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JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

JANUARY FEBRUARY

1985 LIRE 3,000 2.00 D.M. 6

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AN ARMY FOR THE 21st CENTURY

RETHINKING NATO STRATEGY.

WHAT KIND OF ARMED FORCES AND HOW LARGE?

$YATO tAAQGIORE tlat:EfflCfl'G lH REPAITTO

Ti~·o BMsta i . -.

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RUSI Soldier

CONTENTS

Number one 1985 January-February.

The aim o f : he Riv i~:.tH Mi lilore i-:. tc broaden and up<latc tt-c tcchnic~ I <.md voc:<!: 1o nal training o! P..rrnv OH cers and NCO~;. To th :s end it function::. ;,i~_; a · ·.rt-:hic ln ior the dissemination of m1 11:u:y t ·1 ink,nQ anc as a forum ef study :::nd dehale. Tt,e R1v 1s1a rvl i i ~arc is a 1!.io intc n<Jud to :.~e a m eans of inicrm ing the g<·Hl ertd pub li c abou~ t,c /\rmy and mi litnry muHr~H.> :h r::-.>u!'.;11 th e pub !tcatic-n o' ar: icles o f c.urren1 techni c.s I and sci-enti t c intcrc!-.>L

Europ ean Military Press Association

RIVISTA MILITARE

An Army for the 21st Century. ( Umberlo Cappuao)

Editor: Col. Pier Giorgio Franzosi.

Major Armoured Units in Italy. (Ferru ccio /3otu, Nicola P1gna10J

The "Susa" Alpine Battalion.

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(Carlo Cabig ;osu J

39 64

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The Americans in Vietnam. War and Literature .

47353372 · 47355192. Advertisements: by Secretary of Rivista Militare Telephone 6794200. Printed by: Tipografia Regionale • Rome Illustrations by: Rivista Militare .

i Marco Pasquali}

Rethinking NATO Strategy. (VincenLo Tornetta}

Registered for tran smission by post. Subscriptions fo r 1985. Subscriptions run from January 1st (Back issues will be supplied until exhausted). Single issues: L. 3.000 - $ 2 • D.M. 6 · £ 2. Back Number. if available: L 6.000- $ 4 ~ D.M. 12 · £ 4. Year's subscription: Italy L. 16.000. Other countries L. 24.000. Payments may be made by cheque (residents abroad) or through Post OHice Current Account n. 22521009 payable to SME Ufficio Rivista Militare Sezione di Amministrazione - Vi a XX Settembre 123/A. Rome. Registered at the Rome Law Courts .. Decree n. 944 of 7-6-1 949.

This issue went to press on January 2oth, 1985.

1985

Member of USP! U n io ne S W1rl 1.>ct

Per iod ica 1ta Ii anti

What Kind of Armed Forces and How Large? (Gian Giuseppe Santillo}

Technical Data.

Book Reviews.

Ru les tor conuibutors. /\nyonB r.an ccn l r 1::ute. In the inlere:;t o f 1n~ 111::x imum objccti·.,•1ty oi 1;l for111at1on, t:H:! RN s1;,1 lVli lilurc alio\,-;s con tributors cons ·dcra~;lc frcct:om, although i t doc·~> nt)t nece::;f;;ui 'l st; bscr ibe to the ir opini on ~;.. The ,artic les arc pul)lishccl uned ited a nd t ree of any editor ial constra ints and are therefore tht: S()le n:spcnsib ility e t the Author ano ret \cc t his personal ide.s s exclus ively. n 1e 1opi::; m ust be trea t8d in an or ig ina l v,,.ay and the :inicles t:1emselves should not r~xr..eed 10 type,,w iHBn pages i ·1 !c;1q th. Th is 1tm1 : may b e P,xceedect o nly in t h e ca~c o' tHl k;h-:t; 011 p;Hticula rb; c ompl ex subjec ls. l he artic l es st10L.i" d be ()~;ccm p;.rn i ed hy anv necf': ~;s.;H·'r' phot0Qrapt1s. <lra,,-: i nD~ and ex:'.1 1;.i n.atory I.ab le$. Each a J1hor is requested to send a pho tograph of h ir.isclf, togethe r •Nith his "cu: r1cu !:..m1 v1 l aB" .:-H'-O .s ·10-.rnc su -rmarv of the 3n,cle 10 b!:: pub .,st:e::cl. ThB R1v is1a ~v1ilitare resc r·.rcs the fiq !lt 1~) alter tl1c a: t c;l e f ; ~1tlr. .;:r~c· 10 c·1ccse tile typeface 1n v/tnc..: h i t ,s set.

AN ARMY FOR THE 21st CENTURY FOREWORD

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Above: Modena . Ducal Palace. The Military Academy. Upper right: Naples 路 The "Nunziatella" Military College.

I should like to begin by anticipating and clar ifying the substance of what I am about to discu~s and exp lain its tone or, rather, my persona l sentiments as I set about examining the question of the future of our Army. I feel that this is necessary because, first of al l, I want to ensure that what I am about to say and the way I am going to say it does not give rise to misinterpretations and, secondly, because I want the reader to understand exactly what I mean. There is perhaps no other area that has been subjected to so much analysis, 路diagnos is and dpgmatic recipes by so many self-styled expert s as路 the military fie ld. This is beca use of the widespread belief, which might have been val id in the long distant past, but is certa inly no longer acceptable in the technological age, that our military world does not fu lly belong to the scientific sphere, so that laymeri feel obliged to have their say. Until, that is, the military instrument has to be put to the inevitable test of its validity war - because they then toss the ball back into the mi litary court and pin responsibility squarely on the military leaders of the time. What is even more serious is that when they condemn a Commander out of hand, they choose to forget that that Commander has had to use an instrument which another Commander had previously prepared , subject to al l the constraints by which he was bound at the time. 路 In a previous article I pointed out that before we can understand "the day after" we wou ld do well to look carefully at "the day bef9re" . In other words, failure in war is the result of the inadequacy of the state of th_ e force's battle~ readiness in peace time. The 2nd World War is a highly instructive examp le of this. We may well wonder whether the Commanders at the time had ever really felt the need to draw the authorities' attention to the shortcomings and deficiencies before it was too late. There is precious little evidence of this. One may legitimately suspect that they could not - or wou ld not - speak out.. In view of the errors of the past, let me say without mincing my words what I think about the Army today, "sine ira ac studio" - to quote

Tacitus's cautionary words - not to denounce or depress anyone, but merely to offer a word of warning and to urge the authorities to become more committed, and, if possible, to indicate a few goals to work ·t owards. No recriminations are intended; we must look forward with optimism the optimism of the will. The problems we are required to face are extremely complex, and are hard to even define, let alone solve. We are sur.rounded by doubts and bewilderment for a variety of reasons, but most of all because we are on the verge of a turning-point in our history, which may mark the changeover from one civilization to another. The future that awaits us, in my view, will typically bear the following features: • an increasing tendency towards the "internationalization" of relations between nations, in the sense that every problem will have repercussions that range beyond national borders; • electronics will be mythologized in the search for every possible means of aiding man's work and productive activity; • there will be an invincible need for benchmark values, interpreted in contemporary terms that will be tantamount to making a completely fresh start. All three elements are directly relevant to - and will increasingly affect - the whole raison d'etre of the Armed Forces. their structure. their existence . and the way they operate. Taking a philosophical approach, which is not technical in the strict sense of the term, one might be able to envisage the Armed Forces in a totally different manner from their present form, but one should be very careful not to fall prey to over-romanticizing and utopianism. This is not the purpose of my paper, at all events. Despite the title, I do not intend to gaze into crystal balls. I shall try to start with what exists at present, sketch out the way I view the short and medium-term developments and steer clear of the long-term, to avoid falling into error. I do not intend to take the detached approach from the vantage point of a man who looks down from above, but I want to try to see the problems from the point of view of the people who experience the problems of the Armed Forces in the ranks. The reader might interpret this as a protest, b~rdering on anger. But he may rest assured. It w,11 not be a protest. and even less a disconcerting outburst of anger. . ~II I intend to do is to spell out the situation, using plain language merely to indicate the moral tension involved in the effort to overcome the obstacles of the moment, in a spirit of service. Without responding to facile accusations, let me_ recall that the problems connected in any way with the security function do not always find a ready audience, and that is not only true of Italy. Most of these problems require resources

if they are to be solved, and when put on a scale of priorities, they involve very difficult decisions. I wonder whether the tendency to internationalize relations between peoples is a manifestation of the desire to overcome difficulties by placing them in a broader geographical setting to get many different countries involved in finding solutions to them. The truth of the matter is that we are nearing the end of a century, and a millenium. This rather obvious remark may not mean much in rational terms, but in practice, and in terms of actual experience. it is very significant and loaded with implications. The future is full of challenges and prospects for innovation. Technolegy is fashioning new and more sophisticated tools in every sphere: communications, data processing, means of production and, last but not least, means of destruction. Technological progress is a good thing in itself. We must do what we can to foster it; but what is even more important still, is that it must be used rationally and intelligently for what it is worth and for what it can offer us. The danger is that we might consider it a vital part of a game, and forget its validity in terms of its cost:benefit ratio. The technology challenge is a fact. however, and cannot be ignored; and it directly affects mankind in ways that far exceed its operational or productive potential. It affects man's whole being, his education, his spiritual and moral strength, and the substance of the action of command. All this is aggravated by the moral challenge which is coupled with the way in which moral values are being so rapidly reviewed, increasing the vulnerability of contemporary man beyond all proportions, leaving him increasingly prey to doubt and uncertainty. Man today is tending, unconsciously, to over-emphasize personal interest at the expense of community interests in his relations with his institutions, with the result that jealousy prevails

over emulation, selfish ness over cooperat ion , and v iolence over moderation. Almost as if t o emphasize the con tradictions of our age, the same c itizen who sh ies aw ay from the prob lems of his own comm uni ty, takes upon himself the burden of th.e w orld's problems, undertaki ng duties and co mmitments that are far t oo great for him t o cope wi th.. . In practice, however, this leads to disengagement, and this is what always happens when people evade an immed iate pr<:>bl~m in w~ich they are personally involved, by claiming that 1t has t o be dealt with it in a broader co ntext. It is a cosy alibi to avoid decid ing on anything. Cha llenges of t his kind have arisen t ime and time aga in th roughout history, and time and ti me again man has experienced a sense of utter discouragement and regret. What characterizes our age is fear: t he fear of extinction. We are faced w ith t he sense of terror that strangely grips man as every millen ium comes to an end. In t he year 1000 it w as a mystical/religious fear which found it s roots in t he contemporary myth: the myth of the supernatural. The coming of the end of t he world w as lin ked t o the supernatural, and re lat ed to it. Yet since the spread of terror depended on the contemporary mea ns of communication, it spread slow ly and being religious in origin it w as restricted to the Christian world . Despite this, t hat fear had enormous repercussions, and held up the development of the Western w orld for centuries. The phys ica l w orld never came to an end, of course, but a g reat many mi crocosms d id. And the period runn ing from the f all of the Roman Empire t o the yea r 1000 is very aptly called th e "Dark Ages" . Over the next few decades the world is going to have to come to t erms wit h the same fea r, and this time it w ill involve the whole world. The danger of a nuclear disaster has rev ived the same terror tha t gripped the world in the year 1000. And once aga in, the ter ror is li nked to t he cont emporary myth: t echnology. This ti me, how ever, the mass med ia have spread the t error more rapid ly and broadly , and have accentuated it. And th is t ime, the avai labilit y and the real pow er of the weapo n of destruction - nuclear weapons - can wi pe out the macrocosm. . Relatively speaking, t he effect is the same ~s it was 1000 years ago : f ear is hamperi ng initiative, and almost paradoxically, it is fostering destabil ization. But are w e quite certa in that the remova l of f ear wou ld also remove the risk of disaster? Is it _not more likely that the risk wou ld be grea ter, precisely as a resul t of removing the fear of the catastrophe? The moral hurd les are even great er than the operational difficulties when dealing wit h the nuclear question; but as th ings st and at present, the nuclear iss ue can not be set aside because

Turi n - Arsenale Palace T he Service Branch School.

there is no equally effective alternative deterrent to put in its place. In a w orld in which contrasting blocs st and in a deli cately poised relations hip, t he need for security is a fact tha t can not be ig nored or under estimat ed. Security is t he result of the interaction betw een m any fact ors, of which the mil itary factor is obvio usly not of secondary import ance. To preserve securit y, the act ua l or potential power of the mi lita ry factor cannot be viewed independently of a ba lanced combinatio n of the other com ponents - all of them forming part of a dynam ic adjustment process for which the highest responsibilit ies of government have to answer. I do not wish to dwell on analyzi ng the politica l parameters, but l must stress the v ital need for a more broad ly- based democratic consensus if the stability of the system is t o hold. Consensus itself is a secu r ity fac to r, since it underpins a wise defence pol icy based on cred ible instrument s. ln an equ ilibrium that is essent ia lly a matching of potential might, mi lita ry instruments have become t he yardstick by which the credibility of a nation or an alliance is gauged ; the yardstick of it s will to pursue established objectives and to defend past achievement s. T hat is all there is t o it. I think that t he age of prestige-h unti ng is over . Even the Superpowers themselves - and this can be seen from the dif fi culty they are find ing in manag ing t he cr isis - are find ing it impossible to make a show of their pow er . And while this is partly negative beca use it has drastically c urt ailed t he ar bi tration f unction that has prevented many conflicts from breaking out in the past, it is a clear demonstratio n of t he fact that the fear of d isaster is stifling the boldest initiatives, thereby removing the dangers of a general w ar . Nevertheless, there sti ll remain considerable margins for freedom of manoeuvre, particularly in the perip hery, far away from t he f orces that have already been deployed on both sides; th is means that act ions and react ions might deg enerat e into 5

Milan - Cusani Palace 3rd Army Corps HQ.

purely local tensions, emergencies and conflicts. International subjects looking on from outside and not wishing to sit back and merely watch the situation deteriorating, may feel the need to intervene to halt the crisis. Hence it may become necessary to think in terms of resorting more frequently to military instruments as a means of ensuring the peace. Now while it would be foolhardy to commit financial resources to futile power games, it is a demonstration of farsightedness to try to achieve security - through alliances and by keeping an appropriateÂˇ irislrurnent in readiness - by striking an optimum balance between acceptable risk and financially and socially acceptable commitment. Preparing for the year 2000 means coming to terms, in good time, with a changing world. No miracles are required; having a broadly based master plan and the support of broader sections of public opinion would already mark a major step forward. If nothing else, if more people were more aware of the situation, it would help to mitigate many of the causes of disappointment and bitterness, which are a source of considerable concern. What are people expected to feel when faced with a world that sits back powerlessly, witnessing continual, brazen attempts to alter the worldwide equilibria, treacherous attacks on security, threats and blackmail? How can we fail to be saddened at the sight of ambiguity, vanity, injustice, extremism; and mistrust reigning supreme and permeating the thinking of the powerful and the weak - of those who issue orders. and those who are supposed to carry them out? There is no shortage of good reasons for disappointment in our own environment, in the narrow confines of my own branch of the Services. But are we really sure that this is a peculiarity of the present situation, and something that only affects our own country? Are we really sure that in peace time we can always, everywhere, have more, and thus enjoy a state of prestige and 6

have an instrument that is fully adequate? On the wa ll of an old sentry box in the fortress in Gibraltar an unknown hand has written something that we would all do to remember: that "all men worship God and soldiers when things go wrong, but when the war is over and everything is going smoothly, God is forgotten and the old soldiers are despised". We are fortunate in that we are living through a period of peace. . But I think that, if we look at recer.t attitudes, it is no longer true to say that the military are despised . We would naturally have to broaden this to cover the operational aspect in order to see how neglect of the "day before" could affect the consequences of the "day after", but this is hard to do, and even harder to get people to understand.

THE ARMY AND ITS PROBLEMS The Army has many - perhaps too many problems. The most serious. whatever anyone may think; are those that face it as an organization, as a community of officers and men preparing for an event - war - which all of us are determined to prevent. Here lies the key to understanding the sense of frustration and unease; but it is not enough . We must patiently try to clarify and explain matters to a society which is only apparently uninterested. If we insist, we shall manage to do away with the commonplaces and topple some of the myths that someone has created to play at dialectics or solve their own survival problems. Being characterized by the prevalence of duty over rights, convinced obedience over authoritarian imposition, and service over power, the military world often clashes with a society which seems fashionably allergic to the appeal to lofty values: a society which adopts certain sham values that are the very opposite of civic sense and social solidarity. This is a fact, and it is pointless dramatizing it. Without renouncing the will to struggle to establish a concept that is of far greater social utility, our common commitment must be directed towards these contrary cultural patterns, to find a synthesis and coexist with them. We have to recognize that the identity crisis also affects the military institution - ours as much as the others, all the others - and this is a crisis which sometimes slips out of our control. According to the Italian Constitution, selfdefence against an outside threat has a peculiar relevance and a constitutional basis that places it in a superordinate position to all other duties, and the legislators have established it as the common duty of all citizens. Yet how many attempts have there been to make the secondary duties prevail over the essential duty, theÂˇ optional over the compulsory!

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Above: Vicenza - " San Tom maso" Barracks. Military District HO. Upper right: Padua - " Camerini" Palace. A ir Defence Artillery HQ.

In the quest for new formu lae, some have even suggested that the military should be used as careta kers in museums, ignor ing the fact that there are so many other solutions, all of which are far cheaper. But this is only one example, and by no means the most striking. From time t o time one hea rs the na'i've suggestion that the Armed Forces should no longer be closely connected with war matters, or with deterrence, forgetting or pretending to forget that one can only justify having Armed Forces in peace-time t o the exten t that we can train ourselves to face up to an event that might be f orced upon us. Only here can we find the motivations that are needed to mobilize the officers and me n t o underta ke an activity that demands abnegation and sacrifice, self-denial and dedication. The crisis exists, t hen, and it is a real crisis. But we must not lose hope about our chances of overcomi ng it, and we have t o exploit the notable successes we have achieved in winning over increasingly broader sections of pu blic opin ion and esteem. In reality, the crisis seems to be fading, and a recent survey conducted by Pr. Prandstraller of Bologna University on a sample of 600 officers randomly se lected by computer shows that the identity crisis is virtually non-existent now in the operational units - particularly the lower echelon units. The officer corps is working hard and enthusiastically. When engaged on their norma l tra ini ng and operational duties they find their identity in their small, but significant, daily achievements. When t hey are required to undertake emergency duties of whatever kind, they have a greater sense of their civic duty than anyone else, and sh rug off any sense of discouragement and frustration. Italy's consensus is closely bound up with the idea of the usefulness of military service in atta ining the highest moral and social ob jecti'1es. However, one cannot honestly say that the consensus on this is so broad that one might envisage every section of t he national communi ty being involved, even indirectly, in carrying throug h a common programme - the programme connected with "the securit-y function". There are signs of growing support, and that is al ready something, but it is not all. For too long , the Army has been relegated t o a very low level in the sca le of ethica l values, with the results that we know all too well. Today, we are faced with the chance of mak ing a new departure that we have to foster if we wish to establ ish our role as a locomotive force in societ y, leading it on to orderly progress in peace and freedom. With this new mentality, we wou ld hope that the authorities will lend a willing ear to our material demands, which mainly relate to the supervisory personnel of all three Services, and begin to provide solutions ac knowledging the military class which has always generously given of its best without asking for anything in return, except

in the respectful and subordinate form of its hierarchica l relationsh ip. I am obviously referring here to the old, old problem of providing salaries cogent with the atypical nature of the mi litary career, career development, housing appropri.ate to the mobi lity of the personnel, the judicial protection of servicemen, and so many other problems tha t have to be viewed in a comprehensive fash ion to conserve the essential features of a status wh ich cannot. and must not, be compared with the status of any other public service category. Understood properly, in the sense, we want it to be understood, uplifted to a view of life itself, the "military status" deserves special consideration overriding even salary matters, and to be placed on the plane of conserving values. We have to promptly redress the errors that have been committed by app lying ina ppropriate legal provis ions and norms to the military field , to avoid a tendency to corporativism that is out of place in the Italian mi litary tradition. The financial aspect is simply an offshoot of the more important mora l aspect. This is the avenue we intend to pu rsue, and th is is the path laid down by the Minister of Defence. Without becoming over-optimistic, we may well hope that the principle is accepted. Apart from material discomfort, the deepseated reasons for dissatisfaction may be soug ht in the functional inadequacy of the structures in which the personne l have to work. This is professional dissatisfaction, and deserves all our res pect. In 1975, when the Âˇ restructuring process began, a 10-yea r plan was dra fted to make good t he substantial quantitative shortfalls imposed on all t he members of t he Army, while enhancing the qua lity of the units. Today, this programme is sti ll far from being completed as far as the Army is concerned. Only 30%-40% of the objectives have been achieved, and the result is that the Armed Forces do not enjoy that balance which is the fundamental condition for ensuring the efficiency of any operat ional in strument. As in 1975, the Army is still facing a fundamenta l choice: t o make a qual itative leap forward, or to face an operational run down wh ich cou ld prove to be irreversible. Meanwhi le, other things have arisen since 1975 which have to be examined by the people who have to take the decisions . Wh ile the objectives that have not been attained rema in as va lid as ever, and take up the norma l budgetary allocations unti l the year 2000, new ob jectives wi ll be added for the implementat ion of the prog ramme to prod uce a third generation of military hardwa re to keep pace with the technolog ical developments tha t are moving ahead at an increasing speed . Apart from anything else, the Army is being further penalized by the fact that it has never been able to use indirect incremental funds, unlike

the other Services which have benefited from the incentives that have been granted at va rious times to the sh ipbuilding and aerospace industries. This is certain ly ascribable to the lack of a close linkage - a kind of "cartel" - between the industries wh ich ma nufacture ground force systems, and the shortage of financial resources. Comparing these resources with those avai lable to the armies of other countries, we might well be struck by the enormous differences and wonder - in amazed satisfaction - how on earth we ever manage to do what we do. Just thin k, for example, of France and West Germany, even making al lowances for the different sizes of our respective armed forces. The Italian Army is allocated about one third of the funding made ava ila ble to these two countries t o procure new materia ls for the same num ber of operational un its. Moreover, France and the United Kingdom spend 36% and 26% , respectively, of their aggregate investment in the fields of scientific and technological research and the development of prototypes, while the Ita lian Army only spends 10%15%, which is all it has available to it. The inev itable result is that it cannot carry through any major programmes and become independent of . what is be ing studied and produced abroad . Because of this state of affa irs, the largest expenditures connected with the need to give precedence to Italian-made product s should not be met solely out of the already sli m military budget, but shou ld come from other items as an incentive to industry. One might object that al l the Armed Forces are subjected to financial constraints. Th is is true. But not to the same degree! Let us continue with these internationa l compar ison s, and borrow a lesson from the defence po licy of a country which is not a Superpower, an d which is not directly confronted by the threat of an enemy, and which has a long tradition of moderation and peaceful coexistence: Ca nada. In Canada, defence expenditure accounts for 9.2 % of the national budget (compared with 9

Italy's 4.2%). It allocates the equivalent of 87% of the Italian budget to· sustain the equivalent of 23% of the Italian forces. That means that Can ada devotes four times more than Italy to the same force size. But let us return to Europe, and examine the Armed Forces in the All ied cou ntries. Compared with France, the United Kingdom and West Germany, the Italian Army has the lowest man power: basic un it ratio (tank, squad, artillery piece): 53, compared with an average of 70 in the other countries I have mentioned. In view of the number of basic units as the absolute minimum requ ired to perform operationa l duties, this means that: • the Italian Army is not as over-ma nned as peopl e someti mes make out; • the low ratio reflects either the low percentage of men serving with the operational units or the shortcoming s in the support stru ctu re·. We could extend this examination to cover the whole of Italy's Armed Forces, which would show up the difficult situation our Army is in, but this is not the right place to do so. When people talk about balancing the instrument, they restrict this to the " balanced force parameter" as far as the Army is concerned, and this is a mistake. · It would be more accurate to materialize this in terms of concrete defensive and offensive operational capability, unless we prefer to fall back on the empty rhetoric of the hundreds of thousands of bayonets. One thing is, however, certain: when one compares the annual allocations for each basic unit, the Italian Army lags beh ind all the others. with one third of the finance earmarked to the Army in other countries in comparison with the two th irds which is given to the Navy and the Air Force, when even these are worse off than the navies and air forces of other countries. All the Italian Services are under-financed , but t he Army comes off poorly in domestic and international terms.

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS? Despite so many problems, I am quite sure that something is moving in the right direction, even though the bare figures are not very hopeful. In qualitative and qua ntitative terms, there are ma ny urgent needs, covering every field in practice. Modernization cannot be put off any longer if w e want the Army to remain at cred ible level s. Th e programmes drafted by the General Staff cover the whole range of field unit equipment: antitank defence, fire support, ai r defence, heli copters·. command, control, communications and information systems, and armour. With the financial resources allocated for. the decade 1985-1994, about 80% of the ob jectives defined in 1975 may be possible to attain. 10

Provided that there are no operational changes or new orders in the meantime. Other needs worth several thousand billion lire will remain unmet. Corrective measures are therefore needed, and this is the responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who must study the situation and submit concrete proposals to the government. T he Army in the year 2000 will t herebre have its problems, which will be the same it faces today, heightened by the passage of time. To complicate matters still further, developments in strategic and operational th inking are being joined by the "Emergent Technologies" which are already making their impact felt when decid ing on the new equipment needed for fire

Persano - Royal Hunting Lodge - "Fagare" Bersaglieri Battalion HO.

support. Typical examples are the MLRS rocket launchers and the LANCE system. As far as the exciting "Air Land Battle" prospects are concerned, MLRS will depend on the development of rockets fitted with terminal-guided submunitions, while the aging LANCE system raises the problem of having to undergo a radical revamping in its more powerful version ("LANCE 2") that can strike in greater depth (increasing the range from 80 to 200 kms). Both the international programmes place us before two simple alternatives: either to do without them, with all the repercussions that this entails in industrial, technological and operational terms, or to join in and accept the costs that they give rise to.

