management of "hotbeds" will occur under the watchful eye of the media, that will amplify, tone down o r· modify every aspect of the crisis, also according Lo the panicular "conditionings" put into effect by o ne or more of the op posi ng pa r·Lies, or by "aim ed" information campaigns. The impact of one's own or enemy losses will have such a large echo arouse such a great deal of interest that it cou ld compromise the perception o f national security objectives. In consequence, pu blic opinion will s imu ltaneously ask for s uccess and reduction of the physical risks, costs and collateral e ffects typi cal of m ilitary ope rations, s u ch as the involvement of civilians and damages caused to th e e nvironm ent by the battle. T he last elem e nt that must be i nserte cl in the mosaic o f lh e future operational environment concerns the nature and the

Laver o( a self-propelled J~u11.

modus operandi of the potential enemies. There are possibilities thaL the adversary rnay have equal or equivalent military capabililies. but very likely t he enemy will consist of non-regular and nontraditional forces. Nevertheless, our forces will have to be able to confront forces with similar operational capabilities in high-intensity conflicts. On the other路 extccme, it is verv likely that irregular military forces with differ路e nt operational capabilities will conduct a number or 11.011.-conventional hostile acts against us, employing surprise and dccci t, with an asymmetric a n d asynchronous approach in order路 to reach their objective. The c ommand ccntr路cs and the logistic and training bases of the enemy could be spread, like a net, on a global scale and this would make the ir identification very difficult. TerrorisL groups

cou ld sLri.ke in n1.0re and more unexpected ,.vays, and in connection with unknown events. Very likely, the potential enemy wi 11 L.ry Lo prevent us fron1. protecting our vital points on the nat ional territory and Crom taking any repressive and preventive action against terrorism, for instance through the interdiction of the air; railway and sea points of embarkation (APOEs. RPOEs and SPOEs), obs.:ructing at the same time the access Lo the points of en trance to remote theatres; such as air, sea and railway points of disembarkation (APODs, SPODs and RPODs). This makes mandatory for us to envisage and/or confirm the availability of forces deployable in a theatre even in absence of port and airport infrastructure, or to organize easily accessible entrance areas. Tn the ruture it m ighL become very difficult to realize a security frarnework using the classic means

Women O/lzcer cade1s during a hreak in a.11 exercise.

of passive protecL ions and hightech nology surveillance devices. whi le greaLer a ttent ion should instead be directed to forms of in telli gence capab le of gathering informa tion directely from the social environment, prisoners, exfighters, exiles or refugees or from normal civilian personnel present in the operations area (HU.MINT). Fina ll y, with referen ce to the spreading out of the instrnments, it wi ll be expedi ent to set up combat groups capable of con ducti ng autonomous actions, centred on a lower-than -usual level such as the company.

ADAPTATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS

The evolution of the scenarios of em ploym en t th u s ou 1. I i ne d c learly has deep impacts on the 45

Rangers of' the ;,Col lv1oschin" 9t h Regiment on training.

p.lanning of the land instrument. At this point it should be em pha sised hovv, from the viewpoint of force planning, the non-conventional attack carried out to the heart of the United St.ates and the consequent reaction of the international community could be seen as a confirmation or the assumptions of the conceptual and organizational analysis, which, during the last fow years, has led to the renewal of the land instrument of the major Western nations. From the capability of confronting la rge numbers of armoured means, typical of the cold war, we have started long ago to orient ourselves towards capabi lities of intervention, of crisis control and management in the areas of strategic interest, considering the high-intensity combat as the most demanding and most important point of referÂˇence. Nevertheless, the dramatic d evel opment of the events of our times has imposed a great acceleration of LhisÂˇ evolutionary prncess and has required more attention towards the sectors that answer the needs

Restoration of a bridge across t 1 river.

connected with the struggle against typically asymmetric and non-traditional attacks. I wish to point out that the updating/improvement process of the military capabilities of the European Nations of the Alliance at present is regulated by the Defense Capa b ility Initiative (DCI), i.e. by th e process o( alignment of the European capabilities to the US ones, according to convergence standards established in the

Washington summit o f 1999 , under the pressure of tb.e operations in Kosovo. Considering the acceleratio n occurred in the programmes o r tb.e US defence and the size of the changes brought in the relevant planning objectives, it is likely that a similar updating, albeit of lower level, will tak e place w ithin the Alli ance in connection with the convergence standards of the abovesaid DCI. Le t us see how the US Army is reorganizing itself. Thanks to a programme started a long time ago, the US Army is tr"ying to employ in the most effective way the considerable funds thaL will be at its disposal to implement the socalled transformation of the land instrument, according to s t andards that meet the new challenges determined by the "Joint Vision 2020" . Considering that these funds are in anv case still insufficient for. the modernization or the entire instrument, it was dec id ed to divide the developrnent of th e forces along three mainlines. The

legacy force, i.e. the force inherited from the cold war, is based on heavy unj ts and • four main weapon-systems: the "Abrams" tank, the "Bradley'' A PC (and deriving families), the "Apache" and UH-60 helicopters and the MLRS/ATACMS rocket launcher. This body of forces, deemed insufficient for the requirements of the totality of the new scenarios of employment, \.Vill be updated only in part, thro ugh the introduction in some units (a Corps) of indispensable systems, such as computerization, the "Crusader" self-propelled gun and the "Grizzly'' pjoneer tank. These units, backbone of the US Army until the end of its transformation, will have to permit to conduct counteroffensives at Corps level for solving high-intensiLy crises. It should be noted that the technological level of such forces is approximately equivalent Lo the objectives of the modernization and renewal progrnmme of the Italian Army up to 2010 (ARIETE -APC DARDO - PzH 2000 - A 129 - NH-90 - ESC - SAMP-T SIACCON 2) . The interim force, destined to be a gap-filler, with the aim of having immediate availability of an instrument oriented towards the nevv tasks, is formed by the body of the said updated legacy (orces and the 6 IBCT (Interim Brigade Combat Team) medium brigades, that are being realized thanks to the acquisition - w ith a sped-up procedure and the choice of offthe-shelf materials, i.e. withol;t idle times for research and development - of 2100 8x8 LAV lll armoured vehicles in 10 different versions. But the final result of the entire process of transformation will be the objective force, which will constitute the radical change of all the organizational components of the US Army. It will be implemented starting from 2008, in successive stages, until 2020 (2010 is the date in which the initial operational capabi lity will be conferred to the first un it

. ,. GUIDELINES OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE US ARMY RESPONSIVENESS: reduced response times to achieve EARLY EFFECT. DEPLOYABILITY: possibility of deploying , everywhere in the w orld, complexes of Brigade-level in 96 hours, Division in 120 hours and Corps (5 Divisions) in 30 days. AGILITY: possibility of conducting the entire range of military activities. VERSATILITY: capability of "dominating" the enemy at all moments of the missions envisaged. LETHALITY: capabilities distributed over the whole traditional range, decidedly superior to those typical of the present heavy forces. SURVIVABILITY: obtained mainly through situational awareness, in order to prevent threats to the safety of the personnel, and by applying forms of active and passive protection based on innovative technologies. SUSTAINABILITY: adoption of measures aimed at reducing the logistic "burden", such as reductions in consumption of fuel (new propulsors) and ammunition (precision attacks, reduction of calibres}, water production (depuration and conversion of combustion products, employment of dehydrated foods, etc. Fig. 2

reorganized and re-equipped in view of the emisaged goals). In this regard, we ought lo point out that the objective of the planning consists in realizing an organ.i,.ational structure aimed at projecting anywhere in the world, also in situations of unavailability of entrance points or in presence of hostile forces, a force capable of acLi ng as deterrent in peacetime, having dimensions and composition suitable for carrying ou l the entire assumable range of operations (from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity fighting). The guiding pr inciples of this transfonnarion are summarized in Fig.2. The main basic concept of all developments is the ·emphasis on personnel at all levels . Such concept, apparently taken for granted, constitutes the real revolution that needs the support of the doctrine, materials and organizations that will have to be developed. 1n short, with a procedure similar in concept to the one which, in the artillery, has led lo transfer the responsibility of fire delivery from the group to the single gun, it was decided to exploit in a coordinated whole the

capabilities that best clrnracter·ize the young Ame1icans: the high level of knowledge, the ope1mes of mind and the skill in using computer systems, which stems from the extremely rapid evolutionary pace that distinguishes theese tools. It ,vas therefore decided to provide the combatants, down to the IO'west possible level (tl) e individual soldier), ,vitb a constantly updated situation in real tin1e, by means or portable monitors that permit them to receive orders in graphic form and to transmit through sin:iplified schemes his own comments and intentions, contributing actively to the decision-making process. Such possibility will permit to make the most of a large pool of intelligences from the viewpoint of "organized" flexibility. As rega rds materials, the US Army is oriented towards the system of systems approach, obtained through the integration in an all-inclusive package, sustained by the Command and Contro l system, of the components necessary to perform all lhe operational functions. The main elements, as regards technological complexity and cost, will be the C4ISR (command, control, communications-and-information, secret and reserved), in such a way

"/\lpi11i" 011 mck-climhi11g trainil1f!,.

a s ro a c ti vate, down Lo the individual fighte1~ a fiO\\' of clala of lhe type and size that today charac terize the US Bri gade Commands (in E urnpe, of DIV/ Corps level ), an<l the la nd combat system , a whole of pl a tforms of hig h tactica l a nd strategic mobility. There will be one or more t~Âˇpes of land and air platforms, som e of wh ich unrnanne<l . capable of meeLing the entire range of' taclical requirements, on Lhe s u rface and unde r it, and compatible with the C-130 aircraft (a margin of weight reduction by 25% is conside,-ed op tim al , wi th the co n seq uent objective o f 14 t). Eve,-y platform should perfonn two functions (e.g. indirect fire and C4). Among the unmanned platfo ,Âˇ111s, t he RlSTA (reconnaissance, in lelligence, surveillance, target acquisition) robots and two types of umnan ned aircra ft (UAV), a lighter one (airscrew propulsion, stationing at about 150 m of altitude for some hours) at the disposal of platoons, and a more complex one (hel icopter with 40 hours maximum endurance) for combat groups. T he transfonnation/revolutio n o r the US Army, in the light of the mentioned accelerat ion produced b y the e volution of the even ts, envisages the medium-te1Âˇm availability (10- 15 years) of an instrument cap able of m a king obsolete any system in use today in the Western ,vorld. This assumption, acknowledged by most Western Armies, will entail the necessity to have nnits if not comparable (considering the foreseen complexity and costs) at least compatible with the characteristics of the objective fo1'ce. This in view of being able to cooperate actively in tl1e possible f'u ture combined operations. f n particula1~ the approach fol lowed b y most E uropean Armies is oriented towards conferring to a significant part of the available

forces intervention capabilities including, within the formations of refere nce (Brigade and/or b a ttalion/ regim e nt ), a ll the components necessary for an effective e mployme nt at the first moments of projection in ene my operational theatres, even if with dime nsions, type of means and organizational form s clearly differentiated as regards the diverse range of starting s ituation s . B eg inning from a common factor, the major Countries of th e o ld continent s hould co rn bin e (Fig .3) their operational requirements with the avai lability of personnel, financial

resources and materials. Th e results are obviously paced in time according lo the o bjective reality o[ the individual Armies, but the common line is represented by the a pproach towards rl1 e "average" forces, whose concept has b een o utlin ed in the articl e " T he average force s in asyrn rnetrica l confli c ts" ( Ri v ista Mi litare no. 6/2001).

The European average forces w il l h ave t o po ssess th e characte1istics resulting from the compromi s e between th e traditi onal ch aracteristics of the combal power (protect ion , tactical mobility and fire-power)

and the new characteristics of the expeditionary forces: strategic and operational mo.bility; high tactical mobility; sustainability; survivability in front of new threats and reduced "logistic weight".

THE PRIORITIES IN PLANNING THE NATIONAL INSTRUMENT Now it is important to continue on the way of modernization of the Service, confirm ing, above all, the validity of the "capability" effort for the deve.lopment of the forces. The plann ing model based on the capabilities rocuses on what kind of forces wou ld be required to confront a threat that an adversat"y could bring lo our vital interests rat he r· th an on "who" could do it and "wher·e" it would occur. Wi thi n this framework, the short-and medium-term plann ing objective of the Italian Army confers to the future a verage Brigades , equipp ed with armoured vehicles of the "Centauro"

EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES CONNECTED WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF MATERIALS

RADICAL IMPROVEMENI Technological approach Combat systems PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENT Finalization of RESIDUALS OF SITUATION DERIVING FROM COLD WAR

2000

2005

2010

2015

Fig. 3 family, as well as with 8x8 VBCs, soon to be in service, the possibility to produce an immediate operational impact, once they are in the theatre; this is a characteristic much more important than the mere speed of strategic deployment. For the mediurn-long term, we could envisage a combat system, having a co .n-1n1on platform,

emp loyable for the vario u s operational funct ions (Fig.4) . Thererorc the fundamental capabilities of the average Brigades should be: • high mobility (contemporaneously st rategic, operationa l and tactical) ; "B er saf!,lieri" at a checkpoi111 in Kosovo.

actions (raids and ambushes), developing an ti-terroris m operations and acquiri n g objectives of significa nt strategi.c importance; RISTA-EW • widening of the nuclea r, css RSTA biologic and chemical (NB C) Recovery DRONES R defence capabilities, alread v enti r·ely adequate as regard s quality but probab ly GENERAL insufficient, considering th e DIRECT SUPPORT increased probability that these SUPPORT Artillery weapons could be used; To Engineers • constitution of a psychologica l MANOEUVRE J - -_ ____),_,c.__ _ _~ - - - - - operations (PSYOPS) capability, COMBAT al regiment level, according to On-board combat the guidelines being established On-foot combat within NATO; • creation of a number of average forces corresponding to th e Fig. 4 assumptions of employrnen t directly conn ected w ith the • high comprehension capability • constitution of a varied pool of app lication of the jus t of the monoeuvering space; capabilities for reconnaissance, mentioned future scenarios to • higher combat self-reliance at information, surveillance, the force planning proc es s lower-complex level; targe l acquisit ion, electronic necessary to implement th e • combat superiority in operations war (RISTA-EW), in a position missions assigned to th e on compartmentalized and to help making up a Service; urbanized ground. multidimensional informative • qualitative and quantitativ e picture much more composite updating of the manoeuvre and Therefore, accor·di ng to the than what was considered in logistic support necessary for· n ew scenario, the new forces, the past. The most essential an effective employment of the which will allow us lo complete capabilities are those forces listed in the precedin g the range of capabilities already connected with the survei!Jance paragraphs. Among the latter, envisaged for the professional of the manoeuvering space and of particular importance are model, \,vill have to be developed the acquisition of the objectives the short-range and very-short with a greater rapidity than what functional to in-depth range (SHOR.AD and Vhas been clone up to now. In operations, as well as SHORAD) antiaircraft defence, particular, we shall have to consiclecing the grown the possility of carrying out inpursue the fol.lowing objectives, irnportance of the human d epth fire manoeuvres in already pointed out in the dimension, emphasi1.ed by the synchrony with the airlifted Capability Packages project , operations under way - the units (deep operations) and \Nhich \,vill be given maximum constitution of a HUMINT unit with all the very important priority in order to perrnit a for gathering and processing activities of the engineer units quick irnplementation of the information acquired through in the sectors of mobi I ily, necessary operational the direct contact with people counterrnobility and capabilities: and environment; deployment sup port. Th e • increase of the command and • further revaluation of the adherence logistic component control capabilities, necessary capacities of th e light and must assume the operationa.1 to realize the mentioned ai rliftecl forces, through the capab iliti es necessary for an process of e nlargement of the implementation of the all effective support of all of the pool of minds which weather, clay- and night- combat abovesaid components. participate actively in the capabilities in urbanized and Simultaneously it wi ll be decision-making process, to be particularly compartmentalized necessary lo develop short- and obtained thro ugh the environments; medium-terms p rog ram mes application of the new • strengthening of the component (Fig.5-6) in order to acquire the transmission and information of the pool of special-operation equipment and the weapon technologies; forces for conducting direct systems which contribute in

COMBAT SYSTEM

implementing, wi lb in short times , these capabi litie s. The emerging technologies will be employed in a lo1-1g-term perspective, through a diversified dev e lopme nt plan which, gene rally speaking and if the allotted r e so urc e s will permit it , could fo l low g u idelines conceptua.lly similar to the ones laid down by the US Army, with the correctives suited lo tJ-1 e European cl i rnension of our Service.

POSSIBLE PRIORITY SECTORS OF INTERVENTION OPERATIONAL FUNCTION

COMPONENT CAPABILITIES SHORT·, MEDIUM ·& LONG-RANGE A/T SYSTEMS 3··'GENERAT!ON

MALFUNCTION/1L VEHICLE POOL (IN R£?LACEM ENf OF VM•8 , vru., &. AR)

FUTURE•SOLDIER SYSTEM NIGHT VISION

COMBAT CAPABILl1Y OF MANOEUVRE FORCES

NON·LETMAL WEAPONS LIGHT FORCES (VOL. ov~2065)

MEDIUM FORCES vec axe, UPDATED ·ceNTAURO" & ENG,CP, RECOVERY DERIY HEAl'Y FORCES {VARUO - l.i:Of"Ai<•:i' r-::-pl - ~; :CCONA - i:CS)

AIRMOBILE FORCES (NM90 - E5C - CM-47 re ,I -1.1p~;1t cti A· l ?.~

CONCLUSIONS

SPECIFIC SECTORS

The innovations emerged from the international piclu r e as regards the security problems require an acceleration and an adjustm e nt of the renovation process, already in a phase o[ rull development in many \Nestern Armies and in the Italian Arn1y. The analysis of the scenario, of the risk factors and of t h e possible threats, offer useful hints to focalize the areas whe re it is necess a 17 to intervene. Obvoiusly the US - be it because it has always been in the vanguard of technological a nd doctrine innovat ion an d in the procedur es of force employment,

SPECIA~ FORCES

VARIOUS PROGRAMM ES

PSYOPS

VARIOUS PROGRA MMES

CIMIC

VARIOUS PROG!tA MMES

SIMULATION

VA RIOUS PROGRAMM ES

Fig. 5 or because, today, more than ever before, it is determined to boost its operational ea pa bilities over the ent ire range of possible interventions - it is a poin t of refere nce in thi s process of renewal and strengthening and <vv ill be able to pr-ov id12 usefu l suggestions for the Armed Forces of the Allied Countries. 1f it is not possible to converge to,vards a complete system integration, we shall have to pursue at least a sufficient degree of compatibility

POSSIBLE PRIORITY SECTORS OF INTERVENTION OPERATIONAL FUNCTION COMBAT CAPABILITY OF

MANOEUVRE FORCES SUPPORTS COMMAN D

AND CONTROL

COMPONENT CAPABILITIES F IRE SUPPORT - DIRECT! S UPPORT ARTILLERY (PzH•2000 - ULH C2) FIRE SUPPORT - DEEP ATTA CK A RTILLERY ( MLRS - AT ACMS - POLYPHEM) ENGINEERS FOR GEN ERAL S UPPORT ( MIME CLEARING - ENG COM l'LEXES - Sl'ECIAL VEHICLES) ENGINEE RS FOR G ENERAL S U PPORT (BRIDGES - EARTH MOVING EQUIP) Regt - BRIGATE Div. & HRF(L) HQ INF RASTRUCTURAL COM MUN ICATIONS & COM PUTERIZATION UNITS' COMPUTE RIZATION

INTELLIGENCE

RlSTA· EW ( RADAR - SENS0RS-CRE50 -VBL R5TA- DRONES & MINl· RPV)

AIR

S H ORAD & V-5 H ORAD (STINGER - SIDAM rcpl - S KYGUARD repl)

DEFENCE

within lhe All iance . For w hat co n cerns Italy, a provisional surve y of th e funct ions and operational capabilities of the professional model s hows that what has been planned is in line with the ne w scenarios , at least as r e gards the envisaged components. In particula1~ for some sectors, such as Command and Control, light (paratroopers and "Alpini") and ave rage (Ce ntaurn tanks) forces, combat helicopters and clearing o[ explos ive devices and mines (B OE ), we are in a forefront position , even if, in any case, it will be necessary to strengthen and boost these components. The next step is to complete the instrument as soon as possible, starting from the abovementioned pdorities, improving the existing lines of action, in order to optimize and make even more effective the Italian land forces, in accordance with what is done in the other NATO and E U Countries.

