Issuu

CONTENTS

•

Number One 1998 January-February

March -April

Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is t hus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on m ilitary issues.

Politics, Economics and Strategy It will be possible to give the Italian military instrument full validity and effectiveness by exalting professionali~m and enhancing

i/11:1

~Kill~ of 1/Je

individual soldier.

FOUR-MONTHLY Supplem ent to numbers 1 and 2 of Rivista Milita re Italian Edition

Editor in Chief: Giovanni CERBO Management and Editoria l Office 8, Via di S. Marco 00186 Rome Phone 47357373 Advertising Care of the Secretariat of Rivista Militare Phone 6795027 Printer Stilgrafica 36, Via della Martella 00157 Rome Phone 43588200 Photoprocessing Studio Lodoli Phone 5898780 Subscription and forwarding By mail Law 662/96, art. 2, para 20/c Conditions for 1998: One number: Lit. 4,000 One back number: Lit. 8,000 Subscription rates: Italy 22,000 a year Abroad: Lit. 30,000 a year Payment must be made on postal account No. 22521009 in the name of SME - Centro pubblicistica dell'Esercito 123/A, Via XX Settembre - Rome Rasidonts abroad may remit payment through bank cheque or international postal order.

Authorized by the Court o f Rome under No. 944 of the Registry by decree 7-6-1949

1998

ASSOCIATED TO USPI UNIONE STAMPA PERIODICA ITALIANA

2 Strategic Balances (Luigi Semprini)

16 The Indian Subcontinent (Ornella Rota) 22 The Activities in International Operations (Giovanni Manione)

28 Interview with the Chief of Staff of the Netherlands Army

36 Interview with the Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Anny

Science, Technology and Training ARMY PROJECT 2000 44 Guidelines of Change

(Ivan Felice Resce)

52 The Operational Component of the Army (Domenico Villani)

64 Command and Control in Military Operations (Ivan Felice Resce) 78 Battlefield Visualization (Pier Paolo Lune/Ii)

Sommaire - Inhalt - Resumen

Instructions for Contributors: Anyone may contribute. To guarantee the highest objectivity of information, Rivista Militare leaves contributors ample freedom, though it does not necessarily share their opinions. The Author is thus solely responsible for the articles which, published unedited and without editorial ties, exclusively reflect his personal ideas. Articles must be original in thought and should not exceed ten typewritten pages. Once the Author receives his fee, he loses all exclusive rights. Rivista Militare may then pass the article on to other publications and EMPA (European Military Press Association) periodicals. Articles should be accompanied by suitable photographs, illustrations, explanatory tables, together with a photog, aph of the Author, a brief «curriculum vitae" and a ten-line typewritten summary. Rivista Militare reserves the right to change the title of articles and choose the typeface deemed most suitable. Rivista Militare is equipped with a computerized system for phototypesetting and videopaging. In order to make the production of the articles more expeditious, it is desirable that the Authors provide, besides the text on paper, also the diskette with the text files of the article. Any system and type of computer can be used.

S'l~l~A'l~I RISKS OF DESTABILIZATION by Luigi Semprini *

Many countries of North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia have started to look -w ith renewed interest at the weapons of mass destruction in order to regain geostrategic weight. For the moment the arms concerned are chemical and perhaps also bacteriological warheads that can be installed on missiles, air and artillery vehicles. It is an alarm - bell for the Western countries -which are called to a common policy of counterproliferation based on talks and cooperation. This is the only -way to prevent dangerous frictions whose reflections can threaten the continental security and prosperity. 2

THE EMERGING RISKS Within the "post cold-war" international community a sense of allergy to armaments seemed to prevail, especially to the socalled weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers were drastically reduced and disarmament agreements were concluded that up to then had been unthinkable (START II Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, CFE - Conventional Forces in Europe, CTBT - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ewe - Chemical Weapons Convention, etc.). But these euncouraging acts of detente were met by only a few cases of repentance by the countries that up to then had been interested in the acquisition of WMD (South Africa, Argentina, Brazil), while most of the proliferator countries preferred to continue the development of the respective programmes of nonconventional armaments and of delivery systems with increasingly long range; various states within the strip that goes from Morocco to Pakistan were to be included among them. On the contary, during the nineties the proliferation impulses tend to increase causing destabilizing effects also outside the regional sphere, as it happened during the Gulf War. In fact, the discovery of the Iraqi nuclear programme and the mere threat of the employment of biological and chemical weapons, that could be delivered by "Scud" missiles, hinted at the risks to which the strategic balances were exposed also autside the Middle East area. On that occasion, an indefinite sense of danger on the southern flank of NATO started to be perceived (less indefinite in Turkey). The prospects of an increasing exposure of NATO countries to the risks of WMD proliferation coming from the south now reduce the traditional distinction between the European and Middle-East 4

security and emphasize their interdependence with the outcome that the possibilities of intervention of the US forces in the Middle East (like the Gulf War) and in South East Asia are more affected by their freedom of access to the bases and air space of the South-European countries. If the latter become more vulnerable to retaliations, the talks with extraEuropean countries on cooperation tend to become more difficult, or at least to entail higher political and military costs; in any case the European component of the Alliance must be capable of participating more actively in the defence of the West's interests in the Gulf acquiring higher deterrence capabilities against the risks of WMD. There is a need for the West to find a proper answer apt to

phlegmatize the present and potential tensions within the strategic environment of Europe's southern periphery. Besides those regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute, we can list the tensions deriving from: • subversive Islamic actions in Algeria and Egypt; • anti-West terrorism supported by some Maghreb and MiddleEast countries;

• latent conflicts between Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, Libya and Egypt; • antagonism between Iraq and Iran for hegemony in the Gulf area; • contrasts between Turkey and some bordering countries . (Syria, Iraq and Iran); • Morocco's claims on the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The proliferator countries of

the region want to achieve significant potentialities capable of affecting this accumulation of tensions, influencing the relations with the West, and replacing, with new forms of geopolitical weight, the advantages of the old patronages of "cold war" and non-alignment. A Mediten-anean obscured by the 1isks of WMD could become the stage of conflicts along the NorthSouth axis but also of dialogue; both must be faced by applying in a new manner the traditional concepts of stability and deten-ence. INSTABILITY RISKS

The change occmred within the strategic balances of the area can be noticed from the analysis of the multiplicity of the internal

and external challenges \Nhich may have stimulated the wish to possess WMD, as well as the factors which affect the acquisition of such weapons. Some countries, traditionally inclined to disturb the security of the region (Libya, Syria and Iraq) which in the past could count on the political and material support of the Soviet Union, in the nineties have found themselves without a protective deterrent and were compelled to rely exclusively on their own political and military power in order to pursue their regional ambitions; and the same was for the states that were already in a non-aligned position (like Algeria and postrevolutionary Iran) which could acquire strength of strategic value confiding on the antagonism of US and USSR interests.

The Soviet connections with the Middle East, intended to guarantee the security - like that granted by Khmshchev in 1956 dming the Suez crisis - had in fact a stabilizing function in the area. Moscow would not have permitted Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait and prime an escalation of risks. Lacking a "linkage" for the security and foreign policy, many countries of the Middle East and North Africa try to recover geostrategic weight looking with renewed interest to WMD, albeit showing themselves sensitive, at least in appearance, to the positive political initiatives, such as for example the proposal to establish the Arab Union of Maghreb (between Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya). In order to draw the West's attention on the questions of

US-made "THAAD" system for the defence against ballistic missiles and ihe proiection of US Units deployed abroad.

through a policy of technological cooperation \.vith the Arab-Muslim countries, based on the acceptance of calculated lisk. Today the risk is perhaps too high but it cannot be excluded that it may become acceptable sooner or later.

THE REGIONAL TENSIONS

regional security and start a diplomatic blackmail aimed at obtaining strategic assurances, some countries, like Algeria, betray their interest for nuclear weapons by boasting about enigmatic programmes for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The international supplies of WMD and relevant technologies, as well as the common programmes for the development of the weapons, can be founded on strategic al.liances between vaiious regions or on simple agreements, sometimes of uncertain duration or indeed limited to contingent commercial interests. In the relations between the most important Arab-l\tluslim proliferators and the East-Asian exporters of nuclearÂˇ and missile materials and technologies, the commercial interests apparently win over political oppo1tunism:

a country which could count on the solidarity of brother Arab-Muslim countries armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with a \.Viele range of action. On the other hand a scheme of cooperation between the West and the Arab-Muslim world based on coercive diplomacy as regards WMD could prove fragile in the long run, and such as to seriously complicate the European and American choices in cases of crisis. Obstinate proliferators like Libya and Iran could take advantage of WMD \Vith a view to establishing international agreements - limited and temporary as they may be convenient for strengthening their political power with the hidden intent to acquire by all means nonconventional devices and transregional delivery systems. They can credit their dual-use programmes in the nuclear,

despite every possible agreement,

chemical and airspai.;e Gelds as

annaments of all kinds are bar-tered against oil supplies. Were the relations between Islam and West to deteriorate to the point of assuming the aspect of a widespread clash between civilizations, the risk is that the acquisition of any type ofWMD could be legitimized in the name of the Islamic cause. This would make problematic any possible ,.vestern intervention in a nevv crisis against

necessary initiatives for peacekeeping and for the improvement of the technological level of the Arab-Muslim world and for the Third World in general, obtaining moreover a favourable spin-off as regards image in the international held. The countries of the Western Alliance could explore the possibility of controlling the proliferative impulses of the area

In the short term the proliferative d:mamics can be affected by factors of regional security linked with the geopolitical reality of the states and especially of those that have to face internal and external challenges which cause insecurity and the militmization of society. In such a framework any proliferative option or impulse can be a foreboding of unfathomable 1isks. On the Mediteffanean southern shore, pro-west Morocco up to now has shm-v11 indifference to WMD, despite its bordering witl1 an Algeria very much engaged in nuclear and missile military prOb'Tammes and with which has often found itself in contrast (or border disputes and for the support given to the rebels in Western Sahara. It can be surn1ised that the Moroccan position could chm1ge if in Algiers the present Islamic integralism, undoubtedly disruptive for the regional secmity, were to prevail. If this happens, Rabat will have to rely less on its friendship \,\,ith the West, and equip itselh.vith a non-conventional air~rnissile response capability comparable to the dangerousness of the nationalist-Islamic Algerian challenge; only the doubt arises that Morocco should avail itself of its new military capabilities in the contention \-vith Spain for the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves. Algeria has ah.vays wanted to obtain the position of domimmt pmver in

BALLISTIC MISSILES Number of missiles

Range Warheads

Type

Mobility

Guiding System

CEP m

weight (kg)

Libya

Egypt

Syria

Iraq

FROG- 7

mobile

unguided

500

HE Chem. (435)

FROG - 7 modified

mobile

unguided

Cluster ?

SCUDÂˇ B

mobile

inertial

900-1000

300

HE Chem. (985)

SCUD-B modified

mobile

inertial

1000

650

HE Chem. (500)

mobile

inertial

1500-3000

900

HE Chem. (350)

mobile

inertial

550

HE (?)

SS - 21

mobile

inertial + radar homing activation

30-300

HE Chem.

AL FATAH

mobile

inertial

900-1000

950 (?)

? (500)

ALAABED (derived from missile launch msl Tammouz)

inertial

2 000

HE Chem. (750)

IRAN 130

mobile

inertial

130

NAZEAT

mobile

unguided

AL HUSSEIN

SCUD-B modified AL ABBAS

SCUD-C

(North Korean)

(355mm.) S HAHIN

mobile

unguided

mobile

unguided

(333mm.) OGHAB (230mm.)

Maghreb and the leadership of Lhe Arab world, leve1ing on lhe one side on its own bislorical values (the Algerians compare their revolution to Russia's and China's communist ones) and, on the othe1~ on an extreme intcrTegional and international activism supported by the econom ic, demographic and military capacities of the country. The vicissi tucles of the vearslong intesline struggle th:,t lacerates the Algerian community bring to light the ghost of the coming Lo power of an extremely radical regime, assuredly willing to use the WMD at its disposal in order to establish "in the name of Islam '' its regional pre-eminence.

Iran

? 80

6+msls

(482)

under

development

under development

(?)

under development

HE (150)

development

HE (180)

development

HE (70)

Both Algeria and Libya formally justify their WMD programmes with the need to confront the cnonnous strategic threat represented by the nuclear arsenal of the Jew'ish State, despite their being very far from the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To this necessity, Libya adds that of having to face the challenge it has been keeping up for years with the West. Actually Libya ,vants to increase its military capabilities both for contending with Algeria for the hegemonic role in Maghreb and for exerting a remarkable threaten ing power in its strifes with Tunisia and Egypt. Pressed between two less than encouraging realities, Tunisia

under

development

deems hypocritical jts neighbours' assertions, especially after the Camp David Agreements, despite its being the only Maghreb counl.ry to have suffered a military attack by the Jewish State (the Israeli air raid Âˇwhich in 1985 destroyed the PLO headquarters of Hamman Lif, near Tunis) . Tunisia fears chiefly the proliferating impulses of Libya, with ,.vhich it has found itself in conflict siluations; the last one in 1980 in the Gafsa incident. The country fears a Libyan interest for the Tunisian salient in the Mediterranean, in that it would be a perfect launching base for hitting the hea1t of Europe \vi.th ballistic missiles. In order to get 7

CRUISE MISSILES MISSILE

Launcher Denomination Type Installation MM-38 Exocet SSM

Range

(lon)

Ship

SS-N2B

SSM

Ship

SS â€˘ N -2A Styx

SSM

Shlp

SS - N - 2C Styx SSM

Ship

OtomatMK.-1

SSM

Ship

Otomat MK-2

SSM

Ship

180

Coast batteries

6-100

Coast batteries

80-100

Otomat - Coastal SSM <le[.

SSC-3Styx (1 bn)

SSM

SSC - 1B Sepal SSM Mobile Coast batteries SSC-C-2 Silkworm

SSM

RMG-84 Harpoon

SSM

SS-12M AM39

Inertial with radar activation :,e11-gwwng Witn raaar activation m homimr Self-guiding with radar activation IR homing Self-guio.ing with radar activation IR homing Inertial with radar activation Inertial witl1 radar activation Self-guiding with radar activation homing

T~e of war eads (kg)

HE(16 ~.

Number of la unching systems Morocco Algeria Libya Egypt Syria

(513)

12 2

14 3 btrs

18 (1 bn)

(513)

Inertial witlt radar activation homing

(1000)

Self-guiding with radar activation homing

(513)

lnc11ial with radar activation

HE (227)

Self-guiding with radar activation lR homing

Iran

<M> (ffi) HE Se.m ipierciru? (210) HE Sentipiercing (210)

Iraq

Coast batteries

Shlp Submarine

130

SSM

Ship

S,S

wire

ASM

Helicopter

Inertial with radar activation

HE~. (16

Ship

Beam rider

HE (70)

Coastbtr. aircraft

Inertial with terminal radar ac,tivation

HE Semi-

piercing ( 165)

Ship

Self-guiding with radar activation IR homh1g

(513)

t\i}planc

Semi-active radar witlt radar homing activation

(510)

Italian SeakiUcr SSM

C-801

460

Missile Guiding syste m

SSM

CSS-N-2 (Chinese SSM variant SS-N-2 CStyx)

(30)

3 3

C- 601

ASM

Faw 70

SSM

Coast Battedes

Self-guiding wi.tl1 active radaiÂˇ homing

HECh~m. (SOO

FawlSO

SSM

Coast Batteries

150

Self-guiding with active radar oming

HE Chem. (SOO)

Faw200

SSM

Coast Batteries

200

Self-guiding with active radar homing

HE Chem. (SOO)

Aircr-c1ft

SOO

Inertial with tenninal m homing activation

Ababil (deiived ASM from Mirach 100

Helicopter

drone)

hold of that salient it would need only one attak of WMD on the main centres of the country; the attak would destroy a good part of the Tunisian population, which is heavily concentraLed in a few cities. Tunis, with the chimeric intent of discouraging every proliferating ambition in its vicinity, ignores the so-ca lled right to self-defence o( the Arab countries and secretly hopes that the West will come to

its aid in case of possi ble "broLherly" aggress ion fro rn Libya's Jamahiriya. This latter country lives in a state of latent conflic t also w ith Egypl, guilty of being the most pro-Wesl of all Arab countries and, besides Algeria, of also wanting the leadership of the Arab and Musl im world. The purposes of the Egyptian programmes for the development

of WMD and ballistic missiles exceed the mere a mbitions of regional pre-em inence and are su mmed up in the willingness to keep a balance with Israel as regards militarycapabilities - the Camp David agreements non-vilhstanding - and an adequate anti - Libya WMD deterrence, and against similar threats . E1:,'}rpt is also much concerned about the increased range of the

missile systems deployed in the Arab enemy countries of the Gulf area, which do not forgive its friendship with the West and the support given in 1991 to th~ antiSaddam intervention. The strategic importance of the Suez Canal for the purposes of the West's projection in the Gulf area and the endogenous tunnoils of Islamic fundamentalism make Egypt a centre of tensions difficult to control; assuredly if Cairo and Algiers were to fall in the hands of Islamic regimes all hopes to reach a peaceful settlement in the Mediterranean area would be crushed. Proceeding towards the East, proliferative aims can be found also in Syria, a country engaged in a strategic confrontation with Israel and constantlv involved in the destabilizing plo'ts of MiddleEast policy; suffice it to think of its influences on the sovereignty of Beyrouth's government and the assistance given to the Herzbollah groups operating in Southern Lebanon against Israel, as well as the rebels of PK.K (Kurdish Workers Party) hostile to Turkey. Conscious of the risks of this subversive action, Damascus aims at acquiring a WMD deterrent capability, not so much for regionalist ambitions as for preventing possible retaliations from Ankara and Jerusalem. At the foundation of the Iraqi non-conventional armament programmes its dear regionalist ambitions can be detected, as well as the ditch of hostility that separates it from Iran. The scene of the long conflict between the two countries was animated by an undiscriminate exchange of missile attacks (war of the cities) ,vhich had the purpose of bending the morale of the enemy populations and as a consequence putting an end to the stalemate on the battlefield. The Iraqis succeeded in turning the situation in their favour when, overcoming aJJ "taboos", decided to intervene with

Launching of an JCBM 1Hinuteman l fiÂˇom an underground base.

chemical weapons; the same weapons were employed to decimate the Kurdish rebels active in the north of the country. After the Gulf War and the ensuing international sanctions, Baghdad's ambitions as concerns WMD seemed relatively subdued. In Iran a relaunch of the WMD programmes and a generalized improvement of the military instrument of the country, thanks especially to the supply of sophisticated weapons of Soviet and Chinese origin (Kilo-class submarines, "Backfire" bombers, Hegu missile-launching patrol boats, etc.) has been taking place for quite a while. A certain doubt remains about the real ability of the Irani.an Armed Forces to upkeep and operate these very

advanced weapon systems. This strengthening suggests that, despite the coming to power of "moderate" Muhammed Kathami, the regime is nevertheless willing to achieve a geostrategic position that could enable Iran to carry out, without rivals, the dual role of charismatic guide of the Islamic revolution and first enemy of the State of Israel. It is a position that the Ayatullahs will attain onJy when they are able to project their WMD threat on the Israeli territory and major European cities, from Paris to Moscow. With the specious motivation of whishing to prevent dangerous situations in the area of the Gulf, Iran and fraq carry out intimidating actions on certain governments of the Middle-East area, particularly those of Cairo, Amman and Ankara, which can be considered as proper blackmail against Western European countries. Finally, in the strategic calculations of various proliferator states (Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran) there is the willingness of employing the deterrence of non-conventional \Veapons, aleatory as it may be, in order to prevent any projection of the West, and of the Ame1icans in particular, towards the South South East; an intention that they legitimize recalling the arrogance sho\,\,'11 by Western countries, even in the post-colonial era, ,vith their direct interventions: the BritishFrench expedition during the Suez crisis in 1956, up to the last air attacks of the US against Iraq, accused of wanting to assassinMP. President Bush. Muhammar Gaddafi did not esitate to declare that if at the time of the US air raid on Tripoli in 1986 he had had an adequate missile deterrent he would have hit New-York instead of Lampedusa. The strategic role ascribed to the new WMD is also enhanced by the perception - evidenced by the Gulf War expe1ience - that the Americans and the Europeans are 9

COMBAT AIRCRAFT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT F-lE .l:'•11..:

F4D/E Phantom F-5E F-5E/F

MAIN MISSIONS

RANGE naut.mi. 230-750

Multirole Spee.GA "~u-:, IV Interceptor with G.A. visual capability 429-618 Multirole with aut. GA capability

F-16C Alpha Jet CM - 170 Magister

ARMAMENT

6300 AMI and R550 Magic R530; generl Bombs; Rockets o~uu AAl\11 and R550 Magic R530; e:enerl Bombs; Rockets 7250 General Bombs· AAM an d ASM Rockets

Training

Fire Control Systems

Multiwle with oltre 500 aut. GA capability Multirole with 340-740 aut. GA capability 340-:,i:su Light Attack COIN 340-580 Light Attack COIN

5400

General Bombs; AAM ASM Rockets General Bombs; AAl\11 ASM Rockets

5400 2500

Bombs, Rockets Cannon

2500

AS11ASMs Rockets

23 4

174-565

8000

General Bombs; AAM ASM Rockets

MIG - 21 MF/bis

Multiwle with visual GA capability Interceptor with visual GA canabilitv

200-400

1500

AAJ\11; A-2 250-500 kg assorted rockets

485-700

3000

AAMs

378-620

3000

General Bombs; AAl\11-ASM Rockets

Interceptor

675-933

3000

AAMs

Interceptor with visual GA capability 328-620 GA 378-620

3000

AAMs Bombs

4000

General Bombs; AAM & ASM Rockets AMMs; Bombs; Rockets; Othe1·ammo AAJ\,fs; General Bombs Rockets

MIG - ~.,

Intercepto1· ·with visual GA capability i'- l 4A. l (,;.11i!lese Interceptor with version ofMIG21) ,isual GA capability SU-7 SU - 20/22 SU - 25 Mirage :,u 1v.t. vu Mirage 5E2

250

3000

100-200

1500

240-370

4250

240-370

4250

CAS

240-370

4400

350-700

4000

350-700

4000

230-750

6500

230-750

6500

230-750

6500

500-650

6000

370

1000

Mi.tct~e F- l AD

lnterceptol· with visual GA capability Mirage F-IBD/ED GA Mirage F-1EQ5 Mirage2000 J-6 J-7 Tu-22 H -6/TU -16

3175

SU-24 Fencer

.MIG-27

120-570

General Bombs; AAM ASM Rockets

MIG-23MF

1:,

1633

Bombs; A.AM & ASM, AGMs65B Mav.

198-265

!Vllt.:i •

Iran

3175

Light Attack COIN

MIG - 23BN

Iraq

120-570

OV-10

MlG-23 l\11/l\ll:,a

Mol'occo Algeria Libya Egypt Syiia

GA FC.A

F-16A

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT

PAY-

LOAD

Multi.role with GA canabilitv Multirole with aut. GA capability Ligh t Attack

Multirole l\oith visual GA caoability 200-324 1500 Bomber 700-11 85 12000 Bomber

3108

9000

General Bombs; Rockets; AAM.s-ASMs General Bombs; Rockets; AAMs-ASM.s General Bombs; Rockets; AAMs-ASMs General Bombs; Rockets; AAMs-ASMs Gener-al Bombs; Rockets; AA.t\11:s-ASMs General Bombs; Rockets; AAl\·1s-ASMs General Bombs; Rockets; AA.Ms-ASMs Gencn1l Bombs; Rockets; AMls-ASMs General Bombs; Rockets; AAMs-ASMs Bombs & Rockets General Bombs Rockets AA1\1ls General Bombs Rockets AAJ\lls General Bombs Rockets AAM:s

30+15 tng 80+6 tng 40

95+3 50 100+ 150+50 180 tng tng tng 20+5 t ng 60 130 40 40+15 tng 30+5 included 14+3 60+3 tng tng tng lnthd80 75 80 i.ncludc:d i.n 1hc 130

indud<-d inlhe 180

included in the 130

90 included inlhcl30

:,4+5 tng 16

14 18 im:luded io the 130

16+3 tng 40+16 tng 60 6+1 tng

iocludcd intl1e 1,10

included , in the 180

6 i.oduclcd in.tht::6

30+5 tng 25+5 tng

so scared by the prospect of suffering losses that they selfrestrain from any possibility of intervention. In fact, an Indian military expert suggested "don't fight against the United States unless you have nuclear \,v eapons at your disposal". Besides these considerations it seems rather obscure the interest. of the ruling regimes of Algeria, Libya and Iran to rush on with their prolife.r~tive processes, considering that they would have better possibilities to increase prestige and po,ver dangling the nuclear bugaboo as long as possible (like North Corea does). Impatience, besides entailing remarkable costs and risks, can make them miss politically paying occasions in the competition with other regional actors and in the contests with the West. STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF PROLIFERATION

The proliferation of WMD capabilities in the South - South Eastern areas of the Mediterranean can unsettle manv political-strategic situations, up , to now shared by the North Atlantic countries as regards the security of Europe and the Middle Easl. One should therefore raise a quest.ion about the potentiality of these weapons and about the probability and direction of their employment. The range of WMD deployed in the area includes at present conventional, chemical and perhaps abu biological aud radiological warheads mounted on missile - air - and artilJerv vehicles. These devices can , constitute a threat to the neighbouring countries and in any case in the South - South area, where regional tensions prevail; up to now the ballistic missile exchanges have occurred in Afghanistan, between Iraq and lran, in the Gulf War and in the Yemeni conflict.

TesL-launching of an "Aster 30" swfaceair missile, employed in 1he "SAA1PIT'' antiaircraftlantimissile system.