The same applles to air defence, as far as the facilities under the control of the Army are concerned. The HAWK system has been retained by having modernized it in stages when this was felt to be sound and profitable. But above a certain level, one must seriously think about whether it should be replaced. But this lies outside the province of Italy and the Italian Army. However, it is time to open up a debate in order to agree upon a common policy. To cover the operational units, a decision has been taken that I personally consider to have been an act of courage, in view of the fa ith that has been pinned on Italian industries: the "Skyguard-ÂˇAspide" system. 11

The 24 systems which are t o be procured wi ll enable us to solve t he problem of partly covering the Comba t Zone, but will not solve the problem of the units operating in our Territory. To complete the picture, we now have to refer to the likely replacement of the light 40/70 anti-aircraft system . In addition to the pre-feasibil ity study conducted using NATO funds, OTO-MELARA has independently manufactured a 75/52 tracked version of the well-known naval gun which the Armed Force are viewing with great interest. A separate section shou ld be devoted to modernizing the armoured componen t and the combat tanks. During the Nineties, the tracked vehicles in service (M 113 and its derived versions, the VCC 1

and VCC 2) should be gradually replaced by a new fami ly of veh icles based on the VCC-80 (currently being deve loped). and are capab le of being appropriately integrated into the tank units. On the subject of the tank line, there are two short/med ium term requirements to improve it: supplies and R&D. By "supplies", I mean : â€˘ replacing the existing M 47s, which are currently in service with eight of the existing 30 tank battal ions, by setting about the production of an Italian 2nd generation tank and a wheeled personnel carrier; â€˘ improv ing the performance of a certa in proportion of the tanks in service by en hancing their fire power, armour and 105 mun itions. The second set of needs relates to R&D for a 3rd generation tank to replace the 700 1st generation tanks in their present version. When one looks further ahead to the '{ear 2000, the prospects are certainly not very reassuring, but if we are to successfu lly upgrade the Armed Force, we have to approach the problem with a great deal of optim ism . I am referring to the optimism of the wi ll. It is even more necessary to be optimistic - in view of the present shortcomings - when we are not only thinking of modernizing our faci lities but also renewing the infrastructures that have been neglected for so long, and of finding appropriate training areas.

CONCLUSIONS

Above: Palermo - "Marchesi e Campanini di Casa Professa" Palace - Military Engineers HO.

My original idea was to exam ine the problems of the future, but I have only highlighted the problems of today. And I have done so by referring to someth ing that we see happening everywhere today, without trying to identify any of the trends in international relations and force ratios. I have deliberately ignored any operational framework of reference. I admit that this only tells part of the story. It wou ld be very interesting to conduct a more thorough analys is by including the three Services in a number of possible scenarios to define v1hat is demanded of them in terms of their duties and the manner of performing them, viewed in terms of strength, time and space. Th is is what I have proposed to my colleagues on the Chiefs of Staff Comm ittee. In the meantime, what I have said here may be enoug h to explain where we are going and what we expect. I confirm that much has been made and much can be made in the future. Before anything else, however, we rave to solve the personnel problems. Our men have to feel fu lfilled within the Institution. To achieve th is, we can no longer defer recogn ition of the atypical character of the military career - wh ich is so atypica l that some people are

advocating demilitarization - laying down their duties and rights, benefits and services. The increas ing sophistication of our equ ipment requires person'"1el with a longstanding experience who can ooly Âˇ be incorporated on a voluntary basis - and their salaries must be competitive. With regard to the problems of mobility, and hence of housing, infrastructures and training areas, there are no differences of opinion as far as I can see. To make up for the shortage of essential materials, decisions have been taken that leave no further room for doubt or perplexity, and Ita lian industry has been given a unique opportunity to show what it is capable of. To avoid any misundersta ndin gs and offer a word of hope and confidence. I defy anyone to say that no choice has been made . TheÂˇ choice has been made. Those who now have to find the resources know the programmes; those who now have to manufacture the facilities must waste no more time in futi le competition or search for additional sophistication to justify partial failures or delays. Every sector has been spelled out quite clearly. We have to accept the rationale that it is better to have a weapon or vehicle with sound average performa nce levels in a short space of time than to pursue the myth of increasingly more powerful performance to be achieved at some vague point in the future. In other words, we mm;l have the facilities we need at the right time, if we are to implement a cyclical programme for real renewal based on the operational life of the facilities that are real ly available. I do not illude myself by believing that now the choi ces have been made everything is going to proceed smoothly and rapidly. Apart from the uncertainty of the financial factor. I know that the hysteresis of a system in which the operational and the technical/administrative structu res are feather-bedded by checks and balances (that are more often than not purely formal) merely creates innume rable power centres and not a single centre of responsibility. To be somewhat sceptical for a moment. I would be tempted to say that when someone wants to take on this responsibility, he sees his action hampered and diluted to such an extent that he has to admit his impotence. I have said that "I would be tempted to ... ", by which I mean that I do not accept what I have just said as it stands and without qualification. and I am trying to act and react as and when I can. I have added nothing to what my predecessors have said and done before me. The only novelty is the way the outside world sees us. The time is favourable for a mobilization of public awareness, ideas and resources. Not only will the Army benefit from this kind of mobi lization. The development of all the programmes I have referred to above require the

direct cultural and technological involvement of Italian industry which has now completed t he phase of assimilating knowhow in a subordinate position. and is able to move ahead by independently manufacturing products of first rate quality. The Armed Force modernization needs and plans are therefore an opportunity for a historical new departure in relations between the, Army and industry. Much will depend on what the MoD can offer before production can take off, Italian industry become firmly established, and new operational technologies and corporate philosophies be taken on board. The national industry/ Army osmosis is therefore another major factor to exploit, if we are to prove that the Armed Force cannot be considered to be a world apart that has to be kept alive at mere subsistence level. With a little imagination, we might be able to find a way of fitting t he item "Modernization of the Armed Forces" among those that form part of a modern national economic/financial plan, providing industry with reliable bases for drafting longterm production policies, and guaranteeing the Ministry of Defence a sufficiently long period of certainty that its budget will not be cut down at the eleventh hour. In times of dismay one can sometimes despair about one's future, and fear that the solution to our problems may be deferred "sine die". I do not claim to have offered you any certitudes. All I have done is to share with you what we wou ld like to see happen ing. According to contemporary thinking, and looking rationally at the problem, the Armed Forces - and that means the Army first and foremost - will still have a raison d'etre as the next century dawns. One thing is certa in: the increasing demonization of war is going to weigh heavily on the Armed Forces. While this idea may be valid in moral terms. it leads to a disarmament of people's consciences and voids the use of military instruments, even when - as in our case - the Armed Forces serve a purely defensive function. The declining birth rate and the rising costs of armaments will also have negative repercussions. To deal with the first of these, a different relationship will have to be established between conscripts and career soldiers, which will entail higher wage costs. The second problem can only be solved by finding new ways of pooling forces. Is it not true to say that the constitution of rapid deployment forces on the part of certain countries is due to the need to differentiate the performance of di fferent forces in terms of available resources, by creating military structures operating at different speeds? Who knows whether this might not be the only way ahead eventually? Umberto Cappuzzo

Growing attention by politica l leaders and the public has recently been paid to the problems connected with the NATO euromissiles. The debates regarding the intermediate nuclear forces (IN F) negotiations in Geneva and the installation of the new intermediate nuclear systems in western Europe have taken two directions. On the one hand they have alerted large seg-Âˇ ments of the public to the potential dangers of nuclear weapons; on the other hand they have stimulated a rethinking of NATO's current strategy in the light of a balance of forces which in latter years has been considerably modified. Technicomilitary. factors and requirements of a political nature have simultaneously brought forth a reconsideration of the Atlantic:: alliance's defenses in Western Europe. While the primary requirements of NATO's strategy that of insuring a credible system of deterrence - remains the same, the military balance and the related political and public perceptions of the new situation have changed. NATO's present strategy, adopted in 1967, is based on the principles of flexible response and forward defense. Such a doctrine - the main lines of which had been drawn up in the early 1960s . - was adopted when the United States had already lost its nuclear monopoly but still enjoyed a relevant nuclear superiority. This strategy, which presumes the capability to choose between various options and to control the various phases of nuclear escalation, implies a clear superiority which allows the freedom of controlled choices without having to accept, in an uncontrolled way, the choices and the options of an adversary who has become much more powerful. Therefore, while the official NATO doctrine remains unchanged, the problem, which is becoming more evident, is to evaluate if and when such a strategy - conceived in a situation of a substantial nuclear 14

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superiority - should remain fully valid when such superiority no longer exists. Today, the situation rough ly corresponds to global parity but also presents substantial shortcom ings in other critical areas. Finally one has to consider whether the changed balance of forces calls for some appropriate adapta tions or whether it is necessary to reconsider t he basic features of this strategy. Senator Sam Nunn in a report issued in May 1982 (1) says: "NATO remains wedded to a military strategy - flexible response and forward defense whose viability has been severely compromised by profound changes in the global and European military environment" . "This strategy" - he adds - "was adopted at a time when NATO possessed pronounced strateg ic and theather nuclear advantages over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact". Senator Nunn underlines that this situation has been profoundly modified during the last fifteen years:

"Thus as NATO enters the 1980s", he concludes, "it confron ts a military environment characterized by strategi c nuclear parity, growing theater nuclear inferiority, and a continuing lack of a credible con-Âˇ ventional capability". Henry Kissinger also elaborated on the strategic unbalances in Europe in two significant lectures delivered on the continent (2). In 1979 Dr. Kissinger stated: "NATO is reaching a point where the strategic assumption s on which it has been operating, the force structures that it has been generating and the joint policies it has been deve lop ing will be inadequate for the 1980s". In 1982, in The Hague, developing the theme of the nuclea r stru ctu res in Europe, Kissinger observed that "the real issue before us will be the natu re of deterrence and its componen ts", adding that "technology would have imposed a reconsideration of existing strategy in every event".

The decision of the NATO Council on December 12, 1979 t o proceed with the modern ization of the intermediate nuclear systems in Europe, represented an important step toward a strategic restructuring of the NATO forces in order to align them with the cha nged situation. The recognized parity which had been achieved between the central strategic systems of the two superpowers - systems which now tend to neutralize one another - left Europe uncovered. The central strateg ic shield of the Un ited States had become like a blanket that was too narrow to extend efficiently over the old continent. While the preexisting Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles aimed at Europe had not caused any particular alarm, the system represented by the new SS-20s is regarded as an unacceptable threat and calls for adequate countermeasures to reestablish the equilibrium. In fact, with the installation of a powerful system of inter-

mediate strategic missiles, - keeping the whole of Europe under their range, the Soviet Union shouldered a serious responsibility. The Soviet leaders have certainly Âˇ violated the spirit if not the letter, of SALT II which recognized a global strategic parity between East and West. It is certainly surprising that the Soviet leaders did not consider the fact that the Western alliance could but react to such a serious threat which could not be justified by any real military defensive need. After the USSR had obta ined recognition of strategic equality with the United States, it altered this balance in a flagrant way, threatening the European side of NATO. Western Europe found itself in an intolerable strategic subjugation with respect to the USSR. The prevalence of the new intermediate Soviet systems has no. longer been balanced by an external superiority of the United States. From a political point of view, Europe's position

has been seriously undermined since Europe is not a peripheral theater. Western Europe expects to see its centrality in the western strategic system fully recognized. In this context the modification of the denomination of the new systems theater nuclear forces (TNF) to intermediate nuclear forces was significant. These systems must be considered strategic in nature. They represent a projection of the U.S. central strategic systems with the task of shielding t he European pole of the Atlantic alliance. The decision to deploy NATO's new intermediate systems represents an essential element in the updating of NATO' strategy in order to reestablish in Europe a credible deterrence at the strategic level without having to count in every instance on a more hypothetical reliance on the central systems of the United States. Another situation which in recent years has seriously been modified to the detriment of

In the first page. Class "Ivan Rogoff" amphibious assault carrier. This class has a full load displacement of 1300 t, can carry a Marines battalion with all its trucks and have a dock, a flight deck and a hangar for helicopters.

Side page. Class "Victor 111" soviet SSN. This class has an equipage of 115 men and a full load displacement in submersion of 6000 t. The standard weapon system is normally made by 8 anti surface vessels and anti submarines 533 mm torpedoes, 2 nuclear anti surface vessels, 15 k.t torpedoes and 2 nuclear SS-N 15 or 16 missiles with a charge of 15 kt.

Below. Class "Sturgeon" SSN. This class has an equipage of 134 men and a full load displacement in submersion of 4700 t. The standard weapon system is normally made by 17 anti surface vessels MK 48 533 mm torpedoes and 6 anti submarines missiles.

NATO is certainly that of the short range tactical nuclear systems deployed in Europe. Proposals and programs for modernizing this type of force have not been amiss in recent years. It is enough to recall , in this connection. the complex discussions and polemics related to the program of introducing the neutron bomb in NATO's European arsenals. That program was cast aside in 1978 because of the political difficulties and because it was deemed appropriat e to give priority to the intermediate systems whose introduction was con sidered of more urgent nature. Meanwhile the complex and by no means unimportant problem of the short range nuclear systems still remains unsolved. In fact it concerns quantitatively the largest number of nuclear warheads (about 6000) already deployed in Western Europe, the 18

greater part of these introduced towards the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s. These systems, on the whole, are rather antiquated. On the other hand in recent years the Soviets have not limited themselves to the production of SS-20 missiles, but have also been active in producing "sma ller brothers", such as the SS-21, SS-22. and SS-23; weapons of shorter range, but technically very advanced. The introd uction of new Soviet planes with nuclear capability should also be added to this picture. In this situation the short range nuclear systems of the alliance have lost most of their det errence capability. Their possible defensive use has become less credible since they would be counterbalanced by similar but more articulate and modern Soviet systems. It is far from certain that a nuclear confrontation, even if circumscribed to these

tactical levels, would be favorable to the West, while having devastating consequences for European territory. The realization of this deterioration has been one of the main factors for prescribing and in fact imposing a substantial strengthening of the conventional defenses in Europe, with the purpose of avoiding for as long as possible the need of employing nuclear weapons. The requirement to strengthen the conventional defenses of the alliance has become more real and urgent. In 1978 NATO adopted its "Long Term Defense Program", establishing the principle of "force goals" for each member nation. agreed upon and updated bienn ially with the aim of achieving an average yearly increase of military expenses of 3 percent in real terms. Since the early 1970s, the European allies have made substantial

seemed to accept with equaniprogress in strengthening their mity, if not detachment, the miforces although present levels litary realities of the nuclear era. are not considered sufficient. The existence of a nuclear umActually an adequate reinforcement of the conventional forces brella appeared, on the whole, reassuring to the general public is a very complex, slow and ex, and especially to the younger pensive operation especially in generations who had matured times of widespread economic taking peace for granted. difficulties. General Bernard W. But in fact the dangers, Rogers, Supreme Commander of either real or presumed, of nuthe Allied Forces in Europe, in a recent analysis has estimated clear weapons have suddenly been perceived as more concrete that the achievement of an adequate defensive structureÂˇ based and imminent. These perceptions have substantiated widespread on conventional forces would fears that the eventuality of a require an average increase of the European allies' military bud-Âˇ nuclear conflict. once considered a hypothetical and almost abgets of 4 percent yearly, in real stract possibility, has become terms, for a decade (3). increasingly real and alarming. It is not surprising that the Thus, movements of diffe modified balance of forces and the real or presumed dangers of . rent cultural and political origin , having different pacifist, neutrathe new situation attracted the attention of public opinion in the list or unilateralist backgrounds. have gained momentum and subWest. During the last two decastance on both sides of the des, public opinion. both in Atlantic. A deeply rooted and Europe and the United States,

Side page. The british aircraft "Jaguar". The "Jaguar", developed by the frenchbritish manifacture Sepecat, is used by the Royal Air Force in BAI (Battefield Air Interdiction), CAS (Close Air Support) and TAC RECCE (Tactical Reconnaissance) missions.

From top. The soviet aircraft MIG 21 "Fishbed". The "Fishbed", whose standard weapon is a 23 mm gun, can carry 1500 kg of war-load, is equipped with an allweathter radar and has been built in 15000 pieces. The soviet aircraft MIG 21 "Flogger". This aircraft has great armoured plates on the sides of the pilot cabin, its standard weapon system is a 23 mm gun and can carry a war-load of 2000 kg.

deeply felt antinuclear protest is their common denominator. At the origin of these movements one does not find only interested outside influences if there are external propaganda manipulations. Within these movements, the direct participation of religious hierarchies at the highest level, of authoritative scientific communities, and of democratic political groups is sizeable. There have also been some important and respected individuals in the strategic and military field who have openly advocated directives of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. The first signal of this came from the United States in the spring of 1982 in an article signed by four eminent men, who during various periods and under different adm inistrations, held influentia l positions in shaping and directing the military policy of the United States (4). More recently there have been public declarations along similar lines by importa nt European military personalities, such as Lord Carver, formerly Chief of British Defence Staff, and the former German Generals Krause and Loser. In February 1983, there was a pronunciation by the Synod of the Anglican Church and subsequently the American Catholic Bishops published their well-known document on nuclear weapons. These movements certainly deserve careful consideration and evaluation, and, where appropriate, rectification. They can no longer be ignored or dismissed. An alliance of democratic countries, such as NATO, must preserve a wide basis of consent and act in such a way that its directives be clearly understood and accepted. Thus there is a need not only to carefully evaluate the consequences of the modified balance of the military structure but t o attend to certain opinion movements, which meet with larger and more qualified support. For various reasons these movements tend to cast doubts on some of the fundamental strategic directives of NATO which until recent!y remained

unchallenged and were generally accepted. This situation should engender an active reconsideration of NATO's present strategic directives in order to continue to insure an effective and credible deterrence, without which the very structures of the alliance would be jeopardized. In conclusion, there are requirements of a military nature and exigencies of a political nature which are emerging in an increasingly conspicuous way. These requirements - military and political - should not be considered as antithetical. They must be harmonic complementary elements - indispensable to an efficient system of alliance defense. This system must be based on an efficient military and strategic structure and on a broad consensus of opinion at the political level. Together with the modernization of INF the main problems which currently confront NATO are undoubtedly those concerning the conventional defense of the alliance. On baths sides of the Atlantic there is a clear realization that conventional defensive structures in Western Europe should be strengthened in order to reach more adequate levels of efficiency and cred ibility. Although there is agreement regarding the need to reinforce conventional defenses in Western Europe, agreement has not yet been reached regarding the possible aims and the con-Âˇ crete results which can be expected in the short and long terms from such programs (5). Raising the nuclear threshold certainly represents the most important objective. Nevertheless it is still doubtful whether it is possible to reach such a credible level of conventional deterrence allowing the renunciation, in all c ircumstances, of . the option of first use of nuclear weapons even at the tactical level (6) . Many authoritative sources have recently elaborated on various aspects concerning the strengthening of conventiona l defenses, in particular the promising poss ibilities of advanced

technologies and newer more appropriate operational concepts (7) . A more confident evaluation of the potentiality of the allied conventional forces in Western Europe has been developing. A more realistic evaluation is taking shape that, in the medium term and with relatively limited fi nancial efforts, can achieve a more credible and efficient system of conventional defense of Europe. Without going into the details of this complex and important debate, I shall limit myself to underlining the evaluation of General Rogers that "a realistic deterrence in Europe will continue to requ ire the plausible threat of nuclear escalation by NATO" (8). Western Europe's defense requirements are particularly complex because they are conditioned both by the military balance of forces, wh ich is modifiable, and by the geographic and strategic situation, which is not. Geography puts the European allies in a difficult defens ive position. The potential enemy, the Soviet empire, is a compact and centralized continental colossus which, through inte rnal lines, can move and concentrate its forces and resources; while the Western European countries find themselves in a peripheral position lacking territorial continuity and having difficulty with communication links. Moreover they are separated by an ocean from their principal ally and from essential supply sources. Fir.ally, Western Europe lacks territorial depth and is bound to forward defense. It cannot give up space in order to gain time. It cannot fold back on those strategic retreats which on two occasions saved Russia, first from Napoleon's invasion and second from Hitler's. These geographical and strategic constraints imply that Europe's defense requirements - and particularly the need to The launch of an U.S. "Persching 11" missile. The deployment in Europe of this type of missiles, which have a range of 1800 km, began in 1985.

insure a credible deterrence - go beyond a pure and simple balan ce of conventional forces, because geography may play against th e conti nent. As General Rogers said: " even if we were to develop a conventional defense during this decade along the lines described, we could never be certain of success without eventual recourse to nuclear weapons". This situation confronts the allian ce with a serious dilemma: the impossibility of renouncing the potential use of nuclear weapons, and simultaneously the unacceptability' of a nuclear exchange on the continent even at the tactical level which. particularly in the present balance of forces, might be devastating (9). An agreement between the two al liances on a balanced deployment of forces might resolve the dilemma. Such an agreement might be ach ieved in the framework of the negotiations for the Convent ional Arms Control in Europe (MBFR). Such negotiations have now been going on in Viennr1 for about a decade without appreciable results (10). Past experience certainly does not give encouragement for the outcome of these negotiations. Nevertheless there is a framework for negotiations which might positively evolve. In any case this forum can be used by the West to clarify its positions. In the meantime, NATO should conti nue to rely upon a credible system of deterrence which cannot exclude the option of nuclea r use. This option - taking in to account the present milita ry realities, and the weight of public opinion - should be precisely qualified and circumscri bed in its aims and components. First it should be made clear that this option is being retained because of the present imbalances of forces. It should also be specified that such an option ca nnot be renounced until verifiable agreements on force levels, suitable to prevent surprise attacks or concent ration of forces, are reached (11).

The retainment of such an option of limited nuclear first use shou ld therefore be clearly specified in its strictly defensive natu re, and in the territoria l depth of its possible use, corresponding to the depth of the battlefield. NATO should declare that while retaining this limited nuclear option in the tactical

field, it has no intention of taking a first step towards a nuclea r escalation with that limited use. NATO should also clearly stress that in the eventuality of the use of nuclear weapons at any level by the Soviet Union, it will res pond at the level of the intermediate systems, against military objectives in the Soviet territory itself directly or indi-

rectly connected with the ongoing aggression, although avoiding affecting the Soviet strategic systems (1 2).

Italian 105/ 14 howitzer. Italian paratrooper while employing a 105/14 howitzer. This gun has a maximum range of 10500 m, a load of 1290 kg and is decomposable.

NATO's intermediate strategic systems deployed in Europe would basically deter the use of any nuclear weapon by the enemy. Consequently the Soviet Union would also receive the assurance that such systems would not be employed for a first strike or surprise attack. NATO cou ld also take into con sideration a formal "no first use" declaration of its intermedia te systems, which would acquire in this case an exclusively deterrent function. As the alliance limits its response in Europe to the level of the intermediate strategic systems, at the same time avoiding an attack on Soviet central strategic systems, the decision to have recourse to these central systems would be transferred to the Sov iet Union , who would therefore be responsible for in it iati ng a nuclear escalation at the highest strategic level. A policy declaration by NATO, along the above-described lines, would represent an updating and revision of the current officia l stra tegy of the alliance. It would clearly circumscribe the function of NATO's INF in Europe as a deterrent against any use of nuclea r weapons by the enemy. In this way the public would be assured that the aim of these systems would be to deter the Soviets from using their nuclear weapons against Europe, thus eliminating the prospect of a gradual devastating nuclear confrontation limited to the European territory. Second, while the alliance would retain the option .of a tactica l use of nuclear weapons, this option w ou ld be clea rly lim ited in its scope and might be conceived of also as temporary and negotiable. The possible negotiating proposals which NATO might advance for a better balance of conventional forces

in Europe could represent a further justification of such a limited tactical first use and might be given up only when the present imbalances have been eliminated . Finally it must be born in mind that NATO's strategic doctrines have essentially been open ly en unciated along fundamental lines; such a requirement is even more important today than in the past. The mea ns and implications of this strategy of deterrence should be clearly known and eva luated by the potential enemy in order to avoid serious miscalculations and adventurous initiatives. Moreover the alliance's strategy must be understood by the public since the loss of its support wou ld undermine the very cred ibility of deterrence. There have been , and still are, some deliberately vague areas in the alliance's strategic directives. The purpose of these is to keep the adversary in doubt about the nature and level of NATO's response. Never-Âˇ the less such vague areas have also creAtP.cl in pu bli c opini on some misunderstandings concerning NATO's real intentions and have provided elements for hostile propaganda. Public opinion expects more clarity in policy declarations in order to insu re broader and more con vinced support of our democratic societies for the defense policy of the alliance. Taking into account the requirements of a changed situa tion si nce 1967, the Alliance may also consider to be appropriate to mainta in the definition of "Flexible Response" to its official strategy. The real problem is to update its concept to the new realities, both political and military.

NOTES

1, 1979). "Geri Joseph Foundation Memoria l Speech", by Henry A. Kissing er. The Hague, May 12. 1982. (3) General Bernard W. Rogers: "The Atlantic Alliance: PrescriptionÂˇs for a Difficult Decade". Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982. (4) "Nuclear Weapons and the At lantic Alliance" by McGeorge Bundy,

(7) "NATO: Can the Alliance be Saved?" Report of Senator Sam Nunn to th e Committee on Armed Services. United States Senate, May 75, 1982. (2) "NATO: th e Next Thirty Years " Remarks by the Honorable Henry Kissinger (Palais d' Egmont, Brussels. Sept.