AREA DEFENCE (SAMP • T)

,~colonel,

Fig. 6

!lead, Plans Office, Army General Staff 51

Italy is one of the major contributors of forces engaged in Crisis Response Operations under the insignias of NATO. Notwithstanding this contribution, the lack of a suitable ability of Command and Control has, in fact, penalised the role and the : isib ility of Italy in the inlernational context. The events of September 11, moreover, have further imposed the necessity to have a capability of projectable Command and Control, able to manage highly operational resources for the performance of a wide range of missions, Âˇwith the objective to guarantee the safeguard of security, in the widest meaning of the term, that goes well beyond the simple defence of the National sovereignty, but includes the contribute to stability and international security. The project to give life to a NATO Command of elevated readiness and Italian framework, therefore, is established to fill this gap, by revisioning the "traditional" operational structures of the Commands that participate in the project. To realise and be able to count on a H igh Readiness Force HQ for NATO, actually operational, also represents a useful potential in the picture of the integration of the European Defence to safeguard international security. And Italy can give a notable contribuLion to the common project. The project to give life to this Command is shaped, therefore, as a binding challenge, nevertheless surely within the reach of our organisation that, by the rationalisation process of the last years, has acquired a real ability of projection. And the Army is not unprepared for this appointment! In fact, its Units have already shown, amply and on the ground, a capability comparable to those of the Allies and they are fu lly engaged , in terms of ability to be expressed, of personnel lo train and of forces to be made interoperable, in n umerous multila teral initiatives: EUROFOR, MLF, Multinational Peace Force for South East Europe and Stand by High Readiness Brigade. That's why it is also a projccl for NATO, for Europe and for the Army. The purpose of this mticle, and of the one wich will follow, is to give a unitary vis.ion of the general architecture, comprehensive of all the components of the l'vlajor Unit in order to transmit to the reader Lhe clear feeling of the real significance of the project for the structure of the Army, currently in the full process of transformation toward an entirely professional tool. It goes by itself that the article also wants to give the deserved an.cl right recognition to all those who,every day, in a convinced and synergic way, work hard to permit our Army to win this cyclopic challenge, bringing to a conclusion one of the most important projects from the post-war period Lo today. Good reading! Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army

he proj ect rela te d to the constitution of a capaclty of Comman d and Control' at Corps level with elevate1 readiness, for NATO, has imposed lo the Army a radical re vision of the structures of Command of the opera tio nal fo rces . T h e project, in fac t, h as not only i nterested the Command of the Corp s, b ut also t he Combat Support Commands (CS), the Combat Service Support (CSS) and the Intermediate Operational Commands.

(part one)

The scope and the importance of lhe project , as well as the imperious necessity to reach the intended objectives, m u st be shared by all the personnel of the Army, not to exclude us "d e facto" from the group of

organ isms who have a saying within NATO. With the two articles which follow we wil l illustrate the regulative aspects of the project, complete the technical details that often stay closed in the archives of the Staffs, to realise the internal and extern al c o mmunication necessary for the involvement of all the resources of the Army toward the atta inment of the amb itious o bjectives of the project. NEW DEMANDS OF NATO: THE

ITALIAN CANDIDACY To effect ively respond lo the change d strateg ic context. NAT O has started a Lime ly process of restructuring of the

1111 UNITS PERMANENTLY CONSTITUTING THE CORPS HQ c::JI CS ANO CSS UNITS IN SUPPORT OF ARC Uni ls inspired, besides, to the active prevention of crises. To possess the abilities of active preve ntion of c rises m ea ns lo have both ability of Com mand and Control (C2 ) and ready Unils, in quantity and quality to cond uct more operations of management of the crises (Crisis Response Operalions- CRO). l n other words, the process of revisio n of th e forces has the obj ec tive Lo increas e the capabilities to produce security of the alliance through the evaluation and the validation of the resources made available by the member Countries. Within the available resources the greatest gap is referable to the C2 ca pabilities . In fact, today Nato has at its disposal only the ARRC Command (1). As regards the forces, instead, the situation is diversified . The forces of the CS and CSS are numerically scarce, and so is the Corps Hq, while the number and level of the manoeuvre forces are destined to decidedly improve, in virtue of the

Autocolonna pro111a per mento.

movi-

Fig. 1

progressive professionalization of the Units in the forces of almost all the member Countries. ln this picture NATO has presented the dernand to have further C2 capabilities of elevated readiness that, together with the ARRC, will constitute the skeleton of reference for the ma nagement of

crises. The a ttribution of tl,e character of HRF (L) HQ (2), to the commands cand idate for the Full Operationa l Capabili ty (greater operational capability - FOC), will cons litute - on the inlerna tiona l plane - the watershed between the partners able lo actively conni bute to the security or the Allia nce, i.e. able to produce security, and those that instead can play, actually,, on!) the role of contributors or rorces. Italy, e ven though in c lud e d amo ng the grÂˇea test contributor-s of force s eng aged in C RO s , results deprived of a suitabl e ab ility C2, an d thi s h a s dete rmined a limited active role in the decisions. Therefore, the National candidacy for th e constitution of a HRF (L) I IQ i~ set to confer to Italy the ability lo play the international role that it deserves. An obj ective of su ch s cop e necess arily has to invo lve th e lotality or lhe Army. Particularly, the Army has to strengthen an d valori se the attitude to projection and the C2 capa bi lities, as well to as g ive a

complete multinalional dimension to its operational component. This was trans-lated in a National project dedicated to the realisation of a composite complex of resources (fig. 1) Lhat emisages the revision of the "tradiLional" regulative structures of Commands at every level. In substance a lrue "revolution" for the Land Operational Forces, more and more d estined to be fundamental producers of security. The present arlicle refers to the first part of the project, related to the Corps Comrnand and to the Units of direct support [C2S/CIS (3)]. NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITIES: THE REGULATIVE CHOICE

The mission assigned Lo the HRF Commands is to operate as Command of Corps under a Land Componenl Commander, or to constitu te a Land Component Command of Corpsle vel, under the authority of a RHO (Regional HQ), of a CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force) or of a JHQ (Joint HQ). In substance, the HRF Hqs must have the capabiliLy to operate in the whole range of miss ions, included the operations of high intensity (i .e . operations of "classicaJ" war) , in every operational environment, performing all the possible functions of the Alliance, included the function of AJFLCC (Allied Joint Force Land Component Command). Particularly, these Commands have to meet specific requirements defined by NATO. As 路regards the chain of Command and Control (fig. 2) it is to be underlined thaL the Commander or the Corps, permanently under Operational Command of SACEUR, manages the Operational Command on the Staff and on the units of direct C2S support. In operaLions, the Co rps

Fig. 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL MULTINATIONAL CHAIN

SACEU

X HRF

X/111

XX SM

X/111

I~~,-~~~1

1, lMND 1路7 -

__ _ ___ j

1----1

C2S/CIS

t;~JJ -

------~

PERMANENT OPCOM IN-OPERATIONS OPCON

Commander has the Operational Control/Conunancl (OPCONiOPCOM) over路 the Commanders of the Units, assigned by the contiibuting Nations. In substance, the Command of the Corps has an exclusive NATO interest. The employment in operations led by the EU can take place only follow ing decisions assumed b y NATO, wilhin the process of t;ansfer of assets to the EU envisaged by the ESDI (European Security and Defence Identit)i). while the employment in operations with National guidance is to be excluded in every case. Making the project, it has been essentia l to find a C2resourcc already in be ing, to be retrained i n or路der to realize lhe HRF Command. The Intermediate Operational Commands (COINT), constituted in 1997 modifying the old Corps, are the only concrete basis for the realisation of an Italian I !RF. Among the COINT.<; in being, the choice for the constitution of the

Multinational Staff has fallen on the Command of the Operational Projection Forces (FOP), to be located in Solbiate Olona. The motivations must be sought, besides, in the old experience of the COIVIFOP (Activation of the 3rd Italian Division (or ARRC, Operation "Alba"), in the availability of State infrastructure and areas and in a good position with respect to the Nat ional and European transport net. More complex resulted the solution of the problem related lo lhe C2S supports. In facL, the units destined to such function, besides guaranteeing the connections and the tactical and logistic support to the Corps, should have had also the capabil ity to practice the (unction of "National Contingent Command", as well as have a s Lructure suitabl e to th e "prearranged fracture" in case of prnjection. It has been therefore envisaged the constitution of a Signal Brigade, destined to realise the

Fig.

NATIONAL IN-GARRISON C2 CHAIN

xxxx

lsMEI

xxxx

FOREIGN MILITARY AUTHORITY

§]

! I

i i

xtx

~1 H~F I r - - ~)_(_ - -

I' ''I I

l I

I I

: cos :

,____________

i__ · ------------· ···· -----.... · ··-------· ··· -----_------- ;:.

..,. -

111

Ill

Cdo Sede

Ill

- - -- FULL COM DETACHMENT DETACHMENT ----------· CTRL L/AMM - ·-· -·-·- · OPCOM ~ " CONNECTION for questions of NATIONAL INTEREST

integration between the Operational Command (OPCOM) and the Log istic/Administra tive Control, under Full Com mand of th e Corps Commander (fig . 3). Such sol ution allov,1s the Corps Command er to as su me o nly a multinalional function, w hile the Commander of the Signal Brigade has the necessa1y tools to assume the ro le o f Com mand er of the Contingent.

THE MULTINATIONAL STAFF

T he Mult ina tion a l Staff borrows the internal organisation of the ARR C. T he cho ice has been d ete rmined by cons iderations o f prac tical and contingent character: • the current organisation of the ARRC Com man d has a lready been evaluated in operations and keeps t rack o f the expe rtise drawn by the real employment; 56

aoo,

besides, It its [it to satisfy the totality of th e o perat ional requisites set by NATO; • through the adoption of the same SOP,s (4) issued by the ARRC Command, the Italian proposal pursu es the irren ounceable objecti ve of standardisati o n withi n the Alliance; besides, the employment of the same procedures makes the connection with the ARRC Command "easy", in cas e of conte mpo rary employment of the two Army Corps within an operation; •lackin g accords on the multin ationali ty of the Corps Command Lo be constituted, the organ iza tion of the ARRC Command is a certa in refere nce on wbi c h to ca librate t h e employment o f the personnel (percentages of presence of the leader Nation, personn e l requirements already elaborated in detail, etc.) and on which lo plan the relationships with the

DETACHMENT

other contributing Nations; • the ARR C will be the fi rs l Com man cl Lo und ergo the process o[ valiclalion as .H RF, therefore i t w ill be possible to follow and impl ement Lhe p oss ible organisationa l d evelopment consequent to Lhe attribution of the FOC. In paarticu la r, the in te rnal organisation o f the Multinat ional Staff dra ws fr om those consolidated wi thin the Ita li an Army. Both the Corps of the past, and the COINT today, ha ve an artic ula ted structure on two "big ja-..vs", operational and logistic (or support). Instead the HRF Staff (fig. 4) adopts a structure by Divisions, comm ande d by a B rigadier General. Two Divisions follow, in a certain way, the two "big jaws", op era tions a nd s upport, " tradit ional" in th e Nat ion al regulations.

Fig.4

THE HRF(

HEADQUARTERS

0 )

XXX COM

DCOM

Ill

Ill AOCC

NAVY ADVISOR

cos

Hc~~~~~LI

DCOS SPT

DCOS RSC/GS

X DCOS OPS G2

G3 OPS

MOV

I G3 PLANS

IG3 TRG/EPS

TPT/SUP

I I

G3AIR

MED

F COORD

MAIN T

(

)

X ENGINEER

X G6

Called RAPID REACTION CORPS until ToA.

The Rear Support Command (RSC), CIMJC (5) (GS), Engineer and Communications (G6) functions, are managed at divisional level in Lhe Staff, differently from what envisaged in the Italian Corps, in which they were situated at level of Command of the rear areas (RSC and GS), of Engineers Corps Command and Signal Corps Command. Likewise, the Fire function (land and anti -aircraft) is managed within the Staff (by the Fire Co-ordination - F COORD) rather than by the Artillery Command of the Corps. Within the SPT Division is envisaged the Military Police (MP) function that instead in the National arrangements is directlv subordinate to~the Chief of Staff with technical connections with the G2 function . This is a direct consequence of the prerogatives of the Commander \.vho, in the multinational context, are limited

to the general direction, leaving the activities of control and repression to the organisations of National military police. Particular importance is given to the operations with rotating wing assets, also managed inside the Staff by a Cell at Division level (G3 AIR), while in the National arrangements this acl.ivity was at Comrnand of Helicopters Regi ment level. The Central Staff, divided in Divisions, constitutes another particularity that has specialist functions o( particular value (arrangement and organisation of the Staff, political assistant POLAD, legal Assistant - LEGAD, public information, etc.). Particu larly, the POLAD and INFOOPS h.111ctions (Information Operations), generally scheduled for the Commands of operational level, confer to the Corps the capabilities to operate as AJFLCC.

Among the specialist functions situated within the Central Staff it is to be underlined, finally, the Security and Public Order, which is fit to furnish advic e and specialist assistance for the management of public order and respect of the laws in the Area of Responsibility of the Corps. The cell responds, therefore, to an operational demand that has always been the principal responsibility of the Commanders and that in th e CROs is o( particular importance and delicacy, both if they engage units of the Army and if they employ units provided by of Police forces with a military organization (Carabinieri - IT, Gendarmerie FR, Guardia Civil - SP). The management of the air support is effected by the Air Operation Co-ordination Center (AOCC), implying lhe definitive abandonment of the old National organisation based on the JASC 57

(6), that was pul at ROC level (7) (Lhe rcf ore Regional/open.1tiona l leve l) . The organizational presence of the AOCC within the Comrnand of Corps (tact ical level) allows great a<lherence and effec tiveness o r the a ir surport. Th e AOCC 1s an other orga ni sat ion a l elcrnent that confers to th e HRF the cap a bilities to operate a s AJFLCC. For the management of naval corn ponen ls the cons titution of a Naval Operation Co-ord ination Center is e nv isaged (NAOCC) ; taking into accoun t th at thi s <lemand is not made with continuity, the NAOCC is n o t perman ently constituted within the Corps Command. To reduce to the least the hysteresis of the cons titution, within th e Corps Command the l\:avy Advisor cell is permanentl y in s ert e d th at inc lu<l es the key posi t ion s ( Ma nage r a nd H ea d, Plan s Sect ion) o f the NAOCC; besides, the cell prov ides in perma nence the necessary "naval" expert ise to the Corps Staff. THE SIGNAL BRIGADE AND THE C2S AND CIS UNITS The Corps Comma nd mu s t have a complex of resources able to provide the totali ty of the C2S and CIS s upport both in garrison and in operations. Panicularly, s u c h res o urces have to perform th e followin g miss ion: • t o assure s upp ort to th e HR F (L) Command for th e Co mmand and the Control as Corps Comma n d or Land Component Command; • to assure th e clefence, the manage ment and th e logisti c support of the Comman d to a llow Command and Co ntrol; • to furnish LogislidAdministrative support to Lhe whole Italian personne l, regu la rly or tempora ril y assigned Lo th e HRF(L) Comn,and.

THE SIGNAL BRIGADE HQ COMMANDER

ADMIN OFF

DEP CDR

MP SEC CDR & DEP CDR SEC OFFICE 1------+-

--+-1

CARABINIERI SEC

PPB SEC

PERSONNEL OFF

" CARABINIERI" SR OFF

LOGISTIC OFF

TNG & SECURITY OFF

Fig. S Besides , when the l fRF (L) Com rn a ncler passes under a military foreign e r authority (Transfer of Authority), among the Italian General Officers effective to the HR F(L) Comma nd , a Re presentative of the Nat ion a l authority must be appointe<l (8) (Senior Na,tional Represe ntative). He, assisted by a Command at Brigade level, has responsibi li ty of: • dea li ng with al I .t h e as pe c ts related to the assignment and e mployment of the personnel; • providing support to the Ii fe of the HRF(L), through t he un itary manag e ment of the activities developed by the C2S depending units; • ass uring the Securi Ly (i nfrastructures and personnel) a nd Na tional Mi litary Police fu nclions; • constituting, in operat ions, a n Administrative Center of Logistic Comn,and a nd the Natio nal Support Element (NSE). Under th e admini s trative aspect, this Command must be shaped as an Agency, from ,.vhich the Nalional units with Lhe rank of

"Ordinary Detac hm e nts" will depend , and have a devoted PPB Section, in the consideration that it will he <lirectly connected to the Army Ge neral Staff for the Anancial planning. Taking into account tha L the more remar kable op e rati o nal e lem ent of the mission is really the commun ications aspect a n<l Lhat, am o ng the Ch ief of Divisions of the Scaff, the G6 will a lways and sure ly be I tali an, a Command of Signal Brigade will be established (fig. 5), including a ll Lhe C2S and CJS un its t hal directly support the Arrny Corps. ln this way, the G6 wi ll have a double fun c tion: • Staff, fo r which it sha ll employ the G6 Di vision; • command, for w hic h it s hall use l he Signal Brigade's Staff. In s ubstance , a c om pl ex of resources has been e nv isage d, based on one "head", Lhe Signal Brigade Command, and "th ree levers": • the Signal Regiment, to real ise and manage th e CIS system of the Corvs;

• the Headquarters Cornmand, for the tactica l and logistic support and for the secu rity o f the Corps Command; . • the Base Corn rnand , for 1.h e management of the "U. Mara" barracks.

THE HEADQUARTERS COMMAND Fig. 6

The following chapters descr·i be the essential ordinative elements of each of these components.

THE SIGNAL BRIGADE The organisation o f th e Signa l Brigade Command has been obtained adapting to the mission a classic Manoeuv re's Br-igade Command o f manoeu vre. The result is a "simplified" Command, in comparison ,vith the ManoeuvTe unit, of wh ich the Personel , Secretary, Logistics, Training and Secur ity functions r-emain. ln considerat io n of the double function performed by the Commander, a Deputy Commander has been envisaged. He is responsible for a ll the execu tive activi ti es connected with the Brigade's mission and the ordinary administration of the Brigade Command. This last is a function normally performed by the Chi ef of S taff, that doesn't

ex ist in t he Signa l Brigad e's Cornrnand. As already mentioned, the Command Brigade has a PPB Section Ci L to assu re the fina ncial planning. T he o f J\ilil ita ry Pol ice organ isa tion will be detailed la ter. The Brigade's Command ,vill be located in S o lbiate O lona, t he tog et h er w itb the Corp s ' Command.