The only attack on the West occurred in 1986 with the launching of the Libyan "Scuds" near Lampedusa, unless one considers attacks on the vVest also the Iraqi missiles rained on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf conflict. In any case the actual non-conventional (chemical) attacks have always remained in the South - South context. Consequently, at present., the

regional actors of the South are also the subjects more at risk as regards WMD present on their territory, but it could also be delusory to foresee a long deferment of this aspect of the threat. It could suffice the landing in the area of a ballistic missile system with trans-Mediterranean range (i.e. North-Korea's Nodong) in order to worryingly

extend Europe's exposure to the WMD threat. Neither can it be excluded that, in the absence of adequate missile systems, the non-conventional offensive (chemical, biological and radiological) could reach the cities of Southern Europe through air raids or at the hands of terrorist groups. Reflecting upon the political disorder that afflicts this unstable peripheric area of Europe, it seems quite reasonable to fe ar that the still theoretical growth of exposure in the South may unexpectedly turn into real vulnerability. The US military presence in the Mediterranean, though reduced to nominal levels continues, therefore, to have a reason to exist due to its two-way function: support to tbe stability of the immediate southern periphery of Europe, and force of rapid intervention in the Middle-East area. It is an aeronaval presence which, although extremely vulnerable to the ballistic and cruise missiles deployed along North Africa and the Middle East, can appear provocative to certain regimes which have elected themselves avengers of the "victims" of Western aggressions. WMD AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREAS

The perceptions and the security plans outlined by the Southern NATO Countries - from Lisbon to Ankara - about the new risks of \NMD proliferation seem rather discordant - France considers such proliferation a consequence of its nuclear and missile capabilities and therefore foresees a response in very advanced terms; Spain and Italy fear its developments but hesitate to consider the problem of response; Portugal and Greece only now star1 to feel a little worried, unlike Turkey which, running a greater risk, is trying to find an

immediate solution capa ble of safeguarding its secu1ity. The European perceptions on WMD vulnerabilities in the Western Mediterranean area draw the atte ntion on Libya and Algeria. The former is a long-standing proliferator, inclined to employ non-conventional weapons against European targets, coherent w ith Gaddafi's rhe toric of deterrence and self-defence. Already in the past, Libya threatened to attack Spain, Italy and Greece, guilty of having supplied support bases for the US retaliatory actions inside its borders; a threat that cannot be underestimated, given the Libyan interest in finding nuclear knowhow and materials anywhere from the former Soviet republics to China. Algeria inspires fears for the progress made, thanks to Iraqi technological contributions, in the nuclear milita rÂˇy field and for the suspicion of having given shelter to Iraqi plants for experiments on ballistic miss iles. But the dismaying thing is especially the possible confluence of two possibilities; the realization of Algerian WMD and the coming into power of Islamic radicalism in Algie1~ the destabilizing effects of which would certainly project themselves towards Rabat and Cairo. The ghost of an Algeria dominated by a radical Islamic regime can have implications on the dynamics of prol iferation and on the political, economic and territorial tensions of the Mediterranean area (i .e. be:tween Spain and Morocco for the sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla and for the Canary Island's separatism). Given this setting, Spain, France and Italy have already promoted some initiatives intended to increase the ability to acqufre operative-strategic information, to improve air defence and realize effective defence systems against ballistic missiles.

"B- 1B" Bomber of the US Air Force.

The integration of Spain within the networks of NATO and European Ai r defence and the c reation of partnerships for the development of the "Hel ios"(l) satellite survey system and the multirole "Aster 15" and "Aster 30"(2) air defence systems are within this scope. Following the Gulf War the traditional opposition expecially by France - to the concept of strategic defence against the risks coming from the South is overcome. Considering the political consequences derived from the threat of employing nuclear weapons against targets in North Africa, the French now appear inclined to employ conventional m eans for prevention and deterrence against such risks . With a view to this, France tends t<;> strengthen its capabilities of tracking and surgical attack against WMD bases a nd the relevant command and control centres, and boost NATO coordination of systems of air and ballistic missile defence, through bilateral and European cooper ation agreements. The countries most interested in such initiatives are Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece a nd Turkey, more vulnerable in their territories and regional interests a nd with less economic resources for their defence needs . The policy on WMD proliferation outlined in the NATO Conference in Istanbul anyway concerns a wide range of r isks, including those deriving from enemies well beyond the southern borders of the Alliance. The spreading of WMD throgh the Eastern Mediterranean and its hinterlands has s tarted to negatively affect the regional security after the Gulf War.

\ The stategic environment at the sou thern borders of Turkey, already obscured by the Iraqi missile threats, is bound to f-tJrther deteriorate, if Iran and Syria will persist in their decision to acquire and make operational the new-genera tion missile systems. For Ankara suc h systens are not a t all a virtual threat, consider ing on the one side the tension that empoisons its relations with Teheran and Baghdad and on the other the fear of not bei ng able to contrast its new vulnerabilit ies with the assurances that in the past safeguarded it against the risks of Saddam Hussein's missile attacks. Turkey in fact presses for a greater interest of NATO towards two directions: deploym ent of

THE FREEDOM OF ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST.

"Patriot" antimissile systems and realization of an effective policy of counterproliferation. Both measures would represent for Ankara the essential precondition in order to continue its cooperation for security in other fields. Otherwise Turkev could reconsider its relations, with the Alliance and its strategy in the Balkans, and unilaterally acquire adequate defence and

deterrence means, even at the cost of heavy economic sacrifices. Some Greek strategists even fear a Turkish nuclear option, if Iran were to extend its missile threat to Central Europe in the name of the Muslim interest in the Balkans. In broad outline, in view of its new vulnerabilities to WMD attacks, the western policy of counter-proliferation will have to

be approached in such a way as to detect an area of large interest for NATO and the features of cooperation among the Allied states. In the short term, the new vulnerabilities could be assessed by the countries of the southern flank of the Alliance with standards different from those of the countries of Central and Northern Europe, which are still exempt from WMD risks, but, perspectively, also the Europeans, who have hesitated to accepl the security implications deriving from the Turkish membership in NATO and WEU, will have to be less averse to assume new defence obligations aimed at neutralizing the risks inherent to WMD proliferation present in the South and East of the Mediterranean area.

The freedom of action of the United States and its Allies of the southern border of Europe could be considerably reduced if lhe proliferative process did not undergo a pause. The instability of the entire area, with the increasingly dangerous implications of Islamic te1Torism, cannot but emphasize the frictions between North and South and negatively influence the prosperily and security of Europe as a whole. The problems of European and Middle East secmity will become more and more interdependent until they intermingle. The retaliatory function of WMD, deployed from Maghreb to the Persian Gulf, could cut the prospects of a European participation in a possible new "Desert Shield" -like military operation, and of transatlantic cooperation itself as concerns Middle East contingencies. Some Allies lacking anti-WMD deterrent functions, like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, can appear extremely uncertain in offering bases and air space, even if large collective interests are at stake; uncertainties destined to grow if cities like Madrid or Naples were to be subjected to serious 1isks. The cooperation with the United States under WMD threat could also develop through secret ways but this would contrast with the principle of consent and multilateralism.

There is therefore a risk to jeopardize the freedom of action of the United States, whose forces, in order to project into the Mediterranean area, must relay on the freedom of access to the air spaces of Southern Europe. These are the warning signs of a rather probable situation which ,.1vill compel the United States and NATO to pay on increasingly high price for the security of Europe. 13

If faced by a crisis, the South European countries will request, as a prerequisite for NATO intervention, air-defence and antiballistic missile means around their territories, preferably seabased and capable of moving around the Mediterranean. This means that a worsening of the European security deriving from the improved performance of the missile vehicles acquired by the countries of the Third World coulJ imply a more effective presence of US Forces projectable beyond the Mediterranean basin, even if destined to operate in conditions of greater ,,ulnerability. Actually the Mediterranean countries of the Alliance will be tormented by a dramatic dilemma: either try to minimize the risks of WMD, encouraging further reductions of US Forces present in the Mediterranean or to keep, or even increase, their presence, with functions of security and deterrence. In case the second option prevailed, the size of the American force will have to be weighed against the nevv class of contingence, the type of mission (deterrence, prevention, retaliation) and the contribution that can come from the existing initiatives of national and multinational defence. The missions will obviously entail threatening challenges for the strategic and tactical

intelligence services, and precision in case of attack on moving and protected targets. In order to reduce the germs of proliferation, also some nonmilitary options can be paying which are apt to dissolve the perceptions of insecurity and the longing for prestige and geopolitical weight, which notoriously prompt aggressive behaviours. Practically it will be necessary to try to promote any type of agreement or exchange which can level the road of the North - South dialogue on secu1ity. A first step in this direction can be seen in the contacts fostered by the European Community with all the coastal countries of the Mediterranean on economic, cultural and security policy questions, and in those started by NATO in the same direction with Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Jordan. Unfortunately the proliferator countries (like Libya and Iran) scorn every approach to dialogue. FINAL REMARKS

From the gee-strategic point of vjew, the Mediterranean is a place destined to insecmity, being an area of confluence of three differing continental realities. As a matter of fact, in the area, old political, geographical and historical stmctures coexist which are extremely different and

therefore are the harbinger of ambiguities, duplicities ,md misunderstandings which certainly do not facilitate the creation of a collective system of security. This inland sea, which at the time of the "cold war'' constituted the Southern !lank of the ALiiance against the former SO\,jet Union, today paradoxically represents the heart of a future threat difficult to defuse; suffice it to consider the disappointing results of the Bmcelona Conference. Faced by the ruthless challenges of Islam ism, Italy, Europe and NATO seem uncapable of reacting appropriately. The European Community is too involved in the EURO problem, OSCE appears to be a virtual organization and NATO is still influenced by Washington's policy. Meanwhile the countries allergic to dialogue persist in the development of their WMD programmes; Iran already possesses chemical warheads and endeavours to acquire nuclear and biological ones; Iraq is waiting the end of the embargo to relaunch its nuclear military programmes; Libya and Syria have chemical weapons and boost their production (Libya has also biological weapons); Algeria, even if distracted by much more serious problems, has apparently no intention of giving up its nuclear military objectives, from which is not so very far. But the efforts of these countries are essentially airned at increasing the respective capabilities of intervention especially the missile ones having large recourse to China's and North Korea's "keys in hand" supplies; their know-how is still too poor (except Iraq's) for them to try Lo develop any delivery system autonomously.

US "Cruise" missile.

\ "B-52H." of the US Air Force with its

various combinations of warloads.

The endemic political turbulences presenl in the area, worsened hy the destabilizing impulses of Islamic radicalism and by the fallout of the tensions le~ by the Gulf War, encourage in the regional actors the conviction that, thanks to WMD, they can impose themselves as great protagonists in the Arab-Muslim world and on the international stage. If the risks of W MD seem to concentrate for the rnornent along the South - South axis - apart from those already i rnpencling on the Turkish territory - once 1. hr. potential of these weapons is increased, lhe threat will tend to move towards a South - North direction until it touches the capitals of Southern Europe; this could happen within a decade. This realistic forecast shows that any Western multinational intervention beyond the edge of Southern Europe will become more and more politically and operationally problematic. It will

be a problem to ascertain the objectives that should be attained, the modalities, the weapons to be employed, the training of the forces and, above all, it will be difficult to assess the levels of vulnerability and endurance o[ the men called to operate in a non-conventional environment. The countries more vulnerable to WMD will be reluctant to engage forces and allow the access to the bases and airspace which weigh on the vital Mediterranean-Indian Ocean logistic axis, or at the least, they will demand, as a compensation [or their cooperation, the Alliance's pledge to accept very onerous political and military cosLs and warrant adequate deterrence against nonconventional risks. On the technical level, one must look beyond the mere symbolic defence of populated centres and relay on antimissile mobile defences rapidly deployable in the Mediterranean. Tbe preconditions for trying to open channels of cooperation with the Arab-Muslim countries must be found through a serious

'\ . . \

NATO debate on the policy of counterproliferation based on a greater involvement of the Alliance outside its area and a far-sighted negotiatory aclivity. Everything considered, the United States and its key Allies should try to reassess the Alliance's strategy as regards the WMD threats coming from the Middle-East; a strategy that should be considered vital in order to win these new challenges, as the ones coming from the East ,vere won in the Eighties.

D ;, Lt. General (rel.)

NOTES ( I) "Helios" is an optical reconnaissance satellite designed to deliver a da ily supply of pictures of specific sites. According Lo its orbit's heighl it can supply pictures at intervals of 12 or 24 hours. In the future the satellite will be fitted also with IR equipment. (2) "Aster 30" is a very-rapidintervention all-weather missile, capabJc of intercepting highly superson ic fighters and missiles within a ran ge of 45km. The svstern has a surveillance capability o'f 70km.

From Bangladesh to Sri-Lan ka, from Pakistan to India: everywhere the advance of fundanzentalisnz, dernographic den!>ity, ethnic rivalries, class conflicts, unrestrainable migratory /101-vs, abysnial poverty and immoderate riches sho1v the signs of a disconcerting contradiction and of an endemic political and strategic instability made more complex by the probable presence of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in the 1vhole area, equally evident are the upheavals of an Âˇ incessant process of modernization boosted by the enormous technological and industrial capabilities, 1-vhich are among the highest in the 'World. 16

ndia is 75% a rural ~ountry, \vith a level of technology among the highest in the world. T\venty million gods, seven hundred forty languages and at least three hundred thous,md w1iversity and high-school graduates in scientific subjects a yea.i:: More than three hundred million people survive with less than one dollar a day. The film industry is capable of producing eight hundred films a yeai: Stratified through about forty castes - but in some aiÂˇeas the divisions increase tenfolds - the Indian society on the 11 April 1997 has elected for President Mr K.R.Narayanan, an "untouchable". India, a new giant of the 21 " century, represents and expands the potentialities, contradictions and jolts of the whole area. The pratice of democracy disrnpts the ancestral institutional orders. The advance of Islam is a highly uknown factor in societies that have been Hinduist from time immemorial, because polytheism and caste are irreconcilable

according to the Koran: Allah, the only God is the very reason of existence. Equal dignity off all men is an absolute principle. Like everywhere in the world, fear (of the unkno\-vn more than the future) induces "flights" backwards for those entrenched in the past, and forward for those who would like to dismvn it. Nationalisms, dynasties, ethnic rivalries, conuption, abysmal poverty and abysmal wealth, spy waiÂˇs, uncontrolled migratory flows, c1ime and terr01;sm, ~rild urbanization, decay. And a demographic explosion due especially to the Muslim minorities of the area, which take plide in refusing the government's programmes of family planning. Despite this, in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sli-Lcmka, the civilized society continues to grmv. India would suffice to silence those who maintain that democracy and liberalization remain concepts essentially alien to the oliental mentality. In 1996 a survey made in New Delhi by the "Centre for the Study of Developing Societies" showed that 70% of the electorate rejected the idea that the country would be better ruled without political parties and elections. Of the twenty-eigl1t parties in Parliament, half of the members altogether represent the rural zones and less than one third represent the Brahmanic higher classes. The political world and social life freely form alliances unthinkable only a short time ago. Today the Indian subcontinent

has gained a strategic importance unsuspected only a decade ago. The turning-point was precisely the date that changed the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall . without forgetting that some foreboding of the importance of the area had already surfaced during the Afghanistan war. India, which up to then had been leader of the non-aligned countries, like Egypt and Jugoslavia,

INDIA Indepent since August 15, 194 7, the Indian Union comprises 25 States (each with its own Legislative Assembly and Government) and 7 Territories run by the central Government, it is a member of the Commonwealth. Area: 3,288,000 sq km Inhabitants: 913,600,000. Average yearly demographic gro\.\rth rate ('90-'94): 1,8%. Average life expectancy : 62 years. Illiteracy:48% (a 1995 figure) . Actual yearly per capita income: 320 dollars. Avarage yearly official rate of inflation ('90-'94): 9,7%. PAKISTAN Indipendent since August 18,194 7 and a Republic since March 23, 1956, until 1971 it also included the territory of present Bangladesh; it is a member of the Commonwealth. Area: 796.000 sq km. Inhabitants: 126,300,000. Average yearly demographic growth rate ('90-'94): 2,9%. Average life expectancy : 60 years. Illiteracy 62% (a 1995 figure). Actual yearly per capita income : 430 dollars. Avarage yearly official rate of inflation ('90-'94): 9,7%.

traditionally based its international policy on an equidistance from the two blocs, and pursued its national interests through the alliance with the Soviet Union. A policy that was not disagreeable to the West, which considered of the utmost reliability a country where - an unprecedented fact in the history of mankind independence was won through the "non-violence" proclaimed by Gandhi (he was mmdered 50 years ago, on the 30th of January). The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan took place a year after the return of Khomeini to Iran, where he announced his ,Nill to export the revolution. Obviously its immediate goals would he the Countries of the area, well included in the then Soviet Republics of Central Asia (Tagikistan, Kazak.istan, Kirgizistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). While a good part of the world railed against the Soviet aggression, some experts ventured that, in fact, the Soviet Union acted \vith the United States' consent in the common interest of restraining the Islamic threat. From that moment, India 18

appeared essential. Its borders became strategic in 1989, when the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolizing that of the Empire the five Republics obtained their sovereignty, claiming first of all the Moslem "identity" which had been humiliated first by the Czars and then by the Bolsheviks. What would happen if another war flared up between India and Pakistan? With whom would these Republics seek an alliance? And Iran? And how would the 120 million Indian citizens of Moslem religion behave? Meanwhile from the East (the ill-famed "Golden T1iangle") fhe drug traffic moves m ore and more to the west;

significantly half a million Indian soldiers are engaged in police actions against the traffickers. The Afghan war creates monsters ceaselessly, and groups of terrorists spread inside nations that are not

The Temple of the Sun in Karnarak; the ancient black pagoda is 1he highest expression of the architectural school of Lhe State of Orissa.

very far. A situation that prompts the international bodies to consider the Indian subcontinent a "second degree risk zone" (i.e. regional wars). Between India and Pakistan there have been officially three wars (in 1947, 1965 and 1971) plus a fourth war, in the eighties, which was stopped at birth by the U.S. because there were concrete suspicions that the two opponen ts were willing to employ nuclear weapons. There was no denial o( the details of a plan, published by the ''Washington Post", which envisaged the occupation, by paratroops, of areas of both States. For the time being, the relations between India and Pakistan do not

seem particularly bad, despite the mutual accusa6ons of supporting the respective internal guerr.iUa warfare; and the hotly contested Kashmir remains an open.wound. In 1996, the many-decade state of auerrilla warfare risked to 0 precipitate: an attack in Kashmir was immediately followed by a bomb in Karachi; practically the same in Lahore, on the frontier. The tn1ce came, also then, after pressing appeals from the United States and other Countries. In order to offset the quantitative inferiority as compared to India's, Islamabad relies on punctual supplies of the most modem and sophisticated

weapons, often coming from Europe. The Country is suspected of having nuclear weapons made, it is said, to confront the Indian threat. On its tum, according lo rumours, India has reacted by also acquiring atomic bombs. Nerveriheless, both countries deny having nuclear armaments. In Sunnite Pakistan, with strong Sciite minorities, the immobility broken by the process of modernization fosters the govern.ment's instability, spurs intellectual \-ivacity and expands the voices of the national communities living abroad. The economic situation is very uncertain, the influence o( the

International Monetary Fund further reduces the already lirn.ited decision-making margins of governments which are often headed by leaders suspected of corruption. Traditionally prowestern, with excellent relations Âźith the United States, the country has good connections with the international movement of the Muslim Brothers, v,rith important sectors of Saudi Arabia, with some of the Palestinian groups more sensitive to the appeal of Islam. On the connections between Islam and modernity, the ideologists and the Koranic schools suggest theories which are sometimes of great originality, to wh ich the influences

of Sufi (the mystic side of Islam) brotherhoods are added, and also those o f Messianic groups. Founded with the intention of being a Moslem territory, the "Country of the Pure" (that is what the name Pakistan means) suffers from heavy problems as regards public order: separatist feuds and bands of outlaws sometimes paid by large landowners; whole regions (like Baluchistan) are in the hands of armed tribes, entire cities (like Karachi), where only the widespread presence of the Army permits to go about with a minimum of security. Everything in a generalized, inextricable entanglement of plots hatched by sectors directly or indirectly linked with the Secret Service of various countries. In the Indian subcontinent, today, the wars among self-styled secret agents and t heir alleged emissaries seem to replace the traditional conflicts, which are not scarce in any case. Sabotage instead of guns, trafficking, blackmail, terrorist attacks. A reality of perfidies which surpasses the phantasy of any novelist or sc1iptwriter. The most important Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies are respectively the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). Started with the support of the CJ.A., in 1962, after a clash \.\Tith China over on old question regarding borders, the former became known in 1971, at the creation of Bangladesh, which was favoured by India. It gained furtl1er weight with Indira Gandhi, especially in the field of "political intelligence''. In the eighties , in order to "answer to the terroristic initiatives" in Islamabad, RAW operated in Punjab and also in Sind, a Pakistani southern province. Today its main tasks are to protect oil pipelines (which are destined to tal<.e on an absolutely vital importance), to control the utilization of the Indian Ocean's resources (where India has a control station), to ensure adequ ate commercial information and above

SRI LANKA Independent since February 4, 1948, Ceylon was proclaimed a Republic on May 22, 1972 with the name of Sri-Lanka; it is a member of the Commonwealth. Area: 66.000 sq km Inhabitants: 17,900,000 Average yearly demographic growth rate ('90-'91): 1% Average life expectancy: 72 years Illiteracy: 10% (a 1995 figure) Actual yearly per-capita income: 640 dollars Average yearly official rate of inflation ('90-'94): 11 %

BANGLADESH Formally independent since March 26, 1971, sovereign State sin ce December 16, Bangladesh w as born following a secession from Pakistan, of which it constituted the Eastern Region; it is a member of the Commonwealth. Area: 144.000 sq km. Inhabitants: 117,900,000. Average yearly demographic growth rate ('90-'94): 1,7%. Average life expectancy: 57 years. Uliteracy : 62% (a 1995 figure). Actual yearly per capita income : 220 dollars. Average yearly official rate of inflation ('90-'94) 6,6%.

all, to keep a watch on China. The A\Tiation Research Corps (ARC), whose communications are sent preferably by satellite and whose pilots, recruited from the ranl<.s of India's Air Force, operate with the support of a base set up, with CIA'. help, on the eastern coast of the subcontinent - concentrates their attention particularly on Tibet. Certainly no less active is ISI, reference point for the Afghan antiSoviet guerrillas. In 1991, after a journey through India and Pakistan, Robert Gates, forn1er head of the C.I.A., reported that the then Prime .M inister Benaz.ir Bhutto had practically admitted her incapability to dose down the anti-Indian training centres directed by LS.I. In order to support Indian separatism the Pakistanis had apparently set up 37 camps; meanwhile it seems that the Indians, plotting against Islamabad had established 27 of them. The Services of both count1ies face each other in Burn1.a, Nepal, Bhutan (countries that border on

the north-eastern Indian regions, where during the last fortv years insurrection; have follow~ci one another), in Moslem Bangladesh and in Sri-Lanl<.a, where Buddhists are the greatest majmity. Against the Tamil in anns, and after a long sequence of massacres, Colombo asked the intervention of the Indian army, in 1987 and in 1990 (the followjng yeai~ the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was murdered). Bound together by a loathing for modernity individually active in the most different ideologies - the Tan1il fight for the secession of the northern

and eastern provinces and for the full recovery of the values of times past. It is the bloodiest split that the inrush of tl1e modem world has produced in the traditional immobility of the area. The movement finances itself throgh various channels: a manage1ial-like structure which ensures revenues from enterprises spread around the world (i.e. Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore,

Lebanon, Cyprus, Greece), a particular tax system in the areas held by the secessionists, the concrete solidarity of ;nany immigrants abroad and - <: practice

that all guenillas in the world have in common - bank robberies as well as kidnappings (especially in India). Of great importance is the contribution given by the so-called

THE INDIAN MILITARY POWER Military Expenditure and allotments: 7,43 billion dollars (2.26% of GNP), 58% assigned to the land forces, 23% to the Air Force, 14% to the Navy. The abovesaid appropriations are destined to increase to 18-20% within the coming decade, also as a response to the strengthening of the Pakistani and Chinese Navies. Army: 880,000 men; 2,400 tanks; 1,100 armoured vehicles; 5,500 guns; 199 helicopters. Air force: 110,000 men; 844 combat aircraft. Navy: 55,000 men; 26 ships; 1 aircraft carrier; 18 submarines. Several hundreds of thousands of men are members of paramilitary forces. For a long time India got its weapons supplies from the Soviet Union, a "strategic ally"; during the last years Russia has taken its place (especially as regards combat aircraft). The national military industry is also well developed, particularly in the missile field, mainly of the long-range type. Between 1990 and 1994, the military expenses were reduced up to 40%; afterwards there has been a constant increase. Today, India's military power is the fourth in the world.

"MADE IN INDIA" "Electronic City" , Deccan plateau: via satellites, 75 companies of computer engineering services ensure to multinational companies of the standing of Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, Ibm, realtime links with their clients ... the new computerized programme of Bristol underground, realized by Ba and Hal, has its control keyboard in Bangalore. In Bangalore also personalized informatic programmes are in progress for megafirms in the whole world (Swissair among them). There are more than 200 research projects in the most different fields (froin nuclear to biotechnologies) and the "Indian Institute of Science" has produced 1,500 scientific texts. Eleven thousand engineers of the "Indian Space Resear ch Organization" are engaged in the study and realization" of geostationary orbits. Only slightly above 150 million dollars in 1991, the "made in India" exports of software have totalled 620 million in 1996, and by 1998 they are expected to reach one billion dollars. Of the mentioned amount 58% goes to the United States, 20% to the European countries. The rest goes to Australia;- New Zealand, Japan, West and South-East Asia. The forecasts according to which, by 2010, India will be the fourth economic world power, after China, US and Japan, are based above all on the field of technology.

"naval dust": thousands of small boats, often equipped \.vith a radar and mostly entrusted to fishermen who know where to place mines, a network of shipyards and a good number of mini-submarines for suicide actions. To give oneself death as an extreme act of militancy is a widespread cult among the "Tamil Tigers", the armed hand of the movement, which can count at any time on about forty people (including many girls) ready lo die while canying out ten-orist attacks. In Bangladesh, the "split immobility" manifests itself through popular protests, improbable only a short time ago, peaks of radicalism disconcerting in eastern Islam; and spurs lofty debates among the learned men of Dhacca, who try to make some kind of clear distinction between the state and the religious powers. Which is a very difficult enterprise in the allincJusive perspective of the Koran: but it is a necessity, because democracy advances inesorably. A country of rivers, Bangladesh , poverty stricken and \Vith a demographic density among the highest in the world. When the rains pour from heaven you must run in order to survive but most of the times, when you retun1 you find neither village nor hut, not even the land. The river has swallowed up everything. There is nothing else to do but to build somewhere else. Then other rains will come. The Chakhman tribes throng in the south-east, in the hill region of Chittagong, ready to fight in order to avojd all possible intrusions in their habitat, joined by peasant communities migrating from areas of the interior, exhausted by the greatest poverty. The frontiers with India are more than four thousand kilometres long and for hundreds of thousands of Bengalis India is a kind of Eldorado.

D The data reported in the boxes are taken from the "World Development Report" and, unless otherwise stated, refer to 1994.

,Âˇ, contributor to 'La Stampa" and "Prometeo"

THE ACT VITIES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS it

by Giovanni Manione *

he fast geopolitical evolution which in a few years has completely changed the old and wellestablished scenarios, involved, among other things, a greater commitment of the West for the maintenance of world stability through the execution of ''out of area'' operations. Al the same time, political and economic requirements made mor e and mor e unlikely the execution of these operations by an individual Nation. The solution that could seemingly reconcile both requirements, adopted in the Bosnian theatre, is the employment of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The participation in a CJTF represents the dear political will of a Nation to follow the inspiring principles of the mission, giving the military commitment a prominent role and making it one of the main tasks of the Army. In principle, in the Headquarters of a CJTF are represented, for obvious political reasons, all - or almost all - the Nations that contribute Lo the formation of the

International missions are a brand-new variable in the conduct of military operations. It goes beyond the language problem and involves procedures, doctrine and mentality, requiring a considerab~e effort of professional uplifting. The reflections in this article are the result of the experience gained by the author at the SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, and could represent a reliable reference point, specially for the younger Cadres. contingent. For the same reasons, the assigned jobs tend to cover a wide spectrum, as regards both specializations and ranks. This puts in close contact personnel of different nationalities, making the CJTF Headquarters a really multinational structure. Multinationality appears to be a challenge of the present time, and is a completely new variable which goes well beyond lhe language problem, involves procedures , doctrine and mentality, and requires a particular training effort aimed at preparing personnel for the new requirements. The reflections arising at the end of an intense and very significant tour of duty at the SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo could be useful to make known, in particular to the younger Cadres, the peculiarities of a serious task, whose results improve with the betterment of the general and specific preparation of those who have to carry it out. An engagement so fruitful that this experience could possibly become the reference element of the Armed Forces of the near future.