Vincenzo Tornetta

George F. Kenna n, Ro bert McNa mara, Gerard Smith. Foreign Affairs, Spring

1982. (5) Th e Eu ropean allies' con tribut ion to common defenses appears not to be sufficiently known and appreciated in the United States of America. A recent booklet issued by NATO headquarters, "Eurogroup: the Defense of Eu rope 1983", shows the fo llowing percen tages of participation by the European allies to the forces deployed on the continent: about 90 percent of th e ground forces: about 80 percent of the combat aircra ft; about 80 percent of th e tanks; about 90 percent of armored divisions; at sea, in European waters and the Atl antic, European allies provide 70 percent of the fi ghting ships. Th e above percen tages do not include reserves. The evaluation of the European participation, moreover, cannot be limited to fighting forces but the various important infras tru ctures such as ports, airports, communication system s, etc. should be added. (6 ) A very articulated debate on no fi rst use of nuclear weapons was started in the spring o f 1982 and is well known in its essential lines. This author has also dealt with the problem. (See Vincenzo Tornetta "The Nuclear Strategy of th e Atlan tic A lliance and the No First Use Debate" in NATO Review, October 1982). A recent article by the forme r U.S. Secrelary of Defense Robert McNamara on "The Military ro le of Nuclear Wea pons: Perceptions and Misperceptions" {Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983) forcibly develops the thesis that "nuclear weapons serve no military purpose wh atsoever, they are totally useless except only to deter one's opponent from using them". He expresses the conviction that NATO

might realis tical ly switch in the direction of a stra tegy of conventional rleterrence. (7) In his already quoted report (see note 1) Senator Sam Nunn develops interes tin g considerations on the use of the new technologies against attacking forces of "second echelon" and on a new global conceptio n of air-land deten ses in Central Europe. (8) In the above mentioned article (note 3) General Rogers expresses the following con siderations: "Moreover, even if we were to develop a conven tional defense du ring th is decade along the lines described, we could neve r be certain of success without eventual recourse to nuclear weapons. (We should also not lose sight o f t he tactical advantag e to the d efender resulting from his threatened use of nuclear weapons serving as a restraint on the tactical massing of Warsaw Pact forces preparatory to an attack). Hence while I argue th at the nuclear threshold in Europe can and should be raised by improving NATO's conventional capabilities, realistic deterrence in Europe will con tinue to requi re the plausible threat of nuclear escalation by NATO". (Italics by the author). (9) It seems appropriate to recall in this connection the fo llowin g statement Lord Carv er, fo rmerly Chief of the British Defense Staff: "At the thea tre or tactical level any nuclear exchange, however limited it might be, is bound to leave NATO worse off in comparison to the Warsaw Pac t, in terms both of military and civilian casualties and desstruction". (The Sunday Timoc, London, February 21 , 1982). (10) In his well-known " Alasta ir Buchan Memorial Lec ture" of 1977 German Chancellor Schmidt considered in detail the possibility of using the MBFR

negotiations in Vienna in order to reach an agreement on a conventional balance in Europe. Schmidt enumerated seven "musts" and "must nots" for such nego tiations. Schmidt s ta ted th at in th eory there existed "two possible ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact states. One would be for the Western alliance to underta ke a massiveÂˇ build -up of forces and weapons systems: th e order 'or both NATO and the Warsaw Pact :o reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level. I prefer the latter", he con cluded, ard added "Until we see real progress on MBFR, we shall rely on the effectiveness of deterrence". It must be borne ir mind th at in Jam1ary 1984 in Stockho lm, the CDE conference on European security, decided by the recent Madrid CSCE meeting, will begin. This conference will represen t an additional EastWest forum on security pro blems. (11) An interesting negotiating hypothesis in this connection has been put forward by Senator Sam Nunn in his already-mentioned report. According to Senator Nunn, once an adequate strengthening of its con ventional detenses has been achieved, NATO could take into consideration, with the Warsaw Pact, two parallel and interdependent pledges: the one of no first use o f nuclear weapons (tactical) and the other of no large concentrations of :onventi onal ground forces, with special emphasis on armored forces, within specified distance of the borders: th e violation of this latter pledge would render null and voiLI lh~ fin;l. (12) A similar hypothesis to the abov e has been illustrated by Amb zssador Francois de Rose in his article: "Inflexible Response", Foreign Affairs Fall, 1982.

Wi th reference to this article originally published by the Washing!on Quarterly in its Summer 1984 Edition the Supreme A llied Commander, Europe, General U.S. Army Bernard W. Rogers, addressed to the Author th e following letter which we are glad to publish, here on side, with the General's authoriza tion.

SUPR E ME A L LIE D COMMAND ER EU R OPE S HAP E. BE LG I U M

8 NOV 1984

Dear Ambassador Tor netta: Thank you for your kind letter of 1 October 1984. I read your Washington Quarterly art icle with inter est , and found much with which to agree. I share your concern that NATO's deterr ent st rategy be understood and supported by our people. In order to convey t he resolve necessary to convince the Warsaw Pact that the Alliance will impl ement the options of our Flexibl e Response strategy, we need the willing support of our publics. You will recall that I do not believe there is a requirement t o change our strat egy. Fl exible Res ponse, as current ly composed, is the only st rategy which, when supported by adequate forces, takes full account of the imperatives of det errence i n the European environment . The problem i s , as you said in your article, NATO has not kept pace with the massive Soviet military buildup which continues. We should never lose sight of the fact that NATO is a defensive Alliance . As such we will never f ire the f i r st shot of any war . Regardless of any force improvements NATO mi ght make, NATO should not r-enounce the first us e of non-strategic nuclear weapons. As long as we retain this option, the Soviets cannot rely on a relatively cheap and predictable conventional victory. Nor shoul d we spell out in detail how NATO would respond to any specific act or manner of aggression. In my view this uncertainty has been a vi tal component of NATO' s deterr ence. If t he Soviet s wish to avoid the danger of escalation t o the strategic level, they need only refrai n from init iati ng aggression in Western Europe. I agree with you that the fut ure we all want - - peace with our freedoms i ntact , a more stable world environment and reduced and balanced levels of all categories of forces - - can be at tained only at t he negotiating table. Our present strategy is logical and convincing; with dedicated effort I believe we can persuade our peoples that our poli cies and plans will strengthen peace as well as keep our freedom. Wit h all best wishes, Sincerely,

BERNARD W. ROGERS General, U. S. Army Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

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After a long period in the doldrums, there has been a recent revival of interest in military matters in Italy. Another positive note is the fact that, while the matter was formerly dealt with by a small number of specialized publications, popularizing articles are now beginning to appear also in the general press. So far, however,

in treating the various topics,- op,mons and points of view not enough attention has been focused on what ultimately should be of direct interest to the general public, government authorities and members of the Armed Forces, namely the prospects concerning the army of "The

2000".

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS Like all other manmade organizations, the army may be considered as being composed of several elements. One of the most important is of course its statutory purpose, as laid down in article 1 of law no. 382/1978: "The task of the army ..... is, in accordance with the oath taken and in obedience to the orders received, to provide for the Country's defence and to contribute to safeguarding its free institutions and the welfare of the national community in times of public calamity". The other, equally important aspects, which are normally reserved to specialists on the subject, are the quantity and quality of the various elements, the coordination of their functions and their interrelationships. The evolution of these elements often proceeds at different rates, so that the army can, to a certain extent, be likened to a living organism. Its rate of development is above all geared to the time required to get its personnel and equipment into a state of readiness. Under normal conditions, this takes at least 5-6 years for personnel on permanent duty and roughly twice as long for a new weapon or vehicle. To this must be added the time required to weld men and equipment into a singie fighting unit and bring them up to the required level of efficiency. The time requi red is lengthened considerably if the organization undergoes any traumatic changes. For instance, the infa ntry battalions mechanized in 1975-76 actually achieved this state only after they had finally "understood" the APC. The same may be said of the Brigades, which managed to become combined arm complexes only after an indispensable period of "running in". It is thus incorrect to judge the structure of an army before it has been completed and assimilated. For this reason, I do not share the criticism levelled at the organization that the army was forced to give itself in 1975, with only a very brief period of (also psychological) preparation and under emergency financial conditions. A complete break was made with tradition and the previous decades-old mentality, and a number of important functional sectors had to be left incomplete. There are disadvantages, difficulties and problems on which, if only the examination . could be restricted to certain specific sectors, an agree~ ment can be reached in most cases. It is also true, however, that great caution must be observed in introducing any important structural innovation . It is much easier and quicker to destroy than to build or rebuild, and this step should be taken only when the drawbacks are objectively due to the organization itself and not to incidental causes which must be dealt with in ways not involving the organization of the forces. A haphazard policy adopted in this field can only produce negative results in both the long and the short term. In the short term 6ecause it makes it imposs ib le to achieve any degree of

"certainty" or knowledge of the forces involved , which is necessary if they are to be used properly. In the long term because the effect of mistakes only emerge years later, when it becomes difficult to eliminate the causes without jeopardizing natural development. Mistakes made in the personnel field are those that are paid most dearly. If a certain kind of equipment is found to be unsu itable it can in time be replaced, provided one is prepared to lose a certain amount of money on the deal. The same obviously does not apply to personnel that become redundant. or are in short supply or of the wrong calibre.

WHAT KIND OF FORCES? Both Italian and foreign observers have repeatedly pointed out the interrelations between "quality" and "quantity". Although a separate examination of these two elements can sometimes lead to misunderstanding, some kind of schemat- ,Âˇ ization is necessary as several factors are involved in both. I shall take for granted two observations that have frequently been made. The first is that there is usually a tradeoff between "quality" and "quantity". The second is that neither car:i be allowed to drop below a certain level without an irreparable loss in overall efficiency. The problem. facing the planner is how to identi fy the most effective balance between the two a dozen or so years in advance. The first reference is naturally the aim to be achieved, and here we must be quite clear. The fundamental task of the army is to guarantee the survival of the State as an expression of the citizens' choice, and the problem of survival must always be interpreted as mainly consisting of defence against external aggression. The relief of civilian populations struck by serious natural calamity is, it is true, one of the tasks of the military organization. However, this is, and will always be, merely a form of aid that is given within the possibilities

and lim its of a structure designed for another purpose. The chief aim of the army's organization must be to defend the country from external threats. Also in this fiel d the situation may well change owing to the partial disengagement the United States seem to intend to carry out in Europe and to the attitude of certai n Mediterranean countries. However, the effects of a process that has barely begun on the quality of the forces are still uncertain and, at least for the next f ew years, reference will co ntinue to be made to the threat everyone is already fami liar with. The balancing of the various elements of com mand, fighting and support in the Armed Forces can be done in several ways, according to how the type and potential of the enemy forces and the environmental cond itions are evaluated. Maxi mum effectiveness is achieved wh en Âˇ the "support" (in the broad sense} does not contain redundancies, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the actual fighting units. From the process that began in 1975 we can now start drawing a few conclusions about the army's structure as a whole. Care must be taken, however, not to confuse the "real" defects with shortcomings due to the still unsatisfactory function ing of severa l important sectors (comma nd and control, survivability and logistical support) which, for various reasons. it has still not been possible to bring up to scratch. Sometimes. however. this useful distinction is overlooked and a number of people, appa-

rently with some knowledge of the "state of the art" are already clamouring for a completely new configuration based on combined arm "regiments" with di rectly dependent com panies/batteries, i.e. a kind of "mini-Large Units" eq uipped wiLh the wherewithal required to fight autonomously, and commanded through tactical HOs of roughly divisional level by combined service HOs (1 ). The basi c concept is sound enough, because coopera tion is achieved and reinforced also by a series of practical and psychologica l factors that can stem onl y from the men living and work ing ~ogether. At least for the time being, however, such a change would be too radical. and would in any case presuppose above al l a cultural substrate that has still to be created in Italy. It would be preferable to proceed gradually, introducing the necessary and realistically feasible improvements to the forces' organi za tion . The first ob jective of course is to put the finishi ng touches on the sectors still to be completed, particularly as far as the command and support organization is concerned . However. also the bulk of the forces. i. e. the basic infantry, could have its physionomy partially changed as a resu1t of decisions taken in two fundamental sectors: mechan ization and the ta nk/antitank ratio. The issue is topical in most of the western countries. each of which has either found or

(1) "Considerazioni sulle Forze Armate italiane: l'Eserc.;ito e d lntorni .. by P.F. Uuinzio (Rivista ltaliana Difesa. n. 3,

March 1984).

envisaged its own solution. Considering the characteristics of the terrai n in Italy, the cost of material and equipment and the problems of logistical support, the future could conceivably lie in some form of "l ight infantry" (2). This would consist of units capab le of great mobil ity over different types of Âˇterra in and provided with excellent antitank capabi lity, but trained to fight mostly dismounted. The only forces in need of actua l armoured fighting vehicles wou ld be the units needed for cooperation with tanks in their c lassica l role of offensive and decisive weapon par excellence. Furthermore, to take a longer term view, also our Army, operating as it does within the framework of NATO, will have to make up its mind whether. and to what extent, to accept the con ception ot Air/and Battle 2000 developed in the United States . As is ma intained also by the military authorities of the Atlantic Al liance (3). the conventiona l forces shou ld above al l have their command and control capabil ity boosted and be supplied with high-tech ammunition capable of striking the enemy _in depth, exploiting all the potentialities of the emerging technologies. Despite its many attractions, th is conception is not without its drawbacks. The first obstacle to be overcome is financial. The costs of research and development are soaring, and even under normal circumstances the inflation rate for military products often runs even more than 25% higher than ordinary inflation. Sec;o11d ly, there is a constant risk of becom ing increasingly dependent on foreign industry. Account must also be taken of the fact that the new materials may not completely fill the bill and need to be integrated with others. This cou ld lead to an endless spiral. The big problem to solve thus consists of iixing a suitable and acceptable degree of soph istication. Under conditions of limited avai labi lity, priority would be given to those sectors upon the efficiency of which the entire military organ iza tion was dependent - i.e. the socal led C3 (command, control and communications, includi ng the capacity t o acquire information and to interfere with the enemy's capacity to do so), force survivability (antiaircraft, antitank and NBC defence) and logistical support . Technologica l improvement in all the other domains wou ld then depend on the res idual financia l resources availab le. Of course a few fundamental rules must be followed: to have no more than three genera tions of the same equipment in service at any one time, so as to avoid having to replace expensive materials en bloc and thus unduly complicate the logistica l problems ; to budget tor the replacement of material when it is certain that all its potentia l has been exhausted and it cannot be "revived" ; lastly, to make an accurate assess ment of the logistical implications (maintenance, repa irs and spare parts) and functional aspects (the growing technica l complexity of an organiza-

tion is accompanied by the increasing special ization of its parts) (4) . Serious problems are found also in the personnel sector. The Italian Army is, and will conti nue to be, a mixed army, with the majority of troops on short-term national service, and only a minority on permanent duty. From the standpoint of train ing a professional army wou ld be preferable. Also the equipment would be exploited more satisfactorily (and the more sophisticated it becomes, the more convenient it wou ld be to have more career personnel). However. this solution cannot be adopted tor budgetary reasons. because the personnel requirements would not dim inish appreciably, whi le the cost "per soldier" would increase to at least three to four times that of the nationa l serviceman. It could also be a problem to find the required number of long-service soldiers . lt is .a little known fact that, even tho ugh up to 16% of the troops can be vol unteers by law, very few (2) The " light infantry" does not- .co_n.sist, . as. s_ome people imagine. of fight ing units w ith relatively unsoph1st1cated equipment. In the US Army the term is applied to units whose transport assets have been stripped to a minimu~ and whose Âˇ tactical and strategic mobi lity is ensured by helicopters and aircraft. However, they have rough ly the same antitank capa bility at company level as one Italian mechanized battalion. (3) General Bernard W. Rogers, the Allied Supreme Commander in Europe, has treated the topic on several_ occasions. See for instance "The Atlan tic Alliance: prescnpt1ons for a difficult decade" (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982). (4) The last criterion is the one wi th the greatest_ effect on the o rganization of the forces since it helps to modify _t he "teeth-to -tail" rat io (at the end of World War II the United States were using 6-7 "support" troops for every fig_h ting man. while in Viet nam this ratio was estimated as being of the order of 20: 1).

actually do enlist. The reasons for this are not only psychological or economic (although these are important), but also social - all the special recruiting going on at the moment (e.g. Carabinieri, Customs, State Police, Prison Warders, Fire Brigade, Foresters, etc.) has made considerable inroads into the available manpower, which is in much shorter supply than in the other western countries. The objective of increasing the long-service soldiers must be pursued with all available means, because they could be conveniently used to re-

place some of the national servicemen and NCOs (who could then be used for more important tasks). This could be done not only in the logistical services but also in highly specialized technical and tactical tasks and in section or squad leadership. The last important issue concerning the quality of the forces is related to the Cadres. Although it may seem a commonplace, an army is all the more efficient, the better and more highly motivated its officers and NCOs. Motivation, which

in time of peace is dependent both on external support (always lukewarm in Italy) and on an awareness of the usefulness and scope of one's work, is a fundamental factors Âˇwhich justifies someone choosing to w ear "pips" tor the whol e of his working life irr the service of his country. Although there has been- some recent improvement. this is a point which has stil l not been given sufficient importance. The authorities at all levels are responsible for finding ways and means of getting round or of reducing the objective difficulties that are part ly due to the country's social and economic evolution. It is still left to individuals, however. to maintain th e awareness of the significance of their role intact by conscientiously and consistently doing their duty. Technically speaking, another factor to be taken into account is the degree of qualitative imbalance between the various officer ranks, the excessive number of "armchair jobs" and the dysfunctions due to the shortage of officers and NCOs. These are longstanding problems that can only be solveg gradually. There are already signs of this happening: recru iting has picked up and

the new law on the status and promotion of NCOs has com e into effect. Nevertheless. some years will pass before the benefits begin to be felt. THE SIZE OF THE FORCES The other aspect of the problem, i.e. the size of the land forces required by Italy, brings us to a topic that is open to debate. also because the threat may be perceived and configured in different ways, thus enormously increasing its indeterminacy (5). There are virtually no up-to-date publications dealing with the military situation in the Warsaw Pact countries accessible to the public at large in Italy. Nevertheless, only a totally factious public opinion would deny that the eastern bloc has continued ever since the last war to implement an energ etic prog ramme of increasi ng its military strength. that it has definitely achieved numerical superiority and that in certain sectors it is technologically the equal of NATO. The subj ect cannot be discussed exhaustively tor obvious reasons of security. However.

the size of the forces maintained until 1975 (which is known to have been of the order of 36 Brigades ) corresponded to a substantiated and rational evaluation. Indeed, only unsurmountable external constraints led to the forced reduction by one third duri ng the last reorganization. This was

(5) A typical example is the scenario proposed in 1978 by General Robert Close in his "Is Europe undefended?". According to him, one improbable although possibleÂˇ eventuality is that the Russians will take two days to cross West Germany and reach the Rhine. (However. the comment made at the time by th e German authorities was that for thi s to come about th e Bundeswehr and the West German police force would have to direct the traffic fo r the invader).

of time against a compara tively weak attack. But no one knows in advance how long the conflict would last. Recent historical experience warns us that it wou ld certain ly be longer than desired and that all the countries involved in it would need much greater forces than are normal ly kept up in time of peace. Assuming that the maximum possible increase occurs in the quality of the weapons, it wou ld perhaps be possible to comm it fewer Brigades to the direct defence of the frontier than is provided for in current planni ng. However, it wou ld also be necessary to build up reserves in order to cope with unfavourable situations (which would be more probable owing to the reduction of the front line forces) and the protracted defensive effort would have to be further sustained . Considerable doubts are ra ised also by the proposed more extensive use of mobi lization, which is an indispensable means used bv the Armed Forces of all countries . However, while useful for maintaining the forces at their mi nimum necessary quantitative level in time of peace, it can only be fully effective on the assumption tha t the enemy will be unable to launch a su rprise

done on the understanding that the remaining 24 Brigades would represent the bare min imum and that the relinquishment of the other forces had to be offset by a definite qual itative improvement. Since then events in the Mediterranean have led to an increase in the pote ntia l threat to the Italian peninsula and islands. In future, if the strategic hypotheses already evaluated by other countries of possible attacks against raw material sources of vita l importance to a modern state were to take on more concrete form, the significance of the threat could conceivably be considered to have increased. The 24 Brigades must therefore be confirmed and retained . Otherwise, we should simply be lending support to those who maintain that the army is nothing but a liability, but only because it is useless to keep a tool that is unsu ited to its purpose. Some believe that the country's defence could be guaranteed by a smaller force also because the most dangerous and immediate threat from the East is directed towards central Europe. This would be true if we were sure of having to defend ourselves for only a short period

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cttack, or else where the pol itical and social con text allows a firm hand to be kept on the reins. Tech nically spea king , to maintai n a larger number of units in th.eir peacetime configuration would afford direct savi ngs in person nel costs and allow a larger proportion of resources to be devoted to the purchase of material. There are, however, several drawbacks: • increased costs of maintenance and security of the material kept in mothballs for use in times of emergency; · • every substantial innovation in weapons and the most important equipment would require the personnel to be reca lled for further training; • the further training periods would become more important and would have to be coordinated more carefully with the mobilization procedure used for the other components of the nationa l defence; • it would be no easy task to have to rebuild efficient units of greater than com pany strength in a hurry, unless it w ere poss ible to recal l troops for further training, which would be rather diffic ult under the present circ umstances;

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• it the enemy managed to gain initial success and exploit it. th ere may not be enough time to set t he whole system in motion. For a number of reasons , therefore, the present ratio between existing un its and skeleton units used to bring the personnel up to strength on mobi lization are confirmed as the criteria best suited to presen t conditions. In th e final analysis, the present order of battle of the Army appears as a still acceptable comprom ise between functional req uirements and availabil ity of resources (6). Unfortunately, for a long time now the latter have been decreasing in real terms. The graph on page 20 comparing nationa l defence spending with the main economic indicators is quite explicit. If this trend were to continue, the point would quick ly be reached in which it would no longer be possible to reconci le the size of the forces and thei r operational readiness. Having to choose between the two. the form er would naturally be further red uced. And since the margin of manoeuvre that used to exist in the early "seventies" is no more, the threshold below wh ich the army is no longer able to fulfit its tasks would be exceeded. The answer to this problem must be found by the governm ent authorities. as it of course cannot be left to th e Armed Forces themselves . The task of the mil itary cons ists solely in perceiving the difficulti es. constraints and risks and proposing possible solutions.

= ? The graph on page 21 sums up the developments in the army since Italy joined the Atlantic Treaty. At th e beg inning, the Armed Force enj oyed a considerable boost. However, the downward trend beginning in 1956 can be explained by developments in doctrine (i.e. the introduction ot tactical nuclear weapon s). but also by the need to save money. Then, between 1961 and 1962, six Divisions were cut down to Brigade size. The bottom of this trend was reached in 1965 wh en the army took on roughly the shape it was to keep for the next decade or so. Despite the nearly one third reduction visa-vis the 1954 strength, arms and equipment and organization had been standardized, thus making up for the lack of homogeneity of the earl ier years. Furthermore, an org anic reinforcem ent programme had been got under way. There w ere plans to mechan ize the infantry, to replace the existing tanks, to introduce new field artillery and signals equipment and to fill the gaps in an tiaircraft and antita nk defence, in operationa l mobility and night fighting capability. And improvements actually were introduced , particularly in the infantry, which began to receive its first antitank missiles, the first APCs and to updat e its tank line. However, as a result of problems linked to the rising cost of living and the crisis which followed the "economic miracle", the targets were on ly partly reached and then only for certa in units. The full force of the difficulties was felt in the early "seventies". Under increasing pressure to cut costs, the first reduction measures (7) were taken, whi ch were to lead to the drastic 1975 reorganization. This is recent history and need not be repeated here. I shall merely point out that t he considerable quantitative red uction was considered acceptable only on condition that the fun ctional shortcomings observed in the "sixties" could be eliminated during the next ten years. Since then many of the programmes laid down have been completed and others, for which the techniques for producing materia ls measuring up to requirements did not yet exist. have been got under way. The rate ot development in several hig h-tech areas was slower than originally expected mainly because of lack of funds. Although very interesting, it would take too long to analyse the development of the Army as a function of changes in the threat, in weapons and doctrines, in order to separate their natural development from measures imposed by extern al constraints. I sha ll merely point out that the extensive transformations of 1961-1962 and the 1975 reorganization were speed ed up by the troop reductions carried o ut under budgetary pressures. QUALITY X QUANTITY

Precisely because the financial problems still exist, I do not ag ree with the proposed further cuts in the size of the forces, which would supposedly be offset by the introduction of high-

tech material. This may appear contradictory, since the lack of financial resources is one of the main points on which the supporters of the new reo rganization insist. Nevertheless, experience tells us that the only certain result would be the actual cutback in the size of the forces, with the risk of not obtaini ng any qualitative improvement in exchange. And noth ing would stop the same situation recurring several years hence as the cost of materials continued to rise. Moreover, making a realistic estimate of the financi al costs of a qua lita tive increase that would offset the cutback in strength, the conclusions reached would probably be hard to put into practice despite the formal perfection of the logic on which they were based. For instance, the decision to adopt the "Patriot" would allow the army and the air force to share a number ot tasks. However. the cost of the weapon systems of a size adequate for both Armed Forces and the present degree of their integration would in pratice preclude this solution, which seems so rational and advantageous in theory. In actua l f act. there is one way of maintaining the forces at their present size and at the same time of finding funds to modernize material by diverting some resources away from th e "losing" sector of personnel to that of investments. This would consist in extending the national service call-up period so as to reduce the size of ea ch annual int ake. Supposing, for the s:ike of example, that the army needed 200,000 men to be given basic recruit training for 4 montf-s at a cost of 5 million lire per soldier, the annual cost would be as follows: Duration of call-up period

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7500 bill.

850 bill.

120,000 600 bill.