HEADQUARTERS COMMAND The I IeadquarLers Command of the Projection Corps I HRF (L), is the u ni t of suppon o[ the Corps' Command, destined to satisfy the

demands of logistic support, life in tl1 e p erm a nent Center and vigilance of the Corps' Command (fig. 6). Administratively, it includes the organisms that carry out the fun c tion o f Command and Control and th e servi ces in and outside the Center. According to the si t uation, it can be strengthened (or strengthen o ther unites) w ith the i nse r t io n or "ope r a t iona l modules" (9). Th is unit is endowed wi Lh great versatili ty of employm ent and is fiL Lo pe rf o rrn a ll 1.h e ac tiviti es re la ted to the tasks of genera l s upport , such as: • support to the d eployment and li fe of Lh e Corps' Command Posts; • d e fence against observati on; • execution of protection works; • executi on o r c lose defe nce; • infrastruc tural urgency in Le rve n Li o ns in the Operations Zone. In t h e CR Os, bes ide s the ac t iv ities mentioned a bo ve , others a ,·e co nn ected w ith t h e support to civil po pulations, th e resumption o f the normal course o f daily life, the economic activit ies ('within the limits of the availa b le resources and the

An Italian c/Jeckpoint in Albania.

GENERAL RELAY-PLAN

priori Ly of the mission of support to the C0tvs' Command) . The 33 rd Log isti c mano e uvre Regiment of "Ambrosiano", al.ready located in Sol biate, will constitute the base for the constitution of the Hq. Command.

THE SIGNAL REGIMENT

T he Signa l R eg imen t is responsible for the realisa tion of the nets and the management of: Lhe C4 S ys tem Cen lres of Lhe

Fig. 7

Corps a nd S TAR Co mm and Posts. Besid es , the Regim e nt provides net and C4 su ppo rt up to a maximum of four depending Divisions a nd to all the CS a nd CSS units subordi nate Lo the Anny Corps (fig. 7). Th e o rganiza t ion or the Regimen t has been fixed tak ing into acco unt t he fa c t that t h e respons ibility of the connecti ons belongs to the s up erior Commander tow a rds the s ubordinate Comman ders a nd that the Corps is responsible for