PECULIARITIES AND REQUISITES OF OFFICERS OPERATING IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF A CJTF

Having ascertained the inevitability of national contributions to the establishment of the Headquarters of future CJTFs and their importance, both political and prestigewise, as well . as the difficulties that these contributions involve, it is worthwhile to analize the main peculiarities and requisites that an officer should possess in order to be employed there. The knowledge of English is of course the basic prerequisite; but this obvious statement deserves a further explanation. The command of the language - v,,r itten and spoken - is indispensable, but certainly not sufficient: as a matter of fact, as in any working environment, ~Jso in the military setting large use is made of technical tenns, abbreviations and acronyms that must be known thoroughly, in order to avoid tw-ning the language into a closed-circuit means of commwi.ication, Âˇwith the inexorable exclusion of the neophytes. If one also considers the innumerable

An "AB 205'' of Lhe Army Aviation on reconnaissance over Lhe snowy hills near Sarajevo.

accents, the inflections and the dialectal terms used sometimes by "mother-tongue'' colleagues, the picture becomes complete and almost tragic. It is therefore necessary to deepen one's own linguistic knowledge, aiming at the technomilita.ry field, together - if possible - with the familiarization with the most common terms. It is very desirable that this study be connected to practical exercises, aimed at favouring the comprehension of different accents and cadences. The second prerequisite is the thorough knowledge of NATO doctrine and procedures. Here things are even more complex. Although our Country has been present in NATO for several decades, many Italian officers still find it difficult to speak about standard procedures and, above all, about streamlined working procedures, among which the adoption of executive briefings, instead of our long and detailed Staff documents. At SFOR Hq, for example, the activity which supports the decision-making process, although divided - like everywhere else - into a study phase and a phase in which the

possible solutions are submitted to the decision-making Authorities, radically differs from what is done at national level. The submission of solutions takes place, almost always, in the form of executive briefings, at the encl of which, then and there, very often a decision on the subject is made. The distinctive feature of these briefings, which in fact lead to the definition of a line with the value of a concept of action, is that the briefers are not necessarily the Heads of the branches interested in the process, but rather the officers ,vho have made the study, after having specifically analized the problem. In substance, a good knowledge of the matter comes before the rank: it is normal, therefore, for a Liu tenant Colonel, a Majo1~ or even a Captain, to illustrate the solution of a problem to a high - ranking Office1~ It is useless to deny that this methodology of work, mainly based on a matrix-type organizational structure, \Vas rather neglected in the national environment, as was - sometimes also the NATO doctrine. As a consequence, in the SFOR reality, the Italian officer, who is accustomed to produce

memorandums and notes destined to a long route of verifications, co1Tections, screenings and then - perhaps approvals, may find himself illustrating a subject he has studied, verbally and in a foreign language, to a high-level Authority. This practice becomes even more important in case of urgent problems - which, besides, are rather frequent - when the b1iefing, while giving all the details necessary to clarify doubts and perplexities, must not jeopardize the timeliness of the decision. In practice, the adoption of these methods, really rather far from the "mentality of the memorandum for the staff' implies overcoming a real cultural banier, which is difficult to cross. In this sense, things are much easier for the officers from the North European Countries, who are often employed within LANDCENT (Allied Land Forces Central Europe) which normally works ,vith officers from seven nations, many of whom have English as their mother-tongue. In this environment, these procedures are a real and weUestablished fact, with obvious advantages of mutual acquaintance and mixing. Also in this aspect, the process of real integration wjl] require a ce1iain time, and probably - unless the national working methods change in this direction - will also need the experiences gained in more than one multinational mission. Waiting for this to take place, in order to be able to operate efficiently, we carmot but make recourse to our usual, suggestive and unfailing spirit of adaptation but, at the same time, it is indispensable to make all possible efforts to prepare our personnel for these new working environments. In this regard, it

Roadblock set up by the rangers of the "Col Moschin" Regiment in a Sarajevo street.

would be appropliate to envisage procedural and doctrinal lectures for the personnel destined to the mission; this could be done \Vithout particular difficulties, if things are done in good time. To reach a broader result, aimed al a more general preparation in the field of multinationality, one could even consider sending the officers, upon completion of their duty as company commanders, to NATO Commands, to refresh the language and start gaining knowledge of the procedures. The third prerequisite is the "previous experience" in a given field or branch. This particular aspect concerns two seclors: staff officers and Section Chiefs (or higher jobs). As far as the staff officers are concerned, the lower their rank is, the higher their degree of specialization must be. As a consequence, if a person is employed in a branch in w.ich he is not a specialist, he Vvill have to work very hard to achieve the necessary familiarity Vvith the new job. Consideling the average sixmonths duration of an in-theatre tour of duty, this process must be reduced to a minimum, othen.vise the result will be a general decline in his global performance. These are not, therefore, problems related to the preparation of personnel, but it is rather a question of shrewd planning and management of the human resources in relali.on with capabilities and past expe1iences. This process must stem from an enlightened farsightedness, without having to resort to a frenzied search for personnel with the more or less right prerequisites; a search that implies the risk that, at the last moment, an officer or a prerequisite may be missing. It should be noted also that, as in any other Command at Corps

level or higher, also in the CJTF Headquarters there is a sharp distinction, as far as the allocation of jobs is concerned, between General Staff Officers and other Officers. The appointment to a job of prestige, from Section Chief upwards, is therefore conditional as happens often also in the national setting - upon the possession of the War College title and a certain experience in the specific sector, giving a certain guarantee that the officer could perform the tasks connected with the job in a satisfactory manner. In our case, this experience consists of a knowledge of the specific problems of the multinational setting, with special reference to the work in Commands, with all its implications, both from the operational and the personnel policy point of view. In short, the ones that should be able to aspire to jobs of a certain importance from Section Chief upwards should be only General Staff Officers, in possession not only of expelience in the field of doctline, procedures and working modes, but also of the direct knowledge of the CJTF Headquarters. These are qualifications that can be obtained only throught the

participation in similar missions, even in lesser jobs that could serve as a basis for future employments. From the of employment standpoint we can therefore see two differenl types of positions: jobs for staff officers, requiring above all a true experience in the specific field, even if gained only in the national setting, and jobs for General Staff Officers, for whom it is preferable, if not indispensable, to have, besides broad professional knowledge, also a previous experience acquired in a similar Command. Fourth and last prerequisite, which is proving increasingly important, is a certain capability of operating with informatics-related procedures. Computerization tends to accelerate the decisionmaking process, by inserting in a net all terminals of the Command and connecting the various Commands with each other. At the SFOR Headquarters, for example, there is a system of electronic mail, cuD"ently used, which permits a very fast exchange of data and information, as well as the issue of orders in real time. It is not conceivable, therefore, to operate efficiently in a technologically advanced Command such as this without having the notions

Alpini controlling a. road of access to the Bosnian ea.pita.I.

necessary to move easily among the different application programmes. We must admit that today this problem is less felt, since the new generations of officers are more and more oriented towards the use of computers; it must be underlined, howeve1~ that this requisite is not of marginal importance in the selection of the personnel to be employed at the CJTF Headquarters. PRESENT "REALITY" AND STEPS TO BE TAKEN

The picture outlined so far gives a sufficiently clear description of the figure of the Officer who - already now, and even more in the future - will represent the contribution of the Army in the performance of these missions of high significance and increasing importance. As was mentioned above, the main characteristics are: professional preparation, the knowledge of languages, doctrine, NATO procedures, international environment, informatics. As far as the first aspect is concerned, the overall qualities of the Italian officer have been amply proved on several occasions; as for the other qualifications, which are the most specialistic component of the problem, it is possible to take significant steps in order to better the situation. What the Army is doing in this direction shows the will to improve in these sectors by confronting with determination a problem which, until a short time ago, was tackled only marginally. No\v, considering the frequency and scope of the national participation in the CJTFs, the need has been acknO\-vledged to develop a number of phuming and training activities aimed at

preparing the officers for this particufau- operational undertaking. In fact, should the Service ignore this aspect of the problem, it would run the 1isk of being able to employ - on the occasion of future missions - only the "usual restricted circle" of officers, a kind of "caste", increasingly qualified, due to the repeated employments, but withouth the possibility of turnovers and certainly quantitatively insufficent to meet the ever increasing requirements. The Service's efforts should instead aim at qualifying aU its officers for this type of activity, in order to be ready to contribute skilled personnel or even to supply the nucleus of a CITF Heaquarters at very short notice. An in1portant step was the consideration of the knO\vledge of languages as a fundamental component of an officer's training because, without a concrete capability in this field, there could be the paradox of having "excellent" officers who, lacking the most import,mt prerequisite for employment, could not really be utilized in a multinational setting.

In any case the knowledge of a foreign language is not a static result to be considered as constant; on the contrary, it is the most ephemeral thing we can imagine, and requires a continuous exercise to keep it at the right level. In this perspective, one could envisage mandatory refreshers and verifications, that could be very short, during the long period between the end of the Application School and the end of the General Staff Course. Also, the study of languages during the normal duty activities should be made easier, by facilitating and encouraging the use of teaching aids such as, for instance, multimedia co11rs~s which, besides, are already available a t many Organizations. But the road to follo-w must go well beyond the availability of a high number of officers -with a good knowledge of foreign languages; it is essential for them also to know the procedures and working methods which are , becoming more and more established within NATO, as well as to be able to use computerized

supports. Training personnel lo operate in this way requires time, diligence and know-how; furthermore, as was said for languages, the nolions learned risk being quickly forgotten, if they are not constantly applied. If it's true (as it is) that the future of the Army is going to be more and more oriented towards international cooperation, the most complete, effective and durable solution of the problem is that of reducing the differences in methods and technologies existing between our General Staffs and NATO. This would lead to the double result of both modernizing the Headquarters and put the Cadres "in line'' wilh the environment they would find in case of assignment to a CJTF. This is no doubt the most difficult part of the road lowards multinational interoperability, because it implies an openmindedness vis-a-vis more modern organization systems, obviously supported by computerized technology. This naturally requires lhe abandonment by many - either

sponlaneously or forcibly - of a bureaucratic-clerical mentality lending to keep things immobile, based on the "things-werealways-done-this-way" principle. For others, instead, it is just lack of knowledge. As a matter of fact, many are still convinced that to computerize a Command means to provide it with computers, without considering that a compuler, if not inserted in a net, is really of very little advantage. At lhe most, in fact, i.t allows the operator to w1ite a document without the need of a typist. This is not "computerization", but it is rather like using a quill-pen, more sophisticated than those used three hundred years ago, but with the same philosophy of employment: \>vTiting on a piece of paper and taking the resull, by hand , to the addressee. The modern working methods, instead, cannot do without the connection of the computers into a net permitting them to dialogue directly with each other~ to transmit documents, on electronic support, to those who must see them and to receive, in the same way, comments and orders . All this without printing a single piece of paper, reducing, at the same time, the delivery times to minutes. This does not mean to forgo years of experience in Staff service, as some others fea1~ holding the "note" and the "coordination paper" to their hearl, as if this were everyth ing. It means, instead, changing instrurnents as well as hastening the procedures, the scrutiny of Lhe problems and the submission of the relevant solutions. CONCLUSIONS

The international engagement in keeping geopolit.ical stability is becoming more and more important, and the military component is its most visible and immediate part. Many contingent factors give rise to a situation in

which the national contribution cannot be expressed anymore simply in terms of political solidarity and symbolic participalion, but rather in terms of resources, material and equipment, of which the Officers assigned to the CITF Headquarters are a fundamental component. So fundamental, that it has immediate repercussions on the image of the Servjce, since the skills of these officers actively contribute to the success of the mission and, at the same time, to the prestige of the Organization. Having abandoned, at least formally, the "defensive" attitude, mainly aimed at patching up situations of crisis and moving to a more sharply "offensive" attitude, \.vith the purpose of inserting more and more the organization in the environment of multinational cooperali.on, is a very good start, pointing to the right direction. But the effort of the Army, aimed for the moment at having the availability of a good number of versatile elements, possessing the linguistic and technical skills that guarantee their prompt insertion in any type of operation, can and must go farthe1.~ The fi.-1ture of the Organization requires more than this, it requires a more marked approach, in te1ms of methods, tedmologies and -above all mentality, to the "modus operandi" of the Alliance. It requires the effort, on the part of all Cadres, to get ready for the new requirements \vorking, at the same time, for a methodological and technological rene\val of our General Staffs. In substance, we must take up a challenge of utmost importance, which must be won by our Aimed Forces, ,.vhich otherwise wou]d run the risk of being progressively excluded and removed from the international military initiatives wich, in the near future, \Viii be more and more frequent.

D 1 '

Lieutenant Colonel Army General Staff 27

Interview with aa ten SCHOUTEN, nd r in Chief of the I N therlands Army by Enrico Magnani *

THE HEW ARMY The Dutch Army is engaged in a difficult programme of reorganization which will continue up to the year 2000. The aim is to realize a highly flexible instrument, to efficiently contribute to peace operations and to guarantee the defence of the national territory. We discussed these subjects with General Maarten Schouten, Commander in Chief of the Royal Army. Sir, the Royal Netherlands Army today is confronted with great challenges, such as the reduction of the force and the professionalization. Could you describe the situation and the perspective of the Netherlands land forces for the Italian readers? What kind of problems were to he resolved

for this philosophical change? The basis for the reductions you mention and the transition to an all-volunteer army is laid down in the Defence Priorities Review which the Dutch government published in 1993. As a result of this review, the Dutch armed Forces, and therefore also the Army, is better equipped for the tasks they face

following the end of the cold war: Reduced in number, but with better mobility and more flexibility, for being able to make a sufficient contribution to peace operations in addition to the defence of the NATO treaty area. Over the past few years, defence expenditure has clec:reased: the defence hudget for 1998 is in real terms more than a quarter lower than for 1990. The number of personnel in the Dutch Armed Forces is down by more than forty per cent compared to 1990 and drastic restructuring has taken place. Personnel is a decisive factor in armed forces everywhere. The introduction of new weapon systems, the expansion of tasks to include peace operations,

The 11 '" Airborne Brigade, whose (ormaLions operated in Bosnia Herzegovina, is one of the leading units of the Netherlands Army.

is a priority. I have tremendous admiration for my personnel as, in spite of all the unceriainty, they worked hard and with great loyalty on the transformation into a new all-volunteer Army. Special programmes and external agencies were used to supervise the departure of superfluous personnel. In July 1997 we were so far advanced with the process that I was able to announce to the personnel that compulsory redundancies were unnecessary. A second important factor was that we never closed our doors clue to the restn1cturing process. Over the last few years we have contributed fully to various NATO or UN missions, and we continued carrying out training and maintained our state of readiness. During the reorganization process, there tun1ed out to be a surplus of qualified personnel, Officers and NCOs. What kind of solutions are being thought of for a problem with such economic and social impact?

restructuring and changes to management have demanded a great deal of the personnel. The many hundreds of resl.rncturing projects are going according to plan. The entire restrncturing process will continue until the year 2000. We are now busy adding the final touches, finetuning the organisation. For example, the Defence Priorities Review contains the standard that personnel can only be on detachment for a maximum of six months in a period of one and a half years. That means that for

each unit which i.s on detachment, in principle two others must be present. I need to be able to divide the parts of my organisation into dn-ee: for each unit which is on detachment, another of the same type is recuperating and one is preparing. This division into three has now ben achieved. If you asked me what the major problems or points for attention have been, I would name two. In the first place the cutbacks in particular meant a great deal of uncertainty for my personnel. Keeping as many jobs as possible

That is a very pertinent question. For each restructuring process, \vhether you like it or not, the first question is always: what does it mean to me personally? Uncertainty is destructive, especially if il continues for years. Within the framework of personnel leaving the organization, the project "Taking care of work" was crucial. First of all, I asked people to take a close look at themselves to se~ whether they wanted to continue being a part of the new Army. The culture in the Am1ed Forces did not just change thanks to the

introduction of the professional soldier, the sharp increase in the number of missions abroad also set people thinking. In. short, voluntary departure from the organisation was encouraged and did help. That willingness is only created if you offer an alternative. Within the framework of "Taking care of work", an active policy was pursued of finding jobs in industry or business, both individually and collectively. For example, we started a project which enabled transfer to the police or prison service. Other measures, such as early retirement, also helped lo avoid compulsory redundancies.

separate accomodation in the barracks, but I certainly do not see that as a problem. In my experience, woinen are verv have huo-e â€˘ motivated and . 0 stamina. Approximately 9% of my total personnel complement now consists of women. I have nothing against that figure being much higher. In fact, one of the greatest challenges for the Army -

BO-105 Helicopter; Holland has recenll-y acquired attack (AH-64A) and transport (CH.-47D) aircraft for its Airborne Brigade.

What kind of prospects are being offered the young regarding integration into the civil labour market after voluntary military service? The young professional soldier is a highly motivated source of manpower: As far as quality is concerned there is no problem. The quantity required does, however, demand attention. Since 1994 I have been occupied with the transition to an allvolunteer Army. In August 1996 the last conscripts Jef1 my organization. To begin with, I could recruit a large number of

The Italian Armed Forces are preparing for admission of female personnel. Could you describe the experience and difficulties the Royal Netherlands Army has had when introducing female personnel into its ranks? When did the introduction of female personnel start? I can say that I am completely satisfied with our female personnel. The actual intake of women in all ranks started in 1979. Before that time, a small number of female personnel ,.vere to be found in a separate female corps, which mainly handled administrative work. All functions are in principle open to \Vomen, including combat functions. The only exceplion is the Commando Corps. The only limitations which l sometimes see are physical ones; the Commandos are an example of that. The physical limitations are generally not a problem however, as they are solved in the group situation. A fernale mechanic will not often replace the wheel of a large crane. The group will itself ensure that she is given other tasks. Of course, adaptation is necessary, such as

in view of increasing demand on the labour market - is to obtain sufficient numbers of personnel. Without women I would never fulfil! my annual need for approximately 5,000 new personnel.

Transition from conscription to professionalization imposes a philosophical change within the military organization as a whole, starting with recruitment. What kind of measures have been adopted recently to incentivate the enrolement of volunteers?

personnel from the group of former conscripts. Partly thanks to this effect, in 1996 I had a recruitment result of about 92%. In 1997 that figure is aboul ten perÂˇ cent lower. It is not so much that there is less interest in the Army. It is the number of actual applications that has dropped. The improvement in the economy and more alternatives on the labour market are also factors. The number of school leavers is also falling. I do not intend to change the entrance requirements radically: I have, however, drawn up a

The defence of mechanized units against the air threat is ensured by the "Caesar" self-propelled gun, Dutch version of the German "Gepard".

whole portfolio of measures. In addition to the financial reward, you have to think of " mini careers", pre-recruitment, reducing the percentage of dropouts in the training stage and offering recognized diplomas. We increasingly offer study facilities to the regular personnel with a fixed- term contract. Both the professional diplomas and the experience must offer the young service personnel a good starting position on the labour market. Another instrumenL is the "Employer Support" programme, in which together with industry and business we look at what we can offer each other ,vith regard

to personnel. In this way we facilitate the transition to industry or business. Within Employer Support we also learn how we can reach better agreements with industiy or business with regard Lo calling up reservists. The Army recently decided to increase their component of Special Foces dedicated to direct action and long range reconnaissance patrol. What have been the reasons for this choice? The operations in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere have proved the value of small, specialist units. My Commando Corps now has one, partially combat-ready, company. The sustainability of the Commando Corps is being improved by the addition of 87 commandos. The

existing corps is being restructured into a unit with three commando companies. They are indeed used for long range reconnaissance patrols. The direct action you mention is limited to military assignments, in front of or behind our own lines. They are not meant for special assignments outside the military field. Personnel and units of the Royal Netherlands Army have

taken part in several peace support operations under several flags. What lessons, i.e. doctrine and policy, have you learned from participation in peace operations? We have learned a lot. As for Italy and other NATO partners, peace support operations are not new to us. We have been involved with them in various forms

throughout our history, including during the cold war. The Netherlands Army has contributed to all kin~s of UN missions for many years, for example UNIFIL in Leban on. It is obvious that a shift in tasks following the end of the "cold war" has also caused a shift in military thinking. Many counlries have adapted their doctrine as a result of the lessons they have learnt. The doctrine of the Royal Netherlands Army has also changed frindamentally in many respects. In relation to this 'We have folJo\.ved the developments in partner countries and NATO very closely. In April 1996 I published a new doctrine. If you ask me what tbe most important lessons are, I believe that for all operations you need to have a clear "end state" in view. You must also be very conscious of the risk of escalation. Robust action and the built-in opportunity for escalation dominance are key terms for me. Will the professionalization of the Royal Netherlands Army change the path of professional and cultural education and training of the

personnel of the force? What will be the main changes and challenges on this fundamental aspect of military life? The whole system of training changes if you transfer from conscription, in wh ich soldiers are called up for about one year, to a situa tion in which you can have professionals at your disposal with a contract for a minimum of two and a half years. About 60% of them, by the way, extend their contracts and we keep lhe regular personnel with a fixed-term contract until a maximum age of thirty. For me, after restructuring, professionalizalion of the organization is a priority. I am aiming for that by, among other things, improving the position and the role of the noncom m issioned officers. Professional means thal you understand your profession, but it must also be expressed in your attitude and conduct. I am also introducing a code of conduct, which applies lo everyone in my organization: from soldier to general, for military and civilian personnel. The code serves as an instrument for making agreements on standards with regard to attitude and conduct. I see this code of conduct as the

icing on lhe cake of the growth process towards an all-volunteer Army. It is not a new concept, but not all professional service personnel are by definition "professionals". The eigh t ruies describe the desired conduct; they hold up a mirror to people. The code talks of pride, team spirit, security and exudes what lhe Americans call a "can do mentality". A great part of the Royal Netherlands Army is assigned to NATO or is a WEUanswerable force. Does this choice signify a denationalization of your defence? Yes and no. Politically speaking I believe there is no denationalization. When deploying my units, national political approval always comes first, even for non-Article 5 operations. As long as we are not involved in task specialization \.vithin NATO and WEU, national responsibility and decisionmaking will remain dominant. Allow me to say, howeve1~ that in a purely military sense there has been denationalization since the Second World War. I cannot immagine any operations in the near future oulside Dutch territory \vhich will be carried out on a purely national basis. All operalions will in that sense always be Join t a nd Combined. Operalionally we are thus in fact denationalized. The bulk of the heavy forces of the Royal Netherlands Army are part of the NATO main defence forces, as the joint Army Corps with Gennany. When was this Corps

The ! I ih Airborne Brigade was the first unit entirely made up of volunteers.

Holland provided men and equipment to the UNPROFOR contingent in Bosnia, and participated in several other peace-keeping missions.

integrated directing and control authority which goes far beyond the current practice of subordination within NATO. On 5 October 1997, several documents were signed, amongst others by both Ministers of Defence, that led the way to deeper integration. German Crisis Reaction Forces and Dutch Standing Forces assigned to the Corps, or subordinated to it, can be used for joint participation in multinational clisis management operations. The corps headquarters wiU be offered to WEU as Forces Answerable to the WEU. Training and Jogistics are not only national responsibilities but also a collective responsibility, which is a significant and unique form of cooperation between two NATO countries. The technical part of the command and control structure works well; the mental part too, as was demonstrated during the "Active Sword" Corps exercise in the autumn of 1997. I am very pleased with the progress made in the field of integration. I have complete confidence in the effectiveness of this binational Corps staff. established? Would you like to give us a short historical insight about this interesting experiment? By the end of 1991, the Dutch and German Ministers of Defence had decided to set up the I German/NetherJands Corps. Three treaties, which contained the arrangements concerning the actual cooperation, were signed to lay the foundations for this corps. The inauguration took place in the presence of Dutch Prime Minister Kok and German Chancellor Kohl

in the Corps' garrison town of Munster, Germany on 30 August 1995. The Dutch LieutenantGeneral Ruurd Reitsma became the first Commander: The German Liutenant General Karsten Oltmanns took over command on 27 November 1997. It is unique for a commanding officer to be in command of foreign soldiers in peacetime. In European history it is, as far as I know, the first time that two standing Corps staffs have merged into one. The Commander of the Corps has

What are the most important programmes for the future of the Royal Netherlands Army? Are some of them multinational? Through international cooperation, the Royal Netherlands Army attempts to achieve as high a degree of interoperability as possible \.Vith its allies. In view of the close cooperation Â˝ith Gennany in the binational Corps, in many cases

A "Fuchs" of Lhe EW company; m.uch of the Dutch equipment is _similar to that used bv the Germ.ans, in order to facilitate integra.t~On Lhe two Countries' forces in a. bnzat10nal Corps.

t!ie

an extension of that is sought. Other partners, such as the United Kingdom, Fr ance and also Belgium/Luxembourg (in a Benelux context), are also always important with regard to intensive cooperation. Important materiel programmes include the improvement of the Leopard 2, the replacement of the truck stock, the replacement of arrnoured vehicles such as our YPR-765 and, finally, the replacement of the M109/Ml 14 howitzers. As far as materiel projects are concerned, I of course follow closely the developments in the field of digitizing the battlefield. The extent to which we should go along with the developments, in particular in the United States, remains a question to be ,:mswered . I am following those developments with a great deal of interest. As far as programmes are concerned, in addition lo materiel these will involve future spearheads. I would like to conclude by naming three targets. First of all, l would like to improve the manning of the personnel complernent as quickly as possible to above 90%. Secondly, exercises have unfortunately suffered due to the restructuring. The required attention will be paid to exercises, for peace operations and specifically also for the General Defence tasks. Finally, I have already mentioned this, ·r am concentrating on creating an Army of professi~nals. I am ~ proud of the current Royal Netherlands Anny and can honestly say that ·1 view the future with great confidence.

D '°' Journalist

Lieutenant General Maarten SCHOUTEN was born in Waddinxveen on 11 December 1943. He started his military career in September 1961 as a cadet of the Engineer Corps at the Royal Military Academy in Breda. On 1 August 1966, he received his commission as a Second Lieutenant of the Engineers. As Lieutenant and Captain he held various functions with the 43rd Armoured Engineer Company, the Engineer Training Centre and the 11 th Engineer Battalion. In 1974, he began his Advance Military Studies at the Army Staff College in the Hague. After receiving his advanced Military Studies certificate in 1976, he was assigned to the Army Staff as the Head of the Office for Operational Materiel Matters. In 1980, Major Schouten was assigned to the Staff of the First Army Corps as Chief Assistant to the Chief of Staff and subsequently as Deputy Head of Section G3. He was then assigned to the Staff of the Commander in Chief of the RNLA as Head of the General Personnel Matters Commander of the 41st Engineer Battalion in the rank of'Lieutenant Colonel. As a Colonel, he served as Head of Section G3 with the Staff of the 1st (NL) Corps from October 1986 to December 1988. From December 1988 to October 1989, he attended a course at the College of Defence Studies in London. From October 1989 to April 1991, he was Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army Communications Command and Deputy Chief of the Army Staff (Command, Control and Communications). I~ 'April 1991, Brigadier General Schouten became <;ommander of the 1Zth Armoured Infantry Brigade; in April 1992 he was appointed

Comm.inder of the 1st (NL) Corps and simultaneously promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. ·• · In October 1994, he became Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff at the Central Organization of the Ministry of Defence. With effect from July 4, 1995, Lieutenant General Schouten was appointed Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army. Lieutenant General Schouten is a Knight of the Order of the Lion of the Netherlands and an Officer in the Order of Merit of France. He was awarded the Officers' Long Service Medal for 30 years and the 1966 Royal Wedding Medal. He is married to Mrs. Gerdien van Heck and has two children, a daughter and a son.