Neglecting all considerations of wheth er it is econom ical to keep a soldier in the army for a longer period, it can be seen that in a singe year a 6 month inc rease in the cal l-up period would Âˇ allow a saving in resources su fficient to purchase 200 battle tanks or 500-600 armoured f ghting vehicles of 1200 antitank weapon systems, all of the advanced type (8). However, th is type of solution wou ld be strongly opposed in this country and does not seem to be feasible either, at least in the short to medium te rm (even thoug h the matter will (7) Abol ition of 3 Large Unit HQs at Corps level, 14 Regimental HQs, 36 Military Districts and 82 Depcts. p lus the "thinning ou t" o f 56 battalions. (8) The recoupment would be even greater if the costs of incorporation were included (clothing costs would diminish considerably).

probably have to be gon e into further in view of the fall-off in population having occurred also in l~aly in recent years). It has already been seen how the situation regardi ng officer and NCO cadres will rem ai n stationary for severa l more years. As a result, it will be necessary to make do with wha t one has in the personnel sector, making up for any shortcomings by means of enhanced technology. A first step in this direction was taken in 1981 wh en a start was mad e on revisi ng the establishmen ts on the basis of the functional differences between time of peace and emergency. Furthermore, the approval, hopefully in the near future, of the new national service law, should make a larger number of long-service volunteers available. If this did not come to pass, action would have to be taken in another direction and the

number of NCOs allowed by law increased. This is because the process of technological innovation will play an increasingly important role in every sector of the Army. Furthermore, even assuming it can be kept within reasonable bounds, this innovation will lead to an increase in the number of needs which can be add ressed on ly in this way. In the materials sector. everything depends on the amount of fund s available, which will not am ount to much in any case. The main reference hypothesis is sti ll the one introduced in 1975, which would ensure forces thal were balanced and efficient in all sectors . In view of the changes introduced in the meantime under pressure from increasi ng costs, this hypothesis cannot be fulfill ed completely. It will in any case be necessary to complete the current improvement programmes in the fundamental fields of command and con-

trol. surv ivability on t he battlefield. and logistica l support. implementing a high low mix, not by weapon systems but by functiona l sectors. In the other areas an attempt will have to be made to satisfy needs by exploit ing existi ng materials as far as possible and to keep ind ispensable technological development down to a minimum. Personnel and material wi ll th us be made to flow into t he present structures. Time and experience have shown that the battalion and Brigade are va lid operational models. and also suitable for their peacetime tasks. Their only rea l problem is excess ive "red tape", alt hough th is could be so lved by changes in the procedures, and the attai nment of a leve l of operational effic iency wh ich can be increased by layi ng increasing emphasis o n t raining . On the other ha nd it is both possible and conven ient. to simpl ify t he command and support organization of the higher than Brigade levels. The Division had a reason for being at the time when the infa nt ry regiments were being transf ormed into tactical groups by ass imi lating tactical and logistic sub-un its from other units. However, ever since the Brigades were defined as elemen tary Large Units, and t herefore combi ned arm units and functional ly autonomous, the Divi sion's ro le is no longer comp letely clear. Even in tactica l doctrine it is considered to be ha lf way between an elementa ry Large Un it and a complex one . The possibility must t hus be explored of modelling the 3rd and 5th Army Corps on the 4th Alpi ne Army Corps, which has always managed its Brigades directly. The "Mantova". "Fol gore" and " Ariete" Divisions should be grouped differently. owing to t he impossibi lity of uniting them under a single HO because of the practica l problems ccnnected with their size and location. The sure sav ing th us achieved wo uld have no effect on the overa ll effic iency, because the support units wou ld be sized according to t he needs of a si ngle command level. At the same time. the bas is co ul d be laid for solvi ng also the structural prob lems that wi ll have to be dea lt with over the next few yea rs in order to elim inate residual functional shortcomi ngs.

inevitably reduce their operational effectiveness. and if they were to drop below the present level of 24 Brigades, they would no longer be capable of ensuri ng effective and credible defence. There is t hus no point in envisag ing fur t her cuts compensated by qual itative improvements. which in any case cou ld probably not be achieved to t he desired extent; • al lowance m ust be made for the gradual soph ist ication of ma terials so long as it remains within the bounds of normal evol ution , corresponds to true fu nctional needs and is not based on unrea listic objectives. Priority in this field must be gra nted to the sectors of command and control, battlefield survivabi lity (anti-aircraft, antitank and NBC defence) and logistical support. If the budget cannot be stretched to cover the programmes laid down in 1975 for the other components of the Armed Forces. a decis ion will have to be made as to the most suitable ratio of mechan ization for t he infantry and the new t ank/a nti tank ratio. However. in any future developments, priority must be given to the fighti ng troops and everything connected with "support" shou ld be pared to the functional minimum . The structures must be given a degree of stability in order to avoid abrupt changes like t he one imposed by circumstances in 1975. All changes must be introd uced as gradua lly as poss ible in order to avo id dangerous repercussions, above al l in t he personnel sector. which is more lia ble than the others to large-scale structural changes. Of course everyth ing hinges on the amount of reso urces earmarked for mi litary defence. It has been some time now since the Army responsibly and realistically adjusted its demands to su it the country's economic situation. Its fina ncia l plann ing is now geared to mainta ining the mini mum accepta ble level of forces with a barely adequate operational efficiency. If the consequent burden on the budget were found to be too great, it would be necessary to reduce t he size of the forces in order to avoid a fal loff in operationa l efficiency. At t he same t ime, however, it wou ld be necessary to accept th e risks involved in entrusting one's military defence to an undersized army. Gian Giuseppe Santillo

CONCLUSIONS The present Army structure is, on the w hole. fa irly wel l su ited to its tasks. The only important modification that cou ld and shou ld be made is to stream line the operationa l chai n of command by elim inating the divisiona l level and reorganizi ng the support units. In any case, these are the sectors that stil l rema in to be qua litatively aligned wit h the hypotheses on which the 1975 reorganization was carried out. Qual ity and quantity must be reconci led as was recommended at the time, also taking account of the f ollowing considerations: • margi ns no longer exist for modifying the size o·f t he forces involved. Any further cuts would

Col. Gian Giuseppe Santillo g r,;duated from the 15th course of the M ilitary Academy of Modena and has served w i th the 7th Field Artillery Regiment o r the "Crem ona" infantry Division and the Airborne Arti llery Batta lio n o r the "Folgorc' Airborne B ri Qade. He attended the 97th Genera I Staff Course, after wh ich he served at the HO of the " Centauro" Armou red D ivis ion and in the Army Genera l Staff. He was CO o r the 185th Fie ld Artillery Battalion and C\Jf· rently is CO of the M il i t,,ry District of Milan.

tangram integrated logistic system In the modern military field the logistic functions must be really mobile, not only movable ones. These functions must be operative immediately after arriving in site by the use of their own means only. The changing of position must be equally easy and quick. The towing vehicle must assure all the auxiliary functions: from the armoured personnel transportation lo the wounded people gathering, from the supplying of water, fuel compressed air to power and drive. TILOS provides an answer to these needs of mobility, autonomy and operative flexibili ty. TILOS is formed by two vehicles: the towed unit, housing the main logistic function, and the towing vehicle. containing the auxiliary functions, besides the main towing service.

TILOS may be thus employed for instance, but not onl y, as: 0 0 0 D D D 0 D D

communicaiions/command/control post logistics for electronics and missile ,systems surveillance field hospital NBC center mobile air base mobile hydrofoils base mobile system for police control mobile workshop.

TIL.()S 1s the real answer to the needs of logistics in tactical area.

Via Corsica, 19 - 16129 Genoa/Italy

Phone: 10/531101 (lO lines) - Telex: 571250

ARMOURED UNITS IN ITALY

MA/OR ...

TEN YEARS OF WAR AND TEN YEARS OF PEACE ( 1936-1952)

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JANUARY 30, 1936, THE DATE ON WHICH THE CREATION OF A MAJOR TANK UNIT WAS AUTHORIZED, IS A REMARKABLE TURNING POINT IN THE HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN ARMY. IT WAS NOT AN ABSOLUTE NOVELTY: SEVERAL YEARS EARLIER JN GREAT BRITAIN, IN THE SOVIET UNION - AND SINCE OCTOBER 1935, AND ON A GREATER BASIS, ALSO IN GERMANY - THE FIRST UNITS OF THIS TYPE HAD BEEN ORGANIZED AND TESTED. THIS BEGINNING, HOWEVER MODEST, MARKED NEVERTHELESS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS MEETING A REQUIREMENT THAT COULD NO LONGER- BE DEFERRED: UPDATING THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY APPARATUS. IT JS NOT A SECRET, REALLY, THAT (LIKE IN MANY OTHER NATIONS, INCLUDING GERMANY ITSELF) MANY PERSONALITIES OF THAT TIME WERE SHOWING VERY LITTLE ENTHUSIASM ABOUT THE GENERAL CAPABILITIES OF THE TANK, AND, ABOVE· ALL, THEY WEREVERYSKEPTICALABOUT ITS REAL USEFULNESS.·

--, "L. 3" tank . ..., When Gen. Federico Baistrocchi, with his secret Circular no. 7050 of January 30, 1936, ordered the establishment (at the height of the Ethiopian campaign) of a moto-mechanized Brigade (1), it seemed that the problem of constituting a majo'r tank unit had at last been tackled more concretely, even though the unit was much lighter t han had been originally proposed by some experts (2). The appointed Commander was, significantly, Gen. Carlo Favagrossa, who was to be Undersecretary for War Production until September 8, 1943. The Unit, which had been called "First" as a good omen, seemed to be well balanced in its components and equipped with the best material that Italy possessed at t he moment. The armoured mate rial - namely the assault tanks mod. 35, brandnew at the time (though overrated) - was supported by 75/27 guns mod. 911, rightly considered the most modern field pieces available, especially for their wide firing range (3). By June 1, 1936, the Brigade could at last be regarded as complete. The Ethiopian war had ended victoriously and preparations for the usual "National Field Exercises -· Year XV" were under way. They took place from August 24 to August 29, and witnessed a remarkable employment of armoured means, for a total of over 260 assault tanks and break tanks. The area of the exercises was constituted by the Appennine reliefs, which set the natural line of separation and contact between Apulia and Campania . These reliefs are two great parallel barriers. with a North-West and South-West course, broadening in the middle in a series of intermediate tablelands, valleys and hollows, with an average height of 700-1200 metres. The Brigade was part of the "Red Party", behind the frontline and ready to be thrown through the breach opened in the "Blue" front. For the attackers (who, as regards armoured vehicles, could also avail them40

selves of the IX battalion assault nuclei', tanks could prove useful tanks and the IV battalion break (if the terrain permitted their tanks) the subject of the maemployment) .. . their participa noeuvres was the invasion of tion could represent and permit lrpinia; for the "Bl ue Party", inthat forceful timel iness, that stead, it was a withdrawal, fol low- could allow the complete exploied by counter-offensive; i.e . the tation of the battle's outcome. practical employment of the The action of tanks - he went procedures apt to neutra lize on - does not represent the sole the adversary's initial success. means ... but it is rather an addiThe tank units of the oppos- tion of concentrated and more ing party were more or less equiv- rapid forces to an attack unit alent: the X battalion assault which already has in itself the tanks, the V battalion of break capability of starting and causta nks and the expected employing a breach". ment of the II Group fast tanks We find the same concept . of the 2nd Division "Celere", in the "Directives for Division which was kept in reserve. Combat" of 1936, where it is In reality, from the numeristated that the tanks' presence cal viewpoint there was no disis always necessary in battle proportion (4) and this became and particularly during the phase evident at the end of the exof first contact, in the exploitaercises, when the Brigade, which tion of success and in pursuit. was moving along the Appian Road, followed by an infantry (1) The Brigade consis ted of 1 division, was first opposed by Bersaglieri regiment, 2 assault tan< bat"Blue" tank un its and then outta lions (2 companies each). 1 motorized flanked by the 2nd Division 75/27 mm. mod. 11 artillery battalion (2 batteries). 1 Engineer pl atoon· (mixed). "Celere". {2) Lt. Col. Adolfo Infante, an It was therefore a real and artillery officer, had written, in J une true experience of "war of move1934, an article in the "Review of Artil ment", in the initial phase of lery and Engineers" ("New Trends in the Land War" ), in sisti ng on the need which fast and motorized units to prepare an armoured Brigade with acquired a determinant imporstra tegic tasks - according to th e tance. The recent "Directives for British model - with 230 tanks; approxthe Employment of Major Units" imately 70 of them - includ ing t'1 . e "artillery" tanks armed with 75/13 mm. were thus tested. They stated: guns - were to be medium tanks. "The tanks - which for our (3) Th e war establishment of the terrain and our war must be very Brigade, considering th e last changes. light and fast (5) - must not be included: considered only as fighting • 99 offi cers, 2518 other ranks, 27 s ubmach ine-guns, 36 machine-guns, tw.o means, operating interspersed 47 mm. guns. 6 75 mm. guns; and followed by infantry and • 10 cars, 131 trucks, 387 motorcycles, "Celeri": they must also be view- 12 tractors {4 with ammunition waggon); • 62 mod. 35 assault tanks. ed as a mass that surprises, It is evident tha t this strength can breaks t hrough and overtakes be compared with that of the Gerwith decision. Surprise and mass not man Panzer Division of 1935, wh ich will be - in tomorrow's war had 1 tank Brigade (4 ba ttalions of 4 the major elements for a decisive co mpanies, 1 motorized hunter battalion, 1 reconnaissance g roup with armoured victory". cars, one 37 mm. antitank battalion, 1 The latest "Directives for artillery regiment with 24 105 mm. Division Combat" were also put guns. 1 sapper ba ttal ion, services into practice. The evolution along As concerns the armoured me,rns, it can be said that our Ansaldo-Fiat these lines, already prepared mod. 35 was to the Pz.Kpfw. I (M.G.) as with the "Theory of Celeri" exnow - thirty years later - the Swedish pounded by Gen. Ottavio Zoppi in ·:s" tank is to the "Leopard I". (4) The British commentators •10ted his book of 1933, was confirmed by Visconti Prasca the following th is f'act, and wrote that for the first time whole armoured Brigades could year, in his work "The Decisive be seen facing each other, but this was War". In this book he expressed, not the case. though not too explicitly, a cer(5) This is a theoretical postulate, tain confidence in the armoured disproved by facts just a few years later, especially in North Africa; its means, asserting that: "with the orig in was probably also in the chro nic system of the 'autonomous battle shortage of fina ncial resources.

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Medium break tank "M. 11 " .

The exact words are as follows: " A Division 's fighting is particula rly infl uenced by... the nu merous fire and attac~ mean s (guns, mortars and assault .tanks) with which the infa ntry is equ ipped in order to increase its power an d pen etration. Fast motorized units, motort ransported units, reconn naissance planes operating in close cooperation and under the wh ip of a brave and brilliant leader, can reach decisive results ... especially in the preventive occupation of important positions, and in the exploitation of success and pursuit. From this stems the necessity of taking into account. when panning and carrying out the attack, the mighty contribution that these means - employed as an autonomous ma ss and not as a subsidiary element - can give t o the manoeuvre. In the counterattack, armoured and assault tanks can find their best employment in these circumstances , because they are in a ,:osit ion to act with the same procedures as in the offensive action". Nevertheless, when the Brigade was founded, the specific doctrine w as limited to the "Directive for the Employment of Ta nk Units" issued on January 1, 1936, i.e. only 17 days after the unfortunate incident of the Dembeguina Pass. in Eritrea (6) . These orientations derived from prin ciples t hat were by then un iversally accepted: t anks should be used in attack and counterattack, as mobile weapons and not as elemen ts of static defen ce (fire centre) . The t an k was not a substitute for other arms, but had to be employed. to integrate their action. What was strongly underlined in these directions (almost an incitement to meditate, so tha t unlucky inciden ts like the one mentioned should not happen aga in) was that the armoured means should never operate without previous reconnaissance with security elements in t he van and rear guard, and in cooperation with infa ntry.

That the army w as heading towards a real, if pa rtial, mecha nization, was confirmed by two other measures taken in 1936. First of all, the one providing, on the occasion of the Corps' Cen tennial, for the motorization of the Bersaglieri regiments (1 battalion of motortransported cyclists, 1 motor-Âˇ transported bn. with out ma ch ine guns, and 1 motorcycle bn . wi th 1 motorcycle com pany and 1 fast t ank company). From this,

ing to note that in the post -war period, during the fiduciary admin istra tion of Som alia, the 7 batta lions established in 1949 adopted a composition - 3 rifle companies, 1 armou red com pany (tanks and armoured cars) - that was very similar to that provided for in the colon ial establishment of 1936. Only the arti llery , which then should have included 4 motorized battalions, was reduced to an almost symbolic fraction , (a 100/ 17 mm towed battery)

THE ARMOURED BRIGADE IN 1936 X

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one could foresee the prolifera tion of major moto- mecha nized un its, and it was certa in by then that the Bersaglieri would be their infa ntry. The second measu re, taken with the establishment, on September 12, of the "Colonial Army of the Empire" , provided that. next t o a national Division and 17 colonial Brigades, there should be 9 motorized battalions, at disposal of the Regiona l Governors as a reserve mass. Each bat tal ion should have included 2 rifle companies, 1 armoured car company, 1 fast tank company. However, as far as we know, these motorized units. for which the necessary materials should have been availa ble " in loco" (7). were never born , while the motoriza tion process of the Be rsagl ieri did not go much further than the regimen t that paraded in Rome on May 9, 1937, on t he occasion of the fi rst annive rsary of the Empire. But, it is interest -

also consider ing that the Corp~Âˇ actual employment was essentially for internal security. THE BIRTH OF THE ARMOURED BRIGADES While the plans to adopt a tank of greater tonnage (wh ich had become indispensable aft er the Spanish experiences) (8) advanced - rat her slowly, as a matter of fact - the General Staf f, given the results of the manoeu-vres in lrpinia, decided to modify

(6) In an ambush laid by the Abi ssinians, a company of c avalry fas t tanks had suffered very serious losses in men and materials. (7) In May 1936 there were in Italian East Afri ca: 223 tanks and 48 arm oured cars; exactly 4 years later, the fast tanks (of w hich t here was a large stock in Italy) were only 35. but there were 120 armoured vehicles. (8) The mod. 35 tanks had had to c on front armo ured means with a 45 mm. g un in a turnin g turret.

'13

and strengthen the establishment of the mote-mechanized Brigade. thus creating a new type of unit called "Armoured Brigade". The manoeuvres that took place in Sicily in the Summer of 1937 had just the aim of verifying - in the field - the convenience of this transformation, together with the very much discussed infantry Division based on 2 infantry Regiments instead of 3, as in the past. "Anyway (as rightly remarked in the 'Corriere della

units", Valeri went on, "It is eminently a battle un it with a great penetration capability but. if left on its own, it would fatally be destroyed. Unlikely to suffer offences from the ground, it should fear those coming from the air: this is the reason for its great quantity of anti-Âˇaircraft means. The use of these units requires careful preparation and great discipline in motion: as a consequence, it poses a certain number of problems regard ing

THE ARMOURED BRIGADE IN 1937

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Sera' of August 13, 1937 by the military commentator Aldo Valeri) the formations are still at the experimental stage, and the manoeuvres in Sicily will serve to test them in the field (9). The Brigade is a unit especially conceived to break a strongly organized enemy line; its action is mainly based on the presence of two battalions of heavy tanks (break tanks). These battalions must enter in the adversary's defensive system like a wedge, opening a breach where all the other un its, designed to widen and exploit the success. will rapidly be thrown" . "The armoured Brigade's essential character is that it must act in immediate and very close connection with other support

1Po M 30

command, liaison, etc .. that it will be interesting to see solved in the field". The armoured Brigade was born officially with Circular no. 44150 of July 6, 1937, a little over a month before the scheduled manoeuvres. According to it for the time being - two new un its of this type were to be established: the 1st Brigade, through the transformation of the preexisting mechanized Brigade, and the 2nd, brand-new, starting from Ju ly 15. Compared with the formation experimented during the preceding summer, the organization appeared much more complex. In fact, the unit was based on the combination, in almost equal parts, of armour-

ed elements (battalions of break ta nks and battalions of assault tanks). with motorized elements (transported Bersaglieri battalions). In addition, there were elements designed for reconnaissance and security (motorcycle company), elements for antitank defence (two 47 mm gu n companies) and anti-aircraft (one 20 mm battery), others capable of ensuring the continuity of movement and action (a mixed company of motorized Engineers) and, when required, various artillery and service support units. This structure, which incidenta lly - was very similar to the one adopted by the Tank Group in Spain, had been studied in view of the adoption of the 8T tank (later "M11") which, however, was only employed two years later. And, as a matter of fact, the summary establishment data listed in Publication 3300 (Handbook of Organic-TechnicalLogistic Data) of January 3. 1938, provided the Brigade with a force of 86 break tanks (with one machine gun and one cannon each) and 48 assault tanks (with 2 machine guns each); this v1as not found in any of the lists annexed to the abovementioned Circular no. 44150. Also, from the study of the "da ta " mentioned before, it appears that the 68 vehicles of the Bersaglieri regiment are defined "special cars", i.e. "all-terra in" trucks. THE 1st MANOEUVRE BRIGADE The "National Manoeuvres Year XV", which took place from August 13 to Agust 18, 1937 presupposed the possibility of a landing in western Sicily, with beachheads around Marsala and Mazara. After three days, on the 16th, the "Reds", which had landed with 3 Divisions, plus a fourth one kept in reserve, attacked. On the 17th, they called in the 1st Armoured Brigade (Gen . Ouarra) which had landed at Mazara and was assembled at Castelvetrano after repelling the "Blue" group that had been detached there.

Passing north of Partanna, it headed left, behind the front of the "Blues", who were putting up a very strong resistance, while the "Pelor itana" Divi§ion was coming to their help. The action was at its peak when, from Sa nta Ninfa, the "Blue" Command, in i~s turn, threw the "Nucleo Celere " ag ainst the left flank of the armoured Brigade. At this point the exercise could be considered terminated, and from the conclusions that were drawn at the final meeting it emerged, among other thing s, that even with those already obsolete means and with largely incomplete formations, poss ible landings cou ld be repelled (to be true, this evaluation was too optimistic, and disproved by the events that followed) . In the meantime, the new Chief of Staff, Gen. Pariani, con firmed the theory of the "unitary and integral mobile war", perfected by Gen. Ba istrocchi. But the latter had, wisely, stressed many t imes the need for a strong artillery support and for air support, warning, in so man y words, that "withou L fi re one cannot advan ce" . Nevertheless, even more interesti ng and well -ce ntered lessons were learnt from the manoeuvres in Sicily. The Army Corps in Pa lermo, t ransm itting its "Considerations and Recommendations" regarding the employment of the armoured Brig ade on August 17, 1937 - after stating that the unit had operated in reduced numbers (the two 47 mm gun companies had 70 men instead of 180, the Bersaglieri were 550 in stead of 800 and the break tanks were only 20 instead of 90). and, moreover, it had to operate in a depth not appropriate for its possibilities. without a suitable artillery preparation, with its flanks exposed and at unfavourable hours - suggested t he doubling of the assau lt tank component and new procedures of employment. The Brigade, in ord er to open a breach of 1500 m, wou ld have to operate in bulk and by surprise : the break tanks would be followed by assault tanks and then by infantry; the 47 mm

pieces should be rendered more mobile by tra cked tractors, whil e communications stil l needed improvements. On the other hand, the theoretical importance given to reconnaissance with the expression "to surprise and not be surprised" was not supported by facts . The armoured Brigade, which had not been assigned any artillery in order to avoid overwe ig ht, lacked a real reconnaissance un it. probably due to lack of modern armoured cars (and perhaps to avoid employing the Ansa ldo-Lancias of 1915-·18, which were "out of production" and could not be replaced). Nevertheless the idea t hat the army needed many Major armoured Uni ts was by then acknowledged at all levels. The expansion of the colonial empire had made the problem worse, and Marshal Graziani, on December 1, 1937, declared that if Eth iopi a (of wh ich he was Viceroy) was to be defended autonomously, he should be given no less than three armou red Brigades and six batta lions of tanks and armoured cars. We believe nevertheless that, apart from any other consideration, neither Gen. Baistrocchi nor Gen. Paria ni - who replaced him as Under Secretary for War are to be blamed for the unpreparedness of the Italian Army in this specifi sector. Gen. Baistrocchi had, in fact, started a program me of modernization in two phases: 1933-1936 and 19361939, only one of which was he able to complete, i.e. the one that was aimed at correcting the most outsta nding deficiencies. Having Gen. Baistrocchi been forced to resign on October 7, 1936, the programme was slowed down for lack of funds and the orders for 160 medium tan ks and 48 light t anks were also cancelled. But it should also be mentioned that Gen. Pariani resig ned in 1937 because he was refused the 20 billion Lire he considered necessary for the replacement of the old equ ipment. H_e agreed to remain in office on ly after being satisfied that, at least until 1943-1 944, Italy would not get involved in

other military adventures. Thus. the second phase could begin only when, in July 1938, he was granted 5 billion Lire. and, given t he scanty approp ria tion and the priority given to the replacement of obsolete artilleries (10). he could assign only 400 million to tanks. FROM BRIGADE TO ARMOURED DIVISION The results of the employment of the armoured Brigade in Sicily, especially if compared with what was being done ab road, stirred up heated controversies among experts of this very interesting problem. The first to start the discussion was, in January 1938, Gen. Edoardo Oua rra . In his article "On Major Armoured Units". published by the "Rivista di Fanteria" he affirmed that it would be su itable to modify and improve the existi ng Brigades. Gen. Carlo De Simone followed, on the same review. with a well documented article titled " Is it Expedient to Transform the Armoured Brigade into an Armoured Division?". Gen. De Simone was Commander of the 2nd Brigade and, though he had never carried out larg e scale ma noeuvres, had nevertheless studied carefully the exercises of the 1st Brigade, and promoted studies and evaluations on the employment of such un its. His t heses, more comprehensive then Gen. Ouarra·s. con cern ed , first of all, the equi pment. Starting from the fact that only a part of his tanks were armed wi th cann ons, he stressed the need for more anti-tank weapons and for an increase in tan ks from 120 to 210 (al most doubling thei r number) . But, while the tank problem, given the standing orders, seemed to be heading toward a solution, Gen. De Simone appeared to be more concerned about the (9) The armoured Brigade belonged to th e invading party. (10} Regarding the events concern ing the preparations for WWII, see: State Maggiore dell'Esercito - Ufficio Storico: "L" Eserc ito Italiano alla vigilia della 2• Guerra Mondiale" - Roma, 1982.

weakness of the rest. He sa id that it could be useful to transform the Brigade into a Divis ion on condition that the latter could have a greater fire power at its disposal. The Bersag lieri regiment shou ld have acqu ired an other battalion, and be completely carried by "al l terrain" protected trucks. As in the Panzer Division,. it was necessary to have an air flight, but they should be fig hter planes. But the arti llery rema in ed the crucia l problem. Self -propel led guns were lacking and, at this point. rather than equipping the two battalions with obsolete and unsuitable materia l it was better to stay at Brigade level. Otherwise, the operation wo.uld on ly distort the image of the new formation, "impairing the con fidence that - as is the case for any other new means - also in this case is essential for progress". Another contribution of thought was given by Gen. Paolo Berardi (who was to be Army Chief of Staff after the armistice) . He came from the artillery, and in his writing "About the Armoured Brigade, or Division if You Prefer", which appeared in the same Review on May 1938, believed that tanks were more suitable for exploiting success rather than in a break-through action. For this reason. he maintained, the Brigade shou ld have at its disposal, for this phase of the battle, armoured personnel carriers, which, on the other hand, had already been suggested by Gen. De Simone. Berard i's article, wh ich was not devoid of some polemic tones, received an answer on the same issue of the periodica i by Gen . Ouarra, who favoured without reservation the transforma tion of the unit into a division and the in dependent action of the new formations. That the General Staff was by then oriented towards the mechanization and immediate transformation foreseen by Circular 9000 of the following autumn, cou ld also be inferred by an "Extract and Mem orandum about the Armoured Division", dated May 10, 1938. The statement began with a discuss ion on Circular 10600 of

July 20, 1937, about the tasks of the armoured Brigade, which as Gen. Berardi had already po inted out - was deemed more suited for manoeuvre actions rather than for break ing large defensive fronts (which coul d indeed be excluded, un less the enemy was short of antitank weapons). With these premises. the document proposed a Division consisting of four battalions of "M" (medium) tanks and one of "P" (pesanti = heavy) tanks . These latter had not yet been ordered from the manufacturers. The reconnaissance element would cons ist of one motorcycle company, one armoured car company and one self-propel led antitank company. Use less to say, both the armoured cars and the self-propel led antitank guns were sti ll in the pre-production stage. In fact, they could be tested only at the end of 1939. The armoured "all-terrain" vehicle, on the other hand, was completed on ly in

1943. T he infantry would be represented by a Bersaglieri regiment made up of three battalions with one company of machine guns on motorcycles, one antit ank company and one antiaircraft company. Above all, the artil lery component, regarding some materials, was anything but sufficient: one regiment, consisting of three motorized battal ions, armed with 75/18 mm . mod. 35, 100/17 mm . mod. 14, and 105/28 mm. mod. 13 guns. It is true that it was expected that some sti ll inexistent self-propelled battal ions would be added (the studies for these pieces , 75 mm. gu ns mounted on the hull of a 6 ton tank. wil l start only in 1939) . This sector was comp leted by three antiaircraft batteries, (probably 20 mm.} . Âˇ Th is Major Unit, of course, was equipped with elements of Eng ineers, one transportation unit a;1d various divisional serv ices. Another source (11) reports that the outline of the organization drafted in the autumn of 1938 prov ided for 2 armoured Divisions (one of which could be divided in two halves) made up by 1 regiment of 4 tank batta lions,

1 Bersag lieri regiment of 3 battalions, 1 artillery regiment of 2 batta lions and two 20 mm . batteries, 1 company of Engineers and serv ices (1 Medical section, 1 commissary section, and 1 mixed transportation unit) . The scheme shows that the General Staff was, in any case, ready to establ ish the Division, equ ipp ing it with what was avai lable, as the unknown author of the "memorandum" of 1938 concluded. Indeed, contrary to what . was clearly shown in the scheme annexed to the document. he suggested the temporary establishment of 2 Bersag lieri battalions on motorcycles instead of 3 motorized battal ions, without taking in to account the remarkable difference between the two units. which were hardly interchangeable. There was no mention of the protected veh icles proposed by Gen. De Simone and Gen. Oua rra. The studies on doctrine contin ued very actively. We have already mentioned Circular 9000 of October 28, 1938 ("T he Tactical Doctrine in the Realizations of the Year XVI"), which provided for the adoption of what Liddell Hart called "the indirect approach", which in our case meant a manoeuvre on the flanks. It urged "Commanders and Staffs to adopt a vigorous operative action through movement and manoeuvre. which rea lizes its effects and emphasizes them". Still in view of a "rapid course war", a handbook was publ ished (Circular 3446 on "The Employment of Tank Units"), based on these new concepts. The important directive, dated December 1, 1938, defined the tank. firs t of al l, as "an auxiliary means for infantry and fast troops and a fundamenta l element of Ma jor armoured Un its" assigning to "motor-cyclists and machinegunners on motorcycles, who followed the tanks, the task ~o assure the possession of the conquered ground and exploit

(1 1) Stato Maggiore, dell'Eserc ito Uffi cio Storico: "L' Esercito Italiano tra la 1" e la 2" Guerra Mondiale". Roma. 1954.