1st SIGNAL REGIMENT

Fig. 8

I Cdo

~~~

Cdo

the connections w ith a possible adjacent Anny Corps. Beside s, t he fo ll owi ng o bjectives have been pursued: • minimise the typ o logy of materi a ls employed; • gel the maximum flexib ility of the system; • g uara n tee the transportabil iIv o n Cl 30 aircfraft; • rationa lise as much as possible the burdens, reempl oying and possibly rcadapting Lhe matedals (essent ially shelters) current!_\ available within the Army. T h e P 1 Si gn al R egim en t. located in Mila n, desig nated as signal unit to be assigned to the CoqJs, has been therefore form ed (fig. 8) on two battalions: • Lhe first, anicul ated on 3 companies respectively devoted to th e C4 MAIN Systcrn s Centre, to the support of the net and to C4 support for a maximum of 4 Divisions; • the second , based on two c omp a nies, to give C4 10 s upport the STAR Comman d Post s ( "St ep- up Tacti ca l Alternate R ea r and Ea r lyE ntry") and C4 support to I he CS and CSS Un its . ln substance, the Reg irnent w il l realise a Main Comma nd Post (M AIN), R ear Comm and P ost ( REAR) , an Advanc ed Tactical Command Post (TAC CP) and a Comm and Pos t for th e Log istic Co m rnancl of Adherence/Command of the Rear a reas (RSC) . Moreover, the R egim e nt is able to s atisfy the demands of C4 support for a maximum of fou r Division CPs, for the CS and CSS Comma nd Posts, for 20 CS/CSS comm and Posts units and for the connections v.rith the bordering uni Ls.

BASE COMMAND AT THE <U. MARA> BARRACKS

The Co mmand of the "U. Mara" Barracks, bes ides the general

THE "U. MARA" BARRACKS BASE COMMAND Ill Base Commander

Computer Cell

Base Hq

Adm Off

RFCR LOMBARDIA

3rd DGM detached cell(")

"A" type Base unit

Reception Agency

LEGEND: - Employment subordination · · ·--··· Technical connection

assignments o f all Base Commands, envisaged by Pub. SME-DAR N. 2938 "Norms for the life and the internal service of barracks" - Ed . 1998, has the followings peculiar tasks : • monitor the infrastructural activities carried out at the "Mara'' by the technical team; • start the activities of logistic-

Fig. 9 a elm i nistrati ve character, regarding the logistic aspects (contrnct s and services, acqu1s1t10n of materials, management of assigned funds); • continue the activities of maintenance of the infrastructure; • verify/elaborate the preparations for the internal organisation of

the services, the vigilance and the security of the Barracks; • start the preparation and the organisat ion of the structures destined to lodge the Corps' Staff; • assure the punctual management of the activities connected with t he "quality of li fe " of the personnel destined to operate in the Corps Hq. Particularly, it mus t be the only referent for the liaisons with: •• local administrations; • • local Social .Age ncies; • • local medical centres; •• Agencies oC services; •• schools; •• Military Organizations of "general support"; • elaborate the "Vade-mecum" foe the personnel destined to the Co17Js' Com.mane!. The document will he the initial, practical aid to facilitate the insertion of the new

An !Lalian checkpoint in Bosnia.

"PRE-ESTABLISHED FRACTURE" OF ADM SUBORDINATION LINES Adm Off Adm Mgt

Sec Register

Sec

Ill

w w DETACHMENT

DETACHMENT

Ill Base Hq

~ ~

DETACHMENT

Ill

DETACHMENT

111

~ ~

UNIT

personnel and Lo con lribu te concre tely to the solution of the problems connected with the var-ious aspects of the dai ly life of the families. Jn substance, the Cornmand at. the Base (fig. 9) is able to assure, with a unitary vision, the punctual execution of the activities connected with the use, the maintenance and the secur ity or the Barracks. The Command Base guarantees the ma nagem ent o[ the activiti es connected with the quality of life of th e personnel destined !.o orerate within the Corps. On the rn ultinational pla ne, the Base Command is organized for the cons titution of the Na tional Command responsible for the Barracks. In case of emp loyment of the Corps' Command, a s already practised b y oth er, traditi onally

Reg ister Sec

THE ADM LINE IN GARRISON (INFRASTRUCTURE & SUPPORT TO FAMILIES)

THE ADM LINE IN OPERATIONS

Fig. 10 "projectable" Armies, the B ase Command will be able to be the point of reference for the fam ilies guaranteeing, with continuity, assistance and support: a further innovation that puts the Italian Army closer to NATO standards. THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY POLICE FUNCTION

Administrative aspects

To be a ble to satis[y the requisite of the elevated projectability of the Corps' Command and the Units of direct s up po rt , it has bee n necessa1y to develop a particu tar administrative organ isati on (fig. I 0). The focal point of this organisat ion is, o bviously, the Administration office of the Signal

Brigade' s Command ( lO), shaped as "Administrative Agency" with three subordinate "o rd in ary Detac hments". This model has been developed beginning from the administralive organisation in operations and it envisages that: • the administration office of the Signal B r·igacle's Command fo rms the base for th e constitution of the Administrative Center of th e Quartem1aster-general's Branch, maintaining in the Base only tl1e componen ts of personnel and materials m anagem ent (according to its prerogatives); • the Base Commander becomes the Com mander of the Detachment in th e Country, wi t h its own a dministra tive autonomy to manage the infras truc ture and tl,c external services, co ns idering that the

C2 . ORGANIZATION OF THE HRF(L) HQ xxxx

xxxx

ARMY STAFF

SME

MULTI NATIONAL AUTHORITY

DGS UAS

ISPEL

X X

COi

HRF - - - - --

-__ -___-___-______J STAFF

r ··-·1- ·· - · · - · · - ·!-L=~~=--·:.-::x:-:.~·--=--·:=~~=--~·--=-:~L .::.-::~~L·.-::-:~=~~=-::r:~=-= ~·--=--·:=~~=~-f ··- ·- ··.

Ill

III

$[;]$$ - - - FUL L COM - ------·-· OPCOM - - - O PCON -- - -------· ADM CONTROL -··-··- ··- L OG CONTROL ~ lo CONNECTION for issues of nat interest

·i '

: j

$0~ I IJ I IJ I IJ I, <JJ

11/1

D d :

Ill

I~-~~~_IJ] I~-~~~_IJ] I:~~~_IJ] I:~-~~_IJ]

' ''

Ill

·xx j

111/11

l~~,~~~IJ]

~EGT

Ill

-----'

7REGT

Ill

,REGT

111/11

-----' -----' I

-----

Fig. 11 "U. Mara" barracks will keep on supporting the families of the projected personnel, Coreigners included. Consequently, the administrative aspects of the Barracks have been separated from the ones tied to Lhe support or Lhe Command in operations (Headquarters and l st Signal Regiment), envisaging an administrative "pre -arranged fracture" , organisation fit to conform w.i th automatism to the demands of the ernergencv in line with the criterions'' Hxe~I bv the norms ( 11 ), justifying th~ apparent (12) increase in administrative organs . It must be unde;lined, howeve1·, that the provisions adopted give an immedi ate answer to the needs of administrative management in the garr ison ,

while the administrntive aspects related to the employment in operations of the Corps need a further study. 1n fact, the refer·ence no t·ms anticipate the constitution of only one Administrat ive Cente1· of Quartermaster-general's Branch (C.A .L) within the Contingent. therefore, if we analyse the order of battle of the CNps (fig. 11), it appears immediately that the constitution of only one C.A.J. in the Signal Brigade could be mable to s upport this complex and composite Contingent.

Military Police

The NATO doctrine assigns to the National Commanders the 1·esponsibility in the sector of Military Police, while they leave the direction and co-ordination

to the multinational Commanders. Consequently, a lso the organisational structures present this characlerist ic of separation. \Ve a lready mentioned the Provosl Marshal and his position within the Multinational Staff, Regarding the National organisation, it has been pul .in the Si gna l Br igade's Staff / Contingence Command (fig. 5). The struclure so realised is characterised by the presence of only one Nat ional "technical" referent towards the Provost Marshal (Carnbinieri Senior Officer) and b y the possib le mullina tionalit y of the executive componen l (lhe Carabinieri Section can be the National contribulion to a mu l linaL ional Mi lita ry Police company, for the requirements of l.be Corps' Command deployed) .

HRF(L)HQ - IMPLEMENTATION TIMES 01.01.2001

01.02.2001

01.08.2001

01.10.2001

31.10.2001

01.11.2001

Fig. 12 TIME OF REALIZATION

The times of validalion/sclection imposed by NATO have imposed reduced limes of realisation, Lhat have achieved the obj ective to complete the cons titution of the Corps' H eadquarter s and the Uni ls of direct supporl by the end of 2001. As a premise of the reorganisation it has been necess~uy "to free" the FOP Comman d from every o peration a l or m anagerial commitrnent, the refore at the

beginni ng o[ this year the FOP uni Ls h ave been transferred t o oLher Commands. The organi zation proj ec l (fig. 12), by now in a n advanced phase of realisalion, has co nducLed to Lhe realisation: • of the Barracks Command "U . Mara" as of 2 February of last year; • of th e Rapi d Reaction Corps' I feadquarte rs , on AugusL l; at the same lime, the u nit has been pu t un der FOP Co m mander (13) , suppressin g

the FOP H eadquarters Comrnancl; • on October 31 lh was concluded the modification of t he FO P Command and, as of Novem.ber 1st , the Rapid Reaction Army Corps was conslituted; • on Nove mb er 1sL the Signa l B rigade's H q. has bee n const ituted and, con textu a ll v the Commanders of the: •• 1° Signal Regiment, already in phase of modi fication from April I st 200 l; •• lfeadq uarters of lhe Arnw Corps; •• Base Commander of the "U. Mara" Barracks; passed under Lhe command of the Brigade Commandei:

CONCLUSIONS

Thi s necessar ly sy nth c li c de sc ription of the en visage d organ izational measures shov,•s that th e proj e ct for Lhe realization of a Rapid React ion Corps I I q has many more inpli caLions than Lhose Lhat can be perceived at first sight. The realisation of the Command and o f th e Uni ls of . direct support, has imposed Lhe adop tion of differe nt organ isational models and iLs maximum projectabiliLy. Afte r deve lopi n g the organisational models, the Army will have to [ace the mos t difficull and exacli ng part of Lhe project : its realisation . The job will be mad e even more dema nding by Lhe t imes, r elatively narrow, imposed by NATO, that it tends to acquire as soon as possi ble lhe capabilities of Comma nd and Cont r·ol n ecess a ry to s olve lhe cri ses th at the "after cold wa r" has brought on the international sce ne .

"Bersasglieri " protecting a Serbian Kosovar Village.

Italian serviceman on vigilance duty in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, lbe attainment of the objectives of capability fixed by the project is essential for the Italian Army, in order lo acquire the capability of intervention in the decisional process and to continue to be a security producer within the Alliance. The whole Nation is by now aware of this necessity, in order to adequately safeguard what the Italian people perceive like their fundamental interests. C 1 '

Lieutenant Colonel, Section Chief, Forces Organization Office, Army General Staff 1 ·:, ' Captain, Forces Organization Of/ice, Anny General Staff

NOTES (I) Ace Rapid Reaction Corps. lts structure has a British framework. (2) Hi gh Readiness Force (Land) Headquarters. (3) C2S: Command and Control Support. CIS: Communications and Information Systems. (4) SOP: Standing Operating Procedures. (5) CIMIC: Civil Military Co operation. (6) JASC: Joint Air Support Center. ·(7) Regional Operation Center. (8) A fig ure analogous, but not coincide nt, with that of UCRAN, envisaged by the current national doctrine. In fact, being ·the Commander an Italian, the figure of UCRAN is not necessary. (9) For "elementary module" and · "operational module"' it is intended, respectivelv: • the • minimal ent.i.Lv of personnel-with a leader e l~men t , equipm ent and assets - organised and trained to make operational a weapon svstem or a combat means able to· operat, according Lo technical-tactical procedures, within the "operational module";

• the aggregation of two or m ore "elementary modules" for the performance of a task, through a limited tactical action in time and space, developed according to standardised procedures of employment. For organizational ends, it can assume the configuration of platoon or section. (10) The office remains, however, subordinate to the Corps' Commander, up to the mo men t of the TOA to a multi.national authority, because up to that moment the Corps Commander contin ues to maintain the full Command. (J 1) Pub. N. 6583 "The administrative-

management of the con tingent projected out of area and in the metropolitan territory". (12) The n umerical increase of employees in the administrative secLOr is only apparent; it would be necessary, in any case, to create only a structure for the managemen t of the administrative aspects related to the infrastructure. (13) The provision has the purpose to put all the Units of direct support at the orders of a National authority (the d e puty' commander's position has been made available to the possible contributing Nations).

General, the Lithuanian Armed Forces are among the youngest in contemporary Europe. What were the decisive moments of the rebirth, after sixty years of oblivion?

The tragic events of WWII, and even more those preceding it, reduced our population by one third. A hard lesson has been learned but, from now on, if Lithuania's statehood is threatened again, we will defend

ourselves, with or without the support of our friends. The goal of our present defence policy is to prepare the society and the Armed Forces for general defence, and to integrate Lithuania into the Western defence structure. The physical, psychological, cultural and moral damage done by the Communist regime is hard to describe. In 1998 we developed a reconstructjon plan. We are creating Anned Forces based on a Western model, which can be

integrated into NATO and also function independently if we must defend ourselves. A Unified Command is being adopted, also in order to improve the interoperability with NATO structures and procedures. We also established a Territorial Defence Structure, which

provides a good framework for flexible defence and facilitates the integration of the National Volunteer Force. A Basic Training Centre has been constructed and became operational last April with the collaboration of Officers and N CO s from the U nited Kingdom, ,.vho have already

trained 105 Lithuanian instructors. For three consecutive years, B ritish Officers have instructed our cadets at the Military Academy. This year we took over complet ely, and this was a turning point in the training of our future Commanders . Many of our

Officers have graduated from US military schools, and presently we have four cadets at US Mili tary Academies. Other Officers have attended F rench, German, Swedish , Danish and Estonian schools. All of ou r cadets are r equired to take English and may take French and 67

a strategic target for Lithuania. What was done to achieve full interoperability with NATO, and what remains to be done?

We have declared - and pursue the political oqjective of becorni ng a full -fledged member of NATO. Our direct cooperation \.vith NATO takes place within an enhanced and more operational "Partnership for Peace We participate in the Lithuania - NATO Program and other initiatives coordinated by the Alliance. We were the second country to join the PfP in 1994, and believe that this programme is very important in preparing us for the obligations of NATO membership. 11

â€˘

Above.

Civilians and miliwry socializing. Right. A convoy of BRDM-2.

German as a second foreign language. As regards NCOs, the US and UK the military have helped us to establish our NCO School. We must give our NCOs more authority and responsibility. Also to this purpose, I personalJy appoint the "Sergeant Major of the Armed Forces" who advises me on matters essential to this important segment of the Armed Forces . The Collective training is conducted at the units and at the Advanced Training Centre, whose computerized sector has been created with the assistance o f Denmark. The existing infrastructure has been improved, a strategic radio relay network and new military sites have been built. In particular, we focused on the development of proper "host nation support capabilities, increasing our capability to receive, when required, allied reinforcements.

Lithuania fully understands that it must share the risks and burden of collective defence, and is ready to do it. Therefore, one of the three infantry battalions of the Rapid Reaction Brigade will be available for deployment for "Article 5 operations by the end of 2002. Today, we already contribute troops to SFOR and KFOR, and some of our transport aircraft, stationed in Naples, support NATO operations. 11

Last year we partic ipated in 23 exercises, such as "Allied Effort" and "Amber Hope". For the past three years we conducted combat training, here in Lithuania , with about 900 troops from an Italian "Alpini" Brigade. They always performed with distinction, and also their off-duty conduct was admirable. They really won the hearts of the Lithuanian people.

The full integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system is

The Lithuanian Armed Forces have already acquired a certain experience in Peace

Support Operations, providing units and equipment to several missions. Could you summarize these operations? What lessons have been learned? Since 1994, the Lithuanian Armed Forces have served in several UN and NATO operations: in Croatia (UNPROFOR), BosniaHerzegovin a (IFOR a nd S FOR), Albania (AFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR). Currently Lh ere is one motorized infantry platoon serving within KFOR One ai rcraft with a crew within KFOR/SFOR, and two Officers are with SFOR. ln addition, on a rotation basis with Latvia and Estonia, we prnvide one company to the SFOR Danish battalion. The service wilh NATO provides o u r so ldiers wi Lh the skills and the experience essential for th e development of interoperability. In fact, they get familiar with NATO command struc tures, know new types of equipment a nd weaponry and learn Lo deal with sensitive issues, like different cu ltural backgrounds and customs .

A US-Lithuanian joinl exercise.

A military force does not consist of personnel and equipment only, but it includes also operational, training, lob>istic and achninistrative procedures. On what bases and models did you build the rules and norms of your Armed Forces?

Do you have conscription in your Armed Forces? What is the role of professionals, longtenn volunteers, reservis ts and female personnel?

The Train i ng and Doctrine Command coordinates the preparatio n of the military training programmes and tactical manuals, fixing also the standards of soldier and unit training. All these programmes are carried out in accordance with NATO reg ulat ions, publications and STANAGs. For example , all HQs and combat units use NATO Land Forces Tactical Doctrine (ATP-35(B)). We a lso take into account the experience of other countries, as for example the United Kingdom. A British lie utenant c olonel assigned to t.he Training and Doctrine Command will b e replaced shortly by a German Officer. A German colonel and a Danish lieutenant colonel are assigned to o u r Gen e ral Staff, assisting in Lo gistics and operational planning.

CurrenLly our Armed Forces consisL of about 55% professional soldiers an d 45% c on scri p ts . Conscription is set in our Constitulion . The Lraining of conscripts lasts 12 months, after which tb ey cons Li tute the mobili7.ation rese r-vc and attend short refresher courses. Conscription is important for a Country suc h as ours, Âˇwhich moved from a totalitarian form of gover nment to democracy, because it maintains a closer relationship with society at large and builds a stronger national identity. Those ,.vho, because of their religion or pacifist beliefs , are not w illing to serve in the Armed Forces , may ask for an alte rnative serv ice, whose duration is 18 months. We have no plans to abandon compulsory m ilitary service in the foreseeable future, since it is 69

The Fla~ Detail of a Lithuanian unit in a ceremony.

vital lo ensure the effective functioning of the "Total and Unconditional Defence" as well as the tetTitorial Defence. Women have been serving in the Armed Forces since their reestablishment in 1990. They a re not subject to conscription, and presently form 17% of the Officers corps, 19% of the NCOs, 10% of privates and 52% of civilian personneJ. There are women serving in combat units; however, most of them are employed in sectors such as accounting, personnel, logistics, aerospace surveillance and medical services . Followi ng the provisions of a law on equal rights, women can now attend the Military Academy, where they 70

get the same training as men. Presently there are 23 women out of 505 cadets in our Military Academy.

Surveillance Network (BALTNET); Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). BALTBAT was established in 1994, and in 2000 was declared r eady for all types of peace support operations. It is equipped with NATO interoperabl e equi pment and operates according to NATO doctrine and procedures. The next step will be the establishment of 3 battalions designated for rapid deployment in peace operations. They should be operational by the end of 2005. Since 1997 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, with the support of various Âˇwestern Countries, have been building a common naval squadron (BALTRON), which can part1c1pate in the nava l component of int ernationa l peace support operations. The Baltic Defence College is in Tartu, Estonia. lls objective is lo train Officers to assu~e battalion command or higher staff positions. Instructors and students come from several western countries, and the Commandant is an Officer from one of the Baltic Countries. BA LTNET is a Regional Ai r Surveillance Network, created by the three Baltic States and interoperable with NATO's air survei llanc e and defence system.

Regional cooperation is a very important tool for the security policy of Lithuania. In particular, there are several ongoing common projects with Latvia and Estonia. Could you give us some details about them?

After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the Lithuanian Armed Forces inherited a number of bases, installation and training facilities. Has this infrastructure been used, and to what extent?

Our Country carries out extensive cooperation activities with the other two Baltic States. The most important projects are: Baltic Battalion (BALBAT); Baltic Squadron (BALTRON); Baltic Air

The Russians left very li ttle infrastructure which would meet today's living and working requirements also because, in many cases, the facilities were run down and stripped of usable

Parade of a unil during a military ceremony.

items. In 1997 we decided to modernize them, giving priority to troop housing. Tbday our soldiers live in acceptable quarters. Next step \vill be to do the same with the remaining logistic infrastructure. 8.5% of the defence budget was allocated for the development of this sector.

What is the weight of military tradition in a Country that recently regained its independence? What is the role of the military in upholding common values? Are the Anned Forces an instrument of national and cultural cohesion? Today's Armed Forces aim at being as transparent as possible towards society. The population knows our work, and the public participates in military ceremonies. It can be added that the Italian "Alpini" have made an important contribution, visiting various towns with their band and chorus, which were highly appreciated. Furthermore, we carry out many cooperation activities with non-governmental organizations. Last year, for example, the Armed Forces organized 10 su rnmer camps for teen-agers in every region of the Country. Over 1400 young soldiers, children from underprivileged families and youngsters with problems of different kinds, spent a fevv memorable days together. The Armed Forces organize "Open Days", during which our citizens have an excellent opportunity to visit our Training Centres, the Military Academy and other Schools and units, in order to get more familiar with the soldiers and their daiJy routine. Military magazines, together with rad io programs

and TV shows, contribute to a better knowledge of the present day Armed Forces, also in order to overcome the negative image left by the Soviet forces of occupation.

The rise in popularity was very dramatic in the last four years: this is a sign of the growing affection and consideration for our soldiers. D

Major General Jonas A. Kronkaitis was born in Lithuania, and served for 27 years with the US Army, reaching the rank of Colonel. He attended several courses, including the War College, and held many high-responsibility positions, both at operational units and in the administrative sector. In particular, he commanded the Rock Island Arsenal, the largest armament manufacturing facility, were he carried out a vast and complex modernization programme. His forei~n assignments included six years in Germany - with the 4 h Armoured Group, 2 nd Cavalry Regiment and 1 st Armoured Division - and two years in Vietnam. Maj Gen. Kroukaitis holds numerous decorations and awards, among which the Legion of Merit, 3 Bronze Stars, 3 Meritorius Service Medals, the Ai:my Commendation Medal, the Air Medal and the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry w/Palm. After retirement, he served as the Director of the Atlantic Research Corporation, which he left in February 1997, to return to Lithuania and assume the position of Vice Defence Minister. On July 1, 1999, he assumed duties as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and on August 13, 2001, was promoted Major General. Major General Jonas A. Kronkaitis is married and has two children. 71