I terview with the Chief of Staff of the ortuguese Army

by Enrico Magnani '''

THE NEW ARMY The Exercito Portugues has entered the road of a profound renewal which, within the next six years, will transform it into an agile and flexible structure, capable of integrating in international contingents for the development of humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-enforcing missions. Rivista Militare discussed these and other subjects with General Gabriel Augusto do Espirito Santo, Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Army. General, Portuguese soldiers are today engaged in many missions abroad, from Bosnia Âˇwith SFOR to Western Sahara Âˇwith the UN; they frequently operate side by side with Italian contingents. Could you outline the present organization and future programmes of the Portuguese Army? The engagement of the Portuguese miliLary - Cadres and troops, men and ,vomen outside th e national territory corresponds, for the Army, to an orientation, as ror oLher Armies, tovvards "choice conflicts" rather than "necessity conflicts". This means that the Army supporLs the foreign policy of the Nation, as far as it concerns the internationa.1 organizations which safeguard collective security or promote peace on th e Globe. In these missions we are side by side w ith allied and

friendly military contingents. This shows that dialogu e, cooperation and mutual understanding arc the new missions of Armed Forces aiming at peace and stability, in areas of the Earth which long for democracy and development in a frame of security. The Portuguese Army is rnotivated by these missions, but does not forget thaL its primary mission is the defence of the Motherland, its integrity and its population!.i. The Army

is going through an important phase of transition, from an Army based on conscription to one founded an volunteer recruitment. To reach the number of effectives necessary for this system (approximately 24,500-Officers, NCOs and Soldiers included) we need a period of transition (6 years) and adequate financial resources. The objective vve

Of{i.cers of the PorLuguese Army en[!,aged in firing-range training.

contingents from more than twenty nations. What are the lessons learned from this long and difficult multinational experience?

want to achieve is a modern and efficient Army, w ith motivated men and women, well settled on lhe national lerritory, with 2 or 3 Military Regions on the Mainland and 2 Military Zones in the Azores and Madeira. With a force system based on 3 permanent B rigades (one mechanized, one airborne and a light brigade), the Army will have modern and well equipped combat instruments, as well as support fo rmations also abl e to perform missions of p ublic interest, if necessary,

in support of the populations in case of emergency orÂˇ disaster. The Investmenl Laws (M ilitary

The first lesson lem11ed is the easiness, for lhe military, to cooperate with otherÂˇ soldiers. All Armies foster values of comradeship, discipline, hierarchy as well as rites which constitute the common language of the military status; this makes mutual understanding easier: Also lraining - for both Cadres and troops - is not very different from army to army. With this starling base, one must make Lhe appropriate adaptations in command, control and support, w ith very clearly defined rules of engagement. Of course there are cultural differences among soldiers. Not in the case of Porlugal and Italy, since the armies of the two Nalions have been cooperating for more than twenty yearÂˇs, and there are very similar traits in the youth of the two courHries. This makes cohabitation easy, friendly and good-humoured. Also the relations w.ith the contingents o[ the other NATO countries are easy, since for many years the Alliance has been developing relations and doctrines known to all Cadres. But we still have to go a long way, and it is important to

Pl,rnning Law), starti ng in 1998,

continue our cooperation with

will enable the Army to acquire efficient means for Command, Control and Informalion, Combat support (light helicopters), Medical support.

the countries of Ce nlral and Eastern Europe, as well as with those of lhe southern ba sin of the Mediterranean.

Portuguese troops have been participating in the peace mission in Bosnia since December 1995; many units have rotated, cooperating with

Professionalism in the Armed Forces is a need felt in all NATO countries. How does the project of requalification of the Cadres fit in the restructuring and

Also the Portuguese Army carries ouL_ specific training activities in view of "out-of-area" missions.

operational effort of the Portuguese Army?

The Permanent Cadres of the Portuguese Army are very well qualified, due to the efforts the Army has always made for the training and specialization of these officers along their careers. Their adaptation to the new operational requirements has been an easy job. As a matter of fact, the Army can still avail itself of the training and experience of the Anican campaign, where the peace mission strongly required contacts with the population and its protection. These Cadres adapt very well to the new concepts in military service, and accept them better than a short and frustrating military service. The trend in many NATO countries is to arrive at the abolition of conscription. Also in Italy a debate is under way on the convenience of an allvolunteer army. What are the prospects in this sector for the Portuguese Army?

The Portuguese Army hopes, by the year 2003, to increase by

1.000 volunteers each year: The recruitment js made for Platoon Commanders (Officers) and Section Commanders (NCOs); we envisage to reach, for these ranks, the number of 1.500 men. As far as soldiers and corporals are concerned, the num ber to reach is approximately 16.000. This means that these regulars will enable us to have a minimum system of forces, guaranteeing the administrative aspects of some institutions with civilian personnel (approx. 5.500). The transition compels us to establish military duty for about 25.000 youths per year (4

months) with the possibility for some of them (2000) to extend their time up to 7 months. These numbers wil] progressively decrease as the number of volunteers increases. In the Italian situation, the recruitment of volunteers involves remarkable problems, connected with the need to guarantee a future occupation to the young who have honorably carried out their two-year or three-year term of service. What are the solutions, adopted or under study, to encourage the enlistment of volunteers?

During the performance of the military service, the Army tries to facilitate the studies of these youths, and/or to pro'l-ide them with a professional qualification. This takes place in agreement with the state institutions. Furthermore there are incentives, as easy credits for the purchase of a house, a sum of money at the end of the service, as well as favourable conditions for the

.4n instructor shov.is the m.ain components of a CETME automatic rifle.

• Portuguese and lLalia.n soldiers work side by side in the peace-keeping operaLion in Bosnia. ·

admission to the security forces (Police and private Companies) and to the Republican National Guard (comparable to the Italian Carabinieri). The Portuguese Army already has the experience of the presence of female personnel in its ranks. What are the changes, both operational and logistic, that had to be made in order to introduce women in the various jobs? In the Portuguese Army we have, at present, about 1.200 women, in the ranks from private

to major. We have now the first women-officers at the Military Accademy. At the present time, women can only serve at combat support or service support units. At the Military Academy, there is a woman-cadet for the Artillery. We had to adapt str·uctures and Physical Training programmes to the particular requirements of female personnel. For everything else, conditons are the same as for male personnel. In the course of this year, highly specialized units as paratroops, rangers, mechanized and motorized infantry will complete the phase of incorporation into various Atlantic and European commands such as ARRC, EUROFOR and AMF. What have been the main difficulties of adaptation and

standardization the Portuguese Army had to face? The Portuguese Army has a long experience with NATO, which started in the '50s - w.ith the 3rd Po Division - was interrupted in the '60s but resumed in the '70s within AFSOUTH, with the 1st BMI attached to a Unit of the Italian Army. In 1997, a Special Operations Detachment, integrated in the AMF, had to operate in the Arctic Polar Circle. Although climatic conditions \vere atypical compared to those the Detachment \,vas used to, adaptation took place in a short time. lt is abvious that for these situations it is necessary lo have a better tra.ining in the English language as well as in the employment of the most advanced means of communication.

In the recent international crises we see an increase in the number of so-called "low intensity" conflicts as well as in the operations for the rescue of compatriots residing in the crisis areas, the NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Operations). International contingents, among which Portuguese units of operation "Forrez" have recently been deployed for some time in Equatorial Africa to protect the evacuation of foreign citizens from Kinshasa and Brazzaville. Have you developed specific models for these type of operations? Operations in Africa have always been easy for the Portuguese Army. We have been involved in peace operations in Africa (Mozambique, Angola, Western Sahara) since 1994 and recently we partecipated, with others, in an operation in Equatorial Africa. The Ponuguese soldiers fit well in these missions, both from the point of view of the climatic conditions ,:md from that of the contact Âˇwith the population. The operational procedures we follow for the protection of the population, the evacuation to safe areas and the safeguard of humanitarian convoys are described in our manuals and we train very frequently. We can say, in fact, that we do not have to develop any specific operational procedure. Portugal participates in EUROFOR, together with Italy, France and Spain. How will this "package of capabilities" find its place in a Euro-atlantic community which opens to the East and wants to dialogue with the southern shore of the Mediterranean? Portugal is an Atlantic country, but it looks a lso at the Mediterranean. The Portuguese

Army believes that dialogue and cooperation with some Nations of the Mediterranean basin could be important for European security. In this sense, at present, we are carrying out a technomilitary cooperation programme with MOROCCO and TUNISIA. Also Portugal has to face general budget restrictions that inevitably have an effect on the resources for defence. How do you reconcile the reduced budgets with the need to maintain a credible instniment of defence and proceed \\ith the modentlzation programmes?

rn the budgets of the Army, the expenditures for personnel reach a significant percentage. The new system of military sen-ice implies an increase in costs. Only with investments for specific expenses as well as vvith increased budgets will it be possible to re-equip the Anny for the demands of modern combat. This is \.vhat we have endeavoured to do vvith the Law on Military Programming, that in 1998 enters its third cycle of investments which, up Lo 2003, will exceed 60 billion escudos.

D 1 '

Journalist

General Galmel Augusto do Espirito Santo is 62 years ola and has been on active service for 43 years. He was promoted to the present rank in 1991. He attended the Artillery Course at the Anny School, the General and Complementary General Staff Courses, as well as the Higher Course for Command and Direction at the Institute for High Military Studies. He also attended the Command and General Staff Course in Brazil, the 57'1' Course of the NATO Defence College, as well as the Force Planning and Armament Research courses at the IAGB01TOBRUN in Gennany. In the course ofhis career, Gen. Gabriel Augusto do Espirito Santo served in several Units, Institutions and Organizations of the Army and the Anned Forces. He has carried out two tours of dufy in the former Porluguese colonies overseas, one in Mozambique with the rank of Captain, as Artillery Company Commander, and the other in Angola with the rank of Major, as Staff Officer. Promoted to General, he was appointed National Permanent Representative to the NATO Milita1y Committee, and served in this capacity from 1991 to 1994. At the Army General Staff, _Gen. Gabriel Augusto do Espirito Santo hel,d the position of Commander of Logistics from May 1994 to June 1995. . He has been also Deputy Chief uf Stuff uf the Anny from June 23, 1995 to April 16, 1997. On April 17, 1997 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army. His record sheet shows 20 Citations; he also holas several decorations, among which: 2 Gold Medals for Distinguished Service, Silver Medal for Distinguished Service with Praise, Silver Medal for Distinguished Service, l51 and 2"d Class Medals for Military Merit. General Gabriel Augusto do Espirito Santo is married to Mrs. Maria Antoinette Marcelo do Espirito Santo and has two sons, Rui Miguel and Joiro Paolo, and one daughter, Isabel Maria.

by Ivan Felice Resce ~':

he events deriving from the end of the bipolar contn1position in Europe have in practice upseL the system of international relations and required the Atlantic Alliance in the first place, and the member Nations 44

thereafter, to reproject the security and defence system in its entirety. Also the I ta] ian Army, therefore, has entered resolutely the road to change, based on lhe picture of the international s iLuation, but without disregarding, of course, the objective reality of vvhich the Service is a part in the national context.

The carrying structure of the change is essentially based upon four pillars: • simplification of the Command and ConLrol structures; • subdivision of the operational component into "capability packages"; • reconfiguration of the logistic component; • review of Lhe training courses for personnel.

But the change cannot b e considered concluded once the measures now in progress are completed. On the con trary, it must be a continuous process, related to the changes in the reference pictur·e. This article is th e rii·st of a series aiming precisely at the activation of a constructive debate, within the Service, on the main professional aspects, and has the pur pose Lo give a broad view of the guidelines along which the ongoi11g changes are moving.

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

The .h.mdamental assumpt ion on which the new archit ecture of Command and Control is based is essen tially the following: the Service needs a simple and flexible structure, able Lo redesign itself in order to adapt to the continuously evolving modern scenarios.The need to simplify the structure emerges very evidently if one examines the "hierarchical system" adopted by almos t all complex organiz ations, the military ones in the first pla ce. There is ce1tainly no question of discussing the hie.rarcbical system per se, but only to find the function a l and structural adjustments \vhich make it compatible whith the characteristics of modern scenar ios. The system was created lo permit the performance of Comr:nand and Contro.l , whose pivots consist of the triad: • analysis o f the situation; • preparation of operational plans; • activation of control procedures. On this subject, lhe de fin.i Lion of the hierarchical svstem of the Roman legions , gi v~~ by Michael Hammer, appears to b e

signi[icant: "the individuals are dispatch bearers. All the intelligence is concentrated at the top. A selected group makes all decisions; the others are ei th er lancers, i.e. executive personnel, or middle managers conveying clirect ives (rorn lop to bottom, and information from bottom to top". The hierarchical system of the Army must be able to meet the requ irernenls of Command and Control referred on the one hand to the conduct or the assign ed operations, and on the other to the preparation of the instrument. The exercise of Command and Con lrol in operations develops through a decisional process, coherently reiterated at the various levels and made compatible with the dy nam ics of the operational scenarios to which they refer, through an ample recourse to standardization a n d a11 tomation. The process of preparation of the instrument, a lbeit characterized by an increased dynamism compared to the past, permits a more rigorous centralization of Command and Control, able to guara ntee full coherence of intents and objecti ves along the entire chain of command.

Each level has a time reference horizon, \,vhich goes from a few days or weeks of the company Commander to the 1OJ 5 years of the top of the Service (fig. I). In other words, all levels of the hierarchical structure must be able to produce a "vision of the future" and express the objectives clearly. Neve1·theless, basic condit.ions for success are not only a clear vision of the fut u re and the exact individuation of o bjectives at each level but also the coher ence among the obj ectives and the agreement of all those ·who, in the ir 1·especli ve capacities, participate in their achievement. In a phase o f transition such as the one the S ervice is now going through, from a situation of solid certainties - as, after all , ,ve re those g uaranteed by the system of the opposite blocs - to that of marked fluidness, it is indispensable to realize a synergy of w ills towards the change to be made. Bul to realiz.e these assumptions it is necessary to have a simple structu re, where the "persons in charge of the area" are clearly specified for each component of the military instrument.

AR\IYSTAFF

rgt.

YEARS 0

2 45

This is why the new stmcture of Command and Control of the Army meets these requirements, since it poses at the top of each area a sole responsible individual, with the authority necessmy to perfoni:1 the functions he is in charge of (fig.2). It is interesting to note that the previous structure envisaged more than 20 interlocutors of the Army Chief of Staff, while in the present organization there are only five

Annystaff

OPS

LOGISTICS

(3).

THE OPERATIONAL COMPONENT

To clearly outline the assumptions of the configuration of the operational component of the Army, one must describe, albeit briefly, the international and national reference picture. The international panorama ensuing from the bipolar conf·rontation in Europe is much more uncertain than the preceding one. The classic threat, essentially known .in aJl its components and therefore controllable, gave way to numerous r isks, difficult to diagnose, which produce wide areas of instability, some of them in the Balkans, North Africa and the Near East. In this perspective, the concept of "defence", essentially static, evolved into the wider concept of "security", which gives the Armed Forces a more active and dynamic role in support of the foreign policy of the Nations. A far as Italv is concerned, although the .~isk of a conflict involving directly the Peninsula cannot be completely ruled out, certainly it has become much less imminent. The Nation, on the other hand, is greatly interested in guaranteeing international s tability, indispensable condition for the security and 46

Fig. 2

development of its people. ln this perspective Italy defined the new missions for the Armed Forces, which are, in short: • qualified, active and reassuring presence on the national territory, in order to keep a constant vigil and contribute with continuity to the common security and welfare; • projection of forces in areas of crisis in order to concur, in a multinational contest, in the prevention of conflicts through the improvement of conditions of social and economic disorder (humanitarian operations), or to straighten out existing conflict situ ations (peacekeeping operations); • participation in the common defence in the context of the

Atlantic Alliance. In the modern scenario, therefore, the Army is not just a producer of forces trained for defence to be set against the threat in order to make war impossible. It must be, ins tead, an instrument capable of expressing operational capabilities to spend in concrete commitments in support of the security pol icy. All this, with the awareness that, to have a role as a participant in the decisions in the international community, one must be a ble to give a contribution of capability of command and of forces, which must be credible for botb quan ti ty and quality. From the techno-military point

of view, the possible conflict situation that the Service must be prepared to face will be characterized by three main factors: technological level, professional nature of the instruments and intensity of the operations. T11erefore, there will be a spectrum of very diversified conflicts, whose extreme limits fall between symmetric and asymmetric types of conflicts. Symmetric conflicts: there will be instruments equipped with advanced technology, as well as a high degree of professionalism. Operations will be very intense, but presumably short. Asymmetric conflicts: these are practically the ones where we operate today. In at least one of the opposite fronts, there will be improvised technology, lack of rules and possible recourse to terrorism. The intensitv of the operations is low, and their duration is generally long. Often, the military action is inspired by activities typical of police forces. From the analysis of the possible conflict situations the fact clearly eme,rges that each operation of employment requires specific operational capabilities. To quantify and qualify the forces necessary to accomplish the assigned missions it is necessary, therefore, to operate according to two basic principles: • modulation of the structure, which consists in defining the jndividual "operational capabilities", namely tbe basic modules designed to accomplish S?ecific operational functions; • economy of the formations, i.e. the definition of "capability packages", namely whole bodies of individual capabilities suited to the missions to be carried out. The modules, i.e. the individual "capabilities", are dedicated to two macro areas; • exercise of Command and Control, which concerns Commanders and Staffs;

Fig. 4

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CAPABILITIES TO PERFORM THEM FUNCTION Support to Command and Control Intelligence

Units Command Function + Resources

Combat Combat Support

Units Arty, A/A Arty, Eng. , Army Avn. etc

Combat Logistic Support C2W

Logistic units

Deception Security and Protection

Measures l'vfeasures + Resources

NBC Electronic Warfare

NBC Units EWUnits PSYOPS Units

Phychological Operations Host Nation Support Public information

CAPABILITY

Measures

Logistic Commands & Units

Civil-Military Operations

Equipment Equipment+ Units

RSTA

Units + Specialized resources

• development of the operational functions, i.e. more or less complex activities, concerning specific units (fig 4). The individual functions have been analyzed in detail, in order to define, whith a high degree of accuracy and reliability, the "capabilities" that must be predisposed lo accomplish them. Once the "capabilities" are qualitatively and quantitativelv defined, it is possible to " determine the mechanisms - to be tested in appropriate exercises - necessary to harmonically assemble them at the moment of employment, according to the

principle of task organization. In fact, it is a matter of preparing task forces including a structure of Command and Control adequate to the role to play, as well as units suited, in quality and quantity, to the operational functions required by the mission. But then, how to shape the whole operational instrument, from which the individual capabilities will have to be drawn in order to make up the task forces? Of course, if we had unlimited resources, the whole instrument should be shaped for the heaviest

task, which is certainly the engagement in symmetric conflicts. Reality (especially from the fiJ1an cial point of view) compels to make choices, in accordance with the most likely conditions of employment (fig.5). So, the need arises to prepare 1路eal "packages" of forces, to be destined, as a priority, to one of the assigned missions, each with "operational capabilities" suitable for the requirements to be met.

In this perspective the operational forces are classified according to four "capability packages" the we shall call - in relation vvith the priority mission assigned - "projection", "reaction", "presence and surveillance" and "defence" (fig. 6). The "Projection forces package" is, primarily, destined to Lhe defence of the external interests and the concurrence to international security and stability. To enable Italy to play a role of participant in the decisions in the international arena, the "package" should have the capability of projecting the Headquarters o[ a complex large Unit, with relevant support units and at least two Brigades , ensuring their

rotation, should the operational cycle last longer than six months. The "Reaction forces package" is destined to concur to comrnon defence within NATO, and includes the forces necessary to ful fil] the Nation's commitments within NATO, as far a s the Reaction Forces are concerned: the Hq. of a Corps and five Brigades. The "Prnjection and Reaction packages" are, as a whole, forces earmarked for employment outside the national territory. This body of forces is not the total of the two packages, bur is rather formed by their least common multiple, considering very unlikely the occurrence of a NATO engagement and an "out-of-area" enga gement at the same tin,e. The subdivision of the forces earmarked for out-of-area employment into two packages (projection and reaction) essentially answers the requirement to satisfy the politico-social requests which favour the employment, in outof- area peace su pport operations, o nly of units manned by volunteers. For the Reaction forces whose employment is envisaged on the base of the North Atlantic Treaty, there are no restraints . In this first phase of "profess ionaJism" of the instrument is therefore necessary to proceed cautiously and according to very strict priorities in the assignment of the volunteers to tbe various Lmits . fn the future, with the increase of the volunteer force , the two packages will progressively tend to overlap, and finally will coincide (fig. 7). The "Presence and Surveillance" package includes the forces destined to carry out, as a first priority, the undertakings related to

Reaction

路路Projection

"territorial control" - as operations "Vespri Siciliani" and "Partenope"- and to the concurrence in case of disaster. The three "packages" as a whole form the "defence packages" destined to guarantee, 路within the combined and international context, the security of the Country, also through its direct defence. The definition of "capability packages'' is a fundamental step in the direction of a long term plan ning, aimed at improving the quality of the instrument and, as a consequence, its effectiveness. The organization by "packages", as a matter of fact, permits to express the "gravitation" of resources in a manner coherent with the priorities given each mission, and to adapt the characterizations of the units to the operational capabilities required. This is a fundamental step, also because each programme of development or acquisition of system will have an associated speci fie capability to be realized, improved or updated. As a conseguence, every "cut" in the resources for the Army w ill involve a precise choice, by the political decision makers, on the "capabilities" to forgo or postpone.

THE LOGISTIC ORGANIZATlON

Also the changes in lhe Jogislic organization derive, obviously,

from the evolution o( the assumptions on which it is based. Firsl of all , the types of operations have increased in number: no more, or not onlv, classic war operations, but , mainly peace support operations. The reference scenarios, lhat were once essentially bound to the metropolitan territory, are now mainly "out-of-area". Fh1ally, the operalional contexts

are more and more multinational and, to a certain degree, joint. This means that the insti:-ument must be provided with new capabilities among which - just to mention the most notable aspectsthose related to the projectability of components and their integration in rnultinationaI logistic formations. In this context, and with reference to the requirements connected w.ilh the host Nation support activities even in remote theatres, iL .is indispensable for the Service to perfect its capability to lake on the lead Nation role, which is of

particular value, in the perspective of a qualified participation in the international arenas. The inspiring principles of the new logistic organi zation are essentially those of flexibility and simplicity. In line with these principJ.es, the logistic functional chain has been forther shortened by envisaging only two levels, one for support logistics and the other for adherence logistics. Support logistics, in part iculai~ has been reorganized w ith the criterion o f centralization. Pivotal elements of the ne\v structure are a highly a utomated Command and Control system and a logistic instrument based on a reduced number of area-responsible formations and national specialized poles, "oriented" to the supply and maintenance of specific weapon systems. Further, in order to guarantee the conlinu iLy of support to the units operating in Italy and abroad, a particular Agency has been predisposed. It is capable to act autonomously, and is dedicated to the management of intermodal transport, both on the national territory and abroad. As far the adherence logistics is concerned, the reorganiz.aLio11 is still under study. A possibility, still to be verified, could be Lo concentrate the most specialized executive bodies al Jntermediate Operational Command level, real izing at the same time a strong decentralization of the executive org,rns ;lf R<".gimP.nt lr.vd .

SCHOOLSffRAINING COMPONENT

The Army personnel today rnusl hold very diversified jobs, also in joint and multinational contexts; each one of them requires updated know.ledge and skills. ln this perspective, the shaping of personnel rnusl

necessarily leave the logic of a thorough preparation in the initial phase of the career, with rare successiv~ updating activities. Modern training must becom e permanent, following a road made of training moments that, in a temporal succession, precede the fundame ntal steps of employment. In substance, it is a matter of realizing a closer integration between "learning and employment". For the Service, this concept means to guarantee a continuous osmosis between the school/training structure and the other components. The definition of the training objectives, for example, does not concern only the "experts". On the contrary, it stems from the open exchange of ideas and experiences between those in charge of the training of personnel and those who employ them. Likewise, the experience made on the field by the operat ional and logistic components is poured, still "hot", into schools and training centers through cycles of seminars, directed and conducted by the very ones who have gained that experience. A further requirement which emerges overwhelmingly in the Service is the training of the leader. The "pulverization" of the instruments and the widespread propagation of information, on

the one hand multiplied the number of the leaders acting in a modern operational scenario, while, on the otheÂŁ~ deeply changed their characterizing elements. A widespread leadership places, at the key p ositions of an organizazions, elements capable of having a "vision" of the fu ture - be it near or far - of defining the objectives,

amalgamating the group and directing its will towards the achievement of the same objectives. In substance, a widespread leadership is an indispensable prerequisite for the creation or consolidation of the culture that places man at the centre of the factors that determine his acting capability (fig.8). Today all Commanders, down to the lowest levels, must have the qualities of a leader. Suffice i t to think of a team leader, responsible for an isolated check-point in a peace-keeping operation. In critical situations that, however, could be the norm, he is the only reference for his men, who place in him all their expectations for the decision on the line of action that will lead them to success . Consequ ently, the Commanders at the highest levels become leaders of leaders. They must live and interior ize

the reality of every day, in order not only to formulate a clear vision , but also to transmit it in a simple, effective and catching ,.vay. Modern leaders m ust infuse confidence, develop the qualities of their collaborators and obtain their convinced participation, aware that their subor dinates would rather devote their best energies to a cause in which they believe, than drag along an existence without ideals . In the training of a leade1~ therefore, precious resources are to be spent, first of all, by the Schools and Training Institutions, but the "attention" of all components of the Army must be synergically conveyed lo this objective. In synthesis, permanent training, employment-oriented instruction and widespread leadership are the objectives in the field of training and instruction. It was, therefore, a

experiences gained on the field and, above all, to scan the temporal horizon 1n order to express the conceptual assumptions of the changes envisaged. The project of the general architecture of the Anny is an indispensable condition for tbe development of the planning process, since it represents its point of origin. At the same time, the subdivision of the operational component into "capability packages", the streamlining of the logistic support as well as the definition of tbe new courses of instruction, are as many starting points for the area-responsible pe1Âˇsons, who, in dose coordination and in harmony Âˇwith the objectives expressed at the top, can find the most appropriate strategies for keeping the military instrument constantly abreast of the times. This first approach to the "hottest" then1es of the Army is a starting platform that can activate - at least, lhis 1s our hope - a constructive and puqJoseful debate on the emerging directions of Force planning, to enrich the cultural heritage which is the basis of a modern organization.

question of starting to realize what in the civilized world goes under the name of "learning organization", which also po-ints 0111

the need for every

"organization" , as vital 01Âˇgan of the instrument, to have the capability of "growing" while learning. It is, therefore, a flexible, reactive, adaptable, non-bureaucratic svstem, whose foundations are: d~ar guidelines, a general project and a structure with specific characteristics, able to sustain a contiQ.uous training, selftraining included.