THE ARMOURED DIVISION IN 1942

C) X

IOI I C)

~ 20

M41

~a~~ the action, by pursuing the retreating enemy". Everything was now ready for the big step and, indeed, the "Parian i Establishment", which provided in fact for two armoured Divisions, was approved within a few days, on December 22, 1938. On February 1, 1939, the 1st Brigade became thus the 132nd "Ariete" Armoured Division and the following April 20, through the transformation of the 1st Brigade, the 131st "Centa uro" Armoured Division was born. Finally, on September 18 of the sa me year, the 133rd "Littori o" Divisi on ca me into being (12) (in advance of the definitive Establishment of May 9, 1940, which will provide for three armoured Divisions). The "Ariete", though still incom plete, had a chance to participate in the important exercises that took place in the NorthWest of the Peninsula, from August 6 to August 11 : the last exercises before the war. The Division's outdated equipment raised some doubts among those who witnessed them; the establishment was subsequently strengthened, but not even in the immin ence of the war did

105

the Unit possess all the medium tanks required by the table of establish ment (13). THE ITALIAN ARMOURED DIVISIONS IN THE FIELD The first employment in war of the new units t ook place on the Greek-Alban ian front and afterwards, in 1941, in North Africa. Their theoretic structure did not undergo substantial changes in the first two years of war, apart as we shall see later, from the addition of a reconnaissance unit, the renewal of the equi pmen t and the improvement of the artillery and services. Probably they represented the most ba lanced armoured formations among those of the Europea n armies. In fact, the French armoured Division, although it had 2 battalions of light tanks and two of heavy tanks, had only one infan try battalion and two 105 mm. batta lions; more or less similar was the British Armoured Division, which, moreover, had the disadvantage of having only one artillery group. On the con trary, the Panzer Division, whic h had started with one tank Brigade and one infantry Brigade

90 + 20

- which was too much for only two 105 mm battalions - decreased its tanks gradually, down to on ly one regiment: the Pan zergrenadier component was kept at the initial level (1 regiment on protected vehicles and 1 motori zed regiment). strengthening at the same time the artillery and Engineers.

(1 2) It derived its name and part of its personnel from an assault infantry Division. (13) War establishment of the armoured Division: • Division Hqs.; • 1 tank regiment; , 1 Bersaglieri regiment (3 battalions: 1 motorcycle bn. and 2 moto rized bns.) ; • one 47 / 32 mm. company and 1 tran sportation unit: • 1 artillery regim ent (two 75/27 mm. battalions and two 20 mm. anti-aircraft batteries); • 1 mixed company of Engineers; • 1 divisional 47 /32 mm. anti-tank comp any; • services (1 medical section, 1 com missary section, 1 mixed transportation unit) . Altogether: 273 officers. 484 noncommissioned officers and 6682 troops, 76 submachine guns, 410 machine guns, 16 20 mm. guns, 8 47 mm. guns, 24 75 mm. guns, 184 cannons 37 mm.; • 581 motor-vehi cles. 1170 motorcycles, 48 tractors; , 184 " M " tanks.

SP 14/41 with 75 mm. gun.~ One must stress the presence, in all foreign ma jor units, of a reconnaissance unit and , in the Anglo-American forces, the high mechanizat ion of the Engineers. It would seem that al l t he belligerent powers were inspired by the Italian model whi le, just in 1943, our army cha nged its course completely. But let us proceed in chronological order and follow the vicissitudes of the establishment in the war years . The experiences of the first operations in North Africa conv inced our General Staff to improve and strengthen the organization of our ar moured divisions and to f ix once and for all their standards of employment w ith Circular no. 18000. In detail. the new war formations established w ith Circular no. 035000/304 provided for: • Armoured Division Hqs.; • Brigade Hqs. (Tank regiment and Bersaglieri reg iment); • 1 tank regiment (3 battalions of "M" tanks, 1 20 mm . antia ircraft company, 1 un it for ma intenance and repai r ; • Bersaglieri ~eg iment (1 motor cycle company, 2 motorized battalions. 1 support and antiaircraft weapon battalion, 1 transportation unit) ; • Divis ional antitank battalion (two 47 mm. gun companies, possibly self-propelled); • 1 artillery regiment for armoured Division [two 75/ 27 or 34 mm. battalions, one 105/ 28 mm . battalion, one 20 mm. antiaircraft section. 1 mixed antiaircraft battalion (two 90/53 mm . and two 20 mm. motorized gun batteries) and two 75/ 18 or 34 mm. selfpropelled battalions] ; • 1 mixed Engineer battalion (1 sapper company, 1 signal company); • serv ices. Of course t his involved a remarkable increase in personnel and equipment (14), even greater if one adds the presence, outs ide t he establishment, of a reconnaissance unit or group with armoured cars or "L6" tanks. In the beginni ng, a type of "powerful" armoured Division had also been studied , consisting of: 48

• 1 reconnaissance unit; • 2 Brigades, each with 1 "M" tank regiment. 1 Bersaglier i regiment and 1 antitank and antiaircraft battalion; • 2 artillery regiments. one with two 75/1 8 mm. self-propelled battalions and two 105/ 28 mm. battalions, one with two mixed battalions of 90/ 53 mm. and 20 mm . guns; • services. As we shall see, th is project will be resumed in 1943. Accord ing to the or ig ina l wartime prog ramme a fou rth Division. namely the 134th "Freccia", was also envisaged. but never established. The other three, as we said, were widely rearranged: the " Centauro" and "Littorio" fought in the Ba lkans and finally joined the "Ariete " in Africa, w here they were destroyed , after g iving proof of remarkable war capabil it ies. THE ARMOURED CAVALRY DIVISIONS The prev iously mentioned programme of improvements considered in i 942 (accordlng to t he estab lishment approved on t he 28th of November of the preced ing year) , tw o more ar-· moured Divisions, one of which was to be obtained through the transformation of the 2nd "Celere". The first measure taken was the "armouring" of the " Lancieri d i Vittorio Emanuele II" regiment, wh ich was t o have the formation of a tank regiment. With a Circular of April 21, 1942, t he 2nd "Celere" assumed the name and establishment of the armoured Division "Emanuele Fi liberto Testa di Ferro" (134th instead of 136th, as it should have been ). On July 15, also a regiment (the re-established "Lancieri di Montebello" ) w ith two armoured battalions. became part of the Major Unit. But , unexpectedly, on Ju ly 27, the transformation was given up: the armoured regiment was replaced by the "N izza" regiment. and the Div is ion be 0 came again the 2nd " Celere". The "Littorio", "Montebello" , the CXXXIV mixed battalion of Engineers and two heavy mobile

workshops remained at the General Staff's d isposa l until, en April 1, 1943, together with the re-esta blished regiment "Cavalleggeri di Lucca", they became part of the armoured cavalry Division "Ariete" (1 35th ). The unit came to include: • Hqs.; • reconna issance armoured group "Lan cieri di Montebel lo"; • armoured regiment "Lancieri di Vittor io Emanuele II "; • motorized regiment "Cavalleggeri di Lucca"; • CXXXI battalion 75/ 34 mm. selfpropelled and anti-tank g uns; • 135th ar moured artillery regim ent (twenty-four 100/ 22 mm . pieces for t he I and II battalion ; t welve 149/19 mm. pieces for t he Il l battalion; twelve 90/ 53 mm. pieces for t he IV batta lion); • 235th antita nk and self-propel led artillery regiment (twentyfour 75/ 34 mm. guns for t he XX and the XXI battalion and t welve 105/25 mm. self-propelled guns for the DCI); • CXXXIV -mixed Eng ineer batta lion; • services (15). VOLUNTEERS AND LEGIONNAIRES A last armoured Division had been planned, wh ich had been ca lled "Giovan i Fascisti" (136t h}. It had been decidec that it would be obta ined through the (14) Wi th the changes made up to Nov. 11, 1942, it in cluded: • 457 officers, 657 NCOs. 8773 t roops, 64 submach ine-guns, 80 machine-guns. 24 ant itank rifles. 9 81 mm. mortars. th irty- four 20 mm. guns, s ixteen 3? or 47 mm. guns, 32 75 mm. g uns, 8 90 mm. g uns; • 644 motorcycles. 1494 mo tor-ve hicles and tracto rs. 12 trailers, 12 waggons; • 7 armoured cars. 1a· comm and tanks. 192 "M" tanks. 21 SP 47 mm. guns. and 36 SP 75 m m. g u ns. ( 15) T he ac tual force of t he "Ariete II" is not c erta in: according to one source. it should have had between 7500 and 9000 men, with 50 armou red :::ars. 40 " M 42" ta nks. 157 se lf- pro pelled guns. 92 heavy machine g uns (20 mm.). and 12 SP 47 /32 mm. guns, pl us 1000 motorcycles and about 2000 veh icles. Anoth er source, also fro m the " Uffic io Storico d ello Stato M ag g iore d ell'Eserci to", reduces th e a rmou red means to only 176.

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transformation of the "Bersaglieri d' Africa" Division on October 14, 1942, but the idea was soon abandoned; subsequently it was transformed in an infantry Division on February 24, 1943. Nevertheless, in the spring of the same year, a new armoured Major Unit was being formed, the "Camicie Nere" Armoured Division {or "M"). It was founded in the area of Chiusi (Siena). on April 23, 1943, with carefully screened personnel, in part veterans of various fronts (particularly the eastern front). Some of the officers were even War College graduates. The weapons were to be presented by the German Waffen-SS and, in fact, by the end of May, German tanks, artillery and automatic weapons arrived, together with 33 SS instructors, plus 35 armour experts from the Royal Italian Army. By Hie end of June the core of the unit was ready, and on Ju ly 10 a battle group could perform with dignity in a live fire manoeuvre nea r the Capital. Afterwards, the "M" Division, although Incomplete, was put under the direct command of the General Staff oÂˇf the Army, just four days before the well known political events of the 25th of July. In August, the General Staff, having replaced the Commander (Cons. General Lusana) with Gen. Calvi di Bergo lo, former Commander of the "Centauro" Division in Tunisia, gave the Division the name of that unit. Then it started to improve it with every available means, with the intent of establishing again two reliable armoured Major Units. Despite this, on the day of the armistice, September 8, the 136th legionary armoured Division "Centauro" was far from the envisioned formation. Only the "Ariete", though lacking in training, was now complete, but, even to its Commander, Gen. Raffaele Cadorna, 1t appeared "short in motorized infantry", so that he had asked, in vain, that it be reinforced with a Bersaglieri regiment (16). On the other hand, the components, destined to reconnaissance (recce armoured groups) were very powerful: 50

t hose were just the ones that had been so much lacking in North Africa, while the artillery equipment was particularly abundant (the serious inadequacies of 1938 had at last been redressed). The standards of employment were still those listed in Circular no. 18000. It outlined t he main trends concerning the armoured Division: nothing to object about its doctrinal contents, which clearly reflected both the German experiences and those made during the African operations (there was a whole chapter devoted to the employment of tank un its in the desert) with the right emphasis on the cooperation of these units with the other special branches of the Army.

THE RECONSTRUCTION The tragic period 1943-1945, with the forced disbandment of the best units of the Army and particularly of the two surviving armoured units, prevented, both in the north and in the south, the participation of Italian armoured Major Units in t he operations t hat took place in our Peninsula until May 1945. In fact, the attempt to reestablish, with the press communique of October 4, 1943, the "1st Armoured Division 'M'" failed, and the following December 31 was officially abandoned. The Germans, on their part. did not keep the promise (made on October 16, 1943 on the protocol) to arm and thain at Wunsdorf an Italian armoured Division, which was to be ready at the end of 1944. On the Anglo-American side, the attitude on the matter was equally negative and no tank contingent could take part in the war of liberation. With this regard, it must be pointed out that the company of flame-thrower tanks "L35" could not join the 1st Motorized Group, of which it was to become part. and that the 32nd regiment, the only tank unit which had survived, being stationed in Sardinia, was disbanded on October 2, 1944. Anyway, despite the contingent difficulties, in 1946 the Ita lian Army was already engaged in the reconstrCJction of the ar-

moured arm, with the institution - on the 1st of July of the same year - of the Armoured-car School of Tor di Quinto (Rome), which later (July 1948) became t he Armoured Cavalry School, and collected the equipment that the Allies were leaving behind in Italy - often "demilitarizing" them by cutting away the guns in special yards for armoured vehicles. With the Tank School, opened on October 1, 1947 at t he Forte T iburtino, in Rome, the training organization was completed, while the training of personnel destined to the future armoured units proceeded at the other Schools (Artillery and Engineer) .. With the ratification of the Peace Treaty of 1948, with which it accepted to reduce to 200 the number of medium and heavy tanks that could eq ui p the renewed army, Italy started the formation of a few armoured units, appropriately dividing the small fraction of permitted means. Having discarded "a priori"

the solution of re-establishing an armoured Division based on the formations of 1942 - of course with more modern eq uipment classified according to the actual tonnage of 1948 ("L" tanks up to 14 tons, "M" tanks up to 32 tons, and "P" tanks, approximately 52 tons). and owing to the fact that there were no li mitations on light tanks, armoured cars and self-propelled guns, it was preferred, mainly for budgetary reasons, to turn to a different organ ization: a certain number of armoured Brigades. The 1947 plan - which certainly took into account a proposal made by Maj. Gifuni, an artillery officer who, just in that period, had scrutinized the problem in a long article appeared in the "Military Review" ("Organization of the Armoured Troops in the New Italian Army" ) - provided in fact for three Divisions, two of which were to inherit the name and traditions of the "Ariete" and "Centauro". Meanwhile it was necessary to count on the actual immediate

assets. which were M4 "Sherman" tanks. left from the war. This was due to the fact that "Ansaldo-Fossati" - which, until Decem ber 1944 had eroduced the "P40" tanks, the performance of which was more or less that of the America n "M 24" - has been closed in 1946. Therefore, the Army Genera l Staff, with Circular 2510 Ord . (UR/40/ P/2) of September 30, 1948, tempora rily established the fol lowing organization: • Hqs. company, 2 ta nk companies (1 Hq platoon and 2 tan k platoons each) and 1 transporta tion company, for a tota l of 27 offi cers and 367 other ranks (a ltogether 394 men); • 24 tan ks, 8 armoured vehicles of various types, 12 tractors, 12 trai lers, 5 light tracked vehi cles, 44 vehicles and 17 motorcycles. This could permit, employing the "Sherman " as the only medium tank, the formation of 3 regiments of two battalions each, en ough for the three Brigades proposed by Maj. Gifun i. The partici pation in the Atlantic I reaty (NATO) ratified on August 24, 1949 - a few days after the armoured Brigade "Ariete" had been completed and presented to the Minister of Defence at Pia na della Comi na, near Pordenone, on July 25 sped up the programme and allowed the avai lability of more equipment. According to the Circular dated December 1, 1948 (Prot.

no. 350) no. 2930/ Ord./l., the new Brigade would have had the following tasks: • offensive action against weakly orga nized enemy; • preventive occupation of important locations; • exploitation of success; • counterattack (reserve to be kept united); • protection of wi thdrawal. The establishment was similar to the pre-war one: • Brigade Hqs. and Hqs. com pany; • 8th Bersaglieri regiment; • 132th tank regiment; • 132th armoured artillery regiment ; • "Guide" armoured cavalry troop (9 light tanks, 9 "Greyhound" armoured cars, 5 "Scout" cars; • Engin eers com pany (3 Engineers platoons, 1 bridge-laying platoon); • signal company (platoon until 1950) ; • transport unit (9 motorcycles and 68 other vAhicles); • mobile stocks, mobile work shop, Carabinieri unit, servi ces. But, as we said, with the joining of NATO a greater number of ta nks became avai lable and, with Circular SM E Ord . no. 2850/ Ord.II (UR/40/ P/3). dated Decem ber 1, 1949, the tank battalion took on an esta blishment more adeq uate to the requirements:

• Hqs. company (Command er, Officers of the Hqs.); • 3 ta nk companies (1 Hqs . platoon and 3 tank platoons ea ch ); • transport company, for a tota l of 530 men (35 officers and 495 other ra nks). The following types of "Sherman " M4 tanks were in service: • Command tanks : 1; • tanks with 17 lbs. gun (1 per platoon: 3; 3 per company: 9; • ta nks with 105 mm. gun (Hqs . plus 2 in the Hqs. company): 11; company: 2; company Hqs. platoons: 2): 8; • tan ks with 75/37 mm. gun (Hqs. company: 1; tank platoons: 2): 22. Furthermore, the Hqs. company had 5 reconnaissan ce armoured vehicles and 3 Scout Cars. Altogether, the new battalion had 42 tanks, 8 armou red vehicles, 22 motorcycles, 54 vehicles, 6 lig ht tracked vehicles, 15 Diamond-Rogers tractors and trailers. The prompt supply of "M4" tan ks. therefore, allowed, in the financial year 1951-52, the completion of the second armoured (16) It is hard to explain the reason why th e reconna issance units, destined to recce and con tact action s (the cavalry's traditional tasks) should have been formed also by Bersaglieri, who were to be employed. instead, as armoured infantry. The Bersaglieri were defi nitively assigned this ro le, as suggested by Maj. Gifuni in 7947, only after the war.

THE ARMOURED DIVISION IN 1963 XX

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1.on

Brigade "Centauro", whose reestablishment had been ordered by the Army General Staf.f on April 15, 1951 . The Brigade could be paraded on the National Holiday of June 2, along the Via dei Fori lmperiali, the fol lowing year. The establis hment was more or less the same and included: • Brigade Hqs.; • Armoured cavalry troop "Lodi"; • 3rd Bersaglieri regiment (2 battalions); • 31st tank regiment (2 battalions); • 131st armoured artillery regiment (two self-propelled 105 mm. battalions, 1 antitank selfpropelled 76/50 mm. battalion and 1 motorized antiaircraft 40/ 56 mm. battalion; • Engineer companyi • Signal company; • mobile stocks, mobile workshop, medical section, commissary section (17). As we mentioned before, in 1948, considering the performance of the new means ("new" is c1 euphemism for in real ity their plan ning and production dated back to the period 19421944), after the study of the results obtained in training under the unvaried dispositions of Circular 18000, and keeping in mind the war experiences, the "Ariete" Brigade had been able to work out the general standards of employment and the procedures for each element of the Major Unit, thus giving a valuable contribution to the drawing up of the new tactical regulations which were being prepared by the Army General Staff. The norms conformed to Circ. 2600 of 1950 "Outlines of Employment of the Infantry Division"), which assigned to the Major Armoured Units the task to exploit success, after the infantry Division had opened a breach in the enemy lin es. Meanwhile, the den unciation of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty and the subsequent arrival from the U.S. of as many as 800 "M 26" medium tanks and "modern" "M 47s'' al lowed the Army to start the 52

transformation of the Brigades into Divisions - just as had been done some ten year earlier increasing from 2 to 3 the number of the tank and Bersaglieri battalions and that of the self-propelled artillery battalions of the 3 regiments . This transformation, begun towards the end of 1952, constituted an actual strengthening of the Major Units . A document (Historical Memoirs) shows that the "Ariete" at that date possessed the following: • 78 light tracked vehicles, 73 "Half-Tracks", 29 Scout Cars, 9 "M 8" armoured cars; • 1 protected truck; • 9 "M 24" tanks, 15 "Stuart" tanks, 144 "M 4" tan ks, 16 command tanks, 20 special tanks, 6 demilitarized tanks, 156 "M 47" tanks; • 76 self-propelled 105 mm. and 90 mm. guns ; 12 self-·propelled 76/50 mm. guns and 1 tracked motor-crane. The replacement of the M 4 "Sherman" was already completed in November 1952, while the 3rd sel f-propelled 105/22 mm. battalion (two batteries) was formed as part of the 132nd artillery regiment. SOME CONCLUSIVE CONSIDERATIONS As it seems demonstrated, after the uncertainties and delays of the early thirties, the Italian Army, choosing the doctrine of the "rapid course war" (18), in 1938 was oriented towards mechanization and, theoreticall·y, had placed itself on the most advanced positions. The creation of land forces, which were second to none, was nevertheles hindered by the persisting deficiencies in training and equipment. Let us point o.ut that there had been the inten tion to transform two of the three "Celeri" into armoured Divisions and that the planned goals were not reached mainly because of the scarcity of the available re sources. Other drawbacks and problems sprang from the choice - not always an easy one - of the cadres for the new un its, whose personnel, besides being enthu-

siastic and motivated, had to possess the necessary technical knowledge. And yet, every un it had been requested to report all officers with previous tank ex perience or those who were thought suitable to be assi!;ned to such units. Having examined all that was bei ng done abroad, it was a corn, mon be lief that our armoured Division, although less heavy than the others, was capable of carrying out successfully its assigned tasks. It was also acknowledged that - still from the theoretical point of view - the next war would be fought also on terra ins other than the Alpine frontiers (19) . Even the Germans had to admit that their doctrine was similar to the Italian one, at least in the theoretical general lines, if not in the executive details. But the means, above all, remained qualitatively and quantitatively inferior when compared to the needs. In the post-war period, instead, the various assumptions deriving from the even more changeable politicy-military situation induced the Army to go

back to the three armoured Divisions of 1940. Only after some time could it be ascertained that it was too ambitious to stay at those levels, even though there was no need to worry about the equipment. for, in the framework of the U.S. military aid; there were the 250 tanks, the 100 selfpropelled gu ns and the 450 armoured vehicles needed by each Major Unit. Lt. Col. Ferruccio Botti Dr. Nicola Pignato

(77) In 1951, the Brigade had the fol lowin g armoured means: • 731 light tracked vehicles, 66 Half Tracks, 66 Scout Cars, 9 "Greyhound" armoured cars; • 10 "Stuart" tanks, 9 "M 24" tanks, 58 "M 4" tanks w ith 75/37 mm. guns; 26 with 76/55 mm. guns and 16 with 1•) 5/22 mm. guns, 77 SP guns and 31 special tanks. (18) "That is to say, a war that demands the destruct ion of the enemy forces in the shortest possible time: convergence of efforts and rapidity of conduct" (Gen. Pariani). (19) "The variety of the terra in on wh ich we may be ca lled to operate and the very different forms of combat in which we can find ourselves fighting" (Gen. Pariani).

THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT TO THE NATO MOBILE FORCE Ever since 1963 Italy has made a substantial c0ntribution to the NATO Mobile Focce AMF(L) in the form of the "Susa" Alpine Battalion, the 40th mountain artiffery battery, the 101 st air-transportable field hospital and variou s other subunits of the "Taurinense" Alpine

ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION The "Susa" battalion, the 40th battery, one TOW antitank platoon, one pioneer platoon, one signals platoon and a hel icopter squadron are employed as an air-transportable " light infantry" tactical group. A similar organization has been adopted by all the other countries that. like Italy, must contribute to the AMF(L). i.e. Belgium. Canada. West Germany, the UK, Luxembourg and the USA. In addition to the "Taurinense" units , the AMF(L) enjoys also transport support from the 46th Airlift Brigade of the Italian Air Force (which, with its "C-130" and G-222, flies missions for the units when they deploy in their zone of operations) and a "flight" of reconnaissance fighters. In ord er to maintain the degree of efficiency required by :hese activities, the Italian conti ng ent receives thorough training, which is followed with a watchful eye by central military authorities. This extra attention does not amount to much - a few extr;3 officers or language courses run by the Army School of Foreign Languages inside the "Taurinense" Brigade. However, it also means being issued with equipment suitabl e for the probable operation areas. wh ich is replaced or supplemented at regular intervals. Then there is the additional attraction of often being chosen to try out new equipment. The contingent is kept under the watchful eye of a speci al group of personnel operating through the OP section of the "Taurinense" Brigade HO.

Brigade, to which all the above units belong. The statutory task of the AMF(L) is to a!fow rapid intervention in contingency areas in the Allied Countries in which it is necessary to demonstrate the solidarity of NATO members vis -a-vis a threat of aggression by the Warsaw Pact. Th e deterrent function of this intervention is the principal

military and political aim of the AMF(L) itself. Th e premises on which the efficiency and readiness of these forces are based consist of their constant readiness, the possibility of transporting them rapidly to the crisis area and their perfect training, all of which are coordinated by careful planning.

This group maintains contact with the AMF(L) HO in Heidelberg, Germany, and takes part in all the planning and study meetings which are held at frequent interva ls in various parts of Europe. This ra ther hectic activity is vetted by the COs of al l the major components of the contingent and takes the form of planning meetings, study periods spent in the contingency areas, which range from Cape North to Anatolia, of reconnaissance, refresher courses and briefing sessions, and above all of con tinual exercises in the respective contingency areas.

The .exercise itself is divided into the following stag es: • preparation; • deployment; • deterrent stage; • combat stage; • return.

EXERCISES WITH TROOPS The most exacting of all the activities of the contingent units is obviously the annua l field exercise. This is an extremely interesting activity from the professional point of view and provides a rare peacetime occasion for testing all tactical and organizational aspects of movement, deployment and occupying positions, tactics. and the handling of men, materials, equ ipment and vehicles under highly realistic conditions. The "Susa" air-transporta ble tactical group goes on these exercises in Denmark one year and in Norway the next. Although the exercises are basically similar, the one in Norway is more stimulating, partly because of the difficulties of the terrain, and partly because it allows the Alpini to operate in the conditions for which they have been trained.

Preparation The preparation stage is extrem ely important for a unit in which 60-70% of the officers, 10-20% of the NCOs and often 100% of the other ranks are new to the game; furthermore, 30-40% of the latter have been in uniform for not more than three months. Trai ning, which is generally centered around the specific task of the "Susa" battalion, is gradually stepped up, leave is curtailed. night-time and continuous training extended and the linkup with antitank and pioneer units enhanced. This specific training programme calls for: • an initial period of training refinement which is more or less the same for everyone, irrespective of their specialization; • a period of further training at squad and platoon level, with special emphasis on night fighting and the continuous battle; • lectures and demonstration sessions held by officers from battalion HO, as well as by company and battery commanders, on the developm ent of the exercise as a whole, standard procedures. field umpiring, conditions of pay, lega l responsibility, etc., behaviour while travelling and during the stay in the host country;

• for Norway, suitable ski and survivability training periods under Arctic conditions, while in Denmark the accent is placed on the principles of mechanized infantry fighting. This training cycle is carried out mostly away from the base and is concluded by a field exercise with opposing forces selected from within the tactical group. Also to be planned during the preparation stage is the transportation of about 900 men and more than 150 vehicles of the tactical group from their base to the deployment zone. This transport involves movement: • partly by rail, partly by motor convoy from the bases to the airport of departure; • of non air-transportable vehicles from the bases to the port of embarkation or load ing station; • of all personnel by air from the departure airport; • of vehicles by sea or rail. Each of the above operations necessitates a vast amount of national, international and NATO documentation being drafted, which consists mainly of: • movement plans for ordinary and rail routes; • embarkation and flight plans based on the load configurations supplied by the Air Force; • permits to transport arms through the transit countries. Since it takes 5-6 days to air-lift the personnel, in order to· ensure that this stage is carried out correctly it is important to divide the units up into suitablysized echelons, whose arrival in the deployment zone must take place in accordance with the activity programmes previously agreed upon with AMF(L) HO, a:1':I above all taking into account the date of arrival of the vehicles and equipment arriving by ra il or sea. The preparation stage taxes to the full the capacity of the logistical apparatus of the units responsible for carrying out specific checks and other operations in the various service sectors.

The medical service· must mes, nets and non-reflecting carry out a special examination tarpaulins. (very thorough and requiring Each vehicle must also be frequent specialist check-ups checked to make sure that it is in military hospitals) in order to entirely suitable for its proposed ascertain that all the personnel operationa l task: is perfectly phys ically fit. Medi- • the Command Post vehicles of cal officers then give specific the tactical group and company, instructions, particularly prior to together with the HO truck the Norway exercises, on how to (ACL). which has been specially prevent frostbite and on the developed for its purpose by the subject of food. "Susa" battalion, are equipped During the preparation stage with blackout curtains, internal standard rations are supplelighting, tables for the exercise mented by ·alternative ones documents, etc. All vehicle radio better suited to the climate and equipment is inspected and the particular tasks to be peroverhauled; formed, and also to vary the • squad motor vehicles are daily menu. equipped with general-purpose Ordinary non perishable material such as entrenching and food supplies are also prepared, other tools for use on the battletogether with reserve supplies. field, water containers, squad Normal perishable rations gas stoves. are supplied by the British NBC weapons and materials AMF(L) service battalion, which are checked and the procedures sees to their delivery to the got under way for drawing live exercise area on the basis of ammunition (required for the requests forwarded several artillery and mortar field firing months in advance. exercises carried out during Attention is then turned to the early stages of the exercise) all the problems related to the as well as bla nk ammunition Arctic climate, particularly in and pyrotechnics. Norway, in which the kitchen The earthmoving equipment units will have to operate. A of the pioneer platoon must be check is also made that the checked, together with the snowwater tanks are equipped with ploughs and all the simulation heating devices. These are ne- charges to be used for the fieldcessary not only to prevent exercise demolitions . the water freezing but also to Also the logi stic arrangeprovide the soldiers with hot ments are, albeit partially, verified water for ablutions during rest during the preliminary training periods. activity in order to ensure that all Some of the most important units are capable of satisfying prerequisites are those referring the support needs of the tactica_l to motor vehicles. They entail group during operations. complete vehicle overhaul (reliability check) as well as special Deployment operations, particularly in the case of manoeuvres in Norway. Deployment is a delicate These operations consist mainly stage because it involves a of an oil change (this is actually number of activities, some of done at the time of embarkation). which are carried out before mounting studded snow tyres, leaving home, and the others in checking that each vehicle is the contingency area. equipped with snow chains (norThis stage covers the demal and studded) and that there parture from the base and is antifreeze in the radiators arrival in the exercise zone and using washable white paint in accordance to plan, the enhance the vehicles' camoubivouacking of the tactical group flage. in the exercise zone, the beEach vehic le must also ginning of command activities have a complete set of camou- under direct AMF(L) HO control, flage equipment, including fra a check to ensure that logistics

is functioning properly through Press Information Center) organthe new supply chain set up by ized for the duration of the the nationa l support nucleus exercise by AMF(L) HO. and the AM F(L) logistics battalion. Deterrent stage These general activities are Whil e depl oyment and the accompanied by the performtraining and various social actiance of a number of operavities are being carried out, the tional and social tasks planned tactical group's HO and the key at the time of the reconnaiscompany begin the operational sance carried out some two stage known as deterrence. months earlier. The exercise scenario asTh ese tasks consist of trainsumes that the AMF(L) is in the ing activities .involving: contingency area as a result of • combined infantry-armour a situation of tension between exercises with units of the host . NATO and the Warsaw Pact. country's army; So as soon as they are de• field firing exercise by the ployed the units must "show artillery batteries and mortar the flag" in order to implement sections; this activity amounts art. 4 of the Treaty, which conto an exercise within the exercise siders any aggression against and is designed to check the one of the member states as firing procedures used by the an aggression agai nst all the 8-·10 fire un its of different nation- others. alities. under centralized FAO Patrol composed of mem(Force Arti llery Officer) control; bers from the various contin• helicopter mounting and disgents cover the territory in quemounting exercises using FHU stion "with their flags unfurled" (Force Helicopter Unit) aircraft; At the same time close contact is set up between the civilian • aircraft recognition and guiand mil itary authorities concerndance by the FAC (Forward Air Controller) of the tactical group; erl with the defence of the • preparation of procedures for territory. Subsequently, according to signals and NBC defence for the plans of the exercise com officers of both branches; mand, the tension is stepped • checking of exercise medical up and the first incidents are procedures. created by saboteurs, subversiThe social activities are very ves and special forces. demanding as they involve the The situation thus gradually contingent both as a member of precipitates into open co nflict the AM F(L) and from the standlead ing up to the combat stag e point of national prestige. of the exercise. Great care must be devoted to one's image. Radio and TV Combat stage journalists and reporters from During the " Amber Express all over Europe and North America are there to critically scruti 81 " exercise held in Denmark, the Italian ambassador visiting nize this atypical Large Unit, wh ich they often praise, but the camp of the Italian continnever gratuitously. gent must have noticed the Contact with the local popu- sudden movement that occurred lation can take the form of preabout 21.30 hrs. The order to move the entire sentation in schools of all kinds and levels, sports fixtures, fretactical group towards a zone some 70 Km away and to take quent meetings with veterans up a defensive position had associations, exhibitions of military materials and band concerts. arrived 24 hrs earlier than This important aspect of the expected . contingent's activity is coordiDeparture time was midnated by the PIO (Public Inform- night. ation Officer). who also mainStandard procedures lay tains relations with APIC (Allied down that each unit must take

up its battle position at full strength in the column. Movement takes place under radio silence until the assembly area is reached. Here the recce groups immediately begin their work and the platoons subsequently move up to occupy the positions assigned to them . Dig or die is an extremely apt motto for the AMF(L) light infantry. It is rem iniscent of the Italian "more sweat. less bloodshed" and is put into practice every time there is a change of position in the soft and often muddy Danish terrain or in the Arctic snows of Norway. A quick estimate made at th e end of the last exercise shows that our Alpini, in their various positions. dug no fewer than 1,800 shelters and weapon pits, all of which were duly filled in again at the end of the exercise. The now well tested exercise takes place in the following stages: • occupation of a sector and its defence against attack by mechanized forces; • withd rawal to other positions and their defence; • blocking the enemy attack; • co unterattack, which normally marks the end of the exercise. In this way both HOs and units are given the opportunity of reacting correctly to all the more significant operational situations. As an offshoot of these main exercise stages there are also minor episodes designed to test all the importan t aspects of the units' operational efficiency. Special teams from exercise HO check out the field organization of each unit, including their equipment. weapons and individual and unit training. This check also takes in camouflage and concealment, alarm procedures used in the case of air attack or NBC warfare, close defence, anti-aircraft defence. the way supply vehicles are used and logistics procedures. The checks carried out on the efficiency of the medical units are particularly important. On the basis of hypothetical loss esti-

mates. these units are literally overwhelmed with wounded that must be treated and evacuated properly. Also the response to "C" attacks is carefully evaluated, including the sign alli ng cif the attack and the subseq uent steps to cordon off the area, evacuate the wounded and maintain the residual operationa l capacity of the un its involved . Airmobile operations are of the utmost importance in view of the large number of helicopters avai lable to the AMF(L). These operations are carried out repeatedly, up to rein forced company stre ngth, under all the tactical conditions possibly requiring the rapid occupation of positions, q uick penetration in depth or even the deployment of reserve units in new positions. This provides an excellent opport unity for the verification and practical application of all the mission's orga nizational and executive procedures, which have to be set up between the t actical group HO, AM F(L) HO and the MAOT (Mobi le Air Operations Team) having the task of liaison between grou nd troops and helicopter units. Another interesting operational aspect is the rel ief of uni ts in position , wh ich is almost always carried out at the tactical group level within the general ;ramework of the exercise. After a short warning and preliminary contact between the HOs involved, the executive phase is imp lemented. This (night time) phase involves the selection of loading-unload ing areas. approach and ex it routes to and from the positions and the setting up of checkpoints. Th is is all done at night and involves un its speaking different languages under "mi nimized" radio conditions from defensive positions in contact with the en emy and is therefore a good test of o rgan ization al capacity and of the degree of discipline with which orders are carried out . A few words must also be said in praise of the fi eld umpires. Thei r work is invaluable in

determining the success of the exercise. In view of the fact that th e opposing un its are of different national ities, it is easy to imagine the high ly competitive spirit with which they face each other. The umpi resÂˇ arbitration is thus essential to an objective eva luation of a rapidly changing tactical situation, and they must do al l they can not to slow it down or und uly interfere in its nat ural course. However, it is also important to avoid direct contact between units. which must be halted before frayed nerves and weariness lead them to lose their sel f-control when they are face to face or to forget the fact that they are allies. Their work consequently requ ires great self-control. dedication and excellent organization . Their work (and every unit up to company level has its own umpire) has to be ca rried out under a very wide range of tacti cal situations. ranging from those involving whole compan ies down to the level of night patrols. Considering that the actual fighting lasts 6-7 dc:1y::;, Lhe men are und erstandably quite ex hausted in the end! The combat stage is therefore a valid testing bench for a unity, either as an expression of an organization and as a group of individuals. The fact of pass ing the test with flyin g co lours for a contingent like the Italia n one, which is composed of troops that not only have had no specific experience and are indeed pra ctically new to mil itary life in genera l, compared with expert professional soldiers with 6-7 years' experience, is a matter of grea t satisfaction for all concerned and obvious proof that motivated trai ning pays off.

CONCLUSIONS All that remai ns to be added are a few general considerations on the "spinoff" from the presence of the Italian contingent in the AM F(L) in terms of acquired experience and mi litary prestige.

From the sta ndpoint of acquired experience it is confi rmed that the training and logistical system on wh ich our units are based is sound, although there is some room for improvement in certa in details required in a un it th at responds perfectly to all battlefield requirements: e.g. extra individual training aids, better orga niza tion of the Comma nd Posts and signal s, updated docum ents to dissemi nate knowledge of the operational procedures, field ex ercises reflectingÂˇ highly rea listic and non-stereotyped operationa l situations, enhanced camouflage and concealment capa bilities and night vision. These aspects and issues are worthy of our in terest and attention, since they are all related to those tha t, as specified in circular n. 4484, "contribute extensively to the army's credibi lity and hence to its cons ideratio n and prestige in the eyes of the country"; and, we might add in the case of the "Susa" tactica l group, of its alli es. In conclusion, this experience can be said to be valid from various standpoints. In the "Susa" tactical gro up our Army can be considered to possess an efficient. militarily effective asset wh ich is ideal for imagebuilding and constitutes a source of invaluable experience that can be applied to constantly improving the quality of the army as a whole. Carlo Cabigiosu

Col. Carlo Cabigiosu attended the MIiitary Academ y and the Service Branch School. He graduated as a mili ta ry sk i und mo u nta i neeri ng instructor from the Alpin e Military School. While serving as plaroon leader and company commander with . the "Trento" Alpin e Batta Iion. he took a 11 active part in the anti,..__ _, terrorist campaign in progress In Alto Adigc at the time. He subsequently commanded a cadet company o f the 152nd course o f the MI iitary Acoel emy and at tended che 97 th course o f the Wa r College. ISM I and the British Army Staff College. He served in the Stall of the "Julia" A lpine Brigade. du ring which time he was also with the Rescue Opera tions Centre set up for the Friu li earthquake disaster. After a period of service with \he training and regu laI io 11s section of the Army Genera l Staff, he wa s CO of the "Susa" Alpine batta lion attached to 1he NATO AMF(L). He currently directs the regulations section of the Army GS.

The American war in Vietnam began in the '60s, with the arrival of the, first " advisors". After this, with various ups and downs, it escalat ed until early 1973, when the last US units were elaboration of reality. Despite its withdrawn from the area . The intrinsic interest, the subject has Saigon regime and the South so far been barely broached in Vietnam Army (ARVN)Âˇ suffered the United States and there have their final collapse two years been comparatively few specific later, in April 1975. The specific purpose of this , contribution on the matter. Furthermore, little use has been article is to analyse US literary production directly influenced by made of the extensive specialized b ibliographic references the Vietnam war. The term "litew hich still exist on the t opic rature" is used in the sense of creative activity, of personal and . and are by no means rest ricted to the military aspects of the collective response to a shared conflict (1)'. experience and the cu ltural re-

And yet, to be able to analyse the meaning and the consequences of a war through the emotional and cultural reactions of those fighting it or observing it from close quarters, and with the additional capacity to narrate it afterwards, is of fundamenta l importance in penetrating the fighting man's psychology, his motivation, his deepseated anxieties, his reaction to danger, the anything but easy relations with the milita ry ,hierarchy and the dominant ideology. In the specific case of the Vietnam war the constant general impression is one of a nightmarish atmosphere, a costly and yet useless hell of destruction, a situation of stress at all levels, an overall feeling of frustration involving all and sundry which triggers a series of unresolved conflicts. The morale of the US troops reached rock bottom between 1969 and 1973, and became a factor with far-reach ing negative consequences on American collective confidence in its military machine. Not that the Vietnam war had ever been popu lar in the United States - quite the contrary. The "Vietnam syndrome" for many years has hung like a cloud over al l efforts to reorganize the US Army and over American foreign policy (2} . It is no easy matter to pick one's way through the US literature production based on the "dirty war". Neg lecting the literature protesting mi litary intervention , which has been collected in large annotated anthologies (3), we are left with collections of poems, memoirs and at least sixty novels. Together with cheap paperbacks like "Everyday Heroes" by F. Hughes (1981) or "The Green Berets " by R. Moore (1965), wh ich was made popular by John Wayne's cinema version (1968), we have such valid prose efforts as "M" by John Sack (1967}. "Why are We in Vietnam?" by the versatile Norman Mailer (1967}. "One very hot Day" by David Halberstam (1967). Other excellent novels are "Stringer" by W. Just (1974). "Born the 4th of July" by R. Kovic (1977}. "The 13th Valley"

by J . Del Vecch io (1982). "A Rumar of War" by Philip Caputo (1977). "92Â° in the Shade" by T. McGuane (1973}. We have an authentic masterpiece in "Going after Cacciato" by Tim O'Brien, a soldier-cum-writer (1978), who had already written "If I die in a Combat Zone ..." (1973). None of these books have so far been translated into Italian. Half way between journalism and literature we then have the collections of articles by wellknown pressmen and special correspondents, who followed the conflict for years and were thus able to observe and document many of its vital aspects: Bernard Falls, an American correspondent who had been there right from the start and was tragical ly kil led in 1967 (h is "Last Reflections on a War" was published posthumously), Michael Herr. a reporter at Keh Sanh, the author of "Dispatches" {1977}. now considered "a classic". Also very interesting are the Australian William Burchett (a good friend of the Viet-Cong) and, from Italy, Tiziano Terzani, Goffredo Parise ("Due o tre case sul Vietnam", 1967) and the ubi-

quitous Oriana Fallaci ("Niente e cosi sia". 1969). After a period of si lence. we are now witnessing a spate of memoirs. accounts by prisoners of war and collections of interviews given to Vietnam war veterans. One of these "oral books" which would deserve a good Italian translation is "Nam" by Mark Baker (1981 ). although it is necessary to wade through large numbers of military acronysm and often untrans latable Marine slang (4) . Above al l, one must be psycholog ically prepared to make a kind of ha llucinating descent to hell, something to which we were bruta lly but courageously initiated by fi lms like "The Deer Hunter" or "Apocalypse Now". The American war .novel boasts a solid tradition. The forerunner of this genre was "The Red Badge of Courage" written by Stephen Crane in 1895 but set in the period of the American Civil War. Further developments came during World War I with "Farewell to Arms" (1929} b'y' Hemingway, "Through the Wheat" by T. Boyd, "Three Soldiers" by Dos Passos (1921), "Paths of Glory" by Cobb (1934). World War II produced "From here to Eternity" by James Jones (1951 ), "Guard of Honor" by G. Cozzens (1948), "Battle Cry" by Leo Uris (1953} and above all Norman Mailer's masterpiece, "The Naked and the Dead" (1948). Although set in World War II, "Catch-22" by Joseph Heller (1961) actual ly reflects a later political and mi litary situation. Many of the above novels have been made into, often very good, films . Indeed, much of American literature passes through Hollywood. The literary production based on the Vietnam is visibly different from the above novels, obviously because of the unconventiona l nature of this conflict. Thus, whi le technology is ultimately acknowledged to be a determining factor in modern warfare (and possibly in our existence itself) . there is also a tremendous multiplication of the demoniac and neurotic elements. of "darkness", of prolong-

ed stress, an awareness of the uselessness of the efforts being made, the ever-prese nt threat of ambush, the sense of cris is and general insecurcry. Sometimes the scenes are like psychedelic visions, sometimes we are conscious that nervous brea kdown is lurking just below the surface, aggravated by the uncerta inties of the higher ranks as to how the w ar should be conducted. The Vietnam veterans still bear the scars of this ex perience (5). Of the two elements in question (e.g. technology and ''darkness"). the former is not in itself an original conce pt, in the sense that the importance of technological influence on the hu ma n element si mply reflects the social and military reality of America as it has developed since World War II. The ultimate result was that immense and complex military, political and industrial Superpower apparatus with which we are all familiar.

In actual fact, one of the most significant aspects of the Vietnam war is the undue confidence placed in technology: armed helicopters, supersonic fighters, strategic bombers, weapons with extraordinarily high rates of fire, costly and sophisti cated instruments, thousands of tons of bombs - not to mention the trem endo us logistic efforts to supply a millio n men - w ere not enough to win the war. Indeed, we witnessed the greatest waste of resources in mil itary history. Advanced technology was virtually ineffective on such difficult terra in, wh ere an elusive and relatively ill-eq uipped enemy proved extremely formidable. Indeed, recent US specialist studies on the subj ect have finally done justice to the uniq ue and decisive importance of the hu man factor in wa rfa re (6) . An ana lysis of the tech nological factor from a literary point of view has al ready shown that

the t echnologi ca l age wa r novel is less an offshoot of the "great" American tradition and more akin to th e "sc ien ce f iction novel of the '60s". Although visibly influenced by rapid technological progress, the latter nevertheless has also made a critical analysis of its possible effects on society. Kurt Vonnegut in particular deserves further study; his "Slaughterhouse Five" (1969) displays interesting ana logies with " Catch 22" by Heller (1961): i.e. su rrealistic situations, "sick" humour, computers, com plex chains of command, gigantic logistical organizations, destructive power out of all proportion t o the size of the targ et, the possi ble occurrence of fatal mistakes. Also "Doctor Strangelove" springs to mind, the grotesque Ku brick film starri ng Peter Sellers. It is no coincidence that both Vonnegut and Heller were bomber pilots during t he war. The former was also a witness {as a prisoner of war) of the devastation of

Dresden : technology and apocal ipse coexisted even before the nuclear era, and surrealist satire i5 a cu lt ura l form of survival (7). The da rk, demon iac, irrational element is a different matter entirely. Before being turned into subject matter for cultural re-elaboration in the form of "Apocalypse Now" or the long series of journa lists' novels or war veterans' memoirs. this Darkness was essentially a traumatic experience for anyone having been in Vietnam. On every page one reads about Vietnam, one is struck by the continua l revelation of the "American" extraneousness to the Asiatic world, by the impos sibil ity of exerting any real and definitive control over the situation . Even the natu ral environment seems to be irreduc ible: the jungle (which represents concrete rather than merely symbo lic rea lity) ends up by being an environment that is uncontrollable both militari ly and rationally. Neither defoliants nor napa lm provides an ideal way of solvi ng the problem . On the other hand, the enemy feels safe on this terrain, wh ich he knows well. He also enjoys the support of the population (without which no guerrilla war can be won) and avoids a.II direct confrontation with the high ly eq ui pped US troops. But he manages to attack continually and everywhere, leaving boobytraps behind him. Even the large bases on the coast, such as Da Nang, are sometimes not safe . Sa igon is represented in this literature as a kind of corrupt and perverse Babylon, which will ultimately call down divine wrath upon itself... The continual stress ultimately leads to emotional disorders which can end either in a kind of breakd.own of conscience, or neurosis or daydreami ng. It is precisely the rational defence and collective control mechanisms that are stretched beyond endurance, although the collapse of the nervous system (and sometimes the heart attack) can of ten be put off in time (8). From this point of view the Vietnam war is "inferna l" in all senses of 66

basic stimulus comes from an the term . It is only to be hoped that no army, American or other- inner need to narrate. to bear wise, will ever have to repeat witness. On ly at a secondary the experience. level is the story-telling translated into lingu istic and literary Darkness, however, has a structures. precise cultural referent. The term is used with this lingu istic Of course, the experience of and conceptua l meani ng by the war (however traumatic it Joseph Conrad in "Heart of Dark- may be) has a special cultural ness" , a long story published in significance: it is the "Event", 1906. Although originally set in at least for those who do not the Belgian Congo, the book make a profession of it, as is provided many writers about proved by the thousands of Vietnam with a more or less novels and memoirs that accomconscious reference. not to pany any war worthy of the name. mention F. Ford Coppola, who In a way, the best literary prcactually followed the book 's plot duction on the subject ultimately and structure. cons ists of that which is appeDarkness gives a good derently more immed iate, less culscription, or rather evocation, of tura lly re-elaborated, more clothe quite "western" sense of sely linked to persona l and dismay at not being able to collective experiences, but in exert rationa l control over a any case autobiograph ic and world that differs from one's without too many theories tc own, particularly a dark and tro- demonstrate. Examp les of what pica l one . This is the atmosphere I mean are "All quiet on the that prevai ls Âˇ in a recent f ilm, Western Front" by Remarque "Southern Comfort", directed (1929), "Old Soldiers never c'ie" by Wa lter Hill. by F. Richards (1933) and the But it is precisely at the Italian "Centomi la gavette di moment of describing experien- ghiaccio" by Bedeschi (1963). In ces and "elementary" states of these memoi rs the wretched ness mi nd, i.e. those linked to pure of war emerge much more efsurvival, that the gap narrows fectively than it does for insta nce cons iderably between true litein James Jones' ambitious but rature with all its cultural rerhetorical novel "From here to elaborations, and more immeEternity", which is as ful l of diate personal memoirs. Of couraffected psychological introspecse, the use of metaphors and tion as it is of phrases of the more or less conscious text and type "because I am a Sold ier". style quotations are factors On closer scrutiny, however, which distinguis h the professionalso Jones' book is seen to have ai writer from the soldier interthe typical structure of all the viewed in "Nam". And yet o.ne other war novels: it describes has the impression that once the an initiation, it is a Bildungsdecks have been cleared of the roman or novel of education . And c ultural superstructure t he th is brings us to the heart of actua l subject matter can be the matter: military apprenticeseen to be pressi ng to come . ship, traumatic experience, the to the surface in the collective long Âˇ road to peace, are all part consciousness, through t he reÂˇ press ive barriers to wh ich hallu- of the overa ll scheme of initiation, and are perceived as such. The cinating experiences are often survivors cannot in any case subjected . In th is sense William Styron, the author among other remain as they were; their system th ings of "The long March" (1968) of values has to change out of necessity. The basic premise is is right when he says that the in fact that the hero will ultimaauthor writing about war is in tely overcome (others will fall fact attracted by it to a greater extent tha n he wou ld be prepared by the wayside) and be saved. He will atta in a new status preto admit (and t he same could cisely by following the thorny be said about journalists and path of initiation. This is what photographers) . However, the

replace the nightmare . The received ideas are very soon weighed in the ba lance and found wanti ng; there is a feeling of betrayal. However, the col lective realization of all this leads to a powerful urge to escape. For t he American soldier the rea l ob jective is now to escape, if necessary even muti lated, from this hell. Also on the literary plane, the Dream is given a virtual ly psychedelic treatment.

anthropologists ca ll the hero's in it iation pc1thway. It is on ly in comic strips and propaganda that the soldier always remains steadfast, practica lly untouched by the experience, never prepared to question or reassess his own Truth. But then th is un iverse, at once symbolic and functiona l, mystical and earthly, mrl itary and religious, is not a modern cultura l re-elaboration but goes back much further in time. Modern anthropolog ical and literary criticism have identified its deeprooted links w ith the complex world of the initiation ritua ls undergone by young ma les, wh ich are stil l in vogue in the soca lled "primitive peoples" . These ceremonies are fu ll of trials of valour, blind obedience, revealed truth, rituc1I investitures, periods of isolation, ritual death and rebirth, until the final acquis ition of a new status, which is both socially functiona l and symbolic. Indeed, it is astonishing to note to what extent traces of this complex structure are retained even in the most modern armies: i.e. in certain forma lisms, in the typical rituals of the mi litary schools, and above all in the various stages of recruit training (9).