Colonel , more than ten years after independence, what is the status of the Latvian Armed Forces? What are their priorities and what programmes are under way?

Within the framework of our policy of defence and security, the first priority was given to Latvia's full-fledged entry into the North Atlantic Alliance. As a consequence, the goal of our military policy is to shape Armed Forces that can increasingly integrate into the 72

Western mechanisms, in order to meet the expected requirements and standards. The programmes for the development of the forces are included in two plans (4 years and 12 years) . It is important to underline that these plans concern both the reorganization of the structures affecting the preparation for the entry into NATO and the organization of civil support to the armed component. In 2000, meanwhile, three important "partnership" objectives

have been attained. The first is the realization of an adequate structure of the Land Forces Command. The other two concern the Air Force, which acquired an identification system compatible with those of the Alliance and completed the studies for the improvement of

the surface-air missiles. In 2001 we achieved nine more objectives. So, as you said, your Country wants to become, a full-fledged member of NATO or, using an expression very

popular nowadays, of the "Euro-Atlantic" security system. What is your opinion on "Partnership for Peace"? Can it be considered a good starting point in view of your objective?

Actually, the cooperation of

Latvia with NATO is cen tred on the "Membership Action Plan" (MAP) of PfP and on the Council of- the Euro-Atlantic "partnership" (EAPC). I believe that the PfP programme is essential for the global process being carried out with determination by our 73

[lll II

A medica l unit an d a mi Ii tary-pol ice detachmen t have been included in th e British fo rces in Kosovo since February 2000 . Furthermore, we continue to as sign obs ervers to OS C E. Some have already been sent to Bosnia- I I erzegovina and Northern Caucasus, for border control activities. In April 2001 group of Latvian military observers was detached to Skopje for a period of six mon ths, for partic ipation in a control operation along the b order b etwe en Kosovo and Macedonia.

Above.

In fan try platoons armed with 7.62x39 m,:,1 MPiK!vJS. Right. Na tional Guardsmen, armed with AKM, controlling a road.

policy, of which it has become an integral part . Precisely o n the bas is of the PfP exp erienc e our fo rces are acquiring the necessa1y readiness for a full integrabi lity w ith NAT O. T hro ugh its active parti c ipati on in P[P, Latvia is getting ready to conduct NATO op e ration s . In fa ct, our f in al objective is Latvia's participation in joint international operations. Such a strong and pragmatic Euroatlanti c orientation and the achievement o f the main objectives are very useful for the transparency of plans a nd budgets and the democratic management of the Armed Forces, as well as for th e ,interventions in case of disasters or other emergencies. That is why we wa nt to be increasingly active in N P, in all ac tivit es co ncern s planni ng, d ecis ion mak ing and politi cal consultation.

The particip ation i n p e ace missions and in operations in respon se to c rises (CRO) has b een one of th e fi rst engagements of the "reborn " Latvian national Forces. Can you describe their engagement in these sectors?

The companies included in the "Baltic Battalion" (BALTBAT) operate within SFOR in Bosn iaHerzegovi na, rota Ling every six months with similar Lithuan ian and Est on ia n units . Sh ortly, ano ther co mpany w i 11 join the Danish Ballalion .

At th e pres en t Li me, the fo llowing units are available fo r c risis- management operations: one reinforced company from the 1st Infantry Battalion (this units operates within IFOR and SFO R toget her with Swedish a nd Danish conli ngents); some un it s inc lud ed in th e Ba l tic Flotilla; one medical u nit which in April/June 1999 partic ipated i n the AFOR m iss ion a nd in February was attached to the British contingent in Kosovo; one Mi li tary Police u n it (.in Kosovo with KFOR) and one naval unit of fast patrol boats.

Above.

Gunners in a firing exercise. Right. A Russian-made helicopter flying at low altitude.

Volunteers, whatever their rank, must serve (or at least five years . All male citizens are subject to a conscription duty

total strength, subdivided as follows: 9% Offi ce rs , 23% NCOs, 26% privates, 42% civilians .

of 12 months. If they wish, the young recruits can ask to take up the military career. Women can enlist as volunteers, without any limitation on their employment, with both command/combat tasks and specialistic jobs ( radio operators, nurses , etc.) . At present, women in service are about 900, i.e. one fifth of the

We do not envisage an inc rease in the volunteer component .

Probably other elements will shortly be included in the Norwegian contingent. Besides, it should not be forgotten that Latvia, as a member of OSCE, participates in the observer missions in Georgia and Macedonia. Latvia has adopted a "mixed model" based on volunteers, conscripts and on ample recourse to reservists. Do you plan to increase the number of volunteers? What are the role and size of the female component? Our lavv provides that only Latvian c1t1 z cns can be recruited. In peac e time the Armed Forces are constituted by: regulars, conscripts, National Guardsmen, civilian pe rsonne l and reservists on . ' . training.

What are Latvia's most important bilateral relations at the moment? Our relations with the US are certainly outstanding. A rather large 75

Left. Mem bers of 1h e Special Forces armed IVith HK MPS A3. Below . i ndependen ce Memorial, in Rita central square.

common activities, we improve our interoperability with NATO and optim ize the e mployment of our rÂˇesources . Just to m e ntion th e main proj ects in common with Estonia and Lithuania, it is sufficient to cite the BALTBAT Batt a li o n; tl1e BALTN E T airs urv e i 11 ance network; the B ALTRO N floti lla ; the BALTDE FCOL defence college, attend e d b y Off icer s [ro m NATO a nd from candidate Countries, as we ll as by civilian officials. Afte r the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, in your Country

group of American experts are assigned to our Min istry of De fence. They ass ist us in the sectors of perso nnel, securi ty, in f onnation/commu nications, fi n ance and logistics . Also the United Kingdom Fr-ance a nd Canada are of great help to us in all sectors. In particular, many servicemen and civilians are attending English-la nguage courses in th e UK and Ca nada. Very impo1-iant are also our contacts with the new NATO members: Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. Regional coope ration is very important for s ecuri ty. In particular, you are conducting several operational activities togeth er with Estoni a and

Lithuania. Can you tell us something about these initiatives?

T he coo pc ralion a mong th e Ba ltic St ates is rea lly very imporlant. Throu gh these

there are still several bases, installations and training areas forme rly used by them. Do you still use them, and to what extent?

Only a small parl of the large

Ru.ssian-rnade T-55 iank.

areas occupied by lhe Soviets for th eir bases and installa tion s is still used for m ililary p urposes. All th e r es t is now muni cip a l proper ty. It shou ld also be said that all the equipment was either destroyed or damaged before it was left be hind. Only one of the five m ilitary airfields is used, and the Command of ou r Ar me d Forces is located in the building fo r m e rl v u s ed b v t he So v ie t Military Region of the Baltic . We a re also usi ng some firing ranges, and a re c on sid ering whethe r som e b uildings can s ti ll b e restr uc tured and nrnderni zecl. The new independent Latvia wants to become a full-fledged mem b er of N AT O, as you pointed ou t. H ow can this process be reconciled with the role of th e military as a symbol of cohesion and a synthesis of the valu es o f the nation?

The consensus o( our citizens for the Armed Forces is growing a ll the lime, together wi th the approval of

a full participation in the All.anlic Alliance . Th e las t survey was conducted in August 200 1: th e favourable voters were 67%. We shall continue our ac tivi ty of public infor rna tion, in order to spread the kno,..vle d ge a bout

d efen ce issues and the rnl e of NATO , parl icula r ly as r egards our citizens of Russian origin. D 1 '

Journalist

Colonel Raimonds Graube was born in Riga on February 26, 1957 . He served in the Soviet Army from 1976 to 1978, then worked in a factory of electronic equipment and at "Marupa", a collective farm. In 1992, he attended a basic course at the National Guard Training Centre and (~ 1993, at the same Centre, attended several courses in the sectors of operations, training, planning and field tactics, organized by the US Army. The same year, he was promoted to Major. From 1993 to 1995 he was Company Commander; Commander, Special Ops Unit; Commander, pt Brigade, National Guard; Chief of Staff of the same unit. In the same period he attended a Brigade-level course on planning and administration, conducted in the US by the Michigan National Guard. In 1996 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the National Guard and attended the Netherlands Defence College . Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, from 1997 to 1998 attended the Joint Service Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom an d in 1998 was appointed Commander of the National Guard. Promoted to Colonel in 1999, he became Commander of the National Armed Forces. Colonel Raimonds Graube speaks fluent English and Russian, is married and has three children.

. T

he fifteen Caribbean States, with as many votes at the UN, often wooed by the Great Powers of the world. A geopolitical area of vital importance, the Caribbeans spread over a group of islands (English - or Spanish -speaking plus French-

speaking Haiti) and a country on the coast (Belize). A myriad of territorial sovereignties, often more nominal than real. A criss - cross of maritime claims in easily navigable waters and rich in often uncontrolled landing places. A succession of deeply different

Countries, as regards usages, customs, culture and income (that can vary from several thousand dollars per capita to a few hundred). Examples of the extreme heterogeneity of this area are the destinies of Haiti and Santo Domingo, States ad j oining the ancient

island of Hispaniola . The first, independent since 1804, is an absolutely o r iginal nation , born out of an antislavery and anticolonialist revolt, which got rid of almost all the white ethnic element; since then Haiti is the symbol of "Black". The second, independent since 1864, id e ntifies itself with "White": i n particular with Spain, to which the Dominican Republic was annexed for more than twenty years before its independence. If lhe Caribbean Countries were to pursu e a policy of integration, uniting little by little in a single and large area,

capable interacting with the American conlinent and the rest of the world, they could constilute an . immense and shared mothercoun try, also intellectually fertile, because of the age-old intermingling of ethnic groups and cultures. On the contrary, their life is bad: they are in fact excluded from the international decisions, frustrated, owing to a series of reasons going from the impoverishment clue to emigration to lhe fears caused by

political and social ins tability, from an inadequ a te defen ce syslem to the sacrifices im posed by globalization, from the consequences of t he notinfrequent natural disasters lo the repercussions of the local and international criminal traffic. The drug traffic, almost always 79

c..

Haiti. A statue in Port-au-Prince.

connected with Lhe arms trade, (despite the undeniable efforts, also on the military plane, made by some States) in fact extends from South America towards the Norlh of the continent and Europe, along land and maritime roads. Next to the narco groups, elements of the mostly Columbian and Venezuelan (and for a mini maJ p art Peruvian) guerrilla, terrorist formations, also from outside the continent, paramilitary circles and intelligence services of some Counlries pull the strings o[ the traffic. The international crime society pu t globalization inLo practice well before we started to discuss it; terrorism and rackel intermingle as a long-standing reality. In some financ ia l havens of the reg ion, Columbian, Russ ian, Italian -A rne r· ican, Mexican, Turkish and Italian "mafiosi" usually meet Lo de(i ne 80

..._ •.,_,.._ _fee_

their strategies. The flourish ing traffic of clandesline emigrants comes first, follO\ved by toba:cco, alcohol, coffee, electric appliances, gasoline and also chemical precursors (more and more in demand, and th is is a disquieting nole) . Next comes money laundering, accompanied by adequate financial speculations . There is a continuous growth of sumptuous resorts and commercial centres, vvhich have no other explanation other than the will to employ capitals as quickly as possible, even at a loss. The susp icions of money !au ndering, if and when confirmed, stop bolh Lhe granting o r possible loans from international organizations, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, and the flow of foreign investments, which fo r some small Countries of the area arc the main, if not Lhe only, re sou r·ce . The Caribbean politicians and cconom is Ls insist

on the necessity to distinguish money laundering from fiscal havens. They observe that the taxes charged to fo r·eign investors are compu led on an income basis; what makes them incomparably lO\ver as compared to those in force in Europe and the US is only the diversity of the needs of the respeclive commun ities. Certainly the criminal society ha s the u trnost interest in maintaining, or even making worse, Lhe conditions of precariousness and fragmentation of powers and the the socio economic imbalances which make the structures of a Country more permeable to trafficking. So long as the Cold War lasted, the only worry of the US in the Caribbeans was to rnaintain stable regimes. The first Head of State thal linked peace to democracy and economic development was perhaps George Bush , when the relations with

Central America seemed encouraged also by the gradual end of the conflicts previously nourished by the Soviet Union. With time, the auention of the US, and also of Europe, slackened . Nevertheless the interests involved are enormous: suffice it Lo remember lhal lhrough the

Right. Graphic represenlatiou of the Panama Ca nal Zone.

/\ 1

l, .

'[IC

Below. A view of' the Panama Canal.

Panama Canal alone passes 33% of the total bu Ik of wares, that Mexico is the third commercial partner of the US (afte r Canada and Japan), an<l that , if the situation were to get worse, the migratory flow s would ass ume dramatic dimens ions. As regards the European Union, the,-e are different positions . Spa in (with Portugal, th e oldest colonial power of our continent) has retain ed close bo nds with i ts form er American colon ics and today, also taking advantage of the prestige of the Crown, is in a posi t ion to implem en t an a m biti o us cu I rural poli cy, spreading Hispanism an d th e teaching of the Spanish language

Some Car i bbean leaders, and a lso many intellec tua ls an d /or busiJ1essmen, are convinced that a progressive regional integration would s olve a good pan of th e problems . This is certainly true, even if such a process presen ls tremendous difficulties of all kinds, as the Europeans have been able to verify with the construction of the European Union.

in the world (Spanish has become compulsory in Brazil, for example, in view of a p rogressive a pproac h of the Latin-American countries). France, Spain and Italy are well disposed towards an inte ns ificatio n of reJat io ns and trade with the Caribbeans but the other Countries put on the brakes.

Cuba and Venezuela are among the Countries that strongly support the idea of unification. Venezuela, which is not precisely a Caribbean country but whose coasts are washed by the same sea, has rnoreover added Lo its name the expression "Republica BolivaiÂˇista" in homage to Simon Bolivar, bom

IN( 1/1/'lf I If,(/

111 , .,

rua

in Caracas, hero of the ind epend e nce and maximum ideologist of the Latino-American "Great Mother-Country". The "anomaly" o[ Cuba, practically the on ly surviving really Comm unist country in the -.vorld, is, sooner or later, destined to be solved by facts, within the changed in te rnational ba la nces. There are signs suggesting that this is already occurring. The government is now trying to strengt h eri the in 1.e rAmerican bonds essentia lly as a nation, while in the past the island wa s a refe re nce p o int for the insui-rectional moveme nts or the continent, and not only. The Russia ns, meanwhil e, (ou t of regard for the US but also because the iniative has become less useful) have unilaterally denounced the accord stipul a Led w.iLh Cuba for th e spying centre (officially a "Listeni ng Centre") set up on the isl an d (al Lourdes) during the years of th e Co ld War. The US govemment, besides, has started a policy of s low approach , presumab ly destined to increase after the passing away of the elderly Fidel Castro. Th e pro gress ive dip lo matic, econom ic and po litical normalization will have consequ ences al so on t he community o f Cuba n expatriates in the US. Their National Cuban J1111erican Foundation was the first Hi spanic lobby; today its im portance is inversely proportional to the progressive 81

Jamaica. The open museum. at Columbus Parle, west of Discovery Bay.

minimization of the controversial relations bet,.veen the two Counl.ries. With the demonstrations staged during the vicissitude of Elian Gonzales (the child rescued by Florida's Coastal Guard, after the wreckage of the boat on which his mother was trying to take him to the US), the Cubans expatriates wanted to reaffirm with force, before the world, their status of victims; exorcizing their fear of a probable future isolation . As a matter of fact, the privi leges enjoyed by the anti-Castro people are slowly vanishing, also because of the opposition expressed by other powerful Latin American lobbies, such as the National Council of La Raza or the League of Uniled Latin American Citizens. It can be said that in the US, as the weight of the general Hispanic presence grows, the Cu ban influence decreases. There are no doubts that the percentage of US citizens of Hispanic origin is destined Lo grow rapidly. Today 82

and their descendants , but a discussion on the Caribbea n clandestine immigrants is at least equally important . In fact the citizens of Central .America arÂˇe very numerous among the over 5 miLlion illegal immigrants living in the US (according to the Immigration and Naturalization Service), mainly residing in California , Arizona, Texas , Florida, New York and Boston. The racist extreme right considers them a national evil, while others, and many Republicans among them (including Senator Kemp), maintain that the US could not do without the contribution of their work. Christopher Mitchell, an expert on Central America at New York University, underlines the political dilemma. On the one side: the need to keep the illegal immigrants out of the country, or to deport them immediately after they represent 1.l % (31 million) o[ their ent rÂˇy, because this is what the entire national population. the majority of the .Americans say Among the various communities they want. On the other, the fact that form the extraordinary that, on the economic and social ethnic mosaic from which the US plane, .M itchell says, "there is an draws its strength , the fastest evident need . A young couple in growing is the Latin American Los Angeles understands it when one: e.g. 38% between 1990 and they find an Hispanic baby sitter 1999, as compared to a general that costs 30 instead of 100 average of 9%. If the trend lasts, dollars, and the consumers by 2005 the Hispanics will be the Âˇ understand it when they eat the largest minority of the Cou ntry strawberries picked by the Latin (13% of the totali ty of the American labourers. In this case, inhabitants, the Afro Americans it is not a matter of saving but of being 12%); by 2050 they will having the desired product , constitute the 24,5%, and by the because no US citizen wants to end of the Century may become do the agricultural work that the the majority. A radical immigrants do at a low cost". demographic-social change which Despite walls, electronic sensors wi 11 not fai l to produce also and patrolling policemen, the flow political repercussions. of illegal incomers has remained There ,vas an evident proof of unchanged . "Jn reality", the this trend also during the .last professor continues , "the increase electoral campaign, when Al Gore of control reduces the number of and George W Bush v ied in clandestine entries in Lhe major inserting Spanish sentences in cities a long the borders (which their speeches: only a hundred may pay in political terms), but years ago, "the American century" not their total number, because had started building itself on a the immigrants choose different, rigorously "wasp" tradition (i.e. more risky ways . Moreover, the White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant). strong legislative restrictions in These considerations obviously the accepting Country increase concern on.ly the legal immigrants the number of tl1ose who settle

1\erial view of Porl Antonio, wi1h the Blue Mountains in the hackgrouml.

prompt the US government to pay more attention to Central America, thus promoting the strengthening of democracy and economic developn-1ent. FRONTIER AND MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

down permanently. "In the pasl", Mitchell observes , "there were groups that arrived for seasonal ·work , went back home and successively returned, and so on. Now they remain , because they are afraid they won't be able to reenter when they are needed". At political level, the consequences of the stiffened immigration rules are substantially two: "Within the borders the upholders of the hard line have lost a lot of Hispanic votes, whi le on the international plane the government has had to bear lhe pressures of the Countlies

concerned. In 1997, while visiting Central America, President Clinton realized that Lh.e various governments were chiefly, not to say only, interested in annulling the restrictions that had just been approved. Little by little and very quietly in order to avoid negative reactions, the measures were wi thdravvn". At present, the general trend, at least for what regards the US , seems Lo prefer to regulate the flows rather lban build barriers. In the long run, lhe gro,.ving Latin American influence should

• Cuba claims from the US the base of Guantanamo, on Cuban territory, separated from Cuba by a 29 km frontier. • Nicaragua claims from Columbia the sovereignty over the archipelago of San Andres and Providencia ( 44 sq km. 30,000 inhabitants) as well as Banco Roncador, Banco Quit.a Sueno, Banco Serrana, Banco Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. • Guatemala and Belize have still to settle the question of their land frontier, which en tails claims on the territorial waters in the Gulf of Honduras. • Currently there is a tripartite dispute among Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador over the maritime frn ntiers of the Gulf of Fonseca. • The Republic of Haiti claims the island of Navassa from the US. • Vene1.uela and Columbia are unable to come to an accord over the delimitation of their territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela. • Antigua-Barbuda, the Dominican Republic, Sainl Kitts and Nevis, Saint Luc ia, SainL Vincent and Grenadine question the statute, granted to the Venezuelan island of Aves, of an exclusive economic Zone (Zee) and of a continental platform. ur:1

;'Journalist, Contributor to "La Stampa"

fJq IPfNlOO<!;~<!;® ~ ·

'8r

(GiJrm;~fJ)~ !B®~llfl®W<llOOOOiJ

MOBILIZATION: FROM THE OLD TO THE NEW

Not without pride we can state that the Army has been the first Service - and, so fa1~ still the only one - to acquire its own "reservists", thus putting itself on the same level as the Armies of other Countries with a long and well-established expelience in the specific sector. Certainly there

<8r

are still many steps to be taken: p r ocedures must be perfected, the potential of the Completion Forces has still to be exploited in full; but the Army "reservist" exists, lives and operates side by side with the "regular" personnel. It is a working reality! Thus, in order to give credit to those who, albeit for short periods of time, are willing to wear their uniform again and accept to take

a road which, in some cases is more difficult than the one they usually cover every day, we intend to illustrate, in broad outline, the figure of the Army reservist and the organization which has been set up to recruit, train and employ him. The dynamic evolution of the last twenty years has substantially affected the social and economic realities of all European and