;, Brigadier General Chief; Planning Office Army General Staff

CONCLUSIONS

The organization just outlined, which the Army is progressively adopting, could have to

111::i k~

changes 'While the work is "in progress". This possibility should not be seen as a negative fact. On the contrary, an efficient organization must be able Lo reshape itself continuously, ,.vith an eye, to the "lessons learned" in the various o_perations conducted in different scenarios, and the other to the future. This js the objective of planning: to interpret the

NOTES (I) Michael Hammer. former Professor of Science or Tnformation at the Massachussets Institute of Technology, is considered to be one of the most important "thinkers" of management or the '90s. (2) Comanclo Operat.ivo Tntermeclio (not to be confused with SMD Comanclo Operat.ivo T.nterforze), (3) The Territorial Area has been intentionally excluded, since in the short. term will be managed with a joint character,

by Domenico Villani -;:

n modern scenarios the role of the Armed Forces in general and of the Army in particular is that of contr-ibuting to the "security" of the Country. From this point of view, the Anny "operational" component is a fundamental one, in that it actL\ally represents the productive structure of the "security" asset. The other two components - the school-training

and the logistic one - supply in fact the backing in the fields of

Defence Model (task), the Service Operational concept of

doctrine, of the indispensable

the Service is defined; that is, the

provision and support, but without the operational component the Army would have no reason to exist, owing to which it is from the latter that one must start to be able to define the Army in its entirety. To LI-us end it is in fact necessay to produce a kind of "operation order" where, starting from the missions entrusted to the land instrument within the New

line of action that the Commander of the Service, the Army Chief of Staff, according to the recent law on the High Ranks - intends to follovv in order to accornplilsh his tasks. As a consequence, it will be possible to proceed with the indication of the composition and organization of the forces and the assignment of the relevant tasks, definig also the other

aspects necessary to carry out the conceptual intenlions. THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The operational concept of the Army derives from lhe missions that have been assigned to it within the New Defence Model by the changed international scenario and, of course, by the special national necessities. In particulax; in the new international setting, the original concept of "defence" - associated with the threat of a global conflict within the logic of bypolarity and therefore essentially slatic - has been evolving into the wider one of "security". The fo llowing step is the employment of the military instruments orienLed towards the role of "active prevention" of the possible crises, linked wi th the innumerable risks which threaten the modern world and w hich arc always susceptible of conflict situations. Within this framework the Army, together with the other Services, must participate in the implementation of a policy of national security, not only li mited to the metropolitan territory but extended to the external interests and to international security; it must therefore predispose "ready" forces, which can be deployed outside its borders according to the specific decisions of the Government. Moreo'Ve1~ in compliance with the law on ''principles" n°382/1978, the Service must contribute to the

safeguard of our free institutions and the maintenance of public order as well as the welfare of the national community. In the concrete, this entails three principal missions for the Service, frnm which three types of operation or intervention derive which it must be a ble to carry out (fig. I): • presence and surveillance on the national territory;

• defence of external interests and contribution to international security. It implies Lhe a\3ility to cany out humanitarian and peace-keeping operations; • common defence of national and Alliance spaces, which requires capabilities of deterrence, of prevention in the areas of crisis, of direct defence. At this point, having examined the present reality of the land instrument as well as the law restrictions existing in terms o( general structure, number and type of personnel (officers, NCOs, volunteers and conscripts) and the presmnable financ ial resources available for the future, it may be possible to state the operational concept of the Service. To this end, the "Method" for the solution of operational problems comes to our rescue. A method, according to which, for example, on the attack the Commander conceives the manoeuvre in terms of number and type of efforts, gravitation, times of the manoeuvre, employment of the reserve.

MISSION

Presence and Surveillance

Defence of

External Interests

Common Defence

Why is "attack" the reference? Because the challenge that confronts the Army is decisive for its future, considering that, if lost, the land instrument would not be able to contribute, with the other productive forces of the Country, to keep llaly on the same plane of the other count1ies which are leaders at international level, exactly at the moment when the MaasLT.icht agreements are becoming a reality. Moreover, we musL act with rapidity in order to adapt to the new realities an Army which - although having helped to win the "Cold War" would be confined, as far as effectiveness is concerned, to an akeady surpassed past, if it lacked the ability to promptly renew itself. This requires a "cultLiral" aggressiveness which is much nearer to the concept of attack than to that of defence, which io any case implies the attitudes of waiting for someone else's initiative. In short, the operational concept can be stated as follows: Being understood that the military instmment as a ·whole will have to OPERATION

Fig. 1

• Advanced presence (presence on the territo1y of units with preventive and deterren t purposes and defence capabilties if necessary • Contribution to the safeguard of the free Institutions and maintenance of public o rder (i.e. "Vespri Siciliani", "Sa len to", "Partenope" operations, etc.) • Contribution to the Community's welfare • Humanitarian Interventions (conflict prevention by redressing situ ations of social and economic difficulty) • Peacekeeping operations (settlement of conflict situa tions already arisen) • Deterrence (fim 1 policy, credible instrument, staunch participation in the Alliance • Prevention (in clisis areas - NATO Reaction Forces) • Direct Defence (in case of th reat to the national or other Allies' territory)

be in a position to contribute to the common defence in case of direcL threat, in order to carry out the missions entrusted by the political authority the Army will have to (number and t:n,e of efforts): • contribute to the defence of international interests, security and stability by preparing pr~jection forces for "out of area" operations, consisting of projectable commands, readily multinationally expendable and expandable, and single-function units (RegimenLs) manned by volunteers, expressly trained and equipped for peace support operations. In particular, it will be necessary to prepare projection forces (Gg.2) capable of operating as a unit in the same thealre or in two distinct Theatres and having al their disposal: •• Division-level HQ which, if necessary, could becorn.e the Force HQ in case of medium level multinational operations; it could also become the Sector HQ in an organization of high-level multinational forces; in addition, manoeuvre forces (maximum size two framework Brigades); finally, quantitatively and qualitatively adequate tactical and logistic support lmits; •• a second Division-level HQ and two more Brigades and relevant support units to alternate with the abovesaid Forces in case of extended operations; • participate in the common security system ·within the Allied-joint context, equipping Reaction Forces aimed at supplying the p.la1med contribution to NATO's Reaction Forces for the preventive management of crises in NATO contingency areas (counterconcen tration). Also for these Forces, as for the projection ones, there .is today the need to have, at least at medium - long term, voluntary personnel;

PROJECTION FORCES

Fig. 2

• The wide range of activities to be developed and the remarkable deversification of scenarios demand that the units, although grouped in standard formations al their permanent q uarters for disciplinary and administrative reasons, be assembled at the moment of the employment on the basis of the specific requirements and according to the principle of task organization. . • Peace support operations are generally of long duration and do not entail armed clashes; therefore the Command and the Unit employed, while not losing their operational capability, wear out in terms of effectiveness. Hence, after a certain period of employment (for ex. after six months) the Commands will have to be rotated, a nd the same c.;;in be s;;iid for the. units at Regiment level (for ex. after 4 months), in order to have enoough time (about 8 months) to recover the efficiency and to update the training. • The level of participation decided by the political Authorities determines the role that the Nation can play in the international context. Such role can be subordinate, with the employment of a Brigade, o r partaker of the decisions, with the engagement of a Division, as it happens in nations like France and Great Britain. A substantial m ilitary cont1ibution pennits to influence t11e planning of the intervention, while a marginal participation may entail the a greement to a line of action decided by others, w it h the relevant consequences for the forces engaged and for the Country itself. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue a pa1ticipating role in the decisions and consequently provide for the employment of a Division-level Intermediate Command. • The need exists that for operations outside the national territory only volunteer personnel be employed, unless there is a specific authorization by the Political Leadership.

• ensw·e a qualified, active and reassuring presence on the national territory in order to constantly cont1ibute to the collective security and welfare by: •• preparing Forces for territorial defence, equipped and trained for operations related with presence and surveillance but, in case of emergency, able to pmticipate in the fulfillment of "out of area" requirements and to common defence; •• developing along the entire Peninsula training activities designed for the ernployment; •• giving a timely and qualified contribution both in case of disasters and disorders. Such forces can continue lo be constituted by conscript personnel, O\,ving to their prioritary employment inside the country; •• contributing if the need arises, to common defence with all the available forces and, possibly, with the rnobilization ones (Employment ofthe Reserve).

PRIORITIES IN THE PREPARATION OF THE FORCES (GRAVITATION TIMES)

The resources available, of course, do not permit to confer all forces the required standard of efficiency except in the medium - long term. In view of this, the definition of provisioning programmes related to personnel and to the allocation of materials for replacement and/or updating of the equipment rnusL follO\..v precise criteria of priority, both between the three force categories and th~ 11nits belonging to the same category. Premising that all the forces are necessary for defence and that to assign a priority to this or that category means only to establish "where to start from" Lo attain the highest levels of efficiency, the priorities for the categories are: • priority one: Projection Forces; • priority two: Reaction Forces; • priority three: Presence and Surveillance Forces.

:e.~ -~,

- :,J

Needless to say, such priorities must be "assessed" and if necessary adapted according to the situation. Thus, for example, dealing with "volunteers" there is no doubt that they should be destined first to the projection forces and subsequently to the reaction ones; on the other hand, if jt is a matter of preparing interventions for public ordei:; the plans for the presence and surveillance units vvill have first priority, and so on. As regards the times for achieving the foreseen levels of efficiency, the conditioning factors are numerous, first of aU the levels of availability of volunteers and financial resources for the operation and modernization of the instrument. Nevertheless, generally spealci.ng, it could be said that in the short term it is necessary to: • improve the Command and Control structure - already defined during 1997 - within 1998; • make an intermediate Command, two Brigades and relevant support completely projectable ,vithin 1998 and make another Intermediate Command and two Brigade Commands "potentially" projectable within 1999; • render two further Brigades completely projectable within the year 2000.

conflict situations (symmetrical or asymmetrical) (fig.3). It follows that, in order to quantify and qualify the forces, one should operate according to two hrndamental principles: • modular nature of the structure which consists in defining the various "operational capabilities", that is, the basic modules capable of performing specific operational functions; • cost-effectiveness of the formations, which translates into defining "capability packages" i.e. bodies of i_ndividual capabilities suited to the missions to be accomplished. The modules, i.e. the individual "operational capabilities", are destined to:

• exercise of Command and Control, which is a task for Commanders aud Staff; • development of operational funcUons , which is the mission of specific units. Command and Control Modules

In order to carry out this basic activity, according to the "operational concept", one should foresee three levels of command (fig.4): • Command of the Operational Land Forces (COMFOTERComando delle Forze Operative Terrestri) which must be able to assume operational responsibilities, that .is, to supply Fig. 3

POSSIBLE CONFLICT SITUATION

From the tech no-military viewpoint, the possible conflict situations ar e cha r acter ized by th ree fundamental factors: the technological level, the professionalism of the instruments, the intensity of the operations. Therefore, situations of the followi ng type will emerge: • symmetric, conducted by instruments equipped with systems of advanced technology and extremely high professionalism; the operations will be of high intensity but of short dura tion; • asymmetric, in , vhich in one o f t he deploymen ts ther e are improvised tech nologies, absence of rules a nd recourse to terroristic systems: the operations will be of low intensity and long duration ; the military action will often be similar to the typical actions of the police forces.

COMMAND LEVELS

Fig.4

THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS After defining the operational concept of the Service, one should determine, from the quantitative and qualitative point view, the composition and organization of the forces necessary to accomplish the missions entrusted to them. To this end it is useful to remember the need to express real operational capabilities, willingness to play a participant role in decisions Within the international context, diversification of the possible

BRIGADE COMMANDS

modules or staff elements for the constitution of national or multinational cornrnands on the basis of the CJTF (Combined Join! Task Forces) concept; • Intermediate Operational HQ and Brigade HQ, which must be able to exercise Lhe command and control on units at the immediaLeJy in ferior level, organic or in reinforcement, nalional or multinational. The latter can be called to operate in very differing scenarios, theatres and roles. From this the necessity derives to qualify them on the basis of the priority mission entrusted to them. We shall then have: Projection Commands for "out of area" interventions; Reaction Commands for the management of cr.ises inside the Alliance; Commands for Presence and Surveillance on the national territory; Defence Commands. Each type of Command requires its own characteristic that can be referred to three fundamental indicators: "projectability", "interservice expansibility", "multinational expansibility". "Pr~jectability" can be obtained by adopting a "p1·e-established fragmentation" Staff which, in case of employment, permits to duplicate the cells for the management of the essential activities in the nonnal location. Moreover there ·will have to be the cwailability of a Command unit equipped wi th means, material and field systems to wa1Tant operation and life cmtside quarters. The expansibility of the Commands, both in the interservice and international sense, can be obtained by organizational arrangements for the introduction in the staff of air and/or naval cells and liaison teams, the integration of elements/modules of different nationalities, the availability in key positions of personnel with a good knowledge of Lhe rnain European languages (English,

French , German and Spanish) and Lhe adoption o( organizational structures and procedures in common with the other Services and with the Nations with which the forces will probably have to operate. It is a matter, that is, of adopting solutions which permit to adapt the organization to the weight of the operational requirements deriving from the rnanclate received.

Modules for the development o f operational functions

The operational functions constitute the activilies into which the military operations can be subdivided. Therefore only their analysis permits to define the modules necessary at the various levels for the different situations, a precondition indispensable in order to be able to define the Fig. 5

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS" (CONSTITUTION OF THE TASK FORCE) CAPABILITY

FUNCTION

Command and Control Support, Communications, Computer (C4)

Units

Intelligence

Command function + resources

Combat

Units of the main Branch and attack helicopters

Combat Supp ort

Artillery units, Engineers, Army Aviation, Special Forces

Combat Service Su pport

Logistic Units

C2W

Measures

Deceit

Measures

Security and Protection

Measures+ resou rces

NBC

NBC units

Elec tronic Warfare

EW units

Psychologica l Operations

PSYOPS units

Host Nation Support

Logistic units

Public Information

Means

Civil-Military Operat ions

Means + units (if required)

RSTA

Reconnaissance units, surveillance units, objective acquisition units. Informa t ion acquis it io n un its, (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT) Special Forces, LRRP

global capabilities Lha t the Service should express. The fo llowing la ble shows a concise examination of the fundamental functions (fig.5).

SUPPORT FUNCTION TO COMMAND AND CO~TROL COMMUNICATIONS COMPUTER (C4)

The various Commands \.viii have to have a common characterislic.:, made indispensable by the modern operationa l environment marked by wide spaces and scarce availability of forces, i.e. the availability of automated systems capable of process ing datain real time, transmitting orders with grea t rapidily and adjusting them immediately Lo lhc developments of the siluation. As regards the communication field, the Signal units m ust be able to implement a system integrable w ith the "permanent communication netwo1·k" and in a position to support a flow of digitized informati on typical of automated command and control systems, besides possessing the normal prerequisites o f security, redundancy, flexibility and resistance to the electronic warfare measures. In particular, the units destined Lo the suppo rt of Projection/Reaction Commands, with the runction of Command of the Force/Com mand of the national Contingent, s hould have a t their disposal longdistance tra nsmission systems (satellite sets, troposcatler radio links, high-power HF radio stations) integrable with th e ne ts activated in the Theatt·e. Suc h capabilHy will be indispensable to the Signal units s upporti ng the two projection Intermediate Operati o na l Comm ands and only n ecessary in case of coincide nce w ith the Contingent Command for the communication supports of the projection Brigade Commands.

JEW (INTELLIGENCEELECTRONIC WARFARE) FUNCTION

Generally speaking, "military in formation" is the result of a process of analysis, processing and syntesis of the kno\.vleclge of the natural environment and of other components belonging, for a ny reason, to the operational context (crisis, PSO and conven tional warfare) or· i n conditions of

normality. They a rc necessary in order to outline a siluation piclure as realiable as possible in order to define the lines of action mosl suita ble to conrront, by advance planning, the operational events. Taking into accow1t the doctrinal sources (national and NATO) as well as the experiences derived from the operations in Bosnia and Albania, the Intelligence agencies should be organized on three levels. The first level based on Elements of Coordination (EC) should be placed within the Staff of the Command and would have the task to supervise t}1e coordinalion of I.he whole intelligence activity. The second level should be made up by Elements or Direction, Produc tion and Analysis of ln fonmrtfon (EDPAI), coming from IEW (Intelligence and Eleclronic Warfare) units, organics or in reinforcement, with dir·ective I.asks related to resear--ch, analysis and inronnation. ln operations these elements would form a kind or In telligence Opern tional Cent.re (All Sources Ce ll) for the direct support of the Command Post of the Unit. The third level would envisage Execution Elements (EE) formed by a group of specialistic bodies capable of carrying ou t research activities in va1ious fields like, for example, H UM INT (HU Man lNTelligence), SJGINT (SJGnal INTclligence), !MINT (IMagery INTelligcnce), wide-range patrolling, etc. It is important Lo emphasize that these research bodies arc represented in part by

specialistic units and in parl by operational units, which, working in synergy with in the Research Plan, supply the data to be processed. This struct ure, although varying in size, according to the organizational level and the mission assigned, allows to have a lways at o ne's disposal an inlermediate technical element (EDPAJ) between the elements of execution (EE) and the Command stn1clurc (EC) in orclct· to free the latter from the complicated and onerous activities of analysis and intelligence produclion. Finally, it should be emphasized hm.v vital it is, in the intelligence fie.Id, to comply ,vith the principles of readiness and adhc1·ence, in order to promptly fu lfi lI the intelligence requirements (JRS) of the Commander.

RSTA (RECONAISSAN CE SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION)

The RSTA function is strictly cmmectcd to the information brnnch and, according Lo the directives issued by the components o r the Intell igence Structure, must supply with great rnpiclity the infom1ation necessary to plan/control the operations. This is accomplished through the unitary employment or every resource capable of canying out the research and gathering of infom1ation data. This entails therefore the employn1ent, coordinated in space and Lime, of reconnaissance, intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, lM LNT), siuveillancc, target acquisition, electronic warfare un its. Such components, on the basis of the maximum hyvotheses of employment assigned to the Service, will have to be "assembled" for the average TEW support requirements o f two Theatres. Also non-JEW units, i.e. Cavalry Regimen ts and Special Forces, contribut e to the RSTA funcli on.

The Cavalry Regiments, suitable for carrying out tasks connected ,vith secur ity and reconnaissance in PSO and/or classic operations, must have the possibility to act according to two m_e thodologies: the first, following the "RECCE by STEALTH" pxocedures, with extremely light units, equipped with very advanced equiprnent for night reconnaissance and communications; the second, instead, following Lhe typical pr ocedures of "RECCE by FIRE" ,vith heavy units able to engage the enemy with fire actions. The Special Forces, finally, besides fulfilling the combat function, will have to conduct primarily very bold intelligence activities. In fig.6 a schematic depiction poi.Q.ts out the methods of employment of the Systems for ReseaTch and Gathering of Information in a modern scenario. It should be kept in mind, also for the control operations of the territory, the need to give to the RSTA function a certainly bi-dimensional (Jandair) and possibly tri-dimensional (land-a ir-sea) connotation. COMBAT FUNCTION

It is the master function of every operation l t envisages different activities related to the operational environment and requires therefore single-function modules at Regiment level ,vith operational capabilities that can be differentiated in confom1ity with the following fundam ental indicators: projectability, onroad and all-terrain mobility, fire protection and firepower. "Projectability" is an essential cha racteristic for the modern units and can be ensured only by freeing the Regiment from managerial tasks, which should be entrusted to units at the permanen t headquarters, adequately adapted in conformity with the said requir ements.

SYSTEMS FOR SEARCHING AND GATHERING INFORMATION

Fig. 6

As regards "mobility", it must be pointed out how, in peacesupport operations, the ability to drive on most terrains (typical of tracked vehicles) becomes less paying in comparison to the abili ty to move at high speed on the most probable routes (typical of armoured vehicles). The forces - which can be defined as manoeuvre forces - destined to perform this function indude Infantry Reguuents but also Cavaky Regiments, which can be classified within three types of units: • light, equipped with ·wheeled vehicles with partial protection lim ited to the fire of individual weapons; • mechanized on APCs, tracked or wheeled, protected, and with onboard armament, also anti-tank; • armoured, equipped with vehicles with high protection and firep 6wer. The employment of light, mechanized or annoured forces depends on the characteristics of the operational environment and on the tactical operations that must be developed, while the units equipped with wheeled or tracked

vehicles are employed according to the type of practicability marking the physical environment. Mor eover, in the ambit of this function, we should men tion the Attack-.Helicopter Regiments of the Army Aviation (AVES). These, thanks t o their versatility of employment, fire power, mobility also on terrain "impossible" for land forces, are an instrument of exceptional power in the hands of the Commander. As a matter of fact, the modem peace-support operations envisage the availability of contingents able to express a strong deterrence in order to be credible. From this point of new, the attack helicopter units are particularly suitable for developing actions of high value and visibili ty (area secmity, ar med reconnaissance, armed escort to convoys and units, etc.) . Similarly, in classic operations, the attack helicopters can carry out precise, timely and powerful inteventions. Therefore, fore a m odern Army, it is esse ntial to · have such an important component, compatibly with the high costs it entails.

Finally, the comba L[unction requires, jn special circumslances, the combined employment of attack helicopters, light 1nfantry, transport and comba l-suppor l helicopters. The combination of these elements forms the ainnobile forces complexes, which develop the ir manoeuvre starting to fight from the air ,rnd continue on the ground until the target is conquered (an aim10bile operation ditlers from the tactical transport of light-infa nt1y uni ts for the Command and Control capabilities that the complex of forces must possess, in vie,v of the combined employn1ent in time and space of resources or different kind, as well as the active participation of combat helicopters in all phases of the action). The consequence is that speci fie resources must be assigned also lo ai,mobility.

COMBAT SUPPORT FUNCTION (ARTILLERY - ENGINEERS ARMY AVIATION)

Land Arti11ery

The fire support to any land operation will con tin ue to be a fundamental necessity a lso in future scenarios. In peace support operations (asymmetric conlucts) the employment of land artillery has a n outsta nding role, especially as concerns deterrence, pursued through the visibil ity of the deployments and the development of an effective training, which can also a<;sume the aspect of demonstration activity (similar considerations cou ld also be m ade for detemu nate requirements o[ control of the ten-itory). Howeve,~ in case of actual employment or fire, it is essential to be able to operate with extreme p recision a nd selectivity in order to "surgically" hit the objectives - often mingled with the civilian poptdationwithout collateral da mage which, among other things, could cause a

dangerous drop in consent. Such results can he obtained through a carerul preparation of the inte1ventions and a direct fire control by advanced observers, as ,,veil as with appropriate Âˇweapon systems. In this kind of operations the singlc-ban-el a rtillery units (cannon/howitzers and mortars) can operate down to platoon level. In operations of classic warfare (symmetrical conflicts), the NATO doctrine envisions the fire support of land artillery in its two componen ts of general su pport and d irect support. The general support one is employed - as a whole a nd on a single direction - in favou r of the main Un it (CoqJs/Division) and consists of the longer-range units, both single-barrel a nd, especia lly, multibarrel (surface/surface missiles and multiple rocket launchers). The Artillery of direct support operates in favour of the Brigades or of a group of forces with autonomous tasks (Regiment, Combat Group) which in any case support contact operations an d mus Lbe normally equipped with single - ban-el systems.

Talking about the organizational level of resource alloca tion, one should consider lhc possible future developments of the sector, also in the interna tional setting. At present, the only road lo follow seems to be that of grouping at COMFOTER level the longer-range artilleries (missiles and rocket la unchers) and sorne howitzer/can non units fo r the role of general support, keeping the present artil lery component at regimen t-level in each Bligade for direct support; to the Intermed ia te Command level, one would leave only the capability of rire employment, ensuring the availabil ity of an Opera tional Centre of Fire Support (Centro Operativo per il Supporto del Fuoco (COSF) to manage the aitillery units destined to COMFOTER. Antiairc1Âˇaft Artillery

[n general, the new operational concep t of the antiaircra(t mt illery pr'O\,ides for the employment in operations to be implemented

through the aggregation of within the national territory is elementary rnodules in.to complex concerned, it is indispensable to I-VA systems called "clusters". mantain the operational "Elementary module" means a capabilities of the national whole fonned by active systems component of DAI (HAWK (weapons), Command, Control and Systems) at ACE standards. Communication systems and by techno-logistic support systems capa ble of ensuring a single Engineer Corps antiaircraft function (V/SHORAD, SHORAD, medium-altitude The tasks assigned lo the defence, antimissile point defence). Engineer units vary in confonruty A "Cluster" is instead a set fonned ·with the org,mizational level in by several elementary modules, which such units are to be included ,.vhich includes and integrates and the type of operations that are complementary weapon systems going to be carried out (generally capable of supplying an classic warfare or peace support). omnidirectional area-and-point In particular, the units under coverage, from very-low to meditu11 the direct command of altitudes. It includes (when COMFOTER I Logistic available) an antimissile capability Inspectorate will be able to for the defence of vital points. The operate in a decentralized way "cluster" is at the orders of the with time and/or employment Commande1; and must be included restrictions and will pelform in the more general frame of the activities whicb will concern the Integrated Air Defence (DAJ). practicability of the rnain roads With reference to the peace (overcoming wide inteffuptions support operations, normalJy the with road and/or rail bridges, risks to be prevented and/or crossing of unfordable waterconfronted exist within a . courses with the employrnent of generalized air supremacy of the pontoon bridge equipment, hiendly forces and show the construction/restoration and insidious characteristics of the management of rail roads and/or· terroristic use of the weapon rail yards, strengthening of port systems. 1t will be therefore ·installations, etc.) and the general essential to give first p1i01ity to the support (acquisition/production preparation of at least one A/A and distribution of electric and cluster in such a configuration as to water resources, setting up of ensure the coverage of two-tlu·ee lodging facilities, POL pipelines of Brigades under a single divisional limited capacity and lengtl1, etc.). command (HA\i\lK, Stinger and The units subordinate to the SlDAM systems). The follO\~ing Intermediate Operational step could be that of integrating the Commands and to the Brigades divisional "cluster" with an A/A wi.11 iJ1stead take care of the light component (SKYGUARD ;.ir.tiviti~s r.onc~rning the ASPIDE system) and having a practicabiLity of secondary roads teclmo-tactical component for the (overcoming of small inte1TUptions, possible C2 integration opening of roads), the protections of requirements and in-Theatre the units (building of field airspace management, envisaging fortifications, assistance to moreover the ability to identify the camouflage, etc.), and of the faction responsible for the possible activities o( direct support attack; carry out the units' rotation; (clearance of explosive devices, antiadjust, for all systems, the logistic obstacle operations, contribution to support, at present gauged for the plmming of structures, etc.). A operations on the national territory. separate mention should be made As far as the employment for the classic function, not cited

before, of countermobility vis-a-vis the opposing forces. It is a common belie(, in fact, that in the modern conflicts, also the symmetric ones, this function shuld be almost completely reconsidered. In particular it should be kept in mind, with reference to the active obstacle, the ban on inhuman weapons, among which one should mention the anti-personnel mines. In view of this, the countermobili ty should be conceived essentially through the passive obstacle (with a lot of attention, in any case, to the potentially hemy repercussions on the environment) and large recourse to non-lethal weapons. Moreover the Engineer C01ps will contiT1Ue to be the component \Nith the highest value for interventions in case of disasters. It is seems quite probable that this type of activity (disaster relief) could also concern Theatres outside the national te1Titory.