To come back to the American war novel, wh ile the Bildungs-roman structure is respected throughout the genre, the fiction based on the Vietnam war deviated from the "classical " model in certa in respects that must be interpreted as typical of a truly independent re-elaborat ion:

• Initiation is more brutal than in the other American wars. The soldiers are comparatively unmotivated, too you ng (18-19 years old, as aga inst an average of 24-25 years in World War 11) , often badly led, witnesses of, when not actua lly participants in, actions they disapprove of. They are continual ly on the defensive against an elusive enemy, and often against their own means of destruction. Their military and politica l objectives are hardly ever attained , although the units are decimated just the same . Although lasting only twelve months , the "Vietnam Round" is an experience they wil l never forget . • While Darkness is obvious, Light is much less so. There is nothing to compensate the sacrifice, no alternative system of values with which to

• Those who escaped it are marked by the hell they have come through. The social rehabilitation of the veterans has not been an easy task, and still represents a large socia l problem to be solved (10). Morally lynched by publ ic opinion, which has treated them as the scapegoats for both the atrocities committ ed and the military defea t, still in a stat e of shock, now often drug addicts or alcohol ics· and incapab le of returni ng to a normal productive activity, the "vets" have become the victims of the wrong war. Al l th is is obviously reflected in a different litera ry style, in dif ferent lingu istic choice, tending towards brutal descriptive immediacy, or else in the development of the Vision, or in that surrealism that Ol'.'IIY surviva l is capable of producing . If literature consists basica lly of the organ ization of chaos, the Vietnam war has called for an immense effort to be made also in this f ield. Th is is a different, and in a certain sense, atypica I experience for Ameri can culture, mainly because this wa r was never declared, nor won either. SOLDI ERING ON ... A single article is not enough to cope with the huge amount of materia l avai lable. The best way of presenting it is to select the material carefully and to accompa ny it with a commenta ry, in a kind of editing operation. I propose fol lowing t he American soldiers in Vietnam by al lowing them to describe themselves in the pages of t he novels and through their persona l accounts. In a certain sense the

reader is asked to identify with them, to accompany them on their existential jou rney through the ricefields and jungles of Vietnam. ASK NOT ... Many of the books. particularly the memoirs, begin with the draft call-up. At the present time, the US Army is organized exclusively on a volunt eer basis. Up to 1973, however, there was conscription (which was abolished precisely because of t he Vietnam war). A total of 1,759,000 Americans went on the ''Vietnam Round", of exactly one yea r's duration. Forty thousand of them vvere ki lled and two hundred and sixty thousand more or less seriously wounded. The tra ining received was, and still is, normal rookie trai ning, except for A IT (Advanced Infantry Trai ning) for the f uture f ightin g units. and Fort Bragg for the various "Specials" . The organization of the marines (USMC) was different - tougher training and longer tour of duty. The impact with the barracks Âˇand its typical conditioning and constraints are an experience shared by recruits the world over and have been narrated hundreds of times (for insta nce, in "The long March" by W. Styron, "From here to Eternity" by Jones or "The long gray Line" ). And yet it is narrated by t he vario us soldier-writers as t hough it were a unique experience. This is perfectly understandable, because in the economy of personal and collective experi ence it marks the abrupt beginning of a slow initiation - from civilian to "Grunt". The various ing redients are known to al l - the bellowi ng serg eant, the parade ground, training, physica l fatigue and hours of id le ness, mud and forced marches, confrontation with the chaplai n, restrictions on personal freedom, doubt and ilours spent waiting ... "Nam" actually begins by gathering the firsthand accounts of veterans who retrace the steps leading t hem to Vietnam,

Also " A Rumor of Wa r" by Philip Caputo is different. We are nuw in the Mari nes and the author, who had been sent with the first USMC units to Da Nang in 1965, is f ully aware from t he outset what it means to belong to an elite corps: " ... the Marine Corps, as we quickly learned, was more than a branch of the armed services. It was a society unto itself, demanding total commitment to its doctrines and values, rather like one of those quasi-religious military orde-rs of ancient times, the Teutonic Knights or the Theban Band. We were novitiates, and the rigorOl.!S training, administered by high priests called drill instructors, was to be our ordeal of initiation". (From: P. Caputo, "A Rumor of War'', p. BJ.

In view of the fact that this was literature written by veterans, this first experience takes on a dramatic significance of predestin ation. However, the personal r, 1otivations actually emerge. Althoug h somewhat generic vis-a-vis those of th e Vietco_ng,

they can be summed up as fo llows: desire for personal emanc ipa t ion, somet imes a true bent for mi lita ry profess io nalism, al though more often a desire to emulate thei r fat hers' deeds : "I saw older people, World War II age, who weren't in that war. When they were asked about it and what they were doing then , they had to say, 'Oh, well, I was in college'. It was a ma;or historical event that convulsed the world, and yet they missed it. I was the perfect age to participate in Vietnam and I didn't want to miss it, good or bad" . (From: M. Baker, " Nam" , p . 7-8).

"War is always attractive to young men who know nothing about it, but we had also been seduced into uniform by Ken nedy's challenge to 'ask what you can do for your country' and by the missionary idealism he had awakened in us. America seemed omnipotent then: the country could still claim it had never lost a war, and we believed we were ordained to play cop to the Communists' robber and spread our own political faith around the world. Like the French soldiers of the late eighteenth century, we saw ourselves as . the champions of ' a cause that was destined to triumph' . So, when we marched into the rice paddies on that damp March afternoon, we carried, along with our packs and rifles, the implicit convictions that the Viet Cong would be quickly beaten and that we were doing something altogether noble and good. We kept the packs and rifles; the convictions, we lost" , ( From: P. Caputo, " A Rumor of War", p, XIV).

Or again, here is Dave Chri stian, w ho enlisted at t he age of seventeen, as he leaves col lege and his new b ride: "I didn't think of Vietnam as a political war at theÂˇ time. My father had served, everyone in our community had served. My two brothers served over in Vietnam. I hailed from a steel community and we handed out

29,000 boys from my county alone" . (From: M. McLear, " The Ten Thousand Day War", London, 1981, p . 266).

However, literature is mainly cultural re-elaboration. Norman Mailer is probably the one who has taken the concept of in it iat ion to its ult imate conclusion. In "Why Are We in Viet nam?" the various collective events are combined and integrated, and linked up with American frontier t radition, wh ich in his opinion is what explai ns the deep-seated motivations behi nd US interven tion in Vi etnam. "Why Are We in Vietnam?" is not an "easy" novel, but it has the great merit of propos ing a theory to exp lain the origin o f the war. The theory is that "progress" has developed in t he Unit ed States a society and a technological power that make war a necess ity, and Vietnam becomes just another place where it can be waged (11). In the book. the eighteen-yearold D.J. is sitting at table with Tex Hyde the even ing before leaving for rook ie camp. The para llel conti n ue::; between ttte hunting of a famous huge bear, a "grizzer" - a reference to the in it iation - and Vietnam. with al l the attenda nt mythical. sexua l, etc. con no tations . We are reminded also o f "The Deer Hunter" , the fi lm by Michael Cimino, in which not only do hunti ng and war receive para llel treatment. but t here is even a reversa l of roles . from hunter to hunted . UNE SA ISON A L' ENFER W hile romanticism of manner or politica l propaganda have the task of making war pleasant and acceptable (see "The Green Berets" ). Viet nam is f ound to be impervious to rhetoric. When the people writ ing are veterans. the picture t hey pai nt becomes a highly vivid one and the language they use is brut ally rea listic . Here is how a few authors speak of their f irst contac t wi th Vietnam : "I arrived in-count ry at Cam Ranh Bay. It's hot. The kind of hot that Texas is hot. ft takes your breath away as you step

out of the airpfane. We were loaded on an olive-drab school bus for the short ride from the airstrip over to the compound. There was wire mesh over the windows. I said to some-body, 'What the hell is the wire for?'. 'It's the gooks, man, the gooks', they say. 'The gooks will throw grenades through the win dows. See those gooks out there'? I look out and I see shrivelled, little old men squatting beside the road in the fashion of the Vietnamese, filling sandbags. They looked up at me with re-a/ contempt on their faces. Here we are at one of the largest military installations in the world and we have to cover the windows to protect ourselves from little old men. I didn't put it all together at the time, but intuitively I knew something was wrong". ( From: M . Baker, "Nam ", p . 26).

" Wolf said: 'Look, FNG , I don't want to scare you - notody' s trying to scare you - but that stuff fast night wasn't sr.it! Last night was a lark. Wait'// you see some realfy bad shit. That was a picnic fast night. I almost slept through it'. I wondered what a FNG was" . (From: T. O' Brien, " If I die in a Combat Zone", p . 81) .

"But when we got on the ship, everything was hush-hush. I made friends with a couple of sailors. They told me there was a sub following behind us, armed t o the teeth. We didn't know anything was tugazi* until we got to a certain place in the South China Sea. A loudspeaker came over the air, 'This is your capt ain speaking. Be advised that your destination is Da Nang, Republic of Vietnam'. Everybody looks around. What the fuck is a Viet nam?" . (From: M. Baker, " Nam", p. 25).

"When I ;umped back out, my squad leader looked at me and he kept looking at me. Why is this man looking at me so hard? He looks me over again and screams, 'Where did you get that shit from? Where did you get it?'.

'What? What are you talking about?'. 'Them ;ungles you're wearing'. 'I got the· shirt from that pile there and the pants from this one here'. 'Get them off, take them off!'. The same time that he's yelling for me to take· them off, he's pulling them off me with both hands like a crazy man. I'm trying to get away from him, calm him down. ' Okay, okay, give me a chance. Wait a minute· here. I'll take them off. You don't got to rip my clothes off'. 'Get that shit off. Don't you know what piles those are?'. 'How do I know? The lieutenant told me to get ;ungles out of there'. 'That damn boot's only been here two weeks. Them clothes is from the KIA'. 'What the hell is KIA?'. 'Killed in action"'. (From: M. Baker, "Nam", p . 44).

And so on. A whole anthology could be filled with a jigsaw of accounts, novels and reports on the subject. A1though it is a fact that routine prevails over action. Except for the Keh Sanh siege and the Tet offensive (respectively in 1967 and 1968), and the large-scale early · operations of ·"Search and Destroy", few battles were fought in Vietnam in the classical s·ense of the word. This is sometfmes stated expl icitly: Writing about this kind of warfare is not a simple task. Repeatedly, I have found myself wishing that I had been the veteran of a conventional war, with dramatic campaigns and historic battles for subject matter instead of a.monotonous succession of ambu.shes and fire -fights. But there were no Normandies or Gettysburgs for us, no epic clashes that decidecf the fates of armies or nations. The war was mostly a matter of enduring weeks· of expectant waiting and, at random intervals, of conducting vicious manhunts through ;ungles and swamps where snipers harassed us constantly and

booby traps cut us down one by one. The tedium was occasionafly relieved by a largescale searchand-destroy operation, but the exhilaration of riding the lead helicopter into a landing zone was usua{ly followed by more of the same hot walking, with the mud sucking at our boots and the sun thudding against our helmets while an invisible enemy shot at us from distant tree lines. The rare instances when the VG chose to fight a set-piece battle provided the only excitement; not ordinary excitement, but the manic ecstasy of contact. Weeks of bottled-up tensions would be released in a few minutes of orgiastric violence, men screaming and shouting obscenities above the explosions of grenades· and the rapid, ripping bursts of automatic rifles. Beyond adding a few more corpses to the weekly body count, none of these· encounters achieved anything; none wiff ever appear in military histories or be studied by cadets at West Point" . (From: P. Caputo, "A Rumor of War", p. XIV-XV) ,

Or else, it is all marching and fruitless reconnaissance patrols: "While Price gathered his kit, Stringer scouted the mountain: up, down, long looks to the left and right, a careful inspection of their surroundings. He was looking for any sign of trespass, a cigarette pack, the residue of a fire, paper of any kind. There was nothing at aff, the bluff was pristine. 'What do you see·, Stringer?'. 'The footprints of a gigantic hound', he muttered. 'What the hef/ are· you talking about?'. 'A ;oke, Price'. 'Weff, you can save those'. 'There's nothing here. No hounds, no nothing'. 'Save the ;okes'. (From: W. Just, "Stringer", p . 8-9).

"'My real frustration', says Webb, 'is trying to explain what the infantry went through. I was not prepared for the continual primitiveness; I had three hot

meats in nine months. I carried my pack - ,t had a poncho, a tooth-brush, letter-writing gear and that was it. That was aff I carried for nine months. We moved every two days; didn't take a bath for ·months lite,raf/y: may be wash off in a stream, or find a well. We ate C-rations con~ tinua/ly. And virtually every single person in my unit got either ring worm, hook worm, dyse·n tery or malaria. And some of us had them all'. Webb watched as one by one his platoon of twe·nty-five fe{I to the attrition of the bush, only to be replaced in the war that was over except for a date: 'During one period - not quite seven weeks - I took fifty-one casualties, and when number fifty-one got his arm blown off

I ~

I sat down next to him and cried like a baby. I had had it' ". (From: M. Mclear, "'The Ten Thousand Day War"', p. 268).

( i f

There are hund reds of personal accounts of this kind . From the literary standpoi nt, those with a t alent for writing, like Tim O'Brien or Philip Caputo, manage to dose the t ens ion carefully usually breaking it with a sudden fire fight. For example: "The tog rose. The quiet was in his head now. It was swollen there, pushing out. It was all in his head. Morning came and the men climbed from their holes, had breakfast, rolled up their ponchos. Buff kept shaking his head. Stink Harris grinned_~ and Cac-

ciato packed away the basketball, and Frenchie Tuck er complained about his blood pressure. Paul Berlin felt it in his head. They doused the breakfast fires. When the gear was packed, Lieutenant Sidney Martin raised a hand and led them across the river. The water wa s warm. It warmed their legs and belly. Then the y were out of the water, regrouping, moving up the clay path into Trinh Son 2. Paul Berlin's head ro ared with quiet. Splitting - but he moved into the dark village. When Rudy Chass/er hit the mine, the noise w as muffled, almost fragile, but it wa s a relief for a/la of them. (From: T. O'Brien, " Going after Cacciato, p. 108-109).

The more action-fill ed chapters alternate with a soldier's reflections (on himself, of course) during his turn of guard duty in his observation post. One more unusual case is a novel based almost entirely on a day of "heavy contact" " One very hot Day" , by D. Hal bers tam (1967), a typical "pa trol novel", which spans the space of a single but infernal day. It must be acknowledged, however, that only ten percent of the half mi ll ion troops in Vi etnam were actual ly combat units, which also comprised an extremely high percentage of blacks (12). Moreover, in order to avoid further stirri ng up public opinion against an already unpopular war, service in Vietnam was limited to exactly on e year's dura tion (one boo k on the life of US soldiers in Vietnam is actually entitled: "365 Days" ) (13). Th is is, in fac t. one of the reasons why the w ar lasted so long. The infantryman's life was the concern of only pa rt of the US Army, and for the fellow America ns back home Vietnam was far away, despi te t he t elevision and newspaper reports. In any case. the media (with the exception of the "New York Times") were interested only in giving the offici al version of the fac ts (14). If we go back and look at the news reports and magazines again. we are in any case aware of th e continual clash between t echnology and human beings, between incredible fire power and the uselessness of the efforts. This is perhaps the most spectacular aspect of th e war. Considerable capital is made of this con trast in the literature: "At night you could lie out on some sandbags and watch the C-47's mounted with Vu/cans doing their work. The C-47 was a standard prop ffareship, but many of them carried .20- and .762-mm. guns on their doors, Mike-Mikes that could fire out 300 rounds per second, Gatling style, 'a round in every square inch of a football field in fess than a minute', as the handouts said. They used to call i t Puff the Magic Dragon, but the Ma73

rines knew better: they named it Spooky" . (From: M. Herr, "Conclusions at Keh Sanh", p. 118 et seq.).

"Simply by speaking a few words into a two-way radio, I had performed magical teats of destruction. Summoned by my voice, ;et fighters appeared in the sky to loose their lethal droppings on villages and men, High-explosive bombs blasted houses to fragments, napalm sucked air from lungs and turned human flesh to ashes. All this ;ust by saying a few words into a radio transmitter". (From: P. Caputo, "A Rumor of War" , p. 4J.

Indeed, the amount of fire support continua ll y being ca lled up by the un its in Vietnam from the air force or the "Big Boys" (the artil lery) was greater than ever before in the history of war: "Absolute priority was given to these demands ... during three months and a haft. Due Pho batteries fired alone 64,044 rounds on populous level areas ... not counting rounds fired by naval units from South China Sea or by mobile batteries used in close tactical support to operations". (From: J. Schell, " A Reporter at Large: Quang Ngai & Quang Tin", "New Yorker", 9th March 1968).

This technological superiority is reflected also in the peculiar code system used in linguistic express ion, wh ich is perceived as expressionistic by the ord inary reader: "Enemy sit. Aggressor forces in div strength holding MRL Hill 820 complex gc AT 940713951 wlfwd elements est. bn strength junction at gc AT 948715 {See Annex A, Comphibac inte/1. summary period ending 25 June) .. . Mission: BLT 117 seize, hold and defend obj. A gc 94875 ... Execution: BLT 117 land LZ X-RAY AT 946710 at H - Hour 310600 .. . A CO. GRS estab. LZ security LZ X-RAY H minus 10 ... B co. advance axis BLUE H plus 5 estab. blocking pos. vie gs AT 948710 ..." . The alternation of the two codes, i.e. the human and the technological, the clash between

the two worlds. i.e. the American and the Vietnamese, is wnat actually forms the "classi ca l" aspect of this war. It is fou nd in "Last Reflections on a War" by B. Fall, in "Dispatche"s" by M. Herr, in "Americani e Vietcong" by F. Gigno, in "Niente e cosi sia" by Oriana Fal laci, etc. Of course. the human factor wins in the end; technology is not enough by itself. It was precisely at the indi vidual level that the "Grunts" were at a disadvantage. They were often overloaded, but above all the enemy was better armed. At the beginning the M1 6 rifle was much less reliable than the AK47 ~a drawback that was overcome by chrome plating the breech). The uniform material was not always sui table for the sub-tropical climate. Oddly enough, the regulations only allowed the Specials and the South Vietnamese troops to wear camouflage clothing. W. R. Corson, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marines, wrote: "To illustrate, the M-16 rifle uses a cheaply manufactured twenty-round magazine; however, because of the magazine's construction and the cheap spring only eighteen rounds can be placed in the magazine. If the full twenty rounds are forced into the magazine a 'failure to feed' is almost a certainty. A Marine or soldier in a gun-to-gun duel fac es a North Vietnamese soldier or Vietcong armed with a Sovietor Red Chinese-made AK-47 automatic rifle. The AK-47, which is many times more reliable than the M-16, has a magazine made of good metal, i t contains a good spring, and it holds thirty rounds. Ground combat is not like a movie, where the hero never has to reload. Our troops will die because they cannot equal the thirty rounds of the AK-47. One might ask why we do not have a thirty-round magazine for our rifle". (From: W.R. Corson, "The Betrayal", p. 288-289).

The figure of Corson and his book brings us to anoth er two aspects of the problem: commando actions and the atro-

cities committed in Vietnam . Both aspects, which are interrelated, have formed the subject matter for studi es and li terature. The conclusions are un ivocal: the US soldiers were badly led and the Vietnam war will be remembered for its brutality. Episodes such as My Lai 4 are indicative from both standpoints. The studies were carried out by the US Army itself: "The Collapse of the Armed Forces" by Colonel R. Heinl Jr. and "Crisis in Command" by Ma jor R. A. Gabriel and Lt. Colonel P. L. Savage - all career officers - are as pitiless as "The Betraya l" by Lt. Colonel Corson. Too many officers (fifteen per cent of total strength, at least in the last few years) who were hardly ever present: they were always on helicopters or in distant CPs, commanding the men, by whom they were referred to with the col lective terms of REMFs (Rea r Echelon Motherfuckers). Moreover, in order to ensure more rapi d promotion, th eir tour of duty in Vietn am was reduced to six months. In his "Soldier report::;" Westmoreland wrote that he had never in his life seen so many officers. This combination of inexperience and the gap between the officers and men was detrimental in all senses: heavy losses (800 killed and 6000 wounded per month in 1969) , gradual ly spreading indiscipline and lax ity, and ultimately creeping mutiny or the murder of over-zealous officers. The yea r 1969 saw the coining of a new slang term, "fragg ing", which meant killi ng an unpopu lar officer with a fragmentation bomb. It has been officially estimated that between 1969 and 1971 there were a total number of 730 "accidents". 83 of whic h w ere "successful" (15). The literature is full of situations like the ones cited. In "Captai n Hollister" a capta in given the task of writing letters to the families of dead soldiers has a nervous breakdown . "The Lion Heart" by Alan Clark is brimful of brutality, in "The Last Bridge" by Brian Garfield a squad is sent on a suicide mission,

while in " Body Count" by W.T. Huggett the monotony of waiting to go into action mingles with the horror of war and the mi staken decisions of the higher officers. However, also "Nam" is full of inept or remote officers and of attempts to do them in. In " If I die in a Combat Zone" , T. O'Brien gives a vivid descriptio n of the tactica l errors committed by "Captain Smith" (the name is fictitious but the episode actually happened). who is ridiculed by his men (p . 156 et seq .) and ultimately tra nsferred. Likewise, the first important military undertaking of "M" is the killing of a Vietnam ese girl during "Operation Mastiff" . What is worse, Corson is the only one to write explicitly that to win a guerrilla war it is necessary to win over the support of the local population (which, as a Marine officer, he succeeded in doing in the district under his command. " The Betrayal" is perhaps one of the best books ever written by a career officer) . This is in open controversy with "Westy" 's "Bulldozer-kri eg" and the random or delibera te destruc tion caused to the Vietnamese fa rmers, whether Vietcong suspects or not. All the books written by Americans clearl y revea l thei r absolute incomprehension of Asian culture. their ignorance of the Vietnam ese language and society, the feeli ng of being surrounded by hostile people. Giap was right when he said that the Americans were basically fighting a defensive war in Vietnam. He might also have added that being unable t o distinguish between friend and foe did not stop th em shooting. Atrociti es of all kinds are reported in all quarters, in politica l wri tings of the time (e.g. "War Crimes in Vietnam", edited by Bertrand Russell) in press reports and in fiction. Some pages in " Nam " make your hair stand on end , especially Ch. 111, "War Stories". which is divided into "Victors" and "Victims " (pp. 129-154). The question asked in other books is how clean-living farm75

people obviously lived there. It was a place where men died. It was a heavily mined area. There was no tangible obiect to attack except the land itself. And in a sense the area of My Lai itself became the enemy, not the people of My Lai, not even the Viet Cong, but the physical place - the sullen villages, the criss-cross paddies, the bomb craters and the poverty of the place became the enemy. We took revenge, burning down huts, blowing up tunnels". (From: T. O'Brien, "If I die in o Combat Zone", p. 81 ).

boys from Iowa could ·possibly would never have risen to the have massacred civilians and rank of lieutenant. The subseprisoners of war. Philip Caputo quent trial revealed that the milidevotes the entire last chapter tary machine was heavily impliof "A Rumor of War", in which cated. Nor was Mai Lay 4 an he himself and the other soldiers isolated episode in this kind of play the main roles, to showing war. May Lai 4 was actually a to what extent war can bring out group of villages _a round Son My, and the Gls called in "Pinkville" violent psychopathic tendencies (the colour pink is used on in otherwise normal men . He military maps· to indicate a "conpostulates (lntrod. p. XVIII) that the evil was not in the men them- tended area"). The VC were known to be 'in the area, although selves but in the circumstances they were certainly not in the in which they had to live and fight (see also p. 216-217), in the village. On 25th February six Grunts were killed by mine explocontinual frustration and enemy sions ·and twelve others badly atrocities. A similar picture is painted also in "The 13th Valley" wounded. There were further losses on 14th Marcil. The day by J_ ohr\ .·Del _Vecchio. Caputo states that "the Americans were · after, t.he battalion CO, Lt. Colonel:·F. A. Barker Jr. called the horrified by the atrodtfes corn ~ Charlie Company commander mitted by their troops because Captain E. L. Medina and told the American soldier was a him that there were at least reflection of themselves". This brings us to My Lai 4, 250 VC in the area and to go and destroy the village. He had the symbol of a war. The mas24 hours to prepare the operasacre took place on 16 March tion. The rest is historical fact. 1968, but was reported by the This is what O'Brien, who media only one year later (16). also happened to be in the area, That particular day Lt. Calley was to write: led a platoon of thirty soldiers "I knew it was a bad place. to a village in the Quang Ngai area, where he destroyed every- We were afraid to go to Pinkviffe. It was a sullen, hostile, unpeothing and killed from 200 to 500 pled place. We'd go among the unarmed civilians, including My Lai villages and there· we!e women and children. Lt. Calley never any people: deserted, and was subsequently described as yet there were smoldering fires an idiot who, in normal times, 76

The following quotation comes from "The Tarnished Shield" by Lt. Colonel George Walton: "Within My Lai-4 the killings had become more sadistic. Several old men were stabbed wfth bayone-ts and one was thrown down a well to be followed by a hand grenade. Some women and children praying outside of the local temple were killed by shooting them in the back of the head with rifles. Occasionally a soldier would drag a girl, often a mere child, to a ditch where he would rape her. One GI is said to have thrown a grenade into a hootch where a girl of five or six lay that he had ;ust raped. The young were slaughtered with the same impartiality as the ofd. Children barely able to walk were picked off at point blank range". The massacre was stopped by a warrant officer, H. C. Thompson (later decorated). When Colonel Barker arrived in his helicopter, he realised what was happening. He telephoned Captain Medina and ordered him to cease fire. Then they tried to cover everything up. O'Brien further writes: "On the one hand I .was shocked and I thought that this is terrible: you don't kill the people. And then I wasn't shocked. After all the frustrations we had been through, I understood the frustrations that were felt by Galley's company. This is not to excuse his behaviour. I hated what he did. I thought it was

wrong and terrible and I still do. / think that he should have been sent to jail for life. But at the same time, as a man who was there, and who saw men die in the MV Lai, I undersrand what happened". · (From: T. O'Brien , "If I die in a Combat Zone", p . 143).