The decrease in the number of conscripts induced the Army and the other Services to undertake a delicate process of structural reorganization 'Whose goal, according to the provisions of the recent laivs, is to have the availability of a totally professional instrument. In this connection, the Project Groups tasked 1vith the rationalization of all sectors of the Army - operations, logistics, territorial organiza' tion, training and schools - ·have achieved. concrete results which, endorsed by the Army Staff, have made the reorganization activity possible, with a view to constituting, with a unitary vision the synergies necessary to achieve the objective. One of the studies 'Which, probably more than others, ,~epresents a radical change vis-a-vis the past is the "Recruitment and Completion Forces Project". The study, which takes its legal legitimacy from the Decree-Law 464/97, concerning the abandonment of the old "mobilization" concept for a ne1,v one: "co111pletion" of only the existing Bodies, · Commands and Units, culminated in the establishment of the Inspectorate for Recruitment and Completion Forces. It is an ambitious project, i,vhich, since 1999, has been developing through a •gro1iving number of applications to join the "military ivorld" as reservists. This success is certainly not due to curiosity about something ne1v: our reservists have operated brilliantly in "out-of-area" operations and in ·the most important international exercises, and this is due to a deep feeling which, 1ivithout rhetoric, induces citizens to wear the grey-green uniform in order to render a useful service to the Country. Purpose of this article is to present the nei,v organization, in all its coniponents, to give the reader a precise knoivledge of the real significance of the restructuring project of the Army. West ern co untries. T he international political scene has changed and so have the threats, giving rise to new security needs. All institution al bodies had to reckon with this situation. The Army has adap ted its mentality a nd it s orga nization a l st ructu r es, c hanging fro m an instrument quantitatively "present" on the territory to one qualitatively ready to m a n age diverse crisis situations and to defend nationa l intere sts at risk.· The s tra t egic d eci sion o f revie wing the concept of "mobilization" also falls within this context, a d justing the

concept to the real operational requirements. Up to December 31 , 1998 the m obilization system was based on the following standards: • mass mobilization: the forces tha t had to be prepared in case of mobilization, were in fact on a 5 to 1 ratio vis-a-vis the active forces, both to compensate for the los ses s uffe r ed in ope r ati ons and to m a n the Units whose constitution was planne d (Br iga des to b e established on the basis of the r ecalled p erson n el w ho had previously served at Schools, reserve battalions for the Major

Units, security compa nies for surveillance a nd protection of the numerous sensitive points on the national territory, etc); • the transition, within extremely short times, from a peace to a war organization: s ome Units h a d to be operati onally r eady within a few hours, others in 48 hours. The Units to be constituted exn ova h a d to b e op e rat iona l within 20 days. However, this organiza t ion impli ed a remar kable e m ploymen t of pers o n n el at a ll command levels, since every Organization ha d to determine its own mob ilization needs a nd, as a

consequence, summon its personnel by sending recallcards to the Carabinieri Stations, and contact the Military District for the recalling personnel it could not redraft on its own. Furthermore, one must consider the burden deriving from the necessary continuous updating, at the discharge of every class, of the situations concerning all Officers, NCOs and Troops. The reorganization of the mobilization system finds its legal legitimacy in a Decree of 1997, which stales that "the military instrument aims at providing permanent Command and Control structures" and, at article 1, says that the arrangements for mobilization are limited to the completion of "live" Commands, Organizations and Unils. ll was certainly necessary to change the regulations, and had even a politico-strategic justification in the extension of the warning times within \Nhich the mobilization operations could be completed: from the previous 20 days (a fact that made the old system necessary) to the present 180 days, in line \Nith the commitments mad~ to NATO. On the basis of these elements, the Service has set up its new mobilization organization, the 86

"Completion Forces" syslem which,albeit leaving the overall legal picture almost unchanged, has completely redrawn the general standards, rules, instrurnenls and implementing procedures.

THE NEW FORCES

COMPLETION

Basic principles The new mobilization system or, to put it better, "completion system" - is based on the following principles: • simplicity and f1exibility of procedures, achieved by centralizing at the Service's top level the policy functions, leaving to the Units the possibility of proceeding to recalls according to their needs; • gradual start of the mobilization activities only at the first vvarning sign of a crisis situation; • recourse, as much as possible, to voluntary recalls and only subordinately mandatory ones, if necessary for completion of Commands, Organizations and Units; • custody at the Units of I 00% of materials and equipment; • recalls already in peacetime

.4 "Centauro"h.eavy armoured car.

for the Army's operational requirements, both on the national territory and abroad. These are the main changes in lhe system, in that, in practice, they represent a form of real recruitmenl - albeit for a limited time - of already discharged persom1el. The Organization In view of giving the greatest possible impulse to the reorganization of lhis secto1~ with the appropriate visibility both within and outside the Service, on January 1, 2002 a special High Command was established, with the task of expressing a unita17 national s trategy of recruitinent, together with a network of "Recruitment Bodies", which are an efficient and widespread interface with society. The structure consists of: • the Army Inspectorate for Recruitment and Completion Forces, localed in Florence. It has been constituted through the reorganization of the disbanded Command of the Central Military region; • three Interregional Rectrnilment

and Completion Focces Commands - located in Turin, Rome and Palc i:;mo as intennediate bodies, comtituted through the reorganizat ion, respectively, of the Piedmont Military Region Command, the Sicily Autonomous Military Command, and the Rome Command. The latler; renamed Military Cornmand of the Capital, has also assumed the functions of Interregional Recruitment and Completion Forces Command; • seventeen Regional Recruilment and Completion Forces Commands, subordinate to the abovementioned Interregional Commands, and conslituted through the reorganization of the former Regional Military Commands. The need to adopt an organization diffused all over the nal ional terrilory derives frnm the enormous potential, in terms of professional capabi lities and willingness lo part1c1pate, expressed by both the discharged personnel and by citizens who have never had previous contacts with the Army but wish to serve their Country. These human resources a.re the natural feeding basin of the Completion Forces (reservists) and a precious and irrenounceable richness for the Armv, also to offset lhe still existing shortage of Volunteers in relation to the operational commitments in Italy and abroad. These 1·esources must be methodically seeked, also through appropriate promotional initiatives. Organization of the Completion Forces

In relation to the voluntari ness of the individual to be recalled, the Completion Forces ar-e divided in: General Completion Forces They are set up in an emergency

through coercive measures already planned in peacetime. They consist essei:itially in blocking the discharge of the last classes of conscripts; recalling the discharged pe1·sonnel, start ing with the younger ones; suspending the norms on retirement from regu lar- service; increasing Lhc number of recru i ts. These measures are aimed at cornpensating for shortages clue to lhe absence of personnel for various reasons or to possible losses. Voluntary Completion Forces They are the real "revolution" in this sector. . We refer, as we mentioned before, to the nevv figure of the "reservist" who on a voluntary basis· - is employed already in peacetime for the Army's oper-ational needs both within the Country and abroad (support in public order activities or in case of disasters, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping missions, etc .) . These arc discharged personnel (Officers, NCOs and Enlisted Men) who, at the rnoment of discharge, or later~ express their generic willingness Lo be recalled if necessary, but accept the actual recall only upon notice. The authorization to employ these forces is issued every year by an Interm .inisterial Decree fixing the number of personnel and the duration of the recalls. The Voluntary Completion Forces also include the so-called "Select Reserve", formed by highly professional reserve Officers who can profitably operate in the Service. The "Select Reserve" can be joined by both reserve Officers and discharged NCOsienlisted men, who are commissioned as reserve Officers wiLhou t exam.inations, and can reach the rank of Major, as provided by a Royal Decree of 1932 (the so-called "Marconi Law") and

by a Decree-Law of 1997 . The commission is awarded, in compliance \vith a DecreeLaw of 2001, upon agreen-1ent of Lhc Ordinary Commission for Pron,otions, who dec ides Lhe rank and the role of the candid a le, after consu I lation with the Army Chief of Staff. Recruitment of the Completion Forces The recruitme.n L involves Commands and Bodies o[ the Army at all levels, according to an order of responsibilities where the policy activities are allocated to the Arn,y Staff, and the management is carried out at lower levels. In general, as regards the specific responsibilities of the various levels: • the Army Slaff - after consulting the Operationa l Forces Command and the Inspectorates - determines the personnel necessary fo1· the completion, prepares the Defence-Treasury JnterminisLerial Decree which, every year~ authorizes the recalls and their duration (one year maximum), and carries out the preparatory activities for the establishment of the "Select Reserve"; • the Inspectorate for Recruitment and Completion Forces supervises and controls the rnanagemenl activities car-ried out by the subordinate commands; • the Interregional/Regiona l Commands and the Military Districts update the data banks of the personnel qualified for recalls, keep contact with the reservists, perfor-m promotional activities and acquire the availability of the discharged personnel; • the Bodies/Units carry out the arrangements for their completion by acquiring the availability of conscripts 2 months before their discharge; select their own voluntary

Table 1

SELECT RESERVE: THE SITUATION Application evaluated and not accepted

Application Received

Applications being examined

I•

170 (*)

Curriculum Of interest Not of not but excluded immediate adequate or for various interest profession reasons (..) not of interest

Military obligations not performed (Rejected, conscientious objectors)

Military obli gations performed in other Service

Total excluded 54

77 (***)

They also include 39 applications of discharged reserve officers, of whom 26 with a profession of interest. These personnel, although not within the Select Reserve category, can be profitably employed for particular needs. (**) 8 for age limit, 3 medically unfit and 3 renouncers.

(*)

(*w*)

¥ 7 have been declared eligible for commission by the Commission for Promotions; ¥ 20 have been sent to Personnel Directorate for further examinat ion; ¥ 50 are waiting for the results of medical examinations. It must be noted that some applications were not taken into consideration because the applicants, although in possession of excellent curricula, had surpassed t he age limit or were about to reach it.

comp letion Forces w i th the close cooperatio n of th e Mili tary Districtcs; take care of the training and employment of their pe r·son nel. The "recruitment" of civ ilian personnel fo r t he "Se le c t Reserve" deserves a particular men tion. In fac t, considering the c omplex ity o f the p i-o ced ures, involving the General Directorate fo r Military Pe r sonn e l , th e Ordi nary Comm ission for Promotions and even the s ig nature of the Decree by th e President of the Republic, the Arm y Sta ff ca rries out an accu ra te se le c t ion of the applications, constantly trying to combine the needs of the Service and the professional experience of the individ uals. In particular, their cu rricu la are ca re full y

exam ined, with particular r eference to: • age; • educat ional record; • specializations, if any; • courses attended (connected or not wit h the educational record) , with prio rity to those regarding military subjects, such as "m aster in peac ekee p ing", cou rses an human rights laws, etc.); • fo reign languages spoken, and relevant level; • professional experience abroad; • previous collaboration with the Defence Administration; • perform anc e of conscri p Lion du ty (w h en not per formed, reasons must be ascertained) . With refe re nce to the applications already received, it is possible to say, withou t be ing rcl hori ca l. , th at the nu m ber o f

qualified applicants is very high . They have excel.lent pr-ofessional q u alit ie s an d a deep sens e of belonging to the Nation, with Lhe c onse q u ent de s ire to p lay a n institutiona l role wearing the Ar m y uni form. Thi s ca n be ve r i Ge el in th e da ta s h own at Tab les 1 and 2, revised on December 3 1, 200 l. Th e d u ration lim its of the obligation arc specified at Table 3. A w idespr·e ad a nd conLinuou s promotional activity is particularly importa n t . rt must be d irected both outside the Servi ce, mainly ror its implications on the "Select R eserve" and with in the Army itself, in order to encou rage t he assent of those who are about to le ave Lhe se rvice but willing to renew the ir experience, showing

PROFESSIONS OF THE APPLICANTS FOR SELECT RESERVE

Table 2

0 SCIENTIFIC AREA

2%2%

l:J

MEDICAL - VETERINARY

0 ENGINEERING - ARCHITECTURE

JOURNALISM

0 ECONOMY

12%

an identity o f values with the Military Institution.

JURIDICAL AREA

Iii

HUMANISTIC AREA

HISTORY - POLITICS

LANGUAGES

OTHERS

Training of the Completion Forces

In view of this, the promoting The Volunteer Completion capabilities of lhe web should not Forces are trained according to be underrated. They have been need. The practical modalities tested in numerous contacts are fixed by Lhe specific received by the Army Staff thanks Directives issued by the Army to the "Completion Forces» page on the Army in lernet site (http:/ /wwwescrci to. difesa. i l/professio/ PERSONNEL riservisti.htm). Another form of promotion which has confirmed the warm interest in this subject, is the series of lectures given at "Rome 3" University, within the "Master in Peacekeeping and Security studies". Finally, also the Unils can cany out approp1iate initiatives aimed at establishing durable social and professional relations with their Reservists, through their participation in all military and recreational activi Lies, such as ceremonies, meetings, conferences, celebrations.

OFFICERS

"Complemento"

Staff, and go lhrough lhe following tlu-ee phases: • Preparation: carried out during the first recall after discharge last 3 or 4 weeks, depending on the time elapsed after discharge, the position held during service and the possible operational experiences. There is also a particular training cycle for the civilian personnel (who may have no military experience at all) of the "Select Reserve". The lraining's goal is to provide these personnel with the tech no -practical preparation necessary to operate in a security framework. • Updating: the initial phase of the successive recalls, preparatory to the employment. In particular, a course of trarnrng, valid for both preparation and updating has been outlined, envisaging: • Training in the main types of operational employment (individual combat training,

Various Branches: •Sen.Off. • Capt. • 1st Lt. - 2nd Lt. Carabinieri and Logistic Corps •Sen. Off. • Capt. • 1st Lt. - 2nd Lt.

"Complemen to" re serve • Sen. Off. • Capt and below

(*)

Reserve (*)

• • • •

Gen. Col. Lt. Col./Maj. Capt and below

"Complemento" w ith Various Branches and obligations in peacetime Logistic Corps • 1st Mar. • Mar. • Sgt. Maj/Sgt. Carabinieri • 1stMar. • Mar. • Sgt Maj(Brig) / Sgt(V.Brig) "Complemento" with obligations only in wartime

PRIVATES

AGE LIM ITS (years) 52 47 45 54

48 45

65 62

70 66 62

50 48 45 55 52 50 60

Reserve

PRIVATES Reserve VSP

Unlimited discharge

(·) Personnel with obligations only in wartime

NBC decontamincuion of a VM-90

territor-ial control, peace support operations); • At "minor unit" level (squad, platoon, company), a training adaptable to the trainees' skill. Furthermore, in order to optimize the recall time, the organi1.ation and training is entrusted to regular Officers and NCOs with recent operalional experie nces, and the recalls are p lanned, as much as possible, in concomitance with out-of-garrison activities (such as a training camp). It is very imp01tant that the training be essentiall.y practical, limiting the theoretical lessons to the equipment, vel1icles and weapon systems introduced after the r·eservists' discharge, or to the new norms of particular interest (such as human rights, regulations on military discipline, etc.). Al the end of the preparation, the personnel are considered "ready'' for 2 years; after that time they will have to be

"refreshed" with another training period (following the same training course envisaged for the preparation phase) .

• Goal-oriented training. Its durat.ion is variable, and its purpose is to train the reservist for specific operational activities, such as interventions in disasters, territorial control ("Vespri Siciliani" and "Partenope" Operations, etc.), peace-support or peace-enforcing operations. Depending on the type of mission, the refresher· period las t s from one week, for the operations in support of the national community, to two weeks for the operations of territorial control, up to a month for peace-support operations and up to two months for peace enforcing and war operations. Employment

The employment of reservists can last the entire period of time fix ed by the In tem1inisterial

Decree on recalls, or for variable fractions of it . We st r·ess , once more, that the system is very flexible, and can adjust the recalls according to the needs of the Organization, taking also into account the reservists' requests. It is even possible to e nvisage, for the reservists with special qualifications (e.g. physicians), reca ll s of a few days only. In these cases, the reservist does not ha ve to interrup t his work relations for long periods of time. The recall can take place either individually, for the jobs which do not require the insertion in predetermined units, or hy platoon- or company-level modules to be attached to the units so that they may operate according lo the emp loyment modalities of the Branch/Speciality. From the human and professional viewpoint, obviously the most profitable and paying employment is in human itarian operations. In fact , one should not underestimate the fact that the Reservists are a cross-section of the civil society which now

Right. "A rie1e" combat tank.

Below. Rifleme11 on training.

and then they leave to r etu rn to the Serv ice, tak ing with them a remarkable experien ce a nd an alway s positiv e cultura l and professional wealth. Particularly importam has been the e mployment of a full-s trength co mp any, taken from th e Compl etion Forces, withi n the m ultina tional Brigade e ngaged in operation "J oint Guardia n" in Albani a. On this occas ion, th e reservists, afte r trajning for the mission with the "Granatieri d i Sardegna" Brigade, operated in the Theatre w ith great professionalism and enthusi asm, and we re highl y apprec iated at nationa l and international level. Also o n the occ asi on of th e most important exercises carried out outs ide the nationaJ territory - am ong them, the "Balti c" mission in Lithuania, "Koren" in Bulgaria, "Ba laton" in H ungary, "Drawsko" and "Ustka" in Poland - the Co mpl e ti o n F o 1Âˇces gave their pre ciou s and e rfcctive contribution, and were a credit to

their Un its and the whole Nation. Fin ally, another profitable employment fo r reservists with sp ec ia l ski lls was with the military posta l service, in favour of "out-of-area" contingents. The personne l used in this case ,vas from the Italian Ma il organization. The exper ience gained and the very good results achieved "on the field" have le d th e Army to enhance m ore and mo re the integration between regulars and reservists, be ing aware that, by

draw ing hi ghly s pecia li ze d 1-esources from the Completion Forces "bas in ", it is possible to realize remarkable synergies, bolh in Lhe organizationa l/funcli o nal sector and in the operational field. Thi s is the basic concept of the activity under way which is aimed at exploiting the Army's new operational ca pabilit ies in t he CIM IC and PSYOPS secto ,Âˇs . In particu lar, wil hin the NATO CIM IC Group Sou lh, soon LO be cons tituled a t J\llotta di Liven za, the re ,vii I be a res ervis t componen t made up o[ experts in Pu blic Affa irÂˇs, Infrastructure, E con om y a nd Co mm erce, Humanitar ian Support, Cu ltural Affairs. The number of reservists requ ired for these ac tivili es is about 200, but il is also necessary to have a "reservoir" for personn~l turnovers and sustaina bility of the opera lional activities. As co ncerns PSY OP S, by the e nd of 200 5 a unit of this kind ,vii] be estab lished as part of the NATO commitments o f the Army Staff. The fo rmation, of Regiment level, will incorpora te experLs in ethnology, anthropo logy and mass communications. It. w ill a ls o be necessa ry to find experts in ane sth es ia, r adio lo gy, surge r y and 91

pei-son nel, is particularly advanwgeous for l11e Ar-my, both for the Reservists' flexibility o f em ploy ment and the low management costs, being based on the emploment - in periods of great operational activity - of already trained personnel. In conclusion, it can be said that the abandonment of the previous m obilization system in favour of a more modern and effective voluntary-type organization sets the Ita li a n Army on a level with the Armed Forces of the other Europ ea n and Western Countries. Our cognitive journey does not end here. In the next appointment we intend to illustrate what has bee n. done for the s tatus of the Reservists, from the regulation of their service rela tions wit h the Defence Administration, Lo their prornotions.

Army rangers checking 1/zeir equipment before going into ac1ion.

Right. "Bersaglieri" training for combc11 i11 lmi/1-11p areas.

orrhopedics, for the c onstitution of "medical packages" to be employed in the field medical Uni ts , c onsidering Lhe gen e r a l shortage of specialized military physi cians. CONCLUSIONS

The i nte nt of this sho rt excursus on the general orga n ization of the Co mple tion Forces was lo point out the high potential that the reservists can express in favour of our Service. They are a lively a nd continuously evolvin g category, whose employment \Vill be more a nd more us efu l after the 92

transition to a professional Army and which, besides being made up of hig hl y motivated an d te chn ic a ll y we ll prepa red

'Lieutenant Colonel, Section Chie(, Forces Organization O{Fice, Army General Sta((,Âˇ:,1, Lieutenant Colonel, Section Chie(, forces Organization Office, Army General Sta{{

This i s the extraordinary story of an Officer of the Italian old school who, in 1919, wrote an unforgettable page of history i n a Budap e st ravaged by post - war lacerati ons, anticipating courageously and by many decades the modern concept of humanitarian interventions. The protagon ist has remained in the heart of the people of Hungary so deeply that in the twenties the y bestowed great honours upon him and dedicated him a bronze bust. The bust was l ost during the fifties and was recently recovered on the initiative of the Hun garians. It is an exalting epic which has become a harmonious part of the millenarian ItaloH ungari an relations and approaches Guido Romanelli to other great Italians, such as Eugene of Sav oy and Innocent XI, just to m ention two of the many that live in the Magyar historical memory.

n th e high e r s ide o f Budapes t, ~vhere t.he old Buda s tands, the re is the bronze statue of a Hussar who, for a momen t has left off fighting and, standing still, listens to the slory of the Italians on the Danu be, who, as time went by, or despite time going by, h a ve re maine d in the heart of the Magyars. The Huss ar stand s w ith his axms fo lded, h olding his sab re

flat, his .head bent, observing the b lade , li ke s o me on e wh o h as conclu ded a due l a nd , b efore assailin g a new e n e my, gives a solicitous look to his sword . ll is a statue tha t vibrates with energy. Had h e n ot been a warrior, )1 e could have been a dancer in the b r i ef m om e n t between two whirls; but boots , sha ko, clolrnan, pelisse with the superabun da nt ro w s of bu tto ns , and t he