AR.t\:lY AVIATION (AVES)

The AVES units participate in the performance of three fi.m damental operational hmctions: combat, combat support, combat service support. Here we shall refer to AVES as concerns combat support, whithin which it operates in two distinct sectors: • fire support; • operational assistance. Fire support, in peace keeping operations, has essentially functions of deterrence and show of force, security 0£ other forces

(covering Force Operation), and surve illance. In operations of classic war, also actions of counterattack and countermobility are added to the abovesaid activities. • The operational assistance is carried out in every kind of operation, in a ,vide range of activities, among wh ich: search and rescue, reconnaissance and s urveillance, fire d irection and

60 j

electronic warl'are. The operalional capabilities required from lhe A~S units, due to their specific fu ncti911 of combat support, can be described as follows: • outstanding operalional versatility and nexibility; • adequate fire powe r; • high ti,-ansporl capability; • capability of night night given bv devices for instrumental flight and night vis ion . Of course the AVES employment in a scenario "saturated" \-\:ith fire delivery means, aircraft of other Services and other nationalities, presupposes the availability of command a nd conlrol and airspace control systems interoperable with similar systems employed .in the same scenario. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

The fi.mctional logistic cl1ain, on three 1ings, practically has already been transfeD"ed on two rings, in order to confer wide flexibility and cost-effecliveness to the instniment, through centralized and automated management at central level and a support closer to the operational forces. The logistic organization therefore is divided in two areas: • logistic support area under the authority of the Inspectorate of the Service; • logistic adherence area located within the operational compo nent and therefore dealt with in this parag raph. In order to confer efficiency and continuity to the logistic support an essential prerequisite for the success of any activity - one should ensure a har·m01lious allocation of resources and capabilities at the various organizational levels. To this end, COMFOTER should have specific capabi lities in order to ensure the continuity of the logistic function, originated in the support area, up to the units, both for the operations on the national

ten-.i to ry and for those outside it. Therefore it should be able to avail itself of wlits at Regiment level, constituted by elementary modules, each having the capability Lo activate tem1inals, to move and maintain the matetial coming from the support, transportation and tra ffi c-control areas. The Intermediate Operational Command, expected to become projectablc, must have the ability to activate log istic forn,ati ons for the support of un its operating under its Command/Control and in particular, to activate the Divisional Support Group capable to manage, in case of Lead Nation, the National Support Elements (NSEs) of other countlies. Brigades and Regiments must have extremely mobile executive organs, strictly a djusted to the requ irements connected with the average cases of employment and without over loads, in line with the new "from rear to forward" phi losophy of logistic sup port. In fact, the suppl ies will be del ivered "at ho me", with a centralized management of transport, and executive organs acting as "agencies" in charge of control and distribution; the supplies of the in-Theatre operational units will be limited,

because the necessary material stored during the planning phase on the basis of the consumption rates observed during s imilar operations and projec ted only fo r a lim ited part into the Tbeatre - will also be delivered "at home" during the operation, in accordance with the actual consumption. The maintenance activity will be canied out, especia lly for the out-ofarea operations, by mak ing emergency inten1entions as rorward as possible and by replacing entire weapon systems a nd pieces of equipment Rapid interventions by "contact teams" will therefore be envisaged, together with the delivery to the unit of the serviceable equipment - corning from suitable stocks - and the simultaneous removal of the unserviceable material, wich will successively be repaired by the suppott branches at specializec.l centres oriented towards specific yards. As for the in-Thea tre medical support only the interventions connected with emergencies will be considerec.l "as forward as possible" w hile for the delaya ble interventions and for hospita lization and tt·eatment a timely removal to rear structures or repatria tion is e nvisaged. The in-Theatre projection of

intermediate structures wi lh adequale capabilities could be taken into consideration for particular operational environments, especially for humanita1ian interventions in favour of the local population. Finally, it should be remembered that the com bat service support avails itself also of AVES resources, both already devoted to other hmclJons and specifically assigned.

NBC DEFENCE In the modern operational scenarios, lhe nuclear threat has become less massive and impending. Bul, meanwhile, there has been an increase in lhe chemical threal, whjch could appear also in peace support operations and on lhe national territory, as a consequence of accidents at industrial plants or through lerroristic actions. In view of this, it seems necessary to have NBC defence capabilities, nol only at the individual serviceman's level, bu t also at COMFOTER and/or Intermediate Operational Commands level, so as to reconcile the need lo concentrate the necessary specialistic resources with that of ensuring adequate levels of presence on the national territory. For t'he aforesaid Commands one could envision company-level units, equipped with adequate pers01mel and means, capable of operating also by segments to be detailed according lo need; or the resources could be concentrated in a COMFOTER regiment/battalion, organized in company-level modules, detachable when necessary.

PSYCHOLOGIC OPERATIONS PSYOPS constitute a power multiplie1~ both in classic-warfare and in peace-keeping operations. In the tr.aditional operations they

m·e one of the mainstays of C2W (Command and Control Warfare) while in Lhe peace-su pport operations they ar·e lhe instrument which together with CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) and public infonnation, permit to obtain and maintain the consent to the operalion. Being an operational fu nction of outstanding specialization, it can only be entrusted to specifically structured units, equipped and trained lo confonn with those existing in other WesLern coutries. Such u nits should be able to sustain the psychological activity of a group of forces at Intennediate-Command and Division level, and therefore, in harmony with what occurs at NATO, be ahle to ensure: a contribu tion to a possib1c CJPOTF (Combined Join LPsychological Open.1.tion Task Force), a capability for the moment expressed only by the United States, Great Br itain and Germany; 2-3 PSE (Psychologial Support Elements) as reinforcements to a Division Command and to the Brigades; at least six TPT (Tactical Psychological Teams) as reinforcements to the Regiments.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY PACKAGES

If tbe individual operation.al capability is represented by the bas ic module - in term s of units, measures, equipmen t and resources - w hi ch is in a position to c~UTY out one of the functions

mentioned above, the package of operational capabilities is made up by a harmonious who]e of single capabilities with the purpose of ca,rrying out a specific mission. Proceeding frorn what was stated above, one shou ld make up four "capability packages" in accordance with the requirements, which constitute also the aims to be atlai ned. In particular:

1) the "Projection Forces" package, destined to the defence of the external interests and the support to international securi ty and stabilily. Objective: to enable the Army to project a Division Command, with the relevant Supports, and two Brigades in a single operational Theatre or to employ the second Brigade in a separate Theatre; to ensw.-e, moreover~ the rotation of Commands and urij_Ls in case o[ Jong-lasting operations (operation cycle of more than 6 rnon lhs). This \,v ould translate into having the avaiJabilily of: 2) "Reaction Forces" package, destined to contribute to the common defe nce within NATO. Objective: to enable the Army to fulG II the commitments taken on by our Nation with NATO, consisting of a Division Command , Supports and five Brigades. The Projection and Reaction packages form, on their w hole, the forces prepared for the employment outside the national territory. In total they require, as we have seen, t.hree Intermediate Commands and ni ne Brigades. Nevenheless, considering that it is highly improbable that a NATO engagement and an "out-of-area" one occur a t the same time, the complex of forces to be assigned to Projection/Reacli.on is not the toLaJ of the tvvo packages but their "least common multiple", narnely two Intermediate Division-level Commands and seven Brigad es; 3) "Presence and Surveillance Forces" package. O~jective: to ensure specifically the defence of the national territory - which, in any case, is a priority also for the projection and reaction packages - and Lo fulfill the requir·ements of contribution to the maintenance of public

order, safeguard of the free institutions, and in case of disasters. For the • quantification of such Fprces one can refer to t he most demanding one, namely the control of the territory in case of terroristic threat at the same time as the employment of contingents abroad. During the Gulf War, for the "surveillance of sensitive points" the Army supplied 40.000 men, to be considered doubled due to turnover needs. Today this heavy commitmen t would be unsustainable, but we should have at least one Intermediate Command and three Brigades, plus an equal number of Forces for turnovers in longlasting operations, therefore two Intermediate Commands and six Brigades; 4) "Defence Forces" package", which includes the forces of the abovesaid packages, the Command organs that have to employ them, and the remaining Supports. In conclusion, having adopted principle of the "costeffectiveness of the formations", it is necessary to constitute two Division-level intermediate Commands and seven Projection/Reaction Brigades plus two Intermediate Commands and six Presence and Surveillance Brigades. In fig. 7 a schematic example of

LANll !<ORCES COMMANll (COMrnTER)

D E F E N C E

«Julia» is involved in the constitution or an Italian - Slovenian · Hungarian Brigade

configure each package, in fact, one should quantify, functioJt by function, the capabilities that must be prepared. T his will be the maller for further discussions, which will lead to explain "the reason" of the choices already made or being made. It is a fact that the methodology that should be employed to solve any partial

the packages' configuration

problem cannot but be based on

hmited to the main Commands and to the Brigades.

the missions assigned and on the specificat ion of the ensuing "r eal operational capabilities" that need to be expressed, knowing that only in that way it is possible to supply to the politico-military authorities concrete elements of evaluation for the decisions pertaining to them. In fact, it must not be forgotten that, on the basis of the envisaged operational

CONCLUSIONS

What is described in fig.7 is only an "example" of the concrete realization of all the reasonings made un til now as regards th~ operational component of the Service. In order to completely

i----__, x

FOJ.GORE

PROJECTION

RRF = RAPID REACTION FORCES IRF= IM!viEDIATE REACTION FORCES

capabilities, it will be necessary to formulate - or re-formulatethe programmes related to per sonnel (especially the volunteer component) the acquisition of weapo,n systems, equipment and materials, the reconfiguration of the structures and the redeployment of the units on the territor y. On the whole these are things that entail the employment of human and Financial resour ces as well as social implications, which the Country will find acceptable only if the "security goods" supplied are really capable of fulfilling the needs in peacetime and in emergencies.

D 1 '

Colonel

Head, Office of the Deputy

Chief of Staff of the Army

fil]INW [J)W®D~®IT ~®®®

., COMMAND AND CO TROL IN MILITARY OPE

by Ivan Felice Resce ~-:

he function of Command and Control is the connective tissu e 0£ any complex of force , be it structured in s tandard formation or assembled-as it is more often th e case in the present scenarios -a ccording to Lhe "task organization" principle . lL is Lhrough

Command an Control, in fact, t h::it th~ cliffon~n 1 operational capabilil.ies are employed in a harmonious way, in order Lo express th.e synergies indispensable for the accomplishmenL of the assigned mission . The contes ts in which modern operations, which arc mainly mu ltinational and multiservice, take place, exalt the importance or the fu nction we are examining. In "standard"

TIONS

formations, to be employed in nation al scenarios, Command

and Control was normally practiced almost by instinct. It was based upon solid personal relations between Commanders and subordinates, as well as on procedures ,ve could define as "homcmade", whose effectiveness wa s guaranteed by daily experiences. It goes without saying that in the employment of multinational and multiservice forces, one should aim , on Lhe

contrary, at clear relations betv,1een Commander and subordinates, as well a~on standardized procedures, recogni;,.ed and applied in the multinational environment. The terms "Command and Control" (1) are integral parts of the function whose purpose is the exercise of authority, by a Commander on a corn1;lex ..of forces assigned for a specific mission. Simplifying the NATO definitions quoted in the box, we can say that "Command" is the process through wl1ich the Commander makes his decisions and transmits his intentions lo his subordinates, while "Control" is tbe process through which the same Commander, assisted by his staff, directs and coordinates the activities of the forces assigned to him. Command includes the concepts of authority, responsibility and obligation to act. Authority implies tbe exercise of "power" and the right to expect "compliance''. Part of it is normallv entrusted to subordinates, who in turn are invested with the responsibility connected with the degree of authority entrusted to them, without irnpairing in the least the delegating Commander's authority. Responsibility is a un ique concept. It belongs to individuals, and even when it is shared arnong many, the individual responsibility remains intact. Obligatio~ to act synthetizes

the concepts of authocity and responsibility, and implies the "accountability" of one's actions to the bestower of the authoritv. Control must be understool mainly as a verification of the plans, directives and orders issued, to answer the following basic questions: • are they clear; • are they feasible; • are they well executecl

• are lhey effective, i.e. are they appropriale for the achievement of the desired result. It is, therefore, an indispensable instrument for the direction and coordination of the activities. The term must therefore be emptied of any punitive meaning. Control is exercised using procedural measures and positive measures. Procedural measures are those estab.lished in advance and concern sector limits, Ii nes for fire control, rules of engagement, etc. The positive ones are !be most significanl, in that they are directly applied during the execution phase. Their application requires personnel mastering profound knowledge and tested experience, but specially advanced and innovative technologies electronics, automation, informatics, satellite communication - aimed at observing, collecting, processing and transmitting irt(onnation data in r·eal time. Command and Control is exercised in all conditions: peace, crisis, conflict, operations diff eren t from war. No doubt the most difficull conditions are lhose of conflict, which are generally characterized hy uncertainty and permanent risk. An effective action of Command must be based on three fundamental parameters:

responsibility of the subordinates to operate in line with those intentions. In substance, Command must aim at accomplishing the mission (2), be it of lraining or operational character. The application of the concept "command intended for the mission" requires a command style aiming at encouraging decentrali zation of authority, freedom of action and initiative. The key point of the concept is the relation be tween Commander and subordinates: • the Commander: •• gives orders in a way that makes him feel sure that his subordinates understand his intentions, the mission to carry ou l and the context \Vi thin which the i:nission takes place; • • explains in a clear manner the results to achieve, and the reason why they must be attained; •• allocates Lhe resources necessary to accomplis h the assigned mission; • • applies minimal measures of control, safeguarding the freedom of aclion of hi.s subordinates. • the subordinates decide, within their freedom of action and the authority entn1sted to tliem, bow to accomplish the assigned rnission in the best possible way. The concept "Command for the mission" , to be effectively ap_plied in operations, must be experimented daily. It is based on

timely decisions, perfect

some hasic principles, sucb ,1s:

understanding of the intentions of the higher Comrnandet~ clear

• unity 0£ efforts, to be achieved through the conscious and

COMMAND: authority entrusted to a Commander for

the direction and control of military forces (AAP-6). CONTROL: authority exercised by a Commander on part

of the subordinate activities and structures normally not under his command. It i mplies the responsibility of implementing orders and directives (AAP-6).

Fig. 1 STANDARD DIAGRAM OF A COMMAND AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL -

r-- - - ---- ,- - - -- - -- - r---- - --- , LCC

NCC

ACC

socc Subord inate units

JC LCC NCC ACC SOCC

- Joint Command - Land Component Command - Navy Component Command - Air Component Command - Special Operations Component Command _ _ __ _ Command

committed involveme nt of all "actors" . • decentralization of a uthority, to guarantee the respect of the responsibility of each Commander; • mu tual confi dence between Commanders and subor dinates; • understand in g and sharing of intentions, orders and respective requirements; • timeliness of decisions. Never theless, the application of the concept "Command for the mission" should not be considered a dogma. It m ust be adapted to the situation, also depending on the command style of the individual Commander m1d his knowledge of his subordinates.

THE THEORETIC MODEL

Command and Control is, therefore, one of the most complex an d sophisticated functions. It is thus considered appropriate to describe it through the presentation of a theoretic model referred to a generic operation, and then to

probe into the conceptual elements with reference to concr ete cases.

Levels of respons ibility Military ope rations originate from a decision of the political authorities, who recognize that this manner of intervention is the most suitable to achkve a specific objective, generally connected with the security of the Nation or of the Alliance. It is the refore the political a uthority that, with the technical advice of the m ilitary, formulates a mandate and entrusts it to an Operation Comma nder who, under the military profile, becomes the only person responsible for it. Naturally, the same Commander is assigned the resources and the command authority to use them. He entrusts part of his author ity to the subordinate Commanders, each of whom becom.es responsible for a specific component or sector. Therefore, the conduct of an operation invests three levels

responsib ility: strategic, operational and tactic. The strategic level is at the politico-military lop, either national or Allied. At this level as we said - the mandate is formula ted, the resources are defined, and the a ut hority and responsibility to fulfil! the mandate a re give n to a Commande1~ specially designated for the job. The o perational level, specifically military and generally joint, is the vital con nection between the politico - strategic objective and the employment of the forces. At this level, in fact, the political mandate turns into military objectives and the opera tion is conceived, organized and conducted with a un itary vision. The tactical leve l is normally Single Service. At this level, the operation is conducted by component or sector of responsibility. The three levels are no t separated by clear borders and are not associated with headquarte rs of p re-established r ank. Any activity will belong to the s trategic, operational or tactical level, based on the results it produces for the oper ations. What we can say with cer tainty is th at the operational level coincides wit h the Command t o which the operation as a w hole will be entrusted (Command of the Operation ) . Th is Command (fig.1) will normally h ave a joi nt s t ructu re in which the

Comp onent Comm ands o f each individual Service are inclu ded. Chain o f Com mand and Control

The levels o[ responsibility, as a whole, define the chain, or structure, of Command and Control which is a specific feature o( each operation, in that it is devised in relation with the

type, the context and the scenar"io £the action. The definition of the. chain of Command and Control - wl1ich is one of the basic actions for the start of a military operation presupposes the respect of simple but important ru les. First of all, the command lines must be light and envisage only the command levels whkh give an "added value" of their- own to the decision-making process. lL is necessary to avoid structures with hierarchical relations "one to one", without denmltipljcation. Another fundamental element js the scope of control, which must by strictly proportionate to the real capabilities of management of a cornrnand: as a general rule, no more than 5 or 6 elements. 0

Status of Command

lf the level of responsibility (strategic, operational and tactical) refers to the responsibilities in the conduct of operations, the status of command refe i-s to the assigned forces. In thjs respect, the Alliance has codified tne following command authorities (3) which indicate precisely the status of the Commander vis-a-vis the forces assigned for the specific mission. • Operational Command: authoritv o·iven to a ~, b Commander to assign missions or tasks to the subordinate Command:::., to deploy units, to

reassign forces, keep or delegate Operational and/or Tactical Control when necessary. I t does not include logistic and administrative responsibilities. • Operational Control: authority given to a Commander to manage the assigned forces for the h1lfillment of specific missions or tasks - limited in

tirne, space and functions deploy units, keep or delegate Tactical Control of the fo rces. It does not imply the authority to employ components of the assigned forces for the fulfilln1cnt of tasks/missions different from the assigned ones; • Tactical Command: authority given to a Commander to assign tasks to the forces under his command, for the fulfillment of the mission assigned by an authority of higher- level; • Tactical Control: detailed management and contrnl generally limited in space - of the 1novcmcnts and manoeuvres necessary for the fulfillment of the missions or tasks assigned. Organization of Command and Control

Each Commander, to perform his mission, needs a specific organization of Command and Contro l. In a general sense, an "organization" is de fined as a

body of one or more persons working in a coordinated manner to pursue a common goal. In a military sense, an organization planned to support the exercise of Command and Control includes: • personnel, consisting of Commander, Sta ff, Liaison Officers and possibly special i1.ed assis Lan ts; • standardized procedures, among which those relevant to Lhe decision-making process, the compilation and circulation of orders, directives and plans; • Automated System of Command, Control, Com1nu11icatio11 and

Infonnation ( C31); • Headquarters Command, in charge of logistic and administrative support, secu rity and protection of the Commander and his Staff. • The focal element of Command and Control is the Commander. The result of a mission depe nds largely upon his competence, his initiative, his capability of inspiring confidence and of 67

uniting and involving men and units. He has the authority and responsibility of employing the assigned resources, and answers to the higher Commander - and in the last analysis, to the Country - on the resuJts achieved. The staff, presc.inding from the level of command, has two main Toles: to assist the Commander and support the units . The main duty of the staff is to inform, advise and assist the Commander in his decisionmaking activity. In this very delicate role, the staff concentrates on the two main aspects of control: coordination a11el monitoring. As for coordination, the staff supports the Comm,rnder collecting, processing, analyzing and present ing information, in order to make it easier for him to select the most effective line of action. The staff is therefore responsible for planning, drafting and distributing the mea sures o f control, normallv issu ed in the form of orders . ., As regards monitoring, which normally occurs together with coordination, the staff plays an essential role in the dynamic

mechanism of feedback, necessary for a timely decisionmaking activity aimed at adapting the orders to the changing situation. Another important function of the staff is the support of subordinate formations and units. Their capability of survival, training and combat depends in a large measure upon the actions of the staff of the h.igher Cornmand "... the staff must be the servant of the troops; this means that a good stafT Officer rnust serve his Commander and the troops, remaining anonymous" (4). The efficiency of a Command depends on the capability of Lhe staff Lo work in a timely, competent and cooperaLive

manner. The staff rnust not kee p the available information for it.self. It is a precise responsibility of the staff to ma.ke sure that all important pieces of inforrnation are tim ely r e transmitted to all those who need to know, i.e. same level and subordinate units. Procedures are another basic element of Command and Control. Any kind of operation goes through three rnain stages : conceptual, organizational and executive phase . .Moreover~ once the operation is launched, Lh e three phases are repeated in the course of time, in relation with the development of the executive phase and Lhe changing situation. The most qualifying moment of the conceptual phase is decision. "Decision-making" is a fundamental prerogative or the Commander; and stems from a set of activities and interactions between the Commander and his staff, "vhich goes under the name of decision making process. The process starts at the beginning of the operation and takes on a cyclic connotation in the conduct phase, ,.v hen it must combine in a harmonious way the development of the operations under way with the planning of the future ones. The time availabie to reach an executive decision is a fundamenta l element of the process . Normally, the more

THE METHOD FOR THE SOLUTION OF OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS INCLUDES • analysis of mission or task; • evaluation of situation factors; • individuation of possible own lin e s of actions and comparison with "enemy's possibilities of action"; • Commander's de cision, expressed in a synthetic but precise concept of action" or "manoeuvre plan".

instable the situation and lower the level of the interested Commancler's responsibility is, the mo1;e reduced is the avai lable time. It is therefore self-evident l1o·w important it is to have a standard "method", but characterized, at the same time, by a marked flexibility making it adaptable Lo all conditions of employment. The method, in substance, represents a logical - systematic procedure, a guide for the study of complex problems. The Commander's decision sets the organization phase in motion. Then the decision turns into directives, orders and plans. The basic document is the "operation order". It is a standard document which contains all the elements for the development of an operation. It is divided into 5 parts, plus some annexes referring to information, fire employment, use of the engineers, etc. Essential elements of an order are clarity and Limeliness. An indispensable condition for an effective command action is that of guaranteeing that the smallest unit and the individLtal soldier receive clear orders in time to start the activires tbat concern them. It is barelv worth to underline that one of 'the prerequisites of interoperability between Commands of different nationality or Service is the availability of standardized procedures.

The C3I (Command, Control, Communication, Information) systems meet requirements which are inenounceablc in the modern operational contexts, where the ·informative advantage over the enemy or the environment is an essential condition for success. The C3I of the Armv consists of SIACCON (Automati~ed Command and Control System)

THE DOCUMENTS OF C2 (AAP-6 NATO) DIRECTIVE: fonn of written comm unication by which general instn ictions are transmitted, or the ·ex~cution of a well defined action is ordered. ORDER: written or verbal communication by which the Conun ander transmits his intentions to his subordinates. PLAN: term used, instead of "order'' in a planning made according to intervention hypotheses. An operation plan can be made executive at a certain time or by order. OPERATION ORDER (STANAG 2014) 1. Situation: • enemy forces; • friendly forces; 2. Task (of the authority issuing the order); 3. Execution (which must include): • concept of action; • composition and organization of forces with respective tasks; 4. Logistic organization; 5. Command organization. and CATRTN (Integrated Transmission Field System). SlACCON is destined to support the Command and Control function with particular reference to: • Command: support the decision-making process and circulate the relevant orders with adequate speed and relia b iii ty; • Control: point out the gap between the hoped results and tbe achieved ones. The software realized in SIACCON cons ists of five modules: • the Data Base Module which includes, among other things,

personnel and equipment of the units engaged in the specific operation; • the Message Module, for the management of messages, formatted according to international standards. The tnanagernent includes the utilization of the content of the messages for the automated updating of the situation;

• the Map Module which contains the manipulation of the digital maps, with instruments as zoom, panning, distance calculation, drawing of the altimetric profile; • the Command and Control Support Module permits the presentation of the situation map, showing friendJy and enemy units, the geometry of the battlefield etc.; • the Interactive Planning Support Module, which permits the manipulation of the "private" copy of each cell, in order to formulate hypotheses and ask the systf'.rn for 1~v;-il1rntions on the

feasibility and effectiveness of the hypotheses singled out. The architecture of the System envisages a Centre for the Analysis and Selection of Information (CASI), the Fusion Centre (CF) and Decision Centre (CD). CASI is divided into seven functional areas, subdivided into cells, as shown in the general diagram (fig.2),

ORGANIZATION DIAGRAM OF A COMMAND POST

Fig. 2

- Short, medium and long range recce Units - Combat Units - Surveillance Units - Psychological Support Units - Acquisition Units - Special Forces - Intelligence Units _ __.___-._:E:_W. Units

- Logistic Units • CIMIC Organs - PI Organs

- Signal Units • Command and Control Units

• Engineer Units • • ~

SOTRIN

Army Aviation Units A/A Arty Units Liaison with AF Units SOATCC Units

- Land Arty Units • Air and Naval fire Units (possible)

Connections within CP (each F. AREA is also connected with all others)

~ Connections outside CP Within SIACCON, the Dialogue between Operator and System Lakes place using the method of functional icons and windows. The user is in relation with two environmenls, different albeit closely integrated: that of messages and Lhe graphic one (1xesentation/planni ng). SIACCON, as a whole, has the characteristics of a "clisLributed system" consisting of several Local Area Nets (LANs) referring lo each Command Post, geographical ly interr.onrn~r.ted (Wider Area Nel - WAN). All users connected to LAN can share situation data, processed and updated by the personnel in chacge of the various cells. CATRIN consists of a set of sensors, processing systems and communication equipment. It is divided in three subsystems: • an areal basic transmissive net, integrated, digital and highly reliable and survivable

Staff Organs Operational Capabilities SIACCON

(SOTRTN) with centrals o[ various types, central radio sistems, mobile radio terminals, radio links of various range, s upervision systems of various levels, multiplex and cipher devices; • a system for the acquisition of the information (SORAO) needed to outline the piclure of the enemy situation, for a rapid decision-making process and to permit the best use of the available fire resources (longer n'lnge artillery) It includes several types of air sensors (Drones, M.RPV and Creso) and land sensors (Countcrfire Radars, Radars for the Surveillance of the Battlefield, IRT Laser Telegoniometres) as well as an information organization (Data Correlation Centres Net) projected for processing information and generating the enemy situation. • a system for the coordinated

employment of the means that use the air space (SOATCC) above the operation area, able lo meet the requirements of management and control of the air space, permit the exercise of C2 of the A/A a1·tillery units and the Army Aviation, the diffusion of air warning. It consists of radars, a Report Centre, computer centres at various levels. The Army's CJI System must be able to "dialogue" with those of the main partners. This r·equirement is met by t.be Quadrilateral Interoperability Program (QIP) that through a software (gateway) module guarantees the interfacing of SIACCON with the equivalenl systems of France, Great Britain, Germany and the U.S. The last, bLtt not Lhe least, component of an organization of Command and Control. is the Headquarters Command. It consists of a whole formed by

personnel, equipment and material for the logisticadministrative suppprt of the entire Command, a nd m.ust be structured in such a way as to guarantee the projectability outside its quarters.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

The conceptual and organizational elements described so far are concretely appljed in the national and international structures of Command and Control. Before presenting the new structure of the Army, it is deemed appropriate to underline the most quali fying elements of the structures of the main international organizations that have been one of the references for the national solution. The NATO Command and Control structure.