There was, however, some1hing else from wh ich the Ame ricans could draw the strength to go on - the Dream . Many observers (e.g . Oriana Fallaci · in "Niente e cosi sia") have noted how some Gls lived in a surrealistic atmosphere, as though they didn't care two hoots about the real world. Everyone referred to America as "The World". Drugaddiction was rife in every un it. Everybody's aim was just to survive, counting the days and hoping to make it. The watchword of the infantry was "CYA" (Cover Your. Ass). The Dream represented the on ly possible alternative to Darkness, to an unseen enemy, to Vietnam. The Dream is also a literary creation wh ich takes the Vietnam literary production beyond mere brutal

•I

real ism or "technolog ica l" surreal ism. This is seen in "Going after Cacciato" by Tim O'Brien, for instance. Cacciato is a soldier who has decided to desert and go to Paris (rather like Yossaria n in "Comma 22"). He is pursued by a squad who ends up by identifying with his Dream. There is an incredible passage in which (about a third of the way through the novel) soldiers exploring VC tunnels blowing them up, as though by psychedelic expansion, slowly pass from one world to another. The tunnel expands into a busy quarter of Chittagong crowded with people.. . The dreamlike atmosphere of the book is kept up by means of continual flash-backs. Fantasy prevails over rea lity. Marco Pasquali

Marco Pasqua li has a degree in Modern Letters and is a fina l yea r student of Foreign Languages and Literature at the Un iversity of Rome. He works as a librarian at the Rome Mun ici pa I Libra ry. He served as 2nd Lieu tenant in the Infantry Reserve in 1976.

NOTES AND REFERENCES (1) Cf.: R. Jumper, "Vietnam: an annotated Bibliogra phy", Documentary Pns, 1980. Also to be recommended to professional soldiers is th e "Vietnam Studies" series of monogr aphs published by the Department of the A rmy. It is w ri tte n by career officers and deals w ith separate aspects of t he conflict. The series comp,'ses 18 monographs which are availaole from the Government Printing Office. (2) Cf.: J. Buttinger, "Vietnam: the Unforgettable Tragedy". New York, Horizon Press. 1977, or the series of artic les by P. Goldman: "What Vietnam did to us", in : "Newsweek", 14th December 1981. See also " Born the 4th of July" by R. Kovic, N. York, McGraw-Hill, 1976. (3) Cf.: G. Louis Health (ed.), "Mutin y does not happen lightly, the Literature of the American Resistance to the Vietnam War" . T he Scarecrow Press. Inc., Metuchen, N.J., 1976. (4) For the sake of curiosity I shall c ite a few of them: "Big Boys", "diddybopping", "fugazi", "klick", "mike -m ike", "slick", "chopper", "FNG". (5) Cf.: "The Scars of Vietnam", special number of " Newsweek", 14th December 1981; P. Gray, "Flowers of Evil", in: "Tim e Magazine", 11th November 1974; J . Helmer, "Bringing the ·War Home", N.Y., Free press, 1974; R.J. Lifton, "Home from the War • Vietnam Veterans: neither Victims nor Executioners", N. York, Simon & Schuster, 1973, L. Morrow, "The forgotten Warriors", in: "Time Magazine", 13th J uly 1981: P. Starr (ed.): "The Discarded Army: Vetera ns after Vietnam", Charterhouse, 1974. At least the Italian Accademia d i San ita Militare lnterforze should order a copy of "Stress Disord -

ers among Vietnam Ve terans: Theory, Research and Treatment", edited by C.R. Figley, New York, Brunner and Marze! Pub .• 1978. (6) Cf.: W.D. Henderson, "Why th e Viet Cong fough t: Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army". London, Greenwood Pr., 1980. (7) Cf.: A. Kazin, "The War Novel: from Mailer to Vonnegut", in "Saturday Review", 6th February 1971 , p. 13-15, 36. (8) C.R. Figley, "Stress Disorders ...", c it., see note 4. (9) In addition to the classical studies by V. Propp an d the Russ ian formalists, I can recommend the book by P.G. Jones, "War & t he Novelist", University of Missouri Press, Columbia & London, 1976, p. 19-67. The choice is a happy one in that the author, before beginning his academic career, served in Vietnam as an artillery officer. (10) Cf.: note 4. (11 ) Cf. : P. Jones, "War & the Nove list", c i t., p. 53-61. (12) Cf.: R.W. Mullen, "Blacks & Vietnam", U. Pr. of A merica, 1981, and S. Va nce, "Courageous & the Proud", Nort hon, 1972. (13) Cf.: R.J. Glasser, "365 Days", Braziller, 1971, which has also been made into a play by H. Wes ley Balk. (14) Cf.: R.W. Chandler, "War of Ideas: the US Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam", Westview Special Study, Boulder Colorado, 1981 . Plus, of co urse, " Pentagon Palers", which has been transl ated also into Italian. (15) Cf.: M. Mclear, "Vietnam: t he Ten Thousand Day War", Th ames & Meth uen, London, 1981, p. 271-72. (16) Seymour He rsh, "My Lai 4: a report on the Massacre and its Aftermath", New York, Random House, 1970,

FIAT 40-10 WM The 40-10 WM (4X4) is a tactica l vehicle that is light. compact. air-transportable and air-launchable, for road and battlefield transport of troops, supplies and armaments. The truck is extremely mobile and fast, has a payload of 1.5 t and GVW of only 4 t. This vehicle maintains the easy handling, mobility and speed characteristic of a reconnaissance vehicle while permitting the transport of a team of 12 men plus driver or supplies up to 1.5 t. The 40-10 WM is also a tractor tor artillery weighing up to 1.5 t; the body is suitable tor the installation of anti-tank and the civil version have been proanti-aircraft missile systems, duced. They proved their high single or multiple machine guns, performance in all climatic envirecoilles guns, multiple rocket launchers, S. 250 shelters. These ronments and under all heavy duty conditions. tasks are normally carried out -, he vehicle can achieve top by heavier, bulkier vehicles that speed of over 100 kph and run are less mobile and more expenfor 800 km on a full tank. A fordsive overall. ing capacity of 0.7 m maintains Less than 2 metres wide, this the mobility even while crossing vehicle can travel the narrow water without special preparamule-tracks when used by mountion. The turning circle of 6 m tain troops. The maximum height Âˇ allows swift manoeuvres in of 2.25 m, reducible to 1.6 m, cramped spaces. allows the air transportation of A gradeability of over 60% two trucks aboard a C 130 Herfully laden, a side slope of 30% cules. A special kit allows the and high approach and departure air launching of the 40-10 WM. This means, therefore, that the vehicle is particularly suitable for air-borne troops. The vehicle may also be outfitted as an ambulance, command post, weapon stand, etc. Four wheel drive, load distribution over the axles, a specific power output of 25 bhp/t and high minimum axle ground clearance give the 40-10 WN an excellent mobility over any ground condition. The engine is a Diesel Fiat 8140. Supercharged and adapted for military use with a power output of 100 bhp (DIN). Hundreds of thousands of units of 78

angles are all in the 40-10 WM's repertoire. The 40-10 WM can operate in any weather conditions: in freezing polar temperatures -and in desert heat, in dusty regions and, thanks to its rust protection treatment, in warm, humid and salty areas. In the truck version, the steel body, anchored at six points, has a fold-down removable tail gate, tiltable side benches for 10 men and a canvas cover. The platform, less than 1 m from the ground, permits easy supply loading and unloading.

DATA

SECOND SIMFICS ORDER PLACED Weston Simfire, manufacturers of a tank tactical training system, has been awarded a second production contract by the UK Ministry of Defence for the retro-reflector version of the Simfics Direct Fire Weapon Effects Simulator system. The order will complete the outfitting of the British Army's fleet of Chieftain MBTs with Simfics and the entire MBT fleet will eventually be fitted with the Weston Simfire des igned Simfics system. Simfics is a development of the Simfire system specifically designed for tanks equipped with the Marconi Improved Fire Con-

trol System (IFCS). The Simfics interfaces directly with IFCS and simulates the tank laser rangefinder, thus enabling tank crews to combine gunnery and tactical training using the operational fire control system under the most realistic conditions. During a simulated main gun engagement, the on ly operation the crew does not carry out is the actual load ing of live ammunition. The ballistic characteristics of the ammunition are simulated by a computer controlled eye-safe laser beam and a simulated hit on the target vehicle is indicated by the detona-

tion of an orange pyrotechnic device. The order also includes the supply of test equipment for the systems. Commenting on the order, General Manager Mike Richards said "The decision to equip the enti re MBT fleet with Simfics indicates the importance which the British Army places on ensuring that its troops can train realistically with effective tactical and weapon simulators. The Weston Simfire already sold more than 5,000 Simfire systems around the world in more than 35 countries.

GUARDIAN FIRING TESTS About twenty service attaches accredited to foreign embassies in Rome assembled on 3rd May at the Italian military A/ A range on the coast near Rome to witness the performance of the Breda low level air defence system "Guardian". A similar demonstration, to show the accuracy and the effectiveness of the system, had been conducted the previous day before Italian military authorities. A unit of this system consists of one Flycatcher FCS and two carriage mounted Breda Twin 40L70 Guns. The guns, were emplaced 80 metres apart, with the FCS set slightly back, halfway between the guns. The target was provided by Swedair flying a Mitsubishi a/c towing first sleeve KR27-45-450 equipped with MDI, against which inert rounds were fired to record

miss distances in order to demonstrate system accuracy. The same procedure was followed on both days. After the accuracy had been demonstrated by firing practice rounds against a KR27-45-450 sleeve equipped with Miss Distance Indicator, proximity fuzed prefragmented rounds (fuze by Borletti and ammunition by SNIA BPD Difesa Spazi6) was fired against a KRZ751-111-800 sleeve, in order to illustrate the effectiveness of the system, the high lethal ity of which is mainly attributable to the combination of accuracy and proximity fuzed ammunition. Range safety restrictions limited the firing sector to two second firing against crossing targets. The two Twin Breda 40L70s fired simultaneously-rate of fire 1200 rpm. Tarqet speed was 200 knots and altitude 400 metres.

In the case of the six proximity fuzed runs, on each of the demonstration days all six sleeve targets, target coming towards were immediately shot down by the first rounds of the burst. The six runs firing practice ammunition, each of about two seconds (a total of about 220 rounds) resulted in sixty per cent of all rounds fired falling within two metres of the target. which indicates that in the, case of firing against an enemy aircraft target a large proportion of rounds would have been direct hits. This summarizes the results of the tria ls. Firing proximity fuze ammunition against such a target or a miss ile almost all rounds would have inflicted Âˇ damage, with lethal cumulative effect. taking into consideration the actual relatively smal l sleeve dimens ions.

General E. Copel: ·:vaincre la guerre - Une autre def~nse, une autre armee". Lieu Commun, Paris, 1984, 247 .,pp.

It is difficult to explain why, from time to time, anticonformist officers of the French Army periodically come out with profoundly innovatory solutions to contemporary military problems. Fifty years after the publication of the famous book, "Vers l'Armee de metier" in which the then Major De Gaulle suggested that to take on the German threat the army had to radically change course by setting up an armoured rapid deployment volunteer force, General Copel, Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Air Force until 10th March 1984, has come up with his alternative proposal. The form and the technical facilities are different from De Gaulle's proposals, and his theory is considerably !ess substantial. What Copel maintains in this book is certainly not new, and even less definitive or generally accepted. An eloquent demonstration of the "age of uncertainly" {as Galbraith calls it) which inevitably affects strategy, and which has something deia vu about it, rather than being a series of genuine solutions, and is based on hypotheses that are always hard to verify: what a- difference from the presumptuous plans of 1941 l The new defence model suggested here is fuelled by sharp criticism of the present military doctrine o.f France and the West. which the author judges to be likely "to lead to disaster". Nuclear weapons, with their present features, only help to deter a nuclear attack, but they are not able to prevent ·either a conventional attack nor an attack using . chemical weapons. A surprise attack with chemical weapons : could give the Warsaw Pact con. ventional forces a decisive penetration capability that ·they would

not otherwise have, without having to resort to nuclear arms. The race to instal intermediate range missiles in Europe only helps to increase the capability to kill several times over: "What is important is not to fight for a few hundred more or having fewer missiles, but to see to it that the conditions under which they would have to be used never arise". While this diagnosis reflects issues and doubts that periodically come to the surface in the debate on strategy, the treatment the author proposes for France does not seem to be particularly original : to use long-term servicemen to develop a strategic deterrent nuclear force and a rapid deployment force (for external interventii:m); to entrust border defences to a "manoeuvre force" that can be mobilized in a matter of hours, heliborne and equipped with tactical neutron weapons to be used solely within French territory and solely for defensive purposes. Lastly, the "Internal Armed Forces" (mobilized in emergency) would have the task of fighting off an invasion using . tactics that are typical of guerrilla warfare. It is hardly necessary to point out that compulsory military service would be reduced to a few weeks, with periodical recalls. A "contaminatio", therefore, between old, contrasting :> historical motives that have :· emerged during the 50-year de'bate that has been taking -place in France and in Europe. Leaving aside the changes that have occurred in the material sector (the new weapon, in Copel's view, is the helicopter and no longer the tank on which· defence is primarily based, together with fixed wing aircraft), these ideas have much of De Gaulle's thinking about them (or even Bencivenga, or Van Seeckt...). But alongside these advocates of an "elite force", stand Jaures and Marazzi, too. It is the idea of

the Swiss-type "militia army" that the author explicitly refers to, using arguments that remind one of General Fortunato Marazzi where he stresses its cost-effectiveness, without taking account of the fact that organic models are not easily applicable abroad . What the author is advocating is a comprehensive project. that is not without its contradictions and shortcomings (for example, his cost calculation could have been less vague), but it does , have the merit of looking beyond French borders to make a useful contribution to the difficult strategic and ordnance choices that have to be made in the future. Decision-makers will have to take account of the two underlying reasons for Copel's book: Europe . must have a greater political/military role, and the continent must have a defence project that is able· to do without ruinous absolutist alternatives, and hence be sufficiently credible to be able to attract the consensu·s that it will undoubtedly need. Ferruccio Botti

J. Alford: "Arms Control and European Se.curity". 1984, 147 pp. This ,book. is one of a series of publi.c ations by the London-based Institute Strategic Studies, containin\J Collections of the lnstitute's most important essays and articles. The subject is fundamental to European security, and touches on the very essence of t _ he relationship -between deterrence and detente, which the 1968 Harmel Repor:t showed to be wholly compatible. But this compatibility has turned out to be the rationalization of a desire, rather than a reality. Detente is only possible when both parties really want

tor

BOOK

it and pursue it in the same way. In other words, it presupposes that the Soviet Un ion really does accept the status quo, which means accepting the US policy of containment. and renounces expansionism. This could never happen, and has not happened, partly because of the fact that Europe's and the United States' interests and perceptions have been at variance. His history of "arms control", which is the practical application of the detente policy in the security field, reveals all the dilemmas in the posture of a politically fragmented Europe, incapable of adjusting to the new geopolitical dimensions (which would require a review of the old concept of nation-State sovereignty and the drafting of a single security policy) and of paying the economic and social price of adequately upgrading its strategy in the broadest sense of the term, and not merely in the military field. These differing approaches to managing deterrence and detente have heightened the contrasts within the Alliance. Deterrence has been managed collectively within NATO, led by the United States, while detente has been managed by individual countries of the Alliance, often under the impulse of contingent factors, including (perhaps mainly) domestic policy considerations. As a result of this, security strategy has been dissociated from arms control, whereas it should be a component part of it. The authors examine the attempts that have been made to negotiate arms control, and the reasons for the present crisis stemming from the increased tension that exists between the two superpowers, the way in which the "regiona l" approach of the European countries can be reconciled with the "global" approach taken .by the United States and the Soviet Union, the technical procedures for overcoming the deadlock that t:ixists in certain

areas, and the future prospects for arms control and European security. The conclusion reached by the authors is basically this: there are two alternatives, unless the arms control negotiations fa il completely and we return to the traditional power policy. The first is to maintain the present situation which will lead to a confrontation between the two superpowers or to another Yalta, which would be damaging, if not disastrous, for Europe. The second alternative is for the Europeans to become fully aware of their need for security and to face up to the social and economic burden that this entails. Only by so doing can they remain credible, and make their particular interests stick in their dealings with the superpowers, and above all consolidate the Atlantic Alliance on new, better balanced bases that will induce the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously. The present situation is favourable to the Soviet Union. Not only are the tensions in the Alliance increasing, but public opinion in the West is weakening in its support for the present collective security system. Since the Soviet Union can hope to win without fighti ng, it can see no particular reason for negotiating. Carlo Jean

Ruggero Orfei: "Pace tra i missili e fame". Ed. Dehoniane, Naples, 1983, 256 pp.

It has often been said that one of the most worrying phenomena in the present age of the "balance of terror" is the way in which people's consciences and initiatives have been paralyzed by being over-awed by the power of the bomb, which some see as a source of destruction and

others consider to be the ultimate guarantor of peace. This makes it extremely difficult to confer credibility on alternative hypotheses and hence to try out new forms of coexistence and progress. Furthermore, the political and social structures everywhere are suffering from a widespread, disarming sense of impotence to attain positive growth other than antagonistically. The primary, and perhaps the major, merit of Ruggero Orfei's book is that he has tried to suggest a way to beat off not only indifference and fatalism, but also the equally dangerous facile utopianism of those who close their eyes to reality and ignore the serious constraints that exist domestically and internationa Ily. His approach may be fairly defined as "Catholic-humanistic": the reader senses both the tension of the practising Christian acting to bring about the "prophecy of peace" and his genuine faith in the creative capacity of Western civilization to revise errors and to optimize the existing development tools, provided that the internal contradictions that are presently hampering them or misdirecting their development are first resolved. And one of what he calls "the left-overs of a primitive civilization" that has to be done away with its militarism, in the sense of being a war-culture on which the concept of "deterrence" is based, with over-reliance on weapons and setting too little store by discussion and mutual understanding. Yet the means of restoring the balance are - necessarily - inherent in the complex spiritual and intellectual heritage that the Western world has built up over the centuries; what we have to do is to use the resources of this heritage and redirect them. What the author is attempting here is therefore to reconcile the

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past and the future in to a consistent whole, by sp"elling out the need to adopt new, Âˇ wellproven methods for solving our problems. The "peace strategy" must use a methodology and a praxis which are not dissimi lar to those of "war strategy": the goa ls must be clearly identified, and there must be a plan that wi ll lead to the kind of peace that is not simply the absence of war. Consequently, the whole concept of security needs rethinking. Today, it is essentia lly associated with military measures, but greater attention must be paid to man, to broaden his conscience and awareness, and his capacity to live through the fastmoving changes of our age with a constructive spirit. avoiding the facile and illusory refuge offered to him by ideas that may be sol idly built on bases that are no longer solid, and subsequently turn out to be too narrow and too inadequate to stand up to the challenges of the future . The "genes is" project - as the author defines it - stands for a complete reconversion from the military to the civilian world (in cultural. economic and industrial terms) wh ich he sees as being the on ly way of ensuring that the peace culture of the future is irreversible. His analysis and predictions might - and indeed, do - give rise to many questions and doubts. The first of these, which no-one can evade, is what would be the East's attitude to a di fferent type of confrontation, played using new rules that may be seen as highly destabilizing to a major power, much of whose strength comes from harping on the hypothetical external threat. Another question he raises is what concept of security should replace the idea of "national military security", and above all, what guarantees are there? All of this certainly deserves

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very careful thought. requires a great deal of commitment, and reveals his desire to ensure that reason prevai ls over all. In other words, one has to avoid being carried away by "great" ideas and having "everything at once", wh ich often leads people to overlook the usefulness of a step-by-step approach to permanently changing situations and induces them to take up unrealistic attitudes about possible future situations that do not yet exist, and wh ich stil l have to be verified. Sandro Fantina

G.A. Craig: "II potere delle armi Storia e politica dell'esercito prussiano 1640-1945". II Mulino, Bologna, 1984, 588 pp.

Yet another, albeit wel l-written, example of "outer" history, by which I mean one that is ma inly concerned with relations between the mi litary and politicians, and between military institutions and civi lian society in the country wh ich has been cons idered a "sample" for over a century in the military field. Gordon A. Craig's book suffers from two ma in limitations. It is not so much about "history" (wh ich, in the usua l sense of the term, cannot ignore the " intern al", techn ical dimension of a military institution) of the Prussian Army, as an account of its policy; and second ly, perhaps because it was published very shortly after WWII (in 1955). it often indu lges in rather dogmatic judgements which might give the reader the impression that certain phenomena that arise in the relations hip between the military and society - and particularly between militarism and nationa lism - are typical ly Germa n features alone. There is no doubt that there has been a pretty genera l tendency

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throughout Europe at various times in its history, and in varying degrees and forms, for the military to have a privileged relationsh ip with their Sovereign and to restrict the power of parliament and (not only in WWI) to have a completely free hand on the conduct of operations, despite the key idea of Clausewitz that war is an ob ject and a continuation of pol itics. and not a subject (as Ludendorf wou ld have it) . Craig makes no bones about his position in the introduction. He has no doubt that the politica l life of modern Germany and the way it acts has been authoritarian, mi litaristic and aggress ive. He says that the book is based on the assumption that these are not inherent in German character but (as Franz Neumann has. said) are the result of a structure that has thwarted every attempt to create a visible democracy. But this is something lhat rema ins to be proven, be-

cause it is not necessarily true to say that the level of social progress and genu ine democracy in Germany (at least jn the 19th century) was in any way inferior to that of other countries. And to what extent did the demands of a great Empire and a huge fleet weigh on British domestic life? The German writer Gerhard Ritter, in his book "The military and politics in modern Germany" , which was published more or less at the same time (1954). takes a different view to Craig's. Ritter carries out a para llel enqu iry into the main European armies at the turn of the century, and the French and British armies come out pa rticularly badly (compared with the German army) from many points of view: the prevailing internal ethos, the moral cohesion between the officer corps and the rank and file, relations with civilian soc iety, the "mi litary con dition" of the men in the lower

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HH ranks. Ritter concludes thus, "If we want to summarize the difference between the military situation of the Western European powers and the German Empire in the 19th century, we might say that what the Western powers eonsidered to be a necessary evil was deemed to be the supreme pride of the nation in the German Empire". Craig's account - which is far less thorough than Ritter's - never.theless has the merit of resurrecting three questions: how far was the German military institution (which was the only institution capable of containing Nazism for a time, and of trying to kill Hitler) the expression of

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sponsibility, devotion to the State, care of one's soldiers, sense of honour)? These are questions that can only be thoroughly answered with a history that is not based on "theses", and which is able to merge the internal, technical facts with the political-social facts, and above all, a history which takes a European approach to the problem that alone can give back to the military institu tions their rightful role in each country, their rightful prospects and set them in their rightful light, without demonizing them and without rhetoric.

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the German nation and the will of broad sections of German society? Was the traditional central position of the military caste in German society due to the prevarication of a few, or to specific national characteristics whose origins go back to the old Prussia? And lastly, apart from the repression, intrigues and absolutism of people like Ludendorf, Von Schlecher or the aggressive use of German military force, is there a part of the military tradition of old Prussia that should be studied and salvaged because it stands for certain values that are still universally valid (austerity, spirit of sacrifice, initiative, sense of re-

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