rnerciless glare, eve n better than the sabre, reminisce of a hissing ,vaiti ng for t,-agedy, with the steel animated by the will to tear apart limb s a ll around, wi th the irascible determination without hate of the knights of the past . But now th e I lussar rel is hes this p eace and li s tens to the remembra nces tha t hover· a bout the pavement of the ancient city. And not a few remembrances tell of th e lege ndary deeds or the 1talians . The statue was shown to me by a good friend, Gb.a Mihal yi, a living e ncyclopaedia of the JlaloH ungaria n rela t io ns, sta rt ing from the first Magyar King, Saint Stephen, till our days. In the morn ing we attended the unveiling of the bronze bus t oC Lieut e n a nt Co lo nel Guido Romanell i; in the evening Gcza g uid ed me through the su.r nptuo us alleys or Buda where, next to the Hussar, as many as fo u r I tali ans arc portrayed in bronze and stone, worthy men for the Hungarian history and fo r civil izali on. Tha plaque on the millenarian wall of the Major Church of Our Lady of the Ass umption, w hi c h t h e Ilu ngarian s s imply c all Mattias' Church , ev oke s the R oman baron Michele d'Aste, mortally wounded in his ea rly thirties, on the 2 11 d of September 1686, fr·e eing Buda from Ottoman rule. You take a few more steps a nd not far from the War Museum where yo u can find encl less inform at ion abou t the brothe1·hood between Italy a nd Hungary - under the bell-tower, which has survived the air·-ra ids that destroyed the Church of the Magdal en, Sa int Giovann i da Cap estra no , represent ed in brorizc, remind s us of wh e n , fighting in Belgrade against the Turks, on the 6 th of August 1456, he gave c ourage to the a r med defenders a nd and faith to the d yi ng men. He wou ld soon join the latter on the 23 rd of October. 94

He was canon ized in 1690, but earlier still he was in the hearts of the ivlagyars who, eve ry year~ on the October ann iversary cli m.b t he mo un ta i n in Abl'l.l zzi in remembrance. 1 r the b ronz.e of th e monk blends the torture of battle with the suffering and ecstasy of faith , the s tatue of Pope Innocent XI, born Benedetto Odcscalchi, has Lhe serene, simple and yet solemn concentrati o n of prayer. In th e stone, nothing betrays the thundering c rusadin g s pirit of th e Pon ti ff H e hi mself wa s un aware of it until he ascended the Papal throne in 1676. Before, as Cardinal of Ferrara, he had bee n proud of being ca lled "father of th e poor"; as soon as he became Pontiff, he catalyzed the coalition t hat d efended

Vienna and Budapest, preserving the Chri s t ian civilization t hat nourishes us. Thus, thr·ee Italians r·emembered in stone and bronze. They are not alone in keeping com pany to the Hussar with the impatient sabre. Standing a bove everybody a nd far from everybody, as befits the proud ruler of thou sand battl efie lds, Eu ge ne o f Savoy stands o ut in front of the Royal Palace. When he frees Buda from the Ottom ans, in 1686, he is i n his early twenties a nd a Col one l. Four years later· l1e liberates the entire Hungarian land and is Marshal of the Hapsburg Empire. His eques trian sta tu e tells o f a war wo n and of peace reconquered - the latLer is always the beloved daug hter of t he

The bronze statue of 1he standing Hussar, anns be111 io hold his sabre flat ...

former - by an unforgeuable leader~ an Italian, once more an Italian, who humbled even the proud "Roi Soleil." At night, the rider and his horse dominate r.he Danube and narrate or a thousand -year-old destiny that has joined the hands of Hungarians and Italians. Tbose were our thoughts that evening . After many years another Italian has come up by the side of these illustrious men, not in the ancient city but among the soldiers of the lower town . The irascible Hussar appears vexed at the separation, but Rornanelli, who was a simple and rough so ld ier, is glad he has found the some Limes excited , sometimes solemn or rhytmical bawling of barracks. Nevertheless, as ,ve sha ll see, things did nor. go exactly like that, because History, Tim e and Desli ny, well mixed by a powerful and compass ionate Hand, can provide surprises and put things back at their r igl1t place. On the 15 th of November 1919, the Rumanian troops, which had invaded Hungary at the end of July, had withdrawn. The Hungarian authorities had decided to celebrate the regained independen ce with a great military and religious ceremony to be held in the square of thePadiament. The citizens of Budapest, encouraged bv an unusuallv ~ sunny and clear day, rallied around their soldiers. At the end, along the avenues by the Danube, Âˇ from the legendary and shining Hussars to the more modest infantry units, all the Hungarian troops offered themselves to the embrace and the applause of the crowd. A company of cadets of the "Luclovika I" Military Academy, -

On the 1 lth of January 2001, in Budapest, the Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gianfranco Ottogalli attended the ceremony for the unveiling of a bronze bust in memory of Colonel Guido Romanelli. The ceremony was held at the prestigious School of Military Engineering of Budapest, directed by Professor Colonel Berek Lajos, who laid a wreath, followed by the Hungarian Undersecretary of State for Defence, Tivadar Farkas and by Lieutenant General Ottogalli. The statue was blessed by the two m.ilitary chaplains of the School, a Catholic and a Lutheran one and Romanelli's fi.gure was commemorated by Undersecretary Farkas , by Professor Geza Mihalyi and by the Italian Am.bassador Giovanbattista Verderame . The ceremony reached moments of true emotion ·when the notes of taps echoed among Italian and Magyar fl.ags, which, as is well known, bear the same colours even if placed in a different manner, underlining a similarity in diversity. Jn the words of everyone resounded the strong impression and the enduring memory that the figure of this Officer still maintains in the Hungarian collective consciousness and in the memory of the individual persons. As a matter of fact, among those present there was, and not by chance, besides the distinguished members of the"Comrnittee of '56", formed by the Hungarian refugees ·who animated this initiative, like Professor Lajos Pinter, a numerous deputation of former cadets of the "Ludovika I" Academy, Lieutenant General Laszlo Botz, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Hungarian Defence and Colonel General Bela Kiraly, present advisor to the Magyar Government. General Doctor Janos Pioszeghy, Deputy Rector of the Hungarian Defence University, during the party that followed underlined how the event just experienced entered perfectly in the millenarian history of the excellent relations between Italy and Hungary.

having completed their itinerary, headed towards their garrison, turning towards the National Museum and going by the residence of the Italian Military Mission, which was charged with the enforcement of the Treaty of Versai lles. The flag at the head, the Commander marching ten. steps behind it, preceding a square formation of a hundred cadets, rifle on shoulder~ a b it proud and a bit braggart, like all cadets of the . militarv academies when thev , parade. The step was cadenced, the legs st iff, according to the style still in use in the annies of Central Europe, not because inherited from the "goose step" or· the "Roman step", as some

A moment of the unv eiling ceremony of Col. Guido Romane/li's bron ze bust.

believe or fear~ but because it was conceived two centuries before by Eugene of Savoy, \Vho used it to set the pace of his invincible troops. This shows that the memory of lhis great Savoy is

still very much al ive. Turning around the corner of the National Museum, the cadets went by a marble bust of General Garibaldi, who had been elected to Lhe Hungarian Parl iament by the Magyars to spile the House of Hapsburg . Garibaldi never entered the Budapest Parliamen L bu L Hunga r·y was dear- Lo him. As a rnaller of fact he enlisted quite a number of Hungarians in his "Red Shirts", such as his Chief of Staff, Colonel Tun~ and Gener-al Tukory. The latter, a Musl im, died in Sicily and was buried by Ga r·i baldi rnanu 1nilitary .in the Church of San Domenico, in Palermo, overcoming the understandable - and useless resistance of the monks. Earlie r· there had been, and later there would be, numerous and significant cases of Hungarians fighting for Italy and of Italians who reciprocated for the Magyars. Then the Great War broke out and Italians and Hungarians found themselves on opposite fronts. They did their duty, but without hate, treating the prisoners wilh humanity. Thus Lhe parnde of the cadets continued with a perfec tl y aligned manoeuvre beyond the

National Museum, where it n-1et a black "Lancia" automobile, the passenger hidden b.y luggage packed lo the roof and v\!i th an inqu isitive greyhound looking out of the car window. The car stopped, making way for the detachment. The passenger thought it was better to remain in Lhe car~ \Ne ll hidden by the luggage. He had been ordered to leave Budapest as anonimously as possible; therefore, although he very much wanted to be present, had to forgo the ceremony and decided to leave shortly after twelve , when the u ni t s were going back and the crO\vd hastened to their midday meal. He had obeyed, reluctantly but had obeyed, and now he hoped that nobody would recognize him. Nevertheless, the car and the greyhound were well kno\vn Lo the Budapest population. The Commander gave an order which was clearly understood as an order lo render military honours. Lieutenant Colonel Romane lli realized that the honours could only be meant for him. He alighted from Lhe car and stood at attention . Eleven days earlier, a comrnission of four Genera.ls one American, one French , one Italian (Gen. Mombe lli) and one English - wanted by Clemenceau, P resident of the Paris Peace Conference, had heen installed with the task of ensuring tha L Hungary, detached frorn the Austro-Hungarian Empire, would respect the clauses of t he armistice of November 13 t h , 19 18. Moreover, according to Clemenceau , tl1e four Generals should have "kept contact" w ith the Rumanian army, \.vhich had invaded Hungary and caused the fall of Bela Kun's "Government of the Soviets". The Hungar ians had already suffered from a rigid and

punitive policy carried out by the vi c t ors of the war with an economic and socia l chsis thaL had inesorably brought Bela Kun to power \Nhen Count Karoly, the former Pr i me MinisLer, in Oc LO be r 1918 had decided Lo resign, together with tb e entire Cabinet, after only five months of his presidency, indignant with the Allied Commission which was imposing a narrow and punitive frontie rÂˇ. In March Bela Kun had come into pO\ver; and by the midd le of July his destiny was already decided. He was banished by the Entente and the rest had been

done by the end of foreign trade and the collapse of the collective economy. The breakdown c.ould have occurred earlier had there not been the Army, in whicl1 the sudden Communisl colouring, certainly far from the Hapsburg tradition , had not watered down the very strong nationa list sentiments. Therefore the Army stood firm and sustained as much as it could the struggle against Ru mania and Czechoslovakia, which had brought their troops to tbe heart of the Hungarian territory.

As long as the Rumanians and the C7.e chos lovaks were advancing, the Peace Conference of Paris had kept silent. As soon as the Magyars conquered a large slice of Slovakia , togeLher Âˇwith the town of Kassa, inhabited by a Hungarian rnajori ty, the Conference decided to e n fo rce the rights of the vi cto rious powers. On the 9 th of June, the Confere nce ordered Bela Kun to leave Kassa and the e n lire o c cupi ed Slovak te rritory. Similarly, the Rumanians were to vvithdraw on the lines of the armistice of J.9 18.

Lt . Gen. GianfiÂˇanco Ottogalli, Army Chi e f' of Sta ff; and Ambassador Ciovanbattista Verderam e, during ihe ceremony held in Budapesl.

Had the pacts been observed, the Magyars would J1ave gained on Lhe east the amount of territory they were to lose on the norlh. T hings did not go that way. When the Hung,H ians withdrev.-, the Ruman ians never thought of doing the same. Bela Kun's credibility started to

Giovanbattis ta Verderame, Italia 11 Arnbassa.dor to Budapest.

to remain in pmver until Octobe r 1943.

decline and was definitively compromised by the successive offensive against the Rumanians, which was such a failure that it opened them the road to Budapest. Bela Kun fled to Paris and thence to Moscow, \vhere, years l a t e r, h e was p u t to cleat h by Stalin. A1Âˇchcluke Joseph was appointed regent in Budapest and S tephen Friedrich ,,vas designated at the head of the Government, with the 98

agreement of the exiled Kin g Karl. But Clemenceau considered the restoration of the Hapsburgs a calamity and, precisely in order to avoid it, he had a ppointed the four Generals. Soon the Generals forced the Archduke to resign, so that, on the 23 rd of November, he could be replaced by Admiral Horthy who, from that day on, hoisted the 1-JungarÂˇian flag at half mast in remembrance of the unredeemed territories, and was

In December 1918, Guid o Romanelli, an Artillery Lieutenant Colonel, when his regimen t leaves the Piave rÂˇeg ion and is transferred to Catania, ignores that he is going lo be projected into the Hungarian melting-pot . Certainly, he has asked co be employed abroad; he is fluent in French and Englisb, and knows German, but now he is only irritated al having been sent to Catania: he hates garrison life, does nothing Lo hide it and \,vants to be employed where he can have his qualities appreciated. Romanelli has three war campaigns behind him, two in Africa and the last just concluded. He abhors idleness and loves challenges . In the past he has been idle loo, but fo r reasons independent of his will, such as when , b ecause of bis frequent falls from his horse - he loved to break in personally lhe most u nruly ones - he was immobilized for weeks. During one of these periods in the Castro Pretoria barracks, his horse was chosen as model for the quadrigae with which the scu lptor Fontana, adorned the summit of the Tomb of the Unknown Sold ier. In May 1 91 9, ,v hen he has really had enough , the Supreme Command orders him to go to Vi enna, to lhe Joint Allied Armistice Commission. He leaves immediaLely, for fear that a counterorder may return him to the detested idleness of the garrison . He presents himself to General Segre, Head of the Italian Mission in Vienna. The General keeps him under observation for a few days, then sends him to the most spiny seat, that of Budapest, where Bela

Bron ze statue of" St. Giovanni d a Capes trano, located i11 {ro ut of Buda's War Museum.

Kun employs every means a l his disp osa l to qu es tion the Commission's a uthority. Segre has chosen Romanelli [or t his difficult task not only becau se he is a p leasant perso n, but because he realizes that he is an Officer of great worth . Fro m that moment on, Ge neral Segre defended courageously and as much as he cou ld the choices mad e by his d e legat e i n Bud apest, wher e the situ a tion was very precarious. Romanelli's predecessor, Major Pentimalli, has suffered several times the vexations o f Bela KLm's militiamen. He bas been insul Led, abducted, ha had his car stolen. The abuses have diminished a[ter Gen e ral Seg re's perso n al intervenlions. But it is cl ea r by now that Penli malli must go and Romane ll i is neede d lo hand le the s ituation. Romanelli's arTival in Budapest is a turning-point in the relations between Mission and Government, and between the Mission and the civilian population. The first measure is Lo order the Governme nt to a llow those who want Lo leave the Countrv Lo do so. Th e se cond, no less impor tant th a n th e first, is the dismissal of the militia an d the e nd of the ir vexations on the Hungarian population. The res idence of the Mission, the Ho tel Ritz, is a few s teps away frorn the Ch a in Bridge, a point of passage of extraordinary architectura l charm, bet wee n Pest , on the right bank or the Danube, and Buda, on the hills of the opposite bank . The .Mission is in the heart of the city. The c itizens of Budapest, without distinction of class, refer lo it to obtain help and food. Romanelli's most brilliant

quality is initiative, together with a d eep and very c ivi l sen se of solidarity. This makes h im a precursor of a certa in way of unde rstanding these intern a tional miss ions , which restore peace precisely when they are su s tain ed by people like Ro mane lli, ready to assume responsibili ties that are risky but necessary in ord e r to g ive a co ncrete s ense to the mission. Initi a tive is his best weapon and he uses i L generously, often declaring a support from Vienna

w hich is uncerta in or does not exist. But the man has the so ldier's boldness mi xed with the s hrewdness of the diplomat and uses b ot h, adj us ting the doses well. On the 24 th of June there is a revolt. So me un its of the Hungarian Armed ForÂˇccs - Lhc ca dets of th e "Ludovi ka I" M iii t ary Ac ade m y arc am ong rhern - d es perat e ly try to overthrow Bela Kun. They go up the Dan ube on river boats, a rmed mostly witb Lhe gascon spirit of the young. Bela

The eques1rian s1a111e u( Lugene

Savo y, Marshal o( the llap sburg Fmpire, in front of 1/z e Ncuio no { Museum.

Kun deploys guns on the river banks and soon the cadets discover at their cost that, to win a battl e, they need something more than heart and spirit. Defeated, they are captured. Immediately the news is spread that the Government wants to prosecute them, together with other rebellious soldiers. The outcome of the tr..ial is expected and everybody knows the place of the hanging: Octogon square , whose e leg ant , Liberty sty le street lamps are quite suitable to be employed as collective gallO\.vs. 100

In short, the aim is to give an unforgettable example of cruelty by executing the cadets, sons of the Hungarian high society, thus demolishing all possible counter:. revolut ionary ambitions. Romanelli, \Vhose concern towards the Budapest population is \.vell knovvn, is subrnerged by requests to stop the hangman. He does not need entreaties but, nevertheless, he knows that he is alone. His colleagues of the allied nat ions of the Mission, like in other previous occasions, \.Vhen the situation had changed for the worse had speedily taken the road

Lo Vienna "for consultations". Moreove1~ also the communications with the Austt"ian capital, whic h in an y case have never been particularly easy, a r"e once more interrupted and Romanelli in this predicament is aware that he is alone in an isolated Budapest. The folktale says that Lieu tenant Co lonel Romanelli resolves th e situation by rush ing into Bela Kun's office and, with a whiplash on the table, demands and obtains the release of the prisoners. Romanelli, in fact, lwd a riding whip and, like many Officers of his time, had the habit of showing it off, as a gentlemen's accessory, a lso when his horse was not around. In addition, his firm and testy character was very \veil su ited to the picture of a whipping irrupt ion into Bela Kun's study. On the other hand, the people, who had rightly sensed Romane1li's courage, were unable to imagine the subtle political facets which he had to keep into account - as he actually did - being well aware that diplomatic battles, for those who condu ct them, are often more sanguinary than baLtles fought with guns. The Hungarians, therefore, handed down the image of the hissing riding crop, but in reality he had recourse to the rnore prosaic hut no less courageous, peremptory and cutting diplomatic note number 398 of the 28 th of June, 1919, written in impeccable French: .. .je m'adresse a Volre Gouvernernent pour reclarner que la vie des otages et des prisonnier politiques soir respeclee sans exception. Ce son the gents qui se sonl battus pour des idees el des principes et c'esl lout juste qu'ils soient sownis au merne traitemenl

qui est reserve par la Convention de Geneve aux prisonnier::; de guerre. The reader may appreciate the extraordinary modernity of the warning that Romanelli counters to Bela Kun's intentions. It js a humanitarian reasoning of a very topica.l conception, which proves how Romanelli had breathed and acquired it during the long years of his mili Lary educat ion, from the "Collegio Romano" to the Military Academy, and on the battlefields he had crossed, and could bring it forth at a suitable moment , opposing it to Bela Kun's barbarism. The latter ansvvered with rude tones, claiming lhat he was attending to the internal affairs of his Government. Above all, he conclu d e d, "it did not seem possible to him thal th e Italian Govern rnen t could share Romanelli's initiative". It was like saying: "I know you arc isolated and therefore you speak only on behalf of yourself". It is a bad blow and Romane!Ii is conscious oC that. Jle must find - quickly - a point where he can lever and force Bela Kun to stop the hangman. That evening , the ulcer that tormented him and compelled him to keep lo a strict milk diet, must have grown much worse and sleep, which usually lasted only a few hours, went away completely. It is nighttime when Romanelli goes out Âˇ in the streets of Budapes t for a walk with his greyhound. He racks h is brains and the next clay sends a note that is a little rnasterpicce of diplomacy. In substance, he says, I intervene because the armistice conditions, which I am left alone to guarantee in the name of lhe Entente (therefore, mind you, not

on ly in the nam e of Ita ly), em pow er me to do 0o ror the questions susceptible to hinder the maintenance of public order. As ccgarcls the legi timacy of Bela Kun's Governrnent, th is does not exist, because it does not stem from Lhe "libre expression de Lout le Pays et de routes les classe::; sociales" We are in 19 19 and the reader should notice how effectively and synthetically this Officer of the o ld Italian school expresses th e criterion of democratic representation. Romanel.li continu es " ... if you are the expression of a faction I don't ::;ee how the Entente could allow you to issue death ::;entences on olher factions and consider them legitimate ... The friend::;hip of the Italian Government cannot be invoked for the purpose::; of 011.e faclion ... '', and conc ludes, homing the point, " ... / again

draw your attention on the unpleasant consequences that you would cau::;e by disappoinling the wishes and hopes of rhe Allied Countries". With this, Romanelli unveils his innale qua ! i ty of capab le diplomatic negotiator. He has rÂˇernoved th e centre of gravity of the contention, avoiding to propose himself as Bela Kun's direct antagonist, but r alher by pointing out, without arrogance but wiLh clue strength, that he, Bela Kun, is setting himself against lhe who le forces o[ the Entente. The Magyar diclator fears that such a sit uation could produce the pretext thal wou ld allow the Entente to se ttl e the pending scores, considering that, up to now, he has not spared efforts in order to question the authority of lhe Entente.

Equestrian staw.e of a Hussar.

101

The i'vfajor Church oF Our Lady of 1he As s umption, simply called "Mattia 's Church" by Lh e Hungarians.

.,.

Bela Kun thinks it over; no Jess than Romanelli has clone before him, finally he gives in and spares the life of the cadets and of the other soldiers, more than a hundred persons, condemned to certain death. Guido Romanelli breathes a sigh of relief, as does the enLire city with him. He has bluffed and is aware of it, for he is not certain that in Vienna they would have done anything. The proof comes when, a fe,,v clays later, he makes a report and receives a good dressing-clown . Thus he realizes tha l, had Bela Kun resisted, his superiors would have left him alone. Despite everything, his popularity is sky-high, so that, when after a few \,veeks Bela Kun 102

falls, he can intervene with all his authoritativeness and prevent the victims from avenging themselves on their persecutors. We don't know wether, when he visited in jail those who had been \,v arders until the day before, any ironical hint escaped from his mouth. Tl is neverthe less improbable that he should have bullied them, because it wou ld be in contrast with his character. Instead, and this is certain, for the unsuccessful executioners he has the same concern that he has shown tO\vards the cadets . And adds some of his own fars.ighLed ideas . Speaking with firm decision with Clemenceau, he suggests that the Powers of the Entente send a Regiment each, in order to

implement an ante litteram kind of peacekeeping, like th e operations be ing carried out by almost ten thousand Italia n soldiers in various countries of the world . Clemenceau has other things lo think of; on the contrary, he is actually against such an idea and can't wait to get rid of th is ltal ian, who makes Ita ly too popular in Hungary withou t France gaining anything from it. Romanelli, hO\vever, undertakes to mediate between Hungarians and Rumanians. He can no\v use all his prestige with both parties in order to avoid that the Hunga1Âˇians, after Bela Kun's fall, thrO\v themselves into a new war against the Rumanians. Tha facts that followed that tenÂˇi ble summer, proved the Italian Lieutenant Colonel right. Lacking an armed peacemaking intervention of the forces of the Entente, he had in fact foreseen a long period of agony for Hungary Peace arrived Lo the Hungarians, but it was a temporary peace, after three years of suffering. They were kept for three years on the threshold, imploring admittance to the League of Nations, which they obtained in 1922, but it was too late. Meanwhile, during that long summer of 1919, Romanelli, his prestige and his ample vision of prob lems arc cumbersome for those \.vho are in reality unsuited to the challenges of the moment 01~ like Clemenceau, advocates of particular interests. This explains the rapidity \vith which is brought to effect the contrast with General Mombelli, member of the "Four Generals Commission" and, above all, with Cerruti, the Political Commissary for the Italian Foreign Ministry, who keeps in the shade, and