The present military structure of NATO (fig.3) aims at conducting military operations on the base of art.5 (S) of the Treaty, in pre-defined Operational Theatres . In it we can find all the elements described in the theoretic model. First of all, the levels of responsibility: • the politico-strategic level, represented by the North Atlantic Coun.cil, which avails itself of the advice of the Military C:omm.it tee for t he military decisions; • the operational level, whose responsibilities are divided between SHAPE and the Major NATO Commanders (MNC); • the tactical level, normally found in the Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSC) and sub PSCs. The command authoritv attributed to the NATO Military Commanders is established

,. )

Fig. 3 PRESENT NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR)

COMNAEWF

CINCNORTH WEST

COMLANDSOUTH

CINCSOUTH

COMAIRSOUTH

COMNAVSOUTH

during the planning phase on a case-by-case basis. In general, the command of the operations is entrusted to SACEUR \.vho, at t he moment of ToA ("Transfer o f Authority"), assumes the operational command of the forces provided by the Nations. The Operational control is delegated to the Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC) and so on, as appropriate. Thjs strncture, folly valid at the time of the confrontation of the blocs, has proved not completely suitable vis-a-vis the challenges of the "post-bipolar" environment. In fact, after the adoption of a new strategic concept, based on active prevention, and on NATO's commitment to conduct also "non-art.5" operations (6), the Alliance felt the need to establish a projectable Command (Rapid Reaction Corps). Subsequently, NATO commenced a specific study (Long Term Study-NLTS) aimed at starting a transformation process that in a short ~ime will ]ead to the adoption of a solution similar to

CINCCENT

COMSTRIKFORSOUTH

COMLANDSOUTHEAST

the one schematized at fig.4. But the most important aspect of the study is the concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), with the purpose to create the condi tions of establishing and projecting, in an emergency, a m ultinational joint Command (CJTF HQ), capable of assuming responsibility, at the operational level, for the conduct of peace support operations. Permanent strnctures, in fact, are essentially static, and nonp rojectable, in that they are structured for planning and conducting operations in their respective areas of responsibility. With CJTF, NATO intends to acquire the capability, at Regional Command level, to

achieve: • a more flexible and rapid deployment of forces, thanks to the availability of a "projectable" Command of adequate level; • the integration of units from Partnership-for-Peace Nations into the Allied Command and Control system. The CJTF (HQ) is formed by" filiation" (fig.5) from an

Fig. 4 POSSIBLE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF NATO MILITARY COM MANDS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

NAC

PO LITICAL LEVEL

- - - - - - - ... - ... i\,·... - ····- - ·-· ··---...· ------- - --- ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - STRATEGIC l: St rategic Command : . C MILITARY i: Atlantic : Strategic ommand Europe LEVEL :---- -~~~~?~!<_!~~~)___ __ ; SHAPE (BJ

OPERATIONAL LEVE L

REGIONAL COMMAND CENTRE

REGIONAL COMMAND SOUTH (NAPOLI)

REGIONAL COMMAND NORTH

SUB REGIONAL COMMAND (MADRID)

SUB R EGIONAL COMMAND (SMIRNE)

Joint

TACTICAL LEVEL (

)

NATIONAL/MULTINATIONAL FORCES

Navy Component Command. {

)

Air Component Command.

Fig. 5

PROCESS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A CJTF HQ CRISIS

NORMAL CONDITIONS

xxxxx NUCLEUS STAFF -- ~

NUCLEUS STAFF

FROM CJ1 TO CJ9 ""' + SPECIAL STAFF

SU PPORT

I I

PARENT H Q

GARRISON

DACJ1 ACJ9 + SPECIAL STAFF

MODULES

I I

STAFF l f<UGMENTATION

- -;TA ; - I 2 iJt. IJ......

SUPPORT

- - - - -1

SUPPORT

(. ' SUPPORT

FROM OTH ER NATO HOS AN D FROM NATIONS

II II I I

XXX

STAFF FROM CJ1 TO CJ9 + SPECIAL STAFF

SUPPORT

CJTF HQ

-------- AT PARENT HQ GARRISON OR IN OPERATIONS ZON E

alrea dy existing NATO Comman d, which Lakes on t he name of "parent H eadquar ters" and is impl e me nted by augrnen tees made available by o ther natio nal and NATO Commands. The CJTF can be activated also for WEU-l ed operatio ns , base d on th e principle of "separable-but-notseparate" structures . Jn Lhis regards, a special 72

Executi o n

Establishment

OPERATI ONS ZONE

mention is deserved by the allco ntine ntal ini tiative named European Security and Defence Identity-ESDI) . I ts emerg ing role within the Allied environment is a concrete witness of the E uropean assum ption of greater responsibilies in the defence sector, stating, a t the same Li me, the need of maintaining a stable and safe transatlantic dia logue.

Command and Con trol s tructure in WEU From the military point of vie"\v. WEU operates in line with the "Petersberg Agreements", whic h define the scenario \Vithin w hich L.h e o r·gan izalion could be called upon to intervene. For the conduct of operaLions, WEU, at present, has at its disposal only the politico-strategic level, i.e. its own Council. As for the military structure, it avails itself of · existing Commands (national or m ultinational). In this perspective, the WEU document CM (93) - 7, part I envisages: • Command of the Operation, not deployable in the theatre, \,vith Lhe Operation Commander; • Cornmaod of the Force, deployed in the Operation Theatre, w ith the Force Commander. The WEU document does not clearly describe the Au thority status attibuted to the two Commanders, which will have to be defined in relation wit h Lhe case of ernploymenl. Reading the document, nevertheless, o ne can see tha t., in most cases , the Commander of the Operation w ill be given the Operational Command (OPCOM), w hile the Force Cornmander will have the Operatio nal Control (OPCON) . ln ltis turn, the Force Comma nder can delegate, as appropriate, TACO M/TACON to the national/multinational forces that the vario us Nat ions will have ass igned to WE U for the specific need. Command and Control Organization in the UN Also the UN, as WEU , does not h ave a permanent military structure. In the UN-led ope rations, the Operation Command is held by the

Security Council, which exercises it through the Secretary General, who avails himself of the DepartinenL for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) as a Staff orga11jsrn. The Theatre mi] itary Cornrnander, appointed each time, is normally given the OPCO.N. The experiences gained so far evidenced that one of the weak points in the operation under UN Command is precisely Command and Control. The decision-making process to be activated in Lhe conduct phase p.roves to be very complex and complicate in circumstances vvhere - due to unforeseen changes in the Theatre si tuation it becomes necessary to modify tasks and deployments. As a matter of fact, in these cases (fig.6) the Commander of the UN Contingent must consult the Secretary General who, in his turn, informs the Security CounciL The Council, after consulting the Nations which contribute troops to the operation, rnakes its decisi ons and transmits thern to the Secretary General who, finally, informs the military Commander in the Theatre. In Bosnia, the problem of Command and Control has been solved by giving the responsibility of the operation to a regional organization such as NATO, equipped wit h a ,vell "nm-in" organization of Command and Control and with standard procedures. Also in this case , hO\.veve r, the contributing Nations, for socioeconomic reasons, could not forgo the control of their continge nts . In this perspective, the Commander in the Theatre has been granted an authority over the fo rces, corresponding to Operational Control. Th is warrant could prove insufficient in an emergency. This is the reason why ltaly, profi ting from the

Submission f request of change o a

0 Commander f the Secretary General. Q Evaluation and"su mission of request t

Request of opinion f troop Contr°

,O Receipt of opinion . G Discussion at Secu ·1y Co Cl) Orders to the Conti

y the Contingent the Security Council.

mg Nations.

and transmission of recommendations to the Secretary General.

t Commander.

Fig. 7

SYSTEM OF RELATION BETWEEN NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND COMMANDERS OF MULTINATIONAL INTERVENTION FORCES

XXX

. ..

UCRAN¾

.. .. DUCRA~Q

[[I experience gained in previous operations, appo in ted a Coordinating Officer R epresentatitve of the Nationa l Authority (UCRAN) and a Deputy UCRAN. T]1ese General Officers have no authority over the national contingent, bu t work side by side ,vidi the Commander of the Peace Force and the Co.m rnancler

of the Sector where the Italian contingent operates (fig.7). The solutio n ach ieved the twofold goal of guaranteeing to the Italian authorities a supervision on the exercise of OPCON ,vithin the pre -a rTanged limits (adherence to the mandate) and the establishment, in case of emergency, a preferential and direct liaison

with the Nation, in order to meet, more timely and efficiently, the needs to adapt orders and deployments to the changes in the situation as compared with Lhe original mission. This solution was deemed appropriate also by Portugal, which adopted it for its unit, included in the Italian contingent.

Multinational Commands For the completeness of the exposition we deem it appropriate to mention the multinational Commands in \.vhich the Ann y participates. Allied Mobile Force (LAND) HQ: pa-rt of the Immedia te Reaction Force (IRF), it is a Command comparable t o a Brigade Hq. It has a permanent structure built on a rnulLinational base. lt can manage 6-7 combat groups provided by the Nations (for Italy, "Cuneense" contingent).

Fr om the point of view of Command and Control, the force is under the OPCOM of SACEUR. Allied Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC): it constitutes the start of a "new course" in multinational structures. I t is based on a British Corps Hq. which has been "multinationali zed" with the inclusion of personnel from 11 Nations (8). Three rnor e Nations (France, Spain and Non.vay) are present wi th observers. The ARRC Hg. is a Corps Hq. capable to exe rC'ise its Command and Control on its direct supports and on a maximum of 4 Divisions, to be drawn each Ume (according to the mission) from the 10 division-si ze formations made available by the Nations. The Army Corps is under SACE UR's Operational Command . The ltalian contribu tion to this undertaking consists o f: • approximately 20 officers/NCOs

in the HQ. The most representative job is that of Deputy Commander; • Hq. Framework Division (9) and five Brigades, 2 of which in the Italian Framework Division, 1 in the British Framework Division, 1 in the Multinational Division South (Lo be constituted) and one Brigade as Reconnaissance Unit in direct support to the Corps; • other support units, among which: l Engineer Regiment and 1 A/A Artillery Regiment. EUROFOR: it is a Command which originates from a poli Lico-military initiative launched in 1993 by three Nations (France, Italy, Spain) with Portugal joining later. It is a Division-l evel Hq. permanently established in Florence, also with tbe goal to reinforce the European Security and Defence In itiative (ESDI). The forces are made available at the moment of employment, on the base of the "on call" formula. The "typical missions" that can be assigned to this Command cover the whole spectrum of all possible interventions based on the new \A/estern strategy of crisis management. EUROFOR is therefore a Division-level land uni t that, within the WEU, can alternately be: • the Command of the Operation; • the Command of the Force; • the Command o f a land component or of an intervention sector.

Command and Control Structure in the Italian Army One of the most qualifying measures concerning the military land instrument has been the reshaping of the Command and Control structure as a whole. The

objectives (fig.8) were essentially two: • reduce the scope o f control, through a reduction in the number of Commands/Agencies dj rectly subordina te to the Army Chief of S taff (from 22 to 4, plus 3 Military Regions which will a cquire a joint structure); • clearly define the Commande r responsible for each are a, m order to give u ni ty of direction Lo the function s of eac h component. Here, the examination of the new struc ture will be limited to th e two components directly concurring to the developm e nt of military operations: the ope rationa l component and the logistic one. As fa r as the opera tio nal co mpon ent is concerned, the Service felt the need to acquire, in the specific sec tor, capabilities no more lim ited to the requiremen ts connected with the na tiona l territory. The increasing engagemen t in peace support operntions a nd the rem a rkable integratio n of na tional fo rmat io ns in multinational complexes of forces - not NATO on ly required a review of a ll operational functions and, as a conseque nce, of a ll Command and Con trol capabih lies . Th is \,vas done with the a wareness that an active ro le in the interna tional arena, to which Italy legit imately aspires: stems above all from the contribution of ideas, Command ca pability and c redible forces, both for quality and quantity. Jn this pe rspective, the command structure of tlie o perationa l component has been r edesigned , in order to give the Comma nds ma rked capabilities of projection a nd expansion, for the conduct of joint and m ultina tional

ARMY CHI EF OF STAFF ARMY STAFF

LAND FORCES COMMAND

operations, at home and abroad - in the roles of: • Com mand o f the Force in the circw11stances where Italy assu mes the role of lead nation; • Command of a sector in multinational contexts - not NATO only - both fo r peace support operations and for symmeh·ic operations of medium a nd high intensi ty. • Con, ma nd o f the Operati ons, by mandate o f the Chief of Staff of Defence, in case of national o perations characterized by a predominan t land compone nt. The Comm and and Co ntrol struct ure or the o pe ra tional componen t (fig . 9) meets these requirem ents a nd, in genera l, is in line wi th the p}1i losop}1y of the "ca pa bility packages" ( 10). COMFOTER a nd all its subordinate Comm a nds m a ke up the basi c chain of Command a nd Control for the cond uct of large-scale ope rations connected with defence, in case

Fig. g;

of threat or direct aggression agains t the nationa l te r ritory. The Command o f the Projection Forces (COMFOP) is des tined - as a first priority to operation s outside the national territor y. I t is a Comma nd c ha racteri zed by a marked op era tiona l versatility, completely projectable and already part ially multinational through th e integration .in the s taff o r some Portuguese officers . Whe n in garrison, it includes the B rigades o f the "projection package", w hile in opera tions it can take on differen t configurations, the most important of which an:: • Corps-level (Headquarters), expandable in a multina tional and joint sense, to be employed as "Protection Force Command" in case Italy is designated as lead nation as was the case for Opera tion "Alba". • Division-level Headquarters, expa ndable in a m ultinational sense, to be employed, under 75

the FOP Deputy Commander, a s 3rd Italian Division of Lhe ARRC, or as Sector· Command in a multinational context, noL necessarily NATO. ln both cases, COMFOTER takes on the role of Mounting Headquarters ( 11). The Alpine Troop Command (COMTA) is in charge of all Alpine units and is potentially projectable, for employem l as a

Fig. 10 POSSIBLE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL POLITICO/ STRATEGIC LEVEL

_ CHOO ______, ______ ____

___________ _ __ __ __ _, _

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

replacement for COMPOP, in

cases of operational cycles lasling more lhan 6 months. The two Defence Forces Commands (1 st and 2nd COMFOD), when in garrison are in charge also of some units of lhe projection and reaction packages, a11d, as a first priority, a1·e destined to operations connected with presence and surveillance. Finally, the Support Command is in charge all Lactical and logisLic supports of COMFOTER. It guarantees un i Ly of direction in Lhe preparation of the units as well as the ir coordination in case of employment. Among the mosL qualifying activities there is cerlainly the a ssumption of full responsibility for the "adh erence logisLics" (12), with particular reference to the engagements of Italian contingents outside the national territory. Also the Command and Control structure of the logistic cornponent of the Army, devoted to the support of the inslrument, has been entirely redefined. The whole component is s ubordinate to the Logistic Inspectorate, which is in charge of two Area Commands (Logistic Area North and Logislic Area South). For the support of the forces projected outside the national territory, the Logis tic Area South Command will take on a specific configuration, appropriate also for the

POLITICO/MILITARY SUMMIT

SERVICE OPERATIONAL COMMANDS

.... . , , ...........

JOINT OPERATIONAL COMMAND

- - - ----- - OPERATION COMMAND

··· ··· ····················· ····· ········ ··· ··············

INTERMEDIATE SERVICE COMMAND (JOINT RECONFIGURATION)

··· ·· ···· ·· ·

FORCE COMMAND

--- ------ ------- ---- -------------------- ---------TACTICAL LEVEL

LAND NAVAL COMPON~ITT COMPONEt-lT

Al.:I COMPONENT

performance of the role of lead nation, for the managemenl of the logistic activities in relation to the other nations . National Command and Control in operations The problem of Command and Control in operations can be examined only with reference to a joint conlext. As a consequence of the recent approval of the Law on the High Ranks, the ltaiian Armed forces will have at their disposal: • Operational Joint Command (COI), capable of assuming the funcLions of Opera.Lion Command; • Command of Forces of individual components, whose main task is to assemble and prepare the respective forces and, when necessary, to carry out the role of Component Command or Supporting Command. • inlermediate Commands of each Service, capa ble of carrying out the role of "Force Command", afler a "joint" i-econfiguration if necessary. In substance, for national operations the Chief of Staff of Defence, according to the

L'1NO NAVAL AIR COMPONENT COMPONENT CCMPONEHT

circumstances, could avail himself, as Commander of the Operations on National territory, of: • the joint Operational Command, to be established in the near future; • or the Army Operational Commands (for operalions envisaging mainly the employment of a single component). The Command of the inTheatre Force would be ensured by an intermediate Army Command, that would become "Joint" to meet the particular requirement.

CONCLUSIONS The picture o utli ned meant to touch upon Lhe essential aspecLs of "Command and Control", underlining both its value for the operations and its compl exity. Value and complexity emphasized by the contexls (joint and multinational) and scenarios (mainly remote) in which the modern operalions take place: The available capabil ities in the specific sector concur, in a decisive way, in the definition

of the role the Army can play in the national context and, above all, in the international milieu. Excellent capabilities"'i n the various operational functi'ons are of little or no avail if not completed b y those relevant to Comma nd and Control. In this perspec tive, it is necessary to foster a n harm o nious gro\vth or all components required for th e development of the functions. We refer first of a ll to personnel (Commanders and sta ffs) and lo the automated systems, based on advanced tech nologies in the sectors of sate llite communications, informatics, electronics etc. Bu t, at the bottom of everything, lhere must b e an updated doctrine, aimed, on the o ne hand, at the "Command style" and, on the other, at the working procedures with in the staffs, harmonized w ith those employed within the operational context. This is tb e perspective in which one should read this article which, like the others, has the primary obj ective of a c tivating a debate in orde1· to gath er the contributions of thou ght that qualify the d o c trinal concepts deve.loped w ithin the Ar my.

D ,., Brigadier General Chief, Plans Office Army General Stafi·

NOTES (1) Some doctrines, includi ng the

Anglo-Saxon one, mention onlv "Command", in that they consider "Control" one of its components. (2) The British doctrine uses the expression "mission command". (3) NATO envisages Lha t, ·within the national sphere, and in absence of military operations, Commanders be atLributed "Full Comma nd", defined as the authori ty and responsibility of an

Officer to give orders to his subordinates . It covers all aspects, both in the operational and admi nistrative field, and applies within the national context only. The term "command", when used in an international conLext, implies a lesser degree of authority compared to when it is used in the national sphere. As a consequence, a NATO Commander ca nnot ho ld full com mand over the forces assigned to him, since the NaLions, in assigning their forces to NATO, concede operational command and control only. (4) The expression is attributed to Field Marshal Montgomery. (5) Art.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty describes the cases vvhere NATO intervenes militarily. (6) "Non-art. 5" operations are those conducted outside the NATO area. (7) The UN also considers: • operations "under UN mandate". where planning, organization and conduct of the operation are entrusted lo another International Organi:t.a tion (as in Bosnia); • operations "under UN aegis", where the Security Council invi tes the m ember Nations to

pu t into practice the most appropriate means in order Lo "compel" a Country Lo accept one of its resoluti ons (as in Lhc Gulf 'War).

(8) The Nations wh ich signed the MoU for the institution of the ARRC are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, UniLed Kingdom, United States. (9) The expression "Command Frame\.vork Division" describes a Division Hq. vvhose basic framework (approx. 70%) is provided by a lead Nation taking upon itself also the responsibility of its operaLion. (10) Sec articles of same series, published on no. 1/98 of "Rivista Militare", Italian edition. ( 1 l) The espn.:ssion "Moun ting

Headquarters" applies lo a Command which, operating at its garrison, carries out staff and executive functions in favour of forces operating "out of area". (12) The logistic organization of the Army, abandoned the concept of Lhe "rings", is divided in two sectors: adherence logistics, typica.l of the units, and support logistics, under the authority of the Logistic Inspectorate.

The Army General Staff - as is the case with other ::7 Allied Armies - is undertaking specific studies aimed at;,,'. · defining the conceptual aspects of the problems · . :.1 relevant to the struggle for the control of information, r both as regards "traditional" war operations and PSOs_~ · The study is conducted also in the light of the lesson· learned in recent years from the conduct of a number: of "out-of-area" operations and from the experience gained from the long-standing participation in the activities of the allied Commands (ARRC, AMF-L, etc.). In this context, it should be stressed that there are different connotations between the struggle for the control.of information in war operations intended as a key-instrument for the protection of one's own information system and the reduction of the enemy's informative capabilities - and that conducted in PSOs, with particular reference to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, aimed at taking an informative advantage from the environment, in order to safeguard the physical safety of the formations, to know and understand the context of the intervention and, at the same time, to divulge - with the highet trasparency and impartiality - information about the ·objectives and intentions of the intervention Force. Within this framework we can also include·the reorganization of the Intelligence - Security component which, in the wider picture of the measures for the reconfiguration of the Service's architecture envisages: • at the highest level, the inclusion of the Security and MP office (formerly 2nd office of the II Division) in the Employment Division of the Army General Staff, as well as the establishment of an JEW Department under the Services Inspectorate, after the transformation of the pre-existent CIDEE, located at Anzio.

• at the operational level, the establishment of an IEW Group, subordinate to the Land Operation Forces Command. From this vie"\\rpoint, the article by Lt. Col. Lunelli is a valuable contribution of thought an a subject of the greatest topical interest for all modem Armies, characterized by the increasing employment of resources and technologies to achieve the so-called "transparency'' of the battlefield, through the struggle for the superiority in the intelligence field. The Author himself presents a vision of the problems deriving from the operational experience gained by the US Forces and by NATO which, beyond the specific characteristics relevant to the PSO operations mentioned above, is one of the references for the development of the subject in the national ambience. 78

by Pier Paolo Lunelli 1'

n the night _ or Tuesday, . January 29, 1991, te n days after t he start o f the "Desert Storm" a ir cam paign, Sadd am Hussein

A.RNIY PROJICli 21!01 l

la11nch ed a land attack and con quered the city of Al Khafji (1) on the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia . The joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), an airborne system capable of giving the friendly and enemy situation in real time, ,NaS mop itoring the operation,

noting that the penetration \vas conducted by a fo rce of at least two Divisions. The Iraqi units, stopped by the land fo ,Âˇces in contact - (US Marines and Saucl.i infantry), supported by hundreds of air sorties which disjointed the second echelon lost the capability of sustajn ing the battle and were p ushed

back, ,vhile the ci ty was reconquered the follow ing clay. The employment of JSTARS ~tns\vered a big question, i.e. hO\v to monitor rnobile objectives on the battlefield in real time, getting in (ormation on t he intentions of the enemy. This informatio n, combined with the use of air power; puts the

Fig. 1

INFORMATION DOMINANCE

OPSEC PSYOPS EW Physical Destruction

All Source Fusion

RlSTA

E -

Primary l ntclligeacc Requirement~ (l>lR) lutelligc,m: Cycle

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

- Common Picture Uata base, Briefiugs Conference calls, Vidcoconferencc Reporting (Sitrcp, Logrep....)

Di,::it11li:,,cd Battlefield System

Comma nder in front of two options: s top or ma noeuvre. But in both cases, hav ing lost initiative and surprise, the possibilities of being defeated increase a nyvvay. This work is centred on two themes : • control o r infor ma tion on the battlefield, how to achieve a nd keep it; • introduction on the Battlefield Visualization Concept (2) and its connections with the clecision-rnaking process. INFORMATION DOMINANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND "BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION CONCEPT".

Information Dominance on the battlefield, of w hich "Dese rL Storm" is a class ic exampl e, is a part of the so-called Battlefi eld Visualization Concept. Battl efield Visualization is a process through wh ich the Comm ander: • develops a clear a wareness or the situation o[ the mom ent, in connection with the enemy a nd the en vironme nt;

• defines the desired "end state", (3) representing the accomplishment of bis mission; • vis ualizes the sequence of activities needed to take his [orces from the existing situation to the "end s tate". In substance, it can be affirm ed that a Commander has control of the information when he controls his own situation, as well as the enemy's and Lhe environment's, and in this con text can perceive the "end state" . "Battlefield Visualization" has two essential aspects . The first, as already said, concerns the awareness of the existing situation of the foen dly and enen-ty forces . This awa reness does not refer only lo t h P. ,m<lP.rst;mding of the p lans and/or orders issued by the Com mander, the location of the fri e ndly and enemy forces, the level of their operational effectiveness a nd to environmental factors, bu t a lso incl udes human factors, such as fatigue, morale and decis ionm a king system of both fo rces. The second aspect concerns ins tead the ability Lo see and digest the dynamic rela ti on

between the opposing forces, in other words how the Comm ander can lead those forces by means of a sequence oF activities connecting the prese nt s ituation ro the "end stale". "Battlefield Visua lization" includes therefore activities such as foresee ing the moves of the enemy a nd planning the a ppropriate countermeasures, besides time ele ments that suggest when to modi fy gravita tions or pri orities, when Lo reinforce or ask for reinforcements, wh en to break contact e re. "Information Dominance" is based an four cornerstones: comma nd and control warfare, inrell igence, situation aware ness and information systerns. The logic re la tionship a mong the individual elements is shown a t fig. 1.

Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

The capability of exercis ing Command and Control is the prerequ isite for the success of a military operation. Sensors, technology in support of the decision-making process, da ta bases, informati on and communication systems are funda me ntal elem ents of a Command and Control system , while the orderly flow of informa tion through the ne ts realizes the efficency of the system. A Comma nd and Control system includes personnel. equipme nt and prnccdurcs that move from - and go back to knots. These knots a re a critical eleme nts of the sys tem, because t he ir destr uction degrades the capability of exercis ing Command-Control a nd, therefore, of cond ucting military opera tions. For insta nce, the Airborn e Warning and Control Sys tem (AWACS) and JSTARS respec tively improve the capabilities or the air clefence

and the surveillance of the enemy formations on the ground. On the other hand, they are critical knots to be · safeguarded and protected. Command and Control Warfare (C2W) (4) consists in the integrated use of Operations SecurHy (OPSEC), Military Deception, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Electronic Warfare (F.W) ;-ind Physical Destruction, integrated and supported by intelligence, in order to (fig 2): • prevent the enemy from acquiring information; • influence, degrade or destroy his capability to exercise Command and Control; • protect our capability of Command and Control from similar actions conducted by the enemy. In particular: • Operations Security (OPSEC) aims at preventing the enemy from acquiring information; • Military Deception has the purpose of deceiving the enemy, manipulating and distorting the information in his possession. • Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) act on the human element, affecting the enemy's mor ale and willingness to fight. The media are to be considered means for the conduct of PSYOPS. • Electronic Warfare (EW) aims at degrading the efficency of the enemy's radar and communication systems; • Physical Destruction is directed to the enemy's Command and Control critical knots, as Commands, communication cen tres, etc.; • the role of Intelligence, instead, is that of concurring to the detection of the aforesaid critical knots of the enemy Command and Control Svstem and, at the same time, , evaluating the effectiveness of the entire C2W activity.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

OPERATIONS I PSYCHOLOGICALI SECURITY OPERATIONS

DECEPTION

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Gen. Schv,arzkopf's operational concept in Operation "Desert Storm" is a classic example of what has just been said (5). T he main efforL was conducted by the VII Corps on the left flank, directly on Iraqi territory, in order to destroy the Republican Guard. The decision to move the Corps to its staging area \Vas to be taken only after launching the air campaign, vvhich had the purpose of attacking the command and conlrol system (C2W a nd Physical Destruction), affecting the

morale (PSYOPS), conquering and keeping the air superiority, also through actions of electronic warfare (EW), as well as i11 Lenlicli11g I.lie e11e111y

capabi lity of conducting the intelligence activity meant to discover where and when the main effort would be exerted (OPSEC). The definition "C2W" identifies tv•./O action areas and therefore two different planning processes. The first, offensive, is named Command and Control Warfare Targeting, and operates w ithin the framework of the

Fig. 4

Information Fusion

. JSTARS

T .· .

~ TAGRECCE

~ o

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CELLS LINKED VIA SATELLITE

_zZ, ATLOW A L D~ · UNMANNED o

ESM SENSORS

AIRC R A F T . '

0 0 PHOTOGRAPH INTERPRETATION

o EW

Intelligence

TROOPS ON FIELD AS INFO SOURCES

Fig. 5

~ - ---'i!==-- -. IIntelligence Management ~ DISTRIBUTE

•

r=-,, - . -- , '

!!!D!!! IR !!!E!!! C!!! T!!!!!. · ---~ ,~

' I ;!

. Distribute intel info to higher and subordinate Commands . Consider intel requirements from lower levels . Start cycle again

PROCESS

•

. Transform info into intel. . Elaborate targets again. . Analyze situat ion ·. Assemble the PUZZLE

• What are the PIRs? • What intel resources are available? . How can we answer the PIRs pointed out by the Commander?

Target Engagement Cycle. Jt 3im,

;-i(

(fig 3):

• determining the objectives to attack, in accordance with the Commander's operational concept (DECIDE); • identifying the critical knots in the enemy Command and Control system (DETECT); • analyzing their vulnerabil ity and importance from the perspective of Command and Control; • drawing the priority target list;

The second planning process is or a defensive nature, aims at identifying the critical knots in the friendly Command and Control Systern, analyzing i ls vulnerabilities and providing lines of action for their protection.

•

. Assigne tasks

. Gather info on combat

~ . Give support to o •

_____

TARGETING . Refocus the collection if necessary

_,,.,......,__.

• determining the effects desired on each knot;

• hitLing the critical knots (DELIVER) with non-lethal means (soft kill) as, for example, Suppression Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), Electronic Cou nter Measures (ECM), or with lethal means (hard kill); • assessing the effects of the action on the \.v.hole operation (ASSESS); • resuming the cycle.

Intelligence is the second corners lone of Information Dominance. 1t is a very valuable resource, that must be used by the Commander, who determines the priorities relevant to the socalled Primary Intelligence Requirements (PIR) (6) which, in their turn, guide the gathering operation. The intelligence activity must be coord inated at all command levels, and therefore all the agencies concerned are represented within an All Source Cell, i.e. a cell for the fusion of information. Fig. 4 shows, at Corps or Land-Cornponent Commander level, the activity of fus ion of the infonnalion · originated by JSTARS and its ground station, TACRECCE and its unmanned aircraft, AIR RECCE, electronic warfare conducted through Electronic Surveillance .Measures (ESM), hjgher and subordinate Commands, troops on the ground, National lnte.Uigence Cells (NICs) connected via satellite etc. It must be stressed that a single event could be reported by different sou rces at different

times, according to the number of passages along the Command and Control Chain and the reporting system (real time, periodic, casual). Before JSTARS, the fus ion of information often gave muddled results. The sou rces shown at. fig. 4, in fact, suffer from one or more of the following 1imitations: night conditions and poor visibility sensibly

t f

degrade the effectiveness of most systems; none of them is capable of perceiving mobile objectives on large a reas in the range of 300 by 300 km; the analysis of the information requires hours and, in some cases, even days. The e,mpJoyment of JSTARS has therefore remar:kably improved the capability of conducting the so-called Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA) (7) whose components are: • Area Surveillance , Lo gather information on the potential enemy; • ReconJ;J.aissance in DepLh, giving i;nformation on areas that cannot be covered hy direct fire; • Combat Reconnaissance, for the inforn1alion requiremenLs of the units in contact with the enemy. • Target Acquisition, meant as the process giving information on the position of the enemy forces, with such an accuracy as to permit its neutralization or destruction through the employment of a process similar to the one already shown at fig. 3. The coordinated employment of the I.otell.igencc resources, JSTARS included, therefore gives the Commander the possibil ity of visualizing in real ti rne the movements of the friendly and enemy forces, even in conditions of poor visibility. As far as the in formation process is concerned, it goes according to the cvcle shown at fig . 5. Th~ Comman de r determines his Primarv Intelligence R~quirem~nts (PIR), Lhe staff (8) determines the assets most suitable for the job. In their turn, they have the task of gathering the necessary data. They a'r e processed, transformed into Intelligence and then distributeclto all users .

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Situational Awarene ss and relations with the decisionmaking process Situational Awareness is the third cornerstone of the socalled Information Dominance. It gives the Commander the answers on the location of friendly and enemy forces , their activities, their status, their capability of fulfilling the assigned mission, the situation of supplies, etc. A clear Siluab on Awareness (fig. 6) allows the Commander to have a picture of the sittiation of the "1-eal time" type (9), i,e. almost in real time. Tbis general picture derives from the socalled "common picture", which is the result or information in several data bases, shared th~·ough the integration, both vertical (among the different command levels, also in a joint se Lting) and horizontal (vvithin a Command and among agencies of the same level, even if they are j oint ones). It is important to underline that the aforesaid data bases are an integral part of six opera Lio nal systems: Joint , Inte ll igence, Air Defence, i\/lanoeuvTe, Fire and

Logistics, as shown in the example at fig.6 . The common picture includes infor mation coming from plans and/or ord ers received from the .h igher command, informations from the lower con1mands, repor ts on the friendly and e nerny situation, Lhe environment, the noncombatant ele ment s (as refugees, prisone rs of war, non military organization s), status of resources, Recognized Ground and Air Picture (11) and so on. These situation elerne nts, processed b y the staff (Gl - G2 - G3 - G4 - Fire support Element FSE), lead to the staff estimates, then to the S ituation Awareness by the Commander and pr oduce decisions, orders and actions which intervene in the modification of the various j oint data bases , intelligence , air defe nce, manoeuvr e , fire and logistics, putting them at disposal of the Com manclers al the various .levels. The common picture that, as we have already said, aims at visualizing the exis ting situation, is realized through other instruments, such as the

use of written reports (SITREP, I NTELREP, LOGREP etc.), morning and evening meetings (Update Conference Calls), which are made easy through the employment of presentations of the "PowerPoint" type dur ing the videoconferences or phone connections arnong Com rnanders. Furthermore, there are meetings of working groups as the Command Group, Joint Targe ting Group, Corps Planning Team, Crisis Management Team, Media Percep tion Team, Joint Air Defence Group,etc. Situation Awareness and Common Picture are an integral part of the decision - making process, whose model is shown at fig.7. This model, based on the assumption that Blue and Green develop a similar decision-

INFORMATION DOMINANCE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA In operation "Joint Endeavour", non-lethal weapon systems, as SEAD, PSYOPS and media, were amply used. The multinational force, in fact, has never employed lethal weapon systems, although it had the capability to use them. The "Former Warring Factions" (FWF) were astonished at the quality and quantity of information available at coalition level. This information was often utilized in order to prevent hostile acts and force the opponents to stay within the tracks of the peace process. In the sector of Command and Control Warfare (C2W) the aim was to obtain the cooperation of the conflicting parties, encouraging their poten.tial of exercising command and control, rather than destroy it. The management of the media, which is part of PSYOPS, proved to be a force multiplier rather than a distracting element. Radio and TV stations broadcast information on minefield and on the content of the Peace Treaty, while a weekly distributed free of charge informed the population on the progress achieved (fig.A and B). On the other hand, the fact that many TV and new!>paper reporters asked for information directly of the soldiers of the peace force and others had access to some command areas, was a risk for the "Operations Security" (OPSEC). The Intelligence activity, due to the multinational character of the operation, required a remarkable effort in order to realize an information

RADIO STATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Fig. A

CROATIA

SERBIA

164 RADIO STATIONS ~

LIVHO

.MOSLEM RADIO STATIONS

SERBIAN RADIO STATIONS

KONJIC

@â€˘ MONTENEGRO

@ .IFOR RADIO STATIONS

:CROATIAN RADIO STATIONS

network capable of sharing out the information often gathered with non-interoperabl.e systems. Besides, information on the activities of the opposing parties have been collected using various resources s uch as forces on the field, Intelligence assets, reconnaissance on the separation zone, carried out with a:irplanes and helicopters, manoeuvre forces, AWACS a:nd ]STARS, PSYOPS, civil affairs, International Police Taslc Force, Special Forces and Joint Military Commissions (JMCs). As for the Situational Awareness, this did not concern the Implementation Force (/ FOR) akme, but also the Former Warring Factions. The use af formatted reports on the situation, plans, orders, briefings, video-conferences, morning and evening briefings, has made possibl.e to bring up to date, almost in real time, the Comm.anders at all leve ls . Not to be overlooked is the employ ment of many interpreters, who made possible the compilation af a map showing tens of thousands of minefields all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, the sector of information systems has proved a great success. The NATO information system , named CRONOS and consis ting of "Wide Area Networks " (WANs ) c onnected with numerous "Local Area Networlcs" (LANs) has made possible the rapid, efficient and safe passage of information through an electronic-mail service based on Micros oft technology. Thous ands of u s ers had the possibility of exchanging data, information, documents, data base and images, achieving a. real horizontal and vertical integration of the information system.

m aking process, can be explained as follows: • the Com mander, pivotal elemen t of the Command and Control p rocess, observes the envi ronment (th rough sensors, information systems and reports from s ubordinate Comm a nders) in order to gather da ta on the si tuation of friendly and enemy forces . These da ta are corr elated, fu s ed and rep resented in the

so-called Common Picture, which gives an image o f the battle, shared at a ll comma nd levels. Th e information process here plays a primary role on Lhe orienta tio n capabili ty of the decisionmaker; • the Commander orients himself through a cognitive process, givi ng form to a men tal image of the exis ting s ituation, transforming data and in form ation, into

DISTRIBUTION OF THE "HERALD OF PEACE"

Fig. B

CROATIA

SERBIA OSTRAZAC

114,000 copies a week in three languages

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24.000

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41.000

SERBIAN

49.000

TOTAL

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114.000

Fig. 7

DECISION MAKING-EXECUTION CYCLE MODEL

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evaluati ons, deductions and assumptions. At the end of the orientation phase, he realizes the awat·eness o r the battle space, i.e. the "situational awareness". Th is phase is the keystone of the decisionmaking process, in that it influences the modal i Lies by wh ich he observes, decides and acts; • the Commander then dec ides his line of action and expresses his intentions, which arc transformed into plans a nd/or orders by the staff; • finall~,. in the "Act" phase, the Commander interacts with the enemy's decision-making process, monitors the execution of the action on the battlefield, observes the r·esults, and the cycle resumes. The rnodel j ust expou nded suggests the following considerations: • the decis ion-making cycle is a continu ous process, where all p hases arc present at a ll comma nd levels. Each Commander, in fact, gathci-s inrormation, develops the situational awareness a nd p lans

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the futu re actions while conducting the operation; • Commanders at all levels must clearly understand the intentions and orders of their Commande r, in or·der to avoid frictions and unwittingly "row agai nst the current". The "back br·ief' is an instrument that perm its each Commander to vci-ify whether his subordinates have well understood his orders. • although the decision-making cycles of both the Blue a nd Green Commanders sha re the same space/time, they are not synchronized for obvious reasons; • the capability of imparting rhythm to the operations has three components: rapid ity of decisions, rapidity of executi on , rapidity of the forces when moving from an activity to the next. Thi s capabili ty is a success fac to1~ in the sense that a greater rapidity of the InformationDecision-Action in the B1ue camp creates confusion in the Green camp, slowing down the ir decision-making capabili ty and leading them to

defeat. Liddel Hart made this comme nt on the German invasion o f France i11 1940" ... Lhe action conducted by the Gerrnan armoured units paralizcd the French Staffs ... to the poi nt t hat the orders were issued w hen they were a lreadv surpassed by th e situa ti on, often wit h a delay of more than 24 hours ... This created pan ic, led to paralysis and loss of the capability to resisL. .." The cornputc r·ization of the ba ttlefield will reduce the gap between the "near real time" and the "real time" picture. At p resent, the latter is operational only in the sector of air defence. A tank batta lion Commander, fo r instance, wit! ha ve at his disposal, in real time, the situation of a mrnunition a nd POL of each of his combat vehicles a nd , at the same time, follow their movemcn t through obstacles and minefields an a video terminal. Information System s

The Infor m ation Systems, fourth cornerstone or 1ofonnat.ion Dominance, represent the nen ,ous sys tem tha t interconnects Command and Control War fa re, Intelligence and Situationa l Aware ness, as a lready illustrated at fig.I. They permi t to put the coordination into practice almos t in real ti me on the whole a rea of the operations, and to expand it virtually also outside it. T he informa tiontechnology e ra remarkably

i mprovcs the power to visualize, anticipate and deal p rompt ly and correctly wilh the new situations. In particular, the employment of systems suc h as Wide Arca Networks (WANs) and Local Area Networks (LAl'ls), associated w i.th a specifi c soft.ware, posi tively affects the following activities: • fo ,· ce deployment. A software named ADAM (Allied

GLOSSARY " :BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZ1Tl0N CONCEPT The "battlefield visualization concept, describes the way in which Lhe command activi ty shoul d be conducted, not only in war operations, but also in those in s upport of peace. According to th is concept, the Commander, who anyway keeps a promi nent role, employs information sysLems in order to im pr9. ve his situa tional awareness of wha t takes p_lace on the battlefield, to reduce Lhe margins o f uncenami:y and nsk, and hnall y to rap1clly lrasrru l lus rnten t10ns and his onlers. The level of its applica tions, albeit specifica lly referred to the Brigade or h ig her level, reaches all command levels. "lnforma tion Dominance" is a n integral part of this concept. END STATE The "end state" is defi ned as the state 01· the s ituation that m usi: be reached in orde r to consider the conflict ended or solved. Examples of e nd states at o peratio nal level are: t he libe ra tion of Kuwait in operatio n "Deser t Storm"; t he creation of a favourable environme nt, w here the 1i N and the non-gove rnmen tal organizations can assum e f1.dl respo nsibility for the conduct of human itarian operation,-; a,-; in ope rntion "Re:;torn Hope" in Somalia; t he ac hievement - w ith in 12 mon th:, - of the end of hostilities, the wit hdrawa l of all forces, including those belonging to fore ign Nations, from the separation zone, in operation "Joint Endeavour" in Bosnia Herzegovi na. JSTARS (Join t Surveillance Target Acquis itio n Radar System) It is an airborn e syste m for Lhc surveillance of mobile objectives a l low speed (tanks, veh icles, helicopters). It includes lwo complementary clcme11ls: an a irborne sysLe m (Airborne Radar System) o n a Boeing 707 pla tForm, and a ground station (Ground Station Module). The radar informatio n and rnessages between the two ck~ments a rc transmitted via data link using the Joint Tactical Inforn1ation Distribut ion Sys tem (JTIDS) which inser ts the m in the Command and Co ntro l System of the air forces, ernp loyed, a m ong others, also by AWACS. Bolh lhe land a nd the a ir Commanders, as wel l as the operation Commander, can mon itor slaliomu·y and mobile objecLives, facilita ting the target ing act ivities (see below) and the management of Lhe batllefidd. LEAD NATION "Lead Nation" is a Na tion wh ich assumes the responsibility of giving logisLic suppon lo multinational forces . PIR (Pi-imary In telligence Requirement). PIRs are the enemy p ortions of the "Commander 's Critical Informa tion Requirerne11Ls" (CCIR). Th1-ough Lhe m, the Commande1- defines: whm he wan ls to know (intelligence required), 1vhy, wiL hin what Lim e, and finally how (typ e of formal and me Lhod for obtaining il). Although the d efini tio n is close to Lhe "Essential In telligence Requirements" concept, the latter lacks the priority elernenl. RAP (Recognized Air Picture) and RGP (Recognized Grou nd Picture). RAP is the result of Lhe fusion or information coming from vario us radar pla tforms (on land or airborne). For example, on a Division or Brigade-level videoterminal iL is possible to see the a ir situation in real Lime, wi Lh dear indicaLions on friend ly aircraft (who they are, where they are, what they c1re doin g). RGP gives the same information on mobile objectives belonging to th e friendly and enemy forces. I t is possible, for instance, to see a tank column in rnovement. or a convoy of suppl ies. Only JSTARS has this capa bility on areas 300 x 300 km in size. In Lhe immediate future, the "Recognized Air Ground Picture" will come into being, i.e. the in tegra tion between RAP and RGP. The advent of RASP (Recogn ized Air Ground Picture) will a llow the land and a ir Commanders to see, i_n real time, the situation of each other. ROLE SPECIALIZATION The term "Role Specia lization" ap plies ·when a Nation assum es the responsab ility of g iving logistic support to mult inatio na l forces in a specific sector, for example med ical sup po rt a t Ro le 3 level. SITUATION RE AL TIME and NEAR REAL TIME A "real-time" s.ituation derives f-rom t he availa bil ity of data in real time . Examples are the Recognized Ai r Picture provided by ground a nd a irborne radars (AWACS) and the Recogni7.ed Ground P ictu re provided by systems of the JSTARS type. A "near-real-time" situation, instead, derives from the h.1sion o f data co ming from d iffere nt sources, as re ports (SITREPs, INTELREPs, LOGR EPs .. ), air photographs, e tc. This Fusion p rocess requires a cer tain time, a nd therefore prod uces a "near-real-ti me" s ituation. TARGETING It is a process throug h w hich the enemy objectives arc se lected, and the best system is chosen for their neutra lization or destruction. Tt concerns main ly three as pects: • selectio n of e nemy objecti ves, depending on the ir impo rtan ce, only in view of the assigned miss ion; • selectio n of t he m ost suitab le system to find and attack them , not only w ith lethal means, but also with non -le thal ones, as for exa mple SEi\D (Suppression Enemy Air Defence), Info rm ation Campaign, etc.; • result lo achieve, in te nns of clestn.tction , delay in the enemy action , 0 1- li m italiom; in h is li·eedorn of ac tion . To unders tand the c riteria for the selection o f Lhe enemy objectives, let's consider the following example. The enemy assets in Engineer-corps ponloneers arc cer ta inly a n objec tive of h igh intrinsic value w hen the enerny's concept of action envisages the crossing of a waterco urse. Bul if in our operationa l concept we envisage Lo let the enemy cross the 1-ive1-, in order to countera ttack d uring a critical phase of his action, then in this case the enemy Engineer uni t is no t a paying target, although ii maintai ns its h igh inL rinsic value . GPS (Glo ba l Posi tioning System) It consists of: • a system of 20 geosta tionary satellites covering all the earth's surface; • a grou nd ins tallation capable of receiving data from a l least three satellites and determin ing the coord inates of the cornrol st.ation wi th an a pproximation of 5 to 100 - 300 metres. NATION AL SUPPORT ELEMENT Elements tasked wi th the su pport of a force deployed in a theatre di fferen t from the ir mot herland. They normally operate at the "Sea Ports of Disem barka tion" (SEAPODs) and/or t he "Air Ports of Disembarkation" (APODs).

Deploy ment and Movemen t SysLem) is a lready available and c an p roduce the itinerary for materials - he they tanks or tents - and for p ersonnel - By pressing a button it permits to prinl a document such as: "send rada r 111 from Battalion X to Brigade Y by rail on D+S, from Milan to Naples, to be shipped on ship Z, which afLc::r Lwo days o f navigation wi ll arrive at po rt Won D+8". Moreove1- Lhe location of the containers equ ipped w i th a Gl oba l Positioning Sys tem (GPS) can be co nstantly monitored wilh a n error of 5 metres; • logistics, in that it achieves a cost-effective use o f scarce resources, pe rmi tting to promptly detect and meet the requi,-ements of Lhe. battle field. Considerabl e savings can be made by implemen ting Lhe Lead Nation (12) and Role Spec ialization (13) principles, even if this sometimes entails a reduction of t he national authority in the logistic field; • conduct of the o peration s, in that it permits the imm ed iate u pdating of the situation, Lhe prompt delivery of reports, the availability a t the concerned levels of the R ecognised Air Pic ture and Recognised Ground P icture, Lhe pla nning and monitoring of air operations , and so o n. Fig. 8 illusLrates an information system similar Lo Internet, wh ich interconnects the S trategic, Ope rational a nd Tactical Comm anders in Lheir land, air and maritime components, the Commu nications Zone and the National Suppo rt Elements, \.-vhich operate in Sea Ports of Disembarkation (SEAPODs) and in Air Ports of Disembarka tion (APODs) . The reverse of the medal is that the prolife raLi on of

Fig. 8

NETWORKS (LANs & WANs) ~

OPERATIONAL COMMANDER WAN

; BINEDAIR ERATIONS CENTREs (CAOCs) LAN

LAND COMMANDER WAN LAI\: Local Area N~twork. WA~: Wide Area l\etv1·ork

information systems is associated w ith a similar increase in the need for transmission systems and frequencies. The requirements of the modern b attleCield impose the realization of high-security, satellite-linked information net,vorks, the a doption of C4 Syste ms and relevant LANs, (redeployable and possibly withou t connection wires), the removal of bottlenecks (14) and the ava ilability of adequate measures of protection from comp uter viruses ( 15). Moreover the staff should use the same software also for ga rrison a ctivit ies, in order to fac ili tate their employment in operations. Ideally, the personnel employed in a Theatr e should arrive on the spot, plug in a nd obtain the immediate connection with th e desired users. Fig. 9 illus trates both the fra mework a nd the functions of an infor mation system for the management of land operations . Each naLi on has d eveloped ils own Information an d Command

and Control systems, wh ich, neverthless, have scarce interoperability not only at interservice national level but also al multinational level. Among the b etter kno,vn airland sys tems, w e can enum erate: • for the planning and monitoring of lhe employment of the air forces there are two main systems: Lhe Contingency Theatre Air Planning System (CTAPS) and the Interi rn Combined-AirOperation-Ce ntre Capabi li ty (ICC). While the former is adopLed by the Unite S tates, the latter is being implcrnented in a ll NATO European Countries; • for th~ l:rnd Forces Command and Control each cou n try has ils own i nformation system . Th e road foll owed by the US is the Army Battl e Command SysLem (ABCS), which has a certain interservice interoperabi Ii ty, while t he United Kingdom has chosen the Integrated ARCC In formation System (IARRCISS) used at th e

Fig. 9

A,rchitecture of.an Information System for Land Forces Management and Administration of Data Bases Administration of Security Administration of the Net Multimedia! Supports Operational Simulations Office Automation Âˇ Management of Messages Management of File

Fire Planning Engineer Ops Medical Support . A/A Defence

Support to Police Forces Enemy Situation OPLAN/OPORD

Evaluation of Terrain . Plans for movements of convoys

Command of ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (AR RC). The Italian wa y, a lready known , is the Command and Control Au tomated Informat ion System (Sistema Infor mativo Au tom atizzato Comando e Con tr ollo - STACCON) whose functions are outlined at fig. 9. For the m anagem e nt o f th e land antiaircraft and a ir space systems of th e Corps we can mention th e Italian SOATCC, the Air Defence Command Infonnation System (ADCIS) assigned to ARRC, and manv more; â€˘ for the conduct of intersendce Command and Con trol, NATO has at its disposal a system called CRONOS w hich can easily realize the connections

shown at fii:!. 7; finallv, in the field of integrated air, defence, a system a lrea dy well known is the NATO Int~grated Air Defence System (NATfNADS).

Herzegovina mission, the last exarnple of a long series of crises which turned into open warfare, ernphasizes the necessity to possess Intelligence, Information, and Command and Control Systems with the connected telecommunication means. Without these key - elements the ability to efficently manage the crisis fails, together with the possibility to deploy the necessary forces early enough lo prevent dangerous escalations. With.in this framework, to have information dominance in the areas a t risk already in peacetime, and the ability to maintain it in case of employment of force is an important element at the decision makers' disposal.

D ~'Lieutenant Colonel Chief; Air Defence Section, ARRC.

CONCLUSIONS

The slogan "Vigilance is the price of freedom-;; is still wellgroundecl. The Bosnia-

NOTES ( 1) Gen. Schwarz kopf, "It d oes not take a hero", B antam Books, p. 526; Gen. Merril Mc Peak, Chief

of Staff of the Air Forces du r ing oper a tio n "Des ert Storm ", vario us articles. (2) Battlefield Visualization concept, TRADOC Pam 525 - 70. (3) "End State", see Glossary (4) JCS MOP, March 30, 1993 (5) Gen. Schwarzkopf, "It docs not take a h ero", Ban tam Books, p . 473 . (6) The "Pri rna ry Tn telligence Requ irements'' (PTRs) are the enemy portion o f the ''Commander's Critical Information Requiremen ts (CCIR). (7) ATP 35, pp. 2 - 23. (8) The term "staff' indicates the group of officers chiefly responsible for the internal operations of a Com mand. (9) A "real-time " situation depends on the availability of da ta in real time. For fi.u-ther information, sec Glossciry. (J. O) Th e presence o[ eleme nts no t engaged in h os tile activities, called "non com batan ts", and their activity, can a ffect the decision-making process. ( I I) The "Recognized Air Picture", us ually called RAP, is the result of the fusion of information coming from differen t radar platforms , both on land and airborne. For furher information see Glossary . (12) "Lead Na tion" is a Nation which takes upon itself the responsibility of giving logistic su pport to multinational forces. (1 3) The term "Role Specialization" applies when a Na tion takes upo n itself th e responsibility of g iving logistic suppor t Lo m ul tinational forces in a speciJ ic [i elcl, for instance in the medical sector a t "Role 3'' level. (J 4) ''Bottlenecks'', in an information syste m, are obstr uctions on the electronic highways, generating queues and therefore delays in the transmission of information. (15) In t he distri buted comp uterized system s , the transmission of vir u se s is facili ta ted by th e connec tion in LO n etworks . The introductio n of a virus i o one of the term in als can in fec t the e nti re n e t in a short t i.rn e and, some ti m es, makes the system u n serviceable fo r ho u rs . The a vai lability of u p -to-elate antiv irus systems is therefore i nclis pensable.