emerges only every now and then nearer; a sharp orde rÂˇ and the to instigate, if necessary, cadets, turning their head to Mombelli against Rqrnanelli. A render their honours, looked him difficult situation that d1:ags on in the eyes. A couple of brazen until Romanelli, Li red bu l youths sm iled openly. H is heart skipped a beal when untamed, some years later leaves the Army becaus e of the the bearer lowered the flag, as if he were a Head of State.The few persecutions. around clapped But already now, wbile he lives people in Budapest, his relations with affectionately. A simple and s ignificanl the Aulhorities of the Conference come to a head when , on th e tribute, the remembrance of spontaneo us initial ive of Lhe which was dear to him when, people of Budapest, there are back at home, he was followed hy plans to confer the highest Magyar decorations to him, besides naming a street after him ( as in fact ,.vas done: the slreet is the present Illes Utca that starts from Ludovika I Square) and erecting h im a brorv.e hust, for which he cheerfully agreed to sit three times while the sculptor, Alaj os Strobel, worked on his clay model. The casting had to be postponed because bronze was scarce. Imagine the spite of his enemies. That was the last straw. Clemenceau and his aversion for the Italians seemed custom-made for bringing to ils d ue conclusion the envy tha t Rom anelli provoked among his colleagues. At that point the ,.vorried notes from Vienna to Rome, asking that lhe lrouhlesome Lieutenant Colonel be called hack, became more and more frequent . Nol even General Segre , who conlinued to appreciate and defend him till the end, could do anything more. Some days later the Italian Supreme Cornrnand issued the order to return home.

ll1 e revenge of his env ious enemies, which induced the Chief of Staff lo get him out of the way, exiling him to the Osoppo garrison in Friuli, near U<line. ln November 1922, an unexpected letter invited him lo Budapest where, in the Parliament palace, the Primate of Hungary, Car-dinal Csernoch who, according to the old Costitution, was Regent in the King's absence - awarded him

When Romanelli saw the ca<lels unit and heard lbe orders of the Commander, alighted from the car, stood al attention and brought his hand to his cap. The vigourous cadence of the sleps on the pavement got nearer and

Equestrial swlue of St. Swphen.

103

wi Lh an honour sword, preceded served and loved ha by a vi bra nL s peech by the A litt le before or a little after Pri m ale h ims elf who, hav in g 1922, the statue planned in 191 9 reminished the n umerous events was a ct ually rea li zed and two of ,,vh ich he had been p rotagonist, twin copies were cast. co ncl uded b y \-v ish ing a long The first was located a long the lasting peace between Italy and ,valls of the "Ludov ika T" Military Hungary. Academy a nd the secon d was R o man e lli too k the s wo rd , sold by its author, in 1923, to the thanked everyone a nd retur ned National Gall ery of Hungary. · to Osoppo. This latter copy was proba bly As 192 3 gets nea r, Roma nelli set in a decorous pla ce , b o t h knows that ganison life can offer because the subject enjoyed great h.im nothing mo,-e. H e decides to fav o ur and because its aut ho r conclude his career as a Colonel. d eserve d i t. Th e autho r was Wi th the exp erience h e has Alajos Strobe l, as we said, who at ac quired, the rel ations he ha s th e time had realize d m any established and the unconditioned importan t works and \Vas q uite esteem of many impo rtant renowned. persons, he can start in as ma11y Nevert heless, as years went by, profess ions as he wants. th e bronze could not be exhibited H e sti1rts b y being a c apable any m or·e, and no t onl y for diplomat, a s he had previous ly hyp ot he tic al art ist ic reasons . proved to be, achieving the dignity M ost likely, w hen R o ma ne lli 's of !Vlini ster ple ni po ten tia ry, memory had ceased lo be in tune because, Cerruti notwithstand ing, wit h t he politic al wi nd of th e he had earned himself m or·e than n10 m ent , th e re was pro ba bl y a few estimators in the corridors someone w ho - out of sco rn for of the Foreign M inistry. In th is the m an (improbable) or to save capacity he disti nguished himself it fro m u nlucky desti nat ions as Ita ly's Ge nera l Co nsul to transferred t he st atue in the Barcelona from .1927 to 1934. storage r ooms o f the Nati o nal B ut he .longed for H ungary too, Gallery, w hich for a fortuity is and h e re t u n 1ed in 1938, th is loc ate d beh ind t he square time w ilh a ,.vife, two daughters, do mi na ted h v th e st a tue of another greyhound and another Eugene of Sav~y. Afterwa rds, its p r ofess ion : P resid en t or l h e memory w as lost unti l t h e Hung arian -Itali an Ba nk. He present day. remai ned there unti l 1943. . The bronze placed inside the Versatile, energetic a nd clear- · Mili tary Academy had a di fferent headed till the en cl, he p assed a nd more unfortuna te destiny, It away in Fr iuli , at S a n Vi to al sur viv ed u nt il t he e nd or the Tagliamento, nearly 97 years-old, forti es, \Vh e n it was d ecided to in 1973. erect a b r onze mo nu m ent Lo W hen someone rem in ded h.im Stalin, in the vicinity of H eroes' of the p as t, he was fond o f Square, wli.ere the Church of the ,-epeating De Amicis' verses: Patron Saint of Hungary h ad been . · Italy l\lfothe1~ who does 11ot pro111.ise, The colossal statue was actually and suffices us bui lt between 1951 a nd 1952 , the p roud corn fort of having sacrificing n umerous bron zes

104

ta ke n fro m t he st re ets o f Budapest . Ro manelli's was one of them . Thus the statue was lost, hu t no t ils memory and, four years ago, it \Nas decided lo restore it. The promoting committee that was constituted, not knowing of the other twin sta tue, took upon itse lr to realize a new one a nd to give it the appropriate features. Konrad Matthaeidesz, mi li tary edi to r of the Hungarian televis io n, devoted himself to a researc h in the archives of the Magyar Natio n a l Gallery t h at laste d almos t one yea r a nd , un expectedly, brought out the second twin of the original statue. For some time it was thought to put this back in place instead of ,-ealizing a new s tatue. But it wa s s oon cl is covered th at thi s was impossible . Th e o ld statue co ud n ot le ave th e Natio nal Gall ery to w hi ch i l bel ongs . Neverth eless it was useful as a m odel for the bronze e rected o n January 11 , 2001. Thus the second original of the first sta tue , real ized in 1922 , stands u p there in Buda, w here there are the other foui- renowned Italians , n ot exac tly ne xt lo Eugene of Savoy bul near enough. All the intense activity of the po we rful a n d compassi on ate Han d has s ee med appropriate to u s and may b e a ls o the irascible Huss ar is grateful and agrees ,vith us.

i_J

;,Colonel, Head, international Relations Office, Defence General Staff

ive thousand kilomelres of powerful crene laLed wall , marked by over fi[ Leenthousand huge towers: Lhis is the essence of the Chinese Great Wall. T he motivaLion t hat p rom p ted its buildin g -a deat h sentence for myriads or convicts who laboured in its yards - was t he inLent to rep ,-ess the incu ,-sions of Mongols and Hu ns. As far as we kn ow, the consLrnction starled around 215 B.C., when Emperor Shih-huangti sent general Me ng-T'ien (al the h ead of an army of 300 .00 0 labourers, war s laves and criminals) to the northern

frontier, which was systemalicaJly trespassed by the invaders. The pl a n was s imple: a wall approximate ly four-men high, wide enough al Lhe summit to allow six people to walk abreast. T he layout was eve n simp le r: it followed wit hout exception the watershed of the mountain ranges, abso lutely ,-egardless of the e nvi ronmen l's morphology. Between su ppo rte rs and defamerÂˇs, lhe Cyclop ean fortification remained in sen ice for ove r 18 cenluries . It is hard to ascertain its vali dity, especially because the raids never stopped completely. A significant posithÂˇe 1

105

A gastrapheies from the IV Cenw,y B.C. (reconstnic1io11) .

clu e cou ld be found in the continuity of its upkeep, other-wise inexplicable; another could be the mobility recovered be the Chinese armies, which had free d themselves of an exasperating hindering action. It is not by chance , in fact, tl1al after the partial completion of the wall, one of the first Emperors of the Han dynasty. Wu-ti (140 - 87 B.C.) started a series of expanding campaigns towards the west. The initiative \,vas taken up and amplified by his successorÂˇs, who were perhap s puzzled by th e insistent news about the increasing expansion, in the opposite direction, of a contemporaneous huge empire, headed by a city called Rorne. Shortly, thaL lillleknown state entity became Li-Kien in their language. Tf the Chinese somehm.v kne\v about Rome's existence, il is not excessively s urprising that also the Romans could be aware of the existence of peoples living on the eastern ex Lre rni ty of .Asia. If anything, it is 106

astonishing how vague the knowledge of this existence vvas, considering the large and varied quantity of wares that were incessan tly imported from tho se regions . Plinius, for example, on the pretext of censuring the impudicily of some shameless matrons, who had no scruples about appearing in public wearing transparent garments, supplied a short account about the peop l es that produced those very precious fa bricÂˇs . He po inted out. that: ... the Seris owe their celebrity to the wool of their forests, which they gather by combing the white down of the leaves, after soaking il in water. Ov erlooking the obvious inaccuracies, it is easy to recognize Lhe Chinese in the Seris and the ir supposedly vegetable wool in the mytical silk, secreted by si lkworms on mulberry leaves" and spun after boi li ng the cocoons in water. There is no difficulty in aLlributing to the rnerchants that traveled along the endless $.ilk Road the origin of t his information, w hi ch was perhaps purposed ly confused, bei ng the production of si lk a j ea.lously-kept secrel.

In the same historical pcrÂˇiod, the Chinese kept an even more fanatica l secret a bout anoLher prnduction which, unlike th e first, was an exquisitely military one. It should have been - and never has the conditional been obligatory as in this case - the most delicate component of a lethal weapon belonging to the Chinese imperial army: the release-device of a Han crossbow. The cros sbow, which in the West would appear only in the second period of the Middle Ages, in the East had a long tradition already in Plinius' times, because it could be traced back as far as the 12 th Century B.C. ll is therefore obvious that the weapon , having been employed widely for a long time, had b enefited from coun tless im provements. The most important must certainly have concerned the release -device, from which the functioning and cMrect laying depended. Precisely like Loday, also in those tim es money and fights conspired in nullifying an y mililary secret. Probably the shrewd Phoenician traffickers, more pirates than traders, did not miss the opportunity to gel hold of some specimen of t he weapon. Whal is certain is that w ithi n a short time a rudimentary crossbow appears in the Mediterranean region, in the hands of the Punics, who use il in the campaigns of imperial expansion, particularly in Sicily. The precision and power of its throw roused a widespread terror among the Greeks of the island and, at the same time, an impelling need to equip themselves \,v ith it . It is nol by chance, therefore, that at the end of the 5 th Century B. C., Dionysius the Elder, the famous tyrant of Syracuse, gathered the most renowned technicians of the time, engaged with sumptuous remunerations, and urged them to reproduce, and possibly improve and perfect,

'{,

such a weapon, promising fabulous re,varcls in case of success. Wilhin a feyl months, the equipe projected and r,ealized various te r r ibl e obsidional machines, among 路which a let hal crossbow, called gasLrapheres at the time: nevertheless its releasedevice resulted excessively big and stumpy and in a ny case impossible to minialure so as to permit the co ntruction of a 1--cal hand-held crossbow of limi ted dimension and weighl. l t is logi cal to conclude th at the Syracusan reproduction , like the p reced ing Punic - Pho e nic ian ones, had little in common with the Eastern specimen. The Chinese release-device, li ke the similar devices of the medieval crossbows, musl have functioned in a co mp letely diverse manne r-, according to a totall y different concep ti on . Perfectly conscious of the importance of such a delicate component, the Chinese ru lers not only warned their technicians agains t di vul ging its characteristics but compelled the manufaclurers to refrain from expo rtin g any model of it. In order to make th e prohibition even more peremp tory, they selected a very restricted nurn ber of craftsmen, the most talented ones, to whom they granted the ma nufacture : a kind of early manufacturing-licence! As the imperia l army operated exclusively on the north against the Mongol tribes an d on the north-,.vest against the Huns, the risk that such cross bow would spread in case of ca pture appeared unreal, because these nomads lacked the indispensable technology. Nevertheless this did not prevent t.be occurrence t hat specimens se ized by these nomads co u ld be resol d profitably to the West, 路where

such capability certa inly existed. The discovery of a part of a Han crossbow from lhe 1s-t Ce ntury A.D. at Taxila, (a little town about 30 km from Rawalpindi, capital of Pakistan) besides confirrn ing this reasoning, permits to formulate different hypo theses abo ut the a rea of maximum diffusion. ln fact, two findings at Le Puy in central France, dating back to the 1st and 2 nd Century A.O., contribute ta make the story still more pu zzling. The findings are two fig ures in basrelief of Roman manufacture 1路epresenting two crossbows, ,.vhose c haracteristics exclude t heir deriva lion from the ga.straphetes, confirnli ng an im pro bab le autonomous elaboration or a more plausible co-optation. Once rnore the question remains the same: how could the technological decanting possibly occur betvveen socio-cultural worlds so distant from each other? Through which channels and in wha t chronological period? Without considering that, the weapo n be ing quite sophisticated, only a contact, or better a clash. between Roman and Chinese soldiers could have

created the indis p ensable realizing p recondition s : an occun路encc that finds neither corroboration in history nor indirect testimony in the famo us Peut inger's Table. ln fact the longitude considered by tbe Table undoubted ly ex t ends beyond India, b ut its latitude remains always below Tib et, therefore omitting any geographica l reference to China . Nevertheless , a fleeting trace surfaces in the extreme vicissi tudes of the catastrophic campaign of 53 B.C., caused by Crassus' superficiality and tactical foolishness. Strangely, but not inexplicably, these fac ts, overlooked by the coeval writers and p remise to the subsequent oblivion, to a less scholastic .in ves ti gation be tray e nigmatic in co ngru ities a nd tra gic reservations, plaus ible answers to the questions a bove. Thi s is the story in short. In 62 B.C ., Julius Caesar is appointed propraetor of Ulteri Or' Spain, but his many creditors prevent him fro m leaving the City if he doesn't settle his debts. A rich man, Marcus Licin ius Crassus , rescues him from the humiliating situation. 'Whal we know a bout him is bis scarce

Detail of a Graeco-Rornan release device.

.1.07

SeCLion of the release device medieval crossbow.

or a

Facing page. Detail of' 1he release device ofa m edieval amhush-crossbow.

apti tude for command and an absolute lack of scruples: he was incapable or defeating Spartacus' rebellious s laves but capable of crucifying 6000 of them along the Appian Way. In any case, Caesar; freed from his economic worries, granted him his friendship, binding h im with Pompei us in the first triumvirate . lt was of course a pol itical alliance aimed at sharing the power, as it was ac t ua ll y sancLioned at the meeting of Lucca in 56 B .C. Crassus was gr-anted full freedorn or action agains t Parthia, a region ric h b u L beJlicose and u nlrustworthy. Despite his age (he was well into hi s sixties), Crassus, consu l by now, the foll owing year started recn1iting the expeditionary force necessary for the planned invasion campaign. The initiative, because of the we ll- known risks, raised sLrong opposition everywhere, driving the qualified soldiers and veLerans avvay from the recruiters. Finally, the seven legions that, with diffic u lty, he managed to form were cons Li tu led by young recruits or poor wretches pressed by need, lacking any significant military experience and, moreover, intractable and recalcitrant against discip line . Th e only excep t ion was a modest contingent of Ga ll ic cava lry of tried trustworthiness and pugnacity, enrolled by h is son Publius. Once in the area, the contingent was joined by Arab squadrons. T hus, 40 ,000 men left for the unknown territories of the East, under the command of a leader 108

totally unacqua in ted wit h the enemy t hat he was a b out to attack. Leaving out a ny mora l judgement, it seems evident that the great Roman unit wou ld prove itse l f dangerous i n a traditiona l battle, marked by clashes and dominated by close fighting. But the Parthians were indeed famo us for their very high mobility and for their skill in distant con frontaLion: in other words, they were excellent bowmen, very s killed al arrO\Nshooting \Vhile riding, and formidab le lancers . In the spring of 53 B .C., the Romans crossed the Euphrates. At the beginning of March they confronted the desen, being careful to keep in the vicinity of the Belik r路ive ,路: soon, on the opposite bank, they got sight of the first enerny detachments. As soon as they simply appeared, the Arab a ll ies look flight, thus depriving Crassus of an important seclion of the cavalry. The situation started rapidly to d eteriorate and soon became critical for the i n expert lcg ionar- ies, despite their overwhelming numerica l superiority. Orodes, the Parthian King, being unable to take away many warTior路s from the conflict he was having with t he Armenians, ordered a young feudatory, a certain Surenas, who corn mandecl I 0 ,000 mounted b owmen hired by himse lf, to drive back Lhe invaders . Paradoxically, even the numerical s uperiori ty turned into a further calamity for t he Romans . Surenas, in order lo remedy his

dear weakness, had organized, in far-seeing advance, a very efficient logistic support for his archers . About a thousand carnels overloaded with arrows were to provisio n his men w ithout interruption, allowing them to maintain an incessant s hooL ing . When, within a few days, the Romans la u nched the ir allack, according to the trite traditional tactics, a deadly rain o[ arrows fe l I on the first wave and annihilated it. T he few su rvivors on ly with great difficulty cou ld return to their ranks, which had s hu t themselves up in a testuclo formation, in order to offset the tremendous hail of arrows. Man y h o u r路s passed and noth ing permitted to foresee an imminen t thinn ing of the shooting ; the situation from critical started to become lrngic, s ince it was feared that the enemy cavalry could intervene aL any m.ornent. Crassus decided to launch a second wave of attack u nder the direct orders of his son. Despite his proven valour, the R omans were aga in exterminated and rorced to retreat. As regards Pub li u s, s u rroun ded by Par t hian cataphract soldiers, he preferred to be killed. Crassus bore the loss w itl1 dignity, inciting his sold iers to resist, wh ile a c loud or arrows rnowed down the ranks, finally routed by t he cava lry. As night rell, a wretched crowd of fugitives, c hased by Surenas, h eaded for Carrae , leaving behind a large number of wounded. There were numerous cases of dese r t ion . T he two format ions met again in Syria, where the mut inous Romans forced Crassus to nego t ia t e a surrender: a hurni lia tio n that did

not save them. That was t he end of triumvir Crass us . â€˘ At least 20,000 of h is sQldiers lost their life in bat tle; a lmost 10,000, a fte r a pai nfu l march, managed to take shelter in Svria, while ~an equal number of tl1ern were t aken pc isoners by the Parthians . Thirty-three years were to elapse be fore lJ)e very few still -li v ing men cou ld be fre ed by Augustus' legionaries, who, in the same circumstance, managed to salvage a lso various insignia of the unfo rt una te massacred units . But not even their survived con1panions -i ncaptivity could give information about the great mass of captured men. It was confusedly said that many of them had s tarted a nev.: life, e nlisting as mercenaries of the Parthians.Instead, the news about many o thers stopped a~er their d ep ortation to a kind of concentra tion c amp , at a distance of 1500 n1 il es from the last strip of Roman land : nobody could have escaped from there! Plinius the Elder, mentioning Margiana, described it as a region of Central Asia, surrounded by de se r ts, loca ted between Irca,~ia and Bactriana, famous for its mild clima te, so much so as lo permit to produce wine . Not by chance Al exander had foundei there his um pteenth Alexandria, destroyed by nomads and re built some thirty years later bv Antiochus I Soter, between, 293 a nd 281 B.C., with the new name of Antioch. Precisely there , continued the famo us naturalis t, in the city whose ... perim.eter measures seventy stadia ... cut in the m.iddle by the Margo river, whose waters flow into lake Zula ... Orodes led the Rum.ans captured after Crassus' defeat ... . While in Asia Minor the tragedy just d escr ibed was coming to its co nclusion, fu rther to the east the Hsiung-nu tribes wh ich dominated Mongolia, afflicting China with th e ir

incursions - were broken up by a great nu rnher of c.h i efs w ho wa nte d to have an a b solute control over them. Among these there was a certain Jzh-jzh \Nho, having rid himself of the major contenders, Lried to establ ish himself firmly to the north of the Gceat Wall. The formation or a new Asian potentate, extending as far as Sogdiana, the reg ion whose mythical capital was San-1a r kand , \N as immediate ly cons ide re d by China as an explicit threat lo the Silk Road and its r ich trade. Therefore, in 36 B.C., Emperor Gan Yen-Shou, urged by his ambitious adviser Che n-tang, moved towar ds th e Âˇwest, until he reached the capital of Jzh-jzh, ,.vhich he Sq.eked. The dash has reached us vividly narrated in the history of the Grst Han dynasty. ln its pages there is also the story of a peculiar formation of soldiers wbich in that c ircumstance fo ug h t gallantly against the Chinese and was finally entirely c apture d . There were a little more than a hunclr'ecl men, weacing an armour whose oddity stimulated the attention of the imperial c hronicl ers . Never had they seen anything like that but on

fish : and they report it as "fish scales", set as protec tion of the professional fighters , real soldiers, not nomads a nd robbers, as the explicit te rm used by the Chinese permits us to understand. That is, soldiers of the Greek or Roman Lype. But Bactria had fallen a lmost a century before and the smal l, round shields of the Macedonians could noL have turned so q uickly in to "fish-scale" a rÂˇmours. The rout at Carrae, ins tead , dated back to only 18 years before, and the a r rival o( the Rom.a n prisoners to Margiana, adjacent to Sogdiana, was even more recenl. And in fact the Roman legionaries employed the lorica, precisely a n armour that looked very 1T1uch like the scales of a fish! H is therefore logical to conclude that those some-hundred soldiers captured by the Chinese were an entire century, engaged by Jzh-jzh himself in Margiana and transferred more to the east, on the borders of Sogdiana, for its defence in antic ip ati on o f the Chinese atLack or with the task of instructing his men . \,Vhat makes the hypothesis not so st range is the Ch inese d esc ription o f th e particular fortifi cation tha t J09

Left. A simple cro s sbo1,v still used b v Mongols.

Facing page.. Planisphere showing the three irnperial areas. (Circa year OJ

surrounded the city at the moment of their· attack. It was a vallum, surmounted by a double palisade of shar-pened trunks: a system having absolulely no Asian or Greek analogies, bul which \vas lypical of the legionaries' camps. There is still another clue that seems to furl.her confirm this surmise. The official report of the Chinese talks about 145 soldier·s captur·ed on that occasion and lreated very honourably by the conquerors because of their evident valouc The specification or their· number leads us to assume that, besides lhe fish-scale armour; they probably had particular physiognomical features, quite different from their comrades-inarms of lhe moment: a fundamental exp lanation for the rather genlle treatment by th e conquerors who, on the contrary, were knovvn for their proverbia.l bru LaLi ty. It is not surprising, therefore, thal during the journey towards China, the commanders of that peculiar detachment had the possibility to talk to the enemy general, obviously about their mysterious origin and their strange weapons. Moreover, still 110

according to the abovesaid imperial report, as soon as he reaches his home country, t he noble leader organizes a kind of triumph, ,vith an exhibition of tab les representing the most important scenes of the campaign. A precise re produc t ion of the Roman practice! Whatever the truth, it is certain that in the lists of the inhabited

centres of China, compiled in 5 A.D ., there are a town and a counly called Li-Kien , a Chinese term that incli.cates the Roman Empire. At that time, there were only two other equivalent places with analogous names, both related to centres inhabited by immigrants. It is ther·efo.re logical to co nclud e that the famous century was allovved lo found its own village within the immense Chinese empire, a village that in some ways was destined to be rem iniscent of Rome. This series of oddities, even if they don't prove incontrovertibly the presence of th e Roman legio naries in China, show a remarkable credibility. Frorn there to the cooptation of the crossbow and its transmission lo the West it is only a short step.

c:: ·1:

Historian. and